Annulment of disciplinary sanction for stepson appointmentAnulación de sanción disciplinaria por nombramiento de hijastro

CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL, SEVENTH SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at ten hours and forty-five minutes on the twenty-ninth of November two thousand nineteen.

Ordinary proceeding — declared purely a matter of law — filed by Nombre126154, identity card number CED118073, resident of San José, against the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) represented by Jainse Marín Jiménez, attorney, identity card number CED116091, resident of San José; the State represented by Procuradora Andrea Calderón Gassman, attorney and other details unknown, and Nombre16153, public official, identity card number CED118075, resident of San José, represented by her special judicial agent Fernando Morera Solano, attorney, identity card number CED118076, resident of San José. All are of legal age.

WHEREAS

1. In this matter, the claimant seeks a judgment declaring: "(...) the nullity of resolutions PA-011-2011, issued at 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, (by) the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República and resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of August twenty-second, two thousand eleven, signed by the Comptroller General of the Republic Rocío Aguilar Montoya as well as any subsequent and related act derived therefrom." (See folios 01 to 036 of the case file). Subsequently, during the preliminary hearing, the claimant modified his claim, leaving it in the following terms: "Once the nullity of the requested resolutions is declared and as a consequence of that nullity, order the claimant's reinstatement in the position of Mayor of the canton of Goicoechea and if, at the conclusion of this proceeding, the term for which he was appointed has expired, order the State to pay the damages arising from the resolutions sought to be annulled, consisting of salary, year-end bonus, school bonus, salary in kind, vehicle use, cell phone use, and other benefits he obtained while holding the position, estimated at one hundred million colones to be settled upon execution of judgment. Likewise, he requests that the salary amounts be indexed from the time the obligation arose until its effective payment and that the amount be calculated according to the basic passive rate in effect at the time of settlement and judicial determination by final order." (See folios 368 to 369 and 402 to 405 of the case file, as well as the digital recording of the preliminary hearing held).

2. After the corresponding transfer, the co-defendants answered the filed complaint deny, with the representation of the overseeing body invoking the defenses of Estoppel (lack of standing to be sued) and lack of right. For its part, the State's representation raised the exceptions of incompetence - resolved interlocutorily -, lack of right, and lack of current interest. The representation of Ms. Nombre16153 invoked the exceptions of incompetence by reason of subject matter, substantive res judicata, and statute of limitations - all resolved interlocutorily -, prescription - from which she desisted during the preliminary hearing -, as well as lack of current interest and lack of right. (See folios 78 to 146, 150 to 189, 275 to 283, 368 to 369 and 402 to 405 of the case file, as well as the digital recording of the preliminary hearing held).

3. The respective preliminary hearing was held at 13:40 hours on July 3, 2014, and at 08:50 hours on December 9, 2014. In it, the present matter was declared purely a matter of law, and the parties present proceeded to present their conclusions (see folios 368 to 369 and 402 to 405 of the case file, as well as the digital recording of the preliminary hearing held).

4. The procedures have observed the prescriptions and terms of law, and no defects, errors, or omissions capable of producing nullity of the proceedings or defenselessness to the parties are perceived. This judgment is issued within the period allowed by the Office's workload, following the due deliberations and by the unanimous opinion of the Tribunal.

Judge Quesada Vargas writes for the Court; and,

WHEREAS

I.Preliminary. Regarding what occurred in the specific case and judicial independence. Given that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, by means of judgment No. 011-F-S1-2019 of 09:36 hours on February 6, 2019, in resolving the cassation appeals filed by the Contraloría General de la República and the State against this Tribunal's judgment No. 85-2017 of 11:45 hours on May 18, 2015, and its complementary addition, annulled said first-instance judgment for the third time, ordering its remand to again issue the respective ruling, this Tribunal must first point out: At the moment of resolving the challenges presented, the First Chamber of the Court, with the opinion of Magistrate Iris Rocío Rojas Morales, indicated in considering V of the resolution issued by the a-quem, in what is of relevance:

"(...) V.- Considering the structure and reasoning expressed in the contested judgment, as well as, to avoid unnecessary reiterations, this Chamber deems it pertinent, first, to jointly examine the charge raised by the State and the first three substantive objections invoked by the Oversight Body, which aim to break the Tribunal's thesis, mainly on aspects concerning the appropriateness and normative conformity of the sanction applied to the claimant, given that, if the criticisms are upheld, it becomes unnecessary to address the remaining charges (as it would be appropriate to revoke the challenged ruling and return the case file to the Office of origin, so that it can resolve the claimant's arguments whose pronouncement they omitted). Having clarified the above, it is appropriate to examine the claims of the appellants detailed in Whereases II and III of this ruling. For this purpose, it is relevant to specify the following. It is recorded in the case file that Mr. Nombre126154, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicochea (sic), promoted, within the same Institution, a series of appointments in favor of his stepson (undisputed fact). By reason of the above, the CGR initiated a disciplinary proceeding against him, specifically, for allegedly having deviated from the duty of probity contained in mandate 3 of the Ley contra la Corrupción. This norm establishes: 'The public official shall be obliged to orient his or her management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; by ensuring that the decisions adopted in the fulfillment of his or her duties conform to impartiality and to the objectives proper to the institution in which he or she serves; and, finally, by administering public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, satisfactorily rendering accounts.' The Oversight Body considered that the investigated official eventually violated the duty of probity by infringing the prohibition contained in cardinal 127 of the CM (sic), according to which: 'The spouses or relatives, in direct line or collateral up to the third degree inclusive, of any of the councilors, the Mayor, the Auditor, the Directors or Chiefs of Personnel of the recruitment and selection units, or, in general, of those responsible for choosing candidates for municipal positions, may not be municipal employees (...).' The eventual breach of the described prohibition, estimated the Directing Body of the proceeding, occurred through the various hirings promoted by the public servant Nombre126154 in favor of a relative (by affinity), within the Local Entity where he held the position of Mayor. The determination of responsibility, it noted, could entail for him from a written admonition to the cancellation of his credentials, in accordance with, among other norms, Articles 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción and 73 of the LOCGR. By resolution PA-011-2011, the CGR declared Mr. Nombre126154 responsible for the imputed acts. That Entity argued that every public servant must adhere to the principles of probity and legality, which, in the case at hand, translated into not having requested the appointment of his stepson in the Municipality of Goicoechea, given the prohibition contained in canon 127 of the CM (sic). Consequently, it recommended to the TSE (sic): to sanction the official with dismissal without employer liability, which implied the cancellation of his credentials, pursuant to numerals 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción and 18 subsection d) of the CM (sic). The TSE (sic) validated the conclusions and homologated the actions of the Oversight Body; consequently: it deemed the transgression of ordinal 127 of the CM (sic) proven, accepted what was recommended, and ordered the cancellation of Mr. Nombre126154's Mayor credential (resolution 8184-M-2011, confirmed in 253-M-2012). Based on the described scenario, this Deciding Body considers that the factual and legal criteria applied by the Judges when analyzing the appropriateness and legality of the sanction imposed on Mr. Nombre126154 are contrary to law. This Chamber finds no lack or normative gap regarding the sanction recommended and applied to the claimant, as the cassation appellants rightly argue. The Judges fail to recognize that precept 3 of the Ley contra la Corrupción constitutes a blank or incomplete administrative sanctioning norm, which means that its central core can only be understood through its systematic linkage with other legal precepts; that is, it must be integrated with other norms to complete its content. Given the mutatis mutandis application of criminal law to the administrative sphere, it is relevant to cite what the Sala Constitucional has indicated regarding blank criminal norms: 'The principle of legality requires, so that citizens can have knowledge of whether their actions constitute a crime or not, that criminal norms be structured with precision and clarity, which is complicated in cases where not all the elements of the type are found in the same norm; this is known as incomplete legislation, a problem that in doctrine is studied under the doctrine of 'blank criminal laws,' a denomination under which the problem caused by the non-fullness of the type is analyzed; that is, when it is necessary to resort to another norm of equal, superior, or inferior rank, to achieve the fully integrated type. Our Código Penal is not alien to the problem; in Article 292, to establish the typical action, one must necessarily resort to the Constitución Política since it is there where the primary organisms of the State and their faculties are indicated; the same occurs in numeral 6 of the Ley sobre el registro de barcos atuneros, which refers to the fishing activity by foreign boats in waters over which Costa Rica exercises a special jurisdiction indicated in Article 60 of the Constitución Política. Article 244 subsection 3, part a) of the Código Penal is completed with other norms located in the Code itself, Articles 215 and 258; in turn, Article 243 of the repressive ordinance under analysis, in penalizing the issuance of bad checks, does so with remission to numeral 822 of the Código de Comercio, a norm in which the cases where the countermand of payment of a check is appropriate are indicated. All the cases analyzed so far, while entailing a difficulty for the interpreter when determining the content of the type, pose no friction with the constitution, in terms relevant to the appellant. It was also stated that there are criminal laws by reference, or blank laws, that remand to another of lower rank to complete their content; thus, Article 241 of the Código Penal, to repress the authorization of improper acts by directors, administrators, managers, or agents of commercial companies or cooperatives, indicates that it applies to one who lends his concurrence or consent to acts contrary to the law or the statutes, from which some prejudice for the represented party or the public may derive; Article 394, argued as unconstitutional in this action, is another clear example of this legislative technique. (...).' From the points analyzed so far, we have that regarding crimes and penalties, in our constitutional framework, there exists a reservation of law; that is, in that matter, only the action of the Legislative and Executive Powers through formal laws is permitted, but at the same time, legislative technique has accepted as valid and necessary the use of incomplete criminal norms to define criminal types, which achieve full integration by being related to others, even of lower rank, including regulations.' Judgment 1876-90 of 14:00 hours on December 19, 1990. In the same sense, the Constitutional Court has pointed out: 'In criminal law, the legislative technique that allows the use of blank criminal laws or those needing complement is accepted as valid; they are those in which the presupposition is not completely or specifically set out in the law itself, as one must resort to another of equal or different rank to complete it. For example, to be able to establish the content of the criminal type of Article 112, subsection 1 of the Código Penal, it is necessary to resort to the Family Code, which indicates the conditions that must be met to be qualified as ascendant, descendant, or consanguineous sibling; and if subsection 2° of that article is concerned, it is necessary to resort to the Constitution itself, which indicates to whom the treatment of members of the Supreme Powers corresponds. The typification of the conduct is achieved through the union of complementary norms; in order to establish whether it meets the requirements typical of typicity, they must first be related.' Voto 2996-92 of 15 hours 10 minutes on October 6, 1992. As indicated above, mandate 3 of the Ley contra la Corrupción regulates the duty of probity in the conduct of the public official, which manifests itself, among others, in the obligation to administer public resources in accordance with the principle of legality. Being a blank administrative norm or one that requires completion, as explained, that numeral must be integrated with another legal provision to be applied in a specific case, since the conduct to be sanctioned consists of administering public resources in violation of the principle of legality, so that only the law, according to that description, is the sole source that could integrate the administrative sanctioning type (express remission to legality). Now then, for the concretion of said legality in the subjúdice, recourse must be made to what is established in cardinal 127 of the CM, (sic) a norm that prohibits appointing as an employee, and therefore paying with public resources, the spouse or relatives, in direct line or collateral up to the third degree, in the Municipality where the position of Mayor is held. This Chamber is clear that the term 'relative' comprises both the bond by consanguinity and affinity, thus recognized even by the Sala Constitucional (judgments 01809-2009 of December 18, 2009, and 00412-2011 of April 15, 2011) and expressly contemplated in the Código de Familia. Numeral 14 of that normative body establishes: 'Marriage is legally impossible: (...) 2) Between ascendants and descendants by consanguinity or affinity. The impediment does not disappear with the dissolution of the marriage that gave rise to the affinity relationship (...).' Therefore, once the fulfillment of the prohibitive assumption contained in precept 127 of the CM (sic) (appointment of the spouse or relatives up to the third degree) is accredited, as happened in the instant case, the determination of the sanction must conform to what is established in the Ley contra la Corrupción, a normative body that for that effect consecrates: 'Article 40- Violation of the duty of probity. Without prejudice to the applicable civil and criminal liabilities, the duly proven infringement of the duty of probity, following a defense, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability. Article 39.- Administrative sanctions. According to the gravity, the aforementioned faults shall be sanctioned as follows: a) Written admonition published in the Diario Oficial. b) Suspension, without the corresponding salary, per diem, or stipend, of fifteen to thirty days. c) Separation from public office, without employer liability or cancellation of the municipal councilor's credential, as applicable.' In that direction, numeral 18 subsection d) of the CM (sic) establishes: 'The following shall be automatic causes for the loss of the municipal mayor's credential: (..) d) Incurring in any of the causes provided for in Article 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (...).' In relation to this, ordinal 73 cited states: 'The commission of a serious breach by a councilor or trustee, proprietary or alternate, against the norms of the public finance oversight and control system contemplated in this Law and against any other norms relating to public funds; or incurring in any of the acts provided for in the Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, as generating administrative liability, shall be cause for the cancellation of the respective credential. This shall apply when the offender acted in the exercise of his office or by reason of it (...).' As a corollary of the foregoing, it is evident that the infringement of the duty of probity through the occurrence of the conduct prohibited in ordinal 127 of the CM (sic) is indeed subject to specific sanctions, among others: the cancellation of the Mayor's credential. It is important to note that the prohibition in dispute guarantees not only the principle of suitability in a position paid with public resources, but also free access to public positions by the inhabitants of the Republic under conditions of equality, which is undermined in this type of prohibited appointment given the proximity between the contracted parties and the person ordering the hiring. Thus, contrary to the Judges' thesis, there is no legal vacuum in this regard. In that sense, it will be appropriate to uphold the objections invoked, with the effects to be detailed below. (...)"

From the transcribed considering text, it derives with meridian clarity that the judgment issued by the First Chamber of the Court proceeded to conduct a substantive analysis - and not merely a formal one - of the judicial process before us; that is, it proceeded to hear this matter on its merits, even arriving at a legal thesis different from the one upheld by this Chamber in the annulled judgment. But despite the above, the High Tribunal subsequently backtracked and proceeded to annul the judgment previously issued by this panel of Judges; that is, it reverted to the formal analysis of the resolution that was the subject of the substantive cassation analysis, and despite having partially issued its criterion on the merits of the proceeding submitted for judgment by this jurisdiction, it later decided to annul the first-instance judgment and order the return of the case file so that, again, this chamber proceeds to issue the first-instance judgment, now for the fourth time. It appears clearly, in all respects, that in the instant case there is a discrepancy of substantive legal criteria between two jurisdictional bodies: on the one hand, this Seventh Section of the Contencioso-Administrativo Tribunal, and on the other, the First Chamber of the Court, and to that extent, what was evidently appropriate was not to annul, but for the Chamber to proceed to resolve this matter on its merits, exercising as superior the competencies assigned to it by law and, therefore, if it did not share this chamber's criterion, proceed to revoke what was resolved and give the solution that, in its judgment, was appropriate according to law and the merits of the case file, but not to invoke substantive or material considerations to annul (a sanction par excellence applicable to the formal defects of a judicial resolution) the ruling submitted for its consideration. But despite the above, it so expressly ordered in its sixth considering and in its operative part, sections which, as relevant, state:

"VI.- By virtue of the foregoing and in the terms indicated, the cassation appeals shall be granted. Consequently, the contested judgment shall be annulled. In its place, the case file shall be remanded to the Tribunal of origin so that it resolves the claimant's arguments whose pronouncement it omitted. In that sense, it is recorded in the case file that, upon bringing this proceeding, part of the grounds for the claim was based on aspects related to the lack of knowledge of the statement of facts that gave rise to the disputed administrative procedure; the impropriety of the Local Government's Internal Audit Office forwarding report DFOE-DI-1596 to the CGR (without having previously informed the Municipal Council or the Mayor of what occurred), the violation of the principle of access to information and, in general, of due process and the right of defense, as well as the lack of analysis regarding the gravity of the alleged conduct (proportionality of the recommended and applied sanction). These aspects were not analyzed by the Judges, given the manner in which they resolved the specific case. This justifies the remand of the case file to the Tribunal of origin, in order for it to examine the points in question, assess the defense arguments, and the evidence provided, thereby avoiding deciding the matter in a single instance, in violation of the right of defense and the review of the ruling by a second jurisdictional body. (...)." / THEREFORE / The appeals are granted. Consequently, the contested judgment is annulled. In its place, the remand of the case file to the Tribunal of origin is ordered, so that it may resolve in accordance with the law." In addition to the above, it must be noted that from the wording given to the a-quem's resolution, it is inferred that the Chamber's intention is for this Tribunal to conduct the legal analysis for the specific case, starting from the premise of validating the legal position defined in the resolution that annuls our judgment, specifically in what corresponds to the normative integration that must be carried out to provide legal support for the sanction imposed by the defendant administration on Mr. Nombre126154, with the Chamber concluding that there is indeed a legally provided and applicable sanction for the case under examination, a criterion that, although respectable in itself, is not shared by this Tribunal. For it cannot be overlooked that attempting to impose a jurisprudential criterion on a collegiate tribunal, a legal criterion foreign to the one reached internally by the judicial body itself, by its members, in any case implies a flagrant violation of the principle of judicial independence, which guarantees the subjection of the persons exercising jurisdictional activity solely to the Constitución Política and the legislation in force (Articles 39, 41, and 154 of the Constitución Política) and not to criteria foreign to the work carried out within the judicial body, not even to jurisprudential criteria (excepting pronouncements issued by the Sala Constitucional, as expressly established in Article 13 of Law No. 7135). And this applies whether said criterion is issued by a superior Tribunal or by a body external to the jurisdiction. The appellate judicial body cannot claim that this Chamber resolves as, in its opinion, it should, because doing so would openly restrict the judge's freedom of criterion and the independence that each Judge of the Republic holds in the performance of their functions when resolving the specific case, both criteria on which the national legal system is based, guaranteed precisely ab initio by the independence of the Judge, who is free to resolve what, in a grounded and reasoned manner, according to their sound knowledge and understanding, they deem pertinent in each proceeding, although always in subjection to and in accordance with the legal system in force, being removed from any type of interference at the moment of issuing their criterion in the judgment in question. A principle of judicial independence that also entails the right of the parties who appear before the courts for the resolution of their disputes to have their matters reviewed by an independent judge regarding legal criterion, at each instance. By reason of the above and under the protection of what is indicated by numeral 170 of Law No. 7333 Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and its amendments, which establishes that the tribunals shall not entertain a conflict of jurisdiction with the superior who exercises jurisdiction over them, this Chamber will again proceed to issue judgment for the matter submitted to our knowledge, but not as ordered by the First Chamber in its annulment judgment, but rather as this panel of Judges deems appropriate for the specific case. It cannot be omitted to state that despite the foregoing, the questions raised by the parties regarding the appropriateness or otherwise of conducting the administrative procedure is an issue on the merits already resolved in the resolution issued by the First Chamber of the Court when it annulled this Tribunal's judgment for the second time, acting as the Cassation Tribunal for Contencioso-Administrativo matters, who furthermore already clearly established, making a pronouncement on the merits in that jurisdictional act, that the recommendation issued by the Contraloría General de la República within the sanctioning procedure at hand is binding. This is despite the clear impropriety of the legal technique lately used by the referred Chamber.

II.Regarding the proven facts. Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are deemed duly accredited, supported by the evidentiary elements cited in their support: 1. That Ms. Nombre126155 is the mother of Nombre126156, born on January 7, 1990, appearing as his registered father Mr. Nombre126156 (see folio 03 of the administrative proceeding processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the claimant). 2. That Mr. Nombre126154 is the spouse of Ms. Nombre126155, whom he married on March 2, 2007 (see folio 0002 of the administrative proceeding processed by the Contraloría General de la República). 3. That the claimant was appointed Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea in the municipal elections for the 2007-2011 term, subsequently being reelected in the elections held on December 5, 2010, and so declared by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones through resolution No. 0019-E11-2011 "Declaration of Election of Mayors and Deputy Mayors of the Municipalities of the cantons of the province of San José, for the constitutional term between February seven, two thousand eleven, and April thirty, two thousand sixteen" (undisputed fact by the parties, the records, and consultation made by this Tribunal at the electronic addresses "http://www.gaceta.go.cr/pub/2012/01/31/COMP_31_01_2012.pdf" and "Dirección15291"). 4. That through official letter No. AG-1073-2009 dated April 27, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the claimant, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested that Nombre126156 be appointed in the Dirección15290 of the Municipal Road Cleaning Department for a period of two months (see folio 05 of the administrative proceeding processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the claimant). 5. That on April 27, 2009, the fixed-term employment contract No. 183-2009 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal janitor for a term of two months (see folios 06 to 08 of the administrative proceeding processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the claimant). 6. That through official letter No.

AG-1793-2009 dated June 25, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested that Nombre126156 be appointed to Dirección18863 for a period of two months (see folio 10 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 7. That on June 27, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 251-2009 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 11 to 13 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 8. That on August 26, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 349-2009 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 15 to 17 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 9. That through official letter No. AG-3765-2009 dated December 11, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested that Nombre126156 be appointed to Dirección18863 for a period of two months (see folio 24 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 10. That on December 27, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 523-2009 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 25 to 27 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 11. That through official letter No. AG-0629-2010 dated March 8, 2010, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested that Nombre126156 be appointed to Dirección18863 for a period of two months (see folio 29 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 12. That on March 8, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 095-2010 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 30 to 32 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 13. That through official letter No. AG-953-2010 dated April 15, 2010, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested that Nombre126156 be appointed to the position of Clerk a.í. for a period of two months, starting April 18, 2010 (see folio 34 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 14. That on March 8, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 197-1-2010 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a clerk a.í. for a term of two months (see folios 35 to 37 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 15. That on June 18, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 304-1-2010 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a clerk a.í. for a term of two months (see folios 39 to 41 of the administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 16. That the plaintiff was the subject of an administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República under number DJ-83-2010 and initiated by means of an unnumbered resolution at 3:00 p.m. on November 5, 2010, in which Mr. Nombre126154 was charged, that while serving as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea, he hired his stepson as an employee for said local government, thereby violating the prohibition established in Article 127 of the Código Municipal (see administrative file in digital format, disk No.1 and folios 43 to 52 of the procedure followed against the plaintiff). 17. That the respective oral hearing was held at 9:10 a.m. on January 18, 2011 (see folios 128 to 129 of the sanctioning procedure followed against the plaintiff). 18. That said administrative sanctioning procedure concluded with the issuance of resolution PA-11-2011 at 12:00 p.m. on January 31, 2011, issued by the deciding body of the administrative procedure followed before the Contraloría General de la República, in which it was ordered: "(...) 1. To declare Mr. Nombre126154 administratively responsible for the acts attributed in this administrative procedure, for which it is recommended to sanction him with dismissal without employer liability, which implies the cancellation of credentials, pursuant to Article 39 of the Ley contra la corrupción y enriquecimiento ilícito (sic), Article 18 subsection d) of the Código Municipal. (...)". Said resolution was notified to the plaintiff herein on February 4, 2011. (See folios 47 to 60 of the court record and folios 131 to 144 of the administrative file in digital format, disk No.1). 19. That against what was resolved, the now-plaintiff filed a motion for revocation with subsidiary appeal on February 9, 2011 (see folios 146 to 154 of the administrative sanctioning procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff). 20. That through an unnumbered resolution at 12:00 p.m. on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, the revocation attempted by the now-plaintiff was declared without merit (see folios 185 to 194 of the administrative sanctioning procedure processed by the controlling body against the plaintiff herein). 21. That through resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 at 10:00 a.m. on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralora General de la República, the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the final act of the administrative sanctioning procedure followed against him was resolved, ordering its rejection and clarifying ex officio that the recommended sanction was directed to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (folios 51 to 54 of the court record and administrative file in digital format, disk No.1). 22. That through official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República and addressed to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, said entity was made aware of the final act issued within the administrative sanctioning procedure processed under number DJ-83-2010 against Mr. Nombre126154 (see folios 236 of the respective administrative sanctioning procedure). 23. That through an unnumbered resolution at 11:35 a.m. on September 20, 2011, issued by the investigating magistrate Luis Antonio Sobrado González, within the "Proceedings for the cancellation of credentials of the proprietary mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea, province of San José, held by Mr. Nombre126154", the controlling body was requested to send a certified copy of the file of the administrative sanctioning procedure (see folio 237 of the respective sanctioning procedure). 24. That through an unnumbered resolution at 10:40 a.m. on October 10, 2011, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones granted a hearing to the now-plaintiff, so that he could refer to the request presented by the Contraloría General de la República (see folios 240 to 255 of the indicated sanctioning file). 25. That through resolution No. 8184-M-2011 at 1:10 p.m. on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, it was ordered to cancel the credential of Mr. Nombre126154 that accredited him as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea and to designate Mrs. Nombre16153 as the new mayoress and Mrs. Nombre154089 (c.c. Nombre98993) as vice-mayoress. (See folios 240 to 255 of the referred administrative sanctioning procedure). 26. Against what was resolved, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was rejected by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones through resolution No. 253-M-2012 issued at 8:31 a.m. on January 17, 2012 (see folios 256 to 268 of the administrative sanctioning procedure). 27. This matter was filed with the court on January 24, 2012 (see folio 01 of the court record). 28. That Mr. Nombre126156 is a stepson by affinity, within the second degree of kinship by collateral line, of Mr. Nombre126154 (the court record).

III.Unproven facts. 1. That the salary paid to Mr. Nombre126156, stepson of Mr. Nombre126154, was higher than what corresponded for the position he occupied (there is no evidence in this regard in the court record). 2. That Mr. Nombre126156, stepson of the plaintiff herein, did not work in the position to which he was appointed or worked in a position other than that of his appointments (there is no evidence in this regard in the court record). 3. That Mr. Nombre126156 had received payment of his salary without performing the respective work (there is no evidence in this regard in the court record). 4. That the plaintiff Nombre126154 had received any stipend, payment, or benefit from Mr. Nombre126156, to proceed with his appointment to a municipal position (there is no evidence in this regard in the court record). 5. That damage or a real and effective economic loss to the finances or assets comprising the municipal public treasury had been generated in the case under examination (there is no evidence in this regard in the court record).

IV.The plaintiff argues, in support of his action and by way of a tight summary, that an administrative procedure was opened against him for having appointed his stepson on an interim basis as an employee of the local government between April 27, 2009, and August 17, 2010, supposedly contravening Article 127 of the Código Municipal. He narrates, in his opinion, the development of said procedure and points out that the final act was an act with its own effect, as it was binding regarding the facts for the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which is why he appealed it and his appeal was denied. That such resolutions are binding from a technical-factual point of view for the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. He affirms that it is not an electoral act, but an administrative sanctioning act, and furthermore a complex administrative act, because the Contraloría General de la República—hereinafter CGR—cannot cancel the credential of a council member or elected official. He cites national doctrine and points out that a complex act is one formed by the will of two or more subjects or bodies, acting for the same purpose and with the same legal content or effect; it emanates from a complex body formed by the two or more that issue it, and the absence of any one of them or their will annuls it. For this reason, he affirms that the act of cancellation of credentials is a complex act that requires the concurrence of the will of the CGR as the investigating and deciding body, and the will of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones as executor of the proposed sanction, because the decision of the Contraloría is binding. It is not an act of an electoral nature, but a typically administrative sanction. Because the resolutions of the CGR are binding in relation to the facts, he considers any subsequent instance or appeal against them to be a procedural farce. He maintains that if the procedure followed by the CGR is annulled, the resolution issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones—hereinafter TSE—will also be null, because the one issued by the TSE is complementary or accessory to that issued by the CGR. He also affirms that if the act issued by the CGR is flawed in one of its elements, in this case the motive and the content, the resolution of the TSE for the cancellation of credentials will also be flawed, since the flaws suffered by the first—that of the CGR—will also be suffered by the resolution of the TSE. // He points out that the acts issued by the Contraloría General de la República suffer from the following flaws: Said resolutions recommend canceling the mayor's credential for the administrative responsibility he incurred by appointing on an interim basis a person who is not a relative of Mr. Nombre126154; he cites Article 127 of the Código Municipal and points out that he has no bond of affinity or consanguinity with the Mayor, since it is clear that the child of a person one is married to is not a family member in a direct or collateral line to oneself, especially since this involves a person of legal age with a determined filiation. He affirms that in the opinion of the IFAM, the children of spouses are not included within the express prohibition of Article 127 cited. He maintains that for having recommended the hiring of a person to whom no degree of kinship relationship exists, that is nothing. For this reason, he considers the conduct is not sanctionable; it is atypical and does not fit into the cited normative assumption, for which reason that article cannot be applied in the specific case. But despite this, the CGR set aside the will of the voting inhabitants of the canton of Goicoechea, without there being a norm or constitutional principle that establishes this, thereby violating due process and principles of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, of mandatory compliance, and against the popular will, violating the principle of conservation of the electoral act. In administrative proceedings, it was held as an unproven fact that Mr. Nombre126156 was the plaintiff's son, or in any way legitimized as his son-in-law, or that any filial bond existed between them, to satisfy Article 127 of the Código Municipal. For this reason, the conduct is atypical and does not fit into the referenced Article 127, which cannot be applied to him. He argues that for specialists in family law, there is no family relationship or affinity relationship. He points out that the cited Article 127 does not indicate that there is an impediment for relatives by affinity of the officials mentioned in that article to be municipal employees, so that illegitimately extending what the legislator established becomes an expansive interpretation (interpretación extensiva) of the norm, which is inappropriate in sanctioning matters, given that its interpretation must be of a restrictive nature. For this reason, he considers that the directing body of the procedure erroneously recommends a sanction, based on an interpretive criterion that inadequately extends what is stated in the legal text, arrogating legislative powers that do not belong to it, since in exclusive and sanctioning matters the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) governs. Furthermore, the norm intended to be applied does not refer in any way to the children of spouses, insofar as there is no filiation between them and the active subject of the norm. The sanctioning power granted to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and exercised in its instruction by the CGR requires, for the cancellation of a credential, the commission of a specific conduct contemplated in a legal cause. He cites Article 253 of the Código Electoral, regarding "cases expressly contemplated in the law." He continues indicating that this article was disapplied in the plaintiff's case, and the CGR recommended the cancellation of his credentials, which violates the principle of legality provided for in Articles 11 and 39 of the Constitución Política and Article 11 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. He affirms that the interpretation given by the CGR to Article 127 is expansive and nullifying of the principles of legality and specificity (tipicidad), and the sanction for it therefore violates the fundamental rights of Mr. Nombre126154. He continues stating that applying the power to cancel the credential of a popularly elected official for acts that occurred in the exercise of a previous office is equated in its effects to disqualification (inhabilitación), which is not possible due to the principle of restrictive interpretation that governs in sanctioning matters. He points out that the interpretation of the CGR equates children with stepchildren, coming to consider that they are in the same category as children, this being an expansive interpretation and lacking legal foundation that would undermine the institution of the family, by giving a consolidated legal institution new practical effects. // He accuses that during the development of the procedure, a series of irregularities occurred that hindered the plaintiff's right of defense: -first because official letter No. DFOE-DI-1576 was not in the administrative file when the plaintiff's lawyer went to review it; an official letter that corresponds to a statement of facts sent by the Acting Manager of the Area of Complaints and Investigations of the Division of Operational and Evaluative Oversight of the CGR; an official letter that was the basis for the investigation conducted, and it is one day before the hearing (on January 17, 2011) through a resolution signed by the members of the directing body, that copies of that statement of facts are made available to him; for this reason, the suspension of the hearing was requested, to assess the document, but that was denied and the hearing was held. In the act of notification of charges (traslado de cargos), the facts that generated the procedure were not made known, and the indicated official letter was made available to him the day before the hearing; that statement of facts does not even appear in official letter DFOE-DI-1596, so the plaintiff did not know of it, when according to Article 8 of the Ley contra la Corrupción, the documents and evidence of the investigations carried out by internal audits and that generate the opening of a procedure are confidential except for the involved parties, who shall have free access to all of them. -He considers that the Internal Audit should have informed the administration of what was happening, making a warning to the Mayor or the Human Resources Department, or to his hierarchical superior, the Municipal Council. He considers that going directly to the controlling body is an act of bad faith. He cites Articles 22, 35, and 37 of the Ley General de Control Interno, and Articles 45 and 47 of the Reglamento de Organización y Funciones de la Unidad de Auditoría Interna de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, published in La Gaceta No. 16 of January 23, 2009. In this respect, he considers that the Internal Audit did not fulfill its preventive function of warning. He points out that the defendant CGR did not analyze the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, and neither did the TSE, for if they had, they would have realized that said law establishes a series of sanctions according to the severity of the offense. Furthermore, he adds that Article 41 of that law establishes the factors to be taken into consideration to assess the conduct of the alleged responsible party. For this reason, he considers that the appointment of the Mayor's stepson does not have the severity that the law indicates as to warrant canceling his mayoral credential. That there is no damage to its economic interests, no negative impact on the public service occurred, the employee earned the salary he received, received the legal payment, and was not favored by being paid more than the amount legally established. He points out that if the Internal Audit had made the warnings, the matter would not have gone any further. -He accuses that resolution No. PA-011-2011 was not duly notified to him according to Article 38 of the Ley de Notificaciones, as it was not communicated to him before the hearing was held, which violated his right of defense. He invokes Rulings No. 2004-04637 of April 30, 2004, and No. 16955-2007 of November 21, 2007, both from the Sala Constitucional. He affirms that those listed are insurmountable defects that lead to the nullity of the proceedings. -He indicates that the recommended sanctions were not proportional to the severity of the facts accredited in the procedure. -He maintains that the disapplication of substantive norms of positive law is a cause for nullity of a resolution. And in his opinion, in his case, Article 41 of the Ley contra el Enriquecimiento Ilícito was disapplied, since it was not indicated what were the economic interests of the public treasury that the plaintiff harmed, nor were the damages and losses caused to the public treasury and the enrichment obtained by the plaintiff accredited. For this reason, he considers that the imposed administrative sanction is lacking in the analysis of administrative culpability, which implies disapplying the cited Article 41, but despite there being no analysis of culpability, it is recommended to apply the most burdensome sanction against a popularly elected official. He cites resolution No. R-DC-19S-2011 at 3:00 p.m. on December 8, 2011, issued for a similar case in the matter of Mr. Nombre16454, where the sanction applied was suspension for 15 days without pay, an offense, in his opinion, much more serious than that of Mr. Nombre126154, to whom, on the contrary, the most serious sanction possible was applied. He affirms that due process, the principle of parallelism of forms, the democratic principle, and that of popular will were violated. If the people appointed the Mayor, the only one legitimized to dismiss him is the people, in accordance with the principles and bases of the plebiscite. He cites as an example what happened in Nombre265. He invokes the unconstitutionality of Articles 220, 223, and 253 of Law No. 8765, the current Código Electoral, and of resolutions No. 6673-M-2011, No. 7105-M-2011, and No. 8184-M-2011, all of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in order to file an unconstitutionality action. He concludes indicating that the contested acts present serious defects of nullity in their motive and content, which makes them deserving that such nullity be declared. He reiterates that both resolutions are disproportionate and disapply norms referring to the assessment of administrative culpability, proposing the most burdensome sanction for such cases and the most serious for one who holds a popularly elected office. He affirms that the canton of Goicoechea is the second in terms of development and growth due to the management of Mayor Nombre126154, who served one term in said office and was reelected for a second term. For the foregoing, he requests that this process be granted. For its part, the representation of the Contraloría General de la República states that in the act of opening the procedure, he was charged for violation of Article 127 of the Código Municipal and for violation of the duty of probity, according to Article 3 of Law No. 8422, Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. In the act of opening, the directing body clearly indicated that the administrative file was made available to the plaintiff from the moment said act was issued, on November 5, 2011, and it was indicated in detail which evidence comprised the file. When the plaintiff requests the statement of facts, in his request he indicates that it does not appear within the administrative file he had photocopied, so it is not true that he was given access to the file 23 hours before the oral hearing. That statement of facts did not form part of the administrative file nor of the charges (intimación), being only an input for making the act of opening, and it had no relevance in relation to the right of defense and due process. During the oral hearing, it was clarified to the plaintiff that the charged facts were only those stated in the act of opening the procedure —a file that was always at his disposal— and to which the plaintiff had access, not having reason to exercise his right of defense regarding that "statement of facts." For this reason, it is entirely false that that statement of facts was evidence against him, being only an input for the investigation. Resolution PA-011-2011 of January 31, 2011, was issued by the deciding body and not by the directing body of the procedure, and it broadly addresses this topic of the "statement of facts." The plaintiff filed a motion for revocation and subsidiary appeal against the final resolution of the administrative procedure, which were rejected through resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of August 22, 2011. Against resolution No. 8184-M-2012 of December 16, 2011, which the TSE issued removing the plaintiff from office and naming Mrs. Nombre16153 as mayoress, it was contested by means of a motion for reconsideration that was declared without merit through resolution No. 253-M-2012 of January 17, 2012. It cites file No. 12-000748-1027-CA and points out that the same facts as in the present matter are being discussed therein. It affirms that the CGR is a non-active, oversight, and supervisory administration. It involves a tripartite relationship between the CGR, the respective public servant, and the authority called upon to impose the sanction, in this case the TSE. The latter is not substituted by the act issued by the controlling body, bindingly recommending the imposition of the sanction. The cancellation of credentials is the result of the administrative procedure carried out by the CGR and that culminates with the execution by the TSE upon the binding recommendation of sanction issued by the controlling body, just as the Código Electoral and constitutional jurisprudence indicate. The dismissal act issued by the TSE makes the binding recommendation of sanction issued by the CGR effective, and that execution phase implies the withdrawal of the credential. Both the motive and the content and the purpose of the binding recommendation act for the TSE, in the specific case, refer to the public treasury. The motive of the act issued by the CGR are the factual and legal reasons that lead to establishing a judgment of administrative responsibility against a popularly elected municipal official who violated the legal order. The content of the administrative conduct is the binding recommendation of sanction itself, that being the result of the procedure processed by the controlling body. The purpose of said conduct is a matter of safeguarding the public treasury. It points out that according to Article 183 of the Constitución Política, it gives the CGR the function of oversight and control of the public treasury, and according to Article 8 of Law No. 7428, the responsibility of public officials constitutes one of the objective components of the public treasury, for which reason the CGR can conduct administrative procedures and demand that sanctions be applied when required. And this is because the CGR is a superior control and oversight body of the public treasury. The causes of responsibility for determining sanctions come from the LGAP, the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito and its regulation, the Ley de la Administración Financiera, and the Ley Orgánica de la CGR. Article 127 of the Código Municipal protects the public interest by eradicating nepotism and purifying public office. That norm indicates an impediment for relatives by affinity to be municipal employees, when it speaks of relatives in direct lines up to the third degree inclusive. It affirms that according to international doctrine and jurisprudence, a kinship relationship by affinity in the first degree is generated between the spouse and the children of the other, so that the stepchild, stepfather, and stepmother are in a degree of affinity. Nombre126156 being the son of the plaintiff's spouse, he maintains a first degree of consanguinity with her and also a first degree with Mr. Nombre126154, but by affinity. And this does not imply any expansive application of the cited article or a violation of the principle of legality or specificity. For this reason, the resolutions issued are in accordance with the law, since one should not distinguish where the law —the referenced Art. 127— does not distinguish. The cancellation of credentials is provided for in our legal system for certain cases, therefore the principle of legality has not been violated, neither by the TSE nor by the CGR in bindingly recommending the sanction. It again cites Article 253 of the Código Electoral and Article 18 of the Código Municipal, Article 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la CGR, and Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción, to conclude based on said articles that the principle of legality has not been violated by the CGR, there being no discretion or atypicality whatsoever. There is no evidence whatsoever that was not incorporated into the administrative file from the beginning of the procedure. For this reason, the plaintiff is alleging that nullity be declared for nullity's sake, based on a series of superfluous arguments, when in this case due process was never breached. The act of opening the procedure contained a clear, precise, and detailed description of the facts imputed to the plaintiff, the evidence on which said charges (intimación) were based, and the possible sanction to impose. It considers that no harm or grievance has been caused to the plaintiff, his arguments being therefore unfounded, since he had access from the beginning to the administrative file and the plaintiff himself indicated this in the brief where he requested the "statement of facts."

It also asserts that there was no violation of the principle of access to information since the request was made to the oversight body and the CGR provided a copy of it, although it was not part of the administrative file. Regarding the disproportionality of the applied sanction, it cites Article 41 of the Law against Corruption, Article 17 of the Municipal Code, affirming that the mayor is the first called to respect the block of legality and to have unimpeachable conduct and be an example for others. The situation of the plaintiff and his stepson constitutes a serious conflict of interest and violates the principles of legality, probity, and transparency. Furthermore, the faults incurred by mayors affect the credibility of local governments and send a negative message to other municipal employees. The fault in this specific case affected a community and social public interest, since society decided to trust in the diligence of a popularly elected official -the mayor-, but he placed personal interest above the public interest he was called to satisfy, thereby breaching the principle of legality and transparency. For this reason, and for the reasons set forth in the challenged administrative acts, it notes that the applied sanction is reasonable and proportionate, by virtue of the serious fault proven in the administrative procedure, in relation to the content and the public interest protected in numeral 127 of the Municipal Code. Damage does not only exist when the public treasury is economically affected; damage can be of various types, and in this specific case, we are facing an interest of a social and community nature, and the suitability that the person holding a position of such investiture should have, placing public interest over personal interest. It is erroneous to assert that the parallelism of forms must be applied in this case, and therefore, to dismiss a mayor, the people are the only ones legitimized to remove them, since the legal system establishes that the matter of cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales) is a matter of law, and in that regard, the participation of the TSE in the administrative procedure. It refers to Articles 102 subsection 10) of the Political Constitution and 220 of the Electoral Code, Article 18 of the Municipal Code, and Article 73 of the Organic Law of the CGR. It considers that there is a lack of passive standing in relation to the CGR, as well as a lack of right regarding the position of the plaintiff (folios 078 to 111 of the judicial file). On the other hand, the State representation argues that from the issuance of the order to open the administrative procedure, the CGR indicated that the administrative file was available to the plaintiff and all evidence added to said file was indicated. Therefore, it is not true that access to the file was authorized 23 hours before the oral hearing. The sanctioning resolution was issued by the deciding body at 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, and the operative part of said resolution indicated that the sanction implied the cancellation of credentials. The sanctioning act is a complex act. It affirms that the administrative procedure supported by the CGR and the resolution issued by the CGR and referred to the TSE are not acts with their own effect, as the recommendation may or may not be accepted by the TSE, thus not being automatically binding. It cites Resolution No. 253-M-2012. It affirms that it falls to the General Comptroller of the Republic to investigate and provide its recommendation; it is responsible for substantiating the procedure against popularly elected officials who are attributed with committing a fault against the public treasury, and based on such procedure, issue the sanctioning recommendation to the TSE, a recommendation that carries a technical component that is binding regarding elements related to the public treasury. Therefore, the facts proven by virtue of the procedure, as well as the technical elements in matters of its specialty, are the technical aspects fixed in the CGR's recommendation and which are binding for the TSE. It considers that it is the act of cancellation of credentials that creates res judicata (causa estado), since the CGR's recommendation by itself does not generate sanctioning legal effects, which falls to the TSE. Therefore, the act of recommendation cannot be challenged autonomously; rather, the challenge regime of the act that adopts the recommendation and creates res judicata applies. It considers that there is a lack of current interest since the cancellation of the plaintiff's credentials by the TSE has already occurred. It notes that in sanctioning matters, interpretation must be restrictive, as they are acts that negatively affect subjective rights, but in this case, there was no extensive reading of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, since the norm speaks of "relatives (parientes)", which includes relatives by consanguinity and affinity, and no distinction can be made where the law does not. Therefore, it affirms that in relation to the stepson, a kinship bond exists -as a child by affinity-, and the norm was correctly applied to the specific case, as the plaintiff promoted his stepson in the Municipality, an aspect of kinship by affinity that was extensively developed by the TSE in Resolution No. 253-M-2012. The norm refers to all relatives, including those by consanguinity and affinity; therefore, one cannot speak of an improper application of the norm, nor is it appropriate to deny the bond between the plaintiff and Name126156 . Regarding the legal criteria provided by the plaintiff, it considers these to be private works commissioned by himself, lacking support, but which in any case reaffirm the State's position. Therefore, it affirms that there was no discretionary action whatsoever, nor any defect in the exercise of the sanctioning power, nor any violation of the principle of legality. The principle of specificity (tipicidad) is not violated because the plaintiff's conduct violated Article 127 of the Municipal Code, Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration, and Articles 10, 12, 13, 15, and 16 of the General Law of Internal Control, as well as Article 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment. Regarding the cancellation of credentials, this sanction finds support in Article 253 of the Electoral Code and Article 18 of the Municipal Code and Article 73 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic. It considers that there are no nullity defects, because the act opening the administrative procedure contains a clear, precise, and detailed notice of the facts and their possible sanctioning consequences. The evidentiary documents forming the file were also listed therein, for a better defense of the interested party, and the administrative file was made available to him. The document of the alleged "statement of facts (relación de hechos)" that the plaintiff claimed to have missed cannot have any impact on the exercise of the right of defense, as it was not part of the administrative file, and although initially it was an input used by the CGR, it subsequently loses relevance, as what acquires true importance and effects is the set of facts set forth in the opening resolution. The interested party only had to defend himself against the terms of that notice. Not knowing said statement of facts document in no way affected his right of defense. Therefore, the request for it that the plaintiff presented to the CGR, and for which he received a response on January 17 of the current year -one day before the oral hearing-, in no way affected due process, as the document was provided to him out of his interest in having it, but it was not part of the administrative file. When analyzing the challenged administrative resolution of the CGR, No. PA-011-2011, its reasoning at all times refers to the evidentiary elements that form the administrative file, to which the interested party had full access at all times during the procedure, thus having ample opportunity for defense, without the existence of the nullity defects he alleges. It notes that the plaintiff misunderstands the function of internal audits, whose most important function is the preparation of reports for the improvement of administrative management, which are presented to the head of the institution to implement the recommendations they contain, and the institutional hierarchy can, in turn, address its doubts and make observations. But when it comes to sanctioning recommendations, the head is made aware generally when faults have been committed by subordinates, so that the hierarchy may order the opening of the respective administrative procedures. When it concerns findings pointing to the commission of a potential fault by the head, for reasons of legality, logic, and expediency, it is referred to the oversight body, since the CGR is the governing body of the internal control system, for it to evaluate the case and eventually initiate proceedings against the head, all of which it deems lawful and free of any defect. It continues stating that the potential warnings that the internal auditor may issue to the hierarchy on preventive matters are different from the preparation of reports with sanctioning recommendations for faults found, the latter being the case that occurred here. The sanction is not disproportionate, as it is in accordance with the proven irregularity, since numeral 127 combats nepotism in the public function. It affirms that the conduct of the mayor, as the head of the local government, must be unimpeachable and a guiding example for his subordinates. The CGR extensively justified the recommendation of separation and clearly addressed all the elements considered in evaluating the specific case. For the sanctioning resolution, elements were considered such as the express parameter of subsection e) of Article 41 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, subsection b) of Article 108 of the Financial Administration Law, which indicate that the rank and functions of the public servant are a criterion to consider; the higher the rank, the greater the obligation to assess the legality, timeliness, and suitability of the acts issued, norms echoing Article 213 of the LGAP. Therefore, the mayor had a greater obligation to act in accordance with the law, according to the functions granted by Article 17 of the Municipal Code. It notes that the appointment of his stepson by the plaintiff, in the same municipality where he worked, entails a serious situation of conflict of interest, violating the duty of probity under Article 3 of Law No. 8422, in addition to being an action -in its view- contrary to legality and the principle of transparency that he should have honored. This conduct harms public interests and social values, involving a popularly elected official in a democratic system. For this reason, it affirms that the sanction is proportionate and reasonable given the fault committed and the level of hierarchy held by the plaintiff. Regarding the comparison with other cases, it indicates that the party cannot compare, as the full particular conditions of those other cases are unknown. The popular election of a public official does not imply that their removal for serious fault in the performance of their duties must be decided by popular election, which it considers absurd, when these are acts that evidently cannot be subject to such a decision. The exercise of a popularly elected office is subject to the block of legality, and the legal system establishes that the cancellation of credentials is a matter subject to law, according to numerals 220 and 253 of the Electoral Code, 3 and 41 of Law 8422, 18 of the Municipal Code, and 73 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic. Furthermore, the case at hand is totally different from the situation experienced with the mayor of Name265 . Therefore, it requests that the lawsuit be declared without merit in all its claims (folios 150 to 189 of the judicial file). The representation of the co-defendant Name16153 , in support of its positions, notes that the plaintiff was sanctioned for violating Articles 127 of the Municipal Code, Article 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, and Article 14 of the Regulation to said law. It affirms that it was more than two months before the private oral hearing that the administrative file was made available to the plaintiff, specifically in the act of November 5, 2010, the act opening the procedure. It indicates that it is not true that the act issued by the CGR has its own effect, nor is it binding on the TSE; that the plaintiff does not specify why the CGR resolutions are vitiated by nullity, nor do such defects exist. It affirms that the actions carried out by the CGR are completely valid as they are based on documentary evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff took steps seven times to appoint his stepson in the local government body (ayuntamiento). Actions that his lawsuit does not indicate whether he took or not, but he does not deny having committed them. The referred actions violate Article 127 of the Municipal Code, since the plaintiff's legal position is erroneous, because the term "relatives (parientes)" includes both those by consanguinity and affinity, considering that children of one's spouse -stepsons- are a bond by affinity with the stepfather, thus noting that the conduct is not atypical. It maintains that no legal norm in our country establishes that their relatives by affinity inherit or have the right to demand a pension from a person, and affirms that proof of this is that parents-in-law, sons-in-law, or daughters-in-law do not inherit from a person, nor can they claim alimony from them. It considers that appointing a public official based on family or personal interests without considering their suitability is a flawed conduct. The fact that the auditor did not warn him does not exempt him from sanction, with the removal of credentials being based on Articles 18 and 127 of the Municipal Code, 3 and 39 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, 14 of the regulation to said law, Article 253 of the Electoral Code, and Article 73 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic. It indicates that there were no violations of the right of defense, as the initial order of charges was personally served on the plaintiff on November 19, 2010, so he had almost two months to request a document; moreover, said resolution indicates all existing evidence against the plaintiff. The document referred to by the plaintiff is not cited within said resolution, nor was it part of the administrative file; therefore, it considers that requesting a document a few days before the hearing seems more like a maneuver generating an excuse to request nullity, as he is doing. The plaintiff does not explain why said document was important for the case, in order to assess whether or not it generated a lack of defense, and that document was not even considered as evidence to recommend the sanction of dismissal; in any case, the Comptroller relied on abundant evidence to recommend the sanction. Even hypothetically removing the cited document, the acts of the oversight body have sufficient supporting evidence to ground the recommendation for cancellation of credentials. The TSE, through Resolution No. 8184-M-2011, ruled on the violations of due process and the right of defense, indicating that there were none. Article 36 subsection c) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code indicates that a claim is admissible regarding final, definitive, or procedural acts with their own effect, with the CGR actions challenged by the plaintiff lacking their own effect, as they constitute a recommendation directed to the TSE. When the reconsideration appeal was heard, in Resolution No. 253-M-2012, the TSE addressed the issue, indicating that what is binding from the CGR's recommendation is its technical opinion, not its legal opinion, the latter being the responsibility of the TSE, which acts as an electoral judge, with its rulings having the character of material res judicata. Therefore, it points out that it is the sanctioning act that creates res judicata (causa estado), and the CGR's recommendation cannot generate sanctioning legal effects. If the recommended party accepts the recommendation, the elements of the recommendation are communicated to the sanctioning act, the recommendation becoming an integral and substantial part of the sanctioning act, forming an act with its own effect that creates res judicata and cannot be appealed in this jurisdiction according to numeral 103 of the Political Constitution, and therefore it considers that there is a lack of current interest, since the challenged act is unappealable, as the TSE's decision is final. Therefore, it requests that the lawsuit be declared without merit in all its claims (folios 275 to 284 of the judicial file).

V.On the merits of the matter: Without setting aside what was stated in the first considerando of this judgment, it must be noted that, as the plaintiff correctly indicates, in this case the challenged act corresponds to an act classified by public law doctrine as "complex," and furthermore, indeed, the opinion rendered by the General Comptroller of the Republic for this type of matter -which is being challenged in this sub judice case- is binding on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Indeed, we are not facing an electoral act but an administrative sanctioning act. Now, as can be observed from the case file and what was resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice acting as a court of cassation, in the case at hand, the legal point to be elucidated corresponds, first, to establishing whether numeral 127 of the Municipal Code encompasses in its wording the prohibition against hiring a stepson in a municipality where one holds the position of municipal mayor, as occurred in this case; the court must therefore refer to the determination of a restriction on the fundamental right of access to work, in this case, public employment. In order to subsequently determine the legal appropriateness of the sanction that was applied to the plaintiff Name126154 as mayor of the canton of Goicoechea by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, based on the recommendation issued for that purpose by the oversight body. But to carry out this analysis, it is imperative to first establish that the regime of Fundamental Rights is undoubtedly subject to mandatory analysis for the elucidation of this dispute, as it is the opinion of this Chamber that the legal regime of the right of access to public function (derecho de acceso a la función pública) belongs to that fundamental legal domain. And indeed, access to public positions is a fundamental right, derived from its regulation in international human rights instruments, even though it is not expressly contemplated in our current Political Constitution. Therefore, like any fundamental right, it can indeed be restricted, but only through a law in the formal and material sense, in the search for a balance between the rights of individuals and the general public interest, which, in this specific case, translates into the pursuit of transparency, objectivity, independence of judgment, and impartiality in the exercise of public functions. This implies that it is the law's responsibility to establish the conditions of access to service, which necessarily includes eligibility conditions, as well as the establishment of regimes of prohibitions and incompatibilities pertaining to public posts or positions. These latter three conditions tend to safeguard and maintain objectivity and impartiality on the part of the official in the exercise of public functions, for which purpose it is sought to ensure there is no latent conflict of interest between the function performed and its confrontation with other activities carried out by the public servant, particularly private ones. Therefore, as this is a sensitive matter, involving the restriction or limitation of a fundamental right, one must resort to the institution of reservation of law (reserva de ley) as the appropriate mechanism for its regulation or to establish restrictions on the right of free access to public employment. This implies that eligibility conditions must be established by law, as well as ineligibilities and incompatibilities for accessing the position, since these ineligibilities and incompatibilities entail a restriction on the fundamental right, which obliges the application of constitutional principles regarding the legal regime of fundamental rights. In this regard, one may consult, among others, Constitutional Chamber Ruling No. 545-97 at 14:30 hours on January 28, 1997. In accordance with these principles, the restriction and definition of the scope of a human right can only be developed through law -the principle of reservation (principio de reserva)-, and its regulation through the implementation of normative provisions of sub-legal rank is prohibited, an aspect on which Rulings No. 3502-92 at 16:00 hours on November 24, 1992, No. 3173-93 at 14:57 hours on July 6, 1993, No. 2312-95 at 16:15 hrs. on May 9, 1995, No. 5393-97 at 15:18 hours on September 5, 1997, and No. 18-29-99 at 16:09 hours on March 10, 1999, all issued by the Constitutional Chamber, may be consulted. Likewise, it is necessary to emphasize that delegating the issuance of normative regulations on this matter is not viable, and furthermore, the restrictions imposed on the fundamental right must find support in the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality that permeate the entirety of the current legal system. (In this sense, Rulings No. 5058-93 at 14:20 hours on October 14, 1993; No. 3929-95 at 15:24 hours on July 18, 1995; No. 2883-96 at 17:00 hours on June 13, 1996; and No. 6273-96 at 15:30 hours on November 19, 1996, among others; all issued by the Costa Rican Constitutional Court). And indeed, on numerous occasions, the Constitutional Chamber has addressed the subject under study, concerning the principle of legal reservation or reservation of law, when it comes to establishing limits on fundamental rights, stating in this regard, in relevant part:

“Regarding the alleged violation of Article 28, (...) in ruling No. 3550-92 at 16:00 hours on November 24, 1992... the Chamber noted that, of course, fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to certain restrictions, but only those necessary by virtue of democratic and constitutional values. However, for a restriction to be 'necessary,' it must be 'useful,' 'reasonable,' 'timely,' and must imply the 'existence of an imperative need' that supports the restriction. For restrictions on freedom to be constitutionally and internationally lawful, they must be aimed at satisfying an imperative public interest; to achieve this, one must: 1) choose the one that restricts the protected right to the least extent, 2) there must be proportionality between the restriction and the interest justifying it, 3) it must closely conform to the achievement of that legitimate objective, and 4) it must be socially imperative and therefore exceptional, and as such, must be interpreted restrictively, meaning that in case of doubt, freedom must always be preferred within the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values. Regarding the present action of unconstitutionality, the Chamber considers that it is not constitutionally possible to introduce a prohibition of this type in an Executive Decree, because this matter is a reservation of Law (...)” (Ruling No. 6198-95 of November 14, 1995).

Therefore, this jurisdictional body cannot disregard that when performing the hermeneutic exercise on normative provisions establishing limitations or restrictions on fundamental rights, the parameter for interpretation must undoubtedly be restrictive - not extensive - and even more so when we are in the presence of normative provisions establishing eligibility requirements and/or incompatibilities for the exercise of a public office; without setting aside, of course, the public purpose intended to be satisfied in the legal norm under analysis, since in carrying out the interpretative exercise, the Judge must, in this case, seek to protect the public interest that the legislator tried to protect when establishing the limitation or incompatibility; albeit always in a balanced manner and avoiding an irrational or disproportionate constraint on the fundamental right of access to public employment. All this, in order to achieve an adequate balance between the fundamental right and the protected public interest at stake. The Constitutional Chamber has stated this when addressing the issue of the incompatibilities regime for members of the Supreme Powers, indicating in this regard:

“First, it must be mentioned that the Legislator is empowered to establish incompatibilities and prohibitions for public servants that it deems pertinent for the functioning of the State, particularly, the provision of its services. However, this power is subordinated to the principle of constitutional supremacy, which imposes the mandatory observance of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, under which the provisions issued by the Legislator must be examined. Thus, in this matter, this principle requires –as stated in the previous consideration– that the norms have the purpose of preventing the so-called ‘conflict or opposition of interests,’ to ensure the impartiality of Administration servants. Likewise, the means used by the State to avoid the mentioned conflict must not place its recipient in a situation that renders the enjoyment of their fundamental rights meaningless. Ultimately, they must not cause greater harms than those they intend to prevent; that is, they must not violate the fundamental rights recognized in the Constitution and in the International Human Rights Instruments in force in the Republic.” (Ruling No. 2001-01749 of March 7, 2001) And indeed, the existence of so-called eligibility requirements implies per se that a person who does not meet the conditions established by law to access a public post is unable to be appointed to that position, thereby tacitly becoming an ineligibility condition for the post. The foregoing is without prejudice, obviously, that there may be legal provisions expressly establishing and listing the circumstances that will entail the corresponding ineligibility; all this, under the prudent judgment of the legislator, who could well establish, as indeed has been done, that holding the position is incompatible with carrying out certain public or private activities or in relation to a specific post. This implies that even if the candidate meets the legally established eligibility conditions, there could well be a cause of incompatibility that limits their appointment or their permanence in a certain post. Unlike ineligibility conditions -which usually respond to conditions intrinsic to the candidate-, incompatibilities are based above all on the opposition of interests, as well as the need to maintain independence and impartiality in the exercise of public functions, all with the objective of ensuring its most correct and effective exercise. The regulation of incompatibilities in a legal norm turns out to be a manifestation of the principle of transparency that governs the work of the public administration and which constitutes one of the fundamental pillars governing the administration's actions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the express establishment of various types of incompatibilities provided for in a legal norm is aimed at trying to prevent nepotism (“nepotismo // Del lat. nepos, -otis 'sobrino', 'descendiente' e -ismo. // 1. m. Desmedida preferencia que algunos dan a sus parientes para las concesiones o empleos públicos,” according to a consultation made by this Court on the website of the Real Academia de la Lengua Española), as a manifestation of administrative corruption. Nepotism is, in essence, a flagrant violation of the principle of equality in access to public positions, since the appointment of the official is not based on their suitability and the search for more efficient action by the public administration, but on granting advantageous treatment to a relative or close person with whom there is a family bond and therefore, some degree of interest.

VI.

Based on the foregoing, this Court considers that in the specific case, it is imperative to bring up the provisions of Article 127 of the aforementioned Municipal Code, which reads literally:

"Article 127- Individuals who are spouses or relatives, in a direct or collateral line up to and including the third degree, of any of the councilors, the Mayor, the Auditor, the Directors or Heads of Personnel of the recruitment and selection units, or, in general, of those in charge of choosing candidates for municipal positions, may not be municipal employees. // The appointment of one of the officials listed in the preceding paragraph shall not affect the municipal employee who is the spouse or relative of such officials, if appointed previously." From the transcribed legal text, it follows with absolute clarity and without any significant effort, that the legislator expressly established a restriction on accessing the municipal employment regime when a family relationship exists, whether direct or collateral and up to and including the third degree, with respect to the members of the Municipal Council, the municipal auditor, or the mayor. This implies an express legal impossibility for the appointment to a position of a municipal nature for anyone with such a degree of kinship. Now, the second paragraph of the aforementioned regulation indicates that if such a situation arises, the official who was designated first shall remain in their position, and the subsequent appointment of their relative shall not be made. In this specific case, while it is true that there is no blood relationship between the plaintiff, Mr. Nombre126154, and Mr. Nombre126156, as has been proven in the list of substantiated facts supporting this resolution, it is also true that Mr. Nombre126156 is the son of the person who has been the plaintiff's spouse since 2007, Mrs. Nombre126155. That is, before assuming his position as mayor of Goicoechea, Mr. Nombre126154 already had at least some degree of closeness in relation to Mr. Nombre126156, by virtue of the marital bond existing with Mrs. Nombre126155. However, this article does not expressly and in detail indicate which specific persons are affected by the prohibition, merely stating that the restriction shall be applicable to those united by a bond in a direct or collateral line up to the third degree. For this reason, it falls to the legal operator in each specific case to conduct the corresponding assessment and interpretation and determine if an individual falls within the comprehensive scope of the legal restriction under study. Given the breadth and vagueness presented by the wording of the rule, we must explore the possibility of applying various methods of legal interpretation. This leads us to bring up the provisions of Article 10 of the current Civil Code, which establishes the hermeneutical criteria that must be applied by the legal operator when interpreting a normative provision. This article states, in what is of interest:

"(…) The rules shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to the spirit and purpose of them." The transcribed article establishes the criteria for interpreting legal rules in the Costa Rican legal system, also encompassing a variety of hermeneutical methodologies, namely, literal interpretation, historical-social interpretation as reflected in the legislative records and proceedings, and the will or spirit intended by the legislator at the time of creating the respective legal rule. With the foregoing clear, this Chamber must turn to analyze whether, based on the provisions of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, there exists or not a legal bond between the plaintiff and Mr. Nombre126156, within the third degree of kinship, that could have in some way affected the appointments made in their favor at the Municipality of Goicoechea—at the request of the plaintiff herein—and which can be considered a violation of the prohibition established in the aforementioned Article 127. Regarding the concept of kinship (parentesco), the most qualified national doctrine has addressed this topic since long ago, in what is of interest:

“[…] Kinship (parentesco) properly speaking is formed by the consanguineous bond that unites several persons descending one from another, or from a common trunk. According to this, two classes of relatives are distinguished, and for greater clarity, it is customary to distribute them into two series of degrees comprising two lines. A line is, therefore, the series of relatives. Two classes are distinguished: direct and collateral. In the direct line are the progenitors and their descendants; thus we have: grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren. And in the collateral line, also called transversal, are counted those who come from the same trunk but do not descend from one another, as occurs with siblings among themselves; and uncles/aunts with nephews/nieces […] The distinct steps from one relative to another are called degrees, one of these being counted for each generation, which is formed by an individuality in the series, with the exception of that which forms the trunk from which the individuals to be taken into account for the calculation originate; thus, from Nombre111971 to the great-grandfather, there are three generations, although four individualities appear, namely: Nombre111971, grandchild, grandparent, and great-grandparent, the latter not being counted as it is the generator of the others […] In addition to consanguineous kinship (parentesco consanguíneo), there exists another called affinity (parentesco de afinidad), meaning by analogy or similarity, recognized by law, consisting of a civil bond, which, because of marriage, is established between one of the spouses and the consanguineous relatives of the other […] In kinship by affinity, the calculation of degrees is performed in the same manner as in consanguineous kinship and according to the distribution of direct and collateral lines […] the rule can be established that in the same line and in the same degree in which a person is a consanguineous relative of one of the spouses, they are an affine (afín) to the other spouse […]” (Nombre60957. Tratado de las personas. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. Fourth edition. 1984. pp. 23 to 26). (The underlining and highlighting do not correspond to the original).

From the foregoing review, we can conclude that Article 127 of the Municipal Code, while it is true it does not expressly indicate what type of bond—consanguineous or by affinity—it refers to, is nonetheless clear that it encompasses the collateral and direct line up to and including the third degree. Now, the doubt arises immediately as to whether the legislator's intent was to include only the blood bond within the limitation, or whether their will was to encompass both, consanguinity as well as the bond by affinity. In the opinion of this Chamber, to elucidate this aspect, a direct application of the principles of protecting the public treasury (hacienda pública), probity, and transparency in the public function must be undertaken, in addition to considering the legal aphorism stating "one cannot distinguish where the law does not distinguish." Once the respective balancing exercise has been carried out, weighing between these core legal aspects and the simple interest that a private individual might have in being appointed to a public position, and taking into consideration the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, this Court reaches the conclusion that the interpretation must be that the legislator's intent was to include both types of bonds—the consanguineous as well as the legal bond or the one created by law, i.e., affinity—within the cited restriction regime, with both factual scenarios being encompassed within the scope of the incompatibility contained in the aforementioned legal article.

VII.Now, the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy (Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española) defines the noun "stepchild" (hijastro) in the following terms: "(…) From Latin filiaster, filiastra. // 1. m. and f. Child brought to the new marriage by the spouse of a person.", according to a search conducted by this Court on the website "http://dle.rae.es/?id=KODxnLU". Taking into consideration the definition established by the Royal Academy of the Language cited above, as well as the factual situation under analysis, namely, that the spouse of Mr. Nombre126154—Mrs. Nombre126155—is the mother of Mr. Nombre126156—who, it should be noted, has a father-child relationship established with another person who appears in the registry as his father—through the application of a simple categorical syllogism reasoning, it is clear to this Court, as a conclusion, that in the case of Mr. Nombre126156 and his relationship with the plaintiff Nombre126154, the existing bond is one of affinity (that is, a legal nature, generated from the civil union—marriage—between Mr. Nombre126154 and his wife), with Mr. Nombre126156 being a child brought by one of the spouses—Mrs. Nombre126155—to her marriage with Mr. Nombre126154, thereby resulting, in relation to the plaintiff herein and without any doubt, as his stepchild. Once this situation is defined, it is necessary to proceed to determine whether the relationship existing between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 is covered by the prohibition contained in Article 127 repeatedly cited.

VIII.Mr. Nombre60957, as detailed in the preceding lines, has indicated that "(...) In kinship by affinity, the calculation of degrees is performed in the same manner as in consanguineous kinship and according to the distribution of direct and collateral lines […] the rule can be established that in the same line and in the same degree in which a person is a consanguineous relative of one of the spouses, they are an affine (afín) to the other spouse […]” (op cit.). That is, if a person is a niece/nephew by consanguinity of someone united by a marital bond, that person will be, in turn, a niece/nephew by affinity of the respective spouse, applying the same line and degree that exists between the niece/nephew and their consanguineous uncle/aunt, but to the bond by affinity; a criterion shared by this Court. Now, in this case, Mr. Nombre126156 is the child of Mrs. Nombre126155—the spouse of Mr. Nombre126154—according to the consanguineous bond, for which reason, applying the same rules of line and degree—but by affinity—to define the kinship between Mr. Nombre126156 in relation to the plaintiff, he is the stepchild by affinity of Mr. Nombre126154, contrary to what was stated by the plaintiff and in accordance with the definition of said term established in the preceding lines. Additionally, the degree of kinship existing between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 corresponds to the second degree, because the first degree corresponds to the relationship between the plaintiff and Mrs. Nombre126155—spouses to each other—and the second degree in relation to the plaintiff derives from the relationship existing between Mrs. Nombre126155 and her child Nombre126156. Therefore, from Mr. Nombre126154 to Mr. Nombre126156, there are two degrees of bond by affinity. If we again bring up the provisions of Article 127 of the aforementioned Municipal Code, said article covers or encompasses up to the third degree of kinship—without differentiating whether it is by consanguinity or by affinity—which would encompass for Mr. Nombre126154 up to the grandchildren of Mrs. Nombre126155—by affinity—and his own grandchildren in the direct descending line by consanguinity. Therefore, without any doubt, the legal bond existing between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 falls within the scope of application of the legal effects of the indicated rule, as the facts under analysis are subsumed without great difficulty into the factual precondition provided for in the cited legal rule. That is to say, the plaintiff's actions, aimed at obtaining the appointment of his stepchild at the Municipality of Goicoechea, are, in the opinion of this Court, typical and therefore subsumable under the factual scenario contemplated by the aforementioned Article 127, as well as constituting violations of the prohibition established by the legislator in the repeatedly cited article.

IX.It remains now to analyze whether the sanction imposed on the plaintiff by reason of his conduct is, or is not, in accordance with the law. The aforementioned Article 127 is an awkward and scarcely clear rule in its wording, but moreover, it presents a highly sensitive omission as it lacks any provision for a type of sanction applicable to conducts that violate it. Beyond the foregoing, it is entirely silent on referring to other normative provisions for the application of the corresponding sanction. For this reason, the defendant administration proceeded to perform a normative integration (integración normativa) in an effort to find a sanction applicable to the case sub judice, but thereby, it has undoubtedly violated the principle of legality or specificity (principio de tipicidad o de legalidad) that governs sanctioning matters (both in criminal and administrative law), according to which, and for this specific case, the sanctions applicable in the administrative venue must have been previously established through the enactment of a norm of legal rank and force, a precept derived from Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution in relation to Article 124 of Law No. 6227, the General Law of Public Administration. This is in addition to being, in turn, contemplated in Article 253 of the current Electoral Code, which states literally:

"ARTICLE 253.- Competence // The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) shall order the cancellation or annulment of the credentials of popularly elected municipal officials in the cases expressly contemplated by law. These provisions shall also be applicable to district councilors (síndicos), district intendants (intendentes), district council members (concejales de distrito), and members of municipal district councils (concejos municipales de distrito). // In the event of a dispute, the ordinary administrative procedure provided for in the General Law of Public Administration shall first be conducted." (The italics and underlining do not correspond to the original).

In this case, given the poor wording of the aforementioned prohibitive rule, it was not viable to proceed to integrate various normative provisions to try to provide Article 127 of the Municipal Code with an applicable sanction, because this undoubtedly violates the principle of legal reservation that characterizes the sanctioning matter at hand. However, ignoring that legal gap, the active administration proceeded to channel the sanctioning procedure against the plaintiff, starting from the factual premise of a violation of Article 127 of the current Municipal Code. Note that in this case, specifically in administrative resolution No. PA-011-2011 at 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued as a recommendation act by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), reference is only made to the questioned conducts as being violative of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, and it is in relation to said article that the disciplinary procedure is established and carried through to its conclusion, without the content of said act indicating that the conducts attributed to Mr. Nombre126154 were framed by the legal operator within either the Internal Control Law or the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function. It is also not recorded in said act that the conduct carried out by the plaintiff was assessed under the guise of those legal provisions, with the directing body—the Comptroller's Office—merely reiterating that Article 127 of the Municipal Code was violated. Nor is it perceived in that administrative act that a legal analysis was performed regarding the absence of an express sanction in the repeatedly cited Article 127, nor was any considerative reasoning issued on the appropriateness of applying, in the specific case, those legal provisions to fill the normative gap and thus sanction the attributed conducts. It was only in the operative part of that resolution where Articles 18(d) of the Municipal Code and 39 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function were invoked, but without the considerative part of said act explaining why such legal articles are applicable to the specific case. Note that Article 18 of Law No. 7794 states literally:

"Article 18. - The following shall be automatic causes for the loss of the credential of a municipal mayor: a) Losing a requirement or having an impediment, according to Articles 15 and 16 of this code. b) Being unjustifiably absent from work for more than eight days. c) Being declared, by final judicial sentence, disqualified from holding public office. d) Incurring in any of the grounds provided for in Article 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. (Thus amended by Article 66 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004) e) Committing any action sanctioned by law with the loss of the position for popularly elected officials. f) Voluntarily resigning from the position." Additionally, Article 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic states, in what is of interest:

"Article 73-Cancellation of Credential. The commission of a serious offense by a council member (regidor) or district councilor (síndico), whether full or alternate, against the rules of the fiscal oversight and control system of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) contemplated in this Law, and against any other rules relating to public funds; or incurring in any of the acts provided for in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, as generators of administrative responsibility, shall be cause for the cancellation of the respective credential. This shall apply when the offender acted in the exercise of their office or on the occasion thereof. // When the serious offense is committed by virtue of an agreement of the municipal council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, have approved said agreement, shall incur the same ground for cancellation of their credentials. // Likewise, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of the public function, as well as those provided for in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, shall be a ground for canceling the credential of a council member or district councilor, whether full or alternate. The competent judicial authority shall make the respective communication, ex officio, to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. // (Thus amended by Article 63 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004) // ".

Despite the fact that the operative part of the sanctioning administrative act issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff indicates that Mr. Nombre126154 should be sanctioned in accordance with what is indicated in Article 18(d) transcribed above, the obligation to state the reasons for administrative acts, especially disciplinary or sanctioning administrative acts, requires that the considerative part of that resolution contains an express analysis of why that specific legal rule, and not another, must be applied to the particular case. However, in the indicated administrative resolution, no considerative pronouncement whatsoever is perceived regarding the subsumption of the investigated conducts under Article 18(d) (not under subsection "e" of that article, which seemed, in this Court's opinion, to be the most applicable to the case) nor under Article 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which is cited because it is the article to which subsection "d" of the aforementioned Article 18 expressly refers. It should be noted that Article 73 refers to conducts that are harmful "against the rules of the fiscal oversight and control system of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) contemplated in this Law, and against any other rules relating to public funds" and expressly mentions conducts specifically contemplated in that normative body, that is, in that same law; thereby excluding its application to the normative gap found in Article 127 of the Municipal Code, which protects a conduct that violates the duty of probity, but not a violation against the safeguarding and sound administration of the public treasury (hacienda pública). Moreover, this Chamber must remind the parties that the imposition of sanctions—and especially when these entail a sanction as onerous as the removal of credentials for a popularly elected official—is not legally viable through the application of analogy as an interpretative method, because for the application of a sanction, the legislator must expressly establish the illicit nature of the conduct and the respective sanction applicable upon its commission. Now, if these aspects are not provided for in the sanctioning rule, this absence or normative omission cannot be rectified by the legal operator by resorting to normative integration, nor through the analogical application of sanctioning rules created to correct conducts of another nature, as the Comptroller General of the Republic attempted in the matter under examination, trying by all means to sanction the plaintiff. Note that, in this case, the plaintiff is punished for engaging in a conduct that has no express sanction provided for in the current legal system, and furthermore, one that is not expressly punished with a measure as onerous as the cancellation of credentials for a popularly elected position. Added to the above is that Article 39 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, which is cited in the operative part of the sanctioning administrative act issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic to support the removal of the plaintiff's credentials, states literally:

"Article 39.- Administrative sanctions. According to their gravity, the previously indicated offenses shall be sanctioned as follows: a) Written reprimand published in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial). b) Suspension, without pay, allowance, or corresponding stipend, for fifteen to thirty days. c) Separation from the public office, without employer liability or cancellation of the municipal council member’s credential, as applicable.", (the highlighting and underlining do not correspond to the original).

Note that this last article cited specifically indicates that the sanctions established therein shall be applicable to "the previously indicated offenses." That is to say, it refers to the conducts classified as sanctionable in that same legal body, in that same law, and does not contemplate, under any scenario, that they are applicable by analogy to sanction conducts contained in other normative provisions, as is the case with Article 127 of the Municipal Code. Additionally, and by way of corollary, it must be pointed out that in its wording, the repeatedly cited municipal Article 127 also does not refer, either expressly or tacitly, to the application of other sanctioning regulations in case the conduct it prohibits is engaged in, in order to establish a sanctioning regime that guarantees its observance and punishes the violation of the prohibition established therein. To that extent, this Court considers that the administrative act emanating from the Comptroller General of the Republic, which was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, suffers from a defect in its content, this being an absolute defect because it occurs in one of the substantial elements of the administrative act under examination, under the protection of the provisions of Articles 166 in relation to Articles 169 to 172, all of Law No. 6227, the General Law of Public Administration. The foregoing is because the content of said act is completely silent, failing to issue even a cursory analysis on the appropriateness of the supplementary application of other sanctioning legal rules in order to fill the normative gap present in Article 127 of the Municipal Code, given that it establishes no sanction in case of its non-compliance and disregard. The challenged act is also completely silent regarding the analogical application of legal rules specifically enacted by the legislator for the protection of the public treasury (hacienda pública) and public funds, in order to punish a violation committed not against the public treasury, but against the duty of probity, which is the conduct Mr. Nombre126154 engaged in. In addition to this defect in the content of the act, this jurisdictional body considers that the challenged administrative actions also suffer from a defect in the grounds (motivo), because they lack legal basis, since there is no legal rule that specifically and expressly sanctions the violation of the prohibition established in Article 127 of the Municipal Code, nor is there a special and express rule that sanctions a Municipal Mayor with the loss of credentials in the event of violating said prohibitive rule. The foregoing also entails, by parity of reasoning and in accordance with Article 166 of Law No. 6227, the absolute nullity of the administrative conducts challenged before this jurisdiction, given that the grounds of the administrative act (by definition, the factual or legal precedent that serves as the reason or motivation for the issuance of the act by the public administration) is a substantial element thereof. By reason of the considerations set forth, a defect has undoubtedly been generated that renders the administrative acts challenged before this Court absolutely null, coupled with the fact that, in the absence of any pronouncement on the fit of the attributed conduct to the immediately transcribed rules, the plaintiff has been left in evident defenselessness. This is not only because the administration failed to indicate why the plaintiff violated Article 18(d) of the Municipal Code, Article 73 of the LOCGR, and Article 39 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, but also because the obligatory reference to the relationship between the conduct attributed to Mr. Nombre126154 and the sanction that was applied to him was not made in the challenged administrative act. Furthermore, the absence is also felt in the challenged acts of any explanation, at least a succinct one, as to why Article 127 of the Municipal Code—which, it is reiterated, lacks an applicable sanction—must be integrated with those legal texts. Simply, without further substantiation, it is indicated that this should be the case, but without the active administration taking the effort to reasonably justify its proceeding. This resulted in a defect due to a lack of reasoning (falta de motivación) of the administrative act, the lack of substantiation being a defect that directly affects the administrative conduct, generating the absolute nullity of the challenged act. Note that in this case, we are not in the presence of a violation against the public treasury (hacienda pública), but rather the violation attributed to the plaintiff constitutes a breach of the duty of probity incumbent upon him, as it is clear to this Chamber that Mr. Nombre126154 promoted an improper appointment at his own instance, under the provisions of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, by requesting the institutional personnel department to appoint his stepchild Nombre126156 as a municipal employee. The fact is that, even though the plaintiff evidently violated the duty of probity legally required of him, in this specific case, municipal Article 127 does not expressly provide for any burdensome or punitive legal consequence to sanction the act of engaging in the conduct it forbids. Much less does it expressly establish that the commission of such an offense will entail the removal of credentials for a popularly elected official, as occurs in the case before us since it concerns a Municipal Mayor. To that extent, the Comptroller General of the Republic wrongly aimed to do so, because given the normative gap in this area and given the legislator's silence—who omitted establishing specific and express sanctions applicable for the non-compliance with the cited Article 127—said gap in the current legal system could not be filled by means of normative integration and the analogical application of diverse sanctioning provisions, given that the matter before us is an extremely delicate one: a sanctioning and disciplinary matter, where the principle of legal reservation undoubtedly and entirely governs. Therefore, it was not legally viable to attempt to invent the application of a sanction by analogy, or to force the reprehensible conduct in which the plaintiff engaged in order to try, forcefully—and without further analysis—to subsume it under other normative provisions not enacted for cases such as the one before us, but rather for the safeguarding and protection of the public treasury, which, it is reiterated, does not correspond to the case concerning us in this litigation.

The administrative sanctioning acts challenged in this proceeding have undoubtedly violated the principle of specificity (tipicidad) and/or legality in administrative sanctioning matters, as well as the general provision established in Article 253 of the Electoral Code transcribed in the preceding lines, which requires, for cases of this nature, the prior existence of an express sanction contained in a legal norm, in order to punish the respective conduct with it. Therefore, this Court concludes that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff, based on Articles 18(d) and 137, both of the Municipal Code, as well as on Article 39 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, is unlawful, as it lacks the legal support to sustain it, because the aforementioned articles are not applicable to the specific case, in accordance with the considerations set forth in the preceding lines, and because Article 127 of the current Municipal Code lacks a sanction expressly established by prior law that punishes the official who violates such prohibition with dismissal from their position or with the withdrawal of the respective credentials in the case of an official designated by popular election. As a corollary to the foregoing, it is necessary in this instance to declare the absolute nullity of the following administrative acts: resolution No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, which ordered the separation of the plaintiff from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 hours on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 hours on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 hours on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Proceedings for the cancellation of credentials of the incumbent mayor of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea, San José province, held by Mr. Nombre126154"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 13:10 hours on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which ordered the cancellation of Mr. Nombre126154's credential accrediting him as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 08:31 hours on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. For the same reason and consequently, the absolute nullity of the entire administrative sanctioning procedure followed against the plaintiff, which culminated in his dismissal from the position of municipal mayor of Goicoechea and the withdrawal of his respective credentials, is declared.

X.In his statement of claim, the plaintiff argued that a series of irregularities occurred during the sanctioning procedure that hindered his right of defense, indicating that official letter No. DFOE-DI-1576 was not in the administrative file, a document that corresponded to the statement of facts of the disciplinary administrative procedure, a statement of facts that did not come with the act initiating the procedure and the formal notification of charges (acto de apertura y traslado de cargos), which was made known to him only one day before the required oral and private hearing. In this regard, it must be noted that a detailed review of the administrative procedure reveals that, contrary to what the plaintiff stated, the act initiating the procedure and the formal notification of charges corresponding to the unnumbered administrative resolution issued at 15:00 hours on November 5, 2011, by the directing body of the administrative procedure, did contain in its content a duly detailed statement of facts that allowed the plaintiff to clearly determine what factual situations were being imputed to him in the aforementioned sanctioning procedure, thus allowing him to proceed to adequately and effectively exercise his right of defense and due process, in protection of his interests within the indicated sanctioning procedure, without this collegiate Chamber considering that the right of access to the file for Mr. Nombre126154 was violated, nor does it agree that the plaintiff here was left defenseless, by not having been notified with due advance notice of the details of the conduct attributed to him. Note that said statement of facts is contained within the first recital (considerando) of the administrative resolution initiating the procedure and giving formal notification of charges, corresponding to the unnumbered resolution issued at 15:00 hours on November 5, 2011, which appears in the administrative file in digital format, disc No.1 and folios 43 to 52 of the file of the procedure followed against the plaintiff. Therefore, this aspect of the filed claim is rejected.

The plaintiff continues by stating that the Internal Audit, in an act—in his opinion—of bad faith, proceeded to communicate the situation detected involving Mr. Nombre126154 to the Contraloría General de la República, instead of communicating it to the municipal mayor himself or to another internal instance of the municipality. In this regard, it must be noted that while it is true the institutional internal audit could well have acted as the plaintiff indicates, that is, issuing reports on the detected situation and making them known to the institutional head, under the protection of Articles 35 to 37 of Law No. 8292, Internal Control Law, however, communicating the detected situation internally within the corporate entity is not a legally established requirement to be fulfilled beforehand, before sending the matter to the knowledge of the controlling body, as was done in the procedure under review; to which it must be added that, in any case, this allegation is not capable of annulling, per se, the administrative sanctioning act issued and subject to this Court's cognizance. Therefore, this aspect of the filed claim is also rejected.

Continuing with the analysis of the arguments raised by the plaintiff, his representation states that the Contraloría General de la República did not analyze the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, and neither did the TSE, because if they had, they would have realized that this law establishes a series of sanctions based on the seriousness of the fault. In this regard, it must be indicated that the issue of the gradation of sanctions in disciplinary matters, when the legal operator is faced with a plurality of sanctioning options, all legally valid, from which to choose to sanction the offender, requires the application of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, proceeding to carry out an adequate balancing test in order to determine the most reasonable, adequate, and proportional punishment for the factual scenario typified in the sanctioning norm, the commission of which has been proven and which is submitted to disciplinary review. Indeed, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, in its Article 41, establishes a series of criteria that must be taken into account when assessing the conduct of the investigated subject, when they have incurred in unlawful conduct through willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). Said article contemplates the following aspects to be taken into consideration for this purpose, verbatim: "Article 41.-Criteria to be considered. The sanctions stipulated in this Law shall be imposed for the infractions previously typified that have been committed with willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). To assess the conduct of the alleged responsible party, the following factors shall be taken into account, among others: / a) The effective injury to the economic interests of the Public Administration and the amount of the damages and losses caused. / b) The success achieved in obtaining results undesired by the legal system or in the enrichment or favoring of the perpetrator of the infraction or third parties, as well as the effort exerted to obtain them. / c) The negative impact on the public service. / d) Recidivism in any of the faults typified in Article 38 of this Law, within the previous four years. / e) The rank and functions of the public servant; it is understood that the greater the hierarchy and complexity of these, the greater the obligation to appreciate the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the acts dictated, authorized, or executed." Note that in this case, indeed, such aspects must be assessed to determine the seriousness of the committed fault as well as the sanction to be applied in such scenarios; however, in this case, the situation is quite particular, since it is true that in the case sub judice, it was not even possible to proceed to carry out the indicated assessment in order to choose one among several possible sanctions with the objective of sanctioning the plaintiff, because it is true that in this matter, and in the opinion of this Court, there is no legal norm of a sanctioning nature that supports the punishment applied to the plaintiff, since, as indicated in the preceding lines, it was erroneously and unlawfully based on Articles 18(d) and 137, both of the Municipal Code, as well as on Article 39 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, which was contrary to law because the aforementioned articles are not applicable to the specific case, in accordance with the considerations set forth in the preceding lines, and because Article 127 of the current Municipal Code lacks a sanction expressly established by prior law that punishes the official who violates such prohibition with dismissal from their position or with the withdrawal of the respective credentials in the case of an official designated by popular election. In addition to the foregoing, it must be added that, in any case, from a reading of the challenged administrative act, it is concluded that at least the controlling body took into consideration the condition of hierarchical superior—mayor—that the plaintiff held in the aforementioned municipality, as at least this sanctioning act so indicates, albeit without providing greater detail and without conducting an in-depth analysis of the appropriateness of the imposed sanction, because in reality and according to the law, there was no current legal norm that typified the specific conduct accused and that also expressly established for it one or some sanctions concretely applicable to said conduct, making it impossible to perform the analysis on the gradation of sanctions, from which to choose one to resolve the specific case.

The plaintiff continues by stating that in this case there is no injury to his economic interests, no negative impact on the public service occurred, the salary the official received was earned by him, he received the legally mandated payment, and he was not favored by being paid more than the legally established sum. These affirmations are indeed shared by this Court: from a detailed study of the case file, it follows that indeed in this case no impact on the public treasury (hacienda pública) occurred, since there is no document in the case file proving that the salary paid to Mr. Nombre126154's stepson was higher than what corresponded to the position he held, or, there is no evidence in this case proving that the young man did not work in the position to which he was appointed, nor is there evidence proving that Mr. Nombre126156 received his salary without performing the respective work, nor that the former mayor received any stipend from Mr. Nombre126156 to proceed with his appointment; neither does the case file show that a real and effective economic harm or loss was generated to the finances or to the public treasury (hacienda pública), given that the case at hand is restricted, in terms of its scope of impact, to having disregarded the express prohibition established in Article 127 of the current Municipal Code, but as the plaintiff states, the case file does not show an impact on municipal goods and funds, and therefore, on the public treasury (hacienda pública). In that regard, the plaintiff is correct, and without a doubt, such circumstances should have been taken into consideration when assessing the seriousness of the accused conduct and when determining the applicable and corresponding sanction for the specific case, but the truth of the matter is that in this specific issue, such a legal exercise was impossible to perform, because in reality and according to the law, there is in this case no current legal norm of statutory rank that expressly and specially establishes one or some applicable sanctions to punish the specific accused conduct, thus making it impossible to perform the analysis on the gradation of sanctions to then proceed to choose one among several possible ones, to resolve the specific case; that is, in the absence of legally established sanctions for the specific conduct provided for in Article 127 of the Municipal Code, the legal operator was unable to carry out the respective judgment of reasonableness and balancing to choose the most reasonable, logical, and proportional sanction from among several sanctions, corresponding to the concrete and particular circumstances of the case under review. It must again be noted that said lack of legal normative support, per se, renders the sanctioning administrative act challenged here absolutely null and void, as it constitutes a defect in the motive (motivo) and in the content of the same, and which therefore results in its open nonconformity with the current legal system.

This Court cannot omit to point out that even if modern socio-political currents have generated novel interpretative ideologies of the legal system, taking the exercise of disciplinary power within the State to the extreme, the proponents of such ideological currents, like it or not, must adhere to legality and the legal system in force in the country, and the truth of the matter is that, like it or not, whether it is politically correct or not, there is no specific sanction established for the conduct set forth in Article 127 of the current Municipal Code, on the date the acts giving rise to this litigation were committed. This Court does not owe allegiance, nor will it submit, to political-level dimensions or persecutory ideological interpretations that may prevail in any state institution; this Court owes allegiance and submits to legality, to the current Political Constitution, and to the law, and in that regard, applying the restrictive criteria of hermeneutics applicable since very long ago to sanctioning matters, as well as the principle of legality that governs said matters and which establishes that sanctioning matters are reserved to the law, this Chamber cannot, under any circumstances, condone or validate the establishment of sanctions by way of analogy, to complement, with that interpretive method, "open" sanctioning types, or also those that others call "blank" types (tipos sancionatorios "en blanco"), meaning those sanctioning normative provisions that are not self-sufficient and that require, through interpretation, the creation of a sanction applicable to a specific conduct, when the legislator did not establish it in a timely and express manner, which undoubtedly violates the most elementary pro-person (pro-hómine) and pro-liberty (pro-libertatis) legal principles, which this collegiate body fully shares and advocates.

In another vein, it must be indicated to the plaintiff that the resolution issued in the specific case of Mr. Nombre16454 is not applicable to the matter now submitted to this Court's review, as it corresponds to a factual scenario different from the one now before us and, in any case, it holds no binding force over the criterion of this jurisdictional body.

The plaintiff continues by stating that, in this case, administrative resolution No. PA-011-2011 was not duly notified to him according to Article 38 of the Notifications Law, since he was not informed of it before the hearing was held, which violated his right of defense. In this regard, it must be indicated that resolution No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the deciding body of the administrative sanctioning procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República, corresponds to the final act issued within that procedure. This resolution was notified to the plaintiff via facsimile on February 4, 2011, as recorded in the list of proven facts of this resolution and can be verified on folio 144 of the respective administrative file in digital format, disc No.1. The required oral and private hearing was held within this sanctioning procedure on January 18, 2011, as recorded on folio 128 of the digitized administrative procedure provided to the case file. In that regard, it is true that said final act was communicated to the plaintiff more than ten days after the respective oral appearance was held, thereby making it evident that no violation of his right of defense has occurred and that the plaintiff is incorrect in his claims regarding this topic, and this argumentative aspect of the filed claim must be rejected.

Regarding the alleged violations of the principle of parallelism of forms, the democratic principle, and the principle of popular will, as well as his affirmations that if the Mayor was appointed by the people, the only one legitimized to dismiss him is the people, according to the principles and bases of the plebiscite, citing as an example what happened in Nombre265, and the invocation of the unconstitutionality of Articles 220, 223, and 253 of Law No. 8765, current Electoral Code, and of resolutions No. 6673-M-2011, No. 7105-M-2011, and No. 8184-M-2011, all from the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, it must be noted that such arguments exceed the legal competencies assigned to this Court's knowledge, as they pertain to aspects of constitutional order, on which this collegiate body is not to express an opinion, these being the exclusive purview of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), as the Costa Rican system is one of concentrated constitutional control, according to the provisions of Article 10 of the current fundamental norm.

By virtue of the considerations set forth in the preceding lines, it is procedurally correct in accordance with the law to declare the filed claim fully granted, as is indeed ordered. By virtue of having declared the claim at hand granted, according to what is set forth in the preceding recitals (considerandos), the administrative sanctioning procedure followed against the plaintiff is annulled in its entirety, and taking into consideration that this declaration has a declarative and retroactive effect to the start date of the referred procedure, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 131.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code and 171 of Law No. Placa1223, as a direct and immediate consequence thereof, any existing reference, regarding the administrative procedure herein annulled, in any databases of the Contraloría General de la República and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is also annulled, which must be executed immediately once this resolution becomes final (firme). The nullity of the administrative resolutions No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, which ordered the separation of the plaintiff from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 hours on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 hours on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 hours on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Proceedings for the cancellation of credentials of the incumbent mayor of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea, San José province, held by Mr. Nombre126154"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 13:10 hours on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which ordered the cancellation of Mr. Nombre126154's credential accrediting him as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 08:31 hours on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is declared.

XI.In the list of claims (elenco de pretensiones) raised by the plaintiff in this litigation, the plaintiff claims payment for the damages (daños y perjuicios) that he alleges were caused to him by the challenged administrative acts. By way of damages (daños) he claims the sum of one hundred million net colones, which he affirms correspond to the salaries, year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school bonus (salario escolar), benefits in kind (salario en especie), and benefits that he was entitled to as Mayor, a sum he requests be liquidated in the execution of judgment. Likewise, he requests that the salaries be indexed from the moment the obligation arose until the date of their effective payment, in addition to requiring that the amount be calculated according to the basic passive rate (tasa básica pasiva) in effect at the time of liquidation and determination by a final judicial resolution. In this regard, it must be indicated that, in the opinion of this Court, by its unlawful conduct, in applying to the plaintiff a non-existent sanction for the specific case of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, the defendant party has violated the sphere of the plaintiff's patrimonial rights, placing him in a situation of evident employment impact with evident economic and personal consequences, which is inferred without great effort from the case file, since he was dismissed from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea and could not receive the sums and other salary components (extremos salariales) that he eventually could have received, had he remained in office for the entire term of his mandate, which, incidentally, ended in 2016. With this, the plaintiff has been forced to resort, firstly, to an unsuccessful challenge procedure and subsequently to the judicial process that concerns us, to challenge formal actions that, being affected by the legal defects indicated in the preceding paragraphs, had to be annulled by this Tribunal. In summary, the actions of the co-defendants Contraloría General de la República and the State, representing the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, undoubtedly caused the plaintiff an unjust disturbance in his work development, and consequently, it is procedurally correct to order the payment, in favor of Mr. Nombre126154, of the back pay (salarios caídos) and the respective salary components (extremos salariales) to which he would have been entitled, if he had effectively remained in the exercise of the popularly elected office, for the entire term of his appointment as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea. Given that there is no suitable evidence in the case file that allows the Court to determine at this time the sums that must be paid to the plaintiff for this concept, the payment of said amounts is granted abstractly, subject to the proper determination, quantification, and liquidation that will be carried out later, in the execution of judgment stage. As requested by the plaintiff and by virtue of the provisions of Article 123 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, the granted sums must be indexed and brought to present value. Once these sums are quantified and determined, interest will be recognized on them as damages (perjuicios) in accordance with Article 722 of the Civil Code, which will be calculated at the current legal rate, from the date on which the plaintiff should have received each of the corresponding payments until the date of their effective cancellation.

XII.Regarding the defenses (excepciones). Upon answering the claim, the representation of the co-defendants raised the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of standing (falta de legitimación), and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual). In relation to the defense of lack of current interest (falta de interés actual), it must be indicated that it is unfounded, by virtue of the fact that the legal point debated within this matter, corresponding to the assessment of the legality of the sanction applied to the plaintiff by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones upon the recommendation issued for that purpose by the Contraloría General de la República, had not been the subject of analysis or a ruling by any jurisdictional body, to which it must be added that while it is true the plaintiff had appeared before this instance in file No. 12-000748-1027-CA, this was solely through the filing of a request for interim relief (tutela cautelar) from which he ultimately withdrew, without a plenary proceeding ever being filed in that matter or an opinion issued on the merits of the case. Regarding the defense of lack of standing (falta de legitimación), both in its active and passive forms, it is rejected in both senses, since Mr. Nombre126154 was adequately legitimated actively to appear before the court in this proceeding in defense of his interests, as the purpose of the same has been the annulment of the conduct deployed by the co-defendant administration, which culminated in his dismissal from the position of Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea that he held and the withdrawal of his respective credentials; the defense raised in its passive form must meet the same fate, as the challenged administrative acts were issued by the co-defendant bodies in this matter, under the protection of the provisions of Article 12 of the current Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA). And finally, in accordance with the reasoning set forth in the preceding recitals (considerandos), regarding the co-defendants Contraloría General de la República and the State, the invoked defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) is rejected, as the plaintiff party prevailing in this litigation was legally correct in their positions, and consequently, the filed claim is declared granted. Regarding the co-defendant Nombre16153, current Municipal Mayoress of Goicoechea, the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) is upheld, since within his list of claims, the plaintiff considered that if the term for which he was appointed had expired at the time this resolution was issued, in that event he was not requesting to be reinstated in the position he held and that is now exercised by Mrs. Nombre16153, to which it must be added that no aspect of his claim was aimed at obtaining any legal result or any conduct from Mrs. Nombre16153.

XIII.Regarding the costs (costas). In accordance with Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or, when the judgment is rendered due to evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, and specifically regarding the State and the Contraloría General de la República, this Court finds no reason whatsoever to apply the exceptions set forth in the applicable regulations and to break the principle of condemning the losing party to pay costs. Therefore, the condemnation for procedural and personal costs is imposed on the Contraloría General de la República and the State. Regarding Mrs. Nombre16153, given that she was mandatorily brought into the process by express mandate of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, that she had no participation in the issuance of the annulled administrative acts, and that no conduct was sought from her by Mr. Nombre126154, the matter is resolved without a special condemnation for costs.

POR TANTO

The defense of lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) is rejected. Regarding the State and the Contraloría General de la República, the defenses of lack of standing (falta de legitimación) and lack of right (falta de derecho) raised are rejected. Consequently, the filed claim is declared granted, in the following terms, thus: The absolute nullity of the entire administrative sanctioning procedure followed against the plaintiff, which culminated in his dismissal from the position of Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea and the withdrawal of his respective credentials, is declared. The nullity of the administrative resolutions No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, which ordered the separation of the plaintiff from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 hours on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 hours on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No.

DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República; an unnumbered resolution issued at 11:35 a.m. on September 20, 2011, by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Proceedings for the cancellation of credentials of the proprietary mayor of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea, San José province, held by Mr. Nombre126154"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 issued at 1:10 p.m. on December 16, 2011, by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which ordered the cancellation of Mr. Nombre126154's credential accrediting him as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 issued at 8:31 a.m. on January 17, 2012, handed down by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. As a direct consequence of this declaration of nullity, any reference to the procedure hereby annulled must be deleted from any database of the Contraloría General de la República and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, as soon as this judgment becomes final. The Contraloría General de la República and the State are ordered to pay the plaintiff the lost salaries and the respective salary components to which he would have been entitled, had he effectively remained in the exercise of his popularly elected office, for the entire term of his appointment as municipal mayor of Goicoechea, amounts which shall be calculated from the date he was effectively removed from his position and until the day his appointment as municipal mayor would have ended. Said sums must be determined, quantified, and settled during the judgment execution stage. Once determined, such amounts must be indexed and brought to present value. Interest at the current legal rate shall be recognized on these sums, running from the date the plaintiff should have received each of the corresponding salaries, until the date of their effective payment. Regarding Nombre16153, the defense of lack of passive standing invoked is accepted, and the lawsuit filed against her is declared without merit, resolved with no special order as to costs. Both sets of costs of the proceeding are borne by the State and the Contraloría General de la República. Notify. —Sandra M. Quesada Vargas.— Nombre126157.— Luis Polinaris Vives.— *IVQ47OJYPFTY61* SANDRA QUESADA VARGAS - DECIDING JUDGE *DXL7KLRZGSQ61* LUIS ARTURO POLINARIS VIVES - DECIDING JUDGE *HKOOWNQXVO461* Nombre126157 - DECIDING JUDGE Goicoechea, Dirección7876, 50 meters west of BNCR, across from Dirección18098. Telephones: 2545-0099, 2545-0107, 2545-0158. Fax: 2241-5664 and 2545-0006. Email: ...01 It is abundantly clear that in this case there is a discrepancy of substantive legal criteria between two jurisdictional bodies: on the one hand, this Seventh Section of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and, on the other hand, the First Chamber of the Court; consequently, what was evidently proper was not to annul, but rather for the Chamber to proceed to resolve the present matter on its merits, exercising as the superior body the powers that the law assigns to it, and therefore, if it did not share the criterion of this chamber, to proceed to revoke what was resolved and provide the solution that in its judgment was proper according to law and the merits of the case record, but not to invoke substantive or merits-based considerations to annul (the quintessential sanction applicable to formal defects of a judicial ruling) the judgment submitted for its review. But despite the foregoing, it expressly so ordered in its sixth recital and in its operative part, the same sections that, in relevant part, state:

"VI.- By virtue of the foregoing and in the terms indicated, the cassation appeals shall be granted. Consequently, the appealed judgment shall be annulled. In its place, the case file shall be remanded to the court of origin so that it may resolve the claimant's arguments that its decision omitted to address. In that sense, it is on record in the case file that when filing the present proceeding, a part of the cause of action was based on aspects relating to the lack of knowledge of the factual account that motivated the administrative proceeding in dispute; the impropriety of the Internal Audit Office of the Local Government referring report DFOE-DI-1596 to the CGR (without first informing the Municipal Council or the Mayor of what had occurred), the violation of the principle of access to information and, in general, of due process and the right of defense, as well as the lack of analysis regarding the seriousness of the conduct alleged (proportionality of the recommended and applied sanction). These are aspects not analyzed by the Judges, given the manner in which they resolved the specific case. The foregoing justifies remanding the case file to the court of origin, so that it may examine the points in question, assess the defense arguments and the evidence provided, in order to avoid deciding the matter in a single instance, in violation of the right of defense and the review of the ruling by a second jurisdictional body. (...)". / THEREFORE / The appeals are granted. Consequently, the appealed judgment is annulled. In its place, the remand of the case file to the court of origin is ordered, so that it may resolve in accordance with law." In addition to the foregoing, it must be noted that from the wording given to the lower court's ruling, it follows that it is the Chamber's will that this Tribunal conduct the legal analysis for the specific case, starting from the premise of validating the legal position defined in the ruling that annuls our judgment, specifically regarding the normative integration that must be carried out to provide legal support for the sanction imposed by the defendant administration on Mr. Nombre126154, with the Chamber concluding that there is a legally prescribed sanction applicable to the case under examination, a criterion that, although respectable on its face, this Tribunal does not share. It cannot be overlooked that attempting to impose on a collegiate court a legal criterion alien to that which the judicial body itself arrives at internally, by its members, in any case implies a flagrant violation of the principle of judicial independence, which guarantees that those exercising jurisdictional activity are subject solely to the Constitution and to current legislation (articles 39, 41, and 154 of the Political Constitution) and not to criteria alien to the work carried out within the judicial body, not even to jurisprudential criteria (with the exception of pronouncements issued by the Constitutional Chamber, as expressly established by article 13 of Law No. 7135). And this applies whether said criterion is issued by a superior Tribunal or by a body outside the jurisdiction. The higher judicial body cannot expect this Chamber to resolve as it believes it should do so, because in doing so it would be openly restricting the judge's freedom of judgment and the independence that each Judge of the Republic holds in the performance of their duties when resolving the specific case, both criteria on which the national legal system is based, guaranteed precisely *ab initio* by the independence of the Judge, who is free to resolve what, in a well-founded and reasoned manner, according to their loyal knowledge and understanding, they deem appropriate in each case, albeit always in subjection to and in accordance with the current legal system, being removed from any type of interference when issuing their criterion in the judgment in question. This principle of judicial independence also brings with it the right of the parties who appear before the court for the resolution of their disputes to have their matters reviewed by an independent judge with respect to legal criteria, at each instance. By reason of the foregoing and under the protection of what is indicated by numeral 170 of Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and its amendments, which establishes that courts shall not maintain disputes over competence with the superior body exercising jurisdiction over them, this Chamber will proceed again to render judgment for the matter submitted for our review, but not as ordered by the First Chamber in the annulment judgment it issued, but rather as this panel of Judges considers proper for the specific case. It cannot be omitted that despite the foregoing, the questions raised by the parties regarding the propriety or not of the realization of the administrative proceeding is a substantive aspect already resolved in the ruling issued by the First Chamber of the Court when it annulled this Tribunal's judgment for the second time, acting as the Court of Cassation for Administrative Disputes, which moreover already expressly determined, making a pronouncement on the merits in that jurisdictional act, that the recommendation issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic within the sanctioning proceeding in question is binding. This is so despite the clear impropriety of the legal technique lately used by the referred Chamber.

**II. Regarding the proven facts.** Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are deemed duly accredited, as they find support in the elements of conviction cited in their support: **1.** That Mrs. Nombre126155 is the mother of Nombre126156, born on January 7, 1990, with Mr. Nombre126156 appearing as his registered father (see folio 03 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **2.** That Mr. Nombre126154 is the spouse of Mrs. Nombre126155, whom he married on March 2, 2007 (see folio 0002 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic). **3.** That the plaintiff was appointed as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea in the municipal elections for the 2007-2011 term, being subsequently reelected in the elections held on December 5, 2010, and so declared by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal through resolution No. 0019-E11-2011 *"Declaratoria de Elección de alcaldes y vicealcaldes de las Municipalidades de los cantones de la provincia de San José, para el período constitucional comprendido entre el siete de febrero del dos mil once y el treinta de abril de dos mil dieciséis"* (fact not controverted by the parties, the case record, and inquiry made by this Tribunal at the electronic addresses "http://www.gaceta.go.cr/pub/2012/01/31/COMP_31_01_2012.pdf" and "Dirección15291". **4.** That through official letter No. AG-1073-2009 dated April 27, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 to the Dirección15290 of the Department of Road Sanitation of the municipality for a period of two months (see folio 05 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **5.** That on April 27, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 183-2009 was entered into between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, by which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 06 to 08 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **6.** That through official letter No. AG-1793-2009 dated June 25, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 to the Dirección18863 for a period of two months (see folio 10 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **7.** That on June 27, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 251-2009 was entered into between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, by which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 11 to 13 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **8.** That on August 26, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 349-2009 was entered into between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, by which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 15 to 17 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **9.** That through official letter No. AG-3765-2009 dated December 11, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 to the Dirección18863 for a period of two months (see folio 24 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **10.** That on December 27, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 523-2009 was entered into between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, by which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 25 to 27 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **11.** That through official letter No. AG-0629-2010 dated March 8, 2010, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 to the Dirección18863 for a period of two months (see folio 29 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **12.** That on March 8, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 095-2010 was entered into between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, by which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal general worker for a term of two months (see folios 30 to 32 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **13.** That through official letter No. AG-953-2010 dated April 15, 2010, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 to the position of acting Clerk for a period of two months, starting April 18, 2010 (see folio 34 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **14.** That on March 8, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 197-1-2010 was entered into between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, by which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as an acting clerk for a term of two months (see folios 35 to 37 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **15.** That on June 18, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 304-1-2010 was entered into between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, by which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as an acting clerk for a term of two months (see folios 39 to 41 of the administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **16.** That the plaintiff was subject to an administrative proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic under file number DJ-83-2010 and initiated through an unnumbered resolution issued at 3:00 p.m. on November 5, 2010, in which Mr. Nombre126154 was charged with, while serving as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea, hiring his stepson as an employee for said local government, thereby violating the prohibition established in article 127 of the Municipal Code (see the administrative file in digital format, Disc No. 1, and folios 43 to 52 of the proceeding brought against the plaintiff). **17.** That the respective oral hearing was held at 9:10 a.m. on January 18, 2011 (see folios 128 to 129 of the sanctioning proceeding brought against the plaintiff). **18.** That said administrative sanctioning proceeding concluded with the issuance of resolution PA-11-2011 at 12:00 noon on January 31, 2011, issued by the deciding body of the administrative proceeding conducted before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, in which it was ordered: *"(...) 1. To declare Mr. Nombre126154 administratively liable for the acts alleged in this administrative proceeding, therefore, it is recommended to sanction him with dismissal without employer liability, which entails the cancellation of credentials, in accordance with article 39 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (sic), article 18 subsection d) of the Municipal Code. (...)"*. Said resolution was notified to the plaintiff here on February 4, 2011. (See folios 47 to 60 of the case file and folios 131 to 144 of the administrative file in digital format, Disc No. 1). **19.** That against what was resolved, the now plaintiff filed an appeal for reconsideration with appeal in subsidy on February 9, 2011 (see folios 146 to 154 of the administrative sanctioning proceeding conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **20.** That through an unnumbered resolution issued at 12:00 noon on February 24, two thousand eleven, by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the reconsideration sought by the now plaintiff was declared without merit (see folios 185 to 194 of the administrative sanctioning proceeding conducted by the comptroller body against the plaintiff here). **21.** That through resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 issued at 10:00 a.m. on August 22, two thousand eleven, by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the final act of the administrative sanctioning proceeding brought against him was resolved, ordering its rejection and clarifying on its own motion that the sanction recommendation issued was directed to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (folios 51 to 54 of the case file and the administrative file in digital format, Disc No. 1). **22.** That through official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and addressed to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, said entity was made aware of the final act issued within the administrative sanctioning proceeding conducted under file number DJ-83-2010 against Mr. Nombre126154 (see folio 236 of the respective administrative sanctioning proceeding). **23.** That through an unnumbered resolution issued at 11:35 a.m. on September 20, 2011, by the investigating magistrate Luis Antonio Sobrado González, within the *"Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Nombre126154"*, the comptroller body was requested to send a certified copy of the administrative sanctioning proceeding file (see folio 237 of the respective sanctioning proceeding). **24.** That through an unnumbered resolution issued at 10:40 a.m. on October 10, 2011, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal granted a hearing to the now plaintiff, so that he could respond to the submission presented by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (see folios 240 to 255 of the indicated sanctioning file). **25.** That through resolution No. 8184-M-2011 issued at 1:10 p.m. on December 16, 2011, by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, it was ordered to cancel the credential of Mr. Nombre126154 that accredited him as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea and to appoint Mrs. Nombre16153 as the new mayor and Mrs. Nombre154089 (c.c. Nombre98993) as vice-mayor. (See folios 240 to 255 of the referred administrative sanctioning proceeding). **26.** Against what was resolved, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was rejected by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal through resolution No. 253-M-2012 issued at 8:31 a.m. on January 17, 2012 (see folios 256 to 268 of the administrative sanctioning proceeding). **27.** The present matter was filed before the court on January 24, 2012 (see folio 01 of the case file). **28.** That Mr. Nombre126156 is the stepson by affinity, within the second degree of kinship by collateral line, of Mr. Nombre126154 (the case record).

**III. Facts not proven. 1.** That the salary paid to Mr. Nombre126156, stepson of Mr. Nombre126154, was higher than that which corresponded for the position he occupied (there is no evidence in this regard in the case record). **2.** That Mr. Nombre126156, stepson of the plaintiff here, did not work in the position to which he was appointed or worked in a position other than those of his appointments (there is no evidence in this regard in the case record). **3.** That Mr. Nombre126156 received payment of his salary without performing the respective work (there is no evidence in this regard in the case record). **4.** That the plaintiff Nombre126154 received any stipend, payment, or benefit from Mr. Nombre126156 to proceed with his appointment to a municipal position (there is no evidence in this regard in the case record). **5.** That actual and effective damage or economic injury to the finances or assets of the municipal public treasury was generated in the case under examination (there is no evidence in this regard in the case record).

**IV.** **The plaintiff** argues, in support of his action and by way of a tight summary, that an administrative proceeding was opened against him for having temporarily appointed his stepson as an employee of the local government between April 27, 2009, and August 17, 2010, supposedly contravening article 127 of the Municipal Code. He narrates, in his opinion, the development of said proceeding and points out that the final act was an act with its own effect, as it was binding regarding the facts for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which is why he appealed it and his appeal was denied. That such resolutions are binding from a technical-factual standpoint for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. He affirms that it is not an electoral act, but rather an administrative sanctioning act, and moreover a complex administrative act, because the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic —hereinafter CGR— cannot cancel the credential of a council member or elected official.

It cites national doctrine and indicates that a complex act is one formed by the will of two or more subjects or bodies, acting for the same purpose and with the same legal content or effect, emanating from a complex body formed by the two or more that issue it, and the absence of any one of them or of their will nullifies it. It therefore affirms that the act of cancellation of credentials is a complex act that requires the concurrence of the will of the CGR as the investigating and deciding body, and the will of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal as the executor of the proposed sanction, because the decision of the Comptroller’s Office is binding. It is not an act of an electoral nature, but rather a typically administrative sanction. Because the resolutions of the CGR are binding with respect to the facts, it considers that any subsequent instance or appeal against them is a procedural farce. It maintains that if the procedure followed by the CGR is annulled, the resolution issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal – hereinafter TSE – will also be null, because the one issued by the TSE is complementary or accessory to the one issued by the CGR. It likewise affirms that if the act issued by the CGR is vitiated in one of its elements, in this case the grounds (motivo) and content (contenido), the TSE’s resolution for the cancellation of credentials will also be vitiated, since the defects affecting the first – that of the CGR – will also be suffered by the TSE’s resolution. // It indicates that the acts issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic suffer from the following defects: Said resolutions recommend canceling the mayor’s credentials for the administrative liability incurred by provisionally appointing a person who is not a relative of Mr. Nombre126154, cites Article 127 of the Municipal Code, and notes that said person has no bond of affinity or consanguinity with the Mayor, since it is clear that the child of a person to whom one is married is not a relative in the direct or collateral line to oneself, especially since this concerns a person of legal age with a determined filiation. It affirms that in the opinion of IFAM, the children of spouses are not included within the express prohibition of Article 127 cited. It maintains that because he recommended hiring a person with whom he has no degree of kinship, that is nothing. Therefore, it considers that the conduct is not sanctionable, is atypical, and does not fit the cited normative provision, so that numeral cannot be applied in the specific case. Yet despite this, the CGR set aside the will of the voting inhabitants of the canton of Goicoechea, without any constitutional norm or principle so establishing, thereby violating due process and principles of the General Law of Public Administration, which are of mandatory compliance, and acting against the popular will, violating the principle of conservation of the electoral act. In the administrative venue, it was considered an unproven fact that Mr. Nombre126156 was the plaintiff’s son, or in any way legitimized as his stepson, or that any filial bond existed between them, to meet the requirements of numeral 127 of the Municipal Code. Therefore, the conduct is atypical and does not fit the referenced numeral 127, which cannot be applied to him. It alleges that for family law specialists, there is no family relationship or one of affinity. It notes that the cited Article 127 does not indicate that there is an impediment for relatives by affinity of the officials mentioned in that article to be municipal employees, so illegitimately extending what the legislator established becomes an extensive interpretation of the norm, which is improper in sanctioning matters, given that its interpretation must be of a restrictive nature. Therefore, it considers that the directing body of the procedure erroneously recommends a sanction, based on an interpretive criterion that inappropriately extends what is stated in the legal text, arrogating legislative powers that do not correspond to it, since in exclusive and sanctioning matters the principle of legal reserve applies. Furthermore, the norm sought to be applied does not refer in any way to the children of spouses, since there is no filiation between these and the active subject of the norm. The sanctioning power granted to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and exercised in its instruction by the CGR requires, for the cancellation of a credential, the commission of a specific conduct contemplated in a legal cause. It cites Article 253 of the Electoral Code, insofar as it refers to the "cases expressly contemplated in the law." It continues by noting that said numeral was disapplied in the case of the plaintiff, and the CGR recommended the cancellation of his credentials, which violates the principle of legality provided for in Articles 11 and 39 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration. It affirms that the interpretation given by the CGR to Article 127 is extensive and negates the principles of legality and specificity, and the sanction therefore violates the fundamental rights of Mr. Nombre126154. It continues stating that applying the power to cancel the credential of a popularly elected official for events occurring during the exercise of a previous position is equivalent in its effects to a disqualification, which is not possible due to the principle of restrictive interpretation that governs in sanctioning matters. It notes that the CGR’s interpretation equates children with stepchildren, going so far as to consider that they fall into the same category as children, this being an extensive interpretation lacking legal grounds that would undermine the institution of the family, by giving a consolidated legal institution new practical effects. // It accuses that a series of irregularities occurred during the development of the procedure that hindered the plaintiff’s right of defense: -first, because official letter No. DFOE-DI-1576 was not in the administrative file when the plaintiff’s lawyer went to review it, an official letter corresponding to a relation of facts sent by the Acting Manager of the Complaints and Investigations Area of the Division of Operating and Evaluative Oversight of the CGR, an official letter that was the basis for the investigation conducted, and it is one day before the hearing (on January 17, 2011) that, through a resolution signed by the members of the directing body, copies of that relation of facts are made available to him; therefore, the suspension of the hearing was requested to evaluate the document, but this was denied and the hearing was held. In the act of notice of charges, the facts that gave rise to the procedure were not made known, and the indicated official letter was made available to him the day before the hearing; that relation of facts does not even appear in official letter DFOE-DI-1596, so the plaintiff did not become aware of it, even though according to Article 8 of the Law against Corruption, the documents and evidence of the investigations carried out by the internal audit and that lead to the opening of a procedure shall be confidential except for the involved parties, which shall have free access to all of them. -It considers that the Internal Audit should have informed the administration of what was happening, warning the Mayor or the Human Resources Department, or else his hierarchical superior, the Municipal Council. It considers that going directly to the comptroller body is an act of bad faith. It cites Articles 22, 35, and 37 of the General Law of Internal Control, and Articles 45 and 47 of the Regulations on the Organization and Functions of the Internal Audit Unit of the Municipality of Goicoechea, published in La Gaceta No. 16 of January 23, 2009. In that regard, it considers that the Internal Audit did not fulfill its preventive function of warning. It notes that the defendant CGR did not analyze the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, and neither did the TSE, since had they done so they would have realized that said law establishes a series of sanctions according to the seriousness of the fault. Additionally, it adds that Article 41 of that law establishes the factors to be taken into consideration to assess the conduct of the alleged responsible party. Therefore, it considers that the appointment of the Mayor’s stepson does not have the seriousness indicated by the law to warrant the cancellation of his credentials as Mayor. That there is no harm to his economic interests, no negative impact on public service occurred, the salary the official received was earned, he received the legally mandated payment, and he was not favored by being paid more than the legally established amount. It notes that if the Audit had issued the warnings, the matter would not have proceeded further. -It accuses that resolution No. PA-011-2011 was not duly notified to him according to Article 38 of the Law on Notifications, since he was not informed before the hearing took place, which violated his right of defense. It invokes rulings No. 2004-04637 of April 30, 2004, No. 16955-2007 of November 21, 2007, both from the Constitutional Chamber. It affirms that those listed are irremediable defects that give rise to the nullity of the proceedings. -It indicates that the recommended sanctions were not proportional to the seriousness of the facts proven in the procedure. -It maintains that the failure to apply substantive positive law norms is a cause for nullity of a resolution. And in its opinion, in his case, Article 41 of the Law against Illicit Enrichment was disapplied, since it was not indicated what were the economic interests of the public treasury that the plaintiff harmed, nor were the damages and losses caused to the public treasury and the enrichment obtained by the plaintiff accredited. Therefore, it considers that the administrative sanction imposed is remiss in the analysis of administrative culpability, which implies disapplying the cited Article 41, yet despite there being no analysis of culpability, the most severe sanction is recommended against a popularly elected official. It cites resolution No. R-DC-19S-2011 of 3:00 p.m. on December 8, 2011, issued for a similar case regarding Mr. Nombre16454, where the sanction imposed was a 15-day suspension without pay, the fault being, in its opinion, much more serious than that of Mr. Nombre126154, to whom, on the contrary, the most severe possible sanction was applied. It affirms that due process, the principle of parallelism of forms, the democratic principle, and that of popular will were violated. If the Mayor was appointed by the people, the only one legitimized to remove him is the people, in accordance with the principles and bases of the plebiscite. It cites as an example what occurred in Nombre265. It invokes the unconstitutionality of Articles 220, 223, and 253 of Law No. 8765, the current Electoral Code, and of resolutions No. 6673-M-2011, No. 7105-M-2011, and No. 8184-M-2011, all from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in order to file the unconstitutionality action. It concludes by indicating that the challenged acts present serious defects of nullity in their grounds (motivo) and content (contenido), which makes them deserving of having that nullity declared. It reiterates that both resolutions are disproportionate and disapply norms referring to the assessment of administrative fault, proposing the most severe sanction for such cases and the most severe for someone holding a popularly elected office. It affirms that the canton of Goicoechea is the second in terms of development and growth due to the management of Mayor Nombre126154, who served one term in said office and was reelected for a second term. For the foregoing, it requests that this proceeding be declared well-founded. For its part, the representation of the Comptroller General of the Republic states that in the act opening the procedure, he was charged with a violation of Article 127 of the Municipal Code and for violation of the duty of probity, according to Article 3 of Law No. 8422, Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service. In the act of opening, the directing body clearly indicated that the administrative file was made available to the plaintiff from the moment said act was issued, on November 5, 2011, and it was indicated in detail what evidence comprised the file. When the plaintiff requests the relation of facts, in his request he states that it does not appear within the administrative file that he had photocopied, so it is not true that he was given access to the file 23 hours before the oral hearing. That relation of facts did not form part of the administrative file nor of the charges, being only an input to prepare the act of opening, and it had no relevance in relation to the right of defense and due process. During the oral hearing, it was clarified to the plaintiff that the facts charged were only those appearing in the act opening the procedure – a file that was always at his disposal – and to which the plaintiff had access, there being no reason to exercise his right of defense regarding that "relation of facts." Therefore, it is completely false that said relation of facts was evidence against him, being only an input for the investigation. Resolution PA-011-2011 of January 31, 2011, was issued by the deciding body and not by the procedure’s directing body, and it extensively addresses this issue of the "relation of facts." The plaintiff filed an appeal for reversal and a subsidiary appeal against the final resolution of the administrative procedure, which were rejected by resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of August 22, 2011. Resolution No. 8184-M-2012 of December 16, 2011, issued by the TSE removing the plaintiff from office and appointing Mrs. Nombre16153 as mayor, was challenged through a motion for reconsideration that was declared without merit by resolution No. 253-M-2012 of January 17, 2012. It cites file No. 12-000748-1027-CA and notes that the same facts as in this matter are being discussed therein. It affirms that the CGR is a non-active, oversight, and supervisory administration. It involves a tripartite relationship between the CGR, the respective public servant, and the authority called upon to impose the sanction, in this case the TSE. The latter is not substituted by the act issued by the comptroller body, which recommends the imposition of the sanction in a binding manner. The cancellation of the credentials is the result of the administrative procedure carried out by the CGR and which culminates with the execution by the TSE in view of the binding recommendation of sanction issued by the comptroller body, as indicated by the Electoral Code and constitutional jurisprudence. The dismissal act issued by the TSE makes the binding recommendation of sanction issued by the CGR effective, and that execution phase entails the withdrawal of the credential. Both the grounds (motivo), the content (contenido), and the purpose of the binding recommendation act for the TSE, in the specific case, refer to the public treasury (hacienda pública). The grounds (motivo) of the act issued by the CGR are the factual and legal reasons that lead to establishing a judgment of administrative liability against a popularly elected municipal official who violated the legal order. The content (contenido) of the administrative conduct is the binding recommendation of sanction itself, that being the result of the procedure processed by the comptroller body. The purpose of said conduct is a matter of protecting the public treasury. It notes that according to numeral 183 of the Political Constitution, it grants the CGR the function of oversight and control of the public treasury, and according to Article 8 of Law No. 7428, the liability of public officials constitutes one of the objective components of the public treasury, therefore the CGR can carry out administrative procedures and demand that sanctions be applied when required. And this because the CGR is a body of superior control and supervision of the public treasury. The causes of liability for determining sanctions come from the LGAP, the Law on Administrative Procurement, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment and its regulations, the Law on Financial Administration, and the Organic Law of the CGR. Article 127 of the Municipal Code protects the public interest by eradicating nepotism and purifying public service. That norm establishes an impediment for relatives by affinity to be municipal employees, when it speaks of relatives in the direct line up to the third degree inclusive. It affirms that according to international doctrine and jurisprudence, a relationship of kinship by affinity in the first degree is generated between the spouse and the children of the other, so the stepson, the stepfather, and the stepmother are in a degree of affinity. Nombre126156 being the son of the plaintiff’s spouse, with respect to her he maintains a first degree by consanguinity and also a first degree with Mr. Nombre126154, but by affinity. And this does not imply any extensive application of the cited article nor a violation of the principle of legality or specificity. Therefore, the resolutions issued are in accordance with the law, since one should not distinguish where the law – the referenced Art. 127 – does not distinguish. The cancellation of credentials is provided for in our legal system for certain cases, and therefore the principle of legality has not been violated, neither by the TSE nor by the CGR in bindingly recommending the sanction. It again cites Article 253 of the Electoral Code and Article 18 of the Municipal Code, Article 73 of the Organic Law of the CGR, and Article 39 of the Law against Corruption, to conclude based on said numerals that the principle of legality has not been violated by the CGR, there being no discretion nor atypicality whatsoever. There is no evidence whatsoever that was not incorporated into the administrative file from the beginning of the procedure. Therefore, the plaintiff is alleging that nullity be declared for nullity’s sake, based on a series of superfluous arguments, when in this case due process was never breached. The act opening the procedure contained a clear, precise, and detailed description of the facts imputed to the plaintiff, the evidence on which said charges were based, and the possible sanction to be imposed. It considers that no harm or grievance has been caused to the plaintiff, his arguments therefore being unfounded, since he had access to the administrative file from the beginning, and the plaintiff himself indicated so in the brief in which he requested the "relation of facts." It affirms that there was also no violation of the principle of access to information since he made the request to the comptroller body and the CGR provided him a copy thereof, even though it did not form part of the administrative file. Regarding the disproportionality of the sanction applied, it notes Article 41 of the Law against Corruption, Article 17 of the Municipal Code, affirming that the mayor is the first called upon to respect the legal framework and to have an unimpeachable conduct and be an example for others. The situation of the plaintiff and his stepson constitutes a serious conflict of interest and violates the principle of legality, probity, and transparency. Furthermore, the faults incurred by mayors affect the credibility of local governments and send a negative message to the other employees of the municipality. The fault in the specific case affected a community and social public interest, because society decided to trust in the diligence of a popularly elected official – the mayor – but he placed personal interest above the public interest he was called upon to serve, thereby violating the principle of legality and transparency. Therefore, and for the reasons set forth in the challenged administrative acts, it notes that the sanction imposed is reasonable and proportionate, given the serious fault that was proven in the administrative procedure, relative to the content and the public interest protected in numeral 127 of the Municipal Code. There is not only damage when the public treasury is economically affected; the damage can be of various types, and in this specific case we are dealing with an interest of a social and community nature, and the suitability that the holder of an office of such investiture should have, placing the public interest above his private interest. It considers erroneous to affirm that parallelism of forms must be applied in this case, and that therefore, to remove a mayor, it is the people who are the only ones legitimized to remove him, since the legal system establishes that the matter of canceling credentials is a matter of law and, in that regard, so is the participation that the TSE has in the administrative procedure. It refers to Articles 102 subsection 10) of the Political Constitution and 220 of the Electoral Code, Article 18 of the Municipal Code, and Article 73 of the Organic Law of the CGR. It considers that there is a lack of passive standing in relation to the CGR, as well as a lack of right regarding the plaintiff’s position (folios 078 to 111 of the judicial file). On the other hand, the state representation alleges that, from the issuance of the order opening the administrative procedure, the CGR indicated that the administrative file was available to the plaintiff and all the evidence added to said file was listed. Therefore, it is not true that access to the file was authorized 23 hours before the oral appearance. The sanctioning resolution was issued by the deciding body at 12:00 p.m. on January 31, 2011, and the operative part of said resolution indicated that the sanction entailed the cancellation of credentials. The sanctioning act is a complex act. It affirms that the administrative procedure that the CGR substantiates, and the resolution that the CGR issues and sends to the TSE, are not acts with their own effect, since the recommendation may or may not be accepted by the TSE, and therefore it is not an automatically binding act. It cites resolution No. 253-M-2012. It affirms that it is the responsibility of the Comptroller General of the Republic to investigate and give its recommendation, it is its responsibility to substantiate the procedure against popularly elected officials who are attributed with committing a fault against the public treasury, and based on such procedure, to forward the sanctioning recommendation to the TSE, a recommendation that entails a technical component that is binding concerning the elements related to the public treasury. Therefore, the facts proven through the procedure as well as the technical elements in the matter of its specialty are the technical aspects that are fixed in the CGR’s recommendation and that are binding for the TSE. It considers that it is the act of canceling credentials that is final, since the CGR’s recommendation by itself does not generate sanctioning legal effects, this being the responsibility of the TSE. Therefore, the recommendation act cannot be challenged autonomously; instead, the challenge regime for the act that adopts the recommendation and is final applies. It considers that there is a lack of current interest since the cancellation of the plaintiff’s credentials by the TSE has already occurred. It notes that in sanctioning matters, interpretation must be restrictive, as it concerns acts that negatively affect subjective rights, but in this case there was no expansive reading of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, since the norm speaks of "relatives" (parientes), which includes relatives by consanguinity and by affinity, as one cannot distinguish where the law does not. Therefore, it affirms that in relation to the stepson, there is a kinship bond – as a child by affinity –, the norm being correctly applied to the specific case, since the plaintiff promoted his stepson within the Municipality, an aspect of kinship by affinity that was extensively developed by the TSE in resolution No. 253-M-2012. The norm refers to all relatives, including by consanguinity and by affinity; therefore, one cannot speak of an improper application of the norm, nor is it proper to deny the bond between the plaintiff and Nombre126156. Regarding the legal opinions provided by the plaintiff, it considers that they are private works commissioned by him, lacking support, but which in any case reaffirm the state’s position. Therefore, it affirms that there was no type of discretionary action nor is there any defect in the exercise of the sanctioning power, nor any infringement of the principle of legality. The principle of specificity is not violated because the plaintiff’s conduct violated Article 127 of the Municipal Code, Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration, and Articles 10, 12, 13, 15, and 16 of the General Law of Internal Control, as well as Article 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment. As for the cancellation of credentials, said sanction finds support in Article 253 of the Electoral Code and Article 18 of the Municipal Code and Article 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. It considers that there are no defects of nullity, because the act opening the administrative procedure contains a clear, precise, and detailed charge of the facts and the possible sanctioning consequences thereof. It also enumerated the evidentiary documents that comprised the file, for the better defense of the interested party; the administrative file was made available to him. The document of the supposed "relation of facts" that the plaintiff claims was missing cannot have any impact on the exercise of the right of defense, since it did not form part of the administrative file, and although at the beginning it was an input used by the CGR, it later loses relevance, because what acquires true importance and effects is the set of facts recorded in the opening resolution. It being only regarding the points of such charges that the interested party was required to exercise his defense. Not knowing said document of the relation of facts in no way affected his right of defense. Therefore, his request for it, which the plaintiff submitted to the CGR, and for which he received a response on January 17 of the current year – one day before the oral hearing –, in no way affected due process, since the document was provided to him due to his interest in having it, but it was not part of the administrative file. When analyzing the administrative resolution of the CGR being challenged, No. PA-011-2011, its reasoning at all times refers to the evidentiary elements forming the administrative file, to which the interested party had full access at all times during the procedure, therefore having ample opportunity for defense, with none of the alleged defects of nullity existing. It notes that the plaintiff misapprehends the function of internal audits, whose most important function is the preparation of reports for the improvement of administrative management, which are presented to the head of the institution so that they may implement the recommendations they contain, and the institutional hierarchy may in turn clarify doubts and make observations. But when it comes to sanctioning recommendations, they are generally brought to the attention of the head when the faults have been committed by their subordinates, so that the hierarchy may order the opening of the respective administrative procedures. When it concerns findings pointing to the commission of a possible fault by the head, for reasons of legality, logic, and convenience, it is referred to the comptroller body, because the CGR is the governing body of the internal control system, so that it may assess the case and eventually initiate proceedings against the head, all of which it considers legally sound and devoid of any defect. It goes on to state that the potential warnings that the internal auditor may issue to the hierarchy in preventive matters are distinct from the preparation of reports with sanctioning recommendations for faults found, the latter being the situation that occurred in this case. The sanction is not disproportionate, since it is consistent with the irregularity proven, as numeral 127 combats nepotism in public service.

It states that the conduct of the mayor, as head of the local government, must be beyond reproach and serve as an exemplary guide for his subordinates. The CGR extensively substantiated the recommendation for removal and clearly addressed all the elements taken into account to assess the specific case. For the sanctioning resolution, elements were taken into account such as the express parameter of subsection e) of Article 41 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito), and subsection b) of Article 108 of the Financial Administration Law (Ley de la Administración Financiera), which indicate that the rank and functions of the public servant are a criterion to be considered, with a higher rank implying a greater obligation to assess the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the acts issued, norms echoing Article 213 of the LGAP. Therefore, the mayor had a greater obligation to act in accordance with the law, according to the functions granted to him by Article 17 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal). It points out that the plaintiff's appointment of his stepson, in the same municipality where he worked, entails a serious conflict of interest, violating the duty of probity in Article 3 of Law No. 8422, in addition to being an action—in its view—contrary to legality and the principle of transparency that he should have upheld. This conduct harms public interests and social values, as it involves a popularly elected official in a democratic system. For this reason, it affirms that the sanction is proportionate and reasonable given the committed offense and the level of authority held by the plaintiff. Regarding the comparison with other cases, it indicates that the party cannot compare, as the totality of the particular conditions of those other cases is unknown. The popular election of a public official does not imply that their dismissal for serious misconduct in the performance of their duties must be decided by popular election, which it deems absurd when dealing with acts that evidently cannot be subject to such a decision. The exercise of a popularly elected office is subject to the rule of law, and the legal system establishes that the cancellation of credentials is a matter subject to law, according to articles 220 and 253 of the Electoral Code (Código Electoral), 3 and 41 of Law 8422, 18 of the Municipal Code, and 73 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República). Furthermore, the case at hand is completely different from the situation experienced with the mayor of Nombre265. For the foregoing reasons, it requests that the lawsuit be declared without merit in all its aspects (folios 150 to 189 of the judicial file).

The representation of the co-defendant Nombre16153, states in support of its positions that the plaintiff was sanctioned for violating Article 127 of the Municipal Code, Article 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), and Article 14 of the Regulation to said law. It affirms that it was more than two months before the private oral hearing that the administrative file was made available to the plaintiff, specifically in the act of November 5, 2010, the act initiating the procedure. It points out that it is not true that the act issued by the CGR is one with its own effect, nor is it binding on the TSE; that the plaintiff does not specify why the CGR's resolutions are vitiated by nullity, and such defects do not exist. It affirms that the actions carried out by the CGR are entirely valid as they are based on documentary evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff managed 7 times to appoint his stepson in the municipal government. Actions which in his lawsuit he does not indicate whether or not he performed, but he does not deny having committed them. The referred actions violate Article 127 of the Municipal Code, as the plaintiff's legal position is erroneous, because the term relatives includes both those by consanguinity or by affinity, considering that in the case of the children of his spouse—stepchildren—this is a bond by affinity with the stepfather, pointing out therefore that the conduct is not atypical. It argues that no legal norm in our country establishes that relatives by affinity inherit or have the right to demand a pension from a person, and it affirms that proof of this is that parents-in-law, sons-in-law, and daughters-in-law of a person do not inherit nor can they request alimony. It considers that appointing a public official based on family or personal interests without considering their suitability is a flawed conduct. The fact that the auditor did not warn him does not exempt him from sanction, with the withdrawal of credentials being based on Articles 18 and 127 of the Municipal Code, 3 and 39 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, 14 of the regulation to said law, articles 253 of the Electoral Code, and Article 73 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. It points out that there were no violations of the right to defense, as the initial order of indictment for charges was notified to the plaintiff personally on November 19, 2010, meaning he had nearly 2 months to request a document, and moreover, said resolution indicates all the existing evidence against the plaintiff. The document referred to by the plaintiff is not cited in said resolution nor was it part of the administrative file; therefore, it considers that requesting a document a few days before the hearing seems rather like a maneuver generating an excuse to request nullity, as he is doing. The plaintiff does not explain why said document was important for the case, in order to assess whether this caused defenselessness or not, and that document was not even considered as evidence to recommend the disciplinary dismissal (sanción de despido); in any case, the Comptroller's Office relied on the abundant evidence to recommend the sanction. Even hypothetically suppressing the cited document, the acts of the oversight body have sufficient supporting evidence to base the recommendation for the cancellation of credentials. The TSE, through resolution No. 8184-M-2011, ruled on the violations of due process and the right to defense, indicating that there were none. Article 36 subsection c) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) states that the claim is admissible regarding final, definitive, or procedural acts with their own effect, with the CGR actions challenged by the plaintiff lacking their own effect, as they constitute a recommendation addressed to the TSE. Upon hearing the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración), in resolution No. 253-M-2012, the TSE referred to the issue, indicating that what is binding from the CGR's recommendation is its technical opinion, not its legal opinion, the latter corresponding to the TSE, which acts as an electoral judge, with its pronouncements having the character of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Therefore, it points out that it is the sanctioning act that is final, and the CGR's recommendation cannot generate sanctioning legal effects. If the recommended party accepts the recommendation, the elements of the recommendation are communicated to the sanctioning act, the recommendation becoming an integral and substantial part of the sanctioning act, forming a final act with its own effect that cannot be appealed in this jurisdiction according to numeral 103 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), and for this reason, it considers there is a lack of current interest, as the challenged act is unappealable, the matter resolved by the TSE being final. Therefore, it requests that the lawsuit be declared without merit in all its aspects (folios 275 to 284 of the judicial file).

**V. On the merits of the matter:** Without setting aside what was stated in the first recital (considerando) of this judgment, it must be noted that, as the plaintiff correctly indicates, in this case, the challenged act corresponds to one classified by public law doctrine as "complex" and furthermore, effectively, the opinion rendered by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic for this type of matter—the same being challenged in the sub judice case—is binding on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones). Indeed, we are not dealing with an electoral act but with an administrative sanctioning act. Now, as can be observed from the case record and from what was resolved by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice acting as a court of cassation, in the case at hand, the legal point to be elucidated corresponds, first, to establishing whether numeral 127 of the Municipal Code covers in its wording the prohibition against hiring a stepson in a municipality where one holds the position of municipal mayor, as occurs in this case, and the court must, therefore, refer to the determination of a restriction on the fundamental right of access to work, in this case, to public employment. To, subsequently, determine the legal appropriateness of the sanction that was applied to the plaintiff Nombre126154 as mayor of the canton of Goicoechea by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, by virtue of the recommendation issued for this purpose by the oversight body. But to carry out this analysis, it is imperative to first establish that the regime of Fundamental Rights undoubtedly requires mandatory analysis for the elucidation of this dispute (litis), as it is the criterion of this Chamber (Cámara) that the legal regime of the right of access to public service is characteristic of that fundamental legal sphere. And it is that access to public office is a fundamental right, derived from its regulation in international human rights instruments, despite not being expressly contemplated in our current Political Constitution. Therefore, like any fundamental right, it can indeed be restricted, but only by means of a law in the formal and material sense, in the pursuit of that balance between the rights of individuals and the general public interest which, in the specific case, translates into the pursuit of transparency, objectivity, independence of judgment, and impartiality in the exercise of public service. This implies that it is up to the law to establish the conditions for access to service, which necessarily includes eligibility conditions, as well as the establishment of regimes of prohibitions and incompatibilities pertaining to public posts or offices. These last three conditions tend to safeguard and maintain objectivity and impartiality on the part of the official in the exercise of public service, for which it is sought that there is no latent conflict of interest between the function performed and its confrontation with other activities carried out by the public servant, particularly of a private nature. Therefore, as this is a sensitive matter, involving the restriction or limitation of a fundamental right, one must resort to the institution of legal reserve as the suitable mechanism for its regulation or to establish restrictions on the right of free access to public employment. This implies that eligibility conditions must be established by law, as well as ineligibilities and incompatibilities for accessing the position, because these ineligibilities and incompatibilities entail a restriction on the fundamental right, which obliges the application of constitutional principles regarding the legal regime of fundamental rights. In this regard, one may consult, among others, vote No. 545-97 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) at 14:30 hours on January 28, 1997. In accordance with these principles, the restriction and delimitation of the scope of the human right can only be developed by means of law—principle of legal reserve—with its regulation through the implementation of normative provisions of an infra-legal rank being prohibited, an aspect on which votes No. 3502-92 at 16:00 hours on November 24, 1992, No. 3173-93 at 14:57 hours on July 6, 1993, No. 2312-95 at 16:15 hrs. on May 9, 1995, No. 5393-97 at 15:18 hours on September 5, 1997, No. 18-29-99 at 16:09 hours on March 10, 1999, all issued by the Constitutional Chamber, may be consulted. Likewise, it is necessary to highlight that the delegation of the issuance of normative regulations on this matter is not viable and, additionally, the restrictions imposed on the fundamental right must find support in the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality that permeate the entirety of the current legal system. (In this regard, votes No. 5058-93 at 14:20 hours on October 14, 1993; No. 3929-95 at 15:24 hours on July 18, 1995, No. 2883-96 at 17:00 hours on June 13, 1996, and No. 6273-96 at 15:30 hours on November 19, 1996, among others; all issued by the Costa Rican constitutional court). And it is that on not a few occasions, the Constitutional Chamber has addressed the topic under study, regarding the principle of legal reserve or reservation of law, when it comes to the establishment of limits on fundamental rights, stating in this respect, in relevant part:

'Regarding the alleged violation of Article 28, (...) in judgment No. 3550-92 at 16 hours on November 24, 1992... the Chamber stated that, of course, fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to certain restrictions, but only those that are necessary by virtue of democratic and constitutional values. However, for a restriction to be "necessary", it must be "useful", "reasonable", "timely" and must imply the "existence of an imperative need" that supports the restriction. For restrictions on freedom to be constitutionally and internationally lawful, they must be oriented towards the satisfaction of an imperative public interest; to achieve this, one must: 1) choose the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser degree, 2) there must be proportionality between the restriction and the interest that justifies it, 3) closely adjust to the achievement of that legitimate objective, and 4) it must be socially imperative and therefore, exceptional, and as such, must be interpreted restrictively, that is, in case of doubt, freedom must always be preferred within the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values. Regarding the present unconstitutionality action, the Chamber considers that it is not constitutionally possible to introduce a prohibition of this type in an Executive Decree, because this matter is the reserve of Law (...)" (Vote No. 6198-95 of November 14, 1995).

Therefore, this jurisdictional body cannot ignore that when carrying out the hermeneutic exercise on normative provisions that establish limits or restrictions on fundamental rights, the parameter for interpretation must be, without a doubt, restrictive—not extensive—and even more so when we are in the presence of normative provisions that establish eligibility and/or incompatibility requirements for the exercise of a public office; without ignoring, of course, the public purpose that is intended to be satisfied in the legal norm under analysis, because to carry out the interpretive exercise, the Judge must, in this case, seek to safeguard the public interest that the legislator tried to protect when establishing the limitation or incompatibility; although always in a balanced manner and avoiding irrationally or disproportionately constricting the fundamental right of access to public employment. All this, in order to obtain an adequate balance between the fundamental right and the public purpose safeguarded at stake. This has been pointed out by the Constitutional Chamber when addressing the issue of the incompatibility regime for members of the Supreme Powers, stating in this regard:

"First, it must be mentioned that the Legislator is empowered to establish incompatibilities and prohibitions for public servants that it deems pertinent for the functioning of the State, in particular, the provision of its services. However, this power is subject to the principle of constitutional supremacy, which imposes the mandatory observance of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, under which the provisions enacted by the Legislator must be examined. Thus, in this matter, this principle requires—as stated in the previous recital—that the rules have the purpose of preventing the so-called 'conflict or opposition of interests,' to ensure the impartiality of the Administration's servants. Likewise, the means used by the State to avoid the mentioned conflict must not place its addressee in a situation that renders the enjoyment of their fundamental rights nugatory. In short, they must not cause greater evils than those they seek to prevent; that is, they must not violate the fundamental rights recognized in the Constitution and in the International Human Rights Instruments in force in the Republic." (Vote No. 2001-01749 of March 7, 2001) And it is that the existence of the so-called eligibility requirements per se implies that whoever does not meet the conditions established by law to access a public post is prevented from being appointed to said position, thereby tacitly becoming a condition of ineligibility for the position. The foregoing is without prejudice, obviously, to the existence of legal provisions that expressly establish and list the circumstances that will entail the corresponding ineligibility; all this, under the prudent discretion of the legislator, who could well establish, as it has indeed done, that the performance of the office is incompatible with carrying out certain public or private activities or in relation to a specific post. This implies that even if the applicant meets the legally established eligibility conditions, there could well be a ground for incompatibility that limits their appointment or their permanence in a certain post. Unlike ineligibility conditions—which usually respond to conditions intrinsic to the applicant—incompatibilities are based above all on the opposition of interests, as well as on the need to maintain independence and impartiality in the exercise of public service, all this with the objective of guaranteeing its most correct and effective exercise. The regulation of incompatibilities in a legal norm turns out to be a manifestation of the principle of transparency that governs the work of the public administration and constitutes one of the fundamental pillars that govern the actions of the administration. Therefore, it is not surprising that the express establishment of various types of incompatibilities provided for in a legal norm has as its aim to attempt to prevent nepotism (“nepotismo // From Lat. nepos, -otis 'nephew', 'descendant' and -ismo. // 1. m. Excessive preference that some give to their relatives for concessions or public employments”, according to a consultation made by this Court on the website of the Royal Spanish Academy (Real Academia de la Lengua Española)), as a manifestation of administrative corruption. Nepotism is, in essence, a flagrant violation of the principle of equality in access to public office, because the designation of the official is not based on their suitability and the pursuit of more efficient action by the public administration, but rather on giving advantageous treatment to a relative or close person with whom one has some family bond and therefore, some degree of interest.

**VI.** From the foregoing, this Court considers that in the specific case, it is imperative to bring up the provisions of numeral 127 of the Municipal Code cited above, which literally reads:

"Article 127- Those who are spouses or relatives, in a direct or collateral line up to the third degree inclusive, of any of the council members (concejales), the Mayor, the Auditor, the Directors or Personnel Chiefs of recruitment and selection units, nor, in general, those in charge of choosing candidates for municipal positions, may not be municipal employees. // The designation of any of the officials mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall not affect the municipal employee who is the spouse or relative of them, appointed previously." From the transcribed legal text, it is derived with utmost clarity and without the need for greater effort, that the legislator expressly established a restriction for accessing the municipal employment regime in the case of an existing family bond, direct or collateral, within the third degree inclusive, in relation to the members of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), the municipal auditor, or the mayor, which implies an express legal impossibility for designation to a municipal position, for anyone holding such degree of kinship. Now, in the second paragraph, the cited regulation also states that should such a situation arise, the official who had been designated initially shall remain in their position, and the subsequent appointment of their close associate should not be made. In this case, although it is true that there is no consanguinity bond between the plaintiff, Mr. Nombre126154, and Mr. Nombre126156, as has been accredited in the list of proven facts that supports this resolution, it is also true that Mr. Nombre126156 is the son of the person listed as the plaintiff's spouse since 2007, Mrs. Nombre126155. That is, before assuming his post as municipal mayor of Goicoechea, Mr. Nombre126154 already had at least some degree of closeness in relation to Mr. Nombre126156, by virtue of the marital bond existing with Mrs. Nombre126155. However, said article does not expressly and in detail indicate which persons are specifically affected by the prohibition, limiting itself to pointing out that the restriction issued shall be applicable to those united by a bond in a direct or collateral line up to the third degree, which is why it corresponds to the legal operator, in each specific case, to carry out the corresponding assessment and interpretation and determine whether an individual is included within the comprehensive scope of the legal restriction under study. Given the breadth and vagueness that the wording of the rule presents, we must seek the possibility of applying various methods of legal interpretation. The foregoing leads us to bring up the provisions of Article 10 of the current Civil Code (Código Civil), which establishes the hermeneutic criteria that must be applied by the legal operator when interpreting a normative provision. Said article states, in relevant part:

"(…) Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, paying attention fundamentally to the spirit and purpose of them." Having clarified the above, this Chamber must turn to analyzing whether, based on the provisions of Article 127 of the Código Municipal, there exists or not any legal link between the plaintiff and Mr. Nombre126156, within the third degree of kinship (parentesco), that could have in any way affected the appointments made in the Municipality of Goicoechea in his favor -at the request of the plaintiff herein- and that may be considered a violation of the prohibition established in Article 127 cited above. In relation to the concept of kinship (parentesco), the most qualified national doctrine has referred to this topic, indicating from long ago, what is of interest:

“[…] Kinship (parentesco) proper is formed by the blood tie (vínculo consanguíneo) that unites several persons who descend from one another, or from a common trunk. Accordingly, two classes of relatives (parientes) are distinguished, which, for greater clarity, are customarily distributed into two series of degrees that make up two lines. A line is, therefore, the series of relatives. Two classes thereof are distinguished: direct and collateral. In the direct line are the progenitors and their descendants; thus we have: grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren. And in the collateral line, also called transversal, are counted those who come from the same trunk, but who do not descend from one another, as occurs with siblings among themselves; and uncles and aunts with nephews and nieces […] The different steps from one relative to another are called degrees, one of these being counted for each generation, which is formed by an individuality of the series, with the exception of that which forms the trunk from which the individuals that must be taken into account for the computation originate; thus, from Nombre111971 to the great-grandfather, there are three generations, although four individualities appear, namely: Nombre111971, grandchild, grandfather, and great-grandfather, the latter not being counted as it is the generator of the others […] In addition to blood kinship (parentesco consanguíneo), there exists another called affinity (afinidad), meaning by analogy or similarity, recognized by law, consisting of a civil bond, which by reason of marriage is established between one of the spouses and the blood relatives of the other […] In kinship by affinity (parentesco de afinidad), the computation of degrees is carried out in the same manner as in blood kinship and according to the distribution of direct and collateral lines […] the rule can be established that in the same line and in the same degree in which a person is a blood relative of one of the spouses, they are related by affinity to the other spouse […]” (Nombre60957, . Tratado de las personas. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. Fourth edition. 1984. pp. 23 to 26). (The underlining and highlighting do not correspond to the original).

Based on the foregoing review, we can conclude that Article 127 of the Código Municipal, although it is true it does not expressly indicate to which type of link -by blood or by affinity- it refers, is nevertheless clear that it covers the collateral and direct line up to the third degree inclusive. That being so, the question immediately arises as to whether the legislator's intention was to include within the limitation the blood tie (vínculo sanguíneo), or, rather, if it was their will to encompass both, both blood kinship (consanguinidad) and the tie by affinity. In this Chamber's opinion, to elucidate this aspect, one must proceed to the direct application of the principles of protection of the public treasury (hacienda pública), probity, and transparency in public service, in addition to taking into consideration the legal aphorism that states “where the law does not distinguish, one cannot distinguish” (“no se puede distinguir donde la ley no distingue”). Once the respective balancing exercise has been carried out, weighing between these core legal aspects and the simple interest that an individual might have in being appointed to a public position, and taking into consideration the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the Court reaches the conclusion that it must be opted to interpret that it was the legislator's intention to include within the cited restriction regime both types of tie, both the blood tie as well as the legal tie or one created by law -affinity- both factual scenarios being encompassed within the scope of the incompatibility contained in the aforementioned legal article.

**VII.** Now then, the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy defines the noun “hijastro” (stepchild) in the following terms: "(…) From Lat. filiaster, filiastra. // 1. m. and f. Child brought into the new marriage by a person's spouse.", according to a query made by this Court on the website "http://dle.rae.es/?id=KODxnLU". Taking into consideration the definition established by the Royal Academy of the Language cited above, as well as the factual situation under analysis, namely, that the spouse of Mr. Nombre126154 -Mrs. Nombre126155- is the mother of Mr. Nombre126156 -who, it should be noted in passing, has an established paternal-filial relationship with another person who appears in the registry as his father-, through the application of a simple categorical syllogism reasoning, it is clear to this Court and as a conclusion, that in the case of Mr. Nombre126156 and his relationship with the plaintiff Nombre126154, the existing link is one of affinity (that is, of a legal nature, generated from the civil union -marriage- between Mr. Nombre126154 and his wife), Mr. Nombre126156 being a child brought by one of the spouses -Mrs. Nombre126155- to her marriage with Mr. Nombre126154, resulting thereby, in relation to the plaintiff herein and without any doubt, as his stepchild. Once this situation is defined, it is necessary to proceed to determine if the existing relationship between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 is covered by the prohibition contained in the repeatedly cited Article 127.

**VIII.** Mr. Nombre60957, as detailed in the preceding lines, has pointed out that "(...) In kinship by affinity (parentesco de afinidad), the computation of degrees is carried out in the same manner as in blood kinship and according to the distribution of direct and collateral lines […] the rule can be established that in the same line and in the same degree in which a person is a blood relative of one of the spouses, they are related by affinity to the other spouse […]” (op cit.). That is, if a person is a niece by blood kinship of someone united by a conjugal bond, they will in turn be a niece by affinity of the respective spouse, applying the same line and degree that exists between the niece and her blood uncle, but to the bond by affinity; a criterion this Court shares. Now then, in the instant case, Mr. Nombre126156 is the son of Mrs. Nombre126155 -the spouse of Mr. Nombre126154- in accordance with the blood tie, which is why, applying the same rules of line and degree -but by affinity- to define the kinship between Mr. Nombre126156 in relation to the plaintiff, he will be a stepchild by affinity of Mr. Nombre126154, contrary to what was indicated by the plaintiff and in accordance with the definition of said term established in the preceding lines. Additionally, the degree of kinship that exists between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 corresponds to the second degree, since the first degree corresponds to the relationship between the plaintiff and Mrs. Nombre126155 -spouses to each other-, and the second degree in relation to the plaintiff, derives from the existing relationship between Mrs. Nombre126155 and her son Nombre126156, therefore, from Mr. Nombre126154 to Mr. Nombre126156, there are two degrees of link by affinity. If we bring once again to attention the provisions of Article 127 of the Código Municipal cited above, said article covers or includes up to the third degree of kinship -without differentiating whether it is by blood or by affinity-, which would cover for Mr. Nombre126154 up to the grandchildren of Mrs. Nombre126155 -by affinity- and his own grandchildren in a direct descending line by blood. Therefore, without any doubt, the legal link existing between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 is within the scope of application of the legal effects of the indicated rule, since the facts under analysis are subsumed without major difficulty into the factual scenario provided for in the cited legal rule. That is, the plaintiff's actions, aimed at obtaining the appointment of his stepchild in the Municipality of Goicoechea, are, in this Court's opinion, typical and therefore, subsumable into the factual scenario contemplated by Article 127 referred to above, as well as violative of the prohibition set forth by the legislator in the repeatedly cited article.

**IX.** It remains now to analyze whether the sanction imposed on the plaintiff by reason of his conduct is in accordance with law or not. The Article 127 in question is an unfortunate and scarcely clear rule regarding its drafting, but it also presents a highly sensitive omission as it lacks any provision for an applicable sanction for the conduct that violates it. In addition to the above, it is completely remiss in referring to other normative provisions for the application of the corresponding sanction. For this reason, the defendant administration proceeded to carry out a normative integration in order to find a sanction applicable to the case sub judice, but thereby, the principle of legality (tipicidad) or rule of law that governs in sanctioning matters (both criminal and in administrative law) has undoubtedly been violated, in accordance with which and for this specific case, the sanctions applicable in administrative proceedings must be previously established through the enactment of a norm of legal rank and potency, a precept that derives from Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution in relation to Article 124 of Law No. 6227, Ley General de la Administration Pública. Besides being, in turn, contemplated in Article 253 of the current Código Electoral, which literally states:

"ARTÍCULO 253.- Competence // The TSE shall agree to the cancellation or annulment of the credentials of municipal officials of popular election in the scenarios expressly contemplated by law. These provisions shall also be applicable to district council members (síndicos), district mayors (intendentes), district councilors (concejales de distrito), and members of the municipal district councils (concejos municipales de distrito). // In the event that there is contention, the ordinary administrative procedure provided for in the Ley General de la Administración Pública shall first be carried out." (The italics and underlining do not correspond to the original).

In the instant case, it was not viable, given the poor drafting of the prohibitive rule in question, to proceed to integrate various normative provisions to try to provide Article 127 of the Código Municipal with an applicable sanction, as this undoubtedly violates the principle of legal reservation (reserva de ley) that characterizes the sanctioning matter at hand. But ignoring said legal gap, the active administration proceeded to channel the sanctioning procedure against the plaintiff, starting from the factual scenario of violation of Article 127 of the current Código Municipal. Note that in the instant case, punctually in administrative resolution No. PA-011-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued as an act of recommendation by the Contraloría General de la República, reference is only made to the questioned conduct for being violative of Article 127 of the Código Municipal, and it is in relation to said article that the disciplinary procedure is instituted and carried to its conclusion, without it deriving from the content of said act that the conduct attributed to Mr. Nombre126154 was framed by the legal operator either within the Ley de Control Interno or the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, nor is it recorded in said act that the conduct carried out by the plaintiff is assessed under the protection of said legal provisions, the directing body -the Contraloría- limiting itself to reiterating that Article 127 of the Código Municipal was violated. Nor is it perceived in said administrative act that any legal analysis was performed on the absence of an express sanction in the repeatedly cited Article 127, nor that any considerative reasoning was issued on the appropriateness of applying said legal provisions in the specific case to fill the normative gap and thus sanction the attributed conduct, it being only in the operative part of said resolution where Articles 18 subsection d) of the Código Municipal and 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública are invoked, but without the considerative part of said act explaining why such legal articles are applicable to the specific case. Note that Article 18 of Law No. 7794 literally states:

"Article 18. - The following shall be automatic causes for the loss of the municipal mayor's (alcalde municipal) credential:

• a)Losing a requirement or suffering from an impediment, according to Articles 15 and 16 of this code.
• b)Unjustified absence from their duties for more than eight days.
• c)Being declared, by final judicial sentence, disqualified from holding public office.
• d)Incurring in any of the causes provided for in Article 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República.

(Thus amended the foregoing subsection by Article 66 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004) e) Committing any action sanctioned by law with the loss of office for officials of popular election.

• f)Voluntarily resigning from their position." Furthermore, Article 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República states, in what is of interest:

"Article 73-Cancelation of credential. The commission of a serious fault by a council member (regidor) or district council member (síndico), principal or alternate, against the norms of the system for the supervision and control of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds; or incurring in any of the acts provided for in the Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, as generators of administrative liability, shall be cause for the cancelation of the respective credential. This shall apply when the offender has acted in the exercise of their office or on the occasion of it. // When the serious fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the municipal council (concejo municipal), the council members who, with their affirmative vote, have approved said agreement shall incur the same cause for cancelation of their credentials. // Likewise, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public office, as well as for those provided for in the Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, shall be a cause for the cancelation of the credential of a council member or district council member, principal or alternate. The competent judicial authority shall effect, ex officio, the respective communication to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. // (Thus amended by Article 63 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004) // ".

Even though the operative part of the sanctioning administrative act issued by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff indicates that Mr. Nombre126154 should be sanctioned in accordance with what is indicated in Article 18 subsection d) transcribed above, the obligation to state the grounds for administrative acts, especially disciplinary or sanctioning administrative acts, requires that in the considerative part of said resolution an express analysis be made about why that particular legal rule and no other should be applied to the specific case, but in the indicated administrative resolution, no considerative pronouncement is perceived on the subsumption of the investigated conduct into Article 18 subsection d) (not subsection "e" of said article, which seemed in this Court's opinion the most applicable to the instant case) nor into Article 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, which is cited because it is the article to which subsection "d" of Article 18 cited above makes express reference.

It should be noted that Article 73 refers to conduct that is harmful </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">"against the norms of the system of oversight and control of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) </span><span> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> and it expressly mentions the conducts specifically contemplated in that normative body, that is, in that same law; thereby leaving out its application in the face of the normative vacuum that is alleged in article 127 of the Código Municipal, where a conduct that violates the duty of probity is protected, but not a violation of the safeguarding and good administration of the public treasury. Furthermore, this Chamber must bring to the memory of the parties that the imposition of sanctions -and especially when these result in a sanction as burdensome as the withdrawal of credentials for a popularly elected official- is not legally viable by resorting to the application of analogy as an interpretative method, because for the application of a sanction, it is required that the legislator expressly establish the illicit condition of the conduct and the respective sanction that, upon its commission, is applicable. Now then, if said aspects are not provided for in the sanctioning norm, said normative absence or omission cannot be supplied by the legal operator, resorting to the path of normative integration, nor through the analogous application of sanctioning norms created to correct conduct of another kind, as the Contraloría General de la República has attempted in the matter under examination, to try by all means to sanction the claimant;</span><span> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">note that in the instant case, the plaintiff is punished for incurring in conduct that does not have an express sanction provided for in the current legal system and, moreover, that is not expressly punished with a measure as burdensome as the cancellation of credentials in a popularly elected position. To the foregoing is added that Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, the same one cited by the operative part of the sanctioning administrative act issued by the Contraloría General de la República to support the withdrawal of the claimant's credentials, literally states:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; text-align:justify; widows:0; orphans:0\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">"Article 39.-</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">Administrative Sanctions</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">. According to the severity, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub\">the faults </span><span style=\"width:3.87pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; font-size:6.67pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub; display:inline-block; -aw-font-family:'Arial'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub\">previously indicated</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> shall be sanctioned as follows:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; widows:0; orphans:0\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">a) Written reprimand published in the Diario Oficial.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; widows:0; orphans:0\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">b) Suspension, without the corresponding salary, per diem or stipend, from </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">fifteen to thirty days.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; widows:0; orphans:0\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">c) Separation from public office, without employer liability or cancellation </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">of the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">credential of municipal councilor (regidor municipal), as applicable.", (the highlighting </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">and underlining do not correspond to the original). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:7.9pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Observe that this last cited article specifically indicates that the sanctions established therein shall be applicable to "the faults previously indicated". That is, it refers to the conducts classified as sanctionable in that same legal body, in that same law, and does not contemplate under any assumption that the same are applicable by analogy, to sanction conducts contained in other normative provisions, as is the case with Article 127 of the Código Municipal. Additionally, and as a corollary, it should be noted that in its wording, repeatedly cited municipal Article 127 also does not refer, either expressly or tacitly, to the application of other sanctioning regulations in the event of incurring in the conduct it prohibits, for the purpose of establishing a sanctioning regime that guarantees its observance and sanctions the violation of the prohibition established therein. In this regard, this Court considers that the administrative act emanating from the Contraloría General de la República, which was subsequently endorsed by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, suffers from a defect in its content, being a defect of an absolute nature because it occurs in one of the substantial elements of the administrative act under examination, under the protection of the provisions of Articles 166 in relation to Articles 169 to 172, all of Law No. 6227 Ley General de la Administración Pública. The foregoing, because the content of said act is completely silent in that it does not even issue a cursory analysis on the appropriateness of the supplementary application of other legal sanctioning norms in order to supplement the normative vacuum that Article 127 of the Código Municipal has, by not establishing any sanction in case of its non-compliance and inobservance. The challenged act is also completely silent regarding the analogous application of legal norms specifically issued by the legislator to safeguard the treasury and public funds, to punish a violation committed not against the public treasury, but against the duty of probity, which is the conduct that Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">incurred in. In addition to said defect in the content of the act, this jurisdictional body considers that the challenged administrative actions also lack a defect in the grounds (motivo), for lacking legal basis, since there is no legal norm that sanctions in a special and express manner, the violation of the prohibition established in Article 127 of the Código Municipal, nor is there a special and express norm that sanctions a Municipal Alcalde with the loss of credentials, in the event of incurring in any violation of said prohibitory norm. The foregoing also entails the absolute nullity of the administrative conducts challenged before this jurisdiction, by parity of reasoning and in accordance with Article 166 of Law No. 6227, as the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">grounds (motivo)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> of the administrative act (</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">by definition, the factual or legal precedent that serves as the reason or motivation for the issuance of the act by the public administration)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, is a substantial element thereof. By reason of the considerations set forth, a defect has undoubtedly been generated that renders the administrative acts challenged before this Court absolutely null, coupled with the fact that, there being no pronouncement on the classification of the attributed conduct under the immediately transcribed norms, the plaintiff has been left clearly defenseless, not only because the administration did not indicate for what reasons the plaintiff violated Article 18 subsection d) of the Código Municipal, Article 73 of the LOCGR and Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, but also because the mandatory reference to the relationship between the conducts attributed to Mr. Nombre126154 and the sanction that was applied to him was not made in the challenged administrative act. Furthermore, what is also missing from the challenged acts is an explanation, at least a brief one, of why Article 127 of the Código Municipal -which, it is reiterated, lacks an applicable sanction- must be integrated in this matter, with said legal texts. Simply, without further substantiation, it is indicated that this is how it should be, but without the active administration making the effort to reasonably justify its actions. Thereby, a defect has been incurred due to lack of reasoning (falta de motivación) of the administrative act, with the lack of substantiation being a defect that directly affects the administrative conduct, generating the absolute nullity of the challenged act. Note that in the instant case, we are not in the presence of a violation against the public treasury, but rather that the violation alleged against the claimant constitutes a breach of the duty of probity that fell upon him, as it is clear to this Chamber that Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">promoted an improper appointment at his instance, under the protection of what is indicated in Article 127 of the Código Municipal, by requesting the institutional personnel area to appoint his stepson Nombre126156</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">as a municipal official. And it is that, despite the fact that the claimant evidently violated the duty of probity required of him by law, nevertheless, in the instant case, municipal Article 127 does not expressly foresee any burdensome or punitive legal consequence with which to sanction the occurrence of the conduct it prevents. Much less does it expressly establish that the commission of said fault will result in the withdrawal of credentials for a popularly elected official, as occurs in the case at hand, as it involves a Municipal Alcalde. In this regard, the Contraloría General de la República erroneously attempted to do so, because in the face of the normative vacuum regarding this area and in the face of the silence of the legislator -who omitted to establish specific and express applicable sanctions for the non-compliance with cited Article 127-, said gap in the current legal system could not be filled through normative integration and the analogous application of diverse sanctioning provisions, as the matter at hand is a highly delicate one, a sanctioning and disciplinary matter, where the principle of legality (principio de reserva de ley) undoubtedly and unshakably prevails. Therefore, it was not legally viable to try to invent the application of a sanction by analogy, or to force the reprehensible conduct that the claimant incurred in, to try by force -and without further analysis- to try to subsume it into other normative provisions not enacted for cases like the one at hand, but rather for the safeguarding and protection of the public treasury, which, it is reiterated, does not correspond to the case concerning us in this litigation. The sanctioning administrative acts that are challenged in this proceeding have undoubtedly violated the principle of specificity and/or legality in administrative sanctioning matters (principio de tipicidad y/o de legalidad en materia sancionatoria administrativa), as well as the general provision established in Article 253 of the Código Electoral transcribed in the preceding lines, which requires for cases of this caliber, the prior existence of an </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline\">express</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> sanction contained in a norm of legal rank, to punish the respective conduct with it. Therefore, this Court concludes that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff, supported by Articles 18</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> subsection d) and 137, both of the Código Municipal, as well as in Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, becomes illegal, as it lacks legal basis to support it, because the previously cited articles are not applicable to the specific case, in accordance with the considerations set forth in the preceding lines and because Article 127 of the current Código Municipal lacks a sanction expressly established by prior law, that punishes the official who violates such prohibition with dismissal from their position or with the withdrawal of the respective credentials in the case of an official appointed by popular election. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is imperative in the instant case to declare the absolute nullity of the following administrative acts: resolution No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, which ordered the separation of the claimant from his position as Municipal Alcalde of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 hours on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 hours on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 hours on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Proceedings for the cancellation of credentials of the proprietary alcalde of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea, province of San José, held by Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 13:10 hours on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in which it ordered the cancellation of Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">'s credential that accredited him as Alcalde of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea, and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 08:31 hours on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. By parity of reasoning and consequently, the absolute nullity is declared of the entire sanctioning administrative</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">procedure followed against the plaintiff and that culminated in his dismissal from the position of municipal alcalde of Goicoechea and with the withdrawal of his respective credentials. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:7.9pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">X.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">In his statement of claim, the plaintiff argued that during the development of the sanctioning procedure, a series of irregularities occurred that hindered his right of defense, indicating that official letter No. DFOE-DI-1576 was not within the administrative file, a document that corresponded to the statement of facts of the disciplinary administrative procedure, a statement of facts that did not come with the act of initiation (acto de apertura) and notification of charges (traslado de cargos), which was made known to him only one day before the required oral and private hearing. In this regard, it must be noted that from a detailed review of the administrative procedure, it is derived that, contrary to what was indicated by the plaintiff, the act of initiation of the procedure and notification of charges corresponding to the unnumbered administrative resolution issued at 15:00 hours on November 05, 2011, by the directing body of the administrative procedure, did contain in its content a duly detailed statement of facts that allowed the claimant to clearly determine what were the factual situations that were imputed to him in the sanctioning procedure in question, thus allowing him to proceed to adequately and effectively exercise his right of defense and due process, in safeguarding his interests within the indicated sanctioning procedure, without this collegiate Chamber considering that the right of access to the file for Mr. Nombre126154 was violated, nor is it shared that the plaintiff here was left defenseless, by not having been notified in advance, with the detail of the conducts attributed to him. Note that said statement of facts is contained in the first Considerando of the administrative resolution initiating the procedure and notifying charges, corresponding to the unnumbered resolution issued at 15:00 hours on November 05, 2011, which appears in the administrative file in digital format, disc No.1 and folios 43 to 52 of the file of the proceeding followed against the plaintiff. Therefore, this extreme of the filed claim is rejected. The claimant continues by stating that the Internal Audit Office (Auditoría Interna), in an act -in his opinion- of bad faith, proceeded to communicate the situation detected with Mr. Nombre126154 to the Contraloría General de la República, instead of communicating it to the municipal alcalde himself or to another internal instance of the municipality. In this regard, it must be noted that while it is true that the institutional internal audit office could well have acted as indicated by the plaintiff, that is, rendering reports on the detected situation and making them known to the institutional head, under the protection of the provisions of Articles 35 through 37 of Law No. 8292 Ley de Control Interno, however, communicating the detected situation internally to the corporate entity is not a legally established requirement as a prerequisite to sending the matter to the knowledge of the controlling body, as was done in the procedure under examination; to which is added that, in any case, this allegation is not susceptible to annulling per se, the sanctioning administrative act issued and subject to the knowledge of this Court. Therefore, this extreme of the filed claim is also rejected. Continuing with the analysis of the arguments raised by the plaintiff, his representation points out that the Contraloría General de la República did not analyze the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, and neither did the TSE, because if they had done so they would have noticed that said law establishes a series of sanctions according to the severity of the fault. In this regard, it must be indicated that the issue of the gradation of sanctions in disciplinary matters, when the legal operator is faced with a plurality of sanctioning options, all legally valid, among which to choose to sanction the offender, the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality must be applied, and an adequate judgment of weighting must be carried out in order to determine which is the most reasonable, adequate, and proportional punishment for the factual scenario classified in the sanctioning norm, whose commission has been accredited and which is submitted to disciplinary review. Indeed, the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, in its Article 41, establishes a series of criteria, which must be taken into account when assessing the conduct of the investigated subject, when they have incurred in any unlawful conduct due to willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). Said article contemplates the following aspects to be taken into consideration for such effect, literally: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"Article 41.-Criteria to consider. The sanctions stipulated in this Law shall be imposed for the infractions previously typified that have been committed with willful misconduct or gross negligence. To assess the conduct of the alleged responsible party, the following factors, among others, shall be taken into account: / a) The effective harm to the economic interests of the Public Administration and the amount of the damages and losses caused. / b) The success obtained in achieving results undesired by the legal system or in the enrichment or favoritism of the author of the infraction or of third parties, as well as the effort put into procuring them. / c) The negative impact on the public service. / d) Recidivism in any of the faults typified in Article 38 of this Law, within the previous four years. / e) The rank and functions of the public servant; it is understood that, the greater the hierarchy and complexity of these, the greater the obligation to assess the legality, timeliness, and advisability of the acts that are issued, authorized, or executed." </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Note that in the instant case, indeed, such aspects must be assessed to determine the severity of the fault committed as well as the sanction to be applied in such scenarios, however, in the instant case the situation is quite particular, because the truth is that in the sub judice case, it was not even possible to proceed to carry out the indicated assessment for the purpose of choosing one among several possible sanctions with the objective of sanctioning the claimant, because the truth is that in this matter and in the opinion of this Court, there is no legal norm of a sanctioning nature that provides support for the punishment applied to the claimant, because, as was indicated in the preceding lines, it was erroneously and contrary to law based on Articles 18</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> subsection d) and 137, both of the Código Municipal, as well as on Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, which was contrary to law because the previously cited articles are not applicable to the specific case, in accordance with the considerations set forth in the preceding lines and because Article 127 of the current Código Municipal lacks a sanction expressly established by prior law, that punishes the official who violates such prohibition with dismissal from their position or with the withdrawal of the respective credentials in the case of an official appointed by popular election. To the foregoing is added that, in any case, from reading the challenged administrative act it is concluded that at least the condition of hierarchical superior -alcalde- that the claimant held in the municipality in question was taken into consideration by the controlling body, because at least so indicates said sanctioning act, of course, without providing greater detail and without conducting an in-depth analysis on the appropriateness of the sanction imposed, because in reality and in accordance with the law, there was no current legal norm that typified the specific conduct alleged and that likewise, expressly established for it, one or several sanctions specifically applicable for said conduct, making it impossible to carry out the analysis on the gradation of sanctions, from among which to choose one to resolve the specific case. The plaintiff continues by pointing out that in the instant case, there is no harm to his economic interests, there was no negative impact on the public service, the salary that the official received he earned, he received legal payment, and he was not favored by being paid more than the legally established sum. Said affirmations are indeed shared by this Court: from a detailed study of the case records it derives that indeed in the instant case, no effect on the public treasury occurred, because there is no document in the case records that accredits that the salary paid to Mr. Nombre126154's stepson was higher than what corresponded for the position he occupied, or rather, there is no evidence in the instant case that accredits that the young man did not work in the position to which he was appointed, nor is there evidence in the case records that Mr. Nombre126156 had received his salary without performing the respective work, just as there is no evidence that the former alcalde had received any stipend from Mr. Nombre126156</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">to proceed with his appointment; nor does it appear in the case records that a real and effective damage or economic loss was generated to the finances or to the public treasury, the case concerning us being restricted, as to its scope of effect, to having failed to observe the express prohibition established in Article 127 of the current Código Municipal, but as the plaintiff points out, the effect on municipal property and funds, and therefore, on the public treasury, is not recorded in the case records. In this regard, the plaintiff is correct, and undoubtedly such circumstances should have been taken into consideration when assessing the severity of the alleged conduct and when determining the applicable and corresponding sanction for the specific case, but the truth of the matter is that in this specific case, said legal exercise was impossible to carry out, because in reality and in accordance with the law, there is no current legal norm of statutory rank in the instant case that establishes, in an express and special manner, one or several applicable sanctions to punish the specific conduct alleged, thus making it impossible to carry out the analysis on the gradation of sanctions to thereby choose one among several possible ones, to resolve the specific case; that is, in the absence of legally established sanctions for the specific conduct provided for in Article 127 of the Código Municipal, the legal operator was unable to carry out the respective judgment of reasonableness and weighting to choose the most reasonable, logical, and proportional sanction from among several sanctions, corresponding to the concrete and particular circumstances of the case under examination. It must again be noted that said lack of legal normative support, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">per se,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> vitiates with absolute nullity the sanctioning administrative act challenged here, by constituting a defect in its grounds and in its content, and that therefore entails its open non-conformity with the current legal system. This Court cannot omit to point out that even though modern socio-political currents have generated novel interpretative ideologies of the legal system, taking the exercise of disciplinary power within the State to the extreme, the proponents of such ideological currents, like it or not, must subject themselves to legality and the current legal system in the country, and the truth of the matter is that, like it or not, whether it is politically correct or not, there is no specific sanction established for the conduct set forth in Article 127 of the current Código Municipal, as of the date of commission of the acts that give rise to this litigation.

This Tribunal must not and shall not subject itself to political dimensioning or to persecutory ideological interpretations that may prevail in any state institution; this Tribunal owes and subjects itself to legality, to the current Political Constitution, and to the law, and to that extent, applying the restrictive hermeneutical criteria applicable since very old times to sanctioning matters as well as the principle of legality that governs said matter and which establishes that sanctioning matters are reserved to the law, this Chamber can under no circumstance condone or validate the establishment of sanctions by way of analogy, in order to supplement, through that interpretive method, "open" sanctioning types, or also those that others call "blank" types, being those sanctioning normative provisions that are not self-sufficient and that require that, by way of interpretation, a sanction applicable to a specific conduct be created, when the legislator did not establish it in a specific and express manner, which undoubtedly violates the most elementary pro-person (pro-hómine) and pro-liberty (pro-libertatis) legal principles, which this panel fully shares and advocates.

In another order of ideas, the plaintiff must be advised that the resolution issued in the specific case of Mr. Nombre16454 is not applicable to the matter now submitted to the examination of this Tribunal, since it corresponds to a different factual scenario from the one that now occupies us and, in any case, it does not exert any subjection over the criterion of this jurisdictional body.

The plaintiff continues to argue that, in the instant case, administrative resolution No. PA-011-2011 was not properly notified to him according to Article 38 of the Ley de Notificaciones, because he was not informed of it before the hearing was held, which violated his right of defense. In this regard, it must be noted that resolution No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the deciding body of the sanctioning administrative procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República, corresponds to the final act issued within said procedure. This resolution was notified to the plaintiff via facsimile on February 4, 2011, as stated in the set of proven facts of this resolution and can be verified at folio 144 of the respective administrative file in digital format, disk No. 1. The oral and private hearing required by law was held within this sanctioning procedure on January 18, 2011, as stated at folio 128 of the digitized administrative procedure provided to the case file. To that extent, it is clear that said final act was communicated to the plaintiff more than ten days after the respective oral appearance was held, making it therefore evident that no violation of his right of defense has occurred and that the plaintiff is incorrect in his affirmations regarding this topic, so this argumentative aspect of the filed claim must be rejected.

Regarding the alleged violations of the principle of parallel forms, the democratic principle, and that of popular will, as well as his affirmations that if the Mayor was appointed by the people, the only one legitimized to remove him is the people, in accordance with the principles and bases of the plebiscite, citing as an example what happened in Nombre265 and the invocation of the unconstitutionality of Articles 220, 223, and 253 of Law No. 8765, the current Código Electoral, and of resolutions No. 6673-M-2011, No. 7105-M-2011, and No. 8184-M-2011, all from the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, it must be pointed out that such arguments exceed the legal competences assigned to the knowledge of this Tribunal, since they deal with aspects of a constitutional nature, upon which this panel is not to express a criterion, these being the exclusive purview of the Sala Constitucional, as the Costa Rican system is one of concentrated constitutional control, according to the provisions of Article 10 of the current fundamental norm.

By virtue of the considerations set forth in the preceding lines, it is procedurally appropriate according to law to declare the filed claim upheld in all its extremes, as is hereby ordered. By virtue of having declared the claim at hand upheld, according to what is set forth in the preceding considerandos, the sanctioning administrative procedure pursued against the plaintiff is annulled in its entirety, and taking into consideration that this declaration has declaratory and retroactive effect to the date of commencement of the referred procedure, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 131.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and 171 of Law No. Placa1223, as a direct and immediate consequence thereof, any existing reference regarding the administrative procedure annulled here, in any databases of the Contraloría General de la República and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, is also annulled, which must be executed immediately once this resolution becomes final.

The nullity is declared of the following administrative resolutions: No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, in which it was ordered to separate the plaintiff from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 hours on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 hours on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 hours on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Proceedings for the cancellation of credentials of the proprietary mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea, San José province, held by Mr. Nombre126154"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 13:10 hours on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in which it was ordered to cancel the credential of Mr. Nombre126154 that accredited him as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 08:31 hours on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.

**XI.** In the set of claims asserted by the plaintiff in this litigation, the plaintiff seeks the payment of the damages (daños y perjuicios) that he alleges were caused to him by the challenged administrative acts. By way of damages, he claims the sum of one hundred million net colones, which he affirms correspond to the salaries, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary, in-kind salary, and benefits that he had as Mayor, *a sum that he requests be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment (ejecución de sentencia)*. Likewise, he requests that the salaries be indexed from the moment his obligation was generated until the date of their effective payment, in addition to requiring that the amount be calculated according to the basic passive rate in effect at the time of liquidation and determination by firm judicial resolution. In this regard, it must be stated that in this Tribunal's criterion, with its unlawful conduct, by applying to the plaintiff a non-existent sanction for the specific case of Article 127 of the Código Municipal, the defendant party has violated the sphere of the plaintiff's economic rights, placing him in a situation of evident labor detriment with obvious economic and personal consequences, which is inferred from the case file without much effort, since he was removed from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea and could not receive the sums and other salary components that he could have eventually received, had he remained in office for the entire term of his mandate, which, incidentally, ended in 2016. With this, the plaintiff has been forced to resort, firstly, to an unsuccessful challenge procedure and then to the jurisdictional process that concerns us, to challenge formal actions that, being affected by the legal defects indicated in the preceding paragraphs, had to be annulled by this Tribunal. In short, the actions of the co-defendants Contraloría General de la República and the State, representing the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, undoubtedly caused the plaintiff an unjust disturbance in his work life and, consequently, it is procedurally appropriate to order the payment, in favor of Mr. Nombre126154, of the back pay (salarios caídos) and the respective salary components to which he would have been entitled, had he effectively remained in the exercise of the position of popular election, for the entire term of his appointment as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea. Since there is no suitable evidence in the case file that allows the Tribunal to determine at this point the sums that must be paid to the plaintiff for this concept, the payment of said amounts is granted in an abstract manner, subject to the due determination, quantification, and liquidation that will be carried out later, in the enforcement of judgment stage. As requested by the plaintiff and by virtue of the provisions of numeral 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the sums granted must be indexed and brought to present value. Once said sums are quantified and determined, interest will be recognized on them as damages (perjuicios) in accordance with what is indicated by numeral 722 of the Código Civil, which will be calculated at the current legal rate, starting from the date on which each of the corresponding payments should have been received by the plaintiff and until the date of their effective cancellation.

**XII. Regarding the defenses.** Upon answering the claim, the representation of the co-defendants raised the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of standing (falta de legitimación), and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual). In relation to the defense of lack of current interest, it must be stated that it is inadmissible, by virtue of the fact that the legal point debated within this matter, corresponding to the assessment of the legality of the sanction applied to the plaintiff by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones upon a recommendation to that effect issued by the Contraloría General de la República, had not been the subject of analysis or pronouncement by any jurisdictional body, to which is added that, although it is true the plaintiff had appeared before this instance in file No. 12-000748-1027-CA, this was only through the filing of a request for interim relief which he ultimately abandoned, without a main proceedings ever having been raised in that matter or a criterion on the merits of the case ever having been issued. Regarding the defense of lack of standing, both in its active and passive aspects, both must be rejected, since Mr. Nombre126154 was adequately and actively legitimized to appear before this court within this process in defense of his interests, because its purpose was the annulment of the conduct displayed by the co-defendant administration, which culminated in his dismissal from the position of Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea that he held and the withdrawal of his respective credentials; the defense alleged in its passive aspect must meet the same fate, since the challenged administrative acts were issued by the co-defendant bodies in this matter, under the protection of the provisions of numeral 12 of the current CPCA. And finally, in accordance with the reasoning set forth in the preceding considerandos, regarding the co-defendants Contraloría General de la República and the State, the invoked defense of lack of right is rejected, because the plaintiff, the winning party in this litigation, was legally correct in his positions, and consequently the filed claim is declared upheld. With respect to the co-defendant Nombre16153, current Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea, the defense of lack of passive standing is accepted, because within his set of claims the plaintiff estimated that in the event the period for which he was appointed had expired at the time this resolution was issued, in said scenario he was not requesting to be reinstated in the position he held and that Ms. Nombre16153 now holds, to which is added that no extreme of his claim was also directed at obtaining any legal result or any conduct from Ms. Nombre16153.

**XIII. Regarding costs.** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. The dispensation of this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the instant case, and specifically with regard to the State and the Contraloría General de la República, this Tribunal finds no reason to apply the exceptions set forth in the respective regulations and to break the postulate of condemnation in costs to the losing party. Therefore, condemnation for procedural and personal costs is imposed against the Contraloría General de la República and the State. As for Ms. Nombre16153, given that she was joined to the process in a mandatory manner by express mandate of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, that she had no participation whatsoever in the issuance of the annulled administrative acts, and that no conduct was sought from her by Mr. Nombre126154, the matter is resolved without a special condemnation in costs.

**POR TANTO** The defense of lack of current interest is rejected. Regarding the State and the Contraloría General de la República, the defenses of lack of standing and lack of right raised are rejected. Consequently, the filed claim is declared upheld, in the following terms, as follows: The absolute nullity is declared of the entire sanctioning administrative procedure pursued against the plaintiff and which culminated in his dismissal from the position of Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea and the withdrawal of his respective credentials. The nullity is declared of the following administrative resolutions: No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, in which it was ordered to separate the plaintiff from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 hours on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 hours on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 hours on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Proceedings for the cancellation of credentials of the proprietary mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea, San José province, held by Mr. Nombre126154"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 13:10 hours on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in which it was ordered to cancel the credential of Mr. Nombre126154 that accredited him as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 08:31 hours on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. As a direct consequence of this declaration of nullity, any reference that exists regarding the procedure annulled here must be eliminated, from any database of the Contraloría General de la República and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, as soon as this judgment becomes final. The Contraloría General de la República and the State are ordered to pay, in favor of the plaintiff, the back pay and the respective salary components to which he would have been entitled, had he effectively remained in the exercise of the position of popular election, for the entire term of his appointment as municipal mayor of Goicoechea, amounts which shall be counted from the date on which he was effectively separated from his position and until the day his appointment as municipal mayor would have ended. Said sums must be determined, quantified, and liquidated in the enforcement of judgment stage. Once determined, such amounts must be indexed and brought to present value. Interest at the current legal rate shall be recognized on them, which shall run from the date on which the plaintiff should have received each of the corresponding salaries, and until the date of their effective payment. With respect to Nombre16153, the defense of lack of passive standing invoked is accepted and the claim filed against her is declared without merit, resolved without a special condemnation in costs. Both costs of the process are to be borne by the State and the Contraloría General de la República. Let it be notified.- **Sandra M.** Quesada Vargas.- Name126157 - Luis Polinaris Vives.-

Goicoechea, Dirección7876 , 50 meters west of BNCR, opposite Dirección18098 . Telephones: 2545-0099, 2545-0107, 2545-0158. Fax: 2241-5664 and 2545-0006.

**V. On the merits of the case:** Without disregarding what was set forth in the first recital (considerando) of this judgment, it must be noted that, as the plaintiff correctly indicates, in this case the challenged act corresponds to an act classified by public law doctrine as "complex" and furthermore, indeed, the opinion rendered by the Contraloría General de la República for this type of matter—the same being challenged in the present case (sub júdice)—is binding on the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. We are indeed not dealing with an electoral act but rather with an administrative sanctioning act. Now, as can be observed from the case file and from what was resolved by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Corte Suprema de Justicia acting as a court of cassation (tribunal de casación), in the case before us, the legal point to be elucidated corresponds, in the first place, to establishing whether numeral 127 of the Código Municipal encompasses in its wording the prohibition against hiring a stepchild in a municipality where one holds the position of municipal mayor, as occurs in this case, and the court must therefore refer to the determination of a restriction on the fundamental right of access to work, in this case, to public employment. To subsequently determine the legal adequacy of the sanction imposed on the plaintiff Óscar Figueroa Fieujeam as mayor of the canton (cantón) of Goicoechea, by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and by virtue of the recommendation issued for that purpose by the controlling body (órgano contralor). But to carry out this analysis, it is imperative to first establish that the regime of Fundamental Rights is without a doubt of mandatory analysis for the elucidation of this dispute (litis), as it is the criterion of this Chamber that the legal regime of the right of access to public office (función pública) is proper to said fundamental legal sphere. And it is that access to public office is a fundamental right, derived from its regulation in international human rights instruments, despite not being expressly contemplated in our current Constitución Política.

For this reason, like any fundamental right, it can indeed be restricted, but only by means of a law in the formal and material sense, in pursuit of that balance between the rights of individuals and the general public interest, which, in the specific case, translates into the pursuit of transparency, objectivity, independence of judgment, and impartiality in the exercise of public function. This implies that it is the responsibility of the law to establish the conditions of access to the service, which necessarily includes the eligibility conditions, as well as the establishment of the regimes of prohibitions and incompatibilities pertaining to public posts or positions. These last three conditions tend to safeguard and maintain objectivity and impartiality on the part of the official in the exercise of public function, for which it is sought that no latent conflict of interest exists between the function performed and its confrontation with other activities carried out by the servant, particularly those of a private nature.

Therefore, as it is a sensitive matter involving the restriction or limitation of a fundamental right, one must resort to the legal reserve (reserva de ley) as the appropriate mechanism for its regulation or to establish restrictions on the right of free access to public employment. This implies that eligibility conditions must be established by law, as well as the ineligibilities and incompatibilities for accessing the position, since these ineligibilities and incompatibilities entail a restriction on a fundamental right, which requires applying constitutional principles regarding the legal regime of fundamental rights. In this regard, see, among others, the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 545-97 of 2:30 p.m. on January 28, 1997 [...]

Likewise, it is necessary to emphasize that the delegation of the issuance of normative regulations on this matter is not viable and, furthermore, the restrictions imposed on the fundamental right must find support in the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality that permeate the entire current legal system. (In this sense, rulings No. 5058-93 of 2:20 p.m. on October 14, 1993; No. 3929-95 of 3:24 p.m. on July 18, 1995; No. 2883-96 of 5:00 p.m. on June 13, 1996; and No. 6273-96 of 3:30 p.m. on November 19, 1996, among others; all emanating from the Costa Rican constitutional court). And it is that on more than a few occasions, the Constitutional Chamber has addressed the subject matter under study, regarding the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley), in the case of establishing limits on fundamental rights, stating in this regard, as relevant:

'Regarding the alleged violation of Article 28, (...) in judgment No. 3550-92 of 4:00 p.m. on November 24, 1992... the Chamber indicated that, of course, fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to certain restrictions, but only those that are necessary by virtue of democratic and constitutional values. However, for a restriction to be "necessary", it is required that it be "useful", "reasonable", "timely" and must imply the "existence of a compelling need" that justifies the restriction.

In order for restrictions on freedom to be constitutionally and internationally lawful, they must be oriented toward the satisfaction of an imperative public interest; to achieve this, they must: 1) choose the restriction that limits the protected right to the least extent, 2) exist in proportionality between the restriction and the interest that justifies it, 3) closely conform to the achievement of that legitimate objective, and 4) be socially imperative and therefore exceptional, and as such, must be interpreted restrictively, meaning that in case of doubt, liberty must always be preferred within the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values. With respect to the present action of unconstitutionality, the Chamber considers that it is not constitutionally possible to introduce a prohibition of this type in an Executive Decree, because this matter is reserved to Law (…) (Vote No. 6198-95 of November 14, 1995).

Therefore, this jurisdictional body cannot ignore that, when engaging in the hermeneutical exercise regarding normative provisions that establish limits or restrictions on fundamental rights, the parameter for interpretation must undeniably be restrictive—not expansive—and even more so when we are in the presence of normative provisions that establish eligibility requirements and/or incompatibilities for holding public office; without setting aside, of course, the public purpose that the legal norm under analysis seeks to satisfy, for in performing the interpretive exercise, the Judge must, in this case, seek to safeguard the public interest that the legislator tried to protect when establishing the limitation or incompatibility; albeit always in a balanced manner and avoiding the irrational or disproportionate constriction of the fundamental right of access to public employment. All of this, for the sake of achieving an adequate equilibrium between the fundamental right and the safeguarded public interest at stake [...]

For the existence of so-called eligibility requirements implies per se that anyone who does not meet the conditions established by law to access a public position is rendered unable to be appointed to said post, thus tacitly becoming a condition of ineligibility for the position. The foregoing is without prejudice, obviously, to the existence of legal provisions that expressly establish and enumerate circumstances that will entail the corresponding ineligibility; all of this under the prudent judgment of the legislator, who may well establish, as indeed has been done, that holding the position is incompatible with performing certain public or private activities or with respect to a specific post. This implies that even if the applicant meets the legally established eligibility conditions, there could well be a ground of incompatibility that limits their appointment or their continuance in a certain post. Unlike conditions of ineligibility—which usually correspond to conditions intrinsic to the applicant—incompatibilities are fundamentally based on the conflict of interests, as well as on the need to maintain independence and impartiality in the exercise of public function, all with the objective of guaranteeing its most correct and effective exercise. The regulation of incompatibilities in a legal norm is a manifestation of the principle of transparency that governs the activity of the public administration and which constitutes one of the fundamental pillars governing the administration's conduct. Therefore, it is not surprising that the express establishment of various types of incompatibilities provided for in a legal norm is aimed at seeking to prevent nepotism (“nepotism // From Latin nepos, -otis 'nephew', 'descendant' and -ism. // 1. m. Excessive preference that some give to their relatives for concessions or public employment,” according to a consultation made by this Court on the website of the Real Academia de la Lengua Española), as a manifestation of administrative corruption.

Nepotism is, in essence, a flagrant violation of the principle of equality in access to public office, since the designation of the official is not grounded in their suitability and the pursuit of more efficient action by the public administration, but rather in providing advantageous treatment to a relative or close person with whom one has some family tie and therefore, some degree of interest [...]

From the transcribed legal text, it is derived with crystal clarity and without the need for major effort that the legislator expressly established a restriction on access to the municipal employment regime in the event of a family tie, direct or collateral, that falls within the third degree inclusive, in relation to the members of the Concejo Municipal, the municipal auditor, or the alcalde, which implies an express legal impossibility for the designation to a municipal position for anyone holding such a degree of kinship. Now then, in the second paragraph, in addition the cited regulation indicates that should a situation of that nature arise, the official who had been designated in the first instance shall remain in their position, and the subsequent appointment of their close associate should not be carried out. In the present case, although it is true there is no blood relationship between the claimant Mr. Óscar Figueroa Fieujeam and Mr. Rolando Josué Telles Rojas, as has been proven in the set of proven facts supporting this resolution, it is also true that Mr. Rolando is the son of the claimant's spouse since the year 2007, Mrs. Xinia María Rojas A. That is to say, before assuming his position as alcalde municipal of Goicoechea, Mr. Figueroa already had at least some degree of closeness in relation to Mr. Rolando Josué Telles Rojas, by virtue of the marital tie existing with Mrs. Xinia Rojas. However, said article does not expressly and in detail indicate which persons are specifically affected by the prohibition, limiting itself to stating that the issued denial shall be applicable to those who are united by a tie in direct or collateral line up to the third degree, which is why it is incumbent upon the legal operator, in each specific case, to carry out the corresponding assessment and interpretation and determine if a subject is encompassed within the comprehensive scope of the legal restriction under study. Given the breadth and vagueness that the drafting of the rule presents, we must seek the possibility of applying various methods of legal interpretation. The foregoing leads us to bring up what is provided by Article 10 of the current Código Civil, which establishes the hermeneutical criteria that must be applied by the legal operator when interpreting a regulatory provision. Said article indicates, in what is of interest:

"(...) Rules shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to the spirit and purpose of them."

The transcribed article establishes the criteria for interpreting legal rules in the Costa Rican legal system, contemplating at once a variety of hermeneutical methodologies, namely, literal interpretation, historical-social interpretation reflected in the minutes and legislative file, and the will or spirit articulated by the legislator at the time of creating the respective legal rule.

Having clarified the foregoing, this Chamber must now turn to analyzing whether, pursuant to the provisions of Article 127 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), there exists or not any legal relationship between the plaintiff and Mr. Telles, within the third degree of kinship (parentesco), which may have affected in any way the appointments made in his favor by the Municipality of Goicoechea—at the request of the plaintiff herein—and which may be considered a violation of the prohibition set forth in the aforementioned Article 127. Regarding the concept of kinship, the most qualified national doctrine has addressed this topic, indicating for a long time, what is of interest here:

"[…] Kinship properly speaking is formed by the blood tie (vínculo consanguíneo) that unites several persons who descend from one another, or from a common ancestor. Accordingly, two classes of relatives are distinguished which, for greater clarity, are customarily distributed into two series of degrees that make up two lines. A line is, therefore, the series of relatives. Two classes thereof are distinguished: direct and collateral. In the direct line are the progenitors and their descendants; thus we have: grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren.

And in the collateral line, also called transversal, are counted those who come from a common trunk, but who do not descend one from another, as occurs with brothers among themselves; and uncles with nephews and nieces […] The distinct steps from one relative to another are called degrees, counting one of these for each generation, which is formed by an individual in the series, with the exception of that which forms the trunk from which the individuals to be taken into account for the computation originate; thus, from great-grandson to great-grandfather, there are three generations, although four individuals appear, namely: great-grandson, grandson, grandfather, and great-grandfather, this last not being counted because it is the generator of the rest […] In addition to kinship by consanguinity (parentesco consanguíneo), there exists another called affinity (parentesco de afinidad), which means by analogy or similarity, recognized by law, consisting of a civil bond that, because of marriage, is established between one of the spouses and the blood relatives of the other […] In kinship by affinity, the computation of degrees is carried out in the same manner as in consanguinity and in accordance with the arrangement of the direct and collateral lines […] the rule can be stated that in the same line and in the same degree in which a person is a blood relative of one of the spouses, that person is an affine to the other spouse […]” (BRENES CÓRDOBA, Alberto. Tratado de las personas. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. Fourth edition. 1984. pp. 23 to 26). (The underlining and highlighting are not part of the original).

Based on the foregoing summary, we can conclude that article 127 of the Código Municipal, although it is true it does not expressly indicate to what type of bond—by consanguinity or by affinity—it refers, is nevertheless clearly encompassing the collateral and direct line up to the third degree inclusive.

Now then, the question immediately arises as to whether the legislator's intention was to include within the limitation the blood bond, or whether it was their will to encompass both, both consanguinity and the bond by affinity. In this chamber’s opinion, to elucidate this aspect, one must proceed to the direct application of the principles of protection of the public treasury, probity, and transparency in the public function, in addition to taking into consideration the legal aphorism that states "one cannot distinguish where the law does not distinguish." Having carried out the respective balancing exercise, weighing these core legal aspects against the simple interest that an individual might have in being appointed to a public office, and taking into consideration the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the Court reaches the conclusion that it must opt to interpret that it was the legislator's intention to include within the cited restriction regime both types of relationships, the consanguineous as well as the legal relationship or one created by law—affinity (afinidad)—, finding both factual scenarios encompassed within the scope of the incompatibility (incompatibilidad) contained in the above-cited legal article.

**VIII.** Now then, the *Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española* defines the noun *"hijastro"* in the following terms: *"(…) From Latin* filiaster, filiastra.* // 1. m. and f. Child brought to the new marriage by a person's spouse."*, according to a consultation carried out by this Court on the website "http://dle.rae.es/?id=KODxnLU". Taking into consideration the definition established by the aforementioned Real Academia de la Lengua, as well as the factual situation under analysis, namely, that the spouse of Mr. Óscar Figueroa—Mrs. Xinia—is the mother of Mr. Rolando Telles—who, it should be noted, has a paternal-filial relationship established with another person who appears in the registry as his father—, by applying a simple categorical syllogism reasoning, it is clear to this Court, and as a conclusion, that in the case of Mr. Telles and his relationship with the plaintiff Óscar Figueroa Feaujeam, the existing relationship is one by affinity (afinidad) (that is, of a legal nature, generated from the civil union—marriage—between Mr. Óscar and his wife), with Mr. Telles being a child brought by one of the spouses—Mrs. Xinia—to her marriage with Mr. Óscar Figueroa, therefore becoming, in relation to the plaintiff here and without any doubt, his stepson (hijastro). Once this situation is defined, it becomes necessary to proceed to determine if the relationship existing between Mr. Rolando Adolfo Telles and Mr. Figueroa is covered by the prohibition contained in the repeatedly cited Article 127 [...]

**IX.** It remains now to analyze whether the sanction imposed on the plaintiff as a result of his conduct is in accordance with the law or not.

The aforementioned Article 127 is an unfortunate and scarcely clear norm in terms of its wording, but furthermore, it presents a highly sensitive omission since it fails to provide for any type of applicable sanction for conduct that violates it. In addition to the foregoing, it is completely remiss in referring to other regulatory provisions for the application of the corresponding sanction. For this reason, the respondent administration proceeded to carry out a normative integration in order to find a sanction applicable to the case at hand, but in doing so, the principle of specificity (tipicidad) or legality that governs in sanctioning matters (both criminal and in administrative law) has undoubtedly been violated, according to which and for this specific case, the sanctions applicable in administrative proceedings must be previously established through the enactment of a norm of legal rank and force, a precept that derives from constitutional numerals 39 and 41 in relation to Article 124 of Law No. 6227 General Law of Public Administration [...]

In the instant case, it was not viable, given the poor wording of the aforementioned prohibitive norm, to proceed to integrate diverse regulatory provisions in an attempt to provide numeral 127 of the Municipal Code with an applicable sanction, since this undoubtedly violates the principle of legal reservation (reserva de ley) that characterizes the sanctioning matter at hand.

But disregarding this legal loophole (vacío legal), the active administration proceeded to channel the sanctioning procedure against the plaintiff, based on the factual assumption of a violation of Article 127 of the current Código Municipal. Note that in this case, specifically in administrative resolution No. PA-011-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued as an act of recommendation by the Contraloría General de la República, reference is made solely to the questioned conduct as being in violation of Article 127 of the Código Municipal, and it is in relation to said article that the disciplinary procedure is initiated and carried through to its conclusion, without the content of said act indicating that the conduct attributed to Mr. Figueroa was framed by the legal operator within either the Ley de Control Interno or the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. Furthermore, said act does not contain any assessment of the conduct displayed by the plaintiff under those legal provisions, with the directing body—the Contraloría—limiting itself to reiterating that Article 127 of the Código Municipal was violated.

Nor is it perceived in said administrative act that a legal analysis was carried out regarding the absence of an express sanction in Article 127 of the repeatedly cited law, nor that any reasoned consideration was issued on the appropriateness of applying those legal provisions in the specific case to fill the regulatory gap and thus sanction the alleged conduct; it is only in the operative part of said resolution where numbers 18, subsection d) of the Código Municipal and 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública are invoked, but without the recitals of said act explaining why those legal articles are applicable to the specific case [...]

Despite the fact that the operative part of the sanctioning administrative act issued by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff indicates that Mr. Figueroa must be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of number 18, subsection d) transcribed above, the obligation to state the reasons (motivar) for administrative acts, especially disciplinary or sanctioning administrative acts, requires that the recitals of said resolution contain an express analysis of why that particular legal rule and not another should be applied to the specific case; however, in the indicated administrative resolution, no reasoned pronouncement whatsoever is perceived regarding the subsumption (subsunción) of the investigated conduct under number 18, subsection d) (and not subsection "e" of said number, which in this Court's opinion seems more applicable to the matter) or under Article 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, which is cited because it is the number to which subsection "d" of the aforementioned Article 18 makes express reference.

T</span><span style="display: inline; font-family: Arial; font-size: 8pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="display: inline; font-family: Arial; font-size: 8pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;">aking into account that Article 73 refers to conduct that is harmful "against the norms of the oversight and control system of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds" and expressly mentions the conduct specifically contemplated in that normative body, that is, in that same law</span><span style="display: inline; font-family: Arial; font-size: 8pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="display: inline; font-family: Arial; font-size: 8pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;">; thereby excluding its application to the normative gap challenged in Article 127 of the Código Municipal, where conduct that violates the duty of probity is protected, but not a violation of the safeguarding and sound administration of the public treasury. Furthermore, this Chamber must bring to the attention of the parties that the imposition of sanctions—especially when these result in a penalty as severe as the removal of credentials for a popularly elected official—is not legally feasible by resorting to the application of analogy as an interpretive method, since for the application of a sanction, it is required that the legislator expressly establish the illicit condition of the conduct and the respective sanction that is applicable upon its commission</span><span style="display: inline; font-family: Arial; font-size: 8pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="display: inline; font-family: Arial; font-size: 8pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;">.</span> Now then, if these aspects are not provided for in the punitive norm, that normative absence or omission cannot be supplemented by the legal operator, resorting to the avenue of normative integration, nor through the analogical application of punitive norms created to correct conduct of another kind, as the Contraloría General de la República has attempted in the matter under review, trying by all means to sanction the claimant; note that in this case the plaintiff is punished for engaging in conduct that does not have an express sanction provided for in the current legal system and, moreover, is not expressly punished with a measure as burdensome as the cancellation of credentials in a popularly elected office [...]

Furthermore, and as a corollary, it must be indicated that in its wording, the repeatedly cited municipal article 127 also does not refer, either expressly or tacitly, to the application of other punitive regulations in the event of engaging in the conduct it prohibits, in order to establish a sanctioning regime that guarantees its observance and sanctions the violation of the prohibition established therein. To that extent, this Court considers that the administrative act issued by the Contraloría General de la República and which was subsequently endorsed by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, suffers from a defect in its content, being a defect of an absolute nature because it affects one of the substantial elements of the administrative act under review, under the protection of the provisions of articles 166 in relation to articles 169 to 172, all of Law No. 6227, Ley General de la Administración Pública. The foregoing, because the content of said act is completely remiss, failing to issue even a cursory analysis on the appropriateness of the supplementary application of other punitive legal norms in order to supplement the normative gap that article 127 of the Código Municipal has, by not establishing any sanction in case of its breach and non-observance. The challenged act is also completely silent regarding the analogical application of specific legal norms issued by the legislator for the protection of the treasury and public funds, to punish a violation committed not against the public treasury, but against the duty of probity, which is the conduct incurred by Mr. Óscar Figueroa Fieujeam.

In addition to this defect in the content of the act, this jurisdictional body considers that the challenged administrative actions also lack a defect in the grounds, as they have no legal basis, since there is no legal rule that specifically and expressly sanctions the violation of the prohibition established in Article 127 of the Código Municipal, nor is there a special and express rule that sanctions a Municipal Mayor with the loss of credentials (pérdida de credenciales), in the event of incurring in any violation of said prohibitory rule [...]

The sanctioning administrative acts under attack in this proceeding have undoubtedly violated the principle of specificity and/or legality in administrative sanctioning matters, as well as the general provision established in numeral 253 of the Código Electoral transcribed in the preceding lines, which requires for cases of this magnitude, the prior existence of an *express* sanction contained in a legal-rank rule, to punish the respective conduct with it. Therefore, this Court concludes that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff, based on numerals 18 subsection d) and 137, both of the Código Municipal, as well as Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, becomes illegal, as it lacks legal support to sustain it, because the previously cited articles are not applicable to the specific case, in accordance with the considerations set forth in the preceding lines and because Article 127 of the current Código Municipal lacks a sanction expressly established by prior law that punishes the official who violates such prohibition with dismissal from his position or with the withdrawal of the respective credentials in the case of an official designated by popular election. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is necessary in this case to declare the absolute nullity of the following administrative acts: resolution No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, in which it was ordered to separate the plaintiff from his position as Alcalde Municipal de Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 hours on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 hours on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 hours on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Oscar Figueroa Fieujeam"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 13:10 hours on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in which it was ordered to cancel Mr. Óscar Figueroa Fieujeam's credential accrediting him as Alcalde of the Municipalidad de Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 08:31 hours on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. For parity of reason and consequently, the absolute nullity of the entire administrative sanctioning procedure brought against the plaintiff and which culminated in his dismissal from the position of alcalde municipal of Goicoechea and the withdrawal of his respective credentials is declared [...]

This Court does not owe itself to, nor will it subject itself to, political dimensioning or persecutory ideological interpretations that may prevail in any state institution; this Court owes itself to and subjects itself to legality, the current Constitución Política, and the law, and to that extent, applying the restrictive criteria of hermeneutics applicable since ancient times to sanctioning matters as well as the principle of legality that governs said matter and which establishes that sanctioning matters are reserved to the law, this Chamber cannot under any circumstances condone or validate the establishment of sanctions through analogy, using that interpretive method to complement "open" sanctioning types, or also those that others call "blank" types, being those sanctioning regulatory provisions that are not self-sufficient and that require that, through interpretation, a sanction applicable to a specific conduct be created when the legislator did not establish it in a punctual and express manner, which undoubtedly violates the most elementary pro-homine and pro-libertatis legal principles, which this collegiate body fully shares and advocates [...]

By virtue of having declared the lawsuit at hand with merit, according to what is set forth in the preceding considerandos, the sanctioning administrative procedure brought against the plaintiff is annulled in its entirety, and taking into consideration that this declaration has declaratory and retroactive effect to the start date of the referred procedure, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 131.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and 171 of Ley No.

6227, as a direct and immediate consequence thereof, any existing reference in any databases of the Contraloría General de la República and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones regarding the administrative procedure hereby annulled is also annulled, which must be executed immediately once this ruling becomes final." In that regard, it will be appropriate to accept the objections raised, with the effects that will be detailed below. (...)”.

From the transcribed considerative text, it is derived with crystal clarity that the judgment issued by the First Chamber of the Court proceeded to carry out a substantive analysis —and not merely a formal one— of the judicial process before us, that is, it proceeded to hear the merits of this matter, even arriving at a legal thesis different from the one held by this Chamber in the annulled judgment. But despite the foregoing, the high Court subsequently retraces its steps and proceeds to annul the judgment previously issued by this collegiate body of Judges, that is, it falls back on the formal analysis of the decision that was the subject of the substantive cassation analysis, and despite having partially issued its opinion on the merits of the process submitted for judgment in this jurisdiction, it then decides to annul the lower court judgment and order the return of the case file so that, again, this chamber may proceed to issue the lower court judgment, now for the fourth time. It is clearly evident that, in this case, there is a discrepancy of substantive legal criteria between two jurisdictional bodies: on the one hand, this Seventh Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, and on the other hand, the First Chamber of the Court, and to that extent, the appropriate course of action was evidently not to annul, but for the Chamber to proceed to resolve the present matter on the merits, exercising as superior the powers that the law assigns to it, and therefore, if it did not share the criterion of this chamber, to proceed to revoke what was decided and provide the solution that, in its opinion, was appropriate in accordance with the law and the merits of the case file, but not to invoke substantive or merits-based considerations to annul (a sanction par excellence applicable to formal defects of a judicial decision) the ruling submitted for its consideration. Yet despite the foregoing, it expressly so ordered in its sixth considering and in its operative part, the same sections that, in what is relevant, state:

“VI.- By virtue of the foregoing and in the terms indicated, the cassation appeals will be declared upheld. Consequently, the challenged judgment will be annulled. In its place, the case file will be remanded to the Court of origin so that it may resolve the plaintiff's arguments whose pronouncement was omitted. In that sense, it is evident in the case file that, when bringing this process, part of the cause of action was based on aspects relating to the lack of knowledge of the relationship of facts that motivated the disputed administrative procedure; the impropriety of the Internal Audit Office of the Local Government sending report DFOE-DI-1596 to the CGR (without first informing the Municipal Council or the Mayor of what occurred), the violation of the principle of access to information and, in general, of due process and the right of defense, as well as the lack of analysis regarding the seriousness of the notified conduct (proportionality of the recommended and applied sanction). Aspects not analyzed by the Judging body, given the manner in which they resolved the specific case. The foregoing justifies the remand of the case file to the Court of origin, so that it may examine the points in question, assess the defense arguments and the evidence provided, in order to avoid deciding the matter in a single instance, in violation of the right of defense and the review of the ruling by a second jurisdictional body. (...)". / THEREFORE / The appeals are declared upheld. Consequently, the challenged judgment is annulled. In its place, the remand of the case file to the Court of origin is ordered, so that it may resolve in accordance with the law." In addition to the foregoing, it must be indicated that from the wording given to the decision of the appellate body (a-quem), it is evident that it is the will of the Chamber that this Tribunal perform the legal analysis for the specific case, starting from the premise of validating the legal position defined in the decision that annuls our judgment, specifically regarding the regulatory integration that must be carried out to provide a legal basis for the sanction imposed by the defendant administration on Mr. Nombre126154, the Chamber concluding that a sanction of a legal nature does exist, provided for and applicable to the case under examination, a criterion which, although respectable in itself, this Tribunal does not share. And it is that one cannot lose sight of the fact that attempting to impose on a collegiate tribunal a legal criterion different from the one reached internally by its members, in any case implies a flagrant violation of the principle of judicial independence, which guarantees that persons exercising jurisdictional activity are subject only to the Constitution and the legislation in force (articles 39, 41, and 154 of the Political Constitution) and not to criteria foreign to the work carried out internally by the judicial body, nor even to jurisprudential criteria (with the exception of pronouncements issued by the Constitutional Chamber, as expressly established in Article 13 of Law No. 7135). And this applies whether said criterion is issued by a superior Court or by a body outside the jurisdiction. The judicial body on appeal cannot expect this Chamber to resolve according to its own opinion, as this would openly restrict the freedom of judgment of the adjudicator and the independence that each Judge of the Republic holds in the fulfillment of their functions when resolving the specific case, both criteria on which the national legal system is based, precisely guaranteed *ab initio* by the independence of the Judge, who is free to resolve what, in a grounded and reasoned manner, according to their loyal knowledge and understanding, they deem pertinent in each process, although always subject to and in accordance with the legal order in force, being removed from any type of interference when issuing their criterion in the judgment in question. A principle of judicial independence which also entails the right of the parties appearing in court for the resolution of their disputes, that their matters be reviewed by an independent judge in terms of legal criterion, at each instance. By reason of the foregoing and under the protection of what is indicated in numeral 170 of Law No. 7333 Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and its amendments, which establishes that the tribunals shall not sustain competence with the superior body exercising jurisdiction over them, this Chamber will proceed again to issue judgment for the matter submitted for our knowledge, but not as ordered by the First Chamber in the annulment judgment it issued, but rather as this collegiate body of Judges considers appropriate for the specific case. It cannot be omitted to state that despite what was previously set forth, the questions argued by the parties regarding the propriety or not of carrying out the administrative procedure, is a matter of merit already elucidated in the decision issued by the First Chamber of the Court when it annulled the judgment of this Tribunal for the second time, acting as the Court of Cassation for Contentious-Administrative matters, which also already expressly clarified, making a pronouncement on the merits in that jurisdictional act, that the recommendation issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic within the sanctioning procedure in question is binding. This, despite the clear impropriety of the legal technique lately used by the said Chamber.

**II. Regarding the proven facts.** Of importance for the resolution of the present matter, the following are considered duly proven, finding support in the elements of conviction cited in their support: **1.** That Mrs. Nombre126155, is the mother of Nombre126156, born on January 7, 1990, with Mr. Nombre126156 appearing as his registered father (see folio 03 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **2.** That Mr. Nombre126154 is the spouse of Mrs. Nombre126155, whom he married on March 2, 2007 (see folio 0002 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic). **3.** That the plaintiff was designated as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea in the municipal elections for the 2007-2011 period, subsequently being reelected in the elections held on December 5, 2010, and was so declared by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in resolution No. 0019-E11-2011 *“Declaratoria de Elección de alcaldes y vicealcaldes de las Municipalidades de los cantones de la provincia de San José, para el período constitucional comprendido entre el siete de febrero del dos mil once y el treinta de abril de dos mil dieciséis”* (fact not controverted by the parties, the case file, and consultation made by this Tribunal to the electronic addresses "http://www.gaceta.go.cr/pub/2012/01/31/COMP_31_01_2012.pdf" and "Dirección15291". **4.** That by official letter No. AG-1073-2009 dated April 27, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 in the Dirección15290. of the Department of Street Cleaning of the municipality for a period of two months (see folio 05 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **5.** That on April 27, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 183-2009 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal janitor for a period of two months (see folios 06 to 08 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **6.** That by official letter No. AG-1793-2009 dated June 25, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 in the Dirección18863. for a period of two months (see folio 10 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **7.** That on June 27, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 251-2009 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal janitor for a period of two months (see folios 11 to 13 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **8.** That on August 26, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 349-2009 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal janitor for a period of two months (see folios 15 to 17 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **9.** That by official letter No. AG-3765-2009 dated December 11, 2009, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 in the Dirección18863. for a period of two months (see folio 24 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **10.** That on December 27, 2009, fixed-term employment contract No. 523-2009 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal janitor for a period of two months (see folios 25 to 27 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **11.** That by official letter No. AG-0629-2010 dated March 8, 2010, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 in the Dirección18863. for a period of two months (see folio 29 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **12.** That on March 8, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 095-2010 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as a municipal janitor for a period of two months (see folios 30 to 32 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **13.** That by official letter No. AG-953-2010 dated April 15, 2010, addressed to the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Municipality of Goicoechea, the plaintiff, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, requested the appointment of Nombre126156 to the position of Office Clerk a.í. for a period of two months, starting from April 18, 2010 (see folio 34 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **14.** That on March 8, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 197-1-2010 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as an office clerk a.í. for a period of two months (see folios 35 to 37 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **15.** That on June 18, 2010, fixed-term employment contract No. 304-1-2010 was signed between the Municipality of Goicoechea and Nombre126156, in which Mr. Nombre126156 was hired as an office clerk a.í. for a period of two months (see folios 39 to 41 of the administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **16.** That the plaintiff was subject to an administrative procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic under number DJ-83-2010 and initiated by unnumbered resolution at 3:00 p.m. on November 5, 2010, in which Mr. Nombre126154 was charged that, while serving as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea, he hired his stepson as an employee for said local government, thereby violating the prohibition established in Article 127 of the Municipal Code (see administrative case file in digital format, disc No.1 and folios 43 to 52 of the procedure followed against the plaintiff). **17.** That the respective oral hearing was held at 9:10 a.m. on January 18, 2011 (see folios 128 to 129 of the sanctioning procedure followed against the plaintiff). **18.** That said administrative sanctioning procedure culminated in the issuance of resolution PA-11-2011 at 12:00 p.m. on January 31, 2011, issued by the deciding body of the administrative procedure followed before the Comptroller General of the Republic, in which it was ordered: *"(...) 1. To declare Mr. Nombre126154 administratively responsible for the facts attributed in this administrative procedure, therefore recommending that he be sanctioned with dismissal without employer liability, which entails the cancellation of his credentials, in accordance with Article 39 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (sic), Article 18 subsection d) of the Municipal Code. (...)"*. Said resolution was notified to the plaintiff here on February 4, 2011. (See folios 47 to 60 of the case file and folios 131 to 144 of the administrative case file in digital format, disc No.1). **19.** That against what was decided, the now plaintiff filed an appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal on February 9, 2011 (see folios 146 to 154 of the administrative sanctioning procedure processed by the Comptroller General of the Republic against the plaintiff). **20.** That by unnumbered resolution at 12:00 p.m. on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the reversal sought by the now plaintiff was declared without merit (see folios 185 to 194 of the administrative sanctioning procedure processed by the controlling body against the plaintiff here). **21.** That by resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 at 10:00 a.m. on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the final act of the administrative sanctioning procedure followed against him was resolved, ordering its rejection and clarifying ex officio that the sanction recommendation issued was directed to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (folios 51 to 54 of the case file and administrative case file in digital format, disc No.1). **22.** That by official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic and addressed to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, said entity was informed of the final act issued within the administrative sanctioning procedure processed under number DJ-83-2010 against Mr. Nombre126154 (see folio 236 of the respective administrative sanctioning procedure). **23.** That by unnumbered resolution at 11:35 a.m. on September 20, 2011, issued by the investigating magistrate Luis Antonio Sobrado González, within the *"Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Nombre126154"*, the controlling body was asked to send a certified copy of the case file of the administrative sanctioning procedure (see folio 237 of the respective sanctioning procedure). **24.** That by unnumbered resolution at 10:40 a.m. on October 10, 2011, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal granted a hearing period to the now plaintiff to address the petition submitted by the Comptroller General of the Republic (see folios 240 to 255 of the indicated sanctioning case file). **25.** That by resolution No. 8184-M-2011 at 1:10 p.m. on December 16, 2011, issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, it was ordered to cancel the credentials of Mr. Nombre126154 that accredited him as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea and to designate Mrs. Nombre16153 as the new mayor and Mrs. Nombre154089 as the new vice-mayor (c.c. Nombre98993). (See folios 240 to 255 of the referred administrative sanctioning procedure). **26.** Against what was decided, the plaintiff filed an appeal for reconsideration, which was rejected by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal by resolution No. 253-M-2012 at 8:31 a.m. on January 17, 2012 (see folios 256 to 268 of the administrative sanctioning procedure). **27.** The present matter was filed in court on January 24, 2012 (see folio 01 of the case file). **28.** That Mr. Nombre126156 is the stepson by affinity, within the second degree of kinship by collateral line, of Mr. Nombre126154 (the case file).

**III. Facts not proven. 1.** That the salary paid to Mr. Nombre126156, stepson of Mr. Nombre126154, was higher than what corresponded for the position he held (there is no evidence in the case file in this regard). **2.** That Mr. Nombre126156, stepson of the plaintiff here, did not work in the position to which he was appointed, or worked in a position different from those of his appointments (there is no evidence in the case file in this regard). **3.** That Mr. Nombre126156 had received payment of his salary without performing the respective work (there is no evidence in the case file in this regard). 4.

That the petitioner Nombre126154 received any stipend, payment, or benefit from Mr. Nombre126156 to proceed with his appointment to a municipal position (there is no evidence in the record regarding this). 5. That a real and effective damage or economic injury was caused to the finances or assets comprising the municipal public treasury (hacienda pública municipal), in the case under review (there is no evidence in the record regarding this).

IV.The plaintiff argues, in support of his action and as a tight summary, that an administrative procedure was opened against him for having provisionally appointed his stepson as an official of the local government between April 27, 2009, and August 17, 2010, supposedly contravening Article 127 of the Municipal Code. He describes, in his view, the development of said procedure and points out that the final act was an act with its own effect, being binding as to the facts for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE), which is why he appealed it and his appeal was denied. That these resolutions are binding from a technical-factual standpoint for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. He affirms that it is not an electoral act, but a sanctioning administrative act, and furthermore, a complex administrative act, because the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, CGR) cannot cancel the credential of a council member (regidor) or elected official. He cites national doctrine and points out that a complex act is one formed by the will of two or more subjects or bodies, acting for the same purpose and with equal content or legal effect, it emanates from a complex body formed by the two or more that issue it, and the lack of any of them or their will annuls it. Therefore, he affirms that the act of canceling credentials is a complex act that requires the concurrence of the will of the CGR as the instructing and deciding body, and the will of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal as the executor of the proposed sanction, because the Comptroller's decision is binding. It is not an act of an electoral nature, but a typically administrative sanction. Because the CGR's resolutions regarding the facts are binding, he considers that any subsequent instance or appeal against them is a procedural farce. He maintains that if the procedure followed by the CGR is annulled, the resolution issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal will also be null, because that issued by the TSE is complementary or accessory to that issued by the CGR. He also affirms that if the act issued by the CGR is flawed in one of its elements, in this case the grounds (motivo) and the content, the TSE's resolution for the cancellation of credentials will also be flawed, as the flaws suffered by the first—that of the CGR—will also be suffered by the TSE's resolution. // He points out that the acts issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic suffer from the following flaws: These resolutions recommend canceling the mayor's credential for the administrative liability incurred when he provisionally appointed a person who is not a relative of Mr. Nombre126154, cites Article 127 of the Municipal Code, and points out that he has no affinity or consanguinity bond with the Mayor, as it is clear that the son of a person one is married to is not a relative in the direct or collateral line to oneself, especially since this is a person of legal age with a determined filiation. He affirms that in the opinion of IFAM, the children of spouses are not included within the express prohibition of Article 127 cited. He maintains that for having recommended that a person with whom there is no degree of kinship be hired, that is nothing. Therefore, he considers that the conduct is not sanctionable, it is atypical and does not fit into the cited regulatory assumption, so that numeral cannot be applied in this specific case. But despite this, the CGR set aside the will of the voting inhabitants of the canton of Goicoechea, without there being a norm or constitutional principle that establishes this, thereby violating due process (debido proceso) and principles of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), of mandatory compliance, and against the popular will, violating the principle of conservation of the electoral act. In the administrative venue, it was considered an unproven fact that Mr. Nombre126156 was the petitioner's son, or in any way recognized as his son-in-law, or that any filial bond mediated between them, to comply with numeral 127 of the Municipal Code. Therefore, the conduct is atypical and does not fit into the referred numeral 127, which cannot be applied to him. He argues that for specialists in family law, there is no family relationship, nor one of affinity. He points out that cited Article 127 does not indicate that there is an impediment for relatives by affinity of the officials mentioned in that Article to be municipal employees, so illegitimately extending what was established by the legislator becomes an extensive interpretation of the norm, which is improper in sanctioning matters, given that its interpretation must be restrictive in nature. Therefore, he considers that the directive body of the procedure erroneously recommends a sanction, based on an interpretive criterion that improperly extends what is set forth in the legal text, arrogating legislative powers that do not correspond to it, since in exclusive and sanctioning matters the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva de ley) governs. Furthermore, the norm that is sought to be applied does not refer in any way to the children of spouses, since there is no filiation between these and the active subject of the norm. The sanctioning power granted to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and exercised in its instruction by the CGR requires, for the cancellation of a credential, the commission of a specific conduct contemplated in a legal cause. He cites Article 253 of the Electoral Code, as it refers to the "cases expressly contemplated by law." He continues pointing out that this numeral was disapplied in the petitioner's case, and the CGR recommended the cancellation of his credentials, which violates the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) provided for in Articles 11 and 39 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration. He affirms that the interpretation given by the CGR to Article 127 is extensive and nullifies the principles of legality and specificity (tipicidad), and the sanction therefore violates the fundamental rights of Mr. Nombre126154. He continues stating that applying the power to cancel the credential of a popularly elected official for events that occurred in the exercise of a previous office is equivalent in its effects to a disqualification (inhabilitación), which is not possible due to the principle of restrictive interpretation that governs in sanctioning matters. He points out that the CGR's interpretation equates children with stepchildren, going so far as to consider that they are in the same category as children, this being an extensive interpretation lacking legal foundation that would undermine the institution of the family, by giving a consolidated legal institution new practical effects. // He accuses that during the development of the procedure, a series of irregularities occurred that hindered the petitioner's right of defense: -first, because official letter No. DFOE-DI-1576 was not in the administrative file (expediente administrativo) when the petitioner's lawyer went to review it, an official letter that corresponds to a statement of facts sent by the Acting Manager of the Complaints and Investigations Area of the Operational and Evaluative Audit Division of the CGR, an official letter that was the basis of the investigation conducted, and it is one day before the hearing (on January 17, 2011) through a resolution signed by the members of the directive body, that the copies of that statement of facts are made available to him; therefore, the suspension of the hearing was requested to assess the document, but this was denied, and the hearing was held. In the act of notification of charges (acto de traslado de cargos), the facts that generated the procedure were not made known, and the indicated official letter was made available to him the day before the hearing; that statement of facts does not even appear in official letter DFOE-DI-1596, so the petitioner did not know it, when according to Article 8 of the Law against Corruption, the documents and evidence of the investigations carried out by the internal audit that generate the opening of a procedure shall be confidential except for the parties involved, who shall have free access to all of them. -He considers that the Internal Audit should have informed the administration of what was happening, issuing a warning to the Mayor or the Human Resources Department, or to his hierarchical superior, the Municipal Council. He considers that going directly to the comptroller body is an act of bad faith. He cites Articles 22, 35, and 37 of the General Law of Internal Control, and Articles 45 and 47 of the Regulation of Organization and Functions of the Internal Audit Unit of the Municipality of Goicoechea, published in La Gaceta No. 16 of January 23, 2009. In that regard, he considers that the Internal Audit did not fulfill the preventive function of warning. He points out that the defendant CGR did not analyze the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, and neither did the TSE, because if they had done so, they would have realized that this law establishes a series of sanctions according to the seriousness of the fault. In addition, he adds that Article 41 of that law establishes the factors to be taken into consideration to assess the conduct of the alleged responsible person. Therefore, he considers that the appointment of the Mayor's stepson does not have the seriousness that the law indicates as to warrant canceling his Mayoral credential. That there is no injury to his economic interests, there was no negative impact on the public service, the salary that the official received was earned, he received the legal payment, and he was not favored by being paid more than the legally established sum. He points out that if the Audit had issued the warnings, the matter would not have gone further. -He accuses that resolution No. PA-011-2011 was not duly notified to him according to Article 38 of the Notifications Law, as it was not communicated to him before the hearing was held, which violated his right of defense. He invokes rulings No. 2004-04637 of April 30, 2004, and No. 16955-2007 of November 21, 2007, both from the Constitutional Chamber. He affirms that those listed are insurmountable flaws that lead to the nullity of what has been acted upon. -He indicates that the recommended sanctions were not proportional to the seriousness of the facts accredited in the procedure. -He maintains that the disapplication of substantive positive law norms is a cause for nullity of a resolution. And in his opinion, in his case, Article 41 of the Law against Illicit Enrichment was disapplied, as it was not indicated what economic interests of the public treasury the petitioner injured, nor were the damages and losses caused to the public treasury and the enrichment obtained by the petitioner accredited. Therefore, he considers that the administrative sanction imposed fails to analyze administrative culpability, which implies disapplying cited Article 41, but despite there being no analysis of culpability, it is recommended to apply the most severe sanction against a popularly elected official. He cites resolution No. R-DC-19S-2011 of 3:00 p.m. on December 8, 2011, issued for a similar case concerning Mr. Nombre16454, where the sanction applied was suspension for 15 days without pay, being a fault, in his opinion, much more serious than that of Mr. Nombre126154, to whom, on the contrary, the most serious possible sanction was applied. He affirms that due process, the principle of parallelism of forms, the democratic principle, and that of popular will were violated. If the Mayor was appointed by the people, the only one legitimized to remove him is the people, in accordance with the principles and bases of the plebiscite. He cites as an example what happened in Nombre265. He invokes the unconstitutionality of Articles 220, 223, and 253 of Law No. 8765, the current Electoral Code, and of resolutions No. 6673-M-2011, No. 7105-M-2011, and No. 8184-M-2011, all from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in order to file an action of unconstitutionality. He concludes indicating that the challenged acts present serious flaws of nullity in their grounds (motivo) and content, which makes them deserving of that nullity being declared. He reiterates that both resolutions are disproportionate and disapply norms related to the assessment of administrative fault, proposing the most severe sanction for such cases and the most serious for someone holding a popularly elected office. He affirms that the canton of Goicoechea is the second in terms of development and growth due to the management of Mayor Nombre126154, who served one term in said office and was re-elected for a second term. Therefore, he requests that this proceeding be declared with merit. For its part, the representation of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic states that in the act of opening the procedure, he was charged for violation of Article 127 of the Municipal Code and for violation of the duty of probity, according to Article 3 of Law No. 8422, Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service. In the opening act, the directive body clearly stated that the administrative file was made available to the petitioner from the moment said act was issued, on November 5, 2011, and it was indicated in detail which evidence comprised the file. When the petitioner requests the statement of facts, in his request he points out that it does not appear within the administrative file that he had photocopied, so it is not true that he was given access to the file 23 hours before the oral hearing. That statement of facts was not part of the administrative file nor of the charges, being only an input to prepare the opening act, and it had no relevance regarding the right of defense and due process. During the oral hearing, it was clarified to the petitioner that the facts charged were only those contained in the act opening the procedure—a file that was always at his disposal—and to which the petitioner had access, having no reason to exercise his right of defense regarding that "statement of facts." Therefore, it is completely false that this statement of facts was evidence against him, being only an input for the investigation. Resolution PA-011-2011 of January 31, 2011, was issued by the deciding body and not by the directive body of the procedure, and it broadly addresses this issue of the "statement of facts." The petitioner filed an appeal for revocation and subsidiary appeal against the final resolution of the administrative procedure, which were rejected by resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of August 22, 2011. Against resolution No. 8184-M-2012 of December 16, 2011, issued by the TSE removing the petitioner from office and appointing Mrs. Nombre16153 as mayor, it was challenged through a motion for reconsideration that was declared without merit by resolution No. 253-M-2012 of January 17, 2012. It cites file No. 12-000748-1027-CA and points out that the same facts are being discussed in that matter as in the present case. It affirms that the CGR is a non-active, oversight, and vigilance administration. This involves a tripartite relationship between the CGR, the respective public servant, and the authority called to impose the sanction, in this case the TSE. The latter is not substituted by the act issued by the comptroller body, bindingly recommending the imposition of the sanction. The cancellation of credentials is the result of the administrative procedure carried out by the CGR and culminates with the execution by the TSE upon the binding recommendation of sanction issued by the comptroller body, as indicated by the Electoral Code and constitutional jurisprudence. The act of dismissal issued by the TSE makes effective the binding recommendation of sanction issued by the CGR, and that execution phase implies the withdrawal of the credential. Both the grounds (motivo), and the content and the purpose (fin) of the binding recommendation act for the TSE, in this specific case, refer to the public treasury. The grounds of the act issued by the CGR are the factual and legal reasons that lead to establishing a judgment of administrative liability against a popularly elected municipal official who violated the legal system. The content of the administrative conduct is the binding recommendation of sanction in itself, this being the result of the procedure processed by the comptroller body. The purpose of said conduct is a matter of protection of the public treasury. It points out that according to numeral 183 of the Political Constitution, it grants the CGR the function of oversight and control of the public treasury, and according to Article 8 of Law No. 7428, the liability of public officials constitutes one of the objective components of the public treasury, therefore the CGR can carry out administrative procedures and demand that sanctions be applied when required. And this because the CGR is a superior body of control and vigilance of the public treasury. The causes of liability to determine sanctions come from the LGAP, the Administrative Contracting Law, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment and its regulation, the Financial Administration Law, and the Organic Law of the CGR. Article 127 of the Municipal Code protects the public interest by eradicating nepotism and purifying public service. That norm indicates an impediment for relatives by affinity to be municipal employees, when it speaks of relatives in the direct line up to the third degree inclusive. It affirms that according to international doctrine and jurisprudence, between the spouse and the children of the other, a relationship of kinship by affinity in the first degree is generated, so the stepson, the stepfather, and the stepmother are in a degree of affinity. Nombre126156 being the son of the petitioner's spouse, with respect to her he has a first degree by consanguinity and also a first degree with Mr. Nombre126154, but by affinity. And this does not imply any extensive application of the cited article nor a violation of the principle of legality or specificity. Therefore, the issued resolutions are in accordance with the law, as one should not distinguish where the law—referenced art. 127—does not distinguish. The cancellation of credentials is provided for in our legal system for specific cases, therefore the principle of legality has not been violated, neither by the TSE nor by the CGR in bindingly recommending the sanction. It cites again Article 253 of the Electoral Code and 18 of the Municipal Code, Article 73 of the Organic Law of the CGR, and Article 39 of the Law against Corruption, to conclude based on said numerals that the principle of legality was not violated by the CGR, there being no discretion or atypicality whatsoever. There is no evidence that was not incorporated into the administrative file from the beginning of the procedure. Therefore, the plaintiff is arguing for nullity to be declared for nullity's sake, based on a series of superfluous arguments, when in the present matter due process was never infringed. The act opening the procedure contained a clear, precise, and detailed description of the facts imputed to the petitioner, the evidence on which said charges were based, and the possible sanction to be imposed on him. It considers that no damage or grievance has been caused to the petitioner, his arguments being therefore unfounded, as he had access to the administrative file from the beginning, and the petitioner himself indicated this in the written request in which he asked for the "statement of facts." It affirms that there was also no violation of the principle of access to information, since he made the request to the comptroller body and the CGR provided him with a copy of it, although it did not form part of the administrative file. Regarding the disproportion of the applied sanction, it points out Article 41 of the Law against Corruption, Article 17 of the Municipal Code, affirming that the mayor is the first called to respect the rule of law (bloque de legalidad) and to have an impeccable conduct and be an example for others. The situation of the petitioner and his stepson involves a serious conflict of interest and violates the principle of legality, probity, and transparency. Furthermore, the faults incurred by mayors affect the credibility of local governments and transmit a negative message to other municipal employees. The fault in this specific case affected a community and social public interest, because society decided to trust the diligence of a popularly elected official—the mayor—but he placed personal interest above the public interest he was called to satisfy, thereby breaking the principle of legality and transparency. Therefore, and for the reasons expressed in the challenged administrative acts, it points out that the applied sanction is reasonable and proportionate, by virtue of the serious fault that was accredited in the administrative procedure, compared to the content and the public interest protected in numeral 127 of the Municipal Code. Damage does not only exist when the public treasury is economically affected; damage can be of various types, and in the specific case we are dealing with an interest of a social and community nature, and the suitability that should be held by someone occupying a position of such investiture, placing public interest above their private interest. It considers it wrong to affirm that the parallelism of forms must be applied in this case, and therefore, to remove a mayor, the people are the only ones legitimized to remove him, because the legal system establishes that the matter of canceling credentials is subject to law, and in that regard, the participation that the TSE has in the administrative procedure. It refers to Articles 102, section 10) of the Political Constitution and 220 of the Electoral Code, 18 of the Municipal Code, and 73 of the Organic Law of the CGR. It considers that there is a lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) regarding the CGR, as well as a lack of right concerning the petitioner's position (folios 078 to 111 of the judicial file). On the other hand, the State representation argues that from the issuance of the order opening the administrative procedure, the CGR indicated that the administrative file was available to the petitioner, and all the evidence added to said file was listed. Therefore, it is not true that access to the file was authorized 23 hours before the oral hearing. The sanctioning resolution was issued by the deciding body at 12:00 p.m. on January 31, 2011, and the operative part of said resolution indicated that the sanction entailed the cancellation of credentials. The sanctioning act is a complex act. It affirms that the administrative procedure sustained by the CGR and the resolution issued by the CGR and sent to the TSE are not acts with their own effect, as the recommendation may or may not be accepted by the TSE, therefore not being an automatically binding act. It cites resolution No. 253-M-2012. It affirms that it is the responsibility of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic to investigate and give its recommendation, it is responsible for substantiating the procedure against popularly elected officials who are attributed with the commission of a fault against the public treasury, and based on such procedure, to issue the sanctioning recommendation to the TSE, a recommendation that entails a technical component that is binding concerning elements related to the public treasury. Therefore, the facts accredited by virtue of the procedure as well as the technical elements in the matter of its specialty are the technical aspects that are fixed in the CGR's recommendation and are binding for the TSE. It considers that it is the act of canceling credentials that is the final decision (causa estado), because the CGR's recommendation by itself does not generate sanctioning legal effects; this is the responsibility of the TSE. Therefore, the act of recommendation cannot be challenged autonomously, but rather the challenge regime of the act that adopts the recommendation and is the final decision governs. It considers that there is a lack of current interest because the cancellation of the petitioner's credentials by the TSE has already occurred. It points out that in sanctioning matters, interpretation must be restrictive, as these are acts that negatively affect subjective rights, but in this matter, there was no extensive reading of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, because the norm speaks of "relatives" (parientes), which includes relatives by consanguinity and by affinity, one cannot distinguish where the law does not. Therefore, it affirms that regarding the stepson, there is a kinship bond—as a child by affinity—the norm being correctly applied to the specific case, because the petitioner promoted his stepson in the Municipality, an aspect of kinship by affinity that was extensively developed by the TSE in resolution No. 253-M-2012. The norm refers to all relatives, including by consanguinity and by affinity, therefore, one cannot speak of an improper application of the norm, nor is it appropriate to deny the bond between the petitioner and Nombre126156. Regarding the legal criteria provided by the petitioner, it considers that these are private works commissioned by him himself, lacking support, but which in any case reaffirm the State's position. Therefore, it affirms that there was no type of discretionary action, nor is there any flaw in the exercise of the sanctioning power, nor any infringement of the principle of legality. The principle of specificity is not violated because the petitioner's conduct violated Article 127 of the Municipal Code, 11 of the General Law of Public Administration, and Articles 10, 12, 13, 15, and 16 of the General Law of Internal Control, as well as 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment. As for the cancellation of credentials, this sanction finds support in Article 253 of the Electoral Code, 18 of the Municipal Code, and Article 73 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. It considers that there are no flaws of nullity, because the act opening the administrative procedure contains a clear, precise, and detailed notice of the charges of the facts and the possible sanctioning consequences thereof. It also enumerated the evidentiary documents that formed the file, for a better defense of the interested party, and the administrative file was made available to him. The document of the alleged "statement of facts" that the petitioner claims he missed cannot have any impact on the exercise of the right of defense, as it was not part of the administrative file, and although at the beginning it was an input used by the CGR, it later loses relevance, because what acquires true importance and effects is the list of facts set out in the opening resolution. It was only regarding the aspects of such charges that the interested party had to exercise his defense. Not knowing this statement of facts document in no way affected his right of defense. Therefore, the request for the same that the petitioner presented before the CGR, and for which he received a response on January 17 of the current year—one day before the oral hearing—did not affect due process at all, because the document was provided to him due to his interest in having it, but it was not part of the administrative file.

In analyzing the contested administrative resolution of the CGR, No. PA-011-2011, its reasoning at all times refers to the evidentiary elements that form the administrative file, to which the interested party had full access at all times during the procedure, thereby having ample opportunity for defense, without the existence of the nullity defects he alleges. The plaintiff is unaware of the function of internal audits, whose most important function is the preparation of reports for the improvement of administrative management, which are presented to the head of the institution so that the recommendations they contain may be implemented, and the institutional hierarchy may in turn clear up its doubts and make observations. But when it comes to sanctioning recommendations, they are brought to the attention of the head of the institution generally when the faults have been committed by their subordinates, so that the hierarchy may order the opening of the respective administrative procedures. When it comes to findings that point to the commission of a possible fault by the head of the institution, for reasons of legality, logic, and convenience, it is referred to the oversight body, as the CGR is the governing body of the internal control system, so that it may assess the case and eventually initiate proceedings against the head of the institution, all of which it considers lawful and devoid of any defect. It continues stating that the eventual warnings that the internal auditor may issue to the hierarchy in preventive matters are different from the preparation of reports with sanctioning recommendations for faults found, the latter scenario being what occurred in the present case. The sanction is not disproportionate, as it is consistent with the proven irregularity, since numeral 127 combats nepotism in the public function. It affirms that the conduct of the mayor, as the superior of the local government, must be beyond reproach and a guiding example for his subordinates. The CGR extensively substantiated the recommendation for separation and clearly addressed all the elements taken into account to assess the specific case. For the sanctioning resolution, elements were taken into account such as the express parameter of subsection e) of Article 41 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, subsection b) of Article 108 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera, which indicate that the rank and functions of the servant are a criterion to consider, the higher the rank, the greater the obligation to assess the legality, timeliness, and convenience of the acts issued, norms that echo Article 213 of the LGAP. Therefore, the mayor had a greater obligation to act in accordance with the law, according to the functions given to him by Article 17 of the Código Municipal. It points out that the plaintiff's appointment of his stepson in the same municipality where he worked entails a serious situation of conflict of interest, violating the duty of probity of Article 3 of Law No. 8422, in addition to being an action - in its opinion - contrary to legality and the principle of transparency that he should have honored. This conduct harms public interests and social values, as it involves a popularly elected official in a democratic system. For this reason, it affirms that the sanction is proportionate and reasonable given the fault committed and the level of rank the plaintiff held. Regarding the comparison with other cases, it indicates that the party cannot make comparisons, as the totality of the particular conditions of those other cases is unknown. The popular election of a public official does not imply that their dismissal for serious fault in the performance of their duties must be agreed upon by popular election, which it considers absurd, when dealing with acts that evidently cannot be the subject of such a decision. The exercise of a popularly elected office remains subject to the rule of law, and the legal system establishes that the cancellation of credentials is a matter subject to the law, according to numerals 220 and 253 of the Código Electoral, 3 and 41 of Law 8422, 18 of the Código Municipal, and 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Furthermore, the case at hand is totally different from the situation experienced with the mayor of Nombre265. For the foregoing reasons, it requests that the lawsuit be declared without merit in all its aspects (folios 150 to 189 of the judicial file).</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">The representation of the co-defendant </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Nombre16153</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">,</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">states in support of its positions that the plaintiff was sanctioned for violating Articles 127 of the Código Municipal, Article 3 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, and Article 14 of the Regulations to said law. It affirms that it was more than two months before the oral and private hearing that the administrative file was made available to the plaintiff, specifically in the act of November 5, 2010, the act opening the procedure. It points out that it is not true that the act issued by the CGR is one with its own legal effect, nor is it binding on the TSE; that the plaintiff does not specify why the CGR resolutions are vitiated with nullity, and such defects do not exist either. It affirms that the actions carried out by the CGR are completely valid as they are based on documentary evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff took steps 7 times to appoint his stepson in the town hall. Actions which he does not indicate in his lawsuit whether or not he performed them, but he does not deny having committed them. The referred actions violate Article 127 of the Código Municipal, because the legal position of the plaintiff is erroneous, since the term relatives includes both those by consanguinity or affinity, considering that in the case of the children of his spouse - stepchildren - it is a bond by affinity with the stepfather, therefore pointing out that the conduct is not atypical. It maintains that no legal norm in our country establishes that relatives by affinity inherit or have the right to demand a pension from a person, and affirms that proof of this is that parents-in-law, sons-in-law, or daughters-in-law of a person do not inherit nor can they demand alimony. It considers appointing a public official based on family or personal interests without considering their suitability to be flawed conduct. The fact that the auditor did not warn him does not exempt him from sanction, the withdrawal of credentials being based on Articles 18 and 127 of the Código Municipal, 3 and 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, 14 of the regulations to said law, Articles 253 of the Código Electoral and Article 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. It points out that there were no violations of the right of defense, since the initial order of indictment was served on the plaintiff personally as of November 19, 2010, so he had almost 2 months to request a document, in addition to the fact that said resolution indicates all the existing evidence against the plaintiff. The document referred to by the plaintiff is not cited within said resolution nor was it part of the administrative file, therefore, it considers that requesting a document a few days before the hearing seems more like a maneuver generating an excuse to request nullity, as he is doing. The plaintiff does not explain why said document was important for the case, in order to assess whether or not it generated defenselessness, and that document was not even considered as evidence to recommend the sanction of dismissal; in any case, the CGR relied on the abundant evidence to recommend the sanction. Even hypothetically eliminating the cited document, the acts of the oversight body have sufficient supporting evidence to ground the recommendation for cancellation of credentials. The TSE, through resolution No. 8184-M-2011, ruled on the violations of due process and the right of defense, indicating that there were none. Article 36 subsection c) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo indicates that the claim is admissible against final, definitive acts, or procedural acts with a legally binding effect, the actions of the CGR challenged by the plaintiff lacking such effect, as they constitute a recommendation directed to the TSE. Upon hearing the motion for reconsideration, in resolution No. 253-M-2012, the TSE addressed the issue, indicating that what is binding from the CGR's recommendation is its technical opinion, not its legal opinion, the latter corresponding to the TSE, which acts as an electoral judge, its pronouncements having the character of material res judicata. Therefore, it points out that it is the sanctioning act that exhausts administrative remedies, and the CGR's recommendation cannot generate sanctioning legal effects. In the event that the recommended party accepts the recommendation, the elements proper to the recommendation are communicated to the sanctioning act, the recommendation becoming an integral and substantial part of the sanctioning act, forming an act with legally binding effect that exhausts administrative remedies and cannot be appealed in this jurisdiction according to numeral 103 of the Constitución Política, and for this reason, it considers there is a lack of current interest, as the contested act is unappealable, the decision of the TSE being final. Therefore, it requests that the lawsuit be declared without merit in all its aspects (folios 275 to 284 of the judicial file).</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">V. On the merits of the matter:</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Without disregarding what is set forth in the first recital of this judgment, it must be noted that, as the plaintiff correctly indicates, in this case, the contested act corresponds to an act classified by public law doctrine as "complex," and furthermore, indeed, the opinion rendered by the Contraloría General de la República for this type of matter - the very opinion being contested in this sub judice matter - is binding on the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Indeed, we are not dealing with an electoral act but rather an administrative sanctioning act. Now then, as can be observed from the court records and from the decision of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia acting as a cassation court, in the case at hand, the legal point to be elucidated corresponds, firstly, to establishing whether numeral 127 of the Código Municipal encompasses in its wording the prohibition against hiring a stepson in a municipality where the position of municipal mayor is held, which occurs in the present case, the court therefore having to refer to the determination of a restriction on the fundamental right of access to work, in this case, to public employment. In order to, subsequently, determine the legal adequacy of the sanction that was applied to the plaintiff Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">as mayor of the canton of Goicoechea, by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and by virtue of the recommendation issued to that effect by the oversight body.</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">But to carry out said analysis, it is imperative to first establish that the regime of Fundamental Rights is undoubtedly a mandatory analysis for the elucidation of this dispute, as it is the criterion of this Chamber that the legal regime of the right of access to the public function pertains to that fundamental legal sphere. Indeed, access to public office is a fundamental right, derived from its regulation in international human rights instruments, despite not being expressly contemplated in our current Constitución Política. Therefore, like any fundamental right, it can indeed be restricted, but only by means of a law in the formal and material sense, in pursuit of that balance between the rights of individuals and the general public interest which, in this specific case, translates into the pursuit of transparency, objectivity, independence of judgment, and impartiality in the exercise of the public function.</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">This implies that it is for the law to establish the conditions of access to the service, which necessarily includes the eligibility conditions, as well as the establishment of regimes of</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> prohibitions and incompatibilities pertaining to public posts or offices. These latter three conditions tend to safeguard and maintain objectivity and impartiality on the part of the official in the exercise of the public function, for which it is sought that there be no latent conflict of interest between the function deployed and its confrontation with other activities carried out by the servant, particularly of a private nature.</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Therefore, as it involves sensitive subject matter, with the restriction or limitation of a fundamental right at stake, one must resort to the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) as the appropriate mechanism for its regulation or to establish restrictions on the right of free access to public employment. This implies that eligibility conditions must be established by law, as well as ineligibilities and incompatibilities for accessing the office, because these ineligibilities and incompatibilities entail a restriction on the fundamental right, which obliges the application of constitutional principles regarding the legal regime of fundamental rights.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In this regard, one may consult, among others, vote of the Sala Constitucional No. 545-97 of 2:30 p.m. on January 28, 1997.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In accordance with these principles, the restriction and delimitation of the scope of a human right can only be developed by means of law - principle of reserve (principio de reserva) - its regulation through the implementation of normative provisions of infra-legal rank being prohibited, an aspect on which votes No. 3502-92 of 4:00 p.m. on November 24, 1992, No. 3173-93 of 2:57 p.m. on July 6, 1993, No. 2312-95 of 4:15 p.m. on May 9, 1995, No. 5393-97 of 3:18 p.m. on September 5, 1997, No. 18-29-99 of 4:09 p.m. on March 10, 1999, all issued by the Sala Constitucional, may be consulted. Likewise, it is necessary to emphasize that the delegation of the issuance of normative regulations on this matter is not viable, and furthermore, the restrictions imposed on the fundamental right must find support in the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality that permeate the entirety of the current legal system. (In this sense, votes No. 5058-93 of 2:20 p.m. on October 14, 1993; No. 3929-95 of 3:24 p.m. on July 18, 1995, No. 2883-96 of 5:00 p.m. on June 13, 1996, and No. 6273-96 of 3:30 p.m. on November 19, 1996, among others; all emanating from the Costa Rican constitutional court). In fact, on numerous occasions, the Sala Constitucional has addressed the topic under study, regarding the principle of legal reserve or statutory reservation (reserva de ley), when it comes to establishing limits on fundamental rights, stating in this regard, as pertinent: </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-left:35.5pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0; padding-left:31pt"><span style="width:35.5pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">'Regarding the alleged violation of Article 28, (...) in judgment No.</span><span> </span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">3550-92 of 4:00 p.m. on November 24, 1992... the Chamber stated that </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">indeed, fundamental rights and liberties are subject to </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">certain restrictions, but only to those that are necessary by </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">virtue of democratic and constitutional values. However, for</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">a restriction to be "necessary", it is required that it be "useful", "reasonable", </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">"timely" and must imply the "existence of an imperative need" that</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">supports the restriction. For restrictions on liberty to be</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">constitutionally and internationally lawful, they must be oriented towards the</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">satisfaction of an imperative public interest; to achieve this, one must: 1) choose that which</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">restricts the protected right to the least extent, 2) there must be proportionality between the restriction and the interest that justifies it, 3) it must closely conform to the achievement of that legitimate objective, and 4) it must be socially imperative and therefore, exceptional, and as such, must be interpreted restrictively, meaning in case of doubt,</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">liberty should always be preferred within the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values.</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Regarding the present action of unconstitutionality, the Chamber considers</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">that it is not constitutionally possible to introduce a prohibition of this</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">type in a Decreto Ejecutivo, because this matter is reserved for Law (...)"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> (Vote No. 6198-95 of November 14, 1995).</span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial">Therefore, this jurisdictional body cannot ignore that when carrying out the hermeneutic exercise on normative provisions that establish limitations or restrictions on fundamental rights, the parameter for interpretation must undoubtedly be restrictive - not expansive - and even more so when we are in the presence of normative provisions that establish eligibility and/or incompatibility requirements for holding a public office; without neglecting, of course, the public purpose that is intended to be satisfied in the legal norm under analysis, for in carrying out the interpretive exercise, the Judge must, in this case, seek to safeguard the public interest that the legislator tried to protect when establishing the limitation or incompatibility; although always in a balanced manner and avoiding the irrational or disproportionate constriction of the fundamental right of access to public employment. All this, in order to obtain an adequate balance between the fundamental right and the protected public purpose at stake.</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">The Sala Constitucional has so indicated when addressing the issue of the incompatibility regime for members of the Supreme Powers, stating in this regard:</span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">"In the first place, it must be mentioned that the Legislator is empowered to establish for public servants the incompatibilities and prohibitions it deems pertinent for the functioning of the State, in particular, the provision of its services. However, this power is subject to the principle of constitutional supremacy, which imposes the mandatory observance of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, under which the provisions enacted by the Legislator must be examined. Thus, in this matter, said principle requires – as stated in the preceding recital – that the norms aim to prevent the so-called "conflict or opposition of interests", to ensure the impartiality of the servants of the Administration. Likewise, the means used by the State to avoid the aforementioned conflict must not place the recipient in a situation that renders the enjoyment of their fundamental rights nugatory. Ultimately, they must not cause greater evils than those they intend to prevent; that is, they must not violate the fundamental rights recognized in the Constitution and in the International Human Rights Instruments in force in the Republic." (Vote No. 2001-01749 of March 7, 2001)</span></p><p style="margin-top:7.9pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial">Indeed, the existence of so-called eligibility requirements implies </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">per se</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> that a person who does not meet the conditions established by law to access a public post is unable to be appointed to said office, thus becoming, tacitly, a condition of ineligibility for the post. The foregoing without prejudice, obviously, to the existence of legal provisions that expressly establish and enumerate the circumstances that will entail the corresponding ineligibility; all under the prudent discretion of the legislator, who could well establish, as it has indeed done, that the performance of the office is incompatible with the performance of certain public or private activities or in relation to a specific post. This implies that although the applicant meets the legally established eligibility conditions, an incompatibility ground may well exist that limits their appointment or tenure in a certain post. Unlike ineligibility conditions - which usually respond to conditions intrinsic to the applicant - incompatibilities are based above all on the opposition of interests, as well as on the need to maintain independence and impartiality in the exercise of the public function, all with the aim of guaranteeing its most correct and effective exercise. The regulation of incompatibilities in a legal norm is a manifestation of the principle of transparency that governs the work of the public administration and constitutes one of the fundamental pillars governing its actions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the express establishment of various types of incompatibilities provided for in a legal norm has as its guiding principle the attempt to prevent nepotism</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> ("nepotismo // From Lat. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">nepos, -otis</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> 'nephew', 'descendant' and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">-ismo. // </span><span style="font-family:Arial">1. m. Excessive preference that some give to their relatives for public concessions or employments", according to a search performed by this Court on the website of the Real Academia de la Lengua Española), as a manifestation of administrative corruption. Nepotism is, in essence, a flagrant violation of the principle of equality in access to public offices, because the designation of the official is not based on their suitability and the pursuit of more efficient action by the public administration, but on providing advantageous treatment to a relative or close person with whom one has some family bond and therefore, some degree of interest.</span></p><p style="margin-top:7.9pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">VI. </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Based on the foregoing, this Court considers that in this specific case, it is imperative to bring up the provision of numeral 127 of the Código Municipal cited above, which reads literally: </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-left:37.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">"Article 127- Those who are spouses or relatives, in direct or collateral line up to the third degree inclusive, of any of the council members (concejales), the Mayor, the Auditor, the Directors or Personnel Chiefs of the recruitment and selection units may not be municipal employees, nor, in general, those in charge of choosing candidates for municipal posts. // The designation of any</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">of the officials listed in the preceding paragraph shall not affect the municipal employee</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">who is the spouse or relative thereof, appointed previously." </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.9pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial">From the transcribed legal text, it follows with crystal clarity and without need for greater effort, that the legislator expressly established a restriction for accessing the municipal employment regime in the case of an existing family bond, direct or collateral, that is within the third degree inclusive, in relation to the members of the Municipal Council, the municipal auditor, or the mayor, which implies an express legal impossibility for designation to a municipal position for anyone who holds such a degree of kinship. Now, in the second paragraph, the cited regulation also states that should such a situation arise, the official who was designated first shall remain in their post, and the subsequent appointment of their relative shall not be made. In the present case, although it is true there is no consanguinity bond between the plaintiff Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Mr. Nombre126156 </span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> , as has been proven in the list of proven facts supporting this resolution, it is also true that Mr. Nombre126156 is the son of the person who has been the plaintiff's spouse since 2007, Mrs. Nombre126155</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">. That is, before assuming his position as municipal mayor of Goicoechea, Mr. Nombre126154 already had at</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">least some degree of closeness in relation to Mr. Nombre126156 </span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> , by virtue of the existing marital bond with Mrs. Nombre126155 .</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> However, said article does not expressly and in detail indicate which persons are specifically subject to the prohibition, merely stating that the dictated refusal shall be applicable to those united by a direct or collateral bond up to the third degree, which is why it falls to the legal operator, in each specific case, to carry out the corresponding assessment and interpretation and determine whether a subject falls within the comprehensive scope of the legal restriction under study. Given the breadth and vagueness that the wording of the norm presents, we must seek the possibility of applying various methods of legal interpretation.</span> The foregoing leads us to invoke the provisions of Article 10 of the current Civil Code, which establishes the hermeneutic criteria that must be applied by the legal operator when interpreting a normative provision. Said article states, in what is of interest:

"(…) Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose." The transcribed article establishes the criteria for interpreting legal norms in the Costa Rican legal system, contemplating in turn a variety of hermeneutic methodologies, namely, literal interpretation, historical-social interpretation as reflected in the minutes and legislative file, and the will or spirit embodied by the legislator at the time of creating the respective legal norm. Having clarified the foregoing, this Chamber must turn to analyzing whether, based on the provisions of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, there exists or not any legal link between the plaintiff and Mr. Nombre126156, within the third degree of kinship, that could have in some way affected the appointments made in the Municipality of Goicoechea in his favor —at the request of the plaintiff herein— and that may be considered a violation of the prohibition established in the aforementioned Article 127. Regarding the concept of kinship, the most qualified national doctrine has referred to this topic for a long time, stating in what is of interest:

“[…] Kinship properly speaking is formed by the consanguineous bond that unites several persons who descend from one another, or from a common trunk. According to this, two classes of relatives are distinguished which, for greater clarity, are customarily distributed into two series of degrees that make up two lines. A line is, therefore, the series of relatives. Two classes thereof are distinguished: direct and collateral. In the direct line are the progenitors and their descendants; thus we have: grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren. And in the collateral line, also called transversal, are counted those who come from the same trunk, but who do not descend from one another, as occurs with siblings among themselves; and uncles with nephews/nieces […] The different steps from one relative to another are called degrees, one of these being counted for each generation, which is formed by an individuality of the series, with the exception of that which forms the trunk from which the individuals that must be taken into account for the computation originate; thus, from Nombre111971 to the great-grandfather, there are three generations, although four individualities appear, namely: Nombre111971, grandson, grandfather and great-grandfather, the latter not being counted as it is the generator of the others […] In addition to consanguineous kinship there exists another called affinity, which means by analogy or similarity, recognized by law, consisting of a civil bond, which by reason of marriage is established between one of the spouses and the consanguineous relatives of the other […] In kinship by affinity, the computation of degrees is carried out in the same manner as in consanguineous kinship and according to the distribution of direct and collateral lines […] the rule can be established that in the same line and in the same degree in which a person is a consanguineous relative of one of the spouses, he is related by affinity to the other spouse […]” (Nombre60957 , . Tratado de las personas. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. Fourth edition. 1984. pp. 23 to 26). (The underlining and highlighting do not correspond to the original).

Based on the foregoing review, we can conclude that Article 127 of the Municipal Code, while it is true that it does not expressly indicate which type of bond —consanguineous or by affinity— it refers to, it is nevertheless clear that it encompasses the collateral and direct line up to the third degree inclusive. However, the immediate question arises as to whether the legislator's intention was to include only the blood bond within the limitation, or whether their will was to encompass both, consanguinity and the bond by affinity. In the opinion of this chamber, to elucidate this aspect, a direct application of the principles of protection of the public treasury, probity, and transparency in public office must be undertaken, in addition to considering the legal aphorism that states "where the law does not distinguish, one must not distinguish." Once the respective balancing exercise has been carried out, weighing these core legal aspects against the simple interest that might assist a private individual in being appointed to a public office, and taking into consideration the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the Court reaches the conclusion that it must opt to interpret that it was the legislator's intention to include within the cited restriction regime both types of bond, the consanguineous as well as the legal bond or that created by law —affinity—, both factual assumptions being encompassed within the scope of the incompatibility contained in the legal article cited above.

**VII.** Now, the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy defines the noun *"hijastro"* (stepchild) in the following terms: "(…) From Lat. filiaster, filiastra. // 1. m. and f. Child brought to the new marriage by the spouse of a person.", according to a query made by this Court on the website "http://dle.rae.es/?id=KODxnLU". Taking into consideration the definition established by the Royal Spanish Academy cited above, as well as the factual situation under analysis, namely, that the spouse of Mr. Nombre126154 —Mrs. Nombre126155— is the mother of Mr. Nombre126156 —who, it should be noted, has an established paternal-filial relationship with another person who appears in the registry as his father—, through the application of a simple categorical syllogism, it is clear to this Court and as a conclusion, that in the case of Mr. Nombre126156 and his relationship with the plaintiff Nombre126154, the existing bond is one by affinity (that is, of a legal nature, generated from the civil union —marriage— between Mr. Nombre126154 and his wife), Mr. Nombre126156 being a child brought by one of the spouses —Mrs. Nombre126155— to her marriage with Mr. Nombre126154, resulting therefore, in relation to the plaintiff herein and without any doubt, his stepchild (hijastro). Once this situation is defined, it is necessary to proceed to determine if the relationship existing between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 is covered by the prohibition contained in Article 127 as repeatedly cited.

**VIII.** Mr. Nombre60957, as detailed in the preceding lines, has indicated that "(...) In kinship by affinity, the computation of degrees is carried out in the same manner as in consanguineous kinship and according to the distribution of direct and collateral lines […] the rule can be established that in the same line and in the same degree in which a person is a consanguineous relative of one of the spouses, he is related by affinity to the other spouse […]” (op cit.). That is, if a person is a niece/nephew by consanguinity of someone united by a conjugal bond, they will in turn be a niece/nephew by affinity of the respective spouse, applying the same line and degree that exists between the niece/nephew and their consanguineous uncle/aunt, but to the bond by affinity; a criterion this Court shares. Now, in the present case, Mr. Nombre126156 is the son of Mrs. Nombre126155 —the spouse of Mr. Nombre126154— in accordance with the consanguineous bond, for which reason, applying the same rules of line and degree —but by affinity— to define the kinship between Mr. Nombre126156 in relation to the plaintiff, he will be the stepchild (hijastro) by affinity of Mr. Nombre126154, contrary to what was stated by the plaintiff and in accordance with the definition of said term established in the preceding lines. Additionally, the degree of kinship that exists between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 corresponds to the second degree, since the first degree corresponds to the relationship between the plaintiff and Mrs. Nombre126155 —spouses to each other—, and the second degree in relation to the plaintiff derives from the relationship existing between Mrs. Nombre126155 and her son Nombre126156; therefore, from Mr. Nombre126154 to Mr. Nombre126156, there are two degrees of bond by affinity. If we bring up again the provisions of Article 127 of the Municipal Code cited above, said article encompasses or includes up to the third degree of kinship —without differentiating whether it is by consanguinity or affinity—, which for Mr. Nombre126154 would include the grandchildren of Mrs. Nombre126155 —by affinity— and his own grandchildren in direct descendant line by consanguinity. Therefore, without any doubt, the legal bond existing between Mr. Nombre126156 and Mr. Nombre126154 falls within the scope of application of the legal effects of the indicated norm, for the facts under analysis are subsumed without great difficulty into the factual assumption provided for in the cited legal norm. That is, the plaintiff's actions, aimed at obtaining the appointment of his stepchild (hijastro) in the Municipality of Goicoechea, are, in this Court's opinion, typical and therefore, subsumable into the factual situation contemplated by the aforementioned Article 127, as well as violative of the prohibition established by the legislator in the repeatedly cited article.

**IX.** It remains now to analyze whether the sanction imposed on the plaintiff due to his conduct is in accordance with the law or not. The aforementioned Article 127 is an infelicitous norm and scarcely clear in its wording, but furthermore, it presents a highly sensitive omission as it fails to provide for any type of sanction applicable to conduct that violates it. In addition to the foregoing, it is completely remiss in referring to other normative provisions for the application of the corresponding sanction. Therefore, the defendant administration proceeded to carry out a normative integration in order to find a sanction applicable to the case sub judice, but in doing so, it has undoubtedly violated the principle of specificity or legality that governs sanctioning matters (both in criminal and in administrative law), according to which, and for this specific case, applicable sanctions in administrative venue must be previously established through the enactment of a norm of legal rank and force, a precept derived from Constitutional Articles 39 and 41 in relation to Article 124 of Law No. 6227 General Law of Public Administration. Besides being, in turn, contemplated in Article 253 of the current Electoral Code, which states literally:

"ARTÍCULO 253.- Competence // The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) shall order the cancellation or annulment of the credentials of municipal officials of popular election in the cases expressly contemplated in the law. These provisions shall also be applicable to district council members (síndicos), district mayors (intendentes), council members (concejales), and members of the district municipal councils. // In case of contention, the ordinary administrative procedure provided for in the General Law of Public Administration shall be carried out beforehand." (The italics and underlining do not correspond to the original).

In the present case, it was not viable, given the poor wording of the prohibitive norm in question, to proceed to integrate diverse normative provisions to try to endow Article 127 of the Municipal Code with an applicable sanction, as this undoubtedly violates the principle of legal reservation that characterizes the sanctioning matter at hand. But ignoring said legal vacuum, the active administration proceeded to channel the sanctioning procedure against the plaintiff, based on the factual assumption of violation of Article 127 of the current Municipal Code. Note that in the present case, specifically in administrative resolution No. PA-011-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued as an act of recommendation by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), reference is only made to the questioned conducts as being violative of Article 127 of the Municipal Code, and it is in relation to said article that the disciplinary procedure is instituted and carried through to its conclusion, without it being derived from the content of said act that the conducts attributed to Mr. Nombre126154 were framed by the legal operator either in the Law of Internal Control or in the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, nor does it appear in said act that the conduct deployed by the plaintiff is assessed under those legal provisions, the directing body —the Comptroller's Office— limiting itself to reiterating that Article 127 of the Municipal Code was violated. Neither is it perceived in said administrative act that a legal analysis was conducted on the absence of an express sanction in the repeatedly cited Article 127, nor that any reasoned consideration was issued on the appropriateness of applying those legal provisions in the specific case to fill the normative gap and thus sanction the imputed conducts, it being only in the operative part of said resolution where Articles 18 subsection d) of the Municipal Code and 39 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office are invoked, but without the recitals section of said act explaining why such legal articles are applicable to the specific case. Note that Article 18 of Law No. 7794 literally states:

"Article 18. - The following shall be automatic causes for loss of the credential of a municipal mayor (alcalde municipal):

• a)Losing a requirement or suffering from an impediment, according to Articles 15 and 16 of this code.
• b)Being unjustifiably absent from their duties for more than eight days.
• c)Being declared, by a final judicial sentence, disqualified from holding public office.
• d)Incurring in any of the causes provided for in Article 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic.

(Thus amended the preceding subsection by Article 66 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004) e) Committing any action sanctioned by law with the loss of office for officials of popular election.

• f)Voluntarily resigning from their post." Furthermore, Article 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic states, in what is of interest:

"Article 73-Cancellation of Credential. It shall be cause for the cancellation of the respective credential, the commission of a serious fault by a regular or substitute council member (regidor) or district council member (síndico) against the norms of the system of oversight and control of the Public Treasury contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds; or when incurring in any of the acts provided for in the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, as generators of administrative responsibility. This shall apply when the offender has acted in the exercise of their office or on the occasion thereof. // When the serious fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the municipal council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, approved said agreement, shall incur in the same cause for cancellation of their credentials. // Likewise, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public office, as well as for those provided for in the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, shall be cause for cancellation of the credential of a council member (regidor) or district council member (síndico). The competent judicial authority shall make, ex officio, the respective communication to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones)." // (As amended by Article 63 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004) // ".</span></p><p style="margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:5.1pt; margin-bottom:5.1pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">Despite the fact that the operative part of the sanctioning administrative act issued by the Contraloría General de la República against the plaintiff indicates that Mr. Nombre126154 should be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of numeral 18 subsection d) transcribed above, the obligation to state the reasons for administrative acts, especially disciplinary or sanctioning administrative acts, requires that the recitals section of said resolution include an express analysis of why that particular legal norm and not another should be applied to the specific case, but in the indicated administrative resolution, no recital pronouncement whatsoever is perceived regarding the subsumption of the investigated conduct into numeral 18</span><span> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">subsection d) (and not subsection "e" of said numeral, which seemed in this Chamber's opinion to be the most applicable to the matter) nor into Article 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, which is cited because it is the numeral to which subsection "d" of the aforementioned Article 18 makes express referral. It should be taken into account that Article 73 refers to conduct that is harmful </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">"against the norms of the system of oversight and control of the Public Treasury</span><span> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms related to public funds"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> and expressly mentions the conducts specifically contemplated in that regulatory body, that is, in that same law; thereby excluding its application in the face of the normative vacuum that is identified in numeral 127 of the Código Municipal, which protects against conduct that violates the duty of probity, but not a violation against the safeguarding and proper administration of the Public Treasury. Furthermore, this Chamber must remind the parties that the imposition of sanctions—and especially when these result in a sanction as onerous as the withdrawal of credentials for a popularly elected official—is not legally viable by resorting to the application of analogy as an interpretive method, since for the application of a sanction, the legislator must expressly establish the illicit nature of the conduct and the respective sanction applicable upon its commission. Now then, if these aspects are not provided for in the sanctioning norm, said normative absence or omission cannot be supplemented by the legal operator, resorting to the path of normative integration, nor through the analogical application of sanctioning norms created to correct conduct of a different nature, as the Contraloría General de la República has sought to do in the matter under review, to try by all means to sanction the plaintiff;</span><span> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">note that in this case, the plaintiff is punished for engaging in conduct that does not have an express sanction provided for in the current legal system and, furthermore, that is not expressly punished with a measure as onerous as the cancellation of credentials for a popularly elected position. Added to the foregoing is that Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, the same article cited by the operative part of the sanctioning administrative act issued by the Contraloría General de la República to support the withdrawal of the plaintiff's credentials, literally states:</span></p><p style="margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; text-align:justify; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="width:36pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">"Article 39.-</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">Administrative sanctions</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">. According to the severity, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">the infractions </span><span style="width:3.87pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; font-size:6.67pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub; display:inline-block; -aw-font-family:'Arial'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">previously indicated</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub"> shall be sanctioned as follows:</span></p><p style="margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="width:36pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">a) Written reprimand published in the Diario Oficial.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="width:36pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">b) Suspension, without the corresponding salary, per diem, or stipend, of </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">fifteen to thirty days.</span></p><p style="margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="width:36pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">c) Separation from public office, without employer liability or cancellation </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">of the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">credentials of municipal councilor, as applicable." (the emphasis </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">and underlining are not from the original).</span></p><p style="margin-top:7.9pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial">Observe that this last numeral reviewed specifically indicates that the sanctions established therein will be applicable to "the infractions previously indicated." That is, it refers to the conducts classified in that same legal body, in that same law, as being susceptible to sanction and does not contemplate under any assumption that they are applicable by analogy to sanction conducts contained in other regulatory provisions, such as Article 127 of the Código Municipal. Moreover, and as a corollary, it must be indicated that in its wording, the repeatedly cited municipal Article 127 also does not refer, either expressly or tacitly, to the application of other sanctioning regulations in the event of engaging in the conduct it prohibits, in order to establish a sanctioning regime that guarantees its observance and sanctions the violation of the prohibition set forth therein. To that extent, this Chamber considers that the administrative act emanating from the Contraloría General de la República and which was subsequently endorsed by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, suffers from a defect in its content, being an absolute defect because one of the substantial elements of the administrative act under examination is present, pursuant to the provisions of articles 166 in relation to articles 169 to 172, all of Law No. 6227 Ley General de la Administración Pública. The foregoing, in that the content of said act is completely silent, failing to issue even a brief analysis on the appropriateness of the supplementary application of other sanctioning legal norms in order to supplement the normative vacuum in Article 127 of the Código Municipal, by not establishing any sanction in case of its non-compliance and non-observance. The challenged act is also completely silent regarding the analogical application of legal norms specifically issued by the legislator to safeguard the public treasury and public funds, to punish a violation committed not against the Public Treasury, but against the duty of probity, which is the conduct that Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> engaged in. In addition to this defect in the content of the act, this jurisdictional body considers that the challenged administrative actions also suffer from a defect in the motive (motivo), lacking legal basis, since there is no legal norm that specifically and expressly sanctions the violation of the prohibition established in Article 127 of the Código Municipal, nor is there a special and express norm that sanctions a Municipal Mayor with the loss of credentials, in the event of incurring any violation of said prohibitive norm. The foregoing also entails the absolute nullity of the administrative actions challenged before this jurisdiction, for parity of reason and in accordance with Article 166 of Law No. 6227, as the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">motive</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> of the administrative act (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">by definition, the factual or legal precedent that serves as the reason or grounds for the issuance of the act by the public administration)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> is a substantial element thereof. By reason of the foregoing considerations, undoubtedly a defect has been generated that renders the administrative acts challenged before this Chamber absolutely null, coupled with the fact that, there being no pronouncement on the adaptation of the alleged conduct to the norms immediately transcribed, the plaintiff has been left in evident defenselessness, not only because the administration did not state why the plaintiff violated Article 18 subsection d) of the Código Municipal, Article 73 of the LOCGR, and Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, but also because the mandatory reference to the relationship between the conducts attributed to Mr. Nombre126154 and the sanction that was applied to him was not made in the challenged administrative act. Furthermore, the presence in the challenged acts of an explanation, at least a succinct one, of why numeral 127 of the Código Municipal—which, it is reiterated, lacks an applicable sanction—should be integrated in this matter with those legal texts is also absent. It is simply stated, without further basis, that this is how it must be, but without the acting administration taking the effort to reasonably justify its actions. Thus, a defect has been incurred due to a lack of reasoning (motivación) of the administrative act, the lack of reasoning being a defect that directly affects the administrative action, generating the absolute nullity of the challenged act. Note that in this matter, we are not in the presence of a violation against the public treasury, but rather that the violation accused of the plaintiff constitutes an infraction against the duty of probity incumbent upon him, as it is clear to this Chamber that Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">promoted an improper appointment at his own instance, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 127 of the Código Municipal, by requesting from the institutional human resources department the appointment of his stepson Nombre126156</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">as a municipal official. And it is that, despite the fact that the plaintiff evidently violated the duty of probity legally required of him, nonetheless in this matter, municipal numeral 127 does not expressly provide for any onerous or punitive legal consequence with which to sanction the act of engaging in the conduct it warns against. Much less does it expressly establish that the commission of said infraction will result in the withdrawal of credentials for a popularly elected official, as occurs in the case before us, involving a Municipal Mayor. To that extent, the Contraloría General de la República erroneously attempted to do so, as in the face of the normative vacuum regarding this area and the silence of the legislator—who omitted to establish specific and express applicable sanctions for non-compliance with the cited numeral 127—this gap in the current legal system could not be filled through normative integration and the analogical application of diverse sanctioning provisions, given that the matter before us is a highly delicate one, a sanctioning and disciplinary matter, where the principle of legal reservation undoubtedly applies, unimpaired. Therefore, it was not legally viable to attempt to invent the application of a sanction by analogy, or to force the reprehensible conduct the plaintiff engaged in, to try, forcibly—and without further analysis—to subsume it into other regulatory provisions not enacted for cases like the one before us, but rather for the safeguarding and protection of the public treasury, which, it is reiterated, does not correspond to the case concerning us in this litigation. The sanctioning administrative acts challenged in this proceeding have undoubtedly violated the principle of typicality and/or legality in administrative sanctioning matters, as well as the general provision established in numeral 253 of the Código Electoral transcribed in the preceding lines, which requires for cases of this caliber the prior existence of an </span><span style="font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline">express</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> sanction contained in a norm of legal rank, to punish the respective conduct therewith. Therefore, this Chamber concludes that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff, based on numerals 18</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> subsection d) and 137, both of the Código Municipal, as well as on Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, becomes illegal, lacking legal basis to support it, because the articles cited above are not applicable to the specific case, in accordance with the considerations set forth in the preceding lines, and because Article 127 of the current Código Municipal lacks a sanction expressly established by prior law that punishes the official who violates said prohibition with dismissal from their position or with the withdrawal of the respective credentials in the case of an official appointed by popular election. As a corollary to the foregoing, it is required in this matter to declare the absolute nullity of the following administrative acts: resolution No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 hours on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, in which it was ordered to separate the plaintiff from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 hours on February 24, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 hours on August 22, two thousand eleven, issued by the Contralor General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the Legal Division of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 hours on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Proceedings for cancellation of credentials of the proprietary mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea, San José province, held by Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 13:10 hours on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in which it was ordered to cancel the credential of Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">that accredited him as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 08:31 hours on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. For parity of reason and consequently, the absolute nullity is declared of the entire administrative sanctioning procedure</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">followed against the plaintiff and which culminated in his dismissal from the position of municipal mayor of Goicoechea and with the withdrawal of his respective credentials. </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.9pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">X.</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">In his statement of claim, the plaintiff alleged that during the development of the sanctioning procedure, a series of irregularities occurred that hindered his right of defense, indicating that official letter No. DFOE-DI-1576 was not included in the administrative file, a document that corresponded to the statement of facts of the disciplinary administrative procedure, a statement of facts that was not included in the act initiating the procedure and formulating the charges, which was made known to him only one day before the required oral and private hearing. In this regard, it must be noted that a detailed review of the administrative procedure demonstrates that, contrary to what was stated by the plaintiff, the act initiating the procedure and formulating the charges, corresponding to the unnumbered administrative resolution issued at 15:00 hours on November 5, 2011, by the directing body of the administrative procedure, did contain within it a duly detailed statement of facts that allowed the plaintiff to clearly determine the factual situations that were being imputed to him in the aforementioned sanctioning procedure, thus allowing him to adequately and effectively exercise his right of defense and due process, safeguarding his interests within the indicated sanctioning procedure. This collegiate Chamber does not consider that the right to access the file was violated for Mr. Nombre126154, nor does it share the view that the plaintiff here was left defenseless by not having been notified with due advance notice of the details of the conduct attributed to him. Note that said statement of facts is immersed in the first recital (considerando) of the administrative resolution initiating the procedure and formulating the charges, corresponding to the unnumbered resolution issued at 15:00 hours on November 5, 2011, which appears in the administrative file in digital format, disk No. 1 and folios 43 to 52 of the file for the procedure followed against the plaintiff. Therefore, this ground of the filed claim is rejected. The plaintiff continues stating that the Internal Audit, in an act—in his opinion—of bad faith, proceeded to communicate the situation detected regarding Mr. Nombre126154 to the Contraloría General de la República, instead of communicating it to the municipal mayor himself or to another internal body of the municipality. In this regard, it must be noted that while it is true that the institutional internal audit could well have acted as the plaintiff indicates, that is, rendering reports on the detected situation and making them known to the institutional head, pursuant to the provisions of numerals 35 through 37 of Law No. 8292 Ley de Control Interno, however, communicating the detected situation internally within the corporate entity is not a legally established prerequisite for referring the matter to the oversight body, as was done in the procedure under review; to which it is added that, in any case, this argument is not capable of nullifying per se the sanctioning administrative act issued and subject to this Chamber's review. Consequently, this ground of the filed claim is also rejected. Continuing with the analysis of the arguments raised by the plaintiff, his representation indicates that the Contraloría General de la República did not analyze the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, and neither did the TSE, as had they done so, they would have realized that said law establishes a series of sanctions according to the severity of the infraction. In this regard, it must be indicated that the issue of gradation of sanctions, in the case of disciplinary matters and when the legal operator faces a plurality of sanctioning options, all legally valid, from which to choose to sanction the offender, must involve the application of the constitutional principles of reasonability and proportionality, and an adequate balancing exercise must be conducted to determine which punishment is the most reasonable, adequate, and proportional for the factual situation classified in the sanctioning norm, the commission of which has been accredited and which is subject to disciplinary review. Indeed, the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, in its numeral 41, establishes a series of criteria that must be taken into account when assessing the conduct of the investigated subject, when they have engaged in unlawful conduct through willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). Said article contemplates the following aspects to be taken into consideration for such effect, literally: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">"Article 41.-Criteria to consider. The sanctions stipulated in this Law shall be imposed for the infractions previously classified that have been committed with willful intent or gross negligence. To assess the conduct of the alleged responsible party, the following factors, among others, will be taken into account: / a) The effective injury to the economic interests of the Public Administration and the amount of the damages caused. / b) The success obtained in achieving results undesired by the legal system or in the enrichment or favoring of the perpetrator of the infraction or third parties, as well as the effort put into procuring them. / c) The negative impact on the public service. / d) Recidivism in any of the infractions classified in Article 38 of this Law, within the four previous years. / e) The rank and functions of the public servant; it is understood that, the greater the hierarchy and complexity of these, the greater the obligation to assess the legality, timeliness, and advisability of the acts that are issued, authorized, or executed." </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Note that in this matter, effectively, such aspects must be assessed to determine the severity of the infraction committed as well as the sanction to be applied in such scenarios. However, in this matter, the situation is quite particular, as it is true that in the sub judice, it was not even possible to proceed with the indicated assessment in order to choose one among several possible sanctions with the objective of sanctioning the plaintiff, given the truth that in this matter, and in this Chamber's opinion, there is no sanctioning legal norm that supports the punishment applied to the plaintiff, since, as indicated in the preceding lines, it was grounded erroneously and contrary to law, in numerals 18</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> subsection d) and 137, both of the Código Municipal, as well as in Article 39 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, which was contrary to law because the articles cited above are not applicable to the specific case, in accordance with the considerations set forth in the preceding lines, and because Article 127 of the current Código Municipal lacks a sanction expressly established by prior law that punishes the official who violates said prohibition with dismissal from their position or with the withdrawal of the respective credentials in the case of an official appointed by popular election. Added to the foregoing is that, in any case, from reading the challenged administrative act, it is concluded that at least the condition of hierarchical superior—mayor—that the plaintiff held in the aforementioned municipality was taken into consideration by the oversight body, as at least the sanctioning act so indicates, of course without providing greater detail and without conducting an in-depth analysis on the appropriateness of the imposed sanction, because in reality and according to law, there was no current legal norm that classified the specific conduct accused and that, likewise, expressly established for it one or some sanctions applicable concretely to said conduct, making it impossible to carry out the analysis on the gradation of sanctions, from which to choose one to resolve the specific case. The plaintiff continues to state that in this matter, there is no injury to their economic interests, there was no negative impact on the public service, the salary the official received was earned, received in accordance with the law, and he was not favored by being paid more than the legally established sum. These assertions are indeed shared by this Chamber: from a detailed study of the case file, it is shown that indeed, in this matter, no effect on the public treasury occurred, as there is no document in the file demonstrating that the salary paid to Mr. Nombre126154's stepson was higher than the salary corresponding to the position he held, or rather, there is no evidence in the matter demonstrating that the young man did not work in the position to which he was appointed, nor is there evidence in the file that Mr. Nombre126156 received his salary without performing the respective work, nor that the former mayor received any emolument from Mr. Nombre126156</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">to proceed with his appointment; nor is it evident in the file that real and effective economic damage or harm was caused to the finances or to the public treasury, as the case before us is restricted, regarding its scope of effect, to having disregarded the express prohibition established in Article 127 of the current Código Municipal. However, as the plaintiff indicates, the effect on municipal property and funds, thus on the public treasury, is not evident in the file. To that extent, the plaintiff is correct, and undoubtedly such circumstances should have been taken into consideration when assessing the severity of the accused conduct and when determining the applicable and corresponding sanction for the specific case. But the truth of the matter is that, in this specific matter, this legal exercise was impossible to perform, because in reality and according to law, in this matter, there is no current legal norm of legislative rank that establishes, expressly and specially, one or some applicable sanctions to punish the specific conduct accused, thus making it impossible to carry out the analysis on the gradation of sanctions in order to choose one among several possible ones, to resolve the specific case; that is, given the absence of legally established sanctions for the specific conduct provided for in numeral 127 of the Código Municipal, the legal operator was unable to conduct the respective reasonability and balancing exercise to choose the most reasonable, logical, and proportional sanction from among several sanctions, corresponding to the concrete and particular circumstances of the case under review.</span></p> It must again be stated that this lack of legal normative support, <span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">per se,</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> vitiates the challenged administrative sanctioning act with absolute nullity, as it constitutes a flaw in its grounds and in its content, which consequently results in its open non-conformity with the current legal system. This Tribunal cannot omit to point out that even though modern socio-political currents may have generated novel interpretative ideologies of the legal system, taking the exercise of disciplinary power within the State to the extreme, the proponents of such ideological currents, like it or not, must adhere to legality and the current legal system of the country, and the truth of the matter is that, like it or not, whether it is politically correct or not, there was no specific sanction established for the conduct set forth in Article 127 of the current Municipal Code, at the date the events giving rise to this dispute were committed. This Tribunal does not owe, nor will it submit to, political considerations or persecutory ideological interpretations prevailing in any state institution; this Tribunal owes and submits itself to juridicity, the current Political Constitution, and the law, and in that regard, applying the restrictive criteria of hermeneutics long applicable to sanctioning matters, as well as the principle of legality that governs said matter and establishes that sanctioning matters are reserved to law, this Chamber cannot, under any circumstance, condone or validate the establishment of sanctions by way of analogy, to supplement through that interpretative method "open" sanctioning categories, or those that others also call "blank" ones, being those sanctioning normative provisions that are not self-sufficient and require that, by way of interpretation, a sanction applicable to a specific conduct be created, when the legislator did not establish it in a precise and express manner, which undoubtedly violates the most elementary pro-homine and pro-libertatis legal principles, fully shared and advocated by this panel. In another vein, it must be indicated to the plaintiff that the resolution issued in the specific case of Mr. Nombre16454</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">is not applicable to the matter now submitted for this Tribunal's examination, as it corresponds to a factual scenario different from the one before us now and, in any case, exerts no binding effect upon this jurisdictional body's criterion. The plaintiff further argues that, in the present case, administrative resolution No. PA-011-2011 was not duly notified in accordance with Article 38 of the Ley de Notificaciones, as he was not notified before the hearing took place, which violated his right to a defense. In this regard, it must be stated that resolution No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 p.m. on January 31, 2011, issued by the decision-making body of the administrative sanctioning procedure processed by the Contraloría General de la República, corresponds to the final act issued within said procedure. This resolution was notified to the plaintiff via facsimile on February 4, 2011, as recorded in the list of proven facts of this resolution and can be verified on folio 144 of the respective administrative file in digital format, disk No.1. The oral and private hearing required by law was held within this sanctioning procedure, on January 18, 2011, as recorded on folio 128 of the digitized administrative procedure submitted to the case file. In that regard, it is true that said final act was communicated to the plaintiff more than ten days after the respective oral appearance was held, thereby making it evident that no violation of his right to a defense has occurred and that the plaintiff is incorrect in his statements regarding this topic, and this argumentative aspect of the filed complaint must be dismissed. Regarding the alleged violations of the principle of the parallelism of forms, the democratic principle, and that of popular will, as well as his assertions that if the Mayor was appointed by the people, the</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">only one legitimized to remove him is the people, in accordance with the principles and bases of the plebiscite, citing as an example what happened in Nombre265</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and the invocation of the unconstitutionality of Articles 220, 223, and 253 of Law No. 8765, current Código Electoral, and of resolutions No. 6673-M-2011, No. 7105-M-2011, and No. 8184-M-2011, all from the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, it must be noted that such arguments exceed the legal competences assigned to this Tribunal's cognizance, as they deal with aspects of a constitutional nature, upon which this panel is not to issue a criterion, these being within the exclusive purview of the Sala Constitucional, given that the Costa Rican system is one of concentrated constitutional control, as prescribed by Article 10 of the current fundamental norm. By virtue of the considerations set forth in the preceding lines, the procedurally proper action in accordance with law is to grant the filed complaint in all its terms, as is hereby ordered.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> By virtue of the complaint before us having been granted, according to what is set forth in the previous recitals, the administrative sanctioning procedure pursued against the plaintiff is annulled in its entirety, and considering that this declaration has declaratory and retroactive effect to the start date of said procedure, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 131.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and 171 of Law No. Placa1223, as a direct and immediate consequence thereof, any existing reference to the administrative procedure herein annulled in any databases of the Contraloría General de la República and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is also annulled, which must be executed immediately once this resolution becomes final.</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">The nullity is decreed of the following administrative resolutions: No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 p.m. on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, which ordered the plaintiff's removal from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 p.m. on February 24, two thousand eleven issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 a.m. on August 22, two thousand eleven issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 a.m. on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 1:10 p.m. on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which ordered the cancellation of Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">'s credential that accredited him as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 8:31 a.m. on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. </span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.9pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">XI.</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">In the list of claims raised by the plaintiff in this dispute, the plaintiff claims the payment of the damages (daños y perjuicios) that he alleges were caused to him by the challenged administrative acts. As damages, he claims the sum of one hundred million colones net, which he asserts correspond to the salaries, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary, salary in kind, and benefits he was entitled to as Mayor, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">a sum he requests be liquidated in the sentence execution stage. </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Likewise, he requests that the salaries be indexed from the moment the obligation arose until the date of their effective payment, also requiring that the amount be calculated according to the basic passive rate in effect at the time of liquidation and determination by a final judicial resolution. In this regard, it must be stated that in this</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Tribunal's opinion,</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">by acting unlawfully in applying a non-existent sanction to the plaintiff for the specific case under Article 127 of the Código Municipal, the defendant has violated the sphere of the plaintiff's economic rights</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, placing him in a situation of evident labor harm with obvious economic and personal consequences, which is effortlessly inferred from the case file, since he was dismissed from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea and could not receive the sums and other salary components that he could eventually have received, had he remained in office for the entire term of his mandate, which, incidentally, ended in the year 2016. By this, the plaintiff was forced to resort, firstly, to an unsuccessful challenge procedure and then to the jurisdictional process that concerns us, to challenge formal actions that, being affected by the legal defects indicated in the preceding paragraphs, had to be annulled by this Tribunal. In summary, the actions of the co-defendants Contraloría General de la República and the State, representing the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, undoubtedly caused the plaintiff an unjust disruption in his employment development and, consequently, it is procedurally appropriate to order the payment, in favor of Mr. Nombre126154, of the back salaries (salarios caídos) and the respective salary components to which he would have been entitled, had he effectively remained in the exercise of the popularly elected office, throughout the entire term of his appointment as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea. Given that the case file lacks suitable evidence that would allow the Tribunal to determine at this time the sums that must be paid to the plaintiff for this concept, the payment of said amounts is granted in the abstract, subject to the proper determination, quantification, and liquidation to be carried out subsequently, in the sentence execution stage.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> As requested by the plaintiff and by virtue of the provisions of numeral 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the granted sums must be indexed and brought to present value. Once such sums are quantified and determined, interest shall be recognized on them as damages (perjuicios) in accordance with numeral 722 of the Código Civil, which shall be calculated at the current legal rate, from the date on which the plaintiff should have received each of the corresponding payments until the date of their effective cancellation.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">XII. Regarding the defenses. </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Upon answering the complaint, the representation of the co-defendants raised the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of standing (falta de legitimación), and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual). Regarding the defense of lack of current interest, it must be stated that it is unfounded, by virtue of the fact that the legal point debated in this matter, corresponding to the assessment of the legality of the sanction applied to the plaintiff by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones upon a recommendation issued by the Contraloría General de la República, had not been the subject of analysis or ruling by any jurisdictional body, in addition to the fact that while it is true the plaintiff had appeared before this instance in file No. 12-000748-1027-CA, this was solely through the filing of a request for precautionary protection from which he ultimately desisted, without a full proceeding on the merits ever being filed in that matter or a criterion being issued on the substance of the issue. As for the defense of lack of standing, in both its active and passive aspects, its rejection is ordered in both aspects, since Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">was properly actively legitimized to appear before the court in this process in defense of his interests, as its purpose was the annulment of the conducts carried out by the co-defendant administration, which culminated in his dismissal from the position of Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea he held and the withdrawal of his respective credentials; the alleged defense must meet the same fate in its passive aspect, since the challenged administrative acts were issued by the co-defendant bodies in this matter, under the shelter of the provisions of numeral 12 of the current CPCA. And finally, in accordance with the reasoning set forth in the preceding recitals, regarding the co-defendants Contraloría General de la República and the State, the defense of lack of right invoked is rejected, as the winning plaintiff in this dispute was legally correct in his positions, and consequently, the filed complaint is granted. With respect to the co-defendant Nombre16153</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, current Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea, the defense of lack of passive standing is upheld, since within his list of claims, the plaintiff stated that in the event his appointment period had expired at the time of this resolution, under such a scenario he was not requesting reinstatement to the position he previously held and that Mrs. Nombre16153 now occupies, in addition to the fact that no part of his complaint was oriented towards obtaining any legal result or conduct from Mrs. Nombre16153.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">XIII. Regarding costs (costas). </span><span style="font-family:Arial">In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued based on evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In the present case, and specifically concerning the State and the Contraloría General de la República, this Tribunal finds no reason to apply the exceptions set by the respective regulation and break the principle of condemning the losing party to costs. Therefore, the condemnation for procedural and personal costs is imposed on the Contraloría General de la República and the State. Regarding Mrs. Nombre16153, given that she was called to the process mandatorily by the express mandate of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, that she had no participation in the issuance of the annulled administrative acts, and that no conduct was sought from her by Mr. Nombre126154, the matter is resolved without a special condemnation for costs. </span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">POR TANTO</span></p><p style="margin-top:7.8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:0; orphans:0"><span style="font-family:Arial">The defense of lack of current interest is rejected. Regarding the State and the Contraloría General de la República, the defenses of lack of standing and lack of right interposed are rejected. Consequently, the filed complaint is granted, in the following terms, thus:</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The absolute nullity is decreed of the entire administrative</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">sanctioning procedure pursued against the plaintiff, which culminated in his dismissal from the position of Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea and the withdrawal of his respective credentials. The nullity is decreed of the following administrative resolutions: No. PA-11-2011 of 12:00 p.m. on January 31, 2011, issued by the Contraloría General de la República, which ordered the plaintiff's removal from his position as Municipal Mayor of Goicoechea; the unnumbered resolution of 12:00 p.m. on February 24, two thousand eleven issued by the Contraloría General de la República; resolution No. R-DC-147-2011 of 10:00 a.m. on August 22, two thousand eleven issued by the Contralora General de la República; official letter No. DJ-1012-2011 dated September 12, 2011, issued by the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República; the unnumbered resolution of 11:35 a.m. on September 20, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within the "Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">"; resolution No. 8184-M-2011 of 1:10 p.m. on December 16, 2011, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which ordered the cancellation of Mr. Nombre126154</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">'s credential that accredited him as Mayor of the Municipality of Goicoechea; and resolution No. 253-M-2012 of 8:31 a.m. on January 17, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. As a direct consequence of this declaration of nullity, any reference that exists regarding the procedure herein annulled must be eliminated from any database of the Contraloría General de la República and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, as soon as this judgment becomes final. The Contraloría General de la República and the State are condemned to pay the plaintiff the back salaries (salarios caídos) and the respective salary components to which he would have been entitled, had he effectively remained in the exercise of the popularly elected office, throughout the entire term of his appointment as municipal mayor of Goicoechea, amounts which shall be calculated from the date he was effectively removed from his position until the day his appointment as municipal mayor would have ended. Such sums must be determined, quantified, and liquidated in the sentence execution stage. Once determined, such amounts must be indexed and brought to present value. Interest shall be recognized on them at the current legal rate, which shall accrue from the date on which the plaintiff should have received each of the corresponding salaries, until the date of their effective payment. With respect to Nombre16153</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, the invoked defense of lack of passive standing is upheld, and the complaint filed against her is denied, resolved without a special condemnation for costs. Both costs of the process are borne by the State and the Contraloría General de la República. Notify.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">Sandra M.

Quesada Vargas.- Name126157 .- Luis Polinaris Vives.- *IVQ47OJYPFTY61* SANDRA QUESADA VARGAS - JUDGE/DECISION-MAKER *DXL7KLRZGSQ61* LUIS ARTURO POLINARIS VIVES - JUDGE/DECISION-MAKER *HKOOWNQXVO461* Name126157 - JUDGE/DECISION-MAKER Goicoechea, Dirección7876 , 50 meters west of BNCR, opposite Dirección18098 . Phones: 2545-0099, 2545-0107, 2545-0158. Fax: 2241-5664 and 2545-0006. Email: ...01

Documento PJEDITOR *120001431027CA* Proceso de conocimiento Actor: Nombre126154 .

Demandado: Contraloría General de la República y otros.

No. 0118-2019-VII.

TRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN SÉTIMA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las diez horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintinueve de noviembre del dos mil diecinueve.

Proceso de conocimiento -declarado de puro derecho- interpuesto por Nombre126154 , con cédula de identidad CED118073 vecino de San José, contra la Contraloría General de la República representada por Jainse Marín Jiménez, abogado, con cédula de identidad CED116091, vecino de San José; el Estado representado por la procuradora Andrea Calderón Gassman, abogada y demás calidades ignoradas y Nombre16153 , funcionaria pública, con cédula de identidad CED118075, vecina de San José, representada por su apoderado especial judicial Fernando Morera Solano, abogado, con cédula de identidad CED118076 vecino de San José. Todos son mayores.

RESULTANDO

1. Con el presente asunto la parte actora pretende que en sentencia se declare: "(...) la nulidad de las resoluciones PA-011-2011, dictada a las 12:00 horas del 31 de enero de 2011 (por) la División Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República y la resolución No. R-DC-147-2011 del veintidós de agosto del dos mil once, suscrita por la Contralora General de la república (sic) Rocío Aguilar Montoya así como de cualquiera (sic) acto posterior y conexo devenido de las mismas." (Ver folios 01 a 036 de los autos). Posteriormente, en la audiencia preliminar realizada, el actor modificó su pretensión, quedando en los siguientes términos: "Una vez declarada la nulidad de las resoluciones solicitadas y como consecuencia de esa nulidad se ordene la reinstalación del actor en el puesto de Alcalde del cantón de Goicoechea y si cuando termina este proceso se ha cumplido el período por el cual fue nombrado, se condene al Estado al pago de los daños y perjuicios que se originan en las resoluciones que se solicitan anular y que consisten en salario, aguinaldo salario, escolar, (sic) salario en especie, uso de vehículo, uso de celular y demás beneficios que obtenía al mantenerse en el puesto, estimándolo en la suma de cien millones de colones que serán liquidados en ejecución de sentencia. Así mismo solicita que los salarios sean indexados desde el momento en que se generó su obligación hasta su efectivo pago y que el monto sea calculado de acuerdo a la tasa básica pasiva que se encuentre en el momento de liquidación y fijación judicial por resolución firme." (Ver folios 368 a 369 y 402 a 405 de los autos, así como grabación en soporte digital de la audiencia preliminar realizada).

2. Conferido el traslado de rigor, los codemandados contestaron en forma negativa la demanda interpuesta, invocando la representación del órgano contralor las excepciones de falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de derecho. Por su parte, la representación del Estado, interpuso las excepciones de incompetencia -resuelta interlocutoriamente-, falta de derecho y falta de interés actual. La representación de la señora Nombre16153 invocó las excepciones de incompetencia en razón de la materia, cosa juzgada material y caducidad -todas resueltas interlocutoriamente-, prescripción -de la cual desistió en la audiencia preliminar realizada-, así como falta de interés actual y falta de derecho. (Ver folios 78 a 146, 150 a 189, 275 a 283, 368 a 369 y 402 a 405 de los autos, así como grabación en soporte digital de la audiencia preliminar realizada).

3. La audiencia preliminar respectiva fue celebrada a las 13:40 horas del 03 de julio del 2014 y a las 08:50 horas del día 09 de diciembre del 2014. En ella se declaró el presente asunto como uno de puro derecho y las partes presentes procedieron a rendir conclusiones (ver folios 368 a 369 y 402 a 405 de los autos, así como grabación en soporte digital de la audiencia preliminar realizada ).

4. En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones y términos de ley y no se perciben vicios, defectos u omisiones susceptibles de producir nulidad de lo actuado o indefensión a las partes. Se dicta esta sentencia dentro del plazo que permite las labores del Despacho, previas las deliberaciones de rigor y por criterio unánime del Tribunal.

Redacta la Juez Quesada Vargas; y,

CONSIDERANDO

I.De previo. Sobre lo acontecido en el caso concreto y la independencia judicial. Siendo que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante sentencia No. 011-F-S1-2019 de las 09:36 horas del 06 de febrero del 2019, al resolver los recursos de casación presentados por la Contraloría General de la República y el Estado en contra la sentencia de este Tribunal No.85-2017 de las 11:45 horas del 18 de mayo del 2015 y su complementaria adición, anuló dicha sentencia de instancia por tercera vez, ordenando su reenvío para nuevamente dictar el fallo respectivo, de previo a ello debe señalar este Tribunal: Al momento de resolver las impugnaciones presentadas, la Sala Primera de la Corte con la ponencia de la magistrada Iris Rocío Rojas Morales indicó en el considerando V de la resolución emitida por el a-quem, en lo que resulta de interés:

"(...) V.- Considerando la estructura y razonamientos expresados en la sentencia combatida, así como, a fin de evitar reiteraciones innecesarias, esta Sala estima pertinente, en primer lugar, examinar de forma conjunta el cargo planteado por el Estado y los tres primeros reparos sustantivos invocados por el Órgano Contralor, los cuales pretenden quebrar la tesis del Tribunal, principalmente, en aspectos atinentes a la procedencia y conformidad normativa de la sanción aplicada al accionante, dado que, de acogerse las censuras, deviene innecesario referirse a los restantes cargos (pues correspondería revocar el fallo impugnado y devolver el expediente al Despacho de origen, para que resuelva los argumentos del accionante cuyo pronunciamiento omitieron). Aclarado lo anterior, corresponde examinar los reclamos de los recurrentes detallados en los Considerandos II y III de este fallo. Para tal efecto, interesa precisar lo siguiente. Consta en autos, don Nombre126154 en su condición de Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Goicochea (sic) promovió, dentro de la misma Institución, una serie de nombramientos a (sic) favor de su hijastro (hecho no controvertido). En razón de lo anterior, la CGR inició un procedimiento disciplinario en su contra, en lo de interés, al presuntamente haberse apartado del deber de probidad contemplado en el mandado (sic) 3 de la Ley contra la Corrupción. Norma que establece: "El funcionario público estará obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público. Este deber se manifestará, fundamentalmente, al identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias, de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; asimismo, al demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña y; finalmente, al administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente". Consideró el Órgano Contralor que el funcionario investigado, eventualmente, violentó el deber de probidad al infringir la prohibición contenida en el cardinal 127 del CM (sic), según el cual: "No podrán ser empleados municipales quienes sean cónyuges o parientes, en línea directa o colateral hasta el tercer grado inclusive, de alguno de los concejales, el Alcalde, el Auditor los Directores o Jefes de Personal de las unidades de reclutamiento y selección de personal ni, en general de los encargados de escoger candidatos para los puestos municipales (... )". El eventual quebrantó (sic) de la prohibición descrita, estimó el Órgano Director del procedimiento, aconteció por las diversas contrataciones que promovió el servidor Nombre126154 a (sic) favor de un pariente (por afinidad), dentro del Ente Local donde ejercía el cargo de Alcalde. La determinación de responsabilidad, señaló, podía acarrearle desde una amonestación escrita hasta la cancelación de credenciales, de conformidad, entre otras normas, de los artículos 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y 73 de la LOCGR. Por resolución PA-011-2011 la CGR declaró responsable a don Nombre126154 de los hechos imputados. Argumentó ese Ente (sic) que todo servidor público debe apegarse a los principios de probidad y de legalidad, lo cual, para el caso de marras, se traducía en no haber solicitado el nombramiento del hijastro en la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, dada la prohibición contenida en el canon 127 del CM (sic). En consecuencia, recomendó al TSE (sic): sancionar al funcionario con el despido sin responsabilidad patronal, lo cual implicaba la cancelación de credenciales, al tenor de los numerales 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y 18 inciso d) del CM (sic). El TSE (sic) validó las conclusiones y homologó lo actuado por el Órgano Contralor, en consecuencia: tuvo por acreditada la trasgresión del ordinal 127 del CM (sic), acogió lo recomendado y dispuso cancelar al señor Nombre126154 la credencial de Alcalde (resolución 8184-M-2011, confirmada en la 253-M-2012). Con base en el panorama descrito, considera este Órgano Decisor que los criterios fácticos y jurídicos aplicados por los Juzgadores al analizar la procedencia y legalidad de la sanción impuesta al señor Nombre126154 , resultan contrarios a derecho. No encuentra esta Sala carencia o vació normativo con respecto a la sanción recomendada y aplicada al actor, como bien arguyen los casacionistas. Desconocen los Juzgadores que el precepto 3 de la Ley contra la Corrupción constituye una norma sancionadora administrativa en blanco o no completa, lo cual significa que el núcleo central de la misma sólo puede comprenderse mediante su vinculación sistemática con otros preceptos legales, es decir, ha de integrarse con otras normas para completar su contenido. Dada la aplicación mutatis mutandis del derecho penal al ámbito administrativo, interesa traer a colación lo indicado por la Sala Constitucional en cuanto a las normas penales en blanco: "El principio de legalidad exige, para que los ciudadanos puedan tener conocimiento sobre si sus acciones constituyen o no delito, que las normas penales estén estructuradas con precisión y claridad lo que se complica en los casos en que no todos los elementos del tipo se encuentran en la misma norma, a ello se conoce como legislación incompleta, problema que en doctrina se estudia bajo la doctrina de 'leyes penales en blanco', denominación bajo la que se analiza el problema causado por la no plenitud del tipo; sea cuando se necesita recurrir a otra norma de igual superior o inferior rango, para lograr el tipo totalmente integrado. Nuestro Código Penal no es ajeno al problema, en el articulo 292 para establecer la acción típica se debe necesariamente recurrir a la Constitución Política pues es en ella en donde se señalan los organismos primarios del Estado y sus facultades, lo propio ocurre en el numeral 6o. de la Ley sobre el registro de barcos atuneros que se refiere a la actividad de pesca por parte de barcos extranjeros en las aguas sobre las que Costa Rica ejerce una jurisdicción especial jurisdicción señalada en el artículo 60 de la Constitución Política. El artículo 244 inciso 3o. aparte a) del Código Penal se completa con otras normas ubicadas en el propio Código, los artículos 215 y 258, a su vez el artículo 243 del ordenamiento represivo en análisis, al penalizar el libramiento de cheques sin fondos lo hace con remisió n al numeral 822 del Código de Comercio, norma en la que se señalan los casos en que procede la contraorden de pago de un cheque. Todos los casos hasta ahora analizados si bien conllevan una dificultad para el interprete, cuando de fijar el contenido del tipo se trata, ello no presenta roce alguno con la constitución, en los términos que interesa al recurrente. Se dijo que también existen leyes penales en referencia, o en blanco, que se remiten a otra de rango inferior para completar su contenido, así el artículo 241 del Código Penal para reprimir la autorización de actos indebidos de los directores, administradores, gerentes o apoderados de sociedades mercantiles o cooperativas señala que lo hace quien preste su concurso o consentimiento a actos contrarios a la ley o a los estatutos, de los que puedan derivar algún perjuicio para el representado o para el público, el artículo 394 argüido de inconstitucional en la presente acción, es otro claro ejemplo de esta técnica legislativa. (...)". De los puntos hasta ahora analizados tenemos que en cuanto a delitos y penas se refiere, en nuestro marco constitucional existe reserva de ley, sea que en esa materia sólo esta permitido el actuar de los Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo por medio de leyes formales pero a su vez que la técnica legislativa ha aceptado como válida y necesaria la utilización de normas penales no completas, para fijar los tipos penales, las que logran su plena integración al relacionárseles con otras, aún de menor rango, dentro de estas los reglamentos". Sentencia 1876-90 de las 14 horas del 19 de diciembre de 1990. En igual sentido a (sic) señalado el Tribunal Constitucional: "En derecho penal se acepta como válida la técnica legislativa que permite la utilización de las leyes penales en blanco o necesitadas de complemento, son aquellas en que el presupuesto no se consigna completo o específico en la propia ley, pues debe recurrirse a otra de igual o distinto rango para completarla. Por ejemplo para poder establecer el contenido del tipo penal del artículo 112 inciso 1o del Código Penal, es necesario recurrir al de Familia, que es donde se señalan las condiciones que deben reunirse para ser calificado como ascendiente, descendiente o hermano consanguíneo, y si del inciso 2° de aquel artículo se trata, es necesario recurrir a la propia Constitución que es donde se indica a quiénes corresponde dar el trato de miembros de los Supremos Poderes. La tipificación de la conducta se logra con la unión de normas que se complementan; a efecto de establecer si en ella se cumple con las exigencias propias de la tipicidad debe de previo relacionárselas". Voto 2996-92 de las 15 horas 10 minutos del 6 de octubre de 1992. Como se indicó líneas arriba, el mandato 3 de la Ley contra la Corrupción regula el deber de probidad en el actuar del funcionario público, el cual se manifiesta, entre otros, en la obligación de administrar los recursos públicos con apego al principio de legalidad. AI tratarse de una norma administrativa en blanco o que requiere ser completada, conforme se explicó, ese numeral debe integrarse con otra disposición legal para ser aplicada en un caso concreto, pues la conducta a sancionar consiste en administrar recursos públicos en violación del principio de legalidad, de manera que sólo la ley, según esa descripción, es la única fuente que podría integrar el tipo sancionatorio administrativo (remisión expresa a la legalidad). Ahora bien, para la concreción de dicha legalidad en el subjúdice, ha de acudirse a lo establecido en el cardinal 127 del CM, (sic) norma que prohíbe nombrar como empleado y por ende, pagar con recursos públicos, al conyugue (sic) o parientes, en línea directa o colateral hasta tercer grado, en la Municipalidad donde se ejerce el cargo de Alcalde. Tiene claro esta Cámara que el término "pariente" comprende tanto el vínculo por consanguineidad (sic) y afinidad, así reconocido inclusive por la Sala Constitucional (sentencias 01809-2009 del 18 de diciembre de 2009 y 00412-2011 del 15 de abril de 2011) y, contemplado expresamente en el Código de Familia. Estable el numeral 14 de ese cuerpo normativo: "Es legalmente imposible el matrimonio: (...) (sic) 2) Entre ascendientes y descendientes por consanguinidad o afinidad. El impedimento no desaparece con la disolución del matrimonio que dio origen al parentesco por afinidad (...)". Entonces, acreditado el cumplimiento del supuesto prohibitivo contenido en el precepto de 127 del CM (sic) (nombramiento del conyugue (sic) o parientes hasta tercer grado), tal y como aconteció en la especie, la determinación de la sanción ha de ajustarse a lo establecido en la Ley contra la Corrupción, cuerpo normativo que al efecto consagra: "Artículo 40- Violación al deber de probidad. Sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades civiles y penales que procedan, la infracción al deber de probidad debidamente comprobada y previa defensa, constituirá justa causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad patronal. Artículo 39.- Sanciones administrativas. Según la gravedad, las faltas anteriormente señaladas serán sancionadas así: a) Amonestación escrita publicada en el Diario Oficial. b) Suspensión, sin goce de salario, dieta o estipendio correspondiente, de quince a treinta días. c) Separación del cargo público, sin responsabilidad patronal o cancelación de la credencial de regidor municipal según corresponda". En esa dirección consagra el numeral 18 inciso d) del CM (sic): "Serán causas automáticas de pérdida de la credencial de alcalde municipal: (..) d) Incurrir en alguna de las causales previstas en el artículo 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (...)". En relación indica el ordinal 73 de cita: "Será causa para la cancelación de la respectiva credencial la comisión de una falta grave por parte de un regidor o síndico, propietario o suplente, contra las normas del ordenamiento de fiscalización y control de la Hacienda Pública contemplado en esta Ley y contra cualesquiera otras normas relativas a los fondos públicos; o al incurrir en alguno de los actos previstos en la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, como generadoras de responsabilidad administrativa. Esto se aplicará cuando el infractor haya actuado en el ejercicio de su cargo o con motivo de él (...)". Corolario de lo expuesto, resulta evidente, la infracción al deber de probidad por el acaecimiento de la conducta prohibida en el ordinal 127 del CM (sic), sí se encuentra sujeta a sanciones específicas, entre otras: a la cancelación de la credencial de Alcalde. Es importante señalar, con la prohibición en disputa se garantiza no solo el principio de idoneidad en un puesto pagado con recursos públicos, sino también el libre acceso a cargos públicos por parte de los habitantes de la República en condiciones de igualdad, Ío que se ve debilitado en este tipo de nombramientos prohibidos dada la cercanía de los contratados como (sic) quien ordena la contratación. Así las cosas, contrario a la tesis de los Juzgadores, no existe vació legal al respecto. En ese sentido corresponderá acoger los reparos invocados, con los efectos que a continuación se detallarán.(...)".

Del texto considerativo transcrito, se deriva con meridiana claridad que la sentencia emitida por la Sala Primera de la Corte, entró a realizar un análisis sustantivo -y no sólo formal- del proceso judicial que nos ocupa, es decir, procedió a entrar a conocer por el fondo este asunto, inclusive arribando a una tesis jurídica distinta de la sostenida por esta Cámara en la sentencia anulada. Pero pese a lo anterior, posteriormente el alto Tribunal se devuelve sobre lo andado y procede a anular la sentencia otrora emitida por este colegio de Jueces, es decir, se devuelve al análisis formal de la resolución que estaba siendo objeto del análisis casacional sustantivo y pese a haber emitido parcialmente su criterio sobre el fondo del proceso sometido al juzgamiento de esta jurisdicción, luego decide anular la sentencia de instancia y ordenar la devolución de los autos para que, nuevamente, esta cámara proceda al dictado de la sentencia de instancia, ahora por cuarta vez. A todas luces resulta claro, que en la especie se presenta una discrepancia de criterios jurídicos sustantivos entre dos órganos jurisdiccionales: por un lado esta Sección Sétima del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y por otro lado la Sala Primera de la Corte y en ese tanto, lo procedente evidentemente no era anular, sino que la Sala procediera a resolver por el fondo el presente asunto, ejerciendo como superior las competencias que la ley le asigna y por ende, si no compartía el criterio de esta cámara, proceder a revocar lo resuelto y dar la solución que en su criterio era la procedente conforme a derecho y al mérito de los autos, pero no invocar consideraciones de fondo o sustantivas para anular (sanción por excelencia aplicable a los defectos formales de una resolución judicial) el fallo sometido a su conocimiento. Pero pese a lo anterior, así lo dispuso expresamente en su considerando sexto y en su parte dispositiva, mismos apartados que en lo conducente, señalan:

"VI.- En mérito de lo expuesto y en los términos indicados, se declararán con lugar los recursos de casación. En consecuencia, se anulará la sentencia impugnada. En su lugar, se reenviará el expediente al Tribunal de origen para que resuelva los argumentos del accionante cuyo pronunciamiento omitió. En ese sentido, consta en autos que al plantear el presente proceso parte de la causa de pedir se fundamento en aspectos atinentes al no conocimiento de la relación de hechos que motivó el procedimiento administrativo en disputa; la improcedencia de que la Auditoria Interna del Gobierno Local remitiera el informe DFOE-DI-1596 a la CGR (sin que de previo informara lo ocurrido al Concejo Municipal o bien al Alcalde), la violación del principio de acceso a la información y en general, del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa, así como, la falta de análisis en cuanto a la gravedad de la conducta intimada (proporcionalidad de la sanción recomendada y aplicada). Aspectos no analizados por los Juzgadores, dada la forma como resolvieron el caso concreto. Lo indicado justifica el reenvío del expediente al Tribunal de origen, a fin de que examine los puntos en cuestión, valore los alegatos de defensa y la prueba aportada, para así evitar decidir el asunto en una única instancia, con violación del derecho de defensa y a la revisión del fallo por un segundo órgano jurisdiccional. (...)". / POR TANTO / Se declaran con lugar los recursos. En consecuencia, se anula la sentencia impugnada. En su lugar, se ordena el reenvío del expediente al Tribunal de procedencia, para que resuelva conforme a derecho." Aunado a lo anterior, debe indicarse que de la redacción dada a la resolución del a-quem, se desprende que es la voluntad de la Sala que este Tribunal realice el análisis jurídico para el caso concreto, partiendo de la premisa de validar la posición jurídica definida en la resolución que anula nuestra sentencia, puntualmente en lo que corresponde a la integración normativa que debe realizarse para dotar de sustento jurídico la sanción impuesta por la administración demandada al señor Nombre126154, concluyendo la Sala que sí existe una sanción de carácter legal prevista y aplicable al caso bajo examen, criterio que aunque es de suyo respetable, pero que no comparte este Tribunal. Y es que no puede perderse de vista, que el pretender imponer a un tribunal colegiado, un criterio jurídico ajeno al que se arribe a lo interno del órgano judicial mismo, por parte de sus integrantes, en cualquier caso implica una flagrante vulneración al principio de independencia judicial, el cual garantiza la sujeción de las personas que ejercen la actividad jurisdiccional, únicamente a la Constitución y a la legislación vigente (artículos 39, 41 y 154 de la Constitución Política) y no a criterios ajenos a la labor que se desarrolla a lo interno del órgano judicial y ni siquiera a criterios jurisprudenciales (salvedad hecha de los pronunciamientos emitidos por la Sala Constitucional, tal y como lo establece expresamente el artículo 13 de la ley No. 7135). Y esto implica tanto si dicho criterio es emitido por parte de un Tribunal superior, como si es emitido por parte de un órgano ajeno a la jurisdicción. No puede pretender el órgano judicial en alzada, que esta Cámara resuelva conforme en su opinión debe hacerlo, pues con ello estaría coartando abiertamente la libertad de criterio por parte del juzgador y la independencia que ostenta cada Juez de la República en el cumplimiento de sus funciones al resolver el caso concreto, criterios ambos en los que se sustenta el sistema jurídico nacional, garantizado precisamente ab initio por la independencia del Juez, quien es libre de resolver lo que de manera fundada y razonada, según su leal saber y entender, estime pertinente en cada proceso, aunque siempre en sujeción y de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico vigente, encontrándose sustraído de cualquier tipo de injerencia al momento de emitir su criterio en la sentencia de la cual se trate. Principio de independencia judicial que trae además aparejado, el derecho que tienen las partes que acuden a estrados para el dilucidamiento de sus diferendos, a que sus asuntos sean revisados por un juez independiente en cuanto a criterio jurídico, en cada instancia. En razón de lo anterior y al amparo de lo indicado por el numeral 170 de la ley No. 7333 Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y sus reformas, el cual establece que los tribunales no sostendrán competencia con el superior que ejerce jurisdicción sobre ellos, esta Cámara entrará nuevamente a dictar sentencia para el asunto sometido a nuestro conocimiento, pero no conforme lo dispone la Sala Primera en la sentencia anulatoria por ella dictada, sino conforme lo que considera procedente para el caso concreto, este colegio de Jueces. No puede dejar de indicarse que pese a lo anteriormente expuesto, los cuestionamientos esgrimidos por las partes sobre la procedencia o no de la realización del procedimiento administrativo, es un aspecto de fondo ya dilucidado en la resolución emitida por la Sala Primera de la Corte cuando anuló por segunda vez la sentencia de este Tribunal, actuando como Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo, quien además ya decantó expresamente, haciendo pronunciamiento por el fondo en aquél acto jurisdiccional, que la recomendación emitida por la Contraloría General de la República dentro del procedimiento sancionatorio de marras, resulta vinculante. Ello, pese a la clara improcedencia de la técnica jurídica últimamente utilizada por la Sala referida.

II.Sobre los hechos probados. De importancia para la resolución del presente asunto, se tiene como debidamente acreditados los siguientes, por encontrar sustento en los elementos de convicción que en su apoyo se citan: 1. Que la señora Nombre126155 , es la madre de Nombre126156 , nacido el día 07 de enero de 1990, figurando como su padre registral el señor Nombre126156 (ver folio 03 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 2. Que el señor Nombre126154 es cónyuge de la señora Nombre126155 , con quien contrajo nupcias en fecha 02 de marzo del 2007 (ver folio 0002 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República). 3. Que el actor fue designado como Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea en las elecciones municipales para el período 2007-2011, siendo posteriormente reelecto en las elecciones realizadas el día 05 de diciembre del 2010 y así fue declarado por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones mediante resolución Nº 0019-E11-2011 “Declaratoria de Elección de alcaldes y vicealcaldes de las Municipalidades de los cantones de la provincia de San José, para el período constitucional comprendido entre el siete de febrero del dos mil once y el treinta de abril de dos mil dieciséis” (hecho no controvertido por las partes, los autos y consulta realizada por este Tribunal a las direcciones electrónicas "http://www.gaceta.go.cr/pub/2012/01/31/COMP_31_01_2012.pdf" y "Dirección15291". 4. Que mediante oficio No. AG-1073-2009 de fecha 27 de abril del 2009, dirigido a la Jefe del Departamento de Recursos Humanos de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, el actor en calidad de Alcalde Municipal solicitó se nombrara a Nombre126156 en la Dirección15290 . del Departamento de Aseo de Vías del municipio por espacio de dos meses (ver folio 05 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 5. Que en fecha 27 de abril del 2009, se suscribió el contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido No. 183-2009 entre la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y Nombre126156 , en el cual se contrató al señor Nombre126156 como misceláneo municipal por un plazo de dos meses (ver folios 06 a 08 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 6. Que mediante oficio No. AG-1793-2009 de fecha 25 de junio del 2009, dirigido a la Jefe del Departamento de Recursos Humanos de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, el actor en calidad de Alcalde Municipal solicitó se nombrara a Nombre126156 en la Dirección18863 . por espacio de dos meses (ver folio 10 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 7. Que en fecha 27 de junio del 2009, se suscribió el contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido No. 251-2009 entre la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y Nombre126156 , en el cual se contrató al señor Nombre126156 como misceláneo municipal por un plazo de dos meses (ver folios 11 a 13 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 8. Que en fecha 26 de agosto del 2009, se suscribió el contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido No. 349-2009 entre la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y Nombre126156 , en el cual se contrató al señor Nombre126156 como misceláneo municipal por un plazo de dos meses (ver folios 15 a 17 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 9. Que mediante oficio No. AG-3765-2009 de fecha 11 de diciembre del 2009, dirigido a la Jefe del Departamento de Recursos Humanos de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, el actor en calidad de Alcalde Municipal solicitó se nombrara a Nombre126156 en la Dirección18863 . por espacio de dos meses (ver folio 24 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 10. Que en fecha 27 de diciembre del 2009, se suscribió el contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido No. 523-2009 entre la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y Nombre126156 , en el cual se contrató al señor Nombre126156 como misceláneo municipal por un plazo de dos meses (ver folios 25 a 27 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 11. Que mediante oficio No. AG-0629-2010 de fecha 08 de marzo del 2010, dirigido a la Jefe del Departamento de Recursos Humanos de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, el actor en calidad de Alcalde Municipal solicitó se nombrara a Nombre126156 en la Dirección18863 . por espacio de dos meses (ver folio 29 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 12. Que en fecha 08 de marzo del 2010, se suscribió el contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido No. 095-2010 entre la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y Nombre126156 , en el cual se contrató al señor Nombre126156 como misceláneo municipal por un plazo de dos meses (ver folios 30 a 32 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 13. Que mediante oficio No. AG-953-2010 de fecha 15 de abril del 2010, dirigido a la Jefe del Departamento de Recursos Humanos de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, el actor en calidad de Alcalde Municipal solicitó se nombrara a Nombre126156 en la plaza de Oficinista a.í. por espacio de dos meses, a partir del 18 de abril del 2010 (ver folio 34 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 14. Que en fecha 08 de marzo del 2010, se suscribió el contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido No. 197-1-2010 entre la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y Nombre126156 , en el cual se contrató al señor Nombre126156 como oficinista a.í. por un plazo de dos meses (ver folios 35 a 37 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 15. Que en fecha 18 de junio del 2010, se suscribió el contrato de trabajo por tiempo definido No. 304-1-2010 entre la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y Nombre126156 , en el cual se contrató al señor Nombre126156 como oficinista a.í. por un plazo de dos meses (ver folios 39 a 41 del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República contra el actor). 16. Que el actor fue sujeto de un procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República bajo el número DJ-83-2010 e iniciado mediante resolución sin número de las 15:00 horas del 05 de noviembre del 2010, en la que se intimó al señor Nombre126154, que mientras ejercía como Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea contrató a su hijastro como funcionario para dicho gobierno local, violentando con ello la prohibición establecida en el artículo 127 del Código Municipal (ver expediente administrativo en formato digital, disco No.1 y folios 43 a 52 del procedimiento seguido en contra del actor). 17. Que la audiencia oral respectiva se llevó a cabo a las 09:10 horas del 18 de enero del 2011 (ver folios 128 a 129 del procedimiento sancionador seguido en contra del accionante). 18. Que dicho procedimiento administrativo sancionador culminó con el dictado de la resolución PA-11-2011 de las 12:00 horas del 31 de enero del 2011,emitida por el órgano decisor del procedimiento administrativo seguido ante la Contraloría General de la República, en la cual se dispuso: "(...) 1. Declarar al señor Nombre126154 responsable administrativamente de los hechos atribuidos en este procedimiento administrativo, por lo que se recomienda sancionarlo con el despido sin responsabilidad patronal, lo cual implica la cancelación de credenciales, de conformidad con el artículo 39 de la Ley contra la corrupción y enriquecimiento ilícito (sic), artículo 18 inciso d) del Código Municipal. (...)". Dicha resolución fue notificada al aquí accionante el día 04 de febrero del 2011. (Ver folios 47 a 60 de los autos y folios 131 a 144 del expediente administrativo en formato digital, disco No.1). 19. Que en contra de lo resuelto, el ahora accionante interpuso recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio en fecha 09 de febrero del 2011 (ver folios 146 a 154 del procedimiento administrativo sancionador tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República con el accionante). 20. Que mediante resolución sin número de las 12:00 horas del 24 de febrero del dos mil once emitida por la Contraloría General de la República, se declaró sin lugar la revocatoria intentada por parte del ahora accionante (ver folios 185 a 194 del procedimiento administrativo sancionador tramitado por el órgano contralor en contra del aquí accionante). 21. Que mediante resolución No. R-DC-147-2011 de las 10:00 horas del 22 de agosto del dos mil once emitida por la Contralora General de la República, se resolvió el recurso de apelación formulado por el actor contra el acto final del procedimiento administrativo sancionador seguido en su contra, disponiéndose rechazar el mismo y aclarar de oficio que la recomendación de sanción dictada iba dirigida al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (folios 51 a 54 de los autos y expediente administrativo en formato digital, disco No.1 ). 22. Que mediante oficio No. DJ-1012-2011 de fecha 12 de setiembre del 2011, emitido por la División Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República y dirigido al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, se puso en conocimiento de dicha entidad, el acto final dictado dentro del procedimiento administrativo sancionador tramitado bajo el número DJ-83-2010 en contra del señor Nombre126154 (ver folios 236 del procedimiento administrativo sancionador respectivo). 23. Que mediante resolución sin número de las 11:35 horas del 20 de setiembre del 2011 emitida por el magistrado instructor Luis Antonio Sobrado González, dentro de las "Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Nombre126154 ", se solicitó al órgano contralor remitir copia certificada del expediente del procedimiento administrativo sancionador (ver folio 237 del procedimiento sancionador respectivo). 24. Que mediante resolución sin número de las 10:40 horas del 10 de octubre del 2011, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones confirió traslado al ahora accionante, para que se refiriera a la gestión presentada por la Contraloría General de la República (ver folios 240 a 255 del expediente sancionador indicado). 25. Que mediante resolución No. 8184-M-2011 de las 13:10 horas del 16 de diciembre del 2011, emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, se dispuso cancelar al señor Nombre126154 la credencial que le acreditaba como Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y designar como nueva alcaldesa a la señora Nombre16153 y como vice-alcaldesa a la señora Nombre154089 (c.c. Nombre98993). (Ver folios 240 a 255 del procedimiento administrativo sancionador referido). 26. En contra de lo resuelto, el actor interpuso recurso de reconsideración, el cual fue rechazado por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones mediante resolución No. 253-M-2012 de las 08:31 horas del 17 de enero del 2012 dictada (ver folios 256 a 268 del procedimiento administrativo sancionador). 27. El presente asunto fue presentado a estrados el día 24 de enero del 2012 (ver folio 01 de los autos). 28. Que el señor Nombre126156 es hijastro por afinidad, dentro del segundo grado de parentesco por línea colateral, del señor Nombre126154 (los autos).

III.Hechos no probados. 1. Que el salario pagado al señor Nombre126156 , hijastro del señor Nombre126154 fue superior al que correspondía para la plaza por él ocupada (no hay prueba al respecto en autos). 2. Que el señor Nombre126156 , hijastro del aquí accionante, no laborara en la plaza en la que fue nombrado o laborara en una plaza distinta a la de sus nombramientos (no hay prueba al respecto en autos). 3. Que el señor Nombre126156 hubiera recibido el pago de su salario sin realizar el trabajo respectivo (no hay prueba al respecto en autos). 4. Que el accionante Nombre126154 hubiese recibido algún estipendio, pago o beneficio por parte del señor Nombre126156 , para proceder a su designación en un puesto municipal (no hay prueba al respecto en autos). 5. Que se hubiera generado un daño o bien un perjuicio económico real y efectivo a las finanzas o a los bienes integrantes de la hacienda pública municipal, en el caso bajo examen (no hay prueba al respecto en autos).

IV.Argumenta la parte actora, en sustento de su acción y a manera de apretada síntesis, que se le abrió un procedimiento administrativo por haber nombrado interinamente a su hijastro como funcionario del gobierno local entre el 27 de abril del 2009 y el 17 de agosto del 2010, supuestamente contraviniendo el artículo 127 del Código Municipal. Narra en su criterio el desarrollo de dicho procedimiento y señala que el acto final era un acto con efecto propio, por ser vinculante en cuanto a los hechos para el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, razón por la cual lo apeló y su recurso fue denegado. Que tales resoluciones son vinculantes desde el punto de vista técnico-fáctico para el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Afirma que no se trata de un acto electoral, sino de un acto administrativo sancionador, y además un acto administrativo complejo, porque la Contraloría General de la República -en adelante CGR- no puede cancelar la credencial de un regidor o funcionario electo. Cita la doctrina nacional y señala que acto complejo es el conformado por la voluntad de dos o más sujetos u órganos, actuando para un mismo fin y con igual contenido o efecto jurídico, emana de un órgano complejo formado por los dos o más que lo dictan y la falta de cualquiera de ellos o de su voluntad, lo anula. Por ello afirma que el acto de cancelación de credenciales es un acto complejo que requiere de la concurrencia de la voluntad de la CGR como órgano instructor y decisor, y la voluntad del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones como ejecutor de la sanción propuesta, por ser vinculante la decisión de la Contraloría. No se trata de un acto de naturaleza electoral, sino una sanción típicamente administrativa. Por ser vinculantes las resoluciones de la CGR en relación con los hechos, estima que es una farsa procesal cualquiera posterior instancia o recurso contra ellas. Sostiene que si el procedimiento seguido por la CGR se anula, la resolución dictada por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones -en adelante TSE-, será nula también, por ser la emitida por el TSE complementaria o accesoria de la dictada por la CGR. Igual afirma que si el acto emitido por la CGR está viciado en uno de sus elementos, en este caso el motivo y el contenido, la resolución del TSE para la cancelación de credenciales también estará viciada, pues los vicios que padezca la primera -de la CGR- también los sufrirá la resolución del TSE. // Señala que los actos emitidos por la Contraloría General de la República, padecen de los siguientes vicios: Dichas resoluciones recomiendan cancelar la credencial de alcalde por la responsabilidad administrativa en que incurrió al nombrar interinamente a una persona que no es pariente del señor Nombre126154, cita el artículo 127 del Código Municipal y señala que no tiene con el Alcalde ningún vínculo de afinidad o consanguinidad, pues es claro que el hijo de una persona con la que se está casado, no es familiar en línea directa o colateral con uno, máxime que se trata de una persona mayor de edad y con una filiación determinada. Afirma que en criterio del IFAM, los hijos de los cónyuges no están incluidos dentro de la prohibición expresa del artículo 127 citado. Sostiene que por haber recomendado que se contratara a una persona con quien no hay ningún grado de relación de parentesco, eso no es nada. Por ello estima que la conducta no es sancionable, es atípica y no encaja en el supuesto normativo citado, por lo que ese numeral no puede aplicarse en el caso concreto. Pero pese a ello la CGR dejó de lado la voluntad de los habitantes votantes del cantón de Goicoechea, sin existir una norma o principio constitucional que así lo establezca, violentando con ello el debido proceso y principios de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, de obligado cumplimiento y contra la voluntad popular, violentando el principio de conservación del acto electoral. En sede administrativa se tuvo como un hecho no probado que el señor Nombre126156 fuera hijo del accionante, o en cualquier forma legitimado como su hijo político o que mediara algún vínculo filial entre ellos, para cumplir con el numeral 127 del Código Municipal. Por ello la conducta es atípica y no encaja en el numeral 127 referido, el cual no puede serle aplicado. Aduce que para los especialistas en derecho de familia, no hay relación familiar ni de afinidad. Señala que el artículo 127 citado, no indica que haya impedimento para que sean empleados municipales los familiares por afinidad de los funcionarios señalado en ese artículo, por lo que extender de manera ilegítima lo establecido por el legislador deviene en una interpretación extensiva de la norma, lo cual es improcedente en materia sancionatoria, siendo que su interpretación debe ser de carácter restrictivo. Por ello, estima que el órgano director del procedimiento recomienda de manera errada una sanción, basándose en un criterio interpretativo que extiende inadecuadamente lo expuesto en el texto legal, arrogándose competencias legislativas que no le corresponden, pues en materia privativa y sancionatoria rige el principio de reserva de ley. Además la norma que se pretende aplicar no refiere de ninguna manera a los hijos de los cónyuges, por cuanto no existe filiación entre éstos y el sujeto activo de la norma. La potestad sancionatoria otorgada al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y ejercida en su instrucción por la CGR, requieren para la cancelación de una credencial, la comisión de una conducta específica contemplada en una causal legal. Cita el artículo 253 del Código Electoral, en cuanto refiere a los "supuestos contemplados expresamente en la ley". Continúa señalando que ese numeral se desaplicó para el caso del actor, y la CGR recomendó la cancelación de sus credenciales, lo cual violenta el principio de legalidad previsto en los artículos 11 y 39 de la Constitución Política y 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Afirma que la interpretación dada por la CGR al artículo 127, es extensiva y nugatoria de los principios de legalidad y tipicidad, y la sanción por ello conculca derechos fundamentales del señor Nombre126154. Continúa manifestando que aplicar la potestad de cancelar la credencial de un funcionario de elección popular por hechos acaecidos en el ejercicio de un cargo anterior, se equipara en sus efectos a una inhabilitación, lo cual no es posible por el principio de interpretación restricitva que rige en materia sancionatoria. Señala que la interpretación de la CGR equipara a los hijos con los hijastros, llegando a considerar que se encuentran en la misma categoría de los hijos, siendo ello una interpretación extensiva y omisa de fundamentación jurídica que desprotegería el instituto de la familia, al dar a una institución jurídica consolidada, nuevos efectos prácticos. // Acusa que en el desarrollo del procedimiento se dieron una serie de irregularidades que entorpecieron el derecho de defensa del actor: -primero porque el oficio No. DFOE-DI-1576 no estaba dentro del expediente administrativo cuando el abogado del actor lo fue a revisar, oficio que corresponde a una relación de hechos remitida por el Gerente a.í, del Área de Denuncias e Investigaciones de la División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa de la CGR, oficio que fue el fundamento de la investigación realizada, y es un día antes de la audiencia (el 17 de enero del 2011) mediante resolución firmada por los integrantes del órgano director, pone a su disposición las copias de esa relación de hechos; por ello se solicitó la suspensión de la audiencia, para valorar el documento, pero eso le fue denegado realizándose la audiencia. En el acto de traslado de cargos no se pone en conocimiento los hechos que generaron el procedimiento y el oficio indicado se puso a su disposición el día antes de la audiencia; esa relación de hechos ni siquiera consta en el oficio DFOE-DI-1596, por lo que el actor no lo conoció, cuando según el artículo 8 de la Ley contra la Corrupción, los documentos y evidencias de las investigaciones que realicen la auditoría internas y que generen la apertura de un procedimiento, serán confidenciales salvo para las partes involucradas, las cuales tendrán libre acceso a todos ellos. -Considera que la Auditoría Interna debió informar a la administración de lo que estaba ocurriendo, haciendo la advertencia al Alcalde o al Departamento de Recursos Humanos, o bien a su superior jerárquico el Concejo Municipal. Estima que acudir directamente al órgano contralor es un acto de mala fe. Cita los artículos 22, 35 y 37 de la Ley General de Control Interno, y los artículos 45 y 47 del Reglamento de Organización y Funciones de la Unidad de Auditoría Interna de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, publicado en La Gaceta No. 16 del 23 de enero del 2009. En ese tanto, estima que la Auditoría Interna no cumplió con la función preventiva de advertir. Señala que la CGR demandada, no analizó la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, y tampoco lo hizo el TSE, pues de haberlo hecho se hubiesen percatado de que esa ley establece una serie de sanciones según la gravedad de la falta. Además, añade que el artículo 41 de esa ley, establece los factores a tomar en consideración para valorar la conducta del presunto responsable. Por ello, considera que el nombramiento del hijastro del Alcalde no tiene la gravedad que señala la ley como para cancelarle su credencial de Alcalde. Que no hay lesión a sus intereses económicos, no se dio un impacto negativo en el servicio público, el salario que recibió el funcionario se lo ganó, recibió el pago de ley, y no se le favoreció pagándole más de la suma establecida legalmente. Señala que si la Auditoría hubiera realizado las advertencias, el asunto no habría pasado a más. -Acusa que la resolución No. PA-011-2011 no le fue debidamente notificada según el artículo 38 de la Ley de Notificaciones, pues no se le comunicó antes de la realización de la audiencia, lo que violó su derecho de defensa. Invoca los votos No. 2004-04637 del 30 de abril del 2004, No. 16955-2007 del 21 de noviembre del 2007, ambos de la Sala Constitucional. Afirma que los enlistados son vicios insalvables que propician la nulidad de lo actuado. -Indica que las sanciones recomendadas no fueron proporcionales con la gravedad de los hechos acreditados en el procedimiento. -Sostiene que la desaplicación de normas de derecho positivo de fondo, es una causal de nulidad de una resolución. Y en su opinión, en su caso se desaplicó el artículo 41 de la Ley contra el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, pues no se indicó cuáles eran los intereses económicos de la hacienda pública que lesionó el actor, ni tampoco se acreditaron cuáles fueron los daños y perjuicios que a la hacienda pública se causaron y el enriquecimiento que obtuvo el accionante. Por ello, estima que la sanción administrativa impuesta es omisa en el análisis de la culpabilidad administrativa, lo cual implica desaplicar el artículo 41 citado, pero pese a que no hay análisis de la culpabilidad, se recomienda aplicar la sanción más gravosa en contra de un funcionario electo popularmente. Cita la resolución No. R-DC-19S-2011 de las 15:00 horas del 08 de diciembre del 2011 emitida para un supuesto similar en el caso del señor Nombre16454 , donde la sanción aplicada fue la suspensión por 15 días sin goce de salario, siendo una falta, en su criterio, mucho más grave que la del señor Nombre126154, a quien por el contrario, se le aplicó la sanción más grave posible. Afirma que se violentó el debido proceso, el principio del paralelismo de las formas, el principio democrático y el de voluntad popular. Si al Alcalde lo nombró el pueblo, el único legitimado para destituirlo es el pueblo, de acuerdo con los principios y bases del plebiscito. Cita como ejemplo lo acontecido en Nombre265 . Invoca la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 220, 223 y 253 de la ley No. 8765 Código Electoral vigente, y de las resoluciones No. 6673-M-2011, No. 7105-M-2011 y No. 8184-M-2011 todas del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, para proceder a interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad. Concluye indicando que los actos impugnados presentan vicios graves de nulidad en su motivo y contenido, lo cual los hace merecedores de que esa nulidad sea declarada. Reitera que ambas resoluciones son desproporcionadas y desaplican normas referidas a la valoración de la culpa administrativa, proponiendo la sanción más gravosa para esos casos y la más grave para quien ejerce un cargo de elección popular. Afirma que el cantón de Goicoechea es el segundo a nivel de desarrollo y crecimiento debido a la gestión del Alcalde Nombre126154, quien ejerció un período en dicho cargo y fue reelecto por un segundo período. Por lo anterior, solicita se declare con lugar el presente proceso. Por su parte, la representación de la Contraloría General de la República manifiesta que en el acto de apertura del procedimiento se le intimó por violación del artículo 127 del Código Municipal y por violación al deber de probidad, según el artículo 3 de la ley No. 8422 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. En el acto de apertura el órgano director señaló claramente que se ponía a disposición del actor el expediente administrativo desde el momento en que dicho acto se emitió, el 05 de noviembre del 2011, y se indicó detalladamente cuál prueba conformaba el expediente. Cuando el actor solicita la relación de hechos, en su solicitud señala que la misma no consta dentro del expediente administrativo que había fotocopiado, por lo que no es cierto que se le dio acceso al expediente 23 horas antes de la audiencia oral. Esa relación de hechos no formaba parte del expediente administrativo ni de la intimación siendo sólo un insumo para hacer el acto de apertura, y no tenía relevancia en relación con el derecho de defensa y debido proceso. Durante la audiencia oral se le aclaró al actor que los hechos intimados eran sólo los que constaban en el acto de apertura del procedimiento -expediente que siempre estuvo a su disposición- y al cual tuvo acceso el actor, no teniendo porqué ejercer su derecho de defensa en cuanto a esa "relación de hechos". Por ello, es totalmente falso que esa relación de hechos fuera prueba en su contra, siendo sólo un insumo para la investigación. La resolución PA-011-2011 del 31 de enero del 2011 fue emitida por el órgano decisor y no por el órgano director del procedimiento y en ella se aborda ampliamente este tema de la "relación de hechos". El actor interpuso recurso de revocatoria y apelación subsidiaria contra la resolución final del procedimiento administrativo, los cuales le fueron rechazados mediante resolución No. R-DC-147-2011 del 22 de agosto del 2011. Contra la resolución No. 8184-M-2012 del 16 de diciembre del 2011, que emitió el TSE separando del cargo al accionante y nombrando como alcaldesa a la señora Nombre16153 , fue impugnada mediante recurso de reconsideración que se declaró sin lugar mediante resolución No. 253-M-2012 del 17 de enero del 2012. Cita el expediente No. 12-000748-1027-CA y señala que en él se están discutiendo los mismos hechos que en el presente asunto. Afirma que la CGR es administración no activa, fiscalizadora y vigilante. Se trata de una relación tripartita entre la CGR, el servidor público respectivo y la autoridad llamada a imponer la sanción, en este caso el TSE. Esa última no es sustituida con el acto que emite el órgano contralor, recomendando de manera vinculante la imposición de la sanción. La cancelación de las credenciales es resultado del procedimiento administrativo que llevó a cabo la CGR y que culmina con la ejecución por parte del TSE ante la recomendación vinculante de sanción emitida por el órgano contralor, tal y como lo indica el Código Electoral y la jurisprudencia constitucional. El acto de despido que emite el TSE hace eficaz la recomendación vinculante de sanción emitida por la CGR y esa fase de ejecución implica el retiro de la credencial. Tanto el motivo como el contenido y el fin del acto de recomendación vinculante para el TSE, en el caso concreto se refiere a la hacienda pública. El motivo del acto que emite la CGR son las razones fácticas y jurídicas que llevan a establecer un juicio de responsabilidad administrativa en contra de un funcionario municipal de elección popular que violentó el ordenamiento. El contenido de la conducta administrativa es la recomendación vinculante de sanción en sí misma, siendo ése el resultado del procedimiento que tramitó el órgano contralor. El fin de dicha conducta es un tema de tutela de la hacienda pública. Señala que según el numeral 183 de la Constitución Política le da a la CGR la función de fiscalización y control de la hacienda pública, y según el artículo 8 de la ley No. 7428, la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos constituye uno de los componentes objetivos de la hacienda pública, por ello la CGR puede llevar a cabo procedimientos administrativos y exigir que se apliquen sanciones cuando se requiera. Y ello por ser la CGR un órgano de control superior y vigilancia de la hacienda pública. Las causales de responsabilidad para determinar sanciones viene de la LGAP, la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito y su reglamento, la Ley de la Administración Financiera y la Ley Orgánica de la CGR. El artículo 127 del Código Municipal tutela el interés público erradicando el nepotismo y depurando la función pública. Esa norma señala un impedimento para que los familiares por afinidad puedan ser empleados municipales, cuando habla de parientes en líneas directa hasta el tercer grado inclusive. Afirma que según la doctrina internacional y la jurisprudencia, entre el cónyuge y los hijos del otro se genera una relación de parentesco por afinidad en primer grado, por lo que el hijastro, el padrastro y la madrastra están en grado de afinidad. Siendo Nombre126156 hijo de la cónyuge del actor, respecto a ella mantiene un primer grado por consanguinidad y también un primer grado con el señor Nombre126154, pero por afinidad. Y ello no implica ninguna aplicación extensiva del artículo citado ni una violación al principio de legalidad o tipicidad. Por ello, las resoluciones dictadas están apegadas a derecho, pues no se debe distinguir donde la ley -el art. 127 referenciado- no distingue. La cancelación de las credenciales se encuentra prevista en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico para determinados casos, por lo cual no se ha violentado el principio de legalidad, ni por el TSE ni por la CGR al recomendar de manera vinculante la sanción. Cita nuevamente el artículo 253 del Código Electoral y el 18 del Código Municipal, el artículo 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la CGR y el artículo 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción, para concluir con base en dichos numerales que no se ha violentado el principio de legalidad por la CGR, no habiendo discrecionalidad ni atipicidad ninguna. Ninguna prueba hay, que no estuviera incorporada en el expediente administrativo desde el inicio del procedimiento. Por ello, la parte actora está alegando se declare la nulidad por la nulidad misma, con base en una serie de argumentos superfluos, cuando en la especie nunca se quebrantó el debido proceso. El acto de apertura del procedimiento contenía una descripción clara, precisa y circunstanciada de los hechos que se le imputaban al actor, la prueba en que se sustentó dicha intimación y la posible sanción a imponerle. Considera que no se ha ocasionado ningún perjuicio ni agravio al accionante, siendo por ello sus argumentos infundados, pues tuvo acceso desde el inicio al expediente administrativo y el propio actor lo indicó en el escrito en que pidió la "relación de hechos". Afirma que tampoco hubo violación al principio de acceso a la información ya que la solicitud la hizo al órgano contralor y la CGR le entregó copia de la misma, aunque no formaba parte del expediente administrativo. Sobre la desproporción de la sanción aplicada, señala el artículo 41 de la Ley contra la Corrupción, el artículo 17 del Código Municipal, afirmando que el alcalde es el primer llamado a respetar el bloque de legalidad y a tener una conducta intachable y ejemplo para los demás. La situación del actor y su hijastro supone un grave conflicto de intereses y violenta el principio de legalidad, probidad y transparencia. Además, las faltas en que incurran los alcaldes afectan la credibilidad de los gobiernos locales y transmite un mensaje negativo a los demás empleados del municipio. La falta del caso concreto, afectó un interés público comunitario y social, pues la sociedad decidió confiar en la diligencia de un funcionario de elección popular -el alcalde-, pero éste antepuso el interés personal por encima del interés público que estaba llamado a satisfacer, con lo que quebrantó el principio de legalidad y transparencia. Por ello, y por las razones plasmadas en los actos administrativos impugnados, señala que la sanción aplicada es razonable y proporcionada, en virtud de la falta grave que se acreditó en el procedimiento administrativo, frente al contenido y al interés público que se tutela en el numeral 127 del Código Municipal. No sólo existe daño cuando se afecta económicamente la hacienda pública, el daño puede ser de diversos tipos y en el caso concreto estamos ante un interés de carácter social y comunitario, y la idoneidad que debía tener quien ocupa un cargo de tal investidura, sobreponiendo el interés público sobre su interés particular. Considerar erróneo afirmar que el paralelismo de las formas debe aplicarse en este caso, y por ello, para destituir a un alcalde es el pueblo el único legitimado para destituirlo, pues el ordenamiento jurídico establece que el tema de la cancelación de credenciales es materia de ley y en ese tanto, la participación que tiene el TSE en el procedimiento administrativo. Refiere a los artículos 102 inciso 10) de la Constitución Política y 220 del Código Electoral, el 18 del Código Municipal y el 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la CGR. Considera que hay una falta de legitimación pasiva en relación con la CGR, así como una falta de derecho en cuanto a la posición del actor (folios 078 a 111 del expediente judicial). Por otro lado, la representación estatal aduce, que desde la emisión del auto de apertura del procedimiento administrativo, la CGR indicó que el expediente administrativo quedaba a disposición del actor y se señaló toda la prueba agregada a dicho expediente. Por ello, no es cierto que el acceso al expediente se autorizara 23 horas antes de la comparecencia oral. La resolución sancionatoria fue dictada por el órgano decisor a las 12:00 horas del 31 de enero del 2011 y en la parte dispositiva de dicha resolución se indicó que la sanción implicaba la cancelación de credenciales. El acto sancionador es un acto complejo. Afirma que el procedimiento administrativo que sustenta la CGR y la resolución que emite la CGR y que remite al TSE, no son actos con efecto propio, pues la recomendación puede o no ser acogida por el TSE, no siendo por ello un acto vinculante automático. Cita la resolución No. 253-M-2012. Afirma que compete a la Contraloría General de la República investigar y dar su recomendación, le compete sustanciar el procedimiento contra los funcionarios de elección popular a quienes se atribuye la comisión de una falta contra la hacienda pública, y a partir de tal procedimiento, girar la recomendación sancionatoria al TSE, recomendación que conlleva un componente de orden técnico que resulta vinculante en lo que concierne a los elementos relativos a la hacienda pública. Por ello, los hechos acreditados en virtud del procedimiento así como los elementos técnicos en la materia de su especialidad, son los aspectos de orden técnico que quedan fijados en la recomendación de la CGR y que son vinculantes para el TSE. Considera que es el acto de cancelación de credenciales el que causa estado, pues la recomendación de la CGR por sí misma no genera efectos jurídicos sancionadores, lo cual compete al TSE. Por ello, el acto de recomendación no puede ser impugnado de forma autónoma, sino que rige el régimen de impugnación del acto que adopta la recomendación y causa estado. Considera que existe una falta de interés actual pues ya se produjo la cancelación de las credenciales del actor por parte del TSE. Señala que en materia sancionatoria la interpretación debe ser restrictiva, por tratarse de actos que afectan negativamente derechos subjetivos, pero en la especie no hubo una lectura extensiva del artículo 127 del Código Municipal, pues la norma habla de "parientes", lo cual incluye a los parientes por consanguinidad y por afinidad, no pudiendo distinguirse donde la ley no lo hace. Por ello, afirma que en relación con el hijastro, existe un vínculo de parentesco -como hijo por afinidad-, estando la norma correctamente aplicada al caso concreto, pues el actor promovió a su hijastro en la Municipalidad, aspecto de parentesco por afinidad que fue ampliamente desarrollado por el TSE en la resolución No. 253-M-2012. La norma señala a todos los parientes, incluyendo por consanguinidad y por afinidad, por ello, no puede hablarse de una aplicación indebida de la norma, ni procede negar el vínculo entre el actor y Nombre126156 . Sobre los criterios jurídicos que aporta el accionante, considera que se trata de trabajos privados encargados por él mismo, carentes de sustento, pero que en todo caso reafirman la posición estatal. Por ello, afirma que no existió ningún tipo de actuación discrecional ni existe vicio alguno en el ejercicio de la potestad sancionatoria, ni tampoco infracción al principio de legalidad. No se vulnera el principio de tipicidad porque pues la conducta del actor vulneró el artículo 127 del Código Municipal, el 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y los artículos 10,12,13,15 y 16 de la Ley General de Control Interno, así como el 3 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito. En cuanto a la cancelación de credenciales, dicha sanción encuentra sustento en el artículo 253 del Código Electoral y 18 del Código Municipal y el artículo 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Considera que no hay vicios de nulidad, porque el acto de apertura del procedimiento administrativo contiene una intimación clara, precisa y circunstanciada de los hechos y de las posibles consecuencias sancionatorios de ellos. También se enumeró en ella los documentos probatorios que formaban el expediente, para una mejor defensa del interesado, se puso a su disposición el expediente administrativo. El documento de la supuesta "relación de hechos" que el actor afirma echó de menos, no puede tener incidencia en cuanto al ejercicio del derecho de defensa, pues no formó parte del expediente administrativo, y aunque al inicio fue un insumo usado por la CGR, luego pierde reelevancia, pues lo que adquiere verdadera importancia y efectos es el elenco de hechos consignados en la resolución de apertura. Siendo sólo sobre los extremos de tal intimación sobre lo cual le correspondía al interesado ejercer su defensa. No conocer dicho documento de relación de hechos, en nada afectó su derecho de defensa. Por ello, la solicitud del mismo que el actor presentó ante la CGR, y para la cual recibió respuesta el 17 de enero del año en curso -un día antes de la audiencia oral-, no afectó en nada el debido proceso, pues el documento le fue facilitado por su interés de tenerlo, pero no era parte del expediente administrativo. Al analizar la resolución administrativa de la CGR que se impugna, No. PA-011-2011, su fundamentación en todo momento se refiere a los elementos probatorios que forman el expediente administrativo, a los cuales tuvo pleno acceso el interesado en todo momento del procedimiento, teniendo por ello amplia oportunidad de defensa, sin que existan los vicios de nulidad que alega. Señala que desconoce el actor la función de las auditorías internas cuya función más importante es la elaboración de informes para el mejoramiento de la gestión administrativa, que se exponen al jerarca para que implemente las recomendaciones que contienen, y la jerarquía institucional puede a su vez evacuar sus dudas y realizar observaciones. Pero cuando se trata de recomendaciones sancionatorias, se pone en conocimiento del jerarca generalmente cuando las faltas han sido cometidas por sus subalternos, para que la jerarquía pueda disponer la apertura de los respectivos procedimientos administrativos. Cuando se trata de hallazgos que apuntan a la comisión de una eventual falta por parte del jerarca, por razones de legalidad, lógica y conveniencia, se remite al órgano contralor, por ser la CGR la rectora del sistema de control interno, para que valore el caso y eventualmente inicie procedimiento contra el jerarca, todo lo cual estima apegado a derecho y carente de vicio alguno. Continúa manifestando que las eventuales advertencias que puede girar el auditor interno a la jerarquía en materia preventiva, son distintas de la elaboración de informes con recomendaciones sancionatorias por falta encontradas, siendo este último supuesto el que aconteció en la especie. La sanción no es desproporcionada, pues es acorde con la irregularidad acreditada, pues el numeral 127 combate el nepotismo en la función pública. Afirma que la conducta del alcalde, como superior del gobierno local, debe ser intachable y un norte ejemplarizante ante sus subordinados. La CGR fundamentó ampliamente la recomendación de separación y abordó con claridad todos los elementos tomados en cuenta para valorar el caso concreto. Para la resolución sancionatoria se tomaron en cuenta elementos tales como el parámetro expreso del inciso e) del artículo 41 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, el inciso b) del artículo 108 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera, que señalan que el rango y las funciones del servidor son un criterio por considerar, a mayor jerarquía, mayor obligación de apreciar la legalidad, oportunidad y conveniencia de los actos que se dictan, normas eco del artículo 213 de la LGAP. Por eso, mayor obligación tenía el alcalde de actuar conforme a derecho, según las funciones que le da el artículo 17 del Código Municipal. Señala que el nombramiento de su hijastro por parte del actor, en el mismo municipio donde laboraba, apareja una grave situación de conflicto de intereses, violentando el deber de probidad del artículo 3 de la ley No. 8422, además de ser una actuación -en su criterio- contraria a la legalidad y al principio de transparencia que debió honrar. Esa conducta lesiona intereses públicos y valores sociales, al tratarse de un funcionario de elección popular en un sistema democrático. En razón de ello, afirma que la sanción es proporcionada y razonable ante la falta cometida y el grado de jerarquía que ocupaba el actor. Sobre la comparación con otros casos, indica que la parte no puede comparar, pues se desconocen la totalidad de las condiciones particulares de esos otros casos. La elección popular de un funcionario público, no implica que su destitución por falta grave en el desempeño de su cargo, deba ser acordada por elección popular, lo cual estima absurdo, cuando se trata de actos que evidentemente no pueden ser objeto de una decisión así. El ejercicio de un cargo de elección popular queda sujeto al bloque de legalidad, y el ordenamiento establece que la cancelación de credenciales es un aspecto sometido a la ley, según los numerales 220 y 253 del Código Electoral, 3 y 41 de la ley 8422, 18 del Código Municipal y 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Además el caso que nos ocupa es totalmente diferente a la situación que se vivió con el alcalde de Nombre265 . Por lo anterior, solicita se declare sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos (folios 150 a 189 del expediente judicial). La representación de la codemandada Nombre16153 , señala en sustento de sus posiciones, que al accionante se le sancionó por vulnerar los artículos 127 del Código Municipal, artículo 3 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, y el artículo 14 del Reglamento a la citada ley. Afirma que fue más de dos meses antes de la realización de la audiencia oral y privada que se puso a disposición del accionante el expediente administrativo, propiamente en el acto del 05 de noviembre del 2010, acto de apertura del procedimiento. Señala que no es cierto que el acto emitido por la CGR sea uno con efecto propio, ni tampoco es vinculante para el TSE; que el actor no individualiza porqué las resoluciones de la CGR están viciadas de nulidad, y tampoco existen tales vicios. Afirma que las actuaciones desplegadas por la CGR son totalmente válidas pues se basan en prueba documental que demuestra que el actor gestionó 7 veces para nombrar a su hijastro en el ayuntamiento. Actuaciones que en su demanda no indica si las realizó o no, pero no niega haberlas cometido. Las actuaciones referidas violentan el artículo 127 del Código Municipal, pues la posición jurídica del actor es errada, porque el término parientes incluye tanto a los que lo son por consanguinidad o por afinidad, considerando que en el caso de los hijos de su cónyuge -hijastros- se trata de un vínculo por afinidad con el padrastro, señalando por ello que la conducta no es atípica. Sostiene que ninguna norma jurídica en nuestro país establece que sus parientes por afinidad hereden o tengan derecho a exigirle pensión a una persona, y afirma que prueba de ello es que no heredan los suegros, los yernos, ni las nueras de una persona ni tampoco pueden pedirle pensión alimentaria. Considera que es una conducta viciada el nombrar a un funcionario público con base en intereses familiares o personales sin tomar en cuenta su idoneidad. El hecho de que el auditor no lo apercibiera no le exime de sanción, estando el retiro de credenciales fundamentado en los artículos 18 y 127 del Código Municipal, 3 y 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, 14 del reglamento a la citada ley, artículos 253 del Código Electoral y artículo 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Señala que no hubo violaciones al derecho de defensa, pues el auto inicial de imputación de cargos le fue notificado al actor de manera personal desde el 19 de noviembre del 2010, por lo que tuvo casi 2 meses para solicitar un documento, además que dicha resolución indica toda la prueba existente en contra del actor. El documento referido por el actor no aparece citado dentro de dicha resolución ni tampoco formaba parte del expediente administrativo, por ello, considera que solicitar un documento escasos días antes de la audiencia, parece más bien una maniobra generando una excusa para solicitar la nulidad, como lo está haciendo. El actor no explica porqué dicho documento era importante para el caso, a efecto de valorar si ello generó o no indefensión, y ese documento ni siquiera fue considerado como prueba para recomendar la sanción de despido, en todo caso la Contraloría se basó en la abundante prueba para recomendar la sanción. Aún suprimiendo hipotéticamente el documento citado, los actos del ente contralor tienen prueba de respaldo suficiente para fundar la recomendación de cancelación de credenciales. El TSE mediante resolución No. 8184-M-2011 se pronunció sobre las violaciones al debido proceso y al derecho de defensa, indicando que no había tales. El artículo 36 inciso c) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo señala que la pretensión es admisible sobre actos finales, definitivos, o de trámite con efecto propio, siendo las actuaciones de la CGR que impugna el actor, carentes de efecto propio, pues constituyen una recomendación dirigida al TSE. Al conocerse el recurso de reconsideración, en la resolución No. 253-M-2012, el TSE se refirió al tema, indicando que lo que es vinculante, de la recomendación de la CGR, es su opinión técnica, no su opinión jurídica, siendo esta última correspondiente al TSE, quien actúa como juez electoral, teniendo sus pronunciamientos carácter de cosa juzgada material. Por ello, señala que es el acto de sanción el que causa estado, y la recomendación de la CGR no puede generar efectos jurídicos sancionatorios. En caso de que el recomendado acepte la recomendación, se comunican al acto sancionador los elementos propios de la recomendación, quedando ésta como parte integral y sustancial del acto sancionador, conformando un acto con efecto propio que causa estado y que no puede ser recurrido en esta jurisdicción según el numeral 103 de la Constitución Política, y por ello estima que hay una falta de interés actual, pues el acto impugnado es irrecurrible, al estar en firme lo resuelto por el TSE. Por ello, solicita se declare sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos (folios 275 a 284 del expediente judicial).

V.Sobre el fondo del asunto: Sin dejar de lado lo expuesto en el considerando primero de esta sentencia, debe señalarse que tal y como lo indica acertadamente la parte actora, en la especie el impugnado corresponde a un acto calificado por la doctrina iuspublicista como “complejo” y además, efectivamente, la opinión rendida por parte de la Contraloría General de la República para este tipo de asuntos -misma que se viene impugnando en el subjúdice-, resulta vinculante para el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Efectivamente no estamos ante un acto electoral sino ante un acto sancionatorio administrativo. Ahora bien, tal y como puede observarse a partir de los autos y de lo resuelto por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia fungiendo como tribunal de casación, en el caso que nos ocupa el punto jurídico por dilucidar corresponde, en primer término a establecer si el numeral 127 del Código Municipal abarca en su redacción la prohibición para contratar a un hijastro en un municipio en el cual se ejerce el puesto de alcalde municipal, cual en la especie acontece, debiendo por ende referirse el tribunal a la determinación de una restricción al derecho fundamental de acceso al trabajo, en este caso, al empleo público. Para, con posterioridad a ello, determinar la adecuación jurídica de la sanción que le fuera aplicada al accionante Nombre126154 como alcalde de cantón de Goicoechea, por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y en virtud de la recomendación al efecto emitida por el órgano contralor. Pero para realizar dicho análisis, resulta imperioso de previo establecer que el régimen de los Derechos Fundamentales resulta sin duda de obligatorio análisis para la dilucidación de esta litis, pues es criterio de esta Cámara que el régimen jurídico del derecho de acceso a la función pública es propio de dicho ámbito jurídico fundamental. Y es que el acceso a los cargos públicos es un derecho fundamental, derivado de su regulación en instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos, a pesar de no encontrarse expresamente contemplado en nuestra Constitución Política vigente. Por ello, como todo derecho fundamental puede efectivamente ser restringido, pero sólo por medio de una ley en sentido formal y material, en la búsqueda de ese equilibrio entre los derechos de los particulares y el interés general público que, en el caso concreto, se traduce en la búsqueda de la transparencia, la objetividad, independencia de criterio e imparcialidad en el ejercicio de la función pública. Esto implica que corresponde a la ley el establecer las condiciones de acceso al servicio, lo que incluye necesariamente las condiciones de elegibilidad, así como el establecimiento de los regímenes de prohibiciones e incompatibilidades atinentes a los puestos o cargos públicos. Esas tres últimas condiciones tienden a resguardar y mantener la objetividad e imparcialidad por parte del funcionario en el ejercicio de la función pública, para lo cual se procura que no exista conflicto de intereses latente entre la función desplegada y su confrontación con otras actividades desarrolladas por el servidor, particularmente de índole privada. Por ende, al tratarse de materia sensible, estando de por medio la restricción o limitación a un derecho fundamental, debe recurrirse al instituto de la reserva de ley como el mecanismo idóneo para su regulación o establecer restricciones al derecho de libre acceso al empleo público. Ello implica que las condiciones de elegibilidad deben ser establecidas por la ley, así como también las inelegibilidades e incompatibilidades para accesar al cargo, pues esas inelegibilidades e incompatibilidades entrañan una restricción al derecho fundamental, lo que obliga a aplicar los principios constitucionales en orden al régimen jurídico de los derechos fundamentales. Al respecto, puede consultarse, entre otros, el voto de la Sala Constitucional No. 545-97 de las 14:30 horas del 28 de enero de 1997. De conformidad con dichos principios, la restricción y delimitación de los alcances del derecho humano, sólo puede desarrollarse por medio de la ley -principio de reserva-, estando vedada su regulación mediante la implementación de disposiciones normativas de rango infralegal, aspecto sobre el cual puede consultarse los votos No. 3502-92 de las 16:00 horas del 24 de noviembre de 1992, No. 3173-93 de las 14:57 horas del 06 de julio de 1993, No. 2312-95 de las 16:15 hrs. del 09 de mayo de 1995, No. 5393-97 de las 15:18 horas del 05 de setiembre de 1997, No. 18-29-99 de las 16:09 horas del 10 de marzo de 1999, todos emitidos por la Sala Constitucional. Así mismo, resulta necesario destacar que la delegación de la emisión de regulaciones normativas sobre esta materia no resulta viable y además, las restricciones que al derecho fundamental se imponga, deben encontrar sustento en los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que permean la totalidad del ordenamiento jurídico vigente. (En este sentido, votos No. 5058-93 de las 14:20 horas del 14 de octubre de 1993; No. 3929-95 de las 15:24 horas del 18 de julio de 1995, No. 2883-96 de las 17:00 horas del 13 de junio de 1996 y No. 6273-96 de las 15:30 horas del 19 de noviembre de 1996, entre otras; todo emanados del tribunal constitucional costarricense). Y es que en no pocas ocasiones, la Sala Constitucional ha abordado la temática bajo estudio, en lo que atañe al principio de reserva legal o reserva de ley, en tratándose del establecimiento de límites a los derechos fundamentales, señalando al respecto, en lo que interesa:

'En cuanto a la supuesta violación al artículo 28, (...) en la sentencia Nº 3550-92 de las 16 horas del 24 de noviembre de 1992... la Sala señaló que desde luego, los derechos y libertades fundamentales están sujetos a determinadas restricciones, pero únicamente a las que sean necesarias en virtud de los valores democráticos y constitucionales. Sin embargo, para que una restricción sea "necesaria", se requiere que sea "útil", "razonable", "oportuna" y debe implicar la "existencia de una necesidad imperiosa" que sustente la restricción. Para que las restricciones a la libertad sean lícitas constitucional e internacionalmente, han de estar orientadas hacia la satisfacción de un interés público imperativo; para lograr esto debe: 1) escogerse aquella que restrinja en menor escala el derecho protegido, 2) existir proporcionalidad entre la restricción y el interés que la justifica, 3) ajustarse estrechamente al logro de ese legítimo objetivo y 4) debe ser imperiosa socialmente y por ende, excepcional y como tal, ha de interpretarse de manera restrictiva, es decir, en caso de duda debe preferirse siempre la libertad dentro del contexto del orden constitucional como un todo, de conformidad con su sistema de valores fundamentales. En lo atinente a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad la Sala considera que no es posible constitucionalmente introducir una prohibición de éste tipo en un Decreto Ejecutivo, porque esta materia es reserva de Ley (...)" (Voto Nº 6198-95 del 14 de noviembre de 1995).

Por ende, no puede obviar este órgano jurisdiccional, que al momento de realizar el ejercicio hermenéutico sobre disposiciones normativas que establecen limitantes o restricciones a derechos fundamentales, el parámetro para la interpretación ha de ser, sin duda alguna restrictivo -que no extensivo- y más aún cuando estamos en presencia de disposiciones normativas que establecen requisitos de elegibilidad y/o de incompatibilidad para el ejercicio de un cargo público; sin dejar de lado, por supuesto, el fin público que pretende satisfacerse en la norma jurídica que es objeto de análisis, pues para la realización del ejercicio interpretativo, debe en este caso el Juez, buscar resguardar el interés público que trató de proteger el legislador al momento de establecer la limitante o incompatibilidad; aunque siempre de forma ponderada y evitando constreñir de forma irracional o desproporcionada, el derecho fundamental de acceso al empleo público. Todo ello, en aras de obtener un adecuado equilibrio entre el derecho fundamental y el fin público resguardado en juego. Así lo ha señalado la Sala Constitucional al abordar el tema del régimen de incompatibilidades de los miembros de los Supremos Poderes, indicando al respecto:

"En primer término, se debe mencionar que el Legislador se encuentra facultado para establecer a los servidores públicos las incompatibilidades y prohibiciones que considere pertinentes para el funcionamiento del Estado, en particular, la prestación de sus servicios. Sin embargo, dicha facultad se encuentra supeditada al principio de supremacía constitucional, que impone la observancia preceptiva del principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, bajo el cual se deben examinar las disposiciones dictadas por el Legislador. Así, en esta materia, dicho principio exige –según se expuso en el considerando anterior–que las normas tengan por fin la prevención del denominado "conflicto u oposición de intereses", para asegurar la imparcialidad de los servidores de la Administración. Asimismo, los medios que utilice el Estado para evitar el mencionado conflicto no deben colocar a su destinatario en una situación tal que haga nugatorio el goce de sus derechos fundamentales. En definitiva, no deben causar mayores males que los que pretenden evitar; es decir, no deben violar los derechos fundamentales reconocidos en la Constitución y en los Instrumentos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos vigentes en la República." (Voto No. 2001-01749 del 07 de marzo del 2001) Y es que la existencia de los denominados requisitos de elegibilidad, implican per sé que quien no reúna las condiciones establecidas por la ley para accesar a un puesto público, resulta imposibilitado de ser nombrado en dicho cargo, convirtiéndose por ello, tácitamente, en una condición de inelegibilidad para el puesto. Lo anterior sin perjuicio, obviamente, de que existan disposiciones legales que establezcan y enumeren de manera expresa las circunstancias que traerán aparejadas la inelegibilidad corrrespondiente; todo ello, al amparo del prudente arbitrio del legislador, quien bien podría establecer, como en efecto lo ha hecho, que el desempeño del cargo resulta incompatible con el despliegue de determinadas actividades públicas o privadas o en relación con un puesto específico. Ello implica que aunque la persona postulante cumpla con las condiciones de elegibilidad legalmente establecidas, bien podría ser que exista una causal de incompatibilidad que limite su nombramiento o su permanencia en cierto puesto. A diferencia de las condiciones de inelegibilidad -que usualmente responden a condiciones intrínsecas al postulante-, las incompatibilidades encuentran su fundamento sobre todo en la oposición de intereses, así como en la necesidad de mantener la independencia y la imparcialidad en el ejercicio de la función pública, todo esto con el objetivo de garantizar su más correcto y eficaz ejercicio. La regulación de las incompatibilidades en una norma jurídica, resulta ser una manifestación del principio de transparencia que rige el quehacer de la administración pública y que se constituye como uno de los pilares fundamentales que rigen el actuar de la administración. Por ello, no es de extrañar que el establecimiento expreso de diversos tipos de incompatibilidades previstas en una norma legal, tenga como norte el pretender evitar el nepotismo (“nepotismo // Del lat. nepos, -otis 'sobrino', 'descendiente' e -ismo. // 1. m. Desmedida preferencia que algunos dan a sus parientes para las concesiones o empleos públicos”, según consulta realizada por este Tribunal en el sitio web de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española), como una manifestación de la corrupción administrativa. El nepotismo es, en esencia, una vulneración flagrante al principio de igualdad en el acceso a los cargos públicos, pues la designación del funcionario no se encuentra cimentada en su idoneidad y la búsqueda de un más eficiente actuar por parte de la administración pública, sino en el brindar un trato ventajoso a un pariente o persona allegada con quien se tiene algún vínculo familiar y por ende, algún grado de interés.

VI.A partir de lo anteriormente expuesto, considera este Tribunal que en el caso concreto, resulta imperioso traer a colación lo dispuesto por el numeral 127 del Código Municipal antes citado, el cual reza en su literalidad:

"Artículo 127- No podrán ser empleados municipales quienes sean cónyuges o parientes, en línea directa o colateral hasta el tercer grado inclusive, de alguno de los concejales, el Alcalde, el Auditor, los Directores o Jefes de Personal de las unidades de reclutamiento y selección de personal ni, en general, de los encargados de escoger candidatos para los puestos municipales. // La designación de alguno de los funcionarios enunciados en el párrafo anterior no afectará al empleado municipal cónyuge o pariente de ellos, nombrado con anterioridad." Del texto legal transcrito, se deriva con meridiana claridad y sin necesidad de mayor esfuerzo, que el legislador estableció de manera expresa una restricción para acceder al régimen de empleo municipal en el caso de existir un vínculo familiar, directo o colateral, que se encuentre dentro del tercer grado inclusive, en relación con los miembros del Concejo Municipal, el auditor municipal o el alcalde, lo cual implica una imposibilidad jurídica expresa para la designación en un cargo de naturaleza municipal, para quien ostenta tal grado de parentesco. Ahora bien, en el párrafo segundo, además la normativa citada señala que de presentarse una situación de ésa índole, permanecerá en su cargo el funcionario que hubiese sido designado en un primer momento, no debiendo realizarse el nombramiento posterior de su allegado. En la especie, si bien es cierto no existe vínculo por consanguinidad entre la parte accionante don Nombre126154 y el señor Nombre126156 , según ha quedado acreditado en el elenco de hechos probados que sustenta esta resolución, también lo es que don Nombre126156 es hijo de quien figura como cónyuge del accionante desde el año 2007, doña Nombre126155 . Es decir, antes de asumir su puesto como alcalde municipal de Goicoechea, el señor Nombre126154 ya tenía al menos algún grado de cercanía en relación con don Nombre126156 , en virtud del vínculo marital existente con doña Nombre126155 . Sin embargo, dicho articulado no indica de manera expresa y detallada, cuáles son puntualmente esas personas afectas por la prohibición, limitándose a señalar que la negativa dictada será aplicable para quienes se encuentren unidos por vínculo en línea directa o colateral hasta el tercer grado, razón por la cual, corresponde al operador jurídico ante cada caso concreto, realizar la valoración e interpretación correspondiente y determinar si un sujeto se encuentra inmerso dentro del ámbito comprensivo de la restricción legal bajo estudio. A partir de la amplitud y vaguedad que la redacción de la norma presenta, debemos buscar la posibilidad de la aplicación de diversos métodos de interpretación jurídica. Lo anterior nos lleva a traer a colación lo dispuesto por el artículo 10 del Código Civil vigente, el cual estatuye los criterios hermenéuticos que deben ser aplicados por el operador del derecho al momento de interpretar una disposición normativa. Señala dicho articulo, en lo que resulta de interés:

"(…) Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo funda- mentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas." El artículo transcrito establece los criterios de interpretación de las normas jurídicas en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, contemplando a su vez una variedad de metodologías de hermenéutica, a saber, la interpretación literal, la interpretación histórico-social plasmada en las actas y expediente legislativo y la voluntad o el espíritu plasmado por el legislador al momento de crear la norma jurídica respectiva. Teniendo claro lo anterior, debe esta Cámara avocarse a analizar si a partir de lo dispuesto por el artículo 127 del Código Municipal, existe o no algún vínculo jurídico entre el actor y el señor Nombre126156, dentro del tercer grado de parentesco, que hubiese afectado de alguna forma los nombramientos realizados en la Municipalidad de Goicoechea en su favor -por solicitud del aquí accionante- y que puedan considerarse como una violación a la prohibición establecida en el artículo 127 antes citado. En relación con el concepto de parentesco, la más calificada doctrina nacional se ha referido a dicho tema indicado desde vieja data, en lo que resulta de interés:

“[…] El parentesco propiamente tal lo forma el vínculo consanguíneo que une a varias personas que descienden unas de otras, o de un tronco común. Conforme a esto se distinguen dos clases de parientes que, para mayor claridad, se acostumbra distribuir en dos series de grados que componen dos líneas. Línea es, por lo mismo, la serie de parientes. Se distinguen dos clases de ella: directa y colateral. En la directa están los progenitores y sus descendientes; así tenemos: abuelos, padres, hijos, nietos, bisnietos. Y en la colateral, llamada también transversal, se cuentan los que vienen de un mismo tronco, pero que no descienden unos de otros, como ocurre con los hermanos entre sí; y los tíos con los sobrinos […] Los distintos pasos de un pariente a otro, se llaman grados, contándose uno de éstos por cada generación, la que está formada por una individualidad de la serie, con excepción de aquella que forma el tronco de donde arrancan los individuos que deben tomarse en cuenta para el cómputo; así, del Nombre111971 al bisabuelo, hay tres generaciones, aunque aparecen cuatro individualidades, a saber: Nombre111971, nieto, abuelo y bisabuelo, no contándose está última por ser la generadora de las demás […] A más del parentesco consanguíneo existe otro llamado de afinidad, lo que quiere decir por analogía o semejanza, reconocido por la ley, consistente en un vínculo de carácter civil, que a causa del matrimonio se establece entre uno de los cónyuges y los parientes consanguíneos del otro […] En el parentesco de afinidad, el cómputo de grados se practica del mismo modo que en el consanguíneo y con arreglo a la distribución de líneas directa y colateral […] puede sentarse la regla que en la misma línea y en el mismo grado en que una persona es pariente consanguíneo de uno de los cónyuges, es afín al otro cónyuge […]” (Nombre60957 , . Tratado de las personas. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. Cuarta edición. 1984. pp. 23 a 26). (El subrayado y destacado no corresponde al original).

A partir de la reseña anterior, podemos concluir que el numeral 127 del Código Municipal, si bien es cierto no señala expresamente a qué tipo de vínculo -consanguíneo o por afinidad- se refiere, sin embargo es claro que abarca la línea colateral y directa hasta el tercer grado inclusive. Ahora bien, surge la duda de forma inmediata, sobre si la intención del legislador era comprender dentro de la limitación el vínculo sanguíneo, o bien, si era su voluntad abarcar ambos, tanto la consanguinidad como el vínculo por afinidad. En criterio de esta cámara, para dilucidar este aspecto debe procederse a la directa aplicación de los principios de protección de la hacienda pública, probidad y transparencia en la función pública, además de tomarse en consideración el aforismo jurídico que reza “no se puede distinguir donde la ley no distingue”. Una vez realizado el ejercicio de ponderación respectivo, sopesando entre estos aspectos medulares de carácter jurídico y el interés simple que podría asistir a un particular para ser nombrado en un cargo público y tomando en consideración los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucionales, arriba el Tribunal a la conclusión de que debe optarse por interpretar que era la intención del legislador comprender dentro del régimen de restricción citado, ambos tipos de vínculo, tanto el consanguíneo así como también el vínculo jurídico o creado por la ley -afinidad-, encontrándose ambos supuestos de hecho englobados dentro del ámbito de la incompatibilidad contenida en el artículo legal supracitado.

VII.Ahora bien, el Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española, define el sustantivo “hijastro” en los siguientes términos: "(…) Del lat. filiaster, filiastra. // 1. m. y f. Hijo aportado al nuevo matrimonio por el cónyuge de una persona.", según consulta realizada por este Tribunal en el sitio web "http://dle.rae.es/?id=KODxnLU". Tomando en consideración la definición establecida por la Real Academia de la Lengua antes citada, así como la situación fáctica bajo análisis, a saber, que la cónyuge de don Nombre126154 -doña Nombre126155- es la madre del señor Nombre126156 -quien dicho sea de paso cuenta con una relación paterno-filial establecida con otra persona que figura registralmente como su padre-, mediante la aplicación de un simple razonamiento de silogismo categórico, es claro para este Tribunal y como conclusión, que en el caso del señor Nombre126156 y su relación con el accionante Nombre126154 , el vínculo existente es uno por afinidad (es decir, de carácter jurídico, generado a partir de la unión civil -matrimonio- entre don Nombre126154 y su esposa) siendo el señor Nombre126156 un hijo aportado por uno de los cónyuges -doña Nombre126155- a su matrimonio con don Nombre126154 , resultando por ello, en relación con el aquí accionante y sin duda alguna, su hijastro. Una vez definida esta situación, resulta necesario proceder a determinar si la relación existente entre el señor Nombre126156 y el señor Nombre126154, está cubierta por la prohibición contenida en el artículo 127 de repetida cita.

VIII.Don Nombre60957 , tal y como se detallara en las líneas precedentes, ha señalado que "(...) En el parentesco de afinidad, el cómputo de grados se practica del mismo modo que en el consanguíneo y con arreglo a la distribución de líneas directa y colateral […] puede sentarse la regla que en la misma línea y en el mismo grado en que una persona es pariente consanguíneo de uno de los cónyuges, es afín al otro cónyuge […]” (op cit.). Es decir, si una persona es sobrina por consanguinidad de alguien unido por un vínculo conyugal, será a su vez sobrina por afinidad del cónyuge respectivo, aplicando la misma línea y grado que existe entre la sobrina y su tío consanguíneo, pero al vínculo por afinidad; criterio que comparte este Tribunal. Ahora bien, en la especie el señor Nombre126156 es hijo de doña Nombre126155 -la cónyuge de don Nombre126154 - de conformidad con el vínculo consanguíneo, razón por la cual, aplicando las mismas reglas de línea y grado -pero por afinidad- para definir el parentesco entre el señor Nombre126156 en relación con el actor, será hijastro por afinidad de don Nombre126154 , contrariamente a lo señalado por la parte accionante y de conformidad con la definición de dicho término establecida en las líneas precedentes. Adicionalmente, el grado de parentesco que existe entre el señor Nombre126156 y el señor Nombre126154, corresponde al segundo grado, puesto que el primer grado corresponde a la relación entre el accionante y doña Nombre126155 -cónyuges entre sí-, y el segundo grado en relación con el actor, deriva de la relación existente entre doña Nombre126155 y su hijo Nombre126156 , por ende, desde don Nombre126154 hasta don Nombre126156 , hay dos grados de vínculo por afinidad. Si traemos nuevamente a colación lo dispuesto por el numeral 127 del Código Municipal antes citado, dicho articulado abarca o comprende hasta el tercer grado de parentesco -sin diferenciar si es por consanguinidad o por afinidad-, el cuál abarcaría para don Nombre126154 hasta los nietos de doña Nombre126155 -por afinidad- y los nietos propios en línea directa descendiente por consangunidad. Por ello, sin duda alguna el vínculo jurídico existente entre el señor Nombre126156 y don Nombre126154 están dentro del ámbito de aplicación de los efectos jurídicos de la norma indicada, pues los hechos bajo análisis se subsumen sin mayor dificultad en el presupuesto fáctico previsto en la norma legal citada. Es decir, las actuaciones del accionante, tendientes a obtener el nombramiento de su hijastro en la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, resultan en criterio de este Tribunal, típicas y por ello, subsumibles en el supuesto de hecho que contempla el numeral 127 antes referido, así como violatorias de la prohibición dispuesta por el legislador en el numeral de repetida cita.

IX.Resta ahora analizar si la sanción impuesta al accionante en razón de sus conductas, es acorde o no a derecho. El artículo 127 de marras es una norma poco feliz y escasamente clara en cuanto a su redacción, pero además, presenta una omisión altamente sensible pues carece de prever algún tipo de sanción aplicable para las conductas que la vulneren. Además de lo anterior, es totalmente omisa en remitir a otras disposiciones normativas para la aplicación de la sanción correspondiente. Por ello, la administración demandada procedió a realizar una integración normativa en aras de encontrar una sanción aplicable al caso subjúdice, pero con ello, sin duda se ha vulnerado el principio de tipicidad o de legalidad que rige en materia sancionatoria (tanto penal como en derecho administrativo), de conformidad con el cual y para este caso concreto, las sanciones aplicables en sede administrativa deben estar de previo establecidas mediante la promulgación de una norma de rango y potencia legal, precepto que deriva de los numerales 39 y 41 constitucionales en relación con el artículo 124 de la ley No. 6227 Ley General de la Administración Pública. Además de encontrarse, a su vez, contemplado en el artículo 253 del Código Electoral vigente, el cual señala en su literalidad:

"ARTÍCULO 253.- Competencia // El TSE acordará la cancelación o anulación de las credenciales de los funcionarios municipales de elección popular en los supuestos contemplados expresamente en la ley. Estas disposiciones serán aplicables también a síndicos, intendentes, concejales de distrito y miembros de los concejos municipales de distrito. // En caso de que exista contención, antes se desarrollará el procedimiento administrativo ordinario previsto en la Ley general de la Administración Pública." (La itálica y el subrayado no corresponden al original).

En la especie, no resultaba viable, ante la pobre redacción de la norma prohibitiva de marras, proceder a integrar diversas disposiciones normativas para tratar de dotar al numeral 127 del Código Municipal, de una sanción aplicable, pues ello sin duda alguna vulnera el principio de reserva de ley que caracteriza a la materia sancionatoria que nos ocupa. Pero obviando dicho vacío legal, la administración activa procedió a encausar el procedimiento sancionatorio en contra del actor, partiendo del supuesto fáctico de vulneración al numeral 127 del Código Municipal vigente. Véase que en la especie, puntualmente en la resolución administrativa No. PA-011-2011 de las 12:00 horas del 31 de enero del 2011, emitida como acto de recomendación por parte de la Contraloría General de la República, únicamente se hace referencia a las conductas cuestionadas por resultar violatorias del numeral 127 del Código Municipal y es en relación con dicho articulado que se instaura el procedimiento disciplinario y se lleva hasta su conclusión, sin que del contenido de dicho acto se derive que las conductas achacadas al señor Nombre126154 fueran enmarcadas por parte del operador jurídico ni en la Ley de Control Interno ni en la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, siendo que tampoco consta en dicho acto, que se valore la conducta desplegada por el accionante al amparo de dichas disposiciones legales, limitándose el órgano director -la Contraloría- a reiterar que se vulneró el numeral 127 del Código Municipal. Tampoco se percibe en dicho acto administrativo, que se haya realizado un análisis jurídico sobre la ausencia de sanción expresa en el artículo 127 de repetida cita, ni que se emitiera ningún razonamiento considerativo sobre la procedencia de aplicar en el caso concreto dichas disposiciones legales para llenar la laguna normativa y sancionar así las conductas endilgadas, siendo hasta en la parte dispositiva de dicha resolución, donde se invocan los numerales 18 inciso d) del Código Municipal y 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, pero sin que en la parte considerativa de dicho acto, se explique por qué tales artículos legales son aplicables al caso concreto. Véase que el numeral 18 de la ley No. 7794 señala literalmente:

"Artículo 18. - Serán causas automáticas de pérdida de la credencial de alcalde municipal:

• a)Perder un requisito o el adolecer de un impedimento, según los artículos 15 y 16 de este código.
• b)Ausentarse injustificadamente de sus labores por más de ocho días.
• c)Ser declarado, por sentencia judicial firme, inhabilitado para ejercer cargos públicos.
• d)Incurrir en alguna de las causales previstas en el artículo 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República.

(Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 66 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, N° 8422 del 6 de octubre del 2004) e) Cometer cualquier acción sancionada por la ley con la pérdida del cargo para funcionarios de elección popular.

• f)Renunciar voluntariamente a su puesto." Además, señala el artículo 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, en lo que resulta de interés:

"Artículo 73-Cancelación de credencial. Será causa para la cancelación de la respectiva credencial, la comisión de una falta grave por parte de un regidor o síndico, propietario o suplente, contra las normas del ordenamiento de fiscalización y control de la Hacienda Pública contemplado en esta Ley, y contra cualesquiera otras normas relativas a los fondos públicos; o al incurrir en alguno de los actos previstos en la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, como generadoras de responsabilidad administrativa. Esto se aplicará cuando el infractor haya actuado en el ejercicio de su cargo o con motivo de él. // Cuando la falta grave sea cometida en virtud de un acuerdo del concejo municipal, los regidores que, con su voto afirmativo, hayan aprobado dicho acuerdo, incurrirán en la misma causal de cancelación de sus credenciales. // Asimismo, será causal de cancelación de la credencial de regidor o de síndico, propietario o suplente, la condena penal firme por delitos contra la propiedad, contra la buena fe en los negocios y contra los deberes de la función pública, así como por los previstos en la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública. La autoridad judicial competente efectuará, de oficio, la comunicación respectiva al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. // (Así reformado por el artículo 63 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, N° 8422 de 6 de octubre de 2004) // ".

Pese a que en la parte dispositiva del acto administrativo sancionatorio emitido por la Contraloría General de la República en contra del actor, se indica que corresponde sancionar al señor Nombre126154 de conformidad con lo indicado en el numeral 18 inciso d) antes transcrito, la obligación de motivar los actos administrativos, máxime los actos administrativos disciplinarios o sancionatorios, impone que en la parte considerativa de dicha resolución se realice un análisis expreso sobre por qué razón debe aplicarse esa norma jurídica en particular y no otra al caso concreto, pero en la resolución administrativa indicada no se percibe pronunciamiento considerativo alguno sobre la subsunción de las conductas investigadas en el numeral 18 inciso d) (que no el inciso "e" de dicho numeral, que parecía en criterio de este Tribunal el más aplicable a la especie) ni en el artículo 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, el cual se cita por tratarse del numeral al que hace remisión expresa el inciso "d" del artículo 18 antes citado. Tómese en cuenta que el artículo 73 se refiere a las conductas que resulten lesivas "contra las normas del ordenamiento de fiscalización y control de la Hacienda Pública contemplado en esta Ley, y contra cualesquiera otras normas relativas a los fondos públicos" y expresamente hace mención de las conductas puntualmente contempladas en ese cuerpo normativo, es decir, en esa misma ley; con lo cual deja por fuera su aplicación ante el vacío normativo que se acusa en el numeral 127 del Código Municipal, donde se tutela una conducta que vulnera el deber de probidad, pero no una violación al resguardo y buena administración de la hacienda pública. Además, debe traer a memoria de las partes esta Cámara, que la imposición de sanciones -y máxime cuando estas conllevan como resultado una sanción tan gravoso como resulta ser el retiro de las credenciales para un funcionario de elección popular- no resulta viable jurídicamente recurriendo a la aplicación de la analogía como método interpretativo, pues para la aplicación de una sanción, se requiere que el legislador expresamente establezca la condición ilícita de la conducta y la sanción respectiva que ante su comisión, resulta aplicable. Ahora bien, si dichos aspectos no se encuentran previsto en la norma sancionatorio, dicha ausencia u omisión normativa no puede ser suplida por el operador jurídico, recurriendo a la vía de la integración normativa, ni mediante la aplicación analógica de normas sancionatorias creadas para corregir conductas de otra especie, como lo ha pretendido la Contraloría General de la República en el asunto bajo examen, para tratar por todos los medios de sancionar al accionante; nótese que en la especie se castiga a la parte actora, por incurrir en una conducta que no tiene una sanción expresa prevista en el ordenamiento jurídico vigente y más aún, que no se castiga expresamente con una medida tan gravosa como es la cancelación de las credenciales en un puesto de elección popular. A lo anterior se suma que el artículo 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, mismo que cita la parte dispositiva del acto administrativo sancionatorio emitido por la Contraloría General de la República para sustentar el retiro de las credenciales del accionante, literalmente reseña:

"Artículo 39.- Sanciones administrativas. Según la gravedad, las faltas anteriormente señaladas serán sancionadas así:

• a)Amonestación escrita publicada en el Diario Oficial.
• b)Suspensión, sin goce de salario, dieta o estipendio correspondiente, de quince a treinta días.
• c)Separación del cargo público, sin responsabilidad patronal o cancelación de la credencial de regidor municipal, según corresponda.", (el destacado y subrayado no corresponde al original).

Véase que este último numeral reseñado, indica específicamente que las sanciones en él establecidas, serán aplicables a "las faltas anteriormente señaladas". Es decir, hace referencia a las conductas tipificadas en ése mismo cuerpo legal, en esa misma ley, como susceptibles de ser sancionadas y no contempla bajo ningún supuesto que las mismas resulten aplicables por analogía, para sancionar conductas contenidas en otras disposiciones normativas, como resulta ser el artículo 127 del Código Municipal. Además y a modo de corolario, debe indicarse que en su redacción el artículo 127 municipal de repetida cita, tampoco remite, ni expresa ni tácitamente, a la aplicación de otra normativa sancionatoria en caso de incurrirse en la conducta que el mismo prohíbe, a efecto de establecer un régimen sancionatorio que garantice su observancia y sancione la vulneración a la prohibición en él establecida. En ese tanto, considera este Tribunal que el acto administrativo emanado de la Contraloría General de la República y que fue avalado posteriormente por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, adolece de un vicio en su contenido, siendo un vicio de carácter absoluto por concurrir en uno de los elementos sustanciales del acto administrativo bajo examen, al amparo de lo ordenado por los artículos 166 en relación con los artículos 169 a 172, todo de la ley No. 6227 Ley General de la Administración Pública. Lo anterior, por cuanto el contenido de dicho acto es completamente omiso al no emitir ni siquiera un somero análisis sobre la procedencia de la aplicación supletoria de otras normas legales sancionatorias en aras de suplementar el vacío normativo que tiene el artículo 127 del Código Municipal, al no establecer sanción ninguna en caso de su incumplimiento e inobservancia. Siendo también completamente silencioso el acto impugnado, en cuanto a la aplicación analógica de normas jurídicas específicamente emitidas por el legislador en resguardo de la hacienda y de los fondos públicos, para dar castigo a una vulneración cometida no a la hacienda pública, sino al deber de probidad, cual es la conducta en que incurrió don Nombre126154 . Aunado a dicho vicio en el contenido del acto, estima este órgano jurisdiccional que además las actuaciones administrativas impugnadas carecen de un vicio en el motivo, por carecer de sustento jurídico, pues no existe una norma jurídica que sancione de manera especial y expresa, la vulneración a la prohibición establecida en el artículo 127 del Código Municipal, ni tampoco existe una norma especial y expresa que sancione a un Alcalde Municipal con la pérdida de credenciales, en caso de incurrir en alguna violación a dicha norma prohibitiva. Lo anterior, trae también aparejada la nulidad absoluta de las conductas administrativas atacadas ante esta jurisdicción, por paridad de razón y de conformidad con el artículo 166 de la ley No. 6227, al ser el motivo del acto administrativo (por definición, el precedente de hecho o de derecho que sirve de razón o motivación para el dictado del acto por parte de la administración pública), un elemento sustancial del mismo. En razón de las consideraciones expuestas, sin duda se ha generado un vicio que afecta de nulidad absoluta los actos administrativos impugnados ante este Tribunal, aunado al hecho de que no existiendo pronunciamiento sobre la adecuación de la conducta endilgada a las normas inmediatamente transcritas, se ha dejado en evidente indefensión a la parte actora, no sólo porque la administración no indicó porqué razones el actor vulneró el artículo 18 inciso d) del Código Municipal, el artículo 73 de la LOCGR y el artículo 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, sino porque además, porque no se ha realizado en el acto administrativo impugnado, la obligatoria referencia a la relación entre las conductas endilgadas al señor Nombre126154 y la sanción que le fue aplicada. Además, se echa de menos también la presencia en los actos impugnados, de una explicación, al menos suscinta, de porqué debe integrarse en este asunto el numeral 127 del Código Municipal -que se reitera, carece de sanción aplicable-, con dichos textos legales. Simplemente sin más fundamentación se indica que así debe ser, pero sin que la administración activa se tomara el esfuerzo de justificar razonablemente su proceder. Con ello se ha incurrido en un vicio por falta de motivación del acto administrativo, siendo la falta de fundamentación un vicio que afecta de manera directa la conducta administrativa, generando la nulidad absoluta del acto impugnado. Véase que en la especie no estamos en presencia de una vulneración a la hacienda pública, sino que la vulneración acusada al accionante, constituye una falta al deber de probidad que sobre el mismo recaía, en tanto resulta claro para esta Cámara que el señor Nombre126154 promovió un nombramiento indebido a instancia suya, al amparo de lo señalado en el numeral 127 del Código Municipal, al solicitar al área de personal institucional, la designación de su hijastro Nombre126156 como funcionario municipal. Y es que, pese a que evidentemente el accionante vulneró el deber de probidad que por ley se le exigía, sin embargo en la especie, el numeral 127 municipal no preveé de modo expreso ninguna consecuencia jurídica gravosa ni castigadora con la cual sancionar el hecho de incurrir en la conducta que previene. Ni mucho menos establece de manera expresa que la comisión de dicha falta acarreará el retiro de las credenciales para un funcionario de elección popular, cual acontece en el caso que nos ocupa por tratarse de un Alcalde Municipal. En ese tanto, erradamente pretendió hacerlo la Contraloría General de la República, pues ante el vacío normativo en lo que a este ámbito atañe y ante el silencio del legislador -que omitió establecer sanciones específicas y expresas aplicables, por el incumplimiento al numeral 127 citado-, no podía dicha laguna del ordenamiento jurídico vigente ser suplida mediante la integración normativa y la aplicación analógica de disposiciones sancionatorias diversas, al tratarse la que nos ocupa de materia harto delicada, materia sancionatoria y disciplinaria, donde rige sin duda alguna e incólume, el principio de reserva de ley. Por ende, no resultaba jurídicamente viable tratar de inventarse la aplicación de una sanción por analogía, o de forzar la conducta reprochable en que incurrió el accionante, para tratar a la fuerza -y sin mayor análisis- de tratar de hacerla subsumirse en otras disposiciones normativas no promulgadas para casos como el que nos ocupa, sino para el resguardo y protección de la hacienda pública, que se reitera, no corresponde al caso que nos compete en esta litis. Los actos administrativos sancionatorios que se atacan en este proceso, sin duda han violentado el principio de tipicidad y/o de legalidad en materia sancionatoria administrativa, así como también y la disposición general establecida en el numeral 253 del Código Electoral transcrito en las líneas precedentes, que exige para casos de este calibre, la existencia previa de una sanción expresa contenida en una norma de rango legal, para castigar con ella la conducta respectiva. Por ello, concluye este Tribunal que la sanción impuesta al actor, sustentada en los numerales 18 inciso d) y 137, ambos del Código Municipal, así como en el artículo 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, deviene en ilegal, al carecer de sustento legal que le dé soporte, por no ser los artículos antes citados los aplicables al caso concreto, de conformidad con las consideraciones expuestas en las líneas precedentes y por carecer el artículo 127 del Código Municipal vigente de una sanción establecida expresamente mediante ley anterior, que castigue al funcionario que violente tal prohibición con la destitución de su cargo o bien con el retiro de las respectivas credenciales en tratándose de un funcionario designado por elección popular. Como corolario de lo anterior, se impone en la especie declarar la nulidad absoluta de los siguientes actos administrativos: resolución No. PA-11-2011 de las 12:00 horas del 31 de enero del 2011, emitid por la Contraloría General de la República, en la cual se dispuso separar al accionante de su cargo como Alcalde Municipal de Goicoechea; la resolución sin número de las 12:00 horas del 24 de febrero del dos mil once dictada por la Contraloría General de la República; la resolución No. R-DC-147-2011 de las 10:00 horas del 22 de agosto del dos mil once emitida por la Contralora General de la República, el oficio No. DJ-1012-2011 de fecha 12 de setiembre del 2011, emitido por la División Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República; la resolución sin número de las 11:35 horas del 20 de setiembre del 2011 emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones dentro de las "Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Nombre126154 "; la resolución No. 8184-M-2011 de las 13:10 horas del 16 de diciembre del 2011, emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en la que se dispuso cancelar al señor Nombre126154 la credencial que le acreditaba como Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y la resolución No. 253-M-2012 de las 08:31 horas del 17 de enero del 2012 dictada por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Por paridad de razón y consecuentemente, se declara la nulidad absoluta de todo el procedimiento administrativo sancionador seguido contra el actor y que culminó con su destitución del puesto de alcalde municipal de Goicoechea y con el retiro de sus respectivas credenciales.

X.En su escrito de demanda, adujo el accionante que en el desarrollo del procedimiento sancionador se dieron una serie de irregularidades que entorpecieron su derecho de defensa, indicando que el oficio No. DFOE-DI-1576 no se encontraba dentro del expediente administrativo, escrito que correspondía a la relación de hechos del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario, relación de hechos que no venía en el acto de apertura y traslado de cargos, el cual se puso en su conocimiento hasta un día antes de la audiencia oral y privada de rigor. Al respecto debe señalarse, que de una revisión detallada del procedimiento administrativo, se deriva que contrariamente a lo señalado por la parte actora, el acto de apertura del procedimiento y traslado de cargos correspondiente a la resolución administrativa sin número emitida a las 15:00 horas del 05 de noviembre del 2011 por parte del órgano director del procedimiento administrativo, sí contaba en su contenido con una relación de hechos debidamente detallada y que permitía al accionante determinar de manera clara cuáles eras las situaciones fácticas que en el procedimiento sancionador de marras se le imputaban, permitiéndole así proceder a ejercer de manera adecuada y efectiva su derecho de defensa y debido proceso, en resguardo de sus intereses dentro del procedimiento sancionador indicado, sin estimarse por parte de esta Cámara colegiada, que se haya vulnerado el derecho de acceso al expediente para el señor Nombre126154, ni tampoco se comparte que se le haya dejado en indefensión al aquí accionante, al no habérsele notificado con la debida antelación, el detalle de las conductas que se le endilgaron. Nótese que dicha relación de hechos se encuentra inmersa en el considerando primero de al resolución administrativa de apertura del procedimiento y traslado de cargos, correspondiente a la resolución sin número emitida a las 15:00 horas del 05 de noviembre del 2011, la cual consta en el expediente administrativo en formato digital, disco No.1 y folios 43 a 52 del expediente del procedimiento seguido en contra del actor. Se rechaza por ende, este extremo de la demanda planteada. Continúa manifestando el accionante, que la Auditoría Interna, en un acto -en su opinión- de mala fe, procedió a comunicar la situación detectada con el señor Nombre126154, a la Contraloría General de la República, en lugar de comunicarla a la mismo alcalde municipal o bien a otra instancia interna del municipio. Al respecto, debe señalarse que si bien es cierto la auditoría interna institucional bien pudo haber actuado como lo indica la parte actora, es decir, rindiendo informes sobre la situación detectada y haciéndolos del conocimiento del jerarca institucional, al amparo de lo dispuesto por los numerales que corren del 35 al 37 de la ley No. 8292 Ley de Control Interno, sin embargo el comunicar la situación detectada a lo interno de la entidad corporativa no resulta ser un requerimiento jurídicamente establecido como previo, para enviar el asunto al conocimiento del órgano contralor, como se hizo en el procedimiento bajo examen; a lo cual se añade que en todo caso, este alegato no resulta susceptible de anular per sé, el acto administrativo sancionatorio emitido y sujeto al conocimiento de este Tribunal. Por ende, se rechaza también este extremo de la demanda intentada. Continuando con el análisis de las argumentaciones planteadas por el actor, señala su representación que la Contraloría General de la República no analizó la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, y tampoco lo hizo el TSE, pues de haberlo hecho se hubiesen percatado de que esa ley establece una serie de sanciones según la gravedad de la falta. Al respecto, debe indicarse que el tema de la gradación de sanciones entratándose de materia disciplinaria y estando el operador jurídico ante una pluralidad de opciones sancionatorias, todas jurídicamente válidas, entre las cuales escoger para sancionar al infractor, debe de procederse a la aplicación de los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucionales, debiendo proceder a realizarse un adecuado juicio de ponderación a efecto de determinar cuál es el castigo más razonable, adecuado y proporcional para el supuesto fáctico tipificado en la norma sancionatoria, cuya comisión se ha acreditado y que se somete a la revisión disciplinaria. Efectivamente, la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, en su numeral 41 establece una serie de criterios, los cuales deben ser tomados en cuenta al momento valorar la conducta del sujeto investigado, cuando haya incurrido en alguna conducta antijurídica por dolo o culpa grave. Dicho artículo contempla los siguientes aspectos por tomar en consideración para tal efecto, en su literalidad. "Artículo 41.-Criterios por considerar. Las sanciones estipuladas en la presente Ley serán impuestas por las infracciones anteriormente tipificadas que hayan sido cometidas con dolo o culpa grave. Para valorar la conducta del presunto responsable se tomarán en cuenta, entre otros, los siguientes factores: / a) La efectiva lesión a los intereses económicos de la Administración Pública y la cuantía de los daños y perjuicios irrogados. / b) El éxito obtenido en el logro de los resultados no deseados por el ordenamiento jurídico o en el enriquecimiento o favorecimiento del autor de la infracción o de terceros, así como el empeño puesto en procurarlos. / c) El impacto negativo en el servicio público. / d) La reincidencia en alguna de las faltas tipificadas en el Artículo 38 de esta Ley, dentro de los cuatro años anteriores. / e) El rango y las funciones del servidor; se entiende que, a mayor jerarquía y complejidad de estas, mayor será la obligación de apreciar la legalidad, oportunidad y conveniencia de los actos que se dictan, autorizan o ejecutan." Nótese que en la especie, efectivamente, tales aspectos deben de ser valorados para determinar la gravedad de la falta cometida así como la sanción por aplicarse en tales supuestos, sin embargo, en la especie la situación es bastante particular, pues es lo cierto que en el subjúdice, ni siquiera se podía proceder a realizar la valoración indicada con el fin de escoger una entre varias sanciones posibles con el objetivo de sancionar al accionante, pues es lo cierto que en este asunto y en criterio de este Tribunal, no existe una norma jurídica de carácter sancionador que le de sustento al castigo aplicado al accionante, pues tal y como se indicara en las líneas precedentes, la misma se sustentó erradamente y de manera contraria a derecho, en los numerales 18 inciso d) y 137, ambos del Código Municipal, así como en el artículo 39 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, lo cual resultaba contrario a derecho por no ser los artículos antes citados los aplicables al caso concreto, de conformidad con las consideraciones expuestas en las líneas precedentes y por carecer el artículo 127 del Código Municipal vigente de una sanción expresamente establecida mediante ley anterior, que castigue al funcionario que violente tal prohibición con la destitución de su cargo o bien con el retiro de las respectivas credenciales en tratándose de un funcionario designado por elección popular. A lo anterior se añade que en todo caso, de la lectura del acto administrativo impugnado se concluye que al menos se tomó en consideración por parte del órgano contralor, la condición de superior jerárquico -alcalde- que ostentaba el accionante en el municipio de marras, pues al menos así lo indica dicho acto sancionatorio, por supuesto que sin brindar mayor detalle y sin realizar un análisis a profundidad sobre la procedencia de la sanción impuesta, porque en realidad y conforme a derecho, no había una norma jurídica vigente que tipificara la conducta específica acusada y que así mismo, estableciera de manera expresa para ella, una o algunas sanciones aplicables de manera concreta para dicha conducta, imposibilitándose realizar el análisis sobre la gradación de sanciones, entre las cuales escoger una para resolver el caso concreto. Continúa señalando la parte actora, que en la especie no hay lesión a sus intereses económicos, no se dio un impacto negativo en el servicio público, el salario que recibió el funcionario se lo ganó, recibió el pago de ley, y no se le favoreció pagándole más de la suma establecida legalmente. Dichas afirmaciones son efectivamente compartidas por este Tribunal: de un estudio detallado de los autos se deriva que efectivamente en la especie no operó ninguna afección a la hacienda pública, pues no consta en autos ningún documento que acredite que el salario pagado al hijastro del señor Nombre126154 fue superior al que correspondía para la plaza por él ocupada, o bien, no existe prueba en la especie que acredite que el joven no laborara en la plaza en la que fue nombrado, ni tampoco existe en autor prueba de que el señor Nombre126156 hubiera recibido su salario sin realizar el trabajo respectivo, así como tampoco que hubiese recibido el otrora señor alcalde, algún estipendio por parte del señor Nombre126156 para proceder a su designación; tampoco consta en autos que se hubiera generado un daño o bien un perjuicio económico real y efectivo a las finanzas ni a la hacienda pública, siendo que el caso que nos ocupa se restringe, en cuanto a su ámbito de afección, a haber inobservado la prohibición expresa establecida en el artículo 127 del Código Municipal vigente, pero tal y como lo señala la parte actora, no consta en autos la afectación a los bienes y dineros municipales, por ende, a la hacienda pública. En ese tanto, lleva razón la parte actora y sin duda tales circunstancias debieron de ser tomadas en consideración al momento de valorar la gravedad de la conducta acusada y de determinar la sanción aplicable y correspondiente al caso concreto, pero lo cierto del caso es que en este asunto puntual, dicho ejercicio jurídico resultaba imposible de realizar, porque en realidad y conforme a derecho, no hay en la especie una norma jurídica vigente de rango legal que establezca de manera expresa y especial, una o algunas sanciones aplicables para castigar la conducta concreta acusada, imposibilitándose así realizar el análisis sobre la gradación de sanciones para proceder así a escoger una entre varias posibles, para resolver el caso concreto; es decir, ante la ausencia de sanciones legalmente establecidas para la conducta concreta prevista en el numeral 127 del Código Municipal, se veía imposibilitado el operador jurídico de realizar el juicio de razonabilidad y ponderación respectivo para escoger la sanción más razonable, lógica y proporcional de entre varias sanciones, correspondiente a las circunstancias concretas y particulares del caso bajo examen. Debe nuevamente indicarse que dicha falta de sustento normativo legal, per sé, vicia de nulidad absoluta el acto administrativo sancionatorio aquí impugnado, al constituirse como un vicio en el motivo y en el contenido del mismo y que por ende acarrea su abierta disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico vigente. No puede omitir este Tribunal señalar que aún y cuando las modernas corrientes sociopolíticas hayan generado novedosas ideologías interpretativas del ordenamiento jurídico, llevando al extremo el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria dentro del Estado, los postulantes de tales corrientes ideológicas, les guste o no, deben sujetarse a la legalidad y al ordenamiento jurídico vigente en el país, y lo cierto del caso es que, guste o no, sea politicamente correcto o no, no existe una sanción específica establecida para la conducta establecida en el artículo 127 del Código Municipal vigente, para la fecha de comisión de los hechos que dan origen a esta litis. Este Tribunal no se debe ni se sujetará a dimensionamientos de orden político ni a interpretaciones ideológicas de corte persecutorio que imperen en alguna institución estatal; este Tribunal se debe y se sujeta a la juridicidad, a la Constitución Política vigente y a la ley, y en ese tanto, aplicando los criterios restrictivos de hermenéutica aplicables desde muy vieja data a la materia sancionatoria así como el principio de legalidad que rige dicha materia y que establece que la materia sancionatoria es reservada a la ley, no puede bajo ningún supuesto esta Cámara cohonestar ni validar el establecimiento de sanciones por la vía de la analogía, para complementar con ese método interpretativo tipos sancionatorios "abiertos", o también aquellos a quienes otros denominan como "en blanco", siendo aquellas disposiciones normativas sancionatorias que no se bastan a sí mismas y que requieren que por vía de interpretación se proceda a crear una sanción aplicable a una conducta específica, cuando el legislador no la estableció de manera puntual y expresa, lo cual sin duda vulnera los más elementales principios jurídicos pro-hómine y pro-libertatis, que comparte y propugna plenamente este colegiado. En otro orden de ideas, debe indicarse a la parte actora que la resolución dictada en el caso concreto del señor Nombre16454 no resulta aplicable al asunto ahora sometido al examen de este Tribunal, pues corresponde a un supuesto fáctico diverso del que ahora nos ocupa y en todo caso, no ejerce sujeción alguna sobre el criterio de este órgano jurisdiccional. Sigue manifestando la parte actora, que en la especie, la resolución administrativa No. PA-011-2011 no le fue debidamente notificada según el artículo 38 de la Ley de Notificaciones, pues no se le comunicó antes de la realización de la audiencia, lo que violó su derecho de defensa. Al respecto, debe indicarse que la resolución No. PA-11-2011 de las 12:00 horas del 31 de enero del 2011, emitida por el órgano decisor del procedimiento administrativo sancionador tramitado por la Contraloría General de la República, corresponde al acto final dictado dentro de dicho procedimiento. Esta resolución fue notificada a la parte actora vía facsímil en fecha 04 de febrero del 2011, según consta en el elenco de hechos probados de esta resolución y se puede constatar a folio 144 del expediente administrativo respectivo en formato digital, disco No.1. La audiencia oral y privada de ley fue realizada dentro de este procedimiento sancionador, el día 18 de enero del 2011, según consta a folio 128 del procedimiento administrativo digitalizado aportado a los autos. En ese tanto, es el lo cierto que dicho acto final le fue comunicado al accionante más de diez días después de realizarse la comparencia oral respectiva, resultando por ello evidente que no se ha producido ninguna vulneración a su derecho de defensa y que no lleva razón la parte actora en sus afirmaciones atinentes a este tópico, debiendo rechazarse este aspecto argumentativo de la demanda intentada. Con respecto a las alegadas vulneraciones al principio del paralelismo de las formas, el principio democrático y el de voluntad popular, así como a sus afirmaciones de que si al Alcalde lo nombró el pueblo, el único legitimado para destituirlo es el pueblo, de acuerdo con los principios y bases del plebiscito, citando como ejemplo lo acontecido en Nombre265 y la invocación de la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 220, 223 y 253 de la ley No. 8765 Código Electoral vigente, y de las resoluciones No. 6673-M-2011, No. 7105-M-2011 y No. 8184-M-2011 todas del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, debe señalarse que tales argumentaciones exceden las competencias jurídicas asignadas al conocimiento de este Tribunal, pues versan sobre aspectos de orden constitucional, sobre los cuales no corresponde externar criterio a este colegiado, siendo las mismas del resorte propio de la Sala Constitucional, por tratarse el costarricense de un sistema de control concentrado de constitucional, según lo preceptuado por el artículo 10 de la norma fundamental vigente. En virtud de las consideraciones expuestas en las líneas líneas que anteceden, es lo procedente conforme a derecho, declarar con lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda intentada, como en efecto se dispone. En virtud de haberse declarado con lugar la demanda que nos ocupa, según lo expuesto en los considerandos anteriores, se anula en su totalidad el procedimiento administrativo sancionatorio seguido en contra del accionante y tomando en consideración que esta declaratoria tiene efecto declarativo y retroactivo a la fecha de inicio del referido procedimiento, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por los numerales 131.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y 171 de la ley No. Placa1223, como consecuencia directa y inmediata de ello, se anula también cualquiera referencia existente, respecto del procedimiento administrativo aquí anulado, en cualesquiera bases de datos de la Contraloría General de la República y del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, lo cual deberá ejecutarse, de manera inmediata una vez que alcance firmeza la presente resolución. Se declara la nulidad de las resoluciones administrativas No. PA-11-2011 de las 12:00 horas del 31 de enero del 2011, emitid por la Contraloría General de la República, en la cual se dispuso separar al accionante de su cargo como Alcalde Municipal de Goicoechea; resolución sin número de las 12:00 horas del 24 de febrero del dos mil once dictada por la Contraloría General de la República; resolución No. R-DC-147-2011 de las 10:00 horas del 22 de agosto del dos mil once emitida por la Contralora General de la República, el oficio No. DJ-1012-2011 de fecha 12 de setiembre del 2011, emitido por la División Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República; resolución sin número de las 11:35 horas del 20 de setiembre del 2011 emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones dentro de las "Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Nombre126154 "; resolución No. 8184-M-2011 de las 13:10 horas del 16 de diciembre del 2011, emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en la que se dispuso cancelar al señor Nombre126154 la credencial que le acreditaba como Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y la resolución No. 253-M-2012 de las 08:31 horas del 17 de enero del 2012 dictada por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.

XI.En el elenco de pretensiones esgrimidas por el accionante en esta litis, el actor reclama el pago de los daños y perjuicios que alega, le fueron causados con los actos administrativos impugnados. A título de daños pretende la suma de cien millones de colones netos, los cuales afirma que corresponden a los salarios, aguinaldo, salario escolar, salario en especie y beneficios que como Alcalde tenía a su haber, suma que solicita sea liquidada en ejecución de sentencia. Así mismo, solicita que los salarios sean indexados desde el momento en que se generó su obligación hasta la fecha de su efectivo pago, además de requerir que el monto sea calculado de acuerdo a la tasa básica pasiva que se encuentre vigente al momento de liquidación y fijación por resolución judicial firme. Al respecto, debe indicarse que en criterio de este Tribunal, con su proceder antijurídico, al aplicar al actor una sanción inexistente para el caso concreto del artículo 127 del Código Municipal, la parte demandada ha vulnerado la esfera de derechos patrimoniales del actor, colocándolo en una situación de evidente afectación laboral con evidentes consecuencias económicas y personales, lo cual sin mayor esfuerzo se infiere de los autos, pues fue destituido de su puesto como Alcalde Municipal de Goicoechea y no pudo percibir las sumas y demás extremos salariales que eventualmente hubiese podido recibir, de haberse mantenido en el cargo por todo el plazo de su mandato, el cual dicho sea de paso, finalizaba en el año 2016. Con ello, se ha obligado al accionante a acudir, en primer término, a un procedimiento de impugnación infructífero y luego al proceso jurisdiccional que nos atañe, para impugnar actuaciones formales que, por encontrare afectas con los vicios legales señalados en los párrafos precedentes, han debido ser anuladas por este Tribunal. En síntesis, el actuar de los codemandados Contraloría General de la República y el Estado, en representación del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, sin duda alguna le ocasionaron al actor una perturbación injusta en su desarrollo laboral y en consecuencia, es lo procedente ordenar el pago, en favor del señor Nombre126154, de los salarios caídos y los respectivos extremos salariales a los que hubiera tenido derecho, si se hubiera efectivamente mantenido en el ejercicio del cargo de elección popular, durante todo el plazo de su nombramiento como Alcalde Municipal de Goicoechea. Siendo que no existe en autos prueba idónea que permita al Tribunal determinar en este acto, las sumas que por tal concepto deben de pagarse al accionante, se concede el pago de dichas cantidades de manera abstracta, a reserva de la debida determinación, cuantificación y liquidación que al efecto se realice posteriormente, en etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Por haberlo requerido el actor y en virtud de lo dispuesto por el numeral 123 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las sumas concedidas deberán indexarse y traerse a valor presente. Una vez cuantificadas y determinadas dichas sumas, sobre las mismas se reconocerá intereses a título de perjuicios de conformidad con lo indicado por el numeral 722 del Código Civil, los cuales se calcularán al tipo legal vigente, a partir de la fecha en que debió recibir cada uno de los pagos correspondientes el actor y hasta la fecha de su efectiva cancelación.

XII.Sobre las excepciones. Al contestar la demanda, la representación de los codemandados opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación y falta de interés actual. En relación con la defensa de falta de interés actual, debe indicarse que la misma resulta improcedente, en virtud de que el punto jurídico debatido dentro del presente asunto, correspondiente a la valoración de la legalidad de la sanción aplicada al accionante por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones ante recomendación al efecto emitida por la Contraloría General de la República, no había sido objeto de análisis ni de pronunciamiento por parte de ningún órgano jurisdiccional, a lo cual se suma que si bien es cierto el actor había accedido ante esta instancia en el expediente No.12-000748-1027-CA esto lo fue únicamente mediante la interposición de una solicitud de tutela cautelar de la cual a la postre desistió, sin que en aquel asunto se planteara nunca un proceso de conocimiento o se emitiera criterio sobre el fondo del asunto. En cuanto a la excepción de falta de legitimación, tanto en su vertiente activa como pasiva, se procede al rechazo de la misma en sus dos acepciones, pues se encontraba adecuadamente legitimado activamente el señor Nombre126154 para apersonarse a estrados dentro de este proceso en defensa de sus intereses, pues el objeto del mismo ha sido la anulación de las conductas desplegadas por la administración codemandada, que culminaron con su cese en el puesto de Alcalde Municipal de Goicoechea que venía ocupando y el retiro de sus respectivas credenciales; igual suerte debe correr la excepción alegada en su vertiente pasiva, pues los actos administrativos impugnados fueron emitidos por los órganos codemandados en el presente asunto, al amparo de lo dispuesto por el numeral 12 del CPCA vigente. Y por último, de conformidad con los razonamientos expuestos en los considerandos precedentes, en cuanto a los codemandados Contraloría General de la República y el Estado, se rechaza la excepción de falta de derecho invocada, por haber llevado razón jurídica en sus posiciones la parte actora gananciosa de esta litis y consecuentemente se declara con lugar la demanda intentada. En lo que atañe a la codemandada Nombre16153 , actual Alcaldesa Municipal de Goicoechea, se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva, pues dentro de su elenco de pretensiones el actor estimó que en caso de haberse vencido el período por el cual fue nombrado al momento del dictado de esta resolución, en dicho supuesto no solicitaba que se le reinstalara en el cargo que venía ocupando y que ahora ejerce doña Nombre16153 , a lo cual se suma que tampoco ningún extremo de su demanda, se orientaba a la obtención de algún resultado jurídico o de alguna conducta, por parte de la señora Nombre16153 .

XIII.Sobre las costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone al vencida por el mero hecho de serlo. La dispensa de ésta condena sólo resulta viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, y en lo que atañe concretamente al Estado y a la Contraloría General de la República, no encuentra este Tribunal motivo alguno para aplicar las excepciones que fija la normativa respectiva y quebrar el postulado de condena en costas al vencido. Por ende, se impone la condenatoria en costas procesales y personales a cargo de la Contraloría General de la República y del Estado. En cuanto a la señora Nombre16153 , siendo que la misma fue llamada al proceso de manera obligatoria por mandato expreso del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, que ninguna participación tuvo respecto de la emisión de los actos administrativos anulados y que de ella no se pretendía ninguna conducta por parte del señor Nombre126154 , se resuelve el asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas.

POR TANTO

Se rechaza la excepción de falta de interés actual. Respecto del Estado y la Contraloría General de la República, se rechaza las excepciones de falta de legitimación y falta de derecho interpuestas. Consecuentemente se declara con lugar la demanda intentada, en los siguientes términos, así: Se declara la nulidad absoluta de todo el procedimiento administrativo sancionador seguido contra el actor y que culminó con su destitución del puesto de Alcalde Municipal de Goicoechea y con el retiro de sus respectivas credenciales. Se declara la nulidad de las resoluciones administrativas No. PA-11-2011 de las 12:00 horas del 31 de enero del 2011, emitid por la Contraloría General de la República, en la cual se dispuso separar al accionante de su cargo como Alcalde Municipal de Goicoechea; resolución sin número de las 12:00 horas del 24 de febrero del dos mil once dictada por la Contraloría General de la República; resolución No. R-DC-147-2011 de las 10:00 horas del 22 de agosto del dos mil once emitida por la Contralora General de la República, el oficio No. DJ-1012-2011 de fecha 12 de setiembre del 2011, emitido por la División Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República; resolución sin número de las 11:35 horas del 20 de setiembre del 2011 emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones dentro de las "Diligencias de cancelación de credenciales de alcalde propietario de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, provincia San José, que ostenta el señor Nombre126154 "; resolución No. 8184-M-2011 de las 13:10 horas del 16 de diciembre del 2011, emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en la que se dispuso cancelar al señor Nombre126154 la credencial que le acreditaba como Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Goicoechea y la resolución No. 253-M-2012 de las 08:31 horas del 17 de enero del 2012 dictada por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Como consecuencia directa de esta declaratoria de nulidad, deberá eliminarse cualquier referencia que exista respecto del procedimiento aquí anulado, en cualquier base de datos de la Contraloría General de la República y del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, apenas adquiera firmeza esta sentencia. Se condena a la Contraloría General de la República y al Estado al pago, en favor del accionante, de los salarios caídos y los respectivos extremos salariales a los que hubiera tenido derecho, si se hubiera efectivamente mantenido en el ejercicio del cargo de elección popular, durante todo el plazo de su nombramiento como alcalde municipal de Goicoechea, cantidades las cuales se contabilizarán a partir de la fecha en que fue efectivamente separado de su cargo y hasta el día en que hubiese finalizado su nombramiento como alcalde municipal. Dichas sumas deberán ser determinadas, cuantificadas y liquidadas en etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Una vez determinadas, tales cantidades deberán indexarse y traerse a valor presente. Sobre las mismas se reconocerá intereses al tipo legal vigente, los cuales correrán a partir de la fecha en que debió recibir cada uno de los salarios correspondientes el actor, y hasta la fecha de su efectivo pago. Con respecto a Nombre16153 , se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva invocada y se declara sin lugar la demanda contra ella intentada, resolviéndose sin especial condenatoria en costas. Son ambas costas del proceso a cargo del Estado y de la Contraloría General de la República. Notifíquese.-Sandra M. Quesada Vargas.- Nombre126157 .- Luis Polinaris Vives.- *IVQ47OJYPFTY61* SANDRA QUESADA VARGAS - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *DXL7KLRZGSQ61* LUIS ARTURO POLINARIS VIVES - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *HKOOWNQXVO461* Nombre126157 - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A Goicoechea, Dirección7876 , 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Dirección18098 . Teléfonos: 2545-0099, 2545-0107, 2545-0158. Fax: 2241-5664 y 2545-0006. Correo electrónico: ...01