TSE's Authority to Suspend Mayors Based on a CGR RecommendationCompetencia del TSE para aplicar suspensión de alcaldes por recomendación de la CGR

ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: Nombre26667 DEMANDADOS: The State, the Contraloría General de la República, and the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

RECONVENTORA: Contraloría General de la República RECONVENIDOS: The State and the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

No. 0173-2016-VI.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SEXTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at nine hours thirty minutes on the twenty-second of November, two thousand sixteen.

Proceeding of pure law established by Mr. Nombre26667 , holder of identity card number CED109923, represented by attorneys Iván Ramírez Camareno, bar number CED109924 and Nombre139336 , bar number CED88103, against the State, represented in this proceeding by procuradora Paula Azofeifa Chavarría, identity card number CED363, the Contraloría General de la República, represented by Nombre4349 , identity card number CED102428 and Nombre139337 , identity card number CED14290, and the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz (in default). The Contraloría General de la República files a counterclaim against the State and the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

RESULTANDO:

1.- On January 13, 2012, the claimant filed the present lawsuit against the State and the Contraloría General de la República (hereinafter CGR), seeking a judgment ordering: "1) That resolution R-DC-203-2011, of ten hours of December two thousand eleven, and the cited resolution PA-21-2010 be annulled. 2) That it be declared that neither the TSE, nor the CGR, nor the Municipal Council, have the legal authority to sanction a Mayor. 3) That costs be imposed." He also petitioned for a precautionary measure to order the suspension of the effects of the challenged resolution R-DC-203-2011. (Images 3-11 of the file) 2.- Upon being given a hearing on the precautionary measure, the CGR responded negatively in the terms stated in images 103-149 of the file. For its part, the State also opposed the petition for a precautionary measure, as per images 162-174 of the file.

3.- By resolution No. 122-2012 of 15 hours 30 minutes of April 24, 2012, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the request for a precautionary measure. (Images 195-198 of the file) This decision having been challenged (images 203-214 of the file), the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Primera, by resolution No. 617-2012-I of 10 hours 27 minutes of October 12, 2012, ordered the appealed resolution confirmed. (Images 294-295 of the file) 4.- In a writing dated October 30, 2012, the claimant filed an amplification of the lawsuit seeking that "...the sanction that has been reported, consisting of 30 calendar days, be declared absolutely null and void, leaving it without any effect whatsoever. That the defendants be ordered to pay both costs and the damages caused...". (Images 313-330 of the file) 5.- Upon being given the legal hearing, the State responded negatively. It raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of right. (Images 339-365 of the file) For its part, the CGR opposed. It raised the defenses of failure to join a necessary passive co-litigant with respect to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and lack of right. (Images 535-559 of the file) Likewise, the CGR counterclaimed against the claimant, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (State), and the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, seeking a declaration that: "a) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following acts and resolutions issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones: 1. Official letter number STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in which, referring to official letter 00 172-20 12 (DJ-00 18-2012) from the Contraloría General de la República, it indicated that because the sanction recommended by the Contraloría General was not the cancellation of credentials, it was for the municipal council of Santa Cruz to hear the matter and not that Tribunal. (Described in the tenth fact). 2. All connected and derivative acts of the act described in the preceding point. b) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following agreements adopted by the municipal council of Santa Cruz: 1. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, Subsection 14, of January 24, 2012, in which the Municipal Council agreed to abstain from ruling on the merits of the recommendation of suspension without pay and to refer the official letters DJ- 00 17-2012 and Placa26523 12 from this Contraloría General de la República to the Commission on Legal Affairs for its corresponding analysis, recommendation, and subsequent commission opinion. (Described in the twelfth fact). 2. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25 of April 17, 2012, which consists of requesting the Municipal Legal Advisory Office to conduct a legal analysis of official letter 03012 from this Contraloría General de la República. (Described in the sixteenth fact). 3. Agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-20 12, article 3, subsection 08 of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that, having this council become aware of the official letter 10941 from the Contraloría General de la República, it is referred for consideration to a specially appointed Commission to render an opinion. (Described in the eighteenth fact). 4. All connected and derivative acts of the agreements described in the preceding points. c) That the judgment declare that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is the competent body to suspend the credentials of municipal mayors and, consequently, order the TSE to proceed immediately with the execution of the binding recommendation of suspension from office of Mr. Nombre26667 , ordered by the CGR in the final acts of procedure PA-21-2011 referenced. d) That in case of opposition, all counter-defendants be ordered to pay both costs derived from this action. VI ALTERNATIVE CLAIM (...) that the defendant Municipalidad be ordered to execute the binding recommendation of sanction of suspension ordered in the final act of procedure PA-21-2011 defined by the Contraloría General regarding the municipal mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre26667 , which must be executed immediately by the municipal council of Santa Cruz." (Images 559-598 of the file) 6.- By resolution No. 703-2013 of 11 hours of June 27, 2013, the procedural judge ordered that jurisdiction to resolve this matter corresponds to this contentious-administrative jurisdiction. (Images 638-642 of the file) Nonconformity having been raised by the State against that decision (images 667-673 of the file), by resolution No. 1696-C-S1-2013 of 11 hours 05 minutes of December 12, 2013, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ordered that the knowledge of the present proceeding corresponds to the Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. (Images 736-741 of the file) 7.- By resolution No. 313-C-S1-2014 of 09 hours 02 minutes of March 13, 2014, the Sala Primera rejected a request for clarification and addition filed by the State against the decision in ruling No. 1696-C-S1-2013 of 11 hours 05 minutes of December 12, 2013. (Images 751-753 of the file) 8.- Upon being given a hearing on the counterclaim, the State opposed it and formulated the defenses of act not subject to challenge and expiry of the action (caducidad de la acción). (Images 762-767 of the file) 9.- By order No. 1980-2014 of 16 hours 05 minutes of August 12, 2014, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the petition for inadmissibility of the counterclaim. (Images 789-794 of the file) 10.- By order No. 1981-2014 of 16 hours 10 minutes of August 12, 2014, the procedural judge ordered the defense of failure to join the State with respect to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to be upheld. (Images 796-803 of the file) 11.- This decision was appealed by the State, a remedy which was later withdrawn, a procedural step thus accepted by resolution No. 411-2015-II of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Segunda. (Image 830 of the file) 12.- By writing of August 19, 2015, the claimant-counter-defendant answered the counterclaim negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. (Images 847-853 of the file) For its part, the State opposed. It formulated the preliminary defense of res judicata regarding the challenge of the TSE's act, expiry of the action (caducidad de la acción), and lack of right. (Images 856-877 of the file) 13.- Furthermore, by order of 10 hours 24 minutes of December 16, 2015, the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz was declared in default. (Images 882-883 of the file) 14.- The preliminary hearing established in numeral 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which is recorded in the digital system of this Office, was held on April 28, 2016, with the attendance of all parties, except the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz. At that stage, the State withdrew the defense of res judicata, and by resolution No. 943-2016 of 15 hours 15 minutes of April 29, 2016, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the defense of act not subject to challenge. Furthermore, she reserved the defense of expiry (caducidad) for the judgment. As there was no evidence to be presented at trial, in accordance with numeral 98.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the matter was declared of pure law, and the co-defendants rendered their oral conclusions. (Images 895-900 of the file) 15.- The respective file was sent to this Sección Sexta of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo for the issuance of the pertinent ruling on October 18, 2016, as recorded in the detail of the Sistema Escritorio Virtual, which contains the entirety of the principal file. In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities have been observed that must be remedied.

Judge Garita Navarro writes, with the affirmative vote of judges Aguilar Méndez and Brenes Chinchilla;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Proven facts. Of relevance for the resolution of this proceeding are the following: A) REGARDING THE LAWSUIT: 1) That the CGR initiated a formal sanctioning procedure against the claimant and other officials of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, file DJ-67-2010. The opening of this procedure was ordered by the act of 09 hours 30 minutes of September 24, 2010, and was based on numerals 68 of Law No. 7428, 214, 217, 218, 249, and 308 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and in accordance with numerals 18 subsection d) of the Código Municipal, 72 and 73 of Law No. Placa2176, 39 of Law No. 8422, and 113 of Law No. 8131. In that act, a detail was made of the items comprising the file, and an oral and private hearing was convened for December 14, 2010. The directing body was composed of Licenciados Roberto Rodríguez Araica, Sergio Mena García, and Navil Campos Paniagua. (First fact of the lawsuit not controverted regarding the opening of the case, folios 194-230 -images 209-245- of the administrative file) 2) That the División Jurídica of the CGR directed the investigation of the sanctioning file DJ-67-2010 and issued the final act by resolution PA-21-2011 of 13 hours of March 23, 2011, in which it ordered: "I. RESUELVE: Declare Messrs. Nombre26667 , identity card no. CED21663, Mayor (...) of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, responsible for the commission of the acts indicated in the recitals of this resolution and deem their administrative responsibility for gross negligence to be proven in accordance with the provisions of articles 210 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, 110, subsections a), b), d), e), g), and h) of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, 4, 38, and 39 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, and articles 68 and following of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General, for authorizing through his signature a series of payment rolls to contractors without complying with the requirements established in article 2 subsection h) of the cited law and article 136 of the Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, that is, without preparing a simple set of specifications (pliego de condiciones), setting the time and date for the receipt of proposals, inviting no fewer than three potential offerors from the Registry of Suppliers, and awarding the lowest-priced offer, without prejudice to the evaluation of other relevant factors, in short, without preparing a municipal file documenting the administrative procedure for the contracting carried out.// II. Recommend on a binding basis the imposition of a sanction of suspension without pay for a period of thirty working days on Mr. Nombre26667 in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz (...)". (Folios 544 to 574 -images 559-589- of the administrative file). 3) That on March 29, 2011, the claimant formally filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal against resolution number PA-21-2011. The reconsideration was rejected by resolution of 15:00 hours on April 29, 2011. By resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Despacho Contralor at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011, the appeal was declared without merit. However, in point 4) of the operative part, it modified the appealed sanction in the sense that the 30-day suspension is in calendar days (días naturales) and not in working days (días hábiles) as had been established in act PA-21-2011. (Folios 630 to 646 of the administrative file -images 645-661- regarding the reconsideration and folios 791 to 803 of the administrative file -images 806-818- regarding the appeal). B) REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM: 1) That by resolution of 09:30 hours on September 24, 2010, the decision-making body of the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República issued the act of opening of administrative procedure, number DJ-67-2010, against Mr. Nombre26667 , Mayor of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, among others. It was noted that the alleged offenses in which he might have incurred could generate some type of disciplinary liability, specifically the imposition of a sanction ranging from a reprimand to the cancellation of credentials in the position he holds as mayor of the municipality of Santa Cruz, as well as the prohibition on entry or re-entry into positions in the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), the application of which has the consequence of immediate cessation from any Public Treasury position held at that time. This resolution was personally notified to Mr. Nombre26667 on October 20, 2010 (Folios 194-234 and 250 of the administrative file). 2) On February 22, 2011, the oral and private hearing was held, attended by the claimant-counter-defendant and his defense attorney, and in which he presented his arguments and conclusions. (Folios 541-542 of the administrative file, audio recording of that act) 3) That the División Jurídica of the CGR directed the investigation of the sanctioning file DJ-67-2010 and issued the final act by resolution PA-21-2011 of 13 hours of March 23, 2011, in which it recommended suspension without pay for a period of 30 working days. The foregoing, considering that the investigated mayor had authorized a series of payment rolls to contractors without complying with the requirements established in article 2 subsection h) of the cited law and article 136 of the Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, that is, without preparing a simple set of specifications (pliego de condiciones), setting the time and date for the receipt of proposals, inviting no fewer than three potential offerors from the Registry of Suppliers, and awarding the lowest-priced offer, without prejudice to the evaluation of other relevant factors; in short, without preparing a municipal file documenting the administrative procedure for the contracting carried out. (Folios 544-574 of the administrative file) 4) That on March 29, 2011, Mr. Nombre26667 filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal and concomitant nullity against resolution number PA-21- 2011, issued by the decision-making body of the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República. (Folios 591-602 of the administrative file). 5) The reconsideration was rejected by resolution of 15:00 hours on April 29, 2011. By resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Despacho Contralor at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011, the appeal was declared without merit. However, in point 4) of the operative part, it modified the appealed sanction in the sense that the 30-day suspension is in calendar days (días naturales) and not in working days (días hábiles) as had been established in act PA-21-2011. (Folios 630 to 646 of the administrative file regarding the reconsideration and folios 791 to 803 of the administrative file regarding the appeal). 6) That in a writing dated January 12, 2012, the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República, by official letter 00149-2012 (DJ-00 17-2012), notified the Concejo Municipal of Santa Cruz of the final act number PA-27-2011, as well as resolution R-DC-203-2011 from the office of the Contralora General de la República, so that within a maximum period of eight working days, they would proceed to order the execution of the terms imposed in said resolutions. Likewise, citing article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, the council was warned of the possibility of filing a motion for review (gestión de revisión) against the recommendation of sanction, within a period of eight working days counted from the notification of that official letter. (Folios 809-812 of the administrative file). 7) That by official letter 00172-2012 (DJ-00 18-20 12) of January 13, 2012, the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República notified the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones of the final act number PA-21-2011 issued within the administrative procedure processed in the División Jurídica and resolution R-DC-203-2011 from the office of the Contralora General de la República, and that, taking into consideration the precedents of that Tribunal—that in cases where the auditing body does not recommend the cancellation of credentials, the sanction to be imposed should be the responsibility of the Municipal Council—the official letter 00149-2012 (DJ-00 17-2012) described in the previous fact was sent to the Municipal Council. (Folios 814-815 of administrative file DJ-67-2010). 8) That by official letter STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones informed the CGR that the recommended sanction corresponded to the municipal council of Santa Cruz, as it did not involve the cancellation of credentials. (Folios 820-821 -images 839-840- of the administrative file). 9) That by official letter SM-0014-0rd.0014-2012 of January 25, 2012, the Concejo Municipal of Santa Cruz makes known to the Contraloría General de la República the agreement adopted by that collegial body in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, Subsection 14, of January 24, 2012, in which it agreed to abstain from ruling on the merits of the recommendation of suspension without pay. In the same manner, it submitted a request for review (solicitud de revisión) against the recommendation and referred official letters DJ-00 17-2012 and DJ-00 18-2012 from the CGR to the Commission on Legal Affairs for its corresponding analysis, recommendation, and subsequent commission opinion. (Folios 826 of the administrative file). 10) That by resolution number R-DC-25-20 12 of February 29, 2012, the office of the Contralora General de la República declared the motion for review (gestión de revisión) filed by the Concejo Municipal of Santa Cruz without merit as inadmissible. (Folios 830-836 of the administrative file) 11) That by official letter 03012 (DJ-03 14-20 12) of March 29, 2012, the CGR reiterated to the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz the order to execute the recommendation, within a non-extendable period of eight working days, under penalty of incurring the infraction provided for in article 69 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General. Similarly, it informed the local entity of the criterion upheld in official letter STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, in the sense that the execution of the sanction does not correspond to said Tribunal. (Folios 849-850 of the administrative file). 12) That by official letter SM-0324-0rd. l6-2012 of June 6, 2012, the Concejo Municipal of Santa Cruz communicates to the Contraloría General de la República the agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25 of April 17, 2012, in which it was ordered to request the Municipal Legal Advisory Office to conduct a legal analysis of the aforementioned official letter 03012 mentioned in the preceding section. (Folios 869-870 of the administrative file) 13) By official letter 10941 (DJ-1009-2012) of October 17, 2012, the CGR warned the Concejo Municipal of Santa Cruz to order the execution of the sanction imposed on the mayor, given that the precautionary measure filed by that official within this judicial process was rejected by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo and the Tribunal de Apelaciones through resolutions 122-2012 of 15:30 hours on April 24, 2012, and 617-2012 of 10:27 on October 12, 2012, respectively. (Folio 873 of the administrative file) 14) That by official letter SM-856-Ext.2 l-20 12 of October 30, 2012, the Concejo Municipal of Santa Cruz communicates to the Contraloría General de la República the agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-20 12, article 3, subsection 08 of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that, having this council become aware of the official letter from the Contraloría General de la República indicated in the previous fact, it is referred for consideration to a specially appointed Commission to render an opinion. (Folio 879 of the administrative file) II.- Facts not proven: Of relevance for this ruling are the following: 1) That the opening of the sanctioning procedure file DJ-67-2010 was due to a request made by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones or an infraction of the electoral regime. 2) That as of the date of this proceeding, the sanction of suspension ordered by the CGR in sanctioning file DJ-67-2010 had been executed.

III.- Subject matter of the proceeding. Regarding the lawsuit, having delineated the claims of the claimant, the subject matter of this dispute is directed at the analysis of the validity of resolution R-DC-203-2011, of ten hours of December two thousand eleven, and the cited resolution PA-21-2010, both from the CGR, which ordered a sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days without pay against the claimant, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste. From the analysis of the claimant's arguments, it is clear that the cause of nullity revolves around a specific issue, namely, the lack of competence (incompetencia), due to the absence of an enabling statute, for the TSE, the CGR, or the Municipal Council to sanction a Mayor for the infractions against internal control regulations ordered by the CGR. Essentially, he argues that the Mayor is a figure regulated in article 12 of the Código Municipal, being an official elected by popular vote. He says the TSE is responsible for the cancellation of his credentials, but it is not competent to sanction him in any other way. He argues that the TSE is not a hierarchical superior of the Mayor, nor would the general sanctioning power be an electoral matter. He contends that the CGR issued a mere recommendation without specifying to whom it was directed. What the CGR ordered was a recommendation, so no sanction was imposed. He believes the Municipal Council is not the hierarchical superior of the Mayor, so it is not competent to impose sanctions on him. He mentions vote No. 776-CF-S1-2008 of the Sala Primera. He censures that the CGR is requiring the Local Council to sanction the mayor. He believes the act is null as to its content for being unlawful in that it attempts to force an incompetent body to execute what no one ordered or to order what it cannot. He refers that numerals 1, 68, 77, and following of the Ley Orgánica de la CGR (No. Placa2176) do not empower that body to impose sanctions, nor to instruct bodies to sanction when they are not competent. Similarly, in the amplification of the lawsuit, he argues that the Contraloría acted as investigator based on what article 259 of the Código Electoral (Law No. 8765) provides, even though that rule provided for the Contraloría's participation only at the request of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, within a proceeding for potential cancellation of credentials. In this sense, he points out that said Tribunal only has competence to cancel the Mayor's credentials, but not to sanction him in any other way. Regarding these aspects, it is worth noting what is set forth below.

IV.- On the competencies of the CGR to order sanctions related to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) regime. An aspect that is imperative to analyze in this proceeding refers to the competencies of the auditing body to investigate sanctioning procedures against public agents whose actions or omissions constitute infractions against the Public Treasury regime, an axis that includes the correct and efficient management of public funds and assets, internal control, and the duty of probity. In that sense, as a derivation of numerals 183 and 184 of the Magna Carta, the CGR serves as an auxiliary body of the Legislative Assembly with specialized competencies in matters of oversight of the Public Treasury, with functional and administrative independence in the exercise of its duties. Its competencies are specified and developed, in accordance with what is mandated by numeral 184 subsection 5) of the Constitución Política, in its Organic Law (Ley Orgánica), No. 7428, as well as in another set of legal sources that establish regulations referring to or related to that central axis of its powers. Among those norms (but not limited to those references) one can mention the Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, No. 8131, the Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292, the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, No. 8422, and the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, No. 7494. From this perspective, as the State correctly argues, the inspection powers (and eventual administrative sanction) held by the CGR find their basis in the text of the Magna Carta itself and in a prolix legal development. On this plane, as the enabling basis for the powers that the claimant finds lacking, it is worth referring to the provisions of numerals 1, 8, 10, and 68 of Law No. 4828 (Ley Orgánica de la CGR -LOCGR-). Numeral one of that legal source clearly states that the CGR is "...a fundamental constitutional body of the State, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the superior control of the Public Treasury and governing body of the inspection system contemplated by this Law." In that sense, canon 8 of that legal source establishes that the Public Treasury shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to collect, administer, safeguard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial norms relating to the budget process, public procurement, internal and external control, and the liability of public officials. This reference specifies the existence of a set of norms that define and establish the various aspects related to the exercise of competencies to safeguard compliance with the obligations and principles inherent to the Public Treasury. Thus, article 10 of the LOCGR mandates that "The superior control and inspection framework of the Public Treasury comprises the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relationships, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from or necessary for that inspection./ This framework also comprises the norms that regulate the inspection of foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, referred to in this Law, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework." As a derivation of this power, canon 68 of the LOCGR establishes the competence to order and recommend the execution of sanctions as follows: "Article 68.- Power to order and recommend sanctions.

The Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), without prejudice to other sanctions provided by law, when in the exercise of its powers it determines that a servant of the passive subjects has committed infractions against the norms that make up the control and oversight framework contemplated in this Law or has caused harm to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its technical criterion, which is binding, the application of the corresponding sanction according to the merits of the case. The Comptroller shall form a file against the eventual offender, guaranteeing them, at all times, due process and sufficient opportunity for a hearing and for defense in their favor. / The competent authority of the required passive subject must comply, within the period established by the Comptroller, with the recommendation issued by it; unless, within a term of eight business days counted from the notification of the act, a review motion is filed, duly motivated and reasoned, by the head of the required passive subject. In this case, and once said motion is resolved, they must comply without delay with what is provided in the final technical-legal pronouncement of the Comptroller, under penalty of incurring the crime of disobedience, without prejudice to the statute of limitations regime contemplated in this Law. (...)" On the other hand, ordinal 73 of the same law establishes the CGR's competence to instruct procedures to impose the cancellation of credentials of a council member (regidor) or district council member (síndico), proprietor or alternate, who gravely infringe the norms of the oversight and control framework for the Public Treasury contemplated in that Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds; or for incurring in any of the acts provided in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, as generators of administrative liability. Likewise, that precept establishes that when a grave fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), the council members who, with their affirmative vote, have approved said agreement, shall incur the same cause for cancellation of their credentials. Furthermore, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public office, as well as those provided in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, shall be cause for cancellation of the credential of council member or district council member, proprietor or alternate. The competent judicial authority shall effectuate, ex officio, the respective communication to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE). As is evident from the foregoing, Law No. 7428 imposes a special procedure for the administrative sanction of infractions against the norms that make up the control and oversight framework or that have caused harm to the Public Treasury, thus being fully competent to instruct administrative procedures aimed at determining the aforementioned harm and infractions and, based on that procedure, to recommend in a binding manner, to the heads of the passive subjects or, as applicable, to the pertinent bodies, the application of the corresponding sanctions. Canon 43 of Law No. 8422 establishes the same treatment, which legitimizes the CGR to conduct said administrative matters and recommend in a binding manner the sanctions to be imposed. This aspect, which is only tangentially discussed by the lawsuit, has been the subject of extensive development by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), a superior body that has recognized, with all clarity and forcefulness, the powers of that body for corrective actions for infraction of the probity regime and protection of the Public Treasury. By way of reference, in the unconstitutionality action heard in file No. 03-007482-0007-CO, in which the validity was questioned, among other norms, of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 27.974-MP-H, Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the very precept 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LOCGR), through vote (voto) No. 13140 of 14 hours 37 minutes on November 12, 2003, that Constitutional Court stated in the relevant part: "VIII.- (...) Based on these two provisions, in a constant and reiterated manner, constitutional jurisprudence has pronounced on the special competences that the Political Constitution assigns to the Comptroller General of the Republic concerning vigilance in the management of public funds and in the financial management of public employees, and specifically. In this sense, mandatory consultation includes, among others, rulings number 2398-91, of 15:20 hours on November 13, 1991; 0660-92, of 15:00 hours on March 10, 1992; 3607-94; of 15:15 hours on July 19, 1994; 0016-95, of 15:45 hours on January 3, 1995; 2632-95, of 16:06 hours on May 23, 1995; 4284-95, of 15:06 hours on August 3, 1995; 5119-95; of 20:39 hours on September 13, 1995; 0998-98, of 11:30 hours on February 16, 1998; 9524-99, of 9:06 hours on December 3, 1999, 3027-00, of 9:03 hours on April 14, 2000, 2000-6326, of sixteen hours eighteen minutes on July nineteenth, two thousand, and number 2001-4835, of fourteen hours fifty-six minutes on June sixth, two thousand one. In each and every one of the cited rulings, the Chamber emphasizes that by will of the constituent, the Comptroller General of the Republic was created as a –constitutional– organ auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly with a specific and determined function: the vigilance of the Public Treasury, so that by constitutional mandate –Articles 183 and 184– tasks such as the oversight of administrative contracting procedures and the functioning of the financial system, especially regarding the mobilization of capital so that confidence in the correct administration of banking entities is maintained, the management of the budget of each and every public dependency, as well as the control of personnel who 'receive, guard, pay, or administer assets or values of the State' are not beyond the functions entrusted to this comptroller organ, but quite the opposite, since they respond to the interest of the proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies. This is reinforced by the fact that, for the Comptroller to effectively carry out this task, the Political Constitution itself in its Article 24 endows it with a special faculty, which is the possibility to review accounting books and their annexes for tax purposes and to oversee the correct use of public funds respectively, a faculty that the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic develops in Article 13. It is clear that these competences have their origin in constitutional rank norms, and are developed in laws, such as the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, number 7428, the Law of Financial Equilibrium of the Public Sector, number 6955, the Law of Internal Control, number 8292, and the Law of Financial Administration, number 8131; and regarding the control of the budget, contracting, and municipal resources, in the current Municipal Code itself; and even in regulatory norms, such as the Regulation on the functioning of state enterprises structured as commercial companies, Executive Decree number 7927-H, and in the Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic, number 27.974-MP-H. By way of conclusion, what was said by the Chamber regarding the functions entrusted to the Comptroller General of the Republic in ruling number 5119-95, of 20:39 hours on September 13, 1995, is transcribed: 'V.-The Comptroller General of the Republic as its Organic Law emphasizes (Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994) is an organ of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly, whose general function is the superior control of the Public Treasury and the direction of the oversight system regulated in the cited law. It mainly exercises the specific attributions that the Constitution confers on it in Article 184.(...)' Later in that same ruling, concerning the validity of the competence of instruction and sanction referred to by ordinal 68 of the LOCGR, it stated: 'Regarding the challenge of this norm, the Chamber reiterates the considerations given previously in its jurisprudence, both with respect to its special competence, of constitutional order, assigned to the Comptroller General of the Republic, and regarding the faculty, not only to initiate sanctioning procedures, but even to issue binding opinions regarding the sanctions to apply to the servants of its oversight subjects, from which the following conclusions can be derived: a) that the challenged faculty of the Comptroller derives from numerals 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution, for which reason, it cannot be considered that it constitutes an invasion of the autonomy conferred on autonomous institutions in their management, insofar as the sanctioning faculty recognized to this constitutional organ does not derive from a hierarchical or labor relationship; that is, the sanctions it exercises are not disciplinary sanctions, but the faculty of superior vigilance and oversight of the Public Treasury, hence, it does not assume functions of the active administration, because its action is a logical and necessary consequence of its assigned constitutional competence; b) that the challenged faculty materializes as a consequence of the application of an ordinary sanctioning administrative procedure, in which full respect and fulfillment of the guarantees of due process are given, in which the investigated person can effectively exercise their right of defense, such that they can refute the charges imputed to them, provide the evidence they deem necessary, access the file, formulate the remedies they deem convenient, and of course, the motivation of all acts issued; so that the power to issue a binding recommendation is born and materializes only when the Comptroller deems the infraction of the norms that make up the control and oversight framework (constitutional norms and principles of administrative contracting and budget elaboration and execution, the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Law of Internal Control) to be accredited, or when it verifies harm to the Public Treasury; c) that the sanction is not applied by the Comptroller General of the Republic, but by the hierarchical superior of the non-compliant servant; who, in turn, can formulate a review motion (Article 38 of the Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic) before the Comptroller General of the Republic, in case of not agreeing with the recommendation; and d) that the investigation faculty of the Comptroller is limited to the scope of its competence, that is, the management and administration of the Public Treasury, only. Likewise, it must be considered that the autonomy enjoyed by autonomous institutions is not unlimited, insofar as Article 188 of the Political Constitution itself subjects them to the law in matters of government, hence, they are subject to administrative oversight, which is manifested through planning, directives, and of course, the controls provided in the Fundamental Charter itself for the management of public funds, whose constitutional organ in charge of such task is the Comptroller General of the Republic - Articles 183 and 184 -. Therefore, the challenged competence, far from overflowing the natural scope of the functions that the Political Constitution grants to the Comptroller General of the Republic, is congruent with it, such that the attempt to eliminate the faculty of the Comptroller General of the Republic to investigate and sanction public servants who administer public funds would imply diminishing the competence that by constitutional mandate is recognized to this constitutional organ; which, rather, would threaten the Political Constitution itself. By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the action regarding the challenge made of Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and confirm the constitutional jurisprudence that has been dictated in this matter.' This extensive development makes it unnecessary for this Court to elaborate on reasons to sustain the CGR's competence to instruct procedures against a public official for infraction against the Public Treasury, as has been deemed accredited to have occurred in this case, given that the opening of file DJ-67-2010, which involved the plaintiff, referred to conduct related to that regime, and not to electoral matters as the claimant appears to incorrectly assert. In that line, contrary to what is indicated in the lawsuit, the CGR's participation in this questioned procedure does not derive from the assumption regulated in precept 259 of the Electoral Code (Código Electoral). Said norm stipulates the CGR's participation in the procedure for cancellation of credentials, when the cause for that sanction relates to the violation of the norms of the oversight framework contemplated in the LOCGR, Law No. Placa5670, No. 8292, or others related to the Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury. In such an assumption, it is established that the TSE shall remit the file to the CGR so that, in accordance with ordinal 68 of its Organic Law, it recommends what is pertinent. However, from the analysis of the records, in this case, it is not inferred that the CGR's action obeyed the application of that mandate, but rather that the instruction of the procedure was in the direct exercise of its oversight competences. For this, it suffices to note that the sanction imposed was not the cancellation of credentials, but rather suspension from office for 30 calendar days. It is worth highlighting that the alluded competence encompasses any official who administers public funds or is subject to the normative regime of internal control, probity, and sound administration of the Public Treasury, which includes public agents designated through electoral processes, as is the case of the figure of the Municipal Mayor (Alcalde Municipal), an official who enjoys no kind of immunity that places them outside the sanctionable powers for infraction against the Superior Control and Oversight Framework of the Public Treasury or the norms of internal control and administrative contracting in particular.

V.- On the content of the CGR's act and the competence for execution of the sanction. As a second aspect, it is discussed that the act issued by the comptroller body is limited to recommending a sanction, but not imposing it, so it is not appropriate to execute what has not been ordered. This Court respects but in no way shares what is indicated by the petitioner. In accordance with what is stipulated by Article 68 of the LOCGR, once the respective procedure is completed, the CGR shall recommend the application of a sanction, in a binding manner. On the nature and content of these proceedings, in vote number 13926-2006 of 14 hours 44 minutes on September 20, 2006, the Constitutional Chamber ruled: "VI.- ON THE BINDING NATURE OF THE OPINIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC.- The challenge of Articles 4 and 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic is also deemed improper, as it denotes a confusion on the part of the plaintiff regarding the prerogatives that the Political Constitution confers on this constitutional organ of control and oversight of the public treasury, and that the law is responsible for developing. Indeed, it is noted that the binding nature of the Comptroller's opinions is referred not to the studies that precede an administrative procedure –which correspond to the preliminary stage of administrative procedures–, but to the decision that resolves that administrative procedure, in which the sanction to apply is determined, in which full guarantees of due process are provided, as this Court indicated in the cited ruling number 2003-13140. '[...] the challenged faculty materializes as a consequence of the application of an ordinary sanctioning administrative procedure, in which full respect and fulfillment of the guarantees of due process are given, in which the investigated person can effectively exercise their right of defense, such that they can refute the charges imputed to them, provide the evidence they deem necessary, access the file, formulate the remedies they deem convenient, and of course, the motivation of all acts issued; so that the power to issue a binding recommendation is born and materializes only when the Comptroller deems the infraction of the norms that make up the control and oversight framework (constitutional norms and principles of administrative contracting and budget elaboration and execution, the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Law of Internal Control) to be accredited, or when it verifies harm to the Public Treasury;' The above makes sense since it is clarified to the plaintiff that even though the sanctioning power of the Comptroller General of the Republic has been recognized, it is referred to initiating, instructing, and deciding that administrative procedure, such that it is not the organ in charge of applying the sanction to the servant subject to oversight, but rather the authority on which the required subject depends –organizationally, disciplinarily, and hierarchically– (superior head). Thus, this binding nature derives from the same constitutional norms –183 and 184–, that is, from the recognition of the function of control and oversight of the public treasury that has been granted –it is insisted– by constitutional mandate to the Comptroller. Therefore, far from being unconstitutional, Articles 4 and 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic are in conformity with Constitutional Law, insofar as they recognize and provide for the binding nature of the opinions of this constitutional organ, as an indispensable condition for it to fulfill the task that the Fundamental Charter has entrusted to it. (...)". In that context, the alluded norm (Article 68) establishes the CGR's power to initiate the procedure and order the sanction to apply, an application that it recommends in a binding manner to a specific Public Administration. The debate presented by the promoter revolves around the competence to apply that binding recommendation. As has been indicated, the actor postulates that in the absence of an enabling norm, neither the TSE nor the Municipal Council can impose and execute said sanction; the former because the facts by virtue of which the sanctioning regime is sought to be applied escape electoral matters and overflow the sanction of cancellation of credentials, which the Electoral Code confers on that authority. Regarding the Municipal Council, because it is not the hierarchical superior of the mayor, but an internal body of the Municipality with which it shares a duty of inter-administrative coordination. On that particular, it is worth highlighting what is set forth below. The Mayor forms part of the authorities that compose the municipal government, according to what is inferred from ordinal 169 of the Magna Carta. In that line, numeral 12 of the Municipal Code, Law No. Placa1170, establishes that "The municipal government shall be composed of a deliberative body called Council (Concejo) and integrated by the council members determined by law, and additionally, by a mayor and their respective alternate, all popularly elected." This is a popularly elected official, whose designation can be terminated through the cancellation of the respective credential via the procedure stipulated by the respective norms. That particular topic does not matter in this case because it was not the sanction imposed. However, it is worth specifying that in accordance with the current Electoral Code, Law No. 8765, the cancellation of the credential of mayors is the competence of the TSE, as defined from canon 253 of that legal body. However, when the sanction to impose derives from harm to the regime of protection of the Public Treasury (topic of interest), one must discriminate between cases where that transgression is a cause for cancellation of credentials, from those assumptions where the sanction is a suspension in the exercise of office. In the former (cancellation of credentials), although the competence for cancellation belongs to the TSE, as indicated, numeral 259 of the Electoral Code establishes the mandatory participation of the CGR as the governing body in this field. In this assumption, the alluded competence is reiterated by ordinal 73 of the LOCGR insofar as it indicates: "Article 73.-Cancellation of credential (*) The commission of a grave fault by a council member or district council member, proprietor or alternate, against the norms of the oversight and control framework of the Public Treasury contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds; or for incurring in any of the acts provided in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, as generators of administrative liability, shall be cause for the cancellation of the respective credential. This shall apply when the offender has acted in the exercise of their office or on the occasion thereof./ When the grave fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the municipal council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, have approved said agreement, shall incur the same cause for cancellation of their credentials./ Furthermore, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public office, as well as those provided in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, shall be cause for cancellation of the credential of council member or district council member, proprietor or alternate. The competent judicial authority shall effectuate, ex officio, the respective communication to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal." On the other hand, when the applicable sanction is not the cited cancellation, ordinal 68 of the LOCR (which regulates the generic competence of oversight and sanction) limits itself to indicating that the CGR "...shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its technical criterion, which is binding, the application of the corresponding sanction according to the merits of the case...". Thus, in the specific case of municipal mayors, in initial thesis, that mandate does not clearly define the authority that must execute the sanction when it does not involve the cancellation of credentials. At this point, a clarification must be made that this Court considers and deems fundamental in the debate addressed in this case; and that is that there is no absence of express legal regulation regarding the reprehensible conduct and the sanction associated with that fault (should it be accredited). Therefore, no regulatory deficiency occurs regarding the sanction or the conduct that gives rise to it, so no risk whatsoever is observed of infraction of the constitutional guarantee of typicity of faults or reservation of law in matters of regulation of sanctionable conduct (nulla crimen nulla poena sine legem). It is clear that both ordinal 68 of the LOCGR, as well as the regulations contained in ordinals 39, 41, and 42 of Law No. 8292, as well as in mandates 38, 39, 40, 41, and 43 of Law No. 8422, establish the legal normative references that beforehand qualify the conducts and impose the applicable sanctions to the various behaviors that constitute harm to the norms of the superior control and oversight framework of the Public Treasury. Therefore, no debate exists regarding an eventual harm to that guarantee. The matter focuses on the interpretive divergence (if a gap exists) regarding the competence or power to apply the sanctions that the CGR recommends in a binding manner in the exercise of those powers, and in accordance with the procedural framework provided in precept 68 of its Organic Law. At this point, it should be noted that a precedent of this Contentious-Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), specifically, ruling No. 69-2015-VII of 10 hours 45 minutes on July 20, 2015, of Section VII, analyzed an aspect similar to that addressed in this process, but referred to the Mayor of Nombre10042. In that sense, that section of this Contentious-Administrative Court considered that there was no gap whatsoever regarding the power to apply the suspension sanctions of the local mayor that the CGR recommended, given that Law No. 8292 and No. 8422 establish that in the cases of mayors, the CGR remits the file with the respective recommendation to the TSE, so that the pertinent sanction is applied, based on which it deemed that the questioned power corresponded to that electoral authority. As stated, that criterion was based on the interpretation made of the indicated norms, from which those judges inferred that, far from a regulatory gap existing, the norms were clear in the assignment of that power in favor of the TSE. On such aspect, it was indicated: "X.- (...) Notwithstanding what has been said, as will be stated, Articles 42 of the Law of Internal Control No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, and Article 43 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office No. 8422 of October 6, 2004, expressly provide that in the case of administrative sanctions on municipal mayors, the application of sanctions that, in matters of breach of the norms of oversight, control, and vigilance of the Public Treasury, the Comptroller General of the Republic orders in the administrative procedures implemented for such effects, is the competence of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, so there is no legal vacuum on the matter. (...) The cited provisions expressly establish that in the event that the breach of the provisions related to faults contained in the Laws in question are attributed to the members of the supreme powers (among which the Municipal Mayors are found), the Comptroller General of the Republic must report what is pertinent, in this case, to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, so that it proceeds to impose the corresponding sanctions. As provided specifically and crystal clear in the cited norms, contrary to what was argued by the State, said electoral body is also competent to execute the binding administrative sanctions other than the cancellation of credentials, which in the exercise of its constitutional and legal powers, the Comptroller General of the Republic recommends in a binding manner in proceedings where the alleged responsible parties are attributed the breach of provisions of norms that make up the Public Treasury, contained among others in the Law of Internal Control and the Law Against Illicit Enrichment in Public Office. In this same sense, contrary to what was argued by the plaintiff (...), there exists no legal vacuum on the matter, and the cited provisions are compatible with the system of personal responsibility and accountability to which public officials - including municipal mayors - are subject by provision of Article 11 of the Magna Carta. (...)" After the analysis of the norms on which that ruling bases its final decision, this Court fully respects the expressed position, but does not share it, to the extent that although those precepts, with greater emphasis on canon 43 of Law No. 8422, establish that in the case of mayors, the CGR shall inform the TSE so that it imposes the corresponding sanctions, when considering that content with the power stipulated by canon 259 of the Electoral Code (Law No. 8765), which refers to the cancellation of credentials but omits reference regarding other sanctions, a space of little clarity is inferred regarding the debated topic, that is, the competent body to apply sanctions recommended by the CGR against mayors other than the cancellation of credentials, this latter sanction being clearly the concern of the TSE. However, it is deemed, that same regulatory clarity is not observed in the case of the other sanctions. Notwithstanding, the absence of an express rule is not an obstacle for this Court to define the point in question, given that the same Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333, indicates in the second paragraph of mandate 5, the impossibility of excusing oneself from exercising one's authority or from ruling on matters within one's competence due to the lack or clarity of the norm to apply, noting that the jurisdictional work in the specific case must be satisfied in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, adhering to the hierarchical scale of sources. From that angle, it is necessary that, in accordance with mandates 7 and 9 of the LGAP, this Court proceed to integrate the Public Legal System and proceed to interpret and conclude on the applicable rules in light of this apparent normative gap.

For this, it is necessary to note that in accordance with the interpretative guidelines established by precept 10 of that LGAP, the administrative norm should be interpreted in the way that best guarantees the fulfillment of the public purpose to which it is directed. Of course, this task must be carried out with full respect for the rights and interests of individuals and considering whether the language used by the legislator in drafting the norm allows for a level of alternative solutions (polysemy), in which case, it is primary to consider the categorical value to be protected (purpose or ultimate value), as well as the legal means that most adequately and rationally allow for the protection and satisfaction of that purpose (performance criteria). However, it is necessary to indicate that in view of this panorama, it is the legislator who is responsible for defining the debated issue in a clear and unequivocal manner, so the following position is subject to what may eventually be defined in this regard in the respective legal sources. Ergo, the following position derives from the interpretation of the norms that, in the consideration of this Chamber, would provide an answer to the situation under analysis, but with the warning that its pertinence is conditioned on the express legal regulation that may be enacted by law on the matter. All in all, and after this clarification, in the judgment of this collegiate body, several possible scenarios emerge before the dilemma in question, namely: a) The impossibility of executing the sanction due to the absence of an express rule assigning competence; b) Competence of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal); and c) Competence of the TSE. The examination of the possible solutions is entered into next.

VI.- Regarding the allegation of impossibility of executing the sanction: That in the absence of an express norm defining the competence to execute and apply the sanction recommended by the CGR (even when binding), and considering that it is a power of authority (potestad de imperio), as long as there is no express rule on that power, the sanction is inapplicable or unenforceable. From the outset, this thesis is not shared by this Court because it would imply an absolute violation and immunity (and impunity) in favor of the aforementioned local officials, regarding conducts that constitute breaches of the regime for the protection of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), to the extent that those faults do not warrant the cancellation of their credentials. Such an interpretation would lead to accepting a sort of irresponsibility of mayors in those cases, contrary to the constitutional principle of administrative efficiency, accountability of the public agent, and their duty to comply with the norms of probity, internal control, and other components of the Public Treasury. The present action precisely seeks for this Court to make such a declaration, which implies, it is reiterated, making the sanctions ordered by the CGR in these cases unenforceable. If that were the logic of the normative regime indicated above, there would be no sense whatsoever in ordering the opening of administrative proceedings against mayors, the only applicable scenario being when the faults are sanctionable with the cancellation of the credential. If the internal control and probity regime is applicable to all public officials who administer public funds or manage public assets, denying the possibility of sanctions other than the cancellation of their credential to mayors, for the reasons alleged, would generate a material impossibility of sanction, ultimately an inequity that leads to immunity, to the detriment of the due safeguarding of the public interest that guides the adequate and proper handling of public funds. The local autonomy that the constituent conferred on municipal entities does not abstract them from compliance with the norms of probity and, in general, the set of precepts aimed at the protection of the Public Treasury. Despite that degree of autonomy and the procedure for their designation, they are public officials and in that condition, they must subject their conduct to legality and bear the internal corrective consequences deriving from their neglect. On the contrary, as has been pointed out above, both Law No. 8292 and No. 8422 expressly refer to cases of administrative responsibility and establish specific sanctions for municipal mayors who infringe the norms of the Public Treasury (superior control and oversight legal framework). The same occurs with the detail expressed in the LOCGR and in the Electoral Code itself. From this perspective, and reiterating that the dilemma analyzed does not lie in the absence of express regulation on the reprehensibility of conducts or the legal establishment of sanctions, but rather in the competence to apply sanctions imposed on local officials of popular election, a thesis that promotes immunity in the exercise of these positions cannot be sustained, so this thesis must be rejected.

VII.- Regarding the lack of competence of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal): A second possibility in this aspect would be to assign competence to the Municipal Council. Under this position, it could be indicated that the limitation formulated regarding this position is that this local instance is not the hierarchical superior of the mayor, as they are bodies called to coordinate and which together compose the Local Government. In this sense, it is clear that in the initial thesis, the disciplinary power is conferred on the hierarchical superior, as a derivation of the powers conferred on that figure by Article 102, subsections b) and d) of the LGAP. In the Costa Rican municipal organic scheme, in accordance with Article 12 of the Municipal Code, and in consonance with numeral 169 of the Magna Carta, the mayor does not depend hierarchically on the Municipal Council, as both are popularly designated and compose the so-called Local Government. A duty of coordination and a maxim of complementation of competencies is imposed between both bodies. However, in the judgment of this collegiate body, the relationships imposed in the context of those municipal hierarchies, both of popular designation, make it improper for one of them to hold the competence to impose sanctions other than the cancellation of credentials on its counterpart. This Court does not observe that there is any element on which the competence of the Municipal Council to impose sanctions on the mayor could be based, since that first instance holds no power over the content of the mayor's functions, their designation, or in general, over the credential that enables them to exercise the position. On the other hand, from the examination of the legal powers that have been entrusted to the Municipal Council, Articles 13 and 19 of the Municipal Code do not contain, within the attributions of the cited body, any power that allows it to sanction the Municipal Mayor, so attributing that power to that administrative unit becomes improper.

VIII.- Competence of the TSE: At this point, the CGR postulates in its counterclaim that the competence to order and execute the sanction concerns the TSE. To justify this position, it primarily points out that the execution of the sanctions that the CGR recommends in a binding manner was expressly attributed to the cited Court, given the investiture held by the official against whom the recommendation is directed, and that this authority was the one who granted the credential. It says, only the TSE administers the credentials of the designations of municipal mayors, it being an exclusive and excluding competence. It assumes, if the granting of said credential gives the TSE an implicit competence to cancel it, with greater reason it holds the same competence to suspend it. It expresses not sharing the criterion of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), regarding a lack of competence on its part to order the suspension of credentials of municipal officials of popular election. It highlights that the effective accountability and application of the regime of responsibilities of high public officials constitute fundamental tasks of the national legal system. It refers to the principle of parallelism of forms and the juridical aphorism that whoever can do the greater can do the lesser. Thus, the same authority that granted a credential is the one called to suspend it, since suspension is a temporary cancellation of the credentials. It reiterates that the conditions of the credential granted to said official by the TSE can only be varied by that same electoral authority. It asserts that the interpretative criterion upheld by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, regarding the nonexistence of a legal basis enabling it to order the suspension of credentials granted by itself to officials of popular election, specifically to municipal mayors, based on which it has in turn ordered that the respective municipal councils are responsible for executing the binding recommendation of suspension of that server, has generated a serious affectation of the fundamental objectives and purposes of the legal system for the control and oversight of the Public Treasury. It adds that this decision has resulted in the non-execution of said suspension, and consequently, not only in the affectation of the purpose pursued by the control and oversight legal framework for the Public Treasury, but also in the affectation of elementary values and principles of the Costa Rican constitutional and legal order, such as the effective accountability of public authorities and the regime of responsibilities of high public officials. Regarding this particular, it is pertinent to point out what is set forth below. For a proper understanding of the present matter, it is necessary to consider the content and scope of the norm that allows the CGR to recommend the questioned sanctions in a binding manner. As indicated ut supra, in accordance with Article 68 of the LOCGR, this oversight body, after the due process, issues an act in which it recommends the application of the respective sanction to another administrative body or entity. This implies, unlike what the plaintiff affirms, that the actions issued by the CGR are not a simple recommendation lacking executory content, since the procedure carried out in that venue precisely seeks the analysis of whether or not there is harm to the regime of the Public Treasury, competence which, according to what has been stated, has been entrusted to the CGR. In this way, the final act of that proceeding is brought to the attention of the Administration competent to execute and apply the sanction, which implies that it is unnecessary (and improper) to issue a new act, with only the application of the sanction dictated by the CGR remaining. In that sense, the execution of the sanction does not constitute a conduct or operation that must be associated with hierarchical sanctioning powers of a disciplinary nature in the strict sense, even though when the official to be sanctioned has a hierarchical superior, it is clear that the CGR's order is communicated to the latter so that they arrange the internal actions for the execution of that sanction. In accordance with Article 253 of the Electoral Code, the TSE is the competent instance to order the sanction of cancellation of credentials for the causes provided for in that legal source. For such purposes, various scenarios that could give rise to this effect of suppression of the credential are regulated, among them: resignation, absence, affectation of the maritime-terrestrial zone regime, as well as the one of interest in this case, that is, the one referring to substantial infractions of the Public Treasury regime. In that sense, Article 259 ejusdem literally states:

"ARTÍCULO 259.- Cancelación de credenciales por afectación al Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública. When the cancellation of credentials is sought invoking the commission of a serious fault, with violation of the norms of the oversight legal framework contemplated in the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, the General Law of internal control, or others relating to the Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury, the matter shall be referred to the Comptroller General's Office so that it may recommend the corresponding action, in accordance with Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, after having opened the respective file against the presumed responsible party. The Court shall rule once the Comptroller General's Office or the criminal courts have pronounced on the presumed violation of the referred norms." Certainly, the norm establishes the competence to order the cancellation of the credential as the most serious consequence, while, as stated above, it establishes the participation of the CGR in the process, so that it may initiate the procedure provided for in canon 68 LOCGR, in order to issue the corresponding binding recommendation. In the judgment of the plaintiff, and of the State itself (PGR), that norm only enables the imposition of the sanction of cancellation, not one of lesser implications, as is the case of suspension from office. From the analysis and consideration of the implications of the supposed gap that arises in this particular matter, this collegiate body considers that there is merit and sufficient reasons allowing the attribution of the competence in question to the TSE, which are set forth below. Legal nature of the official's designation. A first aspect that this Court must refer to relates to the very rationale of the competence assigned to the TSE regarding the sanctions imposed against the municipal mayor. The constitutional regime and the Electoral Code itself assign the competence of said instance by reason that the procedure allowing the designation of this official is the participation of the electorate through the exercise of the right to suffrage, which, as a derivation of the democratic principle, allows the election of that position by popular designation. Precisely, that modality of configuring the investiture of the official is formalized and perfected with the granting of the respective credential by the Court, once it declares the validity of the respective elections, in accordance with the competencies and powers established by Article 12, subsection h) of the Electoral Code. In the case of officials of popular election, it is evident that despite being constituted as public servants – for the term and validity of their designation – in accordance with the general concept established by canon 111 of the LGAP, they are subject to a sui generis sanctioning regime, to the extent that the sanctioning powers are not assigned to a hierarchical administrative superior in the strict sense, since, on the contrary, they hold the figure of administrative hierarchs. Certainly, this does not imply the impossibility of ordering sanctions against them; however, it is precisely that legal nature of their employment link that has led to establishing specific legal norms that stipulate the ways and scenarios for imposing that type of responsibility on them. From this perspective, the sanctions that may be imposed on this class of public agents do not derive from the exercise of a hierarchical power in the terms that justify mandate 102, subsections b), c), and d) of the LGAP, but rather from the necessary subjection to the legal system regarding their conduct. In that sense, starting from the basis that it is the TSE that confers the credential that constitutes the formal act of investiture (preceded by a popular designation), and from which the official enters into the exercise of the position, it is precisely this same authority that is legitimized to order what is pertinent regarding the cancellation of this status and cause its effects to cease. This being so, these powers are granted for the reason that the TSE constitutes the instance to which the Political Constitution and Law No. 8765 have entrusted the power of management regarding said credentials, given that they involve public agents who have been popularly designated, a reason for which the competence to order sanctions that directly affect the exercise of those positions, in a way that totally or temporarily disqualifies one of those servers, is part of its constitutional and legal competencies. Otherwise, a power whose substantial content would imply temporarily causing the credential granted by the TSE to cease, for the duration of the sanction, would be conferred on another authority that lacks such democratic and institutional legitimization, thus allowing the alteration of the validity and effects of an act by an authority other than the one that formally conferred it. In this manner, the TSE being the instance that grants the credential to officials of popular election, only that instance would be legitimized to order the respective sanctions regarding those officials, due to the competence over those designations that has been granted to it. It is pertinent to add at this point that it is this electoral vocation of the official's appointment that legitimizes the TSE's participation in the sanctions regime, not the nature of the committed faults that give rise to that regime, since, as has been noted, it includes from absence to the infraction of Public Treasury norms. It is, therefore, a competence of a generic scope that allows it to grant and cancel the credentials of these officials, as well as the temporary suspension of that designation. Implications and effects of the suspension. A second aspect derives from the similarity (by analogy) of the effects of the cancellation of credentials to the suspension from the exercise of office that is produced as a consequence of the recommendations that the CGR issues pursuant to Article 68 of Law No. 7428. It is clear that the cancellation of the credential constitutes a definitive cessation of its effects, which evidently implies that the official must leave their position and is prevented, from that content onward, from exercising their competencies. On the other hand, the suspension being referred to implies a sort of temporary cancellation of the credential, to the extent that ultimately, that suspension, although it does not entail a direct withdrawal of the credential, equally disqualifies the official from exercising the position and its competencies for the term of the imposed sanction. From this angle of examination, in the judgment of this Chamber, there is an identity between both figures, if it is considered that both derive from a sanctioning exercise associated with the breach of duties, with the difference that in cancellation, the faults giving rise to it must be serious, whereas in suspension, such seriousness is not present, which does not exclude the infraction of norms imposing duties in the exercise of that function. If one looks closely, there is parity of material effects of both sanctions, with the difference that one implies the definitive cessation, while the other, the temporary cessation, in the exercise of the position. Therefore, within this integrative task required in this specific case, if it corresponds to the TSE to define the definitive cancellation of the credentials of the Municipal Mayors, and the suspension analyzed is a form of temporarily disqualifying from the exercise of the position, it is an application that, within a framework of congruence and efficiency, corresponds to said Court as the holder of the generic defense that the Law has granted it regarding the cited credentials. The opposite, that is, attributing the competence to apply the sanction recommended by the CGR to another authority, would lead to conferring on another authority the power to disqualify the credentials of officials of popular election, even temporarily, even though it is a competence expressly granted to the TSE. More serious generic sanctioning competence. In addition, this Court shares what was alleged by the CGR regarding the necessary invocation of the aphorism "whoever can do the greater can do the lesser." In this aspect, the TSE certainly possesses by law the competence to order the most serious sanction regarding the figure of the municipal mayor, as is the case of the cancellation of their credentials. Therefore, by possessing that power of more severe impact, it is the judgment of this Chamber that it also corresponds to define the lower-ranking sanctions that may derive from the analysis of the conducts that give rise to the procedure provided for in Article 68 of the LOCGR, to the extent that no express norm assigns that power to a different instance. Following these factors, it is the consideration of this Court that the competence to apply and impose the sanctions of suspension on municipal mayors, recommended by the CGR in application of Article 68 LOCGR, corresponds to the TSE. It is worth highlighting, however, that this is a competence that is not inherent to the exercise of its powers relating to electoral matters, for which reason, it is a matter subject to possible control in this jurisdiction, as defined in several precedents by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), among them, votes 2012-001259, 2010-016342 and recently in ruling No. 2015-001780 at 11 hours 34 minutes on February 06, 2015. On the other hand, it is worth highlighting that this process does not debate the express regulation or not of a norm that imposes the possibility of initiating a sanctioning procedure against municipal mayors. Article 68 of the LOCGR, together with the norms of Law No. 8422 and 8292, impose the normative basis for those purposes. The dilemma must focus on the competence to apply the pertinent sanction, so an allegation of harm to the principle of legal reservation or typicity regarding those aspects is not admissible, since the sanctionable conduct as well as the legal consequence are provided for in the written norms of the applicable Legal System. From this perspective, the rejection of the claim must be ordered insofar as it seeks for this collegiate body to declare the incompetence of the TSE for the application of the sanctions dictated by the CGR in this particular case. As a corollary of this particular point, it must be indicated that although this Section VI, in precedent No. 65-2016-VI at 09 hours 30 minutes on April 20, 2016, had established a position different from the one expressed in this ruling, such a vote was issued by a different panel from the one subscribing the present judgment, and includes a criterion that, while respected, is ultimately not shared for the reasons set forth above, which have led this panel to conclude on the competencies of the TSE to order and apply sanctions to municipal mayors in cases such as the one being examined.

IX.- Regarding the other allegations of nullity. Infraction of the principle of natural judge and violation of due process. In another set of grievances, the plaintiff alleges harm to the maxim of the natural judge since the same body instructing the procedure initiated by the CGR was the one that issued the final act, resolution PA-21-2011. In their judgment, this causes nullity since they knew the facts of the process and formed an anticipated criterion, so when resolving the final act in the face of an eventual situation of contradiction, they breached the Principle of Impartiality and Objectivity, as well as their right of defense and due process. Regarding this debate, it is pertinent to reiterate that the Legal System confers special powers on the CGR for the control and oversight of the public treasury, based on norms of legal and constitutional hierarchy, exercising the sanctioning power based on that normative framework. Precisely, for the exercise of that competence, it proceeded in due course to issue the so-called "Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos" (Regulation of Administrative Procedures), an administrative norm that was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 76 of April 20, 2007 (No. R-C0-16-2007). In this norm, Article 28, together with what is provided in numeral 19 of the Organic Regulation of the CGR, Resolution No. R-C0-34-2009 at 10:00 hours on May 22, 2009, subsequently amended by Resolution No. R-DC-123-2010 of the Office of the Comptroller at 14:00 hours on July 19, 2010, establishes that both the opening act and the final resolution would be issued by the Legal Division of said comptroller entity, and its acts could be reviewed by its superior, that is, by the Office of the Comptroller General itself. Contrary to what is asserted by the plaintiff, although the LGAP indicates that the Public Administration will be represented in the procedure by the directing body (art. 282.3) and confers powers of instruction on it, such as the proper one of directing the oral hearing (art. 314 ejusdem), the truth of the matter is that nothing prevents the same body that instructs the case and processes it from being the decision-maker. On the contrary, starting from the fact that it is the instructor who evacuates the evidence and holds the oral hearing, this circumstance enhances and favors the principles of immediacy of evidence, celerity, and orality of the administrative procedure, as stated by the Constitutional Chamber in Resolution No. 6379-2002 at 15:22 hours on June 26, 2002. For its part, in ruling No. 2010-15786 at 09:13 hours on September 24, 2010, it ordered on that specific point: "... it is necessary to point out that the Contraloría General de la República does not harm the principle of impartiality with its actions, since it designates a single body to assume both the instruction and decision functions, a situation that this Court has indicated, on previous occasions, does not violate the principle of impartiality since it even allows the immediacy of evidence ...". Therefore, the concentration of instruction and decision tasks in the same administrative file does not antagonize the alluded principles, so the charge under examination must be rejected. On the other hand, the plaintiff reproaches that in resolution PA-21-2011, the commission of a serious fault was considered proven, having as the only evidence the document dated February 26, 2010, issued by Mr. Nombre139338, without said evidence having been incorporated verbally in the oral hearing, or without Mr. Nombre139338 appearing as a witness to ratify what was indicated in that official letter, and without determining his participation in the facts that were investigated. They consider violated the principles of orality, contradiction, immediacy of evidence, defense, efficiency, and celerity of the process. The grievance in question must be rejected. From the analysis of the administrative file, it is evident that from the initial act of the sanctioning procedure ordered by the CGR, that is, the act at 09 hours 30 minutes on September 24, 2010, that oversight body detailed the pieces making up the file and summoned to an oral and private hearing for December 14, 2010. From that transfer, and attending to the faculties available to the parties within the oral and private hearing, in accordance with canon 317 of the LGAP, the plaintiff could well have opposed said evidence or provided the elements of conviction that would allow refuting the content of that specific element, as well as regarding the set of facts that were intimated to them. Even within the detail of the evidence that was expressed in that initial act, the testimonial deposition of Mr. Nombre139339 is included (see image 244 -folio 229- of the administrative file), so the plaintiff was in full objective possibility of presenting their allegations and other evidence they deemed pertinent. On the other hand, it is worth highlighting that from the analysis of the final act, it is in no way evident that the sanction recommended by the CGR was based solely on that evidence being alleged. Note that resolution RDC-203-2011 points to Official Letter PM-045-2010 of August 3, 2010, as additional evidence, from which that CGR extracted the irregular action in the procurement process investigated in the questioned procedure. Moreover, the plaintiff does not specify the manner in which that matter they accuse generates a substantial nullity, such that in the terms of precept 223 LGAP, it merits the suppression due to invalidity of the procedure and the final decision issued against them, which is decisive if it is considered that the final act relies on other evidence to attribute their responsibility for alleged infractions in the administrative procurement procedures. The rejection of the claim regarding that particular must therefore be ordered.

X.- Regarding the accreditation of the causes for the sanction. Finally, the plaintiff claims that in Resolution PA-21-2011 it was not indicated that the internal unit in charge of carrying out the administrative procurement processes was the Supply Department (Departamento de Proveeduría) together with the Legal Advisory Office (Asesoría Jurídica) of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, with the signing of payment orders being a formal procedure carried out after the procurement process, to disburse payment to suppliers. They specify that those instances never indicated to them that the processes in which they participated were carried out irregularly, so they were unaware of that circumstance. They consider that they had no intention in the infractions, so the sanction is improper.

From the analysis of the case file, it is clear that at the commencement of the procedure, the plaintiff was charged with failing in his duty of diligence and probity as a municipal official and with neglect of the duties inherent to his position, by having authorized the payment payrolls corresponding to contracts in which the administrative contracting procedures were omitted. Following the processing of the respective procedure, file DJ-67-2010, the CGR was able to verify the charges attributed to the petitioner. Specifically, in the final act, resolution PA-21-2011 of 1:00 p.m. on March 23, 2011, it ordered: "l. RESOLVES: To declare responsible the individuals Nombre26667 , identity card no. CED21663, Mayor (...) of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, for the commission of the acts indicated in the recitals of this resolution and to have his administrative liability for gross fault (culpa grave) accredited in accordance with the provisions set forth in Article 210 of the General Public Administration Act, 39 of the General Internal Control Act, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter of the Administrative Contracting Act, 110, subsections a), b), d), e), g) and h) of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets Act, 4, 38 and 39 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, and Articles 68 and following of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General's Office, for having authorized with his signature a series of payment payrolls to contractors without complying with the requirements established in Article 2, subsection h) of the cited law and Article 136 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Act, that is, without preparing a simple set of specifications, setting the time and date for the receipt of proposals, inviting no fewer than three potential bidders from the Suppliers Registry, and awarding the lowest-priced offer, without prejudice to the assessment of other relevant factors, in summary, without creating a municipal file documenting the administrative procedure of the contracting carried out.// II. To recommend with binding force the imposition of a sanction of suspension without pay for a period of thirty business days on Mr. Nombre26667 in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Santa Cruz (...)". This was later confirmed by a resolution at 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 2011, which rejected the filed motion for reversal, and by resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Comptroller's Office at 10:00 a.m. on December 20, 2011, which rejected the appeal. From the examination of these formal conducts, it follows that the CGR concluded that the plaintiff's actions constituted the neglect with which he was charged, which it classified as negligent and remiss in the fulfillment of his own duties. To support this position, the decision on the appeal regarding the qualification of the subjective component of the sanction stated: "...In repeated resolutions, both administrative and judicial, it has been established that the liability of the official is not objective but subjective, in accordance with the regulation contained in the General Public Administration Act. This is so because the public official is personally liable, to third parties or to the Administration itself, when he has acted with gross fault (culpa grave) or willful misconduct (dolo), and in this Office's judgment, there was gross fault in the handling of the matter related to the investigated administrative contracts. There is evidently a deficiency in his conduct, as he did not verify the legality of the contracting procedure followed. That is, his actions and omissions constitute such serious recklessness and negligence that they validly sustain the imposed sanction, as it is attributed based on the protected legal interest, regardless of whether it occurred through willful misconduct or fault. It is important to note that, according to the provisions of Articles 10 and 12 of the General Internal Control Act, No. 8292, the Mayor, as head and administrator of the municipal departments, has the responsibility to maintain and perfect the entity's internal control system and the duty to ensure the proper development of its activity, but as has been demonstrated, his conduct was not in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned regulations. (...)" Ultimately, the plaintiff does not focus on challenging these factual findings nor does he properly debate the conclusions and qualifications given to these aspects by the CGR. From that perspective, in that venue, a factual set of circumstances was considered proven, which constituted the grounds for the act and led to the content of recommending his suspension from office for 30 calendar days. No invalidity is therefore evident with respect to that proceeding. In sum, the proper course is to order the rejection of the lawsuit for the reasons stated above.

XI.- Regarding the counterclaim. As has been noted, the CGR files a counterclaim seeking that this court declare: "a) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following acts and resolutions issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones): 1. Official Letter number STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, upon referring to official letter 00 172-20 12 (DJ-00 18-2012) from the Comptroller General of the Republic, it indicated that because the sanction recommended by the Comptroller General was not the cancellation of credentials, the municipal council of Santa Cruz was responsible for hearing the matter and not that Tribunal. (Described in fact ten). 2. All acts related to and derived from the act described in the preceding point. b) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following agreements adopted by the municipal council of Santa Cruz: 1. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, subsection 14, of January 24, 2012, where the Municipal Council agreed to abstain from ruling on the substance of the recommendation for suspension without pay and to forward to the Commission on Legal Affairs for its corresponding analysis, recommendation, and subsequent commission report, the official letters DJ- 00 17-2012 and Placa26523 12 from this Comptroller General of the Republic. (Described in fact twelve). 2. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25, dated April 17, 2012, which consists of requesting the Municipal Legal Advisory Office to conduct a legal analysis of official letter 03012 from this Comptroller General of the Republic. (Described in fact sixteen). 3. Agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-20 12, article 3, subsection 08 of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that, having become aware of the Comptroller General of the Republic's official letter 10941, it is forwarded for consideration by a named Special Commission, to issue a report. (Described in fact eighteen). 4. All acts related to and derived from the agreements described in the preceding points. c) That the judgment declare that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is the competent body to suspend the credentials of municipal mayors and, consequently, order the TSE to proceed immediately with the execution of the binding recommendation for suspension from office for Mr. Nombre26667 , ordered by the CGR in the final procedural acts of PA-21-2011 referenced. d) That in the event of opposition, all counter-defendants be ordered to pay both sets of legal costs derived from this action. VI SUBSIDIARY CLAIM (...) that the defendant Municipality be ordered to execute the binding recommendation for the sanction of suspension set forth in the final act of procedure PA-21-2011 defined by the Comptroller General with respect to the municipal mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre26667 , which must be executed immediately by the municipal council of Santa Cruz." As a preliminary matter regarding the approach to the counterclaim, it should be noted, having established that the competence to apply the binding recommendation issued by the CGR for the suspension of credentials of municipal mayors, according to the procedures established in conformity with section 68 of Law No. 7428, belongs to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, it is entirely pointless to reiterate the entire examination already set forth as the basis for that conclusion, concerning the claims that challenge the TSE's jurisdiction for these purposes, or to challenge the prior acts of the TSE that declined that jurisdiction in this specific case. Hence, it is unnecessary to address claim a) of the counterclaim, which includes omitting analysis of the defense of lapse (caducidad) raised by the State on this point. However, the truth of the matter is that from what has been analyzed regarding the power to execute the sanctions recommended under Article 68 of Law No. 7428, it is clear that, attending to this addressed competence, the TSE has an obligation to proceed to apply the sanctions for suspension of credentials that the CGR bindingly recommends. This includes the obligation of that authority to implement immediately, if no other legal reason prevents it, the content of what was ordered by the CGR in resolution PA-21-2011 of 1:00 p.m. on March 23, 2011, from the Legal Division of the CGR and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Comptroller's Office at 10:00 a.m. on December 20, 2011, which recommend imposing on the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340 , a sanction of suspension without pay for 30 calendar days. The foregoing entails granting claim c) of the counterclaim. As for the petitionary section b) of the counterclaim, aimed at the suppression due to invalidity of the Municipal Council's agreements, its rejection must be ordered, as fundamentally, they revolve around the definition of the Municipal Council's competence to apply the sanction recommended in those recently cited resolutions, an aspect which, according to what has been stated, does not concern it, as it is a competence beyond its legal powers and attributions. Regarding the subsidiary claim, a ruling is omitted insofar as it seeks to have the judgment establish the Municipal Council's competence to suspend the credentials it may have granted to popularly elected officials, as in the case of the Municipal Mayor.

XII.- Corollary. Analysis of the opposed defenses and claims. Regarding the lawsuit. Concerning the lawsuit, both the State and the CGR opposed the defense of lack of right. In accordance with what was expressed in this ruling, those substantive exceptions must be granted, as the inadmissibility of the claims formulated by the plaintiff concerning the alleged incompetence of the CGR or the TSE to execute sanctions against him has been established. Consequently, the defense of lack of right opposed by the State and the Comptroller General of the Republic concerning the lawsuit is granted. The lawsuit filed by Mr. Nombre26667 against the State and the Comptroller General of the Republic is rejected. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or another applicable one) for Municipal Mayors, which, pursuant to Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (No. 7428), is issued by that administrative body for violations of the norms comprising the control and oversight framework set forth in that legal source or that have caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, is the responsibility of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Regarding the counterclaim. As for the counterclaim, the plaintiff-counter-defendant responded by opposing the defense of lack of right. For its part, the State opposed the preliminary defense of res judicata concerning the challenge of the TSE's act, the lapse (caducidad) of the action, and lack of right. In the preliminary hearing, the State withdrew the defense of res judicata, and by resolution No. 943-2016 of 3:15 p.m. on April 29, 2016, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the defense of act not subject to challenge. Attending to the manner in which the lawsuit was resolved, a ruling is omitted regarding petitionary section a) of the counterclaim, as well as concerning the defense of lapse raised on that particular matter. The defense of lack of right opposed by the State and by Mr. Nombre26667 is rejected. Ex officio, a lack of right is declared concerning the Municipality of Santa Cruz (claim b). Consequently, the counterclaim is partially granted in the following terms: 1. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or another applicable one) for Municipal Mayors, which, pursuant to Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (No. 7428), is issued by that administrative body for violations of the norms comprising the control and oversight framework set forth in that legal source or that have caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, is the responsibility of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. 2. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal is ordered to immediately, if no other legal reason prevents it, take the pertinent actions to allow the execution of the sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days without pay against the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340 , ordered by that oversight body in resolution PA-21-2011 of 1:00 p.m. on March 23, 2011, from the Legal Division and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Comptroller's Office at 10:00 a.m. on December 20, 2011. 3. Regarding the co-defendant Municipality of Santa Cruz, the claim for nullity of the resolutions issued by the cited Municipal Council in which it declares itself incompetent to order the suspension of the municipal mayor is rejected. 4. As unnecessary, a ruling on the subsidiary claim is omitted.

XIII.- Legal costs. Pursuant to section 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, procedural and personal legal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the fact of losing. Exemption from this award is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is handed down based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. The co-defendants requested the award of costs. The State also requested the respective legal interest. In this case, this Tribunal deems that the addressed subject allows for several possible interpretations, which demonstrates that, in this specific case, the parties have litigated in good faith and with sufficient reason, which is why the court resolves to decide this case without a special award of legal costs.

THEREFORE,

Regarding the lawsuit. The defense of lack of right opposed by the State and the Comptroller General of the Republic is granted, having established the inadmissibility of the claims formulated by the plaintiff concerning the alleged incompetence of the Comptroller General of the Republic or the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to execute the sanctions for suspension of credentials against him. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Mr. Nombre26667 against the State and the Comptroller General of the Republic is rejected. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or another applicable one) for Municipal Mayors, which, pursuant to Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (No. 7428), is issued by that administrative body for violations of the norms comprising the control and oversight framework set forth in that legal source or that have caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, is the responsibility of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Resolved without special award of legal costs. Regarding the counterclaim. Due to the manner in which the lawsuit was resolved, a ruling is omitted on petitionary section a) of the counterclaim, as well as concerning the defense of lapse raised on that particular matter. The defense of lack of right opposed by the State and by Mr. Nombre26667 is rejected. Ex officio, a lack of right is declared concerning the Municipality of Santa Cruz in relation to claim b) which seeks the nullity of the agreements of that local authority that declared its incompetence to apply the recommended sanction against the Mayor of that canton. Consequently, the counterclaim is partially granted in the following terms: 1. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or another applicable one) for Municipal Mayors, which, pursuant to Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (No. 7428), is issued by that administrative body for violations of the norms comprising the control and oversight framework set forth in that legal source or that have caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, is the responsibility of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. 2. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal is ordered to immediately, if no other legal reason prevents it, take the pertinent actions to allow the execution of the sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days without pay against the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340 , ordered by that oversight body in resolution PA-21-2011 of 1:00 p.m. on March 23, 2011, from the Legal Division and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Comptroller's Office at 10:00 a.m. on December 20, 2011. 3. Regarding the co-defendant Municipality of Santa Cruz, the claim for nullity of the resolutions issued by the cited Municipal Council in which it declares itself incompetent to order the suspension of the municipal mayor is rejected. 4. As unnecessary, a ruling on the subsidiary claim is omitted. 5. Resolved without special award of legal costs. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez/ José Roberto Brenes Chinchilla*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: Nombre26667 DEMANDADOS: El Estado, la Contraloría General de la República y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

RECONVENTORA: Contraloría General de la República RECONVENIDOS: El Estado y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

IGWTHUP.JRGN.2016 All acts connected to and deriving from the act described in the preceding point. b) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following agreements adopted by the municipal council of Santa Cruz: 1. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, subsection 14, of January 24, 2012, in which the Municipal Council agreed to abstain from ruling on the merits of the recommendation of suspension without pay and to forward official letters DJ- 00 17-2012 and Placa26523 12 from this Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic to the Legal Affairs Committee for its corresponding analysis, recommendation, and subsequent committee opinion. (Described in fact twelve). 2. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25, dated April 17, 2012, which consists of requesting the Municipal Legal Advisory Office to conduct a legal analysis of official letter 03012 from this Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. (Described in fact sixteen). 3. Agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-20 12, article 3, subsection 08, of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that, having this council taken cognizance of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic's official letter 10941, it is forwarded for the knowledge of a specially appointed Committee to render an opinion. (Described in fact eighteen). 4. All acts connected to and deriving from the agreements described in the preceding points. c) That the judgment declare that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is the competent body to suspend the credentials of municipal mayors and, consequently, that the TSE be ordered to proceed immediately with the execution of the binding recommendation of suspension from office of Mr. Nombre26667, ordered by the CGR in the final acts of the referenced procedure PA-21-2011. d) That in the event of opposition, all counter-defendants be ordered to pay both costs arising from this action. VI SUBSIDIARY CLAIM (...) that the defendant Municipality be ordered to execute the binding recommendation of the sanction of suspension set forth in the final act of procedure PA-21-2011 defined by the Office of the Comptroller General with respect to the municipal mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre26667, which must be executed immediately by the municipal council of Santa Cruz." (Images 559-598 of the file) **6.-** By resolution No. 703-2013 of 11:00 hours on June 27, 2013, the procedural judge ruled that jurisdiction to resolve this matter belongs to this contentious-administrative jurisdiction. (Images 638-642 of the file) An objection to that decision having been raised by the State (images 667-673 of the file), by resolution No. 1696-C-S1-2013 of 11:05 hours on December 12, 2013, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ruled that the knowledge of this proceeding belongs to the Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. (Images 736-741 of the file) **7.-** By resolution No. 313-C-S1-2014 of 09:02 hours on March 13, 2014, the Sala Primera rejected a request for clarification and addition filed by the State against the ruling in judgment No. 1696-C-S1-2013 of 11:05 hours on December 12, 2013. (Images 751-753 of the file) **8.-** Once the counterclaim was duly served, the State opposed it and raised the defenses of an act not subject to challenge, and expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción). (Images 762-767 of the file) **9.-** By order No. 1980-2014 of 16:05 hours on August 12, 2014, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the request to declare the counterclaim inadmissible. (Images 789-794 of the file) **10.-** By order No. 1981-2014 of 16:10 hours on August 12, 2014, the procedural judge ordered that the defense of failure to join the State be upheld with respect to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. (Images 796-803 of the file) **11.-** This decision was appealed by the State, an appeal which was subsequently withdrawn, a motion thus granted by resolution No. 411-2015-II of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Segunda. (Image 830 of the file) **12.-** By brief dated August 19, 2015, the plaintiff-counter-defendant answered the counterclaim in the negative and raised the defense of lack of right. (Images 847-853 of the file) For its part, the State opposed it. It raised the preliminary defense of res judicata (cosa juzgada) regarding the challenge to the TSE's act, expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción), and lack of right. (Images 856-877 of the file) **13.-** Additionally, by order of 10:24 hours on December 16, 2015, the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz was declared in default. (Images 882-883 of the file) **14.-** The preliminary hearing established in article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which is recorded in this Court's digital system, was held on April 28, 2016, with the attendance of all parties, except the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz. During that phase, the State withdrew the defense of res judicata, and by resolution No. 943-2016 of 15:15 hours on April 29, 2016, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the defense of an act not subject to challenge. Furthermore, the defense of expiration was reserved for judgment. Since there was no evidence to be presented at trial, in accordance with article 98.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the matter was declared to be purely of law and the co-defendants presented their oral conclusions. (Images 895-900 of the file) **15.-** The respective file was referred to this Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo for the issuance of the pertinent judgment on October 18, 2016, as recorded in the detail of the Sistema Escritorio Virtual, which contains the entire main file. In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities requiring correction have been observed.

**Judge Garita Navarro drafts with the affirmative vote of judges Aguilar Méndez and Brenes Chinchilla;** **CONSIDERING** **I.- Proven facts.** The following facts are relevant to the resolution of this proceeding: **A) REGARDING THE LAWSUIT: 1)** That the CGR conducted a formal sanctioning procedure, file DJ-67-2010, against the plaintiff and other officials of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz. The opening of this procedure was ordered by the act of 09:30 hours on September 24, 2010, and was based on articles 68 of Law No. 7428, 214, 217, 218, 249, and 308 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and in accordance with articles 18 subsection d) of the Código Municipal, 72 and 73 of Law No. Placa2176, 39 of Law No. 8422, and 113 of Law No. 8131. In that act, a detailed list of the documents composing the file was made, and an oral and private hearing was called for December 14, 2010. The directing body was composed of Licenciados Roberto Rodríguez Araica, Sergio Mena García, and Navil Campos Paniagua. (Fact one of the lawsuit, uncontested regarding the opening of the case, folios 194-230 -images 209-245- of the administrative file) **2)** That the División Jurídica of the CGR directed the investigation of sanctioning file DJ-67-2010 and issued the final act by resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, in which it ordered: **"I. RESOLVES:** *To declare as responsible the gentlemen Nombre26667, identification card no. CED21663, Mayor (...) of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, for the commission of the facts indicated in the recitals of this resolution and to have their administrative liability for gross negligence (culpa grave) accredited in accordance with the provisions of articles 210 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, 110, subsections a), b), d), e), g) and h) of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, 4, 38 and 39 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento ilícito, and articles 68 and following of the Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General, by authorizing through their signature a series of payment vouchers to contractors without complying with the requirements established in article 2 subsection h) of the cited law and article 136 of the Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, that is, without preparing a simple set of bidding conditions, setting the time and date for the receipt of proposals, inviting no less than three potential bidders from the Registro de Proveedores, and awarding the lowest-priced offer, without prejudice to the evaluation of other relevant factors, in short, without preparing a municipal file documenting the administrative procedure for the contracting undertaken.// II. To recommend with binding character the imposition of a sanction of suspension without pay for a period of thirty business days to Mr. Nombre26667 in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz (...)". (Folios 544 to 574 -images 559-589- of the administrative file). **3)** That on March 29, 2011, the plaintiff formally filed an appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal against resolution number PA-21-2011. The reversal was rejected by resolution of 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 2011. By resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Despacho Contralor at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011, the appeal was declared without merit. However, in point 4) of the operative part, it modified the appealed sanction in the sense that the 30-day suspension is in calendar days and not business days as had been established in act PA-21-2011. (Folios 630 to 646 of the administrative file -images 645-661- regarding the reversal and folios 791 to 803 of the administrative file -images 806-818- regarding the appeal). **B) REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM:** **1)** That by resolution of 09:30 hours on September 24, 2010, the deciding body of the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República issued the act opening administrative procedure, number DJ-67-2010, against Mr. Nombre26667, Mayor of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, among others. It was warned that the alleged faults incurred could generate some type of disciplinary liability, specifically the imposition of a sanction from a reprimand to the cancellation of credentials in the position held as mayor of the municipality of Santa Cruz, as well as the prohibition to enter or re-enter positions in the public treasury (Hacienda Pública), the application of which results in the immediate cessation from any public treasury position held at that time. This resolution was personally notified to Mr. Nombre26667 on October 20, 2010 (Folios 194-234 and 250 of the administrative file). **2)** On February 22, 2011, the oral and private hearing was held, attended by the plaintiff-counter-defendant and his defense attorney, and during which he presented his arguments and conclusions. (Folios 541-542 of the administrative file, audio file of that act) **3)** That the División Jurídica of the CGR directed the investigation of sanctioning file DJ-67-2010 and issued the final act by resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, in which it recommended suspension without pay for a period of 30 business days. This was based on the finding that the investigated mayor had authorized a series of payment vouchers to contractors without complying with the requirements established in article 2 subsection h) of the cited law and article 136 of the Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, that is, without preparing a simple set of bidding conditions, setting the time and date for the receipt of proposals, inviting no less than three potential bidders from the Registro de Proveedores, and awarding the lowest-priced offer, without prejudice to the evaluation of other relevant factors; in short, without preparing a municipal file documenting the administrative procedure for the contracting undertaken. (Folios 544-574 of the administrative file) **4)** That on March 29, 2011, Mr. Nombre26667 filed an appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal and concomitant nullity against resolution number PA-21- 2011, issued by the deciding body of the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República. (Folios 591-602 of the administrative file). **5)** The reversal was rejected by resolution of 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 2011. By resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Despacho Contralor at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011, the appeal was declared without merit. However, in point 4) of the operative part, the appealed sanction was modified in the sense that the 30-day suspension is in calendar days and not business days as had been established in act PA-21-2011. (Folios 630 to 646 of the administrative file regarding the reversal and folios 791 to 803 of the administrative file regarding the appeal). **6)** That in a brief dated January 12, 2012, the División Jurídica of the Contrataría General de la República, by official letter 00149-2012 (DJ-00 17-2012), communicated to the Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz the final act number PA-27-2011, as well as resolution R-DC-203-2011 from the office of the Contralora General de la República, so that within a maximum period of eight business days, they proceed to order the execution of the provisions imposed in said resolutions. Likewise, citing article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General de la República, said council was advised of the possibility of filing a review motion against the sanction recommendation, within the period of eight business days counted from the communication of that official letter. (Folios 809-812 of the administrative file). **7)** That by official letter 00172-2012 (DJ-00 18-20 12) dated January 13, 2012, the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República communicated to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones the final act number PA-21-2011 issued within the administrative procedure processed in the División Jurídica and resolution R-DC-203-2011 from the office of the Contralora General de la República, and that taking into consideration the precedents of that Tribunal — that in cases where the oversight body does not recommend the cancellation of credentials, the sanction to be imposed should be the knowledge of the Concejo Municipal — official letter 00149-2012 (DJ-00 17-2012) described in the preceding fact was sent to the Concejo Municipal. (Folios 814-815 of the administrative file DJ-67-2010). **8)** That by official letter STSE-0166-2012 dated January 24, 2012, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones indicated to the CGR that the recommended sanction corresponded to the municipal council of Santa Cruz, as it was not a cancellation of credentials. (Folios 820-821 -images 839-840- of the administrative file). **9)** That by official letter SM-0014-0rd.0014-2012 dated January 25, 2012, the Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz makes known to the Contraloría General de la República the agreement adopted by that collegiate body in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, subsection 14, of January 24, 20 12, where it agreed to abstain from ruling on the merits of the recommendation of suspension without pay. Likewise, it filed a request for review against the recommendation and forwarded official letters DJ-00 17-2012 and DJ-00 18-2012 from the CGR to the Legal Affairs Committee for its corresponding analysis, recommendation, and subsequent committee opinion. (Folios 826 of the administrative file). **10)** That by resolution number R-DC-25-20 12 of February 29, 2012, the office of the Contralora General de la República declared without merit as inadmissible the review motion filed by the Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz. (Folios 830-836 of the administrative file) **11)** That by official letter 03012 (DJ-03 14-20 12) of March 29, 20 12, the CGR reiterated to the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz the order for the execution of the recommendation, within the non-extendable period of eight business days, under penalty of incurring the infraction provided for in article 69 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General. Likewise, it made known to the local entity the criterion sustained in official letter STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, to the effect that the execution of the sanction does not correspond to said Tribunal. (Folios 849-850 of the administrative file). **12)** That by official letter SM-0324-0rd. l6-2012 of June 6, 2012, the Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz communicates to the Contraloría General de la República the agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25 dated April 17, 20 12, in which it ordered to request the Municipal Legal Advisory Office to conduct a legal analysis of the official letter 03012 mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (Folios 869-870 of the administrative file) **13)** By official letter 10941 (DJ-1009-2012) of October 17, 2012, the CGR warns the Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz to order the execution of the sanction imposed on the mayor, given that the precautionary measure requested by that official within this judicial proceeding was rejected by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo and the Tribunal de Apelaciones by resolutions 122-2012 of 3:30 p.m. on April 24, 2012 and 617-2012 of 10:27 a.m. on October 12, 20 12 respectively.

(Folio 873 of the administrative file) 14) That by means of official communication SM-856-Ext.2 l-20 12 dated October 30, 2012, the Municipal Council of Santa Cruz, communicated to the Comptroller General of the Republic the agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-20 12, article 3, subsection 08 of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that, having that council taken cognizance of the official communication from the Comptroller General of the Republic indicated in the previous fact, it is referred for consideration to an appointed Special Commission, so that it may issue a report. (Folio 879 of the administrative file) II.- Facts not proven: Of relevance for this judgment are the following: 1) That the opening of sanctioning procedure file DJ-67-2010 was due to a complaint filed by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) or an infraction of the electoral regime. 2) That as of the date of the present, the sanction of suspension issued by the CGR in sanctioning procedure file DJ-67-2010 has been executed.

III.- Object of the process. Regarding the claim, having demarcated the pretensions of the plaintiff, the object of this dispute is directed to the analysis of the validity of resolution R-DC-203-2011, of ten o'clock on December two thousand eleven, and the cited resolution PA-21-2010, both from the CGR, which ordered a sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days against the petitioner, without pay, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste. From the analysis of the allegations of the plaintiff, it follows that the cause of nullity concerns a specific issue, that is, the lack of jurisdiction (incompetencia), due to the absence of an enabling provision, for the TSE, the CGR, or the Municipal Council, to sanction a Mayor for the infractions established by the CGR regarding the internal control system. Essentially, he states that the Mayor is a figure regulated in article 12 of the Municipal Code, being a popularly elected official. He says that the TSE is responsible for the cancellation of his credentials, but it is not competent to sanction him in any other way. He states that the TSE is not a hierarchical superior of the Mayor, nor would the general sanctioning authority be an electoral matter. He accuses that the CGR issued a simple recommendation without specifying to whom it was directed. What was ordered by the CGR was a recommendation, so no sanction was imposed. He considers that the Municipal Council is not the hierarch of the Mayor, and therefore is not competent to impose sanctions on him. He mentions vote No. 776-CF-S1-2008 of the First Chamber. He criticizes that the CGR is requiring the Local Council to sanction the mayor. He considers that the act is null in terms of content for being unlawful insofar as it intends to force an incompetent body to execute what no one ordered or to order what it cannot. He refers to ordinals 1, 68, 77 and following of the Organic Law of the CGR (No. 7428) do not empower that entity to impose sanctions, nor to instruct bodies to sanction when they are not competent. Likewise, in the expansion of the claim, he states that the Comptroller General's Office acted as instructor based on the provisions of article 259 of the Electoral Code (law No. 8765), despite the fact that this norm provided for the participation of the Comptroller General's Office only at the request of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, within a procedure for the eventual cancellation of credentials. In this sense, he points out that said Tribunal only has jurisdiction to cancel the Mayor's credentials, but not to sanction him in any other way. Regarding these aspects, it is appropriate to note what is set forth below.

IV.- On the competencies of the CGR to order sanctions related to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) regime. An aspect that is imperative to analyze in this process refers to the competencies of the controlling body to instruct sanctioning procedures against public agents whose actions or omissions constitute infractions to the Public Treasury regime, an axis that includes the correct and efficient management of public funds and assets, internal control, and the duty of probity. In that sense, as a derivation of ordinals 183 and 184 of the Magna Carta, the CGR serves as an auxiliary body of the Legislative Assembly with specialized competencies in the oversight of the Public Treasury, with functional and administrative independence in the exercise of its duties. Its competencies are specified and developed, in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 184 subsection 5) of the Political Constitution, in its Organic Law, No. 7428, as well as in another set of legal sources that establish regulations referring to or related to that central axis of its powers. Within these norms (but not limited to those references) one can mention the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, No. 8131, the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422, and the Administrative Contracting Law, No. 7494. From this perspective, as the State correctly argues, the oversight (fiscalización) powers (and eventual administrative sanction) held by the CGR find their basis in the text of the Magna Carta itself and in a detailed legal development. On this plane, as the enabling basis of the powers that the petitioner claims are missing, it is worth referring to the provisions of ordinals 1, 8, 10, and 68 of Law No. 7428 (Organic Law of the CGR -LOCGR-). The first ordinal of that legal source states with complete clarity that the CGR is "...a fundamental constitutional body of the State, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the superior control of the Public Treasury and governing body of the oversight system contemplated in this Law." In that sense, canon 8 of that legal source establishes that the Public Treasury shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, hold in custody, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial norms relating to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials. That reference specifies the existence of a set of norms that define and establish the various aspects related to the exercise of competencies to protect compliance with the obligations and principles inherent to the Public Treasury. Thus, article 10 of the LOCGR imposes that "The superior control and oversight system of the Public Treasury comprises the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relationships, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from that oversight or necessary for it./ This system also comprises the norms that regulate the oversight of foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework." As a derivation of that power, canon 68 of the LOCGR establishes the competence to order and recommend the execution of sanctions in the following sense: "Article 68.- Power to order and recommend sanctions. The Comptroller General of the Republic, without prejudice to other sanctions provided for by law, when in the exercise of its powers it determines that a servant of the passive subjects has committed infractions of the norms that make up the control and oversight system contemplated in this Law or has caused an injury (lesión) to the Public Treasury, shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, by means of its technical criterion, which is binding, the application of the corresponding sanction according to the merits of the case. The Comptroller General's Office shall form a file against the potential offender, guaranteeing him, at all times, due process and sufficient opportunity for a hearing and for his defense. / The competent authority of the passive subject so required must comply, within the period established by the Comptroller General's Office, with the recommendation issued by it; unless, within the term of eight business days counted from the notification of the act, a motion for review (gestión de revisión), duly motivated and reasoned, is filed by the hierarch of the required passive subject. In this case and once the indicated motion is resolved, it must comply without delay with what is provided in the final technical-legal pronouncement of the Comptroller General's Office, under penalty of incurring the crime of disobedience, without prejudice to the statute of limitations regime contemplated in this Law. (...)" On the other hand, ordinal 73 of the same law establishes the competence of the CGR to instruct procedures to impose the cancellation of credentials of a council member (regidor) or district syndic (síndico), proprietary or alternate, who gravely infringe the norms of the oversight and control system of the Public Treasury contemplated in that Law, and any other norms relating to public funds; or by incurring any of the acts foreseen in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public service, as generators of administrative responsibility. Likewise, that precept establishes, when the serious fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the Municipal Council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, have approved said agreement, will incur the same cause for cancellation of their credentials. Likewise, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public service, as well as those foreseen in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, shall be a cause for the cancellation of the credential of a council member or district syndic, proprietary or alternate. The competent judicial authority shall make, ex officio, the respective communication to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. As is evident from the foregoing, Law No. 7428 imposes a special procedure for the administrative sanction of infractions of the norms that make up the control and oversight system or that have caused injuries to the Public Treasury, therefore being fully competent to instruct administrative procedures aimed at determining the injuries and infractions just indicated and, from that procedure, to recommend in a binding manner, to the hierarchs of the passive subjects or to the pertinent entities, the application of the corresponding sanctions. The same treatment is established by canon 43 of Law No. 8422, which legitimizes the CGR to conduct said administrative causes and to recommend in a binding manner the sanctions to be imposed. This aspect, which is only tangentially discussed by the claim, has been the subject of vast development by the Constitutional Chamber, a superior body that has recognized, with complete clarity and forcefulness, the competencies of that entity for corrective actions for infraction of the probity regime and protection of the Public Treasury. By way of reference, in the unconstitutionality action heard in file No. 03-007482-0007-CO in which the validity of Executive Decree number 27.974-MP-H, Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the very precept 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, were questioned, through vote No. 13140 at 14 hours 37 minutes on November 12, 2003, that Constitutional Court pointed out relevantly: "VIII.- (...) Based on these two provisions, constantly and repeatedly, constitutional jurisprudence has pronounced on the special competencies that the Political Constitution assigns to the Comptroller General of the Republic with respect to the oversight of the management of public funds and the financial management of public employees, and specifically. In this sense, mandatory consultation includes, among others, judgments number 2398-91, at 15:20 hours on November 13, 1991; 0660-92, at 15:00 hours on March 10, 1992; 3607-94; at 15:15 hours on July 19, 1994; 0016-95, at 15:45 hours on January 3, 1995; 2632-95, at 16:06 hours on May 23, 1995; 4284-95, at 15:06 hours on August 3, 1995; 5119-95; at 20:39 hours on September 13, 1995; 0998-98, at 11:30 hours on February 16, 1998; 9524-99, at 9:06 hours on December 3, 1999, 3027-00, at 9:03 hours on April 14, 2000, 2000-6326, at sixteen hours eighteen minutes on July nineteenth, two thousand, and number 2001-4835, at fourteen hours fifty-six minutes on June sixth, two thousand one. In each and every one of the cited rulings, the Chamber emphasizes that the Constituent's will created the Comptroller General of the Republic as a -constitutional- body auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly with a specific and determined function: the oversight of the Public Treasury, so that by constitutional mandate –articles 183 and 184- tasks such as the oversight of administrative contracting procedures and the functioning of the financial system, especially regarding the mobilization of capital so that confidence is maintained in the correct administration of banking entities, the management of the budget of each and every public dependency, as well as the control of personnel who 'receive, hold in custody, pay, or administer assets or securities of the State' are not beyond the functions entrusted to this controlling body, but quite the opposite, since they respond to the interest of the good functioning of administrative services and dependencies. Reinforcing the above is the fact that for the Comptroller General's Office to carry out this task effectively, the Political Constitution itself in its article 24 endows it with a special power, which is the possibility of reviewing accounting books and their annexes for tax purposes and to oversee the correct use of public funds respectively, a power that the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic develops in article 13. It is clear that these competencies have their origin in norms of constitutional rank, and are developed in laws, such as the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, number 7428, the Financial Balance of the Public Sector Law, number 6955, the Internal Control Law, number 8292, and the Financial Administration Law, number 8131; and with respect to the control of the budget, contracting, and municipal resources, in the current Municipal Code itself; and even in regulatory norms, such as the Regulation on the functioning of state enterprises structured as commercial companies, Executive Decree number 7927-H, and in the Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic, number 27.974-MP-H. By way of conclusion, the Chamber transcribes what it has said regarding the functions entrusted to the Comptroller General of the Republic in judgment number 5119-95, at 20:39 hours on September 13, 1995: 'V.- The Comptroller General of the Republic as its Organic Law emphasizes (Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994) is a body of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly, whose general function is the superior control of the Public Treasury and the direction of the oversight system regulated in the cited law. It mainly exercises the specific attributions that the Constitution confers upon it in article 184.(...)" Further on in that same ruling, regarding the validity of the competence for instruction and sanction alluded to by ordinal 68 of the LOCGR, it stated: "Regarding the challenge of this norm, the Chamber reiterates the considerations previously given in its jurisprudence, both with respect to the special competence, of constitutional order, assigned to the Comptroller General of the Republic, and regarding the power, not only to initiate sanctioning procedures, but also, to issue binding opinions regarding the sanctions to be applied to the servants of the subjects of its oversight, from which the following conclusions can be derived: a) that the challenged power of the Comptroller General's Office derives from numerals 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution, for which reason, it cannot be considered to constitute an invasion of the autonomy conferred upon autonomous institutions in their management, as the sanctioning power recognized to this constitutional body does not derive from a hierarchical or labor relationship; that is, the sanctions it exercises are not disciplinary sanctions, but the power of superior oversight and control of the Public Treasury, hence, it does not assume functions of the active administration, since its action is a logical and necessary consequence of its assigned constitutional competence; b) that the challenged power materializes as a consequence of the application of an ordinary sanctioning administrative procedure, in which full respect and compliance with the guarantees of due process are provided, in which the investigated party can effectively exercise his right of defense, so that he can refute the charges attributed to him, provide the evidence he deems necessary, access the file, formulate the remedies he deems appropriate, and of course, the reasoning (motivación) of all acts issued; so that the power to issue a binding recommendation arises and materializes, only when the Comptroller General's Office has accredited the infraction of the norms that make up the control and oversight system (constitutional norms and principles of administrative contracting and budget preparation and execution, the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the Internal Control Law), or when it verifies an injury to the Public Treasury; c) that the sanction is not applied by the Comptroller General of the Republic, but by the hierarchical superior of the non-compliant servant; who, in turn, can formulate a motion for review (article 38 of the Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic) before the Comptroller General of the Republic, in case of disagreement with the recommendation; and d) that the Comptroller General's Office's investigating power is limited to the scope of its competence, that is, the management and administration of the Public Treasury, only. Likewise, it must be considered that the autonomy enjoyed by autonomous institutions is not unlimited, as article 188 of the Political Constitution itself subjects them to the law in matters of government, hence, they are subject to administrative tutelage, which is manifested through planning, directives, and of course, the controls foreseen in the Fundamental Charter itself for the management of public funds, whose constitutional body in charge of such task is the Comptroller General of the Republic -articles 183 and 184-. Therefore, the challenged competence, far from overflowing the natural scope of the functions that the Political Constitution grants to the Comptroller General of the Republic, is consistent with it, so that the pretense of eliminating the power of the Comptroller General of the Republic to investigate and sanction public servants who administer public funds would imply diminishing the competence that by constitutional mandate is recognized to this constitutional body; which, rather, would violate the Political Constitution itself. By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the action with respect to the challenge made to article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and to confirm the constitutional jurisprudence that has been issued in this matter." That extensive development makes it unnecessary for this Tribunal to elaborate further on reasons to sustain the competence of the CGR to be able to instruct procedures against a public official for an infraction against the Public Treasury, as it has been taken as accredited occurred in this case, given that the opening of file DJ-67-2010, which involved the petitioner, referred to conducts related to that regime, and not to electoral matters as the claimant seems to incorrectly assert. In that line, contrary to what was indicated in the claim, the CGR's participation in this questioned procedure does not derive from the assumption regulated in precept 259 of the Electoral Code. Said norm stipulates the CGR's participation in the procedure for cancellation of credentials, when the cause of that sanction is related to the violation of the norms of the oversight system contemplated in the LOCGR, Law No. 8422, Law No. 8292, or others relating to the Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury. In such cases, it is established that the TSE shall forward the file to the CGR so that, in accordance with ordinal 68 of its Organic Law, it may recommend what is pertinent. However, from the analysis of the case file, it is not inferred in this case that the CGR's action was due to the application of that mandate, but rather that the instruction of the procedure was in the direct exercise of its oversight competencies. For this, it suffices to point out that the sanction imposed was not the cancellation of credentials, but rather suspension from the position for 30 calendar days. It is worth highlighting that the aforementioned competence encompasses any official who administers public funds or is subject to the normative regime of internal control, probity, and sound administration of the Public Treasury, which includes public agents appointed through electoral processes, as is the case of the figure of the Municipal Mayor, an official who does not enjoy any kind of immunity that places him outside the sanctionable powers for infraction of the Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury or the norms of internal control and on administrative contracting in particular.

V.- On the content of the CGR's act and the competence to execute the sanction. As a second aspect, it is discussed that the act issued by the controlling body is limited to recommending a sanction, but not to imposing it, so it is not possible to execute what has not been ordered. This Tribunal respects but does not in any way share what is indicated by the petitioner. In accordance with what is stipulated by article 68 of the LOCGR, once the respective procedure has been completed, the CGR shall recommend the application of a sanction, in a binding manner. On the nature and content of those actions, in vote number 13926-2006 at 14 hours 44 minutes on September 20, 2006, the Constitutional Chamber ordered: "VI.- ON THE BINDING NATURE OF THE OPINIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC.- The challenge of articles 4 and 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic is also deemed improper, as it denotes a confusion on the part of the petitioner regarding the prerogatives that the Political Constitution confers upon this constitutional body of control and oversight of the public treasury, and that the law is responsible for developing.

Indeed, it is noted that the binding nature of the Comptroller General's opinions (vinculatoriedad de los dictámenes de la Contraloría) does not refer to the studies that precede an administrative procedure – which correspond to the preliminary stage of administrative procedures – but rather to the decision that resolves that administrative procedure, in which the penalty to be applied is determined, in which full due process guarantees are provided, as this Court indicated in the cited judgment number 2003-13140. "[...] the challenged power is realized as a consequence of the application of an ordinary sanctioning administrative procedure, in which full respect for and compliance with due process guarantees are provided, in which the investigated party can effectively exercise their right of defense, so that they can refute the charges brought against them, provide the evidence they deem necessary, access the case file, file the appeals they deem appropriate, and of course, the reasoning of all acts issued; so that the power to issue a binding recommendation arises and is realized, only when the Comptroller General's Office (Contraloría General de la República, CGR) considers the infringement of the rules that make up the control and oversight system proven (constitutional norms and principles of administrative contracting and budget preparation and execution, the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Internal Control Law), or when it verifies an injury to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública);" The above makes sense as it clarifies to the claimant that even though the sanctioning power of the CGR has been recognized, it refers to initiating, instructing, and deciding that administrative procedure, such that it is not the body responsible for applying the penalty to the public servant subject to oversight, but rather the authority on which the required subject depends – organizationally, disciplinarily, and hierarchically – (superior hierarch). Thus, this binding nature derives from the same constitutional norms – 183 and 184 – that is, from the recognition of the function of control and oversight of the public treasury that has been granted – it is insisted – by constitutional mandate to the Comptroller's Office. Therefore, far from being unconstitutional, Articles 4 and 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic are in conformity with Constitutional Law, insofar as they recognize and provide for the binding nature of the opinions of this constitutional body, as an indispensable condition for it to fulfill the task that the Fundamental Charter has entrusted to it. (...)". In that context, the aforementioned rule (article 68) establishes the power of the CGR to initiate the procedure and order the penalty to be applied, an application that it recommends in a binding manner to a specific Public Administration. The debate presented by the petitioner revolves around the competence to apply that binding recommendation. As has been indicated, the plaintiff postulates that in the absence of an enabling rule, neither the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, TSE) nor the Municipal Council can impose and execute said penalty; the former because the facts by virtue of which the application of the sanctioning regime is sought fall outside electoral matters and exceed the penalty of cancellation of credentials, which the Electoral Code confers on that authority. Regarding the Municipal Council, because it is not the hierarch of the mayor, but an internal body of the Municipality with which it shares a duty of inter-administrative coordination. On this particular point, it is worth highlighting what is set forth below. The Mayor forms part of the authorities that compose the municipal government, as inferred from article 169 of the Magna Carta. In that line, numeral 12 of the Municipal Code, Law No. Placa1170, establishes that "The municipal government shall be composed of a deliberative body called the Council and integrated by the council members determined by law, in addition, by a mayor and their respective substitute, all popularly elected." This is a popularly elected official, whose appointment can be terminated through the cancellation of the respective credential via the procedure stipulated by the respective norms. That particular issue does not matter in this case because that penalty was not imposed. However, it is worth clarifying that in accordance with the current Electoral Code, Law No. 8765, the cancellation of the credentials of mayors is the competence of the TSE, as defined from canon 253 of that legal body. However, when the penalty to be imposed derives from an injury to the protective regime of the Public Treasury (the issue of interest), a distinction must be made between cases where that transgression is a cause for cancellation of credentials, and those situations where the penalty is a suspension from the exercise of office. In the first case (cancellation of credentials), although the competence for cancellation belongs to the TSE, as has been indicated, numeral 259 of the Electoral Code establishes the mandatory participation of the CGR as the governing body in this field. In this scenario, the aforementioned competence is reiterated by article 73 of the LOCGR, which states: "Article 73.- Cancellation of credentials (*) The commission of a serious fault by a council member or syndic, property owner or substitute, against the norms of the control and oversight system of the Public Treasury contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms related to public funds; or incurring in any of the acts provided for in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, as generators of administrative responsibility, shall be cause for the cancellation of the respective credential. This shall apply when the offender has acted in the exercise of their office or on account of it./ When the serious fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the municipal council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, approved said agreement, shall incur the same cause for cancellation of their credentials./ Likewise, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public office, as well as for those provided for in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, shall be cause for cancellation of the credential of a council member or syndic, property owner or substitute. The competent judicial authority shall make, ex officio, the respective communication to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal." On the other hand, when the applicable penalty is not the aforementioned cancellation, article 68 of the LOCR (which regulates the generic power of oversight and sanction) merely indicates that the CGR "...shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its technical criteria, which is binding, the application of the corresponding penalty in accordance with the merits of the case...". Thus, in the specific case of municipal mayors, as a starting thesis, that mandate does not clearly define the authority that must execute the penalty when it is not a matter of cancellation of credentials. At this point, a clarification must be made that this Court considers and deems fundamental in the debate addressed in this case; that is, there is not an absence of express legal regulation regarding the reprehensible conduct and the penalty associated with that fault (if proven). Therefore, there is no regulatory deficiency regarding the penalty or the conduct that gives rise to it, so that no risk, not even remotely, is observed of infringement of the constitutional guarantee of typicality of offenses or legal reserve in matters of regulation of sanctionable conduct (nulla crimen nulla poena sine legem). It is clear that both article 68 of the LOCGR, and the regulations contained in articles 39, 41, and 42 of Law No. 8292, as well as in mandates 38, 39, 40, 41, and 43 of Law No. 8422, establish the legal normative references that previously qualify the conducts and impose the applicable penalties for the various behaviors that constitute injuries to the norms of the superior control and oversight system of the Public Treasury. There is, therefore, no debate whatsoever regarding a possible injury to that guarantee. The issue centers on the interpretive divergence (if a gap exists) regarding the competence or power to apply the penalties that the CGR recommends in a binding manner in the exercise of those powers, and in accordance with the procedural framework provided in precept 68 of its Organic Law. On this point, it should be noted that a precedent of this Administrative Litigation Court, specifically, judgment No. 69-2015-VII of 10:45 a.m. on July 20, 2015, of Section VII, analyzed an aspect similar to that addressed in this process, but referring to the Mayor of Nombre10042. In that sense, that section of this Administrative Litigation Court considered that there was no gap regarding the power to apply the suspension penalties for the local mayor recommended by the CGR, given that Law No. 8292 and Law No. 8422 establish that in the cases of mayors, the CGR refers the case file with the respective recommendation to the TSE, so that the pertinent penalty is applied, based on which it considered that the questioned power corresponded to that electoral authority. As stated, that criterion was based on the interpretation made of the indicated norms, from which those judges inferred that far from a regulatory gap existing, the norms were clear in assigning that power in favor of the TSE. On such aspect, it was indicated: "X.- (...) Notwithstanding what has been said, as will be stated, Articles 42 of the Internal Control Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, and Article 43 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office No. 8422 of October 6, 2004, expressly provide that in the case of administrative sanctions against municipal mayors, it is the responsibility of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to apply the sanctions that, in matters of breach of the norms of oversight, control, and surveillance of the Public Treasury, are ordered by the Comptroller General of the Republic in the administrative procedures implemented for such purposes, therefore there is no legal vacuum in the matter. (...) The cited provisions expressly establish that in the event that the breach of the provisions related to faults contained in the Laws in question are attributed to members of the supreme powers (among whom are the Municipal Mayors), the Comptroller General of the Republic must inform, in this case, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, so that it proceeds to impose the corresponding sanctions. As provided specifically and clearly in the cited norms, contrary to what was argued by the State, it is also the responsibility of said electoral body to execute binding administrative sanctions other than the cancellation of credentials, which, in the exercise of its constitutional and legal powers, the Comptroller General of the Republic bindingly recommends in procedures in which the presumed responsible parties are attributed with the breach of provisions of norms that make up the Public Treasury, contained, among others, in the Internal Control Law and the Law Against Illicit Enrichment in Public Office. In this same sense, contrary to what was argued by the plaintiff (...), there is no legal vacuum in the matter, and the cited provisions are compatible with the system of personal responsibility and accountability to which public officials are subject – including municipal mayors – by provision of Article 11 of the Magna Carta. (...)" After the analysis of the norms on which that judgment bases its final decision, this Court completely respects the expressed position, but does not share it, to the extent that although those precepts, with greater emphasis on canon 43 of Law No. 8422, establish that in the case of mayors, the CGR shall inform the TSE so that it imposes the corresponding sanctions, when considering that content with the power established by canon 259 of the Electoral Code (Law No. 8765), which refers to the cancellation of credentials, but omits reference regarding other sanctions, a space of little clarity is inferred regarding the debated issue, that is, the instance competent to apply the sanctions recommended by the CGR against mayors other than the cancellation of credentials, this latter penalty being clearly the responsibility of the TSE. However, it is considered that this same regulatory clarity is not observed in the case of other sanctions. Nevertheless, the absence of an express rule is no obstacle for this Court to define the point in question, given that the same Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333, indicates in the second paragraph of mandate 5, the impossibility of being excused from exercising its authority or from ruling on matters within its competence due to the lack or clarity of a rule to apply, noting that the jurisdictional work in the specific case must be satisfied according to the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, attending to the hierarchical scale of sources. From that perspective, it is necessary that, in accordance with mandates 7 and 9 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), this Court proceeds to integrate the Public Legal System and interpret and conclude on the applicable rules in the face of this apparent normative gap. For this, it is necessary to note that in accordance with the interpretative guidelines established by precept 10 of that LGAP, the administrative norm must be interpreted in a way that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed. Of course, this task must be carried out with full respect for the rights and interests of individuals and considering whether the language used by the legislator in drafting the norm allows for a level of alternative solutions (polysemy), in which case, it is primary to consider the categorical value to be protected (purpose or ultimate value), as well as the legal means that, in the most adequate and rational manner, allow the protection and satisfaction of that purpose (performance criteria). However, it is necessary to indicate that in the face of this panorama, it is up to the legislator to clearly and undoubtedly define the debated issue, so the following position is subject to what in this sense may eventually be defined in the respective legal sources. Ergo, the following position derives from the interpretation of the norms that, in the consideration of this Chamber, would provide an answer to the situation under analysis, but with the warning that its relevance is conditioned upon the express legal regulation that may be made on the topic by law. All in all, and after that clarification, in the judgment of this collegiate body, given the dilemma in question, several possible scenarios emerge, namely: a) The impossibility of executing the penalty due to the absence of an express rule assigning competence; b) Competence of the Municipal Council; and c) Competence of the TSE. The examination of the possible solutions follows.

VI.- On the claim of impossibility of executing the penalty: That in the absence of an express norm defining the competence to execute and apply the penalty recommended by the CGR (even when binding), and considering that it is a power of authority, as long as there is no express rule on that power, the penalty is unenforceable or unenforceable. From the outset, this thesis is not shared by this Court because it would imply an absolute violation and immunity (and impunity) in favor of the cited local officials, regarding conducts that constitute breaches of the protective regime of the Public Treasury, to the extent that those faults do not warrant the cancellation of their credentials. Such an interpretation would lead to accepting a sort of irresponsibility of mayors in those cases, contrary to the constitutional principle of administrative efficiency, accountability of the public agent, and their duty to comply with the norms of probity, internal control, and other components of the Public Treasury. This action precisely seeks for this Court to make such a declaration, which implies, it is reiterated, making the sanctions ordered by the CGR in these cases unenforceable. If that were the logic of the normative regime indicated above, there would be no sense whatsoever in ordering the opening of administrative cases against mayors, the only applicable scenario being when the faults are punishable by the cancellation of the credential. If the internal control and probity regime is applicable to every public official who administers public funds or manages public assets, denying the possibility of sanctions other than the cancellation of their credential for mayors, for the reasons alleged, would generate a material impossibility of sanction, ultimately, an inequity that leads to immunity, to the detriment of the due safeguarding of the public interest that guides the adequate and proper management of public funds. The local autonomy that the constituent conferred on municipal entities does not exempt them from compliance with probity norms and, in general, the set of precepts aimed at protecting the Public Treasury. Despite that degree of autonomy and the procedure for their appointment, they are public officials and, in that condition, must subject their conduct to legality and bear the internal corrective consequences that derive from their inattentions. On the contrary, as indicated above, both Law No. 8292 and Law No. 8422 expressly refer to cases of administrative responsibility and establish specific penalties for municipal mayors who violate the norms of the Public Treasury (superior control and oversight system). The same occurs with the detail expressed in the LOCGR and in the Electoral Code itself. From that standpoint, and reiterating that the dilemma analyzed does not lie in the absence of express regulation on the reprehensibility of conduct or the legal establishment of penalties, but rather in the competence to apply penalties imposed on local officials of popular election, a thesis that promotes immunity in the exercise of these offices cannot be sustained, and therefore this thesis must be rejected.

VII.- On the incompetence of the Municipal Council: A second possibility in this regard would be to assign competence to the Municipal Council. Under this approach, it could be indicated that the limitation formulated regarding this position is that this local instance is not the hierarch of the mayor, as they are bodies called upon to coordinate and together compose the Local Government. In this sense, it is clear that as a starting thesis, the disciplinary power is conferred upon the hierarchical superior, as a derivation of the powers conferred on that figure by article 102, subsections b) and d) of the LGAP. In the Costa Rican municipal organizational scheme, in accordance with article 12 of the Municipal Code, and in consonance with numeral 169 of the Magna Carta, the mayor does not depend hierarchically on the Municipal Council, as both are popularly designated and compose the so-called Local Government. A duty of coordination and a maxim of complementation of competencies are imposed between both bodies. However, in the judgment of this collegiate body, the relationships imposed in the context of those municipal hierarchies, both of popular designation, make it inappropriate for one of them to hold the competence to impose penalties other than the cancellation of credentials on its counterpart. This Court does not observe that there is any element on which the competence of the Municipal Council to impose sanctions on the mayor could be based, since that first instance holds no power over the content of the mayor's functions, their appointment, or in general, over the credential that enables them to exercise office. On the other hand, from the examination of the legal powers that have been entrusted to the Municipal Council, articles 13 and 19 of the Municipal Code do not contain, within the attributions of said body, any power that allows it to sanction the Municipal Mayor, therefore attributing that power to that administrative unit becomes inappropriate.

VIII.- Competence of the TSE: At this point, the CGR postulates in its counterclaim that the competence to order and execute the penalty pertains to the TSE. To justify this position, it fundamentally points out that the execution of the sanctions bindingly recommended by the CGR was expressly attributed to said Court, given the investiture held by the official upon whom the recommendation falls, it being that this authority was the one that granted them the credential. It states that only the TSE administers the credentials of municipal mayor appointments, this being an exclusive and excluding competence. It assumes that if the granting of said credential gives the TSE an implicit competence to cancel it, it holds, with greater reason, the same competence to suspend it. It expresses not sharing the criterion of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal regarding a lack of competence on its part to order the suspension of credentials of popularly elected municipal officials. It highlights that effective accountability and application of the responsibility regime for senior public officials constitute fundamental tasks of the national legal system. It refers to the principle of parallelism of forms and the legal aphorism that whoever can do the more can do the less. Thus, the same authority that granted a credential is the one called to suspend it, since suspension is a temporary cancellation of credentials. It reiterates that the conditions of the credential granted to said official by the TSE can only be varied by that same electoral authority. It accuses the interpretive criterion held by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, regarding the non-existence of a legal basis enabling it to order the suspension of credentials granted by it to popularly elected officials, specifically to municipal mayors, based on which it has ordered, in turn, that the respective municipal councils must execute the binding recommendation of suspension of that servant, has generated a serious impact on the fundamental objectives and purposes of the legal system of control and oversight of the Public Treasury. It adds that this decision has resulted in the non-execution of said suspension, and consequently, not only in the impact on the purpose pursued by the control and oversight system of the Public Treasury, but also in the impact on elementary values and principles of the Costa Rican constitutional and legal order, such as the effective accountability of public authorities and the responsibility regime for senior public officials. On this particular point, it is worth highlighting what is set forth below. For the proper understanding of this matter, it is necessary to consider the content and scope of the norm that allows the CGR to bindingly recommend the questioned sanctions. As indicated supra, in accordance with article 68 of the LOCGR, this oversight body, after the due process, issues an act in which it recommends to another administrative body or entity the application of the respective penalty.

This implies, unlike what the plaintiff claims, that the actions issued by the CGR are not a simple recommendation lacking executory content, since the procedure conducted in that venue precisely seeks the analysis of whether or not there is an injury to the regime of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), a competence that, according to the foregoing, has been entrusted to the CGR. In this way, the final act of that proceeding is brought to the attention of the Administration competent to execute and apply the sanction, which means it is unnecessary (and improper) to issue a new act, leaving only the application of the sanction issued by the CGR. In that sense, the execution of the sanction does not constitute conduct or a function that must be associated with hierarchical disciplinary sanctioning powers in the strict sense, although when the official to be sanctioned has a hierarchical superior, it is clear that the CGR's order is communicated to the latter so that they may order the internal actions for the execution of that sanction. Pursuant to section 253 of the Electoral Code (Código Electoral), the TSE is the competent body to order the sanction of cancellation of credentials for the grounds provided in that legal source. For such purposes, various scenarios that could give rise to this effect of suppression of the credential are regulated, including: resignation, absence, infringement of the maritime-terrestrial zone regime (régimen de zona marítimo terrestre), as well as the one relevant to this case, that is, the one referring to substantial infractions of the Public Treasury regime. In that sense, section 259 of the same code states in its literal rigor: "ARTICLE 259.- Cancellation of credentials due to infringement of the Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury (Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública). When the cancellation of credentials is petitioned invoking the commission of a serious fault, with violation of the oversight regulations contemplated in the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, the General Law of Internal Control, or others relating to the Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury, the matter shall be referred to the Office of the Comptroller so that it may recommend what is appropriate, in accordance with Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, after having compiled the respective file (expediente) against the alleged responsible party. The Tribunal shall rule once the Office of the Comptroller or the criminal courts have pronounced on the alleged violation of the referenced norms." Certainly, the rule establishes the competence to order the cancellation of the credential as the most severe consequence, while at the same time, as set forth above, it establishes the participation of the CGR in the proceeding, so that it may initiate the procedure provided for in canon 68 of the LOCGR, in order to issue the corresponding binding recommendation. In the judgment of the plaintiff, and of the State itself (PGR), that rule only enables the imposition of the sanction of cancellation, but not one of lesser implications, such as suspension from office. From the analysis and consideration of the implications of the alleged gap that arises in this particular case, this collegiate body finds that there is merit and sufficient reasons to allow the attribution of the competence in question to the TSE, which are set forth below. Legal Nature of the Official's Designation. A first aspect to which this Tribunal must refer relates to the very ratio of the competence assigned to the TSE regarding sanctions issued against the municipal mayor. The constitutional regime and the Electoral Code itself assign competence to that body because the procedure that allows the designation of this official is the participation of the electorate through the exercise of the right to suffrage, which, as a derivation of the democratic principle, allows the election of that position by popular designation. Precisely that modality of configuring the investiture of the official is formalized and perfected with the granting of the respective credential by the Tribunal, once it declares the validity of the respective elections, according to the competencies and powers established by section 12, subsection h) of the Electoral Code. In the case of popularly elected officials, it is evident that despite being constituted as public servants—for the term and validity of their designation—according to the general concept established by canon 111 of the LGAP, they are subject to a sui generis sanctioning regime, insofar as the sanctioning competencies are not assigned to a strictly administrative superior, since, on the contrary, they hold the figure of administrative superiors. Of course, this does not imply the impossibility of ordering sanctions against them; however, it is precisely that legal nature of their employment relationship that has led to the establishment of specific legal norms that stipulate the means and assumptions for imposing that type of liability upon them. From this perspective, the sanctions that may be imposed on this class of public agents do not derive from the exercise of a hierarchical power in the terms justified by mandate 102 subsections b), c), and d) of the LGAP, but rather from the necessary subjection to the legal system regarding their conduct. In that sense, starting from the basis that it is the TSE that grants the credential that constitutes the formal act of investiture (preceded by a popular designation), and from which the official enters into the exercise of the office, it is precisely this same authority that is legitimized to order what is pertinent regarding the cancellation of this status and to cause its effects to cease. This being so, these powers are granted because the TSE constitutes the body to which the Political Constitution and Law No. 8765 have entrusted the power of management regarding said credentials, given that they are public agents who have been popularly designated, a reason for which the competence to order sanctions that directly affect the exercise of those offices, in a way that totally or temporarily disqualifies one of those servants, is part of their constitutional and legal competencies. Otherwise, another authority that lacks such democratic and institutional legitimation would be granted a power whose substantial content would imply temporarily causing the cessation, for the duration of the sanction, of the credential that was granted by the TSE, thus allowing the alteration of the validity and effects of an act by an authority different from the one that formally granted it. In this way, the TSE being the body that grants the credential to popularly elected officials, only that body would be legitimized to order the respective sanctions regarding those officials, due to the competence over those designations that has been granted to it. It is worth adding at this point that it is that electoral nature of the official's appointment that legitimizes the TSE's participation in the sanctions regime, not the nature of the faults committed that give rise to that regime, since, as has been pointed out, it ranges from absence to the infraction of Public Treasury regulations. It is therefore a competence of a generic scope that allows it to grant and cancel the credentials of these officials, as well as the temporary suspension of that designation. Implications and Effects of Suspension. A second aspect derives from the similarity (by analogy) of the effects of the cancellation of credentials to the suspension in the exercise of office that occurs as a consequence of the recommendations that the CGR issues pursuant to Article 68 of Law No. 7428. It is clear that the cancellation of the credential constitutes a definitive cessation of its effects, which obviously implies that the official must leave their post and is unable, from that point on, to exercise their competencies. On the other hand, the suspension being referred to implies a sort of temporary cancellation of the credential, to the extent that, ultimately, that suspension, although it does not entail a direct withdrawal of the credential, equally disqualifies the official from exercising the office and its competencies for the duration of the imposed sanction. From that angle of examination, in the judgment of this Chamber, there is an identity between both figures, if it is considered that they derive from a sanctioning exercise associated with the breach of duties, with the difference that in the cancellation, the faults giving rise to it must be serious, whereas in the suspension, such seriousness is not present, which does not exclude the infraction of norms that impose duties in the exercise of that function. If examined closely, there is a parity of material effects of both sanctions, with the difference that one implies the definitive cessation, while the other, the temporary, cessation in the exercise of office. Therefore, within this integrative task required in this specific case, if it falls to the TSE to define the definitive cancellation of the credentials of the Municipal Mayors, and the suspension analyzed being a form of temporarily disqualifying the exercise of office, it is an application that, within a framework of consistency and efficiency, corresponds to said Tribunal as the holder of the generic defense that the Law has granted it over said credentials. The opposite, that is, attributing to another authority the competence to apply the sanction recommended by the CGR, would lead to granting another authority the power to disqualify the credentials of popularly elected officials, even temporarily, despite it being a competence expressly granted to the TSE. More Severe Generic Sanctioning Competence. Furthermore, this Tribunal shares what was alleged by the CGR regarding the necessary invocation of the aphorism "who can do the more can do the less." In this respect, the TSE certainly has by law the competence to order the most severe sanction regarding the figure of the municipal mayor, such as the cancellation of their credentials. Therefore, having that power of the most severe impact, it is the judgment of this Chamber that it likewise falls to it to define the lesser-ranking sanctions that may derive from the analysis of the conduct giving rise to the procedure provided for in section 68 of the LOCGR, to the extent that no express rule assigns that power to a different body. Given these factors, it is the consideration of this Tribunal that the competence to apply and impose the sanction of suspension on municipal mayors, recommended by the CGR in application of section 68 of the LOCGR, belongs to the TSE. It should be noted, however, that this is a competence that is not inherent to the exercise of its powers relating to electoral matters, and therefore, it is a matter subject to possible review in this jurisdiction, just as defined in several precedents by the Constitutional Chamber, among them, decisions 2012-001259, 2010-016342 and recently in ruling No. 2015-001780 of 11:34 a.m. on February 6, 2015. On the other hand, it should be highlighted that this proceeding does not discuss whether there is or is not an express regulation of a norm that imposes the possibility of initiating a sanctioning procedure against municipal mayors. Section 68 of the LOCGR together with the norms of Law No. 8422 and 8292 provide the normative basis for those purposes. The dilemma must focus on the competence to apply the pertinent sanction, so an allegation of harm to the principle of legal reservation or specificity regarding those aspects is not admissible, since the sanctionable conduct as well as the legal consequence are provided for in the written norms of the applicable Legal System. From that standpoint, the dismissal of the claim must be ordered insofar as it seeks for this collegiate body to declare the TSE's lack of competence for the application of the sanctions issued by the CGR in this particular case. As a corollary to this particular point, it must be stated that although this Section VI, in precedent No. 65-2016-VI of 09:30 a.m. on April 20, 2016, had taken a position different from the one expressed in this ruling, such decision was issued by a different panel from the one subscribing to this judgment, and includes a criterion that, although respected, is ultimately not shared for the reasons set forth above, which have led this panel to conclude on the TSE's competencies to order and apply sanctions to municipal mayors in cases such as the one under examination.

IX.- On the other allegations of nullity. Infringement of the principle of natural judge and violation of due process. In another order of grievances, the plaintiff alleges harm to the maxim of the natural judge since it was the very investigating body of the procedure initiated by the CGR that issued the final act, resolution PA-21-2011. In his judgment, this causes nullity since they knew the facts of the process and formed an anticipated criterion, such that by resolving the final act in a potential situation of contradiction, they violated the Principle of Impartiality and Objectivity, as well as his right of defense and due process. Regarding this debate, it must be reiterated that the Legal System confers special powers on the CGR for the control and oversight of the hacienda pública, based on norms of legal and constitutional hierarchy, exercising the sanctioning power based on that normative framework. Precisely, for the exercise of that competence, in due time it proceeded to issue the so-called "Regulation of Administrative Procedures" (Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos), an administrative rule that was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 76 of April 20, 2007 (No. R-C0-16-2007). In this rule, section 28, together with the provisions of numeral 19 of the Organic Regulation of the CGR, Resolution N° R-C0-34-2009 of 10:00 a.m. on May 22, 2009, subsequently amended by Resolution N° R-DC-123-2010 from the Office of the Comptroller at 2:00 p.m. on July 19, 2010, establishes that both the opening act and the final resolution would be issued by the Legal Division of said auditing body, and its acts could be reviewed by its superior, that is, by the office of the Comptroller General himself/herself. Contrary to what the petitioner claims, although the LGAP indicates that the Public Administration shall be represented in the procedure by the directing body (art. 282.3) and grants it powers of instruction, such as that of directing the oral hearing (art. 314 of the same code), the truth of the matter is that nothing prevents the same body that investigates the proceeding and processes it from being the decision-maker. On the contrary, starting from the fact that it is the investigator who receives the evidence and holds the oral hearing, that circumstance enhances and favors the principles of immediacy of evidence, speed, and orality of the administrative procedure, as set forth by the Constitutional Chamber in Resolution No. 6379-2002 of 3:22 p.m. on June 26, 2002. For its part, in ruling No. 2010-15786 of 9:13 a.m. on September 24, 2010, it ordered on that specific point: "... it is necessary to point out that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic does not harm the principle of impartiality with its actions, since it designates a single body, which assumes both the functions of instruction and decision, a situation that this Tribunal has indicated, on previous occasions, does not violate the principle of impartiality since it even allows the immediacy of the evidence ...". Therefore, the concentration of the tasks of instruction and decision in the same administrative file (expediente) does not antagonize the aforementioned principles, so the charge under examination must be dismissed. On the other hand, the petitioner reproaches that in resolution PA-21-2011, the commission of a serious fault was considered proven, having as the only evidence the document dated February 26, 2010, issued by Mr. Nombre139338, without said evidence having been verbally incorporated into the oral hearing, or else, without Mr. Nombre139338 appearing as a witness to ratify what was indicated in that official letter, and without determining his participation in the facts that were investigated. He deems the principles of orality, contradiction, immediacy of evidence, defense, efficiency, and speed of the process to be violated. The grievance in question must be dismissed. From the analysis of the administrative file, it is clear that from the act of initiation of the sanctioning procedure ordered by the CGR, that is, the act of 9:30 a.m. on September 24, 2010, that oversight body detailed the pieces that make up the file and called for an oral and private hearing for December 14, 2010. From that transfer and taking into account the powers available to the parties within the oral and private hearing, according to canon 317 of the LGPA, the plaintiff could well have objected to said evidence, or else, contributed the elements of conviction that would allow him to disprove the content of that specific element, as well as regarding the set of facts of which he was notified. Furthermore, within the detail of the evidence that was expressed in that opening act, the testimonial statement of Mr. Nombre139339 is included (see image 244 - folio 229 - of the administrative file), so the petitioner had full objective possibility to present his allegations and other evidence he deemed pertinent. On the other hand, it should be noted that from the analysis of the final act, it does not appear in any way that the sanction recommended by the CGR was based solely on that evidence being challenged. Note that resolution RDC-203-2011 indicates as additional evidence Official Letter PM-045-2010 of August 3, 2010, from which that CGR extracted the irregular action in the contracting process that was investigated in the challenged procedure. Moreover, the plaintiff does not specify the manner in which that matter he accuses generates a nullity of a substantial nature, so that in the terms of precept 223 of the LGAP, it warrants the suppression for invalidity of the procedure and the final decision issued against him, which is decisive if one considers that the final act relies on other evidence to impute his responsibility for alleged infractions in the administrative contracting procedures. The dismissal of the claim regarding that particular must therefore be ordered.

X.- On the substantiation of the grounds for the sanction. Finally, the plaintiff claims that in Resolution PA-21-2011, it was not indicated that the internal unit responsible for carrying out the administrative contracting processes was the Procurement Department together with the Legal Advisory Office of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, the signing of payment orders being a formal procedure carried out after the contracting process, to disburse payment to suppliers. He specifies that those bodies never indicated to him that the processes in which he participated were carried out irregularly, which is why he was unaware of that circumstance. He considers that he had no intention regarding the infractions, so the sanction is improper. From the analysis of the case file, it is clear that in the act of initiation of the procedure, the plaintiff was charged with faults in the duty of diligence and probity as a municipal official and incurring in neglect of the duties inherent to his office, by having authorized the corresponding payment payrolls for contracts in which the administrative contracting procedures were omitted. After the processing of the respective procedure, file DJ-67-2010, the CGR was able to verify the faults attributed to the petitioner. Specifically, in the final act, resolution PA-21-2011 of 1:00 p.m. on March 23, 2011, it ordered: "I. RESOLVES: To declare responsible Messrs. Nombre26667, identity card no. CED21663, Mayor (...) of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, for the commission of the acts indicated in the recital section of this resolution and to consider his administrative responsibility for gross negligence (culpa grave) duly proven in accordance with the provisions of articles 210 of the General Law of Public Administration, 39 of the General Law of Internal Control, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter of the Law on Administrative Contracting, 110, subsections a), b), d), e), g) and h) of the Law on the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, 4, 38 and 39 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, and articles 68 and following of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General, by authorizing through his signature a series of payment payrolls to contractors without complying with the requirements established in article 2, subsection h) of the cited law and article 136 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Contracting, that is to say, without preparing a simple set of bidding conditions, setting the time and date for the receipt of proposals, inviting no fewer than three potential bidders from the Suppliers Registry and awarding the lowest price offer, without prejudice to the valuation of other relevant factors, in summary, without preparing a municipal file where the administrative procedure of the performed contracting was recorded.// II. To recommend with binding character the imposition of a sanction of suspension without pay for a period of thirty business days to Mr. Nombre26667 in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Santa Cruz (...)". This was later confirmed by resolution of 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 2011, which rejected the petition for revocation filed, and by resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller at 10:00 a.m. on December 20, 2011, which rejected the appeal. From the examination of those formal conducts, it is clear that the CGR concluded that the petitioner's actions constituted the neglects of which he was notified, which they qualified as negligent and remiss in the fulfillment of his own functions. For such a position, in the decision on the appeal regarding the qualification of the subjective component of the sanction, it was stated: "...In repeated resolutions, both administrative and judicial, it has been established that the official's liability is not objective but subjective, in accordance with the regulation contained in the General Law of Public Administration. This is so because the public official answers personally, to third parties or to the Administration itself, when he has acted with gross negligence (culpa grave) or fraud (dolo), and in the criterion of this Office, there was gross negligence in the handling of the matter related to the investigated administrative contracts. Evidently there is a deficiency in his conduct, since he did not ascertain the legality of the contracting procedure followed. That is, his actions and his omissions constitute an imprudence and negligence of such gravity that they validly sustain the imposed sanction, given that it is attributed in consideration of the protected legal interest, regardless of whether it occurred with fraud or negligence. It is important to highlight, that according to the provisions of articles 10 and 12 of the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292, the Mayor as superior officer and administrator of the municipal dependencies, has the responsibility to maintain and perfect the internal control system of the entity and the duty to ensure the adequate development of its activity, but as has been demonstrated, his conduct was not in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned regulations. (...)" Ultimately, the plaintiff does not dedicate himself to contesting those factual findings nor does he debate with due propriety the conclusions and qualifications given by the CGR to these aspects. From that standpoint, in that venue, a set of facts was considered proven which constituted the grounds for the act and which gave rise to the content of recommending his suspension from office for 30 calendar days. No nullity whatsoever is evident regarding that procedure. In summary, the proper course is to order the dismissal of the claim for the reasons noted above.

XI.- On the counterclaim (contrademanda). As has been noted, the CGR files a counterclaim (reconvención) so that in this venue it be declared: "a) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following acts and resolutions issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones: 1. Official letter number STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones when referring to official letter 00 172-20 12 (DJ-00 18-2012) of the Contraloría General de la República, indicated that because the sanction recommended by the Contraloría General was not the cancellation of credentials, it was up to the municipal council (concejo municipal) of Santa Cruz to hear the matter and not that Tribunal. (Described in fact ten). 2. All acts connected and derived from the act described in the previous point. b) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following agreements adopted by the municipal council of Santa Cruz: 1. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, subsection 14, of January 24, 2012, where the Municipal Council agreed to abstain from ruling on the merits of the recommendation for suspension without pay and to refer to the Commission on Legal Affairs for its corresponding analysis, recommendation and subsequent commission report (dictamen) the official letters DJ- 00 17-2012 and Placa26523 12 of this Contraloría General de la República. (Described in fact twelve). 2. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25 dated April 17, 2012, which consists of requesting the Municipal Legal Advisory Office to carry out a legal analysis of official letter 03012 of this Contraloría General de la República. (Described in fact sixteen). 3. Agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-20 12, article 3, subsection 08 of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that, having that council taken cognizance of official letter 10941 of the Contraloría General de la República, it is referred to a named Special Commission for consideration, so that it renders a report (dictamen). (Described in fact eighteen). 4. All acts connected and derived from the agreements described in the previous points. c) That the judgment declare that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is the competent authority to suspend the credentials of municipal mayors (alcaldes municipales) and, consequently, order the TSE to immediately proceed with the execution of the binding recommendation for suspension from office of Mr. Nombre26667 , ordered by the CGR in the final acts of the referenced procedure PA-21-2011. d) That in case of opposition, all counter-defendants be ordered to pay both sets of costs (costas) derived from this action. VI SUBSIDIARY CLAIM (...) that the defendant Municipality be ordered to execute the binding recommendation for the sanction of suspension ordered in the final act of procedure PA-21-2011 defined by the Contraloría General regarding the municipal mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre26667 , which must be executed immediately by the municipal council of Santa Cruz." As a preliminary matter regarding the approach to the counterclaim, it should be noted that, having established that the competence to apply the binding recommendation issued by the CGR for the suspension of credentials of municipal mayors, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to article 68 of Law No. 7428, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, it makes no practical sense to enter into reiterating the entire examination already set forth as the basis for that conclusion, regarding the claims that challenge the competence of the TSE for these purposes, or to challenge the prior acts of the TSE that declined that competence in this specific case. Hence, addressing claim a) of the counterclaim (reconvención) is unnecessary, which includes omitting analysis of the defense of expiration (caducidad) that the State formulated regarding this point. However, the fact of the matter is that, based on what was analyzed regarding the power to execute the sanctions recommended under the terms of article 68 of Law No. 7428, it is clear that, considering this competence as discussed, it is the obligation of the TSE to proceed to apply the sanctions for suspension of credentials that the CGR bindingly recommends. This includes the obligation of that authority to immediately execute, if no other legal reason prevents it, the content of what was ordered by the CGR in resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, of the Legal Division of the CGR and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller General (Despacho Contralor) at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011, which recommend imposing on the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340 , a sanction of suspension without pay for 30 calendar days. The foregoing entails granting claim c) of the counterclaim. Regarding the petitionary item b) of the counterclaim, aimed at the invalidation of the agreements of the Municipal Council, its rejection must be ordered, since at their core, they revolve around the definition of the Municipal Council's competence to apply the sanction recommended in those recently cited resolutions, an aspect that, in accordance with what has been stated, does not concern it, as it is a competence outside its powers and legal attributions. Regarding the subsidiary claim, a ruling is omitted insofar as it seeks to order in judgment the competence of the Municipal Council to suspend the credentials it may have granted to officials elected by popular vote, in the case of the Municipal Mayor.

XII.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised and claims. On the claim (demanda). Regarding the claim, both the State and the CGR raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). In accordance with what is expressed in this ruling, those substantive defenses must be granted, having established the inadmissibility of the claims formulated by the plaintiff regarding the supposed incompetence of the CGR or the TSE to execute the sanctions against him. Consequently, the defense of lack of right raised by the State and the Contraloría General de la República regarding the claim is granted. The claim filed by Mr. Nombre26667 against the State and the Contraloría General de la República is rejected. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or other applicable sanction) of Municipal Mayors, which, in accordance with article 68 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428), is issued by that administrative body for infractions of the rules that comprise the control and oversight (fiscalización) framework contemplated in said legal source or for having caused harm to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) regime, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. On the counterclaim. Regarding the counterclaim, the plaintiff-counter-defendant (accionante-reconvenido) answered by raising the defense of lack of right. For its part, the State raised the preliminary defense of res judicata (cosa juzgada) regarding the challenge of the TSE act, expiration (caducidad) of the action, and lack of right. In the preliminary hearing, the State withdrew the defense of res judicata, and by resolution No. 943-2016 at 15 hours 15 minutes on April 29, 2016, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the defense of an act not subject to challenge. Given the manner in which the claim was resolved, a ruling on petitionary item a) of the counterclaim is omitted, as well as regarding the defense of expiration raised on that particular matter. The defense of lack of right raised by the State and by Mr. Nombre26667 is rejected. Ex officio, lack of right is declared regarding the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz (claim b). Consequently, the counterclaim is partially granted in the following terms: 1. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or other applicable sanction) of Municipal Mayors, which, in accordance with article 68 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428), is issued by that administrative body for infractions of the rules that comprise the control and oversight framework contemplated in said legal source or for having caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. 2. The Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is ordered to immediately, if no other legal reason prevents it, proceed to carry out the pertinent actions that allow the execution of the sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days without pay against the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340 , ordered by that oversight body in resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, of the Legal Division and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller General at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011. 3. Regarding the co-defendant Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, the claim for nullity of the resolutions issued by the cited Municipal Council in which it declares itself incompetent to order the suspension of the municipal mayor is rejected. 4. As unnecessary, a ruling on the subsidiary claim is omitted.

XIII.- Costs (Costas). In accordance with article 193 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. The waiver of this award is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there is sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is rendered based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. The co-defendants requested the award of costs. The State also requested the respective legal interest. In this case, this Court considers that the subject matter addressed allows for several possible interpretations, which shows that, in this instance, the parties have litigated in good faith and with sufficient reason, for which reason it is ordered that the present case be resolved without a special award of costs (sin especial condenatoria en costas).

POR TANTO,

On the claim. The defense of lack of right raised by the State and the Contraloría General de la República is granted, having established the inadmissibility of the claims formulated by the plaintiff regarding the supposed incompetence of the Contraloría General de la República or the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to execute the sanctions for suspension of credentials against him. Consequently, the claim filed by Mr. Nombre26667 against the State and the Contraloría General de la República is rejected. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or other applicable sanction) of Municipal Mayors, which, in accordance with article 68 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428), is issued by that administrative body for infractions of the rules that comprise the control and oversight framework contemplated in said legal source or for having caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Resolved without a special award of costs. On the counterclaim. Due to the manner in which the claim was resolved, a ruling on petitionary item a) of the counterclaim is omitted, as well as regarding the defense of expiration raised on that particular matter. The defense of lack of right raised by the State and by Mr. Nombre26667 is rejected. Ex officio, lack of right is declared regarding the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz with respect to claim b) which seeks the nullity of the agreements of that local authority that declared its incompetence to apply the sanction recommended against the Mayor of that canton. Consequently, the counterclaim is partially granted in the following terms: 1. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or other applicable sanction) of Municipal Mayors, which, in accordance with article 68 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428), is issued by that administrative body for infractions of the rules that comprise the control and oversight framework contemplated in said legal source or for having caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. 2. The Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is ordered to immediately, if no other legal reason prevents it, proceed to carry out the pertinent actions that allow the execution of the sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days without pay against the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340 , ordered by that oversight body in resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, of the Legal Division and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller General at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011. 3. Regarding the co-defendant Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, the claim for nullity of the resolutions issued by the cited Municipal Council in which it declares itself incompetent to order the suspension of the municipal mayor is rejected. 4. As unnecessary, a ruling on the subsidiary claim is omitted.

5. It is decided without special award of costs. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez/ José Roberto Brenes Chinchilla*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: Nombre26667 DEMANDADOS: El Estado, la Contraloría General de la República y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

RECONVENTORA: Contraloría General de la República RECONVENIDOS: El Estado y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

*IGWTHUP.JRGN.2016* <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:432pt; border:1pt solid #010101; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:426pt; padding:3pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">Documento firmado por:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">ROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">JOSÉ ROBERTO BRENES CHINCHILLA, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">DANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span></p></td></tr></table> IV.

On the powers of the CGR to impose sanctions related to the Public Treasury regime. An aspect that it is imperative to analyze in this proceeding refers to the powers of the comptroller authority to initiate sanctioning procedures against public agents who, through their actions or omissions, commit infractions against the Public Treasury regime, an axis that includes the correct and efficient management of public funds and assets, internal control, and the duty of probity. In that sense, as a derivation of articles 183 and 184 of the Magna Carta, the CGR serves as an auxiliary body of the Legislative Assembly with specialized powers in matters of oversight of the Public Treasury, with functional and administrative independence in the exercise of its duties. Its powers are specified and developed, in accordance with the provisions of article 184, subsection 5) of the Political Constitution, in its Organic Law, No. 7428, as well as in another set of legal sources that establish regulations referring to or related to that central axis of its powers. Within those norms (but not limited to those references), one may mention the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, No. 8131, the General Internal Control Law, No. 8292, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422, and the Administrative Procurement Law, No. 7494. From this perspective, as the State rightly argues, the oversight powers (and potential administrative sanction) held by the CGR find their basis in the very text of the Magna Carta and in a detailed legal development.

At this level, as the enabling basis for the powers the plaintiff claims are lacking, it is worth referring to the provisions of articles 1, 8, 10, and 68 of Law No. 4828 (Organic Law of the CGR—LOCGR). The first article of that legal source clearly states that the CGR is "...a fundamental constitutional body of the State, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the superior control of the Public Treasury and governing body of the oversight system contemplated in this Law." In that sense, canon 8 of that legal source establishes that the Public Treasury shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, safeguard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial norms relating to the budgetary process, administrative procurement, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials. That reference specifies the existence of a set of norms that define and establish the various aspects related to the exercise of powers to ensure compliance with the obligations and principles inherent to the Public Treasury. Thus, Article 10 of the LOCGR imposes that "The system of superior control and oversight of the Public Treasury comprises the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relationships, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from that oversight or necessary for it./ This system also comprises the norms that regulate oversight over foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework." As a derivation of that power, canon 68 of the LOCGR establishes the competence to order and recommend the execution of sanctions in the following sense: "Article 68.- Power to order and recommend sanctions. The Comptroller General of the Republic, without prejudice to other sanctions provided by law, when in the exercise of its powers it determines that a servant of the passive subjects has committed infractions against the norms that comprise the control and oversight system contemplated in this Law or has caused injury to the Public Treasury, shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its technical criterion, which is binding, the application of the corresponding sanction according to the merits of the case. The Comptroller’s Office shall form a case file against the eventual offender, guaranteeing them, at all times, due process and sufficient opportunity for a hearing and for defense in their favor. / The competent authority of the required passive subject must comply, within the period established by the Comptroller’s Office, with the recommendation issued by it; unless, within a term of eight business days counted from the notification of the act, a review request, duly motivated and reasoned, is filed by the head of the required passive subject. In this case, and once the indicated request is resolved, it must comply without delay with the provisions of the final technical-legal pronouncement of the Comptroller’s Office, under penalty of incurring the crime of disobedience, without prejudice to the statute of limitations regime contemplated in this Law. (...)" On the other hand, article 73 ejusdem establishes the competence of the CGR to initiate procedures to impose the cancellation of the credentials of a council member or district councilor, principal or alternate, who seriously infringes the norms of the oversight and control system of the Public Treasury contemplated in that Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds; or upon incurring any of the acts provided for in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public service, as generating administrative responsibility. Likewise, that precept establishes that when the serious fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the Municipal Council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, approved said agreement, shall incur the same cause for cancellation of their credentials. Similarly, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public service, as well as those provided for in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, shall be cause for cancellation of the credential of a council member or district councilor, principal or alternate. The competent judicial authority shall make, ex officio, the respective communication to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

As evidenced by the foregoing, Law No. 7428 imposes a special procedure for the administrative sanction of infractions against the norms that comprise the control and oversight system or that have caused injuries to the Public Treasury, thus being fully competent to initiate administrative procedures aimed at determining the injuries and infractions just mentioned and, based on that procedure, to recommend, in a binding manner, to the heads of the passive subjects or to the pertinent bodies, the application of the corresponding sanctions. The same treatment is established by canon 43 of Law No. 8422, which legitimizes the CGR to conduct such administrative proceedings and recommend in a binding manner the sanctions to be imposed.

This aspect, which is only tangentially discussed by the complaint, has been the subject of extensive development by the Constitutional Chamber, a higher body that has recognized, with complete clarity and forcefulness, the powers of that body for corrective actions due to infraction of the probity regime and protection of the Public Treasury. By way of reference, in the unconstitutionality action heard in case file No. 03-007482-0007-CO, in which the validity of Executive Decree number 27.974-MP-H, Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the very precept 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic were questioned, among other norms, through vote No. 13140 at 14 hours 37 minutes on November 12, 2003, that Constitutional Court stated, in relevant part: "VIII.- (...) Based on these two provisions, consistently and repeatedly, constitutional jurisprudence has pronounced on the special powers that the Political Constitution assigns to the Comptroller General of the Republic regarding the oversight of the management of public funds and the financial management of public employees, and specifically. In this sense, the following judgments, among others, are of obligatory consultation: number 2398-91, at 15:20 hours on November 13, 1991; 0660-92, at 15:00 hours on March 10, 1992; 3607-94; at 15:15 hours on July 19, 1994; 0016-95, at 15:45 hours on January 3, 1995; 2632-95, at 16:06 hours on May 23, 1995; 4284-95, at 15:06 hours on August 3, 1995; 5119-95; at 20:39 hours on September 13, 1995; 0998-98, at 11:30 hours on February 16, 1998; 9524-99, at 9:06 hours on December 3, 1999, 3027-00, at 9:03 hours on April 14, 2000, 2000-6326, at sixteen hours eighteen minutes on July nineteen, two thousand, and number 2001-4835, at fourteen hours fifty-six minutes on June six, two thousand one. In each and every one of the cited rulings, the Chamber emphasizes that by the will of the constituent, the Comptroller General of the Republic was created as a—constitutional—body auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly with a specific and determined function: the oversight of the Public Treasury, so that by constitutional mandate—Articles 183 and 184—tasks such as the oversight of administrative procurement procedures and the functioning of the financial system, especially regarding the mobilization of capital so that confidence is maintained in the correct administration of banking entities, the management of the budget of each and every public agency, as well as the control of personnel who 'receive, safeguard, pay, or administer assets or securities of the State' are not beyond the functions entrusted to this comptroller body, but quite the opposite, since they respond to the interest of the proper functioning of administrative services and agencies. Reinforcing the foregoing is the fact that for the Comptroller’s Office to carry out this task effectively, the Political Constitution itself, in its Article 24, provides it with a special faculty, which is the possibility of reviewing accounting books and their annexes for tax purposes and to oversee the correct use of public funds, respectively, a faculty that the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic develops in Article 13. It is clear that these powers originate from constitutional norms, and are developed in laws, such as the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, number 7428, the Law of Financial Equilibrium of the Public Sector, number 6955, the Internal Control Law, number 8292, and the Financial Administration Law, number 8131; and with respect to the control of the budget, procurement, and municipal resources, in the current Municipal Code itself; and even in regulatory norms, such as the Regulation on the functioning of state enterprises structured as commercial companies, Executive Decree number 7927-H, and in the Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic, number 27.974-MP-H. By way of conclusion, what the Chamber stated regarding the functions entrusted to the Comptroller General of the Republic is transcribed from judgment number 5119-95, at 20:39 hours on September 13, 1995: 'V.- The Comptroller General of the Republic, as its Organic Law emphasizes (Law No.7428 of September 7, 1994) is a body of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly, whose general function is the superior control of the Public Treasury and the direction of the oversight system regulated in the cited law. It principally exercises the specific attributions that the Constitution confers upon it in Article 184.(...)'" Later in that same ruling, regarding the validity of the power of instruction and sanction referred to in article 68 of the LOCGR, it stated: "Regarding the challenge of this norm, the Chamber reiterates the considerations previously given in its jurisprudence, both regarding the special competence, of constitutional order, assigned to the Comptroller General of the Republic, and regarding the faculty, not only to initiate sanctioning procedures, but also to issue binding opinions regarding the sanctions to be applied to the servants of the entities subject to its oversight, from which the following conclusions can be derived: a) that the challenged faculty of the Comptroller’s Office derives from articles 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution, which is why it cannot be considered to constitute an invasion of the autonomy granted to autonomous institutions in their management, as the sanctioning power recognized to this constitutional body does not derive from a hierarchical or labor relationship; that is, the sanctions it exercises are not disciplinary in nature, but rather the faculty of superior oversight and supervision of the Public Treasury, hence it does not assume functions of the active administration, since its action is a logical and necessary consequence of its assigned constitutional competence; b) that the challenged faculty materializes as a consequence of the application of an ordinary administrative sanctioning procedure, in which full respect and compliance with the guarantees of due process are given, in which the investigated person can effectively exercise their right to defense, so that they can refute the charges imputed to them, provide the evidence they deem necessary, access the case file, file the appeals they deem appropriate, and of course, the reasoning of all acts issued; so that the power to issue a binding recommendation arises and materializes, only when the Comptroller’s Office deems the infraction of the norms that comprise the control and oversight system to be proven (norms and constitutional principles of administrative procurement and of the preparation and execution of the budget, the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Internal Control Law), or when it verifies an injury to the Public Treasury; c) that the sanction is not applied by the Comptroller General of the Republic, but by the hierarchical superior of the non-compliant servant; who, in turn, may file a review request (article 38 of the Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic) before the Comptroller General of the Republic, in case of disagreement with the recommendation; and d) that the investigative faculty of the Comptroller’s Office is limited to its scope of competence, that is, the management and administration of the Public Treasury, only. Likewise, it must be considered that the autonomy enjoyed by autonomous institutions is not unlimited, as Article 188 of the Political Constitution itself subjects them to the law in matters of governance, hence, they are subject to administrative oversight, which manifests itself through planning, directives, and of course, through the controls provided for in the Magna Carta itself for the management of public funds, whose constitutional body tasked with such duty is the Comptroller General of the Republic—Articles 183 and 184—. Therefore, the challenged competence, far from exceeding the natural scope of the functions that the Political Constitution grants to the Comptroller General of the Republic, is consistent with it, so that the attempt to eliminate the faculty of the Comptroller General of the Republic to investigate and sanction public servants who administer public funds would imply diminishing the competence that, by constitutional mandate, is recognized to this constitutional body; which would rather violate the Political Constitution itself. By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the action with respect to the challenge made of Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and to confirm the constitutional jurisprudence that has been issued on this matter." That extensive development makes it unnecessary for this Tribunal to elaborate on reasons to uphold the competence of the CGR to initiate procedures against a public official for infraction against the Public Treasury, as has been deemed proven occurred in this case, given that the opening of case file DJ-67-2010, which involved the plaintiff, referred to conduct related to that regime, and not to electoral matters as the claimant seems to incorrectly assert. Along those lines, contrary to what is indicated in the complaint, the participation of the CGR in this questioned procedure does not derive from the assumption regulated in precept 259 of the Electoral Code. That norm stipulates the participation of the CGR in the credential cancellation procedure, when the cause of that sanction is related to the violation of the norms of the oversight system contemplated in the LOCGR, Law No. 8422, No. 8292, or others related to the System of Control and Superior Oversight of the Public Treasury. In such a scenario, it is established that the TSE will refer the case file to the CGR so that, in accordance with article 68 of its Organic Law, it may recommend what is pertinent. However, from the analysis of the case records, in this case it cannot be inferred that the action of the CGR was due to the application of that mandate, but rather that the initiation of the procedure was in the direct exercise of its oversight powers. To show this, it is sufficient to note that the sanction imposed was not the cancellation of credentials, but rather suspension from office for 30 calendar days. It is worth noting that the aforementioned competence covers any official who administers public funds or is subject to the normative regime of internal control, probity, and sound administration of the Public Treasury, which includes public agents designated through electoral processes, as is the case of the figure of the Municipal Mayor, an official who does not enjoy any kind of immunity that places them outside the powers sanctionable for infraction of the System of Control and Superior Oversight of the Public Treasury or the norms of internal control and administrative procurement in particular.

V.- On the content of the CGR's act and the competence to execute the sanction. As a second aspect, it is argued that the act issued by the comptroller body is limited to recommending a sanction, but not imposing it, and therefore what has not been ordered cannot be executed. This Tribunal respects but does not share in any way what is indicated by the petitioner. In accordance with the provisions of Article 68 of the LOCGR, once the respective procedure has been completed, the CGR shall recommend the application of a sanction, in a binding manner. On the nature and content of those actions, in vote number 13926-2006 at 14 hours 44 minutes on September 20, 2006, the Constitutional Chamber ruled: "VI.- ON THE BINDING NATURE OF THE OPINIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC.- The challenge of Articles 4 and 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic is also deemed inappropriate, as it denotes confusion on the part of the plaintiff regarding the prerogatives that the Political Constitution confers upon this constitutional body of control and oversight of the public treasury, and that the law is responsible for developing. Indeed, it is noted that the binding nature of the Comptroller’s opinions is referred not to the studies that precede an administrative procedure—which correspond to the preliminary stage of administrative procedures—but to the decision that resolves that administrative procedure, in which the sanction to be applied is determined, in which full guarantees of due process are given, as this Tribunal stated in the cited judgment number 2003-13140. '[...] the challenged faculty materializes as a consequence of the application of an ordinary administrative sanctioning procedure, in which full respect and compliance with the guarantees of due process are given, in which the investigated person can effectively exercise their right to defense, so that they can refute the charges imputed to them, provide the evidence they deem necessary, access the case file, file the appeals they deem appropriate, and of course, the reasoning of all acts issued; so that the power to issue a binding recommendation arises and materializes, only when the Comptroller’s Office deems the infraction of the norms that comprise the control and oversight system to be proven (norms and constitutional principles of administrative procurement and of the preparation and execution of the budget, the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Internal Control Law), or when it verifies an injury to the Public Treasury;' The foregoing makes sense in that it clarifies to the plaintiff that even though the sanctioning power of the Comptroller General of the Republic has been recognized, it is referred to initiating, instructing, and deciding that administrative procedure, so that it is not the body in charge of applying the sanction to the servant subject to its oversight, but rather the authority on whom the required subject depends—organizationally, disciplinarily, and hierarchically— (superior head). Thus, this binding nature derives from the constitutional norms themselves—183 and 184—, that is, from the recognition of the function of control and oversight of the public treasury that has been granted—it is insisted—by constitutional mandate to the Comptroller’s Office. Therefore, far from being unconstitutional, Articles 4 and 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic are in accordance with Constitutional Law, as they recognize and provide for the binding nature of the opinions of this constitutional body, as an indispensable condition for it to fulfill the task that the Magna Carta has entrusted to it. (...)".

In that context, the aforementioned norm (Article 68) establishes the power of the CGR to initiate the procedure and order the sanction to be applied, an application it recommends in a binding manner to a specific Public Administration. The debate presented by the petitioner revolves around the competence to apply that binding recommendation. As has been noted, the plaintiff postulates that in the absence of an enabling norm, neither the TSE nor the Municipal Council can impose and execute said sanction; the former because the facts by virtue of which the sanctioning regime is sought to be applied escape electoral matter and exceed the sanction of cancellation of credentials, which the Electoral Code confers upon that authority. Regarding the Municipal Council, because it is not the head of the mayor, but an internal body of the Municipality with which it shares a duty of inter-administrative coordination.

On this particular point, it is worth highlighting what follows. The Mayor forms part of the authorities that make up the municipal government, as deduced from article 169 of the Magna Carta. In that line, numeral 12 of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794, establishes that "The municipal government shall be composed of a deliberative body called the Council and made up of the council members determined by law, and also by a mayor and their respective alternate, all of popular election." This is an official of popular election, whose designation can be terminated through the cancellation of the respective credential via the procedure stipulated by the respective norms. This particular topic is not of interest in this case because the sanction was not imposed. However, it is worth specifying that in accordance with the current Electoral Code, Law No. 8765, the cancellation of the credentials of mayors is the competence of the TSE, as defined from canon 253 of that legal body. However, when the sanction to be imposed derives from an injury to the regime for the protection of the Public Treasury (a topic of interest), a distinction must be made between cases where that transgression is a cause for cancellation of credentials, from those cases where the sanction is a suspension from the exercise of office. In the first case (cancellation of credentials), although the competence for cancellation belongs to the TSE, as has been noted, numeral 259 of the Electoral Code establishes the obligatory participation of the CGR as the governing body in this field. In this scenario, the aforementioned competence is reiterated by article 73 of the LOCGR in that it states: "Article 73.- Cancellation of credential (*) The commission of a serious fault by a council member or district councilor, principal or alternate, against the norms of the oversight and control system of the Public Treasury contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds; or upon incurring any of the acts provided for in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public service, as generators of administrative responsibility, shall be cause for the cancellation of the respective credential. This shall apply when the offender has acted in the exercise of their office or by reason of it./ When the serious fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the municipal council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, have approved said agreement, shall incur the same cause for cancellation of their credentials./ Similarly, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public service, as well as those provided for in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public service, shall be a cause for cancellation of the credential of a council member or district councilor, principal or alternate.

The competent judicial authority shall, ex officio, make the respective communication to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal." On the other hand, when the applicable sanction is not the aforementioned cancellation, Article 68 of the LOCR (which regulates the generic competence of oversight and sanction) merely indicates that the CGR "...shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its binding technical criterion, the application of the corresponding sanction in accordance with the merits of the case...". Thus, in the specific case of municipal mayors, as an initial thesis, that mandate does not clearly define the authority that must execute the sanction when it does not involve the cancellation of credentials. At this point, a clarification must be made that this Tribunal considers and deems fundamental in the debate addressed in this case; that is, there is no absence of express legal regulation regarding the reprehensible conduct and the sanction associated with that offense (should it be proven). Therefore, there is no regulatory deficiency regarding the sanction or the conduct that gives rise to it, so there is no risk whatsoever of infringement of the constitutional guarantee of specificity of offenses or reservation of law in matters of regulating sanctionable conduct (nulla crimen nulla poena sine legem). It is clear that both Article 68 of the LOCGR, and the regulations contained in Articles 39, 41, and 42 of Law No. 8292, as well as in mandates 38, 39, 40, 41, and 43 of Law No. 8422, establish the legal normative references that previously qualify the conduct and impose the applicable sanctions for the various behaviors that constitute violations of the superior control and oversight regulations of the Public Treasury. There is therefore no debate whatsoever regarding a potential violation of that guarantee. The matter centers on the interpretative divergence (if a gap indeed exists) regarding the competence or power to apply the sanctions that the CGR bindingly recommends in the exercise of those powers, and in accordance with the procedural framework provided in precept 68 of its Organic Law. On this point, it is worth noting that a precedent from this Administrative Contentious Tribunal, specifically, judgment No. 69-2015-VII of 10:45 a.m. on July 20, 2015, from Section VII, analyzed a similar aspect to that addressed in this proceeding, but referring to the Mayor of Coto Brus. In that sense, that section of this Administrative Contentious Tribunal considered that there was no gap regarding the power to apply the suspension sanctions for the local mayor recommended by the CGR, given that Law No. 8292 and Law No. 8422 establish that in the cases of mayors, the CGR remits the file with the respective recommendation to the TSE, for the pertinent sanction to be applied, based on which it deemed that the questioned power belonged to that electoral authority. As stated, that criterion was based on the interpretation made of the indicated norms, from which those judges deduced that far from a regulatory gap existing, the norms were clear in assigning that power in favor of the TSE. On this aspect, it was indicated: "X.- (...) Notwithstanding the foregoing, as will be stated, Article 42 of the Internal Control Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, and Article 43 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service No. 8422 of October 6, 2004, expressly provide that regarding administrative sanctions against municipal mayors, it is the responsibility of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to apply the sanctions that the Comptroller General of the Republic orders, in matters of breach of the oversight, control, and surveillance regulations of the Public Treasury, within the administrative procedures implemented for such purposes, so there is no legal vacuum on the matter. (...) The cited provisions expressly establish that in the event that the breach of the provisions related to offenses contained in the Laws in question are attributed to members of the supreme powers (among whom are the Municipal Mayors), the Comptroller General of the Republic must inform the relevant authority, in this case, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, so that it may proceed to impose the corresponding sanctions. As is specifically and clearly provided in the cited norms, contrary to what the State argued, the aforementioned electoral body is also responsible for executing binding administrative sanctions other than the cancellation of credentials, which, in the exercise of its constitutional and legal powers, the Comptroller General of the Republic bindingly recommends in procedures where the presumed responsible parties are attributed with the breach of provisions of norms that comprise the Public Treasury, contained among others in the Internal Control Law and the Law Against Illicit Enrichment in Public Service. In this same sense, contrary to what was argued by the plaintiff (...), there is no legal vacuum on the matter, as the cited provisions are compatible with the system of personal responsibility and accountability to which public officials—including municipal mayors—are subject by provision of Article 11 of the Magna Carta. (...)" After analyzing the norms on which that ruling bases its final decision, this Tribunal respects the expressed position entirely, but does not share it, to the extent that although those precepts, with greater emphasis on canon 43 of Law No. 8422, establish that in the case of mayors, the CGR shall inform the TSE so that it imposes the corresponding sanctions, when considering that content alongside the power established by canon 259 of the Electoral Code (Law No. 8765), which refers to the cancellation of credentials but omits reference to other sanctions, a space of little clarity is inferred regarding the debated issue, namely, the competent body to apply the sanctions recommended by the CGR against mayors other than the cancellation of credentials, this latter sanction being clearly the purview of the TSE. However, it is considered that this same regulatory clarity is not observed in the case of the other sanctions. Nevertheless, the absence of an express rule is not an obstacle for this Tribunal to define the point in question, given that the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch itself, No. 7333, indicates in the second paragraph of mandate 5, the impossibility of excusing oneself from exercising its authority or from ruling on matters within its competence due to the lack or clarity of the applicable rule, noting that the jurisdictional task in the specific case must be satisfied in accordance with the written and unwritten rules of the legal system, attending to the hierarchical scale of sources. From this perspective, it is necessary that, in accordance with mandates 7 and 9 of the LGAP, this Tribunal proceed to integrate the Public Legal System and proceed to interpret and conclude on the applicable rules in the face of this apparent normative vacuum. To do this, it is necessary to note that in accordance with the interpretive guidelines established by precept 10 of that LGAP, the administrative norm must be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed. Of course, this task must be carried out with full respect for the rights and interests of individuals and considering whether the language used by the legislator in drafting the norm allows for a level of alternative solutions (polysemy), in which case, it is primary to consider the categorical value to be protected (purpose or ultimate value), as well as the legal means that most adequately and rationally allow for the protection and satisfaction of that purpose (performance criteria). However, it is necessary to indicate that in the face of this panorama, it is the legislator who is responsible for defining the debated issue clearly and undoubtedly, so the following position is subject to what may eventually be defined in this sense in the respective legal sources. Ergo, the following position derives from the interpretation of the norms that, in the consideration of this Chamber, would provide an answer to the situation under analysis, but with the warning that its pertinence is conditioned by the express legal regulation that may be enacted by law on the matter. Nevertheless, and after that clarification, in the judgment of this collegiate body, several possible scenarios emerge from the dilemma in question, namely: a) The impossibility of executing the sanction due to the absence of an express rule assigning competence; b) Competence of the Municipal Council; and c) Competence of the TSE. The examination of the possible solutions is entered into below.

VI.- Regarding the claim of impossibility of executing the sanction: That given the absence of an express rule defining the competence to execute and apply the sanction recommended by the CGR (even though it is binding), and considering that it is a power of authority, as long as there is no express rule on that power, the sanction is inapplicable or unenforceable. From the outset, this thesis is not shared by this Tribunal because it would imply an absolute violation and immunity (and impunity) in favor of the aforementioned local officials, regarding conduct that constitutes breaches of the regime of protection of the Public Treasury, to the extent that those offenses do not warrant the cancellation of their credentials. Such an interpretation would lead to accepting a sort of irresponsibility of mayors in those cases, contrary to the constitutional principle of administrative efficiency, accountability of the public agent, and their duty to comply with the norms of probity, internal control, and other components of the Public Treasury. This action precisely seeks for this Tribunal to make such a declaration, which implies, it is reiterated, making the sanctions ordered by the CGR unenforceable in these cases. If that were the logic of the normative regime indicated above, there would be no sense whatsoever in ordering the opening of administrative proceedings against mayors, the only applicable scenario being when offenses are sanctionable with the cancellation of the credential. If the internal control and probity regime is applicable to every public official who administers public funds or manages public assets, denying the possibility of sanctions other than the cancellation of their credentials to mayors, for the reasons alleged, would generate a material impossibility of sanction, ultimately, an inequity that leads to immunity, to the detriment of the due safeguarding of the public interest that guides the adequate and proper handling of public funds. The local autonomy that the constituent power conferred upon municipal entities does not exempt them from compliance with probity rules and, in general, with the set of precepts aimed at protecting the Public Treasury. Despite that degree of autonomy and the procedure for their designation, they are public officials and, in that capacity, must subject their conduct to legality and bear the internal corrective consequences that derive from their omissions. On the contrary, as noted above, both Law No. 8292 and Law No. 8422 expressly refer to cases of administrative responsibility and establish specific sanctions for municipal mayors who infringe upon Public Treasury norms (superior control and oversight regulations). The same occurs with the detail expressed in the LOCGR and in the Electoral Code itself. From that standpoint, and reiterating that the dilemma analyzed does not lie in the absence of express regulation on the reprehensibility of conduct or the legal establishment of sanctions, but rather on the competence to apply sanctions imposed on local officials of popular election, a thesis that promotes immunity in the exercise of these positions cannot be sustained, so this thesis must be rejected.

VII.- Regarding the incompetence of the Municipal Council: A second possibility in this aspect would be to assign competence to the Municipal Council. Under this approach, it could be indicated that the limitation formulated regarding this position is that this local body is not the hierarchical superior of the mayor, as they are bodies called to coordinate and together comprise the Local Government. In this sense, it is clear that, as an initial thesis, the disciplinary power is conferred upon the hierarchical superior, as a derivation of the powers conferred upon that figure by Article 102 subsections b) and d) of the LGAP. In the Costa Rican municipal organic scheme, in accordance with Article 12 of the Municipal Code, and in consonance with numeral 169 of the Magna Carta, the mayor does not depend hierarchically on the Municipal Council, as both are popularly designated and comprise what is called the Local Government. A duty of coordination and a maxim of complementation of competences is imposed between both bodies. However, in the judgment of this collegiate body, the relationships imposed in the context of those municipal hierarchies, both of popular designation, makes it inappropriate for one of them to hold the competence to impose on its counterpart sanctions other than the cancellation of credentials. This Tribunal does not observe any element upon which the competence of the Municipal Council to impose sanctions on the mayor could be sustained, as that first body holds no power whatsoever over the content of the mayor's functions, their designation, or in general, over the credential that enables them to exercise the position. On the other hand, from the examination of the legal powers that have been entrusted to the Municipal Council, Articles 13 and 19 of the Municipal Code do not contain within the attributions of the cited body any power that allows it to sanction the Municipal Mayor, so attributing that power to that administrative unit becomes inappropriate.

VIII.- Competence of the TSE: At this point, the CGR postulates in its counterclaim that the competence to order and execute the sanction corresponds to the TSE. To justify this position, it essentially points out that the execution of the sanctions that the CGR bindingly recommends was expressly attributed to the cited Tribunal, given the investiture held by the official upon whom the recommendation falls, as that authority was the one who granted the credential. It says, only the TSE administers the credentials of the designations of municipal mayors, being an exclusive and excluding competence. It assumes, if the granting of said credential gives the TSE an implicit competence to cancel it, with greater reason it holds the same competence to suspend it. It expresses that it does not share the criterion of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal regarding an absence of competence on its part to order the suspension of credentials of municipal officials of popular election. It emphasizes that the effective accountability and application of the regime of responsibilities of high-ranking public officials constitute fundamental tasks of the national legal system. It refers to the principle of parallelism of forms and the legal aphorism that he who can do the more can do the less. Thus, the same authority that granted a credential is the one called to suspend it, since suspension is a temporary cancellation of the credentials. It reiterates, the conditions of the credential granted to said official by the TSE can only be varied by that same electoral authority. It accuses that the interpretive criterion held by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, regarding the non-existence of a legal basis enabling it to order the suspension of credentials granted by itself to popularly elected officials, specifically to municipal mayors, based on which it has in turn ordered that the respective municipal councils are responsible for executing the binding recommendation of suspension of that servant, has generated a serious impact on the fundamental objectives and purposes of the legal system of control and oversight of the Public Treasury. It adds, that decision has resulted in the non-execution of said suspension, and consequently, not only in the impact on the purpose pursued by the control and oversight regulations of the Public Treasury, but also in the impact on elementary values and principles of the Costa Rican constitutional and legal order, such as the effective accountability of public authorities and the regime of responsibilities of high-ranking public officials. On this particular matter, it is worth noting what is set forth below. For the proper understanding of this matter, it is necessary to consider the content and scope of the norm that allows the CGR to bindingly recommend the questioned sanctions. As indicated ut supra, in accordance with Article 68 of the LOCGR, this oversight body, after the due process, issues an act in which it recommends to another administrative body or entity the application of the respective sanction. This implies, unlike what the plaintiff asserts, that the actions issued by the CGR are not a simple recommendation lacking enforceable content, since the procedure carried out in that venue precisely seeks the analysis of whether or not there has been an injury to the Public Treasury regime, a competence that, according to what has been stated, has been entrusted to the CGR. In this way, the final act of that proceeding is brought to the attention of the Administration competent to execute and apply the sanction, which means that it is unnecessary (and inappropriate) to issue a new act, only remaining to apply the sanction ordered by the CGR. In that sense, the execution of the sanction does not constitute a conduct or function that must be associated with hierarchical sanctioning powers of a strictly disciplinary nature, although when the official to be sanctioned has a hierarchical superior, it is clear that the CGR's order is communicated to the latter so that they can order the internal actions for executing that sanction. In accordance with Article 253 of the Electoral Code, the TSE is the competent body to order the sanction of cancellation of credentials for the grounds provided in that legal source. For such purposes, various scenarios that could give rise to this effect of suppression of the credential are regulated, among them: resignation, absence, impact on the maritime-terrestrial zone regime, as well as the one relevant to this case, namely, that referring to substantial infractions of the Public Treasury regime. In that sense, Article 259 ejusdem states in its literal rigor:

"ARTICLE 259.- Cancellation of credentials for impact on the Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury. When the cancellation of credentials is sought, invoking the commission of a serious offense, in violation of the oversight regulations contemplated in the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public service, the General Law of Internal Control, or others related to the Superior Control and Oversight System of the Public Treasury, the matter shall be remitted to the Comptroller's Office so that it may recommend what is appropriate, in accordance with Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, after having prepared the respective file against the presumed responsible party. The Tribunal shall rule once the Comptroller's Office or the criminal courts have pronounced on the alleged violation of the referred norms." Certainly, the norm establishes the competence to order the cancellation of the credential as the most serious consequence, while as stated above, it establishes the participation of the CGR in the process, so that it initiates the procedure provided in canon 68 of the LOCGR, in order to render the corresponding binding recommendation. In the judgment of the plaintiff, and of the State itself (PGR), that norm only enables imposing the sanction of cancellation, not one of lesser implications, such as suspension from office. From the analysis and consideration of the implications of the supposed gap that arises in this particular matter, this collegiate body deems that there is merit and sufficient reasons that allow the attribution of the competence in question to the TSE, which are set forth below. Legal nature of the official's designation. A first aspect to which this Tribunal must refer relates to the very ratio of the competence assigned to the TSE regarding the sanctions imposed against the municipal mayor. The constitutional regime and the Electoral Code itself assign the competence of said body by reason that the procedure allowing the designation of this official is the participation of the electorate through the exercise of the right to suffrage, which, as a derivation of the democratic principle, allows the election to that position by popular designation. Precisely, that modality of configuring the official's investiture is formalized and perfected with the granting of the respective credential by the Tribunal, once it declares the validity of the respective elections, in accordance with the competences and powers established by Article 12 subsection h) of the Electoral Code. In the case of popularly elected officials, it is evident that despite being constituted as public servants—for the term and validity of their designation—, in accordance with the general concept established by canon 111 of the LGAP, they are subject to a sanctioning regime sui generis, to the extent that the sanctioning competences are not assigned to a strict-sense administrative superior, since on the contrary, they hold the figure of administrative superiors themselves. Of course, this does not imply the impossibility of imposing sanctions against them; however, it is precisely that legal nature of their employment relationship that has led to the establishment of specific legal norms stipulating the ways and scenarios for imposing that type of responsibility upon them. From this standpoint, the sanctions that may be imposed on this class of public agents do not derive from the exercise of a hierarchical power in the terms justified by mandate 102 subsections b), c), and d) of the LGAP, but rather from the necessary subjection to the legal system regarding their conduct. In that sense, starting from the basis that it is the TSE that confers the credential constituting the formal act of investiture (preceded by popular designation), and from which the official enters into the exercise of the position, it is precisely this same authority that is legitimized to order what is pertinent regarding the cancellation of this status and to cease its effects. This being so, these powers are granted by reason that the TSE constitutes the body to which the Political Constitution and Law No. 8765 have entrusted the power of management regarding said credentials, given that they are public agents who have been popularly designated, reason for which the competence to order sanctions that directly affect the exercise of those positions, in a manner that totally or temporarily disables one of those servants, is part of their constitutional and legal competences. Otherwise, it would be conferring upon another authority that lacks such democratic and institutional legitimacy a power whose substantial content would imply, temporarily ceasing, for the duration of the sanction, the credential that was granted by the TSE, thereby allowing the alteration of the validity and effects of an act by an authority other than the one that formally conferred it. In that way, the TSE being the body that grants the credential to popularly elected officials, only that body would be legitimized to order the respective sanctions against those officials, due to the competence over those designations that has been granted to it. It is worth adding at this point that it is this electoral vocation of the official's appointment that legitimizes the TSE's participation in the sanction regime, not the nature of the offenses committed that give rise to that regime, since as indicated, it includes everything from absence to infraction of Public Treasury norms. It is, therefore, a generic competence that allows it to grant and cancel the credentials of these officials, as well as the temporary suspension of that designation. Implications and effects of the suspension. A second aspect derives from the similarity (by analogy) of the effects of the cancellation of credentials to the suspension from the exercise of office that occurs as a consequence of the recommendations that the CGR issues pursuant to Article 68 of Law No. 7428. It is clear that the cancellation of the credential constitutes a definitive cessation of its effects, which implies, evidently, that the official must leave their post and is prevented, from that point on, from exercising their competences. On the other hand, the suspension that has been referenced implies a sort of temporary cancellation of the credential, to the extent that ultimately, that suspension, although it does not involve a direct withdrawal of the credential, equally disables the official from exercising the position and its competences for the term of the imposed sanction.

From that angle of examination, in this Chamber's judgment there is an identity between the two figures, considering that they both derive from a sanctioning (sancionatorio) exercise associated with the breach of duties, with the difference that in cancellation, the faults that give rise to it must be serious, whereas in suspension, such seriousness is not present, which does not exclude the violation of rules that impose duties in the exercise of that function. If looked at carefully, there is parity in the material effects of both sanctions, with the difference that one implies definitive cessation, while the other, temporary cessation, in the exercise of the position. Therefore, within this integrative (integrativa) labor that is required in this specific case, if it falls to the TSE to define the definitive cancellation of the credentials of Municipal Mayors, the suspension analyzed being a form of temporarily disqualifying the exercise of the position, it is an application that, within a framework of coherence and efficiency, corresponds to said Tribunal as the holder of the generic defense that the Law has granted it regarding said credentials. The opposite, that is, attributing to another authority the competence to apply the sanction recommended by the CGR, would lead to conferring upon another authority the power to disqualify the credentials of popularly elected officials, even temporarily, despite it being a competence expressly granted to the TSE. **More burdensome generic sanctioning (sancionatoria) competence.** On the other hand, this Tribunal shares the argument made by the CGR regarding the necessary invocation of the aphorism "he who can do more, can do less." In this regard, the TSE certainly possesses by law the competence to order the most burdensome sanction regarding the figure of the municipal mayor, as is the case of the cancellation of his credentials. Therefore, possessing that power of more severe impact, it is this Chamber's judgment that it likewise falls to it to define the lesser-ranking sanctions that may derive from the analysis of the conducts that give rise to the procedure provided for in ordinal 68 of the LOCGR, to the extent that there is no express rule that assigns that power to a different instance. Following these factors, it is this Tribunal's consideration that the competence to apply and impose the suspension sanctions on municipal mayors, which the CGR recommends in application of ordinal 68 LOCGR, falls to the TSE. It must be highlighted, however, that this is a competence not inherent to the exercise of its powers relating to electoral matters, for which reason it is a matter subject to possible review in this jurisdiction, as has been defined in various precedents by the Sala Constitucional, among them, votes 2012-001259, 2010-016342, and recently in ruling No. 2015-001780 of 11 hours 34 minutes of February 06, 2015. On the other hand, it should be noted that this process does not discuss the express regulation or lack thereof of a rule that imposes the possibility of initiating a sanctioning (sancionatorio) procedure against municipal mayors. Ordinal 68 of the LOCGR together with the rules of Law No. 8422 and 8292 provide the normative basis for those purposes. The dilemma must focus on the competence to apply the pertinent sanction, so an allegation of injury to the principle of legal reserve or specificity regarding those aspects is not admissible, since the sanctionable conduct as well as the legal consequence are provided for in the written rules of the applicable Legal System. From that standpoint, the rejection of the claim must be ordered insofar as it intends for this collegiate body to declare the TSE's lack of competence for the application of the sanctions issued by the CGR in this particular case. As a corollary to this particular point, it must be indicated that although this Section VI in precedent No. 65-2016-VI of 09 hours 30 minutes of April 20, 2016 had established a position different from that expressed in this ruling, such vote was issued by a different composition than the one subscribing to this judgment, and includes a criterion that, while respected, is ultimately not shared for the reasons set forth above, which have led this composition to conclude on the TSE's competences to order and apply sanctions to municipal mayors in cases such as the one under examination.

**IX.- Regarding the other allegations of nullity. Infraction of the principle of natural judge and violation of due process.** In another order of grievances, the claimant (accionante) alleges injury to the maxim of the natural judge since it was the same investigating body of the procedure initiated by the CGR that issued the final act, resolution PA-21-2011. In his judgment, this causes nullity since they knew the facts of the process and formed an anticipated criterion, so that by resolving the final act before an eventual situation of contradiction, they violated the Principles of Impartiality and Objectivity, as well as his right to defense and due process. Regarding this debate, it is necessary to reiterate that the Legal System confers upon the CGR special powers for the control and oversight of public finances, based on rules of legal and constitutional hierarchy, exercising the sanctioning (sancionatoria) power based on that normative framework. Precisely, for the exercise of that competence, it proceeded in due course to issue the so-called "Regulation of Administrative Procedures," an administrative rule that was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 76 of April 20, 2007 (No. R-C0-16-2007). In this rule, ordinal 28, together with the provisions in numeral 19 of the Organic Regulation of the CGR, Resolution N° R-C0-34-2009 of 10:00 hours of May 22, 2009, subsequently amended by Resolution N° R-DC-123-2010 of the Office of the Comptroller of 14:00 hours of July 19, 2010, establishes that both the act of opening and the final resolution would be issued by the Legal Division of said controlling entity, and its acts could be reviewed by its superior, that is, by the office of the Comptroller (a) General itself. Contrary to what is affirmed by the petitioner (promovente), although the LGAP indicates that the Public Administration will be represented in the procedure by the directing body (art. 282.3) and confers upon it powers of instruction, such as that of directing the oral hearing (art. 314 ejusdem), the truth of the matter is that nothing prevents the same body that investigates and processes the case from being the decision-maker (decisor). On the contrary, starting from the premise that it is the instructor who evacuates the evidence and holds the oral hearing, this circumstance enhances and favors the principles of immediacy of evidence, speed, and orality (oralidad) of the administrative procedure, as expressed by the Sala Constitucional in Resolution No. 6379-2002 of 15:22 hours of June 26, 2002. For its part, in ruling No. 2010-15786 of 09:13 hours of September 24, 2010, it stated on that specific point: "... it is necessary to point out that the Contraloría General de la República does not injure the principle of impartiality with its actions, since it designates a single body, which assumes both the functions of instruction and decision, a situation that this Tribunal has indicated, on previous occasions, does not violate the principle of impartiality as it even allows the immediacy of the evidence ... ". Therefore, the concentration of the tasks of instruction and decision in the same administrative file does not antagonize (antagoniza) the aforementioned principles, so the charge under examination must be rejected. On the other hand, the plaintiff reproves that in resolution PA-21-2011 the commission of a serious fault was considered proven, having as the only evidence the document dated February 26, 2010, issued by Mr. Olenín Carmona Álvarez, without said evidence having been incorporated verbally in the oral hearing, or, without Mr. Carmona Álvarez having appeared as a witness to ratify what was indicated in that official communication, and without determining his participation in the facts that were investigated. He deems the principles of orality (oralidad), contradiction, immediacy of evidence, defense, efficiency, and speed of the process to have been violated. The grievance in question must be rejected. From the analysis of the administrative file, it is clear that from the act of initiation of the sanctioning (sancionatorio) procedure ordered by the CGR, that is, an act of 09 hours 30 minutes of September 24, 2010, that oversight body detailed the pieces that make up the file and a private oral hearing was convened for December 14, 2010. From that transfer and attending to the faculties that accrue to the parties within the private oral hearing, according to canon 317 of the LGPA, the claimant (accionante) could well have opposed said evidence or, alternatively, provided the elements of conviction that would allow refuting the content of that specific element, as well as regarding the set of facts that were intimated to him. In fact, within the detail of the evidence that was expressed in that initiation act, the testimonial deposition of Mr. Olenín Carmona is included (see image 244 -folio 229- of the administrative file), so the petitioner (promovente) was fully and objectively able to present his arguments and other evidence he deemed pertinent. On the other hand, it must be highlighted that from the analysis of the final act, it does not appear in any way that the sanction recommended by the CGR was based solely on that piece of evidence that is alleged. See that resolution RDC-203-2011 points to the Official Communication PM-045-2010 of August 3, 2010, as additional evidence, from which that CGR extracted the irregular action in the contracting process that was investigated in the questioned procedure. Furthermore, the claimant (accionante) does not specify the manner in which that matter he accuses generates a nullity of a substantial nature, such that in the terms of precept 223 LGAP, it merits the suppression for invalidity of the procedure and the final decision issued against him, which is determinative if it is considered that the final act is supported by other evidence to attribute his responsibility for alleged infractions in the administrative contracting procedures. The rejection of the claim regarding that particular must therefore be ordered.

**X.- Regarding the accreditation of the causes for the sanction.** Finally, the plaintiff claims that in Resolution PA-21-2011 it was not indicated that the internal unit in charge of carrying out the administrative contracting processes was the Procurement Department together with the Legal Advisory Office of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, the signing of payment orders being a formal procedure carried out after the contracting process, to issue payment to suppliers. He specifies that these bodies never indicated to him that the processes in which he participated were carried out irregularly, therefore he was unaware of that circumstance. He considers that he had no intent in the infractions, so the sanction is inadmissible. From the analysis of the case files, it is clear that in the act initiating the procedure, the claimant (accionante) was intimated with faults in the duty of diligence and probity as a municipal official and incurring in neglect of the duties inherent to his position, by having authorized the payment payrolls corresponding to contracts in which the administrative contracting procedures were omitted. After the processing of the respective procedure, file DJ-67-2010, the CGR was able to verify the faults attributed to the applicant (petente). Specifically, in the final act, resolution PA-21-2011 of 13 hours of March 23, 2011, it ordered: **"I. RESOLVES:** *To declare responsible Mr. Jorge Enrique Chavarría Carrillo, identity card no. 5-133-943, Mayor (...) of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, for the commission of the facts indicated in the considerative part of this resolution and to have his administrative responsibility for gross fault proven in accordance with the provisions of articles 210 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, 110, subsections a), b), d), e), g) and h) of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, 4, 38 and 39 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento ilícito, and articles 68 and following of the Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General, for authorizing through his signature a series of payment payrolls to contractors without complying with the requirements established in article 2 subsection h) of the cited law and article 136 of the Regulations to the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, that is, without preparing a simple set of conditions, setting the time and date for the reception of proposals, inviting no less than three potential offerors from the Registry of Suppliers, and awarding the lowest-priced offer, without prejudice to the valuation of other relevant factors, in synthesis, without preparing a municipal file where the administrative procedure of the contracting carried out was recorded.// II. To recommend with binding character the imposition of a suspension sanction without pay for a term of thirty working days to Mr. Jorge Enrique Chavarría Carrillo in his condition as Mayor of the Municipality of Santa Cruz (...)*". This was later confirmed by the resolution of 15:00 hours of April 29, 2011, which rejected the reconsideration filed, and by resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller at 10:00 hours of December 20, 2011, which rejected the appeal. From the examination of these formal conducts, it is clear that the CGR concluded that the actions of the applicant (petente) configured the neglect that had been intimated to him, which they qualified as negligent and remiss in the fulfillment of his own functions. For this stance, in the decision on the appeal regarding the qualification of the subjective component of the sanction, it was stated: *"... In reiterated resolutions, both administrative and judicial, it has been established that the liability of the official is not objective but subjective, in accordance with the regulation contained in the Ley General de la Administración Pública. This is so because the public official responds personally, to third parties or to the Administration itself, when he has acted with gross fault or fraud, and in this Office's criterion, there was gross fault in the handling of the matter related to the administrative contracts investigated. Evidently, there is a deficiency in his conduct, since he did not ascertain the legality of the contracting procedure followed. That is, his actions and omissions constitute imprudence and negligence of such gravity that they validly sustain the imposed sanction, since it is attributed in consideration of the protected legal interest, regardless of whether it occurred with fraud or fault. It is important to highlight that, according to the provisions of articles 10 and 12 of the Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292, the Mayor as the hierarch and administrator of the municipal dependencies, has the responsibility to maintain and perfect the entity's internal control system and the duty to ensure the adequate development of its activity, but as has been demonstrated, his actions were not in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned regulations. (...)"* Ultimately, the plaintiff does not dedicate himself to combating those factual findings nor does he debate with due propriety the conclusions and qualifications given by the CGR to these aspects. From that standpoint, in that venue, a factual set was proven that constituted the grounds for the act and that gave way to the content of recommending suspending him from his position for 30 calendar days. No nullity is therefore evident in that course of action. In sum, the proper course is to order the rejection of the claim for the reasons set forth above [...]." (Images 313-330 of the file) 5.- Upon being granted the legally mandated transfer, the State responded negatively. It raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of right. (Images 339-365 of the file) For its part, the CGR opposed. It raised the defenses of failure to join a necessary passive litisconsortio regarding the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and lack of right. (Images 535-559 of the file) Likewise, the CGR counterclaimed against the plaintiff, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (State), and the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, seeking a declaration that: "a) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following acts and resolutions issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones: 1. Official letter number STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which, when referring to official letter 00 172-20 12 (DJ-00 18-2012) from the Contraloría General de la República, indicated that because the sanction recommended by the Contraloría General was not the cancellation of credentials, it fell to the municipal council of Santa Cruz to hear the matter and not to that Tribunal. (Described in fact ten). 2. All acts connected to and derived from the act described in the preceding point. b) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following agreements adopted by the municipal council of Santa Cruz: l. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, Subsection 14, of January 24, 2012, wherein the Concejo Municipal agreed to abstain from ruling on the merits of the recommendation for suspension without pay and to transfer the official letters DJ- 00 17-2012 and Placa26523 12 of this Contraloría General de la República to the Commission on Legal Affairs for its corresponding analysis, recommendation, and subsequent commission report. (Described in fact twelve). 2. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25 dated April 17, 2012, which consists of requesting that the Municipal Legal Advisory Office provide a legal analysis of official letter 03012 from this Contraloría General de la República. (Described in fact sixteen). 3. Agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-20 12, article 3, subsection 08 of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that, having this council become aware of official letter 10941 from the Contraloría General de la República, it is transferred for review to an appointed Special Commission, so that it may render a report. (Described in fact eighteen). 4. All acts connected to and derived from the agreements described in the preceding points. c) That the judgment declare that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is the competent body to suspend the credentials of municipal mayors and, consequently, order the TSE to proceed immediately with the execution of the binding recommendation for suspension from office of Mr. Nombre26667 , ordered by the CGR in the final acts of the referenced procedure PA-21-2011. d) That in the event of opposition, all counterclaim defendants be ordered to pay both costs arising from this action. VI SUBSIDIARY CLAIM (...) that the defendant Municipalidad be ordered to execute the binding recommendation for the sanction of suspension ordered in the final act of procedure PA-21-2011 defined by the Contraloría General regarding the municipal mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre26667 , which must be executed immediately by the municipal council of Santa Cruz." (Images 559-598 of the file) 6.- By resolution No. 703-2013 of 11:00 hours on June 27, 2013, the procedural judge ordered that jurisdiction to resolve this matter corresponds to this contentious-administrative jurisdiction. (Images 638-642 of the file) Upon the State raising disagreement against this decision (images 667-673 of the file), by resolution No. 1696-C-S1-2013 of 11:05 hours on December 12, 2013, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ordered that jurisdiction over the present proceeding corresponds to the Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. (Images 736-741 of the file) 7.- By resolution No. 313-C-S1-2014 of 09:02 hours on March 13, 2014, the Sala Primera rejected a request for clarification and addition filed by the State against the decision in ruling No. 1696-C-S1-2013 of 11:05 hours on December 12, 2013. (Images 751-753 of the file) 8.- Upon being granted a transfer regarding the counterclaim, the State opposed it and raised the defenses of act not subject to challenge and expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) (Images 762-767 of the file) 9.- By order No. 1980-2014 of 16:05 hours on August 12, 2014, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the petition for inadmissibility of the counterclaim. (Images 789-794 of the file) 10.- By order No. 1981-2014 of 16:10 hours on August 12, 2014, the procedural judge ordered the acceptance of the defense of failure to join the State regarding the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (Images 796-803 of the file) 11.- This decision was appealed by the State, an appeal which was subsequently withdrawn, a motion thus accepted by resolution No. 411-2015-II of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Segunda. (Image 830 of the file) 12.- By a brief dated August 19, 2015, the plaintiff-counterclaim defendant responded to the counterclaim negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. (Images 847-853 of the file) For its part, the State opposed. It raised the preliminary defense of res judicata (cosa juzgada) regarding the challenge of the TSE's act, expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción), and lack of right. (Images 856-877 of the file) 13.- On the other hand, by order of 10:24 hours on December 16, 2015, the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz was declared in default (rebeldía). (Images 882-883 of the file) 14.- The preliminary hearing established in article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which is recorded in this Office's digital system, was held on April 28, 2016, with the attendance of all parties, except the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz. In that phase, the State withdrew the defense of res judicata and by resolution No. 943-2016 of 15:15 hours on April 29, 2016, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the defense of act not subject to challenge. Additionally, the defense of expiration was reserved for judgment. As there was no evidence to be presented at trial, in accordance with article 98.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the matter was declared purely a question of law and the co-defendants rendered their oral conclusions. (Images 895-900 of the file) 15.- The respective file was sent to this Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo for the issuance of the pertinent ruling on October 18, 2016, as recorded in the detail of the Sistema Escritorio Virtual, which contains the entirety of the main file. In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities requiring correction have been observed.

Drafted by Judge Garita Navarro with the affirmative vote of judges Aguilar Méndez and Brenes Chinchilla;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Proven Facts. Of relevance for the resolution of the present proceeding are the following: A) REGARDING THE COMPLAINT: 1) That the CGR pursued a formal sanctioning procedure against the plaintiff and other officials of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, file DJ-67-2010. The opening of this procedure was ordered by the act of 09:30 hours on September 24, 2010, and was based on articles 68 of Law No. 7428, 214, 217, 218, 249, and 308 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and in accordance with articles 18 subsection d) of the Código Municipal, 72 and 73 of Law No. Placa2176, 39 of Law No. 8422, and 113 of Law No. 8131. In that act, a detail of the pieces comprising the file was made and an oral and private hearing was convened for December 14, 2010. The directing body was composed of Licenciados Roberto Rodríguez Araica, Sergio Mena García, and Navil Campos Paniagua. (Fact one of the complaint, uncontested regarding the opening of the case, folios 194-230 -images 209-245- of the administrative file) 2) That the División Jurídica of the CGR directed the investigation of sanctioning file DJ-67-2010 and issued the final act through resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, in which it ordered: "l. RESOLVES: Declare responsible the individuals Mr. Nombre26667 , identity card no. CED21663, Mayor (...) of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, for the commission of the acts indicated in the considering part of this resolution and deem their administrative responsibility for gross fault (culpa grave) accredited in accordance with the provisions of articles 210 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, 110, subsections a), b), d), e), g) and h) of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, 4, 38 and 39 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento ilícito, and articles 68 et seq. of the Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General, for authorizing with their signature a series of payment payrolls to contractors without complying with the requirements established in article 2 subsection h) of the aforementioned law and article 136 of the Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, that is, without preparing a simple statement of conditions, setting the time and date for receipt of proposals, inviting no fewer than three potential offerors from the Registry of Suppliers (Registro de Proveedores), and awarding the lowest-priced offer, without prejudice to the assessment of other relevant factors, in summary, without preparing a municipal file recording the administrative procedure of the contracting performed.// II. Recommend with binding character the imposition of a sanction of suspension without pay for a period of thirty business days on Mr. Nombre26667 in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz (...)". (Folios 544 to 574 -images 559-589- of the administrative file). 3) That on March 29, 2011, the plaintiff formally filed an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against resolution number PA-21-2011. The revocation was rejected by resolution of 15:00 hours on April 29, 2011. Through resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Despacho Contralor at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011, the appeal was declared without merit. However, in point 4) of the operative part, it modified the appealed sanction in the sense that the 30-day suspension is in calendar days and not in business days as had been established in act PA-21-2011. (Folios 630 to 646 of the administrative file -images 645-661- regarding the revocation and folios 791 to 803 of the administrative file -images 806-818- regarding the appeal). B) REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM: 1) That through resolution of 09:30 hours on September 24, 2010, the decision-making body of the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República issued the act opening administrative procedure number DJ-67-2010, against Mr. Nombre26667 , Mayor of the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, among others. It was noted that the alleged faults in which he may have incurred could generate some type of disciplinary responsibility, specifically the imposition of the sanction from reprimand up to the cancellation of credentials in the position he holds as mayor of the municipality of Santa Cruz, as well as the prohibition for entry or re-entry into Public Hacienda positions, the application of which results in the immediate cessation of any Public Hacienda position held at that time. This resolution was personally notified to Mr. Nombre26667 on October 20, 2010 (Folios 194-234 and 250 of the administrative file). 2) On February 22, 2011, the oral and private hearing was held, which the plaintiff-counterclaim defendant and his defense attorney attended, and in which he presented his allegations and conclusions. (Folios 541-542 of the administrative file, audio file of that act) 3) That the División Jurídica of the CGR directed the investigation of sanctioning file DJ-67-2010 and issued the final act through resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, in which it recommended suspension without pay for a period of 30 business days. This was based on estimating that the investigated mayor had authorized a series of payment payrolls to contractors without complying with the requirements established in article 2 subsection h) of the aforementioned law and article 136 of the Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, that is, without preparing a simple statement of conditions, setting the time and date for receipt of proposals, inviting no fewer than three potential offerors from the Registry of Suppliers, and awarding the lowest-priced offer, without prejudice to the assessment of other relevant factors; in summary, without preparing a municipal file recording the administrative procedure of the contracting performed. (Folios 544-574 of the administrative file) 4) That on March 29, 2011, Mr. Nombre26667 filed an appeal for revocation with a subsidiary appeal and concomitant nullity against resolution number PA-21-2011, issued by the decision-making body of the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República. (Folios 591-602 of the administrative file). 5) The revocation was rejected by resolution of 15:00 hours on April 29, 2011. Through resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Despacho Contralor at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011, the appeal was declared without merit. However, in point 4) of the operative part, it modified the appealed sanction in the sense that the 30-day suspension is in calendar days and not in business days as had been established in act PA-21-2011. (Folios 630 to 646 of the administrative file regarding the revocation and folios 791 to 803 of the administrative file regarding the appeal). 6) That in a brief dated January 12, 2012, the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República, through official letter 00149-2012 (DJ-00 17-2012), notified the Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz of final act number PA-27-2011, as well as resolution R-DC-203-2011 from the office of the Contralora General de la República, so that within a maximum period of eight business days, they would proceed to order the execution of the provisions imposed in said resolutions. Likewise, citing article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General de la República, said council was warned about the possibility of filing a challenge for review (gestión de revisión) against the sanction recommendation, within a period of eight business days from the notification of that official letter. (Folios 809-812 of the administrative file). 7) That through official letter 00172-2012 (DJ-00 18-20 12) of January 13, 2012, the División Jurídica of the Contraloría General de la República notified the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones of final act number PA-21-2011 issued within the administrative procedure processed in the División Jurídica and resolution R-DC-203-2011 from the office of the Contralora General de la República, and that considering the records of that Tribunal—that in cases where the supervisory body does not recommend the cancellation of credentials, the sanction to be imposed should be made known to the Concejo Municipal—official letter 00149-2012 (DJ-00 17-2012) described in the previous fact was sent to the Concejo Municipal. (Folios 814-815 of administrative file DJ-67-2010). 8) That through official letter STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones indicates to the CGR that the recommended sanction corresponded to the municipal council of Santa Cruz, as it does not involve a cancellation of credentials. (Folios 820-821 -images 839-840- of the administrative file). 9) That through official letter SM-0014-0rd.0014-2012 of January 25, 2012, the Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz makes known to the Contraloría General de la República the agreement adopted by that collegial body in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, Subsection 14, of January 24, 2012, wherein it agreed to abstain from ruling on the merits of the recommendation for suspension without pay. Likewise, it filed a request for review against the recommendation and transferred to the Commission on Legal Affairs for its corresponding analysis, recommendation, and subsequent commission report the official letters DJ-00 17-2012 and DJ-00 18-2012 of the CGR. (Folios 826 of the administrative file). 10) That through resolution number R-DC-25-20 12 of February 29, 2012, the office of the Contralora General de la República declared the challenge for review filed by the Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz without merit as inadmissible. (Folios 830-836 of the administrative file) 11) That through official letter 03012 (DJ-03 14-20 12) of March 29, 2012, the CGR reiterated to the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz the order for the execution of the recommendation, within a non-extendable period of eight business days, under penalty of incurring the infraction provided for in article 69 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General.

Likewise, it brought to the attention of the local entity the criterion sustained in official letter STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, to the effect that the execution of the sanction does not correspond to said Tribunal. (Folios 849-850 of the administrative file). 12) That by means of official letter SM-0324-Ord. 16-2012 of June 6, 2012, the Municipal Council of Santa Cruz notified the Contraloría General de la República of the agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25 of April 17, 2012, in which it was resolved to request the Municipal Legal Advisory Office to perform a legal analysis of official letter 03012 alluded to in the previous section. (Folios 869-870 of the administrative file) 13) By official letter 10941 (DJ-1009-2012) of October 17, 2012, the CGR warns the Municipal Council of Santa Cruz to order the execution of the sanction imposed on the mayor, given that the precautionary measure filed by that official within this judicial process was rejected by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo and the Tribunal de Apelaciones by means of resolutions 122-2012 at 3:30 p.m. on April 24, 2012 and 617-2012 at 10:27 a.m. on October 12, 2012, respectively. (Folio 873 of the administrative file) 14) That by means of official letter SM-856-Ext. 21-2012 of October 30, 2012, the Municipal Council of Santa Cruz notified the Contraloría General de la República of the agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-2012, article 3, subsection 08 of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that, having known that council of the official letter from the Contraloría General de la República indicated in the previous fact, it is transferred to the knowledge of a named Special Commission to render an opinion. (Folio 879 of the administrative file) II.- Facts not proven: Of relevance for this ruling are the following: 1) That the opening of the sanctioning procedure under expediente DJ-67-2010 was due to a petition formulated by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones or an infraction of the electoral regime. 2) That as of the date of this ruling, the suspension sanction issued by the CGR in sanctioning expediente DJ-67-2010 had been executed.

III.- Object of the process. Regarding the claim, having demarcated the pretensions of the promoting party, the object of this dispute is directed to the analysis of the validity of resolution R-DC-203-2011, of ten hours of December two thousand eleven, and the cited resolution PA-21-2010, both from the CGR, which ordered a sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days against the plaintiff, without pay, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste. From the analysis of the allegations of the promoting party, it is inferred that the cause of nullity deals with a specific issue, that is, the lack of competence, due to the absence of an enabling norm, for the TSE, the CGR, or the Municipal Council, to sanction a Mayor for the infractions established by the CGR to the internal control system. In essence, it states that the Mayor is a figure regulated in article 12 of the Código Municipal, being an official elected by popular vote. It says, the TSE is responsible for the cancellation of his credential, but it is not responsible for sanctioning him in any other way. It states, the TSE is not a hierarchical superior of the Mayor, nor would the general sanctioning power be an electoral matter. It accuses that the CGR issued a simple recommendation without specifying to whom it was directed. What was ordered by the CGR was a recommendation, therefore no sanction was imposed. It considers that the Municipal Council is not the head (jerarca) of the Mayor, therefore it is not competent to impose sanctions on him. It mentions vote No. 776-CF-S1-2008 of the Sala Primera. It criticizes that the CGR is requiring the Local Council to sanction the mayor. It considers that the act is null as to its content for being illicit insofar as it attempts to obligate an incompetent body to execute what no one ordered or to order what it cannot. It refers, that ordinals 1, 68, 77 and following of the Ley Orgánica de la CGR (No. Placa2176) do not empower that instance to impose sanctions, nor to instruct bodies to sanction when they are not competent. Likewise, in the expansion of the claim, it states, the Contraloría acted as an instructor based on what is provided in article 259 of the Código Electoral (Law No. 8765), despite that norm providing for the participation of the Contraloría only at the request of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (TSE), within a procedure for the eventual cancellation of credentials. In this sense, it points out that said Tribunal only has competence to cancel the Mayor's credential, but not to sanction him in any other way. Regarding these aspects, it is pertinent to note what is set forth below.

IV.- On the competences of the CGR to order sanctions related to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) regime. An aspect that is imperative to analyze in this process refers to the competences of the audit body to instruct procedures of a sanctioning nature against public agents who, through their actions or omissions, commit infractions against the Public Treasury regime, an axis that includes the correct and efficient management of public funds and assets, internal control, and the duty of probity. In that sense, as a derivation of ordinals 183 and 184 of the Carta Magna, the CGR serves as an auxiliary body of the Asamblea Legislativa with specialized competences in the area of oversight (vigilancia) of the Public Treasury, with functional and administrative independence in the exercise of its duties. Its competences are specified and developed, in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 184, subsection 5) of the Constitución Política, in its Ley Orgánica, No. 7428, as well as in another set of legal sources that establish regulations referring to or related to that central axis of its powers. Within those norms (but not limited to those references) one can mention the Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, No. 8131, the Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292, the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, No. 8422, and the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, No. 7494. From this perspective, as the State rightly states, the powers of audit (and eventual administrative sanction) that the CGR holds find their basis in the text of the Carta Magna itself and in a detailed legal development. At this level, as the enabling basis for the powers that the plaintiff claims are missing, it is worth referring to the provisions of ordinals 1, 8, 10, and 68 of Law No. 4828 (Ley Orgánica de la CGR -LOCGR-). The first ordinal of that legal source clearly states that the CGR is "...a fundamental constitutional body of the State, auxiliary of the Asamblea Legislativa in the superior control of the Public Treasury and governing body of the audit (fiscalización) system that this Law contemplates." In that sense, canon 8 of that legal source establishes that the Public Treasury shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, safeguard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial norms, relating to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the liability of public officials. That reference specifies the existence of a set of norms that define and establish the various aspects related to the exercise of competences to protect the fulfillment of the obligations and principles inherent to the Public Treasury. Thus, article 10 of the LOCGR imposes that "The superior control and audit (fiscalización) system of the Public Treasury comprises the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relations, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from that audit or necessary for it./ This system also comprises the norms that regulate the audit over foreign entities and organs and private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework." As a derivation of that power, canon 68 of the LOCGR establishes the competence to order and recommend the execution of sanctions in the following sense: "Article 68.- Power to order and recommend sanctions. The Contraloría General de la República, without prejudice to other sanctions provided by law, when in the exercise of its powers it determines that a servant of the passive subjects has committed infractions against the norms that make up the control and audit system contemplated in this Law or has caused harm (lesión) to the Public Treasury, shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its technical criterion, which is binding, the application of the corresponding sanction in accordance with the merits of the case. The Contraloría shall form an expediente against the eventual offender, guaranteeing them, at all times, due process and sufficient opportunity for a hearing and defense in their favor. / The competent authority of the required passive subject shall comply, within the period established by the Contraloría, with the recommendation issued by it; except that, within the term of eight business days counted from the notification of the act, a review petition (gestión de revisión) is filed, duly motivated and reasoned, by the head (jerarca) of the required passive subject. In this case, and once the indicated petition is resolved, it must comply without delay with the provisions of the final technical-legal pronouncement of the Contraloría, under penalty of incurring in the crime of disobedience, without prejudice to the statute of limitations regime contemplated in this Law. (...)" On the other hand, ordinal 73 of the same law establishes the competence of the CGR to instruct the procedures to impose the cancellation of credentials of a council member (regidor) or district councilor (síndico), proprietary or alternate, who seriously infringes the norms of the audit and control system of the Public Treasury contemplated in that Law, and against any other norms relating to public funds; or when incurring in any of the acts provided for in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in the public function, as generators of administrative liability. Similarly, that precept establishes that when the serious fault is committed by virtue of an agreement of the Municipal Council, the council members who, with their affirmative vote, have approved said agreement, shall incur the same cause for cancellation of their credentials. Likewise, the final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public function, as well as for those provided for in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, shall be cause for cancellation of the credential of council member or district councilor, proprietary or alternate. The competent judicial authority shall ex officio make the respective communication to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. As evidenced by the foregoing, Law No. 7428 imposes a special procedure for the administrative sanction of infractions against the norms that make up the control and audit system or that have caused harm to the Public Treasury, making it fully competent to instruct administrative procedures aimed at determining the harm and infractions just indicated and, based on that procedure, to recommend in a binding manner, to the heads (jerarcas) of the passive subjects or to the pertinent instances, the application of the corresponding sanctions. Equal treatment establishes canon 43 of Law No. 8422, which legitimizes the CGR to conduct said administrative causes and to recommend in a binding manner the sanctions to be imposed. This aspect, which is only tangentially discussed by the claim, has been subject to extensive development by the Sala Constitucional, a superior instance that has recognized, with complete clarity and forcefulness, the competences of that instance for corrective actions for infraction against the probity regime and protection of the Public Treasury. By way of reference, in the unconstitutionality action heard in expediente No. 03-007482-0007-CO in which the validity of, among other norms, Decreto Ejecutivo número 27.974-MP-H, Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos de la Contraloría General de la República, and the same precept 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República were questioned, through vote No. 13140 of 2:37 p.m. on November 12, 2003, that Constitutional Tribunal relevantly pointed out: "VIII.- (...) Based on these two provisions, constantly and repeatedly, the constitutional jurisprudence has pronounced on the special competences that the Constitución Política assigns to the Contraloría General de la República regarding the oversight in the management of public funds and in the financial management of public employees, and specifically. In this sense, obligatory consultation results from, among others, judgments number 2398-91, of 3:20 p.m. on November 13, 1991; 0660-92, of 3:00 p.m. on March 10, 1992; 3607-94; of 3:15 p.m. on July 19, 1994; 0016-95, of 3:45 p.m. on January 3, 1995; 2632-95, of 4:06 p.m. on May 23, 1995; 4284-95, of 3:06 p.m. on August 3, 1995; 5119-95; of 8:39 p.m. on September 13, 1995; 0998-98, of 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998; 9524-99, of 9:06 a.m. on December 3, 1999, 3027-00, of 9:03 a.m. on April 14, 2000, 2000-6326, of four eighteen in the afternoon on July nineteen, two thousand, and number 2001-4835, of two fifty-six in the afternoon on June six, two thousand one. In each and every one of the cited rulings, the Chamber emphasizes that by the will of the constituent, the Contraloría General de la República was created as a -constitutional- auxiliary body of the Asamblea Legislativa with a specific and determined function: the oversight (vigilancia) of the Public Treasury, so that by constitutional mandate –articles 183 and 184- tasks such as the audit (fiscalización) of administrative contracting procedures and the functioning of the financial system, especially regarding the movement of capital so that confidence is maintained in the correct administration of banking entities, the management of the budget of each and every one of the public dependencies, as well as the control of personnel that 'receives, guards, pays, or administers assets or values of the State' are not beyond the functions entrusted to this audit body, but quite the contrary, since they respond to the interest of the proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies. This is reinforced by the fact that in order for the Contraloría to effectively carry out this task, the Constitución Política itself in its article 24 endows it with a special faculty, which is the possibility of reviewing accounting books and their annexes for tax purposes and to audit the correct use of public funds respectively, a faculty that the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República develops in article 13. It is clear that these competences have their origin in constitutional rank norms, and are developed in laws, such as in the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, number 7428, the Ley de Equilibrio Financiero del Sector Público, number 6955, the Ley de Control Interno, number 8292, and the Ley de la Administración Financiera, number 8131; and regarding the control of the budget, contracting, and municipal resources, in the Código Municipal itself; and even in regulatory norms, such as the Reglamento sobre el funcionamiento de empresas estatales estructuradas como sociedades mercantiles, Decreto Ejecutivo number 7927-H, and in the Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos de la Contraloría General de la República, number 27.974-MP-H. By way of conclusion, what was said by the Chamber regarding the functions entrusted to the Contraloría General de la República in judgment number 5119-95, of 8:39 p.m. on September 13, 1995, is transcribed: 'V.-The Contraloría General de la República as its Ley Orgánica emphasizes (Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994) is a body of constitutional relevance, auxiliary of the Asamblea Legislativa, whose general function is the superior control of the Public Treasury and the direction of the audit (fiscalización) system regulated in said law. It mainly exercises the specific attributions that the Constitution confers upon it in article 184.(...)'" Further on in that same ruling, regarding the validity of the competence of instruction and sanction to which ordinal 68 of the LOCGR alludes, it stated: "Regarding the challenge of this norm, the Chamber reiterates the considerations previously given in its jurisprudence, both concerning its special competence, of constitutional order, assigned to the Contraloría General de la República, and regarding the faculty, not only to initiate sanctioning procedures, but even to issue binding opinions (dictámenes vinculantes) regarding the sanctions to be applied to the servants of the subjects of its audit, from which the following conclusions can be derived: a) that the challenged faculty of the Contraloría derives from numerals 183 and 184 of the Constitución Política, reason for which, it cannot be considered that it constitutes an invasion of the autonomy conferred upon autonomous institutions in their management, as the sanctioning faculty recognized to this constitutional body does not derive from a hierarchical or labor relationship; that is, the sanctions exercised are not disciplinary ones, but rather the faculty of oversight and superior audit of the Public Treasury, hence, it does not assume functions of the active administration, as its action is a logical and necessary consequence of its assigned constitutional competence; b) that the challenged faculty is materialized as a consequence of the application of an ordinary administrative sanctioning procedure, in which full respect and compliance with the guarantees of due process are given, in which the investigated party can effectively exercise their right of defense, so that they can refute the charges imputed to them, provide the evidence they deem necessary, access the expediente, formulate the appeals they deem appropriate, and of course, the motivation of all the acts issued; so that the power to issue a binding recommendation arises and materializes only when the Contraloría considers the infraction of the norms that make up the control and audit system (constitutional norms and principles of administrative contracting and budget preparation and execution, the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, and the Ley de Control Interno) as proven, or when it verifies harm (lesión) to the Public Treasury; c) that the sanction is not applied by the Contraloría General de la República, but by the hierarchical superior of the non-compliant servant; who, in turn, can formulate a review petition (gestión de revisión) (article 38 of the Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos de la Contraloría General de la República) before the Contraloría General de la República, in case of not agreeing with the recommendation; and d) that the investigative faculty of the Contraloría is limited to the scope of its competence, that is, the management and administration of the Public Treasury, solely. Likewise, it must be considered that the autonomy enjoyed by autonomous institutions is not unlimited, as article 188 of the Constitución Política itself subjects them to the law in matters of government, hence, they are subject to administrative tutelage, which manifests itself through planning, directives, and of course, the controls provided for in the Carta Fundamental itself for the management of public funds, whose constitutional body in charge of such a task is the Contraloría General de la República -articles 183 and 184-. Therefore, the challenged competence, far from exceeding the natural scope of the functions that the Constitución Política grants to the Contraloría General de la República, is consistent with it, so that the pretension of eliminating the faculty of the Contraloría General de la República to investigate and sanction public servants who administer public funds would imply diminishing the competence that by constitutional mandate is recognized to this constitutional body; which, rather, would violate the Constitución Política itself. By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the action regarding the challenge made to article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, and to confirm the constitutional jurisprudence that has been issued on this matter." That extensive development makes it unnecessary for this Tribunal to elaborate on reasons to uphold the competence of the CGR to be able to instruct procedures against a public official for infraction against the Public Treasury, as has been deemed accredited occurred in this case, given that the opening of expediente DJ-67-2010, which involved the plaintiff, referred to conducts related to that regime, and not to electoral issues as the claimant seems to incorrectly assert. In line with that, contrary to what is indicated in the claim, the participation of the CGR in this questioned procedure does not derive from the case regulated in precept 259 of the Código Electoral. Said norm stipulates the participation of the CGR in the credential cancellation procedure, when the cause for that sanction is related to the violation of the audit system norms contemplated in the LOCGR, Law No. Placa5670, No. 8292, or others relating to the Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública. In such cases, it is established that the TSE will send the expediente to the CGR so that, in accordance with ordinal 68 of its Ley Orgánica, it recommends what is pertinent. However, from the analysis of the case file, in this case it is not inferred that the CGR's action was due to the application of that mandate, but rather that the instruction of the procedure was in the direct exercise of its audit (fiscalización) competences. To prove this, it suffices to point out that the imposed sanction was not the cancellation of credentials, but the suspension from office for 30 calendar days. It should be noted that the aforementioned competence encompasses any official who administers public funds or is subject to the normative regime of internal control, probity, and sound administration of the Public Treasury, which includes public agents appointed through electoral processes, as is the case of the Mayor, an official who does not enjoy any sort of immunity that places them beyond the sanctionable powers for infraction against the Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública or the norms of internal control and on administrative contracting in particular.

V.- On the content of the CGR's act and the competence for the execution of the sanction. As a second aspect, it is discussed that the act issued by the audit body is limited to recommending a sanction, but not imposing it, so it is not appropriate to execute what has not been ordered. This Tribunal respects but in no way shares what is indicated by the petitioner.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 68 of the LOCGR, once the respective procedure has been conducted, the CGR will recommend the application of a sanction, in a binding manner. Regarding the nature and content of such actions, in vote number 13926-2006 at 14:44 on September 20, 2006, the Constitutional Chamber ruled: "*VI.- ON THE BINDING NATURE OF THE RULINGS OF THE CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA.-* *Also deemed inadmissible is the challenge to Articles 4 and 68 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República, as it denotes confusion on the part of the plaintiff regarding the prerogatives that the Political Constitution confers upon this constitutional body for the control and oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), which the law is responsible for developing. Indeed, it is noted that the binding nature of the CGR’s rulings is not referred to the studies preceding an administrative procedure – which correspond to the preliminary stage of administrative procedures – but rather to the decision that resolves that administrative procedure, in which the sanction to be applied is determined, and in which full guarantees of due process are provided, as this Court indicated in the cited ruling number 2003-13140.* '[...] the challenged power is materialized as a consequence of the application of an ordinary sanctioning administrative procedure, in which full respect for and compliance with due process guarantees are given, in which the investigated party can effectively exercise their right to defense, such that they can refute the charges imputed to them, provide any evidence they deem necessary, access the case file, file any appeals they deem appropriate, and, of course, rely on the reasoning of all the acts issued; thus, the power to issue a binding recommendation arises and is materialized only when the CGR deems the violation of the norms that make up the control and oversight legal framework (constitutional norms and principles of administrative contracting and budget preparation and execution, the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República, and the Law on Internal Control) to be proven, or when it confirms harm to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública).'* The foregoing makes sense as it clarifies for the plaintiff that even though the sanctioning power of the Contraloría General de la República has been recognized, this power pertains to initiating, instructing, and deciding that administrative procedure, such that it is not the body responsible for applying the sanction to the public servant subject to oversight, but rather the authority upon which the requested subject depends – organizationally, disciplinarily, and hierarchically (superior hierarch). Thus, this binding nature derives from the constitutional norms themselves – 183 and 184 – that is, from the recognition of the function of control and oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) that has been granted – it is insisted – by constitutional mandate to the CGR. Therefore, far from being unconstitutional, Articles 4 and 68 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República are consistent with Constitutional Law, insofar as they recognize and provide for the binding nature of the rulings of this constitutional body, as an indispensable condition for it to fulfill the mission that the Constitution has entrusted to it. (...)" In this context, the aforementioned norm (Article 68) establishes the power of the CGR to initiate the procedure and determine the sanction to be applied, an application that it recommends in a binding manner to a specific Public Administration body. The debate presented by the petitioner revolves around the competence to apply that binding recommendation. As noted, the plaintiff posits that, in the absence of enabling legislation, neither the TSE nor the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) can impose and execute said sanction; the former because the facts by virtue of which the sanctioning regime is sought to be applied fall outside electoral matters and exceed the sanction of cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales) that the Electoral Code confers upon that authority. Regarding the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), because it is not the hierarchical superior of the mayor, but rather an internal body of the Municipality with which it shares a duty of inter-administrative coordination.

On this particular matter, it is worth highlighting what is set forth below. The Mayor is part of the authorities that make up the municipal government, as inferred from Article 169 of the Constitution. In that line, Article 12 of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794, establishes that "*The municipal government shall be composed of a deliberative body called the Council (Concejo) and integrated by the council members (regidores) determined by law, and also by a mayor and their respective alternate, all popularly elected.*" This is a popularly elected official, whose appointment can be terminated by the cancellation of their respective credentials through the process stipulated by the relevant norms. That specific issue is not of interest in this case, as that was not the sanction imposed. However, it is worth clarifying that, in accordance with the current Electoral Code, Law No. 8765, the cancellation of mayors' credentials falls under the TSE's competence, as defined starting from canon 253 of that legal body.

However, when the sanction to be imposed derives from harm to the regime of protection of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (the matter of interest), a distinction must be made between cases where that transgression constitutes grounds for the cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales), and those scenarios where the sanction is a suspension in the exercise of office. In the former (cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales)), although the competence for cancellation belongs to the TSE, as noted, Article 259 of the Electoral Code establishes the mandatory participation of the CGR as the governing body in this field. In this scenario, the competence mentioned is reiterated by Article 73 of the LOCGR, which states: "*Article 73.-Cancellation of credentials (*) *The commission of a serious offense (falta grave) by a council member (regidor) or district council member (síndico), proprietary or alternate, against the norms of the oversight and control framework of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) contemplated in this Law, and against any other norms related to public funds, shall be cause for the cancellation of the respective credentials; or for incurring in any of the acts stipulated in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, which generate administrative liability. This shall apply when the offender has acted in the exercise of their office or by reason thereof./ When the serious offense (falta grave) is committed by virtue of an agreement of the municipal council (concejo municipal), the council members (regidores) who, with their affirmative vote, approved said agreement, shall incur the same grounds for cancellation of their credentials./ Likewise, a final criminal conviction for crimes against property, against good faith in business, and against the duties of public office, as well as for those stipulated in the Law against corruption and illicit enrichment in public office, shall be grounds for cancellation of the credentials of a council member (regidor) or district council member (síndico), proprietary or alternate. The competent judicial authority shall, ex officio, make the respective communication to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.* " On the other hand, when the applicable sanction is not the aforementioned cancellation of credentials, Article 68 of the LOCGR (which regulates the generic competence for oversight and sanctioning) merely indicates that the CGR *"...shall recommend to the competent administrative body or authority, through its binding technical opinion, the application of the corresponding sanction according to the merits of the case..."*. Thus, in the specific case of municipal mayors, as an initial proposition, this mandate does not clearly define the authority that must execute the sanction when it does not involve the cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales).

At this point, a clarification must be made that this Court considers and deems fundamental to the debate addressed in this case; namely, that there is no absence of express legal regulation regarding the reprehensible conduct and the sanction associated with that offense (should it be proven). Therefore, there is no regulatory deficiency concerning the sanction or the conduct that gives rise to it, so that no risk whatsoever is observed of violating the constitutional guarantee of specificity of offenses (tipicidad) or the reservation of law in matters of regulating sanctionable conduct (nulla crimen nulla poena sine legem). It is clear that both Article 68 of the LOCGR, as well as the regulations contained in Articles 39, 41, and 42 of Law No. 8292, and in mandates 38, 39, 40, 41, and 43 of Law No. 8422, establish the legal normative references that beforehand qualify the conducts and impose the applicable sanctions for various behaviors that constitute harm to the norms of the superior control and oversight framework of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). There is, therefore, no debate whatsoever regarding a possible violation of that guarantee. The issue centers on the interpretive divergence (if a gap indeed exists) regarding the competence or power to apply the sanctions that the CGR recommends in a binding manner in the exercise of those powers, and in accordance with the procedural framework provided in precept 68 of its Organic Law.

At this point, it should be noted that a precedent of this Contentious Administrative Court, specifically, ruling No. 69-2015-VII at 10:45 on July 20, 2015, from Section VII, analyzed an aspect similar to that being addressed in this proceeding, but referring to the Mayor of [Nombre10042]. In that sense, that section of this Contentious Administrative Court considered that there was no gap regarding the power to apply suspension sanctions for the local mayor recommended by the CGR, given that Law No. 8292 and Law No. 8422 establish that, in the case of mayors, the CGR sends the case file with the respective recommendation to the TSE, so that the pertinent sanction can be applied, based on which it held that the challenged power corresponded to that electoral authority. As stated, that criterion was based on the interpretation made of the indicated norms, from which those judges inferred that, far from there being a regulatory gap, the norms were clear in assigning that power to the TSE. On this aspect, it was indicated: "*X.- (...) *Notwithstanding the foregoing, as will be discussed, Article 42 of the Law on Internal Control No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, and Article 43 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office No. 8422 of October 6, 2004, expressly provide that, in the case of administrative sanctions against municipal mayors, the application of the sanctions that the Contraloría General de la República orders in the administrative procedures implemented for such purposes regarding violations of the norms of oversight, control, and supervision of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) falls to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; therefore, there is no legal vacuum in this matter. (...) The cited provisions expressly establish that, should the violation of the provisions related to offenses contained in the Laws in question be attributed to members of the supreme branches (among whom are Municipal Mayors), the Contraloría General de la República shall report the pertinent information, in this case, to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, so that it may proceed to impose the corresponding sanctions. As is provided specifically and clearly in the cited norms, contrary to what is argued by the State, the said electoral body also has the competence to execute binding administrative sanctions other than the cancellation of credentials, which, in the exercise of its constitutional and legal powers, the Contraloría General de la República recommends in a binding manner in procedures where the alleged responsible parties are attributed with violating the provisions of norms that comprise the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), contained, among others, in the Law on Internal Control and the Law against Illicit Enrichment in Public Office. In this same vein, contrary to what is argued by the plaintiff (...), there is no legal vacuum in this matter, and the cited provisions are compatible with the system of personal liability and accountability to which public officials – including municipal mayors – are subject by provision of Article 11 of the Constitution. (...)” After analyzing the norms on which that ruling bases its final decision, this Court respects the expressed position but does not share it, to the extent that although those precepts, with greater emphasis on canon 43 of Law No. 8422, state that in the case of mayors, the CGR shall inform the TSE so that it imposes the corresponding sanctions, when considering this content alongside the power established by canon 259 of the Electoral Code (Law No. 8765), which refers to the cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales) but omits reference to other sanctions, an area of little clarity emerges regarding the debated issue, i.e., the competent body to apply sanctions recommended by the CGR against mayors other than the cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales), this last sanction clearly pertaining to the TSE. However, this same regulatory clarity is not observed in the case of other sanctions.

Nevertheless, the absence of an express rule does not prevent this Court from resolving the point in question, given that the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333, indicates in the second paragraph of mandate 5, the impossibility of excusing oneself from exercising authority or ruling on matters within one's competence due to the lack or clarity of a norm to apply, noting that jurisdictional work in the specific case must be satisfied according to the written and unwritten norms of the legal framework, attending to the hierarchical scale of sources. From this perspective, it is necessary that, in accordance with mandates 7 and 9 of the LGAP, this Court proceed to integrate the Public Legal System and interpret and conclude on the applicable rules in the face of this apparent normative vacuum. To this end, it is necessary to note that, in accordance with the interpretative guidelines set by precept 10 of the LGAP, the administrative norm must be interpreted in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed. Naturally, this task must be carried out with full respect for the rights and interests of individuals and considering whether the language used by the legislator in drafting the norm allows for a level of alternative solutions (polysemy), in which case, it is primary to consider the categorical value to be protected (purpose or ultimate value), as well as the legal means that, in a more adequate and rational manner, allow for the protection and satisfaction of that purpose (performance criteria).

However, it is necessary to indicate that, in this context, it is the legislator who must clearly and undoubtedly define the debated issue, so the following position is subject to what in this sense may eventually be defined in the respective legal sources. Ergo, the following position derives from the interpretation of the norms that, in the view of this Chamber, would respond to the situation under analysis, but with the warning that its pertinence is conditioned upon the express legal regulation that on the matter may be established by law. Nonetheless, and after that clarification, in the judgment of this collegiate body, several possible scenarios emerge from the dilemma in question, namely: a) The impossibility of executing the sanction due to the absence of an express rule assigning competence; b) Competence of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal); and c) Competence of the TSE. The examination of the possible solutions follows.

VI.- On the claim of impossibility of executing the sanction: That given the absence of an express norm defining the competence to execute and apply the sanction recommended by the CGR (even when binding), and considering that this is a sovereign power (potestad de imperio), as long as no express rule exists on that power, the sanction is inapplicable or unenforceable. From the outset, this thesis is not shared by this Court, as it would entail an absolute violation and immunity (and impunity) in favor of the aforementioned local officials regarding conducts that constitute breaches of the protective regime of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), to the extent that such offenses do not warrant the cancellation of their credentials. Such an interpretation would lead to accepting a sort of irresponsibility of mayors in those cases, contrary to the constitutional principle of administrative efficiency, accountability of public agents, and their duty to comply with the rules of probity, internal control, and other components of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). The present action precisely seeks for this Tribunal to make such a declaration, which implies, it is reiterated, making the sanctions that the CGR orders in these cases unenforceable. If that were the logic of the regulatory regime mentioned above, there would be no sense whatsoever in ordering the opening of administrative proceedings against mayors, the only applicable scenario being when the offenses are punishable by the cancellation of credentials (cancelación de la credencial). If the regime of internal control and probity is applicable to every public official who administers public funds or manages public assets, denying the possibility of sanctions other than the cancellation of their credentials for mayors, for the reasons alleged, would generate a material impossibility of sanction, ultimately an inequity that leads to immunity, to the detriment of the due safeguarding of the public interest that guides the proper and upright handling of public funds. The local autonomy that the constituent conferred upon municipal entities does not exempt them from compliance with the rules of probity and, in general, the set of precepts aimed at protecting the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). Despite that degree of autonomy and the procedure for their designation, they are public officials and, as such, must subject their conduct to legality and bear the internal corrective consequences arising from their failures.

On the contrary, as noted above, both Law No. 8292 and Law No. 8422 expressly refer to cases of administrative liability and establish specific sanctions for municipal mayors who violate the norms of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (superior control and oversight framework). The same occurs with the detail expressed in the LOCGR and in the Electoral Code itself. From this standpoint, and reiterating that the dilemma analyzed does not lie in the absence of express regulation on the culpability of conduct or the legal establishment of sanctions, but rather in the competence to apply sanctions dictated against local officials of popular election, a thesis that promotes immunity in the exercise of these positions cannot be sustained, and therefore this thesis must be rejected.

VII.- On the incompetence of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal): A second possibility in this aspect would be to assign competence to the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal). Under this approach, it could be indicated that the limitation regarding this position is that this local body is not the hierarchical superior of the mayor, as they are bodies called to coordinate and which together make up the Local Government. In this sense, it is clear that, as an initial proposition, disciplinary power is conferred upon the hierarchical superior, as a derivation of the powers that Article 102, subsections b) and d) of the LGAP confer upon that figure. In the Costa Rican municipal organizational scheme, in accordance with Article 12 of the Municipal Code, and in line with Article 169 of the Constitution, the mayor does not depend hierarchically on the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), as both are popularly designated and make up the so-called Local Government. A duty of coordination and a maxim of complementarity of competencies are imposed between both bodies. However, in the judgment of this collegiate body, the relationships imposed in the context of these municipal hierarchies, both involving popular designation, make it inappropriate for one of them to hold the competence to impose sanctions other than the cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales) on its counterpart. This Court does not observe any element upon which the competence of the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) to impose sanctions on the mayor could be sustained, as that first body holds no power whatsoever over the content of the mayor's functions, their designation, or, in general, over the credentials that enable them to hold office. Furthermore, from the examination of the legal powers that have been entrusted to the Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal), Articles 13 and 19 of the Municipal Code do not contain within the attributions of the cited body any power that allows it to sanction the Municipal Mayor, so attributing that power to that administrative unit becomes inappropriate.

VIII.- Competence of the TSE: At this point, the CGR posits in its counterclaim that the competence to order and execute the sanction pertains to the TSE. To justify this position, it fundamentally argues that the execution of the sanctions that the CGR recommends in a binding manner was expressly attributed to the cited Tribunal, given the status held by the official upon whom the recommendation falls, with that authority being the one that granted the credentials. It states, only the TSE administers the credentials of municipal mayor appointments, this being an exclusive and excluding competence. It assumes, if the granting of said credential gives the TSE an implicit competence to cancel it, all the more reason it holds the same competence to suspend it. It expresses not sharing the TSE's criterion regarding a lack of competence on its part to order the suspension of credentials of popularly elected municipal officials. It highlights that the effective accountability and application of the liability regime for senior public officials constitute fundamental tasks of the national legal system. It refers to the principle of parallelism of forms and the legal aphorism that whoever can do the greater can do the lesser. Thus, the same authority that granted a credential is the one called to suspend it, as suspension is a temporary cancellation of the credentials. It reiterates, the conditions of the credential granted to said official by the TSE can only be varied by that same electoral authority.

The interpretation criterion upheld by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, regarding the nonexistence of a legal basis enabling it to order the suspension of credentials granted by the Tribunal itself to popularly elected officials, specifically municipal mayors, on the basis of which it has further ordered that the respective municipal councils are responsible for executing the binding recommendation to suspend that official, has generated a serious impact on the fundamental objectives and purposes of the legal system for the control and oversight of the Public Treasury. It adds that this decision has resulted in the non-execution of said suspension, and consequently, not only in the impairment of the purpose pursued by the control and oversight system of the Public Treasury, but also in the impairment of elementary values and principles of the Costa Rican constitutional and legal order, such as the effective accountability of public authorities and the liability regime of high-ranking public officials. Regarding this matter, the following should be noted.

For a proper understanding of this matter, it is necessary to consider the content and scope of the rule that allows the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) to issue binding recommendations for the questioned sanctions. As indicated above, in accordance with Article 68 of the LOCGR, this oversight body, following due process, issues an act in which it recommends to another administrative body or entity the application of the respective sanction. This implies, unlike what the plaintiff asserts, that the actions issued by the CGR are not a simple recommendation lacking executory content, since the procedure carried out in that venue precisely seeks to analyze whether or not there is harm to the Public Treasury regime, a competence that, according to the foregoing, has been entrusted to the CGR. Thus, the final act of that proceeding is brought to the attention of the Administration competent to execute and apply the sanction, which means it is unnecessary (and improper) to issue a new act, leaving only the application of the sanction ordered by the CGR. In this sense, the execution of the sanction does not constitute conduct or functioning that must be associated with hierarchical sanctioning powers of a disciplinary nature in the strict sense, although when the official to be sanctioned has a hierarchical superior, it is clear that the CGR's order is communicated to the latter so that they may order the internal actions for the execution of that sanction. Pursuant to Article 253 of the Electoral Code, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) is the competent body to order the sanction of cancellation of credentials on the grounds provided for in that legal source. For such purposes, various scenarios that could give rise to this effect of suppression of the credential are regulated, including: resignation, absence, impact on the maritime-terrestrial zone regime, as well as the one relevant to this case, that is, the one referring to substantial infractions of the Public Treasury regime. In this regard, Article 259 ejusdem states in its literal rigor:

“_**ARTÍCULO 259.- Cancelación de credenciales por afectación al Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública.** When the cancellation of credentials is sought, citing the commission of a serious fault, with violation of the oversight system rules contemplated in the Ley orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, the Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, the Ley general de control interno, or others relating to the Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública, the matter shall be referred to the Contraloría so that it may recommend the appropriate action, in accordance with Article 68 of the Ley orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, after having opened the respective administrative file against the alleged responsible party. The Tribunal shall rule once the Contraloría or the criminal courts have pronounced on the alleged violation of the referred rules._” Certainly, the rule sets the competence to order the cancellation of the credential as the most serious consequence, while also, as stated above, establishing the participation of the CGR in the proceeding, so that it initiates the procedure provided for in Article 68 LOCGR, in order to issue the corresponding binding recommendation. In the opinion of the plaintiff, and of the State itself (Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, PGR), that rule only enables the imposition of the sanction of cancellation, but not one with lesser implications, such as suspension from office. From the analysis and consideration of the implications of the supposed gap that arises in this matter, this collegiate body finds that there is merit and sufficient grounds to attribute the competence in question to the TSE, which are set forth below. **Legal nature of the official's designation.** A first aspect to which this Court must refer relates to the very _ratio_ of the competence assigned to the TSE regarding sanctions imposed against the municipal mayor. The constitutional regime and the Electoral Code itself assign the competence of said instance because the procedure that allows the designation of this official is the participation of the electorate through the exercise of the right to suffrage, which, as a derivation of the democratic principle, allows the election of that position by popular designation. Precisely, this modality of configuring the official's investiture is formalized and perfected with the granting of the respective credential by the Tribunal, once it declares the validity of the respective elections, in accordance with the competences and powers established by Article 12, subsection h) of the Electoral Code. In the case of popularly elected officials, it is evident that despite being constituted as public servants – for the term and duration of their designation – according to the general concept established by Article 111 of the LGAP, they are subject to a _sui generis_ sanctioning regime, insofar as the sanctioning competences are not assigned to a hierarchical administrative superior in the strict sense, since, on the contrary, they themselves hold the figure of hierarchical administrative superiors. Of course, this does not imply the impossibility of ordering sanctions against them; however, it is precisely that legal nature of their employment relationship that has led to the establishment of specific legal rules stipulating the ways and scenarios for imposing that type of liability upon them. From this perspective, the sanctions that may be imposed on this class of public agents do not derive from the exercise of a hierarchical power in the terms justified by mandate 102, subsections b), c), and d) of the LGAP, but rather from the necessary subjection to the legal system with respect to their conduct. In that sense, starting from the basis that it is the TSE that confers the credential constituting the formal act of investiture (preceded by a popular designation), and from which the official enters into the exercise of the position, it is precisely this same authority that is legitimized to order what is pertinent regarding the cancellation of this status and to cause its effects to cease. This being so, these powers are granted because the TSE constitutes the instance to which the Political Constitution and Law No. 8765 have entrusted the power of management regarding said credentials, given that these are public agents who have been popularly designated. For this reason, the competence to order sanctions that directly affect the exercise of those positions, in a manner that totally or temporarily disqualifies one of those servants, is part of its constitutional and legal competences. Otherwise, another authority that lacks such democratic and institutional legitimacy would be conferred a power whose substantial content would imply temporarily causing the cessation, for the course of the sanction, of the credential that was granted by the TSE, thereby allowing the alteration of the validity and effects of an act by an authority different from the one that formally conferred it. Thus, the TSE being the instance that grants the credential to popularly elected officials, only that instance would be legitimized to order the respective sanctions regarding those officials, due to the competence over those designations that has been granted to it. It should be added at this point that it is this electoral nature of the official's appointment that legitimizes the TSE's participation in the sanctions regime, not the nature of the faults committed that give rise to that regime, since, as noted, it includes everything from absence to the infringement of Public Treasury rules. It is, therefore, a generic competence that allows it to grant and cancel the credentials of these officials, as well as the temporary suspension of that designation. **Implications and effects of the suspension.** A second aspect derives from the similarity (by analogy) of the effects of the cancellation of credentials to the suspension from the exercise of office that occurs as a consequence of the recommendations that the CGR issues pursuant to Article 68 of Law No. 7428. It is clear that the cancellation of the credential constitutes a definitive cessation of its effects, which implies, evidently, that the official must leave their position and is prevented, as of that content, from exercising their competences. On the other hand, the suspension being referred to implies a sort of temporary cancellation of the credential, to the extent that, in the final sense, that suspension, although it does not entail a direct withdrawal of the credential, equally disqualifies the official from exercising the position and its competences for the term of the imposed sanction. From this angle of examination, in this Chamber's judgment, there is an identity between both figures, considering that both derive from a sanctioning exercise associated with the breach of duties, with the difference that in cancellation, the faults giving rise to it must be serious, whereas in suspension, such seriousness is not present, which does not exclude the infringement of rules that impose duties in the exercise of that function. If one looks closely, there is parity in the material effects of both sanctions, with the difference that one implies the definitive, while the other the temporary, cessation in the exercise of the position. Therefore, within this integrative task required in this specific case, if it corresponds to the TSE to define the definitive cancellation of the credentials of Municipal Mayors, the suspension analyzed being a form of temporarily disqualifying the exercise of the position, it is an application that, within a framework of congruence and efficiency, corresponds to said Tribunal as the holder of the generic defense that the Law has granted it regarding said credentials. The opposite, that is, attributing to another authority the competence to apply the sanction recommended by the CGR, would lead to conferring upon another authority the power to disqualify the credentials of popularly elected officials, even temporarily, even though this is a competence expressly granted to the TSE. **More serious generic sanctioning competence.** On another note, this Court shares what the CGR alleges regarding the necessary invocation of the aphorism "_quien puede lo más, puede lo menos_" (he who can do the more, can do the less). In this aspect, the TSE certainly possesses by law the competence to order the most serious sanction regarding the figure of the municipal mayor, such as the cancellation of their credentials. Therefore, possessing that power of more severe impact, it is this Chamber's judgment that it also corresponds to define the sanctions of lesser rank that may derive from the analysis of the conduct giving rise to the procedure provided for in Article 68 of the LOCGR, insofar as there is no express rule assigning that power to a different instance. Following these factors, it is this Court's consideration that the competence to apply and impose the sanctions of suspension on municipal mayors, recommended by the CGR in application of Article 68 LOCGR, corresponds to the TSE. It should be highlighted, however, that this is a competence that is not inherent to the exercise of its powers relating to electoral matters, for which reason it is a matter subject to possible review in this jurisdiction, as defined in several precedents by the Constitutional Chamber, among them, rulings 2012-001259, 2010-016342, and recently in judgment No. 2015-001780 of 11:34 a.m. on February 6, 2015. On the other hand, it should be noted that this process does not discuss whether or not there is an express regulation of a rule imposing the possibility of initiating a sanctioning procedure against municipal mayors. Article 68 of the LOCGR, together with the rules of Law No. 8422 and 8292, impose the normative basis for those purposes. The dilemma must be centered on the competence to apply the pertinent sanction, so an allegation of injury to the principle of legal reserve or specificity regarding those aspects is not admissible, since the sanctionable conduct as well as the legal consequence are provided for in the written rules of the applicable Legal System. From this standpoint, the rejection of the claim must be ordered insofar as it seeks that this collegiate body declare the lack of competence of the TSE for the application of the sanctions ordered by the CGR in this particular case. As a corollary to this particular point, it must be indicated that although this Section VI, in precedent No. 65-2016-VI of 09:30 a.m. on April 20, 2016, had adopted a position different from that expressed in this judgment, that ruling was issued by a different panel than the one subscribing to this judgment, and includes a criterion that, while respected, is ultimately not shared for the reasons set forth above, which have led this panel to conclude on the competences of the TSE to order and apply sanctions to municipal mayors in cases such as the one under examination.

**IX.- Sobre las demás alegaciones de nulidad. Infracción al principio de juez natural y violación al debido proceso.** In another order of grievances, the plaintiff alleges injury to the principle of the natural judge because it was the same body that investigated the procedure initiated by the CGR that issued the final act, resolution PA-21-2011. In their view, this causes nullity because they knew the facts of the process and formed a preliminary judgment, so that in resolving the final act in an eventual contradictory situation, violating the Principle of Impartiality and Objectivity, as well as their right of defense and due process. Regarding this debate, it should be reiterated that the Legal System confers upon the CGR special powers for the control and oversight of the public treasury, based on rules of legal and constitutional hierarchy, exercising the sanctioning power based on that normative framework. Precisely, for the exercise of that competence, it proceeded in due course to issue the so-called "Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos," an administrative rule published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 76 of April 20, 2007 (No. R-C0-16-2007). In this rule, Article 28, together with the provisions of numeral 19 of the Reglamento Orgánico de la CGR, Resolution N° R-C0-34-2009 of 10:00 a.m. on May 22, 2009, subsequently amended by Resolution N° R-DC-123-2010 of the Office of the Comptroller of 2:00 p.m. on July 19, 2010, establishes that both the opening act and the final resolution would be issued by the Legal Division of said oversight body, and its acts could be reviewed by its superior, that is, by the Office of the Comptroller General itself. Contrary to what the petitioner asserts, although the LGAP indicates that the Public Administration shall be represented in the procedure by the directing body (Art. 282.3) and confers upon it powers of instruction, such as that of directing the oral hearing (Art. 314 ejusdem), the truth of the matter is that nothing prevents the same body that investigates the case and processes it from also being the decision-maker. On the contrary, assuming that it is the investigator who evacuates the evidence and holds the oral hearing, this circumstance enhances and favors the principles of immediacy of evidence, celerity, and orality of the administrative procedure, as stated by the Constitutional Chamber in Resolution No. 6379-2002 of 3:22 p.m. on June 26, 2002. For its part, in judgment No. 2010-15786 of 09:13 a.m. on September 24, 2010, it ruled on that specific point: "_... it is necessary to point out that the Contraloría General de la República does not injure, with its actions, the principle of impartiality, since it designates a single body that assumes both the investigative and decision-making functions, a situation that this Tribunal has indicated, on previous occasions, does not violate the principle of impartiality as it even allows for the immediacy of the evidence ..._". Therefore, the concentration of investigative and decision-making tasks in the same administrative file does not antagonize the aforementioned principles, so the charge under examination must be rejected.

On the other hand, the plaintiff reproaches that resolution PA-21-2011 deemed the commission of a serious fault proven, having as the only evidence the document dated February 26, 2010, issued by Mr. Nombre139338, without said evidence having been verbally incorporated in the oral hearing, or without Mr. Nombre139338 appearing as a witness to ratify what was indicated in such communication, and without determining his participation in the facts that were investigated. They consider the principles of orality, contradiction, immediacy of evidence, defense, efficiency, and celerity of the process violated. The grievance in question must be rejected. From the analysis of the administrative file, it appears that from the act initiating the sanctioning procedure ordered by the CGR, that is, the act of 9:30 a.m. on September 24, 2010, that oversight body detailed the pieces making up the file and convened an oral and private hearing for December 14, 2010. Based on that transfer, and attending to the faculties available to the parties within the oral and private hearing, in accordance with Article 317 of the LGPA, the plaintiff could well have objected to said evidence or provided the elements of conviction that would allow them to refute the content of that specific element, as well as regarding the set of facts of which they were accused. Even within the detail of the evidence expressed in that initiating act, the testimonial deposition of Mr. Nombre139339 is included (see image 244 -folio 229- of the administrative file), meaning the petitioner was in full objective possibility of presenting their arguments and other evidence they deemed pertinent. On the other hand, it should be noted that from the analysis of the final act, it does not appear in any way that the sanction recommended by the CGR was based solely on that challenged evidence. See that resolution RDC-203-2011, points to Official Communication PM-045-2010 of August 3, 2010, as additional evidence, from which that CGR extracted the irregular action in the contracting process investigated in the questioned procedure. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not specify the manner in which this issue they accuse generates a nullity of a substantial nature, such that in the terms of precept 223 LGAP, it merits the suppression due to invalidity of the procedure and the final decision issued against them, which is decisive if it is considered that the final act relies on other evidence to impute their liability for alleged infractions in the administrative contracting procedures. Therefore, the rejection of the claim must be ordered in this regard.

**X.- Sobre la acreditación de las causas de la sanción**. Finally, the plaintiff complains that in Resolution PA-21-2011, it was not indicated that the internal unit responsible for carrying out administrative contracting processes was the Procurement Department together with the Legal Advisory Office of the Municipality of Santa Cruz, and that signing payment orders is a formal procedure carried out after the contracting process, to issue payment to suppliers. They specify that those bodies never informed them that the processes they participated in were conducted irregularly, so they were unaware of that circumstance. They consider they had no intention in the infractions, so the sanction is improper. From the analysis of the case file, it appears that in the act initiating the procedure, the plaintiff was accused of failures in the duty of diligence and probity as a municipal official and incurring in neglect of the duties inherent to their position, by having authorized the payment rosters corresponding to contracts in which administrative contracting procedures were omitted. After the processing of the respective procedure, file DJ-67-2010, the CGR was able to verify the faults attributed to the petitioner. Specifically, the final act, resolution PA-21-2011 of 1:00 p.m. on March 23, 2011, ordered: **"l. RESUELVE:** _Declarar responsable a los señores Nombre26667 , cédula de identidad no. CED21663, Alcalde (...) de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, por la comisión de los hechos señalados en la parte considerativa de esta resolución y tener por acreditada su responsabilidad administrativa por culpa grave de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos artículo 210 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, 110, incisos a), b), d), e), g) y h) de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, 4, 38 y 39 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento ilícito, y los artículos 68 y siguientes de la Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General, al autorizar mediante su .firma una serie de nóminas de pago a contratistas sin cumplir con los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 2 inciso h) de la citada ley y el artículo 136 del Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, es decir sin confeccionar un pliego de condiciones sencillo, fijar la hora y fecha para la recepción de las propuestas, invitar a no menos de tres potenciales oferentes del Registro de Proveedores y adjudicar la oferta de menor precio, sin pe1juicio de la valoración de otros factores relevantes, en síntesis, sin confeccionar un expediente municipal en donde constara el procedimiento administrativo de la contratación realizada.// II. Recomendar con carácter vinculante la imposición de una sanción de suspensión sin goce de salario por el plazo de treinta días hábiles al señor Nombre26667 en su condición de Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz ( .. .)_". This was subsequently confirmed by a resolution of 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 2011, which rejected the petition for reconsideration filed, and by resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller at 10:00 a.m. on December 20, 2011, which rejected the appeal. From the examination of these formal findings, it appears that the CGR concluded that the petitioner's actions constituted the neglect of which they were accused, which they qualified as negligent and remiss in the fulfillment of their own duties. For this position, in the decision on the appeal regarding the classification of the subjective component of the sanction, it was stated: "_...En reiteradas resoluciones. tanto administrativas como judiciales se ha establecido que la responsabilidad del funcionario no es objetiva sino subjetiva, de conformidad con la regulación que contiene la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Esto es así porque el funcionario público responde personalmente, frente a terceros o ante la propia Administración, cuando haya actuado culpa grave o dolo y en criterio de este Despacho medió una culpa grave en el manejo del asunto relacionado con las contrataciones administrativas investigadas. Evidentemente existe una deficiencia en su proceder, pues no se cercioró de la legalidad del procedimiento de contratación seguido._" That is to say, his actions and omissions constitute recklessness (imprudencia) and negligence of such gravity that they validly support the sanction imposed, for it is attributed in consideration of the protected legal interest, regardless of whether it occurred with malice (dolo) or fault (culpa). It is important to emphasize that, according to the provisions of articles 10 and 12 of the Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292, the Mayor, as the head and administrator of the municipal departments, has the responsibility to maintain and perfect the entity's internal control system and the duty to ensure the adequate development of its activity, but as has been demonstrated, his conduct was not in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned regulations. (...)" Ultimately, the plaintiff does not dedicate himself to combating those factual findings nor does he debate with due propriety the conclusions and qualifications given by the CGR to these aspects. From that standpoint, in this venue, a factual catalog was deemed accredited that constituted the grounds for the act and which gave way to the content of recommending his suspension from office for 30 calendar days. Therefore, no nullity whatsoever is evident regarding that procedure. In sum, what is proper is to order the rejection of the lawsuit for the reasons noted above.

XI.- Regarding the counterclaim. As has been indicated, the CGR files a counterclaim (reconvención) so that in this venue it be declared: "a) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following acts and resolutions issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones: 1. Official letter number STSE-0166-2012 of January 24, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in referring to official letter 00 172-20 12 (DJ-00 18-2012) of the Contraloría General de la República, indicated that because the sanction recommended by the Contraloría General was not the cancellation of credentials (cancelación de credenciales), it fell to the municipal council (concejo municipal) of Santa Cruz to hear the matter and not to that Tribunal. (Described in the tenth fact). 2. All related and derived acts from the act described in the preceding point. b) That the judgment declare the absolute nullity of the following agreements adopted by the municipal council of Santa Cruz: l. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 04-2012, article 4, Subsection 14, of January 24, 2012, wherein the Municipal Council agreed to abstain from ruling on the merits of the recommendation for suspension without pay and to transfer the official letters DJ- 00 17-2012 and Placa26523 12 of this Contraloría General de la República to the Commission on Legal Affairs for its corresponding analysis, recommendation, and subsequent commission opinion. (Described in the twelfth fact). 2. Agreement adopted in ordinary session 16-2012, article 04, subsection 25 dated April 17, 2012, which consists of requesting that the Municipal Legal Advisory Office analyze the legality of official letter 03012 of this Contraloría General de la República. (Described in the sixteenth fact). 3. Agreement adopted in extraordinary session 21-20 12, article 3, subsection 08 of October 25, 2012, in which it is agreed that having this council taken cognizance of the official letter of the Contraloría General de la República 10941, it is transferred for consideration to a named Special Commission, so that it may render an opinion. (Described in the eighteenth fact). 4. All related and derived acts from the agreements described in the preceding points. c) That the judgment declare that the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is the competent body to suspend the credentials of municipal mayors and, consequently, order the TSE to immediately proceed with the execution of the binding recommendation of suspension from office of Mr. Nombre26667, ordered by the CGR in the final acts of procedure PA-21-2011 referred to. d) That in the event of opposition, all counter-defendants be ordered to pay both sets of costs derived from this action. VI SUBSIDIARY CLAIM (...) that the defendant Municipality be ordered to execute the binding recommendation for the sanction of suspension ordered in the final act of procedure PA-21-2011 defined by the Contraloría General regarding the municipal mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre26667, which must be executed immediately by the municipal council of Santa Cruz." As a preliminary aspect regarding the approach to the counterclaim, it is worth noting that, having established that the competence to apply the binding recommendation issued by the CGR for the suspension of credentials of municipal mayors, according to the procedures established in conformity with article 68 of Law No. 7428, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, it is entirely pointless to reiterate the entire examination already set forth as the basis for that conclusion, with respect to the claims that challenge the competence of the TSE for those purposes, or to challenge the prior acts of the TSE that declined that competence in this specific case. Hence, it is unnecessary to address claim a) of the counterclaim, which includes omitting analysis of the defense of expiration (caducidad) that the State formulated regarding this point. However, the truth of the matter is that, from what has been analyzed regarding the power to execute the sanctions recommended under article 68 of Law No. 7428, it is clear that, in accordance with this competence discussed, it is the obligation of the TSE to proceed to apply the sanctions of suspension of credentials that the CGR bindingly recommends. This includes the obligation of that authority to execute immediately, unless another legal reason prevents it, the content of what was ordered by the CGR in resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, of the Legal Division (División Jurídica) of the CGR and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller (Despacho Contralor) at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011, which recommend imposing on the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340, a sanction of suspension without pay for 30 calendar days. The foregoing implies granting claim c) of the counterclaim.

Regarding the petitioning point b) of the counterclaim, aimed at the annulment for invalidity of the agreements of the Municipal Council, its rejection must be ordered, because in essence, they revolve around the definition of the competence of the Municipal Council to apply the sanction recommended in those recently cited resolutions, an aspect which, in order of what has been set forth, does not concern it as it is a competence outside its attributions and legal powers. Regarding the subsidiary claim, a ruling is omitted as it seeks that the judgment declare the competence of the Municipal Council to suspend the credentials it may have granted to popularly elected officials, in this case the Municipal Mayor.

XII.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised and claims. Regarding the lawsuit. With respect to the lawsuit, both the State and the CGR raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). In accordance with what has been expressed in this ruling, those substantive exceptions must be accepted, having established the inadmissibility of the claims made by the plaintiff regarding the alleged lack of competence (incompetencia) of the CGR or the TSE to execute the sanctions against him. Consequently, the defense of lack of right raised by the State and the Contraloría General de la República regarding the lawsuit is accepted. The lawsuit filed by Mr. Nombre26667 against the State and the Contraloría General de la República is rejected. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or other applicable sanction) of Municipal Mayors, which in accordance with article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428) is issued by that administrative body for violations of the rules that make up the control and oversight system contemplated in said legal source or for having caused harm to the Public Treasury regime (régimen de la Hacienda Pública), corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Regarding the counterclaim. As to the counterclaim, the plaintiff-counter-defendant answered and raised the defense of lack of right. For its part, the State raised the preliminary defense of res judicata (cosa juzgada) regarding the challenge to the act of the TSE, expiration of the action, and lack of right. In the preliminary hearing, the State withdrew the defense of res judicata and by resolution No. 943-2016 of 15 hours 15 minutes on April 29, 2016, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the defense of act not subject to challenge. Taking into account the manner in which the lawsuit was resolved, a ruling is omitted regarding the petitioning point a) of the counterclaim, as well as regarding the defense of expiration raised on that particular matter. The defense of lack of right raised by the State and by Mr. Nombre26667 is rejected. Sua sponte, a lack of right is declared with respect to the Municipality of Santa Cruz (claim b). Consequently, the counterclaim is partially accepted in the following terms: 1. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or other applicable sanction) of Municipal Mayors, which in accordance with article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428) is issued by that administrative body for violations of the rules that make up the control and oversight system contemplated in said legal source or for having caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. 2. The Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is ordered to immediately, if another legal reason does not prevent it, proceed to carry out the pertinent actions that permit the execution of the sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days without pay against the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340, ordered by that oversight body in resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, of the Legal Division and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011. 3. Regarding the co-defendant Municipality of Santa Cruz, the claim for nullity of the resolutions issued by the cited Municipal Council in which it declares itself incompetent to order the suspension of the municipal mayor is rejected. 4. As unnecessary, a ruling is omitted regarding the subsidiary claim.

XIII.- Costs. In accordance with article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. Exemption from this award is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there is sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered due to evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. The co-defendants requested the award of costs. The State also requested the respective legal interest. In the present case, this Court considers that the subject matter addressed allows for several possible interpretations, which demonstrates that, in this instance, the parties have litigated in good faith and with sufficient reason. Therefore, it is ordered that the present case be resolved without a special award of costs.

POR TANTO,

Regarding the lawsuit. The defense of lack of right raised by the State and the Contraloría General de la República is accepted, having established the inadmissibility of the claims made by the plaintiff regarding the alleged lack of competence of the Contraloría General de la República or the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to execute the sanctions of suspension of credentials against him. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Mr. Nombre26667 against the State and the Contraloría General de la República is rejected. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or other applicable sanction) of Municipal Mayors, which in accordance with article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428) is issued by that administrative body for violations of the rules that make up the control and oversight system contemplated in said legal source or for having caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. It is resolved without a special award of costs. Regarding the counterclaim. Due to the manner in which the lawsuit was resolved, a ruling is omitted regarding the petitioning point a) of the counterclaim, as well as regarding the defense of expiration raised on that particular matter. The defense of lack of right raised by the State and by Mr. Nombre26667 is rejected. Sua sponte, a lack of right is declared with respect to the Municipality of Santa Cruz as to claim b) that seeks the nullity of the agreements of that local authority that declared its lack of competence to apply the recommended sanction against the Mayor of that canton. Consequently, the counterclaim is partially accepted in the following terms: 1. It is declared that the application and execution of the sanction of suspension (or other applicable sanction) of Municipal Mayors, which in accordance with article 68 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428) is issued by that administrative body for violations of the rules that make up the control and oversight system contemplated in said legal source or for having caused harm to the Public Treasury regime, corresponds to the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. 2. The Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones is ordered to immediately, if another legal reason does not prevent it, proceed to carry out the pertinent actions that permit the execution of the sanction of suspension for 30 calendar days without pay against the Mayor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Nombre139340, ordered by that oversight body in resolution PA-21-2011 of 13:00 hours on March 23, 2011, of the Legal Division and resolution number R-DC-203-2011, issued by the Office of the Comptroller at 10:00 hours on December 20, 2011. 3. Regarding the co-defendant Municipality of Santa Cruz, the claim for nullity of the resolutions issued by the cited Municipal Council in which it declares itself incompetent to order the suspension of the municipal mayor is rejected. 4. As unnecessary, a ruling is omitted regarding the subsidiary claim. 5. It is resolved without a special award of costs. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez/ José Roberto Brenes Chinchilla*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: Nombre26667 DEMANDADOS: El Estado, la Contraloría General de la República y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz. RECONVENTORA: Contraloría General de la República RECONVENIDOS: El Estado y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

IGWTHUP.JRGN.2016 | Documento firmado por: |

ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: Nombre26667 DEMANDADOS: El Estado, la Contraloría General de la República y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

RECONVENTORA: Contraloría General de la República RECONVENIDOS: El Estado y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

No. 0173-2016-VI.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SEXTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del veintidós de noviembre del dos mil dieciséis.

Proceso de puro derecho establecido por el señor Nombre26667 , portador de la cédula de identidad número CED109923, representado por los abogados Iván Ramírez Camareno, carné CED109924 y Nombre139336 , carné CED88103, contra el Estado, representado en este proceso por la procuradora Paula Azofeifa Chavarría, cédula de identidad número CED363, la Contraloría General de la República, representada por Nombre4349 , cédula de identidad número CED102428 y Nombre139337 , cédula de identidad número CED14290 y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz (rebelde). La Contraloría General de la República presenta reconvención contra el Estado y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

RESULTANDO:

1.- En fecha 13 de enero del 2012, el accionante formula la presente demanda contra el Estado y la Contraloría General de la República (en adelante la CGR), para que en sentencia se disponga: "1) Que se anule la resolución R-DC-203-2011, de las diez horas de diciembre del dos mil once, y la resolución PA- 21-2010 citados. 2) Que se declare que ni el TSE , ni la CGR, ni el Consejo (sic) Municipal, tienen potestad legal para sancionar a un Alcalde. 3) Que se condene en costas." Además peticionó medida cautelar para que se dispusiera la suspensión de efectos de la resolución R-DC-203-2011 impugnado. (Imágenes 3-11 del expediente) 2.- Conferido el traslado sobre la medida cautelar, la CGR contestó de manera negativa en los términos que consta a imágenes 103-149 del expediente. Por su parte, el Estado igualmente se opuso a la petición de medida cautelar, según imágenes 162-174 del expediente.

3.- Por resolución No. 122-2012 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de abril del 2012, la juzgadora de trámite dispuso el rechazo de la solicitud de medida cautelar. (Imágenes 195-198 del expediente) Impugnada que fuese esta decisión (imágenes 203-214 del expediente), el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Primera, mediante resolución No. 617-2012-I de las 10 horas 27 minutos del 12 de octubre del 2012, dispuso confirmar la resolución apelada. (Imágenes 294-295 del expediente) 4.- En escrito de fecha 30 de octubre del 2012 el accionante presenta ampliación de la demanda para que "...se declare absolutamente nula la sanción que se ha dado cuenta y que consiste en 30 días naturales, dejándola sin efecto alguno . Se condene a los accionados al pago de ambas costas, daños y perjuicios ocasionados...". (Imágenes 313-330 del expediente) 5.- Conferido el traslado de ley, el Estado contestó de manera negativa. Opuso la defensa de incompetencia, así como la de falta de derecho. (Imágenes 339-365 del expediente) Por su parte la CGR se opuso. Planteó las defensas de falta de integración de litisconsorcio pasivo necesario respecto del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y la de falta de derecho. (Imágenes 535-559 del expediente) De igual manera, la CGR reconvino al accionante, al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (Estado) y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, para que se declare: "a) Que en sentencia se declare la nulidad absoluta de los siguientes actos y resoluciones emitidos por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones: 1. Oficio número STSE-0166-2012 del 24 de enero de 2012, emitido por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones al referirse al oficio 00 172-20 12 (DJ-00 18-2012) de la Contraloría General de la República, indicó que en razón de que la sanción recomendada por la Contraloría General no era la cancelación de credenciales, correspondía al concejo municipal de Santa Cruz conocer del asunto y no a ese Tribunal. (Descrito en el hecho décimo). 2. Todos los actos conexos y derivados del acto descrito en el punto anterior. b) Que en sentencia se declare la nulidad absoluta de los siguientes acuerdos adoptados por el concejo municipal de Santa Cruz: l. Acuerdo adoptado en la sesión ordinaria 04-2012, artículo 4, Inciso 14, del 24 de enero de 2012, en donde el Concejo Municipal acordó abstenerse de pronunciarse sobre el fondo de la recomendación de suspensión sin goce de salario y trasladar a la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos para su correspondiente análisis, recomendación y posterior dictamen de comisión los de oficios DJ- 00 17-2012 y Placa26523 12 de esta Contraloría General de la República. (Descrito en el hecho duodécimo). 2. Acuerdo adoptado en sesión ordinaria 16-2012, artículo 04, inciso 25 de fecha 17 de abril de 2012, el cual consiste en solicitar a la Asesoría Jurídica Municipal, se sirva hacer análisis lega l del oficio 03012 de esta Contraloría General de la República. (Descrito en el hecho décimo sexto). 3. Acuerdo adoptado en sesión extraordinaria 21-20 12, artículo 3, inciso 08 del 25 de octubre de 2012, en el cual se acuerda que habiendo conocido ese concejo el oficio de la Contraloría General de la República 10941, se traslada a conocimiento de una Comisión Especial nombrada, para que rinda dictamen. (Descrito en el hecho décimo octavo). 4. Todos los actos conexos y derivados de los acuerdos descritos en los puntos anteriores. c) Que en sentencia se declare que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones es el competente para suspender las credenciales de los alcaldes municipales y, consecuentemente, se ordene al TSE, proceder de inmediato con la ejecución de la recomendación vinculante de suspensión en el cargo al señor Nombre26667 , dispuestas por la CGR en los actos finales de procedimiento PA-21-2011 referido. d) Que en caso de oposición, se condene a todos los contrademandados al pago de ambas costas derivadas de esta acción. VI PRETENSIÓN SUBSIDIARIA (...) que se ordene a la Municipalidad demandada la ejecución de la recomendación vinculante de sanción de suspensión dispuesta en el acto final del procedimiento PA-21-2011 definida por la Contraloría General respecto del alcalde municipal de Santa Cruz, señor Nombre26667 , las cuales deberán ser ejecutadas de inmediato por concejo municipal de Santa Cruz." (Imágenes 559-598 del expediente) 6.- Por resolución No. 703-2013 de las 11 horas del 27 de junio del 2013, el juzgador de trámite dispuso que la competencia para resolver el presente asunto corresponde a esta jurisdicción contencioso administrativa. (Imágenes 638-642 del expediente) Planteada la inconformidad por parte del Estado contra esa decisión (imágenes 667-673 del expediente), por resolución No. 1696-C-S1-2013 de las 11 horas 05 minutos del 12 de diciembre del 2013, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia dispuso que el conocimiento del presente proceso corresponde al Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. (Imágenes 736-741 del expediente) 7.- Por resolución No. 313-C-S1-2014 de las 09 horas 02 minutos del 13 de marzo del 2014, la Sala Primera rechazó solicitud de aclaración y adición presentada por el Estado contra lo resuelto en fallo No. 1696-C-S1-2013 de las 11 horas 05 minutos del 12 de diciembre del 2013. (Imágenes 751-753 del expediente) 8.- Conferido traslado sobre la reconvención, el Estado se opuso y formuló las defensas de acto no susceptible de impugnación, caducidad de la acción (Imágenes 762-767 del expediente) 9.- Por auto No. 1980-2014 de las 16 horas 05 minutos del 12 de agosto del 2014, el juez de trámite dispuso el rechazo de la petición de inadmisibilidad de la contrademanda. (Imágenes 789-794 del expediente) 10.- Por auto No. 1981-2014 de las 16 horas 10 minutos del 12 de agosto del 2014, el juez de trámite dispuso acoger la defensa de falta de integración del Estado respecto del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (Imágenes 796-803 del expediente) 11.- Esta decisión fue apelada por el Estado, recurso el cual, fue luego desistido, gestión así acogida por resolución No. 411-2015-II del Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Segunda. (Imagen 830 del expediente) 12.- Por escrito del 19 de agosto del 2015 el accionante-reconvenido contestó la contrademanda de manera negativa y opuso la defensa de falta de derecho. (Imágenes 847-853 del expediente) Por su parte el Estado se opuso. Formuló la defensa previa de cosa juzgada en cuanto a la impugnación del acto del TSE, caducidad de la acción y falta de derecho. (Imágenes 856-877 del expediente) 13.- Por otro lado, por auto de las 10 horas 24 minutos del 16 de diciembre del 2015, la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz fue declarada en estado de rebeldía. (Imágenes 882-883 del expediente) 14.- La audiencia preliminar establecida en el ordinal 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, que se encuentra grabada en el sistema digital de este Despacho, fue celebrada el día 28 de abril del 2016, con la asistencia de todas las partes, excepto la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz. En esa fase, el Estado desistió de la defensa de cosa juzgada y por resolución No. 943-2016 de las 15 horas 15 minutos del 29 de abril del 2016, la jueza de trámite dispuso el rechazo de la defensa de acto no susceptible de impugnación. Además, reservó para sentencia la defensa de caducidad. Al no existir prueba que evacuar en juicio, de conformidad con el numeral 98.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, el asunto fue declarado de puro derecho y las co-accionadas rindieron sus conclusiones orales. (Imágenes 895-900 del expediente) 15.- El expediente respectivo fue remitido a esta Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo para la emisión del fallo pertinente en fecha 18 de octubre del 2016, según consta en detalle del Sistema Escritorio Virtual, en el que consta la totalidad del expediente principal. En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas.

Redacta el juzgador Garita Navarro con el voto afirmativo de los jueces Aguilar Méndez y Brenes Chinchilla;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Hechos probados. De relevancia para la resolución del presente proceso se tienen los siguientes: A) SOBRE LA DEMANDA: 1) Que la CGR siguió contra el accionante y otros funcionarios de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz formal procedimiento sancionatorio, expediente DJ-67-2010. La apertura de este procedimiento se dispuso mediante el acto de las 09 horas 30 minutos del 24 de septiembre del 2010 y se fundamentó en los ordinales 68 de la Ley No. 7428, 214, 217, 218, 249 y 308 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y de conformidad con los ordinales 18 inciso d) del Código Municipal, 72 y 73 de la Ley No. Placa2176, 39 de la Ley No. 8422 y 113 de la Ley No. 8131. En ese acto se hizo detalle de las piezas que conforman el expediente y se convocó a audiencia oral y privada para el 14 de diciembre del 2010. El órgano director estaba integrado por los Licenciados Roberto Rodríguez Araica, Sergio Mena García y Navil Campos Paniagua. (Hecho primero de la demanda no controvertido en cuanto a la apertura de la causa, folios 194-230 -imágenes 209-245- del administrativo) 2) Que la División Jurídica de la CGR dirigió la instrucción del expediente sancionatorio DJ-67-2010 y emitió el acto final mediante resolución PA-21-2011 de las 13 horas del 23 de marzo del 2011, en el cual dispuso: "l. RESUELVE: Declarar responsable a los señores Nombre26667 , cédula de identidad no. CED21663, Alcalde (...) de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, por la comisión de los hechos señalados en la parte considerativa de esta resolución y tener por acreditada su responsabilidad administrativa por culpa grave de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos artículo 210 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, 110, incisos a), b), d), e), g) y h) de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, 4, 38 y 39 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento ilícito, y los artículos 68 y siguientes de la Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General, al autorizar mediante su .firma una serie de nóminas de pago a contratistas sin cumplir con los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 2 inciso h) de la citada ley y el artículo 136 del Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, es decir sin confeccionar un pliego de condiciones sencillo, fijar la hora y fecha para la recepción de las propuestas, invitar a no menos de tres potenciales oferentes del Registro de Proveedores y adjudicar la oferta de menor precio, sin pe1juicio de la valoración de otros factores relevantes, en síntesis, sin confeccionar un expediente municipal en donde constara el procedimiento administrativo de la contratación realizada.// II. Recomendar con carácter vinculante la imposición de una sanción de suspensión sin goce de salario por el plazo de treinta días hábiles al señor Nombre26667 en su condición de Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz ( .. .)". (Folios 544 al 574 -imágenes 559-589- del expediente administrativo). 3) Que en fecha 29 de marzo del 2011, la parte actora presentó formalmente recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución número PA-21-2011. La revocatoria fue rechazada por resolución de las 15:00 horas del día 29 de abril de 2011. Mediante la resolución número R-DC-203-2011, dictada por el Despacho Contralor a las 10:00 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2011, se declaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación. Empero, en el punto 4) de la parte dispositiva, modificó la sanción recurrida en el sentido de que la suspensión de 30 días es en días naturales y no en días hábiles como se había establecido en el acto PA-21-2011. (Folios 630 al 646 del expediente administrativo -imágenes 645-661- en cuanto a la revocatoria y folios 791 a 803 del expediente administrativo -imágenes 806-818- en cuanto a la apelación). B) SOBRE LA CONTRADEMANDA: 1) Que mediante resolución de las 09:30 horas del 24 de setiembre de 2010, el órgano decisor de la División Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República emitió el acto de apertura del procedimiento administrativo, número DJ-67-2010, en contra del señor Nombre26667 , Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, entre otros. Se advirtió que las presuntas faltas en que habría incurrido podrían generar algún tipo de responsabilidad disciplinaria, específicamente la imposición de la sanción de amonestación hasta la cancelación de credenciales en el cargo que desempeña como alcalde de la municipalidad de Santa Cruz, así como la prohibición para el ingreso o reingreso en cargos de la Hacienda Pública, cuya aplicación tiene como consecuencia el cese inmediato de cualquier cargo de la Hacienda Pública que se ejerza en ese momento. Esta resolución fue notificada en forma personal al señor Nombre26667 el 20 de octubre de 2010 (Folios 194-234 y 250 del expediente administrativo). 2) En fecha 22 de febrero del 2011 se celebró la comparecencia oral y privada, a la cual asistió el accionante-reconvenido y su abogado defensor, y en la cual presentó sus alegaciones y conclusiones. (Folios 541-542 del administrativo, archivo de audio de ese acto) 3) Que la División Jurídica de la CGR dirigió la instrucción del expediente sancionatorio DJ-67-2010 y emitió el acto final mediante resolución PA-21-2011 de las 13 horas del 23 de marzo del 2011, en la cual recomendó la suspensión sin goce de sueldo por un plazo de 30 días hábiles. Lo anterior al estimar que el alcalde investigado había autorizado una serie de nóminas de pago a contratistas sin cumplir con .los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 2 inciso h) de la citada ley y el artículo 136 del Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, es decir sin confeccionar un pliego de condiciones sencillo, fijar la hora y fecha para la recepción de las propuestas, invitar a no menos de tres potenciales oferentes del Registro de Proveedores y adjudicar la oferta de menor precio, sin perjuicio de la valoración de otros factores relevantes; en síntesis, sin confeccionar un expediente municipal en donde constara el procedimiento administrativo de la contratación realizada. (Folios 544-574 del administrativo) 4) Que el 29 de marzo de 2011, el señor Nombre26667 interpuso recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio y nulidad concomitante contra la resolución número PA-21- 2011, emitida por el órgano decisor de la División Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República. (Folios 591-602 del administrativo). 5) La revocatoria fue rechazada por resolución de las 15:00 horas del día 29 de abril de 2011. Mediante la resolución número R-DC-203-2011, dictada por el Despacho Contralor a las 10:00 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2011, se declaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación. Empero, en el punto 4) de la parte dispositiva, modificó la sanción recurrida en el sentido de que la suspensión de 30 días es en días naturales y no en días hábiles como se había establecido en el acto PA-21-2011. (Folios 630 al 646 del expediente administrativo en cuanto a la revocatoria y folios 791 a 803 del expediente administrativo en cuanto a la apelación). 6) Que en escrito de fecha 12 de enero de 2012, la División Jurídica de la Contrataría General de la República mediante oficio 00149-2012 (DJ-00 17-2012) comunicó al Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz el acto final número PA-27-2011, así como la resolución R-DC-203-2011 del despacho de la Contratara General de la República, a fin de que en un plazo máximo de ocho días hábiles, procediesen a ordenar la ejecución de los extremos impuestos en dichas resoluciones. Asimismo, citando el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General de la República, se advirtió a dicho concejo sobre la posibilidad de interponer una gestión de revisión en contra de la recomendación de sanción, en el plazo de los ocho días hábiles contados a partir de la comunicación de ese oficio. (Folios 809-812 del administrativo). 7) Que mediante oficio 00172-2012 (DJ-00 18-20 12) del 13 de enero de 2012, la División Jurídica de la Contraloría General de la República comunicó al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones el acto final número PA-21-2011 dictado dentro del procedimiento administrativo tramitado en la División Jurídica y resolución R-DC-203-2011 del despacho de la Contralora General de la República, y que tomando en consideración los antecedentes de ese Tribunal -de que en los casos en que el órgano contralor no recomienda la cancelación de credenciales, la sanción a imponer deber de conocimiento del Concejo Municipal- se le envió al Concejo Municipal el oficio 00149-2012 (DJ-00 17-2012) descrito en el hecho anterior. (Folios 814-815 del administrativo DJ-67-2010). 8) Que mediante oficio STSE-0166-2012 del 24 de enero de 2012, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones indica a la CGR que la sanción recomendada correspondía al concejo municipal de Santa Cruz, por cuanto no se trata de cancelación de credenciales. (Folios 820-821 -imágenes 839-840- del administrativo). 9) Que mediante oficio SM-0014-0rd.0014-2012 del 25 de enero de 2012, el Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz, hace de conocimiento de la Contraloría General de la República, el acuerdo adoptado por ese órgano colegiado en la sesión ordinaria 04-2012, artículo 4, Inciso 14, del 24 de enero de 20 12, en donde acordó abstenerse de pronunciarse sobre el fondo de la recomendación de suspensión sin goce de salario. De igual manera, presentó solicitud de revisión en contra de la recomendación y traslada a la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos para su correspondiente análisis, recomendación y posterior dictamen de comisión los oficios DJ-00 17-2012 y DJ-00 18-2012 de la CGR. (Folios 826 del administrativo). 10) Que mediante resolución número R-DC-25-20 12 del 29 de febrero de 2012, el despacho de la Contralora General de la República declaró sin lugar por improcedente la gestión de revisión interpuesta por el Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz. (Folios 830-836 del administrativo) 11) Que mediante oficio 03012 (DJ-03 14-20 12) del 29 de marzo de 20 12, la CGR reiteró a la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz la orden de la ejecución de la recomendación, en el plazo improrrogable de ocho días hábiles, so pena de incurrir en la infracción prevista en el artículo 69 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General. De igual manera, puso en conocimiento del ente local el criterio del sostenido en el oficio STSE-0166-2012 del 24 de enero de 2012, en el sentido que la ejecución de la sanción no corresponde a dicho Tribunal. (Folios 849-850 del administrativo). 12) Que mediante oficio SM-0324-0rd. l6-2012 del 6 de junio de 2012, el Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz, comunica a la Contraloría General de la República el acuerdo adoptado en sesión ordinaria 16-2012, artículo 04, inciso 25 de fecha 17 de abril de 20 12, en el que se dispuso solicitar a la Asesoría Jurídica Municipal, se sirva hacer análisis legal, al oficio 03012 aludido en el aparte previo. (Folios 869-870 del administrativo) 13) Por oficio 10941 (DJ-1009-2012) del 17 de octubre del 2012, la CGR previene al Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz ordenar la ejecución de la sanción impuesta al alcalde, dado que la medida cautelar presentada por ese funcionario dentro de este proceso judicial fue rechazada por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y el Tribunal de Apelaciones mediante resoluciones 122-2012 de las 15:30 horas del 24 de abril ·de 2012 y 617-2012 de las 10:27 del 12 de octubre de 20 12 respectivamente. (Folio873 del administrativo) 14) Que mediante oficio SM-856-Ext.2 l-20 12 del 30 de octubre de 2012, el Concejo Municipal de Santa Cruz, comunica a la Contraloría General de la República el acuerdo adoptado en sesión extraordinaria 21-20 12, artículo 3, inciso 08 del 25 de octubre de 2012, en el cual se acuerda que habiendo conocido ese concejo el oficio de la Contraloría General de la República indicado en el hecho anterior, se traslada a conocimiento de una Comisión Especial nombrada, para que rinda dictamen. (Folio 879 del administrativo) II.- Hechos no probados: De relevancia para este fallo se tienen los siguientes: 1) Que la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio expediente DJ-67-2010 haya sido por gestión formulada por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones o infracción al régimen electoral. 2) Que a la fecha de la presente la sanción de suspensión dictada por la CGR en el expediente sancionatorio DJ-67-2010 se hubiere ejecutado.

III.- Objeto del proceso. En cuanto a la demanda, demarcadas las pretensiones de la parte promovente, el objeto de esta contienda se direcciona al análisis de validez de la resolución R-DC-203-2011, de las diez horas de diciembre del dos mil once, y la resolución PA-21-2010 citados, ambas de la CGR, que dispusieron una sanción de suspensión por 30 días naturales en contra del accionante, sin goce de salario, en su condición de Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste. Del análisis de las alegaciones de la parte promovente, se desprende que la causa de nulidad versa en un tema concreto, sea, la incompetencia, por ausencia de norma habilitante, para que el TSE, la CGR o el Concejo Municipal, puedan sancionar a un Alcalde por las infracciones dispuestas por la CGR al ordenamiento de control interno. En lo medular expone que el Alcalde es una figura regulada en el artículo 12 del Código Municipal, siendo un funcionario de elección popular. Dice, corresponde al TSE la cancelación de su credencial, pero no le compete sancionarlo de ningún otro modo. Expone, el TSE no es ningún superior jerárquico del Alcalde, ni tampoco sería materia electoral la potestad sancionatoria general. Acusa que la CGR emitió una simple recomendación sin precisar a quien la direccionaba. Lo dispuesto por la CGR fue una recomendación, por lo que no fue impuesta ninguna sanción. Estima que el Concejo Municipal no es el jerarca del Alcalde, por lo que no es competente para imponerle sanciones. Menciona el voto No. 776-CF-S1-2008 de la Sala Primera. Censura que la CGR esté requiriendo al Concejo Local que sancione al alcalde. Estima que el acto es nulo en cuanto al contenido por ser ilícito en tanto pretende obligar a un órgano incompetente a ejecutar lo que nadie dispuso o disponer lo que no puede. Refiere, los ordinales 1, 68, 77 y siguientes de la Ley Orgánica de la CGR (No. Placa2176) no facultan a esa instancia a imponer sanciones, ni a instruir a órganos para sancionar cuando no son competentes. De igual modo, en la ampliación de la demanda expone, la Contraloría actuó como instructora con base en lo que dispone el artículo 259 del Código Electoral (ley No. 8765), pese a que esa norma preveía la participación de la Contraloría sólo a solicitud del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, dentro de un procedimiento de eventual cancelación de credenciales. En este sentido, señala que dicho Tribunal sólo tiene competencia para cancelar la credencial del Alcalde, pero no para sancionarlo de otro modo. Sobre estos aspectos cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone.

IV.- Sobre las competencias de la CGR para disponer sanciones relacionadas con el régimen de la Hacienda Pública. Un aspecto que resulta imperativo analizar en este proceso, se refiere a las competencias de la instancia contralora para instruir procedimientos de carácter sancionatorio contra agentes públicos que con sus acciones u omisiones cometan infracciones al régimen de la Hacienda Pública, eje que incluye el correcto y eficiente manejo de los fondos y bienes públicos, control interno, deber de probidad. En ese sentido, como derivación de los ordinales 183 y 184 de la Carta Magna, la CGR, funge como un órgano auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa con competencias especializadas en materia de vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública, con independencia funcional y administrativa en el ejercicio de sus labores. Sus competencias se precisan y desarrollan, a tono con lo preceptuado por el ordinal 184 inciso 5) de la Constitución Política, en su Ley Orgánica, No. 7428, así como en otro conjunto de fuentes legales que establecen regulaciones referidas o relacionadas con ese eje central de sus potestades. Dentro de esas normas (pero no limitado a esas referencias) se pueden mencionar la Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, No. 8131, la Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292, Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, No. 8422, Ley de Contratación Administrativa, No. 7494. Desde esa óptica, como bien expone el Estado, las potestades de fiscalización (y eventual sanción administrativa) que ostenta la CGR, encuentran su base en el texto mismo de la Carta Magna y en un prolijo desarrollo legal. En este plano, como base habilitante de las potestades que el accionante echa de menos, vale referirse a lo dispuesto por los ordinales 1, 8, 10 y 68 de la Ley No. 4828 (Ley Orgánica de la CGR -LOCGR-). El ordinal primero de esa fuente legal expone con toda claridad que la CGR es "...un órgano constitucional fundamental del Estado, auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa en el control superior de la Hacienda Pública y rector del sistema de fiscalización que contempla esta Ley." En ese sentido, el canon 8 de esa fuente legal establece que la Hacienda Pública estará constituida por los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas, administrativas y financieras, relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos. Esa referencia precisa la existencia de un conjunto de normas que definen y establecen los diversos aspectos relacionados con el ejercicio de competencias para tutelar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones y principios inherentes a la Hacienda Pública. Así, el artículo 10 de la LOCGR impone que "El ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública comprende el conjunto de normas, que regulan la competencia, la estructura, la actividad, las relaciones, los procedimientos, las responsabilidades y las sanciones derivados de esa fiscalización o necesarios para esta./ Este ordenamiento comprende también las normas que regulan la fiscalización sobre entes y órganos extranjeros y fondos y actividades privados, a los que se refiere esta Ley, como su norma fundamental, dentro del marco constitucional." Como derivación de esa potestad, el canon 68 de la LOCGR fija la competencia para ordenar y recomendación la ejecución de sanciones en el siguiente sentido: "Artículo 68.- Potestad para ordenar y recomendar sanciones. La Contraloría General de la República, sin perjuicios de otras sanciones previstas por ley, cuando en el ejercicio de sus potestades determine que un servidor de los sujetos pasivos ha cometido infracciones a las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización contemplado en esta Ley o ha provocado lesión a la Hacienda Pública, recomendará al órgano o autoridad administrativa competente, mediante su criterio técnico, que es vinculante, la aplicación de la sanción correspondiente de acuerdo con el mérito del caso. La Contraloría formará expediente contra el eventual infractor, garantizándole, en todo momento, un proceso debido y la oportunidad suficiente de audiencia y de defensa en su favor. / La autoridad competente del sujeto pasivo requerido deberá cumplir, dentro del plazo que le establezca la Contraloría, con la recomendación impartida por esta; salvo que, dentro del término de ocho días hábiles contados a partir de la comunicación del acto, se interponga una gestión de revisión, debidamente motivada y razonada, por parte del jerarca del sujeto pasivo requerido. En este caso y una vez resuelta la gestión indicada, deberá cumplir sin dilación, con lo dispuesto en el pronunciamiento técnico jurídico final de la Contraloría, so pena de incurrir en el delito de desobediencia, sin perjuicio del régimen de prescripciones contemplado en esta Ley. (...)" Por otro lado, el ordinal 73 ejusdem fija la competencia de la CGR para instruir los procedimientos contra imponer la cancelación de credenciales de un regidor o síndico, propietario o suplente, que infrinjan de manera grave las normas del ordenamiento de fiscalización y control de la Hacienda Pública contemplado en esa Ley, y contra cualesquiera otras normas relativas a los fondos públicos; o al incurrir en alguno de los actos previstos en la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, como generadoras de responsabilidad administrativa. De igual manera, ese precepto establece, cuando la falta grave sea cometida en virtud de un acuerdo del Concejo Municipal, los regidores que, con su voto afirmativo, hayan aprobado dicho acuerdo, incurrirán en la misma causal de cancelación de sus credenciales. Asimismo, será causal de cancelación de la credencial de regidor o de síndico, propietario o suplente, la condena penal firme por delitos contra la propiedad, contra la buena fe en los negocios y contra los deberes de la función pública, así como por los previstos en la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. La autoridad judicial competente efectuará, de oficio, la comunicación respectiva al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Conforme se evidencia de lo indicado, la Ley No. 7428 impone un procedimiento especial para la sanción administrativa de infracciones a las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización o que hayan provocado lesiones a la Hacienda Pública, siendo por ende plenamente competente para instruir procedimientos administrativos direccionados a determinar las lesiones e infracciones recién señaladas y a partir de ese porocedimiento, recomendar de manera vinculante, a los jerarcas de los sujetos pasivos o bien, a las instancias pertinentes, la aplicación de las sanciones correspondientes. Igual tratamiento establece el canon 43 de la Ley No. 8422, que legitima a la CGR a realizar dichas causas administrativas y recomendar de modo vinculante las sanciones a imponer. Este aspecto, que solo es discutido tangencialmente por la demanda, ha sido objeto de vasto desarrollo por parte de la Sala Constitucional, instancia superior que ha reconocido, con toda claridad y contundencia, las competencias de esa instancia para las acciones correctivas por infracción al régimen de probidad y tutela de la Hacienda Pública. A modo de referencia, en la acción de inconstitucional ventilada en el expediente No. 03-007482-0007-CO en la que se cuestionaba, entre otras normas, la validez del Decreto Ejecutivo número 27.974-MP-H, Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos de la Contraloría General de la República, y el mismo precepto 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, mediante el voto No. 13140 de las 14 horas 37 minutos del 12 de noviembre del 2003, ese Tribunal Constitucional señaló en lo relevante: "VIII.- (...) Con fundamento en estas dos disposiciones, en forma constante y reiterada, la jurisprudencia constitucional se ha manifestado acerca de las especiales competencias que la Constitución Política le asigna a la Contraloría General de la República en lo que respecta a la vigilancia en el manejo de los fondos públicos y en la gestión financiera de los empleados públicos, y específicamente. En este sentido, resultan de obligada consulta, entre otras las sentencias número 2398-91, de las 15:20 horas del 13 de noviembre de 1991; 0660-92, de las 15:00 horas del 10 de marzo de 1992; 3607-94; de las 15:15 horas del 19 de julio de 1994; 0016-95, de las 15:45 horas del 3 de enero de 1995; 2632-95, de las 16:06 horas del 23 de mayo de 1995; 4284-95, de las 15:06 horas del 3 de agosto de 1995; 5119-95; de las 20:39 horas del 13 de setiembre de 1995; 0998-98, de las 11:30 horas del 16 de febrero de 1998; 9524-99, de las 9:06 horas del 3 de diciembre de 1999, 3027-00, de las 9:03 horas del 14 de abril del 2000, la 2000-6326, de las dieciséis horas dieciocho minutos del diecinueve de julio del dos mil, y la número 2001-4835, de las catorce horas con cincuenta y seis minutos del seis de junio del dos mil uno. En todos y cada uno de los fallos citados, la Sala enfatiza que por voluntad del constituyente se creó la Contraloría General de la República como órgano -constitucional- auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa con una función específica y determinada: la vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública, de manera que por mandato constitucional –artículos 183 y 184- tareas como la fiscalización de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa y el funcionamiento del sistema financiero, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la movilización de capitales a fin de que se mantenga la confianza en la correcta administración de los entes bancarios, el manejo del presupuesto de todas y cada una de las dependencias públicas, así como el control del personal que "recibe, custodia, paga o administra bienes o valores del Estado" no están más allá de las funciones encomendadas a éste órgano contralor, sino todo lo contrario, ya que responden al interés del buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas. Refuerza lo anterior, el hecho de que para que la Contraloría lleve en forma efectiva esta tarea, la propia Constitución Política en su artículo 24 le dota de una facultad especial, cual es la posibilidad de revisar los libros de contabilidad y sus anexos con fines tributarios y para fiscalizar la correcta utilización de los fondos públicos respectivamente, facultad que la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República desarrolla en el artículo 13. Queda claro que estas competencias tienen su origen en normas de rango constitucional, y están desarrolladas en leyes, tales como en la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, número 7428, la Ley de Equilibrio Financiero del Sector Público, número 6955, la Ley de Control Interno, número 8292, y la Ley de la Administración Financiera, número 8131; y en lo que respecta al control del presupuesto, contratación y recursos municipales, en el propio Código Municipal vigente; y aún en normas reglamentarias, como lo es el Reglamento sobre el funcionamiento de empresas estatales estructuradas como sociedades mercantiles, Decreto Ejecutivo número 7927-H, y en el Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos de la Contraloría General de la República, número 27.974-MP-H. A modo de conclusión se transcribe lo dicho por la Sala respecto de las funciones encomendadas a la Contraloría General de la República en sentencia número 5119-95, de las 20:39 horas del 13 de setiembre de 1995: "V.-La Contraloría General de la República como su Ley Orgánica remarca (Ley No.7428 de 7 de setiembre de 1994) es un órgano de relevancia constitucional, auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa, cuya función general es el control superior de la Hacienda Pública y la dirección del sistema de fiscalización regulado en la citada ley. Ejerce principalmente las atribuciones específicas que la Constitución le confiere en el artículo 184.(...)" Más adelante en ese mismo fallo, a propósito de la validez de la competencia de instrucción y sanción a que alude el ordinal 68 de la LOCGR expuso: "Respecto de la impugnación de esta norma, la Sala reitera las consideraciones dadas con anterioridad en su jurisprudencia, tanto en lo que respecta a su la especial competencia, de orden constitucional, asignada a la Contraloría General de la República, como respecto de la facultad, no sólo para iniciar procedimientos sancionatorios, sino inclusive, para dictar dictámenes vinculantes respecto de las sanciones a aplicar a los servidores de los sujetos de su fiscalización, de las cuales se pueden derivar las siguientes conclusiones: a) que la facultad impugnada de la Contraloría deriva de los numerales 183 y 184 de la Constitución Política, motivo por el cual, no puede estimarse que constituya una invasión de la autonomía conferida a las instituciones autónomas en su gestión, en tanto la facultad sancionatoria reconocida a éste órgano constitucional no deriva de una relación jerárquica o de orden laboral; es decir, no son sanciones disciplinarias las que ejercita, sino la facultad de vigilancia y fiscalización superior de la Hacienda Pública, de donde, no asume funciones de la administración activa, por cuanto su actuación es consecuencia lógica y necesaria de su competencia constitucional asignada; b) que la facultad impugnada se concreta como consecuencia de la aplicación de un procedimiento administrativo ordinario sancionador, en el que se dan pleno respeto y cumplimiento de las garantías del debido proceso, en el que el investigado puede ejercer de una forma efectiva su derecho de defensa, de manera que puede refutar los cargos que se le imputan, aportar la prueba que estime necesaria, acceder al expediente, formular los recursos que estime convenientes, y por supuesto, la motivación de todos los actos que se dicten; de manera que la potestad de emitir una recomendación vinculante, nace y se concreta, únicamente cuando la Contraloría tenga por acreditada la infracción de las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización (normas y principios constitucionales de la contratación administrativa y de la elaboración y ejecución del presupuesto, la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República y la Ley de Control Interno), o cuando constate una lesión a la Hacienda Pública; c) que la sanción no la aplica la Contraloría General de la República, sino el superior jerárquico del servidor incumpliente; quien, a su vez, puede formular una gestión de revisión (artículo 38 del Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos de la Contraloría General de la República) ante la Contraloría General de la República, en caso de no estar de acuerdo con la recomendación; y d) que la facultad de investigación de la Contraloría se limita al ámbito de su competencia, sea el manejo y administración de la Hacienda Pública, únicamente. Asimismo, debe considerarse que la autonomía de que gozan las instituciones autónomas no es ilimitada, en tanto el propio artículo 188 de la Constitución Política las sujeta a la ley en matera de gobierno, de donde, están sujetas a la tutela administrativa, que se manifiesta a través de la planificación, directrices, y por supuesto, a los controles previstos en la propia Carta Fundamental para el manejo de los fondos públicos, cuyo órgano constitucional encargado para tal tarea es la Contraloría General de la República -artículos 183 y 184-. Por ello, la competencia impugnada, lejos de desbordar el ámbito natural de las funciones que la Constitución Política le otorga a la Contraloría General de la República, es congruente con ella, de manera que la pretensión de eliminar la facultad de la Contraloría General de la República para investigar y sancionar a los servidores públicos que administran fondos públicos, implicaría disminuir la competencia que por mandato constitucional se le reconoce a este órgano constitucional; lo cual, más bien atentaría contra la propia Constitución Política. En virtud de lo anterior, procede desestimar la acción respecto de la impugnación que se hace del artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, y confirmar la jurisprudencia constitucional que ha dictado en esta materia." Ese extenso desarrollo hace innecesario que este Tribunal abunde en razones para sostener la competencia de la CGR para poder instruir procedimientos en contra de un funcionario público por infracción a la Hacienda Pública, como se ha tenido por acreditado ocurrió en este caso, dado que la apertura del expediente DJ-67-2010, que involucraba al accionante, se refería a conductas relacionadas con ese régimen, y no a cuestiones electorales como de manera incorrecta parece aseverar el reclamante. En esa línea, contrario a lo indicado en la demanda, la participación de la CGR en este procedimiento cuestionado no deriva del supuesto regulado en el precepto 259 del Código Electoral. Dicha norma estipula la participación de la CGR en el procedimiento de cancelación de credenciales, cuando la causa de esa sanción se relacione con la violación de las normas del ordenamiento de fiscalización contemplado en la LOCGR, la Ley No. Placa5670, la No. 8292, u otras relativas al Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública. En tales supuesto, se establece que el TSE remitirá el expediente a la CGR para que de conformidad con el ordinal 68 de su Ley Orgánica, recomiende lo pertinente. Sin embargo, del análisis de los autos, en este caso no se colige que la actuación de la CGR haya obedecido a la aplicación de ese mandato, sino que la instrucción del procedimiento fue en el ejercicio directo de sus competencias de fiscalización. Para ello basta señalar que la sanción impuesta no fue de cancelación de credenciales, sino de suspensión del cargo por 30 días naturales. Cabe destacar que la competencia aludida abarca a todo funcionario que administre fondos públicos o se encuentre sujeto al régimen normativo de control interno, probidad y sana administración de la Hacienda Pública, lo que incluye a los agentes públicos designados mediante procesos electorales, como es el caso de la figura del Alcalde Municipal, funcionario que no goza de ninguna especie de inmunidad que lo ubique fuera de las potestades sancionables por infracción al Ordenamiento de Control y Fiscalización Superiores de la Hacienda Pública o de las normas de control interno y sobre contratación administrativa en particular.

V.- Sobre el contenido del acto de la CGR y la competencia de ejecución de la sanción. Como segundo aspecto se discute que el acto emitido por la instancia contralora se limita a recomendar una sanción, más no a imponerla, por lo que no cabe ejecutar lo que no se ha dispuesto. Este Tribunal respeta más no comparte en modo alguno lo indicado por el petente. A tono con lo estatuido por el artículo 68 de la LOCGR, cursado el procedimiento respectivo, la CGR recomendará la aplicación de una sanción, de manera vinculante. Sobre la naturaleza y contenido de esas actuaciones, en el voto número 13926-2006 de las 14 horas 44 minutos del 20 de septiembre del 2006, la Sala Constitucional dispuso: "VI.- DE LA VINCULATORIEDAD DE LOS DICTÁMENES DE LA CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA.- También se estima improcedente la impugnación de los artículos 4 y 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, en tanto denota una confusión del accionante en atención a las prerrogativas que la Constitución Política le confiere a éste órgano constitucional de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública, y que la ley se encarga de desarrollar. En efecto, se advierte que la vinculatoriedad de los dictámenes de la Contraloría está referida no a los estudios que anteceden un procedimiento administrativo –que corresponden a la etapa preliminar de los procedimientos administrativos–, sino a la decisión que resuelve ese procedimiento administrativo, en el que se determina la sanción a aplicar, en el que se dan plenas garantías del debido proceso, como lo señaló este Tribunal en la citada sentencia número 2003-13140. "[...] la facultad impugnada se concreta como consecuencia de la aplicación de un procedimiento administrativo ordinario sancionador, en el que se dan pleno respeto y cumplimiento de las garantías del debido proceso, en el que el investigado puede ejercer de una forma efectiva su derecho de defensa, de manera que puede refutar los cargos que se le imputan, aportar la prueba que estime necesaria, acceder al expediente, formular los recursos que estime convenientes, y por supuesto, la motivación de todos los actos que se dicten; de manera que la potestad de emitir una recomendación vinculante, nace y se concreta, únicamente cuando la Contraloría tenga por acreditada la infracción de las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización (normas y principios constitucionales de la contratación administrativa y de la elaboración y ejecución del presupuesto, la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República y la Ley de Control Interno), o cuando constate una lesión a la Hacienda Pública;" Lo anterior tiene sentido por cuanto se aclara al accionante que aún cuando se ha reconocido la potestad sancionatoria de la Contraloría General de la República, la misma está referida a iniciar, instruir y decidir ese procedimiento administrativo, de manera que no es el órgano encargado de aplicar la sanción al servidor sujeto de la fiscalización, sino la autoridad de la que que depende –organizativa, disciplinaria y jerárquicamente– el sujeto requerido (superior jerarca). Así, esta vinculatoriedad deriva de las mismas normas constitucionales –183 y 184–, esto es, del reconocimiento de la función de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública que le ha sido otorgada –se insiste– por mandato constitucional a la Contraloría. Por ello, lejos de ser inconstucionales son conformes con el Derecho de la Constitucional los artículos 4 y 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, en tanto reconocen y disponen la vinculatoriedad de los dictámenes de este órgano constitucional, como condición indispensable para que cumpla el cometido que la Carta Fundamental le ha encomendado. (...)". En ese contexto, la norma aludida (artículo 68) fija la potestad de la CGR de iniciar el procedimiento y disponer la sanción a aplicar, aplicación que recomienda de manera vinculante a determinada Administración Pública. El debate que presenta el promovente gravita en torno a la competencia para aplicar esa recomendación vinculante. Como se ha señalado, el actor postula que a falta de norma habilitante, ni el TSE ni el Concejo Municipal pueden imponer y ejecutar dicha sanción; el primero porque los hechos en virtud de los cuales se pretende aplicar el régimen sancionatorio escapa a la materia electoral y desborda la sanción de cancelación de credenciales, que el Código Electoral confiere a esa autoridad. Sobre el Concejo Municipal, por no ser el jerarca del alcalde, sino un órgano interno de la Municipalidad con quien comparte un deber de coordinación inter administrativa. Sobre ese particular cabe destacar lo que de seguido se expone. El Alcalde forma parte de las autoridades que componen el gobierno municipal, según se colige del ordinal 169 de la Carta Magna. En esa línea, el numeral 12 del Código Municipal, Ley No. Placa1170, establece que "El gobierno municipal estará compuesto por un cuerpo deliberativo denominado Concejo e integrado por los regidores que determine la ley, además, por un alcalde y su respectivo suplente, todos de elección popular." Se trata de un funcionario de elección popular, cuya designación puede ser cesada mediante la cancelación de la credencial respectiva mediante el trámite estipulado por las normas respectivas. No interesa en este caso ese tema en particular por no haber sido la sanción impuesta. Empero, vale precisar que a tono con el Código Electoral vigente, Ley No. 8765, es competencia del TSE la cancelación de la credencial de los alcaldes, según se define a partir del canon 253 de ese cuerpo legal. Sin embargo, cuando la sanción a imponer derive de una lesión al régimen de tutela de la Hacienda Pública (tema que interesa), debe discriminarse los casos en que esa transgresión sea una causal de cancelación de credenciales, de aquellos supuestos en que la sanción sea una suspensión en el ejercicio del cargo. En la primera (cancelación de credenciales) si bien la competencia de la cancelación pertenece al TSE, como se ha señalado, el numeral 259 del Código Electoral establece la obligatoria participación de la CGR como instancia rectora en este campo. En este supuesto, la competencia aludida es reiterada por el ordinal 73 de la LOCGR en cuanto señala: "Artículo 73.-Cancelación de credencial (*) Será causa para la cancelación de la respectiva credencial, la comisión de una falta grave por parte de un regidor o síndico, propietario o suplente, contra las normas del ordenamiento de fiscalización y control de la Hacienda Pública contemplado en esta Ley, y contra cualesquiera otras normas relativas a los fondos públicos; o al incurrir en alguno de los actos previstos en la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, como generadoras de responsabilidad administrativa. Esto se aplicará cuando el infractor haya actuado en el ejercicio de su cargo o con motivo de él./ Cuando la falta grave sea cometida en virtud de un acuerdo del concejo municipal, los regidores que, con su voto afirmativo, hayan aprobado dicho acuerdo, incurrirán en la misma causal de cancelación de sus credenciales./ Asimismo, será causal de cancelación de la credencial de regidor o de síndico, propietario o suplente, la condena penal firme por delitos contra la propiedad, contra la buena fe en los negocios y contra los deberes de la función pública, así como por los previstos en la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública. La autoridad judicial competente efectuará, de oficio, la comunicación respectiva al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones." Por otro lado, cuando la sanción aplicable no sea la citada cancelación, el ordinal 68 de la LOCR (que regula competencia genérica de fiscalización y sanción) se limita a indicar que la CGR "...recomendará al órgano o autoridad administrativa competente, mediante su criterio técnico, que es vinculante, la aplicación de la sanción correspondiente de acuerdo con el mérito del caso...". Así, en el supuesto concreto de los alcaldes municipales, en tesis de inicio, ese mandato no define con claridad la autoridad que deberá ejecutar la sanción cuando no se trate de la cancelación de credenciales. En este punto debe realizarse una precisión que este Tribunal considera y estima fundamental en el debate que se aborda en este caso; y es que no se presenta una ausencia de regulación legal expresa en cuanto a la conducta reprochable y la sanción asociada a esa falta (caso de acreditarse). No se produce entonces una falencia regulatoria en cuanto a la sanción o a la conducta que le da cabida, por lo que no se observa, ni por asomo, riesgo alguno de la infracción a la garantía constitucional de tipicidad de las faltas o reserva de ley en menesteres de regulación de conductas sancionables (nulla crimen nulla poena sine legem). Es claro que tanto el ordinal 68 de la LOCGR, como las regulaciones contenidas en los ordinales 39, 41 y 42 de la Ley No. 8292, así como en los mandatos 38, 39, 40, 41 y 43 de la Ley No. 8422, fijan las referencias normativas legales que de previo califican las conductas e imponen las sanciones aplicables a los diversos comportamientos que configuren lesiones a las normas del ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública. No existe por ende debate alguno en cuanto a una eventual lesión a esa garantía. El asunto se centra en la divergencia interpretativa (si es que existe laguna) respecto de la competencia o potestad para aplicar las sanciones que la CGR recomiende de manera vinculante en el ejercicio de esas potestades, y a tono con el marco procedimental previsto en el precepto 68 de su Ley Orgánica. En este punto cabe señalar que ya un antecedente de este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, en concreto, la sentencia No. 69-2015-VII de las 10 horas 45 minutos del 20 de julio del 2015, de la Sección VII, se analizó un aspecto semejante al que se atiende en este proceso, pero referido al Alcalde de Nombre10042 . En ese sentido, esa sección de este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo consideró que no existía laguna alguna en cuanto a la potestad de aplicar las sanciones de suspensión del alcalde local que recomendaba la CGR, dado que la Ley No. 8292 y la No. 8422 establecen que en los casos de los alcaldes, la CGR remite el expediente con la respectiva recomendación al TSE, para que se aplique la sanción pertinente, a partir de lo cual estimó que la potestad cuestionada correspondía a esa autoridad electoral. Como se ha dicho ese criterio se sustentó en la interpretación que se realiza de las normas indicadas, a partir de las cuales, desprendieron esos juzgadores que lejos de existir laguna regulatoria, las normas eran claras en la asignación de esa potestad a favor del TSE. Sobre tal aspecto se indicó: "X.- (...) No obstante lo dicho, conforme se dirá, los artículos 42 de la Ley de Control Interno No.8292 del 31 de julio del 2002 y el artículo 43 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública No. 8422 del 6 de octubre del 2004, de manera expresa disponen que tratándose de sanciones administrativas a los alcaldes municipales, compete al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones la aplicación de las sanciones que en materia quebranto de las normas de fiscalización, control y vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública ordene la Contraloría General de la República en los procedimientos administrativos implementados para tales efectos, por lo que no existe un vacío legal en la materia. (...) Las disposiciones citadas de manera expresa, establecen que en caso de que el quebranto de las disposiciones relacionadas con faltas contenidas en la Leyes en cuestión, sean atribuidas a los miembros de los supremos poderes (entre los que se encuentran los Alcaldes Municipales), la Contraloría General de la República, deberá informar lo pertinente, en este caso, al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, con el fin de que proceda a imponer las sanciones correspondientes. Conforme se dispone de manera específica y cristalina en las normas citadas, contrario a lo argumentado por el Estado, le compete también al citado órgano electoral ejecutar las sanciones administrativas vinculantes distintas a la cancelación de credenciales, que en el ejercicio de sus potestades constitucionales y legales recomiende de manera vinculante la Contraloría General de la República en procedimientos en las que se atribuya a los presuntos responsables el quebranto de disposiciones de normas que integran la Hacienda Pública, contenidas entre otros en la Ley de Control Interno y la Ley contra el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. En este mismo sentido, contrario a lo argumentado por el actor (...), no existe en la materia un vacío legal, siendo que las disposiciones citadas, resultan compatibles con el sistema de responsabilidad personal y rendición de cuentas a que están sujetos los funcionarios públicos -incluidos los alcaldes municipales- por disposición del artículo 11 de la Carta Magna. (...)" Luego del análisis de las normas en las que ese fallo sustenta su decisión final, este Tribunal respeta por demás la postura expresada, más no se comparte, en la medida en que si bien esos preceptos, con mayor énfasis el canon 43 de la Ley No. 8422 fija que en el caso de los alcaldes, la CGR informará al TSE para que imponga las sanciones correspondientes, al considerar ese contenido con la potestad que estatuye el canon 259 del Código Electoral (Ley No. 8765), que refiere a la cancelación de credenciales, pero omite referencia en cuanto a otras sanciones, se colige un espacio de poca claridad en cuanto al tema debatido, sea, la instancia competente para aplicar las sanciones recomendadas por la CGR contra los alcaldes diversas a la cancelación de credenciales, sanción esta última que atañe con toda claridad al TSE. Sin embargo, se estima, esa misma pureza regulatoria no se observa en el caso de las demás sanciones. Con todo, la ausencia de regla expresa no es óbice para este Tribunal defina el punto en cuestión, dado que la misma Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, No. 7333, indica en el párrafo segundo del mandato 5, que la imposibilidad de excusarse de ejercer su autoridad o de fallar en los asuntos de su competencia por la falta o claridad de norma que aplicar, señalando que la labor jurisdiccional en el caso concreto debe satisfacerse acorde a las normas escritas y no escritas del ordenamiento, atendiendo a la escala jerárquica de las fuentes. Desde esa arista, es necesario que a tono con los mandatos 7 y 9 de la LGAP, este Tribunal proceda a integrar el Ordenamiento Jurídico Público y proceda a interpretar y concluir sobre las reglas aplicables ante este aparente vacío normativo. Para ello es necesario advertir que a tono con las pautas interpretativas que fija el precepto 10 de esa LGAP, la norma administrativa deberá ser interpretada de manera en que mejor garantice la realización del fin público a que se dirige. Desde luego que esa labor ha de realizarse con pleno respeto de los derechos e intereses de las personas y considerando si el lenguaje utilizado por el legislador en la redacción de la norma, permite el nivel de alternativas de solución (polisemia), en cuyo caso, es primario considerar el valor categórico a tutelar (fin o valor último), así como los medios jurídicos que de manera más adecuada y racional, permitan la tutela y satisfacción de aquel fin (criterios de rendimiento). No obstante, es necesario indicar que ante este panorama, es el legislador a quien corresponde definir de manera clara e indubitable el tema debatido, por lo que la siguiente postura se encuentra supeditada a lo que en este sentido pueda eventualmente definirse en las fuentes legales respectivas. Ergo, la siguiente postura deriva de la interpretación de las normas que a consideración de esta Cámara, darían respuesta a la situación bajo análisis, pero con la advertencia que su pertinencia se encuentra condicionada a la regulación expresa legal que sobre el tema pueda realizarse por la ley. Con todo, y luego de esa aclaración, a juicio de este cuerpo colegiado, ante el dilema en cuestión emergen varios escenarios posibles, a saber: a) La imposibilidad de ejecutar la sanción por ausencia de regla expresa que asigne la competencia; b) Competencia del Concejo Municipal; y c) Competencia del TSE. De seguido se ingresa al examen de las posibles soluciones.

VI.- Sobre el alegato de imposibilidad de ejecución de la sanción: Que ante la ausencia de norma expresa que defina la competencia para ejecutar y aplicar la sanción recomendada por la CGR (aun cuando vinculante), y considerando que se trata de una potestad de imperio, en tanto no exista regla expresa sobre esa potestad, la sanción es inaplicable o inejecutable. De pleno inicio, esta tesis no es compartida por este Tribunal pues supondrá una vulneración absoluta e inmunidad (e impunidad) a favor de los citados funcionarios locales, respecto de las conductas que constituyan quebrantos al régimen de tutela de la Hacienda Pública, en la medida en que esas faltas no ameriten la cancelación de sus credenciales. Tal interpretación llevaría a aceptar una suerte de irresponsabilidad de los alcaldes en esos casos, contrario al principio constitucional de eficiencia administrativa, rendición de cuentas del agente público y su deber de cumplir con las normas de probidad, control interno, y demás componentes de la Hacienda Pública. La presente acción justamente busca que este Tribunal realice semejante declaración, lo que implica, se reitera, hacer inejecutable las sanciones que disponga la CGR en estos casos. Si esa fuese la lógica del régimen normativo arriba señalado, no tendría sentido alguno ordenar la apertura de las causas administrativas de los alcaldes, siendo el único supuesto aplicable, cuando las faltas sean sancionables con la cancelación de la credencial. Si el régimen de control interno y probidad es aplicable a todo funcionario público que administre fondos públicos o gestiones bienes públicos, negar la posibilidad de sanciones diversas a la cancelación de su credencial a los alcaldes, por las razones alegadas, generaría una imposibilidad material de sanción, a la postre, una inequidad que lleva a inmunidad, en detrimento del debido resguardo del interés público que orienta el adecuado y recto manejo de los fondos público. La autonomía local que el constituyente confirió a los entes municipales no les abstrae del cumplimiento de las normas de probidad y en general, del conjunto de preceptos que propende a la tutela de la Hacienda Pública. Pese a ese grado de autonomía y el procedimiento para su designación, son funcionarios públicos y en esa condición, deben sujetar sus conductas a legalidad y soportar las consecuencias correctivas internas que deriven de sus desatenciones. Por el contrario, según se ha señalado arriba, tanto la Ley No. 8292 como la No. 8422 refieren de manera expresa supuestos de responsabilidad administrativa y fijan sanciones concretas para los alcaldes municipales que infrinjan las normas de Hacienda Pública (ordenamiento superior de control y fiscalización). Lo mismo ocurre con el detalle que se expresa en la LOCGR y en el mismo Código Electoral. Desde ese plano, y reiterando que el dilema analizado no estriba en la ausencia de regulación expresa sobre la reprochabilidad de conductas o establecimiento legal de sanciones, sino en la competencia de aplicación de sanciones dictadas a funcionarios locales de elección popular, no puede sostenerse una tesis que potencie inmunidad en el ejercicio de estos cargos, por lo que esta tesis debe rechazarse.

VII.- Sobre la incompetencia del Concejo Municipal: Una segunda posibilidad en este aspecto sería asignar la competencia al Concejo Municipal. Bajo esta tesitura, podría indicarse que la limitante que se formula en cuanto a esta postura es que esa instancia local no es jerarca del alcalde, pues son órganos llamados a coordinar y que juntos componen el Gobierno Local. En este sentido, es claro que en tesis de inicio, la potestad disciplinaria es conferida al superior jerárquico, como derivación de las potestades que le confiere a esa figura el ordinal 102 inciso b) y d) de la LGAP. En el esquema orgánico municipal costarricense, a tono con el ordinal 12 del Código Municipal, y en consonancia con el numeral 169 de la Carta Magna, el alcalde no depende jerárquicamente del Concejo Municipal, pues ambos son designados popularmente y componen el denominado Gobierno Local. Se impone entre ambos órgano un deber de coordinación y una máxima de complementación de competencias. Sin embargo, a juicio de este cuerpo colegiado, las relaciones que se imponen en el contexto de esas jerarquías municipales, ambas de designación popular, hace improcedente que una de ellas ostente la competencia para imponer a su homólogo, sanciones diversas a la cancelación de credenciales. No observa este Tribunal que exista elemento alguno sobre el cual pueda hacerse sustentar la competencia del Concejo Municipal para imponer sanciones al alcalde, pues aquella primera instancia no guarda poder alguno sobre el contenido de las funciones del alcalde, su designación o en general, sobre la credencial que le habilita para el ejercicio del cargo. Por otro lado, del examen de las potestades legales que han sido confiadas al Concejo Municipal, los artículos 13 y 19 del Código Municipal, no contiene dentro de las atribuciones del citado órgano potestad alguna que le permita sancionar al Alcalde Municipal, por lo que atribuir esa potestad a esa unidad administrativa deviene en improcedente.

VIII.- Competencia del TSE: En este punto, la CGR postula en su contrademanda que la competencia para disponer y ejecutar la sanción atañe al TSE. Para justificar esta postura señala en lo medular que la ejecución de las sanciones que recomiende la CGR de manera vinculante fue atribuida de manera expresa al citado Tribunal, dada la investidura que ostenta el funcionario respecto de quien recae la recomendación, siendo que esa autoridad fue quien le otorgó la credencial. Dice, solo el TSE administra las credenciales de las designaciones de alcaldes municipales, siendo una competencia exclusiva y excluyente. Asume, si el otorgamiento de dicha credencial le da al TSE una competencia implícita para cancelarla, con mayor razón ostenta la misma competencia para suspenderla. Expresa no compartir el criterio del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en cuanto a una ausencia de competencia de su parte para disponer la suspensión de credenciales de los funcionarios municipales de elección popular. Destaca, la efectiva rendición de cuentas y aplicación del régimen de responsabilidades de los altos funcionarios públicos, constituyen cometidos fundamentales del ordenamiento jurídico nacional. Refiere al principio de paralelismo de las formas y el aforismo jurídico de que quien puede lo más puede lo menos. Así, la misma autoridad que otorgó una credencial, es la llamada a suspenderla, pues la suspensión es una cancelación temporal de las credenciales. Reitera, las condiciones de la credencial otorgada a dicho funcionario por el TSE, sólo pueden ser variadas por esa misma autoridad electoral. Acusa, el criterio de interpretación sostenido por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en cuanto a la inexistencia de fundamento jurídico que lo habilite para disponer la suspensión de credenciales otorgadas por él mismo a funcionarios de elección popular, concretamente a los alcaldes municipales, con base en el que ha dispuesto a su vez, que corresponde a los concejos municipales respectivos ejecutar la recomendación vinculante de suspensión de aquel servidor, ha generado una seria afectación de los objetivos y fines fundamentales del ordenamiento jurídico de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública. Agrega, esa decisión ha redundado en la inejecución de dicha suspensión, y en consecuencia, no sólo en la afectación del fin perseguido por el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, sino en la afectación de elementales valores y principios del orden constitucional y legal costarricense, como la efectiva rendición de cuentas de las autoridades públicas y el régimen de responsabilidades de los altos funcionarios públicos. Sobre este particular cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. Para la debida comprensión del presente asunto, es necesario considerar el contenido y alcances de la norma que permite a la CGR recomendar de manera vinculante las sanciones cuestionadas. Como se ha indicado ut supra, a tono con el ordinal 68 de la LOCGR, esta instancia fiscalizadora, luego del trámite debido, emite un acto en el cual, recomienda a otro órgano o ente administrativo, la aplicación de la sanción respectiva. Esto implica, a diferencia de lo que afirma el accionante, que las actuaciones que dicte la CGR no son una simple recomendación carente de contenido ejecutorio, pues el procedimiento que se lleva en esa sede busca precisamente el análisis de la lesión o no al régimen de la Hacienda Pública, competencia que acorde a lo expuesto ha sido confiada a la CGR. De esa manera, el acto final de esa causa se pone en conocimiento de la Administración competente de ejecutar y aplicar la sanción, lo que supone, resulta innecesario (e improcedente) dictar un nuevo acto, restando únicamente aplicar la sanción dictada por la CGR. En ese sentido, la ejecución de la sanción no constituye una conducta o funcionamiento que deba asociarse a las potestades jerárquicas sancionatorias de carácter disciplinario en estricto sentido, aunque cuando el funcionario a sancionar cuenta con un superior jerarca, es claro que la orden de la CGR se comunica a este último para que disponga las acciones internas de ejecución de esa sanción. De conformidad con el ordinal 253 del Código Electoral, el TSE es la instancia competente para disponer la sanción de cancelación de credenciales por las causales previstas en esa fuente legal. Para tales efectos, se regulan diversos supuestos que podrían dar cabida a este efecto de supresión de la credencial, dentro de ellos: renuncia, ausencia, afectación al régimen de zona marítimo terrestre, así como la que interesa en esta causa, sea, la referida a infracciones sustanciales al régimen de Hacienda Pública. En ese sentido el ordinal 259 ejusdem señala en su rigor literal:

“ARTÍCULO 259.- Cancelación de credenciales por afectación al Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública. Cuando se inste la cancelación de las credenciales invocando la comisión de una falta grave, con violación de las normas del ordenamiento de fiscalización contemplado en la Ley orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública, la Ley general de control interno, u otras relativas al Sistema de Control y Fiscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública, el asunto se remitirá a la Contraloría para que esta recomiende lo correspondiente, de conformidad con el artículo 68 de la Ley orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, luego de haber levantado el respectivo expediente contra el presunto responsable. El Tribunal se pronunciará una vez que la Contraloría o los tribunales penales se hayan manifestado sobre la presunta violación de las normas referidas.” Ciertamente la norma fija la competencia para disponer la cancelación de la credencial como consecuencia más gravosa, a la vez que como se ha expuesto arriba, establece la participación de la CGR en el trámite, a fin de que inicie el procedimiento previsto en el canon 68 LOCGR, a fin de que rinda la recomendación vinculante correspondiente. A juicio del accionante, y del propio Estado (PGR) esa norma únicamente habilita a imponer la sanción de cancelación, no así una de menores implicaciones, como es el caso de la suspensión en el cargo. Del análisis y consideración de las implicaciones de la supuesta laguna que se presenta en este particular, estima este cuerpo colegiado que existe mérito y razones suficientes que permitan atribuir la competencia en cuestión al TSE, las que de seguido se exponen. Naturaleza jurídica de la designación del funcionario. Un primer aspecto al que este Tribunal debe hacer referencia se relaciona con la ratio misma de la competencia asignada al TSE respecto de las sanciones dictadas en contra del alcalde municipal. El régimen constitucional y el mismo Código Electoral asignan la competencia de dicha instancia en razón de que el procedimiento que permite la designación de este funcionario es la participación del electorado mediante el ejercicio del derecho al sufragio, que como derivación de principio democrático, permite la elección de ese puesto por designación popular. Precisamente esa modalidad de configuración de la investidura del funcionario se formaliza y perfecciona con el otorgamiento de la credencial respectiva por parte del Tribunal, una vez que declara la validez de las elecciones respectivas, acorde a las competencias y potestades que estatuye el ordinal 12 inciso h) del Código Electoral. En el caso de los funcionarios de elección popular, es evidente que pese a constituirse como servidores públicos –por el plazo y vigencia de su designación-, acorde al concepto general que establece el canon 111 de la LGAP, están sujetos a un régimen sancionatorio sui generis, en la medida en que las competencias sancionatorias no vienen asignadas a un jerarca administrativo estricto sentido, pues por el contrario, ostenta la figura de jerarcas administrativos. Desde luego que ello no implica la imposibilidad de disponer sanciones en su contra, sin embargo, es precisamente esa naturaleza jurídica de su vínculo funcionarial la que ha llevado a establecer normas jurídicas concretas que estipulan las maneras y supuestos de imponerles ese tipo de responsabilidad. Desde este plano, las sanciones que puedan imponerse a esta clase de agentes públicos no derivan del ejercicio de una potestad jerárquica en los términos que justifica el mandato 102 incisos b), c) y d) de la LGAP, sino de la necesaria sujeción al ordenamiento jurídico en lo que a sus conductas se refiere. En ese sentido, partiendo de la base de que es el TSE quien confiere la credencial que constituye el acto formal de investidura (precedido de una designación popular), y a partir de la cual, el funcionario ingresa en el ejercicio del cargo, es precisamente esta misma autoridad la legitimada para disponer lo pertinente en cuanto a la cancelación de este estatus y hacer cesar sus efectos. Siendo así, estas potestades se otorgan en razón de que el TSE constituye la instancia a la cual la Constitución Política y la ley No. 8765 ha confiado la potestad de gestión en cuanto a dichas credenciales, dado que se trata de agentes públicos que han sido designados popularmente, razón por la cual, la competencia para disponer las sanciones que incidan de manera directa en el ejercicio de esos cargos, de manera que inhabiliten total o temporalmente a uno de esos servidores, es parte de sus competencias constitucionales y legales. De otro modo, se estaría confiriendo a otra autoridad que no cuenta con tal legitimación democrática e institucional, una potestad cuyo contenido sustancial implicaría, hacer cesar temporalmente, por el curso de la sanción, la credencial que fue otorgada por el TSE, permitiendo de esa manera la alteración de vigencia y efectos de un acto por parte de una autoridad diversa a la que la ha conferido formalmente. De esa manera, siendo el TSE la instancia que concede la credencial a los funcionarios de elección popular, solamente esa instancia estaría legitimada para disponer las sanciones respectivas respecto de esos funcionarios, por la competencia que sobre esas designaciones le ha sido otorgada. Cabe agregar en este punto que es esa vocación electoral del nombramiento del funcionario el elemento que legitima la participación del TSE en el régimen de sanciones, no así la naturaleza de las faltas cometidas y que dan cabida a ese régimen, pues como se ha señalado, incluye desde la ausencia hasta la infracción a normas de Hacienda Pública. Se trata por ende de una competencia de ámbito genérico que le permite otorgar y cancelar las credenciales de estos funcionarios, así como la suspensión temporal de esa designación. Implicaciones y efectos de la suspensión. Un segundo aspecto deriva de la semejanza (por analogía) de los efectos de la cancelación de credenciales a la suspensión en el ejercicio del cargo que se produce como consecuencia de las recomendaciones que en orden al artículo 68 de la Ley No. 7428 emite la CGR. Es claro que la cancelación de la credencial constituye una cesación definitiva de sus efectos, lo que implica, evidentemente, que el funcionario debe abandonar su puesto y se encuentra imposibilitado, a partir de ese contenido, de ejercer sus competencias. Por otro lado, la suspensión a la que se viene haciendo referencia, implica una suerte de cancelación temporal de la credencial, en la medida en que en último sentido, esa suspensión si bien no supone un retiro directo de la credencial, igualmente inhabilita al funcionario a ejercer el cargo y sus competencias por el plazo de la sanción impuesta. Desde esa arista de examen, a juicio de esta Cámara existe una identidad entre ambas figuras, si se considera que las mismas derivan de un ejercicio sancionatorio asociado al incumplimiento de deberes, con la diferencia que en la cancelación, las faltas que le dan cabida han de ser graves, en tanto que en la suspensión, no se presenta tal gravedad, lo que no excluye la infracción a normas que imponen deberes en el ejercicio de esa función. Si bien se mira, existe paridad de efectos materiales de ambas sanciones, con la diferencia que una implica la cesación definitiva, en tanto que otra, la temporal, en el ejercicio del cargo. Por ende, dentro de esta labor integrativa que se requiere en este caso concreto, si corresponde al TSE definir la cancelación definitiva de las credenciales de los Alcaldes Municipales, siendo la suspensión analizada una forma de inhabilitar temporalmente el ejercicio del cargo, se trata de una aplicación que dentro de un marco de congruencia y eficiencia, corresponde a dicho Tribunal como titular de la defensa genérica que la Ley le ha otorgado respecto de las citadas credenciales. Lo opuesto, sea, atribuir a otra autoridad la competencia para aplicar la sanción recomendada por la CGR, llevaría a conferir a otra autoridad la potestad de inhabilitar las credenciales de funcionarios de elección popular, aun temporalmente, pese a que se trata de una competencia expresamente otorgada al TSE. Competencia sancionatoria genérica más gravosa. Por otra parte, comparte este Tribunal lo alegado por la CGR en cuanto a la necesaria invocación al aforismo “quien puede lo más, puede lo menos”. En este aspecto, ciertamente el TSE posee por ley la competencia de disponer la sanción más gravosa respecto de la figura del alcalde municipal, como es el caso de la cancelación de sus credenciales. Entonces, al poseer esa potestad de impacto más severo, es juicio de esta Cámara que le corresponde igualmente definir las sanciones de menor rango que puedan derivar del análisis de las conductas que dan cabida al procedimiento previsto en el ordinal 68 de la LOCGR, en la medida en que no exista norma expresa que asigne esa potestad a una instancia diversa. Luego de dichos factores, es consideración de este Tribunal que la competencia para aplicar e imponer las sanciones de suspensión a los alcaldes municipales, que recomienda la CGR en aplicación del ordinal 68 LOCGR, corresponde al TSE. Cabe destacar con todo que se trata de competencia que no es propia del ejercicio de sus potestades relativas a la materia electoral, por lo cual, resulta un tema de posible control en esta jurisdicción, tal y como lo ha definido en varios precedentes la Sala Constitucional, entre ellos, los votos 2012-001259, 2010-016342 y recientemente en el fallo No. 2015-001780 de las 11 horas 34 minutos del 06 de febrero del 2015. Por otro lado, cabe destacar que en este proceso no se discute sobre la regulación expresa o no de norma que imponga la posibilidad de instruir un procedimiento sancionatorio en contra de los alcaldes municipales. El ordinal 68 de la LOCGR junto con las normas de la Ley No. 8422 y 8292 imponen la base normativa para esos fines. El dilema se ha de centrar en la competencia para aplicar la sanción pertinente, por lo que no resulta atendible un alegato de lesión al principio de reserva de ley o tipicidad en cuanto a esos aspectos, pues la conducta sancionable así como la consecuencia jurídica se encuentran previstas en las normas escritas del Ordenamiento Jurídico aplicable. Desde ese plano debe disponerse el rechazo de la demanda en cuanto pretende que este cuerpo colegiado declare la incompetencia del TSE para la aplicación de las sanciones dictadas por la CGR en este caso en particular. Como corolario de este punto en particular debe indicarse, si bien esta Sección VI en el precedente No. 65-2016-VI de las 09 horas 30 minutos del 20 de abril del 2016 había dispuesto una postura diversa a la que se expresa en este fallo, tal voto fue emitido por una integración diversa a la que suscribe la presente sentencia, e incluye un criterio que si bien se respeta, en definitiva no se comparte por las razones arriba expuestas, que han llevado a esta integración a concluir sobre las competencias del TSE para disponer y aplicar las sanciones a los alcaldes municipales en casos como el que se examina.

IX.- Sobre las demás alegaciones de nulidad. Infracción al principio de juez natural y violación al debido proceso. En otro orden de agravios, el accionante aduce lesión a la máxima del juez natural ya que fue el mimo órgano instructor del procedimiento instaurado por la CGR, el que emitió el acto final, resolución PA-21-2011. A su juicio, esto causa nulidad ya que conocían los hechos del proceso y se formaron un criterio anticipado, por lo que al resolver el acto final ante una eventual situación de contradicción, quebrantando el Principio de Imparcialidad y Objetividad, así como su derecho de defensa y debido proceso. Sobre este debate cabe reiterar que el Ordenamiento Jurídico confiere a la CGR potestades especiales para el control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública, con base en normas de jerarquía legal y constitucional, ejerciendo la potestad sancionatoria con base en ese marco normativo. Precisamente, para el ejercicio de esa competencia, en su oportunidad procedió a emitir el denominado "Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos", norma administrativa que fuese publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 76 del 20 de abril del 2007 (No. R-C0-16-2007). En esta norma, el ordinal 28, junto con lo dispuesto en el numeral 19 del Reglamento Orgánico de la CGR, Resolución N° R-C0-34-2009 de las 10:00 horas del22 de mayo de 2009, posteriormente reformado mediante Resolución N° R-DC-123-2010 del Despacho Contralor de las 14:00 horas del 19 de julio de 2010, estatuye que tanto el acto de apertura como la resolución final serían emitidos por la División Jurídica de dicho ente contralor, y sus actos podrían ser revisados por su superior, es decir por el propio despacho del (a) Contralor (a) General. Contrario a lo afirmado por el promovente, si bien la LGAP señala que la Administración Pública estará representada en el procedimiento por el órgano director (art. 282.3) y le confiere poderes de instrucción, como es el propio de dirigir la comparencia oral (art. 314 ejusdem), lo cierto del caso es que nada impide que el mismo órgano que instruye la causa y la tramita, sea el decisor. Por el contrario, partiendo que es el instructor quien evacua la prueba y celebra la audiencia oral, dicha circunstancia potencia y favorece los principios de inmediatez de la prueba, celeridad y oralidad del procedimiento administrativo, tal y como lo expuso la Sala Constitucional en la Resolución No. 6379-2002 de las 15:22 horas del 26 de junio del 2002. Por su parte, en el fallo No. 2010-15786 de las 09.13 horas del 24 de septiembre del 2010 dispuso sobre ese punto en concreto: "... es menester señalar que la Contraloría General de la República no lesiona con su actuar el principio de imparcialidad, toda vez que designa un único órgano, que asuma tanto las funciones de instrucción como las de decisión, situación que este Tribunal ha indicado, en anteriores ocasiones, que no violenta el principio de imparcialidad ya que incluso permite la inmediación de la prueba ... ". Por ende, la concentración de las tareas de instrucción y de decisión en un mismo expediente administrativo no antagoniza con los principios aludidos, por lo que, el cargo bajo examen debe ser rechazado. Por otro lado, el actor reprocha que en la resolución PA-21-2011 se tuvo por demostrada la comisión de una falta grave, teniendo como única prueba el documento de fecha 26 de febrero del 2010, emitido por el señor Nombre139338 , sin que dicha prueba se haya incorporado verbalmente en la audiencia oral, o bien, sin que el señor Nombre139338 compareciera en calidad de testigo a ratificar lo indicado en tal oficio, y sin determinar su participación en los hechos que se investigaron. Estima violentados los principios de oralidad, contradicción, inmediación de la prueba, defensa, eficiencia y celeridad del proceso. El agravio en cuestión debe ser rechazado. Del análisis del expediente administrativo se desprende que desde el acto de inicio del procedimiento sancionatorio dispuesto por la CGR, sea, acto de las 09 horas 30 minutos del 24 de septiembre del 2010, esa instancia fiscalizadora hizo detalle de las piezas que conforman el expediente y se convocó a audiencia oral y privada para el 14 de diciembre del 2010. A partir de ese traslado y atendiendo a las facultades que acuden a las partes dentro de la audiencia oral y privada, acorde al canon 317 de la LGPA, el accionante bien pudo haberse opuesto a dicha probanza o bien, aportar los elementos de convicción que permitirían desvirtuar el contenido de ese elemento en concreto, así como respecto del conjunto de hechos que le fuese intimados. Incluso, dentro del detalle de las pruebas que fueran expresadas en ese acto de inicio, se incluye la deposición testimonial del señor Nombre139339 (ver imagen 244 -folio 229- del expediente administrativo), por lo que el promovente se encontraba en plena posibilidad objetiva de presentar sus alegatos y demás prueba que estimara pertinente. Por otro lado, cabe destacar que del análisis del acto final no se desprende en modo alguno que la sanción recomendada por la CGR se haya fundamentado únicamente en esa probanza que se alega. Véase que la resolución RDC-203-2011, señala como prueba adicional el Oficio PM-045-2010 del 3 de agosto del 2010, del que esa CGR extrajo la actuación irregular en el proceso de contratación que se investigó en el procedimiento cuestionado. Por demás, no precisa el accionante la manera en que esa cuestión que acusa genera una nulidad de carácter sustancial, de suerte que en los términos del precepto 223 LGAP, amerite la supresión por invalidez del procedimiento y la decisión final dictada en su contra, lo que resulta determinante si se considera que el acto final se ampara en otras probanzas para imputar su responsabilidad por supuestas infracciones en los procedimientos de la contratación administrativa. Debe disponerse por ende el rechazo de la demanda en cuanto a ese particular.

X.- Sobre la acreditación de las causas de la sanción. Finalmente, el demandante reclama que en la Resolución PA-21-2011 no se indicó que la unidad interna encargada de realizar los procesos de contratación administrativa era el Departamento de Proveeduría en conjunto con la Asesoría Jurídica de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, siendo la firma de órdenes de pago un procedimiento formal que se realiza después del proceso de contratación, para girar el pago a los proveedores. Precisa que esas instancias nunca le indicaron que los procesos en que participó se realizaron de manera irregular, por lo que desconocía esa circunstancia. Considera que no tuvo intención en las infracciones por lo que la sanción es improcedente. Del análisis de los autos se desprende que en el acto de inicio del procedimiento se intimó al accionante faltas al deber de diligencia y probidad como funcionario municipal e incurrir en desatenciones de los deberes inherentes a su cargo, al haber autorizado las nóminas de pago correspondientes a contrataciones en las cuales se omitieron los procedimientos de contratación administrativa. Luego del trámite del respectivo procedimiento, expediente DJ-67-2010, la CGR pudo comprobar las faltas atribuidas al petente. En concreto, en el acto final el acto final, resolución PA-21-2011 de las 13 horas del 23 de marzo del 2011, dispuso: "l. RESUELVE: Declarar responsable a los señores Nombre26667 , cédula de identidad no. CED21663, Alcalde (...) de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, por la comisión de los hechos señalados en la parte considerativa de esta resolución y tener por acreditada su responsabilidad administrativa por culpa grave de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos artículo 210 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno, 96, 96 bis, 96 ter de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, 110, incisos a), b), d), e), g) y h) de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, 4, 38 y 39 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento ilícito, y los artículos 68 y siguientes de la Ley Orgánica de la Contrataría General, al autorizar mediante su .firma una serie de nóminas de pago a contratistas sin cumplir con los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 2 inciso h) de la citada ley y el artículo 136 del Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, es decir sin confeccionar un pliego de condiciones sencillo, fijar la hora y fecha para la recepción de las propuestas, invitar a no menos de tres potenciales oferentes del Registro de Proveedores y adjudicar la oferta de menor precio, sin pe1juicio de la valoración de otros factores relevantes, en síntesis, sin confeccionar un expediente municipal en donde constara el procedimiento administrativo de la contratación realizada.// II. Recomendar con carácter vinculante la imposición de una sanción de suspensión sin goce de salario por el plazo de treinta días hábiles al señor Nombre26667 en su condición de Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz ( .. .)". Esto fue luego confirmado por resolución de las 15:00 horas del día 29 de abril de 2011, que rechazó la revocatoria planteada y por la resolución número R-DC-203-2011, dictada por el Despacho Contralor a las 10:00 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2011, que rechazó la apelación. Del examen de esas conductas formales se desprende que la CGR concluyó que las acciones del petente configuraron las desatenciones que le fuesen intimadas, la cual calificaron de negligente y omisa en el cumplimiento de sus funciones propias. Para tal postura, en la decisión del recurso de apelación sobre la calificación del componente subjetivo de la sanción se expuso: "...En reiteradas resoluciones. tanto administrativas como judiciales se ha establecido que la responsabilidad del funcionario no es objetiva sino subjetiva, de conformidad con la regulación que contiene la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Esto es así porque el funcionario público responde personalmente, frente a terceros o ante la propia Administración, cuando haya actuado culpa grave o dolo y en criterio de este Despacho medió una culpa grave en el manejo del asunto relacionado con las contrataciones administrativas investigadas. Evidentemente existe una deficiencia en su proceder, pues no se cercioró de la legalidad del procedimiento de contratación seguido. Es decir, su actuar y sus omisiones constituyen una imprudencia y negligencia de tal gravedad que sostienen válidamente la sanción impuesta, pues ésta se achaca en atención del bien jurídico tutelado, independientemente de que se diera con dolo o culpa. Es importante destacar, que según lo dispuesto en los artículos 10 y 12 de la Ley General de Control Interno, Nro. 8292, el Alcalde como jerarca y administrador de las dependencias municipales, tiene la responsabilidad de mantener y perfeccionar el sistema de control interno de la entidad y el deber de velar por el adecuado desarrollo de la actividad de éste, pero tal como ha quedado demostrado, su accionar no estuvo acorde con lo dispuesto en la normativa antes citada. (...)" En definitiva, el actor no se dedica a combatir esos hallazgos fácticos ni debate con la propiedad debida las conclusiones y calificaciones dadas por la CGR a estos aspectos. Desde ese plano, en esa sede se tuvo por acreditado un elenco fáctico que constituyó el motivo del acto y que dio paso al contenido de recomendar suspenderlo en su cargo por 30 días naturales. No se evidencia entonces nulidad alguna en cuanto a ese proceder. En suma, lo debido es disponer el rechazo de la demanda por las razones arriba apuntadas.

XI.- Sobre la contrademanda. Como se ha señalado, la CGR formula reconvención para que en esta sede se declare: "a) Que en sentencia se declare la nulidad absoluta de los siguientes actos y resoluciones emitidos por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones: 1. Oficio número STSE-0166-2012 del 24 de enero de 2012, emitido por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones al referirse al oficio 00 172-20 12 (DJ-00 18-2012) de la Contraloría General de la República, indicó que en razón de que la sanción recomendada por la Contraloría General no era la cancelación de credenciales, correspondía al concejo municipal de Santa Cruz conocer del asunto y no a ese Tribunal. (Descrito en el hecho décimo). 2. Todos los actos conexos y derivados del acto descrito en el punto anterior. b) Que en sentencia se declare la nulidad absoluta de los siguientes acuerdos adoptados por el concejo municipal de Santa Cruz: l. Acuerdo adoptado en la sesión ordinaria 04-2012, artículo 4, Inciso 14, del 24 de enero de 2012, en donde el Concejo Municipal acordó abstenerse de pronunciarse sobre el fondo de la recomendación de suspensión sin goce de salario y trasladar a la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos para su correspondiente análisis, recomendación y posterior dictamen de comisión los de oficios DJ- 00 17-2012 y Placa26523 12 de esta Contraloría General de la República. (Descrito en el hecho duodécimo). 2. Acuerdo adoptado en sesión ordinaria 16-2012, artículo 04, inciso 25 de fecha 17 de abril de 2012, el cual consiste en solicitar a la Asesoría Jurídica Municipal, se sirva hacer análisis lega l del oficio 03012 de esta Contraloría General de la República. (Descrito en el hecho décimo sexto). 3. Acuerdo adoptado en sesión extraordinaria 21-20 12, artículo 3, inciso 08 del 25 de octubre de 2012, en el cual se acuerda que habiendo conocido ese concejo el oficio de la Contraloría General de la República 10941, se traslada a conocimiento de una Comisión Especial nombrada, para que rinda dictamen. (Descrito en el hecho décimo octavo). 4. Todos los actos conexos y derivados de los acuerdos descritos en los puntos anteriores. c) Que en sentencia se declare que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones es el competente para suspender las credenciales de los alcaldes municipales y, consecuentemente, se ordene al TSE, proceder de inmediato con la ejecución de la recomendación vinculante de suspensión en el cargo al señor Nombre26667 , dispuestas por la CGR en los actos finales de procedimiento PA-21-2011 referido. d) Que en caso de oposición, se condene a todos los contrademandados al pago de ambas costas derivadas de esta acción. VI PRETENSIÓN SUBSIDIARIA (...) que se ordene a la Municipalidad demandada la ejecución de la recomendación vinculante de sanción de suspensión dispuesta en el acto final del procedimiento PA-21-2011 definida por la Contraloría General respecto del alcalde municipal de Santa Cruz, señor Nombre26667 , las cuales deberán ser ejecutadas de inmediato por concejo municipal de Santa Cruz." Como aspecto previo en cuanto al abordaje de la contrademanda, cabe señalar, al haber establecido que la competencia para aplicar la recomendación vinculante dictada por la CGR para suspensión de credenciales de los alcaldes municipales, acorde a los procedimientos instaurados de conformidad con el ordinal 68 de la Ley No. 7428, corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, carece de todo sentido práctico ingresar a reiterar todo el examen ya expuesto como fundamento de esa conclusión, en lo toca a las pretensiones que cuestionan la competencia del TSE para esos efectos, o bien, combatir los actos previos del TSE que declinaban esa competencia en este caso concreto. De ahí que se sea innecesario el abordaje de la pretensión a) de la reconvención, lo que incluye omitir análisis sobre la defensa de caducidad que respecto de este punto formuló el Estado. Sin embargo, lo cierto del caso es que a partir de lo analizado sobre la potestad de ejecución de las sanciones recomendadas al tenor del artículo 68 de la Ley No. 7428, es claro que atendiendo a esta competencia tratada, es obligación del TSE proceder a aplicar las sanciones de suspensión de credenciales que recomiende de manera vinculante la CGR. Esto incluye la obligación de esa autoridad de ejecutar de inmediato, si otro motivo legal así no lo impide, el contenido de lo dispuesto por la CGR en la resolución PA-21-2011 de las 13 horas del 23 de marzo del 2011 de la División Jurídica de la CGR y resolución número R-DC-203-2011, dictada por el Despacho Contralor a las 10:00 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2011, que recomiendan imponer al Alcalde de Santa Cruz, señor Nombre139340 , una sanción de suspensión sin goce de sueldo de 30 días naturales. Lo anterior supone acoger la pretensión c) de la contrademanda. En lo que toca al extremo petitorio b) de la reconvención, direccionado a la supresión por invalidez de los acuerdo del Concejo Municipal, debe disponerse su rechazo, pues en el fondo, gravitan en torno a la definición de competencia del Concejo Municipal para aplicar la sanción recomendada en esas resoluciones recién citadas, aspecto que en orden a lo expuesto, no le atañe por ser una competencia ajena a sus atribuciones y poderes legales. Sobre la pretensión subsidiaria, se omite pronunciamiento en tanto busca que se disponga en sentencia la competencia del Concejo Municipal para suspender las credenciales que haya otorgado a funcionarios de elección popular, caso del Alcalde Municipal.

XII.- Corolario. Análisis de las defensas opuestas y pretensiones. Sobre la demanda. En lo que corresponde a la demanda, tanto el Estado como la CGR opusieron la defensa de falta de derecho. En orden a lo expresado en este fallo, esas excepciones de fondo deben acogerse al haberse establecido la improcedencia de las pretensiones formuladas por el accionante en cuanto a la supuesta incompetencia de la CGR o del TSE para ejecutar las sanciones en su contra. En consecuencia, se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por el Estado y la Contraloría General de la República en cuanto a la demanda. Se rechaza la demanda incoada por el señor Nombre26667 contra el Estado y la Contraloría General de la República. Se declara que corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones la aplicación y ejecución de la sanción de suspensión (u otra que corresponda) de los Alcaldes Municipales, que de conformidad con el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428) dicte esa instancia administrativa por infracciones a las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización contemplado en dicha fuente legal o haya provocado lesión al régimen de la Hacienda Pública. Sobre la contrademanda. En cuanto a la contrademanda, el accionante-reconvenido contestó opuso la defensa de falta de derecho. Por su parte el Estado opuso la defensa previa de cosa juzgada en cuanto a la impugnación del acto del TSE, caducidad de la acción y falta de derecho. En la audiencia preliminar el Estado desistió de la defensa de cosa juzgada y por resolución No. 943-2016 de las 15 horas 15 minutos del 29 de abril del 2016, la jueza de trámite dispuso el rechazo de la defensa de acto no susceptible de impugnación. Atendiendo a la manera en que fue resuelta la demanda, se omite pronunciamiento en cuanto al extremo petitorio a) la contrademanda, así como respecto de la defensa de caducidad planteada sobre ese particular. Se rechaza la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por el Estado y por el señor Nombre26667 . De oficio, se declara la falta de derecho respecto de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz (pretensión b). En consecuencia, se acoge parcialmente la reconvención en los siguientes términos: 1. Se declara que corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones la aplicación y ejecución de la sanción de suspensión (u otra que corresponda) de los Alcaldes Municipales, que de conformidad con el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428) dicte esa instancia administrativa por infracciones a las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización contemplado en dicha fuente legal o haya provocado lesión al régimen de la Hacienda Pública. 2. Se ordena al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones que de inmediato, si otro motivo jurídico no lo impide, procedan a realizar las acciones pertinentes que permitan la ejecución de la sanción de suspensión de 30 días naturales sin goce de sueldo en contra del Alcalde de Santa Cruz, señor Nombre139340 , dispuesta por esa instancia de fiscalización en la resolución PA-21-2011 de las 13 horas del 23 de marzo del 2011 de la División Jurídica y resolución número R-DC-203-2011, dictada por el Despacho Contralor a las 10:00 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2011. 3. Respecto de la codemandada Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, se rechaza la pretensión de nulidad de las resoluciones dictadas por el citado Concejo Municipal en las que se declara incompetente para ordenar la suspensión del alcalde municipal. 4. Por innecesario se omite pronunciamiento respecto de la pretensión subsidiaria.

XIII.- Costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. Las co-accionadas peticionaron la condena en costas. El Estado solicitó además, los intereses legales respectivos. En la especie, estima este Tribunal que el tema abordado permite varias interpretaciones posibles, lo que pone en evidencia que en la especie, las partes han litigado de buena fe y con motivo suficiente, razón por lo cual, se dispone resolver el presente caso sin especial condenatoria en costas.

POR TANTO,

Sobre la demanda. Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por el Estado y la Contraloría General de la República, al haberse establecido la improcedencia de las pretensiones formuladas por el accionante en cuanto a la supuesta incompetencia de la Contraloría General de la República o del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones para ejecutar las sanciones de suspensión de credenciales en su contra. En consecuencia, se rechaza la demanda incoada por el señor Nombre26667 contra el Estado y la Contraloría General de la República. Se declara que corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones la aplicación y ejecución de la sanción de suspensión (u otra que corresponda) de los Alcaldes Municipales, que de conformidad con el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428) dicte esa instancia administrativa por infracciones a las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización contemplado en dicha fuente legal o haya provocado lesión al régimen de la Hacienda Pública. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas. Sobre la contrademanda. Por la forma en que fue resuelta la demanda, se omite pronunciamiento en cuanto al extremo petitorio a) de la contrademanda, así como respecto de la defensa de caducidad planteada sobre ese particular. Se rechaza la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por el Estado y por el señor Nombre26667 . De oficio, se declara la falta de derecho respecto de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz en cuanto a la pretensión b) que busca la nulidad de los acuerdos de esa autoridad local que declaraban su incompetencia para aplicar la sanción recomendada contra el Alcalde de ese cantón. En consecuencia, se acoge parcialmente la reconvención en los siguientes términos: 1. Se declara que corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones la aplicación y ejecución de la sanción de suspensión (u otra que corresponda) de los Alcaldes Municipales, que de conformidad con el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428) dicte esa instancia administrativa por infracciones a las normas que integran el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización contemplado en dicha fuente legal o haya provocado lesión al régimen de la Hacienda Pública. 2. Se ordena al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones que de inmediato, si otro motivo jurídico no lo impide, procedan a realizar las acciones pertinentes que permitan la ejecución de la sanción de suspensión de 30 días naturales sin goce de sueldo en contra del Alcalde de Santa Cruz, señor Nombre139340 , dispuesta por esa instancia de fiscalización en la resolución PA-21-2011 de las 13 horas del 23 de marzo del 2011 de la División Jurídica y resolución número R-DC-203-2011, dictada por el Despacho Contralor a las 10:00 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2011. 3. Respecto de la codemandada Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, se rechaza la pretensión de nulidad de las resoluciones dictadas por el citado Concejo Municipal en las que se declara incompetente para ordenar la suspensión del alcalde municipal. 4. Por innecesario se omite pronunciamiento respecto de la pretensión subsidiaria. 5. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas. José Roberto Garita Navarro/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez/ José Roberto Brenes Chinchilla*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: Nombre26667 DEMANDADOS: El Estado, la Contraloría General de la República y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

RECONVENTORA: Contraloría General de la República RECONVENIDOS: El Estado y la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz.

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