Coca Cola FEMSA v. INDER: Inadmissibility of claim against preparatory tax audit actCoca Cola FEMSA contra INDER: inadmisibilidad de demanda contra acto de trámite fiscalizador

**Review of the Document** *140027981027CA* Res. 00143-F-TC-2018 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT OF CASSATION. San José, at ten o'clock on the eighteenth of October, two thousand eighteen.

Ordinary proceeding established in the Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Tribunal by COCA COLA FEMSA DE COSTA RICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (FEMSA), represented by its limited generalissimo agent Nombre168028, attorney, resident of Heredia; against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER), represented by its general judicial agent Rosa Eugenia Miranda Villalobos, single. Acting as special judicial agent of the plaintiff are Nombre23181, Nombre21075, and Nombre19955. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, attorneys, and residents of San José.

**WHEREAS** 1.- Based on the facts set forth and legal provisions cited, the plaintiff established an ordinary proceeding, so that the judgment declares: “1.- Null and void and without any legal effect or value, the administrative acts issued by INDER in violation of the Constitution, the law, and applicable regulatory norms, which are the requests for privileged and confidential information with which INDER initiated its audit (fiscalización) process, and others that are impertinent for the purposes of the audit tasks entrusted by law. In particular, I REQUEST that the following acts be annulled: the communication of the initiation of the audit verification (actualización fiscalizadora) document No. IA-FT-03-2013, Resolution No. 006-2014 of 14:00 hours of January 29, 2014, Resolutions No. 007-2014 of 10:00 hours of February 12, 2014, No. 008-2014 of 10:30 hours of February 13, 2014, No. 009-2014 of 12:00 hours of February 13, 2014, and Official Letter No. FT-012-2014 of April 3, 2014. 2.- That regarding the tax created by Law No. 6735 before its reform by Law No. 9036, INDER (formerly IDA) does not have the authority to access taxpayers' private information, and must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación in compliance with the Regulation to said Law, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) NO. 31156. 3.- Time-barred (Prescritos) the taxes in favor of IDA (now INDER) for the period from January 2009 to October 2010. 4.- That INDER be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding.” 2.- The defendant Institute contested negatively and raised the preliminary defense (defensa previa) of an act not subject to challenge (acto no susceptible de impugnación) and the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho).

3.- At 09:00 hours on January 15, 2015, the preliminary hearing was held, attended by the representatives of both parties.

4.- The processing judge (jueza tramitadora) Judith Reyes Castillo, in judgment no. 96-2015 of 11:00 hours on January 15, 2015, resolved: “the inadmissibility of the claim in all its terms is declared, both costs of the proceeding are imposed on the plaintiff, once this resolution is final, proceed with the archiving of the file. Against this resolution, an appeal (recurso) is available in the form and terms established by the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.” 5.- The representative of the plaintiff files a cassation appeal (recurso de casación).

6.- In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Rojas Morales **WHEREAS** I.- Coca Cola Femsa de Costa Rica sued the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (hereinafter Inder). In its statement of claim, it indicated that, through official letter IA-FT-03-2003 dated December 16, 2003, the defendant Institute communicated the initiation of audit verification and investigation actions for the period from January 2009 to November 29, 2012. It narrated that, in said brief, the defendant requested private information, confidential data, and documents with restricted access, some of which, in its judgment, are impertinent for the investigation of the tax granted in its favor through Law no. 6735 (currently repealed). It added that, not being clear about the scope of the audit and, considering, according to what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in vote (voto) no. 12823-2001 at 10 hours 34 minutes of December 14, 2001, that Inder lacked legal competence to request the recently cited information, it requested the reconsideration of the intended tax audit. It recounted that, through resolution no. 006-2014 of 14:00 hours on January 29, 2014, the Administrative and Financial Director of Inder rejected the petition and set a new date for the first coordination meeting for the initiation of the actions. It cited that, dissatisfied with the resolution, it filed an appeal. Likewise, on February 4, 2014, it requested that the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the intended taxes be declared. Based on article 349 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the defendant referred the file to the Executive President, so that, in his capacity as Tax Administrator, he could hear the appeal (resolution no. 007-2014 of 10:00 hours on February 12, 2014). The Executive President, in resolution no. 008-2014 of 10 hours 30 minutes on February 13, 2014, rejected the appeal as inadmissible and, through resolution no. 009-2014 of 12:00 hours on February 13, 2014, reserved the knowledge of the statute of limitations raised for the appropriate procedural moment. It noted that, in official letter no. FT-012-2014, Inder indicated the new date for the visit of the audit team. It requested that the judgment declare: “1.- Null and void and without any legal effect or value, the administrative acts issued by INDER in violation of the Constitution, the law, and applicable regulatory norms, which are the requests for privileged and confidential information with which INDER initiated its audit process, and others that are impertinent for the purposes of the audit tasks entrusted by law. In particular, I REQUEST that the following acts be annulled: the communication of the initiation of the audit action document No. IA-FT-03-2013, Resolution No. 006-2014 of 14:00 hours of (sic) January 29, 2014, Resolutions NO. 007-2014 of 10:00 hours of February 12, 2014, No. 008-2014 of 10:30 hours of (sic) February 13, 2014, No. 009-2014 of 12:00 hours of (sic) February 13, 2014, and Official Letter No. FT-012-2014 of (sic) April 3, 2014. 2. That regarding the tax created by Law No. 6735 before its reform by Law No. 9036, INDER (formerly IDA) does not have the authority to have access to taxpayers' private information, and must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación in compliance with the Regulation to said Law, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 31156. 3. Time-barred the taxes in favor of IDA (now INDER) for the period from January 2009 to October 2010. 4. That INDER be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding.” The defendant Institute responded as shown in folios 184 to 233. It raised the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge and the exception of lack of right. The Processing Judge, in resolution no. 96-2015 of 11:00 hours on January 15, 2015, declared the inadmissibility of the claim in all its terms and ordered the plaintiff company to pay both costs of the proceeding. Disagreeing, the plaintiff appeals in cassation.

II.- In this case, the cassation appellant alleges one grievance of a procedural nature and three grounds for substantive reasons. In the sole procedural complaint, the appellant recriminates violation of procedural norms whose non-observance is sanctioned with absolute nullity. It recounts that the Processing Judge exceeded the powers granted by canon 92, paragraph 6) in accordance with 66, subsection g) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (hereinafter CPCA). It states that the challenged resolution prejudged the merits of the matter at a preliminary stage, thereby transgressing due process and the provisions of canon 96 ibid. It refers to article 92, subsection 7) of the Procedural Code. In the first censure, it invokes erroneous interpretation of numeral 36, subsection c) of the CPCA and ordinal 163, subsection 2) of the Law of Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP). The appellant points out that, in accordance with article 36, subsection c) of the CPCA, the proceeding filed against an administrative act of a preparatory nature with its own effect (acto de trámite con efecto propio) is admissible. On the other hand, precept 163, subsection 2) of the LGAP indicates: “Article 163.- […] 2. The defects inherent in preparatory acts shall be challenged jointly with the act, unless those are, in turn, acts with their own effect. […]” It affirms that the resolution failed to apply said norms, since it denied the admissibility of the claim, even though what was challenged consisted of a preparatory act with its own effect. It maintains that the communication of the initiation of audit actions, by requiring the disclosure of private and confidential information, as well as retroactively applying Law no. 6735, violates constitutional canons 24 and 33. Therefore, by negatively impacting the sphere of rights of the plaintiff company, they possess their own effect. In its view, the Court errs in classifying official letter IA-FT-03-2003 as a simple preparatory act for the audit procedure regulated in tax regulations. It says that the debated resolution is null for lack of reasoning (falta de motivación). It asserts that it does not explain the reasons why it concludes that the constitutional rights to privacy and the retroactive application of the law are not circumvented. Instead, it merely indicates that they are aspects that must be alleged jointly when refuting the final act of the procedure. It warns that the appealed vote, on one hand, prevented the filing of an evident case of legal and unconstitutional violations; and, on the other hand, permitted access to privileged information, for a range of periods not authorized by law. It states that the requirement made by Inder not only constitutes an order for information but is also a warning of the imposition of a fine in case the instruction is not complied with (article 82 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios - hereinafter CNPT). It reiterates that the information requested is privileged in nature. For that reason, providing it would disturb its constitutional right to the privacy of private information. Therefore, it says, the challenged ruling produces harmful effects on the plaintiff's rights. Consequently, contrary to what the jurisdictional body ruled, it considers that the preparatory act does have its own effect and, therefore, the claim is admissible. It refers to numerals 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and canon 11 of the Magna Carta. In the second breach, it accuses the non-application (desaplicación) of article 40 of Law no. 6735 and its regulation. The appellant indicates that the resolution is based on the premise that the auditing powers of the defendant Institute are unrestricted. Hence, it fails to apply the provisions of ordinal 40 of Law 6735 and its regulation. It notes that, according to the recently cited article, the former IDA (now Inder) has the authority to exercise audit and control over the collection of the various assigned revenues. In addition, its officials are empowered to intervene at any time and ensure compliance with the legal norms that grant the economic resources. However, it expressly indicates that, for these purposes, it must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de la Tributación Directa and other public entities. Notwithstanding the above, it indicates that the challenged resolution, without greater analysis, recognizes the arguments outlined by Inder in the response to the claim and takes as true the modification of ordinal 99 of the CNPT and, consequently, of article 40 of Law 6735. Furthermore, based on the tax norm cited above, it grants the defendant the category of Tax Administration and, consequently, grants it unrestricted powers. This, without explaining why the ruling no. 112823-2001 issued by the Constitutional Chamber considered that no norm granted autonomous tax audit powers to Inder, as well as what was stated in that resolution in relation to constitutional ordinal 24. Therefore, it insists, the defendant does not possess unrestricted audit powers. In the third defect, it argues violation of the binding force erga omnes of the Constitutional Chamber judgment no. 2001-12823 at 10 hours 34 minutes of December 14, 2001. The cassation appellant alleges violation of the rights and principles of constitutional law. It narrates that numeral 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and its amendments establishes the binding force erga omnes. It asserts that the appealed ruling disregarded what was ordered by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment no. 2001-12823, thereby violating the aforementioned principle. Thus, in its view, since 2001, IDA (now Inder) was not authorized to regulate control and audit procedures. Nor for it to be able, based on general norms of the CNPT, to have access to documents whose confidentiality is constitutionally guaranteed.

**Appeal for procedural reasons** III.- In the sole grievance of a procedural nature, if what is argued by the cassation appellant in Wherefore II were to occur, we would be in the presence of the cause established in subsection h) of article 137 of the CPCA. The plaintiff affirms that the judging person exceeded the powers granted by article 92, paragraph 6) in accordance with ordinal 66, subsection g) of the CPCA. It points out that the judge, being in a preliminary stage, decided on aspects related to the Tax Administration authority of Inder, exceeding her powers granted by law. It mentions that, by issuing such criteria, she not only prejudged the merits of the matter but also transgressed what is established in norm 96 ibid. Observe that the plaintiff accuses a premature disclosure of criteria (adelanto de criterio) in relation to Inder's competence in Tax Administration matters. It says the jurisdictional body errs in concluding that the defendant Institute possessed broad and unrestricted audit powers. It refers that the preliminary defense alleged by the defendant required a merits analysis that should not have been addressed by the judge in the preliminary hearing. In its view, the dismissal of the invoked defense was appropriate, to carry out its subsequent analysis when the Trial Court hears the merits. Consequently, it considers cardinal 96 of the Procedural Code circumvented. According to what is stated by the appellant, the preliminary defense invoked by the defendant should have been reserved for the merits analysis. In this regard, it is worth noting that the defense raised corresponds to subsection g) of article 66 of the CPCA. Said norm literally states: “ARTICLE 66.- 1) In the response to the claim or counterclaim, all substantive exceptions (excepciones de fondo) may be alleged, as well as the following preliminary defenses (defensas previas): […] g) That the claim is raised against any of the acts not subject to challenge. […] 2) In the case of subsection a), the processing judge (jueza o juez tramitador) will proceed in accordance with article 5 of this same Code; in the other cases, the resolution will be reserved for the preliminary hearing, referred to in chapter VI of title V of this Code.” (The underlining is ours) From what is transcribed, it can be glimpsed that, contrary to what the appellant indicates, the appropriate procedural moment to debate and resolve the defense raised is during the preliminary hearing. Additionally, it suggests a premature disclosure of criteria regarding the merits of the matter. Viewing the challenged resolution, the Processing Judge in Wherefore II, states: “II.- SPECIFIC CASE: From the reading of the claims and the factual framework supporting the claim, it is clear that the plaintiff is seeking the annulment of the initiation of the audit action, that is, the order initiating the administrative procedure for tax determination processed by INDER under No. IA-FT-03-2013. […] On the other hand, the objections against preparatory actions that the parties may have must be challenged jointly with the final act and not before. […] In the case before us, the questioned act, namely the initiation of the audit action through the request for accounting, financial, or commercial information from the plaintiff company, does not bear its own effect nor does it end the procedure, as it is motivated by the Tax Administration, based on the auditing powers conferred by law for compliance with the proper collection of the tax. On the other hand, although the plaintiff raises as its main argument the absence of INDER's legal authority or powers to request confidential and privileged information from the company, it has not managed to combat efficiently and satisfactorily INDER's position that sustains that its audit powers derive from the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios which authorizes it to request the company's accounting and commercial information. In this same sense, Official Letter No. IA-FT-03-2013 challenged here, visible in folio 56 to 61 of the file, bases the request for the plaintiff's financial information on articles 103, 128, and 171 of the indicated Code as they constitute legal obligations of taxpayers. Indeed, INDER constitutes a Tax Administration and, under the Law, exercises the functions of collection and audit of the assigned tax, which evidently allows it to open investigations or administrative procedures against all those obliged to pay the tax and to request information. In this regard, subsection 4 of article 128 of the Tax Code, regarding the supply of information, obliges the taxpayer - among other things - to facilitate the following: \"d. Present or exhibit, in the offices of the Tax Administration or before authorized officials, the financial, accounting, and any other type of records, related to events generating their tax obligations and formulate the applications or clarifications requested of them\". Based on the foregoing and within the parameters of the admissibility of the contentious-administrative claim, it is not verified that the list of documentation requested by INDER from the plaintiff company, visible in folio 58 of the judicial file, requests information alien or different from that established in the law for the control of the tax obligation and that makes the administrative request illegal in an evident and manifest manner. There is no demonstration from the plaintiff to that effect. The other arguments outlined by the representation of the plaintiff, referring to the alleged grounds for nullity of the act initiating the administrative procedure, must be raised eventually jointly when challenging the final act of the procedure, namely those related to the right to privacy, the limits of INDER's audit capacity, and the non-retroactive application of the law. Based on the foregoing, upon verifying that the claim raised is directed against an act not subject to challenge, as it is a mere preparatory act, namely the communication of the initiation of the audit verification with the request for information from the investigated party, the inadmissibility of the claim in all its terms is declared, under numerals 36 subsection c), 62 subsection 1) sub-subsection a) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, including claims 2 and 3 of the claim, considered accessory to the main one and premature, given that the file does not contain the existence of the administrative act that determines the tax payable nor the completion of the procedure.” Observe that the jurisdictional body addresses the issue of the competence or legal powers that Inder possesses to request financial information from the plaintiff, within the parameters of the admissibility of the claim. It mentions the inefficiency in combatting the arguments of the defendant subject, regarding the auditing powers granted by articles 103, 128, and 171 of the CNPT, as an element assessed to determine that official letter IA-FT-03-2013 is not an act with its own effect and, therefore, its challenge will be appropriate when the final act is jointly objected to.

**Appeal for substantive reasons** IV.- In the first ground for substantive reasons, the appellant alleges the defect configured in the cause provided for in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA. It recriminates erroneous interpretation of numeral 36, subsection c) of the CPCA and ordinal 163, subsection 2) of the Law of Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP). It comments that the challenged ruling fails to apply the recently cited norms and denies the admissibility of the claim. It asserts that the communication of the initiation of the audit actions has its own effect. It recounts that the Executing Judge forgets that by requesting information of a private and confidential nature, the constitutional right to the privacy of private information is circumvented, and, subsequently, articles 24 and 33 of the Magna Carta. It refutes that by applying Law no. 6735 retroactively and upholding the position that said official letter must be challenged jointly at the time of debating the final act of the procedure, it causes a harmful effect on the plaintiff company. It insists that the request for information by Inder is much more than a mere preparatory act, since in addition to requesting privileged documentation, it warns the plaintiff of the imminent fine in the event it refuses to provide the requested documents. Consequently, in its view, the claim is admissible. It argues violation of precepts 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and mandate 11 of the Magna Carta. Before the analysis of the charge, it is appropriate to allude to the norm indicated as infringed. According to what is stated by the plaintiff, the Processing Judge erroneously interpreted norm 36, subsection c) of the CPCA and numeral 163, subsection 2) of the LGAP. In this regard, it is worth noting that both mandates concern the effect of acts. Ordinal 36, subsection c) of the CPCA states: “ARTICLE 36.- The administrative claim will be admissible regarding the following: […] c) Administrative acts, whether final, definitive, or preparatory acts with their own effect. […] (The highlighting does not correspond to the original)” For its part, article 163, subsection 2) of the LGAP, notes: “Article 163.- […] 2. The defects inherent in preparatory acts shall be challenged jointly with the act, unless those are, in turn, acts with their own effect. […]” Now then, the act to which this effect is attributed is official letter IA-FT-03-2013 (folio 02 of the judicial file). Observe that the cited brief serves as communication of the initiation of audit verification and investigation actions, aimed at determining the tax corresponding to gaseous or carbonated beverages in a specific fiscal period (items 1 and 2 visible in folio 56 of the principal file). Likewise, it is the mechanism for requesting pertinent information to carry out the examination (Annex 1 – folios 58 of the judicial file). Finally, it is the means by which the plaintiff is warned that the refusal to provide the documentation required by the Tax Authority would constitute an infraction of resistance that would entail a possible economic sanction (section 6 visible in folio 57 of the judicial file). According to the foregoing, it is concluded that the challenged official letter serves as communication of an action to be carried out, requests information, and warns about possible consequences in case of failure to attend to what was requested, but it does not generate any effect on the sphere of the plaintiff company. Hence, the erroneous interpretation of the indicated norm is not discerned. Now then, concerning the violation of numerals 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and constitutional article 11, it is worth noting that the argued norm concerns the principle of legality, the competence of the official or entity to issue an act, and the validity of that act. In the case under exegesis, the defendant Institute, in its capacity as Tax Administrator (article 37 of Law no. 9036) and invested with the powers granted by the current legal system (ordinals 52, 103, 128, and 171, subsection 14 of the CNPT), issued official letter IA-FT-03-2013, which for this Chamber, does not have its own effect. Consequently, this Chamber considers that the transgression of the alleged regulations does not occur.

V.- In the second censure, the appellant invokes non-application of mandate 40 of Law no. 6735 and its regulation. It says that the challenged resolution infers that Inder's audit powers are unrestricted. It exposes that this assessment leads it to fail to apply what is established in article 40 of Law 6735 and its regulation. It points out that, according to the recently cited norm, the defendant Institute and its officials are empowered to exercise audit and control over the collection of the assigned taxes, as well as to intervene and ensure compliance with the legal norms that grant the economic resources. However, to carry out that task, it must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación Directa (hereinafter DGTD) and other public entities. It mentions that, unfortunately, the judging person, under the erroneous assumption that Law no. 7900 modified canon 99 of the CNPT and, tacitly, also ordinal 40 of Law no. 6735, validated the defendant's action. It adds that the Processing Judge also does not explain why her decision contradicts the provisions of constitutional ruling no. 112823-2001.

VI.- Prior to entering the analysis of the charge, for a better understanding of the scope of the norms cited in the preceding Wherefore, it is appropriate to review how they have been transformed over time. Law no. 6735 of March 29, 1982, reformed several articles of Law no. 5792 of September 1, 1975. Specifically, numeral 35 of Law no. 6735 reformed article 6 of Law 5792, which created a tax on the consumption of gaseous and carbonated beverages to be applied to the price of the article before sales tax. For its part, article 40 of the cited law indicates that IDA (current Inder) would have broad powers to exercise audit and control over the collection of the assigned taxes. Likewise, its officials could intervene at any time and in strict adherence to the legal norms that granted them economic resources. Subsequently, through Law no. 9036, which came into effect on November 29, 2012, Law no. 6735 was almost entirely repealed. However, canons 35 and 40 of the recently cited law were only reformed. Thus, articles 37 and 40 of the current norm, respectively, state: “ARTICLE 37.- In force regulations a) Article 35 of Law No. 6735 of March 29, 1982, is reformed. The text is as follows: \"Article 35.- Articles 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of Law No. 5792 of September 1, 1975, are reformed. The texts are as follows: […] Article 6.- A specific tax per unit of consumption is set for carbonated beverages of national and foreign brands, produced in the country or imported, of five point seven hundred twenty-five colones (¢5,725) in favor of Inder. In the case of micro and small businesses, whose annual production does not exceed sixteen million units of consumption, the tax that will apply per unit of consumption of two hundred fifty ml (250 ml) will be two point thirty-five colones (¢2.35). […] For these purposes, each manufacturer must provide Inder with a certification stipulating the theoretical yield in milliliters of finished beverage for each product that is commercialized. […] It is the responsibility of Inder to set and publish by means of a provision of general scope the referred update, within the fifteen days prior to each quarterly application period. […]” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original); and, \"Article 40.- Inder shall have broad powers to exercise audit and control over the collection of the various assigned taxes and may intervene at any time upon prior notification to the taxpayer, within the deadlines established in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, to ensure strict compliance with the legal norms that grant it economic resources. For the purpose of auditing the correct application of the taxes established in this law, Inder is empowered to review the accounting books and their annexes concerning those taxes. For this, the taxpayers must supply all the information that allows determining the nature and amount of the tax obligation, related to the taxes corresponding to Inder." Inder, in its capacity as Tax Administration, shall have the powers established in the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Regarding tax offenses, Inder shall have the powers established in Title III of said Code, with respect to administrative infractions and sanctions. When Inder, in the audit phase of the taxes it administers, becomes aware that a crime has been committed, it shall proceed to report it to the Public Prosecutor's Office. To comply with the provisions of this rule, it shall have the mandatory collaboration of the Directorate General of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación), the Directorate General of Customs (Dirección General de Aduanas), and other public entities." (Underlining is ours) Now, regarding precept 99 of the CNPT, the plaintiff states that it has not changed since 1971. She states that the only modification it underwent was the change of numbering from 99 to 105. However, upon reviewing the text of both mandates, this Court observes that the content of current Article 99 did vary. While it is true the numbering was shifted, the change arises from ordinal 3 of the Tax Justice Law (Ley de Justicia Tributaria) No. 7535 of August 1, 1995, which repealed the former content of canon 99 regarding the breach of formal duties and transferred the old content of precept 105 to that numbering. That is to say, Article 99 was indeed repealed in 1995 and its content replaced by what was found at that time in numeral 105. Therefore, the cassation appellant is not correct in stating that the rule has remained unchanged since 1971. However, it should be noted that both Article 99 and numeral 105 have been amended, but by ordinals 3 and 5 of the Tax Justice Law No. 7535, canon 1 of the Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management (Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria) No. Placa7893, and numeral 2 of the Law for Compliance with the Fiscal Transparency Standard (Ley para el Cumplimiento del Estándar de Transparencia Fiscal) No. 9068. Thus, the current Articles 99 and 105, respectively, state: "Article 99.- Concept and powers. Tax Administration is understood as the administrative body responsible for managing and auditing taxes, whether it is the tax authority (fisco) or other public entities that are active subjects, in accordance with Articles 11 and 14 of this Code. Said body may issue general rules for the purposes of the correct application of tax laws, within the limits set by the pertinent legal and regulatory provisions. The general rules shall be issued by general resolution and considered institutional criteria. They shall be of mandatory compliance in the issuance of all administrative acts, and acts contrary to such rules shall be null and void. In the case of the Tax Administration of the Ministry of Finance, when this Code grants a power or authority to the Directorate General of Taxation, it shall be understood that it is also applicable to the Directorate General of Customs, the Directorate General of Finance (Dirección General de Hacienda), and the Directorate General of the Fiscal Control Police (Dirección General de la Policía de Control Fiscal), within their areas of competence."; and, "Article 105.- Third-party information. Every person, natural or legal, public or private, shall be obliged to provide the Tax Administration with foreseeably relevant information for tax purposes, deduced from their economic, financial, and professional relationships with other persons. It shall be provided as the Administration indicates by means of regulation or individualized requirement. This requirement for information must be duly and expressly justified regarding its relevance in the tax sphere. [...]" (Underlining is not from the original) Continuing with the examination of what is alleged, it is necessary to refer to constitutional vote (voto constitucional) No. 12823-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In this regard, the proponent says the judge does not explain why, contrary to what was ordered in the ruling recently cited, she concludes that Inder possesses unrestricted tax audit powers (facultades irrestrictas de fiscalización tributaria). The aforementioned ruling hears the action of unconstitutionality against the Regulation for the Administration of Taxes of the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) (currently Inder). In said vote, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) concluded that when the IDA issued the cited regulation, it invaded the field of action of the Executive Branch. Therefore, it decreed the unconstitutionality of the regulation, but not of the tax on the consumption of soft drinks and carbonated beverages. It indicated that, as there was no specific rule authorizing the regulation of the control, verification, and audit procedures referred to in canon 40 of Law No. 6735 for the case of the taxes contained in Article 6 of Law No. 5792, these should be governed in light of the CNPT. Finally, it considered it unnecessary to refer to the particular aspects of the rules contained therein, as they were not of significance for the merits of the legal solution of the part. Based on the foregoing, the objection must be rejected.

VII.- In the case sub examine, the cassation appellant debates the unrestricted audit powers of Inder. In her opinion, the determination of the jurisdictional body is mistaken. She maintains that the defendant Institute does not have the power to require confidential documentation and impose sanctions. She points out that for those actions it needs the mandatory intervention of the DGTD and public entities. She bases her position on the lack of application of Article 40 of Law No. 6735 and its regulation, the incorrect interpretation of numeral 99 of the CNPT, and the lack of analysis of constitutional ruling (fallo constitucional) No. 1283-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In accordance with what was outlined in the preceding Considering (Considerando), canon 40 of Law No. 6735 was reformed by Law No. 9036 and the cited regulation was declared unconstitutional. Now, mandate 40 of Law No. 9036 expressly indicates that Inder has the status of Tax Administration. It refers that, in accordance with the CNPT, that category empowers it to exercise the audit and control of the collection of the various assigned taxes. It may intervene at any time with prior notification to the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo), within the deadlines established by the CNPT. Likewise, it may review the accounting books and their annexes regarding taxes. The law establishes that taxpayers must provide all information that allows determining the tax obligation, in the specific case, the consumption tax for carbonated beverages of national and foreign brands, produced in the country or imported. The cited regulatory body stipulates, furthermore, that when it becomes aware of the existence of a crime, it shall report it to the Public Prosecutor's Office, and to comply with the provisions, it shall have the mandatory collaboration of the Directorate General of Taxation, the Directorate General of Customs, and other public entities. To continue with the reasoning of the charge, it is unavoidable to specify the concept of mandatory collaboration. The principle of collaboration or cooperation refers to relationships of mutual assistance; that is, the action and effect of joint work between different bodies for the common achievement of their objectives. The fact that Inder has the mandatory collaboration of the Directorate General of Taxation, the Directorate General of Customs, and other public entities to enforce the tax obligation of the taxpayer does not eliminate its status as Tax Administration, nor does it exclude its power as auditor and controller of the collection of the assigned taxes, all granted by law. Regarding the requested documentation, the information is limited to that provided in Articles 103(b), 104, and 116 of the CNPT, so no illegitimate intrusion into the plaintiff company's confidentiality matters is discernible; in this regard, it is worth clarifying that the right to privacy is a highly personal right of human beings, which does not cover legal persons. In relation to the lack of application of Article 40 of Law No. 6735 and its regulation, it should be noted that the law was repealed and the canon reformed. However, the old article also granted broad powers to exercise audit and control over the collection of taxes. Regarding the regulation, it was declared unconstitutional by vote No. 12823-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In that ruling, the Constitutional Chamber determined that the IDA (now Inder) only had competence to issue service regulations (reglamentos de servicio), but not regulations for control, verification, and audit procedures referred to in Article 40 of Law No. 6735, for which reason it established, as a dimensioning of the scope of the action, that the defendant entity must make the request for tax requirements based on the provisions of the CNPT, as happened in the case under examination. Regarding numeral 99 of the CNPT, it should be noted that it was indeed modified by the Tax Justice Law No. 7535 of August 1, 1995. As of that date, that statement establishes that the Tax Administration is the administrative body responsible for managing and auditing taxes, whether it is the tax authority or other public entities that are active subjects (Articles 11 and 14 of the CNPT). As Inder has the status of Tax Administration and is an active subject, it is not discernible that the jurisdictional body made an incorrect interpretation of the mandate. Finally, as has been repeatedly mentioned, constitutional ruling No. 12823-2001 did not question the audit powers of the defendant Institute. What it did challenge was its competence to issue regulations for control, verification, and audit procedures. For that reason, it declared unconstitutional the Regulation for the Administration of Taxes of the Institute of Agrarian Development, approved by the Board of Directors in Article XVI of session 31-00, held on April 24, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 101 of May 26, 2000, and concluded that the requirements must be made in light of the provisions of the CNPT. Therefore, by issuing official letter (oficio) IA-FT-03-2013 in its capacity as Tax Administration and, in compliance with the rule provided in the CNPT, there is sufficient reason to consider that it acted within the framework of its legal competencies. Consequently, the rejection of the charge is appropriate.

VIII.- In the third reproach, the plaintiff argues violation of the erga omnes binding nature of the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2001-12823 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. She points out that, pursuant to Article 13 of the LJC and its amendments, the aforementioned vote should have been applied to the case of exegesis. She relates that the Constitutional Chamber determined in 2001 that the IDA (now Inder) was not authorized to regulate control and audit procedures, nor to have access to confidential documentation. Ordinal 13 of the LJC establishes the principle of erga omnes binding nature. It states that the jurisprudence and precedents of the Constitutional Chamber are binding erga omnes, except for itself. It indicates that its validity presupposes the existence of a constitutional principle that provides normative foundation. Therefore, it has a double constitutional foundation. Firstly, that provided in Article 42 of the Constitution (Carta Magna) which provides that the judge who issues a resolution cannot resolve its appeal or the extraordinary recourse that proceeds against it, no one can be tried more than once for the same punishable act (non bis in idem), closed criminal cases and trials decided with the authority of res judicata cannot be reopened, except when the appeal for review proceeds; and, secondly, the constitutional principle of legal regularity. For this reason, the resolutions issued by the Constitutional Chamber, both in their operative part and in their ratio decidendi, positively oblige all state organs and entities to comply with what was decided therein and absolutely prohibit the total or partial reproduction of the acts or provisions annulled by means of the same appealed Administration or any other administrative authority. The Chamber's resolutions are binding not only in their operative part but also in their ratio decidendi. As indicated in the previous Considering (Considerandos), in the cited constitutional ruling, the Chamber of Judges determined the lack of competence of Inder to regulate the control, verification, and audit procedures referred to in Article 40 of Law No. 6735 (reformed by Law No. 9036). For that reason, it declared the unconstitutionality of the Regulation for the Administration of Taxes of the Institute of Agrarian Development, approved by the Board of Directors in Article XVI of session 31-00, held on April 24, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 101 of May 26, 2000. However, contrary to what was outlined by the plaintiff, it concluded that the requirements must be made in light of the provisions of the CNPT. Observe that Considering (Considerando) IV expressly states: "IV.- The regulatory power of the IDA. Analysis on the merits. […] In the case of the taxes contained in Article 6 of Law No. 5792, reformed by Article 35 of Law No. 6735, there is no specific rule authorizing the regulation of the control, verification, and audit procedures referred to in Article 40 of Law No. 6735, as stated by the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), and this is the main reason for the IDA to have to construct them based on the provisions of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures and not its own Law, […] (Underlining is ours). Therefore, contrary to what the plaintiff stated, the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2001-12823 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001, in its recital part, according to what was set forth above, established that the IDA (now Inder) had to construct its requirements based on what is regulated in the CNPT. Consequently, by issuing official letter IA-FT-03-2013 in compliance with the provisions of the CNPT, the defendant acted within the parameters indicated in the recital part of the cited ruling, which results in a chain of events that is also binding. Hence, this Chamber considers that the defendant proceeded in accordance with the provisions of the constitutional vote and, consequently, the rejection of the defect follows.

IX.- By virtue of the reasons set forth, the rejection of the appeal filed is imposed, with its costs (costas) to be borne by the party who filed it (Article 150(3) of the CPCA).

POR TANTO

The appeal filed is declared without merit (sin lugar), with its costs to be borne by the plaintiff.

Nombre45162 Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales Nombre165177 Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, electronic mail ...36 She added that, not being clear on the scope of the audit and, considering that, according to what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber in vote no. 12823-2001 at 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001, Inder lacked legal competence to request the recently cited information; she requested reconsideration of the intended tax audit. She related that, through resolution no. 006-2014 of 2:00 p.m. on January 29, 2014, the Administrative and Financial Director of Inder rejected the request and set a new date for the first coordination meeting to begin the proceedings. She cited that, disagreeing with what was resolved, she filed an appeal. Likewise, on February 4, 2014, she requested that the statute of limitations for the intended taxes be declared. Based on article 349 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the defendant forwarded the file to the Executive President, so that, in his capacity as Tax Administrator, he could hear the appeal (resolution no. 007-2014 of 10:00 a.m. on February 12, 2014). The executive president, in resolution no. 008-2014 of 10:30 a.m. on February 13, 2014, rejected the appeal as inadmissible and, through resolution no. 009-2014 of 12:00 p.m. on February 13, 2014, reserved consideration of the invoked statute of limitations for the appropriate procedural moment. She noted that, in official letter no. FT-012-2014, Inder indicated the new date for the audit team's visit. She requested that the judgment declare: "1.- Null and void and without any legal effect or value, the administrative acts issued by INDER in violation of the Constitution, the law, and applicable regulatory norms, which are the requests for privileged and confidential information with which INDER initiated its audit process, and others that are irrelevant for the purposes of the audit tasks that the law entrusts. In particular, I REQUEST the annulment of the following acts: the communication of initiation of audit action document No. IA-FT-03-2013, Resolution No. 006-2014 of 2:00 p.m. on (sic) January 29, 2014, Resolutions NO. 007-2014 of 10:00 a.m. on February 12, 2014, No. 008-2014 of 10:30 a.m. on (sic) February 13, 2014, No. 009-2014 of 12:00 p.m. on (sic) February 13, 2014, and Official Letter No. FT-012-2014 of (sic) April 3, 2014. 2. That regarding the tax created by LEY No. 6735 before its reform by LEY No. 9036, INDER (formerly IDA) does not have the authority to access taxpayers' private information, nor to have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación in compliance with the Regulations for said Law, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31156. 3. That the taxes in favor of IDA (now INDER) for the period from January 2009 to October 2010 are time-barred (prescritos). 4. That INDER be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding." The defendant Institute responded as per folios 184 to 233. It raised the preliminary defense of an act not subject to challenge and the exception of lack of right. The Procedural Judge (Jueza Tramitadora), in resolution no. 96-2015 of 11:00 a.m. on January 15, 2015, declared the inadmissibility of the lawsuit in all its aspects and ordered the plaintiff company to pay both costs of the proceeding. Disagreeing, the plaintiff appeals in cassation.

II.- In the case at hand, the appellant on cassation alleges one grievance of a procedural nature and three grounds for substantive reasons. In the sole procedural complaint, the petitioner reproaches a violation of procedural norms whose non-observance is sanctioned with absolute nullity. She relates that the Procedural Judge exceeded the powers granted by canon 92 paragraph 6) in conjunction with 66 subsection g) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (hereinafter CPCA). She states that the challenged resolution prejudged the merits of the matter at a preliminary stage, thus transgressing due process and the provisions of canon 96 ibidem. She refers to article 92 subsection 7) of the Code of Procedure. In the first censure, she invokes erroneous interpretation of numeral 36 subsection c) of the CPCA and ordinal 163 subsection 2) of the Ley de la Administración Pública (hereinafter LGAP). The appellant points out that, in accordance with article 36 subsection c) of the CPCA, a proceeding filed against a procedural administrative act with its own effect (acto de trámite con efecto propio) is admissible. On the other hand, precept 163 subsection 2) of the LGAP, states: "Artículo 163.- […] 2. Defects pertaining to preparatory acts shall be challenged jointly with the act, unless those are, in turn, acts with their own effect. […]" She affirms that the resolution disregarded those norms, since it denied the admissibility of the lawsuit, even though what was challenged consisted of a preparatory act with its own effect. She contends that the communication of the initiation of audit actions, by requiring the disclosure of private and confidential information, as well as retroactively applying Ley no. 6735, violates constitutional canons 24 and 33. Therefore, by negatively affecting the sphere of rights of the plaintiff company, they possess their own effect. In her view, the Court errs in classifying official letter IA-FT-03-2003 as a simple preparatory act for the audit procedure regulated in tax regulations. She says the debated resolution is null for lack of reasoning. She asserts that it does not explain the reasons why it concludes that the constitutional rights to privacy and against retroactive application of the law are not overlooked. Instead, it merely indicates that these are aspects that must be alleged jointly when refuting the final act of the procedure. She warns that the appealed vote, on one hand, prevented the presentation of an evident case of legal and unconstitutional violations; and, on the other hand, allowed access to privileged information, within a range of periods not authorized by law. She states that the requirement made by Inder not only constitutes an order for information, but is also a warning of the imposition of a fine in the event the instruction is not obeyed (article 82 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios - hereinafter CNPT). She reiterates that the requested information is privileged in nature. For that reason, supplying it would disturb her constitutional right to the privacy of private information. Therefore, she says, the challenged judgment produces harmful effects on the plaintiff's rights. Consequently, contrary to what was ordered by the jurisdictional body, she considers that the procedural act does indeed have its own effect and, therefore, the lawsuit is admissible. She refers to numerals 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and canon 11 of the Magna Carta. In the second violation, she accuses the non-application of article 40 of Ley no. 6735 and its regulations. The petitioner indicates that the ruling is based on the premise that the defendant Institute's audit powers are unrestricted. Hence, it disregards the provisions of ordinal 40 of Ley 6735 and its regulations. She notes, according to the recently cited article, the former IDA (now Inder) has the power to exercise audit and control over the collection of the various assigned tributes. Furthermore, its officials are authorized to intervene at any time and ensure compliance with the legal norms that grant economic resources. However, it expressly indicates that, for these purposes, it must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de la Tributación Directa and other public entities. Notwithstanding the above, she indicates that the challenged resolution, without major analysis, recognizes the arguments outlined by Inder in the response to the lawsuit and accepts as true the modification of ordinal 99 of the CNPT and, consequently, of article 40 of Ley 6735. Moreover, based on the tax norm cited above, it grants the defendant the status of Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) and, consequently, grants it unrestricted powers. This, without explaining why judgment no. 112823-2001 issued by the Constitutional Chamber considered that no norm granted autonomous tax audit powers to Inder, as well as what was expressed in that resolution regarding constitutional ordinal 24. Therefore, she insists, the defendant does not possess unrestricted audit powers. In the third defect, she argues a violation of the erga omnes binding nature of Constitutional Chamber judgment no. 2001-12823 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. The appellant on cassation alleges violation of constitutional rights and principles. She narrates that numeral 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional and its reforms establishes the erga omnes binding nature. She asserts that the appealed judgment disregarded what was ordered by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment no. 2001-12823, thus violating the aforementioned principle. This being the case, in her judgment, since 2001, IDA (now Inder) was not authorized to regulate control and audit procedures. Nor was it authorized to, based on general norms of the CNPT, access documents whose confidentiality is constitutionally guaranteed.

Appeal on procedural grounds III.- In the sole procedural grievance, if what was argued by the appellant on cassation in Considerando II were true, one would be in the presence of the grounds provided for in subsection h) of article 137 of the CPCA. The plaintiff affirms that the judge exceeded the powers granted by article 92 paragraph 6) in conjunction with ordinal 66 subsection g) of the CPCA. She points out that the judge, being in a preliminary stage, decided on aspects related to Inder's power as Tax Administration, exceeding her powers granted by law. She mentions that by issuing such criteria, she not only prejudged the merits of the matter but also transgressed what is established in norm 96 ibidem. It should be noted that the plaintiff accuses an anticipation of criteria regarding Inder's competence in matters of Tax Administration. She says the jurisdictional body errs in concluding that the defendant Institute possessed broad and unrestricted audit powers. She refers that the preliminary defense alleged by the defendant required an analysis of the merits that should not have been addressed by the judge at the preliminary hearing. In her judgment, the invoked defense should have been dismissed, for its subsequent analysis when the Trial Court heard the merits. Consequently, she considers cardinal 96 of the Code of Procedure to be overlooked. According to what was expressed by the petitioner, the preliminary defense invoked by the defendant should have been reserved for the analysis of the merits. In this regard, it should be noted that the defense raised is the one corresponding to subsection g) of article 66 of the CPCA. That norm literally states: "ARTÍCULO 66.- 1) In the response to the lawsuit or counterclaim, all substantive exceptions may be alleged, as well as the following preliminary defenses: […] g) That the claim is brought against any of the acts not subject to challenge. […] 2) In the case of subsection a), the procedural judge shall proceed in accordance with article 5 of this same Code; in the other cases, the resolution shall be reserved for the preliminary hearing, referred to in chapter VI of title V of this Code." (The underlining is ours) From the transcribed text, it can be glimpsed that, contrary to what the appellant indicates, the appropriate procedural moment to debate and resolve the raised defense is during the preliminary hearing. Additionally, she suggests an anticipation of criteria regarding the merits. In view of the challenged resolution, the Procedural Judge in Considerando II, states: "II.- SPECIFIC CASE: From the reading of the claims and the factual framework supporting the lawsuit, it is evident that the plaintiff is seeking the nullity of the initiation of the audit action, that is, the order to open the administrative procedure for tax determination processed by INDER under No. IA-FT-03-2013. […] On the other hand, any challenges against procedural actions that the parties may have must be challenged jointly with the final act and not before. […] In the case before us, the challenged act, that is, the initiation of the audit action through the request for accounting, financial, or commercial information from the plaintiff company, does not have its own effect nor does it terminate the procedure, as it is motivated by the Tax Administration, based on the audit powers conferred by law for the proper collection of the tax. On the other hand, although the plaintiff raises as her main argument the lack of legal competence or powers of INDER to request confidential and privileged information from the company, she has not managed to effectively and satisfactorily counter INDER's position, which maintains that its audit powers derive from the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, authorizing it to request the company's accounting and commercial information. In this same sense, the Official Letter No. IA-FT-03-2013 challenged here, visible at folio 56 to 61 of the case file, bases the request for the plaintiff's financial information on articles 103, 128, and 171 of the indicated Code, as these constitute legal obligations of taxpayers. Indeed, INDER constitutes a Tax Administration and, under the protection of the Law, exercises the functions of collection and audit of the assigned tax, which evidently allows it to open investigations or administrative procedures against all those obliged to pay the tribute and to request information. In this regard, subsection 4 of article 128 of the Tax Code, regarding the supply of information, obligates the taxpayer - among others - to facilitate the following: 'd. Present or exhibit, in the offices of the Tax Administration or before authorized officials, the financial, accounting, and any other type of records related to events generating their tax obligations and make the applications or clarifications requested of them.' Based on the foregoing and within the parameters of the admissibility of the contentious-administrative lawsuit, it is not verified that the list of documentation requested by INDER from the plaintiff company, visible at folio 58 of the judicial file, requests information foreign to or different from what is established in the law for the control of the tax obligation and that would make the administrative request clearly and manifestly illegal. There is no demonstration by the plaintiff in that regard. The other arguments outlined by the plaintiff's representation, referring to the alleged nullity defects of the act initiating the administrative procedure, must eventually be raised jointly when challenging the final act of the procedure, that is, matters relating to the right to privacy, the limits of INDER's audit capacity, and the non-retroactive application of the law. By reason of the foregoing, upon verifying that the claim brought is directed against an act not subject to challenge, as it is a mere procedural act, that is, the communication of the initiation of the audit update with the request for information from the investigated party, the inadmissibility of the lawsuit filed in all its aspects is declared, under the protection of numerals 36 subsection c), 62 subsection 1) sub-subsection a) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, including claims 2 and 3 of the lawsuit, considering them accessory to the main claim and premature, given that the case file does not contain evidence of the existence of the administrative act determining the tax to be paid or the conclusion of the procedure." It can be seen that the jurisdictional body addresses the issue of the competence or legal powers that Inder possesses to request financial information from the plaintiff, within the parameters of the admissibility of the lawsuit. It mentions the ineffectiveness of the counterarguments against the defendant's position, regarding the audit powers granted by articles 103, 128, and 171 of the CNPT, as an element considered in determining that official letter IA-FT-03-2013 is not an act with its own effect and, therefore, its challenge shall proceed when the final act is jointly contested.

Appeal on substantive grounds IV.- In the first ground for substantive reasons, the appellant alleges the defect configured in the grounds provided for in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA. She reproaches an erroneous interpretation of numeral 36 subsection c) of the CPCA and ordinal 163 subsection 2) of the Ley de la Administración Pública (hereinafter LGAP). She comments that the challenged judgment fails to apply the recently cited norms and denies the admissibility of the lawsuit. She asserts that the communication of the initiation of the audit actions has its own effect. She relates that the Enforcement Judge forgets that by requesting private and confidential information, the constitutional right to the privacy of private information is overlooked, and, subsequently, articles 24 and 33 of the Magna Carta. She refutes that by retroactively applying Ley no. 6735 and holding the position that the cited official letter must be challenged jointly when debating the final act of the procedure, it causes a harmful effect on the plaintiff company. She insists that the request for information by Inder is much more than a mere procedural act, since in addition to requesting privileged documentation, it warns the plaintiff of the imminent fine in the event of refusal to provide the requested documents. Consequently, in her judgment, the lawsuit is admissible. She argues a violation of precepts 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and mandate 11 of the Magna Carta. Before analyzing the charge, it is appropriate to refer to the norm indicated as violated. According to what was stated by the plaintiff, the Procedural Judge misinterpreted norm 36 subsection c) of the CPCA and numeral 163 subsection 2) of the LGAP. In this regard, it should be noted that both mandates deal with the effect of acts. Ordinal 36 subsection c) of the CPCA states: "ARTÍCULO 36.- The administrative claim shall be admissible regarding the following: […] c) Administrative acts, whether final, definitive, or procedural with their own effect. […] (The highlighting is not in the original)" For its part, article 163 subsection 2) of the LGAP notes: "Artículo 163.- […] 2. Defects pertaining to preparatory acts shall be challenged jointly with the act, unless those are, in turn, acts with their own effect. […]" Now then, the act to which that effect is attributed is official letter IA-FT-03-2013 (folio 02 of the judicial file). It is observed that the cited memorandum serves as a communication of the initiation of the audit actions of verification and investigation, directed at determining the tax corresponding to gaseous or carbonated beverages in a specific fiscal period (items 1 and 2 visible at folio 56 of the main file). Likewise, it is the mechanism for requesting pertinent information to carry out the examination (Anexo 1 – folios 58 of the judicial file). Finally, it is the means by which the plaintiff is warned that failure to provide the documentation required by the Tax Authority would constitute an infraction of resistance that would entail a possible economic sanction (section 6 visible at folio 57 of the judicial file). Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the challenged official letter serves as a communication of an action to be performed, requests information, and warns about possible consequences for failure to comply with the request, but does not generate any effect on the plaintiff company's sphere. Hence, an erroneous interpretation of the indicated norm is not discernible. Now, regarding the violation of numerals 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and constitutional article 11, it should be noted that the argued norm deals with the principle of legality, the competence of the official or entity to issue an act, and the validity of that act. In the case under analysis, the defendant Institute, in its condition as Tax Administrator (article 37 of Ley no. 9036) and vested with the powers granted by the current legal system (ordinals 52, 103, 128, and 171 subsection 14 of the CNPT), issued official letter IA-FT-03-2013, which, for this Chamber, does not have its own effect. Consequently, this Chamber considers that the transgression of the alleged regulations does not occur.

V.- In the second censure, the petitioner invokes the non-application of mandate 40 of Ley no. 6735 and its regulations. She says the challenged resolution infers that Inder's audit powers are unrestricted. She explains that this estimation leads it to disregard the provisions of article 40 of Ley 6735 and its regulations. She points out that, according to the recently cited norm, the defendant Institute and its officials are empowered to exercise audit and control over the collection of the assigned tributes, as well as to intervene and ensure compliance with the legal norms granting economic resources. However, to carry out this task, it must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación Directa (hereinafter DGTD) and other public entities. She mentions that, unfortunately, the judge, under the erroneous assumption that Ley no. 7900 modified canon 99 of the CNPT and, tacitly, also ordinal 40 of Ley no. 6735, validated the defendant's action.

She adds that the Processing Judge also fails to explain why her decision contravenes the provisions of constitutional ruling no. 112823-2001.

**VI.-** Before proceeding to analyze the charge, for a better understanding of the scope of the rules cited in the preceding Considerando, it is worth reviewing how they have been transformed over time. Law no. 6735 of March 29, 1982, reformed several articles of Law no. 5792 of September 1, 1975. Specifically, numeral 35 of Law no. 6735 reformed Article 6 of Law 5792, which created a tax on the consumption of soft drinks and carbonated beverages to be applied to the price of the article before the sales tax. For its part, Article 40 of the cited law states that the IDA (now Inder) would have broad powers to exercise oversight and control over the collection of the assigned taxes. Likewise, its officials could intervene at any time and in strict compliance with the legal norms granting them economic resources. Subsequently, through Law no. 9036, which took effect on November 29, 2012, Law no. 6735 was almost entirely repealed. However, canons 35 and 40 of the recently cited law were only reformed. Thus, Articles 37 and 40 of the current norm, respectively, state: *“***ARTÍCULO 37.-** **Current regulations a)** *Reforms Article 35 of Law No. 6735, of March 29, 1982. The text is as follows:* **"Artículo 35.-** *Reforms Articles 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of Law No. 5792, of September 1, 1975. The texts are as follows:* […] **Artículo 6.-** *A specific consumption unit tax is established for carbonated beverages of national and foreign brands, produced in the country or imported, of five point seven hundred twenty-five colones (¢5,725) in favor of Inder. In the case of micro and small businesses, whose annual production does not exceed sixteen million consumption units, the tax that shall apply per consumption unit of two hundred fifty ml (250 ml) shall be two point thirty-five colones (¢2.35).* […] *For these purposes, each manufacturer must provide Inder with a certification stipulating the theoretical yield in milliliters of finished beverage for each product marketed.* […] *It corresponds to Inder to set and publish the referred update through a provision of general scope, within the fifteen days prior to each quarterly application period.* […]” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original); and, **"Artículo 40.-** *Inder shall have broad powers to exercise oversight and control over the collection of the various assigned taxes and may intervene at any time upon prior notification to the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo), within the deadlines established in the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures, to ensure strict compliance with the legal norms that grant it economic resources. For the purpose of overseeing the correct application of the taxes established in this law, Inder is empowered to review the accounting books and their annexes regarding those taxes. For this purpose, taxpayers must provide all information that permits determining the nature and amount of the tax obligation, related to the taxes corresponding to Inder. Inder, in its capacity as Tax Administration, shall have the powers established in the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures. Regarding tax offenses, Inder shall have the powers established in Title III of said Code, with respect to administrative infractions and sanctions. When Inder, during the oversight phase of the taxes it administers, becomes aware that a crime has been committed, it shall proceed to report it to the Public Ministry. To comply with the provisions of this norm, it shall have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación, the Dirección General de Aduanas, and other public entities."* (The underlining is ours). Now, regarding precept 99 of the CNPT, the plaintiff claims it has not varied since 1971. She states that the only modification it underwent was the change in numbering from 99 to 105. However, upon reviewing the text of both mandates, this Tribunal observes that the content of the current Article 99 did vary. While it is true that the numbering was shifted, the change arises from ordinal 3 of the Tax Justice Law no. 7535 of August 1, 1995, which repealed the previous content of canon 99 regarding non-compliance with formal duties and transferred the old content of precept 105 to that numbering. That is, Article 99 was indeed repealed in 1995, and its content replaced by that which was found at that time in cardinal 105. Therefore, the appellant is not correct regarding the norm having remained unaltered since 1971. However, it should be noted that both Article 99 and numeral 105 have been modified, but by ordinals 3 and 5 of the Tax Justice Law no. 7535, canon 1 of the Tax Management Strengthening Law no. Placa7893, and numeral 2 of the Law for Compliance with the Fiscal Transparency Standard no. 9068. Thus, the current Articles 99 and 105, respectively, state: *“***Artículo 99.- Concept and powers** *Tax Administration is understood to mean the administrative body responsible for managing and overseeing taxes, whether pertaining to the treasury or other public entities that are active subjects (sujetos activos), pursuant to Articles 11 and 14 of this Code. Said body may issue general rules for the purposes of the correct application of tax laws, within the limits established by the pertinent legal and regulatory provisions. General rules shall be issued by general resolution and considered institutional criteria. They shall be mandatory in the issuance of all administrative acts, and acts contrary to such rules shall be null and void. In the case of the Tax Administration of the Ministry of Finance, when this Code grants a power or authority to the Dirección General de Tributación, it shall be understood that it is also applicable to the Dirección General de Aduanas, the Dirección General de Hacienda, and the Dirección General de la Policía de Control Fiscal, within their areas of competence.”*; and, *“***Artículo 105.- Information from third parties.** *Every person, natural or legal, public or private, shall be obligated to provide the Tax Administration with information foreseeably pertinent for tax purposes, deduced from their economic, financial, and professional relationships with other persons. This information shall be provided as the Administration indicates through regulation or individualized request.* This request for information must be duly and expressly justified regarding its relevance in the tax sphere. […]” (The underlining is not in the original). Continuing with the examination of the arguments, it is necessary to refer to constitutional ruling no. 12823-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In this regard, the plaintiff says the judge does not explain why, contrary to the provisions of the recently cited ruling, she concludes that Inder possesses unrestricted tax oversight powers. The referenced ruling addresses the action of unconstitutionality against the Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (currently Inder). In said ruling, the Constitutional Chamber concluded that when the IDA issued the cited regulation it invaded the sphere of action of the Executive Branch. Therefore, it decreed the unconstitutionality of the regulation, but not of the tax on the consumption of soft drinks and carbonated beverages. It indicated that, as there is no specific norm authorizing the regulation of the control, verification, and oversight procedures referred to in canon 40 of Law no. 6735 for the case of the taxes contained in Article 6 of Law no. 5792, these should be governed in light of the CNPT. Finally, it considered it unnecessary to refer to the particular aspects of the norms contained therein, as it is not of significance for the substance of the legal solution of the case. For the foregoing reasons, the objection must be rejected.

**VII.-** In the case sub examine, the appellant disputes the unrestricted oversight powers of Inder. In her judgment, the jurisdictional body's determination is erroneous. She argues that the defendant Institute has no power to request confidential documentation and impose sanctions. She points out that for those actions it requires the mandatory intervention of the DGTD and public entities. She bases her position on the failure to apply Article 40 of Law no. 6735 and its regulation, the incorrect interpretation of numeral 99 of the CNPT, and the lack of analysis of constitutional ruling no. 1283-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In accordance with what was outlined in the previous Considerando, canon 40 of Law no. 6735 was reformed by Law no. 9036 and the cited regulation was declared unconstitutional. Now, mandate 40 of Law no. 9036 expressly indicates that Inder has the status of Tax Administration. It states that, in accordance with the CNPT, this category empowers it to exercise oversight and control over the collection of the various assigned taxes. It may intervene at any time upon prior notification to the taxpayer, within the deadlines established by the CNPT. Likewise, it may review the accounting books and their annexes with respect to the taxes. The law establishes that taxpayers must provide all information that permits determining the tax obligation, in the specific case, the consumption tax for carbonated beverages of national and foreign brands, produced in the country or imported. The cited body of law also stipulates that when it becomes aware of the existence of a crime, it shall report it to the Public Ministry and, to comply with the provisions, it shall have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación, the Dirección General de Aduanas, and other public entities. To continue with the reasoning of the charge, it is unavoidable to define the concept of mandatory collaboration. The principle of collaboration or cooperation refers to relationships of mutual aid; that is, the action and effect of joint work between distinct bodies for the common achievement of their objectives. The fact that Inder counts on the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación, the Dirección General de Aduanas, and other public entities to enforce the tax obligation of the taxpayer does not eliminate its status as Tax Administration, nor does it exclude its power as overseer and controller of the collection of the assigned taxes, all granted by law. Regarding the requested documentation, the information is limited to that provided in Articles 103 subsection b), 104, and 116 of the CNPT, so no illegitimate intrusion into matters of confidentiality of the plaintiff company is noted; in this regard, it is worth clarifying that the right to privacy is a personal right of human beings, which does not cover legal entities. In relation to the failure to apply Article 40 of Law no. 6735 and its regulation, it must be indicated that the law was repealed and the canon reformed. However, the old article also granted broad powers to exercise oversight and control over the collection of taxes. Regarding the regulation, it was declared unconstitutional through ruling no. 12823-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In that ruling, the Constitutional Chamber determined that the IDA (now Inder) only had jurisdiction to issue service regulations, not control, verification, and oversight procedures regulations to which Article 40 of Law no. 6735 referred. It therefore established, as a dimensioning of the scope of the action, that the defendant entity must make tax requests based on the provisions of the CNPT, just as occurred in the case under review. Regarding numeral 99 of the CNPT, it must be noted that it was indeed modified by the Tax Justice Law no. 7535 of August 1, 1995. As of that date, this text establishes that the Tax Administration is the administrative body responsible for managing and overseeing taxes, whether pertaining to the treasury or other public entities that are active subjects (Articles 11 and 14 of the CNPT). As Inder has the status of Tax Administration and is an active subject, it is not discerned that the jurisdictional body made an incorrect interpretation of the mandate. Finally, as has been repeatedly mentioned, constitutional ruling no. 12823-2001 did not question the oversight powers of the defendant Institute. What it did debate was its jurisdiction to issue regulations on control, verification, and oversight procedures. For that reason, it declared unconstitutional the Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, approved by the Board of Directors in Article XVI of session 31-00, held on April 24, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 101 on May 26, 2000, and concluded that requests must be made in light of the provisions of the CNPT. Therefore, by issuing official communication IA-FT-03-2013 in its capacity as Tax Administration and in compliance with the norms provided in the CNPT, there is sufficient reason to determine that it acted within the framework of its legal powers. Consequently, the rejection of the charge is proper.

**VIII.-** In the **third** objection, the claimant argues a violation of the erga omnes binding nature of Constitutional Chamber ruling no. 2001-12823 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. She points out that, in accordance with Article 13 of the LJC and its reforms, the aforementioned ruling should have been applied to the case at hand. She relates that, since 2001, the Constitutional Chamber determined that the IDA (now Inder) was not authorized to regulate control and oversight procedures, nor to access confidential documentation. Ordinal 13 of the LJC establishes the principle of erga omnes binding nature. She states that the jurisprudence and precedents of the Constitutional Chamber are binding upon all, except for itself. She indicates that its validity presupposes the existence of a constitutional principle granting it normative foundation. Therefore, it has a dual constitutional foundation. Firstly, that provided in Article 42 of the Constitution, which states that the judge issuing a resolution cannot rule on its own appeal or the extraordinary appeal filed against it, no one can be tried more than once for the same punishable act (non bis in idem), closed criminal cases and trials decided with the authority of res judicata cannot be reopened, except when the appeal for review is proper. And secondly, the constitutional principle of juridical regularity. Therefore, the resolutions issued by the Constitutional Chamber, both in their operative part and in their ratio decidendi, positively obligate all state bodies and entities to comply with what was decided there, and absolutely prohibit the total or partial reproduction of the acts or provisions annulled by means of the same appealed Administration or any other administrative authority. The Chamber's resolutions are binding not only in their operative part but also in their ratio decidendi. As has been indicated in previous Considerandos, in the cited constitutional ruling, the Chamber of Judges determined the lack of jurisdiction of Inder to regulate the control, verification, and oversight procedures referred to in Article 40 of Law no. 6735 (reformed by Law no. 9036). For that reason, it declared the unconstitutionality of the Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, approved by the Board of Directors in Article XVI of session 31-00, held on April 24, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 101 on May 26, 2000. However, contrary to what was outlined by the plaintiff, it concluded that requests must be made in light of the provisions of the CNPT. It should be observed that Considerando IV expressly states: “***IV.- The regulatory power of the IDA. Analysis on the merits.** *[...] In the case of the taxes contained in Article 6 of Law No. 5792, reformed by Article 35 of Law No. 6735, there is no specific norm that authorizes the regulation of the control, verification, and oversight procedures referred to in Article 40 of Law No. 6735, as the Attorney General's Office states, and this is the main reason why the IDA must base its approach on the provisions of the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures and not on its own Law,* […] (The underlining is ours). Therefore, contrary to what was expressed by the plaintiff, ruling no. 2001-12823 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001, by the Constitutional Chamber, in its recitals, according to what was set forth above, established that the IDA (now Inder) must base its requests on what is regulated in the CNPT. Consequently, by issuing official communication IA-FT-03-2013 in compliance with the provisions of the CNPT, the defendant acted within the parameters indicated in the recitals of the said ruling, which results in a consequence that is also binding.

Hence, this Chamber considers that the defendant proceeded in accordance with the constitutional ruling and, consequently, the alleged defect must be rejected.

**IX.-** Based on the reasons stated, the appeal filed must be dismissed, with costs to be borne by the party who filed it (Article 150, subsection 3 of the CPCA).

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed is declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the plaintiff.

**Nombre45162** **Román Solís Zelaya** **Rocío Rojas Morales** Nombre165177 Consequently, the rejection of the claim is appropriate.

Res. 00143-F-TC-2018 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL FINANCE COURT OF APPEAL. San José, at ten o'clock on October eighteenth, two thousand eighteen. Process of cognizance established in the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Finance Court by **COCA COLA FEMSA DE COSTA RICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (FEMSA),** represented by its limited general attorney-in-fact Nombre168028, lawyer, resident of Heredia; against the **INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER)**, represented by its general judicial attorney-in-fact Rosa Eugenia Miranda Villalobos, single. Acting as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff Nombre23181, Nombre21075 and Nombre19955. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, lawyers, and residents of San José.

**WHEREAS** **1.-** Based on the facts stated and legal provisions cited, the plaintiff established a process of cognizance, so that in judgment it be declared: “*1.- Null and void and without any legal effect or value, the administrative acts issued by INDER in violation of the Constitution, the law, and applicable regulatory norms, which are the requests for privileged and confidential information with which INDER initiated its audit process, and others that are impertinent for the purposes of the audit tasks entrusted to it by law. In particular, I REQUEST the annulment of the following acts: the communication of initiation of audit action document No. IA-FT-03-2013, Resolution No. 006-2014 of 14:00 hours on January 29, 2014, Resolutions No. 007-2014 of 10:00 hours on February 12, 2014, No. 008-2014 of 10:30 hours on February 13, 2014, No. 009-2014 of 12:00 hours on February 13, 2014, and Official Letter No. FT-012-2014 of April 3, 2014. 2.- That regarding the tax created by Law No. 6735 before its reform by Law No. 9036, INDER (formerly IDA) does not have the authority to access taxpayers' private information, and must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación in compliance with the Regulation to said Law, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31156. 3.- Declared prescribed the taxes in favor of IDA (now INDER) for the period from January 2009 to October 2010. 4.- That INDER be ordered to pay both costs of this process.”* **2.-** The defendant institute answered negatively and raised the preliminary defense of act not susceptible to challenge and the exception of lack of right.

**3.-** At 09:00 hours on January 15, 2015, the preliminary hearing was held, attended by the representatives of both parties.

**4.-** The processing judge Judith Reyes Castillo, in judgment no. 96-2015 of 11:00 hours on January 15, 2015; resolved: *“the inadmissibility of the claim is declared in all its aspects, both costs of the process are imposed on the plaintiff, once this resolution is final, proceed to archive the case file. An appeal is available against this resolution in the form and terms established by the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.”* **5.-** The representative of the plaintiff files a cassation appeal.

**6.-** In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

**Drafted by Judge Rojas Morales** **CONSIDERING** **I.-** Coca Cola Femsa de Costa Rica sued the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (in future references Inder). In its statement of claim, it indicated that, through official letter IA-FT-03-2003 dated December 16, 2003, the defendant Institute communicated the initiation of audit (fiscalización) actions for verification and investigation of the period from January 2009 to November 29, 2012. It narrated that, in said brief, the defendant requested private information, confidential data, and documents with restricted access, some of them, in its judgment, impertinent for the investigation of the tax granted in its favor through Law no. 6735 (currently repealed). It added that, not being clear on the scope of the audit and, considering, according to what was resolved by the Sala Constitucional in vote no. 12823-2001 at 10 hours 34 minutes on December 14, 2001, that Inder lacked legal competence to request the recently cited information, it requested the reconsideration of the intended tax audit. It related that, through resolution no. 006-2014 of 14:00 hours on January 29, 2014, the Administrative and Financial Director of Inder rejected the petition and set a new date for the first coordination meeting for the initiation of actions. It cited that, disagreeing with the resolution, it filed an appeal. Likewise, on February 4, 2014, it requested that the prescription of the intended taxes be declared. Based on article 349 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the defendant forwarded the file to the Executive President, so that in his capacity as Tax Administrator, he could hear the appeal (resolution no. 007-2014 of 10:00 hours on February 12, 2014). The executive president, in resolution no. 008-2014 of 10:30 hours on February 13, 2014, rejected the appeal as inadmissible, and through resolution no. 009-2014 of 12:00 hours on February 13, 2014, reserved the knowledge of the statute of limitations (prescripción) plea for the appropriate procedural moment. It noted, in official letter no. FT-012-2014, Inder indicated the new date for the visit of the audit team. It requested that the judgment declare: *“1.- Null and void and without any legal effect or value, the administrative acts issued by INDER in violation of the Constitution, the law, and applicable regulatory norms, which are the requests for privileged and confidential information with which INDER initiated its audit process, and others that are impertinent for the purposes of the audit tasks entrusted to it by law. In particular, I REQUEST the annulment of the following acts: the communication of initiation of audit action document No. IA-FT-03-2013, Resolution No. 006-2014 of 14:00 hours on (sic) January 29, 2014, Resolutions No. 007-2014 of 10:00 hours on February 12, 2014, No. 008-2014 of 10:30 hours on (sic) February 13, 2014, No. 009-2014 of 12:00 hours on (sic) February 13, 2014 and Official Letter No. FT-012-2014 of (sic) April 3, 2014. 2. That regarding the tax created by Law No. 6735 before its reform by Law No. 9036, INDER (formerly IDA) does not have the authority to access taxpayers' private information, and must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación in compliance with the Regulation to said Law, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31156. 3. Declared prescribed the taxes in favor of IDA (now INDER) for the period from January 2009 to October 2010. 4. That INDER be ordered to pay both costs of this process.”* The defendant Institute responded pursuant to folios 184 to 233. It raised the preliminary defense of act not susceptible to challenge and the exception of lack of right. The Processing Judge, in resolution no. 96-2015 of 11:00 hours on January 15, 2015, declared the inadmissibility of the claim in all its aspects and ordered the plaintiff company to pay both costs of the process. Disagreeing, the plaintiff appeals in cassation.

**II.-** In the case at hand, the cassation appellant alleges **one** grievance of a procedural nature and **three** grounds for substantive reasons. In the **sole** procedural reproach, the appellant accuses a violation of procedural norms whose non-observance is sanctioned with absolute nullity. It relates that the Processing Judge exceeded the powers granted by canon 92 paragraph 6) in conjunction with 66 subsection g) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (successively CPCA). It states that the challenged resolution pre-judged the merits of the matter at a preliminary stage, thereby transgressing due process (debido proceso) and the provisions of canon 96 ibid. It refers to article 92 subsection 7) of the procedural Code. In the **first** censure, it invokes an erroneous interpretation of numeral 36 subsection c) of the CPCA and ordinal 163 subsection 2) of the Ley de la Administración Pública (hereinafter LGAP). The appellant points out that, in accordance with article 36 subsection c) of the CPCA, a process filed against an administrative act of procedure (acto de trámite) with its own effect is admissible. Moreover, precept 163 subsection 2) of the LGAP indicates: *“Article 163.- […] 2. The defects inherent to preparatory acts shall be challenged jointly with the act, unless those are, in turn, acts with their own effect. […]”* It affirms that the resolution failed to apply said norms, since it denied the admissibility of the claim, even though what was challenged consisted of a preparatory act with its own effect. It argues that the communication of the initiation of audit actions, by requiring the disclosure of private and confidential information, as well as by retroactively applying Law no. 6735, violates constitutional canons 24 and 33. Therefore, by negatively impacting the sphere of rights of the plaintiff company, they possess their own effect. In its view, the Court errs in qualifying the official letter IA-FT-03-2003 as a simple preparatory act for the audit procedure regulated in tax regulations. It says the debated resolution is null for lack of reasoning (motivación). It asserts that it does not explain the reasons why it concludes that the constitutional rights to privacy and non-retroactive application of the law are not circumvented. Instead, it limits itself to indicating that these are aspects that must be alleged jointly at the time of refuting the final act of the procedure. It warns that the appealed vote, on one hand, prevented the filing of an evident case of legal and unconstitutional violations; and, on the other hand, allowed access to privileged information, within a range of periods not authorized by law. It states that the requirement made by Inder not only constitutes an information order but is also a warning of imposition of a fine in case the instruction is not complied with (article 82 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios - hereinafter CNPT). It reiterates that the requested information has a privileged nature. For that reason, providing it would disturb its constitutional right to the privacy of private information. Therefore, it says, the challenged ruling produces harmful effects on the plaintiff's rights. Consequently, contrary to what was ordered by the jurisdictional body, it believes the procedural act (acto de trámite) does possess its own effect and, therefore, the claim is admissible. It refers to numerals 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and canon 11 of the Magna Carta. In the **second** violation, it accuses the non-application of article 40 of Law no. 6735 and its regulation. The appellant indicates that the resolution is based on the premise that the audit powers of the defendant Institute are unrestricted. Hence, it fails to apply what is provided in ordinal 40 of Law 6735 and its regulation. It notes that, according to the recently cited article, the former IDA (now Inder) has the power to exercise oversight (fiscalización) and control over the collection of the various assigned revenues. Furthermore, its officials are empowered to intervene at any time and to ensure compliance with the legal norms granting the economic resources. However, it expressly indicates that for these purposes it must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de la Tributación Directa and other public entities. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it indicates that the challenged resolution, without further analysis, recognizes the arguments outlined by Inder in the response to the claim and takes as true the modification of ordinal 99 of the CNPT and, consequently, of article 40 of Law 6735. Moreover, based on the tax norm cited above, it grants the defendant the category of Tax Administration and, consequently, grants it unrestricted powers. This, without explaining why ruling no. 112823-2001 issued by the Sala Constitucional, considered that no norm granted autonomous tax audit powers to Inder, as well as what was expressed in that resolution regarding constitutional ordinal 24. Therefore, it insists, the defendant does not possess unrestricted audit powers. In the **third** defect, it argues violation of the erga omnes binding nature of the judgment of the Sala Constitucional no. 2001-12823 of 10 hours 34 minutes on December 14, 2001. The cassation appellant alleges violation of the rights and principles of constitutional law. It narrates that numeral 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional and its reforms establish the erga omnes binding nature. It asserts that the appealed ruling ignored what was ordered by the Sala Constitucional in judgment no. 2001-12823, thereby violating the aforementioned principle. Thus, in its judgment, since 2001, IDA (now Inder) was not authorized to regulate control and audit procedures. Nor was it authorized, based on the general norms of the CNPT, to have access to documents whose confidentiality is constitutionally guaranteed.

**Appeal for procedural reasons** **III.-** In the **sole** grievance of a procedural nature, if what is argued by the cassation appellant in Considering II were to occur, we would be in the presence of the ground provided for in subsection h) of article 137 of the CPCA. The plaintiff affirms that the judge exceeded the powers granted by article 92 paragraph 6) in conjunction with ordinal 66 subsection g) of the CPCA. It points out that the judge, being at a preliminary stage, decided on aspects related to the Tax Administration power of Inder, exceeding her powers granted by law. It mentions that, by issuing such criteria, she not only pre-judged the merits of the matter but transgressed what is established in norm 96 ibidem. It should be observed that the plaintiff accuses an advancement of criteria regarding the competence of Inder in Tax Administration matters. It says the jurisdictional body errs in concluding that the defendant Institute possessed broad and unrestricted audit powers. It refers that the preliminary defense alleged by the defendant required a substantive analysis that should not have been addressed by the judge at the preliminary hearing. In its judgment, the dismissal of the invoked defense was warranted, to carry out its subsequent analysis when the Trial Court hears the merits. Consequently, it considers cardinal 96 of the procedural Code circumvented. According to what was expressed by the appellant, the preliminary defense invoked by the defendant should have been reserved for the substantive analysis.

In this regard, it should be noted that the defense raised corresponds to subsection g) of article 66 of the CPCA. Said provision literally states: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">ARTICLE 66.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> 1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">In the response to the complaint or counterclaim, all substantive exceptions may be raised, as well as the following preliminary defenses:</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> […] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">g)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">That the claim is brought against an act not subject to challenge.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> […]</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">2</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">In the case of paragraph a), the processing judge shall proceed in accordance with article 5 of this same Code; in the other cases, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">the decision shall be reserved</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">for the preliminary hearing</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">, referenced in chapter VI of title V of this Code.</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Emphasis ours) From the foregoing, it can be discerned, contrary to what the appellant indicates, that the appropriate procedural moment to debate and resolve the defense raised is during the preliminary hearing. Additionally, it suggests an advancement of criteria regarding the merits of the case. In view of the appealed decision,</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> the Processing Judge in Considering II, states: </span><span>“</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">II.- SPECIFIC CASE: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">From a reading of the claims and the factual framework supporting the complaint, it appears that the plaintiff is seeking the nullity of the commencement of the audit action, that is, the order opening the administrative proceeding for tax determination processed by INDER under No. IA-FT-03-2013.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[…] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">On the other hand, challenges against procedural actions that the parties may have must be challenged jointly with the final act and not beforehand.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> […]</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">In the case at hand, the challenged act, that is, the commencement of the audit action through the request for accounting, financial, or commercial information from the plaintiff company, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">does not have its own effect nor does it put an end to the proceeding, as it is motivated by the Tax Administration, based on the audit powers conferred upon it by law for the proper collection of the tax. On the other hand, although the plaintiff raises as its main argument the lack of competence or legal powers of INDER to request confidential and privileged information from the company,</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> it has not managed to efficiently and satisfactorily counter INDER's position, which maintains that its audit powers derive from the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures authorizing it to request accounting and commercial information from the company. In this same vein, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Official Letter No. IA-FT-03-2013 challenged here, visible at folios 56 to 61 of the case file, bases the request for financial information from the plaintiff on articles 103, 128, and 171 of the indicated Code as they constitute legal obligations of taxpayers. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Indeed, INDER constitutes a Tax Administration and, under the Law, exercises the functions of collection and audit of the assigned tax, which evidently allows it to open investigations or administrative proceedings against all those obligated to pay the tax and to request information. In this regard, subsection 4 of article 128 of the Tax Code, regarding the provision of information, obliges the taxpayer -among others- to provide the following: \"d. Present or exhibit, at the offices of the Tax Administration or before authorized officials, the financial, accounting, and any other type of records related to generating events of their tax obligations and formulate the applications or clarifications requested\". </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Based on the foregoing and within the parameters of admissibility of the contentious-administrative complaint, it is not verified that the list of documentation requested by INDER from the plaintiff company, visible at folio 58 of the judicial file, requests information that is unrelated to or different from what is established in the law for the control of the tax obligation and that would make the administrative request evidently and manifestly illegal. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">There is no demonstration by the plaintiff in that sense</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">. The other arguments outlined by the plaintiff's representative, referring to the alleged nullity defects of the act initiating the administrative proceeding, must eventually be raised jointly when challenging the final act of the proceeding, that is, matters relating to the right to privacy, the limits of INDER's audit capacity, and the non-retroactive application of the law.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> By reason of the foregoing, upon verifying that the claim brought is directed against an act not subject to challenge, as it is a mere procedural act, that is, the communication of the commencement of the audit update with the </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">request for information from the investigated party, the inadmissibility of the complaint filed in all its aspects is declared, under numerals 36 subsection c), 62 subsection 1) sub-subsection a) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, including claims 2 and 3 of the complaint, deeming them accessory to the main claim and premature, given that the case file does not contain evidence of the administrative act determining the tax to be paid nor the conclusion of the proceeding.</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">” </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">As can be seen, the jurisdictional body addresses the issue of the competence or legal powers that INDER possesses to require financial information from the plaintiff, within the parameters of admissibility of the complaint. It mentions the inefficiency of the counter to the defendant’s arguments, regarding the audit powers granted by articles 103, 128, and 171 CNPT, as an element assessed to determine that official letter IA-FT-03-2013 is not an act with its own effect and, therefore, its challenge shall proceed when the final act is jointly challenged.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Appeal on substantive grounds</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">IV.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">In the </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">first </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">ground on substantive reasons, the appellant alleges the defect configured in the ground provided for in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA. It reproaches an erroneous interpretation of numeral 36 subsection c) of the CPCA and ordinal 163 subsection 2) of the Law of the Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP). It comments that the appealed decision fails to apply the recently cited rules and denies the admissibility of the complaint. It asserts that the communication of the commencement of audit actions has its own effect. It relates that the Executing Judge forgets that by requesting private and confidential information, the constitutional right to the privacy of private information is disregarded, and subsequently, articles 24 and 33 of the Magna Carta. It refutes that by retroactively applying Law No. 6735 and upholding the position that the cited official letter must be challenged jointly when debating the final act of the proceeding, it causes a harmful effect on the plaintiff company. It insists that the request for information by INDER is much more than a mere procedural act, since in addition to requesting privileged documentation, it warns the plaintiff of the imminent fine in the event it refuses to provide the requested documents. Consequently, in its view, the complaint is admissible. It argues a violation of precepts 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and mandate 11 of the Magna Carta. Before analyzing the charge, it is appropriate to refer to the rule indicated as breached. According to what was stated by the plaintiff, the Processing Judge misconstrued the interpretation of rule 36 subsection c) of the CPCA and numeral 163 subsection 2) of the LGAP. In this regard, it should be noted that both mandates concern the effect of acts. Ordinal 36 subsection c) of the CPCA states: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">ARTICLE 36</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">.- The administrative claim shall be admissible with respect to the following: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[…] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">c)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Administrative acts, whether final, definitive, or procedural with </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">own effect.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[…] (The emphasis does not correspond to the original)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">” </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">For its part, article 163 subsection 2) of the LGAP, limits: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“Article 163.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[…] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">2. The defects inherent in preparatory acts shall be challenged jointly with the act, unless those are, in turn, acts with own effect. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[…]</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">” </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">Now then, the act to which that effect is attributed is official letter IA-FT-03-2013 (folio 02 of the judicial file). It is observed that the cited memorandum serves as communication of the commencement of audit actions for verification and investigation, aimed at determining the tax corresponding to carbonated or soft drinks in a specific fiscal period (items 1 and 2 visible at folio 56 of the main file). Likewise, it is the mechanism for requesting relevant information to carry out the examination (Anexo 1 –folios 58 of the judicial file). Finally, it is the means by which the plaintiff is warned that the refusal to provide the documentation required by the Tax Authority would constitute an infraction of resistance that would entail a possible financial penalty (section 6 visible at folio 57 of the judicial file). According to the foregoing, it is concluded that the challenged official letter serves to communicate an action to be performed, requests information, and warns of possible consequences for failure to comply with the request, but does not generate any effect in the sphere of the plaintiff company. Hence, no erroneous interpretation of the indicated rule is discerned. Now then, regarding the violation of numerals 11, 128, 129, and 166 of the LGAP and article 11 of the Constitution, it should be noted that the argued rule deals with the principle of legality, the competence of the official or entity to issue an act, and the validity of that act. In the case under analysis, the defendant Institute, in its capacity as Tax Administrator (article 37 of Law No. 9036) and vested with the powers granted by the current legal system (ordinals 52, 103, 128, and 171 subsection 14 of the CNPT), issued official letter IA-FT-03-2013, which for this Chamber, does not have its own effect. Consequently, this Chamber considers that the transgression of the alleged regulations does not occur. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">V.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> In the </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">second </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">objection, the petitioner invokes the non-application of mandate 40 of Law No. 6735 and its regulation. It states that the challenged decision infers that INDER's audit powers are unrestricted. It explains that this estimation leads to the non-application of the provisions of article 40 of Law 6735 and its regulation. It points out that, according to the recently cited rule, the defendant Institute and its officials are empowered to exercise the audit and control of the collection of the assigned taxes, as well as to intervene and ensure compliance with the legal rules that grant economic resources. However, to carry out this task, it must have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación Directa (hereinafter DGTD) and other public entities. It mentions that, unfortunately, the adjudicator, under the erroneous position that Law No. 7900 modified canon 99 of the CNPT and, tacitly, also ordinal 40 of Law No. 6735, validated the defendant's action. It adds that the Processing Judge also does not explain why her decision contravenes the provisions of constitutional ruling No. 112823-2001.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VI.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">Before proceeding to the analysis of the charge, for a better understanding of the scope of the rules cited in the previous Considering, it is appropriate to review how they have been transformed over time. Law No. 6735 of March 29, 1982, reformed several articles of Law No. 5792 of September 1, 1975. Specifically, numeral 35 of Law No. 6735 reformed article 6 of Law 5792, which created a tax on the consumption of carbonated soft drinks and carbonated beverages to be applied to the price of the item before the sales tax. For its part, article 40 of the cited law states that the IDA (now INDER) would have broad powers to exercise audit and control over the collection of the assigned taxes. Likewise, its officials could intervene at any time and in strict compliance with the legal rules that granted them economic resources. Subsequently, through Law No. 9036, which entered into force on November 29, 2012, Law No. 6735 was almost entirely repealed. However, canons 35 and 40 of the recently cited law were only reformed. Thus, articles 37 and 40 of the current rule, respectively, state: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">ARTICLE 37.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Current Regulation a)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Article 35 of Law No. 6735, of March 29, 1982, is reformed. The text is as follows: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">\"Article 35.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Articles 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of Law No. 5792, of September 1, 1975, are reformed. The texts are as follows:</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> […] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Article 6.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">A specific tax per unit of consumption is set for carbonated beverages of national and foreign brands, produced in the country or imported, of five point seven hundred twenty-five colones (¢5,725) in favor of</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">INDER</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">. In the case of micro and small enterprises, whose annual production does not exceed sixteen million units of consumption, the tax that shall apply per unit of consumption of two hundred fifty ml (250 ml) shall be two point thirty-five colones (¢2.35).</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> […] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">For these purposes, each manufacturer must provide</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">INDER</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">a certification stipulating the theoretical yield in milliliters of finished beverage for each product marketed.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[…] </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">It corresponds to</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">INDER</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">to set and publish, through a provision of general scope, the referred update, within the fifteen days prior to each quarterly application period.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">[…]” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original); and, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">\"Article 40.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">The</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">INDER</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">shall have broad powers to exercise audit and control over the collection of the various assigned taxes and may intervene at any time upon prior notification to the taxpayer, within the time limits established in the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, to ensure strict compliance with the legal rules that grant it economic resources.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> For the purposes of auditing the correct application of the taxes established in this law, the</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">INDER</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">is empowered to review the accounting books and their annexes concerning those taxes. To this end, taxpayers must provide all information that allows determining the nature and amount of the tax obligation, related to the taxes corresponding to the</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">INDER.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> The</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">INDER, in its capacity as Tax Administration, shall have the powers established in the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Regarding tax offenses, the</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">INDER </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">shall have the powers established in title</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">III</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">of said Code, with respect to infractions and administrative penalties.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> When the</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">INDER, in the audit phase of the taxes it administers, becomes aware that a crime has been committed, it shall report it to the Public Ministry. To comply with the provisions of this rule, it shall have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación, the Dirección General de Aduanas, and other public entities.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> (Emphasis ours) Now then, regarding precept 99 of the CNPT, the plaintiff maintains that it has not changed since 1971. It states that the only modification it underwent was the change of numbering from 99 to 105. However, upon reviewing the text of both mandates, this Court observes that the content of the current article 99 did change. Although it is true that the numbering was shifted, the change arises from ordinal 3 of the Tax Justice Law No. 7535 of August 1, 1995, which repealed the previous content of canon 99 regarding the breach of formal duties and transferred the old content of precept 105 to that numbering. That is, article 99 was indeed repealed in 1995 and its content replaced by what was at that time in cardinal 105. Therefore, the cassation appellant is not correct in asserting that the rule has remained intact since 1971. However, it should be noted that both article 99 and numeral 105 have been modified, but by ordinals 3 and 5 of the Tax Justice Law No. 7535, canon 1 of the Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management No. 7893, and numeral 2 of the Law for Compliance with the Fiscal Transparency Standard No. 9068. Thus, the current articles 99 and 105, respectively, state: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Article 99.- Concept and powers</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Tax Administration is understood as the administrative body responsible for managing and auditing taxes, whether it is the Treasury or other public entities that are active subjects, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">in accordance with articles 11 and 14 of this Code</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> Said body may issue general rules for the purposes of the correct application of tax laws, within the limits set by the pertinent legal and regulatory provisions.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> The general rules shall be issued by general resolution and considered institutional criteria.

They shall be mandatory in the issuance of all administrative acts, and acts contrary to such rules shall be null and void. In the case of the Tax Administration of the Ministry of Finance, when this Code grants a power or authority to the Dirección General de Tributación, it shall be understood to also apply to the Dirección General de Aduanas, the Dirección General de Hacienda, and the Dirección General de la Policía de Control Fiscal, within their respective spheres of competence.”; and, “Article 105.- Information from third parties. Every person, individual or legal entity, public or private, shall be obliged to provide the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) with information foreseeably relevant for tax purposes, derived from their economic, financial, and professional relationships with other persons. It shall be provided as the Administration indicates by means of regulation or individualized request. This request for information must be duly and expressly justified, as to its relevance in the tax field. [...]” (Underlining not in original) Continuing with the examination of the allegations, it is necessary to refer to constitutional vote no. 12823-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In this regard, the petitioner states that the judge does not explain why, contrary to the provisions of the recently cited ruling, she concludes that Inder possesses unrestricted tax inspection powers. The aforementioned judgment hears the unconstitutionality action against the Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (currently Inder). In said vote, the Constitutional Chamber concluded that when the IDA issued the cited regulation, it invaded the field of action of the Executive Branch. Therefore, it decreed the unconstitutionality of the regulation, but not of the tax on the consumption of soft drinks and carbonated beverages. It indicated that, since there was no specific rule authorizing the regulation of the control, verification, and inspection procedures to which canon 40 of Law no. 6735 referred in the case of the taxes contained in Article 6 of Law no. 5792, these should be governed in light of the CNPT. Finally, it considered it unnecessary to refer to the particular aspects of the rules contained therein, as it is not relevant to the substance of the legal solution. For the reasons set forth, the objection must be rejected.

**VII.-** In the case sub examine, the appellant challenges the unrestricted inspection powers of Inder. In her judgment, the determination of the jurisdictional body is erroneous. She maintains that the defendant Institute has no power to request confidential documentation and impose sanctions. She points out that for those actions, it needs the mandatory intervention of the DGTD and the public entities. She bases her position on the lack of application of Article 40 of Law no. 6735 and its regulation, the incorrect interpretation of numeral 99 of the CNPT, and the lack of analysis of constitutional ruling no. 1283-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In accordance with what was outlined in the preceding Considerando, canon 40 of Law no. 6735 was amended by Law no. 9036 and the cited regulation was declared unconstitutional. Now then, mandate 40 of Law no. 9036 expressly indicates that Inder has the status of Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). It states that, in accordance with the CNPT, this category empowers it to exercise inspection and control over the collection of the various assigned taxes. It may intervene at any time upon prior notification to the taxable person (sujeto pasivo), within the time limits established by the CNPT. Likewise, it may review the accounting books and their annexes with respect to the taxes. The law establishes that taxable persons must provide all information that makes it possible to determine the tax liability, in the specific case, the consumption tax on carbonated beverages of domestic and foreign brands, produced in the country or imported. The cited regulatory body stipulates, furthermore, that when it becomes aware of the existence of a crime, it shall report it to the Public Ministry and, to comply with the foregoing, it shall have the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación, the Dirección General de Aduanas, and other public entities. To continue with the reasoning regarding the charge, it is unavoidable to define the concept of mandatory collaboration. The principle of collaboration or cooperation refers to mutual aid relationships; that is, the action and effect of joint work between different bodies to achieve their common objectives. The fact that Inder has the mandatory collaboration of the Dirección General de Tributación, the Dirección General de Aduanas, and other public entities to enforce the tax liability of the taxable person does not eliminate its status as Tax Administration, nor does it exclude its power to inspect and control the collection of assigned taxes, all granted by law. Regarding the documentation requested, the information is limited to that provided for in Articles 103 subsection b), 104, and 116 of the CNPT, so no illegitimate intrusion into confidentiality matters of the plaintiff company is noted; in this regard, it is worth clarifying that the right to privacy is a strictly personal right of human beings, which does not cover legal entities. In relation to the lack of application of Article 40 of Law no. 6735 and its regulation, it must be stated that the law was repealed and the canon amended. However, the former article also granted broad powers to exercise inspection and control over the collection of taxes. Regarding the regulation, it was declared unconstitutional through vote no. 12823-2001 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. In that ruling, the Constitutional Chamber determined that the IDA (now Inder) only had competence to issue service regulations, not regulations for the control, verification, and inspection procedures to which Article 40 of Law no. 6735 referred, and therefore established, as a dimensioning of the scope of the action, that the defendant entity had to make the request for fiscal requirements based on the provisions of the CNPT, as occurred in the case under examination. Regarding numeral 99 of the CNPT, it is worth noting that it was indeed amended by the Ley de Justicia Tributaria no. 7535 of August 1, 1995. From that date onward, that provision establishes that the Tax Administration is the administrative body responsible for managing and inspecting taxes, whether it concerns the treasury or other public entities that are active subjects (Articles 11 and 14 of the CNPT). As Inder has the status of Tax Administration and is an active subject, it is not apparent that the jurisdictional body made an incorrect interpretation of the mandate. Finally, as has been repeatedly mentioned, constitutional ruling no. 12823-2001 did not question the inspection powers of the defendant Institute. What it did debate was its competence to issue regulations for control, verification, and inspection procedures. For that reason, it declared unconstitutional the Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, approved by the Board of Directors in Article XVI of session 31-00, held on April 24, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 101 of May 26, 2000, and concluded that the requirements should be made in light of the provisions of the CNPT. Therefore, by issuing official letter IA-FT-03-2013 in its capacity as Tax Administration and in compliance with the rule set forth in the CNPT, there is sufficient reason to consider that it acted within the framework of its legal powers. Consequently, the rejection of the charge is proper.

**VIII.-** In the **third** objection, the plaintiff argues a violation of the erga omnes binding force of the Constitutional Chamber's judgment no. 2001-12823 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001. She points out that, according to Article 13 of the LJC and its amendments, the vote indicated above should have been applied to the case of exegesis. She relates that the Constitutional Chamber determined in 2001 that the IDA (now Inder) was not authorized to regulate control and inspection procedures, nor to have access to confidential documentation. Ordinal 13 of the LJC establishes the principle of erga omnes binding force. It states that the jurisprudence and precedents of the Constitutional Chamber are binding on all, except for itself. It indicates that its validity presupposes the existence of a constitutional principle that provides it with normative foundation. Therefore, it has a dual constitutional foundation. Primarily, that provided for in Article 42 of the Carta Magna, which provides that a judge who issues a decision cannot hear its own appeal or an extraordinary recourse filed against it, no one can be tried more than once for the same punishable act (non bis in idem), closed criminal cases and judgments decided with the authority of res judicata cannot be reopened, except when the remedy of review is appropriate; and, secondarily, the constitutional principle of legal regularity. For this reason, the decisions issued by the Constitutional Chamber, both in their operative part and in their ratio decidendi, positively oblige all state bodies and entities to comply with what was decided therein, and absolutely prohibit the total or partial reproduction of the acts or provisions annulled by the same respondent Administration or by any other administrative authority. The decisions of the Chamber are binding not only in their operative part but also in their ratio decidendi. As has been indicated in the preceding Considerandos, in the cited constitutional ruling, the Chamber of Judges determined Inder's lack of competence to regulate the control, verification, and inspection procedures to which Article 40 of Law no. 6735 (amended by Law no. 9036) referred. For that reason, it declared the unconstitutionality of the Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, approved by the Board of Directors in Article XVI of session 31-00, held on April 24, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 101 of May 26, 2000. However, contrary to what was outlined by the plaintiff, it concluded that the requirements should be made in light of the provisions of the CNPT. Observe that Considerando IV expressly states: “**IV.- The regulatory power of the IDA. Merits analysis.** [...] *In the case of the taxes contained in Article 6 of Law No. 5792, amended by Article 35 of Law No. 6735, there is no specific rule that authorizes the regulation of the control, verification, and inspection procedures to which Article 40 of Law No. 6735 refers, as expressed by the Procuraduría General de la República, and this is the main reason why the IDA must construct its action based on the provisions of the Tax Code of Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios)* and not from its own Law, [...] (Our underlining). Therefore, contrary to what was stated by the plaintiff, the Constitutional Chamber's judgment no. 2001-12823 of 10:34 a.m. on December 14, 2001, in its reasoning, as set out in the lines above, established that the IDA (now Inder) had to construct its requirements based on what is regulated in the CNPT. Therefore, by issuing official letter IA-FT-03-2013 in compliance with what is provided for in the CNPT, the defendant acted within the parameters indicated in the reasoning of the cited ruling, which is a consequence that is also binding. Hence, this Chamber considers that the defendant proceeded in accordance with the provisions of the constitutional vote and, consequently, the rejection of the defect is warranted.

**IX.-** By virtue of the reasons set forth, the rejection of the appeal filed is mandated, with costs to be borne by the party who filed it (Article 150, subsection 3 of the CPCA).

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed is declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the plaintiff.

**Name45162** **Román Solís Zelaya****Rocío Rojas Morales** Name165177 Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email ...36

Revisión del Documento *140027981027CA* Res. 00143-F-TC-2018 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las diez horas del dieciocho de octubre de dos mil dieciocho.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda por COCA COLA FEMSA DE COSTA RICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA (FEMSA), representada por su apoderada generalísima limitada Nombre168028 , abogada, vecina de Heredia; contra el INSTUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER), representado por su apoderada general judicial Rosa Eugenia Miranda Villalobos, soltera. Figura como apoderado especial judicial de la parte actora Nombre23181 , Nombre21075 e Nombre19955 . Las personas físicas son mayores de edad, y con las salvedades hechas, casados, abogados, y vecinos de San José.

RESULTANDO

1.- Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que citó, el actor estableció proceso de conocimiento, para que en sentencia se declare: “1.- Nulos y sin efecto ni valor jurídico alguno, los actos administrativos emitidos por el INDER en violación de la Constitución, la ley y las normas reglamentarias aplicables, y que son las solicitudes de información privilegiada y confidencial con las que el INDER inició su proceso de fiscalización, y otras que resultan impertinentes para los propósitos de las tareas de fiscalización que la ley le encomienda. En particular, PIDO se anulen los siguientes actos: la comunicación de inicio de actualización fiscalizadora documento No. IA-FT-03-2013, la Resolución No. 006-2014 de las 14:00 horas de 29 de enero de 2014, las Resoluciones N° 007-2014 de las 10: 00 horas de 12 de febrero de 2014. No. 008-2014 de las 10: 30 horas de 13 de febrero de 2014, N° 009-2014 de las 12:00 horas de 13 de febrero de 2014 y el Oficio No. FT-012-2014 de 3 de abril de 2014. 2.- Que respecto del impuesto creado por la Ley No. 6735 antes de su reforma por la Ley No. 9036, el INDER (antes IDA) no tiene facultades para tener acceso a información privada de los contribuyentes, y debe contar con la colaboración obligada de la Dirección General de Tributación en cumplimiento del Reglamento a dicha Ley, Decreto Ejecutivo NO. 31156. 3.- Prescritos los impuestos a favor del IDA (hoy INDER) comprendidos del período de enero de 2009 a octubre de 2010. 4.- Se condene al INDER al pago de ambas costas de este proceso.” 2.- El instituto demandado contestó negativamente y opuso la defensa previa de acto no susceptible de impugnación y la excepción de falta derecho.

3.- Al ser las 09 horas del 15 de enero de 2015, se efectuó la audiencia preliminar, a la que asistieron los representantes de ambas partes.

4.- La jueza tramitadora Judith Reyes Castillo en sentencia no. 96-2015 de las 11 horas del 15 de enero de 2015; resolvió: “se declara la inadmisibilidad de la demanda en todos sus extremos, se condena en ambas costas del proceso a cargo de la parte promovente, firme esta resolución procédase al archivo del expediente. Contra esta resolución procede recurso en la forma y términos que establece el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. ” 5.- La representante de la parte actora formula recurso de casación.

6.- En los procedimientos ante esta Sala se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la magistrada Rojas Morales

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Coca Cola Femsa de Costa Rica demandó al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (en futuras referencias Inder). En su escrito de demanda indicó, mediante oficio IA-FT-03-2003 de data 16 de diciembre de 2003, el Instituto demandado comunicó el inicio de las actuaciones fiscalizadoras de comprobación e investigación del periodo comprendido entre enero de 2009 al 29 de noviembre de 2012. Narró, en dicho memorial, el accionado solicitó información privada, datos confidenciales y documentos de acceso restringido, algunos de ellos, a su juicio, impertinentes para la investigación del impuesto otorgado a su favor, mediante la Ley no. 6735 (actualmente derogada). Agregó, al no tener claro cuál era el alcance de la fiscalización y, por estimar, según lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional en el voto no. 12823-2001 a las 10 horas 34 minutos del 14 de diciembre de 2001, el Inder carecía de competencia legal para solicitar la información de reciente cita; pidió la reconsideración de la pretendida fiscalización del impuesto. Relató, mediante resolución no. 006-2014 de las 14 horas del 29 de enero de 2014, el Director Administrativo y Financiero del Inder rechazó la petición y, señaló una nueva fecha para realizar la primera reunión de coordinación para el inicio de las actuaciones. Citó, inconforme con lo resuelto planteó apelación. De igual modo, el 4 de febrero de 2014, solicitó se declarara la prescripción de los impuestos pretendidos. Con fundamento en el artículo 349 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el demandado remitió el expediente al Presidente Ejecutivo, a fin de que en su condición de Administrador Tributario, conociera del recurso (resolución no. 007-2014 de las 10 horas del 12 de febrero de 2014). El presidente ejecutivo, en resolución no. 008-2014 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 13 de febrero de 2014, rechazó la apelación por improcedente y, a través de la resolución no. 009-2014 de las 12 horas del 13 de febrero de 2014, reservó el conocimiento de la prescripción interpuesta para el momento procesal oportuno. Acotó, en oficio no. FT-012-2014 el Inder indicó la nueva fecha para la visita del equipo de auditores. Solicitó, en sentencia se declare: “1.- Nulos y sin efecto ni valor jurídico alguno, los actos administrativos emitidos por el INDER en violación de la Constitución, la ley y las normas reglamentarias aplicables, y que son las solicitudes de información privilegiada y confidencial con las que el INDER inició su proceso de fiscalización, y otras que resultan impertinentes para los propósitos de las tareas de fiscalización que la ley encomienda. En particular, PIDO se anulen los siguientes actos: la comunicación de inicio de actuación fiscalizadora documento No. IA-FT-03-2013, la Resolución No. 006-2014 de las 14:00 horas de (sic) 29 de enero de 2014, las Resoluciones NO. 007-2014de las 10:00 horas del 12 de febrero de 2014, No. 008-2014 de las 10:30 horas de (sic) 13 de febrero de 2014, No. 009-2014 de las 12:00 horas de (sic) de 13 de febrero de 2014 y el Oficio No. FT-012-2014 de (sic) 3 de abril de 2014. 2. Que respecto del impuesto creado por la LEY No. 6735 antes de su reforma por la LEY No. 9036, el INDER (antes IDA) no tiene facultades para tener acceso a información privada de los contribuyentes, y de contar con la colaboración obligada de la Dirección General de Tributación con cumplimiento del Reglamento a dicha Ley, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31156. 3. Prescritos los impuestos a favor del IDA (hoy INDER) comprendidos del período de enero de 2009 a octubre de 2010. 4. Se condene al INDER al pago de ambas costas de este proceso.” El Instituto accionado contestó conforme a folios 184 a 233. Interpuso la defensa previa de acto no susceptible de impugnación y la excepción de falta derecho. La Jueza Tramitadora, en resolución no. 96-2015 de 11 horas del 15 enero de 2015, declaró la inadmisibilidad de la demanda en todos sus extremos y condenó a la empresa actora al pago de ambas costas del proceso. Inconforme, la demandante acude en casación.

II.- En la especie, la casacionista alega un agravio por índole procesal y tres motivos por razones sustantivas. En el único reproche procesal, la promovente recrimina violación de las normas procesales cuya inobservancia está sancionada con la nulidad absoluta. Relata, la Jueza Tramitadora excedió las facultades otorgadas por el canon 92 párrafo 6) en concordancia con el 66 inciso g) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (sucesivamente CPCA). Manifiesta, la resolución impugnada prejuzgó el fondo del asunto en una etapa previa, transgrediendo de esa forma el debido proceso y lo dispuesto en el canon 96 ibídem. Refiere el artículo 92 inciso 7) del Código de rito. En la primera censura, invoca errónea interpretación del numeral 36 inciso c) del CPCA y el ordinal 163 inciso 2) de la Ley de la Administración Pública (en adelante LGAP). La recurrente señala, de conformidad con el artículo 36 inciso c) del CPCA, es admisible el proceso que se interponga contra un acto administrativo de trámite con efecto propio. Por otra parte, el precepto 163 inciso 2) de la LGAP, indica: “Artículo 163.- […] 2. Los vicios propios de los actos preparatorios se impugnarán conjuntamente con el acto, salvo que aquellos sean, a su vez, actos con efecto propio. […]” Afirma, la resolución desaplicó dichas normas, toda vez que negó la admisibilidad de la demanda, aún y cuando lo impugnado consistía en un acto preparatorio con efecto propio. Sostiene, la comunicación del inicio de actuaciones fiscalizadoras, al requerir la divulgación de información privada y confidencial, así como aplicar retroactivamente la Ley no. 6735, vulnera los cánones 24 y 33 constitucionales. Por ende, al repercutir negativamente en la esfera de los derechos de la empresa actora, poseen efecto propio. En su criterio, el Tribunal yerra al calificar el oficio IA-FT-03-2003, como un simple acto preparatorio para el procedimiento de fiscalización regulado en la normativa tributaria. Dice, la resolución debatida es nula por falta de motivación. Asevera, no explica las razones por las cuales concluye, no se soslayan los derechos constitucionales de intimidad y aplicación retroactiva de la ley. En su lugar, se limita a indicar que son aspectos que deben ser alegados de manera conjunta al momento de refutar el acto final del procedimiento. Advierte, el voto recurrido por una parte, impidió la presentación de un evidente caso de violaciones legales e inconstitucionales; y, por otro lado, permitió el acceso a información privilegiada, en un rango de periodos no autorizados por la ley. Manifiesta, el requerimiento hecho por el Inder no solo constituye una orden de información, sino que también es una advertencia de imposición de multa en caso que la instrucción no sea acatada (artículo 82 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios - en adelante CNPT). Reitera, la información pedida tiene carácter de privilegiada. Por esa razón, suministrarla perturbaría su derecho constitucional a la intimidad de la información privada. Por ello, dice, el fallo impugnado produce efectos nefastos sobre los derechos de la demandante. En consecuencia, contrario a lo dispuesto por el órgano jurisdiccional, estima, el acto de trámite sí posee efecto propio y, por ende, la demanda resulta admisible. Refiere los numerales 11, 128, 129 y 166 de la LGAP y el canon 11 de la Carta Magna. En el segundo quebranto, acusa desaplicación del artículo 40 de la Ley no. 6735 y su reglamento. La promovente indica, lo resuelto parte de la premisa de que las facultades fiscalizadoras del Instituto demandado son irrestrictas. De ahí, desaplique lo dispuesto en el ordinal 40 de la Ley 6735 y su reglamento. Acota, según lo dispone el artículo de reciente cita, el antiguo IDA (hoy Inder) tiene potestad para ejercer la fiscalización y el control de la recaudación de los diversos atributos asignados. Además, sus funcionarios están facultados para intervenir en cualquier momento y procurar el cumplimiento de las normas legales que otorgan los recursos económicos. Empero, expresamente indica, para estos fines debe contar con la colaboración obligada de la Dirección General de la Tributación Directa y los demás entes públicos. No obstante lo anterior, indica, la resolución impugnada sin mayor análisis, reconoce los argumentos esbozados por el Inder en la contestación de la demanda y, tiene como cierto la modificación del ordinal 99 del CNPT y, consecuentemente, del artículo 40 de la Ley 6735. Además, con sustento en la norma tributaria citada líneas arriba, concede al accionado la categoría de Administración Tributaria y, consecuentemente, le otorga potestades irrestrictas. Ello, sin explicar por qué el fallo no. 112823-2001 dictado por la Sala Constitucional, consideró que ninguna norma otorgaba facultades autónomas de fiscalización tributaria al Inder, así como lo externado en esa resolución con relación ordinal 24 constitucional. Por tanto, insiste, el accionado no posee facultades irrestrictas de fiscalización. En el tercer vicio, arguye violación de la vinculatoriedad erga omnes de la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional no. 2001-12823 de las 10 horas 34 minutos del 14 de diciembre de 2001. La casacionista alega violación de los derechos y principios de derecho constitucional. Narra, el numeral 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y sus reformas, establece la vinculatoriedad erga omnes. Asevera, el fallo recurrido desatendió lo dispuesto por la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia no. 2001-12823, violentando de esta manera el principio supra citado. Así las cosas, a su juicio, desde el 2001 el IDA (hoy Inder) no estaba autorizado para reglamentar procedimientos de control y fiscalización. Tampoco para que a partir de normas generales del CNPT pudiese tener acceso a documentos cuya confidencialidad se encuentre garantizada constitucionalmente.

Recurso por razones procesales III.- En el único agravio de índole procesal, de darse lo argumentado por la casacionista en el Considerando II, se estaría en presencia de la causal prevista en el inciso h) del artículo 137 del CPCA. La accionante afirma, la persona juzgadora sobrepasó las potestades otorgadas por el artículo 92 párrafo 6) en concordancia con el ordinal 66 inciso g) del CPCA. Señala, la jueza estando en una etapa preliminar, decidió sobre aspectos relacionados con la potestad de Administración Tributaria del Inder, sobrepasando sus facultades otorgadas por ley. Menciona, al emitir tales criterios, no solo prejuzgó el fondo del asunto, sino que transgredió lo establecido en la norma 96 ibídem. Obsérvese, la demandante acusa un adelanto de criterio en relación con la competencia del Inder en temas de Administración Tributaria. Dice, el órgano jurisdiccional yerra al concluir, el Instituto demandado poseía amplias e irrestrictas facultades de fiscalización. Refiere, la defensa previa alegada por la accionada requería de un análisis de fondo que no debía ser atendido por la juzgadora en la audiencia preliminar. A su juicio, correspondía la desestimación de la defensa invocada, para efectuar su posterior análisis, cuando el Tribunal de Juicio conociera sobre el fondo. Por consiguiente, estima soslayado el cardinal 96 del Código de rito. De acuerdo a lo externado por la promovente, la defensa previa invocada por el demandado debió reservarse para el análisis de fondo. Al respecto cabe indicar, la defensa formula es la correspondiente al inciso g) del artículo 66 del CPCA. Dicha norma literalmente dice: “ARTÍCULO 66.- 1) En la contestación de la demanda o contrademanda, podrán alegarse todas las excepciones de fondo, así como las siguientes defensas previas: […] g) Que la pretensión se deduzca contra alguno de los actos no susceptibles de impugnación. […] 2) En el supuesto del apartado a), la jueza o el juez tramitador procederá conforme al artículo 5 de este mismo Código; en los demás supuestos, la resolución se reservará para la audiencia preliminar, aludida en el capítulo VI del título V de este Código.” (El subrayado es nuestro) De lo transcrito se entrevé, contrario a lo que indica la recurrente, el momento procesal oportuno para debatir y resolver la defensa planteada es la durante la audiencia preliminar. Adicionalmente, sugiere un adelanto de criterio respecto al fondo del asunto. Vista la resolución impugnada, la Jueza Tramitadora en Considerando II, señala: “II.- CASO CONCRETO: De la lectura de las pretensiones y el cuadro fáctico que sustenta la demanda, se desprende que la parte actora, viene pretendiendo la nulidad del inicio de la actuación fiscalizadora, es decir el auto de apertura del procedimiento administrativo para la determinación tributaria tramitado por el INDER con el N°IA-FT-03-2013.[…] Por otro lado, los cuestionamientos contra las actuaciones de trámite que tengan las partes deben ser impugnadas en conjunto con el acto final y no antes. […]En el caso que nos ocupa, el acto cuestionado, sea el inicio de la actuación fiscalizadora mediante la solicitud de información contable, financiera o comercial de la empresa actora, no ostenta efecto propio ni pone fin al procedimiento, por encontrarse motivada por la Administración Tributaria, sobre la base de las facultades fiscalizadoras que le confiere la ley para el cumplimiento de la adecuada recaudación del impuesto. Por otro lado, aunque la parte actora plantea como su principal argumento la ausencia de competencias o facultades legales del INDER para solicitar información confidencial y privilegiada de la empresa, no ha logrado combatir de forma eficiente y satisfactoria la posición del INDER que sostiene que sus facultades fiscalizadoras se derivan del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios que la autorizan para solicitar la información contable y comercial de la empresa. En este mismo sentido, el Oficio N°IA-FT-03-2013 aquí impugnado, visible a folio 56 a 61 de los autos, fundamenta la solicitud de información financiera de la actora en los artículos 103, 128 y 171 del indicado Código por consistir en obligaciones legales de los contribuyentes. En efecto, el INDER se constituye en Administración Tributaria y al amparo de la Ley ejerce las funciones de recaudación y fiscalización del impuesto asignado, lo que evidentemente le permite abrir las investigaciones o procedimientos administrativos contra todos los obligados al pago del tributo y a solicitar información. Al respecto, el inciso 4 del artículo 128 del Código Tributario, en materia de suministro de información obliga al contribuyente -entre otras- a facilitar lo siguiente: "d. Presentar o exhibir, en las oficinas de la Administración Tributaria o ante los funcionarios autorizados, los registros financieros, contables y de cualquier índole, relacionados con hechos generadores de sus obligaciones tributarias y formular las aplicaciones o aclaraciones que se les soliciten". Con base en lo anterior y dentro de los parámetros de la admisibilidad de la demanda contenciosa, no se constata que en la lista de documentación solicitada por el INDER a la empresa actora, visible a folio 58 del expediente judicial, se solicite información ajena o distinta a lo establecido en la ley para el control de la obligación tributaria y que torne en ilegal la solicitud administrativa de manera evidente y manifiesta. No hay demostración de la parte actora en ese sentido. Los demás argumentos esbozados por la representación de la parte actora, referidos a los supuestos vicios de nulidad del acto de inicio del procedimiento administrativo, deberán ser planteados eventualmente de forma conjunta al impugnar el acto final del procedimiento, sea lo relativo al derecho a la intimidad, a los límites de la capacidad fiscalizadora del INDER y a la no aplicación retroactiva de la ley. En razón de lo anterior, al verificar que la pretensión deducida se dirige contra un acto no susceptible de impugnación, por tratarse de un acto de mero trámite, sea la comunicación del inicio de la actualización fiscalizadora con la solicitud de información de la investigada se declara la inadmisibilidad de la demanda formulada en todos sus extremos, al amparo de los numerales 36 inciso c), 62 inciso 1) subinciso a) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, incluyendo las pretensiones 2 y 3 de la demanda, por estimarlas accesorias al principal y prematuras, dado que no consta en autos la existencia del acto administrativo que determine el impuesto a pagar ni la finalización del procedimiento.” Véase, el órgano jurisdiccional aborda el tema de la competencia o facultades legales que posee el Inder para requerir información financiera a la actora, dentro de los parámetros de la admisibilidad de la demanda. Menciona la ineficiencia del combate de los argumentos del sujeto demandado, respecto a las potestades fiscalizadoras que le otorgan los artículos 103, 128 y 171 CNPT, como un elemento valorado para determinar que el oficio IA-FT-03-2013 no es un acto con efecto propio y, por ende, su impugnación procederá cuando de manera conjunta se objete el acto final.

Recurso por motivos sustantivos IV.- El primer motivo por razones sustantivas, la recurrente alega el vicio configurado en la causal prevista en el inciso c) del artículo 138 del CPCA. Recrimina errónea interpretación del numeral 36 inciso c) del CPCA y el ordinal 163 inciso 2) de la Ley de la Administración Pública (en adelante LGAP). Comenta, el fallo impugnado deja de aplicar las normas de reciente cita y deniega la admisibilidad de la demanda. Asevera, la comunicación del inicio de las actuaciones fiscalizadoras, tiene efecto propio. Relata, la Jueza Ejecutora olvida que al solicitarse información de carácter privado y confidencial, se soslaya el derecho constitucional a la intimidad de la información privada y, subsiguientemente, los artículos 24 y 33 de la Carta Magna. Refuta, al aplicarse de manera retroactiva la Ley no. 6735 y sostener la posición de que el citado oficio debe impugnarse de manera conjunta al momento de debatir el acto final del procedimiento, ocasiona un efecto nefasto en la empresa actora. Insiste, el requerimiento de información por parte del Inder es mucho más que un acto de mero trámite, ya que además de pedir documentación privilegiada, advierte a la demandante de la inminente multa en el supuesto que se niegue a proporcionar los documentos solicitados. Por consiguiente, a su juicio la demanda resulta admisible. Arguye vulneración de los preceptos 11, 128, 129 y 166 de la LGAP y el mandato 11 de la Carta Magna. Previo al análisis del cargo, conviene aludir a la norma que se indica quebrantada. Según lo expuesto por la parte actora, la Jueza Tramitadora interpretó equivocadamente la norma 36 inciso c) del CPCA y el numeral 163 inciso 2) de la LGAP. Al respecto, cabe destacar, ambos mandatos versan sobre el efecto de los actos. El ordinal 36 inciso c) del CPCA, dice: “ARTÍCULO 36.- La pretensión administrativa será admisible respecto de lo siguiente: […] c) Los actos administrativos, ya sean finales, definitivos o de trámite con efecto propio. […] (Lo destacado no corresponde al original)” Por su parte, el artículo 163 inciso 2) de la LGAP, acota: “Artículo 163.- […] 2. Los vicios propios de los actos preparatorios se impugnarán conjuntamente con el acto, salvo que aquellos sean, a su vez, actos con efecto propio. […]” Ahora bien, el acto al que se le endilga ese efecto, es el oficio IA-FT-03-2013 (folio 02 del expediente judicial). Obsérvese, el citado memorial sirve de comunicación del inicio de las actuaciones fiscalizadoras de comprobación e investigación, dirigidas a la determinación del impuesto correspondiente a las bebidas gaseosas o carbonatadas en un periodo fiscal específico (ítems 1 y 2 visibles a folio 56 del expediente principal). De igual forma, es el mecanismo de solicitud de información pertinente para lleva a cabo el examen (Anexo 1 –folios 58 del expediente judicial). Finalmente, es el medio por el cual, se previene a la parte actora que la negativa de facilitar la documentación requerida por la Autoridad Tributaria, configuraría una infracción de resistencia que acarrearía una eventual sanción económica (acápite 6 visible a folio 57 del expediente judicial). Conforme a lo expuesto, se concluye, el oficio impugnado sirve de comunicación de una acción por realizar, solicita información y previene sobre posibles consecuencias ante la falta de atención de lo pedido, pero no genera efecto alguno en la esfera de la sociedad actora. De ahí, no se vislumbre la errónea interpretación de la norma indicada. Ahora bien, tocante a la vulneración de los numerales 11, 128, 129 y 166 de la LGAP y el artículo 11 constitucional, cabe destacar, la norma argüida trata sobre el principio de legalidad, la competencia del funcionario o ente para dictar un acto y, la validez de ese acto. En el caso de exégesis, el Instituto demandado en su condición de Administrador Tributario (artículo 37 de la Ley no. 9036) e investido con las facultades otorgadas por el ordenamiento jurídico vigente (ordinales 52, 103, 128 y 171 inciso 14 del CNPT), emitió el oficio IA-FT-03-2013, el cual para la Sala, no tiene efecto propio. En consecuencia, considera esta Cámara, no se produce la transgresión de la normativa alegada.

V.- En la segunda censura, la promovente invoca desaplicación del mandato 40 de la Ley no. 6735 y su reglamento. Dice, la resolución impugnada infiere que las que las facultades fiscalizadoras del Inder son irrestrictas. Expone, esa estimación le lleva a desaplicar lo establecido en el artículo 40 de la Ley 6735 y su reglamento. Señala, de acuerdo con la norma de reciente cita, el Instituto demandado y sus funcionarios, están facultados para ejercer la fiscalización y el control de la recaudación de los tributos asignados, así como intervenir y procurar el cumplimiento de las normas legales que otorgan los recursos económicos. No obstante, para realizar esa tarea, debe contar con la colaboración obligada de la Dirección General de Tributación Directa (en futuras referencias DGTD) y los demás entes públicos. Menciona, desafortunadamente, la persona juzgadora, bajo la errónea tesitura de que la Ley no. 7900 modificó el canon 99 del CNPT y, de manera tácita, también el ordinal 40 de la Ley no. 6735, validó la actuación del demandado. Añade, la Jueza Tramitadora tampoco explica, por qué su decisión se contrapone a lo dispuesto en el fallo constitucional no. 112823-2001.

VI.- Previo al ingreso del análisis del cargo, para una mejor comprensión del alcance de las normas citadas en el Considerando anterior, conviene hacer el repaso de cómo han sido transformadas a lo largo del tiempo. La ley no. 6735 del 29 de marzo de 1982 reformó varios artículos de la Ley no. 5792 del 1 de setiembre de 1975. Puntualmente, el numeral 35 de la Ley no. 6735 reformó el artículo 6 de la ley 5792, donde se creaba un impuesto sobre el consumo de refrescos gaseosos y bebidas carbonatadas a aplicarse sobre el precio del artículo antes del impuesto de ventas. Por su parte, el artículo 40 de la ley citada, señala, el IDA (actual Inder) tendría amplias facultades para ejercer la fiscalización y control en la recaudación de los tributos asignados. Asimismo, sus funcionarios, podrían intervenir en cualquier momento y en apego estricto de las normas legales que les otorgaban recursos económicos. Posteriormente, mediante la Ley no. 9036 que entró en vigencia el 29 de noviembre de 2012, se derogó casi en su totalidad la Ley no. 6735. Empero, los cánones 35 y 40 de la ley de reciente cita solo fueron reformados. Así, los artículos 37 y 40 de la norma vigente, respectivamente, señalan: “ARTÍCULO 37.- Normativa vigente a) Refórmase el artículo 35 de la Ley N.º 6735, de 29 de marzo de 1982. El texto es el siguiente: "Artículo 35.-Refórmanse los artículos 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 y 14 de la Ley N.° 5792, de 1 de setiembre de 1975. Los textos son los siguientes: […] Artículo 6.- Fíjase un impuesto específico por unidad de consumo para las bebidas carbonatadas de marcas nacionales y extranjeras, producidas en el país o importadas, de cinco coma setecientos veinticinco colones (¢5,725) a favor del Inder. En el caso de las micro y pequeñas empresas, cuya producción anual no exceda los dieciséis millones de unidades de consumo, el impuesto que aplicará por unidad de consumo de doscientos cincuenta ml (250 ml) será de dos coma treinta y cinco colones (¢2,35). […] Para estos efectos, cada fabricante deberá proporcionar al Inder una certificación que estipule el rendimiento teórico en mililitros de bebida terminada de cada producto que se comercialice. […] Le corresponde al Inder fijar y publicar mediante disposición de alcance general la actualización referida, dentro de los quince días anteriores a cada período trimestral de aplicación. […]” (Lo resaltado no corresponde al original); y, "Artículo 40.- El Inder tendrá amplias facultades para ejercer fiscalización y control en la recaudación de los diversos tributos asignados y podrá intervenir en cualquier momento previa notificación al sujeto pasivo, dentro de los plazos establecidos en el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, para asegurar el estricto cumplimiento de las normas legales que le otorgan recursos económicos. A efectos de fiscalizar la correcta aplicación de los impuestos establecidos en esta ley, el Inder queda facultado para revisar los libros de contabilidad y sus anexos en lo concerniente a esos impuestos. Para ello, los sujetos pasivos deberán suministrar toda la información que permita determinar la naturaleza y cuantía de la obligación tributaria, relacionada con los tributos correspondientes al Inder. El Inder, en su condición de Administración Tributaria, tendrá las facultades establecidas en el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. En cuanto a ilícitos tributarios el Inder tendrá las facultades establecidas en el título III de dicho Código, en lo que se refiere a infracciones y sanciones administrativas. Cuando el Inder, en la fase de fiscalización de los tributos que administra, tenga noticia de que se ha cometido un delito, procederá a denunciarlo al Ministerio Público. Para cumplir lo previsto en esta norma contará con la colaboración obligada de la Dirección General de Tributación, la Dirección General de Aduanas y de los demás entes públicos.” (El subrayado es nuestro) Ahora bien, respecto al precepto 99 del CNPT, la demandante afirma, no ha variado desde el año 1971. Manifiesta, la única modificación que experimentó, fue el cambio de numeración de 99 a 105. Sin embargo, revisado el texto de ambos mandatos, observa este Tribunal, el contenido del artículo 99 vigente si varió. Si bien es cierto, la numeración fue corrida, el cambio surge a partir del ordinal 3 de la Ley de Justicia Tributaria no. 7535 del 1 de agosto de 1995, que derogó el contenido anterior del canon 99 respecto al incumplimiento de los deberes formales y traspasó el antiguo contenido del precepto 105 a esa numeración. Es decir, el artículo 99 sí fue derogado en el año 1995 y su contenido sustituido por el que se hallaba en ese momento en el cardinal 105. Por ende, no lleva razón la casasionista respecto a que la norma se encuentra incólume desde el año 1971. No obstante, cabe destacar, tanto el artículo 99 como el numeral 105 han sido modificados, pero por los ordinales 3 y 5 de la Ley de Justicia Tributaria no. 7535, el canon 1 de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria no. Placa7893 y el numeral 2 de la Ley para el Cumplimiento del Estándar de Transparencia Fiscal no. 9068. Así las cosas, los artículos 99 y 105 vigentes, respectivamente, dicen: “Artículo 99.- Concepto y facultades Se entiende por Administración Tributaria el órgano administrativo encargado de gestionar y fiscalizar los tributos, se trate del fisco o de otros entes públicos que sean sujetos activos, conforme a los artículos 11 y 14 del presente Código. Dicho órgano puede dictar normas generales para los efectos de la aplicación correcta de las leyes tributarias, dentro de los límites fijados por las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias pertinentes. Las normas generales serán emitidas mediante resolución general y consideradas criterios institucionales. Serán de acatamiento obligatorio en la emisión de todos los actos administrativos y serán nulos los actos contrarios a tales normas. Tratándose de la Administración Tributaria del Ministerio de Hacienda, cuando el presente Código otorga una potestad o facultad a la Dirección General de Tributación, se entenderá que también es aplicable a la Dirección General de Aduanas, a la Dirección General de Hacienda y a la Dirección General de la Policía de Control Fiscal, en sus ámbitos de competencia.”; y, “Artículo 105.- Información de terceros. Toda persona, física o jurídica, pública o privada, estará obligada a proporcionar, a la Administración Tributaria, la información previsiblemente pertinente para efectos tributarios, deducida de sus relaciones económicas, financieras y profesionales con otras personas. La proporcionará como la Administración lo indique por medio de reglamento o requerimiento individualizado. Este requerimiento de información deberá ser justificado debida y expresamente, en cuanto a la relevancia en el ámbito tributario. […]” (El subrayado no es del original) Siguiendo con el examen de lo alegado, es necesario referirse al voto constitucional no. 12823-2001 de las 10 horas 34 minutos del 14 de diciembre de 2001. Al respecto, la promovente dice, la juzgadora no explica por qué contrario a lo dispuesto en el fallo de reciente cita, concluye, el Inder posee facultades irrestrictas de fiscalización tributaria. La aludida sentencia conoce de la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (actualmente Inder). En dicho voto, la Sala Constitucional concluyó, cuando el IDA dictó el citado reglamento invadió el campo de acción del Poder Ejecutivo. Por ende, decretó la inconstitucionalidad del reglamento, más no así del impuesto sobre el consumo de refrescos y bebidas carbonatadas. Indicó, al no existir norma específica que autorizara la reglamentación de los procedimientos de control, verificación y fiscalización a los que se refería el canon 40 de la Ley no. 6735 para el caso de los tributos contenidos en el artículo 6 de la Ley no. 5792; éstos deberían regirse a la luz del CNPT. Finalmente, consideró innecesario referirse a los aspectos particulares de normas allí contenidas, en tanto no es de trascendencia para el fondo de la solución jurídica de la parte. Por lo expuesto el reparo debe rechazarse.

VII.- En el caso sub examine, la casacionista debate las facultades fiscalizadoras irrestrictas del Inder. A su juicio, la determinación del órgano jurisdiccional es equívoca. Sostiene, el Instituto demandado no tiene potestad para requerir documentación confidencial e imponer sanciones. Señala, para esas acciones necesita de la intervención obligada de la DGTD y los entes públicos. Fundamenta su posición en la falta de aplicación del artículo 40 de la Ley no. 6735 y su reglamento, la incorrecta interpretación del numeral 99 del CNPT y la falta de análisis del fallo constitucional no. 1283-2001 de las 10 horas 34 minutos del 14 de diciembre de 2001. De conformidad con lo esbozado en el Considerando anterior, el canon 40 de la Ley no. 6735 fue reformado por la Ley no. 9036 y, el citado reglamento declarado inconstitucional. Ahora bien, el mandato 40 de la Ley no. 9036 expresamente indica, que el Inder tiene condición de Administración Tributaria. Refiere, de conformidad con el CNPT, esa categoría le faculta para ejercer la fiscalización y control de la recaudación de los diversos tributos asignados. Puede intervenir en cualquier momento previa notificación al sujeto pasivo, dentro de los plazos establecidos por el CNPT. Igualmente, puede revisar los libros contables y sus anexos en lo tocante a los impuestos. Establece la ley que los sujetos pasivos deben suministrar toda la información que permita determinar la obligación tributaria, en el caso concreto, el impuesto de consumo para las bebidas carbonatadas demarcas nacionales y extranjeras, producidas en el país o importadas. Estipula el citado cuerpo normativo, además, que cuando conozca de la existencia de un delito lo denunciará ante el Ministerio Público y, para cumplir con lo previsto contará con la colaboración obligada de la Dirección General de Tributación, la Dirección General de Aduanas y de los demás entes públicos. Para proseguir con el razonamiento del cargo, resulta ineludible concretar el concepto de colaboración obligada. El principio de colaboración o cooperación refiere a relaciones de ayuda mutua; es decir, la acción y el efecto del trabajo conjunto entre distintos órganos para el logro común de sus objetivos. El hecho de que el Inder cuente con la colaboración obligada de la Dirección General de Tributación, la Dirección General de Aduanas y de los demás entes públicos para hacer cumplir la obligación tributaria del sujeto pasivo, no elimina su condición de Administración Tributaria, ni excluye su facultad de fiscalizador y controlador de la recaudación de los tributos asignados, todas otorgadas por ley. Respecto a la documentación solicitada, la información se circunscribe a la dispuesta en los artículos 103 inciso b), 104 y 116 del CNPT, por lo que no se denota intromisión ilegítima en temas de confidencialidad de la empresa actora, al respecto valga aclarar, el derecho a la intimidad es un derecho personalísimo de los seres humanos, el cual no cubre a las personas jurídicas. En relación con la falta de aplicación del artículo 40 de la Ley no. 6735 y su reglamento, debe indicarse, la ley fue derogada y el canon reformado. Empero, el antiguo artículo también concedía amplias facultades para ejercer fiscalización y control en la recaudación de los tributos. Respecto al reglamento, fue declarado inconstitucional mediante el voto no. 12823-2001 de las 10 horas 34 minutos del 14 de diciembre de 2001. En ese fallo, la Sala Constitucional determinó, el IDA (hoy Inder) solo tenía competencia para dictar reglamentos de servicio, no así de procedimientos de control, verificación y fiscalización a los que se refería el artículo 40 de la Ley no. 6735, por lo que estableció como dimensionamiento de los alcances de la acción que el ente demandado debía hacer la solicitud de los requerimientos fiscales a partir de las disposiciones del CNPT, tal como aconteció en el caso bajo examen. Relativo al numeral 99 del CNPT, cabe indicar, sí fue modificado por la Ley de Justicia Tributaria no. 7535 del 1 de agosto de 1995. A partir de esa fecha, ese enunciado establece, la Administración Tributaria es el órgano administrativo encargado de gestionar y fiscalizar los tributos, ya sea que se trate del fisco o de otros entes públicos que sean sujetos activos (artículos 11 y 14 del CNPT). Al tener el Inder condición de Administración Tributaria y ser un sujeto activo, no se vislumbra que el órgano jurisdiccional haya realizado una incorrecta interpretación del mandato. Finalmente, tal y como se ha mencionado reiteradamente, el fallo constitucional no. 12823-2001 no cuestionó las facultades fiscalizadoras del Instituto demandado. Lo que sí debatió fue su competencia para dictar reglamentos de procedimientos de control, verificación y fiscalización. Por esa razón, declaró inconstitucional el Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, aprobado por la Junta Directiva en el artículo XVI de la sesión 31-00, celebrada el 24 de abril de 2000, publicado en La Gaceta N° 101 del 26 de mayo de 2000 y, concluyó, los requerimientos debían hacerse a la luz de las disposiciones del CNPT. Por tanto, al emitir el oficio IA-FT-03-2013 en condición de Administración Tributaria y, en apego a la norma dispuesta en el CNPT, hay razón suficiente para estimar, que actuó dentro del marco de sus competencias legales. En consecuencia, procede el rechazo del cargo.

VIII.- En el tercer reproche, la accionante arguye violación de la vinculatoriedad erga omnes de la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional no. 2001-12823 de las 10 horas 34 minutos del 14 de diciembre de 2001. Señala, acorde al artículo 13 de la LJC y sus reformas, el voto supra indicado debió aplicarse al caso de exégesis. Relata, la Sala Constitucional desde el año 2001 determinó, el IDA (hoy Inder) no estaba autorizado para reglamentar procedimientos de control y fiscalización, ni tener acceso a documentación confidencial. El ordinal 13 de la LJC estable el principio de vinculatoriedad erga omnes. Refiere, la jurisprudencia y los precedentes de la Sala Constitucional son vinculantes respecto a todos, salvo para sí misma. Indica, su validez presupone la existencia de un principio constitucional que le otorgue fundamento normativo. Por ende, tiene un doble fundamento constitucional. Primeramente, el previsto en el artículo 42 de la Carta Magna que dispone, la persona juzgadora que dicte una resolución no puede resolver su apelación o el recurso extraordinario que proceda contra ésta, nadie puede ser juzgado más de una vez por un mismo hecho punible (non bis in ídem), no pueden reabrirse causas penales fenecidas y juicios fallados con autoridad de cosa juzgada, salvo cuando proceda el recurso de revisión; y, en segundo término, el principio constitucional de regularidad jurídica. Por ello, las resoluciones emitidas por la Sala Constitucional, tanto en su parte dispositiva como en su ratio decidendi, obligan positivamente a todos los órganos y entes estatales, al cumplimiento de lo allí decidido y, prohíben de manera absoluta la reproducción total o parcial, de los actos o disposiciones anulados por medio de la misma Administración recurrida o de cualquier otra autoridad administrativa. Las resoluciones de la Sala son vinculantes no sólo en su parte dispositiva, sino también en su ratio decidendi. Tal y como se ha indicado en los Considerandos anteriores, en el citado fallo constitucional, la Cámara de Juzgadores determinó la falta de competencia del Inder para reglamentar los procedimientos de control, verificación y fiscalización a los que se refería el artículo 40 de la Ley no. 6735 (reformado por la Ley no. 9036). Por esa razón, declaró la inconstitucionalidad del Reglamento para la Administración de los Tributos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, aprobado por la Junta Directiva en el artículo XVI de la sesión 31-00, celebrada el 24 de abril de 2000, publicado en La Gaceta N° 101 del 26 de mayo de 2000. No obstante, contrario a lo esbozado por la demandante, concluyó, los requerimientos debían hacerse a la luz de las disposiciones del CNPT. Obsérvese, el Considerando IV, expresamente, dice: “IV.- La potestad reglamentaria del IDA. Análisis de fondo. […] En el caso de los tributos contenidos en el artículo 6 de la Ley No. 5792, reformado por el artículo 35 de la Ley No. 6735, no existe una norma específica que autorice a la reglamentación de los procedimientos de control, verificación y fiscalización a que se refiere el artículo 40 de la Ley No. 6735, como lo expresa la Procuraduría General de la República, y es esta la razón principal para que el IDA deba hacer la construcción a partir de las disposiciones del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios y no de su propia Ley, […] (El subrayado es nuestro). Por tanto, contrario a lo manifestado por la parte actora, la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional no. 2001-12823 de las 10 horas 34 minutos del 14 de diciembre de 2001, en su parte considerativa, según lo expuesto líneas arriba; estableció que el IDA (actual Inder), debía construir sus requerimientos a partir de lo regulado en el CNPT. Por ende, al emitirse el oficio IA-FT-03-2013 en apego a lo previsto en el CNPT, el demandado accionó dentro de los parámetros señalados en la parte considerativa del citado fallo, lo que resulta un desencadenamiento que también es vinculante. De ahí, considera esta Cámara, el accionado procedió en correspondencia a lo dispuesto en el voto constitucional y, por consiguiente, deviene el rechazo del vicio.

IX.- En merito de las razones expuestas, se impone el rechazo del recurso formulado, con sus costas a cargo de quien lo interpuso (artículo 150 inciso 3 del CPCA).

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso interpuesto, con sus costas a cargo de la actora.

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