Municipal liability for deficient septic tank inspection in residential developmentResponsabilidad municipal por fiscalización deficiente de tanques sépticos en urbanización

*980003850163CA* RES: 000979-F-2006 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at seven hours fifty-five minutes on December nineteenth, two thousand six.

Ordinary proceeding filed in the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, by NIDIA MARÍA ALFARO ESPINOZA, MANUEL VILLALOBOS VILLALOBOS, MARÍA MAYELA SÁNCHEZ MADRIGAL, Nombre38277 , Nombre38278 , RAFAEL ÁNGEL GUTIÉRREZ MORALES, Nombre99656 , HEIDY OCAMPO VARGAS, Nombre209606 , Nombre80407 , Nombre209607 , Nombre80409 , Nombre38282 , Nombre80410 , Nombre209608 , Nombre38283 , Nombre209609 , Nombre209610 , Nombre39321 , Nombre80411 , Nombre39322 , Nombre38284 , Nombre80412 , Nombre80413 , Nombre209611 , Nombre209612 , Nombre80414 , Nombre209613 and Nombre58688 , all of unstated marital status, profession, or occupation; against the MUNICIPALITY OF HEREDIA, represented by Mayor Nombre20681 , married, Master in Development Project Management. Also appearing as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the co-plaintiffs is licensed attorney Rodolfo Arroyo Porras, married, lawyer. The natural persons are of legal age and residents of Heredia.

RESULTANDO

1.- Based on the facts they set forth and the legal provisions they cited, the co-plaintiffs filed an ordinary lawsuit, the amount in controversy of which was set at the sum of thirty million colones, so that the judgment declares that: "I). The defendant acted negligently in not having required the construction company to complete the playgrounds, communal areas, paving of access roads, and sewage system (sistema de aguas negras) of the Residencial Cedri, where my clients' houses are located. II). The Municipality of Heredia has acted negligently in not piping the open-air irrigation ditch (acequia a cielo abierto) that exists in the Residencial Cedri, which it must do immediately. III). The defendant acted negligently in not finding a solution to the problem of the dump at the Quebrada Seca River. IV). The defendant has promoted the 'tugurización' of the third stage of Residencial Cedri, by granting construction permits without any urban planning. V). The defendant is culpable for the process of contamination, 'tugurización,' and deterioration of each of my clients' houses. VI). The defendant must immediately stop granting construction permits in the slums (tugurios). VII). That the NON-CONTRACTUAL CIVIL LIABILITY of the defendant be declared, both for act and omission, for the damages caused to my clients by the acts denounced herein. Pursuant to the foregoing, the defendant is ordered to pay each of my clients the extremes that will be stated: 1). NIDIA MARÍA ALFARO ESPINOZA SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES. 1,500,000.00 colones. OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones. LOSSES. 2,550,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 2). MANUEL VILLALOBOS VILLALOBOS. SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones, LOSSES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 3). MARÍA MAYELA SÁNCHEZ MADRIGAL. The damages and losses caused to MANUEL VILLALOBOS VILLALOBOS are suffered with María Mayela Sánchez Madrigal. For that reason, its meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. It is so because they are spouses and between their two properties they form house No. (17J). 4). Nombre38277 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 5). Nombre38278 . The damages and losses caused to Nombre38277 are suffered with Nombre38278 . For that reason, its meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. It is so because they are spouses and between their two properties they form house No. (5K). 6). Nombre99656 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 500,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,500,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,500,000.00 colones. 7). Nombre209606 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 2,000,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,000,000.00 colones and LOSSES 4,000,000.00 colones. TOTAL 7,000,000.00 colones. 8). Nombre80407 SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,700,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 600,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,900,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,200,000.00 colones. 9). Nombre209607 . The damages and losses caused to Nombre80407 are suffered with Nombre209607 because they are mother and daughter respectively and between their two properties they form house No. (23J). For that reason, its meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. 10). Nombre80409 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,700,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 600,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,900,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,200,000.00 colones. 11) Nombre38282 . The damages and losses caused to Nombre80409 are experienced together with Nombre38282 . For that reason, its meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. It is so because they are spouses and between their two properties they form house No. (9K). 12. Nombre80410 (12J). SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,900,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 650,000.00 colones and LOSSES 3,200,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,750,000.00 colones. 13). Nombre38283 SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 2,000,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 700,000.00 colones and LOSSES 3,400,000.00 colones. TOTAL 6,100,000.00 colones. 14). Nombre209609 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 15). Nombre209610 SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 500,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,500,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,500,000.00 colones. 16). Nombre39321 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,800,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 650,000.00 colones and LOSSES 3,100,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,550,000.00 colones. 17). Nombre80411 . The damages and losses caused to Nombre39321 are suffered together with Nombre80411 . For that reason, its meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. It is so because they are spouses and between their two properties they form house No.(14J). 18). Nombre39322 (22K). SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 19). Nombre38284 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,700,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 600,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,900,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,200,000.00 colones. 20). Nombre80412 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 500,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,500,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,500,000.00 colones. 21). Nombre80413 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,700,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 600,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,900,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,200,000.00 colones. 22). Nombre209611 () . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 500,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,500,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,500,000.00 colones. 23). Nombre80414 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones and LOSSES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. TOTAL 88,400,000.00 colones. In the amount of losses for each of my clients, legal interest is included. The interest must be established at the rate of 19.20% per annum, which is the rate established for 6-month term deposits in the National Banking System, which shall run from October 25, 1993, until there is total and effective fulfillment of what is established in the final judgment of this trial. The amounts established for the damages, losses, and interest shall run from December 1, 1994, until there is total and effective fulfillment of what is established in the final judgment of this trial. To determine the value of the damages, losses, and interest in this trial, I request that two experts be appointed, one mathematical and the other environmental. VIII). The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of this trial." 2.- The defendant Municipality answered late, for which reason it was declared in default and the facts of the lawsuit were deemed affirmatively answered.

3.- Judge Yazmín Aragón Cambronero, in judgment no. 789-03 at 9:30 a.m. on October 1, 2003, resolved: "The present lawsuit is granted, only in the extremes that will expressly be stated, it being understood as denied in those extremes where no pronouncement is made: The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiffs who have proven to be owners of homes or lots in Residencial Cedri, the damages and losses derived from the lack of installation of the sewage system (sistema de aguas negras) in their residences. Which they must prove in the execution phase of the judgment. The defendant is ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs incurred." 4.- Both parties appealed, and the Administrative Litigation Tribunal, First Section, composed of Judges Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez, Joaquín Villalobos Soto, and Ana Isabel Vargas Vargas, in judgment no. 109-2005 at 10:35 a.m. on March 16, 2005, ordered: "The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders the Municipality of Heredia to pay the damages and losses to the owners of Residencial Cedri, derived from the lack of installation of the sewage system (sistema de aguas negras) in their residences, and it is instead denied; also insofar as it denies the payment of subjective moral damages, for the harm received due to the environmental deterioration suffered by them, and instead, five hundred thousand colones is granted for that concept to each one of them, sums that shall generate interest as of the finality of the judgment. It is confirmed insofar as it denies the other extremes of the action and insofar as it orders the losing party to pay costs." 5.- Both parties file a cassation appeal for procedural and substantive reasons. The co-plaintiffs consider a breach of articles 4 subsection 4) of the repealed Municipal Code; 2 and 4 subsection c) of the current Municipal Code; 11, 41, 170 of the Political Constitution; 87 of the Construction Law; 1045 of the Civil Code; 190 to 198 of the General Law of Public Administration; 98 subsection 2), 155 subsection 3), sections ch), d) and 330 of the Civil Procedure Code. The defendant alleges violation of numerals 106, 153, 155, 221, 222 of the Civil Procedure Code; 704, 1045, 1046 of the Civil Code; 50 of the Political Constitution; 2, 289 of the General Health Law, 4 subsection 4° of the repealed Municipal Code and 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction.

6.- In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed. Drafted by Magistrate González Camacho, except for Considerando XVIII, which is drafted by Magistrate Rivas Loáiciga.

CONSIDERANDO I.- In accordance with the facts narrated in the lawsuit, the co-plaintiffs Nidia María Alfaro Espinoza, Manuel Villalobos Villalobos, María Mayela Sánchez Madrigal, Nombre38277 , Nombre38278 , Rafael Ángel Gutiérrez Morales, Nombre99656 , Heidy Ocampo Vargas, Nombre209606 , Nombre209614 Nombre80407 , Nombre209607 , Nombre80409 , Marjorie Alfaro Jiménez, Nombre80410 , Allisson Arias Víquez, Nombre38283 , Nombre209609 , Nombre209610 , Nombre39321 , Nombre80411 , Nombre39322 , Nombre38284 , Nombre80412 , Nombre80413 , Nombre209611 , Nombre209612 , Nombre80414 , Nombre209613 and Nombre58688 , state that they are each owners of a house or lot in the Residencial Cedri, located in Mercedes Sur de Heredia. They indicate that the construction of that complex, composed of three stages, was in charge of the construction company Desarrollos Urbanos del Oeste S.A. The Municipality of Heredia, they say, approved the corresponding construction permit for that company in April 1993, as a result of which, work began immediately on the properties of the Heredia party, registered under folio real numbers Placa39668 and Placa39669. They state that, in ordinary session 68-04 of October 25, 1993, the local entity agreed to authorize the substitution of the mortgage guarantee offered by the firm Desarrollos Urbanos del Oeste S.A., for the unfinished works of the Urbanización Cedri, with a performance bond (garantía de cumplimiento) issued by an entity of the National Banking System, for the same amount, submitted by its President, Mr. Nombre209615 . They assert that in December 1994, said company delivered the first and second stage to the Municipality in an incomplete manner, since the playgrounds, communal areas, paving of access roads, and sewage systems (sistemas de aguas negras) were missing. They allege that due to the breach by the construction firm, the Mutual de Heredia auctioned off the properties of the residential complex, which were acquired by Vivienda Coop R.L. They state that the part corresponding to the third phase was put up for sale without any urban development plan. They add that the local corporation granted construction permits to the purchasers of lots in the second and third stages, without taking into account the difference with the houses of the first stage; in some cases, those of the third stage have a standard very similar to those of shantytowns (precarios) or social interest housing. They accuse that the residential complex has two sources of environmental contamination: to the north, the Quebrada Seca River and to the south, an open-air irrigation ditch (acequia a cielo abierto). They express that in the river there is a large amount of garbage and all types of foul-smelling waste that produce unbearable odors and a high degree of contamination. The irrigation ditch, for its part, is also full of garbage and putrefied water. They assert that the Municipality, despite an existing recommendation from the Director of the Area of Quality of Life, did not wish to pipe the irrigation ditch that crosses the residential complex. As a consequence thereof, they file the lawsuit that gives rise to this proceeding against the entity of the Central canton of Heredia. Fundamentally, they request that the judgment declare that the defendant: 1.- acted negligently in not having required the construction company to complete the playgrounds, communal areas, paving of access roads, and sewage systems (sistemas de aguas negras) of the Residencial Cedri, where their houses are located; 2.- has acted negligently in not piping the open-air irrigation ditch (acequia a cielo abierto) that exists in the residential complex, which must be done immediately; 3.- was negligent in not providing a solution to the problem of the dump at the Quebrada Seca River; 4.- has promoted the "tugurización" of the third stage of the residential complex, by granting construction permits without any urban planning; 5.- is culpable for the process of contamination, 'tugurización,' and deterioration of their houses; 6.- must immediately suspend the granting of permits for the construction of slums (tugurios); 7.- that the non-contractual civil liability, both for act and omission, be declared for the damages caused by the denounced acts, and in accordance therewith, the plaintiffs must be paid the sums they liquidate in the lawsuit, for those concepts; and 8.- it be ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding. The defendant corporation did not respond in a timely manner, as a result of which, at the request of the plaintiffs, it was declared in default. The Trial Court partially granted the lawsuit. It ordered the Municipality to pay the co-plaintiffs who have proven to be owners of homes or lots in Residencial Cedri, the damages and losses derived from the lack of installation of the sewage system (sistema de aguas negras) in their residences, to be defined in the execution phase. It imposed both costs on the territorial entity. Disagreeing with the decision, the parties appealed. Hearing these appeals, the Tribunal revoked the first instance judgment regarding the order to pay the damages and losses derived from the lack of installation of the sewage system (sistema de aguas negras) in their residences, and instead denied it. Likewise, regarding the denial of the payment of subjective moral damages, for the harm received due to the environmental deterioration suffered by the plaintiffs, a concept for which it granted each one an amount of ₡500,000.00, plus their respective interest running from the finality of the judgment. It confirmed the denial of the other extremes of the action and the imposition of costs. Both parties appeal in cassation, accusing procedural and substantive defects.

II.- Before going into the details of the reproaches formulated by the cassation appellants, and given the manner in which they have been raised, it is necessary to indicate that this Chamber has already established on repeated occasions that the classification that the appellants give to their claims is not an obstacle to conducting their analysis. This is because their legal classification corresponds exclusively to this collegiate body, for which purpose it resorts to the substance and true nature of the argument, rather than its denomination. Hence, it has resolved arguments formulated as substantive as being of a procedural nature, or those typical of direct violation raised as errors committed in evidentiary assessment, or vice versa. Notwithstanding, it is clear that this analysis in question is appropriate, provided that within the corresponding classification they satisfy the requirements imposed by the civil procedural regulations for admitting them to examination. Viewed in this way, the motives interposed will be grouped according to their correct nature, in order to carry out an adequate and objective analysis of the points requested to be reviewed through this appeal.

APPEAL OF THE PLAINTIFFS Substantive Defects III.- Indirect violation. The special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiffs accuses an error of law. He indicates that in Considerando XII of the judgment, the serious fact of the pollution suffered by his clients due to the sources of contamination existing in the Quebrada Seca River to the north, and to the south, an open-air drain, is deemed proven. He adds that this considerando establishes that the Municipality is responsible for the environmental deterioration, for not having adopted the appropriate policies to remedy the problem, and therefore the omission has inflicted moral damages. He indicates that the error consists of not having assigned to the evidentiary elements the true scope they have to determine the magnitude of the environmental damage and thereby the value of the subjective moral damages. In this sense, he points out, the expert report of engineer Nombre38778 establishes aspects that seriously harm the health and morale of the plaintiffs. He refers to the photographs accompanying said expert report. He adds that in a nationally circulated newspaper, namely, La Nación, it was published that the Quebrada Seca River crosses to the north of the Urbanización Cedri, constituted as a kind of natural sewer. Therefore, it is public and notorious that this residential complex is a dirty, unsanitary, unhygienic, and dangerous place, due to the possibility of epidemics. He adds that the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes), in official letter DHR-9801-1783-98, had declared the gravity of the aforementioned sources of contamination, which since 1997 were known by the local authorities. He warns that the testimonies offered reflect that this problem has been suffered since 1993. He reiterates that the error lies in the erroneous and insufficient assessment made by the Tribunal of this evidence, awarding a value that does not correspond to the grave scope they represent. He considers the sum awarded for this concept (moral damages) to be meager and derisory. He provides jurisprudential citations from this Chamber. He reprimands that by not jointly interpreting the evidence, article 330 of the Civil Procedure Code was violated. Likewise, he notes, precepts 190 to 192, 196, and 197 of the General Law of Public Administration have been infringed, as well as canon 4 subsection 4) of the Municipal Code, Law no. 4574, in force at the time the environmental, health, and cited moral damages began to occur, and ordinal 4 subsection c) of the currently governing Municipal Code. Similarly, by not having allowed equitable compensation for the damages suffered, he affirms, ordinals 1045 of the Civil Code and 41 of the Political Constitution have been flagrantly infringed.

IV.- On the error of law. Informal appeal. Regarding the charge formulated, it is worth mentioning that this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the error of law implies disregarding the legal value of a means of evidence, or granting it a value different from that provided by law. Within this, criticism for the violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) is also recognized, which aims to establish the non-observance of the principles of logic, psychology, or experience when evaluating the evidence. When it is alleged, it is necessary to indicate, with clarity and precision, the norms considered infringed concerning the value of the evidentiary elements erroneously assessed. It is also indispensable to cite the rules violated in substance, expressing, with clarity and precision, how the error occurred and the impact it had on the canons that were not applied or were applied incorrectly (article 596 of the Civil Procedure Code). This implies technically pointing out the indirect violation inflicted on the legal system in the substantive norms due to the erroneous assessment, and not merely citing the articles or transcribing them. The charge does not conform to proper technique. The appeal is limited to accusing an alleged mishap in the weighing of the evidence. However, although he cites some substantive norms that he considers infringed, he does not address at all nor detail how such provisions were harmed as a consequence of the mistake he alleges. He invokes in his favor provisions of the General Law of Public Administration, and of the Municipal Code in force at the time the environmental pollution began, however, he does not elaborate on reasons nor explain how the jurisdictional proceeding has disregarded these rules, which, according to what has been stated, is fundamental to proceed to the examination of the claim. In this way, by not satisfying said requirement, the charge turns out to be informal, which implies its rejection.

V.- Direct violation. First. The special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiffs claims that the contested judgment contains provisions contradictory to the law and the expert reports. He maintains, in Considerando VII, it is said that the Municipality should not renounce its powers derived from its autonomy. He indicates that the court, with an evident error of interpretation of municipal autonomy, omits citing in the judgment that it cannot evade the duties imposed on it by law, which are above any regulation. He criticizes that without any evidence, it is deemed that there is no sewage treatment system (sistema de tratamiento de aguas negras) at the site of the events, and that the residential complex had fewer than five hundred houses. For that reason, he says, it is resolved that it was not the responsibility of the local entity to supervise the connection of the sewage and wastewater pipes to the designated ones, which he considers violative of numeral 87 of the Construction Law, which he transcribes. He maintains that the claimed liability was unavoidable, to the point that not only should the municipal entity have supervised the installation of the stormwater and sewage pipes, but it should not even have approved the construction plans, nor allowed the works to proceed. He affirms that by failing in this obligation, precepts 4 of the Municipal Code and 11 of the Political Constitution were breached. Regarding them, he cites precedents from the Constitutional Chamber. He says that this lethal process of deterioration of the environment and of the houses they acquired has been carried out with the full knowledge and tolerance of the Municipality, which should have intervened in defense of the interests of the residents and the environment. He again reproduces resolutions from the Constitutional Tribunal related to the topic. He copies part of the expert report rendered by the professional Nombre38778 , where it is expressed that there were plans indicating the stormwater and sewage pipes for the entire project, to which the local corporation did not give importance. From this, he points out, it is reflected that the defendant did not act in accordance with its duties. He expresses that the Tribunal contradicts itself when it rejects the responsibility of the municipal entity by the sole application of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) no. 18,888, "Regulation of the National Review Office for Construction Projects" ("Reglamento de la Oficina Nacional Revisora de Proyectos de Construcción"), the date of issuance of which it does not indicate. A contradiction consisting of the fact that with this Decree, it subtracts legal competencies, overriding, even canon 87 of the Construction Law, a violation which he considers attacks not only municipal autonomy, but also the hierarchy of norms, damaging the mentioned precept, as well as ordinals 2 of the Municipal Code and 170 of the Magna Carta. He cites national doctrine in his support. He asserts that with this action, the defendant is exonerated from a liability, which causes his clients serious damages and losses, also breaching numeral 1045 of the Civil Code and precepts 190 to 198 of the General Law of Public Administration. Second. He expresses outwardly that the facts are correctly selected and enunciated in the judgment, but the Ad quem (appellate court) incorrectly interprets the applied substantive law. He states that regarding Considerando VII, the Tribunal deemed proven that the stormwater and sewage pipes were not connected to the corresponding designated ones and that the Municipality should not renounce its powers derived from the autonomy granted by the Constitution. He argues that with an evident error of interpretation of what is provided by canons 4 of the Municipal Code, 87 of the Construction Law, and 170 of the Political Constitution, the judgment does not indicate that the local entity cannot evade the duties that this autonomy imposes on it. He estimates that the violation of substantive law consists of the Tribunal interpreting that by virtue of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) no. 3391 of December 13, 1982 (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones), the defendant is exempted from supervising the connection of the referenced pipes, when instead section III.3.2.12 of that legal instrument establishes something quite different. In his judgment, distinctions are made where the law does not make them, and it is overlooked that the aforementioned precepts establish that the Municipality cannot abstain from those duties.

VI.- On municipal autonomy. Principle of legality. Regarding the objections raised, the following should be indicated. Municipalities are local entities that enjoy relative autonomy in the exercise of their functions. The municipal regime is a type of territorial decentralization, as inferred from numeral 168 of the Magna Carta. This level of independence is granted by precept 169 of the Political Constitution, within the framework of its territorial jurisdiction, composed of the physical space designated for the canton it represents, insofar as it states that it corresponds to each city council to: "administer the local interests and services ...". That is, the constituent power has conferred a series of functions or attributions in favor of those governments by reason of "the local," that is, to administer the services and interests of the area to which it is confined, i.e., the canton. This competence is not exclusive of that which has been granted by the Legal System to other entities or organs of the State. In this sense, it is clear that there are interests whose safeguarding corresponds to the Municipalities, and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional or legal protection is attributed to other public entities. The above is because there are interests that transcend the local sphere, because they have an impact on other latitudes outside the canton. However, it must be clear that the administration of those interests within the territorial sphere of the municipality constitutes an original competence of the city councils and can only be displaced from them through a nationalization law, provided that said legislative manifestation does not entail a breach of the referred autonomy or imply emptying the constitutional content of the municipal regime. For its part, article 4 of the Municipal Code, Law no. 7794 of April 30, 1998, develops the types of autonomy that the ordinary legislator deemed these corporations possessed, indicating that they have political, administrative, and financial autonomy. On the scope of this autonomy, see among others, from the Constitutional Chamber, votes 5445-99, 1220-2002, 5204-2004, and 8928-2004. However, as part of an integrated system, within the dynamics of satisfying the interests of the residents, it is clear that there will be interests that are purely local and others that can be considered national. This aspect obliges, within a principle of sound administration, coordination with the administrative instances of the Central Power, which carry out, at a macro level, functions related to those deployed locally by the corporation.

This is an example, in what is relevant to this case, of urban matters, in which, even though pursuant to Article 15 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), each Municipality is responsible for approving the respective Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), coordination with the INVU and the Urbanism Directorate (Dirección de Urbanismo) is required for these purposes, with a view to implementing a national development policy that integrates all the technical, economic, and social variables that converge in this activity. The same coordination particularities are rigorously required in environmental matters, in which certainly, the treatment of natural resources and the actions established by each administrative unit for the defense and protection of the environment, within a perception that should be precautionary and preventive, directly affects not the territorial sphere of the municipality, but the entirety of the national territory. Just as ecosystems maintain a symbiotic linkage and relationship among themselves (as in the case of biological corridors for species conservation), the impacts occurring in a specific sector of the country have consequences for the national environment as a whole. Hence, in this matter, one is faced with both a national and a local interest simultaneously. The Constitutional Chamber, in ruling no. 5445-99, already laid the foundations for the necessary coordination that must prevail in these inter-administrative relations, which arise without prejudice to the autonomy already assigned by the constituent to local entities. In this regard, the cited ruling indicated: "X.- (...) Having defined the material competence of the municipality in a specific territorial jurisdiction, it is clear that there will be tasks that are exclusively municipal by their nature, alongside others that can be deemed national or state-related; therefore, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of attributions that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; consequently, the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent required by the circumstances. That is to say, municipalities may share their competencies with the Public Administration in general, a relationship that must be conducted in the terms defined by law (Article 5 of the former Municipal Code, Article 7 of the new Code), which establishes the obligation of 'coordination' between municipalities and public institutions that concur in the performance of their competencies, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, especially because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy as it is its expression. In other words, the municipality is called upon to enter into cooperative relationships with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincident nature—in many cases—of interests regarding a specific matter. In doctrine, coordination is defined based on the existence of several independent centers of action, each with its own tasks and decision-making powers, which may potentially be discrepant; despite this, there must be a community of ends by subject matter, but by concurrence, insofar as the object receiving the final results of the activity and the acts of each is common. So coordination is the ordering of relations between these diverse independent activities, which addresses that concurrence on a single object or entity, to make it useful to a global public plan, without suppressing the reciprocal independence of the acting subjects. Since there is no hierarchical relationship of the decentralized institutions, nor of the State itself in relation to the municipalities, imposing determined conducts on the latter is not possible, whereby the indispensable inter-institutional 'concert' arises, in a strict sense, insofar as the autonomous and independent centers of action agree on that preventive and global scheme, in which each plays a role with a view to a mission entrusted to the others. Thus, the relationships of the municipalities with other public entities can only be carried out on a level of equality, resulting in agreed-upon forms of coordination, to the exclusion of any imperative form to the detriment of their autonomy that would allow subjecting the corporate entities to a coordination scheme without their will or against it; but which does admit the necessary subordination of these entities to the State and in its interest (through the 'administrative oversight' (tutela administrativa) of the State, and specifically, in the function of legality control that falls to it, with powers of general supervision over the entire sector.)" Now, even with this autonomy, it is clear that under the shelter of precept 11 of the Constitution, the municipalities and their officials are equally subject to the principle of legality, in its double dimension, positive and negative, so that in the exercise of their competencies, they must proceed in accordance with the legal norms that delineate and specify their functioning. This subjection is generic to the entirety of the Legal System, constituting a guarantee for the municipal citizen and civil society in general, that the public acts emanating from those local entities are consistent with it. This includes as a matter of principle, a proper application of the norms, not only in their content, but also in respect for their hierarchical level, from which it is inferred that applications of infra-legal measures that are opposed or contrary to the law are impermissible. The foregoing given that the executive regulatory power and, in general, the issuance of administrative acts of a general or normative nature, as the case may be (Article 121 of the General Public Administration Law), find their insurmountable limit in the law and in the Political Constitution itself, such that they cannot contain regulations that contravene the provisions of those higher-ranking norms, or venture into areas that, in accordance with the content of the law, are forbidden to them (principle of prohibition of arbitrariness of the regulatory power). Hence, when these limits are circumvented, the infra-legal norm is inapplicable, as being contrary to Law. In this sense, an adequate, generalized, and abstract application of norms is sought, avoiding arbitrary and capricious procedures.

VII.- Local autonomy in matters of urban planning and buildings. As has been indicated, municipal autonomy, imposed by the Constitution, grants local corporations a special competence for the administration of the interests of their territorial jurisdiction (Articles 169 and 170). Within this set of interests and services lies the urban planning matter in which the municipality holds an essential competence and, as a matter of principle, one that prevails over that of other institutions, within the local context. In what is relevant to the case, provision 15 of the Urban Planning Law, No. 4240 of November 15, 1968, grants local entities the basic competence to regulate and supervise everything concerning urban planning and development within the limits of their territorial jurisdiction. In this sense, the norm provides: "In accordance with the precept of Article 169 of the Political Constitution, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their jurisdictional territory, is recognized. Consequently, each one of them shall provide what is appropriate to implement a regulatory plan, and the related urban development regulations, in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors, where qualified reasons exist to establish a specific control regime." Note that the assigned competence is not limited to a mere planning aspect, but also includes the powers of control over urban development, which implies a degree of substantive supervision both of works in execution and those already executed, an aspect which will be addressed in more detail below. In this line, the first canon of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), Decree Law No. 833 of November 4, 1949, clearly establishes these powers when it states: "The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other towns possess the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads and in the buildings and constructions erected on their lands, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies." For its part, in accordance with the provisions of Article 13, subsection o) of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), it is the Council's responsibility to issue the norms and measures pertaining to urban planning. In this order, according to the Construction Law, the realization of any work or building requires a municipal license, and the local entity is also responsible for supervision over them (mandates 74 and 87 of that legal body). Therefore, the prevailing role held by the Municipality in these tasks is evident, as it is its duty to order the concrete measures on urban development and planning, as well as the granting of construction "licenses" and the control of those activities in accordance with the norms regulating that field. This has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber itself, among many, in rulings No. 2153-93 of 9:21 a.m. on May 21, 1993, and No. 4205-96 of 2:33 p.m. on August 20, 1996. Now, the scope and effects of urban development and planning occasionally involve the emergence of coordination relationships with various public bodies with concurrent competence in certain areas of administrative activity, as has been explained. The foregoing due to the fact that, although these aforementioned powers arise in relation to a local concept, they must align with national planning policies. These are principles of sound administration that aim to establish coordination mechanisms allowing, in a more adequate manner, an efficient attention to public needs and interests, so that a potential competence conflict is not an obstacle for the State (in a broad sense) to neglect its duties and thereby transgress, due to mere organizational or design aspects, its teleological dimension. Within this framework lies the issuance of regulatory plans, which under the protection of provision 15 of the Urban Planning Law, are carried out by local entities and then approved by the Urbanism Directorate. Article 169 of the Constitution, together with the Urban Planning Law, it is insisted, recognizes the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their territory, through the issuance of this type of plans, which at heart, hold a normative nature insofar as they order the programming of land use in the respective cantonal jurisdiction. That is why, within their processing, a public hearing becomes an insurmountable prerequisite that allows the municipal citizens to pronounce on the proposal, given the evident interest they hold regarding the administrative decision that establishes the purpose to be given to the properties located in the Canton. However, due to the aspect of linkage and harmony with national planning, given that the content of a plan of this nature has a reflexive impact on the integral context of the national territory, they must be approved by the Urbanism Directorate (ordinal 18 ibidem) in order to adjust them to national planning criteria. Nevertheless, it is emphasized, in this matter, the municipality has an original competence, despite the coordination relationships, which allows it to plan, regulate, and supervise urban development within the respective canton.

VIII.- Regulation of urban matters. Control Powers. Having said this, it is fitting to point out that the matter of urban project development, in general terms, is subject to a set of norms that establish the various aspects that converge in this topic, such as structural, construction, health, water treatment, among others. However, broadly speaking (as the provisions specifying this matter are extensive to be sure), its basic regulation lies in the Construction Law and the Urban Planning Law, legal bodies complemented by other norms that develop specific topics, e.g., the General Health Law. In these, generically, the basic prerequisites that delineate the realization of buildings, whether for public or private use, temporary or permanent, are established. Even so, the establishment of a series of factors which, due to their nature, it is not convenient to incorporate within a law, have been elaborated upon in regulations or infra-legal norms. In this same direction, the Urban Planning Law leaves to said latter legal sources the development of aspects of a procedural and other nature. In matters of an urbanistic nature, particularly that of the construction of housing developments or residential complexes, the Construction Law and the Urban Planning Law, in line with what has been said, in their articles 15 and 32 respectively, refer the concretization of aspects that must be covered by developers to a regulation, which in the specific case, is the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions (Fraccionamientos) and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), No. 3991 of December 13, 1982. For its part, in matters of construction, there is the so-called Construction Regulation (Reglamento de Construcciones), published on March 22, 1983. In accordance with the provisions of canons 15 and 74 of the Construction Law, every subdivision and urbanization, as well as every work related to construction, must have an authorizing act issued by the corresponding Municipality. Under provision 19 in relation to 20 subsection h), both of the Urban Planning Law, local entities must issue the pertinent regulation to comply with the conditions of the Regulatory Plan, as well as to ensure the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and well-being. In this direction, ordinal 56 ibidem points out that the Construction Regulation shall set the rules of safety, health, and adornment. However, these aspects are contemplated in the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations, a norm that would be applicable to this effect. It is a legal instrument of a preeminently technical nature, which contains, regarding urbanizations, varied regulations in aspects such as accesses, roadways, lot division (lotificación), green and public areas, drainages, aqueducts, sewers, infrastructure and finishes, among others. Regarding the supervisory exercise, as has been said, canon 1 of the Construction Law establishes that local governments are responsible for ensuring that cities, their buildings, constructions, and public roads meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies. This is once again a legislative manifestation aiming to enhance municipal competencies in favor of their autonomy in the sphere of local interests that concern them. As is proper, these empowerments constitute true powers-duties, that is, they allow it to adopt executive and executory actions, but at the same time impose duties and demands, insofar as it must undertake the appropriate actions to fulfill its tasks. Therefore, it must subject its decisions to the body of legality (in harmony with subjective rights and legitimate interests), which implies, of course, exercising due control over areas of social interest, as is the case with health and safety, when appropriate, in coordination with Central Government authorities. That is why, as a counterpart to the competence to grant the construction licenses established by Article 74 of the Construction Law, Article 87 ibidem imposes on it the duty to supervise and control the works erected in its territory, as well as the use being given to them. These powers entail the competence to establish the harmony of the construction applications with the norms regulating that subject matter, to the point that if non-compliance is inferred, they are empowered to deny the "license" or refuse the required authorizing act. From this standpoint, the role of the municipalities occurs in two instances, namely, preventive and supervisory. In the preventive framework, the "license" is granted if it meets all the requirements, and in that comparison (qualitative and quantitative), such exercise is concretized. In the supervisory role, it verifies that what is being carried out in reality is consistent with what was authorized. It is clear that due to the very dynamics of urban planning matters, a wide range of variables that, by their magnitude and relevance, demand coordination actions from local entities jointly with specialized public units converge. This is the case with public health and the treatment of waters of diverse nature (potable, gray water, black water), cases in which the levels of linkage between the administrative exercise of the municipalities and the bodies or entities with specific functional competence in those areas prevail. Indeed, this is evident from the General Health Law in its provisions 338 and 338 bis, regarding the powers to supervise compliance with sanitary regulations. Likewise, in water matters, precepts 1, 2, 21, and 23 grant competence to the National Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados) to approve water supply systems and their disposal. In sum, under the protection of the cited Construction Law, and in what is relevant to the case, it is the responsibility of the local corporations to issue the authorization to undertake the construction of a specific work (among them, urbanizations). In turn, jointly with other public authorities, to deploy supervisory actions for those works, in order to verify their conformity with the regulatory framework. However, that control, which is their direct concern, is not dependent on the actions of other bodies.

IX.- Scope of the supervisory framework in the specific case. This Chamber considers that the very conception of the supervisory powers in urban matters that have been entrusted to the Municipalities (already discussed), are manifestations of a public power derived from competencies granted by the constitutional and legal order in this field, which justifies the empowerment of the Administration. They therefore allow it the deployment of a series of inherent and necessary attributions for the exercise of sound administration. These empower it to even suspend a specific work when it does not meet the proper conditions, or, within its preventive and foresighted edge, to reject the building petition when the legal and technical requirements imposed by the applicable provisions have not been satisfied. These are concrete manifestations of public power that enable the protection of legal principles, among others, that of safety and health. It constitutes, therefore, an inspection task over the construction aspects of the structures erected in the territorial space of the municipality, in order to determine that they meet the requirements set forth by that legislation, as well as other regulations associated with the activity. These faculties and powers, within their teleological orientation, are placed at the service of public or collective interests, which ultimately are the object that legitimizes their incursion into the control and supervision of urban activity. As these are competencies set by the Legal System (as a direct derivation of their constitutional competencies that were entrusted to them) and are associated with the protection of public interests, the local entity's action must weigh not only a superficial (formal) review of construction permit applications, but a comprehensive and thorough assessment of compliance with the legal and technical demands imposed by the Legal System. That is, verifying compliance not only formally but also qualitatively with the conduct under control. For such purposes, it must consider the harmony of the application and proposals formulated in the respective plan with the technical provisions or rules dictated in each case. Applied to this case, this involves that the Municipality must analyze whether the black water treatment systems offered in the construction plan conform to the applicable technical standards, in such a way that they are functional and have the capacity and volume that the established rules provide. That is, the technical viability of the installation of a septic tank, in the proposed dimensions and conditions, so that it does not imply potential risks of any nature, including public health. But further, the public powers in this field are not exhausted in the deployment of an authorizing conduct. Indeed, the issuance of the act permitting the building or construction of the work must be accompanied, it is insisted, by a controlling and verifying exercise by the granting entity, with the aim of ensuring that the works in execution, as well as those already executed, are within the normative framework regulating the matter. As has been said, this exercise presents itself on a double level: preventive, at the moment of analyzing the application to build; and subsequent, in the inspections of those works to determine that they comply with what was authorized and, in general, with the applicable rules. In this way, the controlling function must be continuous, efficient, and effective. That is why when those competencies have not been properly fulfilled and, as a result of that conduct or dysfunctionality, damage is generated (directly or by concurrence), a causal link arises that allows the injury to be attributed to the Municipality, in accordance with the rules of objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva) set by the Constitution and developed by the General Public Administration Law from canon 190 onward. The foregoing can occur for various causes. In a first stage, by so-called material inactivity, that is, when the controlling and verifying framework is completely unexercised. In a second, when it is not done adequately, insofar as even though the verification was carried out, it was exhausted in a simple comparison of formal requirements, but not in a proper qualitative examination of compliance or non-compliance with the demands that the person intending to build must observe. In this scenario, the Municipality's passivity in the due supervision of basic issues for the purposes of the work allows those rules to be circumvented, which may potentialize future risks or damages to third parties. That is, abnormal functioning operates in these cases, leading to liability. This constitutes administrative conduct, which in itself, departs from good administration (in accordance with the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which, among other things, includes effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, the technical rules, or the expertise and prudent duty in the deployment of its actions, with a harmful effect for the person. Thus, the abnormality is manifested by poor functioning, by insufficient supervisory exercise, and therefore, inadequate one. This is because if the harmful result is produced in relation to facts in which the position of guarantor exercised by the Administration made it obligatory to avoid that consequence through the adequate control it should have exercised, it must face the implications of that non-observance. In this field, liability for "administrative inaction" (even partial) is produced by cause of a double behavior. The first is that of the public or private person by whose action the impairment in the legal sphere of the injured party or parties is produced. The other, which concurs with the former, is the inaction of the public authority that does not properly exercise the conduct required to avoid the damage, which can occur, it is reiterated, totally or partially. In the latter case, when the supervisory framework does not fully encompass the totality of variables that must be weighed in that exercise, so that due to relative non-observance, relevant aspects constituting sources of risk are left aside. It is, therefore, a relativized framework of unperformed administrative protection (in its preventive current), which as inactivity concurs to produce the injury and therefore causes the shared, almost always joint and several (solidaria) liability of the two agents causing the damage (understood as different centers of attribution, public or private). In this way, supervisory inaction in the face of third-party conduct is normally reflected in that irregularity it should have identified in a timely manner; or in that produced damage it should have foreseen according to the state of existing things; or else, in the omission, which for these effects is equivalent to inactivity, reproachable from a legal standpoint, of not having exercised, in a timely and proper manner, the preventions and corrective or preventive measures for the case. It is clear that such imputability depends, to a high degree, on the determination of the existence of a causal link between that inaction (even partial) and the injury, insofar as, only when the inactivity has contributed to the generation of the damage, would the administrative patrimonial liability be applicable. That is, when, had the supervisory exercise not been omitted, the injury probably would not have been caused. On the topic of liability for inaction, see, from this Chamber, ruling No. 308 of 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2006. In this scenario, it must be insisted that the protection or supervision that has been entrusted to the municipalities in urban matters (which includes buildability), is not reduced to formal authorization conducts, but includes substantive, periodic, and effective control over works in execution and executed, in such a way that the omission of this supervisory exercise makes it liable for the damages thereby caused to third parties.

X.- Management of black water. Legal regulation. In the specific case, the appellant considers that provisions 87 of the Construction Law, 4 of the Municipal Code, and 170 of the Political Constitution have been violated, insofar as the Court concluded that the supervision of the connection of the pipes was not an obligation of the defendant Municipality. By this, he indicates, the duty of inspection inherent to local entities is disregarded. Likewise, he accuses that from the application of Decree No. 3391 mentioned, the Ad quem deduces the dispensation of the aforementioned verification, when that norm does not allow such an interpretation. Of interest for the specific case is the control that the Municipality of Heredia must exercise in the specific matter of the black and gray water pipes with which every dwelling within a housing development must be equipped. The foregoing because the appellant alleges that Article 87 of the Construction Law imposes the obligation on local corporations to supervise the building of the works carried out in the respective Canton, and therefore, having failed to do so regarding the referenced pipes, its objective liability for the damages suffered is incurred. In this subject matter, as has been indicated, the Construction Law and the Urban Planning Law refer to regulatory norms. Such development is regulated in the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations, No. 3991 of December 13, 1982. On this point, as the Ad quem has well pointed out, the aforementioned Regulation, in Chapter III, called "Urbanizations," sets the applicable rules. In this sense, the norm provides for several possibilities, depending on the characteristics of each residential urban complex. In this regard, it provides: "III.3.12 Sewers: When areas that have a functioning black water collector service are urbanized, the developer must connect to said system./ When the collector is planned for a later stage, the developer must leave a built sewer system within the development to connect in the future to the planned collector system./ If there is no functioning or planned sewer system, the following alternatives are contemplated: /III.3.12.1 For complexes larger than five hundred (500) dwelling units, the construction of a dedicated black water treatment plant is required: unless a larger complex with a septic tank is negotiated with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (A y A)./ III.3.12.2 In complexes with a smaller number of lots or dwellings, the minimum lot size must be adapted for the use of a septic tank as set forth in this Regulation." In this way, depending on whether a collector exists or not, the developer may opt for one of the regulated possibilities, which, in line with what has been said, must be weighed by the municipality, the instance responsible, once the specific case has been evaluated, for establishing the appropriateness of the proposed measure.

It is clear that the design of the water supply and the treatment and drainage system must conform and correspond to the technical standards established in each case by the authorities with concurrent jurisdiction, including the Ministry of Health and the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA). The foregoing must be reflected in the plan that must be approved by the administrative bodies, as inferred from Chapter VI, canon 3.3 of the cited Regulation. In this sense, as a matter of principle, the AyA is the competent body to set policies and establish and apply rules regarding the supply of drinking water and the evacuation of sewage (article 1 of its Constitutive Law, no. 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its amendments). However, as provided in numeral 23 of its Constitutive Law: "Plans for the construction or partial or total reconstruction of a house or building in the provincial capitals or cantonal capitals whose Municipalities have an Engineering Department shall be submitted for prior approval to said Department and, once approved by it, to the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, for its review…" That same rule applies to urbanization projects. From all of the foregoing, it is inferred that, ultimately, the verification of compliance with regulations inherent to the issue of sewage falls to the local corporations, as they are the competent bodies to grant the construction permit, which is only possible, within an ideal framework, when the regulations inherent to this matter have been satisfied.

XI.- Regarding the specific case. In the instant case, the challenged ruling starts from the proven assumption that, in reality, it has been confirmed that the residential development does not have a functioning sewage treatment system or collector, but only one that is planned, and furthermore, that the number of dwellings does not exceed five hundred. A simplistic examination of this matter would lead to the conclusion that, in consideration of that factual scenario (which the appellant claims is not based on any evidence) and in accordance with the cited Regulation, the theoretically viable solution was to adapt the lot for the use of a septic tank and leave the pipes planned for a later stage. However, this Chamber considers that the particularities involved in this debate require a more in-depth analysis of what happened. Certainly, the aforementioned rule allows the solution that the developer provided for the sewage aspect, that is, leaving the pipes planned (which was authorized by the Municipality). However, the reference to the possibility of installing septic tanks when there is a number of dwellings less than five hundred must be harmonized with the technical viability and suitability of the proposal made by the builder, so that the system definitively adopted is functional and optimal for fulfilling its purpose. Ergo, this does not mean that this solution was adequate and correct for the specific case and for complying with the standards proper to the urban construction field. Indeed, in accordance with the control and inspection powers assigned to it by law, the local entity should have studied whether, regardless of the fact that the conditions established by the rule for installing the septic tank were met, the one offered in the construction plans conformed, in terms of volume and capacity, to the type of dwelling intended to be developed. In this sense, due control required measuring not only the propriety of the requested measure in theoretical terms, but also, and more importantly, the capacity of the proposal to fulfill its function, that is, to serve as an efficient mechanism for the evacuation and storage of sewage, in order to thus avoid potential risks to people's health and the generation of damages or injuries. This is because, in the absence of a wastewater treatment system installed by the Municipality, and since it involves a type of waste whose improper handling can harm the health of residents and the environment, it was imperative to consider whether what was proposed met the needs it had to cover and satisfy. This analysis is far from being a document verification exercise, quite the contrary. Due to the legal values at stake, the activity carried out (urban development), which undoubtedly has public relevance or interest, and the powers assigned in this field to the local corporation (as a function inherent to its territory), it was necessary for the local entity to assess whether the solution proposed by the developer was proper and optimal, so that what was ultimately authorized fully complied with the public purpose and the public service involved in the authorizing titles issued by the municipality. The oversight function assigned to it by the legislator in urban construction activity aims to ensure both preventive and subsequent controls are carried out to ensure that buildings comply with the requirements and conditions established by the regulatory order. Said verification thus tends, within the framework of the construction of urbanizations, to ensure the existence of adequate conditions for the structure in qualitative terms, which implies, as a general rule, that its development occurs within proper channels. This implies that the dwellings have the basic services that allow a normal quality of life for the resident, which is certainly neglected when a sewage waste system does not meet its needs, constituting an imminent risk to their health, their life, and the harmony of the urban environment. The aforementioned oversight cannot be considered correctly performed if the suitability of that already indicated aspect was not assessed, not in formal terms, but in its capacity to successfully solve a basic and foreseeable need of every dwelling. Ergo, the municipal examination should not have been superficial, but in-depth on aspects such as the one indicated. From this perspective, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the defendant Municipality did not exercise due a priori control regarding this aspect. This is because, in the process of issuing construction permits or licenses, it omitted to analyze the suitability of the proposed tanks for the type of building for which the license was requested, which was essential to establish whether they had the relevant volume or capacity. Indeed, regardless of the fact that the Regulations for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations allow that particular technical solution when the factual conditions regulated for the case are met, that does not relieve the local entity from analyzing, within the exercise of its control powers, whether that solution, in the terms in which it was proposed, was viable for each building, with a view to allowing good management of the sewage and wastewater. However, that study was not carried out in a proper manner, giving way to an authorization to install a tank that did not have the volume required by each dwelling. From this standpoint, the expert opinion rendered by engineer Nombre38778 clearly indicates: "As an important technical fact, I clarify to the Court that there are construction plans indicating the stormwater and sewage pipes for the total project, that is, the three stages; however, the construction company did not connect the wastewater from the dwellings to the planned ones that are customarily left in the green zone or sidewalk; on the contrary, in a small front-yard space it built a small absorption well, which does not have the capacity or volume that each of the dwellings requires. In the approved plans, the municipality did not give the technical importance required in these very important aspects and approved the plans of the dwellings with a septic tank solution and drainage pipes, located in these plans in the front-yard area, which cannot be approved as such, because there is not sufficient area for the (porous) drainage pipes to function efficiently with this solution. (...)" (folio 366 of the main file). Note that even in proven fact no. 12, the Trial Court considered this deficiency of administrative control as proven, which was subsequently adopted by the Superior Court. XII.- This collegiate body considers that in the case under review, although the Municipality issued a formal act granting the construction permit, which would presume that it fulfilled its control duties, as has been indicated, that conduct does not fully conform to the Legal System, insofar as it failed to consider whether the sewage system proposed by the developer was adequate or not, limiting itself to a formal examination of that requirement, which indicates an abnormal functioning of the defendant public corporation. It is reiterated, the exercise of the oversight powers inherent to its authority to grant building or construction licenses, and which is expressly provided for in canons 1 and 87 of the Construction Law, is not exhausted in a simple formal act of authorization. Its correct understanding includes proper, continuous, and efficient oversight of the works in progress and those already completed, in order to establish their harmony with the norms that regulate that matter. Therefore, its neglect generates liability for the damages it has caused in the legal sphere of third parties. That being so, it is clear that as an immediate effect of that conduct in the inspections prior to granting the construction permit, the defendant allowed the installation of tanks that, far from representing a proper response to the issue of sewage treatment, led to a problem not only for the plaintiff owners but for public health in general. Then, given the impossibility of executing the guarantee provided by the construction company, the owners of the residences where that circumstance occurred had to solve the water evacuation problems, because, as stated, the well did not have adequate capacity. The reason for attributing liability for those facts to the Municipality does not lie in the lack of installation of a sewage treatment system (since it is clear that as it does not exist, it cannot be put into operation), but in the neglect of its inspection duties regarding the technical viability of the installation of a septic tank, in the dimensions and conditions proposed for this case. Had that aspect been analyzed carefully, it could have been corrected in time and thus, the construction of dwellings lacking an adequate sewage system could have been avoided. In this sense, the General Law of Public Administration establishes the Administration's liability for its lawful and unlawful, normal or abnormal functioning, except for the exonerating causes of force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. On this point, abnormality, as poor public functioning, includes the improper exercise of legally granted powers or faculties. In the case under review, said construction was carried out once authorized by the Municipality, even with the noted deficiencies, thereby failing in its control and oversight duties assigned by numerals 1 and 87 of the Construction Law, which, in this particular case, must be complemented with the provisions of the Regulations for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations. With this, liability is imposed on the local entity, obligating it to cover the damages and losses suffered by the plaintiffs who, on the date of filing the lawsuit, were owners of a house or lot within the Cedri Residence, amounts that must be determined in the sentence execution process. Thus, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that, for the reasons stated, the grievance under examination must be upheld. Therefore, the sentence of the Superior Court must be annulled, and on this point, that of the Trial Court confirmed. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL Cassation for procedural defects XIII.- The Municipal Mayor of Heredia claims as the sole ground of this nature, violation of numerals 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 1046 of the Civil Code, as there is a case of necessary passive joinder of parties. In this direction, he states that joinder of parties is one of the procedural figures of subjective plurality characterized by placing the third party in a common relationship with one of the parties, involving the same object and the same cause of action. He says, thus, the plaintiff should have directed the action against all the institutions to which the law grants specific jurisdiction over the litigation. He states, this figure implies that to resolve a matter, all those subjects whom the resolution may affect must be present, as well as all the public institutions that, by legal provision, hold jurisdiction over the alleged damage. He affirms that, in the instant case, it is essential that this presence be given to complete the procedural relationship. He cites resolution no. 653 of 11:20 a.m. on October 8, 2003, from this Chamber. He argues that environmental contamination entails not only a local problem but a public health one. In accordance with ordinals 50 of the Political Constitution and 2 of the General Law of Health, he indicates, the definition of a general health policy, its standardization, planning, and all actions necessary to safeguard said fundamental right, corresponds to the Ministry of Health, an entity that should have been sued and not the Municipality, for which reason he claims those norms have been violated. He adds that the problems alleged concern not only health but the environment, which is the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the governing body in that matter, pursuant to article 1 and following of the Organic Law of the Environment. He transcribes fragments of vote no. 1322-2001 of the Constitutional Chamber. On the other hand, he alleges that the issue of open-air drains is the jurisdiction of the Public Services Company of Heredia, which is responsible for ensuring the correct establishment, operation, and maintenance of the stormwater and sanitary sewer systems. He reproduces canon 6 of the Transformation Law of the Public Services Company of Heredia, no. 7789, a precept he claims has been violated. In connection, he cites vote no. 1431-03 of the Constitutional Chamber. From this standpoint, he claims violation due to improper application of numerals 289 of the General Law of Health and 4 subsection 4) of the repealed Municipal Code. He concludes that there is a problem of lack of passive standing in favor of the local entity, pursuant to precept 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He argues that the lack of action against the referred entities entails a breach due to failure to apply ordinal 1046 of the Civil Code, since it establishes joint and several liability for the reparation of damages and losses caused by a harmful act. XIV.- Informality. Necessary passive joinder of parties. In the instant case, the challenge contests the fact that certain public entities were not brought into the litigation, which, in the appellant's judgment, were necessary to incorporate for the purpose of the procedural relationship, because by law, they are the competent bodies to hear several of the issues being debated. From this standpoint, in accordance with article 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "For the appeal based on form to be admissible, it is necessary that the rectification of the defect has been requested before the corresponding court, and that the available appeals against the decision have been exhausted." In the instant case, the hypothetical deficiency indicated is raised only in cassation, meaning its correction was not requested in any of the preceding instances. Consequently, in accordance with ordinals 597 and 598 ibidem, the charge in question must be dismissed. Furthermore, even if it were considered that, in essence, a direct violation of substantive law is being challenged, the grievance would also not be capable of being addressed. This is because, under the provisions of numeral 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "Issues that have not been timely proposed and debated by the litigants may not be the object of the cassation appeal." As stated, this argument was not raised by the appellant before either the Trial Court or the Superior Court. Regarding this matter, it should be noted that the Municipality was declared in default for not having answered the lawsuit in time. In accordance with article 298 ibidem, of supplementary application by mandate of canon 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, incomplete necessary joinder is a prior defense that should have been alleged at the appropriate procedural moment, and therefore, having not done so, this point cannot be assessed in cassation, and its rejection is appropriate. Even so, on other occasions, this Chamber has ex officio addressed the constitution of the litis, as it affects standing, which together with the right and the interest constitute elementary procedural prerequisites. However, in the instant case, regardless of whether it could be debated that the environmental contamination problem alleged in this process might lead to the consideration that the liability extends to the State, because the underlying issue incorporates the powers proper to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the fact of the matter is that, on one hand, the appellant has not managed to prove that the cause of environmental pollution occurred as a result of actions or omissions of those public authorities. Thus, that it was necessary to have them as passive parties in the process. Quite the contrary, it is beyond all doubt that in that territorial jurisdiction there is a source of pollution. This problem has not been properly addressed by the Municipality, even though it is occurring in the Canton over which it exercises its powers and for which, therefore, in light of the local interest, it is obligated to undertake the necessary corrective actions. On the other hand, in any case, even under this assumption, the strict liability would be joint and several or eventually subsidiary; ergo, the passive joinder would be permissive and not necessary as argued. Seen this way, there is no reason that leads this Chamber to conclude that it is facing a case of necessary passive litis. Therefore, the claim is not admissible. Cassation on the merits XV.- Indirect violation. He states that the award for subjective moral damages is improper as it completely lacks foundation, containing errors of fact and law in the assessment of the evidence. He claims violation of canons 153 and 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure, norms that impose the duty for judgments to be duly reasoned, which, he considers, is not the case here, because the subjective moral damages awarded lack a clear, precise, and congruent analysis regarding their grounds. He criticizes that the Superior Court merely makes a reference to the evidence indicated in the Trial Court's sentence but does not provide the reasons regarding the propriety of the alleged environmental and health damage caused by the Municipality, nor its repercussions on the plaintiffs' morale. He adds that, although subjective moral damages cannot be structured and their amount demonstrated precisely, their determination must be left to the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, general principles of law and equity, logic, and sound rational criticism. Likewise, he notes, there must be indications allowing proof that they indeed occurred. He says that the judge must be guided by objective criteria to avoid meager, derisory, or excessive reparations, such as the intensity of the fault, personal circumstances of the injured party, among others, which in this case were not applied due to the absence of any reasoning. He provides citations of precedents from the Contentious-Administrative Court. From this standpoint, he attributes a violation due to failure to apply numerals 1045 and 1046 of the Civil Code. He argues that it is not true, and it is not even demonstrated with sufficient indications that the Municipality caused damage to the plaintiffs through malice, fault, negligence, or imprudence. He states that the first-instance sentence, confirmed in this aspect by the Superior Court, established that the local corporation's liability was directly circumscribed to the garbage and malodorous waste discharged into the Quebrada Seca River, which he reiterates is not true. He declares that, although there is contamination, it is not due to malicious, negligent, or omissive conduct by the defendant, since it has not even been proven that the polluting acts of the river are produced within the canton's jurisdiction. He emphasizes that the river originates in the mountainous areas north of the province of Heredia, and that its waters, before entering the territory of the Central canton, flow through San Isidro, San Rafael, and Barva. Based on this, he insists that the contamination observed at the point of Quebrada Seca near the Cedri Urbanization is not a direct product of actions undertaken at the site, so it has not been proven that the pollution was caused within its cantonal jurisdiction. In connection, he alleges violation of ordinal 704 of the Civil Code, insofar as it indicates that the award for damages only includes those that are the immediate and direct consequence of the harmful act. He considers that this produces an error of fact in the assessment of the evidence, as it is not determined that the Municipality is directly responsible for that contamination. Regarding the damage for the open-air drainage, he reiterates that it is the Public Services Company of Heredia S.A. that is responsible for ensuring the correct establishment, operation, and maintenance of the sewer systems, and therefore, on this point, he notes, the contamination is also not the result of negligent conduct by the local entity, from which the non-existence of a cause-effect relationship derives, and consequently, a violation of article 6 of Law no. 7789 and canon 704 of the Civil Code. He adds that the expert evidence clearly indicates that the plaintiffs incurred in violations of the norms and regulations of the Ministry of Health by discharging soapy water from bathrooms, washbasins, and sinks into the stormwater gutters. He argues that there is an obvious error in the application of numeral 4, subsection 4) of the Municipal Code, since based on said precept, it was considered that the Municipality must directly ensure health, when that norm is already repealed by the current Municipal Code. He asserts that, on the date the alleged environmental damages were assessed and the judicial inspection was carried out (February 2, 2001), the applicable regulation was Law no. 7794, which does not establish the obligation that the Superior Court erroneously points out. He insists that it was the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the entities directly responsible for solving the imputed problems, as established by ordinals 340, 341, 345, 346, 355, 356, 357, 370 and following of the General Health Law and the Organic Law of the Environment. He concludes that the subjective moral damages lack grounds.

XVI.- Informal cassation. Does not cite the norms of the General Law of Public Administration. The appellant claims that the challenged ruling regarding the order to pay subjective moral damages is not reasoned. He challenges the evaluative exercise of the evidence carried out by the Superior Court, which led that court to order him to pay this amount, even though his malicious or omissive conduct was not proven. The charge does not conform to proper technique. In accordance with the provisions of canon 595 subsection 3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, when an error of fact is alleged, even if it is not necessary to indicate the infringed legal precept corresponding to the probative value, it is imperative to cite the substantive norms that have been harmed as a consequence of the claimed errors of assessment. Likewise, there is a duty to indicate clearly and precisely what the infringement consists of. In this case, the appellant merely cites provisions of the Civil Code related to the liability system prevailing in that branch of law; however, he omits to allege as violated the norms that regulate the liability of the Public Administration, namely, numerals 190 through 198 of that legal body. That mention is elementary in this case, since what is being debated is the liability of a local corporation, which, although autonomous by constitutional mandate, forms part of the Public Administration (article 1 LGAP), ergo, it is subject to the rules that those precepts provide, as already mentioned in previous sections of this resolution. Faced with this scenario, the charge becomes informal, whereupon its rejection is appropriate.

XVII.- Direct violation. He censures the order for costs decreed against him. He reproaches the violation due to failure to apply or improper application of canons 221 and 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. He argues that, although ordinal 221 establishes the order against the losing party, article 222 of that same legal body and 98 of the mentioned Regulatory Law establish that a cause for exemption from the payment of costs is having litigated in good faith, when the lawsuit includes exaggerated claims, the ruling partially upholds the fundamental claims of the lawsuit, when it accepts important defenses invoked by the losing party, or when there is mutual defeat. He considers that this situation was not analyzed, as it was simply not applied. He cites precedents of the First Section of the Court. He asserts that he acted in good faith within the process, but also that exaggerated claims were made, without ignoring, he says, that only some of the plaintiffs' claims were upheld. At the same time, important defenses were accepted and there was mutual defeat. He adds that, given the exaggerated petitions, he had sufficient reasons to litigate. XVIII.- Regarding costs. Concerning the disagreement with the order for costs, it should be noted that, as inferred from numeral 98 of the Regulatory Law, in relation to numerals 221 and 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of supplementary application as provided by numeral 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, with the exceptions provided in numeral 69 ibidem, the ruling on both costs must be made ex officio. This Chamber, by majority criterion, has established that the order is imposed on the losing party for the fact of being so, that is, for losing the litigation, without thereby being considered a reckless or bad-faith litigant, with the exception being the release from the payment of such items, in the cases defined by the legislator. Indeed, within the scope of the cited law, except for a special norm referring to cases of withdrawal, extra-procedural satisfaction of the claim, and expiration of the process, where the issue of costs is governed under a different criterion, the rule, developed in article 98, follows the same line as the civil procedural regulation, that is, conceiving the order as the principle and the exoneration as the exception. On the subject, in sentence no. 765 at 4:00 p.m. on September 26, 2001. In the present case, the majority of this collegiate body's panel considers that, in ordering the Municipality to pay the indemnity claimed for subjective moral damages due to the detriment caused to the environment, without proper administrative control having occurred, it follows that it was the losing party in the litigation, from which the order for costs derives as the general rule applicable to the case. Exceptionally, the losing party may be exempted from the payment of one or both costs in the cases referred to in ordinal 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. Of these, the one regulated in subsection c) is of interest, as it is the one that contains the alleged case. The rule under consideration provides that: "The losing party may be exonerated from the payment of costs:...c) When by the nature of the issues debated there has been, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate." Similarly, canon 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes the power of exemption in these matters when one has litigated in good faith, when the lawsuit includes exaggerated claims, the ruling partially upholds the fundamental claims of the lawsuit, when it accepts important defenses invoked by the losing party, or when there is mutual defeat. From these precepts, the power of the judge to exonerate costs is inferred, meaning it is not an obligation to do so even if the case provided for therein occurs, but rather it is at the judge's discretion to order such exoneration. When this power is not exercised, the norm cannot be infringed. Conversely, when it is used, it is possible that it is done erroneously or improperly, and then, depending on the circumstances of the case, a cassation appeal may indeed be appropriate. In this sense, see sentence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice no. 3 at 2:40 p.m. on January 6, 1995, and no. 8 at 2:40 p.m. on January 29, 1997.

The appeal seeks to exempt the Municipality, which has lost in this litigation, from paying court costs, under the claim that it litigated with sufficient cause and in evident good faith, and that there was mutual loss, alleging that the Court did not make use of the power granted by law regarding the exemption from costs. However, according to the foregoing, the appeal must be declared without merit as to this point, since the cited rules are not violated, inasmuch as the infringement alleged by the appellant does not occur when the judge applies the general rule of condemning the losing party to pay costs, a review that would be feasible when the exception provided by the law is applied.

XIX.- For the reasons stated, the appeal filed by the plaintiffs is admissible, only with respect to the liability derived from the damages caused by the blackwater and stormwater system. On this point, the ruling of the Court is annulled. In accordance with precept 610 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), on this matter, resolving on the merits, the ruling of the Trial Court is confirmed. In all other respects, the provisions of the Court are upheld. The appeal filed by the Municipality of Heredia (Municipalidad de Heredia) is rejected, with its court costs to be borne by the party that filed it.

POR TANTO

The appeal filed by the defendant is declared without merit, with court costs to be borne by it. The appeal of the plaintiffs is admitted, only with respect to the liability of the Municipality of Heredia for the damages and losses caused by the lack of proper oversight of the septic tanks, a point on which, the judgment of the Court is annulled and, ruling on the merits, the judgment of the Trial Court is confirmed.

Anabelle León Feoli Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Óscar Eduardo González Camacho Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Note from Judges González Camacho and Escoto Fernández I.- The undersigned members do not share the criterion set forth by the majority of this Chamber in Considerando XVIII of the preceding ruling, insofar as it denies cassation review for those cases in which only the general rule of condemning the losing party to pay both court costs is applied, that is, when no rule concerning the exoneration from costs is acted upon or applied. Indeed, the majority's jurisprudential basis assumes that exonerating someone from paying court costs is a discretionary power, in the exercise of which no error or normative infringement occurs when it is not exercised or applied; therefore, it is said, if there is no legal violation, it is not possible in cassation to evaluate or modify what has been decided regarding the condemnation of the losing party, because, it is repeated, for the majority of this Chamber, there can only be a legal violation when the rule corresponding to exoneration is acted upon (among many, see the rulings of this Chamber no. 1001-F-2002, at 11:50 a.m. on December 20, 2002; no. 249-F-2003, at 11:45 a.m. on May 7, 2003; and no. 306-F-2006, at 10:20 a.m. on May 25, 2006). The connection seems logical in principle, since with this premise, if exoneration constitutes a discretionary power, the judge is not obligated to exonerate; and therefore, if the judge does not order or carry out such exoneration, they do not violate the rules corresponding to the matter. Ergo, if there is no violation of rules, there can be no cassation review (consult this Chamber's rulings no. 765 at 4:00 p.m. on September 26, 2001, and no. 561-F-2003, at 10:30 a.m. on September 10, 2003). This chain of reasoning allows them to conclude that in that specific case (the simple condemnation or the non-application of exonerations) "it cannot be subject to examination in this venue" (of this same deciding body, ruling no. 419-F-03, at 9:20 a.m. on July 18, 2003), since it is a scenario "not subject to cassation" (ruling no. 653-F-2003, at 11:20 a.m. on October 8, 2003). Thus, in the opinion of the distinguished colleagues: the cassation appeal is not admissible when the discretionary power to exonerate is not used (see, a contrario sensu, Considerandos III and VIII, in order, of rulings 541-F-2003, at 11:10 a.m. on the 3rd and at 10:50 a.m. on the 10th, both of September 2003). In this way, the majority has deemed that "... condemning the losing party to pay costs, as happened here, is not reviewable in this Venue, given that the Court merely applied the rule as provided for by it" (the emphasis is not from the original, see Considerando X of Voto no. 68-F-2005, at 2:30 p.m. on December 15, 2005). And in notarial matters, it has been stated with greater force that: "... the Court imposed the payment of the costs of the compensatory claim on the complainant, a ruling which, it is repeated, is not subject to cassation." (Considerando X of ruling no. 928-F-2006, at 9:15 a.m. on November 24, 2006).

II.- However, in the opinion of the undersigned, the improper non-application of the precepts that allow the exoneration from costs undoubtedly infringes upon the Legal System and, specifically, the rules that authorize it, whether due to error or inadequate assessment by the judges in the specific conflict. To that extent, even though it is a discretionary power, it is certain that it is not immune to cassation review, because both in its exercise and in its non-application, a violation of law can occur, and to that extent, the improper omission is not, and should not be, synonymous with arbitrariness, in such a case, committed by the Judge themselves. Especially if it concerns a mandate to the judge granted with specific circumstances that limit their discretionary power in this matter. Consequently, on this particular aspect, we estimate that the mere application of the general rule of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (condemning the losing party to pay both court costs) does not close the doors to the cassation appeal, because on the contrary, the matter is admissible for an examination on the merits (provided the legal requirements are met) in the face of a potential omission-based defect in the application of the legal provisions that authorize the exoneration from said costs (canons 55 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria and 98 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa). Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the specific case under review, these members concur with what was decided on the merits by the Court, insofar as the losing party was ordered to pay them, a circumstance that leads us to reject the grievance, and with it, the appeal formulated in this regard.

Óscar Eduardo González Camacho Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Nombre207768 The defendant is ordered (sic) to pay both sets of costs of this proceeding." </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">2.-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101"> The defendant Municipality filed its answer untimely, and was therefore declared in default, with the facts of the complaint deemed affirmatively answered.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">3.- </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101">Judge Yazmín Aragón Cambronero, in judgment no. 789-03 of 9:30 a.m. on October 1, 2003, ruled: “</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">The present complaint is granted, solely as to</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> those claims expressly stated below, and is deemed denied as to any claims on which a ruling is omitted:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiffs who have proven ownership of homes or lots in Residencial Cedri the damages (daños y perjuicios) arising from the failure to install the blackwater system in their residences.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Which they must prove during the judgment enforcement phase.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> The defendant is ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs incurred.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101">”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">4.- </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101">Both parties appealed, and the Administrative Litigation Court, First Section, composed of Judges Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez, Joaquín Villalobos Soto, and Ana Isabel Vargas Vargas, in judgment no. 109-2005 of 10:35 a.m. on March 16, 2005, ordered: “</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders the Municipality of Heredia to pay damages (daños y perjuicios) to the owners of Residencial Cedri arising from the failure to install the blackwater system in their residences, and that claim is instead denied; also insofar as it denies payment for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) for the harm suffered by them due to the environmental degradation endured, and instead awards five hundred thousand colones to each of them under that heading, sums that shall accrue interest as of the date the judgment becomes final.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> It is affirmed insofar as it denies the remaining claims of the action and insofar as it orders the losing party to pay costs.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101">”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">5.- </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101">Both parties filed cassation appeals on procedural and substantive grounds. The co-plaintiffs claim violation of articles 4(4) of the repealed Código Municipal; 2 and 4(c) of the current Código Municipal; 11, 41, 170 of the Constitución Política; 87 of the Ley de Construcciones; 1045 of the Código Civil; 190 to 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 98(2), 155(3), subparagraphs ch), d), and 330 of the Código Procesal Civil. The defendant alleges violation of articles 106, 153, 155, 221, 222 of the Código Procesal Civil; 704, 1045, 1046 of the Código Civil; 50 of the Constitución Política; 2, 289 of the Ley General de Salud, 4(4°) of the repealed Código Municipal, and 98 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa.

6.- In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- In accordance with the facts recounted in the complaint, the co-plaintiffs Nidia María Alfaro Espinoza, Manuel Villalobos Villalobos, María Mayela Sánchez Madrigal, Nombre38277, Nombre38278, Rafael Ángel Gutiérrez Morales, Nombre99656, Heidy Ocampo Vargas, Nombre209606, Nombre209614, Nombre80407, Nombre209607, Nombre80409, Marjorie Alfaro Jiménez, Nombre80410, Allisson Arias Víquez, Nombre38283, Nombre209609, Nombre209610, Nombre39321, Nombre80411, Nombre39322, Nombre38284, Nombre80412, Nombre80413, Nombre209611, Nombre209612, Nombre80414, Nombre209613, and Nombre58688, state that they are each the owner of a house or lot in Residencial Cedri, located in Mercedes Sur de Heredia. They indicate that the construction of that complex, consisting of three phases, was undertaken by the developer Desarrollos Urbanos del Oeste S.A. The Municipalidad de Heredia, they say, approved the corresponding construction permit for that company in April 1993, as a result of which work began immediately on the properties of the Heredia district, registered under real estate folio numbers Placa39668 and Placa39669. They state that, in ordinary session 68-04 of October 25, 1993, the local entity agreed to authorize the substitution of the mortgage guarantee offered by the firm Desarrollos Urbanos del Oeste S.A., for the remaining works of the Urbanización Cedri, with a performance bond issued by an entity of the National Banking System, for the same amount, provided by its President, Mr. Nombre209615. They assert that, in December 1994, said company delivered the first and second phases to the Municipality incomplete, as the children's playgrounds, communal areas, paving of access roads, and black water systems were missing. They allege that, due to the developer's non-compliance, the Mutual de Heredia auctioned off the residential properties, which were acquired by Vivienda Coop R.L. They state that the portion corresponding to the third phase was put up for sale without any urban development plan. They add that the local corporation granted construction permits to the buyers of lots in the second and third phases, without taking into account the difference with the houses of the first; in some cases, those of the third phase have a standard very similar to those of shantytowns (precarios) or social interest housing. They accuse that the residential complex has two sources of environmental contamination: to the north, the Quebrada Seca River, and to the south, an open-air ditch (acequia). They state that in the river there is a large amount of garbage and all kinds of foul-smelling waste that produce unbearable odors and a high degree of contamination. The open-air ditch (acequia), for its part, is also full of garbage and putrid waters. They assert that the Municipality, even though a recommendation existed from the Director of the Quality of Life Area, did not want to pipe the ditch (acequia) that crosses the residential complex. As a consequence of this, they file the complaint that gives rise to the present proceeding against the entity of the Central Canton of Heredia. Fundamentally, they seek in the judgment a declaration that the defendant: 1.- acted negligently by not having obligated the construction company to finish the children's playgrounds, communal areas, paving of access roads, and black water systems of Residencial Cedri, where their houses are; 2.- has acted negligently by not piping the open-air ditch (acequia) that exists in the residential complex, which must be done immediately; 3.- was negligent by not providing a solution to the problem of the garbage dump in the Quebrada Seca River; 4.- has promoted the "shantytown-ization" (tugurización) of the third phase of the residential complex, by granting construction permits without any urban planning; 5.- is guilty of the process of contamination, shantytown-ization (tugurización), and deterioration of their houses; 6.- must immediately suspend the granting of permits for the construction of shanties (tugurios); 7.- that non-contractual civil liability be declared, both for action and omission, for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by the reported acts, and accordingly, the plaintiffs must be paid the sums they liquidate in the complaint for those concepts; and 8.- that it be ordered to pay both sets of court costs of the proceeding. The defendant corporation did not respond in time, as a result of which, at the plaintiffs' request, it was declared in default (rebelde). The Trial Court partially granted the complaint. It ordered the Municipality to pay the co-plaintiffs who have proven to be owners of homes or lots in Residencial Cedri, the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), arising from the lack of installation of the black water system in their residences, to be defined in the execution phase. It imposed both sets of costs on the territorial entity. Disagreeing with the ruling, the parties appealed.

Upon hearing those appeals, the Tribunal revoked the first-instance judgment with respect to the award of damages caused by the failure to install a blackwater system in their residences, and instead denied that claim. Likewise, regarding the denial of subjective non-material damage (daño moral subjetivo) for the harm suffered due to the environmental deterioration (deterioro ambiental) experienced by the plaintiffs, a concept for which it granted each one an amount of ¢500,000.00, plus their respective interest running from the date the judgment becomes final. It confirmed the denial of the other claims and the imposition of costs.

Both parties appeal in cassation, alleging procedural and substantive defects.

II.- Before entering into the detail of the objections raised by the cassation appellants, and given the manner in which they have been presented, it is necessary to note that this Chamber has repeatedly established that the classification the appellants assign to their claims is not an obstacle to conducting their analysis. This is because their legal classification corresponds exclusively to this collegiate body, for which purpose it looks to the substance and true nature of the allegation, rather than its designation. Hence, it has resolved allegations formulated as substantive as being procedural in nature, or those typical of direct violation presented as errors committed in the evidentiary assessment, or vice versa. However, it is clear that this analysis in question is appropriate, provided that within the corresponding classification they satisfy the requirements imposed by the civil procedural rules for their examination. Viewed in this way, the grounds raised will be grouped according to their correct nature, in order to carry out an adequate and objective analysis of the points that are requested to be reviewed through this appeal.

APPEAL OF THE PLAINTIFFS Substantive Defects III.- Indirect violation. The special judicial representative of the plaintiffs alleges an error of law. He indicates that in recital XII of the judgment, the serious fact of the pollution suffered by those he represents due to the sources of contamination existing in the Quebrada Seca River to the north, and an open-air drainage channel to the south, is deemed proven. He adds that this recital establishes that the Municipality is responsible for the environmental deterioration (deterioro ambiental), having failed to adopt appropriate policies to remedy the problem, and therefore the negligent conduct has inflicted non-material damage (daño moral). He indicates the error consists of not having assigned the true scope that the evidentiary elements possess for determining the magnitude of the environmental damage and, with it, the value of the subjective non-material damage (daño moral subjetivo). In this sense, he points out, the expert report of engineer Nombre38778 establishes aspects that seriously harm the health and morale of the plaintiffs. He refers to the photographs accompanying said expert report. He adds that a nationally circulated newspaper, namely La Nación, published that the Quebrada Seca River crosses north of the Urbanización Cedri, having become a natural sewer. Therefore, it is public and notorious that this residential area is a dirty, unhealthy, unsanitary, and dangerous place, due to the possibility of epidemics. He adds that the Defensoría de los Habitantes, in official communication DHR-9801-1783-98, had declared the severity of the aforementioned sources of contamination, which had been known to local authorities since 1997. He warns that the testimony offered reflects that this problem has been suffered since 1993. He reiterates that the error lies in the erroneous and insufficient assessment the Tribunal makes of this evidence, granting a value that does not correspond to the grave scope they represent. He considers the sum granted for this concept (non-material damage (daño moral)) is meager and derisory. He provides citations of case law from this Chamber. He reproaches that by not jointly interpreting the evidence, article 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure was violated. Similarly, he notes, precepts 190 to 192, 196, and 197 of the General Law of Public Administration have been infringed, as well as canon 4, paragraph 4) of the Municipal Code, Law no. 4574, in force at the time the environmental, health, and cited non-material damage (daño moral) violations began to occur, and article 4, paragraph c) of the Municipal Code currently in effect. Likewise, by not allowing equitable compensation for the damages suffered, he claims, articles 1045 of the Civil Code and 41 of the Political Constitution have been flagrantly violated.

IV.- Of the error of law. Informal appeal. Regarding the charge formulated, it is worth mentioning that this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that an error of law entails disregarding the legal value of a means of proof, or granting it a value different from that provided by law. Within this, the objection for violation of the rules of sound judgment is also recognized, which aims to establish the non-observance of the principles of logic, psychology, or experience when evaluating the evidence. When this is alleged, it is necessary to indicate, with clarity and precision, the norms considered as infringed concerning the value of the evidentiary elements erroneously assessed. It is also indispensable to cite the rules violated on the merits, expressing, with clarity and precision, the manner in which the error occurred and the incidence it had on the improperly applied, or inappropriately applied, canons (article 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure). This implies technically indicating the indirect violation inflicted upon the legal system in the substantive norms due to the erroneous assessment, and not merely citing the articles or transcribing them.

The charge does not conform to the proper technique. The appeal limits itself to accusing a supposed error in the weighing of the evidence. However, although it cites some substantive norms that it considers infringed, it does not at all address or detail the manner in which such provisions were harmed as a consequence of the alleged mistake. It cites in its favor norms of the General Law of Public Administration and the Municipal Code in force at the time the environmental pollution began, however, it does not elaborate on reasons or explain how the jurisdictional proceeding has disregarded those rules, which, in light of the foregoing, is fundamental for entering into the examination of the claim. Thus, by not satisfying this requirement, the charge is informal, which implies its rejection.

V.- Direct violation. First. The special judicial representative of the plaintiffs claims that the contested judgment contains provisions contradictory to the law and to the expert reports. He maintains that in recital VII, it is said that the Municipality must not renounce its powers derived from autonomy. He indicates that the court, with an evident error of interpretation of municipal autonomy, omits stating in the judgment that it also cannot evade the duties imposed upon it by law, which are above any regulation. He criticizes that it is estimated, without any proof, that a wastewater treatment system does not exist at the location of the events and that the residential area had fewer than five hundred houses. For this reason, he says, it is decided that it was not the local entity's responsibility to monitor the connection of the blackwater and wastewater pipes to those provided for, which he considers a violation of article 87 of the Constructions Law, which he transcribes. He maintains that the claimed responsibility was unavoidable, to the point that the municipal entity not only should have overseen the installation of the stormwater and blackwater pipes, but it should not even have approved the construction plans, nor allowed the works to proceed. He affirms that by failing in this obligation, precepts 4 of the Municipal Code and 11 of the Political Constitution were breached. Regarding these, he cites precedents from the Constitutional Chamber. He says this lethal process of deterioration of the environment and of the houses they acquired has been carried out in full view and with the patience of the Municipality, which should have intervened in defense of the interests of the residents and the environment. He again reproduces rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal related to the topic.

A copy of the expert report rendered by the professional Nombre38778, stating that there were plans indicating the stormwater and sewage pipes for the total project, to which the local corporation did not give importance. Based on this, it indicates, it is reflected that the defendant did not act in accordance with its duties. It states that the Court contradicts itself when it rejects the responsibility of the municipal entity with the mere application of Decreto Ejecutivo no. 18,888, "Reglamento de la Oficina Nacional Revisora de Proyectos de Construcción", the issuance date of which it does not indicate. A contradiction consisting of the fact that with this Decree, it removes legal competencies, going over even canon 87 of the Ley de Construcciones, a violation that it considers attacks not only municipal autonomy but also the hierarchy of norms, damaging the aforementioned precept, as well as ordinals 2 of the Código Municipal and 170 of the Carta Magna. It cites national doctrine in support. It asserts that with this action the defendant is exempted from responsibility, which causes serious damages and losses to its represented parties, also breaching numeral 1045 of the Código Civil and precepts 190 to 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.

Second. It expresses that the facts are correctly selected and stated in the judgment, but the Ad quem misinterprets the applied substantive law. It states that regarding considerando VII, the Court considered it proven that the stormwater and sewage pipes were not connected to the corresponding planned ones and that the Municipality must not renounce its powers derived from the autonomy granted by the Constitution. It argues that with an evident error of interpretation of the provisions of canons 4 of the Código Municipal, 87 of the Ley de Construcciones, and 170 of the Constitución Política, the judgment does not indicate that the local entity cannot exempt itself from the duties that this autonomy imposes on it. It considers that the violation of substantive law consists of the Court interpreting that by means of Decreto Ejecutivo no. 3391 of December 13, 1982, Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones, the defendant is exempted from monitoring the connection of the referred pipes, when rather part III.3.2.12 of that legal instrument establishes something quite different. In its view, distinctions are made where the law does not make them, and it is overlooked that the previously mentioned precepts establish that the Municipality cannot be absolved of those duties.

VI.- On municipal autonomy. Principle of legality. Regarding the objections raised, the following must be indicated. Municipalities are local entities that enjoy relative autonomy in the exercise of their functions. The municipal regime is a type of territorial decentralization, as inferred from numeral 168 of the Carta Magna. This level of independence is granted by precept 169 of the Constitución Política, within the framework of its territorial jurisdiction, composed of the physical space designated for the canton it represents, as it states that it corresponds to each local government: "the administration of local interests and services …". That is, the constituent power has conferred a series of functions or attributions in favor of those governments by reason of "the local," that is, to administer the services and interests of the sphere to which it is circumscribed, namely, the canton. This competence is not exclusive of that which has been granted by the Legal System to other entities or organs of the State. In this way, it is clear that there are interests whose safeguarding corresponds to the Municipalities, and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional or legal protection is attributed to other public entities. The foregoing is because there are interests that transcend the local sphere, as they affect other latitudes outside the canton. However, it must be clear that the administration of those interests of the territorial sphere of the municipality constitutes an original competence of the local governments and can only be displaced from them by a nationalization law, provided that such a legislative manifestation does not imply a breach of the referred autonomy or entail emptying the constitutional content of the municipal regime. For its part, article 4 of the Código Municipal, Ley no. 7794 of April 30, 1998, develops the types of autonomy that the ordinary legislator deemed these corporations held, indicating that they possess political, administrative, and financial autonomy. On the scope of this autonomy, see, among others, from the Sala Constitucional, votes 5445-99, 1220-2002, 5204-2004 and 8928-2004. Nevertheless, as part of an integrated system, within the dynamics of satisfying the interests of the residents, it is clear that there will be interests that are fully local and others that can be considered national. This aspect obligates, within a principle of sound administration, coordination with the administrative instances of the Central Power, which perform, at a macro level, functions related to those deployed locally by the corporation. This is the example, in what is relevant to this case, of urban aspects, in which, even though according to the terms of article 15 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, each Municipality must approve the respective Regulatory Plan, coordination with the INVU and the Dirección de Urbanismo is imposed for these purposes, with a view to implementing a national development policy that integrates all the technical, economic, and social variables that converge in this activity. Equal particularities of coordination are rigorous in environmental matters, in which certainly, the treatment of natural resources and the actions each administrative unit establishes for the defense and protection of the environment, within a perception that should be precautionary and preventive, directly affects not the territorial sphere of the municipality, but the entirety of the national territory. Just as ecosystems maintain a linkage and symbiotic relationship among themselves (such is the case of biological conservation corridors for species), the incidences produced in a specific sector of the country have consequences for the totality of the national environment. Hence, in this matter, one faces a national and local interest simultaneously. The Sala Constitucional, in resolution no. 5445-99, already laid the foundations for the necessary coordination that must prevail in these inter-administrative relations, which arise without detriment to the autonomy that the constituent power itself assigned to local entities.

In this direction, the cited judgment stated: "X.- (...) Once the material competence of the municipality in a specific territorial circumscription is defined, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be deemed national or state; for this reason, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of attributions that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; from which it results that municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that the circumstances require it. That is, municipalities can share their competencies with the Public Administration in general, a relationship that must develop under the terms defined in the law (article 5 of the former Código Municipal, article 7 of the new Código), which establishes the obligation of 'coordination' between municipalities and the public institutions that concur in the performance of their competencies, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, above all, because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy, being its expression. In other terms, the municipality is called to enter into cooperative relations with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincidental nature–in many cases–of interests around a concrete issue. In the doctrine, coordination is defined based on the existence of several independent centers of action, each with its own tasks and decision-making powers, and eventually divergent; despite this, there must be a community of purposes by subject matter, but by concurrence, insofar as the object receiving the final results of the activity and acts of each one is common. So that coordination is the ordering of relations among these diverse independent activities, which takes charge of that concurrence in a same object or entity, to make it useful to a global public plan, without suppressing the reciprocal independence of the agent subjects. Since there is no hierarchical relationship among decentralized institutions, nor of the State itself in relation to the municipalities, the imposition of specific conduct on the latter is not possible, thereby giving rise to the indispensable inter-institutional 'concert,' in the strict sense, insofar as the autonomous and independent centers of action agree on that preventive and global scheme, in which each one plays a role with a view to a mission entrusted to the others. Thus, the relations of municipalities with other public entities can only be carried out on a plane of equality, resulting in agreed forms of coordination, excluding any imperative form to the detriment of their autonomy, which would allow subjecting the corporate entities to a coordination scheme without their will or against it; but which does admit the necessary subordination of these entities to the State and in the interest of the latter (through the 'administrative oversight' of the State, and specifically, in the function of legality control that corresponds to it, with powers of general surveillance over the entire sector)." Now, even with this autonomy, it is clear that under the shelter of precept 11 of the Carta Magna, municipalities and their officials are equally subject to the principle of legality, in its double dimension, positive and negative, such that in the exercise of their competencies, they must proceed according to the legal norms that delimit and specify their functioning. This subjection is generic to the entirety of the Legal System, constituting a guarantee for the resident and civil society in general, that the public acts emanating from those local entities are consistent with it. This includes, as a rule of principle, a proper application of the norms, not only in their content, but also in respecting their hierarchical level, from which it is inferred that the application of infra-legal measures that are opposed to or contrary to the law are unfeasible. The foregoing is because the executive regulatory power and, in general, the issuance of administrative acts of a general or normative character, as the case may be (article 121 Ley General de la Administración Pública), find their insurmountable limit in the law and in the Constitución Política itself, so that they cannot contain regulations that contradict the statements of those higher-ranked norms, or else, venture into areas that, by order of the content of the law, are prohibited to them (principle of prohibition of arbitrariness of the regulatory power). Hence, when these limits are circumvented, the infra-legal norm is inapplicable, as it is contrary to Law. An adequate, generalized, and abstract application of the norms is sought in this sense, avoiding arbitrary and capricious procedures.

VII.- Local autonomy in matters of urban planning and buildings. As has been indicated, municipal autonomy, imposed by the Carta Magna, confers upon local corporations a special competence for the administration of the interests of their territorial jurisdiction (articles 169 and 170). Within this set of interests and services lies the area of urban planning, in which the local government holds an essential competence and, as a matter of principle, one that prevails over that of other institutions, in the context of the locality.

In what is relevant to the case, numeral 15 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, no. 4240 of November 15, 1968, confers upon local entities the base competence to regulate and monitor everything concerning urban planning and development within the limits of their territorial jurisdiction. In this sense, the norm states: "In accordance with the precept of article 169 of the Constitución Política, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their jurisdictional territory, is recognized. Consequently, each one of them shall provide what is appropriate to implement a regulatory plan, and the related urban development regulations, in the areas where it must apply, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors, where qualified reasons exist to establish a specific control regime." Note that the assigned competence is not limited to an aspect of mere planning, but also includes the powers of control over urban development, which implies a degree of substantive monitoring of both works in execution and those already executed, an aspect that will be addressed in more detail later. In this line, canon one of the Ley de Construcciones, Decreto Ley no. 833 of November 4, 1949, establishes these powers with clear evidence when it states: "The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that the cities and other populated areas meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads and in the buildings and constructions erected on lands thereof, without prejudice to the powers that the laws grant in these matters to other administrative organs." For its part, in accordance with the provisions of article 13 subsection o) of the Código Municipal, it corresponds to the Council to dictate the norms and measures pertaining to urban planning. In this order, according to what is stipulated by the Ley de Construcciones, the realization of any work or building requires a municipal license, while the local entity is responsible for the monitoring thereof (mandates 74 and 87 of that legal body). Therefore, the prevailing role that the Municipality holds in these tasks is evident, given that it is incumbent upon it to provide the specific measures on urban development and planning, as well as the granting of construction "licenses" and the control of those activities according to the norms regulating that field. The Sala Constitucional itself has so defined it, among many, in judgments no. 2153-93 of 9 hours 21 minutes of May 21, 1993, and no. 4205-96 of 14 hours 33 minutes of August 20, 1996.

Now, the scope and effects of urban development and planning imply, occasionally, the emergence of coordination relationships with diverse public organs with concurrent competence in certain areas of administrative activity, as has been explained. The foregoing is because although those aforementioned powers arise in relation to a local concept, they must align with national planning policies. These are principles of sound administration that aim to establish coordination mechanisms that permit, in a more adequate manner, the efficient attention of public needs and interests, so that a potential competence conflict does not constitute an obstacle for the State (in a broad sense) to neglect its duties and thereby transgress, due to aspects of mere organization or design, its teleological dimension. Within this framework lies the issuance of regulatory plans, which, under the shelter of numeral 15 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, are carried out by local entities and then approved by the Dirección de Urbanismo. Article 169 of the Constitution, together with the Ley de Planificación Urbana, it is insisted, recognizes the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their territory, through the issuance of this type of plans, which fundamentally, hold a normative nature insofar as they provide for the programming of land use within the respective cantonal jurisdiction. This is why, within their processing, the public hearing is constituted as an insurmountable prerequisite to allow the residents to pronounce on the proposal, due to the evident interest they hold regarding the administrative decision that establishes the destination to be given to the properties located in the Canton. Nevertheless, due to aspects of linkage and harmony with national planning, given that the content of a plan of this nature reflexively affects the integral context of the national territory, they must be approved by the Dirección de Urbanismo (ordinal 18 ibidem) in order to adjust them to national planning criteria. However, it is reiterated, in this matter, the local government has an original competence, despite coordination relationships, that allows it to plan, regulate, and monitor urban development within the respective canton.

VIII.- Regulation of urban planning matters. Control powers. This said, it should be noted that the area of urban project development, in general terms, is subject to a set of norms that establish the various aspects converging in this topic, such as structural, constructive, health, and water treatment aspects, among others. However, grosso modo (as the provisions specifying this matter are otherwise extensive), its basic regulation lies in the Ley de Construcciones and the Ley de Planificación Urbana, legal sets that are complemented by other norms developing specific topics, e.g., the Ley General de Salud. In these, generically, the basic prerequisites delimiting the realization of buildings, whether for public or private use, temporary or permanent, are established. Even so, the establishment of a series of factors that, by their nature, are not convenient to incorporate into a law have been elaborated upon in regulations or infra-legal norms. In this same direction, the Ley de Planificación Urbana leaves to said latter sources of law the development of procedural and other aspects. In matters of an urban planning nature, in particular, the construction of subdivisions or residential developments, the Ley de Construcciones and the Ley de Planificación Urbana, in tune with what has been said, in their articles 15 and 32 respectively, refer the concreteness of the aspects that must be covered by developers to a regulation, which, in the specific case, is the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, no. 3991 of December 13, 1982. For its part, in tasks of the construction matter, there is the so-called Reglamento de Construcciones, published on March 22, 1983. In accordance with the provisions of canons 15 and 74 of the Ley de Construcciones, every subdivision and urbanization, as well as every work related to construction, must have an authorizing act issued by the corresponding Municipality.

Pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 20(h), both of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), local entities must issue the pertinent regulation to comply with the conditions of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), as well as to ensure the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and well-being. In this regard, Article 56 ibidem indicates that the Building Regulation (Reglamento de Construcciones) shall set the rules of safety, sanitation, and ornamentation. However, these aspects are contemplated in the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), a rule that would be applicable for this purpose. It is a legal instrument of a preeminently technical nature, which contains, in respect of urbanizations, varied regulations on aspects such as access, road networks, lot layout (lotificación), green and public areas, drainage, aqueducts, sewers, infrastructure, and finishes, among others. As regards the supervisory exercise, as has been stated, Article 1 of the Building Law (Ley de Construcciones) establishes that local governments are responsible for ensuring that cities, their buildings, constructions, and public roads meet the necessary conditions of safety, sanitation, comfort, and beauty, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies. This is once again a legislative manifestation intended to enhance municipal powers in furtherance of their autonomy within the sphere of local interests that concern them. As is proper, these empowerments constitute true powers-duties, that is, they allow the adoption of executive and enforceable actions, but at the same time impose duties and requirements, insofar as they must undertake the relevant actions to fulfill their tasks. Therefore, they must subject their decisions to the rule of law (bloque de juridicidad) (in harmony with subjective rights and legitimate interests), which implies, of course, exercising due control over areas of social interest, such as health and safety, when appropriate, in coordination with Central Government authorities. It is for this reason that, as a counterpart to the authority to grant building permits (licencias de construcción) established by Article 74 of the Building Law, Article 87 ibidem imposes the duty to supervise and control the works erected in their territory, as well as the use being made of them. These powers entail the authority to establish the harmony of building applications with the rules regulating that matter, to the point that if they infer non-compliance, they are empowered to deny the "permit" or reject the requested authorizing act. From this perspective, the role of municipalities occurs in two instances: preventive and supervisory. Within the preventive framework, the "permit" is granted if it meets all requirements, and in that comparison (qualitative and quantitative) such exercise is materialized. In supervision, it verifies that what is actually executed conforms to what was authorized. It is clear that, due to the very dynamics of urban planning matters, a wide range of variables converge which, by their magnitude and relevance, require coordination actions by local entities jointly with specialized public units. This is the case of public health and the treatment of waters of diverse nature (potable, greywater, blackwater), scenarios in which levels of connection between the administrative exercise of municipalities and the organs or entities with specific functional competence in those areas prevail. Indeed, this emerges from the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) in its Articles 338 and 338 bis, regarding the powers to supervise compliance with sanitary standards. Likewise, in water-related tasks, precepts 1, 2, 21, and 23 grant competence to the National Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados) to approve water supply systems and their disposal. Ultimately, under the cited Building Law, and in what is relevant to the case, it falls to local corporations to issue the authorization to undertake the construction of a specific work (within these, urbanizations). In turn, jointly with other public authorities, to deploy supervisory actions over those works, in order to verify their conformity with the regulatory framework. However, that control, which is their direct responsibility, is not dependent on the actions of other organs.

**IX.- Scope of the supervisory framework in the specific case.** This Chamber considers that the very conception of supervisory powers in urban planning matters entrusted to the Municipalities (already discussed) are manifestations of a public power derived from competences granted by the constitutional and legal order in this field, which justifies the Administration's empowerment. They therefore allow the deployment of a series of inherent and necessary attributions for the exercise of sound administration. These even empower them to suspend a specific work when it does not meet the required conditions, or, within its preventive and precautionary aspect, to reject a building application when the legal and technical requirements imposed by the applicable provisions have not been satisfied. These are specific manifestations of public power that enable the protection of legal principles, among others, safety and health. It therefore constitutes an inspection task over the constructive aspects of the structures erected in the municipality's territorial space, for the purpose of determining that they comply with the requirements set forth by that legislation, as well as other regulations associated with the activity. These faculties and powers, within their teleological orientation, are placed at the service of public or collective interests, which, ultimately, are the object that legitimizes their involvement in the control and supervision of urban planning activity. As these are competences established by the Legal System (as a direct derivation of their entrusted constitutional competences) and are associated with the protection of public interests, the action of the local entity must weigh not only a superficial (formal) review of building permit applications, but an integral and in-depth assessment of compliance with the legal and technical requirements imposed by the Legal System. That is, verifying not only formal but also qualitative compliance with the conduct subject to control. For such purposes, it must consider the harmony of the application and proposals formulated in the respective plan with the technical provisions or rules issued in each case. Applied to this case, this involves the Municipality analyzing whether the blackwater treatment systems offered in the building plan conform to the applicable technical standards, in such a way that they are functional and have the capacity and volume prescribed by the established rules. That is, the technical feasibility of installing a septic tank, in the proposed dimensions and conditions, so that it does not imply potential risks of any nature, including public health. Furthermore, public powers in this field are not exhausted by the deployment of an authorizing conduct. Indeed, the issuance of the act allowing the building or construction of the work must be accompanied, it is insisted, by a controlling and verifying exercise by the granting entity, for the purpose of ensuring that works under execution as well as those already executed are within the normative framework regulating the matter. As has been stated, this exercise occurs on a double level: preventive, at the time of analyzing the application to build; and subsequent, in inspections of those works to determine that they comply with what was authorized and, in general, with the applicable rules. Thus, the controlling function must be continuous, efficient, and effective. It is for this reason that when these competences have not been duly fulfilled and as a result of that conduct or dysfunctionality damage is generated (directly or concurrently), a causal link arises that allows the injury to be attributed to the Municipality, in accordance with the rules of objective liability established by the Constitution and developed by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) starting from Article 190. The foregoing can occur for several reasons. In a first stage, due to so-called material inactivity, that is, when the controlling and verifying framework is not exercised at all. In a second, when it is not done adequately, because even though verification was carried out, it was exhausted in a simple comparison of formal requirements, and not in an examination that is due in qualitative terms, of compliance or non-compliance with the requirements that the person intending to build must observe. In this scenario, the Municipality's passivity in the proper surveillance of elementary issues for the purposes of the work allows the circumvention of those rules, which can potentiate risks or future damages to third parties. That is, an abnormal functioning operates in these cases that entails liability. This is because they constitute administrative conducts that, in themselves, deviate from good administration (in accordance with the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102(d), which includes, among other things, effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, from technical rules, or from expertise and prudent conduct in the deployment of their actions, with harmful effects for the person. Thus, the abnormality is manifested by malfunctioning, by an insufficient, and therefore inadequate, supervisory exercise. This is because if the harmful result occurs in relation to facts in which the guarantor position held by the Administration made it mandatory to avoid that consequence through the adequate control it should have exercised, it must face the implications of that non-observance. In this area, liability for "administrative inaction" (even partial) arises from a double behavior. The first, by the public or private person whose action causes the impairment in the legal sphere of the injured party or parties. The other, which concurs with the former, by the inaction of the public authority that does not exercise, as it should, the conduct required to prevent the damage, which can occur, it is reiterated, totally or partially. In the latter case, when the supervisory framework does not fully cover the totality of variables that must be weighed in that exercise, so that due to relative non-observance, relevant aspects that constitute sources of risk are set aside. It is therefore a relativized framework of administrative protection not acted upon (in its preventive aspect), which, as inactivity, concurs to produce the injury and thus causes the shared liability, almost always joint and several, of the two agents causing the damage (understood as diverse centers of attribution, public or private). In this way, supervisory inaction in the face of third-party conduct is normally reflected in that irregularity that should have been identified in a timely manner; or in that damage produced that should have been foreseen in accordance with the existing state of affairs; or by the omission, which for these purposes is equivalent to inactivity, reprehensible from a legal standpoint, that did not exercise in time and form the preventions and corrective or precautionary measures of the case. It is clear that such attributability depends, to a high degree, on the determination of the existence of a causal link between that inaction (even partial) and the injury, insofar as only when the inactivity contributed to the generation of the damage would administrative patrimonial liability be applicable. That is, when, had the supervisory exercise not been omitted, the injury would probably not have been caused. On the subject of liability for inaction, see, from this Chamber, judgment No. 308 of 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2006. In this scenario, it must be insisted that the protection or supervision entrusted to the municipalities in urban planning matters (which includes buildability) is not reduced to formal authorization conducts, but includes substantive, periodic, and effective control over works under execution and executed, such that the omission of this supervisory exercise makes them liable for the damages thereby produced to third parties.

**X.- Management of blackwater. Legal regulation.** In this case, the appellant considers that Articles 87 of the Building Law, 4 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), and 170 of the Political Constitution have been violated, insofar as the Court concluded that the supervision of the connection of the pipes was not an obligation of the defendant Municipality. With this, he indicates, the inspection duty inherent to local entities is disregarded. Likewise, he accuses that from the application of Decreto No. 3391 mentioned, the Ad quem deduces the aforementioned dispensation from verification, when that rule does not allow such an interpretation. Of interest for the specific case is the control that the Municipality of Heredia must exercise regarding the specific issue of blackwater and greywater pipes that every dwelling within an urbanization must have. The foregoing because the appellant argues that Article 87 of the Building Law imposes the obligation on local corporations to supervise the construction of works carried out in the respective Canton, so not having done so regarding the referred pipes entails its objective liability for the damages suffered. In this matter, as has been indicated, the Building Law and the Urban Planning Law refer to regulatory provisions. Such development is regulated in the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations, No. 3991 of December 13, 1982. On this point, as the Ad quem has well noted, the aforementioned Regulation, in Chapter III, titled "Urbanizations," sets the rules that are applicable. In this sense, the rule provides several possibilities, depending on the characteristics of each residential urban complex. In this regard, it provides: "*III.3.12 Sewers: When areas are urbanized that have a functioning blackwater collector service, the urbanizer must connect to said system./ When the collector is planned for a later stage, the urbanizer must leave a constructed sewer system within the urbanization to connect in the future to the planned collector system./ If there is no sewer in operation nor planned, the following alternatives are contemplated:/ III.3.12.1 For developments larger than five hundred (500) housing units, the construction of a dedicated blackwater treatment plant is required: unless developments with larger numbers of units with a septic tank are negotiated with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA)./ III.3.12.2 In developments with a smaller number of lots or dwellings, the minimum lot size must be adapted for the use of a septic tank as established by this Regulation.*" Thus, depending on whether a collector exists or not, the urbanizer may opt for one of the regulated possibilities, which, in accordance with what has been said, must be weighed by the municipality, the instance responsible for, once the specific case has been assessed, establishing the appropriateness of the proposed measure. It is clear that the design of the water supply and the treatment and drainage system must be in conformity and correspondence with the technical standards established in each case by the authorities with concurrent competence, among them, the Ministry of Health and the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA). The foregoing must be reflected in the plan that the administrative instances must approve, as deduced from Chapter VI, Article 3.3 of the cited Regulation. In this sense, as a matter of principle, AyA is the competent instance to set policies, establish and apply standards related to the supply of drinking water and evacuation of blackwater (Article 1 of its Constitutive Law, No. 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its amendments). However, in accordance with Article 23 of its Constitutive Law: "*The plans for the construction or partial or total reconstruction of a house or building in the capital cities of provinces or Cantons whose Municipalities have an Engineering Department shall be submitted for prior approval to said Department and, once approved by it, to the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, for its review…*". That same rule is applicable in the case of urbanization projects. From all the foregoing, it is deduced that, ultimately, the verification of compliance with the regulations inherent to the matter of blackwater falls upon the local corporations, given that they are the competent ones to grant the building permit, which is only possible, within an ideal framework, when the regulations inherent to this matter have been satisfied.

**XI.- Regarding the specific case.** In this case, the challenged judgment starts from the demonstrated premise that in reality, it has been verified that the residential development does not have a functioning blackwater treatment system or collector, but only one that is planned, and furthermore, that the number of dwellings does not exceed five hundred. A simplistic examination of this matter would lead to the conclusion that in consideration of that factual picture (which the cassation appellant states is not based on any evidence) and pursuant to the cited Regulation, the theoretically viable solution was to adapt the lot for the use of a septic tank and leave the pipes planned for a later stage. However, this Chamber considers that the particularities involved in this debate require a more in-depth analysis of what happened. Certainly, the aforementioned rule allows the solution that the urbanizer gave to the blackwater aspect, that is, leaving the pipes planned (which the Municipality authorized). However, the reference to the possibility of installing septic tanks when there is a number of dwellings less than five hundred must be harmonized with the technical feasibility and suitability of the proposal put forward by the builder, so that the system ultimately adopted is functional and optimal to fulfill its purpose. Ergo, this does not say that that solution was adequate and correct for the specific case and to comply with the standards proper to the matter of urban construction. Indeed, in line with the control and inspection powers assigned to it by law, the local entity should have studied whether, regardless of the fulfillment of the budgetary conditions established by the rule for installing the septic tank, the one offered in the building plans conformed, in terms of volume and capacity, to the type of dwelling intended to be developed. In this sense, due control required measuring not only the appropriateness of the requested measure in theoretical terms, but also, and more importantly, the capacity of the proposal to fulfill its function, that is, to serve as an efficient mechanism for the evacuation and storage of blackwater, for the purpose of thus avoiding potential risks to people's health and the generation of damages or injuries. This is because, in the absence of a water treatment system installed by the Municipality, and because it concerns a type of waste whose inadequate management can harm the health of residents and the environment, it was imperatively necessary to consider whether what was proposed met the needs it had to cover and satisfy. This analysis is far from being a document verification exercise; quite the contrary. By reason of the legal values at stake, of the activity deployed (urban planning) which undoubtedly has public relevance or interest, and due to the competences assigned to the local corporation in this field (as a function inherent in its territory), it was necessary for the local entity to weigh whether the solution proposed by the urbanizer was proper and optimal, so that what was definitively authorized fully complied with the public purpose and public service involved in the authorizing titles issued by the municipality.

The oversight function assigned to municipal governments by the legislature in urban construction activity is intended to ensure both preventive and subsequent controls, to guarantee that buildings comply with the requirements and conditions established by the normative order. Said verification therefore aims, within the framework of the construction of housing developments, to ensure the existence of adequate structural conditions in qualitative terms, which presupposes, as a general rule, that its development occurs within the proper channels. This implies that the dwellings have the basic services that allow a normal quality of life for the resident, which is certainly neglected when a wastewater disposal system does not meet their needs, constituting an imminent risk to their health, their life, and the harmony of the urban environment. The aforementioned oversight cannot be considered correctly performed if the suitability of that aforementioned aspect was not assessed, not in formal terms, but in its capacity to successfully solve a basic and foreseeable need of every dwelling. Ergo, the municipal examination should not have been superficial, but in-depth on aspects such as the one indicated. From this perspective, it is the opinion of this collegiate body that the defendant Municipality did not exercise due a priori control regarding this aspect. This is because, in the process of issuing construction permits or licenses, it omitted to analyze the suitability of the proposed tanks for the type of building for which the license was requested, which was fundamental to establish whether it had the pertinent volume or capacity. Indeed, regardless of whether the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones allows that specific technical solution when the regulated de facto circumstances for the case concur, this does not relieve the local entity from analyzing, within the exercise of its control powers, whether that solution, in the terms in which it was proposed, was viable for each building, in order to permit proper management of wastewater and sewage. However, that study was not duly performed, giving way to an authorization to install a tank that did not have the volume required by each dwelling. From this standpoint, the expert opinion (experticia) rendered by engineer Nombre38778 clearly indicates: "As an important technical fact, I clarify to the Court that there are construction plans indicating the stormwater and wastewater pipes for the entire project, that is, the three stages; however, the construction company did not connect the sewage from the dwellings to the pipes that are customarily left in the green zone or sidewalk; on the contrary, in a small front yard space it built a small absorption well, which does not have the capacity or volume that each of the dwellings require. In the approved plans, the municipality did not give the technical importance required in these very important aspects and approved the dwelling plans with a solution of a septic tank and drainage pipes, located in these plans in the front yard area, which cannot be approved as such, because there is not sufficient area for the (porous) drainage pipes to function efficiently with this solution. (...)" (folio 366 of the principal case file). Note that even in proven fact no. 12, the Court deemed this deficiency of administrative control to be demonstrated, which was subsequently endorsed by the Tribunal.

XII.- This collegiate body considers that in the sub examine, although the Municipality issued a formal act granting the construction permit, which would presuppose that it fulfilled its control duties, as has been indicated, that conduct is not fully compliant with the Legal System (Ordenamiento Jurídico), insofar as it failed to consider whether the wastewater system proposed by the developer was adequate or not, limiting itself to a formal examination of that requirement, which speaks of an abnormal functioning of the defendant public corporation. It is reiterated, the exercise of the inspection powers inherent to its authority to grant building or construction permits, and which is expressly set forth in canons 1 and 87 of the Ley de Construcciones, is not exhausted in a simple formal act of authorization. Within its correct understanding, it includes due, continuous, and efficient oversight of the works under execution and those already executed, in order to establish their harmony with the norms that regulate this matter. Therefore, its neglect generates liability for the damages it has caused in the legal sphere of third parties. That being so, it is clear that as an immediate effect of that conduct in the inspections prior to the granting of the construction permit, the defendant allowed the installation of tanks that, far from representing an adequate response to the issue of wastewater treatment, led to a problem not only for the plaintiff owners but for public health in general. Subsequently, faced with the impossibility of executing the guarantee provided by the construction firm, the owners of the residences where that circumstance occurred had to solve the water evacuation problems, given that, as has been stated, the well did not have the adequate capacity. The reason for attributing liability to the Municipality for those facts does not lie in the lack of installation of a wastewater treatment system (since it is clear that if it does not exist, it cannot be put into operation), but rather in the neglect of its inspection duties regarding the technical viability of installing a septic tank, in the dimensions and conditions proposed for this case. Had that aspect been carefully analyzed, it could well have been corrected in time and thereby avoid the construction of dwellings that lack an adequate sewer system. In this regard, the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes the Administration's liability for its legitimate and illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for the exonerating causes of force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. On this point, abnormality, as poor public functioning, includes the improper exercise of legally granted powers or faculties. In the sub examine, the said construction was carried out once authorized by the Municipality, despite the deficiencies noted, whereby it failed in its control and inspection duties assigned by numerals 1 and 87 of the Ley de Construcciones, which in this particular case must be complemented with the provisions of the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. Consequently, liability is imposed upon the local entity, obligating it to cover the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) suffered by the plaintiffs who, at the date of filing the lawsuit, were owners of a house or lot within the Residencia Cedri, amounts that must be determined in an execution of judgment proceeding (ejecución de sentencia). Therefore, it is the opinion of this collegiate body that, for the reasons stated, the grievance under examination must be upheld. Therefore, the judgment of the Tribunal must be overturned, and on this point, the judgment of the Trial Court must be confirmed.

RECURSO DE LA DEMANDADA Casación por vicios procesales XIII.- The Alcalde Municipal of Heredia claims as the sole ground of this nature, violation of numerals 106 of the Código Procesal Civil and 1046 of the Código Civil, due to the existence of a necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasiva necesaria).

In this express regard, joinder of parties (litisconsorcio) is one of the procedural figures of subjective plurality characterized by placing a third party in a common relationship with one of the parties, sharing the same object and the same cause of action (causa petendi). It states, in this manner, the plaintiff should have brought the action against all the institutions to which the law grants specific competence over the dispute. It expresses that this figure presupposes that to resolve a matter, all those subjects whom the resolution may affect must be present, as well as all public institutions that by legal provision hold competence over the alleged harm. It affirms that, in this case, it is indispensable that this presence occurs in order to complete the procedural relationship. It cites resolution no. 653 of 11 hours 20 minutes on October 8, 2003, from this Chamber. It argues that environmental pollution entails not only a local problem but also a public health issue. Pursuant to articles 50 of the Political Constitution and 2 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), it indicates that the definition of a general health policy, its standardization, planning, and all actions necessary to protect said fundamental right correspond to the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), an entity that should have been sued and not the Municipality; therefore, it considers those norms violated. It adds that the alleged problems concern not only health but also the environment, which is the competence of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), the governing entity in such matters, pursuant to article 1 and following of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente). It transcribes fragments of vote no. 1322-2001 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). On the other hand, it alleges that the matter of open-air drainage is the competence of the Public Services Company of Heredia (Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia), which is the entity responsible for ensuring the correct establishment, operation, and maintenance of stormwater and sanitary sewer systems. It reproduces article 6 of the Law for the Transformation of the Public Services Company of Heredia (Ley de Transformación de la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia), no. 7789, a precept it claims has been violated. In connection, it cites vote no. 1431-03 of the Constitutional Chamber. From this perspective, it accuses a violation due to improper application of articles 289 of the General Health Law and 4, subsection 4) of the repealed Municipal Code (Código Municipal). It concludes that there is a problem of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) in favor of the local entity, pursuant to precept 104 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). It reproaches that the lack of action against the aforementioned entities entails a breach due to a failure to apply article 1046 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), since it establishes joint and several liability for the reparation of damages and losses caused by a harmful act.

**XIV.- Defect of Form. Necessary Passive Joinder of Parties (Litisconsorcio pasivo necesario).** In this case, the challenge impugns the fact of certain public entities not having been brought into the litigation, which, in the appellant’s judgment, was necessary to incorporate for the purpose of the procedural relationship, given that by law, they are the competent entities to hear several of the issues being debated. From this perspective, in accordance with article 598 of the Civil Procedure Code, "For an appeal on form to be admissible, it is necessary that the correction of the defect has been requested before the corresponding court, and that the available appeals against the resolution have been exhausted." In this case, the hypothetical deficiency indicated is only raised in cassation (casación), meaning its correction was not requested in any of the preceding instances. Consequently, pursuant to articles 597 and 598 ibidem, it is necessary to dismiss the charge in question. On the other hand, and even if considering that, in substance, a direct violation of substantive law is reproached, the grievance would also not be capable of being addressed. This is because, under the shelter of article 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, "Matters that have not been timely proposed and debated by the litigants cannot be the subject of a cassation appeal." As stated, this argument was not raised by the appellant before either the Trial Court or the Tribunal. On this point, it should be highlighted that the Municipality was declared in default (rebelde) for not having answered the lawsuit on time. Pursuant to article 298 ibidem, applicable supplementarily by mandate of article 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), an incomplete necessary joinder of parties is a preliminary defense that should have been raised at the proper procedural moment, so by not having done so, this issue cannot be assessed in cassation, and its rejection proceeds. Nevertheless, on other occasions, this Chamber has entered ex officio to hear about the composition of the litis, given that it affects standing (legitimación), which, along with right and interest, constitutes elementary procedural prerequisites. However, in this case, regardless of whether it could be debated that the environmental pollution problem alleged in this process may lead to the consideration that liability extends to the State, given that the substantive issue incorporates the specific competences of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the truth of the matter is that, on one hand, the appellant has not managed to prove that the cause of the environmental pollution was produced as a result of actions or omissions of those public authorities. And therefore, that it was necessary to have them as passive parties in the process. Quite the contrary, it is beyond any doubt that a source of pollution exists in that territorial jurisdiction. That problem has not been appropriately addressed by the Municipality, despite it developing in the Canton over which it exercises its competences, and that therefore, based on local interest, it is obliged to undertake the necessary corrective actions. On the other hand, in any case, even under this assumption, the strict liability would be joint and several (solidaria) or eventually subsidiary, ergo, the passive joinder of parties would be voluntary (facultativa) and not necessary as argued. Seen this way, there is no reason leading this Chamber to conclude that it is facing a case of necessary passive joinder. Therefore, the claim is not admitted.

**Cassation on the Merits (Casación por el fondo)** **XV.- Indirect Violation (Violación indirecta).** It states that the award of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) is improper for lacking any foundation, containing errors of fact and of law in the assessment of the evidence. It accuses a violation of articles 153 and 155 of the Civil Procedure Code, norms that impose the duty for judgments to be duly reasoned, which, it considers, does not happen in the case at hand, because the subjective moral damages awarded lack a clear, precise, and congruent analysis regarding their reasoning. It criticizes that the Tribunal merely makes a reference to the evidence indicated in the Trial Court’s judgment but does not explain the reasons regarding the appropriateness of the alleged environmental and health damage caused by the Municipality, or its repercussions on the plaintiffs' well-being (moral). It adds that although subjective moral damages cannot be structured and their amount demonstrated precisely, their determination must be left to the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, general principles of law and equity, logic, and sound rational criticism. Likewise, it notes that there must be indications allowing a demonstration that it was effectively produced. It states that the judge must be guided by objective criteria to avoid meager, derisory, or excessive reparations, such as the intensity of the fault, personal circumstances of the injured party, among others, which in the case at hand were not applied as there is no reasoning whatsoever. It provides citations of precedents from the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). From this perspective, it attributes a violation due to failure to apply articles 1045 and 1046 of the Civil Code. It reproaches that it is not true, and is not even demonstrated with sufficient indications, that the Municipality caused harm to the plaintiffs through willful misconduct (dolo), fault, negligence, or imprudence. It states that the first-instance judgment, confirmed in this aspect by the Tribunal, established that the liability of the local corporation was directly confined to the garbage and foul-smelling waste discharged into the Quebrada Seca River, which, it reiterates, is not true. It declares that, although there is contamination, it does not result from a willful, negligent, or omission-based conduct by the defendant, since it has not even been proven that the polluting acts in the river are produced within the canton's jurisdiction. It emphasizes that the river originates in the mountainous areas north of the province of Heredia, and that its waters, before entering the territory of the Central canton, flow through San Isidro, San Rafael, and Barva. Based on this, it insists that the contamination observed at the Quebrada Seca point by the Cedri development is not a direct product of actions undertaken at the site, and therefore it has not been proven that the pollution was caused within its cantonal jurisdiction. In relation to this, it alleges a violation of article 704 of the Civil Code, in that it indicates that the award of damages and losses only includes those that are the immediate and direct consequence of the harmful act.

It considers that this produces an error of fact in the appreciation of the evidence, inasmuch as it is not determined that the Municipality is directly responsible for that contamination. Regarding the damage for the open-air drainage, it reiterates that it is the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia S.A. that is responsible for ensuring the correct installation, operation, and maintenance of the sewer systems, so on this point, it indicates, the contamination is also not the result of negligent conduct by the local entity, from which derives the non-existence of a cause-effect relationship, and therefore, a violation of Article 6 of Law No. 7789 and canon 704 of the Civil Code. It adds that the expert evidence clearly indicates that the plaintiffs incurred violations of the norms and regulations of the Ministry of Health, by discharging soapy water from bathrooms, washbasins, and sinks into the storm drains. It reproaches that there is an evident error in the application of numeral 4, subsection 4) of the Municipal Code, because based on that precept, it was considered that the Municipality must directly take charge of safeguarding health, when that norm is already repealed by the current Municipal Code. It asserts that on the date the alleged environmental damages were observed and the judicial inspection was carried out (February 2, 2001), the applicable law was Law No. 7794, which does not establish the obligation that the Court erroneously points to. It insists that it was the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment and Energy that were the entities directly responsible for solving the imputed problems, as established by ordinals 340, 341, 345, 346, 355, 356, 357, 370 and following of the General Health Law and the Organic Law of the Environment. It concludes that the subjective moral damage lacks foundation.

XVI.- Defective cassation. Does not cite the norms of the General Law of Public Administration. The cassation appellant claims that the challenged ruling, regarding the condemnation to pay subjective moral damage, is not reasoned. It reproaches the evaluative exercise of the evidence carried out by the Court, which led that office to condemn it to pay that item, even though its willful or negligent conduct was not demonstrated. The charge does not conform to due technique. Pursuant to the provisions of canon 595 subsection 3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, when an error of fact is alleged, even though it is not necessary to indicate the infringed legal precept corresponding to the probative value, it is imperative to cite the norms that, regarding the merits, have been injured as a consequence of the claimed errors of appreciation. Likewise, the duty is imposed to indicate in a clear and precise manner what the infraction consists of. In the instant case, the cassation appellant limits itself to citing provisions of the Civil Code related to the liability system that prevails in that branch of law; however, it omits to allege as violated the norms that regulate the liability of the Public Administration, namely, numerals 190 to 198 of that legal body. That mention is elementary in this case, inasmuch as what is being debated is the liability of a local corporation, which although autonomous by constitutional mandate, forms part of the Public Administration (Article 1 LGAP), ergo, is subject to the rules that those precepts provide, as has been mentioned already in previous sections of this resolution. In this scenario, the charge becomes defective, and therefore, its rejection is appropriate.

XVII.- Direct violation. It censures the condemnation in costs decreed against it. It reproaches the violation by lack of application or improper application of canons 221 and 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. It argues that while ordinal 221 establishes the condemnation of the losing party, Article 222 of that same legal body and 98 of the aforementioned Regulating Law establish that a cause for exemption from the payment of costs is having litigated in good faith, when the complaint includes exaggerated claims, the judgment partially grants the fundamental claims of the complaint, when it admits important defenses invoked by the losing party, or when there is reciprocal defeat. It considers that this situation was not analyzed, given that it was simply not applied. It cites precedents from the First Section of the Court. It asserts that it acted in good faith within the process, but also that exaggerated claims were raised, without overlooking, it says, that only some of the plaintiffs' claims were granted. At the same time, important defenses were admitted and there was reciprocal defeat. It adds that, given the exaggerated petitions, it had sufficient reasons to litigate.

XVIII.- Regarding costs. As to the disagreement with the condemnation in costs, it should be noted that according to what emerges from numeral 98 of the Regulating Law, in relation to numerals 221 and 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of supplementary application as provided by numeral 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, with the exceptions provided in numeral 69 ibidem, the pronouncement on both costs must be made ex officio. This Chamber, by majority criterion, has established that the condemnation is imposed on the losing party by the very fact of being so, that is, for losing the litigation, without thereby being considered a reckless or bad-faith litigant, the exception being the release from the payment of such items, in the cases defined by the legislator. Indeed, within the scope of the cited law, except for a special norm referring to cases of dismissal, extrajudicial satisfaction of the claim, and expiration of the process, where the matter of costs is governed under a different criterion, the rule, developed in Article 98, follows the same line as the civil procedural norm, that is, conceiving condemnation as a principle and exoneration as an exception. On the subject, in judgment no. 765 of 16:00 hours on September 26, 2001. In the present case, the majority of the members of this collegiate body considers that, by condemning the Municipality to pay the compensation claimed for subjective moral damage for the detriment caused to the environment, without the due administrative control having been exercised, it emerges that it was defeated in the litigation, from which derives the condemnation in costs as the general rule applicable to the case. Exceptionally, the payment of one or both costs may be exempted in the cases referred to in ordinal 98 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. Of these, the one regulated in subsection c) is of interest, as it is the one containing the alleged case. The norm in comment provides that: "The losing party may be exonerated from the payment of costs:...c) When, due to the nature of the debated issues, there has been, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate". Similarly, canon 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes the power of exemption in these items when the litigation has been conducted in good faith, when the complaint includes exaggerated claims, the judgment partially grants the fundamental claims of the complaint, when it admits important defenses invoked by the losing party, or when there is reciprocal defeat. From said precepts, the power of the judge to exonerate from costs is inferred, that is, it is not an obligation to do so even if the case provided for therein occurs, but rather it is discretionary for the judge to order such exoneration. When that power is not exercised, the norm cannot be infringed. Conversely, when it is used, it is possible that it is done erroneously or improperly, and then, depending on the circumstances of the case, a cassation appeal may indeed be appropriate. In this sense, see judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice no. 3 of 14:40 hours on January 6, 1995, and no. 8 of 14 hours 40 minutes on January 29, 1997. The appeal seeks to exempt the Municipality from the payment of costs, given that it has been defeated in the present litigation, under the allegation that it has litigated with sufficient reason and with evident good faith, and that there was reciprocal defeat, accusing that the Court did not make use of the power granted by law regarding exoneration from costs. However, pursuant to what has been stated, the appeal must be declared without merit regarding this point, as the aforementioned norms are not violated, inasmuch as the infraction alleged by the appellant does not occur when the judge makes use of the general rule of condemnation in costs, a review that would be feasible when the exception provided by the norm is applied.

XIX.- For the reasons stated, it is appropriate to grant the appeal filed by the plaintiffs, only as regards the liability derived from the damages produced by the black water and stormwater system. On this point, the Court's judgment is annulled. In accordance with precept 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on this matter, ruling on the merits, the judgment of the Trial Court is confirmed. In all other respects, what was ordered by the Court is upheld. The appeal filed by the Municipality of Heredia is rejected, with its costs borne by the party that filed it.

POR TANTO

The appeal filed by the defendant is declared without merit, with the costs at its charge. The appeal of the plaintiffs is granted, only as regards the liability of the Municipality of Heredia for the damages caused by the lack of due oversight of the septic tanks, a point on which the Court's judgment is annulled and, ruling on the merits, the judgment of the Trial Court is confirmed.

Note of Magistrates González Camacho and Escoto Fernández I.- The undersigned members do not share the criterion set forth by the majority of this Chamber in considerando XVIII of the previous ruling, insofar as it denies cassation review for those cases in which only the general rule of condemnation of the losing party to pay both sets of costs is used, that is, when no rule concerning the exoneration from them is acted upon or applied. Indeed, the majority’s jurisprudential basis starts from the premise that exoneration from the payment of costs is a *power* (facultad), in which *no error or normative infringement occurs* when it is not exercised or applied; therefore, it is said, if there is no legal violation, it is not possible in cassation to assess or modify what was decided regarding the condemnation of the losing party, since, it is repeated, for the majority of this Chamber, *there can only be a legal infringement when the rule corresponding to exoneration is acted upon* (among many, see rulings of this Chamber no. 1001-F-2002, of 11 hours 50 minutes of December 20, 2002; 249-F-2003, of 11 hours 45 minutes of May 7, 2003; and 306-F-2006, of 10 hours 20 minutes of May 25, 2006). The concatenation seems logical in principle, because with this premise, if exoneration constitutes a power, the judge is not obligated to exonerate; and therefore, if he or she does not order or carry out such exoneration, he or she does not violate the rules pertaining to the matter. Ergo, if no violation of rules occurs, there can be no cassation review (see resolutions of this Chamber no. 765 of 16 hours of September 26, 2001, and 561-F-2003, of 10 hours 30 minutes of September 10, 2003). This chain of ideas allows them to conclude that in that specific scenario (mere condemnation or the non-application of exonerations) "cannot be subject to examination in this venue" (from this same deciding body, ruling no. 419-F-03, of 9 hours 20 minutes of July 18, 2003), since it is a hypothesis "not amenable to cassation" (ruling no. 653-F-2003, of 11 hours 20 minutes of October 8, 2003). Thus, in the opinion of our distinguished colleagues: the cassation appeal has no place when the exonerative power (facultad) is not used (see, a contrario sensu, considerandos III and VIII, in that order, of resolutions 541-F-2003, of 11 hours 10 minutes of September 3, 2003, and of 10 hours 50 minutes of September 10, 2003). In this way, the majority has considered that "… the condemnation of the losing party to pay costs, as happened here, *is not reviewable in this Venue*, given that the Tribunal merely acted upon the rule in the terms set forth by it" (emphasis is not in the original, see considerando X of vote no. 68-F-2005, of 14 hours 30 minutes of December 15, 2005). And in notarial matters, with greater force, it has been indicated that: "… *the Tribunal imposed the payment of costs for the compensatory claim on the complainant, a pronouncement that, it is repeated, has no cassation*." (considerando X of ruling no. 928-F-2006, of 9 hours 15 minutes of November 24, 2006).

II.- However, in the view of the undersigned, the *undue non-application* of the precepts that permit exoneration from costs unquestionably infringes upon the Legal System and, specifically, the rules that authorize it, whether due to error or inadequate assessment by the judges in the specific conflict. To that extent, even though it concerns a power (facultad), the truth is that it is not immune to cassation review, since both in its exercise and in its non-application, a violation of law can occur, and to that extent, undue omission is not, nor should it be, synonymous with arbitrariness, in such case, committed by the Judge himself or herself. Especially if it concerns an empowerment granted to the judge with specific premises that limit his or her discretionary power in this matter. Consequently, in this particular aspect, we consider that mere application of the general rule of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (condemnation of the losing party to pay both sets of costs) does not close the doors to the cassation appeal; on the contrary, the matter is admissible for substantive examination (provided the legal requirements are met) in the face of a potential omission defect in the application of the legal provisions that authorize exoneration from said costs (canons 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law and 98 of the Regulatory Law for the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the specific case under review, these members concur with the decision on the merits reached by the Court, insofar as the losing party was ordered to pay costs, a circumstance that leads us to reject the grievance, and with it, the appeal filed in this regard.

**Óscar Eduardo González Camacho** **Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández** Nombre207768 Thus, the relationships of municipalities with other public entities can only be carried out on a plane of equality, resulting in agreed-upon forms of coordination, to the exclusion of any imperative form that would undermine their autonomy, which would allow subjecting corporate entities to a coordination scheme without their will or against it; but which does admit the necessary subordination of these entities to the State and in the interest of the State (through the State's "administrative supervision" (tutela administrativa), and specifically, in the function of legality control that falls to it, with general oversight powers over the entire sector)." Now, even with this autonomy, it is clear that under the shelter of precept 11 of the Magna Carta, municipalities and their officials are equally subject to the principle of legality, in its double dimension, positive and negative, so that in the exercise of their competencies, they must proceed in accordance with the legal norms that delimit and specify their functioning. This subjection is generic to the entirety of the Legal System, constituting a guarantee for the citizen and civil society in general that the public acts emanating from those local entities are consistent with it. This includes, as a matter of principle, a due application of the norms, not only in their content, but also in respect for their hierarchical level, from which it is inferred that the applications of infralegal measures that are opposed or contrary to the law are unfeasible. The foregoing given that the executive regulatory power and, in general, the issuance of administrative acts of a general or normative character, as the case may be (article 121 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)) find their insurmountable limit in the law and in the Political Constitution itself, so that they cannot contain regulations that contravene the statements of those higher-ranking norms, or venture into areas that, in order of the content of the law, are forbidden to them (principle of prohibition of arbitrariness of the regulatory power). Hence, when these limits are mocked, the infralegal norm is inapplicable, as contrary to Law. An adequate, generalized, and abstract application of the norms is sought in this sense, avoiding arbitrary and capricious proceedings.

VII.- Local autonomy in matters of urban planning and buildings. As has been indicated, municipal autonomy, imposed by the Magna Carta, confers upon local corporations a special competence for the administration of the interests of their territorial jurisdiction (articles 169 and 170). Within this set of interests and services lies the urban planning matter in which the town council holds an essential competence and, in principle, one prevalent over that of other institutions, in the context of the locality. In what is relevant to the case, numeral 15 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), No. 4240 of November 15, 1968, confers upon local entities the base competence to regulate and monitor everything concerning urban planning and development within the limits of their territorial jurisdiction. In this sense, the norm states: "Pursuant to the precept of article 169 of the Political Constitution, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development within the limits of their jurisdictional territory is recognized. Consequently, each one of them shall provide what is appropriate to implement a regulatory plan (plan regulador), and the related urban development regulations, in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors, in which qualified reasons exist to establish a determined control regime." Note that the assigned competence is not limited to an aspect of mere planning, but also includes the powers of control over urban development, which presupposes a degree of substantive oversight of both works in progress and those already completed, an aspect on which we will elaborate in more detail later. In this line, canon one of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), Decree Law No. 833 of November 4, 1949, establishes these powers with evident clarity when it states: "The Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that the cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public roads and in the buildings and constructions erected on the lands thereof, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies." For its part, in accordance with the provisions of article 13, subsection o) of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), the Council is responsible for dictating the norms and measures concerning urban planning. In this order, according to the statutes of the Construction Law, performing any work or building requires a municipal license, while at the same time, the local entity is responsible for oversight over them (mandates 74 and 87 of that legal body). Therefore, the prevalent role that the Municipality holds in these tasks is evident, given that it is incumbent upon it to arrange the concrete measures on urban development and planning, as well as the granting of construction "licenses" and the control of those activities according to the norms that regulate that field. This has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), among many others, in rulings No. 2153-93 of 9:21 a.m. on May 21, 1993, and No. 4205-96 of 2:33 p.m. on August 20, 1996. Now, the scope and effects of urban development and planning sometimes imply the emergence of coordination relationships with various public bodies having concurrent competence in certain areas of administrative activity, as has been explained. The foregoing is because although those alluded powers arise in relation to a local concept, they must be coupled with national planning policies. These are principles of sound administration that seek to establish coordination mechanisms that permit, in a more adequate manner, efficient attention to public needs and interests, so that a potential competence conflict is not an obstacle for the State (in a broad sense) to neglect its duties and transgress by that, due to aspects of mere organization or design, its teleological dimension. Within this framework is located the issuance of regulatory plans, which under the shelter of numeral 15 of the Urban Planning Law, are made by local entities and then approved by the Urbanism Directorate (Dirección de Urbanismo). Constitutional article 169, together with the Urban Planning Law, it is insisted, recognizes the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development within the limits of their territory, through the issuance of this type of plans, which at heart hold a normative nature insofar as they provide for the programming of land use in the respective cantonal jurisdiction. It is for this reason that within its processing, the public hearing allowing the citizens to pronounce on the proposal constitutes an insurmountable prerequisite, in view of the evident interest they hold regarding the administrative decision that establishes the destiny to be given to the properties located in the Canton. However, for aspects of linkage and harmony with national planning, given that the content of a plan of this nature has a reflexive impact on the integral context of the national territory, they must be approved by the Urbanism Directorate (ordinal 18 ibidem) in order to adjust them to national planning criteria. Nevertheless, it is emphasized, in this matter, the town council has an original competence, despite the coordination relationships, which allow it to plan, regulate, and monitor urban development within the respective canton.

VIII.- Regulation of urban planning matters. Control powers. Having said this, it should be noted that the matter of urban development project execution, in general terms, is subject to a set of norms that establish the various aspects that converge in this subject matter, such as structural, constructive, health, water treatment, among others. However, broadly speaking (since the provisions that specify this matter are otherwise extensive), its basic regulation lies in the Construction Law and the Urban Planning Law, legal bodies that are complemented by other norms that develop specific topics, for example, the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud). In these, generically, the basic prerequisites are established that delimit the realization of buildings, whether for public or private use, temporary or permanent. Even so, the establishment of a series of factors that, by their nature, are not suitable to incorporate within a law, have been elaborated upon in regulations or infralegal norms. In this same direction, the Urban Planning Law leaves to said latter sources of law, the development of aspects of procedural and other nature. In matters of urban nature, in particular, the construction of subdivisions or residential developments (urbanizaciones), the Construction Law and the Urban Planning Law, in line with what has been said, in their articles 15 and 32 respectively, refer the realization of the aspects that must be covered by the developers to a regulation, which in the specific case, is the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), No. 3991 of December 13, 1982. For its part, in tasks of the construction matter, there is the so-called Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones), published on March 22, 1983. In accordance with the statutes of canons 15 and 74 of the Construction Law, every subdivision (fraccionamiento) and urbanization, as well as every work related to construction, must have an authorizing act issued by the corresponding Municipality. Pursuant to numeral 19 in relation to 20 subsection h), both of the Urban Planning Law, the local entities must issue the pertinent regulation to comply with the conditions of the Regulatory Plan, as well as to ensure the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and well-being. In this direction, ordinal 56 ibidem points out that the Construction Regulations will set the rules for safety, health, and ornament. However, these aspects are contemplated in the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations, a norm that would be applicable to the effect. It is a legal instrument of preeminently technical nature, which contains, in the aspect of urbanizations, varied regulations in aspects such as access, roadways, lot layouts (lotificación), green and public areas, drainages, aqueducts, sewers, infrastructure, and finishes, among others. In what refers to the oversight exercise, as has been said, canon 1 of the Construction Law establishes that local governments are responsible for ensuring that the cities, their buildings, constructions, and public roads meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty, without prejudice to the powers that laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies. This is once again a legislative manifestation that aims to enhance municipal competencies in favor of their autonomy in the sphere of the local interests that concern them. As is proper, those empowerments constitute true powers-duties, that is, they allow them to adopt executive and enforcement actions, but at the same time impose duties and demands upon them, insofar as they must undertake the actions of merit to fulfill their tasks. Therefore, they must subject their decisions to the block of legality (in harmony with subjective rights and legitimate interests), which implies, of course, exercising due control over areas of social interest, as is the case of health and safety, when appropriate, in coordination with Central Government authorities. It is for this reason that as a counterpart to the competence to grant construction licenses established by article 74 of the Construction Law, article 87 ibidem imposes the duty to oversee and control the works erected in their territory, as well as the use being given to them. These powers presuppose the competence to establish the harmony of construction applications with the norms that regulate that matter, to the point that if inferring non-compliance, they are empowered to deny the "license" or reject the required authorizing act. From this perspective, the role of the municipalities occurs in two instances, that is, preventive and oversight. In the preventive framework, the "license" is granted if it meets all requirements, and in that comparison (qualitative and quantitative) such exercise is concretized. In oversight, it verifies that what is being performed in reality is consistent with what was authorized. It is clear that, due to the dynamics of the urban planning matter itself, a wide range of variables converge that, due to their magnitude and relevance, demand coordination actions by local entities jointly with specialized public units. This is the case of public health and the treatment of waters of diverse nature (potable, wastewater (servidas), sewage (negras)), cases in which levels of linkage prevail between the administrative exercise of the municipalities and the bodies or entities with specific functional competence in those areas. Indeed, this is apparent from the General Health Law in its numerals 338 and 338 bis, regarding the powers of oversight of compliance with sanitary norms. Similarly, in water matters, precepts 1, 2, 21, and 23 grant competence to the National Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados) to approve water supply systems and their disposal. Ultimately, under the shelter of the cited Construction Law, and in what is relevant to the case, it corresponds to local corporations to issue the authorization to undertake the construction of a specific work (among them, urbanizations). In turn, jointly with other public authorities, to deploy oversight actions over those works, in order to verify their conformity with the regulatory framework. However, that control which is of their direct concern, is not dependent on the actions of other bodies.

IX.- Scope of the oversight framework in the specific case. This Chamber considers that the very conception of the oversight powers in urban planning matters that have been entrusted to the Municipalities (already commented upon) are manifestations of a public power derived from competencies granted by the constitutional and legal order in this field, which justifies the empowerment of the Administration. They therefore allow the deployment of a series of inherent and necessary attributions for the exercise of sound administration. These empower them even to suspend a specific work when it does not comply with the proper conditions, or, within its preventive and foresighted edge, to reject the building petition when the legal and technical requirements that the applicable provisions impose have not been satisfied. These are concrete manifestations of public power that allow the protection of legal principles, among others, that of safety and health. It constitutes therefore a labor of inspection over the constructive aspects of the structures that are erected in the territorial space of the municipality, for the purpose of determining that they comply with the exigencies that such legislation provides, as well as other regulations associated with the activity. These faculties and powers, within their teleological orientation, are placed at the service of public or collective interests, which, in the final analysis, are the object that legitimizes their incursion in the control and oversight of urban activity. Being competencies set by the Legal System (as a direct derivation of their constitutional competencies that were entrusted to them) and that are associated with the protection of public interests, the action of the local entity must ponder not only a labor of superficial (formal) review of the construction permit applications, but rather, an integral and in-depth assessment of compliance with the legal and technical exigencies that the Legal System imposes. That is, verifying the compliance not only formal but qualitative of the behavior subject to control. For such effects, it must consider the harmony of the application and proposals formulated in the respective plan with the provisions or technical rules dictated in each case. This applied to this case involves that the Municipality must analyze that the sewage (aguas negras) treatment systems offered in the construction plan conform to the applicable technical norms, in such a way that they are functional and have the capacity and volume that the established rules provide. That is, the technical feasibility of installing a septic tank, in the dimensions and conditions proposed, in a way that does not imply potential risks of any nature, including public health. But moreover, public powers in this field are not exhausted in the deployment of an authorizing conduct. Indeed, the issuance of the act that allows the building or construction of the work must be accompanied, it is insisted, by a supervisory and verifying exercise by the granting entity, with the aim of ensuring that the works in progress as well as those already completed are within the normative framework that regulates the matter. As has been said, this exercise presents itself on a double level: preventive, at the time of analyzing the application to build; and subsequent, in the inspections of those works to determine that they comply with what was authorized and, in general, with the applicable rules. Thus, the supervisory function must be continuous, efficient, and effective. It is for this reason that when those competencies have not been fulfilled properly and as a result of that conduct or dysfunctionality damage is generated (directly or by concurrence), a causal nexus arises that allows imputing the injury to the Municipality, according to the rules of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) set by the Constitution and developed by the General Law of Public Administration starting from canon 190. The foregoing can occur due to several causes. In a first stage, due to the so-called material inactivity, that is, when the supervisory and verifying framework is not exercised at all. In a second, when it is not done adequately, in that even though verification was performed, it was exhausted in a simple comparison of formal requirements, but not in a due examination in qualitative terms of the compliance or non-compliance with the exigencies that the intending builder must observe. In this scenario, the passivity of the Municipality in the due oversight of elementary issues for the purposes of the work allows the mocking of those rules, which can potentiate future risks or damages to third parties. That is, an abnormal functioning operates in these cases that entails liability. This is because they constitute administrative behaviors that, in themselves, depart from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, from technical rules, or from expertise and prudent task in the deployment of their actions, with harmful effect for the person. Thus, abnormality is manifested by poor functioning, by insufficient supervisory exercise, and therefore, inadequate. This is because if the harmful result occurs in relation to facts in which the position of guarantor that the Administration holds made it necessary to avoid that consequence through the adequate control that it should have exercised, it must face the implications of that non-observance. In this field, liability for "administrative inaction" (even partial) is produced by cause of a double behavior. The first, of the public or private person by whose action the impairment in the legal sphere of the injured party or parties is produced. The other, which concurs with the former, due to the inaction of the public authority that does not exercise, as is due, the behavior required to avoid the damage, which can occur, it is reiterated, totally or partially. In the latter case, when the oversight framework does not fully encompass the totality of variables that must be pondered in that exercise, so that due to relative non-observance, relevant aspects that constitute sources of risk are left aside. It is therefore a relativized framework of administrative protection not actuated (in its preventive current), which as inactivity concurs in producing the injury and causes therefore, the shared responsibility, almost always joint and several, of the two agents causing the damage (understood as diverse imputation centers, public or private). In this way, the oversight inaction in the face of third-party conduct is normally reflected in that irregularity that it should have identified in a timely manner; or in that damage produced that it should have foreseen according to the existing state of things; or, by the omission, that for these effects is equivalent to inactivity, reproachable from the legal plane, which it did not exercise in time and form, the preventions and corrective or foresighted measures of the case. It is clear that such imputability depends, to a high degree, on the determination of the existence of a causal nexus between that inaction (even partial) and the injury, insofar as, only when the inactivity has contributed to the generation of the damage, would the administrative patrimonial liability be applicable. That is, when, had the oversight exercise not been omitted, the injury, with probability, would not have come to be caused. On the topic of liability for inaction, see, of this Chamber, ruling No. 308 of 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2006.

In this scenario, it must be insisted that the oversight or supervision (tutela o fiscalización) entrusted to the municipalities in urban planning matters (which includes buildability) is not reduced to formal authorization conduct, but rather includes substantive, periodic, and effective control over works in progress and completed, such that the omission of this supervisory exercise makes them liable for the damages caused to third parties thereby.

X.- Management of blackwater. Legal regulation. In this case, the appellant considers that numerals 87 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), 4 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), and 170 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) have been violated, insofar as the Court concluded that monitoring the connection of the pipes was not the obligation of the defendant Municipality. With this, he indicates, the duty of inspection inherent to local entities is disregarded. Likewise, he accuses that from the application of Decree no. 3391 mentioned, the Ad quem infers the dispensation of verification alluded to, when that norm does not permit such an interpretation. Of interest for the specific case is the control that the Municipality of Heredia must exercise over the specific matter of the blackwater and sewage pipes with which every dwelling within a subdivision (urbanización) must be provided. The foregoing because the appellant alleges that article 87 of the Construction Law imposes the obligation on local corporations to supervise the construction of works carried out in the respective Canton, and therefore, by not having done so regarding the referred pipes, it incurs its strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for the damages suffered. In this matter, as has been indicated, the Construction Law and the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) refer to regulatory norms. Such development is regulated in the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), no. 3991 of December 13, 1982. On this point, as the Ad quem has rightly pointed out, the aforementioned Regulation, in chapter III, called "Urbanizaciones," sets the rules that apply. In this sense, the norm provides for several possibilities, depending on the characteristics of each residential urban complex. In this regard, it stipulates: "III.3.12 Sewers: When areas are urbanized that have a functioning blackwater collector service, the developer (urbanizador) must connect to said system./ When the collector is planned for a later stage, the developer must leave a sewer system built within the subdivision to connect in the future to the planned collector system./ If there is no sewer in operation or planned, the following alternatives are contemplated: /III.3.12.1 For complexes larger than five hundred (500) housing units, the construction of their own blackwater treatment plant is required: except where the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, AyA) negotiates larger complexes with a septic tank./ III.3.12.2 In complexes with a smaller number of lots or dwellings, the minimum lot size must be adapted for the use of a septic tank as established by this Regulation." In this way, depending on whether or not a collector exists, the developer may opt for one of the regulated possibilities, which, in accordance with what has been said, must be weighed by the municipality, the instance responsible, once the specific case has been assessed, to establish the appropriateness of the measure proposed. It is clear that the design of the water supply and the treatment and drainage system must be in conformity and correspondence with the technical standards that in each case are established by the authorities with concurrent competence, among them, the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) and the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA). The foregoing must be reflected in the plan that the administrative instances must approve, as inferred from chapter VI, canon 3.3 of the cited Regulation. In this sense, as a matter of principle, the AyA is the competent instance to set policies, establish, and apply norms referring to the supply of potable water and the evacuation of blackwater (article 1 of its Constitutive Law, no. 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its amendments). However, as stipulated by numeral 23 of its Constitutive Law: "The plans for the construction or partial or total reconstruction of a house or building in the province head cities or Canton head cities whose Municipalities have an Engineering Department shall be submitted for prior approval to said Department and, once approved by it, to the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, for its review…". This same rule applies when dealing with subdivision projects. From all the foregoing, it follows that ultimately, the verification of compliance with the regulations inherent to the issue of blackwater falls on the local corporations, given that they are the competent entities to grant the construction permit, which is only possible, within an ideal framework, when the regulations inherent to this matter have been satisfied.

XI.- Regarding the specific case. In this case, the contested judgment departs from the proven assumption that in reality, it has been verified that the residential complex does not have a functioning blackwater treatment system or collector, but only one planned, and furthermore, that the number of dwellings does not exceed five hundred. A simplistic examination of the present matter would lead to the conclusion that in consideration of this factual scenario (which the appellant claims is not based on any evidence) and in accordance with the cited Regulation, the theoretically viable solution was to adapt the lot for the use of a septic tank and leave the pipes planned for a later stage. However, this Chamber considers that the particularities involved in this debate require a more in-depth analysis of what happened. Certainly, the aforementioned norm permits the solution that the developer gave to the aspect of blackwater, that is, to leave the pipes planned (which the Municipality authorized). However, the reference to the possibility of installing septic tanks when there is a number of dwellings fewer than five hundred must be harmonized with the technical viability and suitability of the proposal put forward by the builder, so that the system definitively adopted will be functional and optimal to fulfill its purpose. Ergo, this does not mean that this solution was the appropriate and correct one for the specific case and to comply with the norms proper to the matter of urban construction. Indeed, in keeping with the powers of control and inspection assigned to it by law, the local entity should have studied whether, aside from the prerequisites established by the norm for installing the septic tank being met, the one offered in the construction plans conformed, in terms of volume and capacity, to the type of dwelling intended to be developed. In this sense, the proper control required measuring not only the appropriateness of the measure requested in theoretical terms, but also, and with greater relevance, the capacity of the proposal to fulfill its function, that is, to serve as an efficient mechanism for the evacuation and storage of blackwater, in order to thus avoid potential risks to people's health and the generation of damages or injuries. This is because, since there was no water treatment system installed by the Municipality, and because it involves a type of waste whose inadequate management can harm the health of residents and the environment, it was imperative to consider whether what was proposed addressed the needs it had to cover and satisfy. This analysis is far from being an exercise in document verification; quite the contrary. By reason of the legal values at stake, of the activity deployed (urban planning) which undoubtedly has public relevance or interest, and of the powers that in this field have been assigned to the local corporation (as a function inherent in its territory), it was necessary for the local entity to weigh whether the solution proposed by the developer was proper and optimal, such that what was definitively authorized fully complied with the public purpose and the public service inherent in the authorizing titles issued by the municipality. The supervisory function assigned to it by the legislator in the activity of urban constructions aims to ensure that both preventive and subsequent controls are carried out, to guarantee that buildings conform to the requirements and conditions established by the normative order. Said verification tends then, within the framework of the construction of subdivisions, to ensure the existence of adequate conditions of the structure in qualitative terms, which implies, as a rule of principle, that its development occurs within the proper channels. This implies that the dwellings have the basic services that allow a normal quality of life for the resident, which is certainly neglected when a blackwater waste system does not meet its needs, constituting an imminent risk to their health, life, and the harmony of the urban environment. The aforementioned supervision cannot be considered correctly performed if the suitability of that already-mentioned aspect was not assessed, not in formal terms, but in its capacity to successfully solve a basic and foreseeable need of every dwelling. Ergo, the municipal examination should not have been superficial, but in-depth, on aspects such as the one indicated. From this perspective, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the defendant Municipality did not exercise proper a priori control regarding this aspect. This is because, in the process of issuing construction permits or licenses, it omitted analyzing the suitability of the proposed tanks for the type of building for which the license was requested, which was elemental to establish whether it had the pertinent volume or capacity. Indeed, despite the fact that the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations permits that specific technical solution when the de facto prerequisites regulated for the case concur, this does not relieve the local entity from analyzing, within the exercise of its powers of control, whether that solution, in the terms in which it was proposed, was viable for each building, in order to allow good management of blackwater and sewage. However, that study was not performed properly, giving way to an authorization to install a tank that did not have the volume required by each dwelling. From this standpoint, the expert opinion rendered by engineer Ricardo Aymerich Kingsbury clearly indicates: "As an important technical fact, I clarify to the Court that there are construction plans indicating the stormwater pipes and blackwater pipes for the total project, that is, the three stages; however, the construction company did not connect the sewage from the dwellings to the planned ones that are customarily left in the green zone or sidewalk; on the contrary, in the small space of the front garden, it built a small absorption well, which does not have the capacity or volume required by each of the dwellings. In the approved plans, the municipality did not give the technical importance required in these very important aspects and approved the dwelling plans with a septic tank solution and drainage pipes, located in these plans in the front garden area, which cannot be approved in this way, because there is not sufficient area for the (porous) drainage pipes to function efficiently with this solution. (...)" (folio 366 of the principal file). Note that even in proven fact no. 12, the Trial Court found this deficiency of administrative control to be proven, which was subsequently endorsed by the Tribunal.

XII.- This collegiate body considers that in the sub examine, although the Municipality issued a formal act in which it granted the construction permit, which would lead one to presume it complied with its duties of control, as has been indicated, that conduct does not fully conform to the Legal System, insofar as it failed to weigh whether the blackwater system proposed by the developer was adequate or not, limiting itself to a formal examination of that requisite, which speaks to an abnormal functioning of the defendant public corporation. It bears repeating, the exercise of the powers of oversight inherent to its authority to grant building or construction licenses, and which is expressly provided for in canons 1 and 87 of the Construction Law, is not exhausted in a simple formal act of authorization. Within its correct understanding, it includes proper, continuous, and efficient supervision of works in progress and those already completed, in order to establish their harmony with the norms that regulate that matter. Therefore, its neglect generates liability for the damages it may have caused to the legal sphere of third parties. This being so, it is clear that as an immediate effect of that conduct during the inspections prior to the granting of the construction permit, the defendant allowed the installation of tanks that, far from representing a proper response to the issue of blackwater treatment, led to a problem not only for the plaintiff owners, but for public health in general. Subsequently, given the impossibility of executing the guarantee provided by the construction firm, the owners of the residences where this circumstance arose had to solve the inconveniences of water evacuation, because, as has been said, the well did not have the adequate capacity. The reason for attributing liability for these events to the Municipality does not lie in the lack of installation of a blackwater treatment system (since it is clear that, as one does not exist, it cannot be put into operation), but rather in the neglect of its duties of inspection regarding the technical viability of installing a septic tank, in the dimensions and conditions proposed for this case. Had that aspect been carefully analyzed, it could well have been corrected in time and thus avoided the construction of dwellings that do not have an adequate sewer system. In this sense, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) establishes the liability of the Administration for its legitimate and illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, save for the exempting causes of force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. In this regard, abnormality, as public malfunction, includes the improper exercise of legally granted powers or faculties. In the sub examine, the said construction was carried out once authorized by the Municipality, despite the deficiencies noted, thereby failing in its duties of control and oversight assigned to it by numerals 1 and 87 of the Construction Law, which, in this particular, must be complemented with the provisions of the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations. With this, liability is imposed on the local entity, obliging it to cover the damages and losses suffered by the plaintiffs who, on the date the lawsuit was filed, were owners of a house or lot within the Residencia Cedri, items that must be determined in the sentence execution process. Thus, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that, for the reasons stated, the grievance under examination must be upheld.

Therefore, the Tribunal's sentence must be annulled, and on this point, the Court's sentence confirmed." Note of the Magistrates González Camacho and Escoto Fernández "I.- The undersigned members do not share the criterion expressed by the majority of this Chamber in Considerando XVIII of the prior ruling, insofar as it denies cassation review for cases in which only the general rule of condemnation of the losing party to pay both costs is used, that is, when no rule concerning exoneration from them is acted upon or applied. Indeed, the majority's jurisprudential basis rests on the premise that exoneration from the payment of costs is a power (facultad), in which no error or normative infringement occurs when it is not exercised or applied; therefore, it is said, if there is no legal violation, it is not possible in cassation to assess or modify what was resolved regarding the condemnation of the losing party, since, it is repeated, for the majority of this Chamber, there can only be a legal infringement when the norm corresponding to exoneration is acted upon (among many, see the sentences of this Chamber no. 1001- F-2002, at 11 hours 50 minutes on December 20, 2002; 249-F-2003, at 11 hours 45 minutes on May 7, 2003; and 306-F-2006, at 10 hours 20 minutes on May 25, 2006). The chain of reasoning seems logical in principle, because with this premise, if exoneration constitutes a power (facultad), the judge is not obligated to exonerate; and therefore, if they do not order or effect such exoneration, they do not violate the rules pertaining to the matter. Hence, if no violation of rules occurs, there can be no cassation review (consult the resolutions of this Chamber no. 765 at 16 hours on September 26, 2001, and 561-F-2003, at 10 hours 30 minutes on September 10, 2003). This chain of ideas allows them to conclude that in that specific scenario (the simple condemnation or the non-application of exonerations) "it cannot be subject to examination in this venue" (from this same deciding body, sentence no. 419-F-03, at 9 hours 20 minutes on July 18, 2003), as it is a hypothesis "not susceptible to cassation" (ruling no. 653-F-2003, at 11 hours 20 minutes on October 8, 2003). Thus, in the opinion of our distinguished colleagues: the cassation appeal has no place when the power to exonerate (facultad exoneratoria) is not exercised (see, a contrario sensu, Considerandos III and VIII, in respective order, of resolutions 541-F-2003, at 11 hours 10 minutes on September 3, and at 10 hours 50 minutes on September 10, both from 2003). In this way, the majority has estimated that "… the condemnation of costs to the losing party, as happened here, is not reviewable in this Venue, given that the Tribunal merely acted upon the rule in the terms set forth by it" (emphasis not in the original, see Considerando X of vote no. 68-F-2005, at 14 hours 30 minutes on December 15, 2005). And in notarial matters, with greater force, it has been indicated that: "… the Tribunal imposed the payment of the costs of the compensatory claim on the complainant, a pronouncement which, it is repeated, has no cassation." (Considerando X of sentence no. 928-F-2006, at 9 hours 15 minutes on November 24, 2006).

II.- However, in the opinion of the undersigned, the improper non-application (indebida inaplicación) of the precepts that permit the exoneration of costs undoubtedly infringes upon the Legal System and, specifically, the norms that authorize it, whether due to error or inadequate appreciation by the judges in the specific conflict. To that extent, even though it is a power (facultad), the truth is that it is not immune to cassation review, since in both its exercise and its non-application, a violation of law can occur, and to that extent, improper omission is not, and should not be, synonymous with arbitrariness, in such case, committed by the Judge themselves. Especially when it involves an empowerment granted to the judge with specific assumptions that limit their discretionary power in this matter. Consequently, on this particular aspect, we consider that the mere application of the general rule of Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure (condemnation of the losing party to pay both costs) does not close the doors to the cassation appeal, since on the contrary, the matter is admissible for its substantive examination (provided the legal requirements are met) given a potential omission-based defect in the application of the legal provisions that authorize the exoneration of said costs (precepts 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law and 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction). Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the specific case under examination, these members agree with what was decided on the merits by the Tribunal, insofar as the losing party was ordered to pay them, a circumstance that leads us to reject the grievance, and with it, the appeal that is formulated in this regard." OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones. DAMAGES. 2,550,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 2). MANUEL VILLALOBOS VILLALOBOS. SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones, DAMAGES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 3). MARÍA MAYELA SÁNCHEZ MADRIGAL. The damages caused to MANUEL VILLALOBOS VILLALOBOS are suffered with María Mayela Sánchez Madrigal. For that reason, its meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. It is so because they are spouses and between their two properties they form House No. (17J). 4). Nombre38277 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 5). Nombre38278 . The damages caused to Nombre38277 are suffered with Nombre38278 . For this reason, their meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. It is so because they are spouses and between their two properties they form House No. (5K). 6). Nombre99656 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 500,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,500,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,500,000.00 colones. 7). Nombre209606 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 2,000,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,000,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 4,000,000.00 (sic) colones. TOTAL 7,000,000.00 colones. 8). Nombre80407 SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,700,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 600,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,900,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,200,000.00 colones. 9). Nombre209607 . The damages caused to Nombre80407 are suffered with Nombre209607 (sic) Nombre80407 because they are mother and daughter respectively and between their two properties they form House No. (23J). For this reason, their meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. 10). Nombre80409 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,700,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 600,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,900,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,200,000.00 colones. 11) Nombre38282 . The damages caused to Nombre80409 are experienced together with Nombre38282 . For this reason, their meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. It is so because they are spouses and between their two properties they form House No. (9K). 12. Nombre80410 (12J). SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,900,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 650,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 3,200,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,750,000.00 colones. 13). Nombre38283 SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 2,000,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 700,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 3,400,000.00 colones. TOTAL 6,100,000.00 colones. 14). Nombre209609 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 15). Nombre209610 SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 500,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,500,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,500,000.00 colones. 16). Nombre39321 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,800,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 650,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 3,100,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,550,000.00 colones. 17). Nombre80411 . The damages caused to Nombre39321 are suffered together with Nombre80411 . For this reason, their meaning, description, and economic value must be divided between both. It is so because they are spouses and between their two properties they form House No. (14J). 18). Nombre39322 (22K). SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. 19). Nombre38284 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,700,000.00 colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 600,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,900,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,200,000.00 colones. 20). Nombre80412 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 500,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,500,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,500,000.00 colones. 21). Nombre80413 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,700,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 600,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,900,000.00 colones. TOTAL 5,200,000.00 colones. 22). Nombre209611 () . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 500,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,500,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,500,000.00 colones. 23). Nombre80414 . SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 1,500,000.00 (sic) colones, OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES 550,000.00 colones and DAMAGES 2,600,000.00 colones. TOTAL 4,650,000.00 colones. TOTAL 88,400,000.00 (sic) colones. The amount of damages for each of my clients includes legal interest. Interest shall be set at the 19.20% annual rate established for six-month term deposits in the National Banking System, which shall run from October 25, 1993, until full and effective compliance with the provisions of the final judgment in this case. The amounts established for damages and interest shall run from December 1, 1994, until full and effective compliance with the provisions of the final judgment in this case. To determine the value of the damages and interest in this case, I request the appointment of two expert witnesses, one mathematician and the other environmental. VIII). The defendant is ordered to pay the costs of both parts of this proceeding." 2.- The defendant Municipality answered untimely, for which reason it was declared in default and the facts of the complaint were deemed affirmatively answered.

3.- Judge Yazmín Aragón Cambronero, in judgment no. 789-03 of 9:30 a.m. on October 1, 2003, resolved: "The present complaint is granted, only with respect to the claims that will be expressly stated herein, and it is understood to be denied regarding those claims on which a ruling is omitted: The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiffs who have proven to be owners of homes or lots in Residencial Cedri, the damages, derived from the failure to install the sewage system (sistema de aguas negras) at their residences. Which must be demonstrated in the judgment enforcement stage. The defendant is ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs incurred." 4.- Both parties appealed, and the Administrative Litigation Tribunal, First Section, composed of Judges Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez, Joaquín Villalobos Soto, and Ana Isabel Vargas Vargas, in judgment no. 109-2005 of 10:35 a.m. on March 16, 2005, ordered: "The appealed judgment is reversed insofar as it orders the Municipality of Heredia to pay damages to the owners of Residencial Cedri, derived from the failure to install the sewage system at their residences, and it is instead denied; also insofar as it denies the payment of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), for the damages received from the environmental deterioration suffered by them, and instead five hundred thousand colones are granted for that concept to each one of them, sums that shall generate interest as of the finality of the judgment. It is confirmed insofar as it denies the other claims of the action and insofar as it orders the losing party to pay costs." 5.- Both parties file an appeal in cassation for procedural and substantive reasons. The co-plaintiffs claim violation of Articles 4 subsection 4) of the repealed Municipal Code; 2 and 4 subsection c) of the current Municipal Code; 11, 41, 170 of the Political Constitution; 87 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones); 1045 of the Civil Code; 190 to 198 of the General Law of Public Administration; 98 subsection 2), 155 subsection 3), subparagraphs ch), d) and 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendant alleges violation of numerals 106, 153, 155, 221, 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure; 704, 1045, 1046 of the Civil Code; 50 of the Political Constitution; 2, 289 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), 4 subsection 4° of the repealed Municipal Code, and 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction.

6.- In the proceedings before this Chamber, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- In accordance with the facts recounted in the complaint, the co-plaintiffs Nidia María Alfaro Espinoza, Manuel Villalobos Villalobos, María Mayela Sánchez Madrigal, Nombre38277, Nombre38278, Rafael Ángel Gutiérrez Morales, Nombre99656, Heidy Ocampo Vargas, Nombre209606, Nombre209614, Nombre80407, Nombre209607, Nombre80409, Marjorie Alfaro Jiménez, Nombre80410, Allisson Arias Víquez, Nombre38283, Nombre209609, Nombre209610, Nombre39321, Nombre80411, Nombre39322, Nombre38284, Nombre80412, Nombre80413, Nombre209611, Nombre209612, Nombre80414, Nombre209613, and Nombre58688, state that they are each the owner of a house or lot in Residencial Cedri, located in Mercedes Sur de Heredia. They indicate that the construction of that complex, consisting of three phases, was undertaken by the developer Desarrollos Urbanos del Oeste S.A. The Municipalidad de Heredia, they say, approved the corresponding construction permit for that company in April 1993, as a result of which work began immediately on the properties of the Heredia district, registered under real estate folio numbers Placa39668 and Placa39669. They state that, in ordinary session 68-04 of October 25, 1993, the local entity agreed to authorize the substitution of the mortgage guarantee offered by the firm Desarrollos Urbanos del Oeste S.A., for the remaining works of the Urbanización Cedri, with a performance bond issued by an entity of the National Banking System, for the same amount, provided by its President, Mr. Nombre209615. They assert that, in December 1994, said company delivered the first and second phases to the Municipality incomplete, as the children's playgrounds, communal areas, paving of access roads, and black water systems were missing. They allege that, due to the developer's non-compliance, the Mutual de Heredia auctioned off the residential properties, which were acquired by Vivienda Coop R.L. They state that the portion corresponding to the third phase was put up for sale without any urban development plan. They add that the local corporation granted construction permits to the buyers of lots in the second and third phases, without taking into account the difference with the houses of the first; in some cases, those of the third phase have a standard very similar to those of shantytowns (precarios) or social interest housing. They accuse that the residential complex has two sources of environmental contamination: to the north, the Quebrada Seca River, and to the south, an open-air ditch (acequia). They state that in the river there is a large amount of garbage and all kinds of foul-smelling waste that produce unbearable odors and a high degree of contamination. The open-air ditch (acequia), for its part, is also full of garbage and putrid waters. They assert that the Municipality, even though a recommendation existed from the Director of the Quality of Life Area, did not want to pipe the ditch (acequia) that crosses the residential complex. As a consequence of this, they file the complaint that gives rise to the present proceeding against the entity of the Central Canton of Heredia. Fundamentally, they seek in the judgment a declaration that the defendant: 1.- acted negligently by not having obligated the construction company to finish the children's playgrounds, communal areas, paving of access roads, and black water systems of Residencial Cedri, where their houses are; 2.- has acted negligently by not piping the open-air ditch (acequia) that exists in the residential complex, which must be done immediately; 3.- was negligent by not providing a solution to the problem of the garbage dump in the Quebrada Seca River; 4.- has promoted the "shantytown-ization" (tugurización) of the third phase of the residential complex, by granting construction permits without any urban planning; 5.- is guilty of the process of contamination, shantytown-ization (tugurización), and deterioration of their houses; 6.- must immediately suspend the granting of permits for the construction of shanties (tugurios); 7.- that non-contractual civil liability be declared, both for action and omission, for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by the reported acts, and accordingly, the plaintiffs must be paid the sums they liquidate in the complaint for those concepts; and 8.- that it be ordered to pay both sets of court costs of the proceeding. The defendant corporation did not respond in time, as a result of which, at the plaintiffs' request, it was declared in default (rebelde). The Trial Court partially granted the complaint. It ordered the Municipality to pay the co-plaintiffs who have proven to be owners of homes or lots in Residencial Cedri, the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), arising from the lack of installation of the black water system in their residences, to be defined in the execution phase. It imposed both sets of costs on the territorial entity. Disagreeing with the ruling, the parties appealed.

Upon hearing those appeals, the Tribunal revoked the first-instance judgment regarding the award of damages arising from the failure to install a blackwater system in their residences, and instead denied it. Likewise, regarding the denial of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) for the harm suffered due to the environmental deterioration endured by the plaintiffs, a concept for which it granted each one an amount of ¢500,000.00, plus their respective interest running from the finality of the judgment. It confirmed the denial of the other claims of the action and the imposition of costs.

Both parties appeal in cassation (casación), alleging procedural and substantive defects.

**APPEAL OF THE PLAINTIFFS** **Substantive Defects** **III.- Indirect violation.** The special judicial representative of the plaintiffs alleges an error of law (error de derecho). He indicates that recital XII of the judgment demonstrates the serious fact of the pollution suffered by his clients due to the sources of contamination existing in the Quebrada Seca river to the north, and to the south, an open-air drainage. He adds that this recital establishes that the Municipality is responsible for the environmental deterioration, by not having adopted appropriate policies to remedy the problem, and that its omission has inflicted moral damages (daños morales). He indicates that the error consists of not having assigned to the evidentiary elements their true scope for determining the magnitude of the environmental damage and, with it, the value of the subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo). In this sense, he points out that the expert report of engineer Nombre38778 establishes aspects that seriously harm the health and morale of the plaintiffs. He references the photographs accompanying that expert report. He adds that a nationally circulated newspaper, namely La Nación, published that to the north of the Cedri Urbanization, the Quebrada Seca river passes, serving as a natural sewer. Therefore, it is public and notorious that this residential area is a dirty, unhealthy, unsanitary, and dangerous place, due to the possibility of epidemics. He adds that the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes), in official communication DHR-9801-1783-98, had declared the seriousness of the aforementioned contamination sources, which had been known to local authorities since 1997. He notes that the testimonies offered reflect that this problem has been suffered since 1993. He reiterates that the error lies in the erroneous and insufficient appreciation that the Tribunal makes of these pieces of evidence, granting a value that does not correspond to the serious scope they represent. He considers that the sum awarded for this concept (moral damage) is meager and derisory. He provides citations of jurisprudence from this Chamber. He contends that by failing to interpret the evidence jointly, Article 330 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) was violated. Similarly, he notes that precepts 190 to 192, 196, and 197 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) have been violated, as well as canon 4, subsection 4), of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), Law No. 4574, in force at the time the environmental, health, and moral damage violations cited began to occur, and article 4, subsection c), of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) currently in force. Likewise, by not having allowed equitable compensation for the damages suffered, he affirms that articles 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) have been flagrantly violated.

**IV.- Regarding the error of law (error de derecho). Informal appeal.** With respect to the charge presented, it should be mentioned that this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that an error of law (error de derecho) involves ignoring the legal value of an evidentiary means, or granting it a value different from that provided for by law. Within this, the challenge for violation of the rules of sound judgment is also recognized, which aims to establish the failure to observe the principles of logic, psychology, or experience when evaluating the evidence. When it is alleged, it is necessary to indicate, with clarity and precision, the norms considered to have been infringed concerning the value of the evidentiary elements erroneously appreciated. It is also essential to cite the substantive rules violated, expressing, with clarity and precision, the manner in which the error occurred and the impact it had on the canons that were misapplied or acted upon improperly (Article 596 of the Civil Procedure Code). This implies technically pointing out the indirect violation inflicted on the legal system in the substantive norms by the erroneous appreciation, and not merely citing the articles or transcribing them.

The charge does not conform to the proper technique. The appeal limits itself to alleging a hypothetical blunder in the weighing of the evidence. However, although it cites some substantive norms it considers violated, it does not address at all nor detail the manner in which such provisions were harmed as a consequence of the alleged mistake. It invokes in its favor norms of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) in force at the time the environmental pollution began, yet it does not elaborate on reasons or explain how the jurisdictional action has disregarded those rules, which, according to what has been stated, turns out to be fundamental for examining the claim. In this way, by not satisfying that requirement, the charge turns out to be informal, which entails its rejection.

**V.- Direct violation. First.** The special judicial representative of the plaintiffs claims that the contested judgment contains provisions contradictory to the law and to the expert reports. He maintains that, in recital VII, it is stated that the Municipality should not renounce its powers derived from its autonomy. He indicates that the court, with an evident error in the interpretation of municipal autonomy, omits to cite in the judgment that it also cannot evade the duties imposed upon it by law, which are above any regulation. He criticizes that, without any evidence, it is deemed that no blackwater treatment system exists at the location of the events, and that the residential area had fewer than five hundred houses. For that reason, he says, it is resolved that it was not the responsibility of the local entity to oversee the connection of the blackwater and wastewater pipes to the planned ones, which he considers a violation of article 87 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), which he transcribes. He maintains that the claimed responsibility was unavoidable, to the point that the municipal entity not only should have overseen the installation of the stormwater and blackwater pipes, but should not have even approved the construction plans or allowed the works to proceed. He affirms that by failing in this obligation, precepts 4 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) and 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) were violated. Regarding them, he cites precedents of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). He says that this lethal process of deterioration of the environment and of the houses they acquired has been carried out in plain sight and with the patience of the Municipality, which should have intervened in defense of the interests of the municipal residents and the environment. He again reproduces decisions of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) related to the matter.

Copy of part of the expert report rendered by the professional Nombre38778, wherein it is stated that there were plans indicating the stormwater and sewage pipes for the entire project, to which the local corporation did not give importance. Based on this, he indicates, it is reflected that the defendant did not act in accordance with its duties. He states that the Court contradicts itself when it rejects the liability of the municipal entity by the mere application of Decreto Ejecutivo no. 18.888, "Reglamento de la Oficina Nacional Revisora de Proyectos de Construcción", the issuance date of which it does not indicate. A contradiction consisting of the fact that with that Decreto, it removes legal competencies, even overriding canon 87 of the Ley de Construcciones, a violation that he considers threatens not only municipal autonomy, but also the hierarchy of norms, injuring the aforementioned precept, as well as ordinals 2 of the Código Municipal and 170 of the Carta Magna. He cites national doctrine in support. He asserts that this action exempts the defendant from liability, which causes serious damages and losses to his represented parties, also violating numeral 1045 of the Código Civil and precepts 190 to 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.

**Second.** He expresses that the facts are correctly selected and enunciated in the judgment, but the Ad quem misinterprets the substantive law applied. He states that, regarding considerando VII, the Court held it as proven that the stormwater and sewage pipes were not connected to the corresponding planned ones and that the Municipalidad must not renounce its powers derived from the autonomy granted by the Constitution. He alleges, with evident error in the interpretation of the provisions of canons 4 of the Código Municipal, 87 of the Ley de Construcciones, and 170 of the Constitución Política, the judgment does not indicate that the local entity cannot evade the duties imposed by that autonomy. He considers that the violation of substantive law consists of the Court interpreting that through Decreto Ejecutivo no. 3391 of December 13, 1982, Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones, the defendant is exempt from supervising the connection of the referenced pipes, when rather sub-section III.3.2.12 of that legal instrument establishes something entirely different. In his opinion, distinctions are made where the law does not make them, and the fact that the previously mentioned precepts establish that the Municipalidad cannot abstract itself from those duties is set aside.

**VI.- Regarding municipal autonomy. Principle of legality.** Regarding the objections raised, the following must be indicated. Municipalidades are local entities that enjoy relative autonomy in the exercise of their functions. The municipal regime is a type of territorial decentralization, as inferred from numeral 168 of the Carta Magna. This level of independence is granted by precept 169 of the Constitución Política, within the framework of its territorial jurisdiction, composed of the physical space established for the canton it represents, as it indicates that it corresponds to each city council to carry out the: "administration of local interests and services…". That is, the constituent power has conferred a series of functions or attributions in favor of those governments by reason of "the local," that is, to administer the services and interests of the area to which it is circumscribed, i.e., the canton. This competence is not exclusive of that which has been granted by the Legal System to other entities or organs of the State. Thus, it is clear that there are interests whose safeguarding corresponds to the Municipalidades and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional or legal protection is attributed to other public entities. The foregoing because there are interests that transcend the local sphere, because they affect other latitudes outside the canton. However, it must be clear that the administration of those interests within the territorial sphere of the municipality constitutes an original competence of the city councils and can only be displaced through a nationalization law, provided that such legislative manifestation does not imply a breach of the referenced autonomy or entail emptying the constitutional content of the municipal regime. For its part, article 4 of the Código Municipal, Ley no. 7794 of April 30, 1998, develops the types of autonomy that the ordinary legislator deemed these corporations held, indicating that they possess political, administrative, and financial autonomy. Regarding the scope of this autonomy, see, among others, from the Sala Constitucional, votos 5445-99, 1220-2002, 5204-2004, and 8928-2004. Nevertheless, as part of an integrated system, within the dynamic of satisfying the interests of the municipality's residents, it is clear that there will be interests that are fully local and others that can be considered national. This aspect obliges, within a principle of sound administration, coordination with the administrative instances of the Central Power, which carry out, at a macro level, functions related to those that the corporation locally deploys. This is the example, in what is relevant to this case, of urban aspects, in which, even though pursuant to article 15 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, each Municipalidad is the one that must approve the respective Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), coordination with INVU and the Dirección de Urbanismo is imposed for these purposes, with a view to implementing a national development policy that integrates all the technical, economic, and social variables that converge in this activity. The same coordination particularities are rigorous in environmental matters, in which certainly, the treatment of natural resources and the actions that each administrative unit establishes for the defense and protection of the environment, within a perception that should be precautionary and preventive, directly affects not the territorial sphere of the municipality, but the entirety of the national territory. Just as ecosystems maintain a symbiotic connection and relationship with each other (as is the case of biological corridors for species conservation), the incidents that occur in a certain sector of the country have their consequences on the entirety of the national environment. Hence, in this matter, one is facing a national and local interest simultaneously. The Sala Constitucional, in resolution no. 5445-99, already laid the groundwork for the necessary coordination that must govern these inter-administrative relations, which arise without detriment to the autonomy that the constituent power has already assigned to local entities.

In this direction, the cited judgment indicated: "X.- (...) Having defined the material competence of the municipalidad in a specific territorial circumscription, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be deemed national or state; for this reason, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of attributions that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalidades is local, and that of the State and other entities, national; from which it results that municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances require. That is, municipalidades can share their competencies with the Public Administration in general, a relationship that must develop in the terms as defined in the law (article 5 of the former Código Municipal, article 7 of the new Código), which establishes the obligation of 'coordination' between the municipalidades and the public institutions that concur in the performance of their competencies, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, above all, because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy by being its expression. In other terms, the municipalidad is called to enter into cooperative relations with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincident character—in many cases—of interests around a specific matter. In the doctrine, coordination is defined based on the existence of several independent centers of action, each with its own tasks and decision-making powers, and potentially discrepant; despite this, there must be a community of ends by subject matter, but by concurrence, insofar as the object receiving the final results of the activity and the acts of each is common. So that coordination is the ordering of the relations between these diverse independent activities, which takes charge of that concurrence on the same object or entity, to make it useful for a global public plan, without suppressing the reciprocal independence of the acting subjects. Since there is no hierarchical relationship of the decentralized institutions, nor of the State itself in relation to the municipalidades, the imposition of certain conducts on them is not possible, with which the indispensable inter-institutional 'concert' arises, in the strict sense, insofar as the autonomous and independent centers of action agree on that preventive and global scheme, in which each one fulfills a role with a view to a mission entrusted to the others. Thus, the relations of the municipalidades with other public entities can only be carried out on a plane of equality, resulting in pact-based forms of coordination, with the exclusion of any imperative form to the detriment of their autonomy, that would allow subjecting the corporate entities to a coordination scheme without their will or against it; but which does admit the necessary subordination of these entities to the State and in the interest of the latter (through the 'administrative oversight' of the State, and specifically, in the function of legality control that corresponds to it, with powers of general surveillance over the entire sector)." Now then, even with this autonomy, it is clear that under the shelter of precept 11 of the Carta Magna, the municipalidades and their officials are equally subject to the principle of legality, in its double dimension, positive and negative, so that in the exercise of their competencies, they must proceed in accordance with the legal norms that delimit and specify their functioning. This subjection is generic to the entirety of the Legal System, constituting a guarantee for the municipality's residents and civil society in general, that the public acts emanating from those local entities are consistent with it. This includes, as a general rule, a due application of the norms, not only in their content, but also in respecting their hierarchical level, from which it is inferred that applications of sub-legal measures that are opposed or contrary to the law are unfeasible. The foregoing given that the executive regulatory power and, in general, the issuance of administrative acts of a general or normative character, as the case may be (article 121 Ley General de la Administración Pública), finds its insurmountable limit in the law and in the Constitución Política itself, such that it cannot contain regulations that contradict the statements of those higher-ranking norms, or else, venture into areas that, in order to the content of the law, are forbidden to them (principle of prohibition of arbitrariness of the regulatory power). Hence, when these limits are mocked, the sub-legal norm is inapplicable, as being contrary to Law. A proper, generalized, and abstract application of the norms is sought in this sense, avoiding arbitrary and capricious procedures.

**VII.- Local autonomy in matters of urban planning and buildings.** As has been indicated, municipal autonomy, imposed by the Carta Magna, confers upon local corporations a special competence for the administration of the interests of their territorial jurisdiction (articles 169 and 170). Within this set of interests and services is the urban planning matter, in which the city council holds an essential competence and, in principle thesis, a prevalent one over that of other institutions, in the context of the locality.

In what is relevant to the case, numeral 15 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, no. 4240 of November 15, 1968, confers upon local entities the base competence to regulate and supervise everything concerning urban planning and development within the limits of their territorial jurisdiction. In this sense, the norm provides: "In accordance with the precept of article 169 of the Constitución Política, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their jurisdictional territory, is recognized. Consequently, each of them shall arrange what is appropriate to implement a regulatory plan, and the related urban development regulations, in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors, where qualified reasons prevail for establishing a specific control regime." Note that the assigned competence is not limited to an aspect of mere planning, but also includes the powers to control urban development, which supposes a degree of substantive supervision of both works in execution and those already executed, an aspect which will be addressed in more detail later. In this line, canon one of the Ley de Construcciones, Decreto Ley no. 833 of November 4, 1949, establishes these powers with evident clarity when it indicates: "The Municipalidades of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that the cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, comfort, and beauty in their public thoroughfares and in the buildings and constructions erected on lands thereof, without prejudice to the faculties that the laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies." For its part, in accordance with the provisions of article 13, subsection o) of the Código Municipal, it corresponds to the Council to issue the norms and measures pertaining to urban planning. In this order, according to what is stipulated by the Ley de Construcciones, the execution of any work or building requires a municipal license, and at the same time, it corresponds to the local entity to supervise them (mandates 74 and 87 of that legal body). Therefore, the prevalent role that the Municipalidad holds in these matters is evident; it is incumbent upon it to arrange the concrete measures on urban development and planning, as well as the granting of construction "licenses" and the control of those activities according to the norms that regulate that field. The Sala Constitucional itself has so defined it, among many, in rulings no. 2153-93 of 9:21 a.m. on May 21, 1993, and no. 4205-96 of 2:33 p.m. on August 20, 1996. Now then, the scope and effects of urban development and planning sometimes imply the emergence of coordination relationships with various public bodies with concurrent competence in certain areas of administrative activity, as has been explained. The foregoing because although those alluded powers arise in relation to a local concept, they must be aligned with national planning policies. These are principles of sound administration that intend to establish coordination mechanisms that allow, in a more adequate manner, the efficient attention of public needs and interests, so that a potential competence conflict is not an obstacle for the State (in the broad sense) to neglect its duties and thereby transgress, due to aspects of mere organization or design, its teleological dimension. Within this framework is located the issuance of regulatory plans, which, under the protection of numeral 15 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, are carried out by the local entities and subsequently approved by the Dirección de Urbanismo. Article 169 of the Constitution, together with the Ley de Planificación Urbana, it is insisted, recognizes the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their territory, through the issuance of this type of plans, which essentially have a normative nature insofar as they provide for the programming of land use in the respective cantonal jurisdiction. It is for this reason that within their processing, the public hearing is constituted as an insurmountable prerequisite, allowing the residents to pronounce on the proposal, due to the evident interest they hold regarding the administrative decision that establishes the destiny that must be given to the properties located in the Canton. However, due to the aspect of linkage and harmony with national planning, given that the content of a plan of this nature indirectly affects the integral context of the national territory, they must be approved by the Dirección de Urbanismo (ordinal 18 ibidem) in order to adjust them to national planning criteria. Nevertheless, it is emphasized, in this matter, the city council has an original competence, despite the coordination relationships, which allow it to plan, regulate, and supervise urban development within the respective canton.

**VIII.- Regulation of the urban planning matter. Control powers.** Having said this, it should be noted that the matter of developing urban projects, in general terms, is subject to a set of norms that establish the diverse aspects that converge in this area, such as structural, constructive, health, water treatment, among others. Nonetheless, broadly speaking (since the provisions that specify this matter are extensive, to say the least), its basic regulation lies in the Ley de Construcciones and the Ley de Planificación Urbana, legal sets that are complemented by other norms that develop specific topics, e.g., the Ley General de Salud. In these, in a generic manner, the basic prerequisites that define the execution of buildings, whether for public or private use, temporary or permanent, are established. Even so, the establishment of a series of factors that, by their nature, are not suitable for incorporation within a law, have been delved into in regulations or sub-legal norms. In this same direction, the Ley de Planificación Urbana leaves to these latter legal sources the development of procedural aspects and other areas. In matters of an urban nature, in particular, the construction of housing developments or residential complexes, the Ley de Construcciones and the Ley de Planificación Urbana, in line with what has been said, in their articles 15 and 32 respectively, refer the concretion of the aspects that must be covered by developers to a regulation, which in this case is the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, no. 3991 of December 13, 1982. For its part, in tasks of the construction matter, there is the so-called Reglamento de Construcciones, published on March 22, 1983. In accordance with the provisions of canons 15 and 74 of the Ley de Construcciones, every subdivision (fraccionamiento) and urbanization, as well as every work related to construction, must have an authorizing act issued by the corresponding Municipalidad.

Pursuant to numeral 19 in relation to 20 subsection h), both of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), local entities must issue the pertinent regulation to comply with the conditions of the Regulating Plan (Plan Regulador), as well as to ensure the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and well-being. In this direction, ordinal 56 ibidem indicates that the Construction Regulation (Reglamento de Construcciones) shall fix the rules of safety, healthfulness, and ornamentation. However, these aspects are contemplated in the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones), a rule that would be applicable to that effect. It is a legal instrument of preeminently technical nature, which contains, in the aspect of urbanizations, varied regulations in aspects such as access, road systems, lot division (lotificación), green and public areas, drainages, aqueducts, sewers, infrastructure, and finishes, among others. Regarding the supervisory exercise, as has been said, canon 1 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) establishes that local governments are responsible for ensuring that cities, their buildings, constructions, and public roads, meet the necessary conditions of safety, healthfulness, comfort, and beauty, without prejudice to the powers that the laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies. This is once again a legislative manifestation intended to enhance municipal competencies for the benefit of their autonomy in the sphere of local interests that concern them. As is due, those empowerments constitute true powers-duties, that is, they allow them to adopt executive and enforceable actions, but at the same time impose duties and requirements on them, insofar as they must assume the actions of merit to fulfill their tasks. Therefore, they must subject their decisions to the block of legality (in harmony with subjective rights and legitimate interests), which implies, of course, exercising due control over areas of social interest, as is the case of health and safety, when appropriate, in coordination with Central Government authorities. It is for this reason that as a counterpart to the competence to grant construction permits (licencias de construcción) established by Article 74 of the Construction Law, article 87 ibidem imposes on them the duty to supervise and control the works erected in their territory, as well as the use being given to them. These powers entail the competence to establish the harmony of construction applications with the rules that regulate this matter, to the point that if they infer non-compliance, they are empowered to deny the "permit" (licencia) or reject the required authorizing act. From this perspective, the role of the municipalities occurs in two instances, that is, preventive and supervisory. In the preventive framework, the "permit" is granted if it meets all requirements, and in that comparison (qualitative and quantitative) such exercise is concretized. In supervision, it verifies that what is actually done is consistent with what was authorized. It is clear that due to the very dynamics of urban planning matters, a wide range of variables converges, which by their magnitude and relevance, require coordination actions from local entities jointly with specialized public units. This is the case of public health and the treatment of water of various natures (potable, greywater (servidas), blackwater (negras)), scenarios in which the levels of linkage between the administrative exercise of the municipalities and the organs or entities with specific functional competence in those areas prevail. Indeed, this is inferred from the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) in its numerals 338 and 338 bis, regarding the powers of supervision of compliance with sanitary regulations. Likewise, in matters of water, precepts 1, 2, 21, and 23 grant competence to the National Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados) to approve water supply systems and their disposal. Ultimately, under the protection of the cited Construction Law, and in what is relevant to the case, it corresponds to the local corporations to issue the authorization to undertake the construction of a specific work (within them, urbanizations). In turn, jointly with other public authorities, to deploy supervisory actions over those works, in order to verify their conformity with the regulatory framework. However, that control which is their direct concern, is not dependent on the actions of other organs.

**IX.- Scope of the supervisory framework in the specific case.** This Chamber considers that the very conception of the supervisory powers in urban planning matters that have been entrusted to the Municipalities (already discussed), are manifestations of a public power derived from competencies granted by the constitutional and legal order in this field, which justifies the empowerment of the Administration. They therefore allow the deployment of a series of inherent and necessary attributes for the exercise of sound administration. These empower them to even suspend a specific work when it does not meet the due conditions, or, within its preventive and foreseeing aspect, to reject the building request when the legal and technical requirements imposed by the applicable provisions have not been satisfied. These are concrete manifestations of public power that allow the protection of legal principles, among others, that of safety and health. It therefore constitutes an inspection task over the constructive aspects of the structures erected in the territorial space of the municipality, for the purpose of determining that they comply with the requirements that such legislation provides, as well as other regulations associated with the activity. These faculties and powers, within their teleological orientation, are placed at the service of public or collective interests, which, in the end, are the object that legitimizes their incursion into the control and supervision of urban planning activity. As they are competencies established by the Legal System (as a direct derivation of their constitutional competencies that were entrusted to them) and are associated with the protection of public interests, the action of the local entity must weigh not only a superficial (formal) revision task of the construction permit applications, but rather, a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of compliance with the legal and technical requirements imposed by the Legal System. That is, verifying not only formal but also qualitative compliance with the conduct subject to control. For such purposes, it must consider the harmony of the application and proposals formulated in the respective plan with the provisions or technical rules dictated in each scenario. Applied to this case, this entails that the Municipality must analyze whether the blackwater treatment systems offered in the construction plan conform to the applicable technical standards, in such a way that they are functional and have the capacity and volume that the established rules provide. That is, the technical feasibility of installing a septic tank (tanque séptico), in the dimensions and conditions proposed, so that they do not entail potential risks of any nature, including public health. But furthermore, public powers in this field are not exhausted in the deployment of an authorizing conduct. Indeed, the issuance of the act that allows the edification or construction of the work must be accompanied, it is insisted, by a controlling and verifying exercise on the part of the granting entity, with the purpose of ensuring that the works under execution as well as those already executed, are within the normative framework that regulates the matter. As has been said, this exercise presents itself on a double level: preventive, at the time of analyzing the application to build; and subsequent, in the inspections of those works to determine that they comply with what was authorized and, in general, with the applicable rules. In this way, the controlling function must be continuous, efficient, and effective. It is for this reason that when these competencies have not been duly fulfilled and as a result of that conduct or dysfunctionality, damage is generated (directly or by concurrence), a causal link arises that allows imputing the injury to the Municipality, in accordance with the rules of objective liability established by the Constitution and developed by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) from canon 190 onward. The foregoing may occur for various causes. In a first stage, due to so-called material inactivity, that is, when the controlling and verifying framework is not exercised at all. In a second, when it is not done adequately, inasmuch as even though verification was carried out, it was exhausted in a simple comparison of formal requirements, and not in a due examination in qualitative terms, of the compliance or not with the requirements that the person intending to build must obey. In this scenario, the passivity of the Municipality in the due vigilance of elementary matters for the purposes of the work allows the mockery of those rules, which can potentiate future risks or damages to third parties. That is, an abnormal functioning that carries liability operates in these scenarios. This is because they constitute administrative conducts, which in themselves, depart from sound administration (in accordance with the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, technical rules, or the expertise and prudent task in the deployment of their actions, with injurious effect for the person. Thus, abnormality manifests itself through poor functioning, through an insufficient, therefore inadequate, supervisory exercise. This because if the injurious result occurs in relation to facts in which the guarantor position exercised by the Administration made it demandable to avoid that consequence through the adequate control it should have exercised, it must face the implications of that non-observance. In this sphere, liability for "administrative inaction" (even partial) occurs due to a double behavior. The first, of the public or private person by whose action the impairment is produced in the legal sphere of the injured party or parties. The other, which concurs with the former, due to the inaction of the public authority that does not exercise, as is due, the conduct required to avoid the damage, which may occur, it is reiterated, totally or partially. In the latter case, when the supervisory framework does not fully encompass the totality of variables that must be weighed in that exercise, so that due to relative non-observance, relevant aspects that constitute sources of risk are set aside. It is therefore a relativized framework of unperformed administrative protection (in its preventive current), which as inactivity concurs to produce the injury and therefore causes the shared liability, almost always joint and several, of the two agents causing the damage (understood as diverse centers of imputation, public or private). In this way, supervisory inaction in the face of third-party conduct is normally reflected in that irregularity that it should have identified in a timely manner; or in that damage produced that it should have foreseen according to the existing state of things; or else, by the omission, which for these purposes is equivalent to inactivity, reprehensible from a legal standpoint, that it did not exercise in time and form, the preventions and corrective or foreseeing measures of the case. It is clear that such imputability depends, to a high degree, on the determination of the existence of a causal link between that inaction (even partial) and the injury, inasmuch as, only when the inactivity has contributed to the generation of the damage, would administrative patrimonial liability be applicable. That is, when if the supervisory exercise had not been omitted, the injury would, with probability, not have come to be caused. On the subject of liability for inaction, see, from this Chamber, ruling no. 308 of 10:30 hours on May 25, 2006. In this scenario, it must be insisted that the protection or supervision that has been entrusted to the municipalities in urban planning matters (which includes buildability), is not reduced to formal conducts of authorization, but includes substantive, periodic, and effective control over the works under execution and executed, such that the omission of this supervisory exercise makes them liable for the damages produced to third parties thereby.

**X.- Management of blackwater. Legal regulation.** In the species, the appellant considers that numerals 87 of the Construction Law, 4 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), and 170 of the Political Constitution have been violated, insofar as the Court concluded that the vigilance of the connection of the pipelines was not an obligation of the defendant Municipality. With this, he indicates, the inspection duty inherent to local entities is disregarded. Likewise, he accuses that from the application of Decree no. 3391 mentioned by the Ad quem, the aforementioned dispensation of verification is inferred, when that rule does not permit such an interpretation. Of interest for the specific case is the control that the Municipality of Heredia must exercise in the concrete matter of the blackwater and greywater pipelines to the provisions that every dwelling must have within an urbanization. The foregoing because the appellant argues that Article 87 of the Construction Law imposes the obligation on local corporations to monitor the edification of the works carried out in the respective Canton (Cantón), so that by not having done so with respect to the referenced pipelines, it incurs objective liability for the damages suffered. In this matter, as has been indicated, the Construction Law and the Urban Planning Law refer to regulatory rule. Such development is regulated in the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions and Urbanizations, no. 3991 of December 13, 1982. On this point, as the Ad quem has rightly pointed out, the aforementioned Regulation, in Chapter III, called "Urbanizations" (Urbanizaciones), sets the rules that are applicable. In this sense, the rule provides for several possibilities, depending on the characteristics of each residential urban development complex. In this regard, it provides: "*III.3.12 Sewers: When areas that have a blackwater collector service functioning are urbanized, the developer (urbanizador) must connect to said system./ When the collector is planned for a later stage, the developer must leave a sewer system built within the urbanization to connect in the future to the planned collector system./ If there is no sewer in operation nor planned, the following alternatives are contemplated: /III.3.12.1 For developments larger than five hundred (500) housing units, the construction of a private blackwater treatment plant is required: except when with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA) developments larger with a septic tank are negotiated./ III.3.12.2 In developments with a smaller number of lots or dwellings, the minimum lot size for the use of a septic tank must be adapted as set by this Regulation.*" In this way, depending on whether a collector exists or not, the developer may choose one of the regulated possibilities, which, in order to what has been said, must be weighed by the municipality, the instance to which it corresponds, once the specific case has been assessed, to establish the appropriateness of the measure being proposed. It is clear that the design of the water supply and the treatment and drainage system must maintain conformity and correspondence with the technical standards that in each case are established by the authorities with concurrent competence, among them, the Ministry of Health and the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA). The foregoing must be reflected in the plan that the administrative instances must approve, as inferred from Chapter VI, canon 3.3 of the cited Regulation. In this sense, in principle, the AyA is the competent instance to set policies, establish, and apply rules regarding the supply of potable water and evacuation of blackwater (Article 1 of its Constitutive Law, no. 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its reforms). However, as provided by numeral 23 of its Constitutive Law: "*The plans for the construction or partial or total reconstruction of a house or building in the head cities of a province or Canton whose Municipalities have an Engineering Department, shall be submitted for prior approval to said Department and once approved by it, to the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, for its review…*". That same rule is applicable when dealing with urbanization projects. From all the foregoing it is inferred that definitively, the verification of compliance with the regulations inherent to the issue of blackwater rests with the local corporations, given that they are the ones competent to grant the construction permit, which is only possible, within an ideal framework, when the regulations inherent to this matter have been satisfied.

**XI.- On the specific case.** In the species, the challenged ruling starts from the demonstrated premise that in reality, it has been verified that the residential development does not have a functioning blackwater treatment system or collector, but only one planned, and furthermore, that the number of dwellings does not exceed five hundred. A simplistic examination of the present matter would lead to the conclusion that in consideration of that factual framework (which the cassation appellant claims is not based on any evidence) and pursuant to the cited Regulation, the theoretically viable solution was to adapt the lot for the use of a septic tank and leave the pipelines planned for a later stage. However, this Chamber considers that the particularities immersed in this debate require a more in-depth analysis of what happened. Certainly, the aforementioned rule allows the solution that the developer gave to the aspect of blackwater, that is, leaving the pipelines planned (which the Municipality authorized). However, the reference to the possibility of installing septic tanks when there is a number of dwellings less than five hundred, must be harmonized with the technical feasibility and suitability of the proposal put forward by the builder, so that the system that is definitively adopted is functional and optimal to fulfill its purpose. Ergo, this does not say that that solution was adequate and correct for the specific case and to comply with the rules specific to the matter of urban construction. Indeed, in line with the control and inspection powers that the law assigns to it, the local entity should have studied, if apart from the fact that the budgets that the rule establishes for installing the septic tank were present, the one being offered in the construction plans conformed, in terms of volume and capacity, to the type of dwelling intended to be developed. In this sense, due control required measuring not only the appropriateness of the measure requested in theoretical terms, but also, and with greater relevance, the capacity of the proposal to fulfill its function, that is, to serve as an efficient mechanism for the evacuation and storage of blackwater, with the aim of thus avoiding potential risks to the health of persons and the generation of damages or injuries. This by virtue of the fact that since there was no water treatment system installed by the Municipality, and because it is a type of waste whose inadequate handling can harm the health of residents and the environment, the need to consider whether what was proposed addressed the needs it had to cover and satisfy was imperative. This analysis is far from being an exercise in document verification, quite the contrary. By reason of the legal values at stake, of the activity deployed (urban planning) which undoubtedly has relevance or public interest, and due to the competencies that in this field have been assigned to the local corporation (as an inherent function in its territory), it was necessary for the local entity to weigh whether the solution proposed by the developer was due and optimal, in such a way that what was definitively authorized, fully complied with the public purpose and the public service immersed in the authorizing titles issued by the municipality.

The oversight function assigned to it by the legislature in urban construction activity is intended to ensure that both preventive and subsequent controls are carried out, to guarantee that buildings comply with the requirements and conditions established by the regulatory framework. Said verification therefore aims, within the framework of housing development construction, to ensure the existence of adequate structural conditions in qualitative terms, which presupposes, as a general rule, that its development occurs within the proper channels. This implies that the homes have the basic services that allow a normal quality of life for the resident, something that is certainly neglected when a blackwater disposal system does not meet its needs, constituting an imminent risk to their health, their life, and the harmony of the urban environment. The aforementioned oversight cannot be considered correctly performed if the suitability of that already indicated aspect was not assessed, not in formal terms, but in its capacity to successfully resolve a basic and foreseeable need of every home. Ergo, the municipal review should not have been superficial, but rather in-depth on aspects such as the one indicated. From this perspective, it is the opinion of this collegiate body that the defendant Municipality did not exercise due a priori control regarding this aspect. This is because, in the process of issuing construction permits or licenses, it omitted to analyze the suitability of the proposed tanks for the type of building for which the license was requested, which was elementary to establish whether it had the pertinent volume or capacity. Indeed, regardless of the fact that the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones allows that particular technical solution when the factual assumptions regulated for the case are present, this does not relieve the local entity of analyzing, within the exercise of its control powers, whether that solution, in the terms in which it was proposed, was viable for each building, with a view to allowing proper management of blackwater and wastewater. However, that study was not duly conducted, giving way to an authorization to install a tank that did not have the volume required by each home. From this standpoint, the expert report rendered by engineer Nombre38778 clearly indicates: "As an important technical detail, I clarify to the Court that there are construction plans indicating the stormwater and blackwater pipes for the entire project, that is, the three stages; however, the construction company did not connect the wastewater from the homes to those provisions customarily left in the green zone or sidewalk; on the contrary, in a small front-garden space, it built a small absorption well (pozo de absorción), which does not have the capacity or volume required by each of the homes. In the approved plans, the municipality did not give the technical importance required in these very important aspects and approved the home plans with a septic tank (tanque séptico) and drainage pipe solution, located in these plans in the front-garden area, which cannot be approved as such, because there is not sufficient area for the (porous) drainage pipes to function efficiently with this solution. (...)" (folio 366 of the main file). Note that even in proven fact no. 12, the Court considered this administrative control deficiency as proven, which was subsequently upheld by the Tribunal.

**XII.-** This collegiate body considers that in the case under review, although the Municipality issued a formal act granting the construction permit, which would presuppose that it fulfilled its control duties, as has been indicated, that conduct does not fully conform to the Legal System, insofar as it failed to consider whether the blackwater system proposed by the developer was adequate or not, limiting itself to a formal review of that requirement, which indicates an abnormal functioning (funcionamiento anormal) of the defendant public corporation. It is reiterated, the exercise of the oversight powers inherent to its authority to grant building or construction licenses, and which is expressly provided for in canons 1 and 87 of the Ley de Construcciones, is not exhausted in a simple formal act of authorization. Within its correct understanding, it includes due, continuous, and efficient oversight of works under execution and those already executed, in order to establish their harmony with the rules governing that matter. Therefore, its neglect generates liability for the damages it may have caused within the legal sphere of third parties. This being so, it is clear that as an immediate effect of that conduct in the inspections prior to the granting of the construction permit, the defendant allowed the installation of tanks that, far from representing a proper response to the issue of blackwater treatment, led to a problem not only for the plaintiff owners, but for public health in general. Subsequently, faced with the impossibility of executing the guarantee provided by the construction firm, the owners of the residences where that circumstance arose had to solve the water evacuation problems, because, as has been stated, the well did not have adequate capacity. The reason for attributing liability to the Municipality for those facts does not lie in the failure to install a blackwater treatment system (since it is clear that if it does not exist, it cannot be put into operation), but rather in the neglect of its inspection duties regarding the technical viability of installing a septic tank, in the dimensions and conditions proposed for this case. Had that aspect been carefully analyzed, it could well have been corrected in time and thereby avoid the construction of homes that lack an adequate sewage system. In this sense, the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes the liability of the Administration for its legitimate and illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for exempting causes of force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. In this regard, abnormality, as public malfunctioning, includes the improper exercise of legally granted powers or faculties. In the case under review, the said construction was carried out once authorized by the Municipality, despite the noted deficiencies, thereby failing in its control and oversight duties assigned by numerals 1 and 87 of the Ley de Construcciones, which, in this particular case, must be complemented with the provisions of the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. Thus, liability is imposed on the local entity, obliging it to cover the damages and losses suffered by the plaintiffs who, at the date of filing the lawsuit, were owners of a house or lot within the Residencia Cedri, amounts that shall be determined in the sentence execution proceedings. In this way, it is the opinion of this collegiate body that for the reasons stated, the grievance under review must be upheld. Therefore, the judgment of the Tribunal must be annulled, and on this point, the judgment of the Court must be confirmed.

**APPEAL OF THE DEFENDANT** **Cassation for procedural defects** **XIII.-** The Municipal Mayor of Heredia claims as the **sole ground** of this nature, violation of numerals 106 of the Código Procesal Civil and 1046 of the Código Civil, in that there exists a necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasiva necesaria).

In this express regard, joinder of parties (litisconsorcio) is one of the procedural figures of subjective plurality characterized by placing the third party in a common relationship with one of the parties, sharing the same object and the same cause of action (causa petendi). It states, in this manner, that the plaintiff should have directed the action against all the institutions to which the law grants specific competence over the litigation. It expresses that this figure presupposes that to resolve a matter, all those subjects whom the resolution may affect must be present, as well as all public institutions that, by legal provision, hold competence over the alleged harm. It affirms that, in this case, that presence is indispensable for the procedural relationship to be complete. It cites resolution no. 653 of 8:20 a.m. on October 8, 2003, from this Chamber. It argues that environmental pollution entails not only a local problem, but also a public health one. According to articles 50 of the Political Constitution and 2 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), it indicates that the definition of a general health policy, its standardization, planning, and all actions necessary to protect said fundamental right, corresponds to the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), an entity that should have been sued and not the Municipality, for which it considers those norms violated. It adds that the alleged problems concern not only health, but also the environment, which is the competence of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), the governing body in this matter, pursuant to Article 1 and subsequent articles of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente). It transcribes fragments of vote no. 1322-2001 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). On the other hand, it alleges that the issue of open-air drains falls under the competence of the Public Services Company of Heredia (Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia), which is the entity responsible for ensuring the correct establishment, operation, and maintenance of stormwater and sanitary sewer systems. It reproduces canon 6 of the Law for the Transformation of the Public Services Company of Heredia, no. 7789 (Ley de Transformación de la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, no. 7789), a precept it claims has been violated. In relation, it cites vote no. 1431-03 of the Constitutional Chamber. From this standpoint, it charges violation due to improper application of articles 289 of the General Health Law, and 4, subsection 4) of the repealed Municipal Code (Código Municipal). It concludes that there is a problem of lack of passive legal standing (legitimación pasiva) in favor of the local entity, pursuant to precept 104 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). It reproaches that the failure to bring action against the referred entities entails a breach due to lack of application of article 1046 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), since it establishes joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) for the reparation of damages caused by a harmful act.

**XIV.- Procedural defect (Informalidad). Necessary passive joinder of parties (Litisconsorcio pasivo necesario).** In this case, the challenge contests the fact that certain public entities were not brought into the litigation, which, in the appellant's opinion, it was necessary to include for the purpose of the procedural relationship, because by law, they are the competent bodies to address several of the matters at issue. From this standpoint, according to Article 598 of the Civil Procedure Code: "*For the appeal on procedural grounds to be admissible, it is necessary that the rectification of the defect has been requested before the corresponding court, and that all available appeals against the decision have been exhausted*." In this case, the hypothetical deficiency indicated is raised only at the cassation stage (casación), meaning its correction was not requested in any of the preceding instances. Consequently, pursuant to the provisions of articles 597 and 598 ibidem, the charge in question must be dismissed. On the other hand, even if considering that, in substance, a direct violation of substantive law is being reproached, the grievance would not be amenable to being heard either. This is because, under the protection of the provisions of numeral 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, "*Matters that have not been timely proposed or debated by the litigants may not be the subject of a cassation appeal*." As has been stated, this allegation was not raised by the appellant before either the Court or the Tribunal. On this matter, it is worth highlighting that the Municipality was declared in default (rebelde) for not having answered the lawsuit on time. Pursuant to Article 298 ibidem, applicable supplementarily by mandate of canon 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), incomplete necessary joinder of parties is a preliminary defense that should have been raised at the appropriate procedural moment, so by not having done so in this manner, such point cannot be evaluated at the cassation stage, leading to its rejection. Nevertheless, on other occasions, this Chamber has sua sponte (de manera oficiosa) considered the composition of the litis (conformación de la litis), given that it affects legal standing (legitimación), which together with right and interest constitute elementary procedural prerequisites (presupuestos procesales). However, in this case, regardless of whether it could be debated that the environmental pollution problem alleged in this process could lead to considering that liability extends to the State, because the substantive matter incorporates the specific competencies of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the truth of the matter is that, on one hand, the appellant has not managed to prove that the cause of environmental pollution occurred as a result of actions or omissions by those public authorities. With that, that it was necessary to have them as passive parties in the process. Quite the opposite, there is no doubt whatsoever that there is a source of pollution in that territorial jurisdiction. That problem has not been duly addressed by the Municipality, even though it develops within the Canton over which it exercises its competencies and therefore, based on local interest, obliges it to undertake the rigorous corrective actions. On the other hand, in any case, even under this assumption, objective liability would be joint and several (solidaria) or eventually subsidiary, ergo, the passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasiva) would be permissive (facultativa) and not necessary as argued. Thus seen, there is no reason that leads this Chamber to conclude that it is facing a situation of necessary passive joinder of parties (litis pasiva necesaria). Therefore, the claim is not admissible.

**Cassation on the merits (Casación por el fondo)** **XV.-** **Indirect violation (Violación indirecta)** **.** It states that the award for subjective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral subjetivo) is improper for lacking total foundation, as it contains errors of fact and law in the assessment of evidence. It charges violation of canons 153 and 155 of the Civil Procedure Code, norms that impose the duty for judgments to be duly reasoned, which, it considers, does not happen in the case in question, since the subjective non-pecuniary damage granted lacks a clear, precise, and congruent analysis regarding its reasoning. It criticizes that the Tribunal merely makes a referral to the evidence indicated in the Court's judgment, but does not provide reasons regarding the appropriateness of the alleged environmental and health damage caused by the Municipality, as well as its repercussions on the plaintiffs' well-being. It adds that, although subjective non-pecuniary damage cannot be structured and its amount demonstrated precisely, its fixation must remain at the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, general principles of law and equity, logic, and sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional). Likewise, it notes that there must be indications that allow demonstrating that it actually occurred. It says the adjudicator must be guided by objective parameters to avoid meager, derisory, or excessive reparations, such as the intensity of the fault, personal circumstances of the injured party, among others, which in the case in question were not applied as there exists no reasoning whatsoever. It provides citations of precedents from the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal. From this standpoint, it attributes violation due to lack of application of articles 1045 and 1046 of the Civil Code. It reproaches that it is not true, nor is it even demonstrated with sufficient indications, that the Municipality caused damage to the plaintiffs through intent, fault, negligence, or recklessness. It puts forth that the first instance judgment, confirmed in this aspect by the Tribunal, established that the local corporation's liability was directly circumscribed to the garbage and foul-smelling waste discharged into the Quebrada Seca River, which it reiterates, is not true. It expresses that, although there is contamination, it is not due to intentional, negligent, or omissive conduct by the defendant, since it has not even been proven that the pollutant acts in the river are produced within the canton's jurisdiction. It highlights that the river originates in the mountainous areas north of the province of Heredia, and that its waters, before entering the territory of the Central canton, flow through San Isidro, San Rafael, and Barva. Based on this, it insists that the contamination seen at the Quebrada Seca point by the Cedri Residential Development (Urbanización Cedri) is not a direct product of the actions undertaken at the site, so it has not been proven that the pollution was caused within its cantonal jurisdiction. In relation, it alleges violation of article 704 of the Civil Code, insofar as it indicates that a condemnation for damages only includes those that are an immediate and direct consequence of the harmful act.

Considers that this produces an error of fact in the assessment of the evidence, insofar as it is not determined that the Municipality is directly responsible for that contamination.

Regarding the damage resulting from the open-air drain, it reiterates that it is the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia S.A. that is responsible for ensuring the correct installation, operation, and maintenance of the sewerage systems, and therefore on this point, it submits, the contamination is also not the result of negligent conduct by the local entity, from which derives the absence of a cause-effect relationship, and consequently, a violation of Article 6 of Ley no. 7789 and canon 704 of the Civil Code. It adds that the expert evidence clearly indicates that the plaintiffs incurred violations of the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Health, by discharging soapy water from bathrooms, washbasins, and sinks into the stormwater gutters. It criticizes that there is an evident error in the application of numeral 4, subsection 4) of the Municipal Code, because based on that provision, it was considered that the Municipality must directly ensure health, when that regulation is already repealed by the current Municipal Code. It asserts that on the date the alleged environmental damages were observed and the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) was conducted (February 2, 2001), the applicable law was Ley no. 7794, which does not establish the obligation that the Tribunal erroneously points to. It insists that the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment and Energy were the entities directly responsible for resolving the alleged problems, as established by ordinals 340, 341, 345, 346, 355, 356, 357, 370 and following of the Ley General de Salud and the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. It concludes that the subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) lack substantiation.

**XVI.- Informal cassation. It does not cite the norms of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.** The appellant (casacionista) claims that the contested ruling, regarding the condemnation to pay subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), is not reasoned. It criticizes the evidentiary assessment exercise carried out by the Tribunal, which led that court to condemn it to pay that item, even though its intentional (doloso) or negligent/omissive conduct was not demonstrated. The charge does not conform to the proper technique. Pursuant to the provisions of canon 595 subsection 3) of the Civil Procedure Code, when an error of fact is alleged, even though it is not necessary to indicate the corresponding infringed legal precept regarding evidentiary value, it is imperative to cite the substantive rules that have been harmed as a consequence of the claimed assessment errors. Likewise, it is required to indicate clearly and precisely what the infringement consists of. In this case, the appellant (casacionista) limits itself to citing provisions of the Civil Code related to the liability (responsabilidad) system that prevails in that branch of law; however, it omits to allege as violated the rules that regulate the liability (responsabilidad) of the Public Administration (Administración Pública), namely, numerals from 190 to 198 of that legal body. That mention is elementary in this case, since what is being debated is the liability (responsabilidad) of a local corporation, which, although autonomous by constitutional mandate, forms part of the Public Administration (Administración Pública) (Article 1 LGAP), ergo, it is subject to the rules that those precepts provide, as has already been mentioned in previous sections of this resolution. Given this scenario, the charge becomes informal, and therefore its rejection proceeds.

**XVII.- Direct violation.** It censures the order to pay costs (costas) decreed against it. It reproaches the violation due to lack of application or improper application of canons 221 and 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as 98 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa. It argues that although ordinal 221 establishes the condemnation of the losing party (vencido), Article 222 of that same legal body and Article 98 of the aforementioned Ley Reguladora establish that grounds for exemption from the payment of costs (costas) include having litigated in good faith, when the claim includes exaggerated pretensions, the ruling partially upholds the fundamental pretensions of the claim, when it admits important defenses invoked by the losing party (vencido), or when there is a reciprocal loss (vencimiento recíproco). It considers that this situation was not analyzed, given that it was simply not applied. It cites precedents from the First Section of the Tribunal. It asserts that it acted in good faith within the process, but also that exaggerated pretensions were raised, without ignoring, it says, that only some of the plaintiffs' pretensions were upheld. At the same time, important defenses were admitted and there was a reciprocal loss (vencimiento recíproco). It adds that, given the exaggerated requests, it had sufficient grounds to litigate.

**XVIII.- Regarding costs (costas).** Concerning the disagreement with the order to pay costs (costas), it should be noted that, as can be inferred from numeral 98 of the Ley Reguladora, in relation to numerals 221 and 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, of supplementary application as provided by numeral 103 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, with the exceptions provided in numeral 69 ibidem, the pronouncement on both types of costs (costas) must be made ex officio. This Chamber, by majority criterion, has established that the order to pay costs is imposed on the losing party (vencido) for the very fact of being so, that is, for losing the litigation, without thereby being considered a reckless or bad-faith litigant, the exemption from the payment of such items being the exception, in the cases defined by the legislator. Indeed, within the scope of the cited law, except for a special rule referring to cases of withdrawal (desistimiento), extra-procedural satisfaction of the claim, and expiration (caducidad) of the process, where the matter of costs (costas) is governed under a different criterion, the rule, developed in Article 98, follows the same line as the civil procedural regulation, that is, conceiving the order to pay costs as a principle and the exoneration as an exception. On the subject, see judgment no. 765 of 4 p.m. on September 26, 2001. In the present case, the majority of this collegiate body's composition considers that, since the Municipality was condemned to pay the compensation claimed as subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) for the detriment caused to the environment, without the proper administrative control having been exercised, it follows that it was the losing party in the litigation, from which the order to pay costs (costas) derives as the general rule applicable to the case. Exceptionally, a party may be exempted from the payment of one or both types of costs (costas) in the cases referred to in ordinal 98 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa. Among these, the one governed by subsection c) is of interest, as it contains the alleged case. The rule under comment provides that: "*The losing party (parte vencida) may be exempted from the payment of costs (costas):...c) When, due to the nature of the debated issues, there has been, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient grounds to litigate*". Likewise, canon 222 of the Civil Procedure Code establishes the power to exempt from these items when one has litigated in good faith, when the claim includes exaggerated pretensions, the ruling partially upholds the fundamental pretensions of the claim, when it admits important defenses invoked by the losing party (vencido), or when there is a reciprocal loss (vencimiento recíproco). From these precepts, the power of the judge to exonerate from costs (costas) is inferred, that is, it is not an obligation to do so even when the situation provided for therein occurs, but rather it is discretionary for the judge to order such exoneration. When that power is not exercised, the rule cannot be infringed. Conversely, when it is used, it may be done erroneously or improperly, and then, depending on the circumstances of the case, a cassation appeal may indeed be appropriate. In this regard, see judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice no. 3 of 2:40 p.m. on January 6, 1995, and no. 8 of 2:40 p.m. on January 29, 1997. The appeal seeks to exempt the Municipality, which has been the losing party in this litigation, from the payment of costs (costas), under the argument that it litigated with sufficient grounds and with evident good faith, and that there was a reciprocal loss (vencimiento recíproco), accusing the Tribunal of not having made use of the power granted by law regarding the exemption from costs (costas). However, in view of the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed regarding this aspect, since the cited rules are not violated, as the infringement alleged by the appellant does not occur when the judge applies the general rule of ordering costs (costas) against the losing party, a review that would be feasible when the exception provided by the rule is applied.

**XIX.-** For the reasons stated, the appeal filed by the plaintiffs is upheld, solely with respect to the liability (responsabilidad) derived from the damages caused by the black water and stormwater system. On this aspect, the judgment of the Tribunal is annulled. In accordance with precept 610 of the Civil Procedure Code, on this matter, ruling on the merits, the judgment of the Trial Court (Juzgado) is confirmed. In all other respects, the ruling of the Tribunal is upheld. The appeal filed by the Municipality of Heredia is rejected, with its costs (costas) borne by the party who filed it.

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed by the defendant is dismissed, with costs (costas) borne by it. The appeal of the plaintiffs is upheld, solely with respect to the liability (responsabilidad) of the Municipality of Heredia for the damages and losses caused by the lack of proper oversight of the septic tanks, an aspect on which the judgment of the Tribunal is annulled, and ruling on the merits, the judgment of the Trial Court (Juzgado) is confirmed.

Anabelle León Feoli Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Óscar Eduardo González Camacho Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Note by Magistrates González Camacho and Escoto Fernández I.- The undersigned members do not share the criterion expressed by the majority of this Chamber in considerando XVIII of the preceding ruling, insofar as it denies cassation review for those cases in which only the general rule of ordering the losing party to pay both sets of costs is applied, that is, when no rule concerning the exoneration from costs is invoked or applied. Indeed, the majority's jurisprudential foundation starts from the premise that exoneration from the payment of costs is a *power* (*facultad*), in which *no error or normative infringement occurs* when it is not exercised or applied; therefore, it is said, if there is no legal violation, it is not possible in cassation to evaluate or modify what was decided regarding the order against the losing party, since, it is repeated, for the majority of this Chamber, *a legal infringement can only exist when the rule corresponding to exoneration is applied* (among many, see rulings of this Chamber No. 1001- F-2002, at 11:50 a.m. on December 20, 2002; No. 249-F-2003, at 11:45 a.m. on May 7, 2003; and No. 306-F-2006, at 10:20 a.m. on May 25, 2006). The reasoning seems logical at first glance, because with this premise, if exoneration constitutes a power, the judge is not obligated to exonerate; and therefore, if such exoneration is not ordered or carried out, the rules pertaining to the matter are not violated. Ergo, if there is no violation of rules, there can be no cassation review (consult resolutions of this Chamber No. 765 at 4:00 p.m. on September 26, 2001, and No. 561-F-2003, at 10:30 a.m. on September 10, 2003). This chain of ideas allows them to conclude that in that specific scenario (the simple order to pay or the non-application of exonerations) "it cannot be subject to examination in this venue" (from this same deciding body, ruling No. 419-F-03, at 9:20 a.m. on July 18, 2003), since it is a hypothesis "not subject to cassation" (ruling No. 653-F-2003, at 11:20 a.m. on October 8, 2003). Thus, in the opinion of the distinguished colleagues: the cassation appeal is not admissible when the exonerating power is not invoked (see, *a contrario sensu*, considerandos III and VIII, in order, of resolutions 541-F-2003, at 11:10 a.m. on the 3rd and at 10:50 a.m. on the 10th, both of September 2003). In this way, the majority has considered that "… *the order for the losing party to pay costs, as happened here, is not reviewable in this Venue, given that the Court merely applied the rule in the terms provided by it*" (emphasis is not from the original, see considerando X of vote No. 68-F-2005, at 2:30 p.m. on December 15, 2005). And in notarial matters, with greater force, it has been pointed out that: "… *the Court imposed the payment of the costs of the compensatory claim on the complainant, a pronouncement which, it is repeated, is not subject to cassation*." (considerando X of ruling No. 928-F-2006, at 9:15 a.m. on November 24, 2006).

II.- However, in the opinion of the undersigned, the *improper non-application* of the precepts that allow the exoneration from costs undoubtedly infringes upon the Legal System and, specifically, the rules that authorize it, whether due to error or inadequate assessment by the judges in the specific conflict. To that extent, although it is a power, the truth is that it is not immune to cassation review, because both in its exercise and in its non-application, a violation of law can occur, and to that extent, the improper omission is not, and should not be, synonymous with arbitrariness, in such a case, committed by the Judge himself. This is especially so if it involves an empowerment granted to the judge with specific scenarios that limit their discretionary power in this matter. Consequently, in this particular aspect, we consider that the mere application of the general rule of Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ordering the losing party to pay both sets of costs) does not close the doors to the cassation appeal, since, on the contrary, the matter is admissible for its examination on the merits (provided the legal requirements are met) in the event of a potential omission defect in the application of the legal provisions that authorize the exoneration from said costs (canons 55 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria and 98 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa). Notwithstanding the above, in the specific case under review, these members concur with what was decided on the merits by the Court, insofar as the losing party was ordered to pay them, a circumstance that leads us to reject the grievance, and with it, the appeal formulated in this regard.

Óscar Eduardo González Camacho Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Nombre207768

*980003850163CA* RES: 000979-F-2006 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las siete horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del diecinueve de diciembre de dos mil seis.

Proceso ordinario establecido en el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, por NIDIA MARÍA ALFARO ESPINOZA, MANUEL VILLALOBOS VILLALOBOS, MARÍA MAYELA SÁNCHEZ MADRIGAL, Nombre38277 , Nombre38278 , RAFAEL ÁNGEL GUTIÉRREZ MORALES, Nombre99656 , HEIDY OCAMPO VARGAS, Nombre209606 , Nombre80407 , Nombre209607 , Nombre80409 , Nombre38282 , Nombre80410 , Nombre209608 , Nombre38283 , Nombre209609 , Nombre209610 , Nombre39321 , Nombre80411 , Nombre39322 , Nombre38284 , Nombre80412 , Nombre80413 , Nombre209611 , Nombre209612 , Nombre80414 , Nombre209613 y Nombre58688 , todos de estado civil, profesión u oficio no indicado; contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE HEREDIA, representada por el Alcalde Nombre20681 , casado, Master en Gerencia de Proyectos de Desarrollo. Figura además, como apoderado especial judicial de los coactores el licenciado Rodolfo Arroyo Porras, casado, abogado. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad y vecinos de Heredia.

RESULTANDO

1.- Con base en los hechos que expusieron y disposiciones legales que citaron, los coactores establecieron demanda ordinaria cuya cuantía se fijó en la suma de treinta millones de colones, a fin de que en sentencia se declare que: “I). La demandada actúo negligentemente al no haber obligado a la empresa constructora a terminar los parques infantiles, áreas comunales, asfaltado de vías de acceso y sistema de aguas negras del Residencial Cedri, donde están las casas de mis representados. II). La municipalidad (sic) de Heredia ha actuado negligentemente al no entubar la acequia a cielo habierto (sic) que existe en el Residencial Cedri, lo cual debe hacer de inmediato. III). La demandada actuó negligentemente al no poner solución a (sic) problema del basurero del Río (sic) Quebrada Seca. IV). La demandada ha promovido la tugurización de la tercera etapa del Residencial Cedri, al otorgar permisos de construcción sin ningún planeamiento urbanístico. V). La demandada es culpable del proceso de contaminación, tugurización y deterioro de cada una de las casas de mis representados. VI). La demandada debe parar de inmediato la concesión de permisos para construcción en los tugurios. VII). Se declare la RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL de la demandada, tanto por acción como por omisión de los daños y perjuicios causados a mis representados con los hechos aquí denunciados. En orden a lo dicho se condene a la demandada a pagar, a cada uno de mis, (sic) representados lo (sic) extremos que se dirán: 1). NIDIA MARÍA ALFARO ESPINOZA DAÑOS MORAL SUBJETIVO. 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones. DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 550.000.oo colones. PERJUICIOS. 2.550.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.650.000.oo colones. 2). MANUEL VILLALOBOS VILLALOBOS. DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, AÑO (sic) MORAL OBJETIVO 550.000.oo colones, PERJUICIOS 2.600.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.650.000.oo colones. 3). MARÍA MAYELA SÁNCHEZ MADRIGAL. Los daños y perjuicios causados a MANUEL VILLALOBOS VILLALOBOS los sufre con María Mayela Sánchez Madrigal. Por esa su, (sic) significado, descripción y valor económico debe dividirse entre ambos. Es así porque son esposos y entre sus dos propiedades forman la casa No. (17J). 4). Nombre38277 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 550.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.600.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.650.000.oo colones. 5). Nombre38278 . Los daños y perjuicios causados a Nombre38277 los padece con Nombre38278 Por (sic) tal razón su significado, descripción y valor económico debe dividirse entre ambos. Es así porque son esposos y entre sus dos propiedades forman la casa No. (5K). 6). Nombre99656 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 500.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.500.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.500.000.oo colones. 7). Nombre209606 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 2.000.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 1.000.000,oo colones y PERJUICIOS 4.000.000.oo de (sic) colones. TOTAL 7.000.000,oo de colones. 8). Nombre80407 DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.700.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 600.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.900.000.oo colones. TOTAL 5.200.000.oo colones. 9). Nombre209607 . Los daños y perjuicios causados a Nombre80407 los padece con Nombre209607 (sic) Nombre80407 porque son madre e hija respectivamente y entre sus dos propiedades forman la casa No. (23J). Por tal razón su significado, descripción y valor económico debe dividirse entre ambos. 10). Nombre80409 . DEÑO (sic) MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.700.000.oo de (sic) colones DAÑO MORA OBJETIVO 600.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.900.000.oo colones. TOTAL 5.200.000.oo colones. 11) Nombre38282 . Los daños y perjuicios causados a Nombre80409 los experimenta junto con Nombre38282 . Por tal razón su significado, descripción y valor económico debe dividirse entre ambos. Es así porque son esposos y entre sus dos propiedades forman la casa No. (9K). 12. Nombre80410 (12J). DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.900.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 650.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 3.200.000.oo colones. TOTAL 5.750.000.oo colones. 13). Nombre38283 DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 2.000.000.oo de colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 700.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 3.400.000.oo colones. TOTAL 6.100.000.oo colones. 14). Nombre209609 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 550.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.600.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.650.000.oo colones. 15). Nombre209610 DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 500.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.500.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.500.000.oo colones. 16). Nombre39321 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.800.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 650.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 3.100.000.oo colones. TOTAL 5.550.000.oo colones. 17). Nombre80411 . Los daños y perjuicios causados a Nombre39321 los padece junto con Nombre80411 . Por tal razón su significado, descripción y valor económico debe dividirse entre ambos. Es así porque son esposos y entre sus dos propiedades forman la casa No.(14J). 18). Nombre39322 (22K). DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 550.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.600.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.650.000.oo colones. 19). Nombre38284 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.700.000.oo de colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 600.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.900.000.oo colones. TOTAL 5.200.000.oo colones. 20). Nombre80412 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 500.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.500.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.500.000.oo colones. 21). Nombre80413 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.700.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 600.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.900.000.oo colones. TOTAL 5.200.000.oo colones. 22). Nombre209611 () . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 500.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.500.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.500.000.oo colones. 23). Nombre80414 . DAÑO MORAL SUBJETIVO 1.500.000.oo de (sic) colones, DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO 550.000.oo colones y PERJUICIOS 2.600.000.oo colones. TOTAL 4.650.000.oo colones. TOTAL 88.400.000.oo de (sic) colones. En el monto de perjuicios de cada uno de mis representados van incluidos los intereses legales. Los intereses deben establecerse al fijan (sic) al 19.20% anual que los establecidos para los depósitos a plazo de 6 meses en el Sistema Bancario Nacional, los cuales correrán desde el 25 de Octubre de 1.993 hasta que haya total y efectivo cumplimiento de lo establecido en sentencia firme de este juicio. Los montos establecidos para los daños, perjuicios e intereses correrán desde el 1 Diciembre de 1.994 hasta que haya total y efectivo cumplimiento de lo establecido en sentencia firme de este juicio. Para determinar el valor de los daños, perjuicios e intereses de este juicio solicito que se nombren dos peritos uno matemático y el otro ambiental. VIII). Se condena (sic) a la demandada al pago de ambas costas de este juicio.” 2.- La Municipalidad demandada contestó en forma extemporánea, por lo que se le declaró rebelde y por contestados afirmativamente los hechos de la demanda.

3.- La Jueza Yazmín Aragón Cambronero, en sentencia no. 789-03 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 1 de octubre de 2003, resolvió: “Se declara con lugar la presente demanda, únicamente en los extremos que expresamente se dirán, entendiéndose denegada en aquellos extremos en que se omita pronunciamiento: Se condena a la demandada a cancelar a los actores que han acreditado ser propietarios de viviendas o lotes en Residencial Cedri, los daños y perjuicios, derivados de la falta de instalación del sistema de aguas negras en sus residencias. Lo cual deberán demostrar en la etapa de ejecución del fallo. Se condena a la demandada al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas.” 4.- Ambas partes apelaron, y el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, integrado por los Jueces Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez, Joaquín Villalobos Soto y Ana Isabel Vargas Vargas, en sentencia no. 109-2005 de las 10 horas 35 minutos del 16 de marzo de 2005, dispuso: “Se revoca la sentencia apelada en cuanto condena a la Municipalidad de Heredia a pagar los daños y perjuicios a los propietarios de Residencial Cedri, derivados de la falta de instalación en sus residencias del sistema de aguas negras, para en su lugar denegarlo; también en cuanto deniega el pago de daño moral subjetivo, por los perjuicios recibidos por el deterioro ambiental padecido por aquéllos, para en su lugar conceder por ese concepto quinientos mil colones a cada uno de ellos, sumas que generarán intereses a partir de la firmeza del fallo. Se confirma en cuanto deniega los demás extremos de la acción y cuanto condena en costas a la vencida.” 5.- Ambas partes formulan recurso de casación por razones procesales y de fondo. Los coactores estiman quebranto de los artículos 4 inciso 4) del derogado Código Municipal; 2 y 4 inciso c) del actual Código Municipal; 11, 41, 170 de la Constitución Política; 87 de la Ley de Construcciones; 1045 del Código Civil; 190 a 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 98 inciso 2), 155 inciso 3), apartes ch), d) y 330 del Código Procesal Civil. La demandada alega violación de los numerales 106, 153, 155, 221, 222 del Código Procesal Civil; 704, 1045, 1046 del Código Civil; 50 de la Constitución Política; 2, 289 de la Ley General de Salud, 4 inciso 4° del derogado Código Municipal y 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa.

6.- En los procedimientos ante esta Sala se han observado las prescripciones de ley. Redacta el Magistrado González Camacho, salvo el considerando XVIII que redacta el Magistrado Rivas Loáiciga CONSIDERANDO I.- De conformidad con los hechos narrados en la demanda, los co-actores Nidia María Alfaro Espinoza, Manuel Villalobos Villalobos, María Mayela Sánchez Madrigal, Nombre38277 , Nombre38278 , Rafael Ángel Gutiérrez Morales, Nombre99656 , Heidy Ocampo Vargas, Nombre209606 , Nombre209614 Nombre80407 , Nombre209607 , Nombre80409 , Marjorie Alfaro Jiménez, Nombre80410 , Allisson Arias Víquez, Nombre38283 , Nombre209609 , Nombre209610 , Nombre39321 , Nombre80411 , Nombre39322 , Nombre38284 , Nombre80412 , Nombre80413 , Nombre209611 , Nombre209612 , Nombre80414 , Nombre209613 y Nombre58688 , señalan que son propietarios cada uno, de una casa o lote en el Residencial Cedri, situado en Mercedes Sur de Heredia. Indican que la construcción de ese complejo, compuesto de tres etapas, estuvo a cargo de la constructora Desarrollos Urbanos del Oeste S.A. La Municipalidad de Heredia, dicen, aprobó a esa empresa el permiso de construcción correspondiente en abril de 1993, producto de lo cual, se iniciaron de inmediato las obras en las fincas del partido de Heredia, matrículas de folio real Placa39668 y Placa39669. Manifiestan, en sesión ordinaria 68-04 del 25 de octubre de 1993, la entidad local acordó autorizar la sustitución de la garantía hipotecaria ofrecida por la firma Desarrollos Urbanos del Oeste S.A., para las obras faltantes de la Urbanización Cedri, por una garantía de cumplimiento extendida por una entidad del Sistema Bancario Nacional, por el mismo monto, rendida por su Presidente, el señor Nombre209615 . Aseguran, en diciembre de 1994, dicha empresa entregó a la Municipalidad la primera y segunda etapa de manera incompleta, pues faltaban los parques infantiles, áreas comunales, asfaltado de vías de acceso y sistemas de aguas negras. Alegan, que por incumplimiento de la firma constructora, la Mutual de Heredia sacó a remate las propiedades del residencial, las que fueron adquiridas por Vivienda Coop R.L. Manifiestan que la parte correspondiente a la tercera fase fue puesta a la venta sin ningún plan de desarrollo urbanístico. Agregan que a los compradores de lotes de la segunda y tercera etapa, la corporación local les otorgó los permisos de construcción, sin tomar en cuenta la diferencia con las viviendas de la primera; en algunos casos, las de la tercera etapa tienen un nivel muy parecido a los de los precarios o casas de interés social. Acusan, el residencial tiene dos focos de contaminación ambiental: al norte el río Quebrada Seca y al sur, una acequia a cielo abierto. Expresan, en el río hay gran cantidad de basura y todo tipo de desechos malolientes que producen olores insoportables y un alto grado de contaminación. La acequia, por su parte, está también llena de basura y aguas putrefactas. Aseveran, la Municipalidad, aún existiendo una recomendación de la Directora del Área de Calidad de Vida, no quiso entubar la acequia que cruza el residencial. Como consecuencia de ello, formulan la demanda que da origen al presente proceso contra la entidad del cantón Central de Heredia. En lo fundamental pretenden en sentencia se declare que la demandada: 1.- actuó negligentemente al no haber obligado a la empresa constructora a terminar los parques infantiles, áreas comunales, asfaltado de vías de acceso y sistemas de aguas negras del Residencial Cedri, donde están sus casas; 2.- ha actuado de manera negligente al no entubar la acequia a cielo abierto que existe en el residencial, lo que debe hacerse de inmediato; 3.- fue negligente al no poner solución al problema del basurero del río Quebrada Seca; 4.- ha promovido la "tugurización" de la tercera etapa del residencial, al otorgar permisos de construcción sin ninguna planificación urbanística; 5.- es culpable del proceso de contaminación, tugurización y deterioro de sus casas; 6.- debe suspender de inmediato la concesión de permisos para la construcción de tugurios; 7.- se declare la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, tanto por acción como por omisión, de los daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos denunciados, y en orden a ellos se le deberán cancelar a los actores las sumas que liquidan en la demanda, por esos conceptos; y 8.- se le condene al pago de ambas costas del proceso. La corporación accionada no contestó en tiempo, producto de lo cual, a petición de los actores, fue declarada rebelde. El Juzgado declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda. Condenó a la Municipalidad a cancelar a los co-actores que han acreditado ser propietarios de viviendas o lotes en Residencial Cedri, los daños y perjuicios, derivados de la falta de instalación del sistema de aguas negras en sus residencias, a definir en fase de ejecución. Impuso ambas costas al ente territorial. Inconformes con lo resuelto, apelaron las partes. Conociendo de dichos recursos el Tribunal revocó el fallo de primera instancia en cuanto a la condena al pago de los daños y perjuicios derivados de la falta de instalación en sus residencias del sistema de aguas negras, para en su lugar denegarlo. Así mismo, en cuanto denegó el pago de daño moral subjetivo, por los perjuicios recibidos por el deterioro ambiental padecido por los accionantes, concepto por el cual concedió a cada uno un monto de ¢500.000,00, más sus respectivos intereses que corren desde la firmeza de la sentencia. Confirmó la denegatoria de los demás extremos de la acción y la imposición en costas. Acuden en casación ambas partes, acusando vicios de procedimiento y de fondo.

II.- De previo a entrar al detalle de los reproches formulados por los casacionistas, y ante la forma en que han sido planteados, es menester indicar que ya esta Sala en reiteradas ocasiones ha establecido que la calificación que los recurrentes otorguen a sus reclamos no es óbice para realizar su análisis. Ello en virtud de que su clasificación jurídica le corresponde con exclusividad a este órgano colegiado, para lo cual se acude al fondo y verdadera naturaleza del alegato, más que a su denominación. De ahí que haya resuelto como de naturaleza procesal alegatos formulados como de fondo, o aquellos propios de violación directa planteados como yerros cometidos en la valoración probatoria o viceversa. No obstante, es claro que este análisis en cuestión es procedente, siempre que dentro de la calificación que corresponda satisfagan los requisitos que impone la normativa procesal civil para ingresar a su examen. Visto así, los motivos interpuestos serán agrupados conforme a su correcta naturaleza, a efecto de realizar un análisis adecuado y objetivo de los puntos que mediante este recurso se solicita revisar.

RECURSO DE LOS ACTORES Vicios de fondo III.- Violación indirecta. El apoderado especial judicial de los demandantes acusa error de derecho. Indica que en el considerando XII del fallo se tiene por demostrado el hecho grave de la polución que sufren sus representados por causa de los focos de contaminación existentes en el río Quebrada Seca por el norte, y al sur, un desagüe a cielo abierto. Agrega, ese considerando establece que del deterioro ambiental es responsable la Municipalidad, al no haber adoptado las políticas apropiadas para remediar el problema, por lo que la conducta omisiva ha inflingido daños morales. Indica, el error consiste en no haber asignado a los elementos probatorios el verdadero alcance que tienen para determinar la magnitud del daño ambiental y con ello el valor del daño moral subjetivo. En este sentido, señala, el informe pericial del ingeniero Nombre38778 , establece aspectos que lesionan gravemente la salud y la moral de los actores. Hace referencia a las fotografías que acompañan dicha experticia. Agrega, en un periódico de circulación nacional, a saber, La Nación, se publicó que por el norte de la Urbanización Cedri, cruza el río Quebrada Seca, constituido como en una cloaca natural. Por ende, es público y notorio que este residencial es un lugar sucio, insalubre, antihigiénico y peligroso, debido a la posibilidad de epidemias. Adiciona, la Defensoría de los Habitantes en oficio DHR-9801-1783-98, había declarado la gravedad de los focos de contaminación aludidos, que desde 1997 eran conocidos por las autoridades locales. Advierte, los testimonios ofrecidos reflejan que esta problemática se padece desde 1993. Reitera, el error radica en la apreciación errónea e insuficiente que hace el Tribunal de esas probanzas, concediendo un valor que no corresponde al grave alcance que representan. Considera, la suma otorgada por este concepto (daño moral) es exigua e irrisoria. Aporta citas de jurisprudencia de esta Sala. Recrimina, con la no interpretación conjunta de las pruebas, se violentó el artículo 330 del Código Procesal Civil. De igual manera, acota, se han visto conculcados los preceptos 190 a 192, 196 y 197 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, así como el canon 4 inciso 4) del Código Municipal, Ley no. 4574, vigente al momento de empezar a producirse las violaciones ambientales, de salud y daños morales citados y ordinal 4 inciso c) del Código Municipal que rige en la actualidad. De igual modo, al no haberse permitido, una indemnización con equidad por los daños padecidos, afirma, se han conculcado de manera flagrante los ordinales 1045 del Código Civil y 41 de la Constitución Política.

IV.- Del error de derecho. Recurso informal. Con respecto al cargo formulado, cabe mencionar que esta Sala en reiteradas ocasiones ha indicado que el error de derecho, supone desconocer el valor legal de un medio probatorio, u otorgarle uno distinto al previsto por la ley. Dentro de éste también se reconoce la censura por la violación de las reglas de la sana crítica, que tiene por objeto establecer la inobservancia de los principios de la lógica, psicología o experiencia al valorar las probanzas. Cuando se alega, es menester indicar, con claridad y precisión, las normas consideradas como infringidas concernientes al valor de los elementos probatorios apreciados erróneamente. Es indispensable, además, citar las reglas vulneradas por el fondo, expresando, con claridad y precisión, la forma en que se produjo el yerro y la incidencia que ello tuvo sobre los cánones desaplicados, o bien, actuados con desatino (artículo 596 del Código Procesal Civil). Esto implica señalar técnicamente la violación indirecta infringida al ordenamiento jurídico en las normas de fondo con la errónea apreciación, y no solo citar los artículos o transcribirlos. El cargo no se ajusta a la técnica debida. El recurso se limita a acusar un supuesto desatino en la ponderación de las pruebas. Sin embargo, si bien cita algunas normas de fondo que considera conculcadas, no aborda en lo absoluto ni detalla la forma en que tales disposiciones se vieron lesionadas como consecuencias del equívoco que aduce. Invoca en su favor normas de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y del Código Municipal vigente al momento de iniciarse la polución ambiental, empero, no abunda en razones ni explica cómo el proceder jurisdiccional ha desatendido esas reglas, lo que en orden a lo expuesto resulta ser fundamental para ingresar al examen del reclamo. De este modo, al no satisfacer dicha exigencia, el cargo resulta ser informal, lo que supone su rechazo. V.- Violación directa. Primero. El apoderado especial judicial de los actores reclama que el fallo impugnado contiene disposiciones contradictorias a la ley y a los informes periciales. Sostiene, en el considerando VII, se dice que la Municipalidad no debe renunciar a sus facultades derivadas de la autonomía. Indica que el despacho con evidente error de interpretación de la autonomía municipal, omite citar en la sentencia que tampoco puede sustraerse de los deberes que le impone la ley, los que están por encima de cualquier reglamento. Critica que sin prueba alguna se estima que no existe un sistema de tratamiento de aguas negras en el lugar de los hechos, y que el residencial tenía menos de quinientas casas. Por esa razón, dice, se resuelve que no era responsabilidad del ente local vigilar la conexión de las tuberías de aguas negras y servidas a las previstas, lo que considera violatorio del numeral 87 de la Ley de Construcciones, el que transcribe. Sostiene, la responsabilidad reclamada era ineludible, al punto que no solamente el ente municipal debió haber vigilado la instalación de las tuberías de aguas pluviales y negras, sino que ni siquiera debió haber aprobado los planos de construcción, ni permitir que las obras siguieran adelante. Afirma, al faltar a esta obligación, resultaron quebrantados los preceptos 4 del Código Municipal y 11 de la Constitución Política. Sobre ellos, cita precedentes de la Sala Constitucional. Dice, este letal proceso de desmejoramiento del ambiente y de las casas que adquirieron, se ha llevado a cabo a vista y paciencia de la Municipalidad, quien debió intervenir en defensa de los intereses de los munícipes y del medio. Vuelve a reproducir resoluciones del Tribunal Constitucional relacionadas con el tema. Copia parte del informe pericial rendido por el profesional Nombre38778 , donde se expresa que existían planos en los que se indicaban las tuberías de aguas pluviales y aguas negras del proyecto total, a los que la corporación local no dio importancia. A partir de ello, señala, se refleja que la demandada no actuó conforme a sus deberes. Expresa, el Tribunal se contradice cuando rechaza la responsabilidad de la entidad municipal con la sola aplicación del Decreto Ejecutivo no.18.888, "Reglamento de la Oficina Nacional Revisora de Proyectos de Construcción", del que no señala su fecha de emisión. Contradicción consistente en que con ese Decreto, sustrae competencias legales, pasando por encima, incluso del canon 87 de la Ley de Construcciones, violación que considera, atenta no solo contra la autonomía municipal, sino contra la jerarquía de las normas, lesionando el precepto aludido, así como los ordinales 2 del Código Municipal y 170 de la Carta Magna. Cita en su apoyo, doctrina nacional. Asevera, con esta actuación se exime a la demandada de una responsabilidad, lo que le causa serios daños y perjuicios a sus representados, quebrantando además el numeral 1045 del Código Civil y preceptos 190 a 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Segundo. Exterioriza, los hechos están correctamente seleccionados y enunciados en el fallo, pero el Ad quem interpreta mal la ley sustantiva aplicada. Manifiesta, respecto del considerando VII, el Tribunal tuvo por demostrado la no conexión de las tuberías pluviales y de aguas negras a las previstas correspondientes y que la Municipalidad no debe renunciar a sus facultades derivadas de la autonomía que le concede la Constitución. Aduce, con evidente error de interpretación a lo dispuesto por los cánones 4 del Código Municipal, 87 de la Ley de Construcciones y 170 de la Constitución Política, en el fallo no se indica que el ente local no puede sustraerse de los deberes que esa autonomía le impone. Estima, la violación de ley sustantiva consiste en que el Tribunal interpreta que mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo no. 3391 del 13 de diciembre de 1982, Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones, la demandada está eximida de vigilar la conexión de las tuberías referidas, cuando más bien el aparte III.3.2.12 de ese instrumento jurídico, establece otra cosa distinta. A su juicio, se hacen diferencias donde la ley no las hace y se deja de lado que los preceptos mencionados anteriormente, establecen que la Municipalidad no se puede abstraer de esos deberes.

VI.- Sobre la autonomía municipal. Principio de legalidad. Referente a los reparos planteados cabe indicar lo siguiente. Las municipalidades son entidades locales que gozan de autonomía relativa en el ejercicio de sus funciones. El régimen municipal es una especie de descentralización territorial, según se colige del numeral 168 de la Carta Magna. Este nivel de independencia lo otorga el precepto 169 de la Constitución Política, en el marco de su jurisdicción territorial, integrada por el espacio físico dispuesto para el cantón al cual representa, en tanto señala que corresponde a cada ayuntamiento la: "administración de los intereses y servicios locales … ". Es decir, el constituyente ha conferido una serie de funciones o atribuciones en favor de esos gobiernos en razón de "lo local", esto es, para administrar los servicios e intereses del ámbito a la que está circunscrita, sea, el cantón. Esta competencia no es excluyente de la que ha sido otorgada por el Ordenamiento a otras entidades u órganos del Estado. De este modo, es claro que existen intereses cuya salvaguardia corresponde a las Municipalidades y junto a ellos, coexisten otros cuya protección constitucional o legal es atribuida a otros entes públicos. Lo anterior debido a que hay intereses que trascienden la esfera de lo local, debido a que inciden en otras latitudes fuera del cantón. Empero, debe quedar claro que la administración de esos intereses de la esfera territorial del municipio constituye una competencia originaria de los ayuntamientos y solo mediante ley de nacionalización puede serles desplazada, siempre que esa manifestación legislativa no suponga un quebranto a la autonomía referida o implique vaciar el contenido constitucional del régimen municipal. Por su parte, el artículo 4 del Código Municipal, Ley no. 7794 del 30 de abril de 1998, desarrolla los tipos de autonomía que el legislador ordinario estimó ostentaban estas corporaciones, indicando que poseen la política, administrativa y financiera. Sobre los alcances de esta autonomía, ver entre otras, de la Sala Constitucional, votos 5445-99, 1220-2002, 5204-2004 y 8928-2004. Con todo, como parte de un sistema integrado, dentro de la dinámica de la satisfacción de los intereses de los munícipes, es claro que existirán intereses que son plenamente locales y otros que pueden ser considerados nacionales. Este aspecto obliga, dentro de un principio de sana administración, a la coordinación con las instancias administrativas del Poder Central, que realizan, a nivel macro, funciones relacionadas con las que localmente despliega la corporación. Es este el ejemplo, en lo que resulta relevante a este caso, de los aspectos urbanos, en los que, aún cuando al tenor del artículo 15 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, es cada Municipalidad la que debe aprobar el respectivo Plan Regulador, se impone una coordinación con el INVU y la Dirección de Urbanismo para estos efectos, de cara a la implementación de una política nacional de desarrollo que integre todas las variables técnicas, económicas y sociales que convergen en esta actividad. Iguales particularidades de coordinación son de rigor en la materia ambiental en la que ciertamente, el tratamiento de los recursos naturales y las acciones que establezca cada unidad administrativa para la defensa y tutela del ambiente, dentro de una percepción que debería ser precautoria y preventiva, incide de forma directa no en la esfera territorial del municipio, sino en la totalidad del territorio nacional. Al igual que los ecosistemas guardan una vinculación y relación simbiótica entre sí (sea el caso de los corredores biológicos de conservación de especies), las incidencias que se produzcan en un determinado sector del país, tienen sus consecuencias en la globalidad del medio nacional. De ahí que en esta materia se esté frente a un interés nacional y local a la vez. Ya la Sala Constitucional en la resolución no. 5445-99, sentó las bases sobre la necesaria coordinación que debe imperar en estas relaciones inter-administrativas, las que surgen sin menoscabo de la autonomía que ya de por sí el constituyente le asignó a las entidades locales. En esta dirección, en el fallo citado se indicó: "X.- (...) Definida la competencia material de la municipalidad en una circunscripción territorial determinada, queda claro que habrá cometidos que por su naturaleza son exclusivamente municipales, a la par de otros que pueden ser reputados nacionales o estatales; por ello es esencial definir la forma de cooparticipación de atribuciones que resulta inevitable, puesto que la capacidad pública de las municipalidades es local, y la del Estado y los demás entes, nacional; de donde resulta que el territorio municipal es simultáneamente estatal e institucional, en la medida en que lo exijan las circunstancias. Es decir, las municipalidades pueden compartir sus competencias con la Administración Pública en general, relación que debe desenvolverse en los términos como está definida en la ley (artículo 5 del Código Municipal anterior, artículo 7 del nuevo Código), que establece la obligación de "coordinación" entre la municipalidades y las instituciones públicas que concurran en el desempeño de sus competencias, para evitar duplicaciones de esfuerzos y contradicciones, sobre todo, porque sólo la coordinación voluntaria es compatible con la autonomía municipal por ser su expresión. En otros términos, la municipalidad está llamada a entrar en relaciones de cooperación con otros entes públicos, y viceversa, dado el carácter concurrente o coincidente -en muchos casos-, de intereses en torno a un asunto concreto. En la doctrina, la coordinación es definida a partir de la existencia de varios centros independientes de acción, cada uno con cometidos y poderes de decisión propios, y eventualmente discrepantes; pese a ello, debe existir una comunidad de fines por materia, pero por concurrencia, en cuanto sea común el objeto receptor de los resultados finales de la actividad y de los actos de cada uno. De manera que la coordinación es la ordenación de las relaciones entre estas diversas actividades independientes, que se hace cargo de esa concurrencia en un mismo objeto o entidad, para hacerla útil a un plan público global, sin suprimir la independencia recíproca de los sujetos agentes. Como no hay una relación de jerarquía de las instituciones descentralizadas, ni del Estado mismo en relación con las municipalidades, no es posible la imposición a éstas de determinadas conductas, con lo cual surge el imprescindible "concierto" interinstitucional, en sentido estricto, en cuanto los centros autónomos e independientes de acción se ponen de acuerdo sobre ese esquema preventivo y global, en el que cada uno cumple un papel con vista en una misión confiada a los otros. Así, las relaciones de las municipalidades con los otros entes públicos, sólo pueden llevarse a cabo en un plano de igualdad, que den como resultado formas pactadas de coordinación, con exclusión de cualquier forma imperativa en detrimento de su autonomía, que permita sujetar a los entes corporativos a un esquema de coordinación sin su voluntad o contra ella; pero que sí admite la necesaria subordinación de estos entes al Estado y en interés de éste (a través de la "tutela administrativa" del Estado, y específicamente, en la función de control la legalidad que a éste compete, con potestades de vigilancia general sobre todo el sector)." Ahora bien, aún con esta autonomía, es claro que al socaire del precepto 11 de la Carta Magna, las municipalidades y sus funcionarios están igualmente sujetos al principio de legalidad, en su doble dimensión, positiva y negativa, de modo que en el ejercicio de sus competencias, deben proceder conforme lo disponen las normas jurídicas que delimitan y precisan su funcionamiento. Esta sujeción es genérica a la globalidad del Ordenamiento Jurídico, constituyendo una garantía para el munícipe y sociedad civil en general, de que los actos públicos que emanen de esas entidades locales, son contestes con aquél. Ello incluye por regla de principio, una aplicación debida de las normas, no solamente en su contenido, sino además en el respeto de su nivel jerárquico, de lo que se infiere que son inviables las aplicaciones de medidas infralegales que sean opuestas o contrarias a la ley. Lo anterior dado que la potestad reglamentaria ejecutiva y en general, la emisión de actos administrativos de carácter general o normativo, según sea el caso (artículo 121 Ley General de la Administración Pública) encuentran en la ley y en la propia Constitución Política, su límite infranqueable, de modo que no puede contener regulaciones que se contrapongan a los enunciados de esas normas de mayor jerarquía, o bien, incursionar en áreas que en orden al contenido de la ley, les están vedadas (principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad de la potestad reglamentaria). De ahí que cuando se burlen estos límites, la norma infralegal sea inaplicable, por contraria a Derecho. Se busca en este sentido, una aplicación adecuada, generalizada y abstracta de las normas, evitando procederes arbitrarios y antojadizos.

VII.- Autonomía local en materia de urbanismo y edificaciones. Según se ha indicado, la autonomía municipal, impuesta por la Carta Magna, confiere a las corporaciones locales una competencia especial para la administración de los intereses de su jurisdicción territorial (artículos 169 y 170). Dentro de este conjunto de intereses y servicios se encuentra la materia urbanística en la cual, el ayuntamiento guarda una competencia esencial y en tesis de principio, prevalente sobre la de otras instituciones, en el contexto de la localidad. En lo que viene relevante al caso, el numeral 15 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, no. 4240 del 15 de noviembre de 1968 confiere a los entes locales la competencia base para regular y vigilar todo lo concerniente a la planificación y desarrollo urbano dentro de los límites de su jurisdicción territorial. En este sentido la norma dispone: "Conforme al precepto del artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, reconócese la competencia y autoridad de los gobiernos municipales para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano, dentro de los límites de su territorio jurisdiccional. Consecuentemente, cada uno de ellos dispondrá lo que proceda para implantar un plan regulador, y los reglamentos de desarrollo urbano conexos, en las áreas donde deba regir, sin perjuicio de extender todos o algunos de sus efectos a otros sectores, en que priven razones calificadas para establecer un determinando régimen contralor." Nótese que la competencia asignada no se limita a un aspecto de mera planificación, sino que además, incluye las potestades de control del desarrollo urbanístico, lo que supone un grado de vigilancia sustantiva tanto de las obras en ejecución, como de las ya ejecutadas, aspecto sobre el cual se ingresará con mas detalle adelante. En esta línea, el canon primero de la Ley de Construcciones, Decreto Ley no. 833 del 4 de noviembre de 1949, establece con claridad evidente estas potestades cuando señala: "Las Municipalidades de la República son las encargadas de que las ciudades y demás poblaciones reúnan las condiciones necesarias de seguridad, salubridad, comodidad y belleza en sus vías públicas y en los edificios y construcciones que en terrenos de las mismas se levanten sin perjuicio de las facultades que las leyes conceden en estas materias a otros órganos administrativos." Por su parte, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 13 inciso o) del Código Municipal, corresponde al Concejo dictar las normas y medidas atinentes al ordenamiento urbano. En este orden, según lo estatuido por la Ley de Construcciones, la realización de toda obra o edificación requiere de una licencia municipal, a la vez que corresponde al ente local la vigilancia sobre aquellas (mandatos 74 y 87 de ese cuerpo legal). Por ende, resulta evidente el papel prevalente que en estos menesteres ostenta la Municipalidad, siendo que le incumbe disponer las medidas concretas sobre el desarrollo y planeamiento urbano, así como el otorgamiento de las "licencias" de construcción y el control de esas actividades acorde a las normas que regulan ese campo. Así lo ha definido la misma Sala Constitucional, entre muchos, en los fallos no. 2153-93 de las 9 horas 21 minutos del 21 de mayo de 1993 y no. 4205-96 de las 14 horas 33 minutos del 20 de agosto de 1996. Ahora bien, los alcances y efectos del desarrollo y planificación urbana implica, en ocasiones, el surgimiento de relaciones de coordinación con diversos órganos públicos con competencia concurrente en ciertas áreas de actividad administrativa, según se ha explicado. Lo anterior debido a que si bien esas potestades aludidas surgen en relación con un concepto local, deben empatarse con políticas de planificación nacional. Se trata de principios de sana administración que pretenden establecer mecanismos de coordinación que permitan de manera más adecuada, una eficiente atención de las necesidades e intereses públicos, a fin de que un eventual conflicto competencial no sea óbice para que el Estado (en sentido amplio) no desatienda sus deberes y transgreda con ello, por aspectos de mera organización o diseño, su dimensión teleológica. Dentro de este marco se ubica la emisión de planes reguladores, los que al amparo del numeral 15 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, son realizados por los entes locales y luego aprobados por la Dirección de Urbanismo. El artículo 169 constitucional, junto con la Ley de Planificación Urbana, se insiste, reconoce la competencia y autoridad de los gobiernos municipales para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano, dentro de los límites de su territorio, a través de la emisión de este tipo de planes, que en el fondo, ostentan una naturaleza normativa en tanto disponen la programación del uso del suelo en la respectiva jurisdicción cantonal. Es por ello que dentro de su tramitación, se constituye en presupuesto infranqueable la audiencia pública que permita a los munícipes, pronunciarse sobre la propuesta, en razón del evidente interés que guardan respecto de la decisión administrativa que establezca el destino que deberá darse a las heredades localizadas en el Cantón. No obstante, por aspecto de vinculación y armonía con la planificación nacional, siendo que el contenido de un plan de esta naturaleza incide de manera refleja en el contexto integral del territorio patrio, deben ser aprobados por la Dirección de Urbanismo (ordinal 18 ibidem) a fin de ajustarlos a criterios de planificación nacional. Sin embargo, se recalca, en esta materia, el ayuntamiento tiene una competencia originaria, pese a las relaciones de coordinación, que le permiten planificar, regular y vigilar el desarrollo urbano dentro del cantón respectivo.

VIII.- Regulación de la materia urbanística. Potestades de control. Dicho esto, cabe señalar que la materia de desarrollo de proyectos urbanísticos, en términos generales, se encuentra sujeta a un conjunto de normas que establecen los diversos aspectos que convergen en esta temática, como son el estructural, constructivo, salud, tratamiento de aguas, entre otros. No obstante, grosso modo (pues las disposiciones que precisan esta materia son extensas por demás), su regulación básica radica en la Ley de Construcciones y la Ley de Planificación Urbana, conjuntos legales que se complementan por otras normas que desarrollan temas concretos, v.gr, la Ley General de Salud. En estas, de forma genérica, se establecen los presupuestos básicos que delimitan la realización de las edificaciones, sean de uso público o privado, temporales o permanentes. Aún así, el establecimiento de una serie de factores que por su naturaleza, no resulta conveniente incorporarlos dentro de una ley, han sido profundizados en reglamentos o normas infralegales. En esta misma dirección, la Ley de Planificación Urbana deja a dichas últimas fuentes del derecho, el desarrollo de aspectos de corte procedimental y de otra índole. En cuestiones de naturaleza urbanística, en particular, la de construcción de urbanizaciones o residenciales, la Ley de Construcciones y la Ley de Planificación Urbana, a tono con lo dicho, en sus artículos 15 y 32 respectivamente, remiten la concreción de los aspectos que deben ser cubiertos por los urbanizadores, a un reglamento, que en la especie, es el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, no. 3991 del 13 de diciembre de 1982. Por su parte, en menesteres de la materia constructiva, se encuentra el denominado Reglamento de Construcciones, publicado el 22 de marzo de 1983. De conformidad con lo estatuido por los cánones 15 y 74 de la Ley de Construcciones, todo fraccionamiento y urbanización, así como toda obra relacionada con la construcción deberá contar con un acto autorizatorio emitido por la Municipalidad correspondiente. Al tenor del numeral 19 en relación al 20 inciso h), ambos de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, las entidades locales deberán emitir el reglamento pertinente para acatar las condiciones del Plan Regulador, así como para velar por la protección de los intereses de la salud, seguridad, comodidad y bienestar. En esta dirección, el ordinal 56 ibidem señala que el Reglamento de Construcciones fijará las reglas de seguridad, salubridad y ornato. Empero, estos aspectos se encuentran contemplados en el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, norma que sería aplicable al efecto. Se trata de un instrumento jurídico de naturaleza preeminentemente técnica, que contiene en aspecto de urbanizaciones, regulaciones variadas en aspectos tales como accesos, vialidad, lotificación, áreas verdes y públicas, drenajes, acueductos, cloacas, infraestructura y acabados, entre otros. En lo que se refiere al ejercicio fiscalizador, como se ha dicho, el canon 1 de la Ley de Construcciones establece que son los gobiernos locales los encargados de velar por que las ciudades, sus edificios, construcciones y vías públicas, reúnan las condiciones necesarias de seguridad, salubridad, comodidad y belleza, sin perjuicio de las facultades que las leyes conceden en estas materias a otros órganos administrativos. Se trata una vez más de una manifestación legislativa que pretende potenciar las competencias municipales en pro de su autonomía en la esfera de los intereses locales que le incumben. Como es debido, esos apoderamientos, constituyen verdaderos poderes-deberes, es decir, le permiten adoptar actuaciones ejecutivas y ejecutorias, pero a la vez le impone deberes y exigencias, en tanto ha de asumir las acciones de mérito para cumplir con sus cometidos. Por tal, debe sujetar sus decisiones al bloque de juridicidad (en armonía con los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos), lo que implica desde luego, ejercer un debido control de áreas de interés social, como es el caso de la salud y la seguridad, cuando proceda, en coordinación con autoridades del Gobierno Central. Es por ello que como contrapartida de la competencia para otorgar las licencias de construcción que establece el artículo 74 de la Ley de Construcciones, el 87 ibidem le impone el deber de fiscalizar y controlar las obras levantadas en su territorio, así como el uso que se les esté dando. Estas potestades suponen la competencia para establecer la armonía de las solicitudes de construcción con las normas que regulan esa materia, al punto que de inferir que se incumplen, están facultadas para negar la "licencia" o denegar el acto autorizatorio requerido. Desde este plano, el papel de los municipios se da en dos instancias, sea, preventiva y fiscalizadora. En el marco preventivo, la "licencia" se otorga si cumple con todas las exigencias y en ese cotejo (cualitativo y cuantitativo) se concreta tal ejercicio. En la fiscalización, verifica que lo que se realiza en la realidad, sea conteste con lo autorizado. Claro está que por la dinámica misma de la materia urbanística, converge una amplia gama de variables que por su magnitud y relevancia, exigen acciones de coordinación de las entidades locales conjuntamente con unidades públicas especializadas. Es el caso de la salud pública y el tratamiento de las aguas de diversa naturaleza (potable, servidas, negras), supuestos en los que imperan los niveles de enlace entre el ejercicio administrativo de las municipalidades y los órganos o entes con competencia funcional específica en esas áreas. En efecto así se desprende de la Ley General de Salud en sus numerales 338 y 338 bis, a propósito de las potestades de fiscalización del cumplimiento de las normas sanitarias. De igual forma, en menesteres de aguas, los preceptos 1, 2, 21 y 23 otorgan la competencia al Instituto Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados para aprobar los sistemas de abastecimiento de agua y su disposición. En definitiva, al amparo de la citada Ley de Construcciones, y en lo que viene relevante al caso, corresponde a las corporaciones locales emitir la autorización para emprender la construcción de una determinada obra (dentro de ellas, las urbanizaciones). A su vez, conjuntamente con otras autoridades públicas, desplegar acciones de fiscalización de esas obras, a fin de constatar su conformidad con el marco regulatorio. Empero, ese control que es de su incumbencia directa, no es dependiente de las acciones de otros órganos.

IX.- Alcances del marco fiscalizador en el caso concreto. Estima esta Sala que la concepción misma de las potestades de fiscalización en materia urbanística que se han encomendado a las Municipalidades (ya comentadas), son manifestaciones de un poder público derivado de competencias otorgadas por el orden constitucional y legal en este campo, que justifica el apoderamiento de la Administración. Le permiten por tanto el despliegue de una serie de atribuciones inherentes y necesarias para el ejercicio de una sana administración. Estas le facultan incluso suspender una determinada obra cuando no cumpla con las condiciones debidas, o bien, dentro de su arista preventiva y previsora, rechazar el pedimento de edificación cuando no se hayan satisfecho los requerimientos jurídicos y técnicos que las disposiciones aplicables imponen. Se trata de manifestaciones concretas del poder público que permiten la tutela de principios jurídicos, entre otros, el de seguridad y de salud. Constituye por ende una labor de inspección sobre los aspectos constructivos de las estructuras que se erijan en el espacio territorial del municipio, a efectos de determinar que cumplan con las exigencias que dispone esa legislación, así como demás regulaciones asociadas a la actividad. Estas facultades y potestades, dentro de su orientación teleológica, se ponen al servicio de los intereses públicos o colectivos, que a fin de cuentas, son el objeto que legitima su incursión en el control y fiscalización de la actividad urbanística. Al ser competencias fijadas por el Ordenamiento (como derivación directa de sus competencias constitucionales que le fueron confiadas) y que se asocian con la tutela de intereses públicos, la acción del ente local debe ponderar no solamente una labor de revisión superficial (formal) de las solicitudes de permiso de construcción, sino, una valoración integral y a fondo del acatamiento de las exigencias jurídicas y técnicas que impone el Ordenamiento. Es decir, verificando el acatamiento no solo formal sino cualitativo de la conducta objeto de control. Para tales efectos, debe considerar la armonía de la solicitud y propuestas formuladas en el plano respectivo con las disposiciones o reglas técnicas dictadas en cada supuesto. Ello aplicado a este caso envuelve que la Municipalidad debe analizar que los sistemas de tratamiento de aguas negras ofrecidos en el plano de construcción, se ajusten a las normas técnicas aplicables, de manera tal que sean funcionales y cuenten con la capacidad y el volumen que las reglas establecidas dispongan. Es decir, la viabilidad técnica de la instalación de un tanque séptico, en las dimensiones y condiciones propuestas, de manera que no impliquen riesgos potenciales de cualquier naturaleza, incluida la salud pública. Pero además, las potestades públicas en este campo no se agotan en el despliegue de una conducta autorizatoria. En efecto, la emisión del acto que permite la edificación o construcción de la obra, debe acompañarse, se insiste, de un ejercicio contralor y verificador por parte del ente otorgante, con el objeto de asegurarse que las obras en ejecución así como las ya ejecutadas, se encuentran dentro del marco normativo que regula la materia. Como se ha dicho, este ejercicio se presenta en un doble nivel: preventivo, al momento de analizar la solicitud para edificar; y posterior, en las inspecciones de esas obras para determinar que cumplen con lo autorizado y en general, con las reglas aplicables. De este modo, la función contralora debe ser continua, eficiente y eficaz. Es por ello que cuando esas competencias no han sido cumplidas de forma debida y a raíz de esa conducta o disfuncionalidad se genera un daño (de forma directa o por concurrencia), surge un nexo causal que permite imputar la lesión a la Municipalidad, conforme a las reglas de la responsabilidad objetiva fijada por la Constitución y desarrollada por la Ley General de la Administración Pública a partir del canon 190. Lo anterior puede darse por varias causas. En un primer estadio, por la denominada inactividad material, esto es, cuando del todo no se ejerce el marco contralor y verificador. En un segundo, cuando no se hace de manera adecuada, por cuanto aún realizada la verificación, se agotó en un simple cotejo de requisitos formales, más no en un examen debido en términos cualitativos, del cumplimiento o no de las exigencias que debe acatar quien pretende construir. En este escenario, la pasividad del Municipio en la debida vigilancia de cuestiones elementales para efectos de la obra, permite la burla de esas reglas, lo que puede potenciar riesgos o daños futuros a terceros. Es decir, opera en estos supuestos un funcionamiento anormal que acarrea responsabilidad. Ello al constituir conductas administrativas, que en sí mismas, se apartan de la buena administración (conforme al concepto utilizado por la propia Ley General en el artículo 102 inciso d., que entre otras cosas incluye la eficacia y la eficiencia) o de la organización, de las reglas técnicas o de la pericia y el prudente quehacer en el despliegue de sus actuaciones, con efecto lesivo para la persona. Así, la anormalidad se manifiesta por un mal funcionamiento, por un ejercicio fiscalizador insuficiente, por tal, inadecuado. Esto por cuanto si el resultado lesivo se produce en relación a hechos en los que la posición de garante que ejerce la Administración hacía exigible evitar esa consecuencia mediante el control adecuado que debió ejercer, debe afrontar las implicaciones de esa inobservancia. En este ámbito, la responsabilidad por la "inacción administrativa" (aun parcial) se produce por causa de un doble comportamiento. El primero de la persona pública o privada por cuya acción se produce el menoscabo en la esfera jurídica del o los lesionados. El otro, que concurre con aquél, por la inacción de la autoridad pública que no ejerce, como es debido, la conducta requerida para evitar el daño, lo que puede producirse, se reitera, de manera total o parcial. En este último, cuando el marco fiscalizador no abarca de manera plena la totalidad de variables que deben ser ponderadas en ese ejercicio, de modo que por inobservancia relativa se dejan de lado aspectos relevantes que conforman fuentes de riesgo. Se trata por ende de un marco relativizado de tutela administrativa no actuada (en su corriente preventiva), que como inactividad concurre a producir la lesión y provoca por tanto, la responsabilidad compartida, casi siempre solidaria, de los dos agentes causantes del daño (entendidos como centros de imputación diversos, públicos o privados). De esta forma, la inacción fiscalizadora frente a conductas de terceros, se refleja normalmente, en aquella irregularidad que debió identificar de manera oportuna; o en aquel daño producido que debió prever de acuerdo con el estado de cosas existentes; o bien, por la omisión, que para estos efectos equivale a inactividad, reprochable desde el plano jurídico, que no ejerció en tiempo y forma, las prevenciones y medidas correctivas o previsoras del caso. Claro está que tal imputabilidad depende, en alto grado, de la determinación de la existencia de un nexo causal entre aquella inacción (incluso parcial) y la lesión, en tanto, solo cuando la inactividad haya coadyuvado en la generación del daño, la responsabilidad patrimonial administrativa sería aplicable. Esto es, cuando de no haberse omitido el ejercicio fiscalizador, la lesión, con probabilidad, no hubiere llegado a causarse. Sobre el tema de la responsabilidad por inacción, véase, de esta Sala, el fallo no. 308 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 25 de mayo del 2006. En este escenario, debe insistirse en que la tutela o fiscalización que le ha sido confiada a las municipalidades en materia urbanística (que incluye la edificabilidad), no se reduce a conductas formales de autorización, sino que incluyen un control sustantivo, periódico y eficaz sobre las obras en ejecución y ejecutadas, de tal modo que la omisión de este ejercicio fiscalizador, le hace responsable de los daños producidos a terceros por ello.

X.- Manejo de las aguas negras. Regulación jurídica. En la especie, el recurrente estima que han sido violentados los numerales 87 de la Ley de Construcciones, 4 del Código Municipal y 170 de la Constitución Política, en tanto el Tribunal concluyó que la vigilancia de la conexión de las tuberías no era obligación de la Municipalidad demandada. Con ello, indica, se desconoce el deber de inspección inherente a las entidades locales. Así mismo, acusa, de la aplicación del Decreto no. 3391 mencionado el Ad quem desprende la dispensa de verificación aludida, cuando esa norma no permite tal interpretación. Interesa para el caso específico, el control que debe ejercer la Municipalidad de Heredia en el tema concreto de las tuberías de aguas negras y servidas a las previstas con que debe contar toda vivienda dentro de una urbanización. Lo anterior en razón de que el recurrente aduce que el artículo 87 de la Ley de Construcciones impone la obligación a las corporaciones locales de vigilar la edificación de las obras que se realicen en el respectivo Cantón, por lo que al no haberlo hecho respecto de las referidas tuberías, le acarrea su responsabilidad objetiva por los daños padecidos. En esta materia, como se ha indicado, la Ley de Construcciones y la Ley de Planificación Urbana remiten a norma reglamentaria. Tal desarrollo se encuentra regulado en el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, no. 3991 del 13 de diciembre de 1982. Sobre el particular, como bien lo ha señalado el Ad quem, el Reglamento aludido, en el capítulo III, denominado "Urbanizaciones", fija las reglas que son de aplicación. En este sentido, la norma prevé varias posibilidades, según sean las características de cada complejo urbanístico residencial. Al respecto dispone: "III.3.12 Cloacas: Cuando se urbanicen áreas que tengan servicio de colector de aguas negras funcionando, el urbanizador deberá conectarse a dicho sistema./ Cuando el colector se tenga previsto para una etapa posterior, el urbanizador deberá dejar construido un sistema de cloacas dentro de la urbanización para empatarse en un futuro al sistema de colectores previsto./ De no existir cloaca en funcionamiento ni prevista, se contemplan las siguientes alternativas: /III.3.12.1 Para conjuntos mayores a quinientas(500)/ unidades de vivienda se requiere la construcción de una planta de tratamiento de aguas negras propia: salvo que con el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (A y A) se negocien conjuntos mayores con tanque séptico./ III.3.12.2 En conjuntos con un número menor de lotes o viviendas se deberá adecuar el tamaño mínimo de lote para el uso de tanque séptico según lo fija este Reglamento." De esta manera, dependiendo de si existe un colector o no, el urbanizador podrá optar por una de las posibilidades reguladas, la que, en orden a lo dicho, debe ser ponderada por el municipio, instancia a quien corresponde, una vez valorado el caso concreto, establecer la procedencia de la medida que se proponga. Claro está que el diseño del abastecimiento de aguas y el sistema de tratamiento y desagüe, deberá guardar conformidad y correspondencia con las normas técnicas que en cada caso establezcan las autoridades con competencia concurrente, entre ellas, el Ministerio de Salud y el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA). Lo anterior debe plasmarse en el plano que deberán aprobar las instancias administrativas, según se colige del capítulo VI, canon 3.3 del citado Reglamento. En este sentido, en tesis de principio, el AyA es la instancia competente para fijar políticas, establecer y aplicar normas referidas al suministro de agua potable y evacuación de aguas negras (artículo 1 de su Ley Constitutiva, no. 2726 del 14 de abril de 1961 y sus reformas). Empero, conforme lo dispone el numeral 23 de su Ley Constitutiva: "Los planos para la construcción o reconstrucción parcial o total de una casa o edificio en las ciudades cabeceras de provincia o de Cantón cuyas Municipalidades tengan Departamento de Ingeniería, serán sometidas para su aprobación previa a dicho Departamento y una vez aprobados por éste, al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, para su revisión…". Esa misma regla es de aplicación cuando se trate de proyectos de urbanización. De todo lo anterior se colige que en definitiva, la verificación del cumplimiento de la normativa inherente al tema de las aguas negras recae en las corporaciones locales, siendo que son las competentes para otorgar el permiso de construcción, lo que solo es posible, dentro de un marco ideal, cuando se hayan satisfecho las regulaciones inherentes a esta materia.

XI.- Sobre el caso concreto. En la especie, el fallo impugnado parte del supuesto demostrado de que en la realidad, se ha constatado que el residencial no cuenta con un sistema de tratamiento o colector de aguas negras en funcionamiento, sino solamente previsto, y además, que el número de viviendas no supera las quinientas. Un examen simplista del presente asunto llevaría a concluir que en consideración de ese cuadro fáctico (el que dice el casacionista no se fundamenta en prueba alguna) y al tenor del citado Reglamento, la solución teóricamente viable era adecuar el lote para el uso de tanque séptico y dejar las tuberías previstas para una etapa posterior. Sin embargo, considera esta Sala que las particularidades inmersas en este debate, exigen un análisis más a fondo de lo sucedido. Ciertamente la norma aludida permite la solución que el urbanizador dio al aspecto de las aguas negras, sea, dejar previstas las tuberías (lo que autorizó la Municipalidad). Empero, la referencia de la posibilidad de instalar tanques sépticos cuando exista un número de viviendas inferior a las quinientas, debe armonizarse con la viabilidad técnica e idoneidad de la propuesta planteada por el edificador, a fin de que el sistema que en definitiva sea adoptado, resulte funcional y óptimo para cumplir su finalidad. Ergo, ello no dice que esa solución fuese la adecuada y correcta para el caso específico y para cumplir con las normas propias de la materia de construcción urbanística. En efecto, a tono con las facultades de control e inspección que le asigna la ley, la entidad local debió estudiar, si al margen de que se dieran los presupuestos que establece la norma para instalar el tanque séptico, el que se ofrecía en los planos de construcción, se ajustaba en cuanto a volumen y capacidad, al tipo de vivienda que se pretendía desarrollar. En este sentido, el control debido exigía medir no solamente la procedencia de la medida solicitada en términos teóricos, sino además, y con mayor relevancia, la capacidad de la propuesta para cumplir con su función, sea, servir de mecanismo eficiente de evacuación y almacenamiento de aguas negras, con el objeto de evitar así riesgos potenciales en la salud de las personas y la generación de daños o lesiones. Ello en virtud de que al no haber un sistema de tratamiento de aguas instalado por la Municipalidad, y por tratarse de un tipo de desecho cuyo manejo inadecuado puede lesionar la salud de los residentes y el ambiente, era imperiosa la necesidad de considerar si lo propuesto, atendía a las necesidades que debía cubrir y satisfacer. Este análisis dista de ser un ejercicio de verificación de documentos, todo lo contrario. En razón de los valores jurídicos en juego, de la actividad desplegada (urbanística) que sin duda tiene relevancia o interés público, y por las competencias que en este campo le han sido asignadas a la corporación local (como función ínsita en su territorio), era necesario que el ente local ponderara si la solución propuesta por el urbanizador era debida y óptima, de modo tal que lo que en definitiva se autorizara, cumpliera a cabalidad con el fin público y el servicio público inmerso en los títulos autorizatorios que expide el municipio. La función fiscalizadora que le ha sido asignada por el legislador en la actividad de construcciones urbanas, pretende que se realicen controles tanto preventivos como posteriores, para asegurar que las edificaciones se ajustan a los requisitos y condiciones que han sido establecidos por el orden normativo. Dicha verificación propende entonces, en el marco de las construcciones de urbanizaciones, al aseguramiento de la existencia de las condiciones adecuadas de la estructura en términos cualitativos, lo que supone, por regla de principio, que su desarrollo, se genera dentro de los causes debidos. Esto implica, que las viviendas cuentan con los servicios básicos que permitan una normal calidad de vida del residente, lo que ciertamente se deja de lado cuando un sistema de desecho de aguas negras no se ajusta a sus necesidades, constituyéndose en un riesgo inminente para su salud, su vida y la armonía del entorno urbano. La fiscalización aludida no puede considerarse realizada correctamente si no se valoró la aptitud de ese aspecto ya señalado, no en términos formales, sino en su capacidad de solventar con acierto una necesidad básica y previsible de toda vivienda. Ergo, el examen municipal no debía ser superficial, sino a fondo en aspectos como el que se indica. Desde esta perspectiva, es criterio de este órgano colegiado que la Municipalidad demandada no ejerció un debido control a priori respecto de este aspecto. Esto por cuanto en el trámite de emisión de permisos o licencias de construcción, omitió analizar la idoneidad de los tanques propuestos, para el tipo de edificación de la que se solicitaba licencia, lo que resultaba elemental para establecer si contaba con el volumen o capacidad pertinentes. En efecto, al margen de que el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones, permita esa determinada solución técnica cuando concurran los presupuestos de hecho regulados para el caso, ello no releva a la entidad local de analizar, dentro del ejercicio de sus competencias de control, si esa solución, en los términos en que fue propuesta, era viable para cada edificación, de cara a permitir un buen manejo de las aguas negras y servidas. Empero, ese estudio no se realizó de forma debida, dando paso a una autorización para instalar un tanque que no tenía el volumen que requiere cada vivienda. Desde este plano, la experticia rendida por el ingeniero Nombre38778 , indica con claridad: "Como dato técnico importante, aclaro al Juzgado que existen planos constructivos en donde se indican las tuberías de aguas pluviales y aguas negras del proyecto total, sean las tres etapas, sin embargo la empresa constructora no conectó las aguas servidas de las viviendas a las previstas que se acostumbra a dejar en la zona verde o acera; por el contrario en poco espacio de antejardín construyó un pequeño pozo de absorción, el cual no tiene la capacidad o volumen que requieren cada una de las viviendas. En los planos aprobados, la municipalidad no le dió la importancia técnica que se requieren en estos aspectos tan importantes y aprobó los planos de las viviendas con una solución de tanque séptico y tuberías de drenaje, ubicados en estos planos en el área de antejardín, lo cual no se puede aprobar así, porque no existe suficiente área, para que las tuberías (porosas) del drenaje funcionen eficientemente con esta solución. (...)" (folio 366 del principal). Nótese que incluso, en el hecho probado no. 12, el Juzgado tuvo por demostrada esta deficiencia de control administrativo, lo que posteriormente fue prohijado por el Tribunal. XII.- Considera este órgano colegiado que en el subexamine, si bien la Municipalidad dictó un acto formal en el que otorgó el permiso de construcción, el que hacía presuponer que cumplió con sus deberes de control, según se ha indicado, esa conducta no se ajusta plenamente al Ordenamiento Jurídico, en tanto dejó de ponderar si el sistema de aguas negras propuesto por el urbanizador, era adecuado o no, limitándose a un examen formal de ese requisito, lo que dice de un funcionamiento anormal de la corporación pública demandada. Se reitera, el ejercicio de las competencias de vigilancia inherente a sus potestades para otorgar las licencias de edificación o construcción, y que se encuentra dispuesta de manera expresa en los cánones 1 y 87 de la Ley de Construcciones, no se agota en un simple acto formal de autorización. Dentro de su correcta comprensión incluye una fiscalización debida, continua y eficiente sobre las obras en ejecución y las ya ejecutadas, a fin de establecer su armonía con las normas que regulan esa materia. Por ende, su desatención le genera la responsabilidad por los daños que haya causado en la esfera jurídica de terceros. Siendo así, es claro que como efecto inmediato de esa conducta en las inspecciones previas al otorgamiento del permiso de construcción, la demandada permitió instalar tanques que lejos de significar una respuesta debida al tema del tratamiento de aguas negras, conllevó a un problema no solamente para los propietarios actores, sino para la salud pública en general. Luego, ante la imposibilidad de ejecutar la garantía rendida por la firma constructora, los propietarios de las residencias en las que se presentó esa circunstancia, debieron solucionar los inconvenientes de evacuación de aguas, en razón de que según se ha dicho, el pozo no tenía la capacidad adecuada. El motivo para atribuirle a la Municipalidad la responsabilidad por esos hechos, no radica en la falta de instalación de un sistema de tratamiento de aguas negras (pues es claro que al no existir no puede ponerse en funcionamiento), sino en la desatención de sus deberes de inspección en torno a la viabilidad técnica de la instalación de un tanque séptico, en las dimensiones y condiciones que se proponía para este caso. De haberse analizado con detenimiento ese aspecto, bien pudo haberse corregido a tiempo y de esa forma, evitar la construcción de viviendas que no cuentan con un sistema de cloacas adecuado. En este sentido, la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece la responsabilidad de la Administración por su funcionamiento legítimo e ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo las causas eximentes de fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de tercero. En este extremo, la anormalidad, como mal funcionamiento público, incluye el ejercicio indebido de potestades o facultades legalmente otorgadas. En el sub-exámine, la construcción dicha se realizó una vez autorizada por la Municipalidad, aún las deficiencias señaladas, con lo cual, faltó a sus deberes de control y vigilancia que le asigna los numerales 1 y 87 de la Ley de Construcciones, los que en el particular, deben complementarse con las disposiciones del Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. Con ello, se impone la responsabilidad a cargo de la entidad local que le obliga a cubrir los daños y perjuicios padecidos por los actores que a la fecha de presentación de la demanda, fuesen propietarios de una casa o lote dentro del Residencia Cedri, partidas que deberán ser fijadas en proceso de ejecución de sentencia. De este modo, es criterio de este órgano colegiado que por los motivos expuestos, debe estimarse el agravio en examen. Por ende, debe anularse la sentencia del Tribunal, y sobre el punto, confirmar la del Juzgado. RECURSO DE LA DEMANDADA Casación por vicios procesales XIII.- El Alcalde Municipal de Heredia reclama como motivo único de esta naturaleza, violación de los numerales 106 del Código Procesal Civil y 1046 del Código Civil, al estarse en presencia de una litis consorcio pasiva necesaria. En esta dirección expresa, el litisconsorcio es una de las figuras procesales de pluralidad subjetiva que se caracteriza por situar al tercero en una relación común con una de las partes, dándose el mismo objeto y la misma causa petendi. Dice, de este modo, el actor debió haber dirigido la acción contra todas las instituciones a las cuales la ley les otorga competencia específica sobre el litigio. Expresa, esta figura supone que para resolver un asunto deben estar presentes todos aquellos sujetos a quienes la resolución pueda afectar, así como todas las instituciones públicas que por disposición legal ostentan competencia sobre el daño alegado. Afirma, en la especie, es indispensable que esa presencia se dé para que se complete la relación procesal. Cita la resolución no. 653 de las 11 horas 20 minutos del 8 de octubre del 2003 de esta Sala. Aduce, la contaminación ambiental conlleva no solo un problema local, sino de salud pública. Conforme a los ordinales 50 de la Constitución Política y 2 de la Ley General de Salud, indica, la definición de una política general de salud, su normativización, planificación y todas las acciones que sean necesarias para tutelar dicho derecho fundamental, corresponde al Ministerio de Salud, instancia a la que debió demandarse y no a la Municipalidad, por lo que tiene por violentadas esas normas. Adiciona, los problemas acusados no conciernen solamente a la salud, sino al ambiente, lo que es competencia del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, entidad rectora en dicha materia, conforme al artículo 1 y siguientes de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Transcribe fragmentos del voto no. 1322-2001 de la Sala Constitucional. Por otro lado, alega, el tema de los desagües a cielo abierto, es competencia de la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, la que es la encargada de velar por la correcta instauración, funcionamiento y mantenimiento de los sistemas de alcantarillados pluviales y sanitarios. Reproduce el canon 6 de la Ley de Transformación de la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, no. 7789, precepto que aduce se ha violentado. En relación, cita el voto no. 1431-03 de la Sala Constitucional. Desde este plano, acusa violación por aplicación indebida de los numerales 289 de la Ley General de Salud, y 4 inciso 4) del derogado Código Municipal. Concluye, existe un problema de falta de legitimación pasiva a favor de la entidad local, conforme al precepto 104 del Código Procesal Civil. Recrimina que la falta de acción contra las entidades referidas, conlleva quebranto por falta de aplicación del ordinal 1046 del Código Civil, toda vez que éste estatuye una responsabilidad solidaria en la reparación de daños y perjuicios ocasionados por hecho dañoso. XIV.- Informalidad. Litisconsorcio pasivo necesario. En la especie la censura impugna el hecho de no haber sido traídas al litigio determinadas entidades públicas, que a juicio del recurrente, era menester incorporar para efecto de la relación procesal, en razón de que por ley, son las competentes para conocer de varios de los extremos que se debaten. Desde este plano, de acuerdo con el artículo 598 del Código Procesal Civil "Para que sea admisible el recurso por la forma, es necesario que se haya pedido ante el tribunal correspondiente la rectificación del vicio, y que se hayan agotado los recursos que quepan contra lo resuelto". En la especie, la hipotética deficiencia que se señala, se expone hasta en casación, es decir, su corrección no fue solicitada en ninguna de las instancias precedentes. De consiguiente, a tenor de lo dispuesto por los ordinales 597 y 598 ibídem, se impone desestimar el cargo en cuestión. Por otra parte, y aún de considerarse que en el fondo, se recrimina una violación directa de ley sustantiva, tampoco el agravio sería pasible de ser atendido. Ello por cuanto al socaire de lo dispuesto por el numeral 608 del Código Procesal Civil, "No podrán ser objeto del recurso de casación cuestiones que no hayan sido propuestas ni debatidas oportunamente por los litigantes." Según se ha dicho, este alegato no fue expuesto por el recurrente ni ante el Juzgado ni el Tribunal. Sobre el particular, es de resaltar que la Municipalidad fue declarada rebelde al no haber contestado en tiempo la demanda. Al tenor del artículo 298 ibidem, de aplicación supletoria por mandato del canon 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, el litisconsorcio necesario incompleto es una defensa previa que debió haber sido alegada en el momento procesal oportuno, por lo que al no haberlo hecho de este modo, tal extremo no puede ser valorado en casación, procediendo su rechazo. Con todo, en otras oportunidades, esta Sala ha ingresado de manera oficiosa a conocer sobre la conformación de la litis, siendo que afecta la legitimación, que junto con el derecho y el interés constituyen presupuestos procesales elementales. No obstante, en la especie, al margen de que en la especie pudiera debatirse que el problema de contaminación ambiental que se acusa en este proceso puede llevar a considerar que la responsabilidad se extiende al Estado, en razón de que el tema de fondo incorpora las competencias propias del Ministerio de Salud y de la cartera de Ambiente y Energía, lo cierto del caso es que por un lado, la recurrente no ha logrado acreditar que la causa de la polución ambiental se produjera a raíz de acciones u omisiones de esas autoridades públicas. Con ello, que fuese necesario tenerlas como partes pasivas del proceso. Todo lo contrario, se encuentra fuera de toda duda que en esa jurisdicción territorial existe un foco de polución. Ese problema no ha sido tratado de forma debida por la Municipalidad, no obstante que se desarrolla en el Cantón sobre el cual ejerce sus competencias y que por tanto, en función del interés local, le obliga a emprender las acciones correctivas de rigor. Por otro, en todo caso, aun en este supuesto, la responsabilidad objetiva sería solidaria o eventualmente subsidiaria, ergo, la litis consorcio pasiva sería facultativa y no necesaria como se arguye. Así visto, no existe motivo que lleva a esta Sala a concluir que se está frente a un supuesto de litis pasiva necesaria. Por ende, el reclamo no es de recibo. Casación por el fondo XV.- Violación indirecta . Dice, la condena en daño moral subjetivo resulta improcedente por carecer de total fundamento, al contener errores de hecho y de derecho en la apreciación de las pruebas. Acusa violación de los cánones 153 y 155 del Código Procesal Civil, normas que imponen el deber de que las sentencias sean debidamente motivadas, lo que, considera, no sucede en el caso en cuestión, por cuanto, el daño moral subjetivo otorgado, carece de un análisis claro, preciso y congruente en cuanto a su fundamentación. Critica, el Tribunal se limita a hacer una remisión a la prueba indicada en la sentencia del Juzgado, pero no motiva las razones en cuanto a la procedencia del supuesto daño ambiental y de salud causado por la Municipalidad, así como sus repercusiones en la moral de los actores. Agrega, si bien el daño moral subjetivo no puede estructurarse y demostrase su cuantía de modo preciso, su fijación ha de quedar al prudente arbitrio del juez, teniendo en consideración las circunstancias del caso, principios generales del derecho y la equidad, la lógica y la sana crítica racional. De igual manera, acota, deben existir indicios que permitan demostrar que efectivamente se produjo. Dice, el juzgador tiene que guiarse por pautas objetivas para evitar reparaciones exiguas, irrisorias o excesivas, tales como la intensidad de la falta, circunstancias personales del damnificado, entre otras, las que en el caso en cuestión no fueron aplicadas al no existir fundamentación alguna. Aporta citas de precedentes del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo. Desde este plano, atribuye violación por falta de aplicación de los numerales 1045 y 1046 del Código Civil. Recrimina, no es cierto, y ni siquiera se demuestra con indicios suficientes que la Municipalidad haya causado daño a los actores por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia. Externa que la sentencia de primera instancia, confirmada en este aspecto por el Tribunal, estableció que la responsabilidad de la corporación local se circunscribía directamente a la basura y los desechos malolientes que se descargaban en el Río Quebrada Seca, lo que reitera, no es cierto. Manifiesta, si bien hay contaminación, no obedece a un proceder doloso, negligente u omisivo de la demandada, pues ni siquiera se ha comprobado que los actos contaminantes del río son producidos dentro de la jurisdicción del cantón. Destaca, el río tiene su origen en las zonas montañosas al norte de la provincia de Heredia, siendo que sus aguas antes de ingresar al territorio del cantón Central, discurren por San Isidro, San Rafael y Barva. Con fundamento en ello, insiste, la contaminación que se aprecia en el punto de Quebrada Seca por la Urbanización Cedri, no es producto directo de las acciones que se emprenden en el sitio, por lo que no se ha acreditado que la polución se haya causado dentro de su jurisdicción cantonal. En relación, aduce violación del ordinal 704 del Código Civil, en cuanto indica que la condena en daños y perjuicios solo comprende los que sean consecuencia inmediata y directa del hecho dañoso. Considera, ello produce un error de hecho en la apreciación de la prueba, en tanto no se determina que la Municipalidad sea la responsable directa de esa contaminación. En cuanto al daño por concepto del desagüe a cielo abierto, reitera que es la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia S.A., la encargada de velar por la correcta instauración, funcionamiento y mantenimiento de los sistemas de alcantarillados, por lo que sobre este particular, señala, la contaminación tampoco es el resultado de un actuar negligente de la entidad local, de lo que deriva la inexistencia de una relación causa-efecto, y por ende, violación del artículo 6 de la Ley no. 7789 y canon 704 del Código Civil. Agrega, la prueba pericial indica con claridad que los actores incurrieron en violaciones a las normas y reglamentos del Ministerio de Salud, al evacuar en las cunetas pluviales aguas jabonosas de los baños, pilas de lavar y fregaderos. Recrimina, existe un evidente error en la aplicación del numeral 4, inciso 4) del Código Municipal, pues con base en dicho precepto, se consideró que la Municipalidad debe encargarse directamente de velar por la salud, cuando esa norma ya se encuentra derogada por el actual Código Municipal. Asevera, a la fecha en que se apreciaron los supuestos daños ambientales y se realizó el reconocimiento judicial (2 de febrero del 2001), la normativa aplicable era la Ley no. 7794, en la que no se estatuye la obligación que erróneamente apunta el Tribunal. Insiste, eran el Ministerio de Salud y el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, las entidades a las que correspondía directamente solucionar los problemas imputados, según lo estatuyen los ordinales 340, 341, 345, 346, 355, 356, 357, 370 y siguientes de la Ley General de Salud y Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Concluye, carece de fundamentación el daño moral subjetivo.

XVI.- Casación informal. No cita las normas de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. El casacionista reclama que el fallo impugnado en cuanto a la condena en el pago del daño moral subjetivo, no se encuentra motivada. Recrimina el ejercicio valorativo de las pruebas realizado por el Tribunal, el cual llevó a ese despacho a condenarle al pago de ese extremo, aún cuando no se demostró su proceder doloso u omiso. El cargo no se ajusta a la técnica debida. Al tenor de lo preceptuado por el canon 595 inciso 3) del Código Procesal Civil, cuando se alega error de hecho, aún cuando no es necesario indicar el precepto legal infringido correspondiente al valor probatorio, sí es imperativo citar las normas que en cuanto al fondo se han visto lesionadas como consecuencia de los yerros de apreciación reclamados. Así mismo, se impone el deber de indicar de manera diáfana y precisa en que consiste la infracción. En la especie, el casacionista se limita a citar disposiciones del Código Civil relacionadas con el sistema de responsabilidad que impera en esa rama de derecho; no obstante, omite alegar como violentadas las normas que regulan la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, a saber, numerales del 190 al 198 de ese cuerpo legal. Esa mención resulta elemental en este caso, en tanto lo que se debate es la responsabilidad de una corporación local, que aún cuando autónoma por mandato constitucional, forma parte de la Administración Pública (artículo 1 LGAP), ergo, está sujeta a las reglas que esos preceptos disponen, según se ha mencionado ya en apartes previos de esta resolución. Ante este escenario, el cargo deviene informal, ante lo cual, procede su rechazo.

XVII.- Violación directa. Censura la condenatoria en costas decretada en su contra. Reprocha la violación por falta de aplicación o aplicación indebida de los cánones 221 y 222 del Código Procesal Civil, así como 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa. Arguye, si bien el ordinal 221 establece la condena al vencido, el artículo 222 de ese mismo cuerpo legal y el 98 de la Ley Reguladora mencionada, establecen que es causal de exención del pago de las costas, el haber litigado de buena fe, cuando la demanda comprenda pretensiones exageradas, el fallo acoja parcialmente las pretensiones fundamentales de la demanda, cuando admita defensas de importancia invocadas por el vencido o cuando haya vencimiento recíproco. Considera, esta situación no se analizó, dado que sencillamente no se aplicó. Cita precedentes de la Sección Primera del Tribunal. Asevera, actúo de buena fe dentro del proceso, pero además se plantearon pretensiones exageradas, sin dejar de lado, dice, que se acogieron solo algunas de las pretensiones de los actores. A la vez, se admitieron defensas importantes y hubo vencimiento recíproco. Adiciona, ante las exageradas peticiones, tuvo motivos suficientes para litigar. XVIII.- Sobre las costas. En lo que se refiere a la disconformidad por la condenatoria en costas, cabe advertir que según se desprende del numeral 98 de la Ley Reguladora, en relación a los numerales 221 y 222 del Código Procesal Civil, de aplicación supletoria según lo dispone el numeral 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, con las excepciones previstas en el numeral 69 ibidem, el pronunciamiento sobre ambas costas, debe hacerse de oficio. Esta Sala, por criterio de mayoría ha establecido que la condenatoria se impone al vencido por el hecho de serlo, es decir, por perder el litigio, sin que por tal se le considere litigante temerario o de mala fe, siendo la excepción, la liberación del pago de tales extremos, en los supuestos definidos por el legislador. En efecto, dentro del ámbito de la ley de cita, salvo por una norma especial referida a los casos de desistimiento, satisfacción extraprocesal de la pretensión y caducidad del proceso, donde el asunto de las costas se norma bajo un criterio diferente, la regla, desarrollada en el artículo 98, sigue la misma línea de la normativa procesal civil, esto es concebir la condenatoria como principio y la exoneración como salvedad. Sobre el tema, en la sentencia no. 765 de las 16 horas del 26 de septiembre del 2001. En el presente caso, estima la mayoría de la integración de este cuerpo colegiado, al condenarse a la Municipalidad al pago de la indemnización reclamada por concepto de daño moral subjetivo por el detrimento causado al ambiente, sin que haya mediado el control administrativo debido, se desprende que fue vencida en el litigio, de lo cual deriva la condenatoria en costas como regla general aplicable al caso. Excepcionalmente puede eximirse al pago de una o ambas costas en los casos a que hace referencia el ordinal 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa. De ellos interesa el regulado en el inciso c), por cuanto es el que contiene el supuesto alegado. La norma en comentario dispone que: "La parte vencida podrá ser exonerada del pago de las costas:...c) Cuando por la naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas haya habido, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo bastante para litigar". De igual modo el canon 222 del Código Procesal Civil estatuye la facultad de exención en estos extremos cuando se haya litigado de buena fe, cuando la demanda comprenda pretensiones exageradas, el fallo acoja parcialmente las pretensiones fundamentales de la demanda, cuando admita defensas de importancia invocadas por el vencido o cuando haya vencimiento recíproco. De dichos preceptos se infiere la facultad del juzgador de exonerar en costas, es decir, no es una obligación hacerlo aún dándose el supuesto previsto en ella, sino que es potestativo del juez disponer tal exoneración. Cuando no se ejerce esa facultad no puede infringirse la norma. A la inversa, cuando se utiliza, es posible que se haga de forma errónea o indebida, y entonces según las circunstancias del caso, si puede resultar procedente un recurso de casación. En este sentido ver la sentencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia no. 3 de las 14:40 horas del 6 de enero de 1995 y no. 8 de las 14 horas 40 minutos del 29 de enero de 1997. El recurso busca eximir del pago de las costas a la Municipalidad, quien ha resultado vencida en el presente litigio, bajo el alegato de que se ha litigado con el motivo suficiente y con evidente buena fe, y de que hubo vencimiento recíproco, acusando que el Tribunal no hizo uso de la facultad otorgada por ley sobre la exención en costas. No obstante, al tenor de lo expuesto, el recurso debe ser declarado sin lugar en cuanto a este extremo, pues no resultan violadas las normas aludidas, en tanto no se produce la infracción alegada por el recurrente cuando el juzgador hace uso de la regla general de la condenatoria en costas, revisión que si sería factible cuando se aplica la excepción dispuesta por la norma.

XIX.- Por las razones expuestas, procede acoger el recurso incoado por los actores, únicamente en lo que se refiere a la responsabilidad derivada por los daños producidos por el sistema de aguas negras y pluviales. Sobre este extremo, se anula el fallo del Tribunal. De conformidad con el precepto 610 del Código Procesal Civil, sobre el particular, resolviendo por el fondo, se confirma el del Juzgado. En lo demás se mantiene lo dispuesto por el Tribunal. Se rechaza el recurso formulado por la Municipalidad de Heredia, con sus costas a cargo de quien lo interpuso.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso formulado por la demandada, con las costas a su cargo. Se acoge el de los actores, únicamente en lo referente a la responsabilidad de la Municipalidad de Heredia por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por la falta de fiscalización debida de los tanques sépticos, extremo sobre el cual, se anula la sentencia del Tribunal y fallando por el fondo, se confirma la del Juzgado.

Anabelle León Feoli Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Óscar Eduardo González Camacho Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Nota de los Magistrados González Camacho y Escoto Fernández I.- Los suscritos integrantes no comparten el criterio plasmado por la mayoría de esta Sala en el considerando XVIII del fallo anterior, en cuanto deniega el control casacional para aquellos casos en los que tan sólo se hace uso de la regla general de la condena al vencido en el pago de ambas costas, es decir, cuando no se actúa o aplica ninguna norma atinente a la exoneración de ellas. En efecto, el fundamento jurisprudencial de mayoría, parte de que la exoneración en el pago de las costas es una facultad, en la que no se produce yerro ni infracción normativa cuando no se ejercita o aplica; por ello, se dice, si no hay violación legal, no es posible en casación entrar a valorar o modificar lo resuelto sobre la condena al vencido, pues se repite, para la mayoría de esta Sala, sólo puede haber infracción jurídica cuando se actúa la norma correspondiente a la exoneración (entre muchas pueden verse las sentencias de esta Sala no. 1001- F-2002, de las 11 horas 50 minutos del 20 de diciembre del 2002; la 249-F-2003, de las 11 horas 45 minutos del 7 de mayo del 2003 y la 306-F-2006, de las 10 horas 20 minutos del 25 de mayo del 2006). La concatenación parece en principio lógica, pues con esta premisa, si la exoneración constituye una facultad, el juzgador no está obligado a exonerar; y por ende, si no ordena o realiza tal exoneración, no viola las normas que corresponden al tema. Ergo, si no se da violación de normas, no puede haber revisión casacional (consúltense las resoluciones de esta Sala n°. 765 de las 16 horas del 26 de septiembre del 2001 y 561-F-2003, de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 10 de septiembre del 2003). Esta relación de ideas, les permite concluir, que en ese supuesto específico (la simple condena o la inaplicación de las exoneraciones) " no puede ser objeto de examen en esta sede" (de este mismo órgano decidor, sentencia n° 419-F-03, de las 9 horas 20 minutos del 18 de julio del 2003), pues se trata de una hipótesis "no pasible de casación" (fallo n° 653-F-2003, de las 11 horas 20 minutos del 8 de octubre del 2003). Así, en opinión de los distinguidos compañeros: no tiene cabida el recurso de casación cuando no se hace uso de la facultad exoneratoria (véanse a contrario sensu los considerandos III y VIII, por su orden de las resoluciones 541-F-2003, de las 11 horas 10 minutos del día 3 y de las 10 horas 50 minutos del día 10, ambas de septiembre del 2003). De esta forma se ha estimado por la mayoría que "… la condena en costas al vencido, como aquí sucedió no es revisable en esta Sede, habida cuenta de que el Tribunal se limitó a actuar la norma en los términos por ella dispuestos" (el destacado no es del original, véase el considerando X del voto no. 68-F-2005, de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 15 de diciembre del 2005). Y en materia notarial, con mayor contundencia, se ha señalado que: "…el Tribunal le impuso el pago de las costas de la pretensión resarcitoria a la denunciante, pronunciamiento que, se repite, no tiene casación". (considerando X de la sentencia n° 928-F-2006, de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 24 de noviembre del 2006).

II.- Sin embargo, en parecer de los suscritos, la indebida inaplicación de los preceptos que permiten la exoneración de costas, infringe, sin duda, el Ordenamiento Jurídico y, en concreto, las normas que la autorizan, ya sea por error o inadecuada apreciación de los jueces en el conflicto específico. En ese tanto, aunque se trate de una facultad, es lo cierto que no se encuentra inmune al control casacional, pues tanto en su ejercicio como en su inaplicación, puede operar una violación de ley, y en esa medida, la indebida omisión no es ni debe ser, sinónimo de arbitrariedad, en tal caso, cometida por el propio Juzgador. Máxime si se trata de un apoderamiento al juez otorgado con supuestos específicos que limitan su poder discrecional en esta materia. En consecuencia, en este particular aspecto, estimamos que con la sola aplicación de la regla general del artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil (condenatoria al vencido al pago de ambas costas), no se cierran las puertas al recurso de casación, pues al contrario, el asunto es admisible para su examen de fondo (siempre y cuando se cumplan los requisitos de ley) ante un eventual vicio omisivo en la aplicación de las disposiciones legales que autorizan la exoneración de dichas costas (cánones 55 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria y 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa). No obstante lo anterior, en el caso concreto de examen, estos integrantes comparten lo dispuesto en el fondo por el Tribunal, en cuanto se impuso al vencido el pago de ellas, circunstancia que nos lleva a rechazar el agravio, y con él, el recurso que en este sentido se formula.

Óscar Eduardo González Camacho Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández Nombre207768