Confirmation of Aggravated Fraud Conviction Against PAC through Simulated ContractsConfirmación de condena por estafa mayor contra el PAC mediante contratos simulados

Resolution: 2017-1491 Resolution: 2017-1491 Case File: 12-000024-0033-PE (3) TRIAL COURT OF CRIMINAL SENTENCE APPEALS. Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Goicoechea, at ten hours fifty minutes, on the fourteenth of December of two thousand seventeen.- APPEALS filed in the present case brought against MAYNOR RICARDO STERLING ARAYA, of legal age, Costa Rican, identity card number 4-0107-0497, born in Heredia, on November 20, 1954, son of Justino Sterling Sterling and Virginia Araya Rojas, marital status unknown, by profession business administrator, resident of Heredia, 200 meters north of the Walmart and MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO, of legal age, Costa Rican, identity card number 9-0002-0051, born in Alajuela, on January 8, 1944, son of Manuel Bolaños Vargas and Iris Murillo Alvarado, married, employee of the Partido Acción Ciudadano, resident of San José, Moravia, from the colegio de Agrónomos 100 meters east and 100 meters north; for the crime of MAJOR FRAUD (ESTAFA MAYOR) AND ANOTHER, to the detriment of THE STATE AND ANOTHER. Judge Rosa María Acón Ng, Judge Kathya Jiménez Fernández, and Judge Edwin Salinas Durán participate in the decision on the appeal. Appearing at this venue are: attorney Alexander Valverde Peña, representing the Deputy Prosecutor's Office of Appeals (Fiscalía Adjunta de Impugnaciones); Masters Milton Castro Serrano and José Rafael Cabrera Badilla, in their capacity as private co-defense attorneys for the defendant Sterling Araya; attorney Randall Albán Aguirre Mena, as legal representative of the Procuraduría General de la República; attorney Ronny Guevara Mora, representing the Partido Acción Ciudadana; attorney Greysa Barrientos Núñez and attorney Alexander Valverde Peña, both representing the Appeals Unit of the Public Ministry.

WHEREAS:

I.- That by means of judgment number 1146-2016, of ten hours on December five, two thousand sixteen, the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, resolved: "THEREFORE (POR TANTO): In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 39, 41, 96 of the Political Constitution; 1, 30, 45, 50, 59 to 63, 71, 106, 216 subsection 2) of the Penal Code; Law 9271 of October 31, 2014; Articles 52, 86 to 119 of the Electoral Code; 1, 6, 10, 16, 141, 111 to 124, 142, 175 to 179, 181, 182, 184, 200, 239, 258, 265, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367, 368, 376 and 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code; Current Rules on Civil Liability Articles 1045, 1046, 1048 and 1163 of the Civil Code, Articles 16, 42 and 44 of the Executive Decree on Fees No. 36562, Regulation on the Financing of Political Parties, Decree No. 17-2009 of October 15, 2009, this court by unanimity of votes resolves: It is declared that MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA and MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO are co-perpetrators responsible for A CRIME OF MAJOR FRAUD (ESTAFA MAYOR), as reclassified, to the detriment of the PUBLIC TREASURY (ERARIO PÚBLICO) and in such capacity, MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA is imposed the penalty of SIX YEARS OF PRISON and MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO is imposed the penalty of THREE YEARS OF PRISON, penalties that once the judgment is final, must be served in the place and manner determined by penitentiary regulations. As he meets the legal requirements, the convicted person MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO is granted the Benefit of Conditional Execution of the Sentence (Beneficio de Ejecución Condicional) for a period of FIVE YEARS, a period during which he must comply with the following conditions: maintain a fixed address and if there is a change, report it to the Office where the case is located, and not commit an intentional crime for which he is convicted with a sentence equal to or greater than six months of prison, otherwise this benefit will be revoked. Until the finality of this judgment and starting from Monday, January 9, 2017, the convicted person MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA is ordered to appear to sign in once a month at the Office where the case is being processed, and his exit from the country is prohibited, for which purpose he is ordered to surrender his passport at the office of this Court within the next forty-eight hours, if he has one. WITH RESPECT TO THE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES (ACCIÓN CIVIL RESARCITORIA): The civil action for damages filed by the Procuraduría General de la República representing the COSTA RICAN STATE against the civil defendants MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA, MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO and THE PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA is declared PARTIALLY WITH MERIT, for which they are sentenced to pay JOINTLY (EN FORMA SOLIDARIA) the following items: a.-) For the concept of pecuniary damage the sum of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES, plus the interest generated from the consummation of the act until its effective cancellation. The payment of personal costs (costas personales) is accepted in the amount of FORTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND COLONES, for the concept of procedural costs (costas procesales) the sum of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES arising from the expert report derived from the civil action for damages. The claim for social damage is rejected. The liquid sums set in the judgment must be deposited by the civilly convicted parties within a period of fifteen business days, otherwise the Procuraduría General de la República must resort to the corresponding avenue to claim them. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA and MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO are sentenced to pay the COSTS OF THE PRIVATE PROSECUTION (COSTAS DE LA QUERELLA) in the sum of SIX MILLION SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED COLONES. REGARDING THE SEIZED DOCUMENTS: As they form part of the evidentiary material of the case, the seized evidence shall be preserved. Notify the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería of the prohibition on leaving the country decreed against MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA. Once the judgment is final, send the testimony of the same to the Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena and the Instituto Nacional de Criminología for their respective duties. The judicial file is made available to the Public Ministry for the opening of an investigation for the crime of False Testimony (Falso Testimonio) against Mrs. LAURA MARÍA GARRO SÁNCHEZ. By reading, let it be notified" (sic).

II.- That against the previous ruling, an appeal was filed by attorney Alexander Valverde Peña, representing the Deputy Prosecutor's Office of Appeals; Masters Milton Castro Serrano and José Rafael Cabrera Badilla, in their capacity as private co-defense attorneys for the defendant Sterling Araya; attorney Randall Albán Aguirre Mena, in his capacity as Criminal Prosecutor (Procurador Penal); and attorney Ronny Guevara Mora, representing the Partido Acción Ciudadana.

III.- That once the respective deliberation was carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court considered the questions raised in the appeal.

IV.- That the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

The Judge of Criminal Sentence Appeals Acón Ng writes; and, WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO):

I.- On the composition of the Court: As indicated in the heading of this judgment, apart from Judges Edwin Salinas Durán and Rosa María Acón Ng, Judge Kathya Jiménez Fernández also participates in the resolution of the appeal, who was not at the hearing. This does not affect due process, nor the principle of immediacy (principio de inmediación), as no evidence was produced at the hearing, nor were the arguments of the appellants expanded, as attested by the members who did participate in it and as is seen in the recording made. The foregoing is done in strict conformity with the binding votes, erga omnes pursuant to Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, No. 1996-6681, of 15:30 hours on December 10, 1996, and 2007-017553, of 12:23 hours on November 30, 2007, both from the Sala Constitucional.

II.- Appeal of Master Milton E. Castro Serrano and Master José Rafael Cabrera Badilla, private defenders of the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya. A) In the first ground of their appeal, they claim infringement of due process and improper assessment of evidence leading to the violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), specifically the principles of derivation. They allege that from an enormous conglomerate of testimonies received at trial (approximately one hundred seventy witnesses), who were unanimous that the accused Sterling Araya had no relationship with the request to the militants of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter PAC) to sign the questioned contracts, the court proceeds to carry out a biased and isolated analysis of scarcely three witnesses to force the verification of his participation in what it calls a "fraudulent scheme", fracturing the principle of innocence that shelters their client. The three witnesses the court exclusively turns to in its argumentation are: Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, and José Reyes Gómez. The witness Valverde Conejo reported that she assumed that what "don Tony" was doing was endorsed by the accused Maynor Sterling Araya. First, because Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo made the proposition to her in the first-person plural, "we" and, second, because she understood that "all of this was something from the treasury". In the case of the witness Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, the co-defense attorneys assert that she was emphatic in saying that she assumed Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo was following instructions from the members of the executive committee, to which the defendant Sterling Araya belonged in his capacity as national treasurer. The appellants consider that what these deponents concluded was in reality, by way of presumption, that is, a subjective opinion. Only in the case of the witness José Reyes Gómez did he indicate that while at a party meeting at a place called "La Catalina" in Heredia, he heard Maynor Sterling Araya give instructions for some documents to be signed so that the party could pay them for the work they had done and thus help the party group. However, contrary to what the judges assert that dozens of people appeared to testify at trial to set out what the scheme was that was proposed to them by the defendants Maynor Sterling Araya and Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, with the exception of said two witnesses, who transmitted was a supposition that Sterling Araya "could" have some participation, and the witness Reyes Gómez who indicated he heard him say to sign them, none of the other one hundred seventy witnesses mentioned that their client had any relationship with the signing of the contracts. As an example of this, they cite the testimonies of Yanina Soto Vargas, Jenny Castro Acuña, and María Elena Rojas Mora, who went to "La Catalina" with the witness Reyes Gómez. The witness Castro Acuña in no way involved the accused Sterling, and indicated that the person who asked them to sign the documents was Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín, as national secretary of the party. The judges take out of context what was said by the deponent, which is absolutely contrasting with what was related by Reyes Gómez, and on the contrary consistent with the other witnesses who declared they were at "La Catalina", who did not place Sterling at the location. As for Mrs. María Elena Rojas Mora and Yanina Soto Vargas, they never said that the justiciable was at the site. The same as the gentlemen Alejandro Li Grau and Carlos Luis Solano Orozco, who also pointed to another person as the one who asked them to sign the documents. Despite the existence of these other testimonies that contradict what was said by Reyes Gómez, the judges exclude them and limit themselves to citing them in the judgment, but obviating the unavoidable analysis, giving absolute credibility to the former. In summary, the appellants affirm that the court completely biased the evidence, that it could not be considered proven that the accused was at "La Catalina" and that he had asked for the contracts to be signed. In the second ground of the appeal brief, the technical defense of the defendant claims violation of due process and improper assessment of evidence leading to the violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), specifically the principles of derivation. The appellants reproach the court for illegitimately analyzing the testimonial evidence, biasing its content, in that from an enormous conglomerate of statements received at trial (approximately one hundred seventy witnesses), who were emphatic in saying that the defendant Sterling Araya had no relationship with the stimulation and request to PAC militants to sign those contracts, it proceeded to make an absolutely illegitimate analysis of Mr. Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, as well as a distorted examination of the statements of their client to form the verification of participation in the so-called "scheme". Cordero Martínez was considered a suspicious witness precisely because the witnesses Isidro Navarro Vargas, Juan Luis Padilla Molina, and Cristian Padilla Molina, were emphatic that they signed the contract at his request. For his part, Cordero Martínez declared that the person who required him to sign the contract was the party secretary, Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín, and not any other member of the executive committee, so from that act, he went to look for other people to sign the contracts; a version that the court omitted in its analysis. It also disregarded the statements made by other witnesses who signed contracts and referred to a conversation that took place three years later, recorded with the consent of the defendant Sterling Araya, from which it is clear that he had no knowledge of the mechanism for subscribing said contracts, nor that he knew that the people who signed them had not performed the functions indicated therein. They cite an excerpt from the dialogue he had with Jeannette de la O Hernández, from which the defenders affirm, it is revealed that he was also not aware of the circumstances in which the contracts were signed. Far from extracting that their client was aware and was the architect of the deception, what emerges instead is that he understood that the people who signed the special service contracts had become entitled to the eventual and remote economic recognition that the type B certificates might attain, and not the PAC, with it corresponding to each person to decide what to do with the money. Contrary to this, the judges opted to point out that this reflected the defendant's knowledge that these people had provided their services free of charge, which finds no support in the abundant testimonial evidence, because what Sterling Araya recognized is that a value had been given to the work of the party's militants. They add that there is not a single witness out of the one hundred seventy, who said they were contacted or sought out by Sterling Araya to sign the contracts, yet the court illegitimately asserted that the witnesses stated as much, referring to the gentlemen and ladies Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, Flor de María Monge Arroyo, José Solís Rojas, Carlos Jaime Gutiérrez Trejos, Luis Carlos Odio Victory, Nicolás Alberto Murillo Rivas, Ricardo Coto Castillo, Ronald Johanning Quesada, Luis Alberto González Agüero, María Jeannette Ruiz Delgado, Laura María Garro Sánchez, Hernán Solano Venegas, Ronald Joaquín Campos Arias, Sylvia Cordero Rojas (who did not remember if she signed the document before Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo or before Maynor Sterling Araya), Rodrigo Alonso Paniagua Carranza and Crissia Fernández Mora, who according to the judges signed the documents at a meeting where Maynor Sterling Araya, Wilfrido Blanco Mora, María Esther Anchía Angulo, César Vindas Otárola, Alexandra Zamora Montero and Yolanda Acuña Castro were present. The only witness who said she did not remember if she signed before Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo or before Maynor Sterling Araya - the witness Sylvia Cordero Rojas -, her statement in light of the principle of reasonable doubt must be interpreted in favor of the justiciable and not to harm him as the court does. In the third ground pleaded in the appeal brief, they allege lack of substantiation of the judgment for infringement of the principle of derivation, this because according to the appellants, from what was said by that enormous number of witnesses it cannot be proven that the defendant Sterling Araya - who even worked ad honorem as national treasurer - contacted or sought out the contractors, and much less that he convinced them to sign under the argument that this contract was going to benefit the party. From the conversations the accused held with various militants, it is clear that he conveyed the conviction that the type B certificates belonged exclusively to the contractors and therefore they were the direct beneficiaries in the remote event that they should come to have economic content. The appellants object to the assessment given by the court to the recorded conversation between their client and Jeannette de la O Hernández, because at no time did he make any reference that he, in his capacity as national treasurer of the PAC, had knowledge or intention that the possible money obtained from those B certificates would be to increase the assets of said political group. In the fourth ground of their appeal, the appellants reproach violation of due process for insufficient substantiation. They assert that all the assessment of the elements of conviction were analyzed by the judges in a prejudiced manner, to the extreme of affirming in several sections of the judgment that the defendant Sterling Araya signed all the contracts, which is false as could be verified from what was stated by around one hundred seventy witnesses. The most serious thing is that despite the fact that the electoral regulatory system required the presentation of those documents from all political parties, Sterling was attributed with the ideation, fabrication, and presentation of the same through an illegitimate derivation from the testimonial evidence, an absolute violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), just as the judges commit the error of analyzing the evidence in a biased manner. They affirm that the creation of the special service contracts was not the work of their client because they already existed from the previous campaign, having provided evidence that proved that in said electoral contest, the political authorities of the PAC had presented in the liquidation for that period, contracts that were called for "personal services", whose structure was identical to the one used for the 2010 elections. Several witnesses, such as Leonel Sequeira, Margarita Bolaños Arquín, Olivier Pérez, and Oscar Fernández Venegas, were emphatic in pointing out the pre-existence of these contracts long before the accused assumed the position of national treasurer. They argue that the fact that the authorities and leaders of the PAC signed receipts and requested the identification of the people who signed contracts, is because the regulatory system itself (Article 47 of the Regulation on the Financing of Political Parties) required it of political parties, not from Maynor Sterling as the judges considered as part of his criminal plan to deceive the authorities. It is false what is indicated in the judgment, that Sterling Araya ratified with his signature the entirety of the contracts, because of the approximately "twenty-seven tens" of contracts, in none of them does their client's signature appear, but rather all were signed by Mrs. Margarita Bolaños, revealing the negative charge and the bias in the analysis of the evidence made by the judges. Furthermore, the gentlemen and ladies María Yenory Gutiérrez Brizuela and Carlos Morera Ballestero, permanent staff of the treasury, as well as Leonel Sequeira, internal auditor, coincided that the signing of the receipts by the defendant responded to fulfilling an administrative obligation, as he was the national treasurer. Through this testimonial evidence it was proven at trial that Mr. Sterling Araya did not remain regularly in the treasury office, but only appeared solely and exclusively to sign documents, he was not dedicated to reviewing the contracts, nor to the designation of bonds, and neither that he gave them instructions to structure a criminal plan. Furthermore, it was proven in the adversarial proceedings that the defendant did not even prepare the expense liquidation, but that this was done by Leonel Sequeira. They object that, for the court, their client's responsibility is inferred because he proposed the modification of the internal statutes of the PAC to increase the percentage of political debt (deuda política) that could be collected in those elections; however, Don Maynor as treasurer and expert on the subject, what he did was make a recommendation for said modification to be analyzed, a decision that corresponded to the core of the party. At that time there were political motives that generated such a need, and in that sense the witnesses Lilliam Arguedas, Amadeo Cordero, Margarita Bolaños, Olivier Pérez, and Herberth Herrera declared. According to the appellants, this also had a regulatory basis, as observed in the recommendation made by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in Resolution No. 1257-P-2000 of 13:50 hours on June 16, 2000. Being closely related, the claims contained in the first four grounds of the appeal are jointly resolved, and they are unfounded. The responsibility of the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya was determined by the Trial Court based on various evidentiary elements analyzed jointly, comprehensively, completely, and not isolated, segmented, and fragmented as the defendant's technical defense does, in an attempt to disqualify and invalidate the assessment and the conclusions reached by the judges. Upon examining the defense attorneys' allegations, their technique of analyzing the testimonial evidence in a biased manner and disconnected from the body of evidence, in order to thus demolish the structured, logical, and reasoned construction of the judgment, is more than evident. From the objections raised by the defense, what is extracted are personal opinions, conjectures, a simple disagreement with the outcome of the conviction, and an attempt to reassess the testimonial evidence according to their client's interests. Contrary to what was interpellated, this Chamber notes that the lower court meticulously addressed each one of the pieces of evidence incorporated in the trial, concatenating the actions of the defendant Sterling Araya that allowed for unequivocally establishing the direction of the plan executed for the purpose of deceiving the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, by presenting a liquidation of expenses for special services that he knew did not conform to reality, to inflate the quota of political debt (deuda política) and thus, for the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter PAC) to receive a greater state contribution than owed. The appellants seek to have it accepted that if approximately one hundred seventy witnesses did not say that it was directly the justiciable who asked them to sign the service contracts, then Don Maynor was not part of the "fraudulent scheme" to defraud the Costa Rican State. This argument not only disregards criminal participation through the figure of control over the act (dominio del hecho), but also seeks to ignore the forcefulness of the accounts provided by the witnesses Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, and José Reyes Gómez, with the appellants asserting that the first two did was "assume" or "presume" that the co-defendant Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo asked them to sign following Sterling Araya's instructions, and regarding the last, evading its impact despite his assertiveness, by indicating that at the meeting held at the convention center called "La Catalina" in Birrí de Heredia, he heard when Don Maynor stated to party militants to sign the contracts to collaborate with its finances. The considerations put forward by the claimants, it is reiterated, respond to their particular and subjective way of examining the evidence, partially and distanced from one another, with the aim of extracting different deductions from those of the judgment. That they randomly name several witnesses who attended the gathering at "La Catalina" (Silvia Yanina Soto Vargas, Jenny Castro Acuña, María Elena Rojas Mora, Alejandro Li Grau, and Carlos Luis Solano Orozco), attempting to discredit the participation of the accused Sterling Araya by stating Castro Acuña that the person who asked her to sign the documents was Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín, while Rojas Mora said she did not know Don Maynor and that it was the cantonal-level president of the PAC, Daniel Quesada, who requested it from her (see f. 2846); whereas Soto Vargas did not even mention if Sterling was in the place, and Li Grau stated he did not remember if he was there (see f. 2877), in no way do these statements discredit what was affirmed by the witness José Reyes Gómez, nor the direction of Sterling Araya in the implementation of the plan. It was an activity where many sympathizers, PAC representatives, and members of the executive committee were gathered, so it cannot be expected that in a crowd of that dimension, everyone necessarily had to determine who was present, like the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya, who due to the type of functions he performed for the party, was generally less known than Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo (even María Elena Rojas Mora indicated she did not know him), the latter with whom the majority of the collaborators had indeed dealt personally. To believe that the witnesses cited by the appellants, to refute the credibility of José Reyes Gómez, had to coincide that Don Maynor was at "La Catalina" and was the one who instructed the congregants to sign the contracts with their signatures, is to disregard the very psychology of testimony, because a group of people concentrated in one place, where some converse while others speak to the public, or are simply present, or are not attentive to details, are never all going to coincide on certain aspects, or such specific ones as who was the one who asked them to sign the documents in question, or if Don Maynor said it to a group of people, or to the collective. Furthermore, aspects inherent to the assessment of testimony must be taken into consideration, such as the time elapsed, the way each individual perceives facts, the way of expressing them, as well as the type of situation one seeks to evoke and the impact it caused. Note that the defenders do not even establish what significance or how the fact that the defendant Sterling Araya was present or not at "La Catalina", or was he or another who there reiterated the slogan of signing service contracts to support the party, has on what was resolved. It is in fact indifferent whether or not they were contacted by Don Maynor, that is, if Flor de María Monge Arroyo referred that they called her from the party, and it was Don Manuel Antonio Bolaños who gave her the documents to sign (see f. 2919); if José Solís Rojas said it was Tony who called him and that he does not know Don Maynor (see f. 2948); or that Luis Carlos Odio Victory stated he only knew Mr. Sterling by sight and that he only noticed the presence of Tony.

Through a simplistic rational exercise that evades the issue of liability for functional co-dominion of the act and the direction of the criminal course of events, the defense attorneys attempt to convince that because their client did not go to collect signatures, or was not seen at “La Catalina” or any other PAC meeting point, addressing the public to promote the signing of the documents, he had no relation to the artifice carried out. It is also irrelevant if the Trial Court erred in stating that the accused Sterling Araya ratified with his signature all the special service contracts, which were signed by Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín as General Secretary of the Executive Committee, since this situation does not diminish his participation within the plan, as the defendant concurred in the various stages of the iter criminis. Such actions on their own are not the only ones the Trial Court weighed to ground his co-perpetration of the consummated fraud, but rather a multitude of circumstances that the appellants avoid mentioning, precisely because a comprehensive analysis of the evidentiary elements, such as the one carried out by the a quo, leads to the inexorable determination that the fraudulent order and plan came from Maynor Sterling Araya and that he held the reins of the criminal course of events, and that the a quo did not reach such considerations due to a negative bias toward the defendant. An objective and appropriate reading of the statements of witnesses Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo and Gloria Cárdenas Miranda shows that neither of them made unfounded suppositions when asserting that the request of co-defendant Bolaños Murillo was backed by the instruction given by the defendant Sterling Araya, who was the Treasurer of the PAC at that time. As highlighted in the judgment, the testimony of witness Gloria Cárdenas Miranda is extremely important for affirming the liability that the technical defense now denies. Not only because she is one of the numerous persons who appeared at the debate to point out that it was co-defendant Bolaños Murillo who summoned her to induce her to sign the documents for supposed special contracts to give a respite to the battered finances of the PAC, but because he revealed who was behind all that planning. When Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo was requesting her signature and explaining the reasoning for signing them, Mrs. Cárdenas Miranda asked him who the whole scheme came from, to which he responded, from Don Maynor Sterling and Doña Margarita Bolaños. The witness emphasized: ...I asked Don Manuel why he was signing the document and he told me that I provided training services and I asked him who had said that, because I knew he was a pawn, and he told me: Margarita Bolaños and Don Sterling, the Committee… (see f. 2924, sic). The same must be said of the testimony of Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, who, although he points to the General Secretary of the party, Margarita Bolaños Arquín, as the one who prompted him to sign, as well as other close associates who turned out to be Isidro Navarro Vargas, Juan Luis Padilla Molina, and Cristian Padilla Molina, such indication in no way exonerates Sterling Araya, the architect of the fraudulent scheme to collect an undue disbursement from the State. The message was —almost invariably— that the signing of the documents was aimed at helping the party financially, by donating the proceeds from the contract they would sign, just as Bolaños Murillo told witness Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, who turned out to have been an envoy of Sterling Araya, as he in turn expressed to deponent Gloria Cárdenas Miranda (see f. 2839 and 2924). It is not, then, an unfounded presumption of the witnesses as the appellants claim, but a deduction they arrived at according to the circumstances, which was confirmed by the elements adduced by the trial court. The judgment states: “...the trial court had the opportunity to directly observe that the witnesses signed those documents out of the great affection and trust they had for the PAC, a party that had raised the banner of ethics and austerity, to help it financially, but they were induced into error because what they did not know was that the party’s intent was for that supposed expense to add up to give greater content to the assignment certificates to the state contribution of series A, which was in the hands of the party's largest 'creditors' and its largest contributors” (cf. f. 3694). Therefore, the scope that the appellants seek to give to the point of whether Don Maynor intervened directly by incentivizing party militants to sign the contracts to credit his participation, is not really what is conclusive, but rather a set of elements obtained from the examination of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, which betray Don Maynor's fraud (dolo) together with his author's plan to deceive the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), which goes beyond the fact of acting as treasurer of the PAC at the date of the criminal events, as well as being part of the executive committee. The testimony of Jeannette de la O Hernández, who also made an audio recording (of having convinced the supporters, personally, to sign the documentation through which the PAC would obtain the equity benefit) of what the accused Sterling Araya stated during the meeting held at the central headquarters of the PAC (see fs. 3527-3556), is one of the pieces that corroborates that Don Maynor indeed knew of and coordinated the plan for special contracts to be signed by party collaborators in order to charge them against the state contribution to political parties, and the fact that he did not request it directly from each of the witnesses who testified at the debate does not detract from his contribution and intervention in the criminal structuring. It was the same presidential candidate for the PAC, Ottón Solís Fallas, who, faced with the concern expressed by Doña Jeannette, because she was being inquired of by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and was even questioning that having provided a service paid by the party, the providers did not report the income to the tax authority, referred her to Don Minor, upon which she and a group of affected persons requested a meeting. What Sterling Araya explained there to those confronting him is the same discourse that on various occasions he disseminated through co-defendant Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, or Margarita Bolaños Arquín, or some local leaders of the PAC such as Daniel Quesada and Eduardo Solís, or even militants such as Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, in the sense that the collaborators' work, even being gratuitous and motivated by empathy for the party's ideals, had to be assigned an economic value. If acknowledgment was obtained from the State, it would be paid to them, or they could donate it to the group, an option that the majority of the witnesses accepted due to their sense of identity, belonging, and loyalty to the cause and, except in some cases, without truly internalizing that it implied an improper charge to the public treasury. Of interest from the recording, it is worth highlighting the following conversations: “MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Well, you remember that during the political campaign you were asked, because you were working on the political campaign, if you wanted to help the party, and since you were working, that work could be quantified and that you would be paid with B bonds, and if that money was acquired as political debt you would decide, two things, one if you kept it and two if you donated it to the party, that was it, it turns out that you signed four documents, (voices that cannot be understood what they say), you signed four documents. JEANNETTE JULIA ROMAN GONZÁLEZ: Now we are in trouble Don Maynor because we do not remember that…” (cf. f. 3529-3530). “MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: ...nobody received money, Why? because the party, due to the quantity of bonds it obtained, did not even cover the totality of A bonds...” (cf. f. 3530). “MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: ...this was kept in custody here for all persons. And why did we leave it in custody?… in the 2002 campaigns and the 2006 campaign… people came and started selling this on the street, and this has no value until the Tribunal says...” (cf. f. 3532). “JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Yes, but what services I provided to the PAC, I said they had to give me that money. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: The special services. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: But the only thing I did was put my car to work and I worked at the tables, I did not want any money. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: It's that this work was quantified and a price was put on it, that's it. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: That without knowing it. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: What do you mean without knowing it? JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: No, I did not know. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Exactly, yes. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Of course, that must have been explained to you. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Yes, we have the document here, but I do not remember at any time, that I was going to receive that amount of money for having provided the car service and for having worked as a poll watcher, which I was never able to do because the paper never reached me. Do you understand me? MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Yes, yes of course I understand you. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: So what I base this on is, if that money had existed, I would have received that one million two hundred thousand they were going to give me. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Eight hundred… MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: But well then, on that I cannot answer you, because well, you are responsible for signing your documents. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: I know, I said, my signature goes on that but… GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: But you didn't handle that, you didn't handle collecting signatures Don Maynor. GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: No one knows how that was collected. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: But what do you mean no one knows. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: I don't get that, I mean I don't understand that part. GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: But, it's that, you didn't handle that Don Maynor? You didn't handle that? You didn't handle collecting signatures… MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: No, no, no, I don't do those things.” (cf. 3547, 3548, and 3549). “JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: At what point was I named a Casa Conde advisor? Transport Advisor, I remember having put my car at the service of the PAC, and without charging anything, because I said, I'll put my own gasoline, anyway we didn't even work much, because there wasn't much service there with the car. So I said, I'll provide my car, I am not going to charge, I am going to give my gasoline the times I have to fill my tank, I donate it to the PAC, I am not going to charge a single cent, OK. After that, the other service I don't know, because the only service I provided was working as a poll watcher, there at the tables...” (cf. f. 3549). “JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: But, I don't know why I was going to receive such a large amount?” (cf. f. 3550, sic). Contrary to what the appellants argue, the foregoing transcripts confirm that Sterling Araya had knowledge of the signing of the “special contracts,” which he could not charge to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal since he knew that the services had been provided gratuitously. As much as he feigned surprise at the meeting about the unreality of the services described in the contracts and their disproportion with the stated amounts, blaming the grantors themselves for not reading what they had signed, it is clear that Don Maynor's knowledge and intentions went beyond the generous gesture of recognizing an economic valuation for the collaborators' work. Jeannette de la O Hernández herself expressed to the accused that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand colones was too much money for what she did during the campaign (supplying gasoline to her vehicle from her own funds and driving it, as well as acting as a poll watcher and an advisor at Casa Conde, which she refused), which Sterling Araya could not overlook, just like the approximately 179 contracts signed by the witnesses who appeared at the debate to tell that their contribution had been voluntary and without compensation, or that they had not provided any service at all. On that occasion, he also tried to distance himself from knowledge of the inconsistencies in the documents, vehemently rejecting that he had taken them to the signatories to be signed, stating: “—no, no, no, no, I don't do those things.” When it is evident that, due to his position as treasurer of the PAC, the task of collecting signatures was not his responsibility, but rather a series of functions by which the charging of an item for “special services” that the PAC had not paid for could not have gone unnoticed. According to Article 30 of the Statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, the group's treasurer was responsible for: a) Coordinating his work with the National Finance Commission. b) Controlling the financial and accounting management of the party and ensuring the strict application of all electoral and legal norms governing the matter, both for private contributions and for state contributions to political parties, especially the regulations issued for that purpose by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), being completely responsible for compliance with the law in this matter. c) Presenting reports to the National Executive Committee and the Political Commission, with a copy to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, regarding the contributions received and the financial progress of the party, with said reports required monthly from one year before the national election until six months after the municipal elections conclude, and quarterly for the rest of the time. d) Presenting an annual report to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. e) Following up on the accounting record of income and expenses of the political party Acción Ciudadana (Article 30 of the Statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana; ordinal 123 of the Electoral Code). f) Faithfully recording the amount and origin of the private contributions, of any kind, that the political party Acción Ciudadana received and the identity of those contributors. See that within Sterling Araya's role as treasurer of the PAC, was the accounting control of the party's money inflows and outflows, which makes it implausible his refusal to accept that he was aware that the contracts were simulated, since the expenses stated in the documentation were never generated for the group. But furthermore, as the a quo properly analyzes, Don Maynor could not introduce into the expense settlement for the collection of the state contribution, services provided gratuitously by party sympathizers, as they not only did not constitute an outlay made, but also revealed another irregularity: not including those donations in his reports to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal as contributions to the party. His clear objective was to present them as disbursements to manage to give the greatest possible economic content to the series A bonds, for the more significant the amount of expenses generated and justified by a political party during the electoral campaign, the more considerable what would be received from the state contribution for the PAC's participation in the national elections would be. One must bear in mind that the political quota for the parties is defined based on two factors: the total valid votes obtained by the political group in the electoral process, and the full amount of expenses settled by the latter before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. This Chamber shares the analysis conducted in the judgment, regarding the simulated nature of the documents and the unavoidable knowledge that Don Maynor had thereof, based on being one of the architects of the plan, as derived from the functional dominion he had over the event, according to what was related by the witnesses and the excerpts from the referenced conversations: “Those documents consisted of the 'SPECIAL SERVICE PROVISION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA AND…'; that from its literal text contained a series of falsehoods (which the accused knew) and that sought to meet the legal requirements to justify an expense for special services that never occurred, for even though in some cases there were various tasks, these were not the ones indicated and in no case was any charge made. See then that this contract described the special service to be provided, these were generic titles with no real content, for example: Cantonal Elector Coordinator, General Cantonal Promoter, General Finance Coordinator, General Organization Coordinator, Cantonal Communications Coordinator, Cantonal Youth Coordinator, and Cantonal Transport Coordinator. With the direct perception provided by the adversarial process, this Trial Court could easily extract from the body language and verbal language of the contractors, their astonishment upon seeing the contract and the assigned position. The vast majority stated they did not know what the position was, what it consisted of, who had appointed them, what their supposed responsibilities would be, and in no case were they asked for accounts or reports on their functions. Another false content of the contract, which ultimately served as a ruse before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, was the amount of the total payment made. An immense majority of the contractor witnesses examined, as seen in Considerando VII, said they had never agreed upon or collected any monetary sum, surprised by this clause and in several cases, deeply dismayed and even angry because they never even had the intention of quantifying their work economically. Others, with a clear interest in protecting their political party, tried unsuccessfully to justify the amount, claiming they performed arduous work, that it was what other parties paid, that it was established according to the minimum wage of their professions, that it was an amount extracted from the total hours worked, and multiple reasons that, compared with one another, make it clear that there was never an agreement between the parties, but rather that they were arbitrary and template amounts filled in by unknown persons at the order of the accused to deceive the electoral body. This contract also included the time range where the special service was supposedly provided, another clear example of the deception the accused attempted, for all the witnesses were in agreement in pointing out that said dates were not related to their functions within the party, when they provided them. They said they had worked before, after, never, or on other dates without also having charged for those periods or the one stated in the contract. All the dates were artificially imposed and filled in by the accused using other persons” (cf. f. 3803). The ruling thus sets forth how, through the same scheme of simulated contracts for large and similar amounts among themselves, the creation of false money receipts, and the issuance of series B certificates that, instead of being delivered to the service providers, were kept in the PAC's treasury, the co-defendants fabricated a framework with the appearance of legality so that all those contracts would enter as “party expenses” in the final settlement and thus achieve, according to the binomial “total votes obtained and expenses”, the approval of more money from the state contribution. It was Don Maynor who on June 16, 2010, at the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, specifically in the Department of Political Party Financing, presented in his capacity as treasurer of the national executive committee of the PAC, the expense settlement certification corresponding to the 2006-2010 electoral process, for a total amount that came to ¢4,238,108,764.79 (four billion two hundred thirty-eight million one hundred eight thousand seven hundred sixty-four colones and seventy-nine centimos). Of the total expense settlement, the item for “special services” reached a value of ¢1,152,040,184 (one billion one hundred fifty-two million forty thousand one hundred eighty-four colones), within which the fraudulent charge for ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones) was included, corresponding to the special service contracts contrary to reality. It was not just any amount that went unnoticed by the PAC's treasurer and that he included within the party's expense settlement; it was 263 simulated special service contracts for an amount that came to the sum of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones). As correctly indicated in the ruling, not only was it deliberately omitted by Sterling Araya to report to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal that they were donations, as he now seeks to validate in his defense, but these items represented 25% of the PAC's electoral expenses in the 2010 contest. An unprecedented figure for a party that promoted austerity and volunteerism among its militants, but which, in contrast, showed a wastefulness in expenses that had no coherence or made sense, with the witnesses themselves estimating that the amounts reflected therein were excessive. In their effort to circumvent their client's liability, the challengers attempt to offload it onto the internal auditor Leonel Sequeira, stating that he was the one who prepared the expense settlement, however, such effort cannot succeed. The Trial Court accurately derived from the statements of Julio Aguilar Silesky, Ronald Eduardo Chacón Bonilla, and of Leonel Sequeira himself, that the latter’s work was documentary in nature, his responsibility being the review that the accounting entries issued by the party corresponded to a justifiable payment, as well as that it complied with legal requirements, such as being accompanied by proof of payment. However, knowledge of the fiction contained in the special service contracts was within the purview of the accused Maynor Sterling. If Don Leonel came to know of the unreality of the contracts that were included in the settlement, this neither excludes nor diminishes Don Maynor's participation in the execution of the plan. In the concatenation of elements that indicate the direction of the actions of the defendant Sterling Araya (giving economic content to the assignment certificates to the state contribution of series A), the Trial Court highlights that in all cases, the same program was used of convincing the supporters to sign the documents as a recognition of an economic sense to their contribution, whether to donate it to the group and strengthen it, or to keep it for themselves as supposed compensation for the services they provided to the PAC. Furthermore, the judges detected that they were exactly the same templates whose blank spaces are written, in the vast majority, with the same handwriting, and for amounts and functions from which a large part of the witnesses dissented, considering them exaggerated given the tasks they actually performed, there also being a divergence between the functions that were recorded and those they actually exercised. The technical defense aims to have it believed in the good faith of the “special services” contracts, arguing their pre-existence, that they had already been used prior to the accused Maynor Sterling Araya assuming the position of Treasurer, and that the regulatory system itself required their preparation by the political parties. This chamber agrees with the a quo that there is no doubt whatsoever about the prior existence and the legitimacy of the instruments called special service contracts. They are certainly a legitimate instrument for party groups to be able to meet the need for services that are neither technical nor professional in nature and that can likewise be paid with assignment certificates of the state contribution, of the series the party deems pertinent as an absolutely valid payment mechanism, which they are and to which party groups resort to obtain resources and thus finance the ongoing campaign. As expressed by the trial court: “...the problem is not in the existence or non-existence of the special service contracts, whether they were used or not in other political campaigns, nor is it in the existence of the assignment certificates to the state contribution, the problem lies in the instrumentalization made of them to use them as the deceptive means to simulate non-existent expenses and thus deceive an institution like the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to manage to obtain greater resources from the state contribution illegitimately. It is not legal and it is not viable for the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the person very especially of the accused, to have remunerated work that it knew was voluntary, gratuitous, and ad honorem, a service that it also knew would be received just the same with or without a contract, as the tribunal has as accredited occurred in this case and whose purpose was to grant greater economic content to the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution of series A and thus be able to honor the debts held with the largest creditors and with the largest contributors during the electoral campaign. The use by Sterling Araya and Bolaños Murillo of legally admitted instruments was, rather, part of the suitability of the deception perpetrated against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, to which a false reality of things was represented, and which at the time of verifying compliance with the normative elements required in the expense settlement, confirmed that the instruments were those required by legislation and by virtue of the principle of good faith, assumed that the Partido Acción Ciudadana was telling the truth regarding its content. The witness Otton Solís Fallas is right when he indicates that there is nothing wrong with individuals donating the fruit of their labor to the party, but that is not the case before us because, on the part of the Partido Acción Ciudadana sympathizers, there was never the intention to charge because their work was gratuitous, and on the part of the party, there was never the intention to contract them and pay for their services; what was devised was a stratagem for illegal charging to the public treasury, giving it the 'appearance' of legality” (see fs. 3793-3794). Sterling Araya had the traced scheme so clear, that the series B bonds were not even delivered to the supposed providers of the services that were simulated as paid, or that emulated having existed, for as indicated, in some cases there were not even any involved. It was proven that another of the documents used was the “proof of payment,” which, like the contract, had a series of falsehoods that the witnesses themselves evidenced unanimously, since the literal text of the proof stated: “The Partido Acción Ciudadana has paid…”, and no amount was paid to anyone. The ruling points out to emphasize the fraud (dolo) with which Sterling Araya acted: “It is important to point out that in this proof of payment, STERLING ARAYA himself signs under the legend: 'Receipt in accordance for the good or service,' well knowing that, in the first place, the service had not been provided and in the second place, that the sum stated therein had never been charged or paid by the Partido Acción Ciudadana. This is, without a doubt, a pre-constitution of evidence for the fraud, which they would ultimately present before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Finally, as part of the ruse, the accused made the contractors instrumentalized for this fraud sign the document that read: “PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECEIPT FOR THE DELIVERY OF BONDS AS PAYMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES”. Again, a document full of falsehoods and inaccuracies, like the previous ones. This referenced the supposed delivery of Type B Certificates to the contractors, which never occurs in the one hundred seventy-nine contracts, with one exception. Even the vast majority of the witnesses never had visual contact with the certificate. On this point, one must remember that the Type A, B, or C Certificates issued by the Executive Committee of the Political Party are, as the Electoral Code in force for the year 2010 indicates, a valid means of payment for all legal effects, as ratified by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Reason for which what was appropriate was to deliver them to those who had provided goods or services to the Partido Acción Ciudadana and thus settle them in the expenses.

This was not the case for the simple reason that there was never any interest in redeeming them. The excuse given by STERLING ARAYA, to the effect that he did it to avoid potential harm to third parties in good faith who might receive them, as he alleged had occurred in previous elections, is unacceptable. The truth is that, by law, the contractors were the only valid holders, since they had been "paid with them." There was not a single document supporting the supposed instantaneous donation of these certificates to the party, or a request that the party at its central headquarters be the guardian of the Certificates. To prove the deceit of the defendants, it is interesting to note that Type A Certificates and Type B Certificates provided to companies or media outlets were indeed delivered, making the disparate treatment clear, their intentions differing from those stated in the literal text of this document. If the contractors intended to donate said amount to the Party once redeemed, the respective procedure for private party financing, in its donation modality, should have been followed. Which never happened. This is because, in the ideation of this criminal structure, they never intended to give them any value; instead, they served to artificially inflate expenses and thus gain access to 100% of the political debt to which the Partido Acción Ciudadana was entitled at that moment, owing to the abrupt change in its statutes that modified the cap from 50% to 100% of the state contribution to be received, and since this occurred after the elections, in the absence of real expenses for the political group P.A.C., they resorted to simulated contracts for special services. Thus, the simulated delivery of the B certificates was a fitting artifice (ardid) to mislead the Costa Rican electoral body, as applying the principle of trust that governs electoral matters and based on the literal text of the submitted documents, which bore the corresponding signatures, including those of the co-defendant STERLING ARAYA and Mrs. Margarita Bolaños, legally accredited a payment that was never made, never collected by the party members, and therefore should never have been accounted for as such. It is important to highlight, as stated, that the certificates, despite their nature, never left the central offices of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, by direct order of the co-defendant STERLING ARAYA. With an exception regarding the 263 contracts presented in this case, these B Certificates were never delivered, which clearly establishes that the defendants BOLAÑOS MURILLO and STERLING ARAYA never intended to give them the legal value they possess by law. Thus, the reasons given by STERLING ARAYA for their non-delivery are highly contradictory to the procedure given to the A certificates and even the B certificates given to companies or media outlets, disparate treatment that confirms that these were part of an elaborate artifice (ardid)" (cf. ff. 3804-3805). The Trial Court thus captured how all these contracts, which were given a similar procedure, were instrumentalized because their sole purpose was to inflate expenses to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Positions, activities, obligations, and amounts owed to the party were established without any objective parameter, but with absolute carelessness, in an arbitrary and capricious manner, which reveals nothing more than the design to make improper charges to the State. This Chamber agrees that unlike the series A certificates and the series B certificates that were delivered to important creditors of the party, the series B certificates related to the special services contracts remained in the possession of the defendant Sterling Araya, despite him issuing the corresponding receipts for the delivery of bonds, demonstrating that from their genesis, there was never any intention that they be even remotely redeemed, giving them a treatment different from the norm that unequivocally indicates that their reason for being was indeed to swell the PAC's expense item. Certainly, had the series B certificates been delivered to the supposed beneficiaries, any intention of collection for the borrowers appearing in the contracts would have been rendered nugatory, and the explanation given by Mr. Maynor, that they were not delivered to prevent their subsequent transfer because they had been issued to bearer, is unacceptable, since, as Margarita Bolaños Arquín asserted, the television company Repretel, several local radio stations, and individuals who gave cash to the party were paid with series B certificates, which were indeed physically delivered to them. The fact that the witnesses María Yenory Gutiérrez Briezuela and Leonel Sequeira indicated that the signing of the receipts by the defendant Sterling was for compliance with an administrative obligation as National Treasurer does not disconnect him from the contrivance and the scheme set up to defraud the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and rather links him to the other actions deployed, aimed at making an illegitimate and improper claim. The ruling also notes that according to what the witnesses stated at trial, the PAC's finances were extremely precarious for the 2010 elections and debts from the previous campaign were still accumulated. As Treasurer of the party, Mr. Maynor was obviously worried about not being able to cover the sums provided by banks and major creditors who had been paid with series A certificates. The judgment sets forth, in a technical and adequate manner, that before the 2006-2010 electoral campaign, the amount of state contribution for each party was 100% for its electoral and campaign expenses. It was starting from the year 2009, that pursuant to the text of Article 52 of the Electoral Code, political parties were required to stipulate in their statutes, in a precise distribution, a percentage of the state contribution for a reserve fund for political training and organization expenses during non-electoral times. The foregoing under the spirit of promoting parties as permanent entities, a reflection of Costa Rican democracy, and not mere electioneering machines hunting for votes in pursuit of winning elections. Internally, the Partido Acción Ciudadana had an austerity rule contained in Article 53 of the Statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the sense that the party group would never collect more than 0.08% of the gross domestic product. It also stipulated that the percentage allocated to the training and political organization reserve item would be 20% charged against the state contribution. This was a rule that economically limited the PAC and worried Maynor Sterling Araya, making him the main driver for a statutory reform to gain access to the full amount of state support. There is no doubt about this, despite his defense arguing that his work as National Treasurer was ad honorem, that he did not regularly stay on the treasury premises, but rather appeared solely and exclusively to sign documents. The judges highlight Mr. Maynor's concern about the PAC's finances in the 2010 electoral contest, noting that he, in his capacity as treasurer of the PAC, together with the treasurers of other political groups (Partido Movimiento Libertario and Partido Liberación Nacional), requested the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones on May 7, 2009, for a reconsideration of the situation, arguing it would imply a "technical financial closure" of parties entitled to the political debt, since the indicated deduction would result in the absolute impossibility of paying monetary obligations or commitments (bonds) already acquired, issued, or contracted, placing them in a financial "crossroads" (encrucijada), because they would have to tell many people or entities that they did not recover their investment, worsening the lack of credibility in political organizations and generating a very serious mistrust towards the financial system of political parties (see f. 3596). The Tribunal responded to the defendant and his counterparts that the portion of the state contribution to be allocated to training and organization was not optional but a duty. Faced with the alert that they would only be receiving 80% of the total amount (subject to expense approval), the ruling describes how the defendant devised a plan to financially satisfy the investors in the electoral campaign, consisting "of the simulation of a large number of contracts for special services supposedly paid with series B certificates of assignment to the state contribution, which were presented as expenses supposedly incurred by the Partido Acción Ciudadana before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. For this, the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the persons of the defendants, illegally assigned an economic value to the ad honorem, free, and voluntary work that their collaborators were performing or had already performed during the presidential campaign, and as is obvious and according to the words of witness Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González from the Political Party Financing Department, a free service cannot constitute an effective expense" (cf. f. 3597). The former presidential candidate and founder of the PAC, Ottón Solís Fallas, himself stated that Sterling Araya was one of the proponents of the statutory change who even deceived him, because Solís Fallas said that at some point he talked with Sterling to desist from promoting that statutory reform; however, far from adhering to the party's principles, he continued to push for its approval. On May 16, 2010, in San Pedro de Montes de Oca, precisely in the Edificio Cooperativo located behind the Mall San Pedro, the national assembly members of the PAC held the National Assembly No. 17, whose minutes record that the referenced statutory reform established in Articles 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56 took place that day. Article four of the minutes reports that Ms. Elizabeth Fonseca, President of the Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, proceeded to read a note left by Maynor Sterling Araya since he was out of the country on that date, for it to be read to the PAC's National Assembly. The minutes state the following: "...I proceed to read, as I told you yesterday, the letter left for us by Mr. Maynor Sterling. Mr. Maynor says: ...I will not be in Costa Rica from May 14 to 29 of this year .... Given that it will not be possible for me to be present at the National Assembly on May 15 ..., I find myself in the need to raise through this medium the reasons why I believe it necessary for our Partido Acción Ciudadana to try to collect the entirety of the political debt in accordance with the Electoral Code... Hence the importance of making this reform and registering it before we file the expense settlement with the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones for the collection of the state contribution in the month of June. For all the foregoing, I respectfully ask you to support the following initiative and vote in favor... if any of you wishes to know more about this matter, you can call me by phone or write to my email and I will try to elaborate on my reasoning a bit more, or if you see fit we can coordinate a meeting..." (cf. main case file volume I, ff. 413 to 415). The interest shown by the defendant to get the statutory reform approved before the filing date of the final expense settlement with the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones aimed to ensure that all those simulated expenses included therein would ultimately be recognized by the Political Party Financing Department and would contribute to giving economic value to the series A certificates. The appellants attempt to refute these assertions by claiming that Mr. Maynor even served as treasurer without receiving remuneration; however, during his tenure, he made it evident that the approval of the statutory reform was achieved thanks to his initiative, highlighting his merits as savior of the party's finances, when he reported: "I wish to highlight the approval by the National Assembly, at the request of the National Treasury, of the collection of the entirety of the political debt (sic), a historic decision that will undoubtedly result in more economic resources to strengthen our party, hence the excellent economic capacity in which the PAC will remain (sic) after collecting that money (sic), as shown below…" (see National Treasury Report dated February 8, 2011, ff. 305 to 315). A reform of this nature that Sterling proclaimed as "urgent" was necessary for his criminal plan—to assign an economic value to the free work that party supporters were performing—to bear fruit and for more state contribution money to be obtained. As indicated, in his memo he warned, in the singular, in the first person, and with profound vehemence, that it was urgent to approve that reform and register it before filing the expense settlement with the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, a settlement where the 263 simulated contracts for special services were included. Far from being a disinterested recommendation, Sterling Araya pressured the National Assembly to modify the statute and thereby achieve his fraudulent objective. Whether out of dedication and devotion to the party, or to appear as its savior, as he always sought to project a good image and credibility in economic matters, Mr. Maynor not only divorced himself from the ethical ideals proclaimed by the group he defended but also transgressed the rule of law. Thus, after an analysis of the derivative process conducted by the judges, it is determined that the errors pointed out by the challengers are non-existent and that the judgment is built upon an adequate assessment of direct and circumstantial evidence, an exercise carried out in an objective, joint, comprehensive, concatenated, and harmonious manner with all the evidentiary elements brought into the adversarial process. B) In the fifth ground of their appeal, they claim insufficient reasoning due to lack of proof of the objective element of the criminal type: financial damage (daño patrimonial). They allege that the court unreasonably concluded the existence of financial harm against the State and, consequently, an economic benefit for the holders of series A political debt assignment certificates; additionally, that the PAC benefited financially from the alleged fraud perpetrated against public funds. They assert that the series B certificates were not redeemed for money, hence the Costa Rican State did not make any disbursement as a consequence of the issuance of said means of payment, and this was established in the resolution of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones No. 7235-E10-2010 at 12:45 p.m. on December 3, 2010, according to which the political debt assignment certificates, series B, did not reach any economic value. This must be contrasted with the reality of the payments approved and made effective by the Ministerio de Hacienda, from which it is obtained that only the equivalent of 98.72% of the total value of the political debt assignment certificates, series A, was paid, meaning the series B certificates did not reach any economic value. They question the conclusions of the ruling, in the sense that according to the judges, the financial harm materialized because the special services contracts, upon being included in the expense settlement of the political debt by the PAC, inflated the amount to which said political group was entitled, and more money was paid than was owed to the holders of series A certificates, thereby procuring an unlawful financial benefit for private third parties who sold goods and services to the PAC, and for the political party itself, which obtained a higher amount of political debt. They consider that the judgment fails to specify exactly which and what person received an unlawful financial benefit, and it is improper in criminal law to make a general allusion that the holders of series A certificates received it. It is also devoid of reasoning regarding the legal reason that prevailed to determine that the amount of money paid to the holders of series A certificates did not correspond to a real payment, since each of the expenses that the PAC paid to its different suppliers was made effectively through A and B certificates, the party making good payment, whether those certificates were redeemed or not, and the PAC received no cash payment. For the appellants, it was impossible to manipulate the amount of the political debt because the amount each party would receive was unknown, under the provisions of Article 90 of the Electoral Code regarding the determination of the distribution of state contributions to political parties. They disapprove of the review procedure for settlements filed by the parties that witnesses Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González, head of the Political Party Financing Department and legal advisor of the same department respectively, detailed in their statements—that is, that their examination is limited to verifying compliance with formal requirements, which is done randomly and partially, without selecting by means of payment or assignment certificates, up to an amount equivalent to the maximum that the political party could access, which has been done out of custom. They affirm that this contravenes the principle of legality because the Electoral Code approved as of September 2009, does not have a norm that determines what procedure should be followed for the documentary review of settlements; however, said normative body in Article 115 indicates, in reference to the political debt assignment certificates, that there is an order of priority (prelación) at the time of their payment, from which it can be inferred that at the moment of liquidating expenses, it must be done in serial order starting with A, and so on successively, and the lack of complete documentary reviews cannot be justified by insufficient time, nor would it delay the payment of settlements to political parties. The appellants argue that if the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones had done their job well and fulfilled their obligation to review the documents for each account that was paid, it would be known whether all the accounts paid with series A certificates should be redeemed or whether some were poorly substantiated and payment was improper. In reality, no financial harm was caused to the public treasury, as it could not be proven that the monies paid to the holders of series A certificates were improper or unjustified. In the sixth ground of their appeal, the technical defense argues the existence of illegitimate reasoning due to violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), as the judges concluded that if the holders of series B certificates, signatories of contracts for special services, made a donation to the PAC, the defendant Sterling Araya should have reported this to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. They state that the series B certificates never had economic support; they were born as an expectation of being redeemed in money, and even before filing the corresponding settlement, it was known that it was impossible to collect them. Thus, they were voluntarily left at the PAC offices by the persons who signed the special services contracts, who could withdraw them or leave them in custody; they were not required to make a decision. Under these conditions, it cannot be established that there was a donation that should have been reported by the PAC's treasurer. In the seventh ground of their appeal, they claim a serious error in the ruling for providing contradictory reasoning that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones had no responsibility whatsoever in verifying the expenses liquidated by the PAC, needing only to perform a verification, whether random or partial, and attributing all responsibility to the party itself. The foregoing, by making an improper interpretation of Constitutional Chamber votes No. 2011-08989 of July 6, 2011, and No. 2013-015343, which indicate that the verification of expenses reported by political parties is an exclusive function or competence of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. The fifth, sixth, and seventh grounds are resolved jointly because they are intimately linked, and since the appellants are not correct, they are rejected. The ruling develops broadly and exhaustively the reasons why, in the specific case, the defendant Steling Araya incurred in the crime of fraud against the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. The defense's claims express nothing more than their mere disagreement with the manner in which the Court decided to approach, analyze, and resolve the matter submitted to its knowledge, as it was adverse to their client's interests, without providing any element that would allow varying the conclusions reached by the judges. They argue the non-demonstration of financial damage, a constitutive element of the criminal type of fraud, resorting to the repetitive argument that the series B certificates were not redeemed, that the state contribution was only enough to pay 98.72% of the total value of the series A political debt assignment certificates, and that, consequently, the Costa Rican State did not make any disbursement for the issuance of said means of payment. Regarding the reproached aspects, the trial court describes the modus operandi of the fraud as follows: it was the massive simulation of contracts for special services that were included as expenses against the issuance of series B assignment certificates, before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in the final expense settlement that the accused Maynor Sterling signed and delivered to the Political Party Financing Department, which were approved and, improperly, came to give economic value to the series A state contribution assignment certificates. It is not, as the appellants argue, that if in the resolution of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones No. 7235-E10-2010 at 12:45 p.m. on December 3, 2010, that body approved electoral expenses generated by the PAC amounting to the sum of two billion, seven hundred thirty-two million, seven hundred eighty-five thousand, nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos (¢2,732,785,956.27), which were to be charged to the state contribution entitlement, with the result that the latter was equivalent to two billion, nine hundred ninety-two million, eight hundred sixty-four thousand, two hundred forty-two colones and ninety-two céntimos (¢2,992,864,242.92)—an amount that was not even enough to cover the totality of the A bonds—therefore there was no harm to the State nor unlawful financial benefit. Note that the amount of two billion, seven hundred thirty-two million, seven hundred eighty-five thousand, nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos (¢2,732,785,956.27) was composed, in part, by the sum of five hundred sixteen million colones (¢516,000,000.00), corresponding to expenses for the 263 simulated special services contracts, which were approved by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and paid with a part of the series B state contribution rights assignment certificates. Not in vain, some witnesses, such as Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, upon hearing the proposal of the co-defendant Bolaños Murillo for her to sign the documents, considered that it was "a little trap" or a "little deception" towards the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. This perception and the carelessness with which this "little trap" was assumed by the PAC members, convinced that they were helping the party, was in reality the scheme that Sterling devised to defraud the State. The Court points out that on this aspect, the witness Ronald Chacón Badilla was extremely clear and conclusive when explaining how the state contribution rights assignment certificates gradually acquire economic value, differing from how the appellants try to make it seem. According to the witness, all expenses that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones approves for a political party become part of a single monetary mass, regardless of the means of payment used by the political party to pay them—be it cash, check, transfer, series A, B, or C state contribution assignment certificates—and once this monetary mass is obtained, the principle of priority (prelación) of the state contribution assignment certificates from Article 115 of the Electoral Code is complied with. For the Court, the financial harm was more than clarified with the example the witness gave in his statement, asking to imagine that the approved expenses are represented by water droplets of different colors for each means of payment. Thus, for example, expenses approved and paid in cash will be represented by yellow droplets, expenses approved and paid by checks will be represented by blue droplets, expenses approved and paid by bank transfer will be represented by orange droplets, expenses approved and paid with series A state contribution assignment certificates will be represented by green droplets, and expenses approved and paid with series B state contribution assignment certificates will be represented by red droplets. All those colored water droplets are placed into a water bottle with a cap that is the amount of the state contribution approved for that political party as an expectation of right, but upon entering that water bottle, absolutely all the droplets acquire the transparent color of the water that may—or may not—reach the top of the amount approved for the state contribution. Once this monetary mass is obtained, it is then when economic value begins to be given to the state contribution rights assignment certificates, taking into account that for payment, the first issuance shall have preference over the second, and so on successively until the last issuance. What this means, the witness indicated, is that with that monetary mass, economic value will first be given to the series A state contribution rights assignment certificates, then to the series B rights assignment certificates, and so on, this being the principle of "order of priority" (prelación) of the state contribution rights assignment certificates, with legal basis in Article 115 of the Electoral Code in force since 2007. The complainants allege that the Electoral Code does not have a norm that indicates what procedure must be followed for the documentary review of settlements, objecting to what the witnesses Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González said—that the review by the Political Party Financing Department is limited to the verification of formal requirements, in a random and partial manner, without separating them by means of payment or assignment certificates—and they believe it should, in their judgment, fulfill its obligation to review each expense that was submitted. Regarding this topic, it is important to mention—as set forth in the appealed judgment—that the 2010 presidential electoral process was developed under the legal framework defined in the current Electoral Code, Law No. 8765 published in Supplement No. 37 to Gazette No. 171 of September 2, 2009, and at the regulatory level, Decree No. 17-2009, published in La Gaceta No. 210 of October 29, 2009, was made official. Prior to September 2, 2009, Law No.

1536 of December 10, 1952 and its amendments, established a model for the review of liquidations that was the responsibility of the Contraloría General de la República, a supervisory body upon which the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones relied in order to rule on the amount of the state contribution that would correspond to each political party based on the strength of the votes and the exercise of expense verification. With the current Electoral Code, the process of reviewing expenses was transferred to the Department of Financing of Political Parties (Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos) of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, whose direction is held by the witness Ronald Chacón Badilla, who is a certified public accountant (contador público autorizado) and holds a master's degree in public accounting. He is a person with extensive experience in the area of reviewing the liquidation of expenses of political parties, because before doing so and being the head for six years of the Department of Financing of Political Parties of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, he performed his duties at the Contraloría General de la República for many years, where he had the opportunity to conduct the reviews of the 1998-2002 and 2002-2006 processes, as he recounted in the debate. The witness also reported that when the liquidation review process was transferred to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, he did not move alone, but was accompanied by personnel also with extensive experience in electoral matters, such as the lawyer Alejandra Peraza Retana and Mr. Esteban Sánchez, a person who had worked at the Contraloría General de la República on an expense review process, Ms. Verónica Portocarrero, who had also previously worked on an expense liquidation review process, and the licensed professional Guiselle Valverde Calderón with extensive experience, of more than twenty years, at the Contraloría General de la República. From the foregoing, the trial court concluded that the process of reviewing the liquidation of expenses of political parties conducted by the Department of Financing of Political Parties of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is in the hands of persons with long-standing experience and knowledge in the matter in which they acted, in compliance with the provisions of electoral regulations, specifically with the provisions of Article 115 of the Electoral Code. Although it is true that during the 2006-2010 campaign there were some changes in electoral matters, according to what the witnesses from the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the National Treasury of the Partido Acción Ciudadana indicated, among them Leonel Sequeira, those changes were not significant, and particularly with respect to the expense liquidation review process, the procedure was the same one that had been carried out at the Contraloría General de la República. In this regard, Mr. Ronald Chacón stated: "...when the function of reviewing expense liquidations was transferred to the tribunal starting in 2009, it practically adopted the work scheme that the Contraloría General de la República had, given that it was—as the governing body of superior oversight and having performed this task for many years—the expert in the matter…". Now, regarding the reproach that the lack of documentary reviews by the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is unjustified, citing lack of time and that this would delay the liquidations, the challenge is untenable and seeks to shift the responsibility of each political party—to be truthful in the liquidation of expenses—to the electoral body and to act in strict compliance with the law and the principle of good faith. According to Article 96 of the Political Constitution, for a political party to be eligible for state financing of the electoral expenses incurred during the campaign, the political group must meet two requirements: i) obtain at least 4% of the validly cast votes at the national or provincial level, if it is only registered at that level, or at least one deputy; and ii) it must verify its expenses before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. As the Court correctly derived from the reading of constitutional numeral 96, it can be inferred that the political party has the obligation to verify its expenses before the TSE—the principle of expense verification—from which the duty of the political group to duly demonstrate its expenses and prove their effective existence is inferred. In this regard, the judges state: “Precisely, that constitutional principle is developed in Section IV of Title VI of the Electoral Code, called ‘Control and Liquidation’ and ‘Economic Regime of Political Parties,’ respectively. Thus, numeral 104 of the Electoral Code provides that the liquidation of electoral expenses, duly endorsed (refrendada) by a certified public accountant, is the means by which political parties verify the expenses they have incurred before the TSE. The certification issued by the certified public accountant is made after the accountant has verified, audited, and evaluated that all expenses redeemable with state contribution conform to the accounting and legal parameters thus required, in accordance with Article 106 ibidem. Numeral 103 of that same regulatory body states that for the evaluation and subsequent payment of the expenses recognized through the accounting control of the liquidations submitted by the political parties, the TSE shall have the authority to systematize the procedures that best safeguard the parameters of the expenses subject to liquidation; in this sense, it may conduct random reviews among parties or among certain items of expenses included in the liquidations to verify them. The legal regulations do not establish, as the defense intends, that it is the TSE that must confirm the material truthfulness of the liquidated expense, but rather that it is the political groups that have such an obligation through the liquidation of electoral expenses. In this sense, Article 42 of the Regulation on Financing of Political Parties (Reglamento de Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos) issued by the TSE is categorical on this aspect by providing that it is the responsibility of the political parties to duly demonstrate their expenses and it is exclusively their responsibility to prove their effective existence. Furthermore, the certified public accountant, as has been explained, performs an accounting and legal verification, audit, and evaluation of the expenses liquidated by the political party. The electoral legislation provides that this public accountant, as stated by witness Julio Aguilar Silesky, performs a documentary review of the expenses liquidated by the political party, but has no obligation to verify whether the service was actually provided or not, as this is a duty of the political group that liquidates the expense. Note that the law provides that the certified public accountant performs an analysis of whether the expenses liquidated by the political party conform to the required accounting and legal parameters. That is, from the accounting point of view, it would be the examination of the procedure used to maintain accuracy and truthfulness in the transactions and in their accounting, which does not imply verification of whether the contracted work was provided or not, but rather the verification that it was duly recorded in the respective accounts and accounting books, which allows determining the real and truthful financial status of the PAC, in this case. And the legal parameter would be framed in that the expense is justifiable in the terms of Article 94 of the Electoral Code. Likewise, the Electoral Code granted the TSE the authority to systematize the procedures that best safeguard the parameters of the expenses subject to liquidation and to conduct random reviews among certain items of the expenses included in the liquidations to verify them. The authority granted by law to the TSE is developed in numeral 71 of the Regulation on Financing of Political Parties, according to which the Department of Financing of Political Parties shall proceed to evaluate the liquidation of electoral expenses taking as a basis the expense certification of the Certified Public Accountant, a document upon which it shall perform random reviews, according to the sample selected from among certain items of expenses included in the liquidations, and shall issue the corresponding reports to the Directorate of Electoral Registry and Financing of Political Parties, a body that submits the pertinent recommendations to the TSE. This Court has described the constitutional, legal, and regulatory norms that empower the TSE to verify the expenses liquidated by the political parties, an occasion in which a random review is performed, based on a sample, of the expenses noted in the respective liquidation” (cf. fs. 3844-3845, sic). In this manner, the review procedure for the liquidation of expenses submitted by the political parties was legal, as it is supported by the legal norms specified in the ruling and which the judges sufficiently analyzed. In no way did the lower court (a quo) give a different reading from what the Sala Constitucional sets forth in the cited vote Nº 8989-2011, as well as in Nº 13-015343 cited by the challengers in their appeal, without the appellants explaining what the “improper interpretation” they consider occurred is. Contrary to what was estimated by the technical defense, the constitutional chamber has indicated that the verification of expenses of political parties, to access the state contribution, is an electoral competence of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and forms part of the electoral function, as ordered by Article 96.4 of the Political Constitution. The Costa Rican legal system conceptualizes the state contribution as a reimbursement of electoral expenses and those related to party organization and training, to which access is only granted, by constitutional mandate, after the political groups have verified them before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. For these purposes, the parties must submit the respective liquidations within the legal deadlines and with the endorsement (referendo) of a certified public accountant. These liquidations must be accompanied by the documents supporting the liquidated expenses, a certification issued by the same accountant regarding such expenses, and, additionally, his report on the results of the study supporting that certification and on the pertinent internal control recommendations. This documentation constitutes the fundamental basis for the subsequent review performed by the Department of Financing of Political Parties, which will only authorize the reimbursement of those expenditures that are legally justifiable and effectively demonstrated and, of course, always bearing in mind the maximum cap to which each political group is entitled according to the electoral results. It is also empowered to verify the truthfulness of the content of the financial statements, by the means and procedures of analysis and investigation it deems appropriate. It is timely to cite what was indicated by the Comptroller General (contralora general) Marta Eugenia Acosta Zúñiga in her report to the Sala Constitucional: “However, one particularly relevant point that is of interest to note is the fact that the challenged norms do not entrust—in a strict sense—the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones with the oversight (fiscalización) of the public resources that finance the expenses of political parties. Rather than that, what they confer upon it is—simply—the authority to carry out the accounting review of the payment vouchers that the political parties submit. (…) As can be seen, the legislation prior to the current Electoral Code placed the Contraloría General in a kind of subordinate body to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, assigning it a role as an accounting reviewer of expenses, documents, and invoices, a function that was clearly not in accordance with the functional scope of competencies of the comptroller body defined by the Political Constitution. As is evident, that role that the previous legislation assigned to the Contraloría General, as an auxiliary accounting reviewer of vouchers and invoices for the expenses of political parties, whose results were documented in a report that was sent to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones—which was responsible for making a final decision on the matter—was the result of a model that did not take into account the natural function of the Contraloría General, defined by the Political Constitution as a superior control body responsible for the oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). In addition to the above, that fragmentation of the analysis of the economic activity of political parties was accentuated by the fact that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones did not have direct participation regarding the verification of the expense related to the state contribution to the political parties, but it did regarding their income, which prevented the existence of a control point that would allow specifying the correspondence between the income and expenses of the different political groups and the complete financing of the electoral campaigns, all to the detriment of the principles of publicity and transparency. By virtue of the absence of basic elements that would allow the development of an integrated, agile, timely, and effective process of control of the income and expenses of political parties by a single unit, society was deprived of control points that would warn of possible income of funds contrary to the principle of legality that could compromise the autonomy of the political parties, thus distorting the essential reason for the state contribution, in its protective function of the independence of political parties as leading actors of the democratic system. Faced with this entire panorama, the current Electoral Code brought with it a change in the prevailing model, defined the functions of the actors involved in the process in their correct perspective and scope, suppressed the fragmented control that had been dragging on until that moment, opted for an integrated and concentrated control in the hands of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and came to renew and strengthen the powers of that Tribunal—which it already inherently had in the existing model until then—in an issue that is directly linked to the electoral matter” (cf. Sala Constitucional, vote N.º 15343-2013). The citation is illustrative of what the trial court correctly extracted from the comprehensive reading of what was resolved by the Sala Constitucional. That is, that the constitutional and legal mandate that the TSE has is the accounting review of the expenses liquidated by the political parties, which implies a documentary examination of these, excluding the obligation to verify the reality of the contract underlying the document. The appellants start from a biased premise when affirming that the ruling considered it proven, unfoundedly, that the holders of Series A cession certificates (certificados de cesión) were made a payment that did not correspond, even questioning that the judges did not indicate who or who received an unlawful economic benefit. It is not that the beneficiaries of the Series A bonds came to receive a payment of the state contribution for a service that was not rendered, which seems to be the meaning the complainants want to give, but rather that if the liquidation of expenses had not been inflated with the simulated contracts for special services, it would not have been enough to cover what ended up being paid to the creditors with Series A bonds. That is, the payment of 98.72% of the total value of the Series A political debt cession certificates would not have been such, but a lower percentage, hence an unlawful economic benefit existed. On the other hand, the defense argues that the accused had no possibility of manipulating the political debt since the amount each party would receive was unknown; however, this is incorrect because as of March 26, 2010, through resolution Nº 2124-E10-2010 at 11:00 hours, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in view of the results of the elections held on February 7, 2010, determined that the PAC, by reason of the votes obtained therein, could receive a maximum of the sum of 3,741,080,303.65 (three billion seven hundred forty-one million eighty thousand three hundred three colones and sixty-five céntimos) as a State contribution for the financing of the expenses generated in the electoral process. Precisely this influences the accused Sterling Araya to hurry to promote the reform of the PAC statutes in May 2010 and to deploy the setup with the simulated special services contracts, the payment of which he backed with Series B bonds that he never delivered to the service providers, and that by June 16, 2016, he presented within the liquidation of campaign expenses, approving, by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones on December 3, 2010, through resolution Nº7235-E10-2010, the sum of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) for PAC electoral expenses. Finally, the appellants are also not correct in objecting that for the Court, the signatories of the contracts for special services and holders of the Series B cession certificates made a donation to the PAC that the accused should have reported, since they never had economic backing and from the beginning it was known that it would be impossible to collect them, to the point that they remained in his office. It is reiterated that the objective set by the accused Sterling Araya was to feed the liquidation of expenses with simulated "special services" contracts that served the function of increasing the amount of state contribution for the PAC, and that without them, the expenditure would have been lower and consequently, the coverage of the Series A cession certificates would have been diminished. Mr. Maynor was interested in ensuring that the major campaign financiers who had lent money to the PAC were paid, that is, those who had been paid with A bonds and a few with B bonds (some media outlets and individuals who had lent cash), but not the collaborators who voluntarily gave their work without expecting any economic retribution. These latter individuals were useful to represent fictitious expenses to charge them to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, convincing the party members to sign contracts where a value or recognition in monetary terms was given to their work, only to then reassure them with the option that if any money were obtained, they could keep it, or they could donate it to the party. The judges, based on the statements of the witnesses and the accused himself, simply indicate that if the work was voluntary and without remuneration, then it was free; consequently, it was not an expense that could be liquidated, but rather a contribution that the accused Sterling should have reported to the Court. C) In the eighth ground of their appeal, the defense counsel for the accused challenge the possibility of applying in his favor an alternative penalty to imprisonment, based on his subjective conditions and the amount (quantum) of the sentence set at six years of imprisonment, alluding to Law No. 9271, “Electronic Monitoring Mechanisms in Criminal Matters” (Mecanismos electrónicos de seguimiento en materia penal). They reproach that the court made a contradictory reasoning because, although the judges admitted that the accused Sterling Araya meets all the requirements for electronic monitoring to be applied, they dismissed that possibility upon considering that the Ministry of Justice has not implemented electronic monitoring due to lack of resources or as a consequence of the convoluted procurement system. They state that the law contains no transitional provision, making it immediately applicable since its entry into force. The convicted person cannot be attributed a burden that does not correspond to him, because of the delay and obstacles in bureaucratic procedures. Finally, the same court noted that in the case of their client, his entry into prison will cause him more harm than benefits, both to him and to society. This ground is reserved to be heard together with the appeal filed by the representatives of the Ministerio Público. The prosecuting attorney (visor fiscal) filed an appeal against the ruling, solely with respect to the penalty imposed on the accused Sterling Araya, since, having requested eight years of imprisonment, the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) set it at six. Considering that one of the preconditions for the application of electronic monitoring is that the penalty does not exceed six years of imprisonment, and there being a challenge to the sanction imposed and a request for a remand on this point, the resolution of this ground is reserved to be heard jointly with the appeal of the Ministerio Público. D) In the ninth ground of their appeal, they allege non-existence of extra-contractual civil liability, because material authorship was not proven with certainty. The court started from a false and illegitimate premise to declare the accused and civil defendant Sterling Araya civilly liable and sentence him jointly and severally to the payment of three hundred fifty-two million seven hundred thousand colones, which is that he devised a plan to cause the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to make an error and thereby obtain an unlawful economic benefit for the PAC and for the holders of the Series A state contribution rights cession certificates. The claim is unaddressable. In the present case, the Court analyzed the reasons of fact and law that accredited the acts that produced the criminal conduct of fraud (estafa) and the application of the subjective civil liability criterion to substantiate that item, with that intentional conduct of the civil defendant Sterling Araya, in association with the civil co-defendant Bolaños Murillo, which caused economic damage to the State. In this regard, it must be noted that the recognition of reparation for economic damage was derived from the concept of subjective civil liability, which has been understood by the doctrine of Loutayf and Costas as that which: “…occurs when the obligation to compensate for damages is based on the voluntary act of the subject who has acted with fault in a broad sense (including intent and negligence), and … The requirements for subjective liability to exist are: a) that it is an unlawful act, that is, that it transgresses the legal system… b) that there is moral imputability of the act to its author, that is, that it is a voluntary act (sic)… c) that there is fault or intent on the part of the author of the act… d) that there is damage caused by the unlawful act… and e) that a causal relationship can be established between the unlawful act and the damage…” (La Acción Civil en Sede Penal, Astrea, Buenos Aires, 2002, pp 756-757)… (see. Sala Tercera of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 2012-001806, at 09:48 hours on December 5, 2012. See in the same sense 2012-01687, at 11:03 hours on November 16, 2012) and whose requirements the lower court in the sub iúdice determined as existing, since the subjective civil liability, derived from numerals 41 of the Constitution and 1045 of the Civil Code, was evidently proven, upon determining not only the intentional action of the civil co-defendant Sterling Araya, but also the existing causal relationship and the damage or detriment to the economic patrimony suffered by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. This is in accordance with what the ruling considered proven, when the accused entered at least 179 simulated contracts for "special services" as PAC expenses in the final liquidation, which led to the approval of more money from the state contribution in favor of the holders of the Series A cession certificates. The ruling is extensive in explaining, with respect to the civil items, the obligation to indemnify of the civil co-defendant Sterling Araya, why the requested claims were (partially) admitted, and the evidence on which the granted amounts were based, to finally establish the economic damage caused to the State by Mr. Maynor's criminal actions. Consequently, the ninth ground of the appeal is declared without merit.

III.- Appeal of the prosecutors Alexander Valverde Peña and Greysa Barrientos Núñez. As the sole ground of their appeal, they express their disagreement with the determination of the penalty. They state that for the imposition of the sanction on the accused Maynor Sterling Araya, the court considered the following aspects: i) the economic damage that reached ¢352,700,000.00, against the state contribution, these being moneys that the Costa Rican State invests every four years to develop democratic processes in the country, which come from taxes that are paid by all the inhabitants of the national territory; ii) the complex criminal scheme orchestrated by the accused, which required the preparation of hundreds of false documents, carefully signed so that they would meet the requirements demanded by electoral regulations to approve expenses, as well as the deception of numerous persons to sign the documentation, and to that effect, the devising of issuing and using Series B rights cession certificates, promoting a change in the statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter PAC) which, prior to the 2010 electoral process, could only receive 50% of the state contribution to which it was entitled in order to thus collect the entirety of the political debt; iii) the actions of the accused affected political pluralism and the equality that must exist between political parties; iv) his actions violated the principles related to the economic regime of political parties, which are: transparency, accountability, publicity, honesty, integrity, and legality, and even those of his own party, such as austerity and the party's own financing; v) the determining motives for his criminal conduct, with the accused acting with the eagerness to achieve a successful management of his position as national treasurer of the party, seeking the highest liquidation of expenses before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, also with the purpose of safeguarding the image of the political group, aiming for the state contribution to cover the majority of the rights cession certificates issued by the PAC, and; v) having taken advantage of his position of power within the political group for the development of the criminal activity, using his accounting, financial, administrative, and legal knowledge. For the appellants, the elements set forth by the court to base the judgment of reproach are fitting. However, they estimate that the six-year prison sentence is insufficient for the degree of reprehensibility of Sterling Araya's conduct, with the proportional and reasonable sentence being the eight-year sentence that was requested by the Ministerio Público. They warn that the actions of the accused after the facts were not assessed, when he met at the party headquarters with some supposed special services contractors, and induced them to believe in the legitimacy of the documentation, with the intention that the facts would not come to light and the fraud that he had promoted in association with Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, against the State, would be exposed. They request that the ruling be declared null and void, solely regarding the setting of the amount of the penalty imposed, and that a remand be ordered. This appeal is heard jointly with the claim contained in the appeal of the defense counsel for the accused Sterling Araya (eighth ground), as they are related, and: the appeal of the Ministerio Público is dismissed; the request regarding the electronic bracelet is granted. The prosecuting appellants agree with the lower court on the elements considered to base the judgment of reproach with respect to the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya.

What they do not share is the imposition of six years of imprisonment instead of the eight years requested, this being the point on which they base their claim, noting that the Court omitted to assess the conduct of the defendant Sterling Araya subsequent to the events, that is, when he met with some of the signatories of the simulated contracts, in an attempt to convince them of the legitimacy of the documentation so that the events would not come to light. Certainly, for the justification of the penalty, the Court indicated a series of circumstances, taking into account various aspects, among them, some quantitative and qualitative aspects of the proven act, as well as the personal conditions of the accused, in accordance with numeral 71 of the Criminal Code. A selective study of said aspects highlights that the judge took into account the seriousness of the acts, since: i) Mr. Maynor was a recognized business administrator, with experience in the Costa Rican environment, who enjoyed the trust of leaders and supporters, who used his knowledge to cause a fraud to the detriment of the money of all Costa Ricans destined to invest in the democracy of this country; ii) it was not a conventional scam, but rather included an entire scheme to induce the officials of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal into error; iii) the principle of equality with respect to the other associations and political pluralism was violated; iv) the PAC's principles of austerity, probity, and transparency were violated, betraying the good faith of the militants; v) the magnitude of the economic damage caused to the State. Regarding the quality of the determining motives: i) Mr. Maynor sought to cultivate an image of success in his management as National Treasurer of the PAC; ii) his concern was to pay the large and important financial creditors, those who had series A certificates, and some of series B, to ensure the future financing of the next electoral campaign, using party collaborators by making them sign simulated contracts for that purpose. It is true that it was not expressly noted that, in the meeting held after party militants were called to account by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the defendant Sterling tried to convince them that they had agreed to the reality of what they had signed, however that is part of what the Court analyzed regarding the damage caused by the implication of the supporters in the preparation of the contracts, which does not add much to what was analyzed. The trial court also considered his personal qualities, indicating that: i) he has maintained a defined life project for many years, as he is married, with two children and a grandchild, whom he still educates; ii) he is a pensioner of the University of Costa Rica, where he worked in his last years as head of accounting, without having a single stain on his professional record; iii) he suffers from diabetes, high blood pressure, and psoriasis, illnesses that it is reasonable to consider will worsen with the passing of the years, Mr. Maynor soon becoming an older adult. This Chamber not only observes that there is an adequate justification regarding the penalty imposed, but also that the quantum of six years of imprisonment is duly justified and responds to the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and legality, without it being considered that its amount is below the reproach it deserves. The penalty is considerably higher than the minimum extreme of the penalty for the crime of fraud (estafa) and, although the eight-year prison sentence requested by the criminal complainant was not imposed, it is considered that the fixing of six years of imprisonment is fair, adequate, equitable, and sufficient, and the complaint of the prosecutors is not admissible. Regarding the application of house arrest with electronic monitoring as a substitution of the penalty, in accordance with article 57 bis of the Criminal Code, the judges acknowledged that the defendant "meets the objective and subjective requirements: such as that the penalty imposed on him does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment; this matter is being processed under the special organized crime procedure; it is not a sexual crime nor one where firearms were used; he is a first-time offender; and there are reasonable elements to deduce that the convicted person does not constitute a danger and will not evade the execution of the sentence (due to his age and his family and domiciliary roots)" (cf. f. 3822). Despite the foregoing, the judgment evades its granting at that juncture, alleging that "the truth is that the Ministry of Justice and Grace has not yet developed the infrastructure to implement said alternative to prison" (cf. f. 3822). In other words, the Court assessed that in the sub judice, the objective and subjective conditions for house arrest by electronic monitoring are applicable, only that it did not grant it, citing exclusively the lack of implementation, at that moment of the issuance of the ruling, of the necessary infrastructure by the Executive Branch. As is publicly known, since the beginning of 2017, the Ministry of Justice has had the electronic bracelet devices and the suitable platform for controlling said measure. For this reason, this appellate Chamber considers that, the aforementioned circumstances having already been weighed by the lower court, the defenders' claim on this point must be upheld, without ordering a remand (without any nullity since what was decided is the basis for the configuration of the objective and subjective conditions for the appropriateness of the requested mechanism), granting house arrest in the electronic monitoring modality to the accused Maynor Sterling Araya. The foregoing does not mean that what is ordered is in a single instance, since the trial court had already assessed granting said substitute primary sanction to the defendant, only that it considered that material limitations for the implementation of the electronic mechanisms prevented its execution.

IV.- Appeal filed by Attorney Randall Albán Aguirre Mena, criminal prosecutor of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. A) In the first ground of his appeal, he alleges contradictory intellectual reasoning and erroneous assessment of the evidence when the judgment rejects the economic damage in 84 of the special services contracts. He indicates that when formulating the civil claim, he made an estimation of civil condemnation for material damage derived from the crime of fraud (estafa) for the totality of the 263 special services contracts that were presented by the PAC before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The court only granted material damage for 179 contracts under the argument that those were the total number of witnesses brought to the adversarial proceedings and that only with the presence of the witnesses could the damage suffered by the State be proven. He considers that the basis for excluding the damage resulting from the 84 contracts is contradictory and cites several excerpts from the judgment taken from the judgment pages numbers 1360, 1361, 1371, 1376 and 1377, 1384, 1479 and 1480, 1524, 1526, 1534 and 1535, 1537, 1538 and 1558, from which it is appreciated that the court derives that the origin of all the contracts was gratuitous, that there was never any intention on the part of the PAC or the defendants for said services to be remunerated, and that therefore the appearance of the remaining 84 witnesses was not necessary to conclude that those 84 contracts are in the same circumstances as the 179 for which the existence of material damage was determined. It was not necessary, as the court indicated, to reach such a conclusion, to know the context in which the will of the contracting party was formed at the time of signing the contract. He maintains that the fraudulent origin of the contracts is not proven only from the will of the service provider, but from the scheme used in the PAC, the documents signed by the providers, the fact that the bonds with which the payment was backed were not delivered and were in the custody of the party, and the statements of Ronald Chacón and Ruy López, among other evidentiary elements. Based on the principle of freedom of evidence, it is possible by different means other than strictly listening to the 84 witnesses who did not appear to testify, to have the existence of the damage and its quantification as proven. The same Trial Court, with the same evidentiary elements analyzed and which resulted in having damage proven in at least 179 contracts, concluded that the PAC was not in a position to contract remunerated labor for special services. That the supporters of said political group provided their work out of commitment and volunteerism, that there was never an intention to economically recognize their work, that the contracts have similarities in the amount, in the type of service provided, and that this is an indication of the criminal action deployed, aspects that entail the recognition of economic damage, not in 179 contracts, but in the 263 special services contracts. The appellant considers that it is not possible to isolate the documentary evidence from which the Court derived the existence of the harm in the 179 contracts, and the same testimonial evidence on which the harm considered proven was based, and then not consider these same evidentiary elements in the analysis of the remaining 84 contracts, and exclude them for the sole fact that the witnesses did not appear before the adversarial proceedings. He asserts that the testimonial evidence of the 179 contracts received in the debate was abundant in that the work provided had a gratuitous origin, that payment was never collected for the same, that the political debt bonds were not delivered to the service providers since they remained in the custody of the PAC, and that for that electoral process, the PAC did not have resources to contract special services. In all these cases, the existence of a fraudulent origin of the contracting carried out was proven, and in the remaining 84 contracts, it is the same contract, with the same amounts of one million eight hundred thousand and two million four hundred thousand, all were collected directly or indirectly by the co-defendant Manuel Antonio Bolaños and were backed by the same documents that appear in the 84 contracts excluded from the economic harm, which were signed by the defendant Mainor Sterling. To conclude that because the service provider did not come to testify, the harm cannot be proven, is to apply a principle of weighted evidence and the principle of freedom of evidence, and to illegitimately exclude the other evidentiary elements incorporated in the debate. Likewise, the documentary evidence, specifically report No. DFPP-DP-06-2012 of October 2, 2012, on folios 5 to 136 of the main case file, and the statements of Ruy López and Ronald Chacón Badilla support that the harm to the public treasury was for the totality of the 263 contracts, whose total amount was ¢516,600,000.00. He requests that the judgment be annulled only insofar as economic compensation was not granted for the 84 special services contracts that were charged to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, representing the sum of one hundred sixty-three million nine hundred thousand colones, plus the interest they generated, and the personal costs on said items. The claim is admissible. In the case, the lower court based its decision to accept the economic damage only regarding 179, out of the 263 contracts for special services that were presented by the civil co-defendant Maynor Sterling Araya, arguing that the contractor was necessarily required "...to know the context in which the will to sign said document was formed, which is lacking in that sense. Therefore, the special contracts whose contractors did not testify at trial cannot be assessed within the economic harm caused to the State through the simulation of expenses that the PAC settled in the 2010 electoral campaign" (cf. f. 3878). The judges note that although some witnesses stated that "everyone" signed, it is a generic and abstract phrase that does not meet the evidentiary requirements of the plaintiff in the civil action for damages, which would violate the principle of orality and immediacy of the evidentiary elements. The first error incurred by the trial court is to base its refusal to recognize economic damage, in those cases or contracts in which the signatory did not testify in the debate, thus resorting to a system of legal or weighted proof of testimonial evidence that has no place, neither in the criminal process, much less in the civil one, ignoring the value of the rest of the evidence that was taken, for the purposes of compensation. According to the judges, with respect to the 84 contracts in which the signatories did not appear to testify, it cannot be assumed that they provided free work to the PAC, however, contradictorily, when carrying out the evidentiary analysis for the purposes of establishing the judgment of culpability of the accused, they determined a "stunning homogeneity" in the preparation and processing of the documents they used to charge the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, expenses for special services contracts that turned out to be simulated. They concluded that all the contracts were adhesion contracts; the same templates and formulas were used in the documents (contract, receipt of money, proof of delivery of series B bonds); the same modus operandi was used for their signing; very similar and disproportionate amounts were set in relation to the functions inserted; the same method was used by the co-defendants to convince the militants to sign them as a kind of economic recognition for the voluntary and free services provided; all the series B assignment certificates through which these works were cancelled remained at the PAC headquarters. One of the many excerpts is transcribed in which the Court refers to the "structured machination", with particular and similar characteristics, in at least 179 of the 263 contracts presented along with the PAC's expense settlement: "In what was taken as proven, one hundred seventy-nine contracts and receipts were used to, by faking expenses for the supposed payment of special services, proceed to deceive in an orchestrated, systematic, studied manner and acting with a high degree of organization against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Note that none of the witnesses who testified in the adversarial proceedings referred to having charged or received any amount for their service (some said they had done so, but that they were going to donate it) when in reality it was unpaid work by supporters of the Partido Acción Ciudadana who, moved by the principles that the group preached, provided their time, work, and even resources totally voluntarily. The ruse is not limited to the mere words of the accused used to convince the contractors to sign; they also used the documents that will be mentioned, to present them to the electoral body passing them off as real and effective expenses for settlement, since the apparent contractors never charged, nor intended to charge, their voluntary work to the party. These documents consisted of the 'SPECIAL SERVICES CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA AND…'; which in its literalness contained a series of falsehoods (that the accused knew of) and that sought to meet the legal requirements to justify an expense for special services that never occurred, because although there were various tasks in some cases, these were not those indicated and in no case was payment collected. See then that this contract described the special service to be provided; these were generic titles without real content, for example: Cantonal Coordinator of Voters, General Cantonal Promoter, General Coordinator of Finance, General Coordinator of Organization, Cantonal Coordinator of Communications, Cantonal Coordinator of Youth, and Cantonal Coordinator of Transport. With the immediacy provided by the adversarial hearing, this Court was able to easily extract from the body language and verbal language of the contractors, their astonishment upon seeing the contract and the assigned position. The vast majority said they did not know what the position was, what it consisted of, who had appointed them, what their supposed responsibilities would be, and in no case were they asked for accounts or reports on their functions. Another false content of the contract, which ultimately served as a ruse before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, was the total payment amount of what was paid. An immense majority of the contractor witnesses who testified, as seen in recital VII, said they had never agreed upon or charged any economic sum, surprised by this clause and, in several cases, deeply dismayed and even angry because they never even had the intention of quantifying their work economically. Others, with a clear interest in protecting their political party, tried unsuccessfully to justify the amount, alleging that they performed arduous work, that it was what other parties paid, that it was established according to the minimum wage of their professions, that it was an amount derived from the total hours worked, and multiple reasons that, confronted with each other, make it clear that there was never an agreement between the parties, but rather that they were arbitrary and template-based amounts filled in by unknown persons at the order of the accused to deceive the electoral body. This contract, moreover, included the time range where the special service was supposedly provided, another clear example of the deception that the accused attempted, since all the witnesses were in agreement in pointing out that said dates were not related to their functions within the party, when they provided them. They said they had worked before, after, never, or on other dates without also having charged for those periods or the one indicated in the contract. All the dates were artificially imposed and filled in by the accused making use of other people. All the contracts were signed by the convicted party STERLING ARAYA in his capacity as National Treasurer of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, who knew of the said falsehoods. Another of the documents used for each of the one hundred seventy-nine contractors was the: 'Payment voucher', which, like the contract, had a series of gross falsehoods that the witnesses themselves unanimously evidenced. In this sense, from the literalness of the voucher it read: 'The Partido Acción Ciudadana has paid to…', since as indicated NO AMOUNT WAS PAID TO ANYONE. Here, it does not indicate that it is a conditional or eventual payment; it says it was paid, which means for any average person that said document accredited the payment of a monetary amount, which, as has been repeatedly stated, never happened. It is important to point out that on this voucher, STERLING ARAYA himself signs under the legend: 'I receive the good or service as agreed', knowing that, in the first place, the service had not been provided and, in the second place, that the sum stated there had never been charged or paid by the Partido Acción Ciudadana. These are, without a doubt, pre-constitution of evidence for the fraud, which they would eventually present before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Finally, as part of the ruse, the accused would have the contractors instrumentalized for this scam sign the document that read: 'PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECEIPT FOR THE DELIVERY OF BONDS AS PAYMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES'. Again, a document full of falsehoods and inaccuracies, like the previous ones. This one referred to the supposed delivery of Type B Certificates to the contractors, which never occurs in the one hundred seventy-nine contracts, with one exception. Even the vast majority of the witnesses never had visual contact with the certificate" (cf. fs. 3802-3804). Therefore, if the judges considered that all the contracts were similar, responding to a single purpose of making an undue charge of money to the public treasury, it is contradictory that to prove the economic damage suffered, they demand the statements of the 84 contracting parties that were dispensed with, without the judgment expressing what incidence the fact that those people did not testify has, and neglects to consider the incorporated documentary evidence regarding them, which according to the judgment were introduced in the PAC's expense settlement to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and were recognized for the payment of the state contribution. On folios 3601 and 3602, the lower court states that according to the testimonial evidence taken in the adversarial proceedings, the co-defendants Sterling Araya and Bolaños Murillo proposed to the supporters the stratagem to defraud the State, under the following three modalities: i) In the majority of cases, their "collaboration" was requested to financially help the party through the "voluntary subscription" of a contract, which would be cancelled with series B assignment certificates, which, if recognized by the Court, the money could be donated to the PAC. ii) On other occasions, supporters were offered remuneration for their services with series B assignment certificates, conditional on these eventually having economic content (however, the certificates were not delivered to the contractors, but were kept at the PAC). iii) On other occasions, supporters were asked for their signature, with the understanding that what they were signing was something completely different. That is, all these modalities described by the 179 witnesses-signatories of contracts, maintain that they were simulated, and although some stated that they did effectively perform work and considered the amount stated there deserved, hoping to receive good payment, the discredit of this version occurs due to the fact that they never withdrew the bonds, these always remaining in the custody of the PAC, an indication that it was never the will of these militants to collect them, nor of the party to make any payment to them. Therefore, what can be derived from these statements is that a considerable number of people (more than half of the signatories of the 263 special services contracts) confirmed having signed the documentation prepared under the mechanism so many times described in the judgment, which was later charged to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. In civil matters, in principle, the principle of proof by writing (documentary evidence) applies, article 351 of the Civil Procedure Code, testimonial evidence being admissible only to prove the agreements that may have existed between the parties. Furthermore, civil procedural regulations empower the judge to adopt the decision to reduce the number of witnesses when they are offered to testify about the same specific facts. That is, the judge can limit the number of witnesses complying with the parameters established in the law, if the evidence offered is superabundant, article 365 of the Civil Procedure Code. Requiring that the 263 contracting parties should have testified at trial to have the total economic damage as proven is not only irrational, but also a requirement that disregards the principles of usefulness, pertinence, reasonableness, and necessity of evidence, when the Court itself has affirmed that all the contracts and receipts have the same format and were systematically prepared under the same criminal scheme or structuring. There is contradictory reasoning when it is said, on one hand, that from the evidence incorporated it was possible to prove a plan to deceive the officials of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal through the presentation of simulated contracts and, on the other, it is indicated that a group of them should not be compensated because testimonial evidence was lacking, despite the existence of clear common elements that reveal the simulation. These are two affirmations that cannot coexist without incurring in vices related to the reasoning of the judgment. Moreover, the state attorney is correct that there is a vice in the assessment of the evidence, since by the lower court granting an exaggerated and unnecessary value (without justifying its transcendence and relevance to the decision) to the witnesses who did not appear, it subtracted value from the documentary evidence analyzed extensively and profusely when making the evidentiary justification in the criminal part. It is important to point out that due to the nature of simulation, circumstantial evidence is consubstantial to it, which is not exclusive to the criminal venue, but is also applicable in civil matters. Regarding circumstantial evidence in civil matters, various integrations of the Second Civil Court have reiterated the following: "...we must analyze the legal figure of simulation and conclude that, given that with the simulated transaction, one wants to give an appearance contrary to reality, with an unreal situation, all types of evidence are allowed, and it has been said that: ² ...the proof of simulation entails almost exclusively a presumptive activity (sic), in such a way that the evidentiary work will consist of gradually establishing the various indicia in the record." (Simulation in Private Law. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo. Talleres de Mundo Gráfico S.A., San José, Costa Rica, 1990. Pg. 186). There are indicia that are typical of simulation and make it easy to infer. The same author just cited highlights them for us in the mentioned work, and among them we have: ...1.- CAUSA SIMULANDI. The causa simulandi is considered the starting point 'seeking the motive for the simulation to later build upon a solid foundation the edifice of proof. The causa simulandi, as we have said above, is the interest, motive that leads the parties to give appearance to an unreal transaction, or to present it differently. The simulatory act is reflexive and conscious, responding to a determined motive...3.- OMNIA BONA. This indicium is divided into two species: the disposal of the entire patrimony or of the most selective or valuable part of it...This indicium operates when the simulator requires, for their purposes, the complete divestment of their assets (to evade the principle that they are common collateral art.981 Civil Code) it is of no use to hide a part if creditors can execute the rest...5.- NOTITIA. This refers to the knowledge of the simulation on the part of the accomplice. This indicium refers to the fact of the concomitant knowledge of the simulators regarding the fiction of the legal transaction, and more specifically, to the knowledge on the part of the accomplice. We know that one of the constitutive elements of simulation is the simulatory agreement, so that knowledge of the fiction by the accomplice is presumed. Consequently, only if the lack of that knowledge were proven, a matter otherwise highly difficilitoris probationes, could the possibility of inferring the authentic reality of the supposedly simulated transaction exist. The foregoing implies that a lack of knowledge on the part of the accomplice demonstrates the non-simulation of the transaction. It operates as a negative indicium of simulation, not an affirmative one... 9.-PRETIUM VILIS. The presence of a low, disproportionate, or derisory price, which bears no relation to the real value of the thing sold, exchanged, or leased, is one of the main indicia of simulation... 15.-TEMPUS. Certain transactions are suspicious of simulation, due to the time or moment of their conclusion...One can speak of three types of tempus: a) Conjunctural Tempus: This indicium requires a certain proximity between the simulation and the disruptive financial event...b) Tempus Celeritas. This refers to the unusual speed of the simulated transaction, a rush outside of the normal and ordinary, in the face of the proximity of an event. A rush that crystallizes in registry urgencies (e.g., Immediate registry inscription of the sale...)" (cf. Second Civil Court, Section I, No. 2002-372. of 09:30 hrs., September 27, 2002). In the specific case, there were 179 witnesses who referred to the simulation of the special services contracts, with 263 contracts presented under the same scheme as settlement expenses to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

The trial court deemed the following to be proven: the *causa simulandi*, the motive that led the co-defendants to give the appearance of an unreal business, which was to inflate the expense item in order to obtain the greatest possible amount to cover the Series A assignment certificates; the *notitia* or presumption of knowledge of the fiction by the accomplice to the simulated agreement, given that both the defendants and the party member who signed knew they were doing a "little trick"; the *tempus* and the *precio vil*, since the contracts were made when the election results were known and the maximum amount of state contribution that the PAC could access was determined, thus proceeding to draw them up for astronomical amounts in order to obtain the greatest possible recognition of political debt. Regarding the assessment of evidence in civil matters and the weighing of circumstantial evidence, it is appropriate to cite the following excerpt from a ruling by the First Chamber: "For a presumption to exist as a means of proof, it is necessary, first, that a positive or negative, certain event occurs from which the event one wishes to ascertain must be deduced. The existence or non-existence of this occurrence, broadly called the basic fact, or more technically, circumstantial evidence (indicio), must be duly accredited in the proceedings to ensure the viability of the presumption. This is deduced from Article 417 of the Civil Procedure Code: 'Human presumptions only constitute proof if they are a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact.' This Chamber has indicated that this type of presumption '...is the result of the exercise of the discretion granted to the judge to assess the evidence, the presumption then deriving from other facts that have been deemed certain' (No. 848-F, at 14:45 on October 31, 2001)." This connection, which must be direct and precise, between the basic fact or circumstantial evidence and the occurrence one seeks to derive (consequence fact), is verified according to purely logical rules, to the rules of human judgment, a task carried out by the Judge vested with discretionary power according to their conscience and discernment. It is the judge who exclusively infers a fact or act from such evidence, as their inner conviction inspires them within a framework of reasonableness and rationality, in a logical *prius* that does not violate sound criticism; hence, their judgment stands, unless it is shown to be contrary to the evidence presented, whether due to an error of fact or law in its estimation regarding the basic or circumstantial facts, or that the inference borders on the absurd by contradicting common sense or natural phenomena" (No. 000025-F-2007, at 10:45 on January 19, 2007)" (cf. First Chamber, No. 2008-216, at 08:25 on March 25, 2008). Through the joint assessment of the evidence presented, the judges correctly concluded that the defendants created simulated contracts with the purpose of obtaining an undue financial benefit for the holders of the Series A assignment certificates, to the detriment of the public treasury, but they contradictorily denied the recognition of the economic damage (daño económico) regarding 84 contracts, arguing that testimonial evidence about them was lacking. The judgment thus incurs the defect of contradictory reasoning and erroneous assessment of evidence on the civil aspect, specifically regarding the economic damage suffered by the State, which recognized to the PAC for the expenses documented in the 263 special service contracts, the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), which is the financial harm generated, and not the sum of ¢352,700,000.00 (three hundred fifty-two million seven hundred thousand colones). The Court established that defendant Sterling settled before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and that the sum of ¢516,600,000 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones) was authorized to the PAC by him, under the concept of "special services" against the state contribution, which allowed a greater percentage of the rights assignment certificates against the state contribution, which had been issued by the Partido Acción Ciudadana during the electoral campaign, to be paid. To that extent, what was resolved must be revoked without the need to order a remand, since the same probative analysis conducted by the lower court regarding the determination of guilt and the establishment of facts allows reaching the same conclusion on the appropriateness of the claim for financial harm claimed in its entirety, for the 263 special service contracts. Consequently, regarding the financial harm claimed by the Procuraduría General de la República representing the Costa Rican State, against the civil defendants Maynor Sterling Araya, Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, and the Partido Acción Ciudadana, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, the sum of ¢516,600,000 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), plus interest generated from the completion of the act until its effective cancellation, as well as the payment of personal costs in the amount of ¢56,160,000.00 (fifty-six million one hundred sixty thousand colones). B) In the second ground of their appeal, the appellant claims a lack of intellectual reasoning and contradictory reasoning regarding the rejection of social damage (daño social). i) Lack of intellectual reasoning: The Procurador states that the events caused significant social damage, as they directly affect the very foundations of our democratic rule-of-law system, within which the Political Constitution fosters an electoral development framework that allows its strengthening and also its permanence over time, through state economic contributions. The duty held by political parties to participate in the education of the people so they feel the security of aspiring to and participating in the democratic ideal signified by the freedom of suffrage, and within this ideal, the need for the sense of belonging, honesty, and transparency that must permeate every phase and every moment of political-electoral exercise, was undermined; an exercise facilitated through state contribution. In the appellant's view, the defendants' actions affect the credibility of the people in the system, cause feelings of disappointment, disinterest, distrust, and apathy in citizens, as well as affecting the democratic system. In this sense, they refer to the statements by witnesses Michael Eugenio Castillo, José Solís Rojas, Teresa Aguilar Brenes, María Elena Rodríguez Rodríguez, Jorge Eduardo Brenes Vargas, Thelma Baldares Carazo, and María Ester Anchía Angulo. From the testimonial evidence gathered at trial, it is concluded that the demonstrated facts occurred in a democratic process in which the defendants made an improper charge to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, taking advantage of the selfless and voluntary participation of hundreds of Costa Ricans. They argue that if the social damage caused on the occasion of a crime occurring in an electoral process is comparable to moral or immaterial damage and is therefore not subject to the proof required to demonstrate material damage, then the court, based on the testimonial evidence, could have derived the existence of social damage and therefore the impact on the Costa Rican democratic system. Additionally, political debt is used to invest in democracy, so the affectation to the amounts that the State allocates to finance said democratic process necessarily impacts the democratic system. They censure that for the judges, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that the conduct deemed proven and which violates a criminal legal norm caused damage to the Costa Rican democratic system. They reproach that it was indicated that their represented party did not conduct a study that included the variable relating to the impact of public knowledge of the facts for which the defendants were convicted, in relation to society's perception of the Costa Rican democratic system. They criticize that for the court, collective social damage can only be evidenced by a verifiable social change before and after the events, with specific evidence such as sociological studies, and not with the testimonial evidence provided at trial. This led to the testimonial evidence not being considered or assessed and the existence of social damage not being analyzed from probative sources other than those the court considered should have been provided. ii) Contradictory reasoning of the court in rejecting social damage: Although the court considered that the existence of an impact on the democratic system was not accredited and therefore rejected the social damage, in some sections of the ruling it evidenced an understanding regarding the existing relationship between the participation of people who worked for free and democracy, as can be deduced from pages 1360, 1479, 1502, 1561 of the judgment. The appellant argues that the most striking fact for which there is contradictory reasoning arises regarding the judgment of reproach, where the court expressed at folio 1573 that the defendant's criminal acts transcend the legal right of property and impact democracy. The claim is dismissed. Having examined the judgment issued by the trial court rejecting compensation for social damage due to a lack of its proper demonstration by the Procuraduría General de la República, it is considered that the judgment is duly reasoned, and that the reasoning employed by the judges conforms to what the law establishes. Regarding collective or social damage, it has been defined as that which: "... propagates or dilutes among the members of the group, whether it is organized and compact or not. It is a supra-individual damage that does not consist of the sum of special damages. Nor is it a harm to the individuals' own and particular assets, but rather a current and concrete injury, only from the point of view of the entire society that suffers it. Damage to the collective affects the group simultaneously and coincidentally. It is the same and unique damage, which is accepted without difficulty today, as a notion with its own entity, which concerns all members of the community equally or certain groups in an indistinct and non-exclusive manner. The recipients are no longer persons, in isolation, but categories or classes of subjects, linked by some quality or characteristic that gives connection to the group. Within this topic, should the obligation to compensate for this type of impairment arise, a sum of identifiable portions is not configured; on the contrary, it is a general injury, which is apprehensible and experienceable, where the affected element is communal or group-related, reaching individual subjects indivisibly, by their insertion in the group" (see First Chamber, vote No. 675, at 10:00 on September 21, 2007). However, like all damage, be it individual, diffuse, economic, material, physical, moral, or of any type, it must be proven, it being inappropriate to presume its existence by the mere fact that the State entity affirms that the facts for which it sued directly affect the foundations of the Costa Rican democratic system. The representative of the State's interests asserted in their lawsuit and in their conclusions at trial, the following: "The action claimed here undermines our democratic rule-of-law system, since it affects our own Constitution, by denigrating various essential consequences of the referred state contribution, namely: the duty held by political parties to participate in the education of the people so that they feel the security of aspiring to and participating in the democratic ideal signified by the freedom of suffrage and within this ideal, the need for the sense of belonging, honesty, and transparency that must permeate every phase and every moment of political-electoral exercise; an exercise that is facilitated through state contribution. Under this framework, the action described here affects the credibility of the people in the system and the dynamics of national politics, which collaborates in maintaining the structural and ideological bases of our democracy. Likewise, the action claimed here causes a feeling of social unrest that cracks our democratic bases, through the loss of the people's credibility in the system and the development of national democratic life. The foregoing, because the Costa Rican people and the State itself have been disrespected, by seeking and having obtained – for the benefit of themselves and third parties – an increase in the recognition and reimbursement of political debt based on deception, for which it must be highlighted that it is we, all citizens, who contribute with our economic contributions to finance political debt and therefore, we have been equally affected." The PGR explains that social damage has been caused by the deterioration of correct political formation and the affecting of the manifestation of popular will due to the loss of credibility in political parties. The civil plaintiff acknowledges that there is disillusionment and loss of credibility in political parties, to which must be added voter abstentionism, to which the criminal actions of the civil defendants contribute" (cf. fs. 3899-3900, see fs. 391-392 case file). It is undeniable that electoral processes constitute a fundamental pillar for the real functioning of an authentic democratic regime and that, in this context, political parties constitute an extremely important element of democratic life, as they are the instruments through which the principles of democratic pluralism are concretized, they concur in the formation and manifestation of popular will, and are fundamental instruments for political participation (see Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. on January 23, 2009, and First Chamber, No. 2010-8297, 02:45 hrs. on May 5, 2010, among others). However, as noted in the ruling, whoever requested the right to compensation for social damage should have accredited the certain, real, and effective damage that the civil defendants (Mr. Maynor, Mr. Antonio, and the PAC) caused to the Costa Rican democratic system, beyond the mere enunciation of the raison d'être of political parties and their role in a democracy like ours. Assuming the reality of the causation of social damage based on what the witnesses who appeared signing the simulated contracts and documents stated in a general assessment is absolutely insufficient to prove that credibility in political parties, a fundamental pillar in a democratic regime, was affected. Michael Eugenio Castillo stated that he worked for the PAC to support his mother, who aspired to a party position, but also for love of the party's ideals of transparency and ethics; he wanted a change at the political level, had no intention of charging for his volunteer work, and his surprise and disillusionment were due to the misrepresentation of what he had signed. For his part, José Solís Rojas related that Rodrigo Carazo brought him to the PAC, he worked selflessly for the party, was an alderman, and over time became independent, without saying that this was due to the actions attributed to the civil defendants. Teresa Aguilar Brenes indicated that she was a founder of the PAC. She stated that she made her personal vehicle and fuel from her own pocket available for the party's needs on several occasions, expressed that she donated her work to help the country, accepting that she signed the contracts and that the money was for the party. At no time did she express sadness for what happened; rather, she defended her free contribution and the deserved recognition to the party of the political debt for her work. Mrs. María Elena Rodríguez Rodríguez noted that she did her work voluntarily, without charging the party because she believes in this country's democracy. Jorge Eduardo Brenes Vargas reported that in the PAC it was difficult to have resources, so they themselves financed the campaign with the contribution of work. What he signed represents a value for his dedication, since he never expected to have financial compensation. As can be seen, none of these people mentioned by the Procurador in their appeal, or the more than 170 witnesses who testified at trial, mentioned having suffered a supra-individual damage that caused impairment to democracy. The majority admitted having provided free collaboration to the party and agreed to sign the documents presented to them, convinced that this would help the party that could eventually be recognized. What they mostly expressed astonishment and non-conformity with was the disproportionate amounts recorded and the type of function assigned to them, which clashed with the reality of the service provided. Some, like Jeannette de la O Hernández, appeared uncomfortable because they were contacted by officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to testify regarding the special service contracts charged to the State, regarding which the service providers had not declared their income to the Dirección General de Tributación Directa. The common denominator among almost all the PAC members who testified is that they wanted to give their work to the party, expecting nothing in return, but if there were economic recognition for their selfless work, it should be given to the party to contribute to its precarious finances. What they said is, in essence, as the witness Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo made clear, the acceptance of carrying out "a little trick" or "a small deception," knowing that it involved public money, such that they are not the best reference to offer a representative sample of the holders of the true collective interest. On the contrary, if any of them evidenced discomfort, it was not due to the attack on the political-electoral institutionality of this country caused by the actions of the civil defendants (in which they themselves participated "in good faith towards the party"), but due to the betrayal suffered in their private sphere, by the PAC towards them, as its members, by filling out the documents with unreal content regarding the amount and the functions performed. The damage to the particular interests of the individuals belonging to a specific group should not be confused with the general injury belonging to the collective. Therefore, the Court correctly concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to prove that, due to the conduct deemed duly proven and which violates a criminal legal norm, damage was caused to the Costa Rican democratic system. The judges are right that the existence of effective harm must be corroborated; which must be evaluable and individualizable, and derived from conduct capable of giving rise to liability. Likewise, the causal link must be examined, as a necessary element to impute the damage to the specific behavior that caused it. The lower court stated: "If the damage cannot be corroborated, the PGR's assertion would be nothing more than an assumption or a hypothesis. Likewise, if the civil plaintiff does not demonstrate the social damage, there is no need to examine whether there is a direct causal relationship between it and the result, as it would be unnecessary and sterile" (cf. f. 3901). It is not, as the Procuraduría generically maintains, that the illicit act configured has caused the deterioration of correct political formation, nor has it affected the manifestation of popular will through the loss of credibility in political parties. The civil plaintiff party pointed out in its appeal that there is disillusionment and loss of credibility in political parties, to which voter abstentionism must be added, in which the criminal actions of the civil defendants contributed. Such assertions by the appellant are unfounded and stem from a first error, which is taking for granted that social damage to the community existed. Having made this assumption, they consider that it must be granted as is done with moral damage, through a weighing by the judges of the quantum of damage to the collective. This Chamber agrees with the trial court that the existence of social damage should have been demonstrated. To this end, the judges set forth the need for a study that considers the variable relating to the impact that public knowledge of the facts for which the defendants were convicted had, in relation to society's perception of the Costa Rican democratic system, before and after. That is: "a comparison between social well-being before the event and after it occurred" (see fs. 3901-3903). Not doing so means it is an uncertain and abstract damage, which is the complete opposite of certain and effective, evaluable, and individualizable damage. As can be seen, the social damage whose compensation the State entity seeks has none of those attributes. The civil plaintiff could not separate, within the confidence index in the democratic system, what the repercussion of the PAC's presentation of the simulated expense settlement was, and what effects are due to other causes, to determine if social damage resulted from the action of the civil defendants. It must be remembered that the favorable or negative perception towards political parties, as channels for democratic participation and the organization of the currents and ideologies of social life, is multifactorial, depending on many situations, such as, for example, the electorate's disappointment due to the lack of public investment in a government, or due to acts of corruption attributed to a public figure at a given moment, among many others. The difficulty in separating this specific situation from others equally capable of creating social damage precisely demonstrates the importance that, in the case of diffuse interests, the damage supposedly caused to the collective does not lead to a presumption of its "automatic" existence, either because it is considered obvious that actions such as those studied violate our institutionality or because the statements of the members are taken in bulk and it is said that they suffered harm, but rather it must be accredited through some appropriate means or measurement instrument, from the perspective of social sciences and statistics, that can establish whether a verifiable social change can be evidenced, before and after the events. It is not enough to simply say that there is social damage because the fact by which the PAC obtained an unlawful financial benefit offended the fundamental principles of peace and democracy enshrined in the Political Constitution. The fact that it concerns assets or values of general interest, as occurs in the case of the concept of political pluralism, an elementary principle of the democratic and constitutional heritage of the nation, which are extremely abstract and generic definitions, does not imply "per se" that the State entity has the right to claim indeterminate social damage, which imposes the rejection of the claim as there are no flaws in the analytical reasoning. This Chamber considers that according to what the judges expressed in the questioned judgment, there is no document in the case file accrediting that an individualizable collective damage was caused to that totality. The foregoing prevents establishing the existence of a causal link between the illicit act and the damage claimed by the plaintiff. Regarding the charge of contradictory reasoning since some sections of the ruling evidenced the relationship between the participation of the people who collaborated for free and democracy, as can be deduced from folios 3597, 3715, 3733, and 3797, there is no doubt that the majority of the witnesses deployed their service to the party voluntarily and without claiming any payment. This does not mean that in those sections of the judgment it is being said that these people suffered an impact on their perception of democracy due to the conduct of the civil defendants. Rather, as indicated, they themselves participated aware that the documents they signed were going to mean a charge to the Costa Rican State, whether the recognition materialized or not. Finally, regarding what the Court expressed on page 1573, folio 3809 of the judgment, that: "The affectation transcends the mere affectation of the legal right of property, the state coffers (sic) have been looted in an area that the constituent himself wished to invest in the backbone of our electoral democracy" (cf. f. 3809), it in no way means that it is assuming the existence of social damage. Simply, in the context of the analysis of financial harm, as an element of the criminal type of the crime of fraud, something undeniable is being stated: the basis of the financing approved directly in the general State budgets to political parties rests on the constitutional recognition of the public interest of the function they perform, as channels for the democratic participation of citizens. Just as the Constitutional Chamber has expressed: "...parties are essential instruments for the exercise of those rights and, therefore, of democracy itself; their most free formation and functioning are, therefore, of the highest public interest, on the sole condition that they fulfill certain requirements objectively derived from the party system; the possibility of constituting, organizing, and registering them and of participating with them in the election of rulers and in the conduct of public affairs must be as broad as possible, within the strictly indispensable limits to preserve the public interests corresponding to their nature, ends, and function" (cf. Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. on January 23, 2009). The actions of the civil defendants attacked funds from the state contribution destined to invest in democracy, which does not mean that the judges are accepting that damage to the democratic system existed, but rather that they are highlighting the intrinsic value of the decision to invest in our country to sustain the electoral system. As a consequence of the foregoing, there are no flaws in the analytical reasoning or contradictory reasoning, and therefore the grievance must be dismissed.

POR TANTO:

The appeal filed by the representatives of the Ministerio Público is dismissed. The appeal filed by the defendant's defense counsel is partially granted, solely regarding the fact that the ruling did not grant the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya the substitute penalty of monitoring via electronic bracelet, ordering its granting from this instance. The appeal filed by the attorney of the Procuraduría General de la República is partially granted, ordering the civil co-defendants Maynor Sterling Araya, Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, and the Partido Acción Ciudadana to pay the Costa Rican State, jointly and severally, for financial harm (daño patrimonial), the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), as well as personal costs in the amount of ¢56,160,000.00 (fifty-six million one hundred sixty thousand colones). In all other respects, the appeals are dismissed and the ruling remains unchanged.

LET IT BE NOTIFIED.- Rosa María Acón Ng Kathya Jiménez Fernández Edwin Salinas Durán Judges of Criminal Sentencing Appeal File: 12-000024-0033-PE (3) Defendant: Maynor Ricardo Sterling Araya and others Victim: The State and another Offense: Major Fraud and another LQUIROSG File: 12-000024-0033-PE (3) - VOTO 2017-1491 - p. 3 It is false what the judgment indicates, that Sterling Araya ratified with his signature all of the contracts, since of the approximately <i>"twenty-seven tens"</i> of contracts, his client's signature does not appear on any of them; rather, all were signed by Mrs. Margarita Bolaños, revealing the negative bias and the skew in the judges' analysis of the evidence. Furthermore, Mrs. María Yenory Gutiérrez Brizuela and Mr. Carlos Morera Ballestero, permanent staff of the treasury, as well as Leonel Sequeira, internal auditor, agreed that the signing of the receipts by the accused was in fulfillment of an administrative obligation, as he was the national treasurer. Through this testimonial evidence, it was proven at trial that Mr. Sterling Araya was not regularly present at the treasury premises, but appeared solely and exclusively to sign documents; he did not engage in reviewing the contracts, nor in the designation of bonds, nor did he give them instructions to structure a criminal plan. In addition, it was proven during the adversarial proceedings that the accused did not even prepare the expense liquidation; rather, this was done by Leonel Sequeira. They object that the trial court infers their client's responsibility because he proposed the amendment of the PAC's internal statutes to increase the percentage of political debt that could be claimed in those elections; however, Mr. Maynor, as treasurer and an expert on the subject, only made a recommendation for that amendment to be analyzed, a decision that rested with the party's internal body. At that time, there were political motives generating such a need, and in that regard, witnesses Lilliam Arguedas, Amadeo Cordero, Margarita Bolaños, Olivier Pérez, and Herberth Herrera testified. According to the appellants, this also had normative support, as observed in the recommendation made by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in resolution No. 1257-P-2000 at 1:50 p.m. on June 16, 2000. <b>Being closely related, the claims contained in the first four grounds of the appeal are resolved jointly, and they are without merit.</b> The trial court determined the responsibility of the accused Maynor Sterling Araya based on various evidentiary elements analyzed jointly, integrally, and completely, and not in an isolated, segmented, and fragmented manner as the technical defense of the defendant does, in an attempt to disqualify and invalidate the assessment and conclusions reached by the judges. When examining the defense counsel's allegations, their technique of analyzing the testimonial evidence in a biased manner, disconnected from the evidentiary universe, to thus dismantle the structured, logical, and reasoned construction of the judgment, is more than evident. From the objections raised by the defense, what is extracted are personal opinions, conjectures, a simple disagreement with the outcome of the conviction, and an attempt to re-evaluate the testimonial evidence according to their client's interests. Contrary to what was challenged, this chamber notes that the <i>a quo</i> meticulously addressed each piece of evidence introduced in the proceedings, linking the actions of the accused Sterling Araya that allowed them to establish unequivocally, the direction of the plan executed in order to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones by presenting a liquidation of expenses for special services that he knew did not conform to reality, in order to inflate the political debt quota and thus, for the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter PAC) to receive a greater state contribution than was due. The appellants seek to have it accepted that because approximately one hundred and seventy witnesses did not say it was directly the defendant who asked them to sign the service contracts, then Mr. Maynor was not part of the <i>"fraudulent scheme"</i> to defraud the Costa Rican State. This argument not only disregards criminal participation through the concept of control over the act (dominio del hecho), but also seeks to ignore the forcefulness of the accounts provided by witnesses Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, and José Reyes Gómez, with the appellants asserting that the first two merely <i>"assumed"</i> or <i>"presumed"</i> that co-defendant Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo asked them to sign following Sterling Araya's instructions, and, regarding the last witness, eluding its impact despite its assertiveness, by pointing out that at the meeting held at the convention center called "La Catalina" in Birrí de Heredia, he heard Mr. Maynor tell party activists to sign the contracts to support its finances. The considerations put forward by the claimants, it is reiterated, reflect their particular and subjective way of examining the evidence, in a partial and disconnected manner, with the aim of extracting deductions different from those in the judgment. The fact that they randomly name several witnesses who attended the gathering at "La Catalina" (Silvia Yanina Soto Vargas, Jenny Castro Acuña, María Elena Rojas Mora, Alejandro Li Grau, and Carlos Luis Solano Orozco), attempting to discredit the participation of the accused Sterling Araya because Castro Acuña stated that the person who asked her to sign the documents was Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín, while Rojas Mora said she did not know Mr. Maynor and that it was the PAC's cantonal-level president, Daniel Quesada, who asked her (see f. 2846); whereas Soto Vargas did not even mention whether Sterling was at the location, and Li Grau stated he did not remember if he was there (see f. 2877)—in no way do these statements discredit what was affirmed by witness José Reyes Gómez, nor the direction of Sterling Araya in the implementation of the plan. This was an activity in which many supporters, PAC representatives, and members of the executive committee were gathered; therefore, it cannot be expected that in a crowd of that size, everyone necessarily had to determine who was present, such as the accused Maynor Sterling Araya, who, given the type of functions he performed for the party, was less known to the general public than Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo (even María Elena Rojas Mora indicated she did not know him), the latter with whom most collaborators had indeed dealt personally. To believe that the witnesses cited by the appellants, to refute José Reyes Gómez's credibility, should coincide that Mr. Maynor was at "La Catalina" and was the one who instructed those gathered to sign the contracts with their signature, is to ignore the very psychology of testimony, as a group of people gathered in a place, where some talk while others speak to the public, or are simply present, or are not attentive to details, will never all coincide on specific aspects, or something as specific as who called for the signing of the documents in question, or whether Mr. Maynor said it to a group of people, or to the collective. In addition, aspects inherent to the assessment of testimony must be considered, such as the time elapsed, the way each individual perceived the facts, the way of expressing them, as well as the type of situation one intends to recall and the impact it caused. Note that the defense does not even establish what significance, or how it affects what was decided, the fact that the accused Sterling Araya was or was not present at "La Catalina," or whether it was he or someone else who reiterated there the call to sign service contracts to support the party. It is actually irrelevant whether or not they were contacted by Mr. Maynor, that is, whether Flor de María Monge Arroyo recounted that she was called from the party, and it was Mr. Manuel Antonio Bolaños who gave her the documents to sign (see f. 2919); whether José Solís Rojas said it was <i>Tony</i> who called him and that he does not know Mr. Maynor (see f. 2948); or that Luis Carlos Odio Victory stated that he only knew Mr. Sterling by sight and only noticed <i>Tony's</i> presence. Through a simplistic rational exercise that evades the issue of responsibility through functional co-control over the act (co-dominio funcional del hecho) and the direction of the criminal events, the defense counsel attempt to convince that, because their client did not go to collect signatures, or was not seen at "La Catalina" or any other PAC meeting point, addressing the public to promote the signing of documents, he had no relation to the artifice carried out. It is also irrelevant whether the Court erred in stating that the accused Sterling Araya ratified with his signature the totality of the special service contracts, which were signed by Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín as General Secretary of the Executive Committee, as this fact does not diminish his participation within the plan, the defendant concurring in the various stages of the <i>iter criminis.</i> Such actions alone are not the only ones the Court weighed to anchor his co-authorship in the perpetrated fraud (estafa), but rather a cumulation of circumstances that the appellants avoid mentioning, precisely because a comprehensive analysis of the evidentiary elements, as carried out by the <i>a quo,</i> leads to the inexorable determination that the order and the fraudulent plan came from Maynor Sterling Araya and that he held the reins of the criminal events, without the <i>a quo</i> reaching such considerations due to a negative bias towards the defendant.

An objective and proper reading of the statements of witnesses Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo and Gloria Cárdenas Miranda shows that neither of them made unfounded assumptions when asserting that the request from co-defendant Bolaños Murillo was based on the instruction given by the defendant Sterling Araya, who was the PAC Treasurer at that time. As the judgment highlights, the statement of witness Gloria Cárdenas Miranda is extremely important to affirm the responsibility that the technical defense now denies. Not only because she is one of the numerous people who appeared at trial to indicate that it was co-defendant Bolaños Murillo who summoned her to induce her to sign the documents for supposed special contracts to give a breather to the PAC's battered finances, but because he revealed to her who was behind all that ideation. When Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo was requesting her signature and explaining the reason for signing, Mrs. Cárdenas Miranda asked him from whom the entire scheme came, to which he responded, from Mr. Maynor Sterling and Mrs. Margarita Bolaños. The witness emphasized: <i>...I asked Mr. Manuel why sign the document and he told me that I provided training services and I asked him who had said so, because I knew he was a pawn, and he said: Margarita Bolaños and Mr. Sterling, the Committee… </i>(see f. 2924, sic). The same must be said of the testimony of Gerardo Amadero Cordero Martínez, who, although he points to the party's General Secretary, Margarita Bolaños Arquín, as the one who promoted his signing, as well as that of other acquaintances who turned out to be Isidro Navarro Vargas, Juan Luis Padilla Molina, and Cristian Padilla Molina, that indication in no way exonerates Sterling Araya, the mastermind of the fraudulent scheme (programación defraudatoria) to claim an improper disbursement from the State. The message was—almost invariably—that signing the documents was aimed at helping the party economically, through donating the proceeds of the contract they would sign, just as Bolaños Murillo told witness Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, he having been an envoy of Sterling Araya, as he in turn told deponent Gloria Cárdenas Miranda (see f. 2839 and 2924). It is not, then, an unfounded assumption by the witnesses, as the appellants assert, but a deduction they reached in accordance with the circumstances, which was confirmed by the elements adduced by the trial court. The judgment states: <i>"...the court had the opportunity to directly perceive that the witnesses signed those documents out of the great affection and trust they had for the PAC, a party that had raised the flag of ethics and austerity, to help it economically, but they were induced into error because what they did not know was that the party's intention was for that supposed expense to add up to give greater content to the certificates of assignment to the state contribution in series A, which was in the hands of the party's main 'creditors' and its large contributors" </i>(cf. f. 3694). Therefore, the scope that the appellants intend to give to the point of whether Mr. Maynor intervened directly by encouraging party activists to sign the contracts in order to prove his participation is not, in reality, what is conclusive, but rather a set of elements obtained from the examination of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, which reveal Mr. Maynor's criminal intent (dolo) together with his perpetrator plan to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which goes beyond the fact of serving as PAC treasurer at the date of the criminal events, as well as being part of the executive committee. The testimony of Jeannette de la O Hernández, who also made an audio recording (of having convinced the supporters, personally, to sign the documentation through which the PAC would obtain the financial benefit) of what was said by the accused Sterling Araya during the meeting held at the PAC's central headquarters (see fs. 3527-3556), is one of the pieces that corroborates that Mr. Maynor indeed knew of and coordinated the plan for party collaborators to sign special contracts in order to charge them against the state contribution to political parties, without the fact that he did not ask each of the witnesses who testified at trial directly detracting from his contribution and intervention in the criminal structuring. It was the PAC's own presidential candidate, Ottón Solís Fallas, who, in response to the concern expressed by Mrs. Jeannette because the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones was inquiring of her and it was even questioned that, having provided a service paid for by the party, the providers did not report the income to the tax authority, referred her to Mr. Minor; she and a group of affected people proceeded to request a meeting. What Sterling Araya explained there to those confronting him is the same discourse that he disseminated on different occasions through co-defendant Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, or Margarita Bolaños Arquín, or some local PAC leaders such as Daniel Quesada and Eduardo Solís, or even activists such as Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, in the sense that the collaborators' work, even though voluntary and motivated by empathy with the party's ideals, had to be assigned an economic value. If recognition was obtained from the State, they would be paid, or they could donate it to the group, an option that most witnesses accepted due to their sense of identity, belonging, and loyalty to the cause and, except in some cases, without truly internalizing that it implied an improper charge to the public treasury. Of interest from the recording, it is worth highlighting the following conversations: <i>"MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Well, you remember that in the political campaign you were asked, because you were working in the political campaign, that if you wanted to help the party, and since you were working, that work could be quantified and would be paid with B bonds, and if that money was acquired as political debt, you decided two things: one, if you kept it, and two, if you donated it to the party. That was it. It turns out you signed four documents (voices that are not understood what they say), you signed four documents. <b>JEANNETTE JULIA ROMAN GONZÁLEZ</b></i> <i>: There we are in trouble, Mr. Maynor, we don't remember that…" </i>(cf. f. 3529-3530). " <b><i>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</i></b><i>: ...nobody received money, Why? Because the party, given the number of bonds it obtained, did not even cover the totality of A bonds..." </i>(cf. f. 3530). "<b><i>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</i></b><i>: ...this was kept in custody here for all the people. And why did we leave it in custody?… in the 2002 campaigns and the 2006 campaign… people came and started to sell these on the street, and this has no value until the Tribunal says..." </i>(cf. f. 3532). <i>"<b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b>: Yes, but what services I provided to the PAC, I said I had to be given that money. <b>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</b>: The special services. <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b>: But the only thing I did was put the car to work and I worked at the polling stations (mesas), I did not want any money. <b>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</b></i> <i>: It's that that work was quantified and a price was put on it, that's it. <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b>: Without knowing it. <b>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</b></i> <i>: How without knowing it? <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b>: No, I didn't know. <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b>: Exactly, yes. <b>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</b></i> <i>: Of course, that must have been explained to you. <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b></i> <i>: Yes, we have the document there, but I don't remember at any time that I was going to receive that amount of money for having provided car service and for having worked as a poll watcher (fiscal), which I could never do because the paper never arrived. Do you understand me? <b>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</b>: Yes, yes, of course I understand you. <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b>: So what I base this on is, if that money had existed, I would have received that one million two hundred thousand they were going to give me. <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b>: Eight hundred… <b>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</b></i> <i>: Well then, on that I can't answer you, because well, you are responsible for signing your documents. <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b></i> <i>: I know, I said, my signature goes on that, but… <b>GUSTAVO MARTINEZ</b>: But that was not your responsibility, collecting signatures was not your responsibility, Mr. Maynor. <b>GUSTAVO MARTINEZ</b>: Nobody knows how that was collected. <b>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</b>: How nobody knows. <b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b>: I don't… that is, I don't understand that part. <b>GUSTAVO MARTINEZ</b>: But, it's that, wasn't that your responsibility, Mr. Maynor? Wasn't that your responsibility? It was not your responsibility to collect signatures… <b>MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA</b></i> <i>: No, no, no, no, I don't do those things." </i>(cf. 3547, 3548, and 3549).<i> "<b>JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</b></i> <i>: At what moment was I appointed as advisor for Casa Conde? Transport Advisor, I remember having put my car at the service of the PAC, and without charging anything, because I said, I provide my gasoline, besides we didn't work much anyway, because there wasn't much service there for the car. So I said, I provide my car, I am not going to charge, I will provide my gasoline the times I have to fill my tank, I donate it to the PAC, I will not charge a cent, OK. After that, the other service I don't know, the only service I provided was working as a poll watcher (fiscal), there at the polling stations (mesas)..." </i>(cf. f. 3549). <b><i>"JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ</i></b><i>: But, I don't know why I would receive such a large amount?" </i>(cf. f. 3550, sic).

Contrary to what the appellants argue, the foregoing transcripts confirm that Sterling Araya knew about the subscription of the "special contracts," which he could not claim from the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones since he knew the services had been provided for free. As much as he feigned surprise at the meeting regarding the unreality of the services described in the contracts and their disproportion to the values stated, holding the grantors themselves responsible for not reading what they had signed, it is clear that Mr. Maynor's knowledge and intentions went beyond the generous gesture of recognizing an economic estimate for the collaborators' work. Jeannette de la O Hernández herself stated to the accused that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand colones was far too much money for what she did during the campaign (providing gasoline to her vehicle from her own pocket and driving it, as well as acting as a poll watcher and advisor at Casa Conde, which she rejected), a fact that Sterling Araya could not overlook, just as he could not overlook the approximately 179 contracts signed by the witnesses who appeared at the trial to recount that their contribution had been voluntary and without remuneration, or that they had not provided any service at all. Also on that occasion, he tried to distance himself from the knowledge of the inconsistencies in the documents, vehemently rejecting that he had brought them to the signatories to be signed, stating: “-no, no, no, no, I don't do those things.” When it is evident that, due to his position as PAC treasurer, the task of collecting signatures was not his responsibility, but rather a series of functions by which he could not have failed to notice the charging of an item for "special services" that the PAC had not paid for.

According to Article 30 of the Statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, the party treasurer was responsible for: a) Coordinating his work with the National Finance Commission (Comisión Nacional de Finanzas). b) Controlling the financial and accounting management of the party and ensuring the strict application of all electoral and legal norms governing the matter, for both private contributions and state contributions to political parties, especially the regulations issued for this purpose by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the Contraloría General de la República, being completely responsible for compliance with the law in this matter. c) Presenting reports to the National Executive Committee (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional) and the Political Commission (Comisión Política), with a copy to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, regarding the contributions received and the financial progress of the party; these reports must be submitted monthly from one year before the national election until six months after the conclusion of the municipal elections, and quarterly the rest of the time. d) Presenting a report to the Contraloría General de la República once a year. e) Monitoring the accounting record of the income and expenses of the political party Acción Ciudadana (Article 30 of the Statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana; Article 123 of the Código Electoral). f) Faithfully recording the amount and origin of private contributions, of any kind, that the political party Acción Ciudadana received, and the identity of those contributors. Observe that within Sterling Araya's role as PAC treasurer was the accounting control of the party's income and outflows, which makes his refusal to accept that he was aware that the contracts were simulated implausible, since the expenses stated in the documentation were never generated for the party. But moreover, as the <i>a quo</i> correctly analyzes, Mr. Maynor could not include, within the expense liquidation for claiming the state contribution, services provided free of charge by party sympathizers, as this not only did not constitute an incurred expenditure, but also revealed another irregularity: not including those donations in his reports to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones as contributions to the party. His clear objective was to present them as disbursements to manage to give the greatest possible economic content to the series A bonds, since the larger the amount of expenses generated and justified by a political party during the electoral campaign, the more considerable what would be received from the state contribution for the PAC's participation in the national elections would be. It must be kept in mind that the political quota (cuota política) for the parties is defined by two factors: the total valid votes obtained by the political group in the electoral process, and the total amount of expenses liquidated by it before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. This Chamber shares the analysis made in the judgment regarding the simulated nature of the documents and the unavoidable knowledge Mr. Maynor had of it, given that he was one of the architects of the plan, as derived from the functional control (dominio funcional) he had over the event, as recounted by the witnesses and the excerpts of the conversations referred to: <i>"Those documents consisted of the 'SPECIAL SERVICES PROVISION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA AND…'; which, from its literal wording, contained a series of falsehoods (that the accused were aware of) and that sought to fulfill the legal requirements to justify an expense for special services that never occurred, because although in some cases there were various tasks, these were not the ones indicated and in no case was payment collected. See then that this contract described the special service to be provided; these were generic titles with no real content, for example: Cantonal Elector Coordinator, General Cantonal Promoter, General Finance Coordinator, General Organization Coordinator, Cantonal Communications Coordinator, Cantonal Youth Coordinator, and Cantonal Transport Coordinator. With the immediacy provided by the adversarial process, this Court could easily extract from the body language and verbal language of the contractors their astonishment upon seeing the contract and the assigned position. The vast majority said they did not know what the position was, what it consisted of, who had appointed them, what their supposed responsibilities would be, and in no case were they asked for accounts or reports on their functions. Another false content of the contract, which ultimately served as a trick before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, was the total payment amount stated as paid. An immense majority of the contractor witnesses examined, as seen in Considerando VII, said they had never agreed upon or received any economic sum, surprised by this clause and, in several cases, deeply dismayed and even angry, for they never even had the intention of quantifying their work economically. Others, with a clear interest in protecting their political party, tried unsuccessfully to justify the amount, arguing that they had carried out arduous work, that it was what other parties paid, that it was established according to the minimum wage for their professions, that it was an amount derived from the total hours worked, and multiple reasons that, when confronted with one another, make it clear that there was never an agreement between the parties, but rather that they were arbitrary and formulaic amounts filled in by unknown persons on the order of the accused to deceive the electoral body. This contract also included the temporal range in which the special service was supposedly provided, another clear example of the deception the accused attempted, as all of the witnesses were in agreement in pointing out that said dates were not related to their functions within the party when they provided them. They said they had worked before, after, never, or on other dates without also having received payment for those periods or the one indicated in the contract. All the dates were artificially imposed and filled in by the accused, making use of other people" </i>(cf. f. 3803). The judgment thus sets out how, through the same scheme of simulated contracts for large and similar amounts, the fabrication of false money receipts, and the issuance of series B certificates that, instead of being given to the service providers, were kept in the PAC treasury, the co-defendants fabricated a framework with the appearance of legality so that all those contracts would be entered as "party expenses" in the final liquidation and thus achieve, according to the binomial "total votes obtained and expenses," the approval of more money from the state contribution. It was Mr. Maynor who, on June 16, 2010, at the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, specifically in the Department of Financing of Political Parties (Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos), presented, in his capacity as treasurer of the PAC's national executive committee, the certification of expense liquidation corresponding to the 2006-2010 electoral process, for a total amount of ¢4,238,108,764.79 (four thousand two hundred thirty-eight million one hundred eight thousand seven hundred sixty-four colones and seventy-nine céntimos).

Of the total expense report, the item for “special services” reached a value of ¢1,152,040,184 (one billion one hundred fifty-two million forty thousand one hundred eighty-four colones), within which the fraudulent charge of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones) was included, corresponding to the contracts for special services contrary to reality. It was not just any amount that went unnoticed by the PAC treasurer and that he included within the party’s expense report; there were 263 simulated special services contracts for an amount that reached the sum of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones). As is rightly indicated in the ruling, Sterling Araya not only deliberately omitted to report to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal that these were donations, as he now seeks to validate in his defense, but these items represented 25% of the PAC’s electoral expenses in the 2010 contest. An unprecedented figure for a party that promoted austerity and volunteerism among its members, yet in contrast, showed wastefulness in expenses that lacked coherence or made sense, with the witnesses themselves estimating that the amounts reflected therein were excessive. In their effort to circumvent the responsibility of their client, the challengers attempt to place it on the internal auditor Leonel Sequeira, stating that he was the one who prepared the expense report; however, this effort cannot succeed. The Court properly derived from the statements of Julio Aguilar Silesky, Ronald Eduardo Chacón Bonilla, and Leonel Sequeira himself that the latter’s work was of a documentary nature, his responsibility being to verify that the accounting entries issued by the party corresponded to a justifiable payment, as well as ensuring compliance with legal requirements, such as being accompanied by proof of payment. However, knowledge of the fiction contained in the special services contracts was the responsibility of the defendant Maynor Sterling. Even if Mr. Leonel came to know of the unreality of the contracts included in the expense report, this does not exclude or diminish Mr. Maynor’s participation in the execution of the plan. In the concatenation of elements indicating the direction of the actions of the defendant Sterling Araya (giving economic substance to the Series A state contribution assignment certificates), the Court highlights that in all cases, the same approach was used of convincing supporters to sign the documents as acknowledgment of an economic sense to their contribution, whether to donate it to the group and strengthen it, or to keep it for themselves as supposed remuneration for the services they provided to the PAC. Furthermore, the judges detected that these were exactly the same templates, whose blank spaces are filled in, in the vast majority, with the same handwriting, and for amounts and functions with which a large portion of the witnesses disagreed, considering them exaggerated given the tasks they actually performed, with divergence also existing between the functions recorded and those they actually exercised. The technical defense seeks to have it believed in the good faith of the “special services” contracts, arguing their pre-existence, that they had been used prior to the accused Maynor Sterling Araya assuming the position of Treasurer, and that the regulatory system itself required political parties to prepare them. This Chamber agrees with the *a quo* that there is no doubt whatsoever about the prior existence and legitimacy of the instruments called special services contracts. They are certainly a legitimate instrument for party groups to meet the need for services that are neither technical nor professional in nature and that can also be paid with assignment certificates for the state contribution, from the series the party deems pertinent, as an absolutely valid payment mechanism, which exist and which party groups resort to in order to obtain resources and thus finance the ongoing campaign. As the trial court states: *“…the problem is not the existence or not of the special services contracts, whether they were used or not in other political campaigns, nor is it the existence of the state contribution assignment certificates; the problem lies in the instrumentalization made of them to use them as the deceitful means to simulate non-existent expenses and thus deceive an institution like the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in order to obtain greater resources from the state contribution illegitimately. It is not legal and it is not viable that the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the person very especially of the accused, remunerated work that it knew was voluntary, free, and ad honorem, a service that it also knew would be received anyway with or without a contract, as the court has proven occurred in this case and whose purpose was to grant greater economic substance to the Series A state contribution rights assignment certificates in order to be able to honor the debts owed to the major creditors and major contributors during the electoral campaign. The use by Sterling Araya and Bolaños Murillo of legally admitted instruments was, rather, part of the suitability of the deception perpetrated against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, to which a false reality of things was represented, and which, upon verifying compliance with the regulatory elements required in the expense report, confirmed that the instruments were those required by law and, by virtue of the principle of good faith, assumed that the Partido Acción Ciudadana was telling the truth regarding their content. Witness Otton Solís Fallas is correct when he indicates that there is nothing wrong with people donating the fruit of their labor to the party, but that is not the case before us because, on the part of the Partido Acción Ciudadana sympathizers, there was never any intention to charge because their work was free, and on the part of the party, there was never any intention to hire them and pay for their services; what was devised was a stratagem of illegal collection from the public treasury, giving it the ‘appearance’ of legality”* (see folios 3793-3794)*.* Sterling Araya had the design so clearly laid out that the Series B bonds were not even delivered to the supposed providers of the services they simulated as remunerated, or that they pretended existed, since as indicated, in some cases there weren’t even any involved. It was proven that another of the documents used was the “*proof of payment*,” which, like the contract, contained a series of falsehoods that the witnesses themselves unanimously demonstrated, as the text of the proof stated: “The Partido Acción Ciudadana has paid to…,” even though no amount was paid to anyone. The ruling points out, to emphasize the criminal intent with which Sterling Araya acted: *“It is important to note that on this proof of payment, **STERLING ARAYA** himself signs under the legend: ‘I acknowledge receipt of the good or service,’ knowing full well that, firstly, the service had not been provided, and secondly, that the sum stated therein had never been charged or paid by the Partido Acción Ciudadana. These are, without a doubt, pre-constitution of evidence for the fraud that they would ultimately present before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Finally, as part of the ruse, the accused had the contractors instrumentalized for this fraud sign the document stating: ‘PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECEIPT FOR THE DELIVERY OF BONDS AS PAYMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES.’ Again, a document full of falsehoods and inaccuracies, like the previous ones. This referred to the supposed delivery of Type B Certificates to the contractors, which never occurs in the one hundred seventy-nine contracts, with one exception. Even the vast majority of witnesses never had visual contact with the certificate. At this point, it must be remembered that the Type A, B, or C Certificates issued by the Executive Committee of the Political Party are, as the Electoral Code in force for the year 2010 indicates, a valid means of payment for all legal purposes, as ratified by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. This is why the appropriate action was to deliver them to those who had provided goods or services to the Partido Acción Ciudadana and thus settle them in the expenses. The foregoing did not happen for the simple reason that there was never any interest in canceling them. The excuse given by **STERLING ARAYA**, in the sense that he did it to avoid potential harm to third parties in good faith who might receive them, as he alleged had occurred in previous elections, is unacceptable. The fact is that by law, the contractors were the only valid holders, as they had been ‘paid with them.’ There was not a single document supporting the supposed instantaneous donation of the same to the party, or the request for the party at its headquarters to be the guardian of the Certificates. To verify the deception of the accused, it is interesting that the Type A Certificates and Type B Certificates provided to companies or media outlets were indeed delivered, making clear, through the differing treatment, their intentions differing from those indicated in the text of this document. If the contractors intended to donate said amount to the Party once paid, the respective procedure for private financing of parties, in its donation modality, had to be followed. Which was never done. This is because, in the ideation of this criminal structure, there was never any intention to give them substance, but rather for them to serve to artificially inflate expenses and thus gain access to 100% of the political debt the Partido Acción Ciudadana was entitled to at that time, due to the abrupt change in its bylaws that modified the ceiling from 50% to 100% of the state contribution to be received, and given that this occurs after the elections, in the absence of real expenses of the political group P.A.C., simulated contracts for special services were resorted to. Thus, the simulated delivery of the B certificates was a suitable ruse to lead the Costa Rican electoral body into error, since applying the principle of trust that governs electoral matters and based on the text of the documents presented, which had the corresponding signatures, among them those of the co-defendant **STERLING ARAYA** and Mrs. Margarita Bolaños, they legally accredited a payment that was never made, was never charged by the party militants, and therefore should never have been accounted for as such. It is important to highlight, as stated, that the certificates, despite their nature, never left the central offices of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, by a direct provision of the co-defendant **STERLING ARAYA**. With one exception out of the 263 contracts presented in this case, these B Certificates were never delivered, which clearly establishes that the accused **BOLAÑOS MURILLO*** *and* ***STERLING ARAYA,** never wanted to give them the legal value they have by law. Thus, the reasons given by **STERLING ARAYA** for their non-delivery prove highly contradictory to the procedure given to the A certificates and even the B certificates given to companies or media outlets, differing treatment that confirms these were part of an elaborate ruse”* (cf. folios 3804-3805). The trial court thus outlines how all these contracts were instrumentalized and given a similar process because their sole purpose was to inflate expenses to deceive the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Positions, activities, obligations, and amounts were established for the party, without any objective parameter, but with absolute lightness, in an arbitrary and capricious manner, revealing nothing other than the design to make improper charges to the State. This Chamber agrees that, unlike the Series A and Series B certificates that were delivered to major creditors of the party, the Series B certificates related to the special services contracts remained in the possession of the defendant Sterling Araya, despite the fact that he issued the corresponding receipts for the delivery of bonds, evidencing that from their genesis, there was never any intention for them to be, even remotely, canceled, with a different treatment from the norm that unequivocally indicates that their reason for being was indeed to swell the PAC’s expense item. Certainly, by having delivered the Series B certificates to the supposed beneficiaries, any intention of collection for the providers appearing in the contracts was rendered nugatory, without the explanation given by Mr. Maynor—that they were not delivered so they would not be subsequently transmitted because they had been issued to bearer—being acceptable, given that according to what Margarita Bolaños Arquín stated, the television company Repretel and various local broadcasters and individuals who gave cash to the party were paid with Series B certificates, which were indeed delivered to them physically. The fact that witnesses María Yenory Gutiérrez Briezuela and Leonel Sequeira indicated that the signing of the receipts by the accused Sterling was in fulfillment of an administrative obligation as National Treasurer does not disconnect him from the artifice and the scheme mounted to defraud the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, but rather links him to the other actions deployed, aimed at making an illegitimate and improper charge. The ruling also notes that, according to what the witnesses stated at trial, the PAC’s finances were extremely precarious for the 2010 elections, and there were still accumulated debts from the previous campaign. As party Treasurer, Mr. Maynor was obviously concerned about not being able to cover the sums provided by banks and large creditors who had been paid with Series A certificates. The judgment sets out, in a technical and adequate manner, that before the 2006-2010 electoral campaign, the amount of the state contribution for each party was 100% for its electoral and campaign expenses. It was from the year 2009 onward that, in application of the text of Article 52 of the Electoral Code, political parties were required to allocate in their bylaws, in precise distribution, a percentage of the state contribution to a reserve for training expenses and political organization in non-electoral times. The foregoing under the spirit of promoting parties as permanent entities, a reflection of Costa Rican democracy, and not simple electoral machines hunting for votes in pursuit of winning elections. Within the Partido Acción Ciudadana, there was an austerity rule contained in Article 53 of the Partido Acción Ciudadana’s Bylaws, in the sense that the party group would never charge more than 0.08% of the gross domestic product. It was also provided that the percentage allocated to the training and political organization reserve item would be 20% charged to the state contribution. This was a rule that economically limited the PAC and worried Maynor Sterling Araya, constituting the main driving force for a bylaw reform to be enacted so as to access the totality of the amount of state support. There is no doubt about this, no matter how much his defenders allege that his work as National Treasurer was *ad honorem*, that he did not remain regularly in the treasury office, but appeared solely and exclusively to sign documents. The judges show Mr. Maynor’s concern for the PAC’s finances in the 2010 electoral contest, noting that both he, in his capacity as PAC Treasurer, together with the treasurers of other political groups (Partido Movimiento Libertario and Partido Liberación Nacional), requested the Supreme Electoral Tribunal on May 7, 2009, for a reconsideration of the situation, arguing that it would entail a “technical financial closure” of the parties entitled to political debt, since the indicated deduction would result in the absolute impossibility of paying monetary obligations or commitments (bonds) already acquired, issued, or contracted, placing them in a financial “crossroads” because they would have to tell many people or entities that they did not recover their investment, worsening the lack of credibility in political organizations and generating very strong distrust toward the financial system of political parties (see folio 3596). The Tribunal responded to the defendant and his counterparts that the part of the state contribution to be allocated to training and organization was not optional but a duty. Faced with the warning that they would only be receiving 80% of the total amount (subject to expense approval), the ruling describes how the accused machinated a plan to economically satisfy the investors in the electoral campaign, consisting of this *“in the simulation of a large number of special services contracts supposedly canceled with Series B state contribution assignment certificates, which were presented as expenses supposedly incurred by the Partido Acción Ciudadana before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; for this, the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the person of the accused, illegally assigned an economic value to the ad honorem, free, and voluntary work that its collaborators had been performing or had already performed during the presidential campaign, and as is obvious and according to the words of witness Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González of the Political Party Financing Department, a free service cannot constitute an effective expense”* (cf. folio 3597).* *The former presidential candidate and founder of the PAC himself, Ottón Solís Fallas, stated that Sterling Araya was one of the promoters of the bylaw change who even deceived him, because Solís Fallas said that at some point he spoke with Sterling to desist from promoting that reform to the bylaws; however, far from adhering to the party’s principles, he continued promoting its approval. On May 16, 2010, in San Pedro de Montes de Oca, specifically in the Edificio Cooperativo located behind the Mall San Pedro, the PAC national assembly members held National Assembly No. 17, whose minutes record that on that day the referred bylaw reform established in Articles 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56 took place. In Article four of the minutes, it is reported that Mrs. Elizabeth Fonseca, President of the National Executive Committee, proceeded to read a note that Maynor Sterling Araya had left, as he was out of the country on that date, to be read to the PAC National Assembly. The minutes state the following: *"...I proceed to read, as I told you yesterday, the letter that Mr. Maynor Sterling left us. Mr. Maynor says: ...I will not be in Costa Rica from May 14 to 29 of this year .... By virtue of the fact that it will not be possible for me to be present at the National Assembly on May 15 ..., I find it necessary to set out for you by this means the reasons why I believe our Partido Acción Ciudadana needs to try to collect the totality of the political debt in accordance with the Electoral Code... Hence the importance of making this reform and registering it before we present the expense report to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for the collection of the state contribution in the month of June. For all the foregoing, I respectfully ask you to give your support to the following initiative and vote in favor of it... if any of you wish to learn more about this matter, you can call me by phone or write to me by email and I will try to deepen my reasoning a little more, or if you deem it appropriate, we can coordinate a meeting..."* (cf. main case file volume I, folios 413 to 415). The interest shown by the accused in having the bylaw reform approved before the date for the presentation of the final expense report to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was intended so that all those simulated expenses included therein would ultimately be recognized by the Political Party Financing Department and would help give economic substance to the Series A certificates. The appellants attempt to deny these motivations by arguing that Mr. Maynor even served as Treasurer without receiving remuneration;* *however, in the course of his management, he made it clear that the approval of the bylaw reform was achieved thanks to his initiative, highlighting his merits as savior of the party’s finances when he reported: *"I wish to highlight the approval by the National Assembly, at the request of the National Treasury, of the collection of the totality of the political debt (sic), a historic decision that will undoubtedly result in more economic resources to strengthen our party, hence the excellent economic capacity in which the PAC is left (sic) after the collection of that money (sic), as shown below…"* (see National Treasury Report dated February 8, 2011, folios 305 to 315). A reform of this nature, which Sterling proclaimed as “urgent,” was necessary for his criminal plan of assigning an economic value to the free work that the party’s followers had been performing to bear fruit and achieve more money from the state contribution. As indicated, in his note, he warned, individually, in the first person, and with deep vehemence, that it was pressing to approve that reform and register it before presenting the expense report to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, a report in which the 263 simulated special services contracts were included. Far from being a recommendation without any interest, Sterling Araya pressured for the National Assembly to modify the bylaws and thus achieve his fraudulent objective. Whether out of dedication and devotion to the party, or to appear as its redeemer, since he always sought to project a good image and credibility in economic matters, Mr. Maynor not only divorced himself from the ethical ideals proclaimed by the group he defended but transgressed the legal framework. Thus, after an analysis of the derivative process carried out by the judges, it is determined that the errors pointed out by the challengers are non-existent and that the judgment is based on an adequate assessment of the direct and circumstantial evidence, an exercise performed in an objective, joint, comprehensive, concatenated, and harmonious manner of all the evidentiary elements brought to the adversarial process. **B)** In the **fifth ground** of their appeal, they allege insufficient reasoning due to lack of proof of the objective element of the criminal offense: patrimonial harm. They allege that the court concluded unfoundedly on the existence of patrimonial harm against the State and, consequently, of an economic benefit in favor of the persons holding Series A political debt assignment certificates; additionally, that the PAC benefited pecuniarily from the supposed fraud perpetrated against public funds. They assert that the Series B certificates were not redeemed for money; hence, the Costa Rican state did not make any disbursement as a result of the issuance of said means of payment, and this was established in the resolution of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal No. 7235-E10-2010 of 12:45 p.m. on December 3, 2010, according to which the political debt assignment certificates, Series B, achieved no economic substance. This must be contrasted with the reality of the approved and effective payments made by the Ministry of Finance, from which it is obtained that only the equivalent of 98.72% of the total value of the Series A political debt assignment certificates was canceled, so that the Series B certificates achieved no economic substance. They question the ruling’s conclusions, in the sense that according to the judges, the economic harm materialized because the special services contracts, upon being included by the PAC in the political debt expense report, inflated the amount to which said political group was entitled and more money was paid than was owed to the holders of Series A certificates, thereby procuring an unlawful patrimonial benefit for private third parties who sold goods and services to the PAC, and in favor of the political party itself, which obtained a higher amount of political debt. They consider that the judgment is remiss in exactly pointing out which person and who received an unlawful patrimonial benefit, it not being procedurally correct in criminal law to make a general allusion that it was received by the holders of Series A certificates. It is also devoid of reasoning as to the legal reason that prevailed to determine that the amount of money paid to the holders of Series A certificates did not correspond to a real payment, since each of the expenses that the PAC paid to its different suppliers was made effectively through A and B certificates, the party making good payment, whether or not those certificates were redeemed, and no cash payment was received from the PAC. For the appellants, there was an impossibility of manipulating the amount of the political debt because the amount each party would receive was unknown, under the protection of the provisions of Article 90 of the Electoral Code concerning the determination of the distribution of the state contribution to political parties. They disapprove of the review procedure for the expense reports presented by the parties, which witnesses Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González, head of the Political Party Financing Department and legal advisor of the same department, respectively, detailed in their statements; that is, that their examination is limited to verifying compliance with formal requirements, which is done randomly and partially, without selecting them by means of payment or assignment certificates, up to an amount equivalent to the maximum the political party could access, which has been done by custom. They affirm that this contravenes the principle of legality because the Electoral Code approved as of September 2009 does not have a rule determining which procedure must be followed for the documentary review of the expense reports; however, this regulatory body in Article 115 indicates, in reference to the political debt assignment certificates, that there is an order of priority at the time of their payment, from which it is inferred that when liquidating expenses, it must be done in serial order, beginning with A, and so on successively, without justifying the lack of complete documentary reviews due to insufficient time for it and that it would delay the payment of expense reports to political parties. The appellants argue that if the officials of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal had done their job well and fulfilled their obligation to review the documents for each account that was canceled, it would be known whether all the accounts paid with Series A certificates should be redeemed, or if some were poorly substantiated and payment was not appropriate. In reality, no economic harm was caused to the public treasury, since it could not be proven that the monies paid to the holders of Series A certificates were improper or unjustified. In the **sixth ground** of their appeal, the technical defense maintains the existence of illegitimate reasoning due to violation of the rules of sound criticism, in that the judges concluded that if the holders of Series B certificates, signatories of special services contracts, made a donation to the PAC, the accused Sterling Araya should have reported this to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

They state that the series B certificates never had any economic backing, arose as an expectation of being redeemed for money, and even before the corresponding liquidation was filed, it was known that collecting them was impossible. Thus, they were voluntarily left at the PAC offices by the persons who signed the special services contracts, who could retrieve them or leave them in custody; no decision was demanded of them. Under these conditions, it cannot be established that there was a donation that should have been reported by the PAC treasurer. In the **seventh ground** of their appeal, they claim a serious error in the judgment for finding, in a contradictory manner, that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal bore no responsibility whatsoever for verifying the expenses liquidated by the PAC, needing only to carry out a verification, whether random or partial, and attributing all responsibility to the party itself. This, they argue, results from an improper interpretation of Constitutional Chamber rulings No. 2011-08989 of July 6, 2011, and No. 2013-015343, which indicate that verifying the expenses reported by political parties is an exclusive function or competence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. **The fifth, sixth, and seventh grounds are resolved jointly, as they are intimately linked, and the appellants being incorrect, they are rejected.** The judgment amply and exhaustively develops the reasons why, in the specific case, the accused Steling Araya committed the crime of fraud against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The defense counsel's complaints express nothing more than their mere disagreement with the manner in which the Court decided to approach, analyze, and resolve the matter submitted for its consideration, it being adverse to the interests of their client, without providing any element that would alter the conclusions reached by the judges. They argue that the financial harm, a constituent element of the criminal offense of fraud, was not demonstrated, resorting to the repetitive argument that the series B certificates were not redeemed, that the state contribution only sufficed to pay 98.72% of the total value of the series A political debt assignment certificates, and that, consequently, the Costa Rican state made no disbursement for the issuance of those payment instruments. Regarding the criticized aspects, the *a quo* court describes the *modus operandi* of the fraud as follows: it involved the massive simulation of special services contracts that were included as expenditures against the issuance of series B assignment certificates, before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in the final expense liquidation signed and delivered by the accused Maynor Sterling at the Department of Financing of Political Parties, which were approved and improperly gave economic content to the series A assignment certificates for the state contribution. It is not, as the appellants argue, that because Supreme Electoral Tribunal Resolution No. 7235-E10-2010 of 12:45 p.m. on December 3, 2010, approved electoral expenses incurred by the PAC amounting to the sum of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) to be charged against the right to the state contribution, with the latter amounting to ¢2,992,864,242.92 (two billion nine hundred ninety-two million eight hundred sixty-four thousand two hundred forty-two colones and ninety-two céntimos)—an amount insufficient even to cover all the series A bonds—therefore, there is no harm to the State and no unlawful financial benefit. Note that the amount of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) was comprised, in part, of the sum of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones), corresponding to expenses for the 263 simulated special services contracts, which were approved by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and paid with a portion of the series B certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution. Not in vain did some witnesses, such as Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, upon hearing the co-defendant Bolaños Murillo's proposal to sign the documents, consider that it was a *"little trap" (trampita)* or a *"little deception" (pequeño engaño)* vis-à-vis the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. This perception and the lightheartedness with which this "little trap" was assumed by PAC activists, convinced that they were thereby helping the party, was in reality the structure devised by Sterling to defraud the State. The Court states that on this aspect, witness Ronald Chacón Badilla was extremely clear and forceful in explaining how the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution acquire economic content, contrary to how the appellants try to make it seem happened. According to the witness, all expenses that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal approves for a political party become part of a single pool of funds, regardless of the payment instrument used by the political party to pay them, be it cash, check, transfer, or series A, B, or C certificates of assignment to the state contribution, and once that pool of funds exists, the principle of precedence for certificates of assignment to the state contribution under Article 115 of the Electoral Code is applied. For the Court, the economic harm was more than clarified by the example the witness provided in his statement, asking to imagine that the approved expenses are represented by water drops of different colors for each payment instrument. Thus, for example, approved expenses paid in cash will be represented by yellow drops, approved expenses paid by check will be represented by blue drops, approved expenses paid by bank transfer will be represented by orange drops, approved expenses paid with series A certificates of assignment to the state contribution will be represented by green drops, and approved expenses paid with series B certificates of assignment to the state contribution will be represented by red drops. All those colored water drops are placed in a bottle of water with a top that represents the amount of the state contribution approved for that political party as an expectation of right, but upon entering that bottle of water, absolutely all drops acquire the transparent color of the water, which may—or may not—reach the top of the amount approved for the state contribution. Once that pool of funds exists, economic content begins to be given to the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution, considering that for payment, the first issuance takes precedence over the second, and so on up to the last issuance. This means, the witness indicated, that with that pool of funds, economic content will first be given to the series A certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution, then to the series B certificates of assignment of rights, and so on, this being the principle of "order of precedence" of the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution, with its legal basis in Article 115 of the Electoral Code in force since 2007. The complainants argue that the Electoral Code lacks a rule indicating the procedure for the documentary review of liquidations, objecting to what witnesses Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González stated—that the Department of Financing of Political Parties' examination is limited to verifying formal requirements, on a random and partial basis, without separating them by payment instrument or assignment certificates—asserting in their view, it must fulfill its obligation to review each expense submitted. Regarding this matter, it is important to mention—as set forth in the appealed judgment—that the 2010 presidential electoral process was conducted under the legal framework defined in the current Electoral Code, Law No. 8765, published in Supplement No. 37 to Gazette No. 171 of September 2, 2009, and at the regulatory level, Decree No. 17-2009, published in Gazette No. 210 of October 29, 2009, was made official. Prior to September 2, 2009, Law No. 1536 of December 10, 1952, and its reforms, established a model for reviewing liquidations that was the responsibility of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the oversight body upon which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal relied to rule on the amount of the state contribution to which each political party was entitled based on vote strength and the expense verification process. With the current Electoral Code, the expense review process passed to the Department of Financing of Political Parties of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, whose director is witness Ronald Chacón Badilla, who is a certified public accountant and holds a master's degree in public accounting. He is a person with extensive experience in the area of reviewing political party expense liquidations, because before doing so and being the head for six years of the Department of Financing of Political Parties of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, he performed his functions at the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic for many years, where he had the opportunity to review the 1998-2002 and 2002-2006 processes, as he recounted during the trial. The witness also informed that when the process of reviewing liquidations passed to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, he did not move alone, but was accompanied by personnel also with extensive experience in electoral matters, such as attorney Alejandra Peraza Retana and Mr. Esteban Sánchez, a person who had worked at the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic on an expense review process, Ms. Verónica Portocarrero, who had also already worked on an expense liquidation review process, and Ms. Guiselle Valverde Calderón, who has extensive experience of over twenty years at the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. From the foregoing, the trial court concluded that the process of reviewing political party expense liquidations carried out by the Department of Financing of Political Parties of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is in the hands of individuals with long-standing experience and knowledge in the matter they acted upon, in compliance with electoral regulations, specifically with the provisions of Article 115 of the Electoral Code. While it is true that during the 2006-2010 campaign there were some changes in electoral matters, according to what the witnesses from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the National Treasury of the Citizens' Action Party (PAC) stated, including Leonel Sequeira, those changes were not significant, and particularly regarding the expense liquidation review process, the procedure was the same one that had been carried out at the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. In this regard, Mr. Ronald Chacón stated: *"...when the function of reviewing expense liquidations was transferred to the Tribunal starting in 2009, it practically adopted the work scheme that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic had, given that it was—as the governing body of supreme oversight and having held this role for many years—the expert in the matter…"*. Now, regarding the complaint that the lack of documentary reviews by the officials of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is not justified, arguing lack of time and that this would delay the liquidations, the questioning is untenable and seeks to transfer the responsibility of each political party—to be truthful in the expense liquidation—to the electoral body and to act in strict compliance with the law and the principle of good faith. According to Article 96 of the Political Constitution, for a political party to be eligible for state financing of the electoral expenses it incurred during the campaign, the political group must fulfill two requirements: i) obtain at least 4% of the votes validly cast at the national or provincial level, if registered only at that level, or at least one deputy; and ii) it must verify its expenses before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. As the Court correctly derived from reading constitutional Article 96, it can be inferred from it that the political party has the obligation to verify its expenses before the TSE—the principle of expense verification—from which the duty of the political group to duly demonstrate its expenses and prove their effective existence is inferred. In this regard, the judges state: *"Precisely, that constitutional principle is developed in Section IV of Title VI of the Electoral Code, called 'Control and Liquidation' and 'Economic Regime of Political Parties', respectively. Thus, Article 104 of the Electoral Code provides that the liquidation of electoral expenses, duly certified by a certified public accountant, is the means by which political parties verify before the TSE the expenses they have incurred. The certification issued by the certified public accountant is made after the accountant has verified, audited, and evaluated that all expenses redeemable with the state contribution conform to the accounting and legal parameters so required, pursuant to Article 106 ibidem. Article 103 of that same regulatory body states that for the evaluation and subsequent payment of expenses recognized through the accounting control of the liquidations submitted by the political parties, the TSE shall have the power to systematize the procedures that best safeguard the parameters of the expenses subject to liquidation; in this regard, it may conduct random reviews among parties or among certain items of expenses included in the liquidations to verify them. The legal regulations do not establish, as the defense claims, that the TSE must confirm the material veracity of the liquidated expense, but rather it is the political groups that have such obligation through the liquidation of electoral expenses. In this sense, Article 42 of the Regulation for Financing Political Parties issued by the TSE is categorical in this aspect by providing that it is the responsibility of political parties to duly demonstrate their expenses and only they shall be responsible for proving their effective existence. On the other hand, the certified public accountant, as has been set forth, carries out an accounting and legal verification, audit, and evaluation of the expenses liquidated by the political party. The electoral legislation provides that this certified public accountant, as witness Julio Aguilar Silesky affirmed, performs a documentary review of the expenses liquidated by the political party, but has no obligation to verify whether the service was actually rendered or not, since that is a duty of the political group that liquidates the expense. Note that the law provides that the certified public accountant performs an analysis of whether the expenses liquidated by the political party conform to the required accounting and legal parameters. That is, from an accounting standpoint, it would be the examination of the procedure used to maintain accuracy and veracity in the transactions and in their recording, which does not imply verifying whether the contracted work was rendered or not, but rather the confirmation that it was duly recorded in the respective accounts and accounting books allowing the determination of the true and accurate financial status of the PAC, in this case. The legal parameter would be framed by whether the expense is justifiable under the terms of Article 94 of the Electoral Code. Likewise, the Electoral Code imposed on the TSE the power to systematize the procedures that best safeguard the parameters of the expenses subject to liquidation and to conduct random reviews among certain items of expenses included in the liquidations to verify them. The power granted in the law to the TSE is developed in Article 71 of the Regulation for Financing Political Parties, according to which the Department of Financing of Political Parties shall proceed to evaluate the liquidation of electoral expenses based on the expense certification of the Certified Public Accountant, a document upon which it will conduct random reviews, according to the selected sample from among certain items of expenses included in the liquidations, and will issue the corresponding reports to the Directorate of Electoral Registry and Financing of Political Parties, an organ that forwards the pertinent recommendations to the TSE. This Court has described the constitutional, legal, and regulatory provisions that empower the TSE to verify the expenses liquidated by political parties, an occasion on which a random review, based on a sample, of the expenses recorded in the respective liquidation is carried out"* (cf. folios 3844-3845, sic). Thus, the procedure for reviewing the liquidations of expenses submitted by political parties was lawful, as it is protected by the legal provisions specified in the judgment and which the judges amply analyzed. In no way did the *a quo* court give a reading different from what the Constitutional Chamber sets out in the cited ruling No. 8989-2011, as well as in No. 13-015343 cited by the appellants in their appeal, without the appellants explaining what the "improper interpretation" they consider occurred consists of. Contrary to what the technical defense estimated, the constitutional chamber has indicated that verifying the expenses of political parties, in order to access the state contribution, is an electoral competence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and forms part of the electoral function, just as Article 96.4 of the Political Constitution mandates. The Costa Rican legal system conceptualizes the state contribution as a reimbursement of electoral expenses and those related to party organization and training, which is only accessed, by constitutional mandate, after the political groups have verified them before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. For these purposes, the parties must submit the respective liquidations within the legal deadlines and with the endorsement of a certified public accountant. Attached to these liquidations must be the documents supporting the liquidated expenses, a certification issued by the same accountant regarding such expenses, and, additionally, a report from the accountant on the results of the study supporting that certification and on the pertinent internal control recommendations. This documentation constitutes the fundamental basis for the subsequent review performed by the Department of Financing of Political Parties, which will only authorize the reimbursement of those expenditures that are legally justifiable and effectively demonstrated, and, of course, always keeping in mind the maximum limit to which each political group is entitled based on the electoral results. It is also empowered to verify the truthfulness of the content of the financial statements, through the means and procedures of analysis and investigation it deems appropriate. It is opportune to cite what was stated by Comptroller General Marta Eugenia Acosta Zúñiga in her report to the Constitutional Chamber: *"Now, one aspect of special relevance that is worth noting is the fact that the challenged rules do not entrust—in the strict sense—the Supreme Electoral Tribunal with the oversight of the public resources that finance the expenses of political parties. Before that, what they confer upon it is—simply—the power to carry out the accounting review of the payment receipts submitted by political parties. (...) As can be observed, the legislation prior to the current Electoral Code placed the Office of the Comptroller General in a kind of subordinate body to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, entrusting it with the role of accounting reviewer of expenses, documents, and invoices, a function that was clearly not consistent with the functional scope of competences of the comptroller body defined by the Political Constitution. As is evident, that role that the previous legislation assigned to the Office of the Comptroller General, as an auxiliary accounting reviewer of receipts and invoices for the expenses of political parties, the results of which were documented in a report sent to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal—which was responsible for adopting a final decision on the matter—was the result of a model that did not take into account the natural function of the Office of the Comptroller General, defined by the Political Constitution as a supreme oversight body responsible for monitoring the Public Treasury. In addition to the above, this fragmentation of the analysis of the economic activity of political parties was accentuated by the fact that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not have direct participation regarding the verification of expenses related to the state contribution to political parties, but did with respect to their income, which prevented the existence of a control point that would allow specifying the correspondence between the income and expenses of the different political groups and the complete financing of electoral campaigns, all to the detriment of the principles of publicity and transparency. Due to the absence of basic elements that would allow the development of an integrated, agile, timely, and effective process of control over the income and expenses of political parties by a single unit, society was deprived of control points that would alert to possible inflows of funds contrary to the legal framework and that could compromise the autonomy of political parties, thus distorting the essential reason for the state contribution, in its protective function of the independence of political parties as protagonist actors of the democratic system. Faced with this entire panorama, the current Electoral Code brought with it a change in the prevailing model, defined in its correct perspective and scope the functions of the actors involved in the process, eliminated the fragmented control that had persisted until then, opted for an integrated and concentrated control in the hands of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and came to renovate and strengthen the powers of that Tribunal—which it already had in the existing model up to that point—on a matter directly linked to electoral matters"* (cf. Constitutional Chamber, ruling No. 15343-2013). The quotation is illustrative of what the trial court correctly extracted from a comprehensive reading of what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. That is, that the constitutional and legal mandate that the TSE has is the accounting review of the expenses liquidated by political parties, which implies a documentary examination of these, excluding the obligation to verify the reality of the contract underlying the document. The appellants start from a biased premise in affirming that the judgment held it to be proven, without basis, that the holders of series A assignment certificates received a payment that did not correspond to them, even questioning that the judges did not indicate who received an unlawful financial benefit. It is not that the beneficiaries of the series A bonds went to receive a payment from the state contribution for a service that was not rendered, which seems to be the sense that the complainants wish to give, but rather that if the expense liquidation had not been inflated with the simulated special services contracts, it would not have sufficed to cover what ended up being paid to the creditors with series A bonds. That is, the payment of 98.72% of the total value of the series A political debt assignment certificates would not have been such, but rather a lower percentage, hence there was an unlawful financial benefit. Furthermore, the defense counsel argue that the accused had no possibility of manipulating the political debt because the amount each party would receive was unknown; however, this is incorrect, given that as of March 26, 2010, through Resolution No. 2124-E10-2010 of 11:00 a.m., the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in view of the results of the elections held on February 7, 2010, determined that the PAC, due to the votes obtained in those elections, could receive at most the sum of 3,741,080,303.65 (three billion seven hundred forty-one million eighty thousand three hundred three colones and sixty-five céntimos) as a State contribution to finance the expenses incurred in the electoral process. Precisely that influenced the accused Sterling Araya to hasten to promote the reform of the PAC's statutes in May 2010 and to deploy the setup with the simulated special services contracts, the payment of which he backed with the series B bonds he never delivered to the service providers, and for him to submit, within the campaign expense liquidation on June 16, 2016, the sum approved by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2010, through Resolution No. 7235-E10-2010, of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) for PAC electoral expenses. Finally, the appellants are also incorrect in objecting that, for the Court, the signatories of the special services contracts and holders of the series B assignment certificates made a donation to the PAC that the accused should have reported, given that they never had economic backing and it was known from the beginning that it would be impossible to collect them, to the point that they were left in his office. It is reiterated that the objective set by the defendant Sterling Araya was to feed the expense liquidation with simulated "special services" contracts that served the function of inflating the amount of the state contribution for the PAC, and that without them, the expenditure would have been lower and, consequently, the coverage of the series A assignment certificates would have been diminished. Mr. Maynor was interested in paying the campaign's major financiers who had lent money to the PAC, that is, those who had been paid with series A bonds and a few with series B bonds (some media outlets and individuals who had lent cash), but not the collaborators who voluntarily gave their labor without expecting any financial retribution. The latter were useful for representing fictitious expenses to charge to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, convincing the activists to sign contracts where a value or recognition in monetary terms was given to their work, and then reassuring them with the option that if any money was obtained, they could keep it, or they could donate it to the party. The judges, based on what was declared by the witnesses and the accused himself, simply point out that if the work was voluntary and without remuneration, then it was gratuitous; consequently, it was not an expense that could properly be liquidated, but rather a contribution that the defendant Sterling should have reported to the Court. **C)** In the **eighth ground** of their appeal, the defense counsel for the accused claim the possibility of applying an alternative sentence to imprisonment in his favor, based on his subjective conditions and the *quantum* of the sentence set at six years of imprisonment, alluding to Law No. 9271, "Electronic Monitoring Mechanisms in Criminal Matters".

They criticize that the court provided contradictory reasoning because, although the judges admitted that the accused Sterling Araya meets all the requirements for electronic monitoring to be applied to him, they rejected that possibility on the grounds that the Ministry of Justice has not implemented electronic monitoring due to a lack of resources or as a consequence of the convoluted contracting system. They state that the law contains no transitory provision, making it immediately applicable from its effective date. A burden that does not correspond to him cannot be attributed to the convicted person because of delays and obstacles in bureaucratic procedures. Finally, the same court indicated that in the case of their client, his entry into prison will cause more harm than benefits, both to him and to society. <b>This ground is reserved to be heard together with the appeal filed by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office. </b>The prosecuting attorney filed an appeal against the judgment, solely regarding the sentence imposed on the accused Sterling Araya, because, having requested eight years of imprisonment, the Trial Court set it at six. Considering that one of the prerequisites for the application of electronic monitoring is that the sentence does not exceed six years of imprisonment and, there being a challenge to the imposed sanction and a request for a remand on that point, the resolution of this ground is reserved to be heard jointly with the Public Prosecutor's Office's appeal. <b>D) </b>In the <b>ninth ground </b>of their appeal, they allege the non-existence of non-contractual civil liability, because material authorship was not proven with certainty. The court started from a false and illegitimate premise to declare the accused and civil defendant Sterling Araya civilly liable and to jointly and severally sentence him to the payment of three hundred fifty-two million seven hundred thousand colones, namely that he devised a plan to cause the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to err and thus obtain an unlawful financial benefit for the PAC and for the holders of certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution of series A.<b> The claim is unacceptable. </b>In the present case, the Court analyzed the factual and legal reasons that proved the acts that produced the criminal conduct of fraud and the application of the subjective civil liability criterion to support that item, it being that intentional conduct by the civil defendant Sterling Araya, in association with the co-civil defendant Bolaños Murillo, which caused financial harm to the State. In this regard, it must be noted that the recognition of reparation for the concept of financial damage was derived from the concept of subjective civil liability, which has been understood from the doctrine of Loutayf and Costas as that which: “…<i>takes place when the obligation to compensate damages is based on the voluntary act of the subject who has acted with fault in a broad sense (including intent and negligence), and …The requirements for subjective liability to exist are: a) that it is an unlawful act, that is, one that transgresses the legal system…b) that there is moral imputability of the act to its author, that is, that it is a voluntary act</i>(sic)….<i>c) that there is fault or intent on the part of the author of the act…d) that there is damage caused by the unlawful act…and e) that a causal relationship can be established between the unlawful act and the damage…”(</i> <i><u>La Acción Civil</u></i><u> <i>en Sede Penal</i></u><i>, Astrea, Buenos Aires, 2002, pp 756-757)…</i>(see. Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice<b>, </b>vote 2012-001806, at 09:48 hours on December 05, 2012. See in the same sense 2012-01687, at 11:03 hours on November 16, 2012) and whose requirements the <i>a quo </i>in the sub judice, determined to exist, since the subjective civil liability, derived from numerals 41 of the Constitution and 1045 of the Civil Code, was evidently proven, upon determining not only the intentional action of the co-civil defendant Sterling Araya, but also the existing causal relationship and the harm or impairment of the economic assets suffered by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. This is according to what the judgment held as proven, when the accused entered as PAC expenses at least 179 simulated contracts for “special services” in the final liquidation that led to the approval of more money from the state contribution in favor of the holders of the series A assignment certificates. The judgment is extensive in explaining, with respect to the civil items, the obligation to indemnify of the co-civil defendant Sterling Araya, why the requested claims were (partially) upheld and the evidence on which the granted amounts were based, to finally establish the economic damage caused by Mr. Maynor's criminal act to the State. Consequently, the ninth ground of the appeal is declared without merit.

III.- Appeal by prosecutors Alexander Valverde Peña and Greysa Barrientos Núñez. As the <b>sole ground </b>of their appeal, they express their disagreement with the determination of the sentence. They state that for the imposition of the sanction on the accused Maynor Sterling Araya, the court considered the following aspects: <i>i) </i>the financial damage that reached ¢352,700,000.00, against the state contribution, these being monies that the Costa Rican State invests every four years to develop democratic processes in the country, which come from the taxes paid by all the inhabitants of the national territory; <i>ii) </i>the complex criminal scheme orchestrated by the accused, which required the preparation of hundreds of false documents, carefully signed to meet the requirements demanded by electoral regulations to approve expenses, as well as the deception of numerous people to sign the documentation and, to that effect, the devising of issuing and using series B certificates of assignment of rights promoting a change in the statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter PAC) which, prior to the 2010 electoral process, could only receive 50% of the state contribution to which it was entitled in order to collect the entirety of the political debt; <i>iii) </i>the actions of the accused affected political pluralism and the equality that must exist between political parties; <i>iv) </i>his actions violated the principles relating to the economic regime of political parties, which are: transparency, accountability, publicity, honesty, integrity, and legality, and even those of his own party, such as austerity and the party's own financing; <i>v) </i>the determining motives for his criminal conduct, the accused acting with the desire to carry out successful management of his position as National Treasurer of the party, seeking the maximum liquidation of expenses before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, likewise, with the purpose of safeguarding the image of the political group, attempting to have the state contribution cover most of the certificates of assignment of rights issued by the PAC, and; <i>v) </i>having taken advantage of his position of power within the political group for the development of the criminal activity, using his accounting, financial, administrative, and legal knowledge. For the appellants, the elements set forth by the court to support the judgment of reproach are accurate. However, they consider that the sentence of six years of imprisonment is insufficient for the degree of reprehensibility of Sterling Araya's conduct, the proportional and reasonable sentence being the eight years that were requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office. They warn that the conduct of the accused after the facts was not assessed, when he met at the party headquarters with some supposed contractors of special services, and induced them to believe in the legitimacy of the documentation, with the intention that the facts not come to light and the fraud he had promoted in association with Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo against the State be revealed. They request that the nullity of the judgment be decreed, solely regarding the setting of the <i>quantum </i>of the imposed sentence, and that a remand be ordered.<b> This appeal is heard jointly with the claim contained in the appeal of the defenders of the accused Sterling Araya (eighth ground), because they are related, and: the Public Prosecutor's Office's appeal is without merit; the request regarding the electronic bracelet is upheld. </b>The appellant prosecutors agree with the <i>a quo </i>on the elements considered to support the judgment of reproach concerning the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya. What they do not share is the imposition of six years of imprisonment instead of the eight years requested, this being the point on which they base their claim, warning that the Court omitted to assess the conduct of the accused Sterling Araya subsequent to the facts, that is, when he met with some of the signatories of the simulated contracts, attempting to convince them of the legitimacy of the documentation so that the facts would not come to light. Certainly, for the reasoning of the sentence, the Court indicated a series of circumstances, taking into account various aspects, among them, some quantitative and qualitative aspects of the proven fact, as well as the personal conditions of the accused, in accordance with numeral 71 of the Penal Code. A selective study of said aspects highlights that the judge took into account the seriousness of the facts, since: <i>i)</i> Mr. Maynor was a recognized business administrator, with experience in the Costa Rican environment, who enjoyed the trust of leaders and supporters, who used his knowledge to cause a fraud to the detriment of the money of all Costa Ricans destined to invest in the democracy of this country; <i>ii)</i> it was not a conventional fraud, but rather included an entire scheme to induce the officials of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal into error; <i>iii) </i>the principle of equality with respect to the other groups and political pluralism was violated; <i>iv) </i>the PAC's principles of austerity, probity, and transparency were violated, betraying the good faith of the militants; <i>v) </i>the magnitude of the financial damage caused to the State.<i> </i>Regarding the quality of the determining motives: <i>i) </i>Mr. Maynor sought to earn an image of success in his management as National Treasurer of the PAC; <i>ii) </i>his concern was to pay the large and important financial creditors, those who had series A certificates, and some with series B, to ensure future financing for the next electoral campaign, using party collaborators by making them sign simulated contracts for that purpose. It is true that it was not expressly noted that in the meeting that took place after party militants were called to account by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the accused Sterling tried to convince them that they had agreed with the reality of what they had signed, however, that is part of what the Court analyzed regarding the damage caused by the implication of the supporters in the preparation of the contracts, which does not add much to what was analyzed. The trial court also considered his personal qualities, indicating that: <i>i)</i> he has maintained a defined life project for many years, as he is married, with two children and a grandchild, whom he still educates; <i>ii)</i> he is retired from the University of Costa Rica, where he served in his later years as head of accounting, without having a single stain on his professional file; <i>iii)</i> he suffers from diabetes, high blood pressure, and psoriasis, illnesses which it is reasonable to consider will worsen over the years, Mr. Maynor soon becoming an older adult. This Chamber not only observes that there is adequate reasoning regarding the imposed sentence, but also that the <i>quantum </i>of six years of imprisonment is duly justified and responds to the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and legality, without it being considered that its amount is below the reproach it deserves. The sentence is considerably higher than the minimum extreme of the penalty for the crime of fraud and, although the sentence of eight years of imprisonment requested by the criminal prosecutor was not imposed, it is considered that the setting of six years of imprisonment is fair, adequate, equitable, and sufficient, without the complaint raised by the prosecutors being receivable. Regarding the application of house arrest with electronic monitoring as a substitution of the sentence, in accordance with article 57 <i>bis</i> of the Penal Code, the judges recognized that the accused <i>“meets the objective and subjective requirements: such as that the sentence imposed on him does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment; this matter is being processed under the special procedure for organized crime; it does not involve a sexual crime nor one where the use of firearms has occurred; he is a first-time offender; and there are reasonable elements to infer that the convicted person does not constitute a danger and will not evade the fulfillment of the sentence (due to his age and his family and domiciliary roots)” </i>(cf. f. 3822). Despite the foregoing, the judgment avoids granting it at that juncture, alleging that<i> “the truth is that the Ministry of Justice and Grace has not yet developed the infrastructure to implement said alternative to prison” </i>(cf. f. 3822)<i>. </i>In other words, the Court assessed that in the <i>sub judice</i> the prerequisites, both objective and subjective, for house arrest through electronic monitoring are applicable, only that it did not grant it attending exclusively to the lack of implementation, at that moment of the dictation of the judgment, of the necessary infrastructure by the Executive Branch. As is publicly known, since the beginning of 2017, the Ministry of Justice has had the electronic bracelet devices and the platform suitable for the control of said measure. For that reason, this Appellate Chamber considers that, the <i>a quo </i>having already weighed the said circumstances, the claim of the defenders on this point must be upheld, without ordering a remand (without any nullity since what is resolved is the basis for the configuration of the objective and subjective prerequisites for the appropriateness of the requested mechanism), granting house arrest in the electronic monitoring modality to the accused Maynor Sterling Araya. The foregoing does not mean that what is ordered is in a single instance, since the trial court had already assessed accepting said alternative main sanction for the accused, only that it considered that material limitations for the implementation of the electronic mechanisms prevented its execution.

IV.- Appeal by attorney Randall Albán Aguirre Mena, criminal prosecutor of the Attorney General's Office. A) In the <b>first ground</b> of his appeal, he alleges contradictory intellectual reasoning and erroneous assessment of the evidence upon the judgment rejecting the economic damage in 84 of the special services contracts. He indicates that when filing the civil action, he made an estimation of civil condemnation for material damages derived from the crime of fraud for the entirety of the 263 special services contracts that were presented by the PAC before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The court only granted the material damage for 179 contracts under the argument that these were the total number of witnesses brought to the adversarial proceedings and that only with the presence of the witnesses could the damage suffered by the State be proven. He considers that the basis for excluding the damage resulting from the 84 contracts is contradictory and cites several excerpts from the judgment taken from pages of the judgment numbered 1360, 1361, 1371, 1376 and 1377, 1384, 1479 and 1480, 1524, 1526, 1534 and 1535, 1537, 1538 and 1558, from which it is appreciated that the court derives that the origin of the entirety of the contracts was gratuitous, that the PAC or the accused never had the intention for said services to be remunerated, and that therefore the appearance of the remaining 84 witnesses was not necessary to conclude that those 84 contracts find themselves in the same circumstances as the 179 for which the existence of material damage was determined. It was not necessary, as the court indicated, to reach such a conclusion, to know the context in which the will of the contracting party was formed at the time of signing the contract. He maintains that the fraudulent origin of the contracts is not proven solely from the will of the service provider, but rather from the scheme used in the PAC, from the documents signed by the service providers, from the fact that the bonds with which payment was backed were not delivered and were in the custody of the party, and from the statements of Ronald Chacón and Ruy López, among other evidentiary elements. Based on the principle of freedom of evidence, it is possible by different means, not strictly hearing the 84 witnesses who did not appear to testify, to take the existence of the damage and its quantification as proven. The same Trial Court, with the same evidentiary elements analyzed and which derived in taking as proven damage in at least 179 contracts, concluded that the PAC was not in a position to contract paid labor for special services. That the supporters of said political group provided their work out of dedication and volunteerism, that there was never an intention to economically recognize their labor, that the contracts have similarities in the amount, in the type of service provided, and that this is an indication of the deployed criminal activity, aspects that entail the recognition of economic damage, not in 179 contracts, but in the 263 special services contracts. The appellant considers that it is not possible to isolate the documentary evidence on which the Court derived the existence of the harm in the 179 contracts, and the same testimonial evidence on which the harm taken as proven was supported, to then not consider these same evidentiary elements in the analysis of the remaining 84 contracts, and to exclude them for the sole fact that the witnesses did not appear at the adversarial proceedings. He asserts that the testimonial evidence from the 179 contracts received in the debate was abundant in that the works provided had a gratuitous origin, that payment was never made for them, that the political debt bonds were not delivered to the service providers since they remained in the custody of the PAC, and that for that electoral process the PAC did not have resources to contract special services. In all these cases, the existence of a fraudulent origin of the contracting carried out was proven, it being that in the remaining 84 contracts, it is the same contract, with the same amounts of one million eight hundred and two million four hundred thousand, all were collected directly or indirectly by the co-defendant Manuel Antonio Bolaños and were backed by the same documents that appear in the 84 contracts excluded from the financial harm, which were signed by the accused Mainor Sterling. To conclude that because the service provider did not come to testify, the harm cannot be proven, is to apply a principle of assessed proof and the principle of freedom of evidence, and to illegitimately exclude the other evidentiary elements incorporated in the debate. Likewise, the documentary evidence, specifically report No. DFPP-DP-06-2012 of October 02, 2012, at folios 5 to 136 of the main judicial file, and the statements of Ruy López and Ronald Chacón Badilla support that the harm to the public treasury was for the entirety of the 263 contracts, whose total amount amounted to ¢516,600,000.00. He requests that the judgment be annulled only insofar as economic compensation was not granted for the 84 special services contracts that were charged to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, representing the sum of one hundred sixty-three million nine hundred thousand colones, plus the interest that they generated, and the personal costs on said items.<b> The claim is admissible. </b>In the case at hand, the <i>a quo </i>based its decision to uphold the financial damage only as to 179 of the 263 contracts for special services that were presented by the co-civil defendant Maynor Sterling Araya, arguing that the contractor was necessarily required <i>“...to know the context in which the will was formed to sign said document, which is lacking in that sense. Therefore, the special contracts whose contractors did not testify at trial cannot be assessed within the economic harm caused to the State through the simulation of expenses that the PAC liquidated in the 2010 electoral campaign” </i>(cf. f. 3878). The judges note that although some witnesses stated that <i>“all” </i>signed, it is a generic and abstract phrase that does not meet the evidentiary requirements that the plaintiff of the compensatory civil action has, which would violate the principle of orality and immediacy of the evidentiary elements. The first error committed by the trial court is basing its refusal to recognize economic harm in those cases or contracts in which the signatory did not testify at the debate, thus resorting to a system of legal or assessed proof of testimonial evidence that has no place, neither in the criminal process, much less in the civil one, ignoring the value of the rest of the evidence that was actually produced, for purposes of compensation. According to the judges, with respect to the 84 contracts in which the signatories did not appear to testify, it cannot be assumed that they gave work on a gratuitous basis to the PAC, however, contradictorily, when carrying out the evidentiary analysis for the purposes of establishing the guilt judgment of the defendants, they determined an <i>“astonishing homogeneity” </i>in the preparation and processing of the documents used to charge the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for expenses for special services contracts that turned out to be simulated. They concluded that all the contracts were adhesion contracts; the same templates and formulas were used in the documents (contract, money receipt, proof of delivery of series B bonds); the same <i>modus operandi</i> was used for their signing; very similar and disproportionate amounts were set in relation to the functions that were inserted; the same method was used by the co-defendants to convince the militants to sign them as a kind of economic recognition for the voluntary and gratuitous services provided; all the series B assignment certificates through which these works were paid remained at the PAC headquarters. One of the many excerpts in which the Court refers to the <i>“structured machination”</i> is transcribed, with particular and similar characteristics, in at least 179 of the 263 contracts presented along with the PAC's expense liquidation: <i>“In what was held as proven, one hundred seventy-nine contracts and receipts were used to, simulating expenses for the supposed payment of special services, proceed to deceive in an orchestrated, systematic, studied manner and acting with a high degree of organization against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. It should be noted that none of the witnesses who testified in the adversarial proceedings referred to having charged or received any amount for their service (some said they had done so, but that they were going to donate it) when in reality it was unpaid work of Partido Acción Ciudadana supporters who, moved by the principles that the group advocated, provided their time, work, and even resources in a totally voluntary manner. The deceit is not limited to the mere words of the defendants used to convince the contractors to sign, they also used the documents to be mentioned, to present them to the electoral body passing them off as real and effective expenses for the liquidation, it being that the apparent contractors never charged, nor intended to charge, their voluntary labors to the party. Those documents consisted of the “CONTRACT FOR THE PROVISION OF SPECIAL SERVICES CONCLUDED BETWEEN PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA AND…”; which from its literal meaning contained a series of falsehoods (that the defendants knew) and that sought to comply with the legal requirements to justify an expense for special services that never occurred, since although in some cases there were various labors, these were not those indicated and in no case was payment made. See then that this contract described the special service to be provided, these were generic titles without real content, for example: Cantonal Coordinator of Voters, Cantonal General Promoter, General Coordinator of Finances, General Coordinator of Organization, Cantonal Coordinator of Communications, Cantonal Coordinator of Youth and Cantonal Coordinator of Transport. With the immediacy that the adversarial proceedings provide, this Court was able to easily extract from the body language and verbal language of the contractors their astonishment upon seeing the contract and the assigned position. The vast majority said they did not know what the position was, what it consisted of, who had appointed them, what their supposed responsibilities would be, and in no case were they asked for accounts or reports on their functions. Another false content of the contract, which ultimately served as a deceit before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was the amount of the total payment of what was paid. An immense majority of the contractor witnesses produced, as seen in Considerando VII, said they had never agreed upon or charged any economic sum, surprised by this clause and in several cases, deeply dismayed and even angry since they never had the slightest intention of economically quantifying their labor. Others, with a clear interest in protecting their political party, tried unsuccessfully to justify the amount, claiming that they performed arduous labor, that it was what other parties paid, that it was established according to the minimum salary of their professions, that it was an amount extracted from the total hours worked, and multiple reasons that, compared with one another, make it clear that there was never an agreement between the parties, but rather they were arbitrary and template amounts filled in by unknown persons under the order of the defendants to deceive the electoral body. This contract, in addition, included the temporal range where the special service was supposedly provided, another clear example of the deceit that the defendants attempted, since the totality of the witnesses were unanimous in stating that said dates were not related to their functions within the party, when they provided them. They said they had worked before, after, never, or on other dates without also having charged for those periods or the one stated in the contract. All the dates were artificially imposed and filled in by the defendants, making use of other people. All the contracts were signed by the sentenced <b>STERLING ARAYA </b>in his capacity as National Treasurer of Partido Acción Ciudadana, who knew about the said falsehoods. Another of the documents used for each one of the one hundred seventy-nine contractors was the: “Payment Voucher”, which just like the contract, had a series of gross falsehoods that the witnesses themselves demonstrated unanimously.

In this regard, the literal wording of the voucher stated: “The Partido Acción Ciudadana has paid to…”, it being the case that, as indicated, NO AMOUNT WAS PAID TO ANYONE. Here, it does not indicate that it is a conditional or contingent payment; it says it was paid, which means for any average person that said document accredited the payment of a monetary amount, which, as has been repeatedly stated, never occurred. It is important to note that on this voucher, <b>STERLING ARAYA</b> himself signs under the legend: “Conforming receipt for the good or service,” knowing that, firstly, the service had not been provided, and secondly, that the sum stated therein had never been charged or paid by the Partido Acción Ciudadana. These are, without a doubt, pre-constitution of evidence for the fraud, which they would ultimately present before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Lastly, as part of the ruse, the defendants had the contractors instrumentalized for this scam sign the document that stated: “PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECEIPT FOR THE DELIVERY OF BONDS AS PAYMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES.” Again, a document full of falsehoods and inaccuracies, like the previous ones. This referred to the supposed delivery of Type B Certificates to the contractors, which never occurs in the one hundred seventy-nine contracts, with one exception. Even the vast majority of the witnesses never had visual contact with the certificate” </i>(cf. pp. 3802-3804). Therefore, if the judges considered that all the contracts were similar, responding to a single purpose of making an improper collection of money from the public treasury, it is contradictory that, to prove the economic damage suffered, they require the statements of the 84 contracting parties that were dispensed with, without the judgment expressing how the failure of those persons to testify has an impact, and overlooks considering the documentary evidence incorporated about them, which, according to the judgment, were introduced in the expense liquidation of the PAC to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and were recognized for the payment of the state contribution. At pages 3601 and 3602, the <i>a quo </i>sets forth that according to the testimonial evidence presented at the adversarial hearing, the co-defendants Sterling Araya and Bolaños Murillo proposed to the supporters the scheme to defraud the State, under the three following modalities: <i>i) </i>In most cases, their “collaboration” was requested to help the party economically through the “voluntary subscription” of a contract, which would be paid with Series B assignment certificates, which if recognized by the Tribunal, the money could be donated to the PAC. <i>ii) </i>On other occasions, remuneration for their services was offered to the supporters with Series B assignment certificates, conditional on these eventually having economic content (however, the certificates were not delivered to the contracting parties, but rather were kept at the PAC). <i>iii) </i>On other occasions, the supporters’ signatures were requested, with the understanding that what they were signing was something completely different. That is, all these modalities described by the 179 witness-subscribers of contracts, maintain that they were simulated, and although some stated that they effectively performed work and considered the amount indicated therein deserved, hoping to receive good pay, the discredit to this version follows from the fact that they never withdrew the bonds, these always remaining in the custody of the PAC, an indication that it was never the will of these militants to collect them, nor of the party to make any payment to them. So, what can be derived from these statements, is that a considerable number of people (more than half of the subscribers of the 263 contracts for special services) ratified that they signed the documentation prepared under the machinery so many times described in the judgment, which was then charged to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. In civil matters, the principle of written proof (documentary evidence) governs in principle, Article 351 of the Civil Procedure Code, testimonial evidence being admissible only to verify the conventions that may have existed between the parties. Furthermore, civil procedural regulations empower the judge to make the decision to reduce the number of witnesses when they are offered to declare about the same specific facts. That is, the judge may limit the number of witnesses, complying with the parameters established in the law, if the evidence offered is superabundant, Article 365 of the Civil Procedure Code. Demanding that the 263 contracting parties should have declared at trial in order to consider the total economic damage proven is not only irrational, but a requirement that disregards the principles of utility, relevance, reasonableness, and necessity of evidence, when the same Tribunal has affirmed that all the contracts and receipts have the same format and were systematically prepared under the same scheme or criminal structuring. There is contradictory reasoning when it is said, on the one hand, that from the evidence incorporated it was possible to prove a plan to deceive the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones through the presentation of simulated contracts, and, on the other, it is indicated that a group of them should not be indemnified because testimonial evidence was found lacking, despite there being clear common elements that reveal the simulation. These are two affirmations that cannot coexist without incurring in vices related to the reasoning of the judgment. The state attorney is also right that there is a vice in the evidentiary assessment, because by granting the <i>a quo </i>an exaggerated and unnecessary value (without justifying its transcendence and relevance in the decision) to the witnesses who did not appear, it detracted value from the documentary evidence analyzed extensively and profusely when establishing the evidentiary basis for the criminal part. It is important to note that, due to the nature of simulation, circumstantial evidence is consubstantial to it, which is not exclusive to the criminal jurisdiction but is also applicable in civil matters. Regarding circumstantial evidence in civil matters, it has been reiterated by various compositions of the Tribunal Segundo Civil, the following: <i>“...we must analyze the legal concept of simulation and conclude that, in view of the fact that the simulated transaction seeks to give an appearance contrary to reality, with an unreal situation, all types of evidence are permitted, and it has been said that: ² ...proof of simulation almost exclusively involves a presumptive activity (sic), such that the evidentiary work will consist of gradually establishing in the case file the various indicators.” (Simulation in Private Law. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo. Talleres de Mundo Gráfico S.A., San José, Costa Rica, 1990. Page 186). There are indicators that are characteristic of simulation and that make it easy to infer. The same author just cited highlights them in the aforementioned work, and among them we have: ...1.- CAUSA SIMULANDI. The causa simulandi is considered the starting point “to seek the motive for the simulation in order to later build the edifice of proof on a solid foundation. The causa simulandi, we have said supra, is the interest, the motive that leads the parties to give appearance to an unreal transaction, or to present it in a different manner. The simulator act is reflective and conscious, it obeys a determined motive...3.- OMNIA BONA. This indicator bifurcates into two species: the alienation of the entire patrimony or of the most selective or valuable part thereof...This indicator operates when the simulator requires for his purposes the integral dispossession of his assets (to evade the principle that they are common collateral Art. 981 Civil Code) it is of no use to hide a part if the creditors can execute the rest...5.- NOTITIA. It refers to the knowledge of the simulation by the accomplice. This indicator refers to the fact of the concomitant knowledge of the simulators regarding the fiction of the legal transaction, and more specifically, to the knowledge on the part of the accomplice. We know that one of the constitutive elements of simulation is the simulatory agreement, so the knowledge of the fiction by the accomplice is presumed. Consequently, only if the lack of that knowledge were proven, a matter otherwise highly difficilitoris probationes, would the possibility exist of inferring the authentic reality of the supposedly simulated transaction. The foregoing implies that a lack of knowledge by the accomplice demonstrates the non-simulation of the transaction. It operates as a negative indicator of simulation, not an affirmative one... 9.-PRETIUM VILIS. The presence of a cheap, disproportionate, or derisory price, which bears no relation to the real value of the thing alienated, exchanged, or leased, is one of the main indicators of simulation... 15.-TEMPUS. Certain transactions are suspicious of simulation, due to the time or moment of their execution...One can speak of three types of tempus: a) Conjunctural tempus: This indicator requires a certain proximity between the simulation and the disruptive patrimonial event...b) Tempus celeritas. It refers to the unusual speed of the simulated transaction, a haste out of the normal and ordinary, given the proximity of an event. A haste that crystallizes in registry urgencies (e.g., Immediate registry inscription of the sale...” </i>(cf. Tribunal Segundo Civil, Section I, No. 2002-372. at 09:30 hrs., September 27, 2002). In the specific case, there were 179 witnesses who referred to the simulation of the contracts for special services, with 263 contracts presented under the same scheme as liquidation expenses to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. The lower court had as proven: <i>the causa simulandi</i>, the motive that led the co-defendants to give appearance to an unreal transaction, which is to inflate the expense item to obtain the highest possible amount to cover the Series A assignment certificates; <i>notitia</i> or the presumption of knowledge of the fiction by the accomplice to the simulatory agreement, it being the case that both the defendants and the militant who signed, knew they were doing a <i>“little trick”</i>; the <i>tempus</i> and the <i>cheap price</i>, because the contracts were made when the result of the elections was known and the maximum amount of state contribution to which the PAC could access, thus proceeding to prepare them for astronomical amounts in order to obtain the greatest possible recognition of political debt. Regarding the assessment of evidence in civil matters and the appreciation of indicators, it is appropriate to cite the following extract from what was decided by the Sala Primera: “<i>For a presumption to exist as a means of proof, it is necessary, in the first place, that a positive or negative, certain event occurs from which the one to be known must be deduced. The existence or non-existence of this occurrence, broadly referred to as the base fact, or more technically indicator, must be duly proven in the process to ensure the viability of the presumption. This is deduced from Article 417 of the Civil Procedure Code: </i>“<i>Human presumptions only constitute evidence if they are a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact”. The Chamber has indicated that this type of presumption “…is the result of the exercise of the discretion granted to the judge to assess the evidence, the presumption then deriving from other facts that have been held as true” (No. 848-F, at 14 hours 45 minutes on October 31, 2001)”. This connection, which must be direct and precise, between the base fact or indicator and the occurrence intended to be derived (consequence fact), is verified according to purely logical norms, the rules of human judgment, a task carried out by the Judge invested with discretionary power according to his conscience and discernment. It is this judge who exclusively infers a fact or act from such proof, as his inner conviction inspires him within a framework of reasonableness and rationality, in a logical prius</i> <i>that does not violate sound criticism, hence, his judgment is upheld, unless it is shown to be contrary to the evidence that the proofs display, whether by mediating an error of fact or of law in its estimation regarding the base or indicative facts, or that the inference borders on the absurd by contradicting common sense or natural phenomena”</i> <i>(No. 000025-F-2007, at 10 hours 45 minutes on January 19, 2007)” </i>(cf. Sala Primera, No. 2008-216, at 08:25 hrs., March 25, 2008)<i>. </i>The judges, through the joint assessment of the evidence presented, correctly concluded that the defendants created simulated contracts with the purpose of obtaining an undue patrimonial benefit for the holders of the Series A assignment certificates, to the detriment of the public treasury, but contradictorily denied the recognition of the economic damage with respect to 84 contracts, arguing that testimonial evidence regarding them was lacking. Thus, the judgment incurs the vice of contradictory reasoning and erroneous assessment of the evidence in the civil aspect, specifically regarding the economic damage suffered by the State, which recognized to the PAC for the expenses documented in the 263 contracts for special services, the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), which is the patrimonial harm generated, and not the sum of ¢352,700,000.00 (three hundred fifty-two million seven hundred thousand colones). The Tribunal had it established that the defendant Sterling liquidated before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and they were authorized to the PAC by him, the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), under the concept of “special services” against the state contribution, which allowed paying a greater percentage of the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution, which had been issued by the Partido Acción Ciudadana during the electoral campaign. To that extent, the decision must be revoked without needing to order a remand, since from the same evidentiary analysis conducted by the <i>a quo</i> in relation to the determination of the culpability judgment and the establishment of the facts, it allows reaching the same conclusion on the appropriateness of the claim for patrimonial damage sought in its entirety, for the 263 contracts for special services. Consequently, with respect to the patrimonial damage claimed by the Procuraduría General de la República in representation of the Costa Rican State, against the civil defendants Maynor Sterling Araya, Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, and the Partido Acción Ciudadana, they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), plus the interest generated from the consummation of the act until its effective cancellation, as well as the payment of personal legal costs in the amount of ¢56,160,000.00 (fifty-six million one hundred sixty thousand colones).

<b>B) </b>In the <b>second ground</b> of his appeal, the appellant claims a lack of intellectual reasoning and contradictory reasoning regarding the rejection of social damage. <b><i>i)</i></b><i> </i>Lack of intellectual reasoning: The state attorney expresses that the facts caused significant social damage, given that it directly affects the very foundations of our democratic system of Law, within which the Political Constitution fosters an electoral development scheme that allows its strengthening but also its permanence over time, through economic state contributions. The duty held by political parties to participate in the education of the people was undermined, so that they feel the security of aspiring to and participating in the democratic ideal that signifies the freedom of suffrage, and within this ideal, the need for the feeling of belonging, honesty, and transparency with which every phase and every moment of the political-electoral exercise must be imbued; an exercise that is facilitated through the state contribution. In the appellant’s judgment, the actions of the defendants affect the credibility of the people in the system, cause feelings of disappointment, disinterest, distrust, and apathy in citizens, as well as affecting the democratic system. In this sense, he refers to what was indicated by the witnesses Michael Eugenio Castillo, José Solís Rojas, Teresa Aguilar Brenes, María Elena Rodríguez Rodríguez, Jorge Eduardo Brenes Vargas, Thelma Baldares Carazo, and María Ester Anchía Angulo. From the testimonial evidence gathered in the debate, it is concluded that the proven acts occurred in a democratic process in which the defendants made an improper charge to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones using the disinterested and voluntary participation of hundreds of Costa Ricans. He argues that if the social damage caused by a crime occurring in an electoral process is comparable to moral or immaterial damage and therefore is not subject to the proof required to demonstrate material damage, then the tribunal, based on the testimonial evidence, could have derived the existence of social damage and thus the impact on the Costa Rican democratic system. Additionally, political debt is used to invest in democracy, so the impact on the amounts that the State allocates to finance said democratic process necessarily affects the democratic system. He criticizes that for the judges, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that the conducts held as proven, which violate a criminal legal norm, caused damage to the Costa Rican democratic system. He reproaches that it was pointed out that his represented party did not conduct a study that included the variable related to the impact of public knowledge of the facts for which the defendants were convicted, in relation to society’s perception of the Costa Rican democratic system. He criticizes that for the tribunal, collective social damage can only be evidenced by a verifiable social change before and after the events, with specific evidence such as sociological studies, and not with the testimonial evidence provided at the adversarial hearing. This led to the testimonial evidence not being considered or valued, and the existence of social damage not being analyzed from other evidentiary sources different from those the tribunal deemed should have been provided. <b><i>ii) </i></b>Contradictory reasoning of the tribunal in rejecting the social damage: Although the tribunal considered that the existence of an impact on the democratic system was not proven and therefore rejected the social damage, in some sections of the judgment it evidenced the understanding regarding the existing relationship between the participation of the people who worked without charge, and democracy, as is shown on pages 1360, 1479, 1502, 1561 of the judgment. The appellant argues that the most striking fact for which there is contradictory reasoning arises regarding the judgment of reproach, where the tribunal expressed on page 1573 that the criminal acts of the defendant transcend the legal good of property and affect democracy.

<b>The claim is dismissed. </b>Having examined the judgment issued by the lower court rejecting the compensation for social damage for lack of its proper demonstration by the Procuraduría General de la República, it is considered that it is duly reasoned, and that the reasoning used by the judges conforms to what the law establishes. Regarding collective or social damage, it has been defined as that which: “… <i>propagates or dilutes among the members of the group, whether it is organized and compact or not. It is a supraindividual damage that does not consist of the sum of special damages. Nor in a harm to the own and particular assets of the individuals, but in a current and concrete harm, only from the point of view of the entire society that suffers them. The collective damage affects the group simultaneously and coincidentally. It is one and the same single damage, which today is accepted without difficulty, as a notion with its own entity, which pertains equally to all members of the community, or to certain groups indistinctly and not exclusively. The addressees are no longer persons, in isolation, but categories or classes of subjects, linked by some quality or characteristic that gives connection to the whole. Within this topic, if the obligation to compensate this type of harm arises, a sum of identifiable portions is not configured; on the contrary, it is a general harm, which is apprehensible and experienceable, where the affected element is communal or group, reaching the individual subjects indivisibly, through their insertion into the whole</i>” (see. Sala Primera, decision No. 675, at 10:00 hours on September 21, 2007). Now then, like any damage, be it individual, diffuse, economic, material, physical, moral, or of any type, it must be proven, and it is not appropriate to presume its existence due to the fact that the state entity affirms that the facts for which it sued directly affect the foundations of the Costa Rican democratic system. The representative of the State’s interests stated in his claim and in his closing arguments at the debate, the following: <i>“The action claimed here undermines our democratic system of law, given that it affects our own Constitution, by denigrating various essential consequences of the referred state contribution, namely: the duty held by political parties to participate in the education of the people so that they feel the security of aspiring to and participating in the democratic ideal that signifies the freedom of suffrage, and within this ideal, the need for the feeling of belonging, honesty, and transparency with which every phase and every moment of the political-electoral exercise must be imbued; an exercise that is facilitated through the state contribution. Under this scheme, the action described here affects the credibility of the people in the system and the dynamics of national politics, which collaborates in maintaining the structural and ideological bases of our democracy. Likewise, the action claimed here provokes a feeling of social unrest that cracks our democratic foundations, through the loss of credibility of the people in the system and the development of national democratic life. The foregoing, because the Costa Rican people and the State itself, have been disrespected, by seeking and having obtained –for their own benefit and that of third parties– an increase in the recognition and reimbursement of the political debt based on a deception, for which it must be highlighted that we are all citizens who contribute with our economic contributions to finance the political debt and therefore, we have been equally.” The PGR explains that social damage has been caused by the deterioration of correct political education and the impact on the manifestation of the popular will due to the loss of credibility in political parties. The civil plaintiff recognizes that there is disenchantment and loss of credibility in political parties, to which must be added voter abstentionism, to which the criminal conduct of the civil defendants contributes” </i>(cf. pp. 3899-3900, see. pp. 391-392 case file) <i>. </i>It is undeniable that electoral processes constitute an essential pillar for the actual functioning of an authentic democratic regime and that, in this context, political parties constitute a highly important element of democratic life, as they are the instruments through which the principles of democratic pluralism are realized, they contribute to the formation and manifestation of the popular will, and are fundamental instruments for political participation (see. Sala Constitucional, decision No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. on January 23, 2009, and Sala Primera, No. 2010-8297, 02:45 hrs. on May 05, 2010, among others). However, as noted in the judgment, whoever sought the right to compensation for social damage had to prove the certain, real, and effective damage that the civil defendants (don Maynor, don Antonio, and the PAC) caused to the Costa Rican democratic system, beyond the mere statement of the purpose of political parties and their role in a democracy like ours. Assuming the reality of the causation of social damage based on what the witnesses who appeared subscribing to the simulated contracts and documents declared in a general appreciation is absolutely insufficient to prove that credibility in political parties, a fundamental pillar in a democratic regime, was affected. Michael Eugenio Castillo stated that he worked for the PAC to support his mother who was aspiring to a position from the party, but also out of love for the ideals of transparency and ethics of the group, he wanted a change at the political level, he had no intention of charging for his volunteer work, and his surprise and disappointment were due to the distortion of what he had signed. For his part, José Solís Rojas related that he was brought to the PAC by Rodrigo Carazo, he worked disinterestedly for the party, was a council member, and over time became independent, without saying that this was due to the actions attributed to the civil defendants. Teresa Aguilar Brenes indicated that she was a founder of the PAC. She referred that she made her personal vehicle and fuel from her own pocket available for the party’s needs on several occasions, she expressed that she donated the work to help the country, accepting that she signed the contracts and that the money be for the party. At no time did she express sadness about what happened; rather, she came out in defense of her gratuitous contribution and the deserved recognition to the party of the political debt for her work. Mrs. María Elena Rodríguez Rodríguez noted that she did her work voluntarily, without charge to the party because she believes in the democracy of this country. Jorge Eduardo Brenes Vargas reported that in the PAC it was difficult to have resources, so they themselves financed the campaign with the contribution of work. What he signed represents a value for his dedication, since he never expected to have economic compensation. As can be seen, none of these persons mentioned by the state attorney in his appeal, or the more than 170 witnesses who testified at the debate, mentioned having suffered a supraindividual damage that caused an impairment to democracy. The majority admitted having provided gratuitous collaboration to the party and agreed to sign the documents presented to them, convinced that this helped the group that could eventually be recognized. What they mostly expressed astonishment and disagreement about, was the disproportionate amounts that were recorded and the type of function assigned to them, which were at odds with the reality of the service provided. Some, like Jeannette de la O Hernández, appeared uncomfortable because they were contacted by officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to declare in relation to the contracts for special services charged to the State, regarding which the service providers had not declared their income to the Dirección General de Tributación Directa. The common denominator among almost all the PAC militants who testified is that they wanted to give the work to the party, without expecting anything in return, but if economic recognition for their disinterested labor came, that it be given to the party to contribute to its precarious finances. What they said is, at heart, as the witness Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo noted, the acceptance of carrying out <i>“a small trap”</i> or, <i>“a small deception,” </i>knowing that it involved public funds, so they are not the best reference for offering a representative sample of the holders of the true collective interest.

On the contrary, if any of them showed discomfort, it was not due to the attack that the actions of the civil defendants caused to the political-electoral institutions of this country (in which they themselves, <i>“in good faith toward the party”</i>, participated), but rather due to the betrayal suffered in their private sphere, from the PAC toward them, as its members, when the documents were filled out with unreal content regarding the amount and the functions performed. The harm to the private interests of the individuals belonging to a specific group must not be confused with the general injury belonging to the collective. Therefore, the Court correctly concluded that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the conduct deemed duly demonstrated and which violates a criminal legal norm caused damage to the Costa Rican democratic system. The judges are correct that the existence of effective damage must be corroborated; this damage must be assessable and individualizable, and derived from conduct capable of giving rise to liability. Likewise, the causal link must be examined as a necessary element to attribute the damage to the specific behavior that provoked it. The lower court (<i>a quo</i>) stated: <i>“If the damage cannot be corroborated, the Attorney General's Office (PGR) statement would be nothing more than an assumption or a hypothesis. Similarly, if the civil plaintiff does not demonstrate social damage, there is no need to go on to examine whether a direct causal relationship exists between it and the result, as that would be unnecessary and fruitless”</i> (cf. f. 3901). It is not, as the Attorney General's Office generically maintains, that with the established unlawful act, the correct political formation has been deteriorated, and the expression of the popular will has been affected due to the loss of credibility in political parties. The civil plaintiff argued in its appeal that there is disillusionment and a loss of credibility in political parties, to which voter abstentionism must be added, to which the criminal actions of the civil defendants contributed. Such assertions by the appellant are unfounded and stem from an initial error, which is taking for granted that there was social damage to the community. Given this assumption, it estimates that it should be granted as is done with moral damages, through a weighing by the judges of the <i>quantum </i>of damage to the collective. This Chamber agrees with the trial court that the existence of social damage should have been demonstrated. To this effect, the judges set forth the need for a study that contemplates the variable related to the impact that knowledge of the acts for which the accused were convicted had, in relation to society's perception of the Costa Rican democratic system, before and after. That is: <i>“a comparison between the social welfare before the event and after it occurred” </i>(see fs. 3901-3903). By not being done in this manner, it constitutes an uncertain and abstract damage, which is the exact opposite of a certain and effective, assessable, and individualizable damage. As can be seen, the social damage whose compensation the state entity seeks has none of these attributes. The civil plaintiff could not dissociate, within the index of confidence in the democratic system, what the repercussion of the presentation of the simulated expense liquidation by the PAC is, and which effects are attributable to other causes, in order to determine if social damage resulted from the action of the civil defendants. It must be remembered that the favorable or negative perception toward political parties, as channels for democratic participation and the organization of currents and ideologies of social life, is multifactorial, dependent on many situations, such as, for example, the electorate's disappointment due to a lack of public investment in a government, or acts of corruption attributed to a public figure at a specific time, among many others. The difficulty in separating this specific situation from others equally capable of creating social damage precisely demonstrates the importance that, when dealing with diffuse interests, the damage supposedly caused to the collective does not create a presumption of its <i>“automatic” </i>existence, either because it is considered obvious that actions like those studied undermine our institutions or because the statements of the members are taken as a whole and it is said they suffered harm; instead, it must be accredited through some appropriate means or measurement instrument, from the perspective of social sciences and statistics, that can establish whether a verifiable social change can be evidenced before and after the events. It is not enough simply to say that there is social damage because the event by which the PAC obtained an unlawful pecuniary benefit offended the fundamental principles of peace and democracy enshrined in the Political Constitution. The fact that these are assets or values of general interest, as occurs in the case of the concept of political pluralism, an elementary principle of the nation's democratic and constitutional heritage, which are extremely abstract and generic definitions, does not imply <i>“per se”</i> that the state entity gains the right to claim undetermined social damage, which mandates the rejection of the claim as there are no flaws in the analytical reasoning. This Chamber considers that, according to what was stated by the judges in the challenged judgment, there is no document in the file accrediting that an individualizable collective damage was caused to that entity as a whole. The foregoing prevents establishing the existence of a causal link between the unlawful act and the damage claimed by the plaintiff. Regarding the charge of contradictory reasoning, since in some sections of the ruling the relationship between the participation of the people who collaborated gratuitously and democracy was evidenced, as derived from folios 3597, 3715, 3733, and 3797, there is no doubt that the majority of the witnesses provided service to the party voluntarily and without seeking any payment. This does not mean that in those sections of the judgment it is being stated that these people suffered an impact on their perception of democracy due to the actions of the civil defendants. Rather, as indicated, they themselves participated aware that the documents they signed were going to mean a charge to the Costa Rican State, whether recognition was given or not. Finally, regarding what was expressed by the Court on page 1573, folio 3809 of the judgment, that: <i>“The impact transcends the mere impact on the legal asset of property; the state’s coffers (sic) have been plundered in a category that the constituent himself wanted to invest in the vertebral column of our electoral democracy” </i>(cf. f. 3809), this in no way means that the existence of social damage is being assumed. Simply, in the context of the analysis of pecuniary harm, as an element of the criminal type of the crime of fraud, something undeniable is being indicated: the basis of the financing approved directly in the State's general budgets for political parties rests on the constitutional recognition of the public interest of the function they perform, as channels for the democratic participation of citizens. As the Constitutional Chamber has stated: <i>“...parties are essential instruments for the exercise of those rights and, therefore, for democracy itself; their entirely free formation and functioning are, therefore, of the highest public interest, subject only to the condition that they comply with certain requirements objectively derived from the party system; the possibility of constituting them, organizing them, registering them, and participating with them in the election of rulers and in the conduct of public affairs must be as broad as possible, within the strictly indispensable limits to preserve the public interests corresponding to their nature, purposes, and function” </i>(cf. Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. on January 23, 2009). The actions of the civil defendants harmed state contribution funds destined for investment in democracy, which does not mean that the judges are accepting that there was damage to the democratic system, but rather that they are highlighting the intrinsic value of the decision to invest in our country to sustain the electoral system. As a consequence of the foregoing, there are no flaws in the analytical reasoning or contradictory reasoning, and therefore the grievance must be rejected.

POR TANTO:

The appeal filed by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office is declared without merit. The appeal filed by the defendant's defense attorneys is partially upheld, solely in regard to the ruling’s failure to grant the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya the alternative penalty of monitoring by electronic bracelet, ordering its granting from this instance. The appeal filed by the attorney of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic is partially upheld, ordering the civil co-defendants Maynor Sterling Araya, Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, and the Partido Acción Ciudadana to pay the Costa Rican State, jointly and severally, for pecuniary damage, the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), as well as personal costs in the amount of ¢56,160,000.00 (fifty-six million one hundred sixty thousand colones). In all other respects, the challenges are rejected and the ruling remains intact. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Rosa María Acón Ng Kathya Jiménez Fernández Edwin Salinas Durán Judges of Criminal Sentencing Appeal Imputado: Maynor Ricardo Sterling Araya y otros Ofendido: El Estado y otro Delito: Estafa mayor y otro LQUIROSG “II.-[…] As they are closely related, the claims contained in the first four grounds of the appeal are resolved jointly, and they are inadmissible. The Trial Court determined the responsibility of the accused [Name1] based on various evidentiary elements analyzed jointly, integrally, completely, and not in an isolated, segmented, and fragmented manner as the legal defense of the defendant does, in an attempt to disqualify and invalidate the assessment and the conclusions reached by the judges. Upon examining the defense's allegations, their technique of analyzing the testimonial evidence in a biased and disconnected manner from the evidentiary universe, in order to demolish the structured, logical, and reasoned construction of the judgment, is more than evident. From the objections raised by the defense, what is extracted are personal opinions, conjectures, a simple disagreement with the outcome of the conviction, and an attempt to reassess the testimonial evidence according to the interests of their client. Contrary to what was challenged, this Chamber notes that the lower court (a quo) meticulously addressed each of the pieces of evidence incorporated in the debate, linking the actions of the indictee [Name2] that unequivocally established the direction of the plan executed in order to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, by presenting a liquidation of expenses for special services that he knew did not reflect reality, in order to inflate the political debt contribution (cuota de la deuda política) and thus, for the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter [Name3]) to receive a greater state contribution than was due. The appellants seek to have it accepted that if approximately one hundred and seventy witnesses did not say that it was directly the defendant who asked them to sign the service contracts, then Mr. [Name4] was not part of the "fraudulent scheme" (esquema fraudulento) to defraud the Costa Rican State. Said argument not only disregards criminal participation through the figure of control over the act (dominio del hecho), but also seeks to ignore the forcefulness of the accounts provided by witnesses [Name5], [Name6], and [Name7], with the appellants asserting that the first two merely "assumed" or "presumed" that the co-defendant [Name8] asked them to sign following instructions from [Name2] and, regarding the latter, evading its impact despite its assertiveness, by pointing out that at the meeting held at the convention center called “La Catalina” in Birrí de Heredia, he heard when Mr. [Name4] told party militants to sign the contracts to collaborate with its finances. The considerations put forward by the claimants, it is reiterated, arise from their particular and subjective way of examining the evidence, in a partial manner and distanced from one another, with the aim of drawing deductions different from those of the ruling. Their randomly naming several witnesses who attended the gathering at “La Catalina” (Silvia [Name9], [Name10], [Name11], [Name12], and [Name13]), attempting to discredit the participation of the accused [Name2] by stating that [Name14] indicated that the person who asked him to sign the documents was Mrs. [Name15], while [Name16] said he did not know Mr. [Name4] and that it was the cantonal-level president of the [Name3], [Name17], who asked him (see folio 2846); while [Name18] did not even mention whether [Name19] was at the place, and [Name20] stated he did not remember if he was there (see folio 2877), these statements in no way discredit what was affirmed by witness [Name7], nor [Name2]'s direction in the implementation of the plan. It involved an activity in which many sympathizers, representatives of the [Name3], and members of the executive committee were gathered, so it cannot be expected that in a gathering of that size, everyone necessarily had to determine who was present, such as the accused [Name1], who, due to the type of functions he performed for the party, was generally less known than [Name8] (even [Name11] indicated not knowing him), the latter with whom the majority of the collaborators had indeed dealt personally. To believe that the witnesses cited by the challengers, to refute the credibility of [Name7], had to agree that Mr. [Name4] was at “La Catalina” and was the one who instructed those gathered to sign the contracts with their signature, is to disregard the very psychology of testimony, since a group of people concentrated in one place, where some talk while others speak to the public, or are simply present, or are not attentive to details, will never all coincide on specific aspects, or as specific as who it was that called for the signing of the documents in question, or if Mr. [Name4] said it to a group of people, or to the collective. Furthermore, aspects inherent to the assessment of testimony must be taken into consideration, such as the time elapsed, the way each individual perceives the facts, the way they express them, as well as the type of situation being recalled and the impact it caused them. Notice that the defenders do not even establish what relevance or how it impacts the decision, the fact that the indictee [Name2] was present or not at “La Catalina,” or whether it was he or another who reiterated the call there to sign service contracts to support the party. It is truly immaterial whether or not they were contacted by Mr. [Name4], that is, if [Name21] from [Name22] stated that they called her from the party, and it was Mr. [Name23] who gave her the documents to sign (see folio 2919); if [Name24] said it was [Name25] who called him and that he does not know Mr. [Name4] (see folio 2948); or that [Name26] stated he only knew Mr. [Name19] by sight and only noticed the presence of [Name25]. Through a simplistic rational exercise that evades the issue of liability through functional co-control over the act (co-dominio funcional del hecho) and the direction of the criminal events, the defenders try to convince that because their client did not go to collect signatures, or was not seen at “La Catalina” or any other meeting point of the [Name3], addressing the public to promote the signing of the documents, he had no relation to the artifice carried out. It is also irrelevant if the Court erred in stating that the accused [Name2] ratified with his signature the totality of the special services contracts, which were signed by Mrs. [Name15] as Secretaria General of the Comité Ejecutivo, as this situation does not diminish his participation within the plan, with the defendant concurring in the various stages of the criminal process (iter criminis). Such actions by themselves are not the only ones that the Court weighed to establish his co-authorship of the perpetrated fraud, but rather a cluster of circumstances that the appellants avoid mentioning, precisely because a comprehensive analysis of the evidentiary elements such as that carried out by the lower court (a quo) leads to the inexorable determination that the order and the fraudulent plan came from [Name1] and that he had the reins of the criminal events, without the lower court (a quo) having reached such considerations due to a negative bias towards the defendant. An objective and adequate reading of the statements of witnesses [Name5] and [Name6] shows that neither of them made unfounded assumptions when asserting that the request of the co-defendant [Name27] was backed by the instruction given by the defendant [Name2], who was the Tesorero of the [Name3] at that time. As the judgment highlights, the statement of witness [Name6] is extremely important to affirm the responsibility that the legal defense now denies. Not only because she is one of the numerous people who appeared at the debate to point out that it was the co-defendant [Name27] who summoned her to induce her to sign the documents for supposed special contracts to give a breather to the battered finances of the [Name3], but also because she revealed who was behind all that ideation. When [Name8] was requesting her signature and explaining the rationale for signing them, Mrs. [Name28] asked him who the whole scheme came from, to which he responded that it was from Mr. [Name29] and Mrs. [Name30]. The witness emphasized: ...I asked Mr. [Name31] why I am signing the document and he told me that I was providing training services and I asked him who said so, because I knew he was a pawn, and he told me: [Name30] and Mr. [Name19], the Committee… (see folio 2924, sic).

The same must be said of the testimony of [Nombre32], who, while pointing to the party's Secretary General, [Nombre15], as the person who prompted her to sign, as well as others close to her who turned out to be [Nombre33], [Nombre34], and [Nombre35], that indication in no way exonerates [Nombre2], the architect of the fraudulent scheme to collect an improper disbursement from the State. The message was—almost invariably—that signing the documents was intended to help the party financially, through the donation of the proceeds of the contract they would sign, just as [Nombre27] told the witness [Nombre5], having turned out to be an envoy of [Nombre2], as he in turn told the deponent [Nombre6] (see folios 2839 and 2924). It is not, therefore, an unfounded presumption on the part of the witnesses, as the appellants claim, but rather a deduction they arrived at based on the circumstances, which was confirmed by the elements put forth by the trial court. The judgment states: “…the court had the opportunity to directly perceive that the witnesses signed those documents out of great affection for and trust in [Nombre3], a party that had raised the banner of ethics and austerity, to help it financially, but they were misled because what they did not know was that the party’s intent was for that supposed expenditure to add greater substance to the series A state contribution assignment certificates, which were in the hands of the party’s major ‘creditors’ and its large donors” (cf. folio 3694). Therefore, the scope that the appellants seek to give to the point of whether Mr. [Nombre4] directly intervened by encouraging party militants to sign the contracts to certify their participation is not, in reality, what is conclusive, but rather a set of elements obtained from the examination of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, which reveal the fraudulent intent of Mr. [Nombre4] along with his master plan to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which goes beyond the fact of him serving as treasurer of [Nombre3] at the time of the criminal events, as well as being part of the executive committee. The testimony of [Nombre36], who also recorded in audio (having personally convinced the supporters to sign the documentation through which [Nombre3] would obtain the financial benefit) what was stated by the accused [Nombre2] during the meeting held at the central headquarters of [Nombre3] (see folios [Telf1]), is one of the pieces that corroborates that Mr. [Nombre4] effectively knew about and arranged the plan for party collaborators to sign special contracts in order to collect on them against the state contribution to political parties, without the fact that he did not ask each of the witnesses who testified at trial directly diminishing his contribution and involvement in the criminal structure. It was the very presidential candidate for [Nombre3], [Nombre37], who, given the concern expressed by Ms. [Nombre38] that she was being investigated by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and it was even questioned that, having provided a service paid for by the party, the providers did not report the income to the tax authority, referred her to Mr. [Nombre39], with her and a group of affected persons then requesting a meeting. What [Nombre2] explained there to those confronting him is the same narrative that, on different occasions, he disseminated through the co-defendant [Nombre8], or through [Nombre15], or through some local leaders of [Nombre3] like [Nombre17] and [Nombre40], or militants like [Nombre41], to the effect that the collaborators' work, even being free and motivated by empathy for the party's ideals, had to be assigned an economic value. If the State recognized it, they would be paid, or they could donate it to the political group, an option that the majority of witnesses accepted out of their sense of identity, belonging, and loyalty to the cause and, except in some cases, without really understanding that this implied an improper charge to the public treasury. Of interest in the recording, the following conversations are worth highlighting: “MAYNOR [Nombre2]: Well, you remember that in the political campaign you were asked, because you were working in the political campaign, if you wanted to help the party, and as you were working, that work could be quantified and that you were paid with B bonds, and if that money was acquired as a political debt you decided two things, one if you kept it and two if you donated it to the party, that was it, it turns out that you signed four documents, (unintelligible voices talking), you signed four documents. **[Nombre42]**: Here we are in trouble Don [Nombre4], we don’t remember that…” (cf. folio [Telf2]). “**[Nombre1]**: ...no one received money. Why? Because the party, due to the amount of bonds it obtained, did not even cover the totality of the A bonds…” (cf. folio 3530). “**[Nombre1]**: ...this was kept in custody here for everyone. And why did we leave it in custody?… in the 2002 and 2006 campaigns… people came and started selling this on the street, and this has no value until the Tribunal says…” (cf. folio 3532). “**[Nombre36]**: Yes, but the services I provided to [Nombre3], that I said they had to give me that money. **[Nombre1]**: The special services. **[Nombre36]**: But the only thing I did was put the car to work and worked at the tables, I didn't want any money. **[Nombre1]**: It's that that work was quantified and assigned a price, that's it. **[Nombre36]**: That, without knowing it. **[Nombre1]**: How without knowing it? **[Nombre36]**: No, I didn't know. **[Nombre36]**: Exactly, yes. **[Nombre1]**: Of course, that must have been explained to you. **[Nombre36]**: Yes, we have the document here, but I don't remember at any point that I was going to receive that amount of money for having provided the service of the car and for having worked as a poll watcher, which I could never do because the paper never arrived for me. Do you understand me? **[Nombre1]**: Yes, yes, of course I understand you. **[Nombre36]**: So what I'm basing it on is, if there had been that money, I would have received that one million two hundred thousand that they were going to give me. **[Nombre43]**: … **[Nombre1]**: But then, well, I can't answer you there, because well, you are the one responsible for signing your documents. **[Nombre36]**: I know, I said, that's my signature there but… **[Nombre44]**: But that wasn't your job, it wasn't your job to collect the signatures Don [Nombre45]. **: No one knows how it was collected. **[Nombre1]**: But how does no one know. **[Nombre36]**: I don't, that is, I don't understand that part. **[Nombre44]**: But, it's that, that wasn't your job Don [Nombre4]? Wasn't that your job? It wasn't your job to collect the signatures… **[Nombre1]**: No, no, no, I don't do those things.” (cf. CED1, CED2, and CED3). “**[Nombre36]**: At what moment was I appointed advisor for Casa Conde? Transportation Advisor. I remember putting my car at the service of [Nombre3], and without charging anything, because I said, I'll pay for my gasoline, besides we didn't even work much, because there wasn't much service there in the car. So I said I'll put my car, I'm not going to charge, I'm going to donate my gasoline the times I have to fill my tank, I donate it to [Nombre3], I'm not going to charge a single cent, OK. Afterwards, the other service, I don't know, the only service I provided was working as a poll watcher, there at the tables...” (cf. folio CED3). “JEANNETTE [Nombre46]: But, I don't know why I was going to receive such a large amount?” (cf. folio 3550, sic). Contrary to what the appellants argue, the preceding transcriptions confirm that [Nombre2] had knowledge of the signing of the “special contracts,” which he could not collect from the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones since he knew that the services had been provided free of charge. However much he feigned surprise at the meeting about the unreality of the services described in the contracts and their disproportion to the recorded values, blaming the signatories themselves for not reading what they had signed, it is clear that Mr. [Nombre4]'s knowledge and intentions went beyond the generous gesture of recognizing an economic estimate for the collaborators' work. [Nombre36] herself expressed to the accused that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand colones was too much money for what she did during the campaign (buying gasoline for her vehicle from her own funds and driving it, as well as serving as a polling station monitor and advisor at Casa Conde, which she declined), which [Nombre2] could not have overlooked, just like the approximately 179 contracts signed by the witnesses who appeared at trial to recount that their contribution had been voluntary and without compensation, or that they had not provided any service at all. On that occasion as well, he tried to distance himself from knowledge of the inconsistencies in the documents, vehemently denying that he had brought them to the signatories to be signed, stating: “-no, no, no, no, I don't do those things.” When it is evident that, due to his position as treasurer of [Nombre3], the task of collecting signatures did not correspond to him, but rather a series of functions by which the collection of an item for “special services” that [Nombre3] had not paid could not have gone unnoticed by him. In accordance with Article 30 of the Partido Acción Ciudadana’s Bylaws, the treasurer of the political group was responsible for: a) Coordinating his work with the National Finance Commission. b) Controlling the financial and accounting management of the party and ensuring the strict application of all electoral and legal norms governing the matter, both for private contributions and for state contributions to political parties, especially the regulations issued for this purpose by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the Contraloría [Nombre47], being completely responsible for compliance with the law in this matter. c) Presenting reports to the National Executive Committee and the Political Commission, with a copy to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, about the contributions received and the financial progress of the party, with said reports to be presented monthly from one year before the national election until six months after the conclusion of the municipal elections, and quarterly the rest of the time. d) Presenting one report per year to the Contraloría [Nombre47]. e) Following up on the accounting record of the income and expenses of the Acción Ciudadana political party (Article 30 of the Partido Acción Ciudadana’s Bylaws; clause 123 of the Electoral Code). f) Faithfully recording the amount and origin of private contributions, of any kind, that the Acción Ciudadana political party received and the identity of those contributors. See that within the role of [Nombre2] as treasurer of [Nombre3], was the accounting control of the party's incoming and outgoing money, which makes his refusal to accept that he was aware that the contracts were simulated implausible, as the expenses recorded in the documentation were never generated for the political group. But furthermore, as the lower court (a quo) correctly analyzes, Mr. [Nombre4] could not insert into the expense settlement for collecting the state contribution services provided free of charge by party sympathizers, since not only did they not constitute an actual disbursement, but it revealed another irregularity: not including those donations in his reports to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones as contributions to the party. His clear objective was to present them as disbursements to give the greatest possible economic substance to the series A bonds, because the more significant the amount of expenses generated and justified by a political party during the electoral campaign, the more considerable the amount received from the state contribution for [Nombre3]'s participation in the national elections. It must be remembered that the political quota for the parties is defined based on two factors: the total number of valid votes obtained by the political group in the electoral process, and the total amount of expenses settled by the latter before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. This Chamber shares the analysis made in the judgment regarding the simulated nature of the documents and the unavoidable knowledge that Mr. [Nombre4] had thereof, as one of the architects of the plan, as derived from his functional control over the event, according to what was reported by the witnesses and the excerpts from the referenced conversations: “Those documents consisted of the ‘SPECIAL SERVICES PROVISION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA AND…’; which on its face contained a series of falsehoods (that the defendants knew about) and sought to meet the legal requirements to justify a special services expense that never occurred, because although in some cases there were various tasks, these were not the ones indicated and in no case was payment collected. See, then, that this contract described the special service to be provided, these being generic titles without real content, for example: Cantonal Coordinator of Voters, Cantonal General Promoter, General Finance Coordinator, General Organization Coordinator, Cantonal Communications Coordinator, Cantonal Youth Coordinator, and Cantonal Transportation Coordinator. With the direct perception that the adversarial process provides, this Tribunal could easily extract from the contractors’ body and verbal language their amazement upon seeing the contract and the assigned position. The vast majority said they did not know what the position was, what it consisted of, who had appointed them, what their supposed responsibilities would be, and in no case were they ever asked for accounts or reports on their functions. Another false content of the contract, which ultimately served as [Nombre48] before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, was the total payment amount of what was paid. An immense majority of the contractor witnesses discharged, as seen in Considerando VII, said they never agreed upon or collected any economic sum, surprised by this clause and, in several cases, deeply dismayed and even angry, as they never even had the intention of quantifying their work economically. Others, with a clear interest in protecting their political party, tried unsuccessfully to justify the amount, claiming they performed arduous work, that it was what other parties paid, that it was established according to the minimum salary of their professions, that it was an amount extracted from the total hours worked, and multiple reasons that, confronted with one another, make it clear that there was never an agreement between the parties, but rather arbitrary and template-based amounts filled in by unknown persons under the defendants' orders to deceive the electoral body. This contract, moreover, included the time frame in which the special service was supposedly provided, another clear example of the deception the defendants attempted, as all the witnesses were unanimous in pointing out that those dates were not related to their functions within the party, when they provided them. They said they had worked before, after, never, or on other dates, also without ever having been paid for those periods or the one indicated in the contract. All the dates were artificially imposed and filled in by the defendants, making use of other persons” (cf. folio 3803). The ruling thus sets out how, through the same scheme of simulated contracts for large and similar amounts, the fabrication of false money receipts, the issuance of series B certificates that, instead of being delivered to the service providers, were kept in the treasury of [Nombre3], the co-defendants fabricated a web with the appearance of legality so that all those contracts would be entered as “party expenses” in the final settlement and thus achieve, according to the binomial “total votes obtained and expenses,” the approval of more money from the state contribution. It was Mr. [Nombre4] who, on June 16, 2010, at the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, specifically in the Department of Financing of Political Parties, presented in his capacity as treasurer of the national executive committee of [Nombre3], the expense settlement certification corresponding to the electoral process [Telf3], for a total amount of ¢4,238,108,764.79 (four thousand two hundred thirty-eight million one hundred eight thousand seven hundred sixty-four colones and seventy-nine céntimos).

Of the total expense settlement, the line item for "special services" reached a value of ¢[...] (one billion one hundred fifty-two million forty thousand one hundred eighty-four colones), within which the fraudulent charge of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones) was included, corresponding to contracts for special services contrary to reality. It was not just any amount that went unnoticed by the treasurer of [Nombre3] and which he included within the party's expense settlement; there were 263 simulated special services contracts for an amount that reached the sum of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones). As correctly indicated in the judgment, not only did [Nombre2] deliberately omit to report to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal that these were donations, as he now seeks to validate in his defense, but these items represented 25% of [Nombre3]'s electoral expenses in the 2010 contest. An unprecedented figure for a party that promoted austerity and volunteerism among its members, but which, in contrast, showed wastefulness in expenses that lacked coherence or made sense, with the witnesses themselves estimating that the amounts reflected therein were excessive. In their effort to evade the responsibility of their client, the appellants try to shift it onto the internal auditor [Nombre49], stating that he was the one who prepared the expense settlement; however, this effort cannot succeed. The Court appropriately derived from the statements of [Nombre50] [Nombre51], [Nombre52] and of [Nombre49] himself, that the latter's work was of a documentary nature, corresponding to him the review that the accounting entries issued by the party corresponded to a justifiable payment, as well as ensuring that it complied with legal requirements, such as being accompanied by the proof of payment. However, knowledge of the fiction contained in the special services contracts was the responsibility of the accused [Nombre29]. If Mr. [Nombre53] came to know of the unreality of the contracts that were included in the settlement, this neither excludes nor diminishes the participation of Mr. [Nombre4] in the execution of the plan. In the chain of elements indicating the direction of the actions of the defendant [Nombre2] (giving economic content to the state contribution assignment certificates of series A), the Court highlights that in all cases, the same scheme was used of convincing supporters to sign the documents as acknowledgment of an economic sense to their contribution, whether to donate it to the group and strengthen it, or to leave it for them as supposed compensation for the services they provided to [Nombre3]. Furthermore, the judges detected that exactly the same templates were used, whose blank spaces were filled in, in the vast majority, with the same handwriting, and for amounts and functions that a large part of the witnesses disagreed with, considering them exaggerated given the tasks they actually performed, with divergence also existing between the functions recorded and those they actually carried out. The technical defense seeks for the special services contracts to be believed in good faith, arguing their pre-existence, that they had already been used before the accused [Nombre1] assumed the position of Treasurer, and that the regulatory system itself required their preparation by political parties. This Chamber agrees with the a quo that there is no doubt whatsoever about the prior existence and legitimacy of the instruments called special services contracts. They are certainly a legitimate instrument for party groups to meet the needs of having services that are neither technical nor professional in nature and that can also be paid with state contribution assignment certificates, of the series that the party deems pertinent as an absolutely valid payment mechanism, which exist and to which party groups resort to obtain resources and thus finance the ongoing campaign. As the trial court states: "...the problem is not the existence or not of the special services contracts, whether they were used or not in other political campaigns, nor is it the existence of the state contribution assignment certificates; the problem is the instrumentalization that was made of them to use them as the deceptive means to simulate non-existent expenses and thus deceive an institution like the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to obtain greater resources from the state contribution illegitimately. It is not legal and it is not viable, that the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the person very especially of the accused, remunerated work that it knew was voluntary, free, and ad honorem, a service that it also knew would be received with or without a contract, as the court has established as proven occurred in this case and whose purpose was to grant greater economic content to the assignment of rights certificates to the state contribution of series A, in order to honor the debts owed to the largest creditors and the largest contributors during the electoral campaign. The use by [Nombre2] and [Nombre27] of legally admitted instruments, rather, was part of the suitability of the deception directed at the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, to which a false reality of things was represented, and which, when verifying compliance with the regulatory elements required in the expense settlement, confirmed that the instruments were those required by legislation and, by virtue of the principle of good faith, assumed that the Partido Acción Ciudadana was telling the truth regarding its content. The witness [Nombre54] Fallas is correct when he indicates that there is nothing wrong with people donating the fruit of their labor to the party, but that is not the case at hand because the sympathizers of the Partido Acción Ciudadana never had the intention of charging because their work was free, and the party never had the intention of hiring them and paying for their services; what was devised was a stratagem for illegal collection from the public treasury, giving it an 'appearance' of legality" (see folios [Telf4]). So evident was [Nombre2]'s established design that the series B bonds were not even delivered to the supposed recipients of the services that were simulated as remunerated, or that were emulated as having existed, since as indicated, in some cases there were none even involved. It was established that another of the documents used was the "proof of payment (comprobante de pago)", which, like the contract, contained a series of falsehoods that the witnesses themselves unanimously demonstrated, since the literal text of the proof stated: "The Partido Acción Ciudadana has paid to...", whereas no amount was ever paid to anyone. The judgment points out to emphasize the intent (dolo) with which [Nombre2] acted: "It is important to note that on this proof, [Nombre2] himself signs under the legend: 'Receipt of conformity of the good or service', knowing full well that, in the first place, the service had not been provided and in the second place, that the sum stated therein had never been charged or paid by the Partido Acción Ciudadana. These are, without a doubt, pre-constituted evidence for the fraud, which would ultimately be presented before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Finally, as part of [Nombre48], the accused made the contractors instrumentalized for this fraud sign the document that read: 'PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECEIPT FOR THE DELIVERY OF BONDS AS PAYMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES'. Again, a document full of falsehoods and inaccuracies, like the previous ones. This referred to the supposed delivery of Type B Certificates to the contractors, which never occurred in the one hundred seventy-nine contracts, with one exception. Even the vast majority of the witnesses never had visual contact with the certificate. At this point, it must be remembered that the CED4, issued by the Executive Committee of the Political Party, are, as indicated by the Electoral Code in force for the year 2010, a valid means of payment for all legal purposes, as ratified by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. For this reason, what was appropriate was to deliver them to those who had provided goods or services to the Partido Acción Ciudadana and thus settle them in the expenses. The foregoing did not occur for the simple reason that there was never any interest in paying them. The excuse given by [Nombre2], in the sense that he did it to avoid eventual harm to third parties in good faith who might receive them, as he alleged had occurred in previous elections, is not acceptable. The truth is that by law, the contractors were the only valid holders, since they had been 'paid with them'. There was not a single document that supported the supposed instant donation of the same to the party, or the request that the party at its headquarters be the guardian of the Certificates. It is interesting to verify the deception of the accused, that the Type A Certificates and Type B Certificates provided to companies or media outlets were indeed delivered, making clear from the diverse treatment their diverse intentions, different from those indicated in the literal text of this document. If the contractors intended to donate said amount to the Party once paid, the respective procedure for the private financing of parties, in its donation modality, should have been followed. Which was never done. This is because, in the ideation of this criminal structure, it was never thought to give them content, but rather to serve to artificially increase expenses and thus have access to 100% of the political debt to which the Partido Acción Ciudadana was entitled at that time due to the abrupt change in its bylaws that modified the ceiling from 50% to 100% of the state contribution that was to be received, and given that this occurred after the elections, in the absence of real expenses of the political group P.A.C., simulated contracts for special services were resorted to. Thus, the simulated delivery that was made of the B certificates was an ideal [Nombre48] to lead the Costa Rican electoral body into error, since applying the principle of trust that governs in electoral matters and based on the literal text of the documents presented, which had the corresponding signatures, among them those of the co-accused [Nombre2] and Mrs. [Nombre30], they legally accredited a payment, which was never made, never charged by the party members, and which therefore should never have been accounted for as such. It is important to highlight, as stated, that the certificates, despite their nature, never left the central offices of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, due to a direct provision of the co-accused [Nombre2]. With one exception among the 263 contracts presented in this case, these B Certificates were never delivered, which clearly establishes that the accused [Nombre27] and [Nombre2] never wanted to give them the legal value that they have by law. So the reasons given by [Nombre2] for their non-delivery are highly contradictory with the procedure given to the A certificates and even the B certificates given to companies or media outlets, a diverse treatment that confirms that these formed part of an elaborate [Nombre48]" (cf. folios [Telf5]). The trial court thus sets out how all these contracts were instrumentalized, given a similar processing because their sole purpose was to inflate expenses to deceive the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Positions, activities, obligations, and amounts were established towards the party, without any objective parameter, but with absolute carelessness, in an arbitrary and whimsical manner, which reveals nothing other than the design to make improper charges to the State. This Chamber shares the view that unlike the series A and series B certificates that were delivered to important creditors of the party, those of the series B referring to the special services contracts remained in the possession of the defendant [Nombre2], even though he issued the corresponding receipts for the delivery of bonds, evidencing that from their genesis, there was never any intention that they be, even remotely, paid, giving a treatment different from the normal one, which unequivocally indicates that indeed their reason for being was to inflate the expense item of [Nombre3]. Certainly, by having delivered the series B certificates to the supposed beneficiaries, any intention of collection for the service providers appearing in the contracts became null, without the explanation provided by Mr. [Nombre4], that they were not delivered so they would not be subsequently transferred since they had been issued to bearer, being acceptable, since according to what was asserted by [Nombre15], the television company Repretel and several local radio stations and individuals who gave cash to the party were paid with series B certificates, which were indeed delivered to them in their materiality. The fact that witnesses [Nombre55] and [Nombre49] indicated that the signing of the receipts by the accused [Nombre19] was in compliance with an administrative obligation as National Treasurer, does not disconnect him from the artifice and the framework set up to defraud the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and rather links with the other actions deployed, aimed at making an illegitimate and improper charge. The judgment also notes that according to what the witnesses stated at trial, the finances of [Nombre3] were extremely precarious for the 2010 elections, and debts from the previous campaign were still accumulated. As Treasurer of the party, Mr. [Nombre4] was obviously concerned about not being able to cover the sums provided by banks and large creditors who had been paid with CED5. The sentence exposes, in a technical and adequate manner, that before the electoral campaign of the year [Telf3], the amount of the state contribution for each party was 100% for its electoral and campaign expenses. It was from the year 2009 that, in application of the text of article 52 of the Electoral Code, political parties were required to establish in their bylaws, in precise distribution, a percentage of the state contribution for the reserve for training and political organization expenses in non-electoral times. The foregoing under the spirit of promoting parties as permanent entities, a reflection of Costa Rican democracy, and not mere electoral machines hunting for votes in the quest to win the elections. Internally within the Partido Acción Ciudadana, there was a rule of austerity that was contained in article 53 of the Bylaws of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the sense that the party group would never charge more than 0.08% of the gross domestic product. It was also provided that the percentage allocated to the reserve item for training and political organization would be 20% charged to the state contribution. This was a rule that economically limited [Nombre3] and worried [Nombre1], constituting him as the main promoter for a bylaw reform to be made in order to access the total amount of state support. There is no doubt about this, no matter how much his defenders claim that his work as National Treasurer was ad honorem, that he did not remain regularly in the treasury premises, but rather appeared solely and exclusively to sign documents. The judges demonstrate the concern of Mr. [Nombre4] for the finances of [Nombre3] in the 2010 electoral contest, stating that both he, in his capacity as treasurer of [Nombre3], together with the treasurers of other political groups (Partido Movimiento Libertario and Partido Liberación Nacional), requested the Supreme Electoral Tribunal on May 7, 2009, for a reconsideration of the situation, arguing that it would imply a "technical financial closure" of the parties entitled to political debt, since the indicated deduction would result in the absolute impossibility of paying monetary obligations or commitments (bonds) already acquired, issued, or contracted, placing them in a financial "crossroads", because they would have to tell many people or entities that they did not recover their investment, aggravating the lack of credibility in political organizations and generating strong distrust towards the financial system of political parties (see folio 3596). The Court responded to the accused and his counterparts that the part of the state contribution to be allocated to training and organization was not optional but a duty. Given the alert that they would only be receiving 80% of the total amount (subject to the approval of expenses), the judgment describes how the accused devised a plan in order to economically satisfy the investors in the electoral campaign, this consisting of "the simulation of a large number of special services contracts supposedly paid with state contribution assignment certificates of series B, which were presented as expenses supposedly incurred by the Partido Acción Ciudadana before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. For this, the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the person of the accused, illegally assigned an economic value to the ad honorem, free, and voluntary work that its collaborators had been developing or had already developed during the presidential campaign and, as is obvious and according to the words of witness [Nombre56] and [Nombre57] from the Department of Financing of Political Parties, a free service cannot constitute an effective expense" (cf. folio 3597). The former presidential candidate and founder of [Nombre3], [Nombre37], stated that [Nombre2] was one of the promoters of the bylaw change, who even deceived him, because Mr. [Nombre58] Fallas said that at some point he spoke with [Nombre19] to desist from promoting that bylaw reform; however, far from adhering to the party's principles, he continued to promote its approval. On May 16, 2010, in San Pedro de Montes de Oca, specifically in the Edificio Cooperativo located behind [Dirección1] San [Dirección2], the national assembly members of [Nombre3] held National Assembly No. 17, whose minutes show that on that day the referred bylaw reform that was established in articles 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56 took place. In article four of the minutes, it is reported that Mrs. [Nombre59], President of the National Executive Committee, proceeded to read a note that [Nombre1] had left, as he was out of the country on that date, so that it could be read to the National Assembly of [Nombre3]. The minutes state the following: "...I proceed to read, as I told you yesterday, the letter that Mr. [Nombre29] left us. Mr. [Nombre4] says: ...I will not be in Costa Rica from May 14 to 29 of this year .... By virtue of the fact that it will not be possible for me to be present at the National Assembly on May 15 ..., I find it necessary to set forth to you by this means the reasons why I believe it necessary for our Partido Acción Ciudadana to try to collect the entirety of the political debt in accordance with the Electoral Code... Hence the importance of making this reform and registering it before we submit the expense settlement to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for the collection of the state contribution in the month of June. For all the foregoing, I respectfully request that you give your support to the following initiative and vote in favor of it... if any of you wishes to know more about this matter, you can call me by phone or write to my email and I will try to deepen my reasoning a little more or, if you deem it appropriate, we can coordinate a meeting..." (cf. main file volume I, folios 413 to 415). The interest shown by the accused for the bylaw reform to be approved before the date of submission of the final expense settlement to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, was intended so that all those simulated expenses included therein would ultimately be recognized by the Department of Financing of Political Parties and would contribute to giving economic content to the series A certificates. The appellants attempt to refute said motivations by arguing that Mr. [Nombre4] even served as treasurer without receiving remuneration; however, in the course of his management, he revealed that the approval of the bylaw reform was achieved thanks to his initiative, highlighting his merits as the savior of the party's finances, when he reported: "I wish to highlight the approval by the National Assembly, at the request of the National Treasury, of the collection of the entirety of the political debt (sic), a historic decision that will undoubtedly result in more economic resources to strengthen our party, hence the excellent economic capacity in which [Nombre3] (sic) remains after the collection of that money (sic), as shown below..." (see National Treasury Report dated February 8, 2011, folios 305 to 315). A reform of this nature that [Nombre19] proclaimed as "urgent" was necessary so that his criminal plan of assigning an economic value to the free work that the party's followers had been developing would bear fruit and more money from the state contribution would be obtained.

As indicated, in his note he warned, in the singular, in the first person, and with profound vehemence, that it was urgent to approve that reform and register it before presenting the expenditure settlement to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, a settlement that included the 263 simulated special services contracts. Far from being a disinterested recommendation, [Name60] pressured the Asamblea Nacional to modify the statute and thus achieve his fraudulent objective. Whether out of dedication and devotion to the party, or to appear as its redeemer, since he always wanted to project a good image and credibility in economic matters, [Name4] not only divorced himself from the ethical ideals proclaimed by the organization he defended, but also transgressed the legal framework. Thus, after an analysis of the derivative process carried out by the judges, it is determined that the errors pointed out by the challengers are nonexistent and that the judgment is based on an adequate assessment of the direct and circumstantial evidence, an exercise that was done in an objective, joint, comprehensive, concatenated, and harmonious manner of all the evidentiary elements that were brought to the adversarial proceeding.

• B)In the fifth ground of their appeal, they allege insufficient reasoning due to a lack of proof of the objective element of the criminal offense: financial harm. They claim that the court concluded without basis regarding the existence of financial harm against the State and consequently an economic benefit in favor of the holders of series A political debt assignment certificates; additionally, that [Name3] benefited financially from the alleged fraud perpetrated against public funds. They assert that the series B certificates were not redeemed for money, hence the Costa Rican State did not make any disbursement as a consequence of the issuance of said means of payment, and this was established in the resolution of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones No. 7235-E10-2010 of 12:45 hours on December 3, 2010, according to which the political debt assignment certificates, series B, never attained any economic content. This must be contrasted with the reality of the payments approved and made effective by the Ministerio de Hacienda, from which it is obtained that only the equivalent of 98.72% of the total value of the political debt assignment certificates, series A, was paid, such that the series B certificates never attained any economic content. They question the conclusions of the ruling, in the sense that according to the judges the economic harm materialized because the special services contracts, upon being included in the political debt expenditure settlement by [Name3], inflated the amount to which said political organization was entitled and more money was paid than was owed to the holders of CED6, thereby procuring an unlawful financial benefit for the benefit of private third parties who sold goods and services to [Name3] and in favor of the political party itself, which obtained a greater amount of political debt. They consider that the judgment fails to specify exactly which person received an unlawful financial benefit, and that it is not proper in criminal law to make a general allusion that the holders of series A certificates received it. It is also devoid of reasoning as to the legal rationale that prevailed to determine that the amount of money paid to the holders of series A certificates did not correspond to a real payment, since each of the expenses that [Name3] paid to its various suppliers was made effectively through the A and B certificates, the party making good payment, whether or not those certificates were redeemed, and [Name3] received no cash payment. For the appellants, it was impossible to manipulate the amount of the political debt because the amount each party would receive was unknown, under the provisions of Article 90 of the Código Electoral regarding the determination of the distribution of state contributions to political parties. They reproach the review procedure for settlements submitted by the parties, which witnesses [Name56] and [Name57], head of the Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos and legal advisor of the same department respectively, detailed in their statements, that is, that their examination is limited to verifying compliance with formal requirements, which is done randomly and partially, without selecting them by means of payment or assignment certificates, up to an amount equivalent to the maximum that the political party could access, which has been done by custom. They affirm that this contravenes the principle of legality because the Código Electoral approved as of September 2009 does not have a rule that determines the procedure to be followed for the documentary review of settlements; however, said normative body in Article 115 indicates, in reference to the political debt assignment certificates, that there is an order of priority at the time of their payment, from which it is inferred that when settling expenses, it must be done in serial order starting with CED7, and so on, without justifying the lack of complete documentary reviews on the grounds that there is not enough time and it would delay the payment of settlements to political parties. The appellants argue that if the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones had done their job well and fulfilled their obligation to review the documents pertaining to each account that was paid, it would be known whether all the accounts paid with series A certificates should have been redeemed or whether some were poorly substantiated and payment was not appropriate. In reality, no economic harm was caused to the treasury, since it could not be proven that the money paid to the holders of series A certificates was improper or unjustified.

In the sixth ground of their appeal, the technical defense maintains the existence of illegitimate reasoning due to violation of the rules of sound criticism, in that the judges concluded that if the holders of series B certificates, signatories of special services contracts, made a donation to [Name3], the accused [Name2] should have reported it to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. They state that the series B certificates never had economic backing; they originated as an expectation of being redeemed in money, and before the corresponding settlement was presented, it was known that it was impossible to collect them. Thus, they were left at the offices of [Name3] voluntarily by the persons who signed the special services contracts, who could remove them or leave them in custody; no decision was demanded of them. Under these conditions, it cannot be established that there was a donation that should have been reported by the treasurer of [Name3].

In the seventh ground of their appeal, they claim a serious error in the ruling by reasoning in a contradictory manner that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones had no responsibility whatsoever in verifying the expenses settled by [Name3], needing only to perform a verification, whether random or partial, and attributing all responsibility to the party itself. The foregoing, by making an improper interpretation of the votes of the Sala Constitucional No. 2011-08989 of July 6, 2011, and No. 2013-015343, in which the function or exclusive competence of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is indicated as the verification of expenses reported by political parties.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh grounds are resolved jointly because they are intimately linked, and as the appellants are not correct, they are rejected. The ruling extensively and exhaustively develops the reasons why, in the specific case, the accused [Name61] committed a crime of fraud against the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. The claims of the defense attorneys express nothing more than their mere disagreement with the way in which the Court decided to address, analyze, and resolve the issue submitted to its knowledge, because it is adverse to the interests of their client, without providing any element that would allow varying the conclusions reached by the judges. They argue the lack of demonstration of financial harm, a constitutive element of the criminal offense of fraud, resorting to the repetitive argument that the series B certificates were not redeemed, that the state contribution only sufficed to pay 98.72% of the total value of the series A political debt assignment certificates, and that, consequently, the Costa Rican State made no disbursement for the issuance of said means of payment. Regarding the aspects criticized, the a quo describes the modus operandi of the fraud as follows: it involved the massive simulation of special services contracts that were included as expenditures against the issuance of series B assignment certificates, before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in the final expenditure settlement signed and delivered by the accused [Name29] in the Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos, which were approved and improperly came to give economic content to the series A state contribution assignment certificates. It is not as the appellants argue, that if in the resolution of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones No. 7235-E10-2010 of 12:45 hours on December 3, 2010, that entity approved electoral expenses generated by [Name3] amounting to the sum of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) that were to be charged against the right to state contribution, the latter being equivalent to ¢2,992,864,242.92 (two billion nine hundred ninety-two million eight hundred sixty-four thousand two hundred forty-two colones and ninety-two céntimos) – an amount that was not even sufficient to cover the entirety of the A bonds – therefore there is no harm to the State nor unlawful financial benefit for the benefit of another. Note that the amount of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) was constituted, in part, by the sum of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones, corresponding to expenses for the 263 simulated special services contracts, which were approved by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and paid with a part of the B series of the state contribution rights assignment certificates. It is not in vain that some witnesses, such as [Name5], upon hearing the proposal of the co-defendant [Name27] to sign the documents, considered it to be "a small trick" or a "small deception" against the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. This perception and the lightness with which this "little trick" was assumed by the militants of [Name3], convinced that they were thereby helping the party, was in reality the structuring devised by [Name19] to defraud the State. The Court points out that on this aspect, witness [Name56] was extremely clear and forceful in explaining how the state contribution rights assignment certificates acquire economic content, differently from how the appellants try to make believe it occurred. According to the witness, all expenses that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones approves for a political party become part of a single pool of money, regardless of the means of payment used by the political party to pay them, be it cash, check, transfer, series A, B, or C state contribution assignment certificates, and once that pool of money is established, the principle of priority of state contribution assignment certificates under Article 115 of the Código Electoral is complied with. For the Court, the economic harm was more than clarified with the example that the witness provided in his statement, asking to imagine that the approved expenses are represented by drops of water of different colors for each means of payment. Thus, for example, expenses approved and paid with cash will be represented by yellow drops, expenses approved and paid with checks will be represented by blue drops, expenses approved and paid by bank transfer will be represented by orange drops, expenses approved and paid with series A state contribution assignment certificates will be represented by green drops, and expenses approved and paid with series B state contribution assignment certificates will be represented by red drops. All these colored drops of water are entered into a bottle of water with a cap that is the amount of the state contribution that was approved for that political party as an expectation of right, but upon entering that bottle with water, absolutely all the drops acquire the transparent color of the water that may – or may not – reach the cap of the amount approved for the state contribution. Once that pool of money is established, it is then that the state contribution rights assignment certificates begin to be given economic content, taking into account that for payment, the first issuance will have preference over the second, and so on, up to the last issuance. What this means, the witness indicated, is that with that pool of money, the series A state contribution rights assignment certificates will first be given economic content, then the series B rights assignment certificates, and so on, this being the principle of "order of priority" of state contribution rights assignment certificates, with legal basis in Article 115 of the Código Electoral in force since 2007. The complainants allege that the Código Electoral does not have a rule indicating the procedure for the documentary review of settlement reports, objecting to what was said by witnesses [Name56] and [Name57], that the examination of the Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos is limited to verifying formal requirements, randomly and partially, without separating them by means of payment or assignment certificates, and in their opinion, it should fulfill its obligation to review each expense that was presented. Regarding this topic, it is important to mention – as set forth in the appealed judgment – that the 2010 presidential electoral process was developed under the legal framework defined in the current Código Electoral, Law No. 8765 published in Supplement No. 37 to Gaceta No. 171 dated September 2, 2009, and at the regulatory level, Decreto No. 17-2009 published in La Gaceta No. 210 of October 29, 2009, was made official. Prior to September 2, 2009, Law No. 1536 of December 10, 1952, and its reforms, established a settlement review model that was in charge of the Contraloría [Name47], the oversight body on which the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones relied for the purpose of ruling on the amount of the state contribution that would correspond to each political party based on the strength of the votes and the expense verification exercise. With the current Código Electoral, the expense review process moved to the hands of the Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, whose direction is held by witness [Name56], who is a certified public accountant and holds a master's degree in public accounting. He is a person with extensive experience in the topic of reviewing political party expenditure settlement reports, because before doing so and being the head for six years of the Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, he carried out his functions in the Contraloría [Name47] for many years where he had the opportunity to perform the reviews of the 1998-2002, [Phone6] processes, as he recounted in the debate. The witness also reported that when the settlement review process moved to the hands of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, he did not move alone, but was accompanied by personnel also with extensive experience in electoral matters, such as lawyer [Name62] and Mr. [Name63], a person who had worked in the Contraloría [Name47] on an expense review process, Mrs. [Name64], who had also already worked on a process of reviewing expenditure settlements, and Ms. [Name65] with extensive experience of more than twenty years in the Contraloría [Name47]. From the foregoing, the trial court concluded that the process of reviewing political party expenditure settlement reports carried out by the Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is in the hands of persons with long careers and knowledge in the subject in which they acted, in compliance with the provisions of electoral regulations, specifically the provisions of Article 115 of the Código Electoral. While it is true that during the [Phone3] campaign there were some changes in electoral matters, according to what the witnesses from the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the Tesorería Nacional of the Partido Acción Ciudadana pointed out, among them [Name49], those changes were not significant, and particularly with regard to the process of reviewing expenditure settlement reports, the procedure was the same as had been developed in the Contraloría [Name47]. In this regard, Mr. [Name66] stated: "...when the function of reviewing expenditure settlement reports was transferred to the tribunal as of 2009, what it practically does is piggyback on the work scheme that the Contraloría [Name47] had, being that it was – as the governing body of superior oversight and having had this task for very many years – the expert in the matter…".

Now, regarding the reproach that the lack of documentary reviews by the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is not justified, arguing lack of time and that it would delay settlement reports, the questioning is untenable and seeks to transfer the own responsibility of each political party – to be truthful in the expenditure settlement to the electoral body and to act in strict compliance with the law and the principle of good faith – to the electoral body. According to Article 96 of the Constitución Política, for a political party to be eligible for state financing of the electoral expenses it incurred during the campaign, the political organization must meet two requirements: i) achieve at least 4% of the valid votes cast at the national or provincial level, if it is only registered at that level, or at least one deputy; and ii) it must verify its expenses before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. As the Court correctly derived from the reading of constitutional numeral 96, it is inferred from it that the political party has the obligation to verify its expenses before the TSE – principle of expense verification – from which is inferred the duty of the political organization to duly demonstrate its expenses and prove their effective existence. In this regard, the judges state: "Precisely, that constitutional principle is developed in Section IV of Title VI of the Código Electoral, called 'Control and Settlement' and 'Economic Regime of Political Parties', respectively. Thus, numeral 104 of the Código Electoral provides that the electoral expense settlement, duly endorsed by a certified public accountant, is the means by which political parties verify before the TSE the expenses they have incurred. The certification issued by the certified public accountant is made after the latter has verified, audited, and evaluated that all expenses redeemable with state contribution conform to the accounting and legal parameters thus required, according to Article 106 ibid. Numeral 103 of that same regulatory body indicates that for the evaluation and subsequent payment of expenses recognized through the accounting control of the settlement reports submitted by political parties, the TSE shall have the power to systematize the procedures that best safeguard the parameters of the expenses subject to settlement; in that sense, it may conduct random reviews among parties or among certain categories of expenses included in the settlement reports to verify them. The legal regulations do not establish, as the defense intends, that it is the TSE that must confirm the material veracity of the settled expense, but rather it is the political organizations that have such an obligation through the electoral expense settlement. In that sense, Article 42 of the Regulations on Financing of Political Parties issued by the TSE is categorical in that aspect by providing that it is the responsibility of the political parties to duly demonstrate their expenses and only to them shall correspond to prove their effective existence. On the other hand, the certified public accountant, as has been set forth, performs an accounting and legal verification, audit, and evaluation of the expenses settled by the political party. The electoral legislation provides that this public accountant, as witness [Name67] asserted, performs a documentary review of the expenses settled by the political party, but does not have the obligation to verify whether the service was actually provided or not, since that is a duty of the political organization that settles the expense. Note that the law provides that the certified public accountant performs an analysis of whether the expenses settled by the political party conform to the required accounting and legal parameters. That is, from an accounting point of view, it would be the examination of the procedure used to maintain accuracy and veracity in the transactions and in their accounting, which does not imply verification of whether the contracted work was provided or not, but rather verification that it was duly recorded in the respective accounts and accounting books that allows determining the real and truthful financial state of [Name3], in this case. And the legal parameter would be framed in that the expense is justifiable under the terms of Article 94 of the Código Electoral. Likewise, the Código Electoral imposed on the TSE the power to systematize the procedures that best safeguard the parameters of the expenses subject to settlement and to conduct random reviews among certain categories of expenses included in the settlement reports to verify them." The authority granted to the TSE by law is developed in numeral 71 of the Regulation on the Financing of Political Parties (Reglamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos), according to which the Department of Financing of Political Parties shall proceed to evaluate the liquidation of electoral expenses based on the expense certification of the Certified Public Accountant (Contador Público Autorizado), a document on which it shall carry out random reviews, according to a sample selected from among certain categories of expenses included in the liquidations, and shall issue the corresponding reports to the Directorate of Electoral Registry and Financing of Political Parties (Dirección de Registro Electoral y de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos), a body that forwards the pertinent recommendations to the TSE. This Court has described the constitutional, legal, and regulatory norm that empowers the TSE to verify the expenses liquidated by the political parties, an occasion on which a random review is carried out, based on a sample, of the expenses recorded in the respective liquidation” (cfr. fs. [Telf7], sic). In this way, the procedure for reviewing the liquidations of expenses presented by the political parties was legal because it is protected by the legal norms specified in the ruling and which the judges amply analyzed. In no way did the a quo give a different reading to what the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) sets forth in the cited ruling No. [Telf8], as well as in No. 13-015343 cited by the appellants in their appeal, without the appellants explaining what the “improper interpretation” is that they consider occurred. Contrary to what was estimated by the technical defense, the constitutional chamber has indicated that the verification of political party expenses, to access the state contribution (contribución estatal), is an electoral competence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) and is part of the electoral function, just as Article 96.4 of the Political Constitution orders. The Costa Rican legal system conceptualizes the state contribution as a reimbursement of electoral expenses and those related to party organization and training, which can only be accessed, by constitutional mandate, after the political groups have verified them before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. For these purposes, the parties must present the respective liquidations within the legal deadlines and with the endorsement of a certified public accountant. These liquidations must be accompanied by the documents that support the liquidated expenses, a certification issued by the same accountant regarding such expenses, and, in addition, a report from them on the results of the study that supports that certification and on the pertinent internal control recommendations. That documentation constitutes the fundamental basis for the subsequent review carried out by the Department of Financing of Political Parties, which will only authorize the reimbursement of those expenditures that are legally justifiable and effectively demonstrated and, of course, always keeping in mind the maximum limit to which each political group is entitled according to the electoral results. It is also authorized to verify the veracity of the content of the financial statements, by any means and procedures of analysis and investigation it deems appropriate. It is timely to cite what the Comptroller General (contralora general) [Nombre68] indicated in her report to the Constitutional Chamber: “Now then, a point of special relevance that is of interest to note is the fact that the challenged norms do not entrust—in the strict sense—the Supreme Electoral Tribunal with the oversight (fiscalización) of the public resources that finance the expenses of political parties. Before that, what they confer upon it is—simply—the attribution to carry out the accounting review of the payment vouchers that the political parties submit. (…) As can be seen, the legislation prior to the current Electoral Code placed the General Comptroller's Office (Contraloría General) in a sort of subordinate body of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, entrusting it with a role as an accounting reviewer of expenses, documents, and invoices, a function that clearly was not in accordance with the functional scope of competencies of the comptroller body defined by the Political Constitution. As is evident, that role that the previous legislation assigned to the General Comptroller's Office, as an auxiliary accounting reviewer of vouchers and invoices of political party expenses, the results of which were documented in a report sent to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal —which was responsible for adopting a final decision on the matter—, was the result of a model that did not take into account the natural function of the General Comptroller's Office, defined by the Political Constitution as a superior control body responsible for the oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). In addition to the above, that fragmentation of the analysis of the economic activity of the political parties was accentuated by the fact that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not have direct participation regarding the verification of the expense related to the state contribution to political parties but did regarding their income, which prevented the existence of a control point that would allow determining the correspondence between the income and expenses of the different political groups and the complete financing of electoral campaigns, all to the detriment of the principles of publicity and transparency. By virtue of the absence of basic elements that would allow the development of an integrated, agile, timely, and effective process of control of the income and expenses of political parties by a single agency, society was deprived of having control points that would warn about possible entries of funds contrary to the legality block and that could compromise the autonomy of political parties, thus distorting the essential reason for the state contribution, in its protective function of the independence of political parties as key actors in the democratic system. Faced with this entire panorama, the current Electoral Code brought with it a change in the prevailing model, defined in its correct perspective and scope the functions of the actors involved in the process, eliminated the fragmented control that had been dragging on until then, opted for an integrated and concentrated control in the hands of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and came to renovate and strengthen the attributions of that Court—which it already had in the existing model until then—, on a topic that is directly linked to electoral matters” (cfr. Constitutional Chamber, ruling No. 15343-2013). The quote is illustrative of what the trial court correctly extracted from a comprehensive reading of what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. That is, that the constitutional and legal mandate that the TSE has is the accounting review of the expenses liquidated by the political parties, which involves a documentary examination of these, excluding the obligation to verify the reality of the contract underlying the document. The appellants start from a biased premise by affirming that the ruling considered it demonstrated, in an unfounded manner, that the holders of assignment certificates (certificados de cesión) of series A were made a payment that did not correspond, even questioning that the judges did not point out who received an unlawful patrimonial benefit. It is not that the beneficiaries of the A bonds appeared to receive a payment from the state contribution for a service that was not rendered, which seems to be the meaning that the complainants want to give, but rather that if the expense liquidation had not been inflated with the simulated contracts for special services, it would not have been enough to cover what ended up being paid to the creditors with series A bonds. That is, the cancellation of 98.72% of the total value of the political debt assignment certificates (certificados de cesión de deuda política) series A would not have been such, but rather a lower percentage, hence there existed an unlawful patrimonial benefit. On the other hand, the defenders argue that the defendant had no possibility of manipulating the political debt because the amount that each party would receive was unknown; however, this is incorrect because as of March 26, 2010, through resolution No. 2124-E10-2010 at 11:00 a.m., the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in view of the results of the elections held on February 7, 2010, determined that [Nombre3], by reason of the votes obtained therein, could receive a maximum of the sum of 3,741,080,303.65 (three billion seven hundred forty-one million eighty thousand three hundred three colones and sixty-five cents), as a state contribution for the financing of the expenses generated in the electoral process. Precisely that influences the defendant [Nombre2] to rush to promote the reform of the statutes of [Nombre3] in May 2010 and to deploy the set-up with the simulated contracts for special services, whose payment he backed with the series B bonds that he never delivered to the service providers, and so that on June 16, 2016, he would present them within the liquidation of campaign expenses, with the sum of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven cents) being approved by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2010, through resolution No. 7235-E10-2010, for electoral expenses of [Nombre3]. Finally, the appellants are also not correct in objecting that for the Court, the signatories of the contracts for special services and holders of the assignment certificates, series B, made a donation to [Nombre3] that the defendant should have reported, since they never had any economic backing and from the beginning it was known it would be impossible to collect them, to the point that they remained in his office. It is reiterated that the objective set by the accused [Nombre2] was to feed the expense liquidation with simulated “special services” contracts that fulfilled the function of inflating the amount of the state contribution for [Nombre3], and that without them, the expenditure would have been less and, consequently, the coverage of the series A assignment certificates would have been diminished. Mr. [Nombre4] was interested in ensuring that the major campaign financiers who had lent money to [Nombre3] were paid, that is, those who had been paid with A bonds and a few with B bonds (some media outlets and individuals who had lent cash money), but not the collaborators who voluntarily gave their work without expecting any economic retribution. The latter were useful for representing fictitious expenses to charge to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, convincing the militants to sign contracts where a value or recognition in monetary terms was given to their work, to then reassure them with the option that if some money was obtained they could keep it, or, they could donate it to the party. The judges, based on what was declared by the witnesses and the defendant himself, simply point out that if the work was voluntary and without remuneration, then it was gratuitous, consequently, it was not an expense that should have been liquidated, but rather a contribution that the accused [Nombre19] should have reported to the Court. C) In the eighth ground of their appeal, the defense attorneys for the accused claim the possibility of applying an alternative penalty to prison in his favor, based on his subjective conditions and the quantum of the penalty set at six years in prison, alluding to Law No. 9271, “Electronic Monitoring Mechanisms in Criminal Matters” (Mecanismos electrónicos de seguimiento en materia penal). They reproach that the court performed a contradictory reasoning because although the judges admitted that the accused [Nombre2] meets all the requirements for electronic monitoring to be applied to him, they dismissed that possibility considering that the Ministry of Justice has not implemented electronic monitoring due to a lack of resources or as a consequence of the convoluted contracting system. They state that the law contains no transitional provision, being immediately applicable from its entry into force. The convicted person cannot be assigned a burden that does not correspond to him, due to the delay and obstacles in bureaucratic procedures. Finally, the same court pointed out that in the case of their represented party, his entry into prison will cause him more harm than benefits, both to him and to society. This ground is reserved to be heard together with the appeal filed by the representatives of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público). The prosecutorial examiner filed an appeal against the ruling, solely regarding the penalty imposed on the defendant [Nombre2], because having requested eight years in prison, the Trial Court set it at six. Given that one of the requirements for the application of electronic monitoring is that the penalty does not exceed six years in prison, and there being a challenge to the sanction imposed and a request to order a retrial on that extreme, the resolution of this ground is reserved to be heard jointly with the appeal of the Public Ministry. D) In the ninth ground of their appeal, they allege the nonexistence of extracontractual civil liability, due to not having been proven with certainty the material authorship. The court started from a false and illegitimate premise to declare the accused and civil defendant [Nombre2] civilly liable and sentence him jointly and severally to pay three hundred fifty-two million seven hundred thousand colones, which is that he devised a plan to cause the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to fall into error and thus obtain an unlawful patrimonial benefit for [Nombre3] and for the holders of the series A state contribution rights assignment certificates. The claim is unanswerable. In the present case, the Court analyzed the reasons of fact and law that credited the acts that produced the criminal conduct of fraud and the application of the criterion of subjective civil liability to base that item, with that willful action of the civil defendant [Nombre2], in association with the co-civil defendant [Nombre27], being what caused a patrimonial harm to the State. In this regard, it must be indicated that the recognition of reparation for patrimonial damage was derived from the concept of subjective civil liability, which has been understood from the doctrine of [Nombre69] and [Nombre70] as that which: “…occurs when the obligation to compensate damages is based on the voluntary act of the subject who has acted with fault in a broad sense (comprising intent and negligence), and …The requirements for subjective liability to exist are: a) that it is an unlawful act, that is, that it transgresses the legal system…b) that there is moral imputability of the act to its author, that is, that it is a voluntary act (sic)…. c) that there is fault or intent in the author of the act…d) that there is damage caused by the unlawful act…and e) that a causal relationship can be established between the unlawful act and the damage…” (La Acción Civil en Sede Penal, Astrea, Buenos Aires, 2002, pp 756-757)…(see Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), ruling 2012-001806, at 09:48 a.m. on December 5, 2012. See in the same sense 2012-01687, at 11:03 a.m. on November 16, 2012) and whose requirements the a quo in the sub iúdice determined as existing, since the subjective civil liability, derived from numerals 41 Constitutional and 1045 of the Civil Code, was evidently proven, by determining not only the willful action of the co-civil defendant [Nombre2], but also the existing causal relationship and the harm or impairment of the economic patrimony suffered by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. This is in accordance with what the ruling considered credited, when the accused entered as expenses of [Nombre3] at least 179 simulated contracts for “special services” in the final liquidation that led to the approval of more money from the state contribution in favor of the holders of the series A assignment certificates. The ruling is extensive in explaining, with respect to the civil items, the indemnification obligation of the co-civil defendant [Nombre2], why the requested claims were (partially) accepted, and the evidence on which the granted amounts were based, to finally establish the economic damage caused to the State by the criminal actions of Mr. [Nombre4]. Consequently, the ninth ground of the appeal is declared without merit.

III.- Appeal of prosecutors [Nombre71] and [Nombre72]. As the sole ground of their appeal, they express their disagreement with the determination of the penalty. They state that for the imposition of the sanction on the defendant [Nombre1], the court considered the following aspects: i) the patrimonial damage that reached ¢352,700,000.00, against the state contribution, dealing with monies that the Costa Rican State invests every four years to develop the democratic processes in the country, which come from the taxes that are paid by all the inhabitants of the national territory; ii) the complex criminal scheme orchestrated by the accused, which required the preparation of hundreds of false documents, carefully signed to meet the requirements demanded by the electoral regulations to approve expenses, as well as the deception of numerous people into signing the documentation and, to that effect, the ideation of issuing and using series B rights assignment certificates promoting a change in the statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter [Nombre3]) that prior to the 2010 electoral process, could only receive 50% of the state contribution to which it was entitled, in order to thus collect the entirety of the political debt; iii) the defendant's actions affected political pluralism and the equality that must exist among political parties; iv) his actions violated the principles relating to the economic regime of political parties, which are: transparency, accountability, publicity, honesty, integrity, and legality, and even those of his own party, such as austerity and the party's own financing; v) the determining motives for his criminal conduct, the defendant acting with the desire to achieve a successful management of his position as national treasurer of the party, seeking the maximum expense liquidation before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, likewise, with the aim of safeguarding the image of the political group, attempting for the state contribution to cover most of the rights assignment certificates issued by [Nombre3], and; v) having taken advantage of his position of power within the political group for the development of the criminal activity, employing his accounting, financial, administrative, and legal knowledge. For the appellants, the elements presented by the court to base the judgment of reproach are accurate. However, they consider that the penalty of six years in prison is insufficient for the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct of [Nombre2], with the proportional and reasonable penalty being the eight years that the Public Ministry had requested. They warn that the court did not value the defendant's actions subsequent to the facts, when he met at the party headquarters with some alleged contractors for special services and induced them to believe in the legitimacy of the documentation, with the intention that the facts would not transcend and that the fraud he had brought about in association with [Nombre8] against the State would be revealed. They request that the ruling be annulled, solely regarding the setting of the quantum of the penalty imposed, and that a retrial be ordered. This appeal is heard jointly with the claim contained in the appeal of the defense attorneys for the defendant [Nombre2] (eighth ground), as they are related, and: the appeal of the Public Ministry is without merit; the request regarding the [Placa1] is accepted. The prosecuting appellants agree with the a quo on the elements considered to base the judgment of reproach regarding the justiciable [Nombre1]. What they do not share is the imposition of six years in prison instead of the eight years requested, this being the extreme on which they base their claim, warning that the Court omitted to value the conduct of the defendant [Nombre2] subsequent to the facts, that is, when he met with some of the signatories of the simulated contracts, attempting to convince them of the legitimacy of the documentation so that the facts would not transcend. Certainly, for the reasoning of the penalty, the Court pointed out a series of circumstances, taking into account various aspects, among them, some quantitative and qualitative aspects of the credited fact, as well as the personal conditions of the accused, in accordance with numeral 71 of the Penal Code.

A selective study of those aspects highlights that the judge took into account the seriousness of the facts, because: i) Mr. [Nombre4] was a recognized business administrator, with experience in the Costa Rican environment, who enjoyed the trust of leaders and supporters, and who used his knowledge to cause a fraud to the detriment of the money of all Costa Ricans intended to be invested in this country's democracy; ii) it was not a conventional scam (estafa), but rather included an entire scheme to mislead the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; iii) the principle of equality with respect to the other groups and political pluralism was violated; iv) the [Nombre3]'s principles of austerity, probity, and transparency were violated, betraying the good faith of the militants; v) the magnitude of the patrimonial damage caused to the State. Regarding the quality of the determining motives: i) Mr. [Nombre4] sought to cultivate an image of success in his management as National Treasurer of the [Nombre3]; ii) his concern was to pay the large and important financial creditors, those who held CED5, and some from the B series, to ensure future financing for the next electoral campaign, using party collaborators by having them sign simulated contracts for that purpose. It is true that it was not expressly noted that, in the meeting held after party militants were called to account by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, the accused [Nombre19] tried to convince them that they had been in agreement with the reality of what they had signed; however, that is part of what the Court analyzed regarding the damage caused by the implication of the supporters in the preparation of the contracts, which does not add significantly to what was already analyzed. The trial court also considered his personal qualities, indicating that: i) he has maintained a defined life project for many years, as he is married, with two children and a grandchild, whom he is still educating; ii) he is a pensioner of the Universidad de Costa Rica, where he served in his last years as head of accounting, without a single stain on his professional record; iii) he suffers from diabetes, high blood pressure, and psoriasis, diseases that it is reasonable to consider will worsen with the passage of years, with Mr. [Nombre4] soon becoming an older adult. This Chamber not only observes that there is adequate reasoning regarding the imposed penalty, but that the quantum of six years of imprisonment is duly justified and responds to the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and legality, without it being considered that its amount is below the reproach it deserves. The penalty is considerably higher than the minimum end of the penalty range for the crime of scam (estafa) and, although the penalty of eight years of imprisonment requested by the criminal plaintiff was not imposed, it is considered that the setting of six years of imprisonment is just, adequate, equitable, and sufficient, without the complaint raised by the prosecutors being receivable. Regarding the application of house arrest with electronic monitoring as a substitution of the penalty, in accordance with Article 57 bis of the Penal Code, the judges recognized that the accused "meets the objective and subjective requirements: such as that the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment; this matter is being processed under the special procedure for organized crime; it is not a sexual crime nor one where firearms were used; he is a first-time offender; and there are reasonable elements to infer that the convicted person does not constitute a danger and will not evade the fulfillment of the penalty (due to his age and his family and home ties)" (cfr. f. 3822). Despite the foregoing, the sentence evades granting it at that juncture, alleging that "the truth is that the Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia has not yet developed the infrastructure to implement said alternative to imprisonment" (cfr. f. 3822). In other words, the Court assessed that in the sub judice the requirements, both objective and subjective, for house arrest through electronic monitoring are applicable, only that it did not grant it, exclusively based on the lack of implementation at the time of the issuance of the ruling, regarding the necessary infrastructure by the Poder Ejecutivo. As is public knowledge, since the beginning of 2017, the Ministerio de Justicia has had the CED8 devices and the platform suitable for controlling said measure. For that reason, this appellate Chamber considers that, the a quo having already weighed the said circumstances, the defense's claim on this point must be upheld, without ordering a remand (without any nullity since what was resolved is the basis for the configuration of the objective and subjective requirements for the appropriateness of the requested mechanism), granting house arrest in the electronic monitoring modality to the defendant [Nombre1]. The foregoing does not mean that what is ordered is in a single instance, since the trial court had already assessed granting said alternative main sanction to the accused, only that it deemed that material limitations for the implementation of the electronic mechanisms prevented its execution.

IV.- Appeal of Lic. [Nombre73], criminal prosecutor of the Procuraduría [Nombre47]. A) In the first ground of his appeal, he alleges contradictory intellectual reasoning and erroneous evaluation of the evidence when the sentence rejects the economic damage in 84 of the special service contracts. He indicates that when formulating the civil claim, he made an estimate of civil condemnation for material damage derived from the crime of scam (estafa) for the entirety of the 263 special service contracts that were submitted by the [Nombre3] to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. The court only granted material damage for 179 contracts under the argument that those were the total number of witnesses brought to the adversarial proceeding and that only with the presence of the witnesses could the damage suffered by the State be accredited. He considers that the basis for excluding the damage resulting from the 84 contracts is contradictory and cites several excerpts from the sentence taken from pages of the sentence numbers 1360, 1361, 1371, 1376 and 1377, 1384, 1479 and 1480, 1524, 1526, 1534 and 1535, 1537, 1538 and 1558, from which it is apparent that the court deduces that the origin of the entirety of the contracts was gratuitous, that there never existed on the part of the [Nombre3] or the accused the intention that said services be remunerated, and that therefore the appearance of the remaining 84 witnesses was not necessary to conclude that those 84 contracts are in the same circumstances as the 179 for which the existence of material damage was determined. It was not necessary, as the court indicated, to reach such a conclusion, to know the context in which the contracting party's will was formed at the time of signing the contract. He maintains that the fraudulent origin of the contracts is accredited not only from the will of the service provider, but in the scheme used in the [Nombre3], in the documents signed by the service providers, in that the bonds with which the payment was backed were not delivered and were in the custody of the party, and in the statements of [Nombre66] and [Nombre74], among other evidentiary elements. Based on the principle of freedom of evidence, it is possible by different means other than strictly hearing the 84 witnesses who did not appear to testify, to have the existence of the damage and its quantification as accredited. The same Trial Court, with the same evidentiary elements analyzed that resulted in having damage accredited in at least 179 contracts, concluded that the [Nombre3] was not in a position to hire paid labor for special services. That the supporters of said political group provided their work out of mystique and volunteering, that there was never an intention to economically recognize their work, that the contracts have similarities in the amount, in the type of service provided, and that this is an indication of the criminal action deployed, aspects that entail the recognition of economic damage, not in 179 contracts, but in the 263 special service contracts. The appellant considers that it is not possible to isolate the documentary evidence from which the Court derived the existence of the damage in the 179 contracts, and the same testimonial evidence on which the accredited damage was supported, and then not consider these same evidentiary elements in the analysis of the remaining 84 contracts, and exclude them for the sole fact that the witnesses did not appear at the adversarial proceeding. He asserts that the testimonial evidence of the 179 contracts received in the debate was abundant in that the work provided had a gratuitous origin, that payment was never made for them, that the political debt bonds were not delivered to the service providers since they remained in the custody of the [Nombre3], and that for that electoral process the [Nombre3] did not have resources to contract special services. In all these cases, the existence of a fraudulent origin of the contracting carried out was accredited, and in the remaining 84 contracts it is the same contract, with the same amounts of one million eight hundred thousand and two million four hundred thousand, all were collected directly or indirectly by the co-defendant [Nombre23] and were backed by the same documents that appear in the 84 contracts excluded from the patrimonial damage which were signed by the accused [Nombre75]. To conclude that because the service provider did not come to testify, the damage cannot be accredited, is to apply a principle of weighted evidence and the principle of freedom of evidence, and to illegitimately exclude the other evidentiary elements incorporated in the debate. Likewise, the documentary evidence, specifically report No. DFPP-DP-06-2012 of October 2, 2012, on folios 5 to 136 of the main file, and the statements of [Nombre74] and [Nombre56] support that the damage to the public treasury was for the entirety of the 263 contracts, whose total amount ascended to ¢516,600,000.00. He requests that the ruling be annulled only insofar as economic compensation was not granted for the 84 special service contracts that were charged to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which represents the sum of one hundred sixty-three million nine hundred thousand colones, plus the interest they generated, and the personal costs on said items. The claim is admissible. In the specific case, the a quo based its decision to accept the patrimonial damage only regarding 179, of the 263 special service contracts that were presented by the co-civil defendant [Nombre1], arguing that the contractor was necessarily required "...to know the context in which his will to sign said document is formed, which is lacking in that sense. Therefore, the special contracts whose contracting parties did not testify in trial cannot be valued within the economic damage caused to the State through the simulation of expenses that the [Nombre3] settled in the 2010 electoral campaign" (cfr. f. 3878). The judges note that although some witnesses asserted that "all" signed, it is a generic and abstract phrase that does not meet the evidentiary demands that the plaintiff of the civil action for damages has, thereby violating the principle of orality and immediacy of the evidentiary elements. The first error incurred by the trial court is to base its refusal to recognize the economic damage, in those cases or contracts in which the signatory did not testify in the debate, thus resorting to a system of legal or weighted evidence of testimonial proof that has no place, neither in the criminal process, much less in the civil one, ignoring the value of the rest of the evidence that was indeed presented, for indemnification purposes. According to the judges, with respect to the 84 contracts in which the signatories did not appear to testify, it cannot be assumed that they provided work free of charge to the [Nombre3]; however, contradictorily, when performing the evidentiary analysis for the purpose of establishing the judgment of guilt of the defendants, they determined an "astonishing homogeneity" in the preparation and processing of the documents they used to charge the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones for expenses for special service contracts that turned out to be simulated. They concluded that all the contracts were adhesion contracts; the same templates and formulas were used in the documents (contract, receipt of money, proof of delivery of the series B bonds); the same modus operandi was used for their signature; very similar and disproportionate amounts were set in relation to the functions inserted; the same method was used by the co-defendants to convince the militants to sign them as a kind of economic recognition for the voluntary and gratuitous services provided; all the transfer certificates for the B series through which these works were paid remained at the headquarters of the [Nombre3]. One of the many excerpts in which the Court refers to the "structured machination," with particular and similar characteristics, in at least 179 of the 263 contracts presented along with the expense settlement of the [Nombre3], is transcribed: "In what was proven, one hundred seventy-nine contracts and receipts were used to, by simulating expenses for the supposed payment of special services, proceed to deceive in an orchestrated, systematic, studied manner and acting with a high degree of organization against the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Note that none of the witnesses who testified in the adversarial proceeding mentioned having charged or received any amount for their service (some said they had done so, but that they were going to donate it) when in reality it was unpaid work by supporters of the Partido Acción Ciudadana who, moved by the principles preached by the group, provided their time, work, and even resources completely voluntarily. The [Nombre48] is not limited to the mere words of the defendants used to convince the contractors to sign; they also used the documents that will be mentioned, to present them before the electoral body passing them off as real and effective expenses for settlement, since the apparent contractors never charged, nor intended to charge, their voluntary work to the party. Those documents consisted of the 'CONTRACT FOR THE PROVISION OF SPECIAL SERVICES ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA AND…'; which, from its literal wording, contained a series of falsehoods (which the defendants knew) and which sought to meet the legal requirements to justify an expense for special services that never occurred, because although in some cases there were various tasks, these were not those indicated and in no case was payment made. See then that this contract described the special service to be provided, these were generic titles without real content, for example: Cantonal Coordinator of Electors, Cantonal General Promoter, General Coordinator of Finance, General Coordinator of Organization, Cantonal Coordinator of Communications, Cantonal Coordinator of Youth, and Cantonal Coordinator of Transportation. With the immediacy provided by the adversarial proceeding, this Court was able to easily extract from the body language and verbal language of the contractors, their astonishment upon seeing the contract and the assigned position. The vast majority said they did not know what the position was, what it consisted of, who had appointed them, what their supposed responsibilities would be, and in no case were they asked for accounts or reports on their functions. Another false content of the contract, which ultimately served as [Nombre48] before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, was the amount of the total payment of what was paid. A vast majority of the evacuated contractor witnesses, as seen in considerando VII, said they never had agreed upon or charged any economic sum, surprised by this clause and in several cases, deeply dismayed and even angry because they never had even the intention of quantifying their work economically. Others, with a clear interest in protecting their political party, tried unsuccessfully to justify the amount, alleging that they performed arduous work, that it was what other parties paid, that it was established according to the minimum wage of their professions, that it was an amount derived from the total hours worked, and multiple reasons that, confronted with each other, make it clear that an agreement between the parties never existed, but rather they were arbitrary and templated amounts filled in by unknown persons on the order of the defendants to deceive the electoral body. This contract, in addition, included the time range where the special service was supposedly provided, another clear example of the deception attempted by the defendants, since the totality of the witnesses were unanimous in pointing out that said dates were not related to their functions within the party, when they provided them. They said they had worked before, after, never, or on other dates without also having charged for those periods or the one indicated in the contract. All the dates were artificially imposed and filled in by the defendants using other people. All the contracts were signed by the sentenced [Nombre2] in his capacity as National Treasurer of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, who knew of the said falsehoods. Another of the documents used for each one of the one hundred seventy-nine contractors was the: 'Payment Voucher', which like the contract, contained a series of gross falsehoods that the witnesses themselves unanimously evidenced. In this sense, from the literal wording of the voucher it was stated: 'The Partido Acción Ciudadana has paid to…', and as indicated, NO ONE WAS PAID ANY AMOUNT. Here, it is not indicated that it is a conditional or eventual payment; it says it was paid, which means for any average person that said document accredited the payment of a monetary amount, which as has been repeatedly stated never occurred. It is important to note that on this voucher [Nombre2] himself signs under the legend: 'I receive conformity of the good or service', knowing that, in the first place, the service had not been provided and in the second place, that the sum stated therein had never been charged or paid by the Partido Acción Ciudadana. These are, without a doubt, pre-constitution of evidence for the fraud, which would ultimately be presented to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Finally, as part of [Nombre48], the defendants made the contractors instrumentalized for this fraud sign the document that stated: 'PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECEIPT FOR THE DELIVERY OF BONDS AS PAYMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES'. Again, a document full of falsehoods and inaccuracies, like the previous ones. In this, reference was made to the supposed delivery of Type B Certificates to the contractors, which never occurs in the one hundred seventy-nine contracts, with one exception. Even the vast majority of the witnesses never had visual contact with the certificate" (cfr. fs. [Telf9]). Then, if the judges considered that all the contracts were similar, responding to a single purpose of making an undue charge of money to the public treasury, it is contradictory that to accredit the economic damage suffered, they require the statements of the 84 contracting parties who were dispensed with, without the ruling expressing how the fact that those people did not testify affects it, and side step considering the documentary evidence incorporated about them, which according to the ruling were introduced into the expense settlement of the [Nombre3] to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and were recognized for the payment of the state contribution. At folios 3601 and 3602, the a quo sets forth that according to the testimonial evidence presented in the adversarial proceeding, the co-defendants [Nombre2] and [Nombre27] proposed to the supporters the stratagem to defraud the State, under the following three modalities: i) In the majority of cases, their "collaboration" was requested to economically help the party through the "voluntary subscription" of a contract, which would be paid with series B transfer certificates, which if recognized by the Court, the money could be donated to the [Nombre3]. ii) On other occasions, the supporters were offered remuneration for their services with series B transfer certificates, conditional on these eventually having economic content (however, the certificates were not delivered to the contracting parties, but were kept at the [Nombre3]). iii) On other occasions, the supporters' signature was requested, under the understanding that what they were signing was something completely different. That is, all these modalities described by the 179 witness-signatories of contracts, maintain that they were simulated, and although some stated that they indeed did work and considered the amount indicated therein deserved, hoping to receive good payment, the discrediting of this version comes due to the fact that they never withdrew the bonds, with these always remaining in the custody of the [Nombre3], an indication that it was never the will of these militants to collect them, nor of the party to make any payment to them. Then, what can be derived from these statements is that a considerable number of people (more than half of the signatories of the 263 special service contracts) ratified that they signed the documentation prepared under the mechanism described so many times in the sentence, which was later charged to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. In civil matters, in principle, the principle of proof in writing (documentary evidence) governs, Article 351 of the Código Procesal Civil, with testimonial evidence being admissible only to prove the agreements that may have existed between the parties. Furthermore, civil procedural regulations empower the judge to adopt the decision to reduce the number of witnesses when they are offered to testify about the same specific facts. That is, the judge can limit the number of witnesses complying with the parameters established by law, if the evidence offered is superabundant, Article 365 of the Código Procesal Civil. To require that the 263 contracting parties should have testified in the trial to have the total economic damage as accredited is not only irrational, but a requirement that disregards the principles of utility, relevance, reasonableness, and necessity of the evidence, when the same Court has affirmed that all the contracts and receipts have the same format and were systematically prepared under the same criminal scheme or structuring. There is contradictory reasoning when it is said, on the one hand, that from the incorporated evidence it was possible to accredit a plan to deceive the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones by presenting simulated contracts and, on the other, it is indicated that for a group of them, compensation is not appropriate because testimonial evidence was missed, despite the existence of clear common elements that reveal the simulation. These are two affirmations that cannot coexist without incurring vices related to the reasoning of the sentence.

The state prosecutor is also correct that there is a defect in the assessment of evidence, because by granting an exaggerated and unnecessary value (without justifying its significance and relevance to the decision) to the witnesses who did not appear, the *a quo* court diminished the value of the documentary evidence analyzed extensively and profusely when establishing the evidentiary foundation for the criminal aspect. It is important to note that due to the nature of simulation, circumstantial evidence is inherent to it, which is not exclusive to the criminal jurisdiction but is also applicable in civil matters. Regarding circumstantial evidence in civil matters, various panels of the Second Civil Court have reiterated the following: *“...we must analyze the legal concept of simulation and conclude that, since a simulated transaction seeks to give an appearance contrary to reality, with an unreal situation, all types of evidence are permitted, and it has been said that: ² ...the proof of simulation almost exclusively involves a presumptive (sic) activity, such that the evidentiary task will consist of gradually establishing the various pieces of circumstantial evidence in the case file.” (La simulación en el Derecho Privado. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo. Talleres de Mundo Gráfico S.A., San José, Costa Rica, 1990. Pág. 186). There are pieces of circumstantial evidence that are typical of simulation and make it easy to infer. The same author just cited highlights them in the aforementioned work, and among them we have: ...1.- CAUSA SIMULANDI. The causa simulandi is considered the starting point “to seek the motive for the simulation in order to then build the edifice of proof on a solid foundation. The causa simulandi, we have said supra, is the interest or motive that leads the parties to give the appearance of an unreal transaction, or to present it differently. The simulatory act is reflexive and conscious; it obeys a specific motive...3.- OMNIA BONA. This piece of circumstantial evidence branches into two types: the disposal of the entire estate or of the most select or valuable part of it...This piece of circumstantial evidence applies when the simulator requires, for their purposes, the complete divestment of their assets (to evade the principle that they are common collateral, art. 981 of the Civil Code); it is of no use to hide a part if creditors can execute on the rest...5.- NOTITIA. This refers to the knowledge of the simulation by the accomplice. This piece of circumstantial evidence refers to the fact of the simulators' concomitant knowledge regarding the fiction of the legal transaction, and more specifically, to the knowledge on the part of the accomplice. We know that one of the constitutive elements of simulation is the simulatory agreement, so the knowledge of the fiction by the accomplice is presumed. Consequently, only if the lack of such knowledge were proven—a matter otherwise of highly difficult proof (*difficilitoris probationes*)—would it be possible to infer the genuine reality of the supposedly simulated transaction. The foregoing implies that a lack of knowledge by the accomplice demonstrates the non-simulation of the transaction. It operates as a negative piece of circumstantial evidence for simulation, not an affirmative one... 9.-PRETIUM VILIS. The presence of a vile, disproportionate, or derisory price, which bears no relation to the real value of the thing sold, exchanged, or leased, is one of the principal pieces of circumstantial evidence of simulation... 15.-TEMPUS. Certain transactions are suspected of simulation due to the time or moment of their execution...One can speak of three types of tempus: a) Tempus coyuntural: This piece of circumstantial evidence requires a certain proximity between the simulation and the disruptive patrimonial event...b) Tempus celeritas. This refers to the unusual speed of the simulated transaction, a haste outside the normal and ordinary, given the proximity of an event. Haste that crystallizes in registry urgencies (e.g., immediate registry inscription of the sale...”* (cf. Second Civil Court, Section I, No. 2002-372. at 09:30 hrs., 27 September 2002). In the specific case, there were 179 witnesses who referred to the simulation of the contracts for special services, with 263 contracts presented under the same scheme as liquidation expenses to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. The trial court found the following proven: the *causa simulandi*, the motive that led the co-defendants to give the appearance of an unreal transaction, which was to inflate the expense item to obtain the highest possible amount to cover the Series A assignment certificates; the *notitia* or presumption of the accomplice's knowledge of the fiction within the simulatory agreement, given that both the defendants and the party member who signed knew they were doing a *“little trick”*; the *tempus* and the *precio vil*, since the contracts were made when the election results were known and the maximum amount of state contribution that [Name3] could access was determined, thus proceeding to prepare them for astronomical amounts in order to obtain the greatest possible recognition of political debt. Regarding the assessment of evidence in civil matters and the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, it is appropriate to cite the following extract from a decision by the First Chamber: *“For a presumption to exist as a means of proof, it is necessary, in the first instance, that a positive or negative, certain event occurs, from which the event one wishes to ascertain can be deduced. The existence or non-existence of this occurrence, broadly called the base fact, or more technically, the piece of circumstantial evidence, must be duly accredited in the process to ensure the viability of the presumption. This is deduced from Article 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure: ‘Human presumptions only constitute evidence if they are a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact.’ The Chamber has indicated that this type of presumption ‘…is the result of the exercise of discretion granted to the judge to assess the evidence, thereby deriving the presumption from other facts that have been taken as true’ (No. 848-F, at 14 hours 45 minutes on 31 October 2001).” This connection, which must be direct and precise, between the base fact or piece of circumstantial evidence and the occurrence intended to be derived (consequence fact), is verified according to purely logical norms, the rules of human judgment, a task carried out by the Judge vested with discretionary power according to conscience and discernment. It is the Judge who exclusively infers a fact or act from such evidence, as inspired by internal conviction within a framework of reasonableness and rationality, in a logical *prius* that does not violate sound criticism; therefore, the judgment stands, unless it is demonstrated to be contrary to the evidence that the proofs display, either through an error of fact or of law in its estimation regarding the base or circumstantial facts, or that the inference borders on the absurd by contradicting common sense or natural phenomena” (No. 000025-F-2007, at 10 hours 45 minutes on 19 January 2007)* (cf. First Chamber, No. 2008-216, at 08:25 hrs., 25 March 2008). The judges, through the overall assessment of the evidence presented, correctly concluded that the defendants created simulated contracts with the purpose of obtaining an undue patrimonial benefit for the holders of the Series A assignment certificates, to the detriment of the public treasury, but contradictorily denied the recognition of economic damage regarding 84 contracts, arguing that witness testimony about them was not received. The judgment thus incurs the defect of contradictory reasoning and erroneous assessment of evidence in the civil aspect, specifically regarding the economic damage suffered by the State, which recognized to [Name3] for the expenses documented in the 263 contracts for special services, the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), which is the patrimonial damage generated, and not the sum of ¢352,700,000.00 (three hundred fifty-two million seven hundred thousand colones). The Court found it established that the defendant [Name19] settled before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and they were authorized to [Name3] by him, the sum of ¢516,600,000 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones) under the concept of “special services” against the state contribution, which allowed a greater percentage of the state contribution rights assignment certificates, which had been issued by the Partido Acción Ciudadana during the electoral campaign, to be paid. To that extent, the decision must be revoked without the need to order a remand, since the same evidentiary analysis carried out by the *a quo* court regarding the determination of criminal liability and the establishment of the facts allows reaching the same conclusion on the validity of the claim for integral patrimonial damage for the 263 contracts for special services. Consequently, regarding the patrimonial damage claimed by the Attorney General's Office [Name47] on behalf of the Costa Rican State, against the civil defendants [Name1], [Name8], and the Partido Acción Ciudadana, they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the sum of ¢516,600,000 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), plus the interest generated from the consummation of the act until its effective payment, as well as the payment of personal costs in the amount of ¢56,160,000.00 (fifty-six million one hundred sixty thousand colones). **B)** In the **second ground** of their appeal, the appellant claims a lack of intellectual reasoning and contradictory reasoning regarding the rejection of social damage. **i)** Lack of intellectual reasoning: The state prosecutor states that the events caused significant social damage, since they directly affect the very foundations of our democratic rule of law system, within which the Political Constitution promotes an electoral development scheme that allows its strengthening, but also its permanence over time, through economic state contributions. The duty of political parties to participate in the education of the people was undermined, so that they feel secure in aspiring to and participating in the democratic ideal that is freedom of suffrage, and within this ideal, the need for a sense of belonging, honesty, and transparency that must permeate every phase and moment of political-electoral activity; activity that is facilitated through state contribution. In the appellant's judgment, the defendants' actions affect the people's credibility in the system, cause feelings of disappointment, disinterest, distrust, and apathy in citizens, as well as affecting the democratic system. In this regard, they refer to what was indicated by witnesses [Name76], [Name24], [Name77], [Name78], [Name79], [Name80], and [Name81]. From the witness testimony gathered in the trial, it is concluded that the proven events occurred in a democratic process in which the defendants made an improper charge to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones using the selfless and voluntary participation of hundreds of Costa Ricans. They argue that if the social damage produced by a crime occurring in an electoral process is comparable to moral or intangible damage and is therefore not subject to the proof required to demonstrate material damage, then the court, from the witness testimony, could have derived the existence of social damage and therefore the impact on the Costa Rican democratic system. Additionally, the political debt is used to invest in democracy, so the impact on the amounts that the State allocates to finance said democratic process necessarily affects the democratic system. They criticize that, for the judges, there is insufficient evidence to prove that the behaviors found proven, which violate a criminal legal norm, caused damage to the Costa Rican democratic system. They reproach the finding that their represented party did not perform a study that included the variable relating to the impact of public knowledge of the events for which the defendants were convicted, in relation to society's perception of the Costa Rican democratic system. They criticize that, for the court, collective social damage can only be evidenced by a verifiable social change before and after the events, with specific evidence such as sociological studies, and not with the witness testimony provided in the adversarial proceedings. This led to the witness testimony not being considered or assessed, and that the existence of social damage was not analyzed from evidentiary sources other than those the court deemed should have been provided. **ii)** Contradictory reasoning by the court in rejecting social damage: Although the court considered that the existence of an impact on the democratic system was not proven and therefore rejected the social damage, in some sections of the ruling, it revealed an understanding of the relationship between the participation of people who worked for free and democracy, as can be seen from pages 1360, 1479, 1502, 1561 of the judgment. The appellant argues that the most striking fact for which there is contradictory reasoning arises in the judgment of reproach, where the court stated on page 1573 that the defendant's criminal acts transcend the legal interest of property and impact democracy. **The claim is not admissible.** Having examined the judgment issued by the trial court rejecting compensation for social damage due to the failure of the Attorney General's Office [Name47] to adequately prove it, it is considered that it is duly reasoned and that the reasoning employed by the judges conforms to what the law establishes. Regarding collective or social damage, it has been defined as that which: “… *spreads or is diluted among the members of the group, whether the group is organized and compact or not. It is a supra-individual damage that does not consist of the sum of specific damages, nor is it an injury to the individuals' own and particular assets, but rather an actual and concrete injury, solely from the point of view of the entire society that suffers it. The damage to the collective affects the group simultaneously and coincidentally. It is one and the same single damage, which is nowadays accepted without difficulty as a notion with its own entity, which concerns all members of the community equally, or specific groups in an indistinct and non-exclusive manner. The recipients are no longer persons in isolation, but categories or classes of subjects, linked by some quality or characteristic that gives connection to the group. Within this context, if the obligation to compensate this type of impairment arises, it does not constitute a sum of identifiable portions; on the contrary, it is a general injury that is apprehensible and experienceable, where the affected element is communal or group-based, reaching individual subjects indivisibly due to their insertion in the group*” (see First Chamber, decision No. 675, at 10:00 hours on 21 September 2007). However, like any damage, whether individual, diffuse, economic, material, physical, moral, or of any type, it must be proven, and it is not appropriate to presume its existence simply because the state entity asserts that the facts for which it brought action directly affect the foundations of the Costa Rican democratic system. The representative of the State's interests asserted in their complaint and in their conclusions during the trial, the following: *“The action claimed here undermines our democratic rule-of-law system, since it affects our own Constitution, by denigrating various essential consequences of the referred state contribution, namely: the duty of political parties to participate in the education of the people so that they feel secure in aspiring to and participating in the democratic ideal that is freedom of suffrage, and within this ideal, the need for a sense of belonging, honesty, and transparency that must permeate every phase and moment of political-electoral activity; activity that is facilitated through state contribution. Under this scheme, the action described here affects the people's credibility in the system and the dynamics of national politics, which collaborates in maintaining the structural and ideological bases of our democracy. Likewise, the action claimed here provokes a feeling of social unrest that fractures our democratic bases, through the loss of the people's credibility in the system and the development of national democratic life. The foregoing, because the Costa Rican people and the State itself have been disrespected, by attempting and having obtained—for the benefit of oneself and third parties—an increase in the recognition and reimbursement of the political debt based on a deception, for which it must be emphasized that it is all citizens who contribute with our economic contributions to finance the political debt and, therefore, have been equally [affected].”* The PGR explains that social damage has been caused because correct political training has deteriorated and the expression of the popular will has been affected by the loss of credibility in political parties. The civil plaintiff recognizes that there is disillusionment and loss of credibility in political parties, to which must be added voter abstentionism, to which the criminal actions of the civil defendants contribute” (cf. fs. [Telf10], see fs. 391-392 of the appeal case file). It is undeniable that electoral processes constitute an indispensable pillar for the real functioning of an authentic democratic regime and that, in this context, political parties constitute an extremely important element of democratic life, as they are the instruments through which the principles of democratic pluralism are realized, they contribute to the formation and expression of the popular will, and are fundamental instruments for political participation (see Constitutional Chamber, decision No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. on 23 January 2009, and First Chamber, No. [Telf11], 02:45 hrs. on 05 May 2010, among others). However, as noted in the ruling, the party who claimed the right to compensation for social damage had to prove the certain, real, and effective damage that the civil defendants (Mr. [Name4], Mr. [Name82], and [Name3]) caused to the Costa Rican democratic system, beyond the mere statement of the raison d'être of political parties and their role in a democracy like ours. To assume the reality of the causation of social damage based on what was declared by the witnesses who appeared signing the simulated contracts and documents, in a general assessment, is absolutely insufficient to prove that credibility in political parties, a fundamental pillar in a democratic regime, was affected. [Name76] stated that they worked for [Name3] to support their mother, who was aspiring to a position in the party, but also out of love for the ideals of transparency and ethics of the group; they wanted a change at the political level, had no intention of charging for their volunteer work, and their surprise and disappointment were due to the misrepresentation of what they had signed. For their part, [Name24] related that [Name83] brought them to [Name3]; they worked selflessly for the party, were a council member, and over time became independent, without saying that this was due to the actions attributed to the civil defendants. [Name77] indicated that they were a founder of [Name3]. They stated that they used their personal vehicle and paid for fuel out of their own pocket for the party's needs on several occasions, expressed that they gave their work to help the country, acknowledging that they signed the contracts and that the money was for the party. At no time did they express sadness about what happened; rather, they defended their free contribution and the deserved recognition by the party of the political debt for their work. Mrs. [Name78] noted that they did their work voluntarily, without charging the party because they believe in this country's democracy. [Name79] reported that in [Name3] it was difficult to have resources, so they themselves financed the campaign with their labor contributions. What they signed represents a value for their dedication, as they never expected to have economic compensation. As can be seen, none of these persons mentioned by the prosecutor in their appeal, nor the more than 170 witnesses who testified during the trial, mentioned having suffered a supra-individual damage that caused harm to democracy. The majority admitted having provided free collaboration to the party and agreed to sign the documents presented to them, convinced that doing so would help the group which could eventually be recognized. What they mostly expressed astonishment and disagreement about were the disproportionate amounts that were recorded and the type of function assigned to them, which were at odds with the reality of the service provided. Some, like [Name36], appeared uncomfortable because they were contacted by officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to declare regarding the contracts for special services charged to the State, concerning which the service providers had not declared their income to the Dirección General de Tributación Directa. The common denominator among almost all the party members of [Name3] who testified is that they wanted to give their work to the party, without expecting anything in return, but if economic recognition for their selfless labor were to occur, it should be given to the party to contribute to its precarious finances. What they said, in essence, as the witness [Name5] made clear, was the acceptance of carrying out *“a little trick”* or *“a small deception”*, knowing that it involved public funds, such that they are not the best reference to offer a representative sample of the holders of the true collective interest. On the contrary, if any of them evidenced discomfort, it was not due to the attack on the political-electoral institutional framework of this country caused by the actions of the civil defendants (in which they themselves participated *“in good faith towards the party”*), but due to the betrayal suffered in their personal sphere, from [Name3] towards them as its party members, when the documents were filled out with content that was unreal in amount and regarding the functions performed. The damage to the particular interests of individuals who belong to a specific group should not be confused with the general injury that belongs to the collective. Therefore, the Court correctly concluded that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the behaviors found duly proven, which violate a criminal legal norm, caused damage to the Costa Rican democratic system. The judges are correct that the existence of effective damage must be corroborated; damage that must be assessable and individualizable, and derived from conduct suitable for the emergence of liability. Likewise, the causal link must be examined as a necessary element to attribute the damage to the specific behavior that caused it. The *a quo* court indicated: *“If the damage cannot be corroborated, the PGR's assertion would be nothing more than a supposition or a hypothesis. Similarly, if the civil plaintiff does not prove the social damage, there is no need to proceed to examine whether a direct causal relationship exists between it and the result, as it would be unnecessary and sterile”* (cf. f. 3901). It is not, as the Attorney General's Office generically maintains, that with the established unlawful act, correct political training has deteriorated, and the expression of the popular will has been affected by the loss of credibility in political parties.

The civil party plaintiff pointed out in its appeal that there is disenchantment and a loss of credibility in political parties, to which the abstentionism of voters must be added, to which the criminal conduct of the civil defendants contributed. Such assertions by the appellant are unfounded and stem from an initial error, which is taking for granted that there was social harm (daño social) to the community. Having made this assumption, it considers that it should be granted as is done with moral harm (daño moral), through a weighing by the judges of the quantum of the harm to the collective. This Chamber agrees with the trial court that the existence of social harm had to be demonstrated. To that end, the judges set forth the need for a study that contemplates the variable relating to the impact that knowledge of the facts for which the defendants were convicted had, in relation to the perception that society has of the Costa Rican democratic system, before and after. That is: "a comparison between social well-being before the event and after it occurred" (see folios [Telf12]). If not done in that manner, it is an uncertain and abstract harm, which is the complete opposite of a certain and effective, assessable and individualizable harm. As can be seen, the social harm whose compensation the state entity seeks has none of those attributes. The civil plaintiff could not separate, within the confidence index of the democratic system, what the repercussion of the presentation of the liquidation of simulated expenses by the [Nombre3] was, and which effects are due to other causes, in order to determine whether social harm resulted from the actions of the civil defendants. It must be remembered that the favorable or negative perception of political parties, as channels for democratic participation and the organization of currents and ideologies of social life, is multifactorial, it depends on many situations, such as, for example, the disappointment of the electorate due to the lack of public investment in a government, or due to acts of corruption attributed to a public figure at a certain time, among many others. The difficulty in separating this specific situation from others equally capable of creating social harm precisely demonstrates the importance that, in the case of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), the harm supposedly caused to the collective does not lead to a presumption of its "automatic" existence, either because it is deemed obvious that actions such as those studied break our institutionality or because the declarations of the militants are taken as a whole and it is said that they suffered damage; rather, it must be proven through some appropriate means or measuring instrument, from the perspective of social sciences and statistics, which can establish whether a verifiable social change can be evidenced, before and after the events. It is not enough to simply say that there is social harm because the act through which [Nombre3] obtained an unlawful patrimonial benefit offended the fundamental principles of peace and democracy enshrined in the Political Constitution. The fact that these are assets or values of general interest, as occurs in the case of the concept of political pluralism, an elementary principle of the nation's democratic and constitutional heritage, which are highly abstract and generic definitions, does not imply "per se" that the state entity acquires the right to claim an indeterminate social harm, which imposes the rejection of the claim as there are no flaws in the analytical reasoning. This Chamber considers that, according to what was expressed by the judges in the challenged sentence, there is no document in the case file proving that an individualizable collective harm was caused to that whole. The foregoing prevents establishing the existence of a nexus of causation (nexo de causalidad) between the unlawful act and the harm claimed by the plaintiff. Regarding the charge of contradictory reasoning, since in some sections of the judgment the relationship between the participation of people who collaborated gratuitously and democracy was evidenced, as can be seen from folios 3597, 3715, 3733, and 3797, there is no doubt that the majority of the witnesses performed their service to the party voluntarily and without seeking any payment. That does not mean that in those sections of the judgment it is being said that these people suffered an impact on their perception of democracy due to the conduct of the civil defendants. Rather, as indicated, they participated aware that the documents they signed would represent a charge to the Costa Rican State, whether the recognition was given or not. Finally, regarding what was expressed by the Trial Court on page 1573, folio 3809 of the judgment, that: "The impact transcends the mere impact to the legal right to property, the state coffers (sic) have been plundered in an area that the constituent body itself wanted to invest in the vertebral column of our electoral democracy" (cf. f. 3809), in no way does it mean that the existence of social harm is being assumed. Simply, in the context of the analysis of the patrimonial harm, as an element of the criminal offense of the crime of estafa (fraud), something undeniable is being pointed out: the basis of the financing approved directly in the general budgets of the State for political parties rests on the constitutional recognition of the public interest of the function they perform, as channels for the democratic participation of citizens. As the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has expressed: "...parties are essential instruments for the exercise of those rights and, therefore, of democracy itself; their completely free formation and functioning are, thus, of the highest public interest, on the sole condition that they meet certain requirements objectively derived from the party system; the possibility of constituting, organizing, and registering them and of participating with them in the election of rulers and in the conduction of public affairs must be as broad as possible, within the strictly indispensable limits to preserve the public interests corresponding to their nature, purposes, and function" (cf. Constitutional Chamber, Voto No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. of January 23, 2009). The actions of the civil defendants harmed state contribution funds destined to invest in democracy, which does not mean that the judges are accepting that there was harm to the democratic system, but rather that they are highlighting the intrinsic value of the decision to invest in our country to sustain the electoral system. As a consequence of the foregoing, there are no flaws in the analytical reasoning nor contradictory reasoning, and therefore the grievance must be rejected.

In summary, the appellants assert that the trial court completely biased the evidence, and that it could not be considered proven that the accused was at “La Catalina” and that he had asked for the contracts to be signed. In the **second ground** of the appellate brief, the technical defense of the accused claims a violation of due process and improper weighing of evidence, which leads to a violation of the rules of sound criticism, specifically regarding the principles of derivation. The appellants criticize the fact that the trial court illegitimately analyzed the testimonial evidence, biasing its content, since out of an enormous body of statements received at trial (approximately one hundred seventy witnesses), who were unanimous in saying that the accused Sterling Araya had no relation to the encouragement and request to PAC members to sign those contracts, it proceeded to perform an absolutely illegitimate analysis of Mr. Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, as well as a distorted examination of their defendant’s statements to establish proof of participation in the so-called “scheme.” Cordero Martínez was considered a suspicious witness precisely because witnesses Isidro Navarro Vargas, Juan Luis Padilla Molina, and Cristian Padilla Molina were unanimous in stating that they signed the contract at his request. For his part, Cordero Martínez declared that the person who asked him to sign the contract was the party secretary, Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín, and not any other member of the executive committee, which led him to seek out other people to sign the contracts; a version the trial court omitted in its analysis. It also disregarded the statements made by other witnesses who signed contracts and referred to a conversation recorded three years later, with the consent of the accused Sterling Araya, from which it can be inferred that he had no knowledge of the mechanism for signing such contracts, nor that he knew that the people who signed them had not performed the functions indicated therein. They cite an excerpt from the dialogue he held with Jeannette de la O Hernández, from which the defenders affirm, it is clear that he was also not aware of the circumstances under which the contracts were signed. Far from inferring that their client was aware of and the architect of the deception, what is actually inferred is that he understood that the individuals who signed the special services contracts had become entitled to the eventual and remote economic recognition that the type B certificates might achieve, and not the PAC, and it was up to each person to decide what to do with the money. Contrary to this, the judges chose to state that this reflected the defendant’s knowledge that these people had provided their services free of charge, which finds no support in the abundant testimonial evidence, since what Sterling Araya acknowledged was that a value had been assigned to the work of the party members. They add that not one single witness out of the one hundred seventy stated that they were contacted or sought out by Sterling Araya to sign the contracts; however, the trial court illegitimately asserted that the witnesses did state this, referring to Mrs. Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, Flor de María Monge Arroyo, José Solís Rojas, Carlos Jaime Gutiérrez Trejos, Luis Carlos Odio Victory, Nicolás Alberto Murillo Rivas, Ricardo Coto Castillo, Ronald Johanning Quesada, Luis Alberto González Agüero, María Jeannette Ruiz Delgado, Laura María Garro Sánchez, Hernán Solano Venegas, Ronald Joaquín Campos Arias, Sylvia Cordero Rojas (who did not remember if she signed the document before Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo or before Maynor Sterling Araya), Rodrigo Alonso Paniagua Carranza, and Crissia Fernández Mora, who according to the judges signed the documents at a meeting where Maynor Sterling Araya, Wilfrido Blanco Mora, María Esther Anchía Angulo, César Vindas Otárola, Alexandra Zamora Montero, and Yolanda Acuña Castro were present. The only witness who said she did not remember if she signed before Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo or before Maynor Sterling Araya—the witness Sylvia Cordero Rojas—her statement, in light of the principle of reasonable doubt, must be interpreted in favor of the defendant and not to his detriment, as the trial court does. In the **third ground** set forth in the appellate brief, they allege a lack of sufficient reasoning in the judgment due to an infringement of the principle of derivation, because according to the appellants, from what that enormous number of witnesses stated, it cannot be proven that the accused Sterling Araya—who even worked *ad honorem* as national treasurer—contacted or sought out the contractors, much less that he convinced them to sign under the argument that the contract was going to benefit the party. From the conversations the accused held with various party members, it can be inferred that he conveyed the conviction that the type B certificates belonged exclusively to the contractors and that they were therefore the direct beneficiaries in the remote event that they might acquire economic value. The appellants object to the weight given by the trial court to the recorded conversation between their defendant and Jeannette de la O Hernández, since at no time did he make any reference to him, in his capacity as national treasurer of the PAC, having the knowledge or intention that the possible money obtained from those type B certificates was to increase the assets of that political group. In the **fourth ground** of their appeal, the appellants criticize a violation of due process due to insufficient reasoning. They assert that all the weighing of the evidentiary elements was analyzed by the judges in a prejudiced manner, to the extreme of affirming in several sections of the judgment that the accused Sterling Araya signed all the contracts, which is false as could be verified from the testimony of approximately one hundred seventy witnesses. Most serious is that despite the fact that the electoral regulatory system required the presentation of those documents from all political parties, the ideation, fabrication, and presentation of the same were attributed to Sterling through an illegitimate derivation from the testimonial evidence, an absolute violation of the rules of sound criticism, and the judges commit the error of analyzing the evidence in a biased manner. They assert that the creation of the special services contracts was not the work of their defendant since they already existed from the previous campaign, having provided evidence proving that in said electoral contest, the political authorities of the PAC had presented, in the liquidation for that period, contracts denominated for “personal services,” whose structure was identical to the one used for the 2010 elections. Several witnesses, such as Leonel Sequeira, Margarita Bolaños Arquín, Olivier Pérez, and Oscar Fernández Venegas, were unanimous in pointing out the pre-existence of those contracts long before the accused assumed the position of national treasurer. They argue that the fact that the authorities and leaders of the PAC signed receipts and requested the identification of the persons who signed contracts was because the regulatory system itself (Article 47 of the Reglamento de Financiamiento de los partidos políticos) required it of political parties, not of Maynor Sterling as the judges considered as part of his criminal plan to deceive the authorities. It is false what is indicated in the ruling, that Sterling Araya ratified with his signature the entirety of the contracts, since out of the approximately *“veintisiete decenas”* of contracts, his defendant’s signature appears on none of them, but rather all were signed by Mrs. Margarita Bolaños, revealing the negative bias and slant in the analysis of the evidence made by the judges. Furthermore, Mrs. María Yenory Gutiérrez Brizuela and Mr. Carlos Morera Ballestero, permanent staff of the treasury, as well as Leonel Sequeira, internal auditor, agreed that the signing of receipts by the accused was in fulfillment of an administrative obligation, as he was the national treasurer. Through this testimonial evidence, it was proven at trial that Mr. Sterling Araya was not regularly present at the treasury office, but rather appeared solely and exclusively to sign documents; he was not engaged in reviewing contracts, nor in designating bonds, nor did he give them instructions to structure a criminal plan. In addition, it was proven in the adversarial proceedings that the defendant did not even prepare the expense liquidation; rather, this was done by Leonel Sequeira. They object that, for the trial court, their client’s responsibility is inferred because he proposed the modification of the PAC’s internal bylaws to increase the percentage of political debt that could be collected in those elections; however, Mr. Maynor, as treasurer and an expert on the subject, merely made a recommendation for said modification to be analyzed, a decision that corresponded to the party's internal body. At that time, there were political reasons that generated such a need, and in that sense, witnesses Lilliam Arguedas, Amadeo Cordero, Margarita Bolaños, Olivier Pérez, and Herberth Herrera testified. According to the appellants, this also had a regulatory basis, as observed in the recommendation made by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in resolution No. 1257-P-2000 at 1:50 p.m. on June 16, 2000. **Because they are closely related, the claims contained in the first four grounds of the appeal are resolved jointly; they are unfounded.** The responsibility of the accused Maynor Sterling Araya was determined by the Trial Court based on various evidentiary elements analyzed jointly, integrally, and completely, and not in an isolated, segmented, and fragmented manner as the technical defense of the defendant does, in an attempt to disqualify and invalidate the weighing and the conclusions reached by the judges. Upon examining the allegations of the defenders, their technique of analyzing the testimonial evidence in a biased manner and disconnected from the evidentiary universe to thus demolish the structured, logical, and reasoned construction of the judgment is more than evident. From the objections raised by the defense, what is extracted are personal opinions, conjectures, a simple disagreement with the outcome of the conviction, and an attempt to reassess the testimonial evidence according to the interests of their client. Contrary to what is questioned, this chamber notes that the *a quo* meticulously addressed each piece of evidence admitted in the debate, linking the actions of the accused Sterling Araya that allowed the direction of the plan executed in order to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to be unequivocally established, by presenting an expense liquidation for special services that he knew did not conform to reality, to increase the political debt quota and thus allow the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter PAC) to receive a greater state contribution than was due. The appellants seek acceptance that if approximately one hundred seventy witnesses did not say that it was directly the defendant who asked them to sign the service contracts, then Mr. Maynor was not part of the *“fraudulent scheme”* to swindle the Costa Rican State. This argument not only ignores criminal participation through the figure of control over the act, but also seeks to ignore the forcefulness of the accounts provided by witnesses Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, and José Reyes Gómez, with the appellants asserting that the first two merely *“assumed”* or *“presumed”* that co-defendant Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo asked them to sign following Sterling Araya's instructions and, regarding the last one, disregarding its impact despite its assertiveness, in pointing out that at the meeting held at the convention center called “La Catalina” in Birrí de Heredia, he heard when Mr. Maynor told party members to sign the contracts to collaborate with its finances. The considerations put forward by the claimants, it is reiterated, are due to their particular and subjective way of examining the evidence, in a partial manner and isolated from each other, for the purpose of drawing deductions different from those in the ruling. That they randomly name several witnesses who attended the gathering at “La Catalina” (Silvia Yanina Soto Vargas, Jenny Castro Acuña, María Elena Rojas Mora, Alejandro Li Grau, and Carlos Luis Solano Orozco), attempting to discredit the participation of the accused Sterling Araya when Castro Acuña stated that the person who asked her to sign the documents was Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín, while Rojas Mora said she did not know Mr. Maynor and that it was the PAC's cantonal-level president, Daniel Quesada, who asked her (see p. 2846); whereas Soto Vargas did not even mention whether Sterling was at the location, and Li Grau stated he did not remember if he was there (see p. 2877), in no way do these statements discredit what witness José Reyes Gómez affirmed, nor Sterling Araya’s direction in implementing the plan. It was an event where many sympathizers, PAC representatives, and members of the executive committee were gathered together, so it cannot be expected that in a crowd of that size, all necessarily had to determine who was present, such as the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya, who, due to the type of functions he performed for the party, was generally less known than Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo (even María Elena Rojas Mora indicated she did not know him), the latter with whom the majority of the collaborators had indeed dealt personally. To believe that the witnesses cited by the appellants, to refute the credibility of José Reyes Gómez, should agree that Mr. Maynor was at “La Catalina” and was the one who instructed those gathered to sign the contracts with their signature, is to fail to recognize the very psychology of testimony, since a group of people gathered in a place, where some talk while others speak to the audience, or are simply present, or are not attentive to details, will never all agree on specific aspects, or ones as specific as who was the one who called for signing the documents in question, or whether Mr. Maynor said it to a group of people, or to the collective. Furthermore, aspects inherent to the assessment of testimony must be taken into consideration, such as the time elapsed, the way each individual perceives facts, the way of expressing them, as well as the type of situation one is attempting to recall and the impact it caused. Note that the defenders do not even establish what significance, or how it affects the decision, the fact that the accused Sterling Araya was present or not at “La Catalina,” or whether it was he or another who there reiterated the instruction to sign service contracts to support the party. It is actually irrelevant whether or not they were contacted by Mr. Maynor, that is, whether Flor de María Monge Arroyo reported that she was called by the party, and it was Mr. Manuel Antonio Bolaños who gave her the documents to sign (see p. 2919); whether José Solís Rojas said it was *Tony* who called him and that he does not know Mr. Maynor (see p. 2948); or that Luis Carlos Odio Victory stated he only knew Mr. Sterling by sight and only noticed the presence of *Tony.* Through a simplistic rational exercise that evades the issue of responsibility for functional co-control over the act and the direction of the criminal event, the defenders attempt to convince that because their defendant did not go to collect signatures, or was not seen at “La Catalina” or at any other PAC meeting point, addressing the public to promote the signing of documents, he had no connection to the artifice carried out. It is also irrelevant if the Court erred in stating that the accused Sterling Araya ratified with his signature the entirety of the special services contracts, which were signed by Mrs. Margarita Bolaños Arquín as General Secretary of the Executive Committee, since this situation does not detract from his participation within the plan, as the defendant concurred in the various stages of the *iter criminis.* Such actions alone are not the only ones the Court weighed to establish his co-perpetration of the fraud perpetrated, but rather a multitude of circumstances that the appellants avoid mentioning, precisely because a comprehensive analysis of the evidentiary elements, such as the one carried out by the *a quo,* leads to the inexorable determination that the order and the defrauding plan originated from Maynor Sterling Araya and that he held the reins of the criminal event, and not that the *a quo* reached such considerations due to a negative bias towards the accused. An objective and appropriate reading of the statements of witnesses Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo and Gloria Cárdenas Miranda shows that neither of them made unfounded assumptions when asserting that the request from co-defendant Bolaños Murillo was supported by the instruction given by the defendant Sterling Araya, who was the PAC Treasurer at that time. As the ruling highlights, the statement of witness Gloria Cárdenas Miranda is extremely important in affirming the responsibility that the technical defense now denies. Not only because she is one of the numerous people who appeared at the debate to state that it was co-defendant Bolaños Murillo who summoned her to induce her to sign the documents for supposed special contracts to provide relief to the PAC’s battered finances, but because he revealed to her who was behind all that ideation. When Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo was requesting her signature and explaining the reason for signing them, Mrs. Cárdenas Miranda asked him from whom the whole scheme came, to which he responded, from Mr. Maynor Sterling and from Mrs. Margarita Bolaños. The witness emphasized: *...I asked Don Manuel why I was signing the document and he told me that I provided training services and I asked him who had said that, because I knew he was a pawn, and he told me: Margarita Bolaños and Don Sterling, the Committee…* (see p. 2924, sic). The same must be said of the testimony of Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, who, although pointing to the party’s General Secretary, Margarita Bolaños Arquín, as the one who promoted him signing, as well as encouraging other associates who turned out to be Isidro Navarro Vargas, Juan Luis Padilla Molina, and Cristian Padilla Molina, to do so, that indication in no way exonerates Sterling Araya, the mastermind of the fraudulent scheme to collect an undue disbursement from the State. The message was—almost invariably—that signing the documents was aimed at helping the party financially, through the donation of the proceeds from the contract they would sign, just as Bolaños Murillo told witness Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, turning out to have been an envoy of Sterling Araya, as he in turn stated to the deponent Gloria Cárdenas Miranda (see pp. 2839 and 2924). It is not, then, an unfounded presumption by the witnesses as the appellants claim, but a deduction they reached according to the circumstances and which was confirmed by the elements advanced by the trial court. The judgment states: *“...the court had the opportunity to directly perceive that the witnesses signed those documents out of the great affection and trust they had for the PAC, a party that had raised the banner of ethics and austerity, to help it economically, but they were misled because what they did not know was that the party intended for that supposed expense to add up to give greater value to the certificates of assignment to the state contribution of series A, which were in the hands of the party’s largest ‘creditors’ and its large contributors”* (cf. p. 3694). Therefore, the scope that the appellants seek to give to the point of whether Mr. Maynor directly intervened by encouraging party members to sign the contracts to prove his participation is actually not conclusive; rather, it is a set of elements obtained from the examination of both testimonial and documentary evidence that reveal Mr. Maynor’s criminal intent together with his mastermind plan to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which goes beyond the fact of serving as PAC treasurer at the time of the criminal events, as well as being part of the executive committee. The testimony of Jeannette de la O Hernández, who also made an audio recording (having personally convinced supporters to sign the documentation through which the PAC would obtain the financial benefit) of what the accused Sterling Araya said during the meeting held at the PAC central headquarters (see pp. 3527-3556), is one of the pieces that corroborates that Mr. Maynor indeed knew of and arranged the plan for special contracts to be signed by party collaborators to charge them against the state contribution to political parties, without the fact that he did not directly ask each of the witnesses who testified in the debate detracting from his contribution and intervention in the criminal structuring. It was the presidential candidate for the PAC himself, Ottón Solís Fallas, who, in response to the concern expressed by Mrs. Jeannette because she was being questioned by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and even being asked how, having provided a service paid for by the party, the providers did not report the income to the tax authorities, referred her to Mr. Minor, after which she and a group of affected persons requested a meeting. What Sterling Araya explained there to those who confronted him is the same discourse that, on different occasions, he disseminated through co-defendant Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, or through Margarita Bolaños Arquín, or through some local PAC leaders like Daniel Quesada and Eduardo Solís, or else, members like Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, in the sense that the work of the collaborators, even being free and motivated by empathy with the party’s ideals, had to be assigned an economic value. If recognition was obtained from the State, they would be paid, or they could donate it to the group, an option that the majority of witnesses accepted out of their sense of identity, belonging, and loyalty to the cause and, except in some cases, without really internalizing that this implied an improper charge to the public treasury. Of interest from the recording, it is worth highlighting the following conversations: *“MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Well, you all remember that during the political campaign you were asked, because you were working in the political campaign, if you wanted to help the party, and since you were working, that work could be quantified and would be paid to you with B bonds, and if that money was acquired as political debt, you would decide two things: one, if you kept it, and two, if you donated it to the party; that’s what it was, it turns out that you signed four documents, (voices that cannot be understood), you signed four documents. JEANNETTE JULIA ROMAN GONZÁLEZ: There we are in trouble, Don Maynor, because we don’t remember that…”* (cf. pp. 3529-3530). *“MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: ...nobody received money. Why? Because the party, due to the number of bonds it obtained, did not even cover all the A bonds...”* (cf. p. 3530). *“MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: ...this was held in custody here for all the people. And why did we leave it in custody?… in the 2002 and 2006 campaigns… people came and started selling this on the street, and this has no value until the Tribunal says...”* (cf. p. 3532). *“JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Yes, but what services did I provide to the PAC that I said they had to give me that money for? MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: The special services. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: But all I did was put my car to work and I worked at the polling stations; I didn’t want any money. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: That work was quantified and a price was put on it, that’s it. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: That was without knowing it. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: How without knowing it? JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: No, I didn't know. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Exactly, yes. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Of course, that must have been explained to you. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Yes, we have the document there, but I don't remember at any point that I was going to receive that amount of money for having provided the service of my car and for having worked as a polling station monitor, which I could never do because the paper never arrived. Do you understand me? MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Yes, yes, of course I understand you. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: So, what I base myself on is, if there had been that money, I would have received that one million two hundred thousand they were going to give me. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Eight hundred… MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: But well, then I can’t answer you on that, because well, you are responsible for signing your documents. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: I know, I said, my signature is on it but… GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: But that wasn’t your job, it wasn’t your job to collect the signatures, Don Maynor. GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: Nobody knows how those were collected. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: But how does nobody know? JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: I don’t, I mean, I don’t understand that part. GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: But, isn’t that right, you didn’t handle that, Don Maynor? You didn’t handle that? It wasn’t your job to collect signatures… MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: No, no, no, no, I don’t do those things.”* (cf. pp. 3547, 3548, and 3549). *“JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: At what point was I appointed as a consultant for Casa Conde? Transport Consultant? I remember putting my car at the service of the PAC, and without charging anything, because I said, I’ll pay for my own gas, anyway, we didn't even work much, because there wasn't much car service there. So, I said, I’ll put my car, I’m not going to charge, I’m going to pay for my gas whenever I have to fill my tank, I’ll donate it to the PAC, I’m not going to charge a single cent. OK. Then the other service, I don’t know, the only service I provided was working as a polling station monitor, there at the tables...”* (cf. p. 3549). *“JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: But, I don’t know why I was going to receive such a large amount?”* (cf. p. 3550, sic). Contrary to what the appellants argue, the previous transcripts confirm that Sterling Araya had knowledge of the signing of the “special contracts,” which he could not charge to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones since he knew that the services had been provided free of charge. No matter how much he feigned surprise at the meeting about the unreality of the services described in the contracts and their disproportionality to the values stated, blaming the signatories themselves for not reading what they had signed, it is clear that Mr. Maynor’s knowledge and intentions went beyond the generous gesture of acknowledging an economic estimate for the collaborators’ work. Jeannette de la O Hernández herself expressed to the accused that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand colones was too much money for what she did during the campaign (supplying gasoline to her vehicle from her own pocket and driving it, as well as acting as a polling station monitor and consultant at Casa Conde, which she declined), a fact that Sterling Araya could not overlook, just like the approximately 179 contracts signed by the witnesses who appeared at the debate to tell that their contribution had been voluntary and without remuneration, or that they had not provided any service at all. Also, on that occasion, he tried to distance himself from knowledge of the inconsistencies in the documents, vehemently denying that he had brought them to the signatories to be signed, stating: “-no, no, no, no, I don’t do those things.” When it is evident that, due to his position as treasurer of the PAC, he was not responsible for the task of collecting signatures, but rather a series of functions by which the collection of an item for “special services” that the PAC had not paid could not have gone unnoticed. According to Article 30 of the Bylaws of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, the treasurer of the group was responsible for: a) Coordinating his work with the National Finance Commission. b) Controlling the financial and accounting management of the party and ensuring the strict application of all electoral and legal norms governing the matter, both for private contributions and for state contributions to political parties, especially the regulations issued for this purpose by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the Contraloría General de la República, being completely responsible for compliance with the law in this matter. c) Presenting reports to the National Executive Committee and the Political Commission, with a copy to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, regarding the contributions received and the financial progress of the party, with the result that said reports must be presented monthly from one year before the national election, until six months after the conclusion of the municipal elections, and quarterly the rest of the time. d) Presenting a yearly report to the Contraloría General de la República. e) Monitoring the accounting record of the income and expenses of the political party Acción Ciudadana (Article 30 of the Bylaws of the Partido Acción Ciudadana; Article 123 of the Electoral Code). f) Faithfully recording the amount and origin of private contributions, of any kind, that the political party Acción Ciudadana received and the identity of those contributors. Note that within the role of Sterling Araya as treasurer of the PAC, was the accounting control of the inflows and outflows of money of the party, which makes his refusal to accept that he was aware that the contracts were simulated implausible, since the expenses consigned in the documentation were never generated for the group. But furthermore, as the lower court (a quo) correctly analyzes, Mr. Maynor could not introduce into the liquidation of expenses for the collection of the state contribution, services provided free of charge by party sympathizers, since not only did they not constitute an expenditure made, but it also betrayed another irregularity: not including those donations in his reports to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones as contributions to the party. His clear objective was to present them as disbursements to give the greatest possible economic content to the Series A bonds, because the more significant the amount of expenses generated and justified by a political party during the electoral campaign, the more considerable the amount to be received from the state contribution for the PAC's participation in the national elections would be. It must be borne in mind that the political quota for the parties is defined based on two factors: the total valid votes obtained by the political group in the electoral process, and the full amount of expenses settled by the latter before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. This Chamber shares the analysis made in the judgment, regarding the simulated nature of the documents and the unavoidable knowledge that Mr. Maynor had of it, based on being one of the architects of the plan, as derived from the functional control he had over the event, as reported by the witnesses and the extracts of the referred conversations: “These documents consisted of the ‘CONTRACT FOR THE PROVISION OF SPECIAL SERVICES ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA AND…’; that from its literal wording contained a series of falsehoods (which the defendants knew) and which sought to meet the legal requirements to justify an expense for special services that never occurred, because although in some cases there were various tasks, these were not the ones indicated and in no case were they charged. Note then that this contract described the special service to be provided, these were generic titles without real content, for example: Cantonal Coordinator of Electors, Cantonal General Promoter, General Coordinator of Finance, General Coordinator of Organization, Cantonal Coordinator of Communications, Cantonal Coordinator of Youth and Cantonal Coordinator of Transportation. With the immediacy provided by the adversarial process, this Court was able to easily extract from the body language and verbal language of the contractors, their amazement upon seeing the contract and the assigned position. The vast majority said they did not know what the position was, what it consisted of, who had appointed them, what their supposed responsibilities would be, and in no case were they asked for accounts or reports on their functions. Another false content of the contract, which ultimately served as a ruse before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, was the amount of the total payment of what was paid. An immense majority of the contractor witnesses examined, as seen in Considering VII, said they had never agreed to or collected any economic sum, surprised by this clause and in several cases, deeply dismayed and even angry because they never even had the intention of quantifying their work economically. Others, with a clear interest in protecting their political party, tried unsuccessfully to justify the amount, arguing that they performed arduous work, that it was what other parties paid, that it was established according to the minimum wage of their professions, that it was an amount derived from the total hours worked, and multiple reasons that, confronted with one another, make it clear that there was never an agreement between the parties, but rather that they were arbitrary and boilerplate amounts filled in by unknown persons at the order of the defendants to deceive the electoral entity. This contract, furthermore, included the time range where the special service was supposedly provided, another clear example of the deception attempted by the defendants, since all the witnesses were unanimous in stating that said dates were not related to their functions within the party, when they provided them. They said they had worked before, after, never, or on other dates, also without having charged for those periods or the one stated in the contract. All the dates were artificially imposed and filled in by the defendants using other people” (cf. folio 3803). The ruling thus exposes how, through the same scheme of simulated contracts for large and similar amounts, the fabrication of false money receipts, the issuance of Series B certificates which, instead of being delivered to the service providers, were kept in the PAC treasury, the co-defendants fabricated a framework with the appearance of legality so that all these contracts would be entered as “party expenses” in the final liquidation and thus achieve, according to the binomial “total votes obtained and expenses,” the approval of more money from the state contribution. It was Mr. Maynor who, on June 16, 2010, at the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, specifically in the Department of Financing of Political Parties, presented in his capacity as treasurer of the national executive committee of the PAC, the certification of expense liquidation corresponding to the 2006-2010 electoral process, for a total amount of ¢4,238,108,764.79 (four billion two hundred thirty-eight million one hundred eight thousand seven hundred sixty-four colones and seventy-nine céntimos). Of the total expense liquidation, the item for “special services” reached a value of ¢1,152,040,184 (one billion one hundred fifty-two million forty thousand one hundred eighty-four colones), within which the fraudulent charge for ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones, corresponding to the contracts for special services contrary to reality) was included. It was not just any amount that went unnoticed by the treasurer of the PAC and that he included within the party's expense liquidation; there were 263 simulated contracts for special services for an amount that rose to the sum of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones). As correctly indicated in the ruling, Sterling Araya not only deliberately omitted to report to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones that these were donations, as he now seeks to validate in his defense, but these items represented 25% of the PAC's electoral expenses in the 2010 contest. An unprecedented figure for a party that promoted austerity and volunteerism among its members, but which in contrast, showed a wastefulness in expenses that had no coherence or made sense, with the same witnesses estimating that the amounts reflected therein were excessive. In their effort to circumvent the responsibility of their client, the appellants attempt to shift it onto the internal auditor Leonel Sequeira, stating that he was the one who prepared the expense liquidation, however, this effort cannot succeed. The Court properly derived from the statements of Julio Aguilar Silesky, Ronald Eduardo Chacón Bonilla, and Leonel Sequeira himself, that the latter's work was of a documentary type, being responsible for reviewing that the accounting entries issued by the party corresponded to a justifiable payment, as well as ensuring it complied with legal requirements, such as being accompanied by proof of payment. However, knowledge of the fiction contained in the special services contracts was the domain of the defendant Maynor Sterling. If Mr. Leonel came to know of the unreality of the contracts included in the liquidation, this does not exclude or diminish Mr. Maynor's participation in the execution of the plan. In the concatenation of elements indicating the direction of the defendant Sterling Araya's actions (to give economic content to the Series A state contribution assignment certificates), the Court highlights that in all cases, the same method was used: convincing supporters to sign the documents as recognition of an economic sense for their contribution, either to donate it to the group and strengthen it, or to leave them for themselves as supposed compensation for the services they provided to the PAC. Furthermore, the judges detected that they were exactly the same boilerplate documents whose blank spaces are written, in the vast majority, with the same handwriting, and for amounts and functions that a large part of the witnesses disagreed with, considering them exaggerated given the tasks they actually performed, with divergence also existing between the functions recorded and those they actually exercised. The technical defense intends for us to believe in the good faith of the “special services” contracts, arguing their pre-existence, that they had already been used before the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya assumed the position of Treasurer, and that the regulatory system itself required their preparation by political parties. This chamber agrees with the lower court (a quo) that there is no doubt whatsoever about the prior existence and legitimacy of the instruments called special services contracts. They are certainly a legitimate instrument for party groups to meet the needs of services that are neither technical nor professional in nature and that can also be paid with certificates of assignment of the state contribution, of the series the party deems pertinent, as an absolutely valid payment mechanism, which they are and to which party groups resort to obtain resources and thus finance the ongoing campaign. As the trial court expresses: “...the problem is not in the existence or not of the special services contracts, if they were used or not in other political campaigns, nor is it in the existence of the state contribution assignment certificates, the problem is in the instrumentalization that was made of them to use them as the deceptive means to simulate non-existent expenses and thus deceive an institution like the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to unlawfully obtain greater resources from the state contribution. It is not legal and it is not viable, for the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the person very especially of the defendants, to have paid for work they knew was voluntary, free, and ad honorem, a service they also knew would be received anyway, with or without a contract, as the court has established occurred in this case and whose purpose was to give greater economic content to the Series A assignment of rights to the state contribution certificates and thus be able to honor the debts owed to the largest creditors and the largest contributors during the electoral campaign. The use by Sterling Araya and Bolaños Murillo of legally admitted instruments, rather, was part of the suitability of the deception inflicted upon the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, to whom a false reality of things was represented, and which, at the time of verifying compliance with the normative elements required in the expense liquidation, confirmed that the instruments were those required by legislation and, by virtue of the principle of good faith, assumed that the Partido Acción Ciudadana was telling the truth regarding their content. The witness Otton Solís Fallas is right when he indicates that there is nothing wrong with people donating the fruit of their work to the party, but that is not the case before us because, on the part of the sympathizers of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, there was never the intention to charge because their work was free, and on the part of the party, there was never the intention to hire them and pay for their services; what was devised was a stratagem for illegal collection from the public treasury by giving it an ‘appearance’ of legality” (see folios 3793-3794). Sterling Araya had the outlined design so clearly in mind that the Series B bonds were not even delivered to the supposed borrowers of the services they simulated as remunerated, or that they emulated as having existed, because as indicated, in some cases there were none involved at all. It was proven that another of the documents used was the “payment voucher,” which, like the contract, contained a series of falsehoods that the witnesses themselves unanimously evidenced, because the literal text of the voucher read: “The Partido Acción Ciudadana has paid to…”, when in fact no amount was paid to anyone. The ruling points out, to emphasize the criminal intent (dolo) with which Sterling Araya acted: “It is important to point out that in this voucher, STERLING ARAYA himself, signs under the legend: ‘Receipt confirming the good or service’, knowing full well that, firstly, the service had not been provided and secondly, that the sum stated therein had never been charged or paid by the Partido Acción Ciudadana. These are, without a doubt, pre-constituted evidence for the fraud, which they would ultimately present before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Finally, as part of the ruse, the defendants had the contractors instrumentalized for this scam sign the document that read: ‘PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECEIPT FOR THE DELIVERY OF BONDS AS PAYMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES’. Again, a document full of falsehoods and inaccuracies, like the previous ones. This referred to the supposed delivery of Type B Certificates to the contractors, which never happens in the one hundred seventy-nine contracts, with one exception. Even the vast majority of the witnesses never had visual contact with the certificate. At this point, it must be remembered that the Type A, B, or C Certificates, issued by the Executive Committee of the Political Party, are, as the Electoral Code in force for the year 2010 indicates, a valid means of payment for all legal purposes, as ratified by the jurisprudence of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Reason for which the corresponding action was to deliver them to those who had provided goods or services to the Partido Acción Ciudadana and thus liquidate them as expenses. The foregoing does not occur for the simple reason that there was never any interest in paying them. The excuse given by STERLING ARAYA, in the sense that he did it to avoid eventual harm to third parties in good faith who might receive them, as he alleged had occurred in previous elections, is not acceptable. The truth is that, by law, the contractors were the only valid holders, since they had been ‘paid with them’. There was not a single document supporting the supposed instantaneous donation of the certificates to the party, or the request for the party at its headquarters to be the guardians of the Certificates. It is interesting, to verify the deception of the defendants, that the Type A Certificates and Type B Certificates provided to companies or media outlets, were indeed delivered, making clear, through the diverse treatment, their intentions diverse from those indicated in the literal text of this document. If the contractors intended to donate said amount to the Party once paid, the respective procedure for private financing of parties, in its donation modality, should have been followed. Which is never done. This is because, in the ideation of this criminal structure, it was never thought to give them content, but rather to serve to artificially increase expenses and thus have access to 100% of the political debt to which the Partido Acción Ciudadana was entitled at that time due to the abrupt change in its bylaws that modified the cap from 50% to 100% of the state contribution to be received, and since this occurs after the elections, given the absence of real expenses by the political group P.A.C., simulated contracts for special services were resorted to. Thus, the simulated delivery of the B certificates was a suitable ruse to lead the Costa Rican electoral entity into error, since, applying the principle of trust that governs electoral matters and based on the literal wording of the documents presented, which had the corresponding signatures, among them those of the co-defendant STERLING ARAYA and Mrs. Margarita Bolaños, they legally accredited a payment that was never made, never charged by the party's militants, and which therefore should never have been accounted for as such. It is important to highlight, as stated, that the certificates, despite their nature, never left the central offices of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, by a direct disposition of the co-defendant STERLING ARAYA. With one exception out of the 263 contracts presented in this case, these B Certificates were never delivered, which clearly establishes that the defendants BOLAÑOS MURILLO and STERLING ARAYA never wanted to give them the legal value they have by law. So the reasons given by STERLING ARAYA for their non-delivery are highly contradictory with the processing given to the A certificates and even the B certificates given to companies or media outlets, diverse treatment that confirms that these formed part of an elaborate ruse” (cf. folios 3804-3805). The trial court thus captures how all these contracts were instrumentalized and processed similarly because their sole purpose was to inflate expenses to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Positions, activities, obligations, and amounts were established for the party, without any objective parameter, but with absolute lightness, in an arbitrary and capricious manner, which reveals nothing other than the design to make improper charges to the State. This Chamber shares the view that, unlike the Series A and Series B certificates delivered to important creditors of the party, those of the Series B referring to the special services contracts remained in the possession of the defendant Sterling Araya, even though he issued the corresponding receipts for the delivery of bonds, demonstrating that from its genesis, there was never any intention for them to be even remotely paid, with a different treatment being given from the norm, which unequivocally indicates that their reason for being was indeed to inflate the expense item of the PAC. Certainly, had the Series B certificates been delivered to the supposed beneficiaries, any intention of collection for the service providers appearing in the contracts would have been rendered nugatory, without the explanation given by Mr. Maynor, that they were not delivered so they would not be subsequently transferred as they had been issued to bearer, being acceptable, since according to what Margarita Bolaños Arquín asserted, the television company Repretel and several local radio stations and individuals who gave cash to the party were paid with Series B certificates, which were indeed physically delivered to them. The fact that the witnesses María Yenory Gutiérrez Briezuela and Leonel Sequeira indicated that the signing of the receipts by the defendant Sterling was in compliance with an administrative obligation as National Treasurer, does not disconnect him from the artifice and the framework set up to defraud the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, but rather links with the other actions deployed, aimed at making an illegitimate and improper charge. The ruling also notes that according to what the witnesses stated at trial, the PAC's finances were extremely precarious for the 2010 elections and there were still accumulated debts from the previous campaign. As Treasurer of the party, Mr. Maynor was obviously concerned about not being able to cover the sums provided by the banks and the large creditors who had been paid with Series A certificates. The judgment sets forth, in a technical and adequate manner, that before the 2006-2010 electoral campaign, the amount of the state contribution for each party was 100% for its electoral and campaign expenses. It was starting in 2009, that in application of the text of Article 52 of the Electoral Code, political parties were required to allocate in their bylaws, in precise distribution, a percentage of the state contribution for the reserve for training and political organization expenses in non-electoral times. The foregoing under the spirit of promoting parties as permanent entities, a reflection of Costa Rican democracy, and not mere electoral machines hunting for votes in the search to win elections. Within the Partido Acción Ciudadana, there was a rule of austerity that was contained in Article 53 of the Bylaws of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the sense that the party group would never charge more than 0.08% of the gross domestic product. It was also provided that the percentage destined for the reserve item for training and political organization would be 20% charged to the state contribution. This was a rule that economically limited the PAC and worried Maynor Sterling Araya, becoming the main driver for a reform of the bylaws to be able to access the full amount of the state support. There is no doubt about this, no matter how much his defenders argue that his work as National Treasurer was ad honorem, that he did not regularly stay in the treasury premises, but appeared solely and exclusively to sign documents. The judges show Mr. Maynor's concern for the PAC's finances in the 2010 electoral contest, noting that he, in his capacity as PAC treasurer, together with the treasurers of other political groups (Partido Movimiento Libertario and Partido Liberación Nacional), requested the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones on May 7, 2009, a reconsideration of the situation, arguing that it would imply a “technical financial closure” of the parties entitled to political debt, since the indicated deduction would result in the absolute impossibility of paying monetary obligations or commitments (bonds) already acquired, issued, or contracted, placing them in a financial “crossroads,” because they would have to tell many people or entities that they did not recover their investment, aggravating the lack of credibility in political organizations and generating very strong distrust towards the financial system of political parties (see folio 3596). The Court responded to the defendant and his counterparts that the part of the state contribution to be allocated to training and organization was not optional but a duty. Faced with the warning that they would only be receiving 80% of the total amount (subject to the approval of expenses), the ruling describes how the defendant schemed a plan to economically satisfy the investors in the electoral campaign, consisting of “the simulation of a large quantity of contracts for special services supposedly paid with Series B state contribution assignment certificates, which were presented as expenses supposedly incurred by the Partido Acción Ciudadana before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. For this, the Partido Acción Ciudadana, in the person of the defendants, illegally assigned an economic value to the ad honorem, free, and voluntary work that their collaborators had been developing or had already developed during the presidential campaign, and as is obvious and according to the words of witness Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González from the Department of Financing of Political Parties, a free service cannot constitute an effective expense” (cf. folio 3597). The former presidential candidate and founder of the PAC himself, Ottón Solís Fallas, stated that Sterling Araya was one of the promoters of the change to the bylaws, who even deceived him, because Solís Fallas said that at some point he spoke with Sterling to dissuade him from promoting that reform to the bylaws; however, far from adhering to the party's principles, he continued to promote its approval. On May 16, 2010, in San Pedro de Montes de Oca, specifically in the Cooperative Building located behind Mall San Pedro, the national assembly members of the PAC held National Assembly No. 17, the minutes of which record that on that day the said statutory reform established in Articles 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56 was passed. In Article four of the minutes, it is reported that Mrs. Elizabeth Fonseca, President of the National Executive Committee, proceeded to read a note that Maynor Sterling Araya had left, as he was outside the country on that date, for it to be read to the National Assembly of the PAC. The minutes state the following: "...I proceed to read, as I told you yesterday, the letter that Mr. Maynor Sterling left us. Mr. Maynor says: ...I will not be in Costa Rica from May 14 to 29 of this year .... By virtue of the fact that it will not be possible for me to be present at the National Assembly on May 15 ..., I find it necessary to set forth to you by this means the reasons why I believe it is necessary for our Partido Acción Ciudadana to try to collect the entirety of the political debt according to the Electoral Code... Hence the importance of making this reform and registering it before we present the expense liquidation to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones for the collection of the state contribution in the month of June. For all the above, I respectfully ask you to give your support to the following initiative and vote in favor of it... if any of you wish to know more about this matter, you can call me by phone or write to me by email and I will try to deepen my reasoning a little more, or if you deem it appropriate we can coordinate a meeting..." (cf. main case file volume I, folios 413 to 415). The interest shown by the defendant in getting the reform to the bylaws approved before the filing date of the final expense liquidation before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, was intended to ensure that all those simulated expenses included therein would ultimately be recognized by the Department of Financing of Political Parties and would contribute to giving economic content to the Series A certificates.

The appellants attempt to refute those reasons by arguing that Mr. Maynor even served as treasurer without receiving any remuneration; however, in the course of his management, he made it clear that the approval of the amendment to the bylaws was achieved thanks to his initiative, highlighting his merits as the savior of the party's finances, when he reported: <i>"I wish to highlight the approval by the National Assembly, at the request of the National Treasury, of the collection of the entirety of the political debt (sic), a historic decision that will undoubtedly result in more economic resources to strengthen our party, hence the excellent economic capacity in which the PAC (sic) remains after the collection of that money (sic), as shown below…" </i>(see National Treasury Report dated February 8, 2011, folios 305 to 315). A reform of this nature, which Sterling proclaimed as “urgent,” was necessary so that his criminal plan to assign an economic value to the volunteer work that the party's followers had been carrying out would bear fruit and more money from the state contribution would be obtained. As indicated, in his note he warned, singularly, in the first person and with deep vehemence, that it was urgent to approve that reform and register it before submitting the expense liquidation (liquidación de gastos) to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), a liquidation in which the 263 simulated contracts for special services were included. Far from being a disinterested recommendation, Sterling Artaya pressured the National Assembly to amend the bylaws and thus achieve his fraudulent objective. Whether out of dedication and devotion to the party, or to appear as its redeemer, since he always wanted to project a good image and credibility in economic matters, Mr. Maynor not only divorced himself from the ethical ideals proclaimed by the group he defended, but also violated the legality framework. Thus, after an analysis of the derivative process carried out by the judges, it is possible to determine that the errors pointed out by the challengers are non-existent and that the judgment is based on an adequate assessment of the direct and circumstantial evidence, an exercise that was carried out in an objective, joint, comprehensive, concatenated, and harmonious manner with all the evidentiary elements that were submitted to the adversarial process. <b>B) </b>In the <b>fifth ground</b> of their appeal, they allege insufficient reasoning due to the lack of accreditation of the objective element of the criminal offense: pecuniary damage (daño patrimonial). They claim that the court concluded without foundation on the existence of a pecuniary injury against the State and consequently an economic benefit in favor of the holders of political debt assignment certificates (certificados de cesión de deuda política) series A; additionally, that the PAC benefited financially from the alleged fraud (estafa) perpetrated against public funds. They assert that the series B certificates were not redeemed for money, hence the Costa Rican State made no disbursement as a result of the issuance of said payment instruments, and this was established in the resolution of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal No. 7235-E10-2010 of 12:45 p.m. on December 3, 2010, according to which the political debt assignment certificates, series B, did not attain any economic value. This must be contrasted with the reality of the payments approved and made effective by the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda), from which it is obtained that only the equivalent of 98.72% of the total value of the political debt assignment certificates, series A, was paid, such that the series B certificates did not attain any economic value. They question the conclusions of the ruling, in the sense that according to the judges the economic injury materialized because the contracts for special services, upon being included in the liquidation of political debt expenses by the PAC, inflated the amount to which that political group was entitled and more money was paid than was owed to the holders of series A certificates, thereby procuring an unlawful pecuniary benefit to private third parties who sold goods and services to the PAC and, in favor of the political party itself, which obtained a higher amount of political debt. They consider that the judgment is remiss in specifying exactly which person and what person received an unlawful pecuniary benefit (beneficio patrimonial antijurídico), it not being appropriate in criminal law to make a general allusion that the holders of series A certificates received it. It is also devoid of reasoning as to the legal reason that prevailed to determine that the amount of money paid to the holders of series A certificates did not correspond to a real payment since each of the expenses that the PAC paid to its different suppliers was effectively made by means of the A and B certificates, with the party making good payment, whether or not those certificates were redeemed, and the PAC received no cash payment. For the appellants, it was impossible to manipulate the amount of the political debt because the amount each party would receive was unknown, under the provisions of Article 90 of the Electoral Code regarding the determination of the distribution of the state contribution to political parties. They reject the review procedure of the liquidations submitted by the parties that the witnesses Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González, head of the Department of Financing of Political Parties and legal advisor of the same department respectively, detailed in their statements, that is, that their examination is limited to verifying compliance with formal requirements, which is done randomly and partially, without selecting them by means of payment or assignment certificates, up to an amount equivalent to the maximum that the political party could access, which has been done by custom. They affirm that this contravenes the principle of legality since the Electoral Code approved as of September 2009 does not have a rule determining the procedure to be followed for the documentary review of the liquidations; however, said normative body in Article 115 indicates, in reference to the political debt assignment certificates, that there is an order of priority at the time of their payment, from which it is inferred that when liquidating expenses it must be done in serial order starting with A, and so on, without the lack of complete documentary reviews being justified on the grounds that there is not enough time for it and it would delay the payment of liquidations to political parties. The appellants argue that if the officials of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal had done their job well and fulfilled their obligation to review the documents pertaining to each account that was settled, it would be known whether all the accounts paid with series A certificates should be redeemed or if some were poorly substantiated and payment was not appropriate. In reality, no economic injury (perjuicio económico) to the public treasury occurred, since it could not be proven that the money paid to the holders of series A certificates was improper or unjustified. In the <b>sixth ground</b> of their appeal, the technical defense maintains the existence of illegitimate reasoning due to violation of the rules of sound criticism in that the judges concluded that if the holders of series B certificates, signatories of contracts for special services, made a donation to the PAC, the defendant Sterling Araya should have reported it to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. They state that the series B certificates never had economic substance, they were born as an expectation of being redeemed for money, and even before submitting the corresponding liquidation, it was known that it was impossible to collect them. Thus, they were left at the PAC offices voluntarily by the persons who signed the contracts for special services, who could withdraw them or leave them in custody; a decision was not demanded of them. Under these conditions, it cannot be established that there was a donation that had to be reported by the treasurer of the PAC.<b> </b>In the <b>seventh ground</b> of their appeal, they claim a serious error in the ruling by grounding it contradictorily in that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal had no responsibility in verifying the expenses liquidated by the PAC, needing only to do a verification, whether random or partial, and attributing all responsibility to the party itself. The foregoing, making an improper interpretation of the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 2011-08989 of July 6, 2011, and No. 2013-015343, in which it is indicated as the exclusive function or competence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal the verification of the expenses reported by the political parties.<b> The fifth, sixth, and seventh grounds are resolved jointly as they are intimately linked, and the appellants not being right, they are rejected. </b>The ruling broadly and exhaustively develops the reasons why, in the specific case, the accused Sterling Araya incurred in the crime of fraud (estafa) against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The defenders' complaints express nothing more than their mere disagreement with the way the Court decided to approach, analyze, and resolve the issue submitted for its consideration, as it is adverse to the interests of their client, without providing any element that would allow varying the conclusions reached by the judges. They argue the non-demonstration of the pecuniary damage (daño patrimonial), a configurative element of the criminal offense of fraud (estafa), resorting to the repetitive argument that the series B certificates were not redeemed, that the state contribution only sufficed to pay 98.72% of the total value of the political debt assignment certificates series A, and that, consequently, the Costa Rican State made no disbursement for the issuance of such payment instruments. Regarding the criticized aspects, the <i>a quo </i>describes the <i>modus operandi </i>of the fraud (estafa) as follows: it involved the massive simulation of contracts for special services that were included as expenses against the issuance of series B assignment certificates, before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in the final expense liquidation (liquidación final de gastos) that the accused Maynor Sterling signed and delivered to the Department of Financing of Political Parties, which were approved and improperly gave economic value to the state contribution assignment certificates of series A. It is not as the appellants argue, that if in the resolution of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal No. 7235-E10-2010 of 12:45 p.m. on December 3, 2010, that entity approved electoral expenses generated by the PAC amounting to the sum of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) that should be charged to the state contribution right, resulting that the latter was equivalent to ¢2,992,864,242.92 (two billion nine hundred ninety-two million eight hundred sixty-four thousand two hundred forty-two colones and ninety-two céntimos) - an amount that was not even enough to cover the entirety of the A bonds -, therefore there is no injury to the State or unlawful pecuniary benefit. Note that the sum of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) was constituted, in part, by the sum of ¢516,000,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million colones, corresponding to expenses for the 263 simulated special services contracts, which were approved by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and paid with a part of the series B of the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution. Not in vain, some witnesses like Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, upon hearing the proposal of the co-defendant Bolaños Murillo to sign the documents, considered that it was a matter of <i>“a small trick” (una pequeña trampa) </i>or a<i> “small deception” (pequeño engaño) </i>towards the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. This perception and the lightness with which this “<i>little trick” (trampita)</i> was assumed by PAC militants, convinced that they were helping the party, was actually the structuring that Sterling devised to defraud the State. The Court points out that on this aspect, the witness Ronald Chacón Badilla was extremely clear and forceful in explaining how the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution acquire economic value, differently from what the appellants try to make believe happened. According to the witness, all the expenses that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal approves for a political party become part of a single monetary mass, regardless of the means of payment used by the political party to pay them, be it cash, check, transfer, state contribution assignment certificates of series A, B, or C, and once that monetary mass is established, the principle of priority of the state contribution assignment certificates of Article 115 of the Electoral Code is complied with. For the Court, the economic injury (perjuicio económico) was more than clarified with the example that the witness provided in his statement, asking to imagine that the approved expenses are represented by drops of water of different colors for each means of payment. Thus, for example, the expenses approved and paid with cash will be represented by yellow drops, the expenses approved and paid with checks will be represented by blue drops, the expenses approved and paid by bank transfer will be represented by orange drops, the expenses approved and paid with state contribution assignment certificates of series A will be represented by green drops, and the expenses approved and paid with state contribution assignment certificates of series B will be represented by red drops. All those colored water drops are poured into a water bottle with a ceiling that is the amount of the state contribution that was approved for that political party as an expectation of right, but upon entering that bottle of water, absolutely all the drops acquire the transparent color of the water that may -or may not- reach the ceiling of the amount approved for the state contribution. Once that monetary mass is established, that is when economic value begins to be given to the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution, taking into account that for payment, the first issuance shall have preference over the second and so on until the last issuance. The witness indicated that this means that with that monetary mass, economic value will first be given to the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution of series A, then to the assignment of rights certificates of series B, and so on, this being the principle of "order of priority" of the certificates of assignment of rights to the state contribution, with legal basis in Article 115 of the Electoral Code in force since 2007. The complainants allege that the Electoral Code does not have a rule indicating the procedure for the documentary review of the liquidations, objecting to what was said by the witnesses Ronald Chacón Badilla and Rui López González that the examination by the Department of Financing of Political Parties is limited to verifying formal requirements, randomly and partially, without separating them by means of payment or assignment certificates, arguing that in their judgment they should fulfill their obligation to review each expense that was presented. Regarding this issue, it is important to mention -as stated in the appealed judgment- that the presidential electoral process of 2010 was developed under the legal framework defined in the current Electoral Code, Law No. 8765 published in Supplement No. 37 to the Gazette No. 171 of September 2, 2009, and at the regulatory level, Decree No. 17-2009 was made official, published in La Gaceta No. 210 of October 29, 2009. Prior to September 2, 2009, Law No. 1536 of December 10, 1952, and its amendments, established a liquidation review model that was in charge of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), a supervisory body on which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal relied, for the purpose of ruling on the amount of the state contribution that would correspond to each political party based on the strength of the votes and the expense verification exercise. With the current Electoral Code, the expense review process passed into the hands of the Department of Financing of Political Parties of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, whose direction is held by the witness Ronald Chacón Badilla, who is an authorized public accountant and has a master's degree in public accounting. He is a person with extensive experience in the area of reviewing the liquidation (liquidación) of political party expenses, because before doing so and being the head for six years of the Department of Financing of Political Parties of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, he performed his duties at the Comptroller General of the Republic for many years where he had the opportunity to carry out the reviews of the 1998-2002, 2002-2006 processes, as he recounted in the debate. The witness also reported that when the liquidation (liquidación) review process passed into the hands of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, he did not transfer alone, but was accompanied by personnel also with extensive experience in electoral matters, such as the lawyer Alejandra Peraza Retana and Messrs. Esteban Sánchez, a person who had worked at the Comptroller General of the Republic in an expense review process, Ms. Verónica Portocarrero, who had also already worked on a process of reviewing expense liquidations (liquidaciones de gastos), and the licensed Guiselle Valverde Calderón with extensive experience, of more than twenty years at the Comptroller General of the Republic. From the foregoing, the trial court concluded that the political party expense liquidation (liquidación de gastos) review process carried out by the Department of Financing of Political Parties of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is in the hands of persons with long experience and knowledge in the subject in which they acted, in compliance with the provisions of the electoral regulations, specifically with the provisions of Article 115 of the Electoral Code. While it is true that during the 2006-2010 campaign there were some changes in electoral matters, according to what was indicated by the witnesses from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the National Treasury of the Citizen Action Party, among them Leonel Sequeira, those changes were not significant and particularly with regard to the expense liquidation (liquidación de los gastos) review process, the procedure was the same one that had been carried out at the Comptroller General of the Republic. In this regard, Mr. Ronald Chacón stated: <i>"...when the function of reviewing expense liquidations (liquidaciones de gastos) was transferred to the tribunal starting in 2009, what it practically does is mount itself on the work scheme that the Comptroller General of the Republic had, being that it was -as the governing body of superior oversight and having had this task for many years-, the expert in the matter…" </i>. Now, regarding the reproach that the lack of documentary reviews by the officials of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is not justified, arguing lack of time and that it would delay the liquidations (liquidaciones), the questioning is unsustainable and seeks to transfer the responsibility of each political party to be truthful in the liquidation of expenses (liquidación de gastos) to the electoral body and to act in strict adherence to the law and the principle of good faith. According to Article 96 of the Political Constitution, for a political party to be eligible for state financing of the electoral expenses incurred during the campaign, the political group must meet two requirements: i) achieve at least 4% of the validly cast votes at the national or provincial level, if it is only registered at that level, or at least one deputy; and ii) it must verify its expenses before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. As the Court correctly derived from the reading of constitutional numeral 96, it is inferred from it that the political party has the obligation to verify its expenses before the TSE -principle of expense verification-, from which the duty of the political group to duly demonstrate its expenses and verify their effective existence is inferred. In this regard, the judges state: <i>“Precisely, that constitutional principle is developed in Section IV of Title VI of the Electoral Code, called 'Control and Liquidation' (Control y Liquidación) and 'Economic Regime of Political Parties' (Régimen Económico de los Partidos Políticos), respectively. Thus, numeral 104 of the Electoral Code provides that the electoral expense liquidation (liquidación de gastos electorales), duly certified by an authorized public accountant, is the means by which political parties verify before the TSE the expenses they have incurred. The certification issued by the authorized public accountant is made after the latter has verified, audited, and evaluated that all redeemable expenses with state contribution conform to the accounting and legal parameters so required, according to Article 106 ibidem. Numeral 103 of that same normative body indicates that for the evaluation and subsequent payment of the expenses recognized through the accounting control of the liquidations (liquidaciones) submitted by political parties, the TSE shall have the power to systematize the procedures that best safeguard the parameters of the expenses subject to liquidation (liquidación); in that sense, it may conduct random reviews among parties or among certain items of the expenses included in the liquidations (liquidaciones) to verify them. The legal regulations do not establish, as the defense intends, that it is the TSE that must confirm the material veracity of the liquidated expense, but rather that it is the political groups that have such an obligation through the electoral expense liquidation (liquidación de gastos electorales). In that sense, Article 42 of the Regulation on Financing of Political Parties issued by the TSE is categorical in that aspect by providing that it is the responsibility of the political parties to duly demonstrate their expenses and only they shall be responsible for verifying their effective existence. On the other hand, the authorized public accountant, as has been stated, makes an accounting and legal verification, audit, and evaluation of the expenses liquidated by the political party. The electoral legislation provides that this public accountant, as the witness Julio Aguilar Silesky asserted, performs a documentary review of the expenses liquidated by the political party, but does not have the obligation to verify whether the service took place in reality or not, since that is a duty of the political group that liquidates the expense. Note that the law provides that the authorized public accountant performs an analysis of whether the expenses liquidated by the political party conform to the required accounting and legal parameters. That is, from an accounting point of view it would be the examination of the procedure used to maintain accuracy and truthfulness in transactions and in their accounting, which does not imply the verification of whether the contracted work was given or not, but the verification that it was duly recorded in the respective accounts and accounting books that allows determining the real and truthful financial state of the PAC, in this case. And the legal parameter would be framed in the expense being justifiable under the terms of Article 94 of the Electoral Code. Likewise, the Electoral Code imposed on the TSE the power to systematize the procedures that best safeguard the parameters of the expenses subject to liquidation (liquidación) and to make random reviews among certain items of the expenses included in the liquidations (liquidaciones) to verify them. The power granted by law to the TSE is developed in numeral 71 of the Regulation on Financing of Political Parties, according to which the Department of Financing of Political Parties shall proceed to evaluate the electoral expense liquidation (liquidación de gastos electorales) based on the expense certification of the Authorized Public Accountant, a document on which it shall make random reviews, according to the sample selected from among certain items of the expenses included in the liquidations (liquidaciones) and shall issue the corresponding reports to the Directorate of Electoral Registry and Financing of Political Parties, a body that submits the pertinent recommendations to the TSE. This Court has described the constitutional, legal, and regulatory norms that empower the TSE to verify the expenses liquidated by political parties, an occasion on which a random review is made, based on a sample, of the expenses noted in the respective liquidation (liquidación)” </i>(cf. folios 3844-3845, sic) <i>.</i> In this way, the procedure for reviewing the expense liquidations (liquidaciones de los gastos) submitted by the political parties was legal since it is protected by the legal norms specified in the ruling and which the judges amply analyzed. In no way did the <i>a quo </i>give a different reading to what the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) sets forth in the cited ruling (voto) No. 8989-2011, as well as in No. 13-015343 cited by the challengers in their appeal, without the appellants stating what the “<i>improper interpretation”</i> they consider occurred, is. Contrary to what is estimated by the technical defense, the constitutional chamber has indicated that the verification of political party expenses, in order to access the state contribution, is an electoral competence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and forms part of the electoral function, as ordered by Article 96.4 of the Political Constitution. The Costa Rican legal system conceptualizes the state contribution as a reimbursement of electoral expenses and those related to party organization and training, which is only accessed, by constitutional mandate, after the political groups have verified them before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. For these purposes, the parties must submit the respective liquidations (liquidaciones) within the legal deadlines and counting on the endorsement of an authorized public accountant. To these liquidations (liquidaciones) must be attached the documents supporting the liquidated expenses, a certification issued by the same accountant on such expenses and, in addition, a report from him on the results of the study supporting that certification and on the pertinent recommendations for internal control. That documentation constitutes the fundamental basis for the subsequent review carried out by the Department of Financing of Political Parties, which will only authorize the reimbursement of those expenditures that are legally justifiable and effectively demonstrated and, of course, always bearing in mind the maximum ceiling to which each political group is entitled according to the electoral results. It is also enabled to verify the veracity of the content of the financial statements, by the means and procedures of analysis and investigation it deems appropriate. It is opportune to cite what was indicated by the Comptroller General Marta Eugenia Acosta Zúñiga in her report to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional):<i> “Now, a point of special relevance that is of interest to note, is the fact that the challenged norms do not entrust –in the strict sense– the Supreme Electoral Tribunal with the oversight of the public resources that finance the political parties' expenses. Rather than that, what they confer on it is –simply– the power to carry out the accounting review of the payment vouchers submitted by the political parties.

(…) As can be seen, the legislation prior to the current Electoral Code placed the Contraloría General de la República in a sort of subordinate position to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, assigning it the role of an accounting reviewer of expenditures, documents, and invoices, a function that was clearly not in accordance with the functional scope of competencies of the oversight body defined by the Constitución Política. As is evident, this role that prior legislation assigned to the Contraloría General, as an auxiliary accounting reviewer of vouchers and invoices for political party expenses, whose results were documented in a report sent to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones—which was responsible for adopting a final decision on the matter—was the result of a model that did not take into account the natural function of the Contraloría General, defined by the Constitución Política as a superior control body responsible for the vigilance of the Hacienda Pública. In addition to the foregoing, this fragmentation of the analysis of the economic activity of political parties was accentuated by the fact that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones did not have direct participation in verifying the expenditure related to the state contribution to political parties, but did with respect to their income, which prevented the existence of a control point to accurately determine the correspondence between the income and expenses of the different political groups and the complete financing of electoral campaigns, all to the detriment of the principles of publicity and transparency. Due to the absence of basic elements that allowed for the development of an integrated, agile, timely, and effective process of control over the income and expenses of political parties by a single agency, society was deprived of control points that would warn of potential inflows of funds contrary to the legal framework and that could compromise the autonomy of political parties, thus distorting the essential reason for the state contribution, in its protective function of the independence of political parties as protagonists of the democratic system. Faced with this entire panorama, the current Electoral Code brought about a change in the prevailing model, defined in its correct perspective and scope the functions of the actors involved in the process, eliminated the fragmented control that had persisted until then, opted for integrated control concentrated in the hands of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and renewed and strengthened the powers of that Tribunal—which it already held under the model existing until then—on a matter directly linked to electoral matters” (cfr. Sala Constitucional, Voto N.º 15343-2013). The citation is illustrative of what the trial court correctly extracted from a comprehensive reading of the decision of the Sala Constitucional. That is, that the constitutional and legal mandate of the TSE is the accounting review of the expenses liquidated by political parties, which implies a documentary examination of these, excluding the obligation to verify the reality of the contract underlying the document. The appellants start from a biased premise by stating that the judgment found, without grounds, that the holders of Series A assignment certificates received a payment that did not correspond, even questioning that the judges did not indicate who received an unlawful patrimonial benefit. It is not that the beneficiaries of the A bonds appeared to receive a payment from the state contribution for a service that was not performed, which seems to be the meaning the complainants want to give, but rather that if the expense liquidation had not been inflated with the simulated contracts for special services, it would not have been enough to cover what ultimately was paid to creditors with Series A bonds. That is, the payment of 98.72% of the total value of the series A political debt assignment certificates would not have been such, but rather a lower percentage, hence there existed an unlawful patrimonial benefit. On the other hand, the defense argues that the accused had no possibility of manipulating the political debt as the amount each party would receive was unknown; however, this is incorrect since on March 26, 2010, by resolution Nº 2124-E10-2010 at 11:00 a.m., the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in view of the results of the elections held on February 07, 2010, determined that the PAC, based on the votes obtained therein, could receive a maximum sum of 3,741,080,303.65 (three billion seven hundred forty-one million eighty thousand three hundred three colones and sixty-five céntimos), as a state contribution for financing expenses generated in the electoral process. Precisely this influences the accused Sterling Araya to rush to promote the reform of the PAC statutes in May 2010 and to deploy the setup with the simulated special services contracts, whose payment he backed with series B bonds that he never delivered to the service providers, and for him to submit, on June 16, 2016, within the campaign expense liquidation, the amount of ¢2,732,785,956.27 (two billion seven hundred thirty-two million seven hundred eighty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six colones and twenty-seven céntimos) for PAC electoral expenses, approved by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones on December 03, 2010, through resolution Nº7235-E10-2010. Finally, the appellants are also not correct in objecting that for the Tribunal, the subscribers of the special services contracts and holders of the series B assignment certificates made a donation to the PAC that the accused should have reported, since they never had economic support and from the beginning it was known that it would be impossible to collect them, to the point that they remained in his office. It is reiterated that the objective set by the indicted Sterling Araya was to feed the expense liquidation with simulated "special services" contracts that served the function of inflating the amount of the state contribution for the PAC, and without which, the outlay would have been less and consequently, the coverage of the series A assignment certificates would have been diminished. Mr. Maynor was interested in ensuring that the major campaign financiers who had lent money to the PAC were paid, that is, those who had been paid with A bonds and a few with B bonds (some media outlets and individuals who had lent cash), not the collaborators who voluntarily gave their work without expecting any financial reward. The latter were useful for representing fictitious expenses to charge to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, convincing the activists to sign contracts where a value or recognition in monetary terms was given to their work, only to reassure them with the option that if any money was obtained they could keep it, or they could donate it to the party. The judges, based on the statements of the witnesses and the accused himself, simply point out that if the work was voluntary and unpaid, then it was free, consequently, it was not an expense that could be liquidated, but rather a contribution that the indicted Sterling should have reported to the Tribunal. C) In the eighth ground of their appeal, the defense counsels for the accused claim the possibility of applying an alternative penalty to prison, based on his subjective conditions and the quantum of the penalty set at six years of imprisonment, alluding to Law No. 9271, "Mecanismos electrónicos de seguimiento en materia penal". They criticize that the court carried out a contradictory reasoning because, although the judges admitted that the indicted Sterling Araya meets all the requirements for electronic monitoring to be applied, they dismissed that possibility by considering that the Ministerio de Justicia has not implemented electronic tracking due to a lack of resources or as a consequence of the overly complex contracting system. They state that the law contains no transitional provision, being immediately applicable since its entry into force. A burden that does not belong to him cannot be attributed to the convict, due to delay and obstacles in bureaucratic procedures. Finally, the same court pointed out that in the case of their client, his admission to prison will cause more harm than benefit, both to him and to society. This ground is reserved to be heard together with the appeal filed by the representatives of the Ministerio Público. The fiscal inspector filed an appeal against the judgment, solely regarding the penalty imposed on the accused Sterling Araya, since having requested eight years of imprisonment, the Trial Court set it at six. Given that one of the requirements for the application of electronic monitoring is that the penalty does not exceed six years of imprisonment, and there being a challenge to the imposed sanction and a request for a rehearing on that point, the resolution of this ground is reserved to be heard jointly with the appeal of the Ministerio Público. D) In the ninth ground of their appeal, they allege the nonexistence of extra-contractual civil liability, as material authorship had not been proven with certainty. The court started from a false and illegitimate premise to declare the indicted and civil defendant Sterling Araya civilly liable and to jointly and severally sentence him to pay three hundred fifty-two million seven hundred thousand colones, which is that he devised a plan to cause the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to fall into error and thus obtain an unlawful patrimonial benefit for the PAC and for the holders of the series A state contribution rights assignment certificates. The claim is untenable. In the present case, the Tribunal analyzed the factual and legal reasons that accredited the acts that produced the criminal conduct of fraud and the application of the criterion of subjective civil liability to ground that item, with that fraudulent act of the civil defendant Sterling Araya, in association with the co-civil defendant Bolaños Murillo, being what caused a patrimonial harm to the State. In this regard, it must be noted that the recognition of reparation for patrimonial damage was derived from the concept of subjective civil liability, which has been understood from the doctrine of Loutayf and Costas as that which: “…takes place when the obligation to compensate for damages is based on the voluntary act of the subject who has acted with fault in a broad sense (encompassing intent and negligence), and …The requirements for subjective liability are: a) that it is an unlawful act, that is, one that transgresses the legal system…b) that there is moral imputability of the act to its author, that is, that it is a voluntary act (sic)….c) that there is fault or intent on the part of the author of the act…d) that there is damage caused by the unlawful act…and e) that a causal relationship can be established between the unlawful act and the damage…” (La Acción Civil en Sede Penal, Astrea, Buenos Aires, 2002, pp 756-757)…(see. Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Voto 2012-001806, at 09:48 a.m. on December 05, 2012. See in the same sense 2012-01687, at 11:03 a.m. on November 16, 2012) and whose requirements the a quo, in the sub iúdice, determined as existent, since subjective civil liability, derived from numerals 41 of the Constitución Política and 1045 of the Código Civil, was evidently proven, by determining not only the fraudulent action of the co-civil defendant Sterling Araya, but also the existing causal relationship and the harm or detriment to the economic patrimony suffered by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. This is in accordance with what the judgment found as proven, by the indicted entering as PAC expenses at least 179 simulated contracts for "special services" in the final liquidation that led to the approval of more money from the state contribution in favor of the holders of the series A assignment certificates. The judgment is extensive in explaining, regarding civil matters, the obligation to indemnify of the co-civil defendant Sterling Araya, why the claims requested were (partially) accepted, and the evidence on which the granted amounts were based, to finally establish the economic damage caused to the State by the criminal act of Mr. Maynor. Consequently, the ninth ground of the appeal is dismissed.

III.- Appeal of prosecutors Alexander Valverde Peña and Greysa Barrientos Núñez. As the sole ground of their appeal, they express their disagreement with the determination of the penalty. They state that for the imposition of the sanction on the accused Maynor Sterling Araya, the court considered the following aspects: i) the patrimonial damage that reached ¢352,700,000.00, against the state contribution, being monies that the Costa Rican State invests every four years to develop democratic processes in the country, which come from taxes paid by all the inhabitants of the national territory; ii) the complex criminal scheme orchestrated by the accused, in which the preparation of hundreds of false documents was required, carefully signed to meet the requirements demanded by electoral regulations to approve expenses, as well as the deception of numerous people to sign the documentation and, for this purpose, the devising of issuing and using series B rights assignment certificates by promoting a change in the statute of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (hereinafter PAC) which, prior to the 2010 electoral process, could only receive 50% of the state contribution to which it was entitled, in order to thus collect the entirety of the political debt; iii) the actions of the accused affected political pluralism and the equality that must exist among political parties; iv) his actions violated the principles relating to the economic regime of political parties, which are: transparency, accountability, publicity, honesty, integrity, and legality, and even those of his own party, such as austerity and the party's own financing; v) the determining motives for his criminal conduct, with the indicted acting with the desire to carry out successful management of his position as national treasurer of the party, seeking the highest possible expense liquidation before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, likewise, with the aim of safeguarding the image of the political group, intending for the state contribution to cover most of the rights assignment certificates issued by the PAC, and; v) having taken advantage of his position of power within the political group to carry out the criminal activity, using his accounting, financial, administrative, and legal knowledge. For the appellants, the elements set forth by the court to ground the reproach judgment are accurate. However, they believe that the penalty of six years of imprisonment is insufficient for the degree of reprehensibility of Sterling Araya's conduct, with the proportional and reasonable penalty being the eight years that were requested by the Ministerio Público. They warn that the indicted's conduct subsequent to the events was not assessed, when he met at the party headquarters with some supposed special services contractors, and induced them to believe in the legitimacy of the documentation, with the intention that the facts would not come to light and that the fraud he had fostered in association with Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo against the State would be exposed. They request the annulment of the judgment be decreed, solely as to the setting of the quantum of the imposed penalty, and that a rehearing be ordered. This appeal is heard jointly with the claim contained in the appeal of the defense counsels for the accused Sterling Araya (eighth ground), as they are related, and: the appeal of the Ministerio Público is dismissed; the request for the electronic bracelet is granted. The prosecuting appellants agree with the a quo on the elements considered to ground the reproach judgment regarding the defendant Maynor Sterling Araya. What they do not agree with is the imposition of six years of imprisonment instead of the eight years requested, this being the point on which they base their claim, warning that the Tribunal omitted to assess the conduct of the accused Sterling Araya after the facts, that is, when he met with some of the signatories of the simulated contracts, in attempting to convince them of the legitimacy of the documentation so that the facts would not come to light. Certainly, for the justification of the penalty, the Tribunal indicated a series of circumstances, taking into account various aspects, among them, some quantitative and qualitative aspects of the proven fact, as well as the personal conditions of the indicted, in accordance with numeral 71 of the Código Penal. A selective study of said aspects highlights that the judge took into account the gravity of the facts, as: i) Mr. Maynor was a recognized business administrator, with experience in the Costa Rican market, who enjoyed the trust of leaders and supporters, who used his knowledge to cause a fraud to the detriment of the money of all Costa Ricans destined to invest in the democracy of this country; ii) it was not a conventional fraud, but included an entire scheme to induce the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones into error; iii) the principle of equality with respect to the other groups and political pluralism was violated; iv) the PAC principles of austerity, probity, and transparency were violated, betraying the good faith of the activists; v) the magnitude of the patrimonial damage caused to the State. As for the quality of the determining motives: i) Mr. Maynor sought to cultivate an image of success in his management as National Treasurer of the PAC; ii) his concern was to pay the large and important financial creditors, those who held series A certificates, and some with series B certificates, to ensure future financing for the next electoral campaign, using party collaborators by making them sign simulated contracts for that purpose. It is true that it was not expressly noted that in the meeting held after party activists were called to account by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, the accused Sterling tried to convince them that they had agreed to the reality of what they had signed; however, that is part of what the Tribunal analyzed regarding the damage caused by the implication of the supporters in the making of the contracts, which does not add significantly to what was analyzed. The trial court also considered his personal qualities, indicating that: i) he has maintained a defined life plan for many years, as he is married, with two children and a grandchild, whom he still educates; ii) he is retired from the Universidad de Costa Rica, where he served in his last years as head of accounting, without having a single stain on his professional record; iii) he suffers from diabetes, high blood pressure, and psoriasis, diseases that it is reasonable to consider will worsen over the years, with Mr. Maynor soon becoming an older adult. This Chamber not only observes that there is adequate justification regarding the penalty imposed, but that the quantum of six years of imprisonment is duly justified and responds to the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and legality, and it is not considered that its amount is below the reproach deserved. The penalty is well above the minimum end of the penalty for the crime of fraud, and although the penalty of eight years of imprisonment requested by the penal actor was not imposed, it is considered that the setting of six years of imprisonment is fair, adequate, equitable, and sufficient, without the grievance of the prosecutors being admissible. Regarding the application of house arrest with electronic monitoring as a substitution of the penalty, in accordance with Article 57 bis of the Código Penal, the judges recognized that the accused “meets the objective and subjective requirements: such as that the penalty imposed on him does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment; this matter is being processed under the special procedure for organized crime; it is not a sexual crime nor one where firearms were used; he is a first-time offender; and there are reasonable elements to deduce that the convict does not constitute a danger and will not evade the completion of the penalty (due to his age and his family and domiciliary roots)” (cfr. f. 3822). Despite the foregoing, the judgment evades granting it at that juncture, arguing that “the fact is that the Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia has not yet developed the infrastructure to implement said alternative to prison” (cfr. f. 3822). In other words, the Tribunal assessed that in the subjudice, the requirements, both objective and subjective, for house arrest through electronic monitoring are applicable, only that it did not grant it, solely attending to the lack of implementation, at the time the judgment was issued, of the necessary infrastructure by the Poder Ejecutivo. As is public knowledge, since the beginning of 2017, the Ministerio de Justicia has had the electronic bracelet devices and the suitable platform for controlling said measure. For this reason, this Court of Appeal considers that, the a quo having already weighed the said circumstances, the defense's claim on this point must be granted, without ordering a rehearing (without any annulment, since what was resolved is the basis for the configuration of the objective and subjective requirements for the requested mechanism to proceed), granting house arrest in the modality of electronic monitoring to the indicted Maynor Sterling Araya. The foregoing does not mean that what is ordered is at a single instance, since the trial court had already assessed granting said substitute principal sanction to the accused, only that it considered that material limitations for the implementation of the electronic mechanisms prevented its execution.

IV.- Appeal of attorney Randall Albán Aguirre Mena, criminal prosecutor of the Procuraduría General de la República. A) In the first ground of his appeal, he alleges contradictory intellectual reasoning and erroneous assessment of evidence by rejecting the judgment's finding of economic damage in 84 of the special services contracts. He indicates that when formulating the civil claim, he made an estimate of civil damages for material damage derived from the crime of fraud for the entirety of the 263 special services contracts that were submitted by the PAC to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. The court only granted material damage for 179 contracts under the argument that those were the total number of witnesses brought to the adversarial hearing and that only with the presence of the witnesses could the damage suffered by the State be proven. He considers that the basis for excluding the damage from the 84 contracts is contradictory and cites several extracts from the judgment taken from pages of the judgment numbers 1360, 1361, 1371, 1376 and 1377, 1384, 1479 and 1480, 1524, 1526, 1534 and 1535, 1537, 1538 and 1558, from which it can be seen that the court deduces that the origin of all the contracts was free, that there never existed an intention on the part of the PAC or the accused for said services to be remunerated, and that therefore the appearance of the remaining 84 witnesses was not necessary to conclude that those 84 contracts are in the same circumstances as the 179 for which the existence of material damage was determined. It was not necessary, as the court indicated, to reach such a conclusion, to know the context in which the will of the contracting party was formed at the time of signing the contract. He maintains that the fraudulent origin of the contracts is not proven solely from the will of the service provider, but from the scheme used in the PAC, the documents signed by the service providers, the fact that the bonds backing the payment were not delivered and were in the custody of the party, and the statements of Ronald Chacón and Ruy López, among other evidentiary elements. Based on the principle of evidentiary freedom, it is possible by various means other than strictly listening to the 84 witnesses who did not appear to testify, to deem the existence of the damage and its quantification as proven. The same Trial Court, with the same evidentiary elements analyzed and that resulted in finding proven damage in at least 179 contracts, concluded that the PAC was not in a position to contract paid labor for special services. That the supporters of said political group provided their work out of volunteer spirit and dedication, that there was never an intention to financially recognize their work, that the contracts have similarities in amount, in the type of service provided, and that this is an indicative of the criminal action deployed, aspects that entail the recognition of economic damage, not in 179 contracts, but in the 263 special services contracts. The appellant considers that it is not possible to isolate the documentary evidence from which the Tribunal derived the existence of harm in the 179 contracts, and the same testimonial evidence on which the proven harm was based, to then not consider these same evidentiary elements in the analysis of the remaining 84 contracts, and exclude them solely because the witnesses did not appear at the adversarial hearing. He asserts that the testimonial evidence from the 179 contracts received in the debate was abundant in that the work provided had a free origin, that a charge was never made for it, that the political debt bonds were not delivered to the service providers as they remained in the custody of the PAC, and that for that electoral process the PAC did not have the resources to contract special services. In all these cases, the existence of a fraudulent origin of the contracting carried out was proven, and the remaining 84 contracts are the same contract, with the same amounts of one million eight hundred and two million four hundred, all were collected directly or indirectly by the co-indicted Manuel Antonio Bolaños and were backed by the same documents that appear in the 84 contracts excluded from the patrimonial harm, which were signed by the accused Mainor Sterling. Concluding that because the service provider did not appear to testify, the harm cannot be proven, is to apply a principle of weighed evidence and the principle of evidentiary freedom, and illegitimately exclude the other evidentiary elements incorporated in the debate. Likewise, the documentary evidence, specifically report No.

DFPP-DP-06-2012 of October 2, 2012, on pages 5 to 136 of the main case file, and the statements of Ruy López and Ronald Chacón Badilla support that the injury to the public treasury was for all 263 contracts, the total amount of which reached ¢516,600,000.00. They request that the judgment be annulled only insofar as no financial compensation was granted for the 84 special services contracts that were charged to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, representing the sum of one hundred sixty-three million nine hundred thousand colones, plus the interest they generated, and personal costs on those amounts. <b>The claim is admissible.</b> In this case, the <i>a quo</i> based its decision to uphold the pecuniary damage only regarding 179 of the 263 special services contracts submitted by the civil co-defendant Maynor Sterling Araya, arguing that the contractor's testimony was necessarily required <i>"...to understand the context in which the intent to sign that document was formed, which is lacking in that sense. Therefore, the special contracts whose contracting parties did not testify at trial cannot be assessed within the economic injury caused to the State through the simulation of expenses liquidated by the PAC in the 2010 electoral campaign"</i> (cf. p. 3878). The judges note that although some witnesses affirmed that <i>"everyone"</i> signed, this is a generic and abstract phrase that fails to meet the evidentiary requirements incumbent upon the plaintiff in a civil damages action, thereby violating the principle of orality and immediacy of evidentiary elements. The first error incurred by the trial court is basing its refusal to recognize economic damage, in those cases or contracts where the signatory did not testify in the hearing, thus resorting to a system of legal or fixed-weight evidence regarding testimonial evidence, which has no place in the criminal process, much less the civil one, ignoring the value of the rest of the evidence that was indeed evaluated for indemnification purposes. According to the judges, regarding the 84 contracts for which the signatories did not appear to testify, it cannot be assumed that they provided work free of charge to the PAC; however, contradictorily, when conducting the evidentiary analysis to establish the culpability judgment of the accused, they determined an <i>"astonishing homogeneity"</i> in the preparation and processing of the documents used to charge the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones for expenses related to special services contracts that turned out to be simulated. They concluded that all contracts were adhesion contracts; the same templates and formulas were used in the documents (contract, receipt of money, proof of delivery of series B bonds); the same <i>modus operandi</i> was used for their signing; very similar and disproportionate amounts were set in relation to the functions inserted; the same method was used by the co-defendants to convince party militants to sign them as a kind of financial recognition for voluntary and free services rendered; all Series B assignment certificates through which these works were paid remained at the PAC headquarters. One of the many excerpts is transcribed in which the Court refers to the <i>"structured scheme"</i>, with particular and similar characteristics, in at least 179 of the 263 contracts submitted along with the PAC expense liquidation: <i>"In what was proven, one hundred seventy-nine contracts and receipts were used to, by feigning expenses for the supposed payment of special services, proceed to deceive the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in an orchestrated, systematic, studied manner, acting with a high degree of organization. Note that none of the witnesses who testified in the adversarial proceedings mentioned having charged or received any amount for their service (some said they had, but that they were going to donate it) when in reality it was unpaid work by supporters of the Partido Acción Ciudadana who, moved by the principles touted by the group, freely gave their time, work, and even resources entirely voluntarily. The ruse is not limited to the mere words of the defendants used to convince contractors to sign; they also used the documents to be discussed, presenting them to the electoral body, passing them off as real and effective expenses for the liquidation, when the apparent contractors never charged, nor intended to charge, the party for their voluntary labors. These documents consisted of the "SPECIAL SERVICES PROVISION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA AND…"; whose literal wording contained a series of falsehoods (known to the defendants) that sought to meet the legal requirements to justify an expense for special services that never occurred, for although in some cases there were various labors, they were not those indicated, and in no case was payment received. Note then that this contract described the special service to be provided; these were generic titles without real content, for example: Cantonal Coordinator of Voters, Cantonal General Promoter, General Coordinator of Finance, General Coordinator of Organization, Cantonal Coordinator of Communications, Cantonal Coordinator of Youth, and Cantonal Coordinator of Transportation. With the immediacy provided by the adversarial hearing, this Court could easily extract from the contractors' body language and verbal expressions their astonishment upon seeing the contract and the assigned position. The vast majority said they did not know what the position was, what it consisted of, who had appointed them, what their supposed responsibilities would be, and in no case were they asked for accounts or reports on their functions. Another false content of the contract, which ultimately served as a ruse before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, was the total payment amount settled. An immense majority of the contractor witnesses evaluated, as seen in Considerando VII, said they never agreed upon or collected any sum of money, surprised by this clause and, in several cases, deeply dismayed and even angry, since they never even had the intention of quantifying their work financially. Others, with a clear interest in protecting their political party, tried unsuccessfully to justify the amount, alleging that they performed arduous work, that it was what other parties paid, that it was established according to the minimum wage of their professions, that it was an amount derived from total hours worked, and multiple reasons which, when confronted with each other, make it clear that there was never an agreement between the parties, but rather arbitrary and templated amounts filled in by unknown persons by order of the defendants to deceive the electoral body. This contract also included the time frame in which the special service was supposedly provided, another clear example of the deception attempted by the defendants, since all witnesses were unanimous in indicating that those dates were not related to their functions within the party or when they provided them. They said they had worked before, after, never, or on other dates, without also having charged for those periods or the one indicated in the contract. All dates were artificially imposed and filled in by the defendants, using other people. All contracts were signed by the convicted person <b>STERLING ARAYA</b> in his capacity as National Treasurer of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, who knew of said falsehoods. Another document used for each of the one hundred seventy-nine contractors was the: "Payment Voucher," which, like the contract, contained a series of gross falsehoods that the witnesses themselves unanimously evidenced. In this sense, the literal wording of the voucher stated: "The Partido Acción Ciudadana has paid to…", given that, as indicated, NO AMOUNT WAS PAID TO ANYONE. Here, it is not indicated that payment is conditional or eventual; it states payment was settled, meaning for any average person that said document accredited the payment of a sum of money, which, as has been repeatedly stated, never occurred. It is important to note that on this voucher, <b>STERLING ARAYA</b> himself signs under the legend: "Receipt Conforming to the good or service," knowing that, firstly, the service had not been provided, and secondly, that said sum had never been charged or paid by the Partido Acción Ciudadana. These are, without a doubt, pre-constituted evidence of fraud, which would later be presented before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Finally, as part of the ruse, the defendants had the contractors instrumentalized for this fraud sign the document stating: "PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECEIPT FOR THE DELIVERY OF BONDS AS PAYMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES." Again, a document full of falsehoods and inaccuracies, like the previous ones. This one referred to the supposed delivery of Type B Certificates to the contractors, which never occurred in the one hundred seventy-nine contracts, with one exception. Even the vast majority of witnesses never had visual contact with the certificate"</i> (cf. pp. 3802-3804). Therefore, if the judges considered that all the contracts were similar, responding to a single purpose of making an improper charge of money to the public treasury, it is contradictory that to prove the economic damage suffered, they require the statements of the 84 contracting parties who were dispensed with, without the judgment expressing how the fact that those individuals did not testify has an impact, and overlooks considering the documentary evidence introduced about them, which, according to the judgment, was included in the PAC's expense liquidation submitted to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and was recognized for the payment of state campaign finance contributions. On pages 3601 and 3602, the <i>a quo</i> states that according to the testimonial evidence evaluated in the adversarial hearing, the co-defendants Sterling Araya and Bolaños Murillo proposed to the supporters the scheme to defraud the State, under the following three methods: <i>i)</i> In most cases, their "collaboration" was requested to help the party financially through the "voluntary subscription" of a contract, which would be settled with series B assignment certificates, which, if recognized by the Tribunal, the money could be donated to the PAC. <i>ii)</i> On other occasions, supporters were offered remuneration for their services with series B assignment certificates, conditional on these eventually having economic content (however, the certificates were not given to the contracting parties, but were kept at the PAC). <i>iii)</i> On other occasions, supporters were required to sign, under the understanding that what they were signing was something completely different. That is, all these methods described by the 179 witness-signatories of contracts maintain that they were simulated, and although some stated that they indeed performed work and considered the amount stated there deserved, expecting to receive good payment, this version is discredited by the fact that they never withdrew the bonds, these always remaining in the PAC's custody, an indication that it was never the will of these militants to collect them, nor of the party to make any payment to them. Therefore, what can be derived from these statements is that a considerable number of people (more than half of the signatories of the 263 special services contracts) confirmed that they signed the documentation prepared under the mechanism so often described in the judgment, which was then charged to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. In civil matters, the principle of written proof (documentary evidence) generally applies, article 351 of the Código Procesal Civil, with testimonial evidence being admissible only to verify conventions that may have existed between the parties. Furthermore, civil procedural law empowers the judge to decide to reduce the number of witnesses when they are offered to testify about the same specific facts. That is, the judge can limit the number of witnesses, complying with the parameters established by law, if the evidence offered is superabundant, article 365 of the Código Procesal Civil. Requiring that all 263 contractors had to testify at trial for the total economic damage to be considered proven is not only irrational, but a requirement that disregards the principles of usefulness, relevance, reasonableness, and necessity of evidence, when the Court itself has affirmed that all contracts and receipts have the same format and were systematically prepared under the same criminal scheme or structuring. There is contradictory reasoning when it is stated, on the one hand, that from the admitted evidence it was possible to prove a plan to deceive the officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones through the presentation of simulated contracts, and, on the other hand, it is indicated that a group of them are not eligible for compensation because testimonial evidence was lacking, despite the existence of clear common elements that reveal the simulation. These are two statements that cannot coexist without incurring defects related to the reasoning of the judgment. The state attorney is also correct that there is a defect in the assessment of evidence, because by granting an exaggerated and unnecessary value (without justifying its significance and relevance to the decision) to the witnesses who did not appear, the <i>a quo</i> diminished the value of the documentary evidence analyzed extensively and profusely when making the evidentiary reasoning for the criminal part. It is important to note that due to the nature of simulation, circumstantial evidence is inherent to it, which is not exclusive to the criminal jurisdiction but is also applicable in civil matters. Regarding circumstantial evidence in civil matters, it has been reiterated by different panels of the Tribunal Segundo Civil, the following: <i>"...we must analyze the legal concept of simulation and conclude that, given that with the simulated transaction the aim is to create an appearance contrary to reality, with an unreal situation, all types of evidence are allowed, and it has been said that: ² ...proving simulation entails almost exclusively a presumptive activity (sic), in such a way that the evidentiary task will consist of gradually establishing the various pieces of circumstantial evidence in the case file." (La simulación en el Derecho Privado. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo. Talleres de Mundo Gráfico S.A., San José, Costa Rica, 1990. Pg. 186). There are pieces of circumstantial evidence that are typical of simulation and make it easy to infer. The same author just cited highlights them in the aforementioned work, among them we have: ...1.- CAUSA SIMULANDI. The causa simulandi is considered the starting point "to search for the motive of the simulation, in order to subsequently build the edifice of proof upon a solid foundation. The causa simulandi, as we have said above, is the interest or motive that leads the parties to create the appearance of an unreal transaction, or to present it differently. The simulated act is reflective and conscious; it responds to a specific motive...3.- OMNIA BONA. This piece of circumstantial evidence is divided into two types: the transfer of the entire estate or the most select or valuable part of it... This piece of circumstantial evidence operates when the simulator requires, for their purposes, the comprehensive divestiture of their assets (to circumvent the principle that they constitute common collateral, art. 981 C.C.); it is of no use to hide a part if creditors can execute against the rest... 5.- NOTITIA. This refers to the knowledge of the simulation by the accomplice. This piece of circumstantial evidence refers to the fact of the concomitant knowledge of the simulators regarding the fiction of the legal transaction, and more specifically, the knowledge on the part of the accomplice. We know that one of the constitutive elements of simulation is the simulatory agreement, so that knowledge of the fiction by the accomplice is presumed. Consequently, only if the lack of that knowledge were proven, a matter otherwise of highly difficultibus probationes, would it be possible to infer the authentic reality of the supposedly simulated transaction. The foregoing implies that a lack of knowledge by the accomplice demonstrates the non-simulation of the transaction. It operates as negative, not affirmative, circumstantial evidence of simulation... 9.- PRETIUM VILIS. The presence of a cheap, disproportionate, or ridiculous price, which bears no relation to the real value of the thing transferred, exchanged, or leased, is one of the main pieces of circumstantial evidence of simulation... 15.- TEMPUS. Certain transactions are suspicious of simulation due to the time or moment of their celebration... One can speak of three types of tempus: a) Tempus coyuntural: This piece of circumstantial evidence requires a certain proximity between the simulation and the patrimonial disturbing event... b) Tempus celeritas: This refers to the unusual speed of the simulated transaction, a hurry outside the normal and usual, in the face of the proximity of an event. A hurry that crystallizes in registration urgencies (e.g., immediate registration of the sale..." </i>(cf. Tribunal Segundo Civil, Section I, No. 2002-372, at 09:30 hrs., September 27, 2002). In the specific case, there were 179 witnesses who referred to the simulation of the special services contracts, with 263 contracts presented under the same scheme as liquidation expenses to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. The trial court held as proven: <i>the causa simulandi</i>, the motive that led the co-defendants to create the appearance of an unreal transaction, which is to inflate the expense item to obtain the highest possible amount to cover the series A assignment certificates; <i>notitia</i> or the presumption of knowledge of the fiction by the accomplice to the simulatory agreement, given that both the defendants and the militant who signed knew they were doing a <i>"trick"</i>; <i>tempus</i> and the <i>pretium vilis</i>, because the contracts were made when the election results and the maximum amount of state campaign finance contributions accessible to the PAC were known, thus proceeding to prepare them for astronomical amounts to obtain the highest possible recognition of political debt. Regarding the assessment of evidence in civil matters and the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, it is appropriate to cite the following excerpt from the ruling of the Sala Primera: "<i>For a presumption to exist as a means of proof, it is necessary, firstly, that a positive or negative event, certain in nature, occurs from which the one sought to be known must be deduced. The existence or non-existence of this occurrence, broadly termed the base fact, or more technically, circumstantial evidence, must be duly accredited in the process to ensure the viability of the presumption. This is deduced from article 417 of the Código Procesal Civil: "Human presumptions only constitute evidence if they are a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact." The Chamber has indicated that this type of presumption "...is the result of the exercise of the discretionary power granted to the judge to assess the evidence, thus deriving the presumption from other facts that have been held as true" (No. 848-F, at 14:45 hrs., October 31, 2001). This connection, which must be direct and precise, between the base fact or piece of circumstantial evidence and the occurrence sought to be derived (consequence fact), is verified according to purely logical norms, the rules of human judgment, a task carried out by the Judge, vested with discretionary power according to their conscience and discernment. It is the judge who exclusively infers a fact or act from such evidence, as their internal conviction inspires within a framework of reasonableness and rationality, in a logical prius that does not violate sound critique; hence, their judgment stands, unless it is proven to be contrary to the evidence that the proofs display, either due to an error of fact or of law in their estimation regarding the base or circumstantial facts, or because the inference borders on the absurd by contradicting common sense or natural phenomena" (No. 000025-F-2007, at 10:45 hrs., January 19, 2007)"</i> (cf. Sala Primera, No. 2008-216, at 08:25 hrs., March 25, 2008)<i>. </i>The judges, through the overall assessment of the evidence evaluated, correctly concluded that the defendants created simulated contracts with the purpose of obtaining an undue pecuniary benefit for the holders of the series A assignment certificates, to the detriment of the public treasury, but contradictorily denied the recognition of economic damage regarding 84 contracts, arguing that testimonial evidence about them was lacking. The judgment thus incurs the defect of contradictory reasoning and erroneous assessment of evidence on the civil aspect, specifically regarding the economic damage suffered by the State, which recognized to the PAC for the expenses documented in the 263 special services contracts, the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), which is the patrimonial injury generated, and not the sum of ¢352,700,000.00 (three hundred fifty-two million seven hundred thousand colones). The Court held as established that the defendant Sterling liquidated before the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and they were authorized to the PAC by it, the sum of ¢516,600,000 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), under the concept of "special services" against the state campaign finance contribution, which allowed a higher percentage of the certificates of assignment of rights to the state campaign finance contribution, which had been issued by the Partido Acción Ciudadana during the electoral campaign, to be paid. To that extent, the decision must be revoked without needing to order a remand, since the same evidentiary analysis carried out by the <i>a quo</i> regarding the determination of the culpability judgment and the establishment of the facts allows reaching the same conclusion on the admissibility of the claim for patrimonial damage claimed comprehensively, for the 263 special services contracts. Consequently, with respect to the patrimonial damage claimed by the Procuraduría General de la República on behalf of the Costa Rican State, against the civil defendants Maynor Sterling Araya, Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, and the Partido Acción Ciudadana,<b> </b> they are jointly and severally sentenced to pay <b>, </b>the sum of ¢516,600,000 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), plus the interest generated from the consummation of the act until its effective payment, as well as the payment of personal costs in the amount of ¢56,160,000.00 (fifty-six million one hundred sixty thousand colones). <b>B) </b>In the <b>second ground</b> of his appeal, the appellant claims a lack of intellectual reasoning and contradictory reasoning regarding the rejection of social damage. <b><i>i)</i></b><i> </i>Lack of intellectual reasoning: The state attorney expresses that the events caused significant social damage, since they directly affect the very foundations of our democratic Rule of Law system, within which the Political Constitution fosters an electoral development scheme that allows for its strengthening and also its permanence over time, through state campaign finance contributions of an economic nature. The duty of political parties to participate in the education of the people was undermined, so that they feel the security of aspiring to and participating in the democratic ideal that is the freedom of suffrage, and within this ideal, the necessity of a feeling of belonging, honesty, and transparency that must permeate every phase and every moment of the political-electoral exercise; an exercise facilitated through state campaign finance contributions. In the appellant's judgment, the actions of the defendants affect the people's credibility in the system, causing feelings of disappointment, disinterest, distrust, and apathy in citizens, as well as affecting the democratic system. In this regard, he refers to what was stated by witnesses Michael Eugenio Castillo, José Solís Rojas, Teresa Aguilar Brenes, María Elena Rodríguez Rodríguez, Jorge Eduardo Brenes Vargas, Thelma Baldares Carazo, and María Ester Anchía Angulo. Based on the testimonial evidence gathered in the hearing, it is concluded that the proven events occurred in a democratic process in which the defendants made an improper charge to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, taking advantage of the selfless and voluntary participation of hundreds of Costa Ricans. He argues that if the social damage caused by a crime occurring in an electoral process is comparable to moral or non-material damage, and therefore is not subject to the proof required to demonstrate material damage, then the court could have derived the existence of social damage, and thus the affectation of the Costa Rican democratic system, from the testimonial evidence. Additionally, political debt is used to invest in democracy, so the affectation of the amounts the State allocates to finance said democratic process necessarily impacts the democratic system. He criticizes that for the judges, there is insufficient evidence to prove that the behaviors held as proven, which violate a criminal legal norm, caused damage to the Costa Rican democratic system. He reproaches the indication that his represented party did not conduct a study that included the variable relating to the impact of the public knowledge of the facts for which the defendants were convicted, in relation to the perception society holds of the Costa Rican democratic system. He criticizes that for the court, collective social damage can only be evidenced by a verifiable social change before and after the events, with specific evidence such as sociological studies, and not with the testimonial evidence provided in the adversarial hearing. This led to the testimonial evidence not being considered or assessed, and the existence of social damage not being analyzed from evidential sources other than those the court deemed should have been provided. <b><i>ii)</i></b> Contradictory reasoning of the court when rejecting social damage: Despite the court considering that the existence of an affectation of the democratic system was not proven, and therefore rejected the social damage, in some sections of the judgment it evidenced an understanding of the relationship between the participation of people who worked for free and democracy, as can be deduced from pages 1360, 1479, 1502, and 1561 of the judgment. The appellant argues that the most striking fact for which there is contradictory reasoning arises regarding the judgment of reproach, where the court stated on page 1573 that the defendant's criminal acts transcend the legal interest of property and affect democracy. <b>The claim is inadmissible.</b> Having examined the judgment issued by the trial court, through which it rejects compensation for social damage due to the lack of its proper demonstration by the Procuraduría General de la República, it is considered that it is duly reasoned, and that the reasoning used by the judges conforms to what the law establishes. Regarding collective or social damage, it has been defined as that which: "… <i>is propagated or diluted among the members of the group, whether it is organized and cohesive or not. It is a supra-individual damage that does not consist of the sum of special damages. Nor in an injury to the proper and particular assets of individuals, but in a current and concrete injury, only from the perspective of the entire society that suffers it. Collective damage affects the group simultaneously and coincidentally. It is one and the same, unique damage, which today is accepted without difficulty, as a notion with its own entity, which concerns equally all members of the community, or certain groups indistinctly and not exclusively.</i> The recipients are no longer persons, in isolated form, but categories or classes of subjects, linked by some quality or characteristic that gives connection to the whole. Within this subject matter, if the obligation to compensate this type of impairment arises, a sum of identifiable portions is not configured; on the contrary, it is a general injury, which is apprehensible and experienceable, where the affected element is communal or group-based, reaching individual subjects indivisibly, by insertion into the whole” (see. First Chamber, vote No. 675, of 10:00 hours on September 21, 2007). Now, as with any damage (daño), whether individual, diffuse, economic, material, physical, moral or of any type, it must be proven, and it is not appropriate to presume its existence merely because the state entity asserts that the facts for which it brought action directly affect the foundations of the Costa Rican democratic system. The representative of the State’s interests asserted in its complaint and in its conclusions at trial, the following: “The conduct challenged here undermines our democratic rule-of-law system, since it affects our own Constitution, by denigrating various essential consequences of the referred state contribution, namely: the duty held by political parties to participate in the education of the people so that they feel the security to aspire and participate in the democratic ideal signified by the freedom of suffrage and, within this ideal, the necessity of the feeling of belonging, honesty, and transparency with which every phase and every moment of the political-electoral exercise must be imbued; an exercise that is facilitated through state contribution. Under this framework, the conduct described here affects the people’s credibility in the system and the dynamics of national politics, which collaborates in maintaining the structural and ideological bases of our democracy. Likewise, the conduct challenged here provokes a sentiment of social malaise that fractures our democratic foundations, through the loss of the people’s credibility in the system and the development of national democratic life. The foregoing, because the Costa Rican people and the State itself have been disrespected, by procuring and having obtained – for one’s own benefit and that of third parties – an increase in the recognition and reimbursement of the political debt based on a deception, for which it must be highlighted that we are all citizens who contribute with our economic contributions to finance the political debt and therefore, we have been equally.” The PGR explains that social damage (daño social) has been caused by the deterioration of proper political education and the manifestation of the popular will being affected by the loss of credibility in political parties. The civil plaintiff acknowledges that there is disenchantment and loss of credibility in political parties, to which voter abstentionism must be added, to which the criminal conduct of the civil defendants contributes” (cf. fs. 3899-3900, see. fs. 391-392 legajo acr). It is undeniable that electoral processes constitute an indispensable pillar for the real functioning of an authentic democratic regime and that, in this context, political parties constitute an extremely important element of democratic life, as they are the instruments through which the principles of democratic pluralism are concretized, they concur in the formation and manifestation of the popular will, and are fundamental instruments for political participation (see. Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. on January 23, 2009 and First Chamber, No. 2010-8297, 02:45 hrs. on May 5, 2010, among others). However, as is noted in the judgment, the party that requested the right to compensation for social damage (daño social) had to prove the certain, real, and effective damage that the civil defendants (Mr. Maynor, Mr. Antonio, and the PAC) caused to the Costa Rican democratic system, beyond the mere enunciation of the raison d'être of political parties and their role in a democracy such as ours. Assuming the reality of the causation of social damage based on what the witnesses stated who appeared signing the simulated contracts and documents in a general assessment is absolutely insufficient to prove that the credibility in political parties, a fundamental pillar in a democratic regime, was affected. Michael Eugenio Castillo stated that he worked for the PAC to support his mother who was aspiring to a position through the party, but also out of love for the ideals of transparency and ethics of the group, he wanted a change at the political level, he had no intention of charging for his volunteer work, and his surprise and disillusionment was due to the misrepresentation of what he had signed. For his part, José Solís Rojas recounted that he was brought into the PAC by Rodrigo Carazo, he worked selflessly for the party, he was a regidor and over time became independent, without saying that this was due to the actions attributed to the civil defendants. Teresa Aguilar Brenes indicated that she was a founder of the PAC. She stated that she put her personal vehicle and fuel from her own pocket at the disposal of the party's needs on several occasions, expressed that she gave her work to help the country, accepting that she signed the contracts and that the money was for the party. At no time did she express sadness about what happened; rather, she came out in defense of her free contribution and the recognition deserved by the party for the political debt for her work. Mrs. María Elena Rodríguez Rodríguez noted that her work was done voluntarily, without charge to the party because she believes in the democracy of this country. Jorge Eduardo Brenes Vargas reported that in the PAC it was difficult to have resources, so they themselves financed the campaign with the contribution of work. What he signed represents a value for his dedication, as he never expected to have any economic retribution. As seen, none of these persons mentioned by the Procurador in his appeal, or the more than 170 witnesses who gave testimony at trial, mentioned having suffered a supra-individual damage that caused impairment to democracy. The majority admitted having provided free collaboration to the party and were in agreement with signing the documents presented to them, convinced that in doing so they were helping the group that could eventually be recognized. Their astonishment and disagreement were primarily expressed regarding the disproportionate amounts recorded and the type of function assigned, which clashed with the reality of the service provided. Some, such as Jeannette de la O Hernández, showed discomfort because they were contacted by officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to testify concerning the contracts for special services charged to the State, for which the service providers had not declared their income to the Dirección General de Tributación Directa. The common denominator among almost all the PAC militants who testified is that they wanted to give their work to the party, without expecting anything in return, but if an economic recognition for their selfless work was forthcoming, that it be given to the party to contribute to its precarious finances. What they said, at its core, as the witness Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo made clear, was the acceptance of carrying out “a small trick” or, “a small deception,” knowing that it involved public money, so they are not the best reference to offer a representative sample of the holders of the true collective interest (interés colectivo). On the contrary, if any of them showed discomfort, it was not because of the attack that the conduct of the civil defendants caused to the political-electoral institutionality of this country (in which they themselves, “in good faith towards the party,” participated), but because of the betrayal suffered in their private sphere, from the PAC towards them, as its militants, by filling out the documents with unrealistic contents in amount and regarding the functions performed. Damage to the particular interests of individuals belonging to a determined group must not be confused with the general injury that belongs to the collective. For this reason, the lower court (Tribunal) correctly concluded that there is no sufficient proof to demonstrate that, due to the conducts duly proven and that violate a criminal legal norm, damage was caused to the Costa Rican democratic system. The judges are correct that the existence of an effective damage must be corroborated; which must be assessable and individualizable, and derived from conduct apt for the arising of liability. Likewise, the causal link must be examined, as a necessary element to impute the damage to the specific behavior that caused it. The a quo stated: “If the damage cannot be corroborated, the assertion of the PGR would be nothing more than an assumption or a hypothesis. Likewise, if the civil plaintiff does not prove the social damage (daño social), there is no need to examine whether a direct causal relationship exists between it and the result, as it would be unnecessary and sterile” (cf. f. 3901). It is not, as the Procuraduría generally maintains, that with the established unlawful act, the correct political education has been deteriorated, as well as the manifestation of the popular will being affected by the loss of credibility in political parties. The civil plaintiff party pointed out in its appeal that there is disenchantment and loss of credibility in political parties, to which voter abstentionism must be added, to which the criminal conduct of the civil defendants contributed. Such assertions by the appellant are unfounded and stem from a first error, which is to take for granted that there was social damage to the community. Having made this assumption, it deems that it must be granted, as is done with moral damages (daño moral), through a weighting by the judges of the quantum of the damage to the collective. This Chamber agrees with the trial court that the existence of social damage (daño social) had to be proven. To that end, the judges set forth the need for a study contemplating the variable relative to the impact that knowledge of the facts for which the accused were convicted had, in relation to the perception that society has of the Costa Rican democratic system, before, and after. That is: “a comparison between social well-being before the act and after it occurred” (see. fs. 3901-3903). Not having done so in that manner, it constitutes uncertain and abstract damage, which is entirely contrary to certain and effective, assessable, and individualizable damage. As seen, the social damage whose compensation the state entity seeks has none of those attributes. The civil plaintiff could not separate out, within the confidence index in the democratic system, what is the repercussion of the submission of the liquidation of simulated expenses by the PAC, and which effects are due to other causes, in order to determine if, as a result of the civil defendants’ actions, there was social damage. It must be remembered that the favorable or negative perception towards political parties, as channels for democratic participation and the organization of currents and ideologies of social life, is multifactorial, depending on many situations, such as, for example, the electorate's disappointment due to a lack of public investment in a government, or due to acts of corruption imputed to some public figure at a given moment, among many others. The difficulty in separating this specific situation from others equally capable of creating social damage precisely demonstrates the importance that, in the case of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), the damage supposedly caused to the collective does not give rise to the “automatic” presumption of its existence, either because it is considered obvious that actions such as those studied break our institutional framework or because the declarations of the militants are taken in bulk and it is said they suffered harm; rather, it must be proven through some appropriate means or measurement instrument, from the perspective of social sciences and statistics, that can establish whether a verifiable social change can be evidenced, before and after the events. It is not sufficient to state merely that there is social damage because the fact by which the PAC imposed an unlawful patrimonial benefit offended the fundamental principles of peace and democracy enshrined in the Political Constitution. The fact that they are assets or values of general interest, as occurs in the case of the concept of political pluralism, an elementary principle of the democratic and constitutional patrimony of the nation, which are definitions of an extremely abstract and generic nature, does not imply per se that the right to claim an indeterminate social damage is born in the state entity, which imposes the rejection of the claim as there are no flaws in the analytical reasoning. This Chamber deems that, according to what was expressed by the judges in the contested judgment, there is no document in the case file attesting that individualizable collective damage was caused to that whole. The foregoing prevents establishing the existence of a causal link between the unlawful act and the damage claimed by the plaintiff. Regarding the charge of contradictory reasoning since some sections of the judgment evidenced the relationship between the participation of the persons who collaborated gratuitously, with democracy, as seen in folios 3597, 3715, 3733 and 3797, there is no doubt that the majority of the witnesses performed service to the party voluntarily and without intending any charge. This does not mean that those sections of the judgment are saying that these persons suffered an impact on their perception of democracy due to the conduct of the civil defendants. Rather, as indicated, they themselves participated aware that the documents they signed were going to represent a charge to the Costa Rican State, whether the recognition was given or not. Finally, regarding what was expressed by the Tribunal on page 1573, folio 3809 of the judgment, that: “The affectation transcends the mere affectation of the legal asset of property, the state coffers (sic) have been looted in an item that the constituent power itself wanted to invest in the vertebral column of our electoral democracy” (cf. f. 3809), in no way means that it is assuming the existence of social damage. Simply, in the context of the analysis of patrimonial harm, as an element of the criminal type for the crime of estafa, something undeniable is being indicated: the basis for financing approved directly in the State’s general budgets for political parties rests on the constitutional recognition of the public interest of the function they perform, as channels for citizens' democratic participation. As the Constitutional Chamber has expressed: “...parties are essential instruments for the exercise of those rights and, therefore, of democracy itself; their free formation and functioning are, thus, of the highest public interest, subject solely to the condition that they meet certain requirements objectively derived from the party system; the possibility to constitute, organize, and register them and to participate with them in the election of rulers and in the conduct of public affairs must be as broad as possible, within the limits strictly indispensable to preserve the public interests corresponding to their nature, ends, and function” (cf. Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. on January 23, 2009). The conduct of the civil defendants acted against state contribution funds destined to invest in democracy, which does not mean that the judges are accepting that damage to the democratic system existed, but rather that they are highlighting the intrinsic value of the decision to invest in our country to sustain the electoral system. As a consequence of the above, there are no flaws in the analytical reasoning or contradictory reasoning, therefore the grievance must be rejected.

POR TANTO:

The appeal of the Public Prosecutor's representatives is declared without merit. The appeal of the defense counsel for the accused is partially granted, solely in that the judgment did not grant the accused Maynor Sterling Araya the alternative penalty of monitoring by electronic bracelet, ordering its granting from this instance. The appeal of the lawyer for the Procuraduría General de la República is partially granted, ordering the co-civil defendants Maynor Sterling Araya, Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, and the Partido Acción Ciudadana to pay the Costa Rican State, jointly and severally, for the concept of patrimonial damage (daño patrimonial), the sum of ¢516,600,000.00 (five hundred sixteen million six hundred thousand colones), as well as the personal legal costs in the amount of ¢56,160,000.00 (fifty-six million one hundred sixty thousand colones). In all other respects, the challenges are rejected and the judgment remains unaltered. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Rosa María Acón Ng Kathya Jiménez Fernández Edwin Salinas Durán Judges of the Appeal of Criminal Sentence File: 12-000024-0033-PE (3) Accused: Maynor Ricardo Sterling Araya and others Victim: The State and another Crime: Estafa mayor and another LQUIROSG

Resolución: 2017-1491 Resolución: 2017-1491 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Goicoechea, al ser las diez horas cincuenta minutos, del catorce de diciembre de dos mil diecisiete.- RECURSOS DE APELACIÓN interpuestos en la presente causa seguida contra MAYNOR RICARDO STERLING ARAYA, mayor, costarricense, cédula de identidad número 4-0107-0497, nacido en Heredia, el 20 de noviembre de 1954, hijo de Justino Sterling Sterling y Virginia Araya Rojas, estado civil desconocido, de oficio administrador de negocios, vecino de Heredia, 200 metros norte del Walmart y MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO, mayor, costarricense, cédula de identidad número 9-0002-0051, nacido en Alajuela, el 08 de enero de 1944, hijo de Manuel Bolaños Vargas e Iris Murillo Alvarado, casado, funcionario del Partido Acción Ciudadano, vecino de San José, Moravia, del colegio de Agrónomos 100 metros al este y 100 metros norte; por el delito de ESTAFA MAYOR Y OTRO, en perjuicio de EL ESTADO Y OTRO. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, las juezas Rosa María Acón Ng, Kathya Jiménez Fernández y el juez Edwin Salinas Durán. Se apersonaron en esta sede el licenciado Alexander Valverde Peña, en representación de la Fiscalía Adjunta de Impugnaciones; los máster Milton Castro Serrano y José Rafael Cabrera Badilla, en su condición de co-defensores particulares del encausado Sterling Araya; el licenciado Randall Albán Aguirre Mena, como representante legal de la Procuraduría General de la República; el licenciado Ronny Guevara Mora, en representación del Partido Acción Ciudadana; la licenciada Greysa Barrientos Núñez y el licenciado Alexander Valverde Peña, ambos en representación de la Unidad de Impugnaciones del Ministerio Público.

RESULTANDO:

I.- Que mediante sentencia número 1146-2016, de las diez horas del cinco de diciembre de dos mil dieciséis, el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, artículos 39, 41, 96 de la Constitución Política; 1, 30, 45, 50, 59 a 63, 71, 106, 216 inciso 2) del Código Penal; Ley 9271 del 31 de octubre del 2014; artículos 52, 86 a 119 del Código Electoral; 1, 6, 10, 16, 141, 111 a 124, 142, 175 al 179, 181, 182, 184, 200, 239, 258, 265, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367, 368, 376 y 378 del Código Procesal Penal; Reglas Vigentes sobre la Responsabilidad Civil artículos 1045, 1046, 1048 y 1163 del Código Civil, artículos 16, 42 y 44 del Decreto Ejecutivo de Honorarios N° 36562, Reglamento sobre Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos, Decreto N° 17-2009 del 15 de octubre del 2009, este tribunal por unanimidad de los votos resuelve: Se declara a MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA y MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO coautores responsables de UN DELITO DE ESTAFA MAYOR, así recalificado, en perjuicio del ERARIO PÚBLICO y en tal carácter, se impone a MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA la pena de SEIS AÑOS DE PRISIÓN y a MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO la pena de TRES AÑOS DE PRISIÓN, penas que una vez firme el fallo, deberán descontar en el lugar y forma que determinen los reglamentos penitenciarios. Por cumplir con los requisitos de ley, se concede al condenado MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO el Beneficio de Ejecución Condicional de la pena impuesta, por un periodo de CINCO AÑOS , período durante el cual deberá cumplir las siguientes condiciones: mantener un domicilio fijo y si hubiere un cambio reportarlo en el Despacho donde se encuentre la causa y no cometer delito doloso en el que resulte condenado con pena igual o superior a seis meses de prisión, caso contrario este beneficio le será revocado. Hasta la firmeza de este fallo y a partir del día lunes 9 de enero del 2017, se ordena al condenado MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA presentarse a firmar una vez al mes al Despacho en donde se encuentre en trámite la causa y se ordena su impedimento de salida del país, para lo cual se le ordena entregar su pasaporte en el despacho de este Tribunal dentro de las siguientes cuarenta y ocho horas, si es que lo tuviera. CON RESPECTO A LA ACCION CIVIL RESARCITORIA: Se declara PARCIALMENTE CON LUGAR la acción civil resarcitoria presentada por la Procuraduría General de la República en representación del ESTADO COSTARRICENSE contra los demandados civiles MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA, MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO y EL PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA por lo que se les condena a pagar EN FORMA SOLIDARIA los siguientes rubros: a.-) Por concepto de daño patrimonial la suma de TRESCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y DOS MILLONES SETECIENTOS MIL COLONES, mas los intereses que se generen desde la consumación del hecho hasta su efectiva cancelación. Se acoge el pago de las costas personales en el monto de CUARENTA MILLONES CUATROCIENTOS TREINTA MIL COLONES, por concepto de costas procesales la suma de SEISCIENTOS MIL COLONES con ocasión del peritaje derivado de la acción civil resarcitoria. Se rechaza la pretensión de daño social. Las sumas líquidas fijadas en sentencia deberán depositarlas los condenados civiles en el plazo de quince días hábiles, caso contrario la Procuraduría General de la República deberá acudir a la vía correspondiente a reclamarlas. Se condena a MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA y MANUEL ANTONIO BOLAÑOS MURILLO al pago de las COSTAS DE LA QUERELLA en la suma de SEIS MILLONES SESENTA Y CUATRO MIL QUINIENTOS COLONES. SOBRE LOS DOCUMENTOS DECOMISADOS: Por ser parte del material probatorio de la causa consérvese la evidencia decomisada. Comuníquese a la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería sobre el impedimento de salida del país decretado contra MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA . Una vez firme la sentencia remítase el testimonio de la misma ante el Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena y el Instituto Nacional de Criminología para lo de sus cargos. Queda a la orden del Ministerio Público el expediente judicial para la apertura de la investigación por el delito de Falso Testimonio contra la señora LAURA MARÍA GARRO SÁNCHEZ. Por lectura notifíquese " (sic).

II.- Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, interpusieron recurso de apelación el licenciado Alexander Valverde Peña, en representación de la Fiscalía Adjunta de Impugnaciones; los máster Milton Castro Serrano y José Rafael Cabrera Badilla, en su condición de co-defensores particulares del encausado Sterling Araya; el licenciado Randall Albán Aguirre Mena, en calidad de Procurador Penal y el licenciado Ronny Guevara Mora, en representación del Partido Acción Ciudadana.

III.- Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 465 del Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso de apelación.

IV.- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta la jueza de Apelación de Sentencia Penal Acón Ng; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Sobre la integración del Tribunal: Como se indica en el encabezado de esta sentencia, aparte de los jueces Edwin Salinas Durán y Rosa María Acón Ng, también interviene en la resolución del recurso, la jueza Kathya Jiménez Fernández, quien no estuvo en la audiencia. Ello no afecta el debido proceso, ni el principio de inmediación, pues en la misma no se produjo prueba ni se ampliaron los argumentos de los recurrentes, según dan fe los integrantes que sí participaron de la misma y así se aprecia en la grabación efectuada. Lo anterior se hace de estricta conformidad con los votos vinculantes, erga omnes al tenor del artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, Nº 1996-6681, de las 15:30 horas. del 10 de diciembre de 1996 y 2007-017553, de las 12:23 horas, del 30 de noviembre de 2007, ambos de la Sala Constitucional.

II.- Recurso del Máster Milton E. Castro Serrano y del Máster José Rafael Cabrera Badilla, defensores particulares del imputado Maynor Sterling Araya. A) En el primer motivo de su recurso reclaman infracción al debido proceso e indebida valoración de la prueba que conlleva a la violación de las reglas de la sana crítica, específicamente a los principios de derivación. Alegan que de un enorme conglomerado de testimonios que se recibieron en el debate (aproximadamente ciento setenta testigos), los que fueron contestes en que el acusado Sterling Araya no tuvo relación con la petición a los militantes del Partido Acción Ciudadana (en adelante PAC) para que firmaran los contratos cuestionados, el tribunal procede a efectuar un análisis sesgado y aislado de escasos tres testigos para forzar la comprobación de su participación en lo que denomina “esquema frudulento”, fracturando el principio de inocencia que cobija a su representado. Los tres testigos a que exclusivamente acude el tribunal en su argumentación son: Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, Gloria Cárdenas Miranda y José Reyes Gómez. La testigo Valverde Conejo informó que ella asumió que lo que estaba haciendo “don Tony” era avalado por el acusado Maynor Sterling Araya. Primero, porque Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo le hizo el planteamiento en primera persona plural, “nosotros” y, segundo, porque ella entendió que “todo eso era algo de la tesorería”. En el caso de la testigo Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, aseveran los co-defensores que fue conteste en decir que ella asumió que Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo seguía instrucciones de los miembros del comité ejecutivo, al cual pertenecía el encartado Sterling Araya en su condición de tesorero nacional. Consideran los impugnantes que lo que dichas deponentes concluyeron fue en realidad, por la vía de presunción, es decir, un criterio subjetivo. Solamente en el caso del testigo José Reyes Gómez éste indicó que encontrándose en una reunión de partido en un lugar denominado “La Catalina” en Heredia, escuchó a Maynor Sterling Araya girar instrucciones para que se firmaran unos documentos para que el partido les pudiera pagar el trabajo que habían hecho y ayudar de esta manera a la agrupación partidaria. Sin embargo, contrario a lo que aseveran los jueces de que decenas de personas se presentaron a declarar a juicio a exponer cuál fue el esquema que les fue planteado por los imputados Maynor Sterling Araya y Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, con excepción de dichas dos testigos, que lo que transmitieron fue una suposición de que Sterling Araya “podía” tener alguna participación, y del testigo Reyes Gómez que indicó que lo escuchó decir que los suscribieran, el resto de los ciento setenta testigos ninguno mencionó que su defendido tuviera alguna relación con las firmas de los contratos. Cita como ejemplo de ello, los testimonios de Yanina Soto Vargas, Jenny Castro Acuña y María Elena Rojas Mora, quienes fueron a “La Catalina” con el testigo Reyes Gómez. La testigo Castro Acuña en modo alguno involucró al endilgado Sterling, y señaló que quien les pidió que firmaran los documentos fue la señora Margarita Bolaños Arquín, como secretaria nacional del partido. Los jueces sacan de contexto lo dicho por la deponente, que es absolutamente contrastante con lo relatado por Reyes Gómez, y por el contrario concordante con los otros testigos que declararon que estuvieron en “La Catalina”, los que no ubicaron a Sterling en el lugar. En cuanto a las señoras María Elena Rojas Mora y Yanina Soto Vargas, nunca dijeron que el justiciable estuviese en el sitio. Lo mismo que los señores Alejandro Li Grau y Carlos Luis Solano Orozco, quienes además señalaron a otra persona como la que les pidió que suscribieran los documentos. Pese a la existencia de esos otros testimonios que contradicen lo dicho por Reyes Gómez, los jueces excluyen los mismos y se limitan a citarlos en el fallo, pero obviando el ineludible análisis, dando absoluta credibilidad a aquel. En síntesis, afirman los recurrentes que el tribunal sesgó totalmente la prueba, que no se podía tener por comprobado que el acusado estuvo en “La Catalina” y que hubiese pedido que se firmaran los contratos. En el segundo motivo del libelo impugnaticio, la defensa técnica del imputado reclama violación al debido proceso e indebida valoración de la prueba que conlleva a la violación de las reglas de la sana crítica, específicamente de los principios de derivación. Recriminan los recurrentes que el tribunal analizó ilegítimamente la prueba testimonial, sesgando su contenido, por cuanto de un enorme conglomerado de declaraciones que se recibieron en juicio (aproximadamente ciento setenta testigos), quienes fueron contestes en decir que el imputado Sterling Araya no tuvo ninguna relación con la estimulación y petición a los militantes del PAC para que firmaran esos contratos, procedió a hacer un análisis absolutamente ilegítimo del señor Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, así como un examen tergiversado de las manifestaciones de su defendido para formar la comprobación de participación en el llamado “esquema”. A Cordero Martínez se le tuvo como testigo sospechoso precisamente porque los testigos Isidro Navarro Vargas, Juan Luis Padilla Molina y Cristian Padilla Molina, fueron contestes en que ellos firmaron el contrato a solicitud de este. Por su parte, Cordero Martínez declaró que quien le requirió la firma del contrato fue la secretaria del partido, la señora Margarita Bolaños Arquín, y no ningún otro miembro del comité ejecutivo, por lo que a partir de ese acto, él fue a buscar a otras personas para que firmaran los contratos; versión que omitió el tribunal en su análisis. También soslayó las manifestaciones que rindieron otros testigos que firmaron contratos y se refirieron a una conversación que se llevó a cabo tres años después, grabada con el consentimiento del encartado Sterling Araya, de la cual se desprende que no tenía conocimiento sobre el mecanismo de suscripción de dichos contratos, tampoco que supiera que las personas que suscribieron los mismos no hubiesen realizado las funciones que ahí se indicaban. Citan un extracto del diálogo que sostuvo con Jeannette de la O Hernández, del cual afirman los defensores, se pone de manifiesto que él tampoco estaba al tanto de las circunstancias en que se firmaron los contratos. Lejos de extraerse que su representado estaba consciente y era el artífice del engaño, lo que se desprende más bien es que entendía, que las personas que suscribieron los contratos de servicios especiales se habían hecho acreedoras del eventual y remoto reconocimiento de contenido económico que alcanzaran los certificados tipo B, y no el PAC, correspondiendo a cada quien decidir qué hacer con el dinero. Contrario a ello, los juzgadores se decantaron por señalar que eso reflejaba el conocimiento del endilgado de que estas personas habían prestado sus servicios de forma gratuita, lo que no encuentra soporte en la abundante prueba testimonial, pues lo que Sterling Araya reconocía es que se le había dado un valor al trabajo de los militantes del partido. Agregan que no hay ni un solo testigo de los ciento setenta, que haya dicho que fueron contactados o buscados por Sterling Araya para suscribir los contratos, sin embargo el tribunal aseveró ilegítimamente que los testigos así lo manifestaron, refiriéndose a los señores Gloria Cárdenas Miranda, Flor de María Monge Arroyo, José Solís Rojas, Carlos Jaime Gutiérrez Trejos, Luis Carlos Odio Victory, Nicolás Alberto Murillo Rivas, Ricardo Coto Castillo, Ronald Johanning Quesada, Luis Alberto González Agüero, María Jeannette Ruiz Delgado, Laura María Garro Sánchez, Hernán Solano Venegas, Ronald Joaquín Campos Arias, Sylvia Cordero Rojas (quien no recordó si el documento lo firmó ante Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo o ante Maynor Sterling Araya), Rodrigo Alonso Paniagua Carranza y Crissia Fernández Mora, quienes según los juzgadores firmaron los documentos en una reunión donde se encontraban Maynor Sterling Araya, Wilfrido Blanco Mora, María Esther Anchía Angulo, César Vindas Otárola, Alexandra Zamora Montero y Yolanda Acuña Castro. La única testigo que dijo no recordar si firmó ante Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo o ante Maynor Sterling Araya -la testigo Sylvia Cordero Rojas-, su manifestación a la luz del principio de la duda razonable debe ser interpretada a favor del justiciable y no para perjudicarlo como lo hace el tribunal. En el tercer motivo deducido en el escrito recursivo alegan falta de fundamentación de la sentencia por infracción al principio de derivación, ello por cuanto según los impugnantes, de lo dicho por esa enorme cantidad de testigos no se puede acreditar que el encartado Sterling Araya -quien incluso trabajó ad honorem como tesorero nacional- contactó o buscó a los contratistas, y mucho menos que los convenciera a que firmaran bajo el argumento de que con ese contrato se iba a beneficiar al partido. De las conversaciones que el acusado sostuvo con varios militantes, se desprende que transmitía el convencimiento de que los certificados tipo B pertenecían exclusivamente a los contratistas y por tanto eran los beneficiados directamente ante el remoto supuesto de que alcanzaran a tener contenido económico. Objetan los recurrentes la valoración otorgada por el tribunal a la conversación grabada entre su defendido y Jeannette de la O Hernández, pues en ningún momento este hizo referencia alguna de que él, en su condición de tesorero nacional del PAC, tuviera el conocimiento o intención de que el posible dinero que se obtuviera de esos certificados B fuera para aumentar el patrimonio de dicha agrupación política. En el cuarto motivo de su recurso, los recurrentes recriminan violación al debido proceso por fundamentación insuficiente. Aseveran que toda la valoración de los elementos de convicción fueron analizados por los juzgadores de manera prejuiciada, al extremo de afirmar en varias secciones de la sentencia que el imputado Sterling Araya suscribió todos los contratos, lo cual es falso según se pudo comprobar de lo depuesto por alrededor de ciento setenta testigos. Lo más grave es que pese a que el sistema normativo electoral exigía la presentación de esos documentos a todos los partidos políticos, se atribuyó a Sterling la ideación, fabricación y presentación de los mismos por medio de una derivación ilegítima de la prueba testimonial, una absoluta violación a las reglas de la sana crítica, así como los jueces cometen el yerro de analizar sesgadamente la prueba. Afirman que la creación de los contratos de servicios especiales no fue obra de su defendido pues ya existían desde la campaña anterior, habiendo aportado prueba que acreditaba que en dicha contienda electoral, las autoridades políticas del PAC habían presentado en la liquidación de ese período, contratos que se denominaron por “servicios personales”, cuya estructura era idéntica a la utilizada para las elecciones del 2010. Varios testigos, como Leonel Sequeira, Margarita Bolaños Arquín, Olivier Pérez y Oscar Fernández Venegas, fueron contestes al señalar la preexistencia de esos contratos desde mucho antes que el acusado asumiera el cargo de tesorero nacional. Arguyen que el hecho de que las autoridades y los dirigentes del PAC suscribieran unos recibos y solicitaran la identificación de las personas que suscribieron contratos, obedece a que el mismo sistema normativo (artículo 47 del Reglamento de Financiamiento de los partidos políticos) se lo exigía a los partidos políticos, no a Maynor Sterling como consideraron los jueces como parte de su plan delictivo para engañar a las autoridades. Es falso lo indicado en el fallo, que Sterling Araya ratificó con su firma la totalidad de los contratos, pues de las aproximadamente “veintisiete decenas” de contratos, en ninguno de ellos aparece la firma de su defendido, sino que todos fueron firmados por la señora Margarita Bolaños, poniéndose en evidencia la carga negativa y el sesgo en el análisis de la prueba que hacen los jueces. Además, los señores María Yenory Gutiérrez Brizuela y Carlos Morera Ballestero, funcionarios de planta de la tesorería, así como Leonel Sequeira, auditor interno, coincidieron en que la suscripción de los recibos por parte del imputado, atendía al cumplimiento de una obligación administrativa, por ser el tesorero nacional. A través de esa prueba testimonial se acreditó en juicio que, el señor Sterling Araya no permanecía regularmente en el recinto de la tesorería, sino que se apersonaba única y exclusivamente a suscribir documentos, no se dedicó a la revisión de los contratos, ni a la designación de bonos, y tampoco que les girara instrucciones para estructurar un plan delictivo. Además se acreditó en el contradictorio, que el endilgado ni tan siquiera elaboró la liquidación de los gastos, sino que esto lo hizo Leonel Sequeira. Objetan que, para el tribunal la responsabilidad de su representado se infiere porque propuso la modificación de los estatutos internos del PAC para aumentar el porcentaje de deuda política que se podía cobrar en esas elecciones, sin embargo, don Maynor como tesorero y experto en el tema, lo que hizo fue una recomendación para que se analizara dicha modificación, cuya decisión correspondía al seno del partido. Para esa época había motivos políticos que generaban tal necesidad, y en ese sentido lo declararon los testigos Lilliam Arguedas, Amadeo Cordero, Margarita Bolaños, Olivier Pérez y Herberth Herrera. Según los impugnantes ello también tenía un sustento normativo, como se observa en la recomendación que hizo el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en la resolución No. 1257-P-2000 de las 13:50 horas del 16 de junio de 2000. Por estar estrechamente relacionados, se resuelven conjuntamente los reclamos contenidos en los primeros cuatro motivos del recurso, los cuales son improcedentes. La responsabilidad del imputado Maynor Sterling Araya la determinó el Tribunal de Juicio a partir de diversos elementos probatorios analizados de manera conjunta, integral, completa, y no aislada, segmentada y fragmentada como lo hace la defensa técnica del justiciable, en un intento de descalificar e invalidar la valoración y las conclusiones a que arribaron los juzgadores. Al examinarse las alegaciones de los defensores, resulta más que evidente su técnica de analizar la prueba testimonial, de manera sesgada e incomunicada del universo probatorio, para así derribar la construcción estructurada, lógica y razonada de la sentencia. De las objeciones planteadas por la defensa, lo que se extrae son opiniones personales, conjeturas, un simple desacuerdo con el desenlace de la condena y, un intento de revaloración de la prueba testimonial acorde con los intereses de su patrocinado. Contrario a lo interpelado, nota esta cámara que el a quo abordó minuciosamente cada una de las probanzas incorporadas en el debate, concatenando las actuaciones del encartado Sterling Araya que permitieron establecer de manera unívoca, la dirección del plan ejecutado en aras de llevar a engaño al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, al presentar una liquidación de gastos por servicios especiales que sabía, no se apegaban a la realidad, para engrosar la cuota de la deuda política y así, recibir el Partido Acción Ciudadana (en adelante PAC) una mayor contribución estatal a la debida. Los recurrentes pretenden se acepte que si aproximadamente ciento setenta testigos no dijeron que fue directamente el justiciable quien les pidió que firmaran los contratos de servicios, entonces don Maynor no formó parte del “esquema fraudulento” para estafar al Estado costarricense. Dicho argumento no solo desconoce la participación criminal a través de la figura del dominio del hecho, sino que procura se ignore la contundencia de los relatos brindados por los testigos Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, Gloria Cárdenas Miranda y José Reyes Gómez, aseverando los recurrentes que los dos primeros lo que hicieron fue “asumir” o “presumir” que el co-imputado Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo les pidió firmar siguiendo instrucciones de Sterling Araya y, en cuanto al último, soslayando su impacto a pesar de su asertividad, al señalar que en la reunión que se realizó en el centro de convenciones llamado “La Catalina” en Birrí de Heredia, escuchó cuando don Maynor manifestó a militantes del partido que firmaran los contratos para colaborar con sus finanzas. Las consideraciones que esgrimen los reclamantes, se reitera, obedecen a su modo particular y subjetivo de examinar la prueba, en forma parcial y distanciada una de otra, con el objeto de extraer deducciones distintas a las del fallo. El que al azar nombren a varios testigos que asistieron a la convocatoria en “La Catalina” (Silvia Yanina Soto Vargas, Jenny Castro Acuña, María Elena Rojas Mora, Alejandro Li Grau y Carlos Luis Solano Orozco), intentando desacreditar la participación del acusado Sterling Araya al manifestar Castro Acuña que quien le pidió que firmara los documentos fue la señora Margarita Bolaños Arquín, mientras que Rojas Mora dijo no conocer a don Maynor y que fue el presidente a nivel cantonal del PAC, Daniel Quesada, quien se lo solicitó (vd. f. 2846); en tanto que Soto Vargas no mencionó siquiera si Sterling estuvo en el lugar, y Li Grau manifestó no recordar si él se encontraba ahí (vd. f. 2877), en modo alguno esas declaraciones vienen a desacreditar lo afirmado por el testigo José Reyes Gómez, ni la dirección de Sterling Araya en la puesta en marcha del plan. Se trató de una actividad en la que estuvieron reunidas muchas personas simpatizantes, representantes del PAC y miembros del comité ejecutivo, por lo que no puede esperarse que en una aglomeración de esa dimensión, todas debieron, necesariamente, determinar quiénes estuvieron presentes, como el endilgado Maynor Sterling Araya, quien por el tipo de funciones que desempeñaba para el partido, para la generalidad era menos conocido que Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo (incluso María Elena Rojas Mora indicó no conocerlo), este último con quien la mayoría de los colaboradores sí había tratado personalmente. Creer que los testigos citados por los impugnantes, para refutar la credibilidad de José Reyes Gómez, debían coincidir en que don Maynor estuvo en “La Catalina” y fue quien instruyó a los congregados a suscribir los contratos con su rúbrica, es desconocer la psicología misma del testimonio, pues un grupo de personas concentradas en un lugar, donde algunos conversan mientras otros hablan al público, o simplemente están presentes, o no está atentos a detalles, nunca van todos a coincidir en aspectos determinados, o tan específicos como quién fue el que llamó a firmar los documentos en cuestión, o si don Maynor se lo dijo a un grupo de personas, o al colectivo. Además, debe tomarse en consideración aspectos propios de la valoración del testimonio, tales como el tiempo transcurrido, la forma de percibir los hechos por parte de cada individuo, la forma de que le causó. Véase que los defensores no establecen siquiera qué trascendencia o cómo incide en lo resuelto, el hecho que el encartado Sterling Araya estuviese presente o no en “La Catalina”, o fuera él u otro quien ahí reiteró la consigna de suscribir contratos de servicios para apoyar al partido. Resulta en realidad indiferente si fueron o no contactados por don Maynor, es decir si Flor de María Monge Arroyo refirió que la llamaron del partido, y fue don Manuel Antonio Bolaños quien le dio los documentos para que los firmara (vd. f. 2919); si José Solís Rojas dijo que fue Tony quien lo llamó y que no conoce a don Maynor (vd. f. 2948); o que Luis Carlos Odio Victory manifestó únicamente conocer al señor Sterling de vista y que solo se percató de la presencia de Tony. Mediante un ejercicio racional simplista que evade el tema de la responsabilidad por co-dominio funcional del hecho y la dirección del acontecer delictivo, los defensores intentan convencer que porque su defendido no fue a recoger firmas, o no se le vio en “La Catalina” o en cualquier otro punto de reunión del PAC, dirigiéndose al público para promover la suscripción de los documentos, no tuvo relación con el artificio llevado a cabo. Resulta también irrelevante si el Tribunal erró al expresar que el acusado Sterling Araya ratificó con su firma la totalidad de los contratos de servicios especiales, los que fueron firmados por la señora Margarita Bolaños Arquín como Secretaria General del Comité Ejecutivo, pues dicha situación no le resta participación dentro del plan, concurriendo el justiciable en las diversas etapas del iter criminis. Tales acciones por sí solas no son las únicas que ponderó el Tribunal para afincar su coautoría sobre la estafa perpetrada, sino un cúmulo de circunstancias que esquivan los recurrentes mencionar, precisamente porque un análisis integral de los elementos probatorios como el efectuado por el a quo, lleva a la determinación inexorable que la orden y el plan defraudatorio provinieron de Maynor Sterling Araya y que este tuvo las riendas del acontecer delictivo, sin que a tales consideraciones arribara el a quo, a causa de una carga negativa hacia el encausado. Una lectura objetiva y adecuada de las declaraciones de los testigos Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo y Gloria Cárdenas Miranda evidencia que ninguna de ellas hizo suposiciones infundadas al aseverar que el pedido del coimputado Bolaños Murillo, estaba respaldado en la instrucción impartida por el justiciable Sterling Araya, quien era el Tesorero del PAC para ese entonces. Tal y como lo destaca el fallo, la declaración de la testigo Gloria Cárdenas Miranda es sumamente importante para afirmar la responsabilidad que la defensa técnica ahora niega. No sólo porque es una de las numerosas personas que se presentaron al debate a señalar que fue el coimputado Bolaños Murillo quien la citó para inducirla a firmar los documentos de supuestos contratos especiales para dar un respiro a las maltrechas finanzas del PAC, sino que le reveló quiénes estaban detrás de toda esa ideación. Cuando Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo le estaba requiriendo su firma y le estaba explicando la razón de ser de suscribirlos, la señora Cárdenas Miranda le consultó de quién provenía toda la maquinación, a lo que este respondió, que de don Maynor Sterling y de doña Margarita Bolaños. Enfatizó la testigo: ...le pregunté a don Manuel que por qué firma el documento y me dijo que yo brindaba servicios de capacitación y yo le pregunté quién había dicho, porque yo sabía que él era un peón, y me dijo: Margarita Bolaños y don Sterling, el Comité… (vd. f. 2924, sic). Lo mismo ha de decirse del testimonio de Gerardo Amadero Cordero Martínez, quien si bien apunta a la Secretaria General del partido, Margarita Bolaños Arquín, como quien promovió que firmara, así como que lo hicieran otros allegados que resultaron ser Isidro Navarro Vargas, Juan Luis Padilla Molina y Cristian Padilla Molina, esa indicación en modo alguno exonera a Sterling Araya, gestor de la programación defraudatoria, para cobrar al Estado un desembolso indebido. El mensaje fue -casi invariablemente- que la firma de los documentos iba dirigido a ayudar económicamente al partido, a través de la donación del producto del contrato que firmarían, tal cual se lo dijo Bolaños Murillo a la testigo Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, resultando haber sido un enviado de Sterling Araya, como se lo manifestó a su vez a la deponente Gloria Cárdenas Miranda (vd. f. 2839 y 2924). No es entonces una presunción infundada de las testigos como aseguran los recurrentes, sino una deducción a la que llegaron de acuerdo con las circunstancias y que se vio confirmada por los elementos que esgrimió el tribunal de mérito. Expresa la sentencia: “...el tribunal tuvo la oportunidad de inmediar que los testigos firmaron esos documentos por el gran cariño y confianza que le tenían al PAC, un partido que había levantado la bandera de la ética y la austeridad, para ayudarlo económicamente, pero fueron inducidos a error porque lo que no sabían era que el partido lo que pretendía era que ese supuesto gasto sumara para dar mayor contenido a los certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal de la serie A, que estaba en manos de los mayores “acreedores” del partido y de sus grandes contribuyentes” (cfr. f. 3694). Por ello, el alcance que pretenden otorgar los recurrentes al punto de si don Maynor intervino directamente incentivando a los militantes del partido a suscribir los contratos para acreditar su participación, en realidad no es lo concluyente, sino un conjunto de elementos obtenidos del examen de las probanzas, tanto testimonial como documental, que delatan el dolo de don Maynor junto con su plan de autor para engañar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, que va más allá del hecho de fungir como tesorero del PAC a la fecha de los eventos delictivos, así como formar parte del comité ejecutivo. El testimonio de Jeannette de la O Hernández, quien además grabó en audio (de haber convencido a los partidarios, personalmente, de firmar la documentación mediante la cual el PAC obtendría el beneficio patrimonial) lo expresado por el acusado Sterling Araya durante la reunión celebrada en la sede central del PAC (vd. fs. 3527-3556), es una de las piezas que corrobora que don Maynor efectivamente conocía y concertaba el plan de que se firmaran contratos especiales por parte de los colaboradores del partido para cobrarlos contra la contribución estatal a los partidos políticos, sin que el hecho de que no lo pidiera directamente a cada uno de los testigos que declaró en el debate, desvirtúe su aporte e intervención en la estructuración delictiva. Fue el mismo candidato presidencial por el PAC, Ottón Solís Fallas, quien ante la preocupación que externó doña Jeannette, porque la estaban inquiriendo del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y hasta se cuestionaba que habiendo brindado un servicio remunerado por el partido, los proveedores no reportaron el ingreso al fisco, la remitió con don Minor, procediendo ella y un grupo de personas afectadas a solicitar una reunión. Lo que ahí explicó Sterling Araya a quienes lo confrontaban, es el mismo discurso que en distintas ocasiones difundió a través del coimputado Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, o de Margarita Bolaños Arquín, o de algunos dirigentes locales del PAC como Daniel Quesada y Eduardo Solís, o bien, militantes como Gerardo Amadeo Cordero Martínez, en el sentido de que el trabajo de los colaboradores, aun siendo gratuito y motivado por empatía con los ideales del partido, debía asignarse un valor económico. Si lograba reconocimiento por el Estado se les pagaba, o bien podían donarlo a la agrupación, opción que la mayoría de los testigos aceptó por su sentido de identidad, pertenencia y lealtad a la causa y, salvo en algunos casos, sin interiorizar realmente que ello implicaba un cobro indebido al erario público. De interés de la grabación conviene resaltar las siguientes conversaciones: “MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Bueno, ustedes recuerdan que en la campaña política a ustedes se les pidió, porque ustedes estaban trabajando en la campaña política que si querían ayudarle al partido, y como estaban trabajando, ese trabajo se podía cuantificar y que se le pagaba con bonos B, y si ese dinero se adquiría como deuda política ustedes decidían, dos cosas, uno si se lo dejaban y dos si se lo donaban al partido, eso fue, resulta que ustedes firmaron cuatro documentos, (voces que no se entienden lo que dicen), ustedes firmaron cuatro documentos. JEANNETTE JULIA ROMAN GONZÁLEZ : Ahí estamos en problemas Don Maynor que no nos acordamos de eso…” (cfr. f. 3529-3530). “ MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: ...nadie recibió plata, ¿Por qué?, porque el partido por la cantidad de bonos que obtuvo ni siquiera cubrió la totalidad de bonos A...” (cfr. f. 3530). “MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: ...esto se quedó en custodia aquí para todas las personas. ¿Y por qué lo dejamos en custodia?… en las campañas del 2002 y la campaña del 2006… la gente llegó y empezó a vender esto en la calle, y esto no tiene ningún valor hasta que el Tribunal diga...” (cfr. f. 3532). “JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Si, pero que servicios yo los presté al PAC que yo dije que me tenían que dar ese dinero. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Los servicios especiales. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Pero yo lo único que puse fue el carro a trabajar y trabajé en las mesas, yo no quería ningún dinero. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA : Es que ese trabajo se cuantificó y se le puso un precio, eso es. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Eso sin saberlo. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA : ¿Cómo sin saberlo? JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: No yo no sabia. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Exacto, si. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA : Claro eso tiene que habérselos explicado. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ : Si, tenemos ahí el documento, pero yo no me acuerdo en ningún momento, que yo iba a recibir esa cantidad de dinero por haber prestado el servicio del carro y por haber trabajado como fiscal, que nunca pude hacerlo porque nunca me llegó el papel. ¿Me entiende? MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Si, si claro que la entiendo. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Entonces a lo que yo me baso es, si hubiese habido ese dinero, yo hubiera recibido ese millón doscientos mil que me iban a dar a mi. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Ochocientos… MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA : Pero diay entonces yo ahí si no puedo responderle, porque diay usted es la responsable de firmar sus documentos. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ : Yo se, yo dije, yo en eso va mi firma pero… GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: Pero eso no le tocó, eso a usted no le tocó recoger las firmas Don Maynor. GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: Eso nadie sabe cómo se recogió. MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA: Pero cómo nadie sabe. JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: Yo eso no, o sea no entiendo esa parte. GUSTAVO MARTINEZ: Pero, es que, ¿eso no le tocó usted don Maynor? ¿A usted no le tocó eso? No le tocó recoger las firmas… MAYNOR STERLING ARAYA : No, no, no yo no hago esas cosas.” (cfr. 3547, 3548 y 3549). “JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ : ¿En que momento me nombraron a mi asesora de Casa Conde?. Asesora de Transporte, yo recuerdo haber puesto mi carro al servicio del PAC, y sin cobrar nada, porque yo dije, yo pongo mi gasolina, a de por si tampoco ni trabajamos mucho, porque no había mucho servicio ahí en el carro. Entonces yo dije yo pongo mi carro, yo no voy a cobrar, yo voy a dar mi gasolina las veces que yo tenga que llenar mi tanque, yo lo dono al PAC yo no voy a cobrar ni un centavo OK. Después el otro servicio yo no sé, que el único servicio que yo presté fue trabajar como fiscal, ahí en las mesas...” (cfr. f. 3549). “JEANNETTE DE LA O HERNÁNDEZ: ¿Pero, no se porque iba a recibir yo una cantidad tan grande?” (cfr. f. 3550, sic). Contrario a lo que esgrimen los recurrentes, las anteriores transcripciones ratifican que Sterling Araya tenía conocimiento de la suscripción de los “contratos especiales”, los que no podía cobrar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones desde que sabía que los servicios se habían prestado en forma gratuita. Por más que en la reunión fingió sorprenderse sobre la irrealidad de las prestaciones descritas en los contratos y su desproporción con los valores consignados, responsabilizando a los mismos otorgantes por no leer lo que habían firmado, es claro que el conocimiento y las intenciones de don Maynor iban más allá del generoso gesto de reconocer una estimación económica al trabajo de los colaboradores. La propia Jeannette de la O Hernández expresó al imputado que la suma de un millón ochocientos mil colones era demasiado dinero para lo que hizo durante la campaña (abastecer gasolina a su vehículo de su propio peculio y manejarlo, así como fungir como fiscal de mesa y asesora en Casa Conde, que rechazó), lo cual Sterling Araya no podía pasar por alto, al igual que los alrededor de 179 contratos que suscribieron los testigos que se apersonaron al debate a contar que el aporte había sido voluntario y sin retribución, o bien que no habían prestado servicio alguno. También en esa oportunidad intentó distanciarse del conocimiento de las inconsistencias en los documentos, rechazando con vehemencia que él los hubiese llevado a los signatarios para que fuesen firmados, indicando: “-no, no, no, no, yo no hago esas cosas”. Cuando es evidente que, por su cargo como tesorero del PAC, no le correspondía la labor de recolección de firmas, sino una serie de funciones por las cuales no podía haber pasado desapercibido el cobro de una partida por “servicios especiales” que el PAC no había pagado. De acuerdo con el artículo 30 del Estatuto del Partido Acción Ciudadana, al tesorero de la agrupación le correspondía: a) Coordinar su trabajo con la Comisión Nacional de Finanzas. b) Controlar el manejo financiero y contable del partido y velar por la aplicación estricta de todas las normas electorales y legales que rigen la materia, tanto para las contribuciones privadas como para los aportes estatales a los partidos políticos, en especial los reglamentos dictados al efecto por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y la Contraloría General de la República, resultando completamente responsable por el cumplimiento de la ley en esta materia. c) Presentar informes al Comité Ejecutivo Nacional y a la Comisión Política, con copia al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, acerca de las contribuciones que se reciban y la marcha financiera del partido, resultando que dichos informes se deben presentar mensualmente desde un año antes de la elección nacional, hasta seis meses después de concluidas las elecciones municipales, y trimestralmente el resto del tiempo. d) Presentar a la Contraloría General de la República un informe por año. e) Dar seguimiento al registro contable de los ingresos y los egresos del partido político Acción Ciudadana (artículo 30 del Estatuto del Partido Acción Ciudadana; ordinal 123 del Código Electoral). f) Registrar fielmente el monto y origen de las contribuciones privadas, de cualquier clase, que el partido político Acción Ciudadana recibiera y la identidad de esos contribuyentes. Véase que dentro del rol de Sterling Araya como tesorero del PAC, estaba el control contable de las entradas y salidas de dinero del partido, lo que hace inverosímil su negativa a aceptar que estaba enterado de que los contratos eran simulados, pues nunca se generaron para la agrupación los gastos consignados en la documentación. Pero además, como bien lo analiza el a quo, no podía don Maynor introducir dentro de la liquidación de gastos para el cobro de la contribución estatal, servicios brindados en forma gratuita por simpatizantes del partido, pues no solo no constituían una erogación realizada, sino que delataba otra irregularidad: el no incluir esas donaciones en sus informes al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones como contribuciones al partido. Su objetivo claro era presentarlos como desembolsos para lograr dar el mayor contenido económico posible a los bonos de la serie A, pues entre más importante fuera la cantidad de gastos generados y justificados por un partido político durante la campaña electoral, más considerable sería lo que se recibiría de la contribución estatal por la participación del PAC en las elecciones nacionales. Debe tenerse presente que la cuota política para los partidos se define a partir de dos factores: el total de votos válidos alcanzado por la agrupación política en el proceso electoral, y el monto íntegro de gastos liquidados por esta última ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Esta Cámara comparte el análisis realizado en la sentencia, sobre el carácter simulado de los documentos y el ineludible conocimiento que de ello tenía don Maynor, a partir de ser uno de los artífices del plan, conforme se deriva del dominio funcional que tenía del suceso, según lo relatado por los testigos y los extractos de las conversaciones referidas: “Esos documentos consistían en el “CONTRATO DE PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS ESPECIALES CELEBRADO ENTRE EL PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA Y…”; que de su literalidad contenía una serie de falsedades (que conocían los encartados) y que buscaban cumplir con los requisitos legales para justificar un gasto por servicios especiales que nunca se daba, pues aunque en algunos casos habían labores varias, estas no eran las indicadas y en ningún caso se cobró. Véase entonces que este contrato se describía el servicio especial a brindar, estos eran títulos genéricos y sin un contenido real, por ejemplo: Coordinador Cantonal de Electores, Promotor General Cantonal, Coordinador General de Finanzas, Coordinador General de Organización, Coordinador Cantonal de Comunicaciones, Coordinador Cantonal de Juventudes y Coordinador Cantonal de Transportes. Con la inmediación que brinda el contradictorio, este Tribunal pudo extraer con facilidad del lenguaje corporal y verbal de los contratistas, su asombro al ver el contrato y el puesto asignado. La gran mayoría dijo desconocer que era el puesto, en que consistía, quien lo había nombrado, cuáles serían sus supuestas responsabilidades y en ningún caso se les pidió cuentas o informes sobre sus funciones. Otro contenido falso del contrato, que a la postre sirvió como ardid ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones era el monto del pago total de lo cancelado. Una inmensa mayoría de los testigos contratistas evacuados, como se vió en el considerando VII, dijeron nunca haber pactado o cobrado suma económica alguna, sorprendidos por esta cláusula y en varios casos, profundamente consternados y hasta enojados pues nunca tuvieron siquiera la intención de cuantificar económicamente su labor. Otros, con claro interés de proteger a su partido político, trataban infructuosamente, de justificar el monto, alegando que realizaron una ardua labor, que era lo que pagaban otros partidos, que se estableció según el salario mínimo de sus profesiones, que era un monto extraído del total de horas trabajadas, y múltiples razones que, confrontadas unas con otras, dejan claro que nunca existió un acuerdo entre las partes, si no que fueron montos antojadizos y machoteros que llenaron personas desconocidas por orden de los encartados para engañar al ente electoral. Este contrato, además, incluía el rango temporal donde supuestamente se brindaba el servicio especial, otro claro ejemplo del engaño que intentaron los encartados, pues la totalidad de los testigos fueron contestes en señalar que dichas fechas no estaban relacionadas con sus funciones dentro del partido, cuando las brindaron. Dijeron haber trabajado antes, después, nunca o en otras fechas sin tampoco haber cobrado para esos plazos o el señalado en el contrato. Todas las fechas eran artificialmente impuestas y llenadas por los encartados haciéndose valer de otras personas” (cfr. f. 3803). El fallo expone así, cómo a través del mismo esquema de contratos simulados por montos cuantiosos y similares entre sí, confección de recibos de dinero falsos, emisión de certificados de la serie B que en lugar de entregarse a los proveedores de los servicios se conservaron en la tesorería del PAC, los coimputados fabricaron un entramado con apariencia de legalidad para que todos esos contratos ingresaran como “gastos de partido” en la liquidación final y así lograr, conforme al binomio “total de votos obtenidos y gastos”, la aprobación de mayor dinero de la contribución estatal. Fue don Maynor quien el 16 de junio de 2010, en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, propiamente en el Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos, presentó en su condición de tesorero del comité ejecutivo nacional del PAC, la certificación de liquidación de gastos correspondiente al proceso electoral 2006-2010, por un monto total que ascendía a ¢4.238.108.764.79 (cuatro mil doscientos treinta y ocho millones ciento ocho mil setecientos sesenta y cuatro colones con setenta y nueve céntimos). Del total de la liquidación de gastos, el rubro por “servicios especiales” alcanzó un valor de ¢1.152.040.184 (mil ciento cincuenta y dos millones cuarenta mil ciento ochenta y cuatro colones), dentro del cual se incluyó el cobro fraudulento por ¢516.000.000,00 (quinientos dieciséis millones de colones, correspondientes a los contratos por servicios especiales contrarios a la realidad. No fue un monto cualquiera el que pasó inadvertido para el tesorero del PAC y que incluyó dentro de la liquidación de gastos del partido, fueron 263 contratos por servicios especiales simulados por un monto que ascendió a la suma de ¢516.000.000,00 (quinientos dieciséis millones de colones. Como acertadamente se indica en el fallo, no solo se omitió, deliberadamente, por parte de Sterling Araya, reportar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones que se trataron de donaciones, como ahora procura validar en su defensa, sino que estos rubros representaron el 25% de los gastos electorales del PAC en la contienda del año 2010. Un dato sin precedentes de un partido que promovía la austeridad y el voluntariado de sus militantes, pero que en contraste, mostraba un despilfarro en gastos que no tenían coherencia ni guardaban sentido, estimando los mismos testigos que los montos ahí reflejados eran desmedidos. En su empeño de sortear la responsabilidad de su representado, los impugnantes intentan descargarla en el auditor interno Leonel Sequeira, manifestando que fue quien elaboró la liquidación de gastos, no obstante dicho esfuerzo no puede fructificar. El Tribunal derivó adecuadamente de las declaraciones de Julio Aguilar Silesky, Ronald Eduardo Chacón Bonilla y del mismo Leonel Sequeira, que la labor de este último fue de tipo documental, correspondiéndole la revisión de que los asientos contables emitidos por el partido correspondieran a un pago justificable, así como que este cumpliera con los requerimientos legales, como ir acompañado del comprobante de pago. Sin embargo, el conocimiento de la ficción contenida en los contratos de servicios especiales fue de resorte del encartado Maynor Sterling. Si don Leonel llegó a saber de la irrealidad de los contratos que se incluyeron en la liquidación, ello no excluye ni disminuye la participación de don Maynor en la ejecución del plan. En la concatenación de elementos que indican la dirección del accionar del justiciable Sterling Araya (dar contenido económico a los certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal de la serie A), el Tribunal destaca que en todos los casos, se usó el mismo programa de convencer a los partidarios que firmaran los documentos como reconocimiento de un sentido económico a su aporte, ya fuera para donarlo a la agrupación y robustecerla, o bien para dejárselos para ellos como supuesta retribución de los servicios por ellos brindados al PAC. Además, detectan los juzgadores que se trató exactamente de los mismos machotes cuyos espacios en blanco se encuentran escritos, en la inmensa mayoría, con la misma letra en manuscrito, y por montos y funciones de los que discreparon una gran parte de los testigos, los que consideraron exagerados en razón de las labores que efectivamente realizaron, existiendo también divergencia entre las funciones que se consignaron y las que realmente ejercieron. La defensa técnica pretende se crea en la buena fe de los contratos por “servicios especiales”, argumentado su preexistencia, que ya habían sido utilizados con anterioridad a que el imputado Maynor Sterling Araya asumiera el cargo de Tesorero, y que el mismo sistema normativo exigía su confección a los partidos políticos. Esta cámara concuerda con el a quo en que no hay duda alguna sobre la existencia previa y la legitimidad de los instrumentos denominados contratos por servicios especiales. Ciertamente son un instrumento legítimo para que las agrupaciones partidarias puedan solventar las necesidades de contar con servicios que no son de naturaleza ni técnica, ni profesional y que igualmente pueden ser cancelados con certificados de cesión de la contribución estatal, de la serie que el partido estime pertinente como mecanismo de pago absolutamente válido, que son y a los cuales recurren las agrupaciones partidarias para obtener recursos y así financiar la campaña en curso. Tal y como lo expresa el tribunal de mérito: “...el problema no está en la existencia o no de los contratos por servicios especiales, si se utilizaron o no en otras campañas políticas, tampoco está en la existencia de los certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal, el problema está en la instrumentalización que se hizo de los mismos para utilizarlos como el medio artificioso para simular gastos inexistentes y así engañar a una institución como el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones para lograr obtener mayores recursos de la contribución estatal de manera ilegítima. No es legal y no es viable, que el Partido Acción Ciudadana en la persona muy especialmente de los imputados haya remunerado un trabajo que sabía, era voluntario, gratuito y ad honorem, un servicio que también sabía, igual se iba a recibir con contrato o sin él, como el tribunal tiene por acreditado ocurrió en este caso y que tenía como fin otorgar mayor contenido económico a los certificados de cesión de derechos a la contribución estatal de la serie A y así poder honrar las deudas que se tenían con los mayores acreedores y con los mayores contribuyentes durante la campaña electoral. La utilización por parte de Sterling Araya y Bolaños Murillo de instrumentos legalmente admitidos, más bien fue parte de lo idóneo del engaño proferido al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones a quien se le representó una falsa realidad de las cosas y que a la hora de verificar el cumplimiento de los elementos normativos exigidos en la liquidación de los gastos, confirmó que los instrumentos eran los que exigía la legislación y en virtud del principio de buena fe, asumió que el Partido Acción Ciudadana le estaba diciendo la verdad en cuanto a su contenido. Lleva razón el testigo Otton Solís Fallas cuando indica que no hay nada de malo en que las personas donen al partido el fruto de su trabajo, pero ese no es el caso que nos ocupa porque de parte de los simpatizantes del Partido Acción Ciudadana nunca hubo la intención de cobrar porque su trabajo era gratuito y de parte del partido nunca existió la intención contratarlos y pagar por sus servicios, lo ideado fue un estratagema de cobro ilegal al erario público dándole "apariencia" de legalidad” (vd. fs. 3793-3794). Tan patente tenía Sterling Araya el designio trazado, que los bonos de la serie B ni siquiera fueron entregados a los supuestos prestatarios de los servicios que simularon remunerados, o que emularon que existieron, pues como se indicó, en algunos casos ni siquiera los hubo de por medio. Se acreditó que otro de los documentos utilizados, fue el “comprobante de pago”, el cual igual que el contrato, tenía una serie de falsedades que los propios testigos evidenciaron de manera unánime, pues la literalidad del comprobante decía: “El Partido Acción Ciudadana ha pagado a…”, siendo que a nadie se le canceló monto alguno. Señala el fallo para recalcar el dolo con el que actuó Sterling Araya: “Importante señalar que en este comprobante el propio STERLING ARAYA, firma bajo la leyenda: “Recibo conforme del bien o servicio”, a sabiendas que, en primer lugar, no se había brindado el servicio y en segundo lugar que nunca se había cobrado o cancelado la suma ahí dicha por parte del Partido Acción Ciudadana. Estos son, sin duda, preconstitución de prueba para el fraude, que a la postre presentaran ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Por último, como parte de ardid, los encartados hacían firmar a los contratistas instrumentalizados para esta estafa, el documento que decía: “PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECIBO POR LA ENTREGA DE BONOS COMO PAGO POR LA PRESTACIÓN DE BIENES Y SERVICIOS”. Nuevamente, un documento lleno de falsedades e imprecisiones, como los anteriores. En este se hacía referencia a la supuesta entrega de Certificados Tipo B a los contratistas, lo que nunca se da en los ciento setenta y nueve contratos, con una excepción. Incluso la gran mayoría de los testigos nunca tuvieron contacto visual con el certificado. En este punto hay que recordar que los Certificados tipo A, B o C, que emitiera el Comité Ejecutivo del Partido Político, son como lo indica el Código Electoral vigente para el año 2010 un medio de pago válido para todos los efectos legales como lo ratifica la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Razón por la cual lo correspondiente era entregarlos a quienes hubieren prestado bienes o servicios al Partido Acción Ciudadana y así liquidarlos en los gastos. Lo anterior no se da por la simple razón que nunca se tuvo interés de cancelarlos. La excusa dada por STERLING ARAYA, en el sentido que lo hizo para evitar un eventual perjuicio a terceros de buena fe que pudieran recibirlos, como alegó había ocurrido en elecciones anteriores, no es de recibo. Lo cierto es que por ley los contratistas eran los únicos tenedores válidos, pues se les había “cancelado con ellos”. No existió un solo documento que respaldara la supuesta donación instantánea de los mismos al partido, o la solicitud que el partido en su sede central fueran los guardianes de los Certificados. Interesante resulta para comprobar el engaño de los encartados, que los Certificados tipo A y Certificados tipo B brindados a empresas o medios de comunicación, si fueron entregados, dejando claro del tratamiento diverso, sus intenciones diversas a las indicadas en la literalidad de este documento. Si los contratistas pretendían donar dicho importante al Partido una vez cancelado, se debía seguir el procedimiento respectivo para el financiamiento privado de partidos, en su modalidad de donaciones. Lo cual nunca se realiza. Esto porqué, en la ideación de esta estructura delictiva, nunca se pensó en darles contenido a los mismos, sino que sirvieran para subir los gastos de manera artificial y así tener acceso al 100 % de la deuda política que el Partido Acción Ciudadana tenía derecho para ese momento por el abrupto cambio en sus estatutos que modificaba el tope de un 50 % a un 100% de la contribución estatal que se iba a recibir, y siendo que esto ocurre posterior a las elecciones, al no existir gastos reales de la agrupación política P.A.C., se echa mano a contratos simulados por servicios especiales. Así la entrega simulada que se hacía de los certificados B eran un ardid idóneo para llevar a error al ente electoral costarricense, toda vez que aplicando el principio de confianza que rige en materia electoral y a partir de la literalidad de los documentos presentados, los cuales contaban con las firmas correspondientes, entre ellas las del co encartado STERLING ARAYA y la señora Margarita Bolaños, acreditaban jurídicamente un pago, que nunca se realizó, nunca se cobró por parte de los militantes del partido y que por lo tanto nunca debió de contabilizarse como tal. Importante resaltar, como se dijo, que los certificados, a pesar de su naturaleza, nunca salieron de las oficinas centrales del Partido Acción Ciudadana, por una disposición directa del co encartado STERLING ARAYA. Con una excepción de los 263 contratos presentados en este caso, estos Certificados B nunca fueron entregados, siendo que esto deja claramente establecido que los encartados BOLAÑOS MURILLO y STERLING ARAYA, nunca quisieron darles a los mismos el valor jurídico que por ley tienen. Así que las razones dadas por STERLING ARAYA para su no entrega resultan altamente contradictorias con la tramitología dada a los certificados A e incluso los B dados a empresas o medios de comunicación, diverso tratamiento que confirmar que estos formaban parte de un elaborado ardid” (cfr. fs. 3804-3805). El Tribunal de mérito deja así plasmado cómo se instrumentalizaron todos estos contratos a los que se dio un trámite similar porque su único fin era inflar los gastos para engañar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Se establecieron puestos, actividades, obligaciones y montos para con el partido, sin ningún parámetro objetivo, sino con absoluta ligereza, de manera arbitraria y antojadiza, que no revela otra cosa más que el designio de hacer cobros indebidos al Estado. Comparte esta Cámara que a diferencia de los certificados de la serie A y de la serie B que se entregaron a importantes acreedores del partido, los de la serie B referentes a los contratos de servicios especiales, quedaron en poder del justiciable Sterling Araya, a pesar de que este emitió los correspondientes recibos por la entrega de bonos, evidenciando que desde su génesis nunca se tuvo la intención de que fueran siquiera, remotamente, cancelados, dándose un tratamiento diverso al normal que viene a indicar, inequívocamente, que efectivamente su razón de ser, era para abultar la partida de gastos del PAC. Ciertamente, al haberse entregado los certificados serie B a los supuestos beneficiados, se tornaban nugatorias cualquier intención de cobro para los prestatarios que aparecían en los contratos, sin que la explicación brindada por don Maynor, de que no fueron entregados para que no fueran posteriormente transmitidos pues habían sido emitidos al portador, sea de recibo, puesto que según lo aseveró Margarita Bolaños Arquín, a la empresa de televisión Repretel y a varias emisoras locales y personas físicas que entregaron dinero efectivo al partido, se les pagó con certificados de la serie B, los que sí se les entregaron en su materialidad. El hecho de que los testigos María Yenory Gutiérrez Briezuela y Leonel Sequeira indicasen que la suscripción de los recibos por parte del imputado Sterling atendía al cumplimiento de una obligación administrativa por ser el Tesorero Nacional, no lo desconecta del artilugio y el entramado montado para estafar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, y más bien se enlaza con las otras acciones desplegadas, dirigidas a hacer un cobro ilegítimo e improcedente. Advierte también el fallo que de acuerdo a lo que manifestaron los testigos en el juicio, las finanzas del PAC eran sumamente precarias para los comicios del 2010 y aún se tenían deudas acumuladas de la campaña anterior. Como Tesorero del partido, don Maynor estaba obviamente preocupado por no poder cubrir las sumas suministradas por los bancos y los grandes acreedores a los cuales se les había pagado con certificados de la serie A. La sentencia expone, de manera técnica y adecuada, que antes de la campaña electoral del año 2006-2010, el monto de la contribución estatal para cada partido era de un 100% para sus gastos electorales y de campaña. Fue a partir del año 2009, que en aplicación del texto del artículo 52 del Código Electoral se exigió a los partidos políticos disponer en sus estatutos, en distribución precisa, un porcentaje de la contribución estatal para la reserva de gastos de capacitación y organización política en tiempos no electorales. Lo anterior bajo el espíritu de promover a los partidos como entes permanentes, reflejo de la democracia costarricense, y no simples máquinas electoreras a las caza de votos en la búsqueda de ganar los comicios. A lo interno del Partido Acción Ciudadana existía una regla de austeridad que estaba contenida en el artículo 53 del Estatuto del Partido Acción Ciudadana, en el sentido de que la agrupación partidaria nunca iba a cobrar más del 0.08% del producto interno bruto. Se dispuso también que el porcentaje destinado al rubro de reserva por capacitación y organización política sería de un 20% con cargo a la contribución estatal. Esta era una regla que limitaba económicamente al PAC y que preocupaba a Maynor Sterling Araya, constituyéndose en el principal propulsor para que se diera una reforma al estatuto para poder acceder a la totalidad del monto del apoyo estatal. No hay duda sobre ello por más que sus defensores aleguen que su labor como Tesorero Nacional era ad honorem, que no permanecía regularmente en el recinto de la tesorería, sino que se apersonaba única y exclusivamente a suscribir documentos. Los jueces evidencian la inquietud de don Maynor por las finanzas del PAC en la contienda electoral del 2010, refiriendo que tanto él en su calidad de tesorero del PAC, junto con los tesoreros de otras agrupaciones políticas (Partido Movimiento Libertario y Partido Liberación Nacional), solicitaron al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en fecha 7 de mayo de 2009, una reconsideración de la situación, aduciendo que implicaría un “cierre técnico financiero” de los partidos con derecho a la deuda política, toda vez que la deducción indicada tendría como consecuencia la imposibilidad absoluta de pago de obligaciones dinerarias o compromisos (bonos) ya adquiridos, emitidos o contraídos, colocándolos en una “encrucijada” financiera, porque tendrían que decirle a muchas personas o entidades, que no recuperaron su inversión, agravando la no credibilidad en las organizaciones políticas y generando una fortísima desconfianza hacia el sistema financiero de los partidos políticos (vd. f. 3596). El Tribunal respondió al imputado y a sus homólogos que la parte de la contribución estatal a destinar a capacitación y organización no resultaba potestativo sino un deber. Ante la alerta de que solo estarían recibiendo un 80% del monto total (sujeto a la aprobación de gastos), el fallo describe cómo el encartado maquinó un plan a fin de satisfacer económicamente a los inversionistas en la campaña electoral, consistente este “en la simulación de una gran cantidad de contratos por servicios especiales supuestamente cancelados con certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal de la serie B, que fueron presentados a manera de gastos supuestamente incurridos por el Partido Acción Ciudadana ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, para ello, el Partido Acción Ciudadana en la persona de los imputados, de manera ilegal le consignó un valor económico al trabajo ad honorem, gratuito y voluntario que venían desarrollando o que ya habían desarrollado sus colaboradores durante la campaña presidencia y como es obvio y de acuerdo a las palabras del testigo Ronald Chacón Badilla y Rui López González del Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos, un servicio gratuito no puede constituir un gasto efectivo” (cfr. f. 3597). El propio ex candidato presidencial y fundador del PAC, Ottón Solís Fallas, refirió que Sterling Araya fue uno de los impulsores del cambio del estatuto quien incluso hasta lo engañó, porque dijo Solís Fallas que en algún momento él conversó con Sterling para que se desistiera de promover esa reforma al estatuto, sin embargo lejos de apegarse a los principios del partido, siguió fomentando su aprobación. El 16 de mayo de 2010, en San Pedro de Montes de Oca, propiamente en el Edificio Cooperativo ubicado detrás del Mall San Pedro, los asambleístas nacionales del PAC celebraron la Asamblea Nacional No. 17, cuya acta da cuenta que ese día se dio la referida reforma estatutaria que estaba establecida en los artículos 52, 53, 54, 55 y 56. En el artículo cuarto del acta se informa que la señora Elizabeth Fonseca, Presidenta del Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, procedió a leer una nota que había dejado Maynor Sterling Araya por encontrarse en esa fecha fuera del país, para que la misma fuera leída a la Asamblea Nacional del PAC. El acta refiere lo siguiente: "...Procedo a leer como ayer les dije, la carta que nos dejara don Maynor Sterling. Dice don Maynor: ...no estaré en Costa Rica del 14 al 29 de mayo del presente año .... En virtud de que no me será posible estar presente en la Asamblea Nacional del próximo 15 de mayo ..., me veo en la necesidad de plantearles por este medio las razones del porqué creo necesario que nuestro Partido Acción Ciudadana trate de cobrar la totalidad de la deuda política del acuerdo con el Código Electoral... De allí la importancia de hacer esta reforma e inscribirla antes de que presentemos la liquidación de gastos al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones para el cobro de la contribución estatal en el mes de junio. Por todo lo anterior, respetuosamente le solicito darle su apoyo a la siguiente iniciativa y votarla a favor... si alguno de ustedes desea conocer más de este asunto, me pueden llamar por teléfono o escribirme al correo y trataré de profundizar un poco más mis razonamientos o si lo tienen a bien podemos coordinar una reunión..." (cfr. expediente principal tomo I, fs. 413 a 415). El interés mostrado por el encartado para que se aprobara la reforma al estatuto antes de la fecha de presentación de la liquidación final de gastos ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, lo que pretendía era que todos esos gastos simulados que iban allí incluidos, fueran al fin reconocidos por el Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos y abonaran a dar contenido económico a los certificados de la serie A. Los recurrentes intentan desmentir dichas motivaciones aduciendo que don Maynor incluso fungía como tesorero sin recibir una remuneración, sin embargo en el curso de su gestión, este puso de manifiesto que la aprobación de la reforma al estatuto se logró gracias a su iniciativa, destacando sus méritos como salvador de las finanzas del partido, cuando informó: "Deseo resaltar la aprobación por parte de la Asamblea Nacional a petición de la Tesorería Nacional, del cobro de la totalidad de deuda política (sic), decisión histórica que sin duda redundará en más recursos económicos para fortalecer nuestro partido, de allí la excelente capacidad económica en que queda al PAC (sic) después del cobro de esos dinero (sic), según se muestra más adelante…" (vd. Informe de Tesorería Nacional de fecha 8 de febrero de 2011, fs. 305 a 315). Una reforma de esta naturaleza que proclamaba Sterling como “urgente”, era necesaria para que su plan delictivo de consignar un valor económico al trabajo gratuito que venían desarrollando los seguidores del partido, diera sus frutos y se alcanzara más dinero de la contribución estatal. Tal y como se indicó, en su nota advirtió, en singular, en primera persona y con profunda vehemencia, que resultaba apremiante aprobar esa reforma e inscribirla antes de presentar la liquidación de gastos al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, una liquidación donde iban incluidos los 263 contratos por servicios especiales simulados. Lejos de tratarse de una recomendación sin ningún interés, Sterling Artaya presionó para que la Asamblea Nacional modificara el estatuto y así alcanzar su objetivo defraudatorio. Ya fuera por entrega y devoción al partido, o por aparecer como su redentor, pues siempre quiso proyectar una buena imagen y credibilidad en los temas económicos, don Maynor no solo se divorció de los ideales éticos que proclamaba la agrupación que defendía, sino que transgredió el bloque de legalidad. Es así que, luego de un análisis del proceso derivativo realizado por los juzgadores, se logra determinar que los yerros apuntados por los impugnantes son inexistentes y que, la sentencia se cimenta a partir de una adecuada valoración de la prueba directa e indiciaria, ejercicio que se hizo de manera objetiva, conjunta, integral, concatenada y armónica de todos los elementos probatorios que fueron allegados al contradictorio. B) En el quinto motivo de su recurso aducen fundamentación insuficiente por ausencia de acreditación del elemento objetivo del tipo penal: daño patrimonial. Alegan que el tribunal concluyó de manera infundada sobre la existencia de un perjuicio patrimonial en contra del Estado y consecuentemente de un beneficio económico a favor de las persona tenedoras de certificados de cesión de deuda política serie A; adicionalmente, que el PAC se benefició pecuniariamente de la supuesta estafa perpetrada contra fondos públicos. Aseveran que los certificados serie B no fueron redimidos por dinero, de ahí que el estado costarricense no realizó ningún desembolso como consecuencia de la emisión de dichos medios de pago, y así se estableció en la resolución del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones No. 7235-E10-2010 de las 12:45 horas del 03 de diciembre de 2010, según la cual los certificados de cesión de deuda política, serie B, no alcanzaron ningún contenido económico. Ello debe contrastarse con la realidad de los pagos aprobados y hechos efectivos por el Ministerio de Hacienda, de donde se obtiene que solamente se canceló el equivalente al 98,72% del total del valor de los certificados de cesión de deuda política, serie A, de modo que los certificados seriados B no alcanzaron ningún contenido económico. Cuestionan las conclusiones del fallo, en el sentido de que según los jueces el perjuicio económico se materializó porque los contratos de servicios especiales al ser incluidos en la liquidación de gastos de la deuda política por parte del PAC, inflaron el monto al que dicha agrupación política tenía derecho y se canceló más dinero del que se debía a los tenedores de certificados serie A, procurándose así un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico a terceros particulares que vendieron bienes y servicios al PAC y, en favor del partido político mismo que obtuvo un monto mayor de deuda política. Estiman que la sentencia es omisa en señalar exactamente, cuál y qué persona fue la que recibió un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico, sin que sea procedente en materia de derecho penal realizar una alusión general de que lo recibieron los tenedores de certificados serie A. También es ayuna de fundamentación en cuanto a la razón legal que prevaleció para determinar que la cantidad de dinero cancelada a los tenedores de certificados serie A, no correspondió a un pago real desde que cada uno de los gastos que pagó el PAC a sus diferentes proveedores, lo hizo en forma efectiva mediante los certificados A y B, haciendo buen pago el partido, fuesen o no redimidos esos certificados, y ningún pago en efectivo recibió del PAC. Para los recurrentes existía imposibilidad de manipular el monto de la deuda política por desconocerse el monto que recibiría cada partido, al amparo de los dispuesto en el artículo 90 del Código Electoral acerca de la determinación de la distribución del aporte estatal a los partidos políticos. Reprueban el procedimiento de revisión de las liquidaciones presentadas por los partidos que los testigos Ronald Chacón Badilla y Rui López González, jefe del Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos y asesor legal del mismo departamento respectivamente, que detallaron en sus declaraciones, esto es, que su examen se limita a la verificación del cumplimiento de requisitos formales, lo que se hace en forma aleatoria y parcial, sin seleccionarlos por medio de pago o certificados de cesión, hasta por un monto equivalente al máximo que el partido político pudo acceder, lo que se ha venido haciendo por costumbre. Afirman que ello contraviene el principio de legalidad pues el Código Electoral aprobado a partir de setiembre de 2009, no tiene una norma que determine cuál es el procedimiento que se debe seguir para la revisión documental de las liquidaciones, sin embargo dicho cuerpo normativo en el artículo 115 señala, en referencia a los certificados de cesión de la deuda política, que existe un orden de prelación al momento de su pago, de lo que se colige que al momento de liquidar gastos se debe hacer en orden serial comenzando por la A, y así sucesivamente, sin que se justifique la falta de revisiones documentales completas en que no hay tiempo suficiente para ello y se retrasaría el pago de liquidaciones a los partidos políticos. Argumentan los recurrentes que si los funcionarios del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones hubiesen realizado bien su trabajo y cumplido con su obligación de revisar los documentos propios de cada cuenta que se canceló, se sabría si todas las cuentas pagadas con certificados serie A debían ser redimidas o si algunas estaban mal fundamentadas y no procedía el pago. No se produjo en realidad ningún perjuicio económico al erario, ya que no se pudo comprobar que los dineros cancelados a los tenedores de certificados serie A fuesen improcedentes o injustificados. En el sexto motivo de su recurso, la defensa técnica sostiene la existencia de fundamentación ilegítima por violación a las reglas de la sana crítica en cuanto a que los juzgadores concluyeron que si los tenedores de certificados serie B, suscriptores de contratos por servicios especiales, hicieron una donación al PAC, ello debió reportarlo el encartado Sterling Araya al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Manifiestan que los certificados serie B nunca tuvieron sustento económico, nacieron como una liquidación correspondiente, se sabía que era imposible cobrarlos. Es así que fueron dejados en las oficinas del PAC en forma voluntaria por las personas que firmaron los contratos de servicios especiales, quienes podían retirarlos o dejarlos en custodia, no se les exigió una decisión. En estas condiciones, no se puede establecer que hubo una donación que debía ser reportada por el tesorero del PAC. En el sétimo motivo de su recurso reclaman un grave yerro en el fallo al fundamentar de manera contradictoria que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones no tenía responsabilidad alguna en la verificación de los gastos liquidados por el PAC, debiendo solo hacer una verificación, ya sea aleatoria o parcial y atribuyendo toda la responsabilidad al partido mismo. Lo anterior, haciendo una interpretación impropia de los votos de la Sala Constitucional No. 2011-08989 de 6 de julio de 2011 y No. 2013-015343, en los que se señala como función o competencia exclusiva del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la comprobación de los gastos reportados por los partidos políticos. Se resuelven conjuntamente los motivos quinto, sexto y sétimo por estar íntimamente vinculados y, no llevando razón los recurrentes, se rechazan. El fallo desarrolla con amplitud y de manera exhaustiva los motivos por los cuales en el caso concreto, el imputado Steling Araya incurrió en un delito de estafa contra el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Los reclamos de los defensores no decidió abordar, analizar y resolver el planteamiento sometido a su conocimiento, por ser adverso a los intereses de su patrocinado, sin que aporten algún elemento que permita variar las conclusiones a que arribaron los jueces. Arguyen la no demostración del daño patrimonial, elemento configurativo del tipo penal de estafa, acudiendo al argumento repetitivo de que los certificados de la serie B no fueron redimidos, que la contribución estatal solamente alcanzó para pagar el 98.72% del total del valor de los certificados de cesión de deuda política serie A, y que, en consecuencia, el estado costarricense no realizó ningún desembolso por la emisión de dichos medios de pago. Sobre los aspectos reprochados el a quo describe el modus operandi de la estafa de la siguiente manera: se trató de la simulación masiva de contratos por servicios especiales que fueron incluidos como erogaciones contra la emisión de certificados de cesión de la serie B, ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones en la liquidación final de gastos que firmó y entregó el acusado Maynor Sterling en el Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos, los que fueron aprobados e, indebidamente vinieron a dar contenido económico a los certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal de la serie A. No es como lo argumentan los recurrentes, que si en la resolución del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones No. 7235-E10-2010 de las 12:45 horas del 03 de diciembre de 2010, ese ente aprobó gastos electorales generados por el PAC ascendientes a la suma de ¢2.732.785.956,27 (dos mil setecientos treinta dos millones setecientos ochenta y cinco mil novecientos cincuenta y seis colones con veintisiete céntimos) que debían cargarse al derecho de contribución estatal, resultando que este último equivalía a ¢2.992.864.242,92 (dos mil novecientos noventa y dos millones ochocientos sesenta y cuatro mil doscientos cuarenta y dos colones con noventa y dos céntimos) -monto que no alcanzó siquiera para cubrir la totalidad de los bonos A-, por ende no hay perjuicio para el Estado ni beneficio patrimonial antijurídico. Nótese que el importe de ¢2.732.785.956,27 (dos mil setecientos treinta dos millones setecientos ochenta y cinco mil novecientos cincuenta y seis colones con veintisiete céntimos) estaba constituido, en parte, por la suma de ¢516.000.000,00 (quinientos dieciséis millones de colones, correspondientes a gastos por los 263 contratos de servicios especiales simulados, que fueron aprobados por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y cancelados con una parte de la serie B de los certificados de cesión de derechos a la contribución estatal. No en vano, algunos testigos como Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, al escuchar la propuesta del coimputado Bolaños Murillo para que firmara los documentos, consideró que se trataba de “una pequeña trampa” o un “pequeño engaño” hacia el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Esta percepción y la ligereza con que fue asumida esta “trampita” por los militantes del PAC, convencidos de que con ello ayudaban al partido, se trató en realidad de la estructuración que ideó Sterling para defraudar al Estado. El Tribunal señala que sobre este aspecto fue sumamente claro y contundente el testigo Ronald Chacón Badilla al explicar cómo es que los certificados de cesión de derechos a la contribución estatal van adquiriendo contenido económico, distinto a como los recurrentes pretenden hacer creer que ocurrió. Según el testigo, todos los gastos que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones le aprueba a un partido político pasan a ser parte de una sola masa dineraria, independientemente del medio de pago que se haya utilizado por el partido político para cancelarlos, llámese dinero en efectivo, cheque, transferencia, certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal de las serie A, B o C, y una vez que se tiene esa masa dineraria, se procede a dar cumplimiento al principio de prelación de los certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal del artículo 115 del Código Electoral. Para el Tribunal, el perjuicio económico quedó más que esclarecido con el ejemplo que el testigo brindó en su declaración, solicitando imaginar que los gastos aprobados están representados por gotas de agua de diferente color para cada medio de pago. Así por ejemplo, los gastos aprobados y cancelados con dinero en efectivo van a estar representados por gotas de color amarillo, los gastos aprobados y cancelados con cheques van a estar representados por gotas de color azul, los gastos aprobados y cancelados por transferencia bancaria van a estar representados por gotas de color naranja, los gastos aprobados y cancelados con certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal de la serie A van a estar representados por gotas de color verde y los gastos aprobados y cancelados con certificados de cesión a la contribución estatal de la serie B van a estar representados por gotas de color rojo. Todas esas gotas de agua de colores se ingresan a una botella de agua con un tope que es el monto de la contribución estatal que le fuera aprobada a ese partido político como una expectativa de derecho, pero al ingresar a esa botella con agua, absolutamente todas las gotas adquieren el color transparente del agua que podrá -sí o no- alcanzar el tope del monto aprobado por concepto de la contribución estatal. Cuando ya se tiene esa masa dineraria, es entonces cuando se empieza a dar contenido económico a los certificados de cesión de derechos a la contribución estatal tomando en cuenta que para el pago, la primera emisión tendrá preferencia sobre la segunda y así sucesivamente hasta la última emisión. Esto lo que quiere decir, indicó el testigo, es que con esa masa dineraria primero se dará contenido económico a los certificados de cesión de derechos a la contribución estatal de la serie A, luego a los certificados de cesión de derechos de la serie B, y así sucesivamente, siendo este el principio de "orden de prelación" de los certificados de cesión de derechos a la contribución estatal, con fundamento legal en el artículo 115 del Código Electoral con vigencia desde el año 2007. Alegan los quejosos que el Código Electoral no tiene una norma que indique cuál es el procedimiento para la revisión documental de las liquidaciones, objetando lo dicho por los testigos Ronald Chacón Badilla y Rui López González de que el examen del Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos se limita a la verificación de requisitos formales, de manera aleatoria y parcial, sin separarlos por medios de pago o certificados de cesión, debiendo a su juicio cumplir con su obligación de revisar cada gasto que se presentó. Con respecto a este tema es importante mencionar -tal cual se 2010 se desarrolló bajo el marco legal definido en el actual Código Electoral, Ley No. 8765 publicado en el Alcance No. 37 de la Gaceta No. 171 de fecha 2 de septiembre del año 2009 y a nivel reglamentario se oficializó el Decreto No. 17-2009 publicado en La Gaceta No. 210 del día 29 de octubre del 2009. De previo al 2 de septiembre del año 2009, la Ley No. 1536 del 10 de diciembre de 1952 y sus reformas, establecía un modelo de revisión de liquidaciones que estaba a cargo de la Contraloría General de la República, órgano fiscalizador en el cual se apoyaba el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, a efectos de pronunciarse sobre el monto de la contribución estatal que habría de corresponderle a cada partido político a partir de la fuerza de los votos y el ejercicio de comprobación de gastos. Con el Código Electoral actual el proceso de revisión de gastos pasó a manos del Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, cuya dirección la ostenta el testigo Ronald Chacón Badilla que es contador público autorizado y master en contaduría pública. Es una persona de amplia experiencia en el tema de revisión de liquidación de gastos de los partidos políticos, porque desde antes de hacerlo y ser el jefe desde hace seis años del Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, sus funciones las desarrolló en la Contraloría General de la República por muchos años donde tuvo la oportunidad de hacer las revisiones de los procesos de 1998-2002, 2002-2006, según relató en el debate. El testigo informó además, que cuando el proceso de revisión de liquidaciones pasó a manos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, él no se trasladó solo, sino que lo acompañó personal también de amplia experiencia en materia electoral como lo fueron la abogada Alejandra Peraza Retana y los señores Esteban Sánchez, una persona que había trabajado en la Contraloría General de la República en un proceso de revisión de gastos, la señora Verónica Portocarrero, quien también había trabajado ya en un proceso de revisión de liquidaciones de gastos y la licenciada Guiselle Valverde Calderón con amplia experiencia, de más de veinte años en la Contraloría General de la República. De lo anterior, el tribunal de mérito concluyó que el proceso de revisión de liquidación de gastos de los partidos políticos que hace el Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, se encuentra en manos de personas de larga trayectoria y conocimientos en el tema en que actuaron, en apego a lo dispuesto en la normativa electoral, concretamente en lo dispuesto en el artículo 115 del Código Electoral. Si bien es cierto en el curso de la campaña 2006-2010 hubo algunos cambios en la materia electoral, de acuerdo con lo que señalaron los testigos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y de la Tesorería Nacional del Partido Acción Ciudadana, entre ellos Leonel Sequeira, esos cambios no fueron significativos y particularmente en lo que se refirió al proceso de revisión de liquidación de los gastos, el procedimiento fue el mismo que se venía desarrollando en la Contraloría General de la República. Al respecto el señor Ronald Chacón refirió: "...cuando al tribunal se le traslada a partir del año 2009 la función de la revisión de las liquidaciones de gastos, prácticamente lo que hace es montarse en el esquema de trabajo que tenía la Contraloría General de la República, siendo que era -como órgano rector de la fiscalización superior y habiendo tenido esta labor durante muchísimos años-, la experta en la materia…". Ahora bien, en punto al reproche de que no se justifica la falta de revisiones documentales por parte de los funcionarios del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones aduciendo falta de tiempo y que ello retrasaría las liquidaciones, el cuestionamiento es insostenible y pretende trasladar la propia responsabilidad de cada partido político, de ser veraz en la liquidación de gastos al órgano electoral y actuar en estricto apego a la ley y al principio de buena fe. Según el artículo 96 de la Constitución Política para que un partido político pueda optar por el financiamiento estatal de los gastos electorales en que incurrió durante la campaña, la agrupación política debe cumplir dos requisitos: i) alcanzar al menos 4% de los sufragios válidamente emitidos a escala nacional o provincial, si solo está inscrito a ese nivel, o al menos un diputado; y ii) deberá comprobar sus gastos ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Tal y como acertadamente el Tribunal derivó de la lectura del numeral 96 constitucional, del mismo se infiere que al partido político le corresponde la obligación de comprobar sus gastos ante el TSE -principio de comprobación del gasto-, del cual se infiere el deber de la agrupación política de demostrar debidamente sus gastos y comprobar su efectiva existencia. Al respecto señalan los juzgadores: “Precisamente, ese principio constitucional es desarrollado en la Sección IV del Título VI del Código Electoral, llamada “Control y Liquidación” y “Régimen Económico de los Partidos Políticos”, en forma respectiva. De tal manera que el numeral 104 del Código Electoral dispone que la liquidación de gastos electorales, debidamente refrendada por un contador público autorizado, es el medio por el cual los partidos políticos comprueban ante el TSE los gastos en los que han incurrido. La certificación emitida por el contador público autorizado se hace luego de que éste verificó, fiscalizó y evaluó que la totalidad de los gastos redimibles con contribución estatal se ajustan a los parámetros contables y legales así exigidos, de acuerdo al artículo 106 ibídem. El numeral 103 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo señala que para la evaluación y posterior pago de los gastos reconocidos mediante el control contable de las liquidaciones que presenten los partidos políticos, el TSE tendrá la facultad de sistematizar los procedimientos que mejor resguarden los parámetros de los gastos objeto de liquidación; en ese sentido, podrá realizar revisiones de carácter aleatorio entre partidos o entre determinados rubros de los gastos incluidos en las liquidaciones para constatarlos. La normativa legal no establece, como lo pretende la defensa, que sea el TSE quien deba confirmar la veracidad material del gasto liquidado, sino que son las agrupaciones políticas las que tienen tal obligación a través de la liquidación de gastos electorales. En ese sentido, el artículo 42 del Reglamento de Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos emitido por el TSE es tajante en tal aspecto al disponer que es responsabilidad de los partidos políticos demostrar en debida forma sus gastos y únicamente a ellos corresponderá comprobar su efectiva existencia. Por otro lado, el contador público autorizado, tal y como se ha expuesto, hace una verificación, fiscalización y evaluación contable y legal de los gastos liquidados por el partido político. La legislación electoral dispone que ese contador público, como lo aseveró el testigo Julio Aguilar Silesky, hace una revisión documental de los gastos liquidados por el partido político, pero no tiene la obligación de verificar si el servicio se dio en la realidad o no, pues tal es un deber de la agrupación política que liquida el gasto. Véase que la ley dispone que el contador público autorizado realiza un análisis de si los gastos liquidados por el partido político se ajustan a los parámetros contables y legales exigidos. Es decir, desde el punto de vista contable sería el examen del procedimiento empleado para conservar la exactitud y la veracidad en las transacciones y en la contabilización de éstas, lo que no implica la verificación de si el trabajo contratado fue dado o no, sino la constatación de que éste fue debidamente anotado en las cuentas y libros contables respectivos que permita determinar el estado financiero real y veraz del PAC, en este caso. Y el parámetro legal estaría enmarcado en que el gasto sea justificable en los términos del artículo 94 del Código Electoral. Asimismo, el Código Electoral impuso al TSE la facultad de sistematizar los procedimientos que mejor resguarden los parámetros de los gastos objeto de liquidación y de hacer revisiones aleatorias entre determinados rubros de los gastos incluidos en las liquidaciones para constatarlos. La facultad dada en la ley al TSE se desarrolla en el numeral 71 del Reglamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos, según el cual el Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos procederá evaluar la liquidación de gastos electorales tomando como base la certificación de gastos del Contador Público Autorizado, documento sobre el que realizará revisiones de carácter aleatorio, conforme la muestra seleccionada de entre determinados rubros de los gastos incluidos en las liquidaciones y emitirá los informes correspondientes a la Dirección de Registro Electoral y de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos, órgano que eleva las recomendaciones pertinentes al TSE. Este Tribunal ha descrito la norma constitucional, legal y reglamentaria que facultan al TSE a comprobar los gastos liquidados por los partidos políticos, ocasión en la cual se hace una revisión aleatoria, con base a una muestra, de los gastos anotados en la respectiva liquidación” (cfr. fs. 3844-3845, sic) . De esta manera, el procedimiento de revisión de las liquidaciones de los gastos presentados por los partidos políticos fue legal pues se encuentra amparado en las normas jurídicas precisadas en el fallo y que los juzgadores analizaron sobradamente. En modo alguno el a quo dio una lectura distinta a lo que expone la Sala Constitucional en el citado voto Nº 8989-2011, así como en el Nº 13-015343 citado por los impugnantes en su recurso, sin que los recurrentes Contrario a lo estimado por la defensa técnica, la cámara constitucional ha señalado que la comprobación de gastos de los partidos políticos, para acceder a la contribución estatal, es una competencia electoral del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y forma parte de la función electoral, tal y como lo ordena el artículo 96.4 de la Constitución Política. El ordenamiento jurídico costarricense conceptualiza la contribución estatal como un rembolso de los gastos electorales y de los relativos a organización y capacitación partidaria al que solo se accede, por mandato constitucional, luego de que las agrupaciones políticas los hayan comprobado ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Para esos efectos, los partidos deben presentar las respectivas liquidaciones dentro de los plazos de ley y contando con el referendo de un contador público autorizado. A esas liquidaciones deben anexarse los documentos que respalden los gastos liquidados, una certificación emitida por el mismo contador sobre tales gastos y, además, un informe suyo sobre los resultados del estudio que sustenta esa certificación y sobre las recomendaciones pertinentes de control interno. Esa documentación constituye la base fundamental para la ulterior revisión que realiza el Departamento de Financiamiento de Partidos Políticos, que solo autorizará el reembolso de aquellas erogaciones que sean legalmente justificables y efectivamente demostradas y, desde luego, teniendo siempre presente el tope máximo a que tiene derecho cada agrupación política de acuerdo con los resultados electorales. También se le habilita para constatar la veracidad del contenido de los estados financieros, por los medios y procedimientos de análisis e investigación que estime oportunos. Resulta oportuno citar lo indicado por la contralora general Marta Eugenia Acosta Zúñiga en su informe a la Sala Constitucional: “Ahora bien, un extremo de especial relevancia que interesa apuntar, es el hecho que las normas impugnadas no encargan –en sentido estricto- al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la fiscalización de los recursos públicos que financian los gastos de los partidos políticos. Antes que eso, lo que le confieren es –simplemente- la atribución de llevar a cabo la revisión contable de los comprobantes de pago que remiten los partidos políticos. (…) Como puede advertirse, la legislación anterior al Código Electoral vigente, colocó a la Contraloría General en una suerte de órgano subordinado del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, encargándole un papel de revisor contable de gastos, documentos y facturas, función que a todas luces no era acorde con el ámbito funcional de competencias del órgano contralor definido por la Constitución Política. Tal y como es evidente, ese rol que la legislación anterior asignaba a la Contraloría General, como un auxiliar contable revisor de comprobantes y facturas de los gastos de los partidos políticos, cuyos resultados se documentaban en un informe que era remitido al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones -a quien le correspondía la adopción de una decisión final en la materia-, fue resultado de un modelo que no tuvo en cuenta la función natural de la Contraloría General, definida por la Constitución Política como un órgano de control superior encargado de la vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública. Amén de lo anterior, esa fragmentación del análisis de la actividad económica de los partidos políticos, se acentuó por el hecho que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, no tuvo una participación directa respecto a la comprobación del gasto relacionado con el aporte estatal a los partidos políticos pero sí con relación a sus ingresos, lo cual impidió que existiera un punto de control que permitiera precisar la correspondencia entre los ingresos y los gastos de las diferentes agrupaciones políticas y el financiamiento completo de las campañas electorales, todo ello en detrimento de los principios de publicidad y transparencia. En virtud de la ausencia de elementos básicos que permitieran, el desarrollo de un proceso integrado, ágil, oportuno y efectivo de control de los ingresos y los gastos de los partidos políticos por parte de una misma dependencia, se privó a la sociedad de contar con puntos de control que alertaran respecto a posibles ingresos de fondos a contrapelo del bloque de legalidad y que pudieran comprometer la autonomía de los partidos políticos, desvirtuando así la razón esencial de la contribución estatal, en su función protectora de la independencia de los partidos políticos como actores protagónicos del sistema democrático. Frente a todo este panorama, el Código Electoral vigente trajo consigo un cambio en el modelo imperante, definió en su correcta perspectiva y alcances las funciones de los actores involucrados en el proceso, suprimió el control fragmentado que se arrastraba hasta el momento, apostó por un control integrado y concentrado en manos del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y, vino a remozar y robustecer las atribuciones de ese Tribunal –las cuales ya de por sí tenía en el modelo existente hasta el momento-, en un tema que se vincula de manera directa con la materia electoral” (cfr. Sala Constitucional, voto N.º 15343-2013). La cita es ilustrativa de lo que el tribunal de instancia extrajo, acertadamente, de la lectura integral de lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional. Esto es, que el mandato constitucional y legal que tiene el TSE, es la revisión contable de los gastos liquidados por los partidos políticos, lo que implica un examen documental de éstos, excluyendo la obligación de comprobar la realidad del contrato que subyace en el documento. Los recurrentes parten de una premisa sesgada al afirmar que el fallo tuvo por demostrado, de manera infundada, que a los tenedores de certificados de cesión de la serie A se les hizo un pago que no correspondía, incluso cuestionando que los jueces no señalaron quién o quiénes recibieron un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico. No es que los beneficiarios de los bonos A concurrieran a recibir un pago de la contribución estatal por una prestación que no se hizo, que pareciera el sentido que quieren dar los quejosos, sino que si no se hubiese abultado la liquidación de gastos con los contratos simulados por servicios especiales, no habría alcanzado para cubrir lo que terminó pagándose a los acreedores con bonos de la serie A. Es decir, la cancelación del 98.72% del total del valor de los certificados de cesión de deuda política serie A, no habría sido tal, sino un porcentaje inferior, de ahí que haya existido un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico. Por otra parte argumentan los defensores que el imputado no tuvo posibilidad de manipular la deuda política al desconocerse el monto que recibiría cada partido, sin embargo ello es incorrecto pues desde el 26 de marzo de 2010, mediante resolución Nº 2124-E10-2010 de las 11:00 horas, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones con vista en los resultados de las elecciones celebradas el 07 de febrero de 2010, determinó que el PAC en razón de los votos obtenidos en las mismas, podía recibir como máximo la suma de 3.741.080.303,65 (tres mil setecientos cuarenta y un millones ochenta mil trescientos tres colones con sesenta y cinco céntimos), por concepto de contribución del Estado para el financiamiento de los gastos generados en el proceso electoral. Precisamente eso incide para que el imputado Sterling Araya se apresure a propulsar la reforma de los estatutos del PAC en mayo de 2010 a y para que despliegue el montaje con los contratos por servicios especiales simulados, cuyo pago respaldó con los bonos de la serie B que nunca entregó a los prestatarios, y que para el 16 de junio de 2016 presentara dentro de la liquidación de los gastos de campaña, aprobándose por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones el 03 de diciembre de 2010, mediante resolución Nº7235-E10-2010, la suma de ¢2.732.785.956,27 (dos mil setecientos treinta dos millones setecientos ochenta y cinco mil novecientos cincuenta y seis colones con veintisiete céntimos) por gastos electorales del PAC. Por último, tampoco llevan razón los recurrentes al objetar que para el Tribunal los suscriptores de los contratos por servicios especiales y tenedores de los certificados de cesión, serie B, hicieron una donación al PAC que el imputado debió reportar, pues nunca tuvieron sustento económico y desde un principio se sabía que sería imposible cobrarlos, al punto que quedaron en su oficina. Se reitera que el objetivo trazado por el encartado Sterling Araya fue alimentar la liquidación de gastos, con contratos de “servicios especiales” simulados que cumplieron la función de engrosar el monto de contribución estatal para el PAC, y que sin ellos, la erogación habría sido menor y en consecuencia, la cobertura de los certificados de cesión serie A se habría visto mermada. A don Maynor le interesaba que se pagara a los grandes financistas de la campaña que habían prestado dinero al PAC, esto es, a los que se les había pagado con bonos A y a algunos pocos con bonos B (algunos medios de comunicación y personas físicas que habían prestado dinero efectivo), no así a los colaboradores que voluntariamente dieron su trabajo sin esperar retribución económica alguna. Estos últimos fueron útiles para representar gastos ficticios para cobrarlos al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, convenciendo a los militantes para que suscribieran contratos donde se daba un valor o reconocimiento en términos monetarios a su labor, para luego tranquilizarlos con la opción de que si se obtenía algún dinero podían dejárselo, o bien, podían donarlo al partido. Los juzgadores, a partir de lo declarado por los testigos y el propio imputado, simplemente señalan que si el trabajo fue voluntario y sin remuneración, entonces fue gratuito, en consecuencia no se trató de un gasto que procedía liquidar, sino de una contribución que debió informar el encartado Sterling al Tribunal. C) En el octavo motivo de su recurso, los defensores del acusado reclaman la posibilidad de aplicar a su favor una pena alternativa a la prisión, con base en sus condiciones subjetivas y el quantum de la pena fijada en seis años de prisión, aludiendo a la Ley No. 9271, “Mecanismos electrónicos de seguimiento en materia penal”. Recriminan que el tribunal realizó una fundamentación contradictoria pues si bien los jueces admitieron que el encartado Sterling Araya cumple con todos los requisitos para que le sea aplicado el monitoreo electrónico, desecharon esa posibilidad al considerar que el Ministerio de Justicia no ha implementado el seguimiento electrónico por falta de recursos o como consecuencia del alambicado sistema de contratación. inmediata desde su vigencia. No se le puede atribuir al condenado una carga que no le corresponde, a causa de la dilación y los obstáculos en los trámites burocráticos. Finalmente, el mismo tribunal señaló que en el caso de su representado, su ingreso a prisión le va a causar más perjuicios que beneficios, tanto a él como a la sociedad. Se reserva este motivo para ser conocido junto con el recurso de apelación interpuesto por los representantes del Ministerio Público. El visor fiscal presentó recurso de apelación contra el fallo, únicamente en cuanto a la pena impuesta al imputado Sterling Araya, pues habiendo solicitado ocho años de prisión, el Tribunal de Juicio le fijó seis. En vista de que uno de los presupuestos para la aplicación del monitoreo electrónico es que la pena no exceda los seis años de prisión y, existiendo impugnación sobre la sanción impuesta y solicitud para que se ordene el reenvío sobre dicho extremo, se reserva la resolución de este motivo para conocerlo conjuntamente con el recurso del Ministerio Público. D) En el noveno motivo de su recurso alegan inexistencia de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por no haberse acreditado con certeza la autoría material. El tribunal partió de una premisa falsa e ilegítima para declarar al encartado y demandado civil Sterling Araya, civilmente responsable y condenarlo solidariamente al pago de trescientos cincuenta y dos millones setecientos mil colones, cual es que ideó un plan para hacer incurrir en error al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y así obtener un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico para el PAC y para los tenedores de certificados de cesión de derechos a la contribución estatal de la serie A. El reclamo es inatendible. En el presente caso el Tribunal analizó las razones de hecho y derecho que acreditaron los actos que produjeron la conducta delictiva de estafa y la aplicación del criterio de responsabilidad civil subjetiva para fundamentar ese rubro, siendo ese actuar doloso del demandado civil Sterling Araya, en asocio del co-deamandado civil Bolaños Murillo, lo que provocó un perjuicio patrimonial para el Estado. Al respecto, debe indicarse que el reconocimiento de reparación por concepto de daño patrimonial fue derivado del concepto de responsabilidad civil subjetiva, que ha sido entendido desde la doctrina de Loutayf y Costas como aquel que: “…tiene lugar cuando la obligación de resarcir los daños se funda en el actuar voluntario del sujeto que ha obrado por culpa en un sentido amplio (comprensiva de dolo y culpa), y …Son requisitos para que exista responsabilidad subjetiva: a) que sea un acto antijurídico, es decir, que transgrede el ordenamiento jurídico…b) que haya imputabilidad moral del acto a su autor, es decir, que se trata de un acto voluntrio(sic)….c) que haya culpa o dolo en el autor del acto…d) que haya un daño causado con el acto antijurídico…y e) que se pueda establecer una relación de causalidad entre el acto antijurídico y el daño…”( La Acción Civil en Sede Penal, Astrea, Buenos Aires, 2002, pp 756-757)…(vd. Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto 2012-001806, de las 09:48 horas del 05 de diciembre de 2012. Ver en igual sentido 2012-01687, de las 11:03 horas del 16 de noviembre de 2012) y cuyos requisitos el a quo en el sub iúdice, determinó como existentes, ya que la responsabilidad civil subjetiva, derivada de los numerales 41 Constitucional y 1045 del Código Civil, fue evidentemente probada, al determinarse no solo la actuación dolosa del co-demandado civil Sterling Araya, sino además la relación causal existente y el perjuicio o menoscabo del patrimonio económico sufrido por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Ello conforme a lo que el fallo tuvo por acreditado, al ingresar el encartado como gastos del PAC, al menos 179 contratos simulados por “servicios especiales” en la liquidación final que llevaron a la aprobación de mayor dinero de la contribución estatal a favor de los tenedores de los certificados de cesión serie A. El fallo es extenso en explicar con respecto a los rubros civiles, la obligación de indemnizar del co-demandado civil Sterling Araya, el por qué se acogieron (parcialmente) las pretensiones solicitadas y la prueba sobre las que se basaron los montos concedidos, para establecer finalmente el daño económico ocasionado por el actuar delictivo de don Maynor al Estado. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar el motivo noveno del recurso.

III.- Recurso de los fiscales Alexander Valverde Peña y Greysa Barrientos Núñez. Como único motivo de su recurso de apelación expresan su inconformidad con la determinación de la pena. Refieren que para la imposición de la sanción al imputado Maynor Sterling Araya, el tribunal consideró los siguientes aspectos: i) el daño patrimonial que alcanzó los ¢352.700.000,00, contra la contribución estatal, tratándose de dineros en los que el Estado costarricense invierte cada cuatro años para desarrollar los procesos democráticos en el país, los cuales provienen de los impuestos que son cancelados por todos los habitantes del territorio nacional; ii) el complejo entramado delictivo orquestado por el acusado, en el que se requirió la elaboración de centenares de documentos falsos, cuidadosamente suscritos para que cumplieran los requisitos exigidos por la normativa electoral para aprobar gastos, así como del engaño a numerosas personas para que firmaran la documentación y, al efecto la ideación de emitir y utilizar certificados de cesión de derechos serie B promoviendo un cambio en el estatuto del Partido Acción Ciudadana (en adelante PAC) que con anterioridad al proceso electoral de 2010, solamente podía percibir el 50% de la contribución estatal a que tenía derecho para así cobrar la totalidad de la deuda política; iii) las actuaciones del imputado afectaron el pluralismo político y la igualdad que debe existir entre los partidos políticos; iv) sus acciones violentaron los principios relativos al régimen económico de los partidos políticos, cuales son: la transparencia, la rendición de cuentas, la publicidad, la honestidad, la integridad y la legalidad, e incluso los de su propio partido, tales como la auteridad y el financiamiento del propio partido; v) los motivos determinantes de su conducta delictiva, actuando el encartado con el afán de realizar una gestión exitosa de su cargo como tesorero nacional del partido, buscando la mayor liquidación de gastos ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, asimismo, con la finalidad de salvaguardar la imagen de la agrupación política, pretendiendo que la contribución estatal cubriera la mayor parte de los certificados de cesión de derechos emitidos por el PAC, y; v) el haberse aprovechado de su posición de poder dentro de la agrupación política para el desarrollo de la actividad delictiva, empleando su conocimiento contable, financiero, administrativo y legal. Para los recurrentes, los elementos expuestos por el tribunal para fundar el juicio de reproche resultan atinados. No obstante, estiman que la pena de seis años de prisión es insuficiente para el grado de reprochabilidad de la conducta de Sterling Araya, siendo lo proporcional y razonable, la pena de ocho años que fuera solicitada por el Ministerio Público. Advierten que no se valoró la actuación del encartado posterior a los hechos, cuando se reunió en la sede del partido con algunos supuestos contratistas de servicios especiales, y los inducía a creer en la legitimidad de la documentación, con la intención de que los hechos no trascendieran y se evidenciara la estafa que había propiciado en asocio de Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo, en contra del Estado. Solicitan se decrete la nulidad del fallo, únicamente en cuanto a la fijación del quantum de la pena impuesta, y se ordene el reenvío. Se conoce este recurso conjuntamente con el reclamo contenido en el recurso de los defensores del imputado Sterling Araya (octavo motivo), por estar relacionados, y: sin lugar el recurso del Ministerio Público; se acoge lo solicitado sobre el brazalete electrónico. Los fiscales recurrentes coinciden con el a quo en los elementos considerados para fundar el juicio de reproche con respecto al justiciable Maynor Sterling Araya. Lo que no comparten es la imposición de seis años de prisión en lugar de los ocho años peticionados, siendo este extremo en el que cifran su reclamo, advirtiendo que el Tribunal omitió valorar la conducta del imputado Sterling Araya, posterior a los hechos, esto es, cuando se reunió con algunos de los suscribientes de los contratos simulados, al intentar convencerlos de la legitimidad de la documentación con el fin de que los hechos no trascendieran. Ciertamente, para la fundamentación de pena, el Tribunal señaló una serie de circunstancias, tomando en cuenta diversos aspectos, entre ellos, algunos cuantitativos y cualitativos del hecho acreditado, así como las condiciones personales del encartado, conforme al numeral 71 del Código Penal. Un estudio selectivo de dichos aspectos, destaca que tomó en cuenta el juzgador la gravedad de los hechos, pues: i) don Maynor era un administrador de empresas reconocido, con experiencia en el medio costarricense, que gozaba de la confianza de dirigentes y partidarios, quien utilizó sus conocimientos para ocasionar una defraudación en perjuicio del dinero de todos los costarricenses destinado a invertir en la democracia de este país; ii) no se trató de una estafa convencional, sino que incluyó todo un entramado para inducir en error a los funcionarios del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; iii) se violentó el principio de igualdad con respecto a las demás agrupaciones y el pluralismo político; iv) se vulneraron los principios del PAC de austeridad, probidad y transparencia, traicionándose la buena fe de los militantes; v) la magnitud del daño patrimonial causado al Estado. En cuanto a la calidad de los motivos determinantes: i) don Maynor buscaba granjearse una imagen de éxito en su gestión como Tesorero Nacional del PAC; ii) su preocupación era pagar a los grandes e importantes acreedores financieros, los que tenían certificados de la serie A, y algunos de la serie B, para asegurar el futuro financiamiento de la siguiente campaña electoral, utilizando a colaboradores del partido haciendo que para ello firmaran contratos simulados. Es cierto que no se apuntó, expresamente, que en la reunión que se hizo posteriormente a que militantes del partido fueran llamados a cuentas por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, el imputado Sterling intentó convencerlos de que habían estado de acuerdo en la realidad de lo que habían firmado, sin embargo eso es parte de lo que el Tribunal analizó acerca del daño ocasionado por la implicación de los partidarios en la confección de los contratos, que no añade mayormente a lo que fuera analizado. El tribunal de mérito consideró además sus cualidades personales, indicando que: i) ha mantenido un proyecto de vida definido durante muchos años, pues se encuentra casado, con dos hijos y un nieto, a quienes aún educa; ii) es pensionado de la Universidad de Costa Rica, donde ejerció en sus últimos años como jefe de contabilidad, sin que tuviese una sola mancha en su soriasis, enfermedades que es razonable considerar que se agravarán con el paso de los años, siendo dentro de poco tiempo don Maynor, una persona adulta mayor. No sólo observa esta Cámara que existe una adecuada fundamentación en lo que se refiere a la pena impuesta, sino que el quantum de seis años de prisión, se encuentra debidamente justificado y responde a los principios de proporcionalidad, razonabilidad y legalidad, sin que se estime que su monto esté por debajo al reproche que merece. La pena es bastante superior al extremo mínimo de la pena para el delito de estafa y, si bien no se impuso la pena de ocho años de prisión solicitada por el actor penal, se considera que la fijación de seis años de prisión es justa, adecuada, equitativa y suficiente, sin que sea de recibo lo aquejado por los fiscales. En cuanto a la aplicación del arresto domiciliario con monitoreo electrónico como sustitución de la pena, de conformidad con el artículo 57 bis del Código Penal, los juzgadores reconocieron que el imputado “cumple con los requisitos objetivos y subjetivos: tales como que la pena que se le impuso no superan los 6 años de prisión; este asunto se está tramitando bajo el procedimiento especial de crimen organizado; no se trata de un delito sexual ni donde ha mediado uso de armas de fuego; se trata de un delincuente primario; y hay elementos razonables para desprender que el condenado no constituye un peligro y no se evadirá del cumplimiento de la pena (por su edad y sus arraigos familiares y domiciliares)” (cfr. f. 3822). Pese a lo anterior, la sentencia evade su otorgamiento en esa coyuntura, alegando que “lo cierto es que aún el Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia no ha desarrollado la infraestructura para implementar dicha alternativa a la prisión” (cfr. f. 3822). En otras palabras, el Tribunal valoró que en el subjudice son de aplicación los presupuestos, tanto objetivos como subjetivos, del arresto domiciliario mediante monitoreo electrónico, solo que no lo concedió atendiendo exclusivamente a la falta de implementación en ese momento del dictado del fallo, a la infraestructura necesaria por parte del Poder Ejecutivo. Como es de conocimiento público, desde inicios del año 2017 el Ministerio de Justicia cuenta con los artefactos de brazalete electrónico y la plataforma apta para el control de dicha medida. Por ese motivo, esta Cámara de apelación considera que, habiendo ponderado ya el a quo las circunstancias dichas, el reclamo de los defensores sobre este extremo debe acogerse, sin ordenar el reenvío (sin nulidad alguna desde que lo resuelto es la base de la configuración de los presupuestos objetivos y subjetivos para la procedencia del mecanismo pedido), concediéndose el arresto domiciliario en la modalidad de monitoreo electrónico al encartado Maynor Sterling Araya. Lo anterior no significa que lo ordenado sea en única instancia, desde que el tribunal de mérito ya había valorado acoger dicha sanción principal sustitutiva al imputado, solo que estimó que limitaciones materiales para la puesta en práctica de los mecanismos electrónicos impedía su ejecución.

IV.- Recurso de apelación del licenciado Randall Albán Aguirre Mena, procurador penal de la Procuraduría General de la República. A) En el primer motivo de su recurso alega contradictoria fundamentación intelectiva y errónea valoración de la prueba al rechazar la sentencia el daño económico en 84 de los contratos de servicios especiales. Indica que al formular la demanda civil, hizo una estimación de condena civil por daño material derivado del delito de estafa por la totalidad de los 263 contratos de servicios especiales que fueron presentados por el PAC ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. El tribunal solamente concedió el daño material por 179 contratos bajo el argumento que esos fueron el total de testigos que se llevaron al contradictorio y que solo con la presencia de los testigos se podía acreditar el daño sufrido por el Estado. Considera que el fundamento para excluir el daño producto de los 84 contratos es contradictorio y cita varios extractos de la sentencia tomados de las páginas de la sentencia números 1360, 1361, 1371, 1376 y 1377, 1384, 1479 y 1480, 1524, 1526, 1534 y 1535, 1537, 1538 y 1558, a partir de los cuales se aprecia que el tribunal deriva que el origen de la totalidad de los contratos fue gratuito, que nunca existió por parte del PAC ni de los imputados la intención de que dichos servicios fueran remunerados y que por lo tanto no era necesaria la comparecencia de los restantes 84 testigos para concluir que esos 84 contratos se encuentran en las mismas circunstancias que los 179 sobre los que sí se determinó la existencia de un daño material. No era necesario, tal y como indicó el tribunal, para arribar a tal conclusión, conocer el contexto en el que se formó la voluntad del contratante al momento de firmar el contrato. Sostiene que el origen fraudulento de los contratos no se acredita solo a partir de la voluntad del prestatario del servicio, sino en el esquema utilizado en el PAC, en los documentos suscritos por los prestatarios, en que los bonos con que se respaldó el pago no fueron entregados y estaban en custodia del partido y en las declaraciones de Ronald Chacón y Ruy López, entre otros elementos probatorios. A partir del principio de libertad probatoria es posible por distintos medios que no fuera estrictamente, escuchar a los 84 testigos que no se presentaron a declarar, tener por acreditada la existencia del daño y su cuantificación. El mismo Tribunal de Juicio con los mismos elementos probatorios analizados y que derivaron en tener por acreditado un daño en al menos 179 contratos, concluyó que el PAC no estaba en posibilidad de contratar labor remunerada por servicios especiales. Que los partidarios de dicha agrupación política brindaban su trabajo por mística y voluntariado, que nunca existió intención de reconocer económicamente su labor, que los contratos tienen similitudes en el monto, en el tipo de servicio prestado y que ello es un indicativo de la acción delictiva desplegada, aspectos que conllevan el reconocimiento del daño económico, no en 179 contratos, sino en los 263 contratos de servicios especiales. Considera el recurrente que no es posible aislar la prueba documental en la que el Tribunal derivó la existencia del perjuicio en los 179 contratos, y la misma prueba testimonial en la cual se sustentó el perjuicio tenido por acreditado, para luego no considerar estos mismos elementos probatorios en el análisis de los restantes 84 contratos, y excluirlos por el solo hecho que los testigos no se presentaron al contradictorio. Asevera que la prueba testimonial de los 179 contratos recibida en el debate fue abundante en cuanto a que los trabajos prestados tuvieron un origen gratuito, que nunca se realizó un cobro por los mismos, que los bonos de deuda política no fueron entregados a los prestatarios de los servicios ya que se quedaron en custodia del PAC y que para ese proceso electoral el PAC no contaba con recursos para contratar servicios especiales. En todos estos casos se acreditó la existencia de un origen fraudulento de la contratación realizada, siendo que en los 84 contratos restantes se trata del mismo contrato, con los mismos montos de un millón ochocientos y dos millones cuatrocientos, todos fueron recolectados directa o indirectamente por el co-encartado Manuel Antonio Bolaños y fueron respaldados por los mismos documentos que aparecen en los 84 contratos excluidos del perjuicio patrimonial los cuales fueron firmados por el imputado Mainor Sterling. Concluir que porque el prestatario del servicio no llegó a declarar, no se puede acreditar el perjuicio, es aplicar un principio de prueba tasada y el principio de libertad probatoria, y excluir ilegítimamente los demás elementos probatorios incorporados en el debate. Así mismo, la prueba documental, en específico el informe No. DFPP-DP-06-2012 del 02 de octubre de 2012, a folios 5 a 136 del expediente principal, y las declaraciones de Ruy López y Ronald Chacón Badilla respaldan que el perjuicio al erario público fue por la totalidad de los 263 contratos, cuyo monto en total ascendió a ¢516.600.000,00. Solicita se anule el fallo solamente en cuanto no se otorgó indemnización económica por los 84 contratos de servicios especiales que fueron cobrados al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, que representa la suma de ciento sesenta y tres millones novecientos mil colones, más los intereses que los mismos generaron, y las costas personales sobre dichos rubros. El reclamo es procedente. En la especie, el a quo fundó su decisión de acoger el daño patrimonial únicamente en cuanto a 179, de los 263 contratos por servicios especiales que fueron presentados por el co-demandado civil Maynor Sterling Araya, aduciendo que se requería necesariamente del contratista “...para conocer el contexto en que éste se forma la voluntad para suscribir dicho documento, lo que se adolece en tal sentido. Por ello, los contratos especiales cuyos contratantes no declararon en juicio no pueden ser valorados dentro del perjuicio económico causado al Estado a través de la simulación de gastos que liquidó el PAC en la campaña electoral de 2010” (cfr. f. 3878). Acotan los jueces que si bien algunos testigos aseveraron que “todos” firmaron, se trata de una frase genérica y abstracta que no llega a cumplir con las exigencias probatorias que tiene la parte actora de la acción civil resarcitoria, con lo que se violentaría el principio de oralidad e inmediación de los elementos probatorios. El primer yerro en que incurre el tribunal de mérito, es fundar su negativa a reconocer el daño económico, en aquellos casos o contratos en los que el suscribiente no atestiguó en el debate, acudiendo así a un sistema de prueba legal o tasada de la prueba testimonial que no tiene cabida, ni en el proceso penal, mucho menos en el civil, desconociendo el valor del resto de la prueba que sí se evacuó, para los efectos indemnizatorios. Según los juzgadores, con respecto a los 84 contratos en los cuales no se presentaron a declarar los suscribientes, no puede asumirse que dieron un trabajo a título gratuito al PAC, sin embargo, de manera contradictoria, al realizar el análisis probatorio a los fines de establecer el juicio de culpabilidad de los acusados, determinaron una “homogeneidad pasmosa” en la confección y el trámite de los documentos que utilizaron para cobrar al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, gastos por contratos de servicios especiales que resultaron ser simulados. Concluyeron que todos los contratos eran de adhesión; se utilizaron los mismos machotes y fórmulas en los documentos (contrato, recibo de dinero, comprobante de entrega de los bonos serie B); se empleó el mismo modus operandi para su firma; se fijaron montos muy similares y desproporcionados con relación a las funciones que se insertaron; se utilizó el mismo método por parte de los co-imputados para convencer a los militantes de que los suscribieran como una especie de reconocimiento económico por los servicios voluntarios y gratuitos prestados; todos los certificados de cesión de la serie B mediante los cuales se cancelaron estos trabajos, permanecieron en la sede del PAC. Se transcribe uno de los tantos extractos en que el Tribunal se refiere a la “maquinación estructurada”, con características particulares y semejantes, en al menos 179 de los 263 contratos presentados junto con la liquidación de gastos del PAC: “En lo que se tuvo por probado, ciento setenta y nueve contratos y recibos fueron utilizados para, aparentando gastos por el supuesto pago de servicios especiales, proceder a engañar de manera orquestada, sistemática, estudiada y actuándose con un alto grado de organización contra el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Nótese que ninguno de los testigos que declararon en el contradictorio refirieron haber cobrado o recibido monto alguno por su servicio (algunos dijeron que si lo habían hecho, pero que lo iban a donar) cuando en realidad era trabajo no remunerado de partidarios del Partido Acción Ciudadana que movidos por los principios que pregonaba el grupo brindaban su tiempo, trabajo y hasta recursos de manera totalmente voluntaria. El ardid, no se limita a las meras palabras de los encartados utilizadas para convencer a los contratistas que firmaran, también utilizaron los documentos que se dirán, para presentarlos ante el ente electoral haciéndolos pasar por gastos reales y efectivos para la liquidación, siendo que los aparentes contratistas nunca cobraron, ni pretendían cobrar sus labores voluntarias al partido. Esos documentos consistían en el “CONTRATO DE PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS ESPECIALES CELEBRADO ENTRE EL PARTIDO ACCION CIUDADANA Y…”; que de su literalidad contenía una serie de falsedades (que conocían los encartados) y que buscaban cumplir con los requisitos legales para justificar un gasto por servicios especiales que nunca se daba, pues aunque en algunos casos habían labores varias, estas no eran las indicadas y en ningún caso se cobró. Véase entonces que este contrato se describía el servicio especial a brindar, estos eran títulos genéricos y sin un contenido real, por ejemplo: Coordinador Cantonal de Electores, Promotor General Cantonal, Coordinador General de Finanzas, Coordinador General de Organización, Coordinador Cantonal de Comunicaciones, Coordinador Cantonal de Juventudes y Coordinador Cantonal de Transportes. Con la inmediación que brinda el contradictorio, este Tribunal pudo extraer con facilidad del lenguaje corporal y verbal de los contratistas, su asombro al ver el contrato y el puesto asignado. La gran mayoría dijo desconocer que era el puesto, en que consistía, quien lo había nombrado, cuáles serían sus supuestas responsabilidades y en ningún caso se les pidió cuentas o informes sobre sus funciones. Otro contenido falso del contrato, que a la postre sirvió como ardid ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones era el monto del pago total de lo cancelado. Una inmensa mayoría de los testigos contratistas evacuados, como se vió en el considerando VII, dijeron nunca haber pactado o cobrado suma económica alguna, sorprendidos por esta cláusula y en varios casos, profundamente consternados y hasta enojados pues nunca tuvieron siquiera la intención de cuantificar económicamente su labor. Otros, con claro interés de proteger a su partido político, trataban infructuosamente, de justificar el monto, alegando que realizaron una ardua labor, que era lo que pagaban otros partidos, que se estableció según el salario mínimo de sus profesiones, que era un monto extraído del total de horas trabajadas, y múltiples razones que, confrontadas unas con otras, dejan claro que nunca existió un acuerdo entre las partes, si no que fueron montos antojadizos y machoteros que llenaron personas desconocidas por orden de los encartados para engañar al ente electoral. Este contrato, además, incluía el rango temporal donde supuestamente se brindaba el servicio especial, otro claro ejemplo del engaño que intentaron los encartados, pues la totalidad de los testigos fueron contestes en señalar que dichas fechas no estaban relacionadas con sus funciones dentro del partido, cuando las brindaron. Dijeron haber trabajado antes, después, nunca o en otras fechas sin tampoco haber cobrado para esos plazos o el señalado en el contrato. Todas las fechas eran artificialmente impuestas y llenadas por los encartados haciéndose valer de otras personas. Todos los contratos fueron firmados por el ajusticiado STERLING ARAYA en su calidad de Tesorero Nacional del Partido Acción Ciudadana, quien conocía las falsedades dichas. Otro de los documentos utilizados para cada uno de los ciento setenta y nueve contratistas, fue el: “Comprobante de pago”, el cual igual que el contrato, tenía una serie de falsedades groseras que los propios testigos evidenciaron de manera unánime. En este sentido, de la literalidad del comprobante se decía: “El Partido Acción Ciudadana ha pagado a…”, siendo que como se indicó A NADIE SE LE CANCELÓ MONTO ALGUNO. Aquí, no se indica que sea un pago condicionado o eventual, dice se canceló, lo que significa para cualquier persona promedio que dicho documento acreditaba el pago de un monto dinerario, lo que como se ha indicado reiteradas veces nunca se dio. Importante señalar que en este comprobante el propio STERLING ARAYA, firma bajo la leyenda: “Recibo conforme del bien o servicio”, a sabiendas que, en primer lugar, no se había brindado el servicio y en segundo lugar que nunca se había cobrado o cancelado la suma ahí dicha por parte del Partido Acción Ciudadana. Estos son, sin duda, preconstitución de prueba para el fraude, que a la postre presentaran ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Por último, como parte de ardid, los encartados hacían firmar a los contratistas instrumentalizados para esta estafa, el documento que decía: “PARTIDO ACCIÓN CIUDADANA / RECIBO POR LA ENTREGA DE BONOS COMO PAGO POR LA PRESTACIÓN DE BIENES Y SERVICIOS”. Nuevamente, un documento lleno de falsedades e imprecisiones, como los anteriores. En este se hacía referencia a la supuesta entrega de Certificados Tipo B a los contratistas, lo que nunca se da en los ciento setenta y nueve contratos, con una excepción. Incluso la gran mayoría de los testigos nunca tuvieron contacto visual con el certificado” (cfr. fs. 3802-3804). Entonces, si los jueces consideraron que todos los contratos eran similares, respondiendo a una sola finalidad de hacer un cobro indebido de dinero al erario público, resulta contradictorio que para acreditar el daño económico sufrido, exijan las declaraciones de los 84 contratantes que se prescindieron, sin que el fallo exprese en qué incide el que esas personas no atestiguaran y soslaye considerar la prueba documental incorporada acerca de los mismos, que de acuerdo al fallo se introdujeron en la liquidación de gastos del PAC al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, y fueron reconocidos para el pago de la contribución estatal. A folios 3601 y 3602, expone el a quo que de acuerdo a la prueba testimonial evacuada en el contradictorio, los coimputados Sterling Araya y Bolaños Murillo plantearon a los partidarios la estrategema de defraudar al Estado, bajo las tres siguientes modalidades: i) En la mayoría de los casos se les solicitó su “colaboración” para ayudar económicamente al partido a través de la “suscripción voluntaria” de un contrato, el cual sería cancelado con certificados de cesión de la serie B, los cuales si eran reconocidos por el Tribunal, el dinero podía ser donado al PAC. ii) En otras oportunidades se ofreció a los partidarios la remuneración por sus servicios con certificados de cesión de la serie B, condicionado a que estos llegaran a tener contenido económico (sin embargo los certificados no fueron entregados a los contratantes, sino que se mantuvieron en el PAC). iii) En otras ocasiones se requirió a los partidarios su firma, en el entendido de que lo que estaban firmando era una cosa completamente diferente. Es decir, todas estas modalidades descritas por los 179 testigos-suscriptores de contratos, mantienen que los mismos eran simulados, y aunque algunos manifestaron que efectivamente hicieron un trabajo y consideraron merecido el importe que ahí se indicaba, esperando recibir buen pago, el descrédito a esta versión sobreviene ante el hecho de que nunca retiraron los bonos, quedando estos siempre en custodia del PAC, indicio de que nunca fue la voluntad de estos militantes, cobrarlos, ni del partido hacerles algún pago. Entonces, lo que puede derivarse de estas declaraciones, es que un número considerable de personas (más de la mitad de los suscribientes de los 263 contratos por servicios especiales) ratificó que firmó la documentación confeccionada bajo el engranaje tantas veces descrito en la sentencia, que luego se cobró al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. En materia civil, en principio rige el principio de prueba por escrito (prueba documental), artículo 351 del Código Procesal Civil, siendo admisible la prueba testimonial solo para comprobar las convenciones que haya habido entre las partes. Además, la normativa procesal civil faculta al juez a adoptar la decisión de reducir el número de testigos cuando son ofrecidos para declarar sobre los mismos hechos específicos. Es decir, el juez puede limitar el número de testigos cumpliendo con los parámetros establecidos en la ley, si la prueba ofrecida es superabundante, artículo 365 del Código Procesal Civil. Exigir que los 263 contratantes debieron declarar en el juicio para tener por acreditado el daño económico total no solo resulta irracional, sino un requisito que se desentiende de los principios de utilidad, pertinencia, razonabilidad y necesidad de la prueba, cuando el mismo Tribunal ha afirmado que todos los contratos y recibos tienen el mismo formato y se confeccionaron sistemáticamente bajo el mismo esquema o estructuración delictiva. Existe fundamentación contradictoria cuando se dice, por un lado que de las probanzas incorporadas fue posible acreditar un plan para engañar a los funcionarios del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones mediante la presentación de contratos simulados y, por otro, se indique que un grupo de ellos no procede indemnizarlos porque se echó de menos la prueba testimonial, pese a existir claros elementos comunes que revelan la simulación. Son dos afirmaciones que no pueden coexistir sin incurrir en vicios relacionados con la fundamentación de la sentencia. Lleva además razón el procurador estatal en que hay un vicio en la valoración de la prueba, pues al otorgar el a quo un valor exagerado e innecesario (sin justificar su trascendencia y la relevancia en la decisión) a los testigos que no se hicieron presentes, restó valor a la prueba documental analizada de manera extensa y profusa a la hora de hacer la fundamentación probatoria de la parte penal. Es importante señalar que por la naturaleza de la simulación, es consustancial a ésta la prueba de indicios, la que no es exclusiva de la sede penal, sino que es aplicable también en materia civil. Sobre la prueba indiciaria en materia civil, se ha reiterado por distintas integraciones del Tribunal Segundo Civil, lo siguiente: “...debemos analizar la figura jurídica de la simulación y concluir que en vista de que con el negocio simulado se quiere dar una apariencia contraria a la realidad, con una situación irreal, se permite todo tipo de prueba y se ha dicho que: ² ...la prueba de la simulación comporta casi exclusivamente una actividad presunsional (sic), de manera tal que la labor probatoria consistirá en ir fijando en autos los diversos indicios.” (La simulación en el Derecho Privado. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo. Talleres de Mundo Gráfico S.A., San José, Costa Rica, 1990. Pág. 186). Existen indicios que son propios de la simulación y que la hacen fácil inferir. El mismo autor recién citado nos los destaca en la obra mencionada y entre ellos tenemos: ...1.- CAUSA SIMULANDI. La causa simulandi se considera el punto de partida “buscar el motivo de la simulación para levantar después sobre fundamento sólido el edificio de la prueba. La causa simulandi hemos dicho supra es el interés, motivo que lleva a las partes a dar apariencia a un negocio irreal, o a presentarlo de manera distinta. El acto simulatorio es reflexivo y conciente, obedece a un motivo determinado...3.- OMNIA BONA. Este indicio se bifurca en dos especies: la enajenación de todo el patrimonio o de la parte más selectiva o valiosa del mismo...Este indicio opera cuando el simulador requiere para sus fines el desapoderamiento integral de sus bienes (para eludir el principio de que son prenda común art.981 C.C.) de nada le sirve ocultar una parte si los acreedores pueden ejecutar el resto...5.- NOTITIA. Se refiere al conocimiento de la simulación por parte del cómplice. Se refiere este indicio al hecho del conocimiento concomitante de los simuladores en orden a la ficción del negocio jurídico, y más concretamente, al conocimiento por parte del cómplice. Sabemos que uno de los elementos constitutivos de la simulación, lo constituye el acuerdo simulatorio, de modo que el conocimiento de la ficción por parte del cómplice se presume. En consecuencia, sólo si se probara la falta de ese conocimiento, materia por lo demás altamente difficilitoris probationes, cabría la posibilidad de inferir la auténtica realidad del negocio supuestamente simulado. Lo anterior implica que a falta de conocimiento del cómplice se demuestra la no simulación del negocio. Opera como indicio negativo de la simulación, no afirmativo... 9.-PRETIUM VILIS. La presencia de un precio vil, desproporcionado o irrisorio, que no guarda relación con el valor real de la cosa enajenada, permutada o locada, es uno de los principales indicios de la simulación... 15.-TEMPUS. Determinados negocios son sospechosos de simulación, por el tiempo o momento de su celebración...Se puede hablar de tres tipos de tempus: a) Tempus coyuntural: Este indicio exige cierta proximidad entre la simulación y el evento perturbador patrimonial...b) Tempus celeritas. Se refiere a la velocidad inusitada del negocio simulado, una prisa fuera de lo normal y corriente, ante la proximidad de un evento. Prisa que se cristaliza en las urgencias registrales (vg. Inmediata inscripción registral de la venta...” (cfr. Tribunal Segundo Civil, Sección I, No. 2002-372. de las 09:30 hrs., 27 de setiembre de 2002). En el caso concreto, hubo 179 testigos que se refirieron a la simulación de los contratos por servicios especiales, siendo 263 los contratos presentados bajo el mismo esquema como gastos de liquidación al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. El tribunal de instancia tuvo por demostrado: la causa simulandi, el motivo que llevó a los coimputados a dar apariencia a un negocio irreal, que es el de abultar la partida de gastos para obtener el mayor monto posible para cubrir los certificados de cesión de la serie A; la notitia o presunción del conocimiento de la ficción por parte del cómplice del acuerdo simulatorio, siendo que tanto los imputados como el militante que firmó, sabían que estaban haciendo una “trampita”; el tempus y el precio vil , pues los contratos se hicieron cuando se supo el resultado de los comicios y el monto máximo de contribución estatal a que podía acceder el PAC, procediéndose así a confeccionarlos por montos astronómicos con tal de obtener el mayor reconocimiento posible de deuda política. Acerca de la valoración de la prueba en materia civil y la apreciación de indicios, resulta oportuno citar el siguiente extracto de lo resuelto por la Sala Primera: “Para que exista una presunción como medio de prueba es necesario, en primer término, que se de un acontecimiento positivo o negativo, cierto del que ha de deducirse el que se quiere conocer. La existencia o inexistencia de este acaecimiento denominado en sentido amplio hecho base, o más técnicamente indicio, tiene que estar debidamente acreditado en el proceso para que asegure la viabilidad de la presunción. Así se deduce del artículo 417 del Código Procesal Civil: “Las presunciones humanas sólo constituyen prueba si son consecuencia directa, precisa y lógicamente deducida de un hecho comprobado”. La Sala ha indicado que este tipo de presunción “…es el resultado del ejercicio de la discrecionalidad otorgada al juzgador para apreciar la prueba, derivando entonces la presunción de otros hechos que se han tenido por ciertos” (no. 848-F, de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 31 de octubre del 2001)”. Esta conexión, que debe ser directa y precisa, entre el hecho base o indicio y el acaecimiento que se pretende derivar (hecho consecuencia), se verifica con arreglo a normas puramente lógicas, a las reglas del criterio humano, tarea que lleva a cabo el Juez investido de poder discrecional según su conciencia y discernimiento. Es éste quien de modo exclusivo infiere de tal prueba un hecho o acto, según su convicción interna le inspire dentro de un marco de razonabilidad y racionalidad, en un prius lógico que no atente con la sana crítica, de ahí que, su juicio se mantiene, salvo se demuestre ser contrario a la evidencia que las pruebas ostentan, ya sea por mediar error de hecho o de derecho en su estimación respecto de los hechos base o indiciarios, o bien, que la inferencia raye en lo absurdo por contrariar el sentido común o los fenómenos naturales” (no. 000025-F-2007, de las 10 horas 45 minutos del 19 de enero de 2007)” (cfr. Sala Primera, No. 2008-216, de las 08:25 hrs., 25 de marzo de 2008). Los jueces por medio de la valoración en conjunto de la prueba evacuada, concluyeron acertadamente que los imputados crearon contratos simulados con el propósito de obtener un beneficio patrimonial indebido para los tenedores de los certificados de cesión de la serie A, en detrimento del erario público, mas en forma contradictoria denegaron el reconocimiento del daño económico respecto de 84 contratos aduciendo que faltó por recibir prueba testimonial sobre ellos. Incurre así la sentencia en el vicio de fundamentación contradictoria y en errónea valoración de la prueba en el aspecto civil, específicamente en torno al daño económico sufrido por el Estado, que reconoció al PAC por concepto de los gastos documentados en los 263 contratos por servicios especiales, la suma de ¢516.600.000,00 (quinientos dieciséis millones seiscientos mil colones, que es el perjuicio patrimonial generado, y no la suma de ¢352.700.000,00 (trescientos cincuenta y dos millones setecientos mil colones). El Tribunal tuvo por establecido que el imputado Sterling liquidó ante el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y fueron autorizados al PAC por él mismo, la suma de ¢ 516.600.000 (quinientos dieciséis millones seiscientos mil colones), bajo el concepto de “servicios especiales” contra el aporte estatal, lo cual permitió cancelar un mayor porcentaje de los certificados de cesión de derechos a la contribución estatal, que habían sido girados por el partido Acción Ciudadana durante la campaña electoral. En esa medida debe revocarse lo resuelto sin necesidad de ordenar el reenvío, desde que del mismo análisis probatorio realizado por el a quo en relación a la determinación del juicio de culpabilidad y fijación de los hechos, permite llegar a la misma conclusión sobre la procedencia del reclamo del daño patrimonial reclamado de manera integral, por los 263 contratos por servicios especiales. En consecuencia, con respecto al daño patrimonial reclamado por la Procuraduría General de la República en representación del Estado Costarricense, contra los demandados civiles Maynor Sterling Araya, Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo y el Partido Acción Ciudadana, se les condena a pagar en forma solidaria , la suma de ¢ 516.600.000 (quinientos dieciséis millones seiscientos mil colones), mas los intereses que se generen desde la consumación del hecho hasta su efectiva cancelación, así como al pago de las costas personales en el monto de ¢56.160.000,00 (cincuenta y seis millones ciento sesenta mil colones). B) En el segundo motivo de su recurso, el recurrente reclama falta de fundamentación intelectiva y contradictoria fundamentación en cuanto al rechazo del daño social. i) Falta de fundamentación intelectiva: Expresa el señor procurador que los hechos provocaron un importante daño social, toda vez que afecta de manera directa las bases mismas de nuestro sistema democrático de Derecho, dentro del cual la Constitución Política propicia un esquema de desarrollo electoral que permite su fortalecimiento pero además su permanencia a través del tiempo, mediante aportes estatales de carácter económico. Se socavó el deber que ostentan los partidos políticos de participar en la educación del pueblo para que sientan la seguridad de aspirar y participar del ideal democrático que significa la libertad del sufragio y dentro de este ideal, la necesidad del sentimiento de pertenencia, honestidad y transparencia del que debe estar impregnada toda fase y todo momento del ejercicio político-electoral; ejercicio que se facilita mediante la contribución estatal. A juicio del impugnante, las actuaciones de los imputados afectan la credibilidad del pueblo en el sistema, ocasionan sentimientos de decepción, desinterés, desconfianza y apatía en los ciudadanos, así como afectación del sistema democrático. En tal sentido refiere lo indicado por los testigos Michael Eugenio Castillo, José Solís Rojas, Teresa Aguilar Brenes, María Elena Rodríguez Rodríguez, Jorge Eduardo Brenes Vargas, Thelma Baldares Carazo y María Ester Anchía Angulo. A partir de la prueba testimonial recabada en el debate se concluye que los hechos demostrados se dieron en un proceso democrático en el cual los imputados realizaron un cobro indebido al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones valiéndose de la participación desinteresada y voluntaria de cientos de costarricenses. Arguye que si el daño social que se produce con ocasión de un delito ocurrido en un proceso electoral es equiparable a un daño moral o inmaterial y por ello no está afecto a la prueba que se requiere para demostrar el daño material, entonces el tribunal a partir de la prueba testimonial pudo haber derivado la existencia de un daño social y por ende la afectación al sistema democrático costarricense. Adicionalmente, la deuda política se utiliza para invertir en democracia, por lo que la afectación a los montos que el Estado destina para financiar dicho proceso democrático, incide necesariamente en el sistema democrático. Fustiga que para los juzgadores no hay prueba suficiente para acreditar que por las conductas tenidas por demostradas y que violentan una norma jurídica penal, se haya causado un daño al sistema democrático costarricense. Recrimina que se señalara que su representada no hizo un estudio que incluyera la variable relativa al impacto que tuvo el conocimiento público de los hechos por los cuales se condenó a los imputados, en relación con la percepción que tiene la sociedad sobre el sistema democrático costarricense. Critica que para el tribunal, el daño social colectivo solo puede evidenciarse por un cambio social verificable antes y después de los eventos, con prueba específica como lo son estudios sociológicos, y no con la prueba testimonial aportada al contradictorio. Ello llevó a que no se considerara ni valorara la prueba testimonial y que no se analizara la existencia del daño social de otras fuentes probatorias distintas a los que estimó el tribunal que debió haber sido aportada. ii) Contradictoria fundamentación del tribunal al rechazar el daño social: No obstante que el tribunal consideró que no se acreditó la existencia de una afectación al sistema democrático y por ende rechazó el daño social, en algunos apartados del fallo evidenció la comprensión en cuanto a la relación existente entre la participación de las personas que laboraron gratuitamente, con la democracia, como así se desprende de las páginas 1360, 1479, 1502, 1561 de la sentencia. Argumenta el impugnante que el hecho más llamativo por lo cual existe una contradictoria fundamentación surge en cuanto al juicio de reproche, en donde el tribunal expresó a folio 1573 que los hechos delictivos del imputado trascienden el bien jurídico propiedad e inciden en la democracia. No ha lugar el reclamo. Examinada la sentencia dictada por el tribunal de instancia mediante la cual rechaza el resarcimiento por daño social a falta de su debida demostración por parte de la Procuraduría General de la República, se estima que la misma se encuentra debidamente fundamentada, y que los razonamientos empleados por los juzgadores se ajustan a lo que establece la ley. Sobre el daño colectivo o social, se le ha definido como el que: “… se propaga o diluye entre los miembros del conjunto, sea que este se encuentre o no organizado y compacto. Se trata de un daño supraindividual que no consiste en la suma de daños especiales. Ni en un perjuicio de bienes propios y particulares de los individuos, sino en una lesión actual y concreta, sólo desde el punto de vista de la sociedad entera que los sufre. El daño al colectivo afecta simultánea y coincidentemente al grupo. Se trata de un mismo y único daño, que hoy en día se acepta sin dificultad, como una noción con entidad propia, que atañe por igual a todos los miembros de la comunidad, o a determinados grupos de manera indistinta y no exclusiva. Los destinatarios no son ya las personas, en forma aislada, sino categorías o clases de sujetos, vinculados por alguna calidad o característica que da conexión al conjunto. Dentro de esta temática, de surgir la obligación de resarcir este tipo de menoscabo, no se configura una suma de porciones identificables; por el contrario, es una lesión general, que resulta aprehensible y experimentable, en donde el elemento afectado es comunitario o grupal, que llega a los sujetos individuales indivisiblemente, por la inserción en el conjunto” (vd. Sala Primera, voto No. 675, de las 10:00 horas del 21 de setiembre de 2007). Ahora bien, como todo daño, sea individual, difuso, económico, material, fÍsico, moral o de cualquier tipo, éste debe probarse, sin que sea procedente presumir su existencia por el hecho de afirmar el ente estatal que los hechos por los cuales accionó, afectan de manera directa las bases del sistema democrático costarricense. Aseveró el representante de los intereses del Estado en su demanda y en sus conclusiones en el debate, lo siguiente: “La actuación aquí reclamada, socava nuestro sistema democrático de derecho, toda vez, que afecta a nuestra propia Constitución, al denigrar diversas consecuencias esenciales de la contribución estatal referida, a saber: el deber que ostentan los partidos políticos de participar en la educación del pueblo para que sientan la seguridad de aspirar y participar del ideal democrático que significa la libertad del sufragio y dentro de este ideal, la necesidad del sentimiento de pertenencia, honestidad y transparencia del que debe estar impregnada toda fase y todo momento del ejercicio político-electoral; ejercicio que se facilita mediante la contribución estatal. Bajo este esquema, la actuación aquí descrita afecta la credibilidad del pueblo en el sistema y la dinámica de la política nacional, la cual colabora en el mantenimiento de las bases estructurales e ideológicas de nuestra democracia. Asimismo, la actuación aquí reclamada, provoca un sentimiento de malestar social que resquebraja nuestras bases democráticas, mediante la pérdida de credibilidad del pueblo en el sistema y desarrollo de la vida democrática nacional. Lo anterior, por cuanto el pueblo costarricense y el Estado mismo, han sido irrespetados, al procurarse y haberse obtenido –en beneficio propio y de terceros- un incremento en el reconocimiento y reembolso de la deuda política sobre la base de un engaño, para lo cual debe resaltase que somos todos los ciudadanos quienes contribuimos con nuestros aportes económicos a financiar la deuda política y por ende, hemos sido igualmente.”. Explica la PGR que se ha provocado un daño social por haberse deteriorado la correcta formación política y afectarse la manifestación de la voluntad popular por la pérdida de credibilidad en los partidos políticos. La actora civil reconoce que existe un desencanto y pérdida de credibilidad en los partidos políticos, a lo cual debe sumarse el abstencionismo de los votantes, el cual contribuye la actuación delictuosa de los demandados civiles” (cfr. fs. 3899-3900, vd. fs. 391-392 legajo acr) . Es innegable que los procesos electorales constituyen un pilarspensable para el funcionamiento real de un auténtico régimen democrático y que, en este contexto, los partidos políticos constituyen un elemento importantísimo de la vida democrática, pues son los instrumentos a través de los cuales se concretan los principios del pluralismo democrático, concurren a la formación y manifestación de la voluntad popular, y son instrumentos fundamentales para la participación política (vd. Sala Constitucional, voto No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. de 23 de enero de 2009 y Sala Primera, No. 2010-8297, 02:45 hrs. de 05 de mayo de 2010, entre otros). Sin embargo, tal y como se advierte en el fallo, quien solicitó el derecho al resarcimiento por daño social debió acreditar el daño cierto, real y efectivo que los demandados civiles (don Maynor, don Antonio y el PAC) ocasionaron al sistema democrático costarricense, más allá de la mera enunciación de la razón de ser de los partidos políticos y su papel en una democracia como la nuestra. Asumir la realidad de la causación del daño social basándose en lo que declararon los testigos que aparecieron suscribiendo los contratos y documentos simulados en una apreciación general, es absolutamente insuficiente para probar que se afectó la credibilidad en los partidos políticos, pilar fundamental en un régimen democrático. Michael Eugenio Castillo manifestó que trabajó para el PAC para apoyar a su mamá que aspiraba a un puesto por el partido, pero también por amor a los ideales de transparencia y ética de la agrupación, quería un cambio a nivel político, no tenía intención de cobrar por su voluntariado y, su sorpresa y desilusión obedeció a la tergiversación de lo que había firmado. Por su parte, José Solís Rojas relató que al PAC lo llevó Rodrigo Carazo, trabajó desinteresadamente para el partido, fue regidor y con el tiempo se hizo independiente, sin que dijera que ello obedeció a las acciones achacadas a los demandados civiles. Teresa Aguilar Brenes indicó que fue fundadora del PAC. Refirió que puso su vehículo personal y el combustible de su propio bolsillo a disposición de las necesidades del partido en varias ocasiones, expresó que regaló el trabajo para ayudar al país, aceptando que firmó los contratos y que la plata fuera para el partido. En ningún momento externó tristeza por lo sucedido, más bien salió en defensa de su aporte gratuito y del reconocimiento merecido al partido de la deuda política a su labor. La señora María Elena Rodríguez Rodríguez acotó que su trabajo lo hizo voluntariamente, sin cobro al partido porque cree en la democracia de este país. Jorge Eduardo Brenes Vargas informó que en el PAC era difícil contar con recursos, así que ello mismos financiaban la campaña con el aporte de trabajo. Lo que firmó representa un valor por su entrega, pues nunca esperó tener una retribución económica. Como se ve, ninguna de estas personas mencionadas por el procurador en su recurso, o los más de 170 testigos que rindieron declaración en el debate, mencionaron haber sufrido un daño supraindividual que ocasionara un menoscabo a la democracia. La mayoría admitió haber prestado una colaboración gratuita al partido y estuvieron de acuerdo con firmar los documentos que se les presentó, convencidos de que con ello se ayudaba a la agrupación que eventualmente podría ser reconocida. En lo que mayormente externaron asombro e inconformidad, fue en los montos desproporcionados que se consignaron y la clase de función que se les asignó, los cuales reñían con la realidad del servicio prestado. Algunos, como Jeannette de la O Hernández, se mostraron incómodos porque fueron contactados por funcionarios del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones para declarar con relación a los contratos por servicios especiales cobrados al Estado, respecto de los cuales los prestatarios, no habían declarado sus ingresos a la Dirección General de Tributación Directa. El común denominador entre casi todos los militantes del PAC que depusieron, es que quisieron dar el trabajo al partido, sin esperar nada a cambio, mas si se daba un reconocimiento económico por su labor desinteresada, que este se entregara al partido para contribuir con sus precarias finanzas. Lo que dijeron es en el fondo, como lo hizo ver la testigo Ana Lorena Valverde Conejo, la aceptación de llevar a cabo “una pequeña trampa” o, “un pequeño engaño”, sabiendo que se trataba de dineros públicos, de modo que, no son el mejor referente para ofrecer una muestra representativa de los titulares del verdadero interés colectivo. Por el contrario, si alguno de ellos evidenció malestar, no fue por el ataque que con el accionar de los demandados civiles se ocasionó a la institucionalidad político-electoral de este país (en lo que ellos mismos, “de buena fe para con el partido”, participaron), sino por la traición sufrida en su esfera particular, del PAC hacia ellos, como sus militantes, al llenarse los documentos con contenidos irreales en el monto y en cuanto a las funciones desempeñadas. No debe confundirse el daño en los intereses particulares de los individuos que pertenecen a una agrupación determinada, con la lesión general que le pertenece al colectivo. Por ello, acertadamente, el Tribunal concluyó que no hay prueba suficiente para acreditar que, por las conductas tenidas por debidamente demostradas y que violentan una norma jurídico penal, se haya causado un daño al sistema democrático costarricense. Llevan razón los juzgadores en que se debe corroborar la existencia de un daño efectivo; el cual debe ser evaluable e individualizable, y derivado de una conducta apta para el surgimiento de la responsabilidad. De igual manera, debe examinarse el nexo de causalidad, como elemento necesario para imputar el daño al comportamiento específico que lo ha provocado. Indicó el a quo: “Si no logra corroborarse el daño, la afirmación de la PGR no pasaría de ser un supuesto o una hipótesis. De igual manera, si la actora civil no demuestra el daño social, no hay necesidad de pasar a examinar si existe una relación de causalidad directa entre éste y el resultado, pues sería innecesario y estéril” (cfr. f. 3901). No es, como la Procuraduría de manera genérica sostiene, que con el hecho ilícito configurado se ha visto deteriorada la correcta formación política, así como afectada la manifestación de la voluntad popular por la pérdida de credibilidad en los partidos políticos. Apuntó la parte actora civil en su recurso, que existe un desencanto y pérdida de credibilidad en los partidos políticos, a lo cual debe sumarse el abstencionismo de los votantes, en lo cual contribuyó la actuación delictuosa de los demandados civiles. Tales aseveraciones del recurrente son infundadas y parten de un primer error, que es dar por sentado que existió un daño social a la colectividad. Hecha esta suposición, estima que debe concederse como se hace con el daño moral, mediante una ponderación de los juzgadores sobre el quantum del daño al colectivo. Comparte esta Cámara con el tribunal de mérito, que debió demostrarse la existencia del daño social. A tales efectos, los jueces impacto que tuvo el conocimiento de los hechos por los cuales se condenó a los imputados, en relación con la percepción que tiene la sociedad sobre el sistema democrático costarricense, antes, y después. Es decir: “una comparación entre el bienestar social antes del hecho y luego de sucedido éste” (vd. fs. 3901-3903). Al no hacerse de esa manera, se trata de un daño incierto y abstracto, que es todo lo contrario a un daño cierto y efectivo, evaluable e individualizable. Como se ve, nada de esos atributos tiene el daño social cuyo resarcimiento pretende el ente estatal. El actor civil no pudo escindir dentro del índice de confianza al sistema democrático, cuál es la repercusión de la presentación de la liquidación de gastos simulados por parte del PAC, y cuáles efectos obedecen a otras causas, para determinar si producto de la acción de los demandados civiles hubo daño social. Debe recordarse que la percepción favorable o negativa hacia los partidos políticos, como canales para la participación democrática y de la organización de las corrientes e ideologías de la vida social, es multifactorial, depende de muchas situaciones, como por ejemplo, la decepción del electorado por la falta de inversión pública en un gobierno, o bien, por actos de corrupción imputados a alguna figura pública en un momento determinado, entre muchos otros. La dificultad para separar esta situación concreta de otras igualmente aptas para crear un daño social, precisamente demuestra la importancia de que, tratándose de intereses difusos, el daño supuestamente causado al colectivo, no hace presumir la existencia “automática” de éste, ya sea porque se crea obvio que acciones como las estudiadas quebrantan nuestra institucionalidad o porque se tome en bulto las declaraciones de los militantes y se diga que sufrieron un perjuicio, sino que debe acreditarse a través de algún medio o instrumento de medición apropiado, desde la óptica de las ciencias sociales y la estadística, que venga a establecer si puede evidenciarse un cambio social verificable, antes y después de los eventos. No es suficiente decir, solamente, que hay daño social por cuanto el hecho por el cual el PAC se impuso de un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico, ofendió los principios fundamentales de paz y democracia que consagra la Constitución Política. El hecho de que se trata de bienes o valores de interés general, como ocurre en el caso del concepto de pluralismo político, principio elemental del acervo democrático y constitucional de la nación, los cuales son definiciones de corte sumamente abstracto y genérico, no implica “per se” que nazca en la entidad estatal el derecho de reclamar un daño social indeterminado, lo que impone el rechazo del reclamo al no existir vicios en la fundamentación analítica. Estima esta Cámara que conforme a lo expresado por lo jueces en la sentencia cuestionada, no existe en el expediente documento que acredite haberse causado un daño colectivo individualizable a esa globalidad. Lo anterior impide establecer, la existencia de un nexo de causalidad, entre el hecho ilícito y el daño que reclama el actor. En torno al cargo de fundamentación contradictoria desde que en algunos apartados del fallo se evidenció la relación entre la participación de las personas que colaboraron gratuitamente, con la democracia, como se desprende de los folios 3597, 3715, 3733 y 3797, no existe duda en que la mayoría de los testigos desplegó el servicio al partido en forma voluntaria y sin pretender cobro alguno. Ello no significa que en esos apartados de la sentencia se esté diciendo que estas personas sufrieron una afectación en su percepción acerca de la democracia, por el proceder de los demandados civiles. Antes bien, como se indicó, los mismos participaron conscientes de que los documentos que suscribieron iban a significar un cobro al Estado costarricense, se diera el reconocimiento o no. Finalmente, en cuanto a lo expresado por el Tribunal en la página 1573, folio 3809 de la sentencia, que: “La afectación trasciende de la mera afectación al bienjurídico propiedad, las arcas del estado (sic) han sido saqueadas en un rubro que el mismo constituyente quiso invertir en la columna vertebral de nuestra democracia electoral” (cfr. f. 3809), en modo alguno significa que se está asumiendo la existencia del daño social. Simplemente, en el contexto del análisis del perjuicio patrimonial, como elemento del tipo penal del delito de estafa, se está indicando algo que es innegable: la base de la financiación aprobada directamente en los presupuestos generales del Estado a los partidos políticos, descansa en el reconocimiento constitucional del interés público de la función que realizan, como canales para la participación democrática de los ciudadanos. Tal y lo ha esenciales del ejercicio de aquellos derechos y, por ende, de la democracia misma; su formación y funcionamiento libérrimos, son, pues de un altísimo interés público, a la sola condición de que cumplan algunos requisitos objetivamente derivados del sistema de partidos; la posibilidad de constituirlos, organizarlos e inscribirlos y de participar con ellos en la elección de los gobernantes y en la conducción de los asuntos públicos, debe ser lo más amplia posible, dentro de los límites estrictamente indispensables para preservar los intereses públicos correspondientes a su naturaleza, fines y función” (cfr. Sala Constitucional, voto No. 2009-849, 12:35 hrs. de 23 de enero de 2009). El accionar de los demandados civiles atentó contra fondos de la contribución estatal destinados a invertir en democracia, lo que no significa que los jueces estén aceptando que existió un daño al sistema democrático, sino que están destacando el valor intrínseco de la decisión de invertir en nuestro país por sostener el sistema electoral. Consecuencia de lo anteriormente expuesto, no existen vicios en la fundamentación analítica ni fundamentación contradictoria, por lo que procede rechazar el agravio.

POR TANTO:

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación de los representantes del Ministerio Público. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso de apelación de los defensores del imputado, únicamente en cuanto a que el fallo no concedió al imputado Maynor Sterling Araya la pena sustitutiva del monitoreo mediante brazalete electrónico, ordenándose su otorgamiento desde esta instancia. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso de apelación del abogado de la Procuraduría General de la República, ordenándose a los co-demandados civiles Maynor Sterling Araya, Manuel Antonio Bolaños Murillo y el Partido Acción Ciudadana pagar al Estado Costarricense, en forma solidaria, por concepto de daño patrimonial, la suma de ¢516.600.000,00 (quinientos dieciséis millones seiscientos mil colones), así como las costas personales por el monto de ¢56.160.000,00 (cincuenta y seis millones ciento sesenta mil colones). En todo lo demás, se rechazan las impugnaciones y el fallo permanece incólume. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Rosa María Acón Ng Kathya Jiménez Fernández Edwin Salinas Durán Juezas y juez de Apelación de Sentencia Penal Imputado: Maynor Ricardo Sterling Araya y otros Ofendido: El Estado y otro Delito: Estafa mayor y otro LQUIROSG 12-000024-0033-PE (3) - VOTO 2017-1491 - pág.: 3