← Environmental Law Center← Centro de Derecho Ambiental
Res. 00792-2015 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago · Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago · 30/11/2015
OutcomeResultado
The court upheld the criminal conviction for violation of electronic communications, revoked the civil award to the wife due to res judicata, and annulled the award to the other communicant due to insufficient reasoning, ordering a retrial on the moral damages of the latter.El tribunal confirmó la condena penal por violación de comunicaciones electrónicas, revocó la indemnización civil a la esposa por cosa juzgada, y anuló la indemnización al otro comunicante por falta de fundamentación, ordenando reenvío para nuevo debate sobre el daño moral de este último.
SummaryResumen
The Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of Cartago resolved an appeal against a conviction for violation of electronic communications (Article 196 bis of the Criminal Code). The accused had accessed and disclosed messages from his wife's phone, alleging jealousy and infidelity. The appeal raised three grounds: (1) that jealousy constituted self-defense of honor or a state of violent emotion, (2) that a family conciliation agreement extinguished both criminal and civil actions, and (3) that the harm to the other communicant and moral damages were not substantiated. The court rejected the first ground: jealousy is neither a generic mitigating factor nor an exclusion of culpability for this crime; self-defense requires an actual or imminent unlawful aggression, which was absent, and the concept of "man's honor" is incompatible with the legal system. Regarding the second ground, it confirmed that the family conciliation does not extinguish criminal action, but it does produce res judicata over the civil claim, thus revoking the award to the wife. On the third ground, it annulled the civil award for moral damages to the other communicant due to insufficient reasoning, ordering a retrial on that issue. The criminal conviction remained intact.El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago resolvió un recurso contra una condena por violación de comunicaciones electrónicas (artículo 196 bis del Código Penal). El acusado había revisado y divulgado mensajes del teléfono de su esposa, alegando celos e infidelidad. La apelación planteó tres motivos: (1) que los celos configuraban legítima defensa del honor o un estado de emoción violenta, (2) que un acuerdo de conciliación de familia extinguía la acción penal y civil, y (3) que no se fundamentó la afectación al otro comunicante ni el daño moral. El tribunal rechazó el primer motivo: los celos no son atenuante genérica ni excluyente de culpabilidad en este delito; la legítima defensa exige agresión ilegítima actual o inminente, inexistente aquí, y el concepto de “honor del hombre” es incompatible con el ordenamiento jurídico. Respecto al segundo motivo, confirmó que la conciliación familiar no extingue la acción penal, pero sí produce cosa juzgada sobre la acción civil resarcitoria, por lo que revocó la indemnización a la esposa. En cuanto al tercer motivo, anuló la condena civil por daño moral al otro comunicante por insuficiente fundamentación, ordenando reenvío para nuevo debate. La condena penal se mantuvo firme.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In this regard, it must be clearly stated concerning jealousy or any other emotional state that may cause a psychological disturbance affecting the inhibitory brakes of the acting subject (state of violent emotion), that the Costa Rican legislator has not provided for them as a generic mitigating factor, that is, applicable to any criminal offense. On the contrary, the Criminal Code has opted to accept such factors as grounds for reducing the sentence, but only with respect to specific offenses in the special part of the Code (for example, in Articles 113 and 127 of the Criminal Code). [...] Furthermore, in this particular case, the objective requirements imposed by the justification of self-defense, according to the criteria clearly outlined in Article 28 of the Criminal Code and the doctrine and jurisprudence that inform it, are not met. [...] The right to privacy of communications holds constitutional rank, as established by the fundamental law of our country in its Article 24. [...] Based on this systematic legal framework, it would be openly disproportionate if, where the law has not authorized the limitation of the privacy of communications except in cases of serious forms of crime, the conduct of a husband who violates such a fundamental right of his spouse, due to circumstances that exacerbated his jealousy, were to be authorized, justified, excused, or considered non-punishable and excusable in criminal proceedings.En este sentido debe indicarse con claridad sobre los celos u otro estado emocional que pueda ocasionar una alteración psíquica que afecte los frenos inhibitorios del sujeto actuante (estado de emoción violenta), que el legislador costarricense no los ha previsto como una atenuante genérica, o sea, aplicable para cualquier tipo penal. Por el contrario, en el Código Penal se tomó partido por aceptar dichos factores como causales para la disminución de la pena, pero únicamente respecto de tipos penales específicos de la parte especial del Código (por ejemplo, en los artículo 113 y 127 del Código Penal). [...] Tampoco se cumplen en este caso particular los requisitos objetivos que impone la causal de justificación de la legítima defensa, según los criterios claramente trazados por el artículo 28 del Código Penal, así como por la doctrina y la jurisprudencia que lo informan. [...] El derecho a la privacidad de las comunicaciones posee rango constitucional, tal como lo establece la Ley fundamental de nuestro país en su artículo 24. [...] Partiendo de este marco jurídico sistemático, resultaría abiertamente desproporcionado que ahí donde la ley no ha autorizado la limitación de la privacidad de las comunicaciones sino en casos de formas de delincuencia graves, se viniera a autorizar, justificar, exculpar o considerar como no punible y excusable en sede penal el comportamiento de un marido que vulnera tal derecho fundamental de su cónyuge, por el hecho de que actuó movido por una circunstancia o situación que exacerbó sus celos.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El legislador costarricense no los ha previsto como una atenuante genérica, o sea, aplicable para cualquier tipo penal."
"The Costa Rican legislator has not provided for them as a generic mitigating factor, that is, applicable to any criminal offense."
Considerando II
"El legislador costarricense no los ha previsto como una atenuante genérica, o sea, aplicable para cualquier tipo penal."
Considerando II
"No cabe la invención de supuestos bienes jurídicos por parte de ninguno de los sujetos del proceso."
"The invention of purported legal interests by any party to the proceedings is not permissible."
Considerando II
"No cabe la invención de supuestos bienes jurídicos por parte de ninguno de los sujetos del proceso."
Considerando II
"El derecho a la privacidad de las comunicaciones posee rango constitucional."
"The right to privacy of communications holds constitutional rank."
Considerando II
"El derecho a la privacidad de las comunicaciones posee rango constitucional."
Considerando II
"Resultaría abiertamente desproporcionado que ahí donde la ley no ha autorizado la limitación de la privacidad de las comunicaciones sino en casos de formas de delincuencia graves, se viniera a autorizar, justificar, exculpar o considerar como no punible y excusable en sede penal el comportamiento de un marido que vulnera tal derecho fundamental de su cónyuge."
"It would be openly disproportionate if, where the law has not authorized the limitation of the privacy of communications except in cases of serious forms of crime, the conduct of a husband who violates such a fundamental right of his spouse were to be authorized, justified, excused, or considered non-punishable and excusable in criminal proceedings."
Considerando II
"Resultaría abiertamente desproporcionado que ahí donde la ley no ha autorizado la limitación de la privacidad de las comunicaciones sino en casos de formas de delincuencia graves, se viniera a autorizar, justificar, exculpar o considerar como no punible y excusable en sede penal el comportamiento de un marido que vulnera tal derecho fundamental de su cónyuge."
Considerando II
Full documentDocumento completo
**Documento PJEDITOR** **110018650345PE** C/: [Name [Name1]] Of/: [Name [Name2]] and another D/: Violation of Electronic Communications Res: 2015-792 Cartago Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal, second section. At sixteen hours and eight minutes on November thirtieth, two thousand fifteen.
Appeal of criminal sentence filed in this case against [Name [Name1]], [...], for the crime of Violation of Electronic Communications, to the detriment of [Name [Name2]] and another. Judges Gustavo Chan Mora, [Name3], and Jorge Arturo Rojas Fonseca participate in the decision of the appeal. Appearing in the appeal were Attorney [Name4] as private defense counsel for the accused and [Name5] representing the Public Prosecutor's Office.
**Whereas:**
1. That through judgment No. 669-2014 at sixteen hours and fifty-six minutes on September eighth, two thousand fourteen, the Cartago Trial Court resolved: "THEREFORE: In accordance with articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 1, 11, 12, 30, 45, 50, 51, 71, 72, 73, 74, and 196 bis of the Criminal Code in force at the date of the facts; articles 1 to 15, 142, 145, 180 to 184, 324 to 340, 341, 343, 349 to 354, 356, 358, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, and 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this Court declares the defendant [Name [Name1]] responsible as the perpetrator of the crime of VIOLATION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS committed to the detriment of [Name [Name2]] and [Name [Name6]] and in that capacity imposes a penalty of 6 MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT, which he shall serve in the place and manner indicated by penitentiary regulations, after crediting any preventive detention served, if any. Since the convicted person meets the requirements established by law in articles 59 and 60 of the Criminal Code and the penalty imposed permits it, he is granted the Benefit of Conditional Execution of the Sentence for a period of THREE YEARS, during which the convicted person may not commit intentional crimes punishable by a penalty of more than six months of imprisonment; otherwise, this benefit will be revoked. Once this judgment becomes final, register it with the Judicial Registry and certify the necessary documents to be sent to the Sentence Execution Court and the National Institute of Criminology. Based on articles 1045 of the Civil Code, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 134, 135 and 137 of the Current Rules on Civil Liability of 1941, article 70 of the Criminal Procedure Code, article 196 bis of the criminal code in force at the date of the facts, the civil action for damages filed by [Name [Name2]] and [Name [Name6]] in their capacity as direct victims, and exercised through their legal representative [Name7], is granted, sentencing [Name [Name1]] to the payment of the following amounts: in the case of both victims, since both requested a sentence for moral damages, each is granted the sum of two and a half million colones for a total of FIVE MILLION COLONES. For personal costs, in accordance with articles 16, 38 and 42 of the fee decree 36562-JP, [Name [Name1]] is ordered to pay the sum of TWO MILLION COLONES, since in addition to the civil action, the complaint for a publicly prosecutable offense was filed, where Attorney [Name8] also represents the two complaining victims herein. All the above sums of money must be deposited within the next fifteen days from the date the judgment becomes final. For the full reading of the judgment, it is scheduled for sixteen hours on September sixteenth, two thousand fourteen. Notify. Msc. [Name9]. Criminal Judge, Cartago Criminal Court." (sic)
2. That against the preceding ruling, Attorney [Name4] filed the appeal.
3. That having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of article 466 of the Criminal Procedure Code, amended by Law 8837 published on December ninth, two thousand eleven (Creation of the Sentence Appeal), the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.
4. That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.
Drafted by Judge [Name10]; and, **Considering:** I.- The first ground is filed for defects in reasoning and failure to apply the rules of sound rational criticism in the assessment of evidence. The appellant alleges that the conviction judgment did not consider that the defendant encountered a situation of infidelity on the part of his wife and suggests that the Trial Court erred in not considering the jealousy with which he reacted as a ground for justification. The appellant's arguments, in summary, revolve around that central idea and the indicators of that infidelity (calls from another person—her ex-lover or lover—to his wife), to conclude that the accused's conduct, taking his wife's phone and gaining knowledge of the information contained therein, was due to that behavior of his spouse and the jealousy it aroused in him. He adds to this effect that the Court made no effort to assess the altered emotional state of the defendant, as he himself narrated, which moved him to check the phone, driven by those actual factors of infidelity to which reference has been made. He suggests along these lines that the accused's action was carried out in legitimate defense of his honor and his family against the illegitimate aggression of his wife and that, according to the parameters of legitimate defense, or in its case of an excess, this would stem from an excitement or disturbance that the circumstances would allow to be excused, it being impossible to demand that he behave differently. The second ground of the appeal is filed due to disagreement with the legal assessment of the conciliation in family court. In summary, on this point, the appellant understands that conciliation is an institution created for conflict resolution and that the Alternative Dispute Resolution Law, in its article 9, establishes that its completion generates res judicata. In this regard, the appellant maintains that through the conciliation carried out by the defendant and the victim in family court, a series of considerations primarily of a patrimonial nature were agreed upon, and it was also agreed that they thereby waived the collection of damages that may have been caused during the marriage. From the existence of such an agreement, the appellant suggests that it would have effects on the criminal matter and also derives that the civil action filed by the aggrieved party was inadmissible, and that the Court disregarded such a conciliatory agreement. He therefore requests that what was resolved regarding the civil action for damages be declared null and void. The third ground is titled as a lack of reasoning regarding the objective and subjective imputation against the complainant and civil plaintiff [[Name11]]. The defense attorney considers that the trial court did not explain how the accused violated the privacy of [[Name11]]'s communications if he never manipulated or viewed his phone and the information stored on [[Name12]]'s phone was under her responsibility and control and she was the one who could delete them, publish them, or even show them. The conclusion that [[Name11]]'s divorce was a product of the defendant's action was also not reasoned, when his wife indicated that the cause of such separation was another (suspicions of infidelity of [[Name11]] with [[Name12]]).
II.- The first ground of the appeal cannot be entertained. First of all, it must be indicated that, contrary to what the defense claims, based on the joint analysis of the evidence (from the statement of the defendant himself, and the witnesses listed in the appealed judgment), it was possible to demonstrate that the defendant indeed found out that the person who at that time was his wife exchanged telephone messages with [[Name11]] (folio 305 of the judgment). However, neither that circumstance, nor even that his ex-spouse had a clandestine romantic relationship with this latter person, have the legally relevant effects or relevance that the appellant wants to assign to them, as a factor generating a state of violent emotion or as a ground for justification, in relation to the criminal wrong committed by the defendant by violating the private communications of the victim [[Name12]], as established by article 196 bis of the Criminal Code, in force at the time of the events. What the appellant does with his claim, in reality, is to enunciate supposed errors of reasoning, actually non-existent, in order to oppose the substantive conclusions made by the Court regarding the justification and other defenses or mitigating factors of criminal liability already argued since the trial. Expressed in other terms, no defects in reasoning are observed, nor any impact on the rules of sound rational criticism in the contested ruling (neither does the appellant identify them, nor does this Appeals Chamber detect any error of that nature), but rather the defense attorney improperly refers to those supposed defects to actually attack a substantive consideration of the trial court with which he disagrees: precisely, that in this particular case, the existence or not of those messages, and even of a conjugal infidelity, would not justify the objectively and subjectively typical behavior of the defendant. In this sense, it must be clearly indicated regarding jealousy or another emotional state that may cause a psychological disturbance affecting the inhibitory brakes of the acting subject (state of violent emotion), that the Costa Rican legislator has not provided for them as a generic mitigating factor, that is, applicable to any criminal type. On the contrary, the Criminal Code opted to accept such factors as grounds for reducing the penalty, but only with respect to specific criminal types in the special part of the Code (for example, in articles 113 and 127 of the Criminal Code). The defense counsel's argument in this sense overlooks this objective framework, clearly established in the Costa Rican legal system. Nor does a mere state of violent emotion fit under the assumptions of unimputability or diminished imputability (exclusions of criminal culpability) since these are due to the existence of mental illnesses or serious disorders of consciousness, whether of biological or non-biological origin, and not to mere jealousy; the latter issue (that of incapacity for culpability) which, in any case, has neither been alleged by the defense nor accredited in this case through the rigorous forensic expert examinations. This being so, that emotional state to which the defense attorney alludes lacks relevance (by the Costa Rican legislator's own decision) to mitigate the penalty for the crime of violation of correspondence or electronic communications for which the defendant was tried and convicted, even under the assumption of a real betrayal or infidelity. Nor are the objective requirements imposed by the justification ground of legitimate defense met in this particular case, according to the criteria clearly outlined by article 28 of the Criminal Code, as well as by the doctrine and case law that inform it. Firstly, it must be indicated that the protection of legitimate defense or necessary defense (as it is known in other latitudes) finds its basis in the principle that no one is obliged to tolerate what is unjust, so that, given the impossibility of the State coming to aid, authorization is granted so that whoever sees a right or legal right of which they are the holder affected, or even that of a third party, defends it against an illegitimate aggression that represents a current or imminent danger to them. That defensive action must be reasonable, in the sense of being suitable (adequate to achieve the defensive objective) and necessary (it must be the least harmful mechanism available to the acting subject to effectively repel that aggression). While it is true that for this particular justification, a balancing judgment is not required (even legal rights of greater value can be sacrificed to safeguard others of lesser importance), the truth is that the indicated requirements must necessarily be analyzed promptly, without forgetting also that the invention of supposed legal rights by any of the subjects of the process is not permitted. In this latter sense, first of all, the concept of "honor" that the appellant handles in his argument that the defendant's conduct was protected by the aforementioned justification ground must be rejected, for the simple reason that such meaning is not only openly archaic (the sullied honor of the man or male) and recalls past eras in which to defend that "man's honor," his power to beat his wife was even recognized; but also because such an meaning of honor finds no protection in the Costa Rican legal system, besides the fact that it is in open contradiction with international law mechanisms (for example, the Belém do Pará Convention) provided to prevent any form of discrimination or violence against women. Apart from the foregoing, in any case, neither the legitimate defense of that supposed legal right, nor that of a "right to the family," can be accepted unless the demands or objective requirements for this justification ground to operate are met. Among those requirements, as has been seen, there must be an illegitimate aggression, materialized as a current or imminent human action, which never occurred in this case, since, as derived from the defendant's own deposition (folios 284 to 28), his illicit behavior, of checking his spouse's phone and then disseminating the information found therein, occurred because he saw messages arrive on it, and from the jealousy caused by seeing that she at some time exchanged glances with [Name [Name6]], even days before his illicit behavior, and never as a product of an illegitimate aggression against him. Even setting aside the non-existence in this case of an illegitimate human aggression, it must be added that the accused's illicit action also does not possess the attributes of reasonableness demanded by article 28 cited above. The means (the typical action) used to repel an illegitimate aggression must be suitable and necessary for that purpose. In this sense, again as inferred from the accused's own statement (folios 282 to 288), and as the trial court stated (folio 304), the action of the justiciable was executed only with the objective of calming his jealousy (an aspect which, as already seen, lacks criminal relevance in this case as a defense or mitigating factor) and finally to pre-constitute evidence for the eventual divorce process he filed, and not as a suitable means (adequate, pertinent) to defend those supposed threatened rights. Much less does the requirement of necessity of the means used (the violation of private communications) for that purpose concur, since if it is understood that for this, one must resort to the least harmful or drastic mechanism available against the legal right being sacrificed (in this case the privacy of private communications), it can clearly be derived that the accused always had at his disposal other less harmful means (dialogue, for example) in order to safeguard his family, without having to violate the privacy of his ex-spouse's private communications. Added to what was reasoned in this regard by the trial judge, from a subjective dimension it must be added that from what was stated by the defendant, a defensive intent on his part is never inferred, that is, that the defendant's knowledge and will were oriented towards exercising any defensive action, but rather to achieve those other illegitimate objectives to which reference has been made. Finally, the thesis of an excess in defense cannot be accepted either because this is actually a form of error of prohibition (indirect), in which the perpetrator carries out an action that does not have the attribute of necessity previously explained, under the mistaken consideration that it does possess it, an error on which, in any case, no evidence whatsoever is appreciated that supports its existence. Neither was that excess, that form of indirect error of prohibition, nor that it was due to an excusable disturbance, given the circumstances mentioned previously, accredited. While article 29 of the Criminal Code establishes that the excess (the error of prohibition regarding the necessity of the means used) is non-punishable if it is the product of a disturbance that the circumstances made excusable, in this specific case it must be considered that the defendant acted motivated by circumstances that caused him jealousy which, from the perspective of this Appeals Chamber, did not make his actions excusable, since he could and should have reacted differently (asking his wife, dialoguing with her, observing her reactions to the questions), other than violating her private communications. The right to privacy of communications has constitutional rank, as established by the fundamental Law of our country in its article 24: “The right to intimacy, freedom, and secrecy of communications is guaranteed. Private documents and written, oral, or any other type of communications of the inhabitants of the Republic are inviolable. However, the law, whose approval and amendment shall require the votes of two-thirds of the Deputies of the Legislative Assembly, shall establish in which cases the Courts of Justice may order the seizure, registration, or examination of private documents, when it is absolutely indispensable to clarify matters submitted to their knowledge. Likewise, the law shall determine in which cases the Courts of Justice may order any type of communication to be intervened and shall indicate the crimes in whose investigation the use of this exceptional power may be authorized and for how long. It shall also indicate the responsibilities and sanctions incurred by officials who illegally apply this exception. Judicial rulings supported by this norm must be reasoned and may be executed immediately. Their application and control shall be the non-delegable responsibility of the judicial authority. The law shall establish the cases in which competent officials of the Ministry of Finance and the Comptroller General of the Republic may review accounting books and their annexes for tax purposes and to supervise the correct use of public funds. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total number of Deputies, shall determine which other bodies of the Public Administration may review the documents that said law indicates in relation to the fulfillment of their regulatory and surveillance powers to achieve public purposes. Likewise, it shall indicate in which cases such review proceeds. Correspondence that is stolen, nor information obtained as a result of the illegal intervention of any communication, shall produce legal effects.” It is, as can be seen, a fundamental right, of capital importance in the context of a liberal democracy, for whose restriction or limitation the approval of a law by two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly is required, in which case, as is well known, it has been legislated that this authorization for restriction only proceeds regarding extremely serious crimes. Based on this systematic legal framework, it would be openly disproportionate that where the law has not authorized the limitation of the privacy of communications except in cases of serious forms of crime, the behavior of a husband who violates this fundamental right of his spouse should be authorized, justified, exculpated, or considered as non-punishable and excusable in criminal court, for the fact that he acted moved by a circumstance or situation that exacerbated his jealousy. For this reason, those of us who concur in issuing this appeal ruling consider that it should not be accepted as non-punishable or excusable a weakening or violation of said fundamental right, also protected in numeral 196 bis of the Criminal Code, due to disturbances moved, provoked, by feelings such as jealousy. So, neither was that form of error (regarding the necessity of the illicit action undertaken) accredited, nor are we facing an assumption of non-punishability due to perturbations of the accused that the circumstances made excusable, so as not to demand that he behave in accordance with the law. For all the foregoing, the first ground of the defense appeal is denied.
III.- The second ground of the appeal must be partially granted. For the adequate resolution of this ground, the consequences generated by a conciliatory agreement agreed upon in another material jurisdiction (family, for example) must be separated regarding the criminal action on one hand and, on the other hand, in relation to the civil action for damages that was heard in this criminal court. Regarding that first dimension, the appellant's claim that such an agreement can generate res judicata over the criminal action must be dismissed, for two precise reasons: 1.- Firstly, because Law 7727 or the Law on Alternative Dispute Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace, in its article 2, clearly establishes that the mediation and conciliation mechanisms provided for therein are for the resolution of conflicts or divergences of a patrimonial nature and, therefore, do not generate extinctive effects on the criminal action: “Resolution of patrimonial differences. Every person has the right to resort to dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and other similar techniques, to solve their patrimonial differences of an available nature.” 2.- Secondly, because when contrasting that form of conciliation provided for in numeral 9 of the law cited by the defender in his appeal, and article 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this latter numeral has an attribute of specialty, based on which the application of that other norm is displaced. Put another way, the provisions in the conciliation norms of that law do not apply in relation to the criminal action, since in this matter there is a specific regulation of conciliation via article 36 of the Code of Procedure cited. That conciliatory divorce agreement to which the appellant refers, therefore, as inferred from the cited articles and their connection with numerals 30 subsection k) and 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code, does not generate an extinctive effect on the criminal action. Regarding that extreme, therefore, the defense's argument does not prosper. Now, what must be conceded to the challenger is that the conciliatory agreement agreed upon between [[Name13]] and [[Name12]], which was approved in family court, has a very clear and well-defined patrimonial content, which generates effects in relation to the civil action for damages filed in criminal court. Indeed, as stated in folios 182 to 183 and 186 to 189, before the Family Court of Cartago, a conciliation was held for the dissolution of the matrimonial bond, which was approved by that jurisdictional entity by resolution at fourteen hours and twenty minutes on February first, two thousand ten, that is, after the events adjudicated and from which the extra-contractual civil liability of the defendant was derived. In what is of capital relevance, it must be highlighted that, both in the content of the conciliatory agreement and in the judgment through which it was approved, it literally states (folio 189) that upon settling Mr. [Name [Name1]] and Mrs. [Name [Name2]] “Further, they waive the collection of damages that may have been caused during the marriage” (emphasis added); that is, they expressly agreed on a topic of patrimonial content, waiving any collection or claim for compensation on those specific points. This express waiver of the collection of damages has res judicata effects on the civil action for damages filed in criminal court. This is so since article 220 of the Civil Procedure Code establishes: “Effects. Conciliatory agreements approved by the judge shall produce res judicata. Their compliance shall proceed through the judgment execution process”; this coinciding with what is established in numeral 9 of the Law for Alternative Dispute Resolution cited above: “Judicial and Extrajudicial Agreements. Judicial conciliation agreements, once approved by the judge, and extrajudicial ones, shall have authority and efficacy of material res judicata and shall be immediately enforceable.” So the discussion regarding any divergence of a patrimonial nature, related to damages caused during the marriage -and those caused as a consequence of the execution of the adjudicated crime were- was closed by the express and voluntary waiver of the parties, which acquired the character of res judicata through the judicial approval alluded to. The foregoing, however, was not taken into account by the trial judge when granting the civil action for damages in the case of Mrs. [Name [Name2]] and ordering compensation of two and a half million colones for moral damages in her favor. This decision was issued at the cost of ignoring that waiver of the collection of damages agreed by the parties, which has the character of res judicata. Therefore, this argument of the second ground of the defense appeal must be partially granted and, consequently, this part of the judgment must be revoked and, in its place, for the reason noted, the civil action for damages filed by [[Name12]] must be denied.
IV.- The appeal is partially granted. The existence of flaws in the argumentation regarding the existence and determination of moral damages in relation to [[Name11]] is declared. Regarding this subject, the civil action for damages filed on his behalf was granted, declaring the existence of moral damage and the respective duty of compensation based on the following arguments: 1.- The intrusion of the defendant into [[Name12]]'s communications, despite not having been done on the former's phone, also affected his intimacy and his private life, because the messages were a private communication between both, without either giving authorization to anyone to disclose them. 2.- Because the defendant brought those messages to the knowledge of [[Name11]]'s wife, which generated consequences for his marriage. 3.- Because there is a causal relationship between the defendant's illicit action and the damage to intimacy caused to them. 4.- Based on the foregoing, the existence of moral damage to the victim was determined, for whose compensation the amount of two and a half million colones was set. The determination of this compensatory amount was based on the following reasoning: “Now then, the Court proceeds to assess the amounts to be compensated taking into account the personal aspects of the defendant, who is an employee of a private institution, who has two daughters who depend on him, considering the sentence to pay the following amounts proportionate (…)” (folios 316 and 317). Regarding those arguments, it must be indicated that the appellant is not correct when he states that the trial judicial chamber did not explain how [[Name11]]'s intimacy was violated if his phone was never viewed. Such an affirmation is false, since the judgment clarified that the communications the accused illicitly learned of had been exchanged by both, that is, by [[Name12]] and by [[Name11]], from which it is inferred that they were both the holders of the right to privacy of such communications. This ownership of the right to privacy of (electronic) communications derives from the fact that both were the intercommunicating subjects of such messages, for which it is irrelevant who was the owner of the phone, or that they were viewed on the latter's device.
In any communication of a private nature (whether electronic or not), each of the subjects who participate in it holds the right to its privacy; therefore, whoever discloses such information affects the right of all who participate, regardless of who is the owner of the device accessed by the perpetrator of the illicit act to unlawfully learn the information contained therein. Certainly, the telephone was under the responsibility and control of [[Nombre12]] but, again, this is irrelevant to the analysis of the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) because, despite this, it was not an action of hers, but an unlawful act (acción ilícita) of the accused that affected such right, such protected legal interest, by learning and disclosing the messages found there. On the other hand, it is also false that there was no adequate reasoning regarding the causal link existing between the unlawful act of the accused and the divorce of [Nombre [Nombre6]] (an aspect that was analyzed for purposes of moral damages (daño moral)), since the intellectual reasoning of the judgment addresses that point. The appellant errs again in his affirmations, given that this latter subject's own wife indicated entirely the opposite: "[Nombre [Nombre1]] sent me the messages on September 17, 2009 (...) and I remember it well because that is why I got divorced (...)", thereby, through that testimony, as well as that of [Nombre [Nombre6]] himself, the causal link between the committed crime and the alleged moral damages of the civilly affected party was demonstrated. Regarding these aspects, therefore, the appellant's claims must be dismissed. Notwithstanding the foregoing, deficiencies and gaps in argumentation are indeed evident regarding the delimitation and estimation of moral damages. Moral damages cannot be presumed by any judge of the Republic; rather, they must be inferred, and it must be expressly explained, from the evidentiary elements duly submitted in trial. It is based on said evidence that it had to be demonstrated, for this specific case, what the suffering or pain inflicted upon [Nombre [Nombre6]] by the unlawful act of the accused consisted of, as it could be appreciated, both because his intimacy was affected and because that illicit act was the original cause of his divorce, taken into account for the respective weighting since this was by mutual consent of the parties, as indicated in the analysis of the trial judgment dedicated to the civil action for damages (folio 315). The existence of such moral damages must be supported by a clear explanation of what such suffering consisted of, to then derive the amount for which it must be indemnified. However, the civil part of the judgment never sufficiently explains in what way [[Nombre11]] suffered, nor what consequences arose from the infringement of his intimacy or from his divorce, so as to provoke such suffering, eventually constituting moral damages of a subjective nature, as a direct consequence of the imprudent unlawful action executed by the person named as the accused in this case. Moral damages must be supported by evidence in an adequate descriptive reasoning of the same, but it must also be sustained in a proper intellectual reasoning of that evidence, in order to finally proceed to the pecuniary valuation thereof. It is therefore necessary to distinguish that, for the accreditation of the existence of moral damages, any lawful evidentiary element may be considered, including the declaration of the civilly affected party itself, but that such testimony must be analyzed in a complete manner, through the argumentation requirements imposed by the system of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional). Once the existence of that damage has been demonstrated, the respective amount that corresponds for it must be weighted, that is, it must be fixed. Even though the judge has the power to prudentially fix the amount to be indemnified for moral damages without the appointment of an expert being required for this purpose, as has been reiterated on repeated occasions in the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber (see for example the Criminal Cassation Judgment 1803 of December 16, 2009) and of the First Chamber (for example, one may also consult Voto number 170 of March 4, 2008, issued by that high court), that valuation cannot be done capriciously; rather, it must be based on an adequate analysis and explanation of the information provided by the evidentiary elements to carry out such weighting, that is, explaining, based on said evidence, what were, for example, the sufferings, alterations to daily life, and deprivations suffered by the civilly affected party as a consequence, in this case, of the crime that harmed his intimacy and originally generated a divorce finally agreed upon by mutual consent. Regarding this exercise of argumentation, there are evident gaps in the appealed judgment, which warrant declaring this extreme ineffective and ordering remittal (reenvío) for a new debate on this aspect. Therefore, the first ground of the defense's appeal is dismissed, whereby the conviction (sentencia condenatoria), in its criminal dimension, remains unassailable. The second ground of the defense's appeal is partially granted, whereby, given the existence of res judicata (cosa juzgada) regarding any claim for indemnification for damages (daños y perjuicios), the civil judgment against the defendant in favor of [Nombre [Nombre2]] is revoked. The third ground of the defense's appeal is granted. The existence of reasoning defects is declared regarding the declaration and pecuniary determination of moral damages in favor of [Nombre [Nombre6]], by virtue of which the ineffectiveness of this extreme of the judgment is ordered, and remittal is ordered for a new proceeding (sustanciación). The resolution regarding the second and third grounds of the appeal has a direct impact on the calculation of personal procedural costs (costas personales) in this matter, such that it is also appropriate to order the ineffectiveness of that extreme of the appealed judgment and to order remittal for a new calculation thereof.
Por tanto
The first ground of the defense's appeal is dismissed, whereby the conviction, in its criminal dimension, remains unassailable. The second ground of the defense's appeal is partially granted, whereby, given the existence of res judicata regarding any claim for indemnification for damages, the civil judgment against the defendant issued in favor of [Nombre [Nombre2]] is revoked. The third ground of the defense's appeal is partially granted. Consequently, the existence of reasoning defects is declared regarding the existence and pecuniary determination of moral damages in favor of [Nombre [Nombre6]], by virtue of which the ineffectiveness of this extreme of the judgment is decreed, and remittal is ordered for a new proceeding. The resolution regarding the second and third grounds of the appeal has a direct impact on the calculation of personal procedural costs in this matter, such that it is also appropriate to declare the ineffectiveness of that extreme of the appealed judgment and to order remittal for a new calculation thereof. Let it be notified.
[Nombre14] CED1 [Nombre15] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A CED2 [Nombre16] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A CED3 JORGE ARTURO ROJAS FONSECA - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A In this latter sense, first of all the concept of “honor” wielded by the appellant in his argument that the accused's conduct was covered by the cited justification ground must be rejected, for the simple reason that such meaning is not only openly archaic (the besmirched honor of the man or male) and recalls bygone eras in which, to defend that “man’s honor,” even his authority to strike his wife was recognized; but also because such an understanding of honor finds no protection whatsoever in the Costa Rican legal system, besides being in clear opposition to international law mechanisms (for example, the Convención de Belem do Pará) designed to prevent any form of discrimination or violence against women. Apart from the foregoing, in any case, neither the self-defense (legítima defensa) of that supposed legal interest, nor that of a “right to the family,” can be accepted unless the objective demands or requirements for this justification ground to operate are present. Among those requirements, as has been seen, there must be an illegitimate aggression, materialized as a current or imminent human action, which never occurred in this case, since, as derived from the accused’s own testimony (folios 284 to 28), his unlawful conduct, of checking his spouse’s phone and then disseminating the information found therein, occurred as a consequence of seeing messages arrive on it, and from the jealousy caused by seeing that she had on some occasion exchanged glances with [Name [Nombre6]], even days before his unlawful conduct, and never as the result of an illegitimate aggression against him. Even setting aside the nonexistence in this case of an illegitimate human aggression, it must be added that the accused’s unlawful action also lacks the attributes of reasonableness required by Article 28 cited above. The means (the typical action) used to repel an illegitimate aggression must be suitable and necessary for that purpose. In this sense, again as inferred from the accused’s own statement (folios 282 to 288), and as set forth by the a quo (folio 304), the justiciable’s action was not carried out except with the objective of calming his jealousy (an aspect which, as already seen, lacks criminal relevance in this case as an exemption or mitigating factor) and ultimately to pre-constitute evidence for the eventual divorce proceedings he filed, and not as a suitable (appropriate, pertinent) means to defend those supposedly threatened rights. Much less is the requirement of necessity of the means used (the violation of private communications) for that purpose met, since if it is understood that for this one must resort to the least harmful or drastic available mechanism regarding the legal interest sacrificed (in this case the privacy of private communications), it can clearly be derived that the accused always had at his disposal other less harmful means (dialogue, for instance) for the purpose of safeguarding his family, without having to violate the privacy of his ex-spouse’s private communications. In addition to what was reasoned on the matter by the trial judge, from a subjective dimension it must be added that from what the defendant stated, a defensive intent on his part is never inferred, that is, that the justiciable’s knowledge and will were oriented toward the exercise of any defensive action, but rather toward achieving those other illegitimate objectives to which reference has been made. Finally, the thesis of an excess in defense (exceso en la defensa) cannot be accepted either, because this is actually a form of error of prohibition (indirect), in which the perpetrator carries out an action that lacks the attribute of necessity previously explained, under the mistaken belief that it does possess it, an error regarding which, in any case, no evidentiary element whatsoever is observed that might support its existence. Neither was that excess, that form of indirect error of prohibition, accredited, nor that it was due to an excusable disturbance, given the circumstances that have been previously mentioned. Although Article 29 of the Penal Code establishes that the excess (the error of prohibition regarding the necessity of the means employed) is not punishable if it results from a disturbance that the circumstances made excusable, in this specific case it must be considered that the accused acted driven by circumstances that provoked jealousy which, from the perspective of this Court of Appeals, did not render his conduct excusable, since he could and should have reacted in another way (asking his wife, dialoguing with her, observing her reactions to questions), different from the violation of her private communications. The right to privacy of communications holds constitutional rank, as established by our country’s fundamental Law in its Article 24: “ The right to privacy, to freedom and to the secrecy of communications is guaranteed. Private documents and the written, oral or any other type of communications of the inhabitants of the Republic are inviolable. However, the law, whose approval and reform shall require the votes of two thirds of the Deputies of the Legislative Assembly, shall establish in which cases the Courts of Justice may order the seizure, search or examination of private documents, when it is absolutely indispensable to clarify matters submitted to their cognizance. Likewise, the law shall determine in which cases the Courts of Justice may order that any type of communication be intercepted and shall indicate the crimes in whose investigation the use of this exceptional power may be authorized and for how long. It shall also indicate the responsibilities and sanctions to which officials who illegally apply this exception shall be subject. Judicial decisions covered under this rule must be reasoned and may be executed immediately. Their application and control shall be a non-delegable responsibility of the judicial authority. The law shall establish the cases in which the competent officials of the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic may review accounting books and their attachments for tax purposes and to supervise the correct use of public funds. A special law, approved by two thirds of the total Deputies, shall determine which other Public Administration bodies may review the documents that that law indicates in relation to the fulfillment of their regulatory and supervisory competences to achieve public purposes. Likewise, it shall indicate in which cases such review is appropriate. Correspondence that is improperly obtained and information obtained as a result of the illegal interception of any communication shall produce no legal effects.” It is, as can be seen, a fundamental right, of paramount importance within the context of a liberal democracy, for whose restriction or limitation the approval of a law by two thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly is required, in which case, as is well known, it has been legislated that this authorization for restriction only applies to extremely serious crimes. Based on this systematic legal framework, it would be openly disproportionate that, where the law has not authorized the limitation of the privacy of communications except in cases of serious forms of crime, the conduct of a husband who violates this fundamental right of his spouse would be authorized, justified, exculpated or considered non-punishable and excusable in criminal court, due to the fact that he acted driven by a circumstance or situation that exacerbated his jealousy. For that reason, those of us concurring in the issuance of this appeal ruling consider that a weakening or violation of said fundamental right, also protected under Article 196 bis of the Penal Code, should not be accepted as non-punishable or excusable due to disturbances moved, provoked, by feelings such as jealousy. Thus, neither was that form of error (regarding the necessity of the illegal action undertaken) accredited, nor are we before a case of non-punishability due to disturbances of the accused that the circumstances made excusable, so as not to require him to behave in accordance with the law. Based on all the foregoing, the first ground of the defense’s appeal is declared without merit.
III.- The second ground of the appeal must be declared partially with merit. For the proper resolution of this ground, the consequences generated by a conciliation agreement (acuerdo conciliatorio) agreed upon in another material jurisdiction (family, for instance) must be distinguished regarding the criminal action on one hand and, on the other, in relation to the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) that was heard in this criminal venue. Regarding that first dimension, the appellant’s claim that such agreement may create res judicata (cosa juzgada) over the criminal action must be dismissed, for two specific reasons: 1.- First, because Law 7727 or Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace Law, in its Article 2, clearly establishes that the mediation and conciliation mechanisms provided therein are for the solution of conflicts or divergences of a patrimonial nature and, therefore, do not generate extinctive effects on the criminal action: “Solution of patrimonial differences. Every person has the right to resort to dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and other similar techniques, to solve their patrimonial differences of an available nature.” 2.- Second, because when contrasting that form of conciliation provided for in Article 9 of the law cited by the defense counsel in his appeal, and Article 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this latter article has the attribute of specialty, based on which the application of that other rule is displaced. Stated differently, what is set forth in the conciliation rules of that law does not apply in relation to the criminal action, because in this matter there is a specific regulation of conciliation through Article 36 of the cited procedural Code. That divorce conciliation agreement to which the appellant refers, therefore, as inferred from the cited articles and their connection with Articles 30 subsection k) and 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code, does not generate an extinctive effect on the criminal action. Regarding that aspect, therefore, the defense’s argument does not prevail. However, what reason must be granted to the appellant on is that the conciliation agreement agreed upon between [[Nombre13] ] and [[Nombre12] ], which was approved in family court, has a very clear and well-defined patrimonial content, which generates effects in relation to the civil action for damages filed in criminal court. Indeed, as shown on folios 182 to 183 and 186 to 189, before the Family Court of Cartago a conciliation was held for the dissolution of the marital bond, which was approved by that jurisdictional body by means of a ruling at fourteen hours and twenty minutes on February first, 2010, that is, subsequent to the facts adjudicated and from which the defendant's extra-contractual civil liability was derived. In what is of cardinal relevance, it must be highlighted that, both in the content of the conciliation agreement and in the judgment by which it was approved, it is literally recorded (folio 189) that upon settling, Mr. [Name [Nombre1]] and Mrs. [Name [Nombre2]] “Furthermore, they waive the collection of damages that may have been caused during the marriage” (bold is added); that is, they expressly agreed upon a matter of patrimonial content, waiving any collection or claim for compensation regarding those specific aspects. This express waiver of the collection of damages has res judicata effects over the civil action for damages filed in criminal court. This is so since Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Code establishes: “Effects. The conciliation agreements approved by the judge shall produce res judicata. Their enforcement shall proceed through the judgment execution process”; this coinciding with what is set forth in Article 9 of the Alternative Conflict Resolution Law cited above: “Judicial and extrajudicial agreements Judicial conciliation agreements once approved by the judge, and extrajudicial ones, shall have the authority and efficacy of material res judicata and shall be immediately enforceable.” Thus, the discussion about any divergence of a patrimonial nature, related to damages caused during the marriage —and those caused as a consequence of the commission of the crime adjudicated were such— was closed by the express and voluntary waiver of the parties, which acquired the character of res judicata through the judicial approval to which allusion was made. The foregoing, however, was not taken into account by the a quo judge upon declaring the civil action for damages with merit for the case of Mrs. [Name [Nombre2]] and upon ordering in her favor compensation of two million five hundred thousand colones for moral damages (daño moral). This decision was issued at the cost of disregarding that waiver of the collection of damages agreed upon by the parties, which possesses the character of res judicata. Based on the foregoing, this argument of the second ground of the defense’s appeal must be declared partially with merit and, consequently, this aspect of the judgment must be revoked and, in its stead, for the reason noted, the civil action for damages filed by [[Nombre12] ] must be declared without merit.
IV.- The appeal is declared partially with merit. The existence of reasoning defects regarding the existence and determination of moral damages in relation to [[Nombre11] ] is declared. Regarding this subject, the civil action for damages filed in his favor was declared with merit, declaring the existence of moral damage and the respective duty of compensation based on the following arguments: 1.- The accused’s intrusion into the communications of [[Nombre12] ], despite not having been done on his phone, also affected his privacy and his private life, because the messages were a private communication between both, without either giving authorization to anyone to divulge them. 2.- Because the defendant brought those messages to the attention of [[Nombre11] ]’s wife, which generated consequences in his marriage. 3.- Because there is a causal relationship between the accused’s unlawful action and the damage to their privacy it caused. 4.- Based on the above, the existence of moral damage to the aggrieved party was determined, for whose compensation the amount of two million five hundred thousand colones was set. The setting of this compensation amount was supported by the following reasoning: “ Now then, the Court proceeds to appraise the amounts to be compensated taking into account the personal aspects of the accused, who is an employee of a private institution, who has two daughters who depend on him, considering proportional the sentence to pay the following amounts (...)” (folios 316 and 317). Regarding those arguments, it must be stated that the appellant is incorrect when he asserts that the a quo judicial body did not explain in what manner the privacy of [[Nombre11] ] was violated if his phone was never examined. Such assertion is false, since the judgment clarified that the communications the accused unlawfully became aware of had been initiated by both, that is, by [[Nombre12] ] and by [[Nombre11] ], from which it is inferred that it was the two of them who held the right to privacy of such communications. That ownership of the right to privacy of (electronic) communications stems from the fact that both were the intercommunicating subjects of such messages, for which it is irrelevant who owned the phone, or that they were viewed on the latter’s device. In every communication of a private nature (whether electronic or not), each of the subjects who participate in it holds the right to its privacy, so whoever divulges such information affects the right of all who participate, regardless of who owns the device the perpetrator of the unlawfulness accesses to illegally become aware of the information contained therein. Certainly the phone was under the responsibility and control of [[Nombre12] ] but, again, this is irrelevant for the analysis of the civil action for damages because despite this, it was not an action by her, but an unlawful action by the accused that affected such right, such protected legal interest, upon learning of and divulging the messages found therein. Moreover, it is also not true that there was no adequate reasoning on the causal link between the defendant’s unlawful act and the divorce of [Name [Nombre6]] (an aspect that was analyzed for the purposes of moral damage), since the intellectual reasoning of the judgment addresses that point. Again, the appellant errs in his assertions, since this latter individual’s own wife stated quite the contrary: “ [Name [Nombre1]] passed me the messages on September 17, 2009 (...) and I remember it well because that is why I got divorced (...)”, thus, through both that testimony and that of [Name [Nombre6]] himself, the causal link between the committed crime and the allegedly aggrieved civil party’s moral damage was demonstrated. Regarding those aspects, therefore, the appellant’s complaints must be declared without merit. Notwithstanding the above, what does reveal deficiencies and gaps in reasoning is the definition and estimation of the moral damage. Moral damage cannot be supposed by any judge of the Republic, but must be inferred, and must be expressly explained, from the evidentiary elements duly presented at trial. It is on the basis of said evidence that it should have been demonstrated, for this specific case, in what the accused’s unlawful conduct consisted, how it could be seen that it generated suffering or pain for [Name [Nombre6]], as a consequence thereof, both because his privacy was affected, and also because that unlawful act was the primary cause of his divorce, taken into account for the respective weighing, considering that regarding this, mutual consent of the parties mediated, as stated in the analysis of the trial judgment dedicated to the civil action for damages (folio 315). The existence of that moral damage must be supported by a clear explanation of what that suffering consisted of, in order to then derive the amount for which it must be compensated. However, the civil part of the judgment never sufficiently explains in what manner [[Nombre11] ] suffered, nor what consequences were entailed by the affectation of his privacy or by his divorce, so as to cause such suffering, potentially shaping subjective moral damage, as a direct consequence of the imprudent unlawful action carried out by the person appearing as the accused in this cause. Moral damage must be supported by evidence in an adequate descriptive reasoning thereof, but must also be sustained by proper intellectual reasoning of that evidence, in order to finally proceed to its pecuniary assessment. A distinction must therefore be drawn: for the accreditation of the existence of moral damage, any lawful evidentiary element may be considered, including the civilly affected party’s own statement, but said testimony must be analyzed in a complete manner, through the reasoning demands imposed by the system of sound rational criticism. Once the existence of that damage has been demonstrated, the respective amount corresponding for it must be weighed, that is, set. Although the judge has the power to set, in a prudential manner, the amount to be compensated for moral damage without requiring the appointment of an expert for that purpose, as has been repeatedly reiterated in the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber (see for instance Criminal Cassation Sentence 1803 of December 16, 2009) and of the First Chamber (for example, one may also consult ruling number 170 of March fourth, 2008, issued by that high court), that assessment cannot be carried out arbitrarily, but must be supported by an adequate analysis and explanation of the information provided by the evidentiary elements to perform such weighing, that is, explaining based on such evidence what were, for instance, the sufferings, disruptions to daily life, and privations suffered by the civilly affected party as a consequence, in this case, of the crime that injured his privacy and primarily generated a divorce ultimately agreed upon by mutual consent. Regarding this exercise in reasoning, there are evident gaps in the appealed judgment, which warrant declaring this aspect ineffective and ordering a remand for a new hearing on this point. Thus, the first ground of the defense’s appeal is declared without merit, so the judgment of conviction, in its criminal dimension, remains unaltered. The second ground of the defense’s appeal is declared partially with merit, so that, given the existence of res judicata in relation to any claim for compensation for damages, the civil condemnation of the defendant in favor of [Name [Nombre2]] is revoked. The third ground of the defense’s appeal is declared partially with merit. The existence of reasoning defects is declared regarding the declaration and pecuniary setting of moral damage in favor of [Name [Nombre6]], by virtue of which the ineffectiveness of this aspect of the judgment is ordered and a remand for a new proceeding is directed. What has been decided in relation to the second and third grounds of the appeal has a direct impact on the calculation of the personal legal costs in this matter, so the ineffectiveness of that aspect of the appealed judgment must also be ordered and a remand for a new calculation thereof is directed.
Por tanto
The first ground of the defense’s appeal is declared without merit, so the judgment of conviction, in its criminal dimension, remains unaltered. The second ground of the defense’s appeal is declared partially with merit, so that, given the existence of res judicata in relation to any claim for compensation for damages, the civil condemnation of the defendant issued in favor of [Name [Nombre2]] is revoked. The third ground of the defense’s appeal is declared partially with merit. Consequently, the existence of reasoning defects is declared regarding the existence and pecuniary setting of moral damage in favor of [Name [Nombre6]], by virtue of which the ineffectiveness of this aspect of the judgment is decreed and a remand for a new proceeding is ordered. What has been decided in relation to the second and third grounds of the appeal has a direct impact on the calculation of the personal legal costs in this matter, so the ineffectiveness of that aspect of the appealed judgment must also be declared and a remand for a new calculation thereof is ordered.
Notify.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span>[Nombre14]</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span><span> </span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:432pt; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:154.5pt; padding:2.25pt 2.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span> </span></p></td><td style="width:267pt; padding:2.25pt 2.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT; font-size:8pt">CED1</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT">[Nombre15]</span><span style="font-family:ArialMT; -aw-import:spaces">   </span><span style="font-family:ArialMT">- JUDGE</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT">DECISION-MAKER</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span><span> </span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:432pt; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:243pt; padding:2.25pt 2.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT; font-size:8pt">CED2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT">[Nombre16]</span><span style="font-family:ArialMT; -aw-import:spaces">   </span><span style="font-family:ArialMT">-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT">JUDGE DECISION-MAKER</span></p></td><td style="width:178.5pt; padding:2.25pt 2.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT; font-size:8pt">CED3</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT">JORGE ARTURO ROJAS FONSECA -</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:ArialMT">JUDGE DECISION-MAKER</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p></div></body></html> Among those requirements, as has been seen, there must be an illegitimate aggression, materialized as a current or imminent human action, which never occurred in this case, since, as is derived from the accused's own deposition (folios 284 to 28), his illicit behavior, of checking his spouse's phone and then divulging the information found there, occurred as a consequence of seeing messages arriving on it, and from the jealousy provoked by seeing that she exchanged glances on some occasion with [[Nombre1]</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">  </span><span>], even days before his illicit behavior, and never as a product of an illegitimate aggression against him. Even setting aside the nonexistence in this case of an illegitimate human aggression, it must be added that the accused's illicit action also does not possess the attributes of reasonableness required by Article 28 cited above. The means (the typical action) employed to repel an illegitimate aggression must be suitable and necessary for that purpose. In this sense, again as inferred from the accused's own statement (folios 282 to 288), and as set forth by the <span style="font-style:italic">a quo</span><span> (folio 304), the action of the justiciable was not executed except with the objective of calming his jealousy (an aspect which, as already seen, lacks criminal relevance in this case as an exonerating or mitigating factor) and finally to pre-constitute evidence for the eventual divorce proceeding he filed, and not as a suitable (adequate, pertinent) means to defend those supposedly threatened rights. Much less does the requirement of necessity of the means used (the violation of private communications) concur for that purpose, since if it is understood that for this end one must resort to the available mechanism least harmful or drastic to the legal right sacrificed (in this case the privacy of private communications), it can clearly be derived that the accused always had at his disposal other less harmful means (dialogue, for example) for the purpose of safeguarding his family, without having to violate the privacy of his ex-spouse's private communications. In addition to what was reasoned in this regard by the trial judge, from a subjective dimension it must be added that from what was testified by the accused, no defensive intent on his part is ever inferred, that is, that the knowledge and will of the justiciable were oriented toward the exercise of any defensive action, but rather to achieve those other illegitimate objectives that have been referred to. Finally, the thesis of an excess in defense cannot be accepted either because this is in reality a form of (indirect) error of prohibition, in which the author carries out an action that does not have the attribute of necessity explained before, under the mistaken consideration that it does possess it, an error about which, in any case, no element of proof is observed that comes to support its existence. Neither was that excess, that form of indirect error of prohibition, accredited, nor that it was due to an excusable disturbance, given the circumstances that have been mentioned previously. Although Article 29 of the Penal Code establishes that excess (the error of prohibition regarding the necessity of the means employed) is not punishable if it is the product of a disturbance that the circumstances made excusable, in this specific case it must be considered that the accused acted moved by circumstances that provoked jealousy which, from the perspective of this Chamber of Appeals, did not make his acting excusable, since he could and should have reacted in another way (asking his wife, dialoguing with her, observing her reactions to the questions), different from the violation of her communications of a private nature. The right to the privacy of communications possesses constitutional rank, as established by the fundamental Law of our country in its Article 24: “<span style="font-style:italic">The right to intimacy, freedom, and secrecy of communications is guaranteed. Private documents and written, oral, or any other type of communications of the inhabitants of the Republic are inviolable. However, a law, whose approval and reform will require the votes of two-thirds of the Deputies of the Legislative Assembly, shall establish in which cases the Courts of Justice may order the seizure, search, or examination of private documents, when it is absolutely indispensable to clarify matters submitted to their knowledge. Likewise, the law shall determine in which cases the Courts of Justice may order the intervention of any type of communication and shall indicate the crimes in whose investigation the use of this exceptional power may be authorized and for how long. It shall also indicate the responsibilities and sanctions incurred by officials who illegally apply this exception. Judicial resolutions covered by this norm shall be reasoned and may be executed immediately. Their application and control shall be the non-delegable responsibility of the judicial authority. The law shall establish the cases in which the competent officials of the Ministry of Finance and the Comptroller General of the Republic may review accounting books and their annexes for tax purposes and to supervise the correct use of public funds. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total Deputies, shall determine which other Public Administration bodies may review the documents indicated by that law in relation to the fulfillment of their regulatory and oversight competencies to achieve public ends. Likewise, it shall indicate in which cases such review proceeds. Correspondence that has been stolen and information obtained as a result of the illegal intervention of any communication shall not produce legal effects.</span><span>” It is a matter, as can be appreciated, of a fundamental right, of capital importance in the context of a liberal democracy, for whose restriction or limitation the approval of a law by two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly is required, in which case, as is well known, it has been legislated that this authorization of restriction only proceeds regarding extremely serious crimes. Starting from this systematic legal framework, it would be openly disproportionate that where the law has not authorized the limitation of the privacy of communications except in cases of serious forms of crime, one would come to authorize, justify, exculpate, or consider as non-punishable and excusable in criminal proceedings the behavior of a husband who violates such a fundamental right of his spouse, by reason of having acted moved by a circumstance or situation that exacerbated his jealousy. For this reason, those of us who concur in issuing the present appeal judgment consider that a weakening or violation of said fundamental right, also protected in numeral 196 bis of the Penal Code, should not be accepted as non-punishable or excusable due to disturbances moved, provoked, by feelings such as jealousy. So that neither was that form of error (regarding the necessity of the illicit action undertaken) accredited, nor are we facing a case of non-punishability due to disturbances of the accused that the circumstances made excusable, so as not to require him to behave in accordance with the law. For all the foregoing, the first ground of the defense's appeal is declared without merit.
III.- The second ground of the appeal must be declared partially with merit. For the adequate resolution of this ground, the consequences generated by a conciliatory agreement agreed upon in another material jurisdiction (family, for example) must be delineated regarding the criminal action on one hand and, on the other hand, in relation to the civil action for damages that was heard in this criminal venue. Regarding that first dimension, the appellant's claim that such agreement can produce res judicata over the criminal action must be dismissed, for two precise reasons: 1.- Firstly because Law 7727 or the Law on Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace, in its Article 2, clearly establishes that the mediation and conciliation mechanisms provided therein are for the solution of conflicts or divergences of a patrimonial nature and, therefore, do not generate extintive effects on the criminal action: “Solution of patrimonial differences. Every person has the right to resort to dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and other similar techniques, to solve their patrimonial differences of a disposable nature.” 2.- Secondly, because when contraposing that form of conciliation provided in numeral 9 of the law cited by the defense counsel in his appeal, and Article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this latter numeral has an attribute of specialty, based on which the application of that other norm is displaced. Stated another way, the provisions in the conciliation norms of that law do not apply in relation to the criminal action, since in this matter there is a specific regulation of conciliation via Article 36 of the cited procedural Code. That conciliatory divorce agreement to which the appellant refers, therefore, as inferred from the cited articles and their connection with numeral 30 subsection k) and 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not generate an extintive effect on the criminal action. Regarding that point, therefore, the defense's allegation does not prosper. Now, what must be granted to the appellant is that the conciliatory agreement agreed upon between [Name [Name3]] and [Name [Name4]], which was homologated in family court, has a very clear and well-defined patrimonial content, which generates effects in relation to the civil action for damages filed in criminal court. Indeed, as recorded from folios 182 to 183 and 186 to 189, before the Family Court of Cartago a conciliation was held for the dissolution of the marital bond, which was homologated by that jurisdictional entity by resolution at fourteen hours and twenty minutes on February first, 2010, that is, subsequent to the facts judged and from which the extra-contractual civil liability of the accused was derived. In what is of capital relevance, it must be emphasized that, both in the content of the conciliatory agreement and in the judgment by which it was homologated, it literally appears (folio 189) that when Mr. [Name [Name3]] and Mrs. [Name [Name4]] transacted “Furthermore they waive the collection of damages and losses that may have been caused during the marriage” (boldface added); that is, they expressly agreed on a matter of patrimonial content, waiving any charge or claim for compensation on those specific points. This express waiver of the collection of damages and losses has res judicata effects on the civil action for damages filed in criminal court. This is so since Article 220 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes: “Effects. Conciliatory agreements homologated by the judge shall produce res judicata. Their fulfillment shall be pursued through the sentence execution process”; this coinciding with what is set forth in numeral 9 of the Law on Alternative Conflict Resolution cited above: “Judicial and extrajudicial agreements. Judicial conciliation agreements, once homologated by the judge, and extrajudicial ones, shall have the authority and efficacy of material res judicata and shall be immediately enforceable.” So that the discussion regarding any divergence of a patrimonial nature, related to damages and losses caused during the marriage - and those caused as a consequence of the execution of the crime judged were so -, was closed by express and voluntary waiver of the parties, which acquired the character of res judicata through the judicial homologation referred to. The foregoing, however, was not taken into account by the a quo judge when declaring the civil action for damages with merit for the case of Mrs. [Name [Name4]] and when ordering in her favor compensation of two million five hundred thousand colones for moral damage. This decision was issued at the cost of overlooking that waiver of the collection of damages and losses agreed upon by the parties, which possesses the character of res judicata. For the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare this allegation of the second ground of the defense's appeal partially with merit and, consequently, it proceeds to revoke this point of the judgment and, in its place, for the reason noted, it is appropriate to declare without merit the civil action for damages filed by [[Name2] ].
IV.- The appeal is declared partially with merit. The existence of reasoning defects regarding the existence and fixing of moral damage in relation to [[Nombre1] ] is declared. In what corresponds to this subject, the civil action for damages filed in his favor was declared with merit, declaring the existence of moral damage and the respective duty of compensation based on the following arguments: 1.- The intrusion of the accused into the communications of [Name [Name4]], even though it was not done on his phone, also affected his intimacy and his private life, because the messages were a private communication between the two of them, without either giving authorization to anyone to divulge them. 2.- Because the accused brought those messages to the attention of the wife of [[Nombre1] ], which generated consequences in his marriage. 3.- Because there is a causal relationship between the illicit action of the accused and the damage to intimacy caused to them. 4.- Based on the foregoing, the existence of moral damage to the aggrieved party was determined, for whose compensation the amount of two million five hundred thousand colones was fixed. The fixing of this compensatory amount was supported by the following reasoning: “Now, the Court proceeds to assess the amounts to compensate taking into account the personal aspects of the accused, who is an employee of a private institution, who has two daughters who depend on him, considering proportional the sentence to pay the following amounts (...)” (folios 316 and 317). Regarding those arguments, it must be indicated that the appellant is not correct when he affirms that the a quo judicial Chamber did not explain in what way the intimacy of [Name [Name5]] was violated if his phone was never observed. Such an affirmation is false, since in the judgment it was clarified that the communications of which the accused unlawfully took notice had been engaged in by both, that is, by [Name [Name4]] and by [Name [Name5]], from which it is inferred that the two of them were the holders of the right to privacy of such communications. That ownership of the right to privacy of (electronic) communications derives from the fact that both were the intercommunicating subjects of such messages, for which it lacks relevance who the owner of the phone was, or that they were viewed on the device of the latter. In every communication of a private nature (whether electronic or not), each of the subjects who participate in it are holders of the right to privacy of the same, such that whoever divulges such information affects the right of all who participate, independently of who the owner of the device is that the perpetrator of the illegality accesses to take illegal notice of the information contained therein. Certainly the phone was under the responsibility and control of [[Name2] ] but, again, this lacks relevance for the analysis of the civil action for damages because despite this it was not an action of hers, but an illicit action of the accused that affected such right, such protected legal right, by knowing and divulging the messages that were found there. On the other hand, it is also not true that there was no adequate substantiation regarding the causal link existing between the illicit action of the accused and the divorce of [[Nombre1] ] (an aspect which was analyzed for the purposes of moral damage) since the intelectual substantiation of the judgment addresses that point. Again the appellant errs in his affirmations, since this latter subject's own wife indicated exactly the opposite: “[ [Name6] ] passes the messages to me on September 17, 2009 (...) and I remember it well because that is why I got divorced (…)”, whereby, both through that testimony and through that of [[Nombre1] ] himself, the causal link between the crime committed and the supposed moral damage to the civilly affected party was demonstrated. Regarding those aspects, therefore, the appellant's claims must be declared without merit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, what deficiencies and gaps in argumentation are observed is regarding the delimitation and estimation of moral damage. Moral damage cannot be supposed by any judge of the Republic, but rather must be inferred, and must be expressly explained as such, from the elements of proof duly presented at trial. It is based on such evidence that it had to be demonstrated, for this specific case, in what it consisted, how it could be appreciated, that the illicit acting of the accused generated suffering or pain for [Name [Name5]], as a consequence thereof, both because his intimacy was affected, and also because said illegality was the primeval cause of his divorce, taken into account for the respective weighting which, regarding this, mediated mutual consent of the parties, as indicated in the analysis of the trial judgment dedicated to the civil action for damages (folio 315). The existence of that moral damage must be supported by a clear explanation of in what such suffering consisted, in order to then derive the amount for which it must be compensated. However, it is never sufficiently explained in the civil part of the judgment in what way [Name [Name5]] suffered, nor what consequences were entailed by the affectation of his intimacy or by his divorce, so as to provoke such suffering, eventually configurative of moral damage of a subjective nature, as a direct consequence of the negligent illicit action executed by the one who figures as accused in this cause. Moral damage must be supported by evidence and adequate descriptive substantiation of the same, but it must also be sustained by adequate intelectual substantiation of that evidence, in order to finally proceed to its pecuniary valuation. It is pertinent to distinguish then that for the accreditation of the existence of moral damage, any element of licit proof may be considered, including the own statement of the civilly affected party, but that said testimony must be analyzed completely, through the argumentative requirements imposed by the system of rational sound criticism. Once the existence of that damage is demonstrated, it must be weighed, that is, the respective amount that corresponds for it must be fixed. Although the judge has powers to fix in a prudential manner the amount to compensate for moral damage without requiring the appointment of an expert for this purpose, as has been reiterated on repeated occasions in the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber (see for example the Criminal Cassation Judgment 1803 of December 16, 2009) and of the First Chamber (for example, one may also consult vote number 170 of March 4, 2008 issued by that high court), that valuation cannot be carried out in a capricious manner, but rather must be supported by an adequate analysis and explanation of the information provided by the elements of proof to carry out such weighting, that is, explaining based on such evidence what were, for example, the sufferings, alterations to daily life, and privations suffered by the civilly affected party as a consequence, in this case, of the crime that harmed his intimacy and primordially generated a divorce finally agreed upon by mutual consent. Regarding this argumentative exercise, there are evident gaps in the appealed judgment, which merit declaring the ineffectiveness of this point and ordering a remand for a new hearing on this aspect. Thus, the first ground of the defense's appeal is declared without merit, so the condemnatory judgment, in its criminal dimension, remains unaltered. The second ground of the defense's appeal is declared partially with merit, so that, given the existence of res judicata in relation to any claim for compensation for damages and losses, the civil condemnation of the defendant in favor of [Name [Name4]] is revoked. The third ground of the defense's appeal is declared with merit. The existence of substantiation defects is declared regarding the declaration and pecuniary fixing of moral damage in favor of [Name [Name5]], by virtue of which the ineffectiveness of this point of the judgment is ordered and a remand for a new proceeding is ordered. What is resolved in relation to the second and third grounds of the appeal has a direct incidence on the calculation of personal costs in this matter, so it also proceeds to order the ineffectiveness of that point of the appealed judgment and orders a remand for a new calculation of the same.
C/: [Name [Name1]] Of/: [Name [Name2]] and another D/: Violation of Electronic Communications Res: 2015-792 Cartago Criminal Sentence Appeals Court, Section Two. At sixteen hours and eight minutes on November thirtieth, two thousand fifteen.
Appeal of criminal sentence filed in the present case against [Name [Name1]], for the crime of Violation of Electronic Communications, to the detriment of [Name [Name2]] and another. Judges Gustavo Chan Mora, [Name3], and Jorge Arturo Rojas Fonseca participate in the decision of the appeal. Appearing in the appeal were licensed attorney [Name4] as private defense counsel for the accused and [Name5] representing the Public Prosecutor's Office.
**Resultando**:
**1.** That by judgment No. 669-2014 at sixteen hours fifty-six minutes on September eighth, two thousand fourteen, the Cartago Trial Court resolved: "***POR TANTO***: *Pursuant to Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 1, 11, 12, 30, 45, 50, 51, 71, 72, 73, 74, and 196 bis of the Penal Code in force at the date of the facts; Articles 1 to 15, 142, 145, 180 to 184, 324 to 340, 341, 343, 349 to 354, 356, 358, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court declares the accused [Name [Name1]] guilty as the responsible author of the crime of* ***VIOLATION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS*** *committed to the detriment of [Name [Name2]] and [Name [Name6]] and in such character imposes the penalty of* ***6 MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT***, *to be served in the place and manner indicated by penitentiary regulations, after crediting any pretrial detention served. As the convicted person meets the requirements established by law in Articles 59 and 60 of the Penal Code and since the imposed sentence allows it, the Benefit of Conditional Execution of Sentence is granted for a period of THREE YEARS, within which the convicted person shall not commit intentional crimes punishable by a penalty greater than six months of imprisonment; otherwise, this benefit shall be revoked. Once this judgment is final, it shall be registered with the Judicial Registry and the necessary certified copies shall be issued to be sent to the Sentence Execution Court and the National Institute of Criminology. Based on Articles 1045 of the Civil Code, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 134, 135 and 137 of the Current Rules on Civil Liability of 1941, Article 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 196 bis of the penal code in force at the date of the facts, the civil action for damages brought by [Name [Name2]] and [Name [Name6]] in their capacity as direct offended parties, and exercised through their legal representative [Name7], is declared well-founded, ordering the payment of the following amounts: in the case of both offended parties, as both requested a punitive award for moral damage, each is granted the sum of two million five hundred thousand colones for a total of FIVE MILLION COLONES. For the concept of personal costs, in accordance with Articles 16, 38 and 42 of Fee Decree 36562-JP, [Name [Name1]] is ordered to pay the sum of TWO MILLION COLONES, as in addition to the civil action, the private prosecution for a public crime was exercised, in which licensed attorney [Name8] also represents the two offended complaining parties here. All the aforementioned sums of money must be deposited within the next fifteen days from the date the judgment becomes final. For the integral reading of the judgment, the date is set for sixteen hours on September sixteenth, two thousand fourteen. Notify. Msc. [Name9]. Criminal Trial Judge of the Cartago Criminal Court.*" (sic)
**2.** That against the preceding pronouncement, licensed attorney [Name4] filed the corresponding appeal.
**3.** That upon completing the respective deliberation in accordance with Article 466 of the Criminal Procedural Code, reformed by Law 8837 published on December ninth, two thousand eleven (Creation of the Criminal Sentence Appeal), the Court addressed the questions raised in the appeal.
**4.** That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed.
Judge [Name10] drafts this opinion, and; **Considering:** **I.- The first ground is filed for defects in reasoning and failure to apply the rules of sound rational criticism in the assessment of the evidence.** The appellant alleges that the conviction judgment did not take into consideration that the accused encountered a situation of infidelity on the part of his wife and suggests that the trial court erred by not considering the jealousy with which he reacted as a defense (causal de justificación). The appellant's arguments, in summary, revolve around that central idea and the indicators of that infidelity (calls from another person -her ex-lover or lover- to his wife), concluding that the accused's conduct, in taking his wife's phone and gaining knowledge of the information contained therein, was due to that behavior of his spouse and the jealousy that arose in him as a result. In this regard, he adds that the Court made no effort to assess the altered emotional state of the accused, as he himself narrated it, which moved him to check the phone, driven by those real factors of infidelity already mentioned. He suggests along these lines that the accused's action was carried out in self-defense (legítima defensa) of his honor and his family against the illegitimate aggression of his wife, and that, according to the parameters of a self-defense, or in its case an excess, this would stem from an excitement or disturbance that the circumstances would allow to be excused, it being impossible to demand that he behave differently. **The second ground of the appeal is filed due to disagreement with the legal assessment of the conciliation (conciliación) in family court.** In sum, on this point, the appellant understands that conciliation is an institution created for dispute resolution and that the Alternative Dispute Resolution Law, in its Article 9, establishes that its completion generates res judicata. Regarding this, the appellant maintains that with the conciliation carried out by the accused and the offended party in family court, a series of mutual considerations of a mainly patrimonial nature were agreed upon, and it was also agreed that they thereby waived the collection of damages that might have been caused during the marriage. From the existence of such an agreement, the appellant suggests that it would have effects on the criminal matter and also derives that the civil action filed by the aggrieved party was improper, and that the Court disregarded said conciliation agreement. He therefore requests that what was resolved regarding the civil compensatory action be declared null. **The third ground is entitled for absence of reasoning in relation to the objective and subjective imputation against the plaintiff and private prosecutor [[Name11]].** The defense attorney considers that the court *a quo* did not explain how the accused violated the privacy of communications of [[Name11]] if he never manipulated or observed his phone and the information stored on [[Name12]]'s phone was under her responsibility and control, and it was she who could delete, publish, or even show them. Nor was the conclusion substantiated that the divorce of [[Name11]] was a product of the accused's action, when his spouse indicated that the cause of such separation was different (suspicions of infidelity of [[Name11]] with [[Name12]]).
**II.- The first ground of the appeal cannot be upheld.** First of all, it must be stated that, contrary to what the defense claims, based on the joint analysis of the evidentiary elements (from the statement of the accused himself, and the witnesses that appear in the appealed judgment), it was possible to demonstrate that the accused indeed found out that the person who was his wife at the time exchanged telephone messages with [[Name11]] (folio 305 of the judgment). However, neither that circumstance, nor even that his ex-spouse had a clandestine love affair with this latter person, have the legal effects or relevance that the appellant wishes to assign to them, as a factor generating a state of violent emotion or as a defense, in relation to the criminal offense committed by the accused when he violated the private communications of the offended party [[Name12]], as established by Article 196 bis of the Penal Code, in force at the time of the facts. What the appellant does with his claim, in reality, is to state supposed errors in reasoning, actually nonexistent, in order to oppose the substantive conclusions made by the Court regarding the defense and other exculpatory or mitigating circumstances of criminal responsibility already alleged since the trial. Put in other terms, no defects in reasoning are observed, nor any affectation of the rules of sound rational criticism in the challenged ruling (neither does the appellant identify them, nor does this Chamber of Appeals detect any error of that nature); rather, the defense attorney improperly refers to those supposed defects to actually attack a substantive consideration of the *a quo* that he does not share: precisely, that in this particular case, the existence or not of those messages, and even of marital infidelity, would not justify the objectively and subjectively typical behavior of the accused. In this sense, it must be clearly indicated regarding jealousy or another emotional state that may cause a psychological alteration affecting the inhibitory brakes of the acting subject (state of violent emotion), that the Costa Rican legislator has not provided for them as a ***generic mitigating circumstance***, that is, applicable to any criminal type. On the contrary, the Penal Code opted to accept such factors as grounds for reducing the sentence, but only regarding specific criminal types in the special part of the Code (for example, in Articles 113 and 127 of the Penal Code). The defense's argument in this sense overlooks this objective framework, clearly drawn in the Costa Rican legal system. Nor does a mere state of violent emotion fall under the assumptions of unimputability or diminished imputability (excluding criminal blameworthiness), as these are due to the existence of mental illnesses or serious disorders of consciousness, whether of biological or non-biological origin, and not to mere jealousy; the latter topic (that of incapacity for blameworthiness) which, in any case, has neither been alleged by the defense nor proven in the present case through the requisite forensic expert examinations. That being so, that emotional state to which the defense attorney alludes lacks relevance (by the Costa Rican legislator's own decision) to mitigate the sentence regarding the crime of violation of correspondence or electronic communications for which the defendant was tried and convicted, even under the assumption of a betrayal or infidelity of a real nature. Nor are the objective requirements met in this particular case that the defense of self-defense imposes, according to the criteria clearly drawn by Article 28 of the Penal Code, as well as by the doctrine and jurisprudence that inform it. In the first place, it must be indicated that the protection of self-defense or necessary defense (as it is known in other latitudes) finds its foundation in the principle that no one is obligated to tolerate what is unjust, so that, given the impossibility of the State coming to aid, an authorization is granted for someone whose right or legal interest of which they are the holder, or even that of a third party, is affected, to defend it against an illegitimate aggression that represents a current or imminent danger to them. That defensive action must be reasonable, in the sense of being suitable (adequate to achieve the defensive objective) and necessary (it must be the least harmful mechanism available to the acting subject to effectively repel that aggression). While it is true that for this particular defense a balancing judgment is not required (even legal interests of greater value can be sacrificed to safeguard others of lesser importance), the truth is that the requirements mentioned must necessarily be analyzed punctually, without forgetting also that the invention of supposed legal interests by any of the subjects of the process is not permissible. In this latter sense, first of all, the concept of "honor" used by the appellant in his argument that the accused's conduct was protected by the mentioned defense must be rejected, for the simple reason that such meaning is not only openly archaic (the tarnished honor of the male man) and recalls past eras when, to defend that "man's honor," even his power to beat his wife was recognized; but also because such an understanding of honor finds no protection in the Costa Rican legal system, besides the fact that it stands in stark contradiction to the international law mechanisms (for example, the Belém do Pará Convention) provided to prevent any form of discrimination or violence against women. Aside from the foregoing, in any case, neither the self-defense of that supposed legal interest, nor that of a "right to a family," can be accepted if the requirements or objective conditions for this defense to operate are not met. Among those requirements, as has been seen, there must be an illegitimate aggression, materialized as a current or imminent human action, which never occurred in this case, because as derived from the accused's own deposition (folios 284 to 28), his unlawful behavior, checking his spouse's phone and then disclosing the information found there, occurred as a consequence of seeing messages come in on it, and the jealousy caused by seeing that she exchanged glances with [Name [Name6]] on some occasion, even days before his unlawful behavior, and never as a product of an illegitimate aggression against him. Even setting aside the non-existence in this case of an illegitimate human aggression, it must be added that the accused's unlawful action also does not possess the attributes of reasonableness required by Article 28 cited above. The means (the typical action) used to repel an illegitimate aggression must be suitable and necessary for that purpose. In this sense, again as inferred from the accused's own statement (folios 282 to 288), and as the *a quo* stated (folio 304), the defendant's action was executed only with the objective of calming his jealousy (an aspect which, as already seen, lacks criminal relevance in this case as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance) and finally to pre-constitute evidence for the eventual divorce proceeding he initiated, and not as a suitable means (adequate, pertinent) to defend those supposedly threatened rights. Much less does the requirement of necessity of the means used (the violation of private communications) concur for that purpose, because if it is understood that for this, one must resort to the least harmful or drastic available mechanism regarding the legal interest being sacrificed (in this case, the privacy of private communications), it can clearly be derived that the accused always had other, less harmful means at his disposal (dialogue, for example) in order to safeguard his family, without having to violate the privacy of his ex-spouse's private communications. Added to what the trial judge reasoned in this regard, from a subjective dimension it must be added that from what the defendant stated, a defensive intent on his part is never inferred; that is, that the defendant's knowledge and will were oriented towards the exercise of any defensive action, but rather towards achieving those other illegitimate objectives that have been referenced. Finally, the thesis of an excess in defense cannot be accepted either, because this is actually a form of mistake of law (indirect), in which the author carries out an action that does not have the attribute of necessity explained above, under the mistaken consideration that it does possess it, an error for which, in any case, no evidentiary element is observed to support its existence. Neither was that excess, that form of indirect mistake of law, proven, nor that it was due to an excusable disturbance, given the circumstances mentioned previously. Although Article 29 of the Penal Code establishes that the excess (the mistake of law regarding the necessity of the means used) is not punishable if it is the product of a disturbance that the circumstances made excusable, in this specific case it must be noted that the accused acted moved by circumstances that caused him jealousy which, from the perspective of this Chamber of Appeals, did not make his action excusable, since he could and should have reacted differently (asking his wife, dialoguing with her, observing her reactions to the questions), in a way distinct from violating her communications of a private nature. The right to privacy of communications holds constitutional rank, as established by the fundamental Law of our country in its Article 24: "*The right to intimacy, freedom, and secrecy of communications is guaranteed. Private documents and written, oral, or any other type of communications of the inhabitants of the Republic are inviolable. However, a law, whose approval and reform shall require the votes of two-thirds of the Deputies of the Legislative Assembly, shall determine in which cases the Courts of Justice may order the seizure, search, or examination of private documents, when it is absolutely indispensable to clarify matters submitted to their knowledge. Likewise, the law shall determine in which cases the Courts of Justice may order the intervention of any type of communication and shall indicate the crimes in whose investigation the use of this exceptional power may be authorized and for how long. It shall also indicate the responsibilities and sanctions incurred by officials who apply this exception illegally. Judicial resolutions protected under this norm must be reasoned and may be executed immediately. Their application and control shall be the non-delegable responsibility of the judicial authority. The law shall determine the cases in which the competent officials of the Ministry of Finance and the General Comptroller of the Republic may review accounting books and their annexes for tax purposes and to supervise the correct use of public funds. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total Deputies, shall determine which other organs of the Public Administration may review the documents that said law indicates in relation to the fulfillment of their regulatory and oversight competences to achieve public purposes. It shall also indicate in which cases such review proceeds. Correspondence that is stolen and information obtained as a result of the illegal intervention of any communication shall not produce legal effects.*" It is, as can be seen, a fundamental right, of capital importance in the context of a liberal democracy, for whose restriction or limitation requires the approval of a law by two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly, in which case, as is well known, it has been legislated that this authorization for restriction only proceeds with respect to extremely serious crimes. Based on this systematic legal framework, it would be openly disproportionate if, where the law has not authorized the limitation of the privacy of communications except in cases of serious forms of crime, the behavior of a husband who violates such a fundamental right of his spouse were to be authorized, justified, exculpated, or considered non-punishable and excusable in the criminal sphere, due to the fact that he acted moved by a circumstance or situation that exacerbated his jealousy. For this reason, those of us concurring in the issuance of the present appeal ruling consider that a weakening or violation of said fundamental right, also protected in numeral 196 bis of the Penal Code, should not be accepted as non-punishable or excusable due to disturbances moved, provoked, by feelings such as jealousy. Therefore, neither was that form of error (regarding the necessity of the unlawful action undertaken) proven, nor do we find ourselves facing an assumption of non-punishability due to disturbances of the accused that the circumstances made excusable, so as not to require him to behave in accordance with the law. For all the foregoing reasons, the first ground of the defense's appeal is declared without merit.
**III.- The second ground of the appeal must be partially granted.** For the proper resolution of this ground, the consequences generated by a conciliation agreement (acuerdo conciliatorio) reached in another material jurisdiction (family, for example) must be distinguished regarding the criminal action on one hand and, on the other hand, in relation to the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) that was heard in this criminal venue. Regarding that first dimension, the appellant's claim that such an agreement could generate res judicata (cosa juzgada) over the criminal action must be dismissed, for two precise reasons: 1.- Firstly, because Law 7727 or the Law on Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace (Ley 7727 o Ley sobre la Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social), in its article 2, clearly establishes that the mediation and conciliation mechanisms provided for therein are for the solution of conflicts or divergences of a patrimonial nature and, therefore, do not generate extinctive effects on the criminal action: "Solution of patrimonial differences. Every person has the right to resort to dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and other similar techniques, to solve their patrimonial differences of a disposable nature." 2.- Secondly, because when contrasting that form of conciliation provided for in numeral 9 of the law cited by the defender in his appeal, and article 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), this last numeral has an attribute of specialty (especialidad), based on which the application of that other norm is displaced. Stated otherwise, the provisions of the conciliation norms of that law do not apply in relation to the criminal action, since in this matter there is a specific regulation of conciliation via article 36 of the referenced Procedural Code. That conciliation agreement for divorce to which the appellant refers, therefore, as inferred from the cited articles and their link with numerals 30 subsection k) and 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code, does not generate an extinctive effect on the criminal action. Regarding this point, therefore, the defense's argument does not prosper. Now, what must be conceded to the challenger is that the conciliation agreement agreed upon between [[Nombre13] ] and [[Nombre12] ], which was approved (homologado) in family court, has a very clear and well-defined patrimonial content, which generates effects in relation to the civil action for damages filed in criminal court. Indeed, as recorded on folios 182 to 183 and 186 to 189, a conciliation was held before the Family Court of Cartago for the dissolution of the marital bond, which was approved by that jurisdictional entity through a resolution at fourteen hours and twenty minutes on February first, two thousand ten, that is, after the events judged and from which the extra-contractual civil liability of the accused derived. In what is of capital relevance, it must be highlighted that, both in the content of the conciliation agreement and in the judgment by which it was approved, it literally states (folio 189) that upon settling, Mr. [Nombre [Nombre1]] and Mrs. [Nombre [Nombre2]] “Furthermore, they waive the collection of damages (daños y perjuicios) that may have been caused during the marriage” (bold added); that is, they expressly agreed upon a matter of patrimonial content, waiving any collection or claim for compensation on those specific points. This express waiver of the collection of damages has res judicata effects on the civil action for damages filed in criminal court. This is so since article 220 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) establishes: "Effects. Conciliation agreements approved by the judge shall produce res judicata. Their compliance shall be pursued through the judgment execution process"; this coinciding with what is established in numeral 9 of the Law for Alternative Conflict Resolution cited above: "Judicial and extrajudicial agreements. Judicial conciliation agreements once approved by the judge, and extrajudicial ones, shall have authority and efficacy of material res judicata and shall be immediately enforceable." Thus, the discussion on any divergence of a patrimonial nature, related to damages caused during the marriage—and those caused as a consequence of the execution of the crime judged were so—was closed by the express and voluntary waiver of the parties, which acquired the character of res judicata through the judicial approval alluded to. The foregoing, however, was not taken into account by the trial judge (jueza a quo) when declaring the civil action for damages admissible in the case of Mrs. [Nombre [Nombre2]] and ordering compensation of two and a half million colones for moral damages (daño moral) in her favor. This decision was issued at the cost of overlooking that waiver of the collection of damages agreed upon by the parties, which possesses the character of res judicata. For the reasons stated, it is appropriate to partially grant this argument of the second ground of the defense's appeal and, consequently, it is fitting to revoke this portion of the judgment and, in its place, for the reason noted, it is necessary to declare inadmissible the civil action for damages filed by [[Nombre12] ].
**IV.-** **The appeal is partially granted. The existence of reasoning defects (vicios de argumentación) is declared regarding the existence and determination of moral damages in relation to [[Nombre11] ]. ** Regarding this subject, the civil action for damages filed in his favor was declared admissible, declaring the existence of moral damages and the respective duty to compensate based on the following arguments: 1.- The accused's intrusion into the communications of [[Nombre12] ], despite not being done on his phone, also affected his privacy and his private life, because the messages were a private communication between both, without either giving anyone authorization to disclose them. 2.- Because the defendant brought those messages to the attention of the wife of [[Nombre11] ], which generated consequences for his marriage. 3.- Because there is a causal relationship between the illicit action of the accused and the damage to the privacy caused to them. 4.- Based on the foregoing, the existence of moral damages for the victim was determined, for whose compensation the amount of two and a half million colones was set. The determination of this compensatory amount was based on the following reasoning: “Now then, the Court proceeds to estimate the amounts to be compensated taking into account the personal aspects of the accused, who is an employee of a private institution, who has two daughters who depend on him, considering the sentence to pay the following amounts proportional (...)” (folios 316 and 317). Regarding these arguments, it must be stated that the appellant is not correct when he affirms that the trial chamber (Cámara judicial a quo) did not explain how the privacy of [[Nombre11] ] was violated if his phone was never examined. Such an affirmation is false, since the judgment clarified that the communications that the accused illicitly accessed had been established by both, that is, by [[Nombre12] ] and by [[Nombre11] ], from which it is inferred that the two of them were the holders of the right to the privacy of such communications. This ownership of the right to privacy of (electronic) communications arises from the fact that both were the intercommunicating subjects of such messages, for which it is irrelevant who was the owner of the phone, or that they were viewed on the latter's device. In any communication of a private nature (whether electronic or not), each of the subjects participating in it are holders of the right to its privacy, so whoever discloses such information affects the right of all participants, regardless of who owns the device the perpetrator of the unlawfulness accesses to illegally learn the information contained therein. Certainly, the phone was under the responsibility and control of [[Nombre12] ] but, again, this is irrelevant for the analysis of the civil action for damages because despite this, it was not an action by her, but an illicit action by the accused that affected such right, such protected legal interest, by learning and disclosing the messages contained therein. Moreover, it is also not true that there was no adequate reasoning on the causal link between the illicit action of the accused and the divorce of [Nombre [Nombre6]] (an aspect that was analyzed for purposes of moral damages) since the intellectual reasoning of the judgment addresses this point. The appellant again errs in his affirmations, since the wife of this latter subject indicated the complete opposite: “ [Nombre [Nombre1]] passes me the messages on September 17, 2009 (…) and I remember it well because that is why I got divorced (...)”, with which, both through that testimony and that of [Nombre [Nombre6]] himself, the causal link between the crime committed and the alleged moral damages of the civilly affected person was demonstrated. Regarding these aspects, therefore, the appellant's claims must be declared without merit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, what does show deficiencies and gaps in reasoning is regarding the delimitation and estimation of moral damages. Moral damages cannot be assumed by any judge of the Republic; rather, they must be inferred, and it must be expressly explained as such, from the elements of proof duly presented in the hearing. It is based on such evidence that it had to be demonstrated, for this specific case, what the suffering or pain consisted of, how it could be appreciated, that the illicit act of the accused generated for [Nombre [Nombre6]], as a consequence thereof, both because his privacy was affected, and also because that unlawfulness was the primary cause of his divorce, taken into account for the respective weighing regarding which there was mutual consent of the parties, as indicated in the analysis of the trial judgment dedicated to the civil action for damages (folio 315). The existence of that moral damage must be based on a clear explanation of what such suffering consisted of, to then derive the amount for which it must be compensated. However, it is never sufficiently explained in the civil part of the judgment in what way [[Nombre11] ] suffered, nor what consequences were entailed by the affectation of his privacy or by his divorce, so as to cause such suffering, eventually configuring moral damages of a subjective nature, as a direct consequence of the imprudent illicit action executed by the person named as the accused in this case. Moral damages must be supported by evidence in an adequate descriptive reasoning thereof, but must also be sustained by a proper intellectual reasoning of those pieces of evidence, in order to finally proceed to the pecuniary valuation thereof. It is pertinent to distinguish then that for proving the existence of moral damages, any lawful element of proof may be considered, including the declaration of the civilly affected person himself, but that such testimony must be analyzed completely, through the reasoning requirements imposed by the system of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional). Once the existence of that damage is demonstrated, the respective corresponding amount for it must be weighed, that is, must be set. Although the judge has powers to prudentially set the amount to be compensated for moral damages without requiring the appointment of an expert, as has been reiterated on repeated occasions in the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) (see for example Criminal Cassation judgment 1803 of December 16, 2009) and of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) (for example, vote number 170 of March four, two thousand eight issued by that high court can also be consulted), that valuation cannot be carried out arbitrarily, but must be based on an adequate analysis and explanation of the information provided by the elements of proof to perform such weighing, that is, explaining based on such evidence what were, for example, the suffering, alterations of daily life, and deprivations suffered by the civilly affected person as a consequence, in this case, of the crime that injured his privacy and primarily generated a divorce finally agreed upon by mutual consent. Regarding this exercise of reasoning, there are evident gaps in the appealed judgment, which warrant declaring the ineffectiveness of this point and ordering a remand (reenvío) for a new debate on this aspect. Thus, the first ground of the defense's appeal is dismissed, so the condemnatory judgment, in its criminal dimension, remains intact. The second ground of the defense's appeal is partially granted, so, given the existence of res judicata in relation to any claim for compensation for damages, the civil judgment against the defendant in favor of [Nombre [Nombre2]] is revoked. The third ground of the defense's appeal is granted. The existence of reasoning defects is declared regarding the declaration and pecuniary determination of moral damages in favor of [Nombre [Nombre6]], by virtue of which the ineffectiveness of this portion of the judgment is ordered and a remand for a new proceeding is mandated. What is resolved in relation to the second and third grounds of the appeal has a direct impact on the calculation of personal costs (costas personales) in this matter, so it is also fitting to order the ineffectiveness of that portion of the challenged judgment and mandate a remand for a new calculation thereof.
**Por tanto** The first ground of the defense's appeal is dismissed, so the condemnatory judgment, in its criminal dimension, remains intact. The second ground of the defense's appeal is partially granted, so, given the existence of res judicata in relation to any claim for compensation for damages, the civil judgment entered against the defendant in favor of [Nombre [Nombre2]] is revoked. The third ground of the defense's appeal is partially granted. Consequently, the existence of reasoning defects is declared regarding the existence and pecuniary determination of moral damages in favor of [Nombre [Nombre6]], by virtue of which the ineffectiveness of this portion of the judgment is decreed and a remand for a new proceeding is ordered. What is resolved in relation to the second and third grounds of the appeal has a direct impact on the calculation of personal costs in this matter, so it is also fitting to declare the ineffectiveness of that portion of the challenged judgment and order a remand for a new calculation thereof. Notify.
[Nombre14]
| CED1 [Nombre15] - JUDGE/A DECISION-MAKER/A | |
|---|---|
| CED2 [Nombre16] - JUDGE/A DECISION-MAKER/A | CED3 JORGE ARTURO ROJAS FONSECA - JUDGE/A DECISION-MAKER/A | |
Documento PJEDITOR *110018650345PE* C/:[Nombre [Nombre1]] Of/: [Nombre [Nombre2]] y otro D/: Violación de las Comunicaciones Electrónicas Res: 2015-792 Tribunal de Apelación de la Sentencia Penal de Cartago, sección segunda. A las dieciséis horas ocho minutos del treinta de noviembre de dos mil quince.
Recurso de apelación de sentencia penal interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre [Nombre1]], [...], por el delito de Violación de las Comunicaciones Electrónicas, en perjuicio de [Nombre [Nombre2]] y otro. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los jueces Gustavo Chan Mora, [Nombre3] y Jorge Arturo Rojas Fonseca. Se apersonaron en apelación, el licenciado [Nombre4] en calidad de defensor particular del encausado y [Nombre5] representante del Ministerio Público.
Resultando:
1. Que mediante sentencia No. 669-2014 de las dieciséis horas cincuenta y seis minutos del ocho de setiembre de dos mil catorce, el Tribunal de Juicio de Cartago, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 1, 11, 12, 30, 45, 50, 51, 71, 72, 73, 74, y 196 bis del Código Penal vigente para la fecha de los hechos ; artículos 1 a 15, 142, 145, 180 a 184, 324 a 340, 341, 343, 349 a 354, 356, 358, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365 y 367 del Código Procesal Penal, este Tribunal, declara al imputado [Nombre [Nombre1]] autor responsable del delito de VIOLACIÓN DE COMUNICACIONES ELÉCTRONICAS cometido en perjuicio de [Nombre [Nombre2]] y de [Nombre [Nombre6]] y en tal carácter se le impone la pena de 6 MESES DE PRISIÓN, que deberá descontar en el lugar y forma que indiquen los reglamentos penitenciarios, previo abono de la preventiva sufrida si la hubiere. Por contar el condenado con los requisitos establecidos por la ley en sus artículos 59 y 60 del Código Penal y siendo que la pena impuesta se lo permite, se le concede el Beneficio de Ejecución Condicional de la Pena por el plazo de TRES AÑOS, dentro de los cuales el condenado no podrá cometer delitos dolosos que se sancionen con pena mayor a seis meses de prisión, caso contrario se le revocará ese beneficio. Una vez firme esta sentencia, inscríbase la misma ante el Registro Judicial y testimóniense las piezas necesarias para ser remitidas al Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena y al Instituto Nacional de Criminología. Con fundamento en los artículos 1045 del Código Civil, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 134, 135 y 137 de las Reglas Vigentes sobre Responsabilidad Civil de 1941, artículo 70 del Código Procesal Penal, artículo 196 bis del código penal vigente para la fecha de los hechos, se declara con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria incoada por [Nombre [Nombre2]] y [Nombre [Nombre6]] en su calidad de ofendidos directos, y ejercida a través de su representante legal [Nombre7] , condenándosele al pago de los siguientes montos: en el caso de ambos ofendidos, ya que ambos pidieron condena por rubro de daño moral, se les concede a cada uno la suma de dos millones y medio de colones para un total de CINCO MILLONES DE COLONES. Por concepto de costas personales, de conformidad con los artículos 16, 38 y 42 del decreto de honorarios 36562-JP se condena a [Nombre [Nombre1]], al pago de la suma de DOS MILLONES DE COLONES, al haberse ejercido además de la acción civil, la querella por delito de acción pública en donde también representa a los dos aquí ofendidos querellantes, el licenciado [Nombre8] . Todas las anteriores sumas de dinero deberán ser depositadas dentro de los próximos quince días a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia. Para la lectura integral de la sentencia se señalan las dieciséis horas del dieciséis de setiembre del dos mil catorce. Notifíquese. Msc. [Nombre9] . Jueza Penal Tribunal Penal de Cartago." (sic)
2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el licenciado [Nombre4] interpuso el recurso de apelación.
3. Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 466 del Código Procesal Penal, reformado por Ley 8837 publicada el nueve de diciembre de dos mil once (Creación de Recurso de Apelación de la Sentencia), el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.
4 . Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.
Redacta el Juez [Nombre10] , y;
Considerando:
I.- El primer motivo se interpone por vicios de motivación y falta de aplicación de las reglas de la sana crítica racional en la valoración de la prueba. Alega el recurrente que en la sentencia condenatoria no se tomó en consideración que el imputado se encontró con una situación de infidelidad de parte de su esposa y sugiere que el Tribunal de juicio erró al no considerar como una causal de justificación los celos con los que este reaccionó. Los argumentos del recurrente, en resumen, giran en torno a esa idea central y los indicadores de aquella infidelidad (llamadas de otra persona -su examante o amante- a su esposa), para concluir que la conducta del acusado, de tomar el teléfono de su esposa e imponerse del conocimiento de la información que había en él se debió a aquel comportamiento de su cónyuge y a los celos que en él se suscitaron al efecto. Agrega al efecto que el Tribunal no hizo ningún esfuerzo por valorar el estado anímico alterado del imputado, según él mismo lo narró, que lo movió a revisar el teléfono, impulsado por aquellos factores reales, de infidelidad, a que se ha hecho mención. Sugiere en esta línea, que la actuación del acriminado fue realizada en legítima defensa de su honor y su familia frente a la agresión ilegítima de su esposa y que, según los parámetros de una legítima defensa, o en su caso de un exceso, este provendría de una excitación o turbación que las circunstancias permitirían excusar, no pudiendo exigírsele que se comportara de manera diferente. El segundo motivo del recurso se interpone por inconformidad con la valoración jurídica de la conciliación en sede de familia. En resumidas cuentas, sobre este punto, el recurrente entiende que la conciliación es un instituto creado para la solución de conflictos y que la Ley de Resolución Alterna de Conflictos, en su artículo 9, establece que su realización genera cosa juzgada. Al respecto, el recurrente sostiene que con la conciliación realizada por el imputado y la ofendida en sede de familia se pactaron una serie de contraprestaciones de naturaleza principalmente patrimonial y se acordó también que se renunciaba con ello al cobro de daños y perjuicios que se pudieran haber ocasionado durante el matrimonio. De la existencia de tal acuerdo, el recurrente sugiere que eso tendría efectos sobre el tema penal y también deriva que la acción civil interpuesta por la agraviada era improcedente, y que el Tribunal desconoció tal acuerdo conciliatorio. Solicita por ello que se declare la nulidad de lo resuelto en relación con la acción civil resarcitoria. El tercer motivo se titula por ausencia de fundamentación en relación con la imputación objetiva y subjetiva frente al querellante y actor civil [[Nombre11] ]. El abogado defensor considera que el Tribunal a quo no explicó de qué manera violentó el acusado la intimidad de las comunicaciones de [[Nombre11] ] si nunca manipuló u observó el teléfono de este y la información guardada en el teléfono de [[Nombre12] ] estaba bajo su responsabilidad y control y era ella quien podía borrarlos, publicarlos o incluso enseñarlos. Tampoco se fundamentó la conclusión de que el divorcio de [[Nombre11] ] fuera producto de la actuación del sindicado, cuando la esposa de este señaló que la causal de tal separación fue otra (las sospechas de infidelidad de [[Nombre11] ] con [[Nombre12] ]).
II.- El primer motivo del recurso no puede ser atendido. Primero que todo debe indicarse que, en contra de lo que afirma la defensa, con base en el análisis conjunto de los elementos de prueba (a partir de la declaración del propio encausado, y de los testigos que constan en la sentencia recurrida), se pudo demostrar que el imputado efectivamente se enteró de que quien en aquel momento era su esposa intercambió mensajes telefónicos con [[Nombre11] ] (folio 305 de la sentencia). Sin embargo, ni esa circunstancia, y ni siquiera aquella de que su ex-cónyuge hubiese tenido una relación amorosa clandestina con esta última persona, tienen los efectos o relevancia jurídica que el recurrente quiere asignarles, como un factor generador de un estado de emoción violenta o como una causal de justificación, en relación con el injusto penal que ejecutó el imputado al violar las comunicaciones privadas de la ofendida [[Nombre12] ], según lo establecido por el artículo 196 bis del Código Penal, vigente al momento de los hechos. Lo que hace el recurrente con su reclamo, en realidad, es enunciar supuestos errores de fundamentación, en realidad inexistentes, con el fin de oponerse a las conclusiones de fondo hechas por el Tribunal sobre la causa de justificación y otras eximentes o atenuantes de responsabilidad penal alegadas ya desde el debate. Expuesto en otros términos, no se aprecian defectos de motivación, ni afectación alguna de las reglas de la sana crítica racional en el fallo impugnado (ni el recurrente los identifica, ni esta Cámara de impugnaciones detecta yerro alguno de esa naturaleza), sino que el abogado defensor se refiere de manera impropia a esos supuestos vicios para atacar en realidad un consideración de fondo del a quo que no comparte: precisamente, la de que en este caso particular, la existencia o no de aquellos mensajes, e incluso de una infidelidad conyugal, no justificaría el comportamiento objetiva y subjetivamente típico del sindicado. En este sentido debe indicarse con claridad sobre los celos u otro estado emocional que pueda ocasionar una alteración psíquica que afecte los frenos inhibitorios del sujeto actuante (estado de emoción violenta), que el legislador costarricense no los ha previsto como una atenuante genérica, o sea, aplicable para cualquier tipo penal. Por el contrario, en el Código Penal se tomó partido por aceptar dichos factores como causales para la disminución de la pena, pero únicamente respecto de tipos penales específicos de la parte especial del Código (por ejemplo, en los artículo 113 y 127 del Código Penal). El alegato del defensor en este sentido, obvia este marco objetivo, trazado claramente en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense. Tampoco encuadra un mero estado de emoción violenta bajo los supuestos de inimputabilidad o imputabilidad disminuida (excluyentes de la culpabilidad penal) ya que estos se deben a la existencia de enfermedades mentales o graves trastornos de la conciencia, de base biológica o no biológica, y no a los meros celos; tema último (el de la incapacidad de culpabilidad) que, en todo caso, no ha sido ni alegado por la defensa, ni acreditado en la presente causa mediante las experticias forenses de rigor. Siendo así, ese estado anímico al que hace alusión el abogado defensor, carece de relevancia (por la propia decisión del legislador costarricense) para atenuar la pena respecto del delito de violación de correspondencia o comunicaciones electrónicas por el cual fue juzgado y condenado el encartado, aun ante el supuesto de una traición o infidelidad de naturaleza real. Tampoco se cumplen en este caso particular los requisitos objetivos que impone la causal de justificación de la legítima defensa, según los criterios claramente trazados por el artículo 28 del Código Penal, así como por la doctrina y la jurisprudencia que lo informan. En primer lugar, deben indicarse que la tutela de la legítima defensa o defensa necesaria (como se le conoce en otras latitudes) encuentra su fundamento en el principio de que nadie está obligado a soportar lo injusto, por lo que, ante la imposibilidad de que el Estado acuda en auxilio, se concede una autorización para que quien ve afectado un derecho o bien jurídico del cual es titular, o incluso el de un tercero, lo defienda respecto de una agresión ilegítima que represente un peligro actual o inminente para aquellos. Esa acción defensiva debe ser razonable, en el sentido de idónea (adecuada para lograr el objetivo defensivo) y necesaria (debe ser el mecanismo menos lesivo con el que cuenta el sujeto actuante para repeler de manera efectiva aquella agresión). Si bien es cierto que para esta justificante en particular no se requiere un juicio de ponderación (se pueden sacrificar incluso bienes jurídicos de mayor valía, para salvaguardar otros de menor importancia), lo cierto es que los requisitos apuntados necesariamente deben ser analizados puntualmente, sin olvidar además que no cabe la invención de supuestos bienes jurídicos por parte de ninguno de los sujetos del proceso. En este último sentido, primero que todo debe rechazarse el concepto de “honor” que maneja el recurrente en su alegato de que la conducta del sindicado estuvo amparada en la causal de justificación aludida, por la sencilla razón de que tal significado no solo es abiertamente arcaico (el honor de hombre o varón mancillado) y recuerda épocas pretéritas en que para defender ese “honor del hombre” se reconocía incluso su potestad para golpear a su mujer; sino también porque tal acepción del honor no encuentra tutela alguna en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, amén de que ella se encuentra en franca contraposición con los mecanismos de derecho internacional (por ejemplo la Convención de Belem do Pará) previstos para evitar cualquier forma de discriminación o violencia contra las mujeres. Aparte de lo anterior, en todo caso, no se puede aceptar ni la legítima defensa de ese supuesto bien jurídico, ni tampoco la de un “derecho a la familia”, sino se presentan las exigencias o requisitos objetivos para que opere esta causal de justificación. Entre esos requisitos, como se ha visto, debe existir una agresión ilegítima, materializada como una acción humana actual o inminente, lo cual nunca se presentó en este caso, pues como se deriva de la propia deposición del sindicado (folios 284 a 28), su comportamiento ilícito, de revisar el teléfono de su cónyuge y luego divulgar la información ahí localizada, se dio como consecuencia de que vio ingresar mensajes en él, y de los celos que le provocó ver que aquella intercambió en alguna ocasión miradas con [Nombre [Nombre6]], incluso días antes de su comportamiento ilícito, y nunca como producto de una agresión ilegítima en su contra. Aun dejando de lado la inexistencia en este caso de una agresión humana ilegítima, debe agregarse que la acción ilícita del acriminado tampoco guarda los atributos de razonabilidad que exige el artículo 28 arriba citado. El medio (la acción típica) empleado para repeler una agresión ilegítima debe ser idóneo y necesario con ese fin. En este sentido, de nuevo como se infiere de la propia declaración del acusado (folios 282 a 288), y como lo expuso el a quo (folio 304), la acción del justiciable no fue ejecutada sino con el objetivo de calmar sus celos (aspecto que como ya se vio carece en este caso de relevancia penal como eximente o atenuante) y finalmente de preconstituir prueba para el eventual proceso de divorcio que entabló, y no como un medio idóneo (adecuado, pertinente) para defender aquellos supuestos derechos amenazados. Mucho menos concurre la exigencia de la necesidad del medio utilizado (la violación de comunicaciones privadas) con ese fin, pues si se entiende que para ello se debe recurrir al mecanismo disponible menos lesivo o drástico del bien jurídico que se sacrifica (en este caso la privacidad de las comunicaciones privadas), claramente se puede derivar que el acusado siempre tuvo a su disposición otros medios menos lesivos (diálogo por ejemplo) con el fin de salvaguardar su familia, sin tener que violar la privacidad de las comunicaciones privadas de su ex-cónyuge. Sumado a lo razonado al respecto por la jueza de juicio, desde una dimensión subjetiva debe agregarse que de lo depuesto por el procesado no se infiere nunca un ánimo defensivo de su parte, es decir que el conocimiento y voluntad del justiciable fueran orientados hacia el ejercicio de acción defensiva alguna, sino para lograr aquellos otros objetivos ilegítimos a los que se ha hecho referencia. Finalmente, tampoco puede aceptarse la tesis de un exceso en la defensa porque este es en realidad una forma de error de prohibición (indirecto), en el cual el autor lleva a cabo una acción que no tiene el atributo de necesidad antes explicado, bajo la equivocada consideración de que sí lo posee, error sobre el cual, en todo caso, no se aprecia elemento de prueba alguno que venga a sustentar su existencia. Ni se acreditó ese exceso, esa forma de error de prohibición indirecto, ni tampoco que el mismo se debiera a una turbación excusable, dadas las circunstancias a que se ha hecho mención de manera precedente. Si bien en el artículo 29 del Código Penal se establece que el exceso (el error de prohibición sobre la necesidad del medio empleado) resulta no punible si es producto de una turbación que las circunstancias hicieran excusable, en este caso concreto debe atenderse que el imputado, actuó movido por circunstancias que le provocaron celos que, desde la perspectiva de esta Cámara de impugnaciones, no hicieron excusable su actuar, ya que podía y debía haber reaccionando de otra manera (preguntando a su esposa, dialogando con ella, observando sus reacciones ante las preguntas), distinta a la vulneración de sus comunicaciones de naturaleza privada. El derecho a la privacidad de las comunicaciones posee rango constitucional, tal como lo establece la Ley fundamental de nuestro país en su artículo 24: “ Se garantiza el derecho a la intimidad, a la libertad y al secreto de las comunicaciones. Son inviolables los documentos privados y las comunicaciones escritas, orales o de cualquier otro tipo de los habitantes de la República. Sin embargo, la ley, cuya aprobación y reforma requerirá los votos de dos tercios de los Diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa, fijará en qué casos podrán los Tribunales de Justicia ordenar el secuestro, registro o examen de los documentos privados, cuando sea absolutamente indispensable para esclarecer asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento. Igualmente, la ley determinará en cuáles casos podrán los Tribunales de Justicia ordenar que se intervenga cualquier tipo de comunicación e indicará los delitos en cuya investigación podrá autorizarse el uso de esta potestad excepcional y durante cuánto tiempo. Asimismo, señalará las responsabilidades y sanciones en que incurrirán los funcionarios que apliquen ilegalmente esta excepción. Las resoluciones judiciales amparadas a esta norma deberán ser razonadas y podrán ejecutarse de inmediato. Su aplicación y control serán responsabilidad indelegable de la autoridad judicial. La ley fijará los casos en que los funcionarios competentes del Ministerio de Hacienda y de la Contraloría General de la República podrán revisar los libros de contabilidad y sus anexos para fines tributarios y para fiscalizar la correcta utilización de los fondos públicos. Una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los Diputados, determinará cuáles otros órganos de la Administración Pública podrán revisar los documentos que esa ley señale en relación con el cumplimiento de sus competencias de regulación y vigilancia para conseguir fines públicos. Asimismo, indicará en qué casos procede esa revisión. No producirán efectos legales, la correspondencia que fuere sustraída ni la información obtenida como resultado de la intervención ilegal de cualquier comunicación.” Se trata, como puede apreciarse, de un derecho fundamental, de importancia capital en el contexto de una democracia liberal, para cuya restricción o limitación se requiere la aprobación de una ley por parte de dos tercios de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, en cuyo caso, como bien se sabe, se ha legislado que esta autorización de restricción solamente procede respecto de delitos de extrema gravedad. Partiendo de este marco jurídico sistemático, resultaría abiertamente desproporcionado que ahí donde la ley no ha autorizado la limitación de la privacidad de las comunicaciones sino en casos de formas de delincuencia graves, se viniera a autorizar, justificar, exculpar o considerar como no punible y excusable en sede penal el comportamiento de un marido que vulnera tal derecho fundamental de su cónyuge, por el hecho de que actuó movido por una circunstancia o situación que exacerbó sus celos. Por esa razón, quienes concurrimos en el dictado del presente fallo de apelación consideramos que no debe aceptarse como no punible o excusable un debilitamiento o vulneración de dicho derecho fundamental, protegido también en el numeral 196 bis del Código Penal, debido a turbaciones movidas, provocadas, por sentimientos como los celos. De modo que ni se acreditó aquella forma de error (sobre la necesidad de la acción ilícita emprendida), ni tampoco nos encontramos ante un supuesto de no punibilidad por perturbaciones del acusado que las circunstancias hicieran excusables, como para no exigirle que se comportara conforme a derecho. Por todo lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar el primer motivo del recurso de la defensa.
III.- El segundo motivo del recurso debe ser declarado con lugar parcialmente. Para la adecuada resolución de este motivo deben deslindarse las consecuencias que genera un acuerdo conciliatorio pactado en otra competencia material (de familia, por ejemplo) en cuanto a la acción penal por un lado y, por otra parte, en relación con la acción civil resarcitoria que fue conocida en esta sede penal. En cuanto a aquella primera dimensión debe desecharse la pretensión del recurrente de que tal acuerdo pueda generar cosa juzgada sobre la acción penal, por dos razones precisas: 1.- En primer lugar porque la Ley 7727 o Ley sobre la Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social, en su artículo 2, establece claramente que los mecanismos de mediación y conciliación previstos en ella lo están para la solución de conflictos o divergencias de naturaleza patrimonial y, por lo tanto, no generan efectos extintivos de la acción penal: “Solución de diferencias patrimoniales. Toda persona tiene el derecho de recurrir al diálogo, la negociación, la mediación, la conciliación, el arbitraje y otras técnicas similares, para solucionar sus diferencias patrimoniales de naturaleza disponible.” 2.- En segundo lugar, porque al contraponer aquella forma de conciliación prevista en el numeral 9 de la ley que cita el defensor en su recurso, y el artículo 36 del Código Procesal Penal, este último numeral tiene un atributo de especialidad, con base en el cual se desplaza la aplicación de aquella otra norma. Expuesto de otra manera, lo dispuesto en las normas de conciliación de aquella ley no se aplica en relación con la acción penal, pues en esta materia existe una regulación específica de la conciliación por vía del artículo 36 del Código de rito citado. Aquel acuerdo conciliatorio de divorcio al que hace referencia el recurrente, por lo tanto, conforme se infiere de los artículos citados y de su vinculación con los numerales 30 inciso k) y 36 del Código Procesal Penal, no genera un efecto extintivo de la acción penal. En cuanto a ese extremo, por lo tanto, el alegato de la defensa no prospera. Ahora bien, en lo que sí debe concederse razón a quien impugna es en que el acuerdo conciliatorio pactado entre [[Nombre13] ] y [[Nombre12] ], el cual fue homologado en sede de familia, tiene un clarísimo y bien delimitado contenido patrimonial, que genera efectos en relación con la acción civil resarcitoria incoada en sede penal. Efectivamente, tal como consta de folios 182 a 183 y 186 a 189, ante el Juzgado de Familia de Cartago se realizó una conciliación para la disolución del vínculo matrimonial, la cual fue homologada por ese ente jurisdiccional mediante resolución de las catorce horas y veinte minutos del primero de febrero de 2010, es decir con posterioridad a los hechos juzgados y de los cuales se derivó la responsabilidad civil extra-contractual del sindicado. En lo que resulta de capital relevancia debe destacarse que, tanto en el contenido del acuerdo conciliatorio como en la sentencia mediante la cual se homologó el mismo, consta literalmente (folio 189) que al transar el señor [Nombre [Nombre1]] y la señora [Nombre [Nombre2]] “Además renuncian al cobro de daños y perjuicios que se pudieron haber ocasionado durante el matrimonio” (la negrilla se adiciona) ; es decir pactaron expresamente un tema de contenido patrimonial, renunciando a cualquier cobro o pretensión de indemnización sobre esos extremos específicos. Esta renuncia expresa al cobro de daños y perjuicios tiene efectos de cosa juzgada sobre la acción civil resarcitoria incoada en sede penal. Esto es así desde que el artículo 220 del Código Procesal Civil establece: “Efectos. Los acuerdos conciliatorios homologados por el juez producirán cosa juzgada. Se procederá a su cumplimiento mediante el proceso de ejecución de sentencia”; esto de manera coincidente con lo fijado en el numeral 9 de la Ley para la resolución alterna de conflictos arriba citada: “Acuerdos judiciales y extrajudiciales Los acuerdos de conciliación judiciales una vez homologados por el juez, y los extrajudiciales, tendrán autoridad y eficacia de cosa juzgada material y serán ejecutorios en forma inmediata.” De modo que la discusión sobre cualquier divergencia de naturaleza patrimonial, relacionada con daños y perjuicios ocasionados durante el matrimonio -y aquellos causados como consecuencia de la ejecución del delito juzgado lo fueron-, quedó cerrada por renuncia expresa y voluntaria de las partes, la cual adquirió el carácter de cosa juzgada mediante la homologación judicial a que se hizo alusión. Lo anterior, sin embargo, no fue tomado en cuenta por la jueza a quo al declarar con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria para el caso de la señora [Nombre [Nombre2]] y al ordenar a su favor una indemnización de dos millones y medio de colones por concepto de daño moral. Esta decisión fue emitida a costa de soslayar aquella renuncia al cobro de daños y perjuicios acordada por las partes, la cual posee carácter de cosa juzgada. Por lo expuesto, corresponde declarar parcialmente con lugar este alegato del segundo motivo del recurso de la defensa y, en consecuencia, procede a revocar este extremo de la sentencia y, en lugar del mismo, por la razón apuntada, toca declarar sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta por [[Nombre12] ].
IV.- Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso. Se declara la existencia de vicios de argumentación respecto de la existencia y fijación del daño moral en relación a [[Nombre11] ]. En lo que corresponde a este sujeto, se declaró con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta en su favor, declarando la existencia de un daño moral y, el respectivo deber de indemnización con base en los siguientes argumentos: 1.- La intromisión del imputado en las comunicaciones de [[Nombre12] ], a pesar de que no se hizo en el teléfono de aquel, también afectó su intimidad y su vida privada, porque los mensajes eran una comunicación privada entre ambos, sin que ninguno diera la autorización a nadie para que los divulgara. 2.- Debido a que el procesado puso esos mensajes en conocimiento de la esposa de [[Nombre11] ], lo cual generó consecuencias en su matrimonio. 3.- Porque existe una relación de causalidad entre la acción ilícita del acusado y el daño a la intimidad que les ocasionó. 4.- Con base en lo anterior de determinó la existencia de un daño moral para el ofendido, para cuya indemnización se fijó el monto de dos millones y medio de colones. La fijación de este monto indemnizatorio se sustentó en el siguiente razonamiento: “ Ahora bien, el Tribunal procede a justipreciar los montos a indemnizar tomando en cuenta los aspectos personales del imputado, que es un empleado de una institución privada, que tiene dos hijas que dependen de él considerando proporcional la condena al pago de los siguientes montos (...)” (folios 316 y 317). Respecto de esos argumentos debe indicarse que no guarda razón el recurrente cuando afirma que la Cámara judicial a quo no explicó de qué manera se violentó la intimidad de [[Nombre11] ] si nunca se observó el teléfono de éste. Tal afirmación es falsa, ya que en sentencia se aclaró que las comunicaciones de las que se impuso ilícitamente el acusado habían sido entabladas por ambos, es decir por [[Nombre12] ] y por [[Nombre11] ], de los cual se infiere que eran ellos dos los titulares del derecho a la privacidad de tales comunicaciones. Esa titularidad del derecho a la privacidad de las comunicaciones (electrónicas) deviene del hecho de que ambos eran los sujetos intercomunicantes de tales mensajes, para lo cual carece de relevancia quien fuera la dueña del teléfono, o que los mismos hayan sido visualizados en el aparato de aquella última. En toda comunicación de naturaleza privada (sea electrónica o no) son titulares del derecho a la privacidad de la misma cada uno de los sujetos que intervienen en ella, por lo que quien divulga tal información afecta el derecho de todos los que participan, independientemente de quién sea el dueño del aparato al que acceda el autor de la ilicitud para imponerse ilegalmente de la información en él contenida. Ciertamente el teléfono estaba bajo la responsabilidad y control de [[Nombre12] ] pero, de nuevo, esto carece de relevancia para el análisis de la acción civil resarcitoria porque a pesar de ello no fue una actuación de esta, sino una acción ilícita del acusado la que afectó tal derecho, tal bien jurídico tutelado, al conocer y divulgar los mensajes que ahí se encontraban. Por otra parte, tampoco es cierto que no hubo fundamentación adecuada sobre el vínculo de causalidad existente entre la actuación ilícita del imputado y el divorcio de [Nombre [Nombre6]] (aspecto que fue analizado para efectos del daño moral) ya que la fundamentación intelectiva de la sentencia se ocupa de tal punto. De nuevo yerra en sus afirmaciones el recurrente, ya que la propia esposa de este último sujeto indicó todo lo contrario: “ [Nombre [Nombre1]] me pasa los mensajes el 17 de setiembre del 2009 (…) y lo recuerdo bien porque por eso fue que me divorcié (...)”, con lo que tanto mediante ese testimonio, como con el del propio [Nombre [Nombre6]], se demostró el vínculo causal entre el delito cometido y el supuesto daño moral del civilmente afectado. En cuanto a esos aspectos, por lo tanto, los reclamos del recurrente deben ser declarados sin lugar. No obstante lo anterior en lo que sí se aprecian deficiencias y vacíos de argumentación es en cuanto a la delimitación y estimación del daño moral. El daño moral no puede ser supuesto por ningún juez de la República, sino que debe inferirse, y así debe explicarse expresamente, de los elementos de prueba debidamente evacuados en debate. Es con base en dichas probanzas que debía demostrarse, para este caso concreto, en qué consistió, como pudo apreciarse, que el actuar ilícito del acusado le generó a [Nombre [Nombre6]] sufrimiento o dolor, como consecuencia del mismo, tanto porque se le afectó su intimidad, como también porque aquella ilicitud fue la causa primigenia de su divorcio, tomada en cuenta para la respectiva ponderación que en cuanto a este medió mutuo consentimiento de las partes, como se indicó en el análisis de la sentencia de juicio dedicada a la acción civil resarcitoria (folio 315). La existencia de ese daño moral debe sustentarse en la clara explicación de en qué consistió tal sufrimiento, para luego derivar el monto por el que debe ser indemnizado. Sin embargo nunca se explica de manera suficiente en la parte civil de la sentencia de qué manera padeció [[Nombre11] ], ni que consecuencias se vieron aparejadas por la afectación de su intimidad o por su divorcio, como para provocar tal sufrimiento, eventualmente configurador de un daño moral de naturaleza subjetiva, como consecuencia directa del accionar ilícito imprudente ejecutado por quien figura como imputado en esta causa. El daño moral debe sustentarse en prueba en una fundamentación descriptiva adecuada de la misma, pero también debe sostenerse en una debida fundamentación intelectiva de esas probanzas, con el fin de proceder finalmente a la valoración pecuniaria del mismo. Corresponde distinguir entonces que para la acreditación de la existencia del daño moral puede considerarse cualquier elemento de prueba lícito, incluyendo la propia declaración del civilmente afectado, pero que dicho testimonio debe ser analizado de manera completa, mediante las exigencias de argumentación que impone el sistema de sana crítica racional. Una vez demostrada la existencia de ese daño, debe ponderarse, es decir debe fijarse, el monto respectivo que corresponde para el mismo. Si bien el juez tiene potestades para fijar de manera prudencial el monto a indemnizar por concepto de daño moral sin que se requiera al efecto el nombramiento de un perito, tal como se ha reiterado en repetidas ocasiones en la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera (véase por ejemplo la sentencia de Casación Penal 1803 del 16 de diciembre de 2009) y de la Sala Primera (para el ejemplo puede consultarse también el voto número 170 del cuatro de marzo de 2008 emitido por ese alto tribunal), esa valoración no puede realizarse de manera antojadiza, sino que debe sustentarse en una adecuado análisis y explicación de la información que le aportan los elementos de prueba para realizar tal ponderación, es decir, explicando con base en tales probanzas cuáles fueron, por ejemplo, los sufrimientos, alteraciones de la vida cotidiana y las privaciones que sufrió el afectado civil como consecuencia, en este caso, del delito que lesionó su intimidad y generó de manera primigenia un divorcio finalmente pactado por mutuo consentimiento. En cuanto a este ejercicio de argumentación, existen evidentes vacíos en la sentencia recurrida, que ameritan que se declare la ineficacia de este extremo y que se ordene el reenvío para un nuevo debate sobre este aspecto. Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar el primer motivo del recurso de la defensa, por lo que la sentencia condenatoria, en su dimensión penal, se mantiene incólume. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el segundo motivo del recurso de la defensa por lo que, dada la existencia de cosa juzgada en relación con cualquier pretensión de indemnización por daños y perjuicios se revoca la condenatoria civil del encartado en favor de [Nombre [Nombre2]]. Se declara con lugar el tercer motivo del recurso de la defensa. Se declara la existencia de vicios de fundamentación en cuanto a la declaratoria y fijación pecuniaria del daño moral en favor de [Nombre [Nombre6]], en virtud de lo cual se ordena la ineficacia de este extremo de la sentencia y se dispone el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación. Lo resuelto en relación con los motivos segundo y tercero del recurso tiene incidencia directa sobre el cálculo de las costas personales en este asunto, por lo que también procede ordenar la ineficacia de ese extremo de la sentencia impugnada y dispone el reenvío para un nuevo cálculo de las mismas.
Por tanto
Se declara sin lugar el primer motivo del recurso de la defensa, por lo que la sentencia condenatoria, en su dimensión penal, se mantiene incólume. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el segundo motivo del recurso de la defensa por lo que, dada la existencia de cosa juzgada en relación con cualquier pretensión de indemnización por daños y perjuicios, se revoca la condenatoria civil del encartado dictada en favor de [Nombre [Nombre2]]. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el tercer motivo del recurso de la defensa. En consecuencia, se declara la existencia de vicios de fundamentación en cuanto a la existencia y fijación pecuniaria del daño moral en favor de [Nombre [Nombre6]], en virtud de lo cual se decreta la ineficacia de este extremo de la sentencia y se ordena el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación. Lo resuelto en relación con los motivos segundo y tercero del recurso tiene incidencia directa sobre el cálculo de las costas personales en este asunto, por lo que también procede declarar la ineficacia de ese extremo de la sentencia impugnada y ordenar el reenvío para un nuevo cálculo de las mismas. Notifíquese.
[Nombre14] CED1 [Nombre15] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A CED2 [Nombre16] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A CED3 JORGE ARTURO ROJAS FONSECA - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A
Document not found. Documento no encontrado.