Invasion in Ostional Refuge and eviction order despite mistake of lawInvasión en Refugio Ostional y orden de desalojo pese a error de prohibición

* 070001170414PE * * 070001170414PE * VOTO 217-15 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz, at thirteen hours thirty minutes on twenty-nine October two thousand fifteen.

Appeal filed in case 07-000117-0414-PE against [Nombre1] , identification number CED1, born on 8 November 1959, daughter of [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] ; [Nombre4] , identification number CED2, born on 25 August 1952, son of [Nombre5] and [Nombre6] ; and [Nombre7] , identification number CED3, born on 5 October 1985, daughter of [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] , for the crime of VIOLATION OF THE FORESTRY LAW IN THE MODE OF INVASION OF CONSERVATION AREAS AND USURPATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN ASSETS to the detriment of NATURAL RESOURCES. Judge Lucila Monge Pizarro and judges Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas and Luis Guillermo Araya Vallejos participate in the decision of the appeal. Appearing at this venue were attorney [Nombre10] , public defender of the accused [Nombre11] , attorney [Nombre12] , public defender of the accused [Nombre4] , attorney [Nombre13] , public defender of the accused [Nombre7] , the State Attorneys attorney [Nombre14] and attorney [Nombre15] , and as representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, attorney [Nombre16] and attorney [Nombre17] .

WHEREAS

1.- By judgment No. 134-2015 at seven hours fifteen minutes on twenty-six May two thousand fifteen, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Nicoya seat, resolved: "THEREFORE: Based on the foregoing, articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 1, 2, 9, 31, 32, 33, 142, 265, 267, 360, 361, 364, 365, 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1, 24, 30, 31, 34, 35, 45, 225 of the Criminal Code, 58 of the Forestry Law, [Nombre18] , [Nombre19] AND [Nombre20] ARE ACQUITTED OF PENALTY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIMES OF VIOLATION OF THE FORESTRY LAW IN THE MODE OF INVASION OF CONSERVATION AREAS AND USURPATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN ASSETS TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE STATE. Once the judgment becomes final, the eviction (desalojo) of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge and demolition of the constructed works that gave rise to this complaint are ordered. The execution and fulfillment of the eviction and demolition shall be the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, National System of Conservation Areas of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge jointly with the Municipality of Nicoya. The civil action for damages filed by the Attorney General's Office is dismissed and resolved without ruling on personal and procedural costs. Once the judgment becomes final and the eviction and demolition have been executed, the archiving of the case is ordered; the costs of the criminal proceedings shall be borne by the State. Notify by reading. [Nombre21] Trial Judge". (sic).

2.- Against the foregoing decision, attorney [Nombre10] , public defender of the accused [Nombre22] , attorney [Nombre12] , public defender of the accused [Nombre23] , attorney [Nombre13] , public defender of the accused [Nombre24] , filed appeals.

3.- An oral hearing was held at ten hours twelve minutes on ten September two thousand fifteen, at which were present the public defenders attorney [Nombre12] , attorney [Nombre10] , attorney [Nombre13] , the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, attorney [Nombre17] , and the representative of the Attorney General's Office, attorney [Nombre15] . Judge [Nombre25] was not present at said hearing; however, no evidence was taken nor new arguments raised therein.

4.- Having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court considered the questions raised in the appeal.

5.- The pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge [Nombre26] ; and,

CONSIDERING

I- Appeal of attorney [Nombre10] . The public defender of the accused [Nombre11] filed an appeal against the judgment that acquitted his client, considering that an erroneous application of substantive law occurred. He states that the court considers a mistake of law (error de prohibición) to be proven because it considers that his client believed she was acting under the protection of a document—a cadastral map (plano catastrado)—and in the belief that her father's possession as an occupier or settler was transmitted to her by tradition, when the truth is that his client acted without intent—regarding the objective and subjective elements of the criminal definition—despite which the court ordered the demolition of the defendant's dwelling, without indicating the reasons or the basis for doing so. He states that his client has at no time acted based on a false assessment of the circumstances or because she was unaware of any or all of the objective elements of the criminal definition, but rather because she alleges that she lived in the area before the law's existence. At the oral hearing, the defender indicated that the accused and her family arrived in the area as settlers, that she has had to endure errors of the Administration, and that foreigners inhabiting the area have even been allowed to build an airport. The appeal is without merit. The accused [Nombre11] stated in her statement that she has lived for twelve years on the land her father left her, that before it was a refuge he had this land, that he was a pioneer around the year 1957. She stated that she is unjustly accused of being an invader and has fought for this property. Likewise, that she has a map (plano) that makes her the owner of the property, that she has a right to that land, and that her family struggled to survive there (folio 450). Regarding the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge, this Court stated: "The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly pronounced that the Ostional Wildlife Refuge is a natural heritage of the State, has the character of public domain asset (bien demanial), and cannot be subject to private appropriation; it has also clarified the use of the concept of 'public zone' contained in the Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law, as applied to Refuges. In this regard, we can cite rulings No. 5976-93 of 15:42 hours on 16 November 1993, No. [Telf1] of 08:52 hours on 22 August 2003, No. 2008-013655 of 11:55 hours on 5 September 2008, No. 2009-002020 of 8:30 hours on 13 February 2009, in addition to the one analyzed in the contested judgment, No. 13558-2003 of 12:28 hours on 28 November 2003. Our Constitutional Court has stated: '…in accordance with the provisions of Transitory Provision 1 of the Wildlife Conservation Law No. 7317 of 30 October 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 235 of 7 December 1992, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge of the Tempisque Conservation Area is located within the two hundred meters of the maritime terrestrial zone that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste, therefore it is indisputable that it is a public domain asset, a state-owned refuge according to the terminology used by article 82 of that Law. Added to the above, according to article 13 of the Forestry Law No. 7575 of 13 February 1996, published in the supplement to La Gaceta No. 72 of 16 April 1996, it forms part of the State's Forestry Heritage. Moreover, numeral 14 of the same regulatory body reiterates its inalienability, unattachability, and imprescriptibility as such. By virtue of its public domain nature and its correlative dedication to the protection of the flora and fauna of the area, the lands that make up the reserve cannot be appropriated by private individuals. In other words, no natural or legal person may claim any possessory right, let alone a property right, over any property located within the reserve, except in the case of lands occupied by private individuals prior to the declaration of the Protected Wildlife Area, by Law No. 6919 of 17 November 1983, regarding which expropriation proceedings must be initiated if there is opposition by the titleholder to subject the property to the regime, in accordance with the provisions of articles 84 and 87 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. Correspondingly, the authorities may only authorize, within refuges such as Ostional, activities aimed at research, protection, training, and ecotourism, as established by article 14 of the Forestry Law.' (Constitutional Chamber, Resolution No. 2009-002020 of 8:30 hours on 13 February 2009, emphasis supplied)." (Judgment of this Court, number 62-15 of 13:35 hrs. on 14-04-15). Likewise, the Third Chamber of the Court resolved regarding settlers (pobladores) and occupiers (ocupantes): "III.- Of the settler and the occupier in the public zone of the maritime terrestrial zone. The Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law (LZMT) 6043, of 02 March 1977 (published in Supplement 35 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta 52 of 16 March 1977, and effective as of this latter date, hereinafter LZMT) establishes in article 12, generally regarding the maritime terrestrial zone, that 'it is prohibited, without due legal authorization, to exploit the existing flora and fauna, to demarcate with fences, paths, or in any other way, to erect buildings or installations, cut down trees, extract products, or carry out any other type of development, activity, or occupation.' And specifically regarding the public zone, it determines in numeral 20: 'Except for the exceptions established by law, the public zone may not be the object of occupation under any title or in any case. No one may claim any right over it. It shall be dedicated to public use and especially to the free transit of persons. The entities and authorities indicated in article 18 shall issue and enforce the necessary provisions to guarantee the free and safe transit of persons and the public use of this zone.' The exceptions referred to in this numeral 20 of the LZMT are: A) Those sections which, due to their geographical configuration, topography, or special conditions, cannot be used for public use, in which case their development is authorized by the respective municipality and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, provided they are not transferred and a zone of free transit is established that facilitates the public use and enjoyment of beaches, cliffs, and estuaries, and the safety of pedestrians is guaranteed (article 21 LZMT). B) Infrastructure and construction works approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism, and the respective municipality, attending to the public use for which they are intended, or because they involve the establishment and operation of state tourist facilities of notable convenience for the country (article 22 LZMT). And C) The cases contained in laws that regulate special aspects of the maritime terrestrial zone, for example, the case contained in Law 7744, Concession and Operation of Marinas and Tourist Docks of 19 December 1997 (published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 26 of 06 February 1998). However, it is appropriate to specify that Law 6043, on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and its Regulations (issued by Decree 7841-P, of 16 December 1977, published in Supplement 16 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta 20, of 27 January 1978, and effective as of this latter date; hereinafter RLZMT) establish two categories of natural persons who exercise acts of occupation in the maritime terrestrial zone: settler (poblador) and occupier (ocupante). The figure of the settler is regulated in articles 70 of the LZMT and 75 of the RLZMT; that of the occupier is found in articles 44 and Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT. Article 70 of the LZMT reads: 'Settlers of the maritime terrestrial zone, Costa Rican by birth, with more than ten years of residence therein, according to information from the local Rural Assistance Guard authority or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property. However, they must submit to the zoning plan, for which purpose they may be relocated and compensated for their improvements in accordance with this law. In all cases, the public zone must be respected.' Numeral 75 of the RLZMT states: ' Settlers of the maritime terrestrial zone, Costa Rican by birth, with more than ten years of continuous residence therein, according to information from the local Rural Assistance Guard authority or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property, and may be relocated according to the zoning plan, upon prior compensation for improvements. In all cases, the public zone must be respected. When the period of residence is less than ten years, the settlers may apply for a concession over the property, provided that no part of the public zone is included. If there are improvements in the public zone, the provisions of subsection e), article 73 of the regulations shall apply, and the provisions of article 74 of the regulations if the improvements are located in the restricted zone. Those who, not being settlers, have built or constructed in the restricted zone on illegally possessed properties, shall not have the right to payment for improvements. However, they may apply for a concession over the property and, if granted, they shall not be charged for the use and enjoyment of those improvements. Concession applications made by occupiers of the maritime terrestrial zone shall have priority over others.' Article 44 of the LZMT reads: ' Concessions shall be granted in accordance with the principle that first in time is first in right. However, the regulations of this law may establish an order of priorities according to the nature of the exploitation and its greater public convenience; but under equal conditions, preference shall be given to the occupier of the land who has possessed it quietly, publicly, and peacefully on a continuous basis.' And Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT states: 'Municipalities with jurisdiction in the maritime-terrestrial zone shall collect the fee established by this law from the occupiers thereof. The collection shall be made according to use and the current valuation of the General Directorate of Direct Taxation. This authorization shall be provisional until the development plan for the respective zone comes into effect, and it does not grant any right to the occupiers with regard to a concession.' From the reading of the transcribed norms, the existence of requirements that every person must meet to hold the status of settler is concluded: a) continuous possession of at least 10 years' seniority prior to the entry into force of the LZMT—16 March 1977—that is, possession that began at least from 1967; b) being born before 1949, in order to be of legal age at the start of the indicated 10 years of possession; c) being Costa Rican by birth; d) not being the owner of another piece of land; e) having a report from the Public Force or a certification from the Civil Registry, which serve as proof of the possession in question. In relation to the category of occupier, the requirements for holding such status are: i) possession of less than 10 years prior to the entry into force of the LZMT (16 March 1977), that is, possession that began after 1967; b) being born before 1959; c) being Costa Rican by birth; d) not being the owner of another piece of land; e) having a report from the Public Force or a certification from the Civil Registry that serve as proof of the possession in question. Thus, except for a special legal provision, persons who 1) entered the maritime terrestrial zone before the LZMT was in force and are neither settlers nor occupiers, and 2) entered after 16 March 1977, are in a situation of illegal occupation. By harmonizing articles 70, 44 and Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT and 75 of the RLZMT with numerals 12 and 20 of the LZMT, it is concluded that settlers and occupiers are not within the exception cases provided for in the latter article (i.e., article 20 ibidem), so it must be understood that the recognitions granted by the LZMT are limited to the restricted zone of the maritime terrestrial zone, and not to the public zone. The argument of contradictory precedents formulated by Public Defender [Nombre27] is therefore resolved, in the sense that regarding the public zone of the maritime terrestrial zone a) eviction (desalojo) of settlers and occupiers and the destruction of the constructions used by them is proper when they lack a permit or concession that legally enables them to exercise such possession, and b) said eviction and destruction of constructions may be suspended for 24 months as provided in articles 1 and 7 of Law 9073, Protection of Occupants of Zones Classified as Special of 19 September 2012, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 206 of 25 October 2012, Supplement 163 (on which relevant elements are set forth in Considering V infra)." (Judgment 1617-14 of 8:43 hours on 10-10-14 of the Third Chamber of the Court). As this Court correctly pointed out in judgment number 380-12 of 13:22 hrs. on 24-10-12, "[...] the areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves may be found within the maritime terrestrial zone, without such circumstance causing that zone to lose its name (in fact, the very rule just transcribed so states). They continue to be part of the zone, but they are assigned a different management or treatment from that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the point of view of their administrative management (different institutions in charge of their administration), but also according to the use and purposes to which they must respond, so that projects that could be carried out in accordance with the provisions on the maritime terrestrial zone may not be executed under the wildlife conservation law or other special regulations and, conversely, the specific purposes of the reserves would allow the design of projects alien to the purposes of the maritime terrestrial zone law and open the way for community participation, promoted in article 17 of the Wildlife Conservation Law; while article 83 of that same text provides: 'The General Directorate of Wildlife shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, with respect to National Wildlife Refuges that include areas of the maritime terrestrial zone.' The very law that created the Ostional Refuge (Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 6919 of 17 November 1983) located it '... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Nosara River to Punta India...' (emphasis supplied); while Law No. 7317, of 30 October 1992 (wildlife conservation law), expanded it, placing it '... in the two hundred meters of the maritime terrestrial zone that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste...' (the bold does not appear in the original). Furthermore, the matter has been the subject of multiple pronouncements by the Constitutional Chamber, some cited by the appellant himself, and in ruling No. [Telf2], of 8:30 hours on 13 February 2009, the said Chamber expressly highlighted that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge is a 'public domain asset' that extends over the maritime terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy that public domain property lack any property right. It is worth reiterating that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas included in the public zone of the maritime terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons stated herein, could never have been subject to acquisition by private individuals." From the foregoing, it is clear that the area over which the Ostional Wildlife Refuge extends is maritime terrestrial zone and is also a reserve created by law for the protection of flora and fauna, natural and forestry heritage of the State. Due to its character as a public domain asset (bien demanial), it is inalienable, unattachable, and imprescriptible. Hence, the lands cannot be subject to appropriation by private individuals. In the partially transcribed jurisprudential precedent of the Third Chamber of the Court, which this Court fully shares, reference is made to the legal requirements that occupiers and settlers must meet to be recognized as such; however, it is noted that in the case of the public zone—as applies to this case—they may not hold any right, permit, or concession, and what is appropriate is the eviction and demolition of the constructions. The defendant does not have the status of occupier or settler, because what she indicates is that she has lived for twelve years on the land her father left her, and that he in turn had it since 1957, and also that she has a map (plano) that makes her the owner of the property. None of those assumptions grants her any right over the public domain asset, given that the status of occupier or settler cannot be transmitted (in the event that her father had met the requirements) and the creation of a cadastral map (plano catastrado) does not grant any right; for which reason her possession is illegitimate, and because it involves public domain assets, what is appropriate is to order the eviction and demolition of the works, to recover the public use of the zone, as resolved by the court below. Among other aspects, the trial court held the following: "The defendants have stated at trial that their family has resided in that sector for a long time and that today it is part of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge; they contend that decades ago the father of [Nombre28] had the status of settler or occupier of the maritime terrestrial zone where the Ostional wildlife refuge was created. The mentioned map (plano) was registered in the name of [Nombre11] in 1999, stating that the property is under the administration of the Ministry of Environment. This situation makes the defendants believe that they have the standing to carry out repairs or constructions on the property, which has provided grounds for a mistake of law (error de prohibición) or of fact (error de tipo). The maritime terrestrial zone in the public or restricted zone, the first of 50 meters and the second of 150 meters, is a state public domain (demanial) and imprescriptible asset, not susceptible to usucaption or possession. The Ostional Wildlife Refuge extends beyond the maritime terrestrial zone because it is not limited to the indicated dimension of 200 meters. Administratively, the status of settler or occupier can be recognized, but these cases are exceptional and must be recognized as such; it is not admissible for that status to be deemed in a judicial forum, but rather in an administrative one. The defendants have not documentary proven the status of settler or occupier, and this is a non-transferable status via succession or contract, precisely due to the public domain nature of the asset. On the other hand, the status of occupier or settler is recognized only to those subjects whose permanence predates the constitution of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge or the maritime terrestrial zone law. Having a cadastral map (plano catastrado) in the Public Property Registry was considered an authorization from the legal system to carry out the reported constructions." (folio 452 recto and verso). This Chamber considers that, as characterized by the lower court, in the present case we are facing a mistake of law (error de prohibición), given that the accused [Nombre11] stated that she has a map that makes her the owner of the land, that she has a right because her father, who was the possessor of those lands, gave it to her, that the map bears her name, so she considers that the land is hers (folio 450). From those statements, the trial court inferred that this is a mistake of law because the defendants falsely believed that the circumstances existed that would justify their conduct. The court states: "A mistake of law exists when the active subject makes a defective interpretation of the fact or the norm itself. This leads the active subject to falsely believe that, in the specific case, the circumstances exist that would justify their typical conduct. In another sense, a mistake of law exists when the active subject considers that there is an authorization from the legal system to carry out the action foreseen by the criminal definition (indirect mistake of law) or else that the act they carry out is not subject to penalty; in this case, the error does not fall on the circumstances but on the prohibition itself (direct mistake of law). The case could also be approached as a mistake of fact, when it is assumed that this false representation leads the subject to believe that in the specific case the necessary circumstances that would give rise to the action foreseen in the criminal definition are not present, which would exclude intent. It is said that an error regarding the circumstances foreseen in the objective criminal definition that must be known at the level of the subjective criminal definition is a phenomenon that determines the absence of intent when, there being an objective criminality, the knowledge of the elements required by the objective criminal definition does not exist or is false; if there is a mistake of fact, the typical finality disappears, that is, the will to carry out the objective criminal definition, and lacking that will, there is no intent, and therefore the conduct would be atypical." (folios 451 verso and 452 recto). Regarding the mistake of law (error de prohibición), the Third Chamber of the Court has resolved: "[...] the commentators [Nombre29] and [Nombre30] state: 'A mistake of law exists not only when the perpetrator believes they are acting lawfully, but also when they do not even consider the unlawfulness of their act. The mistake of law may refer to the existence of the prohibitive norm as such (direct mistake of law) or to the existence, limits, or objective assumptions of a justification cause that authorizes the action, generally prohibited, in a specific case (indirect mistake of law or mistake regarding justification causes). In the first case, the perpetrator is unaware of the existence of a norm that prohibits their conduct; in the second, the perpetrator knows that their conduct is generally prohibited, but mistakenly believes that in the specific case a justification cause exists that permits it, that they act within its limits, or that its objective assumptions are present.' (Criminal Law, General Part, 7th revised edition, Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2007, pp. 382 and 383). Likewise, this Chamber has indicated on the subject: '… the mistake of law involves a defective interpretation of the fact or of the norm itself, which leads the active subject to falsely believe that in the specific case the circumstances exist that would justify their typical conduct, that is, that there is an authorization from the legal system to carry out the action foreseen by the criminal definition (indirect mistake of law), or that the act they carry out is not subject to penalty, in which case the error does not fall on the circumstances but on the prohibition itself (direct mistake of law). On the contrary, the mistake of fact rather assumes that this false representation leads the subject to believe that in the specific case the necessary circumstances that would give rise to the action foreseen by the criminal definition are not present, which would exclude intent: '(...) a mistake of law may come from false knowledge or ignorance of the fact that generates a situation we believe to be justified or about the norm that prohibits the conduct. Therefore, the doctrine prefers to refer to the mistake of fact (its analysis located within criminality) and the mistake of law (its analysis located within culpability) (...) When the Criminal Code states in article 35 that the insurmountable error must fall on the situation or 'fact' that is carried out that is not subject to penalty, it directly means that the subject must falsely believe that the act is not subject to penalty, which may occur when: a) The subject acts without knowing that what they are doing falls within the prohibitive scope of the Norm; b) the subject who acts considers that the Legal System grants them a permission for their action; c) The subject who acts believes they are within the scope of a justification cause when in reality they are not. These three assumptions are included in the legal formula conceived by the Code, so there seems to be no problem in including here the elements of direct and indirect mistake of law.' In this nomenclature, fully compatible with our Code, direct mistake (error directo) falls upon the knowledge of the prohibitive norm (the "You shall not take land from another citizen," a criminal norm placed before the criminal offense of usurpation (usurpación), for example), while indirect mistake (error indirecto) comes to signify the false supposition of the existence of a permit that the law does not grant, and the problems of putative justification." Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Voto N°446-F-92, of 3:25 p.m. on September 25, 1992 (…) In accordance with the foregoing, it would be clear that if in this case it had been established at trial that the accused always acted under the false belief that the property he possessed was not the State's but his own, we would be facing a mistake of fact (error de tipo) and not one of prohibition (error de prohibición)." (Third Chamber, judgment N°758-2005, of ten hours ten minutes on July eight, two thousand five)." Third Chamber of the Court, judgment number 1779-13 of 2:42 hrs. on December 3, 2013. Thus, we are in the presence of a direct mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición directo), because the accused falsely believed that the acts she performed are not subject to punishment because they are not prohibited by any norm. This means that the existence of a typical and unlawful fact that is not culpable, and therefore cannot be reproachable, was accredited, pursuant to the provisions of Article 35 of the Criminal Code. Although the tribunal does not determine whether it is dealing with a surmountable (vencible) or insurmountable (invencible) mistake, which is necessary to determine whether or not the application of a penalty is appropriate, the truth is that this Chamber does not proceed to assess that aspect, because it was not alleged by the defense, the only appellant of the judgment. In any case, it must be noted that both under the assumption of a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición) and under a mistake of fact (error de tipo), the truth is that in both scenarios, the order for eviction (desalojo) and demolition (demolición) is appropriate, as these are public domain assets (bienes demaniales), over which no private individual holds, nor can hold or be recognized, any right whatsoever, making it irrelevant whether one is facing one or the other.

II.- Appeal of attorneys [Nombre31] and [Nombre13]. The public defenders of the accused [Nombre32] and [Nombre7] filed respective appeals because they consider that the contested judgment incurs in inobservance of procedural rules in the reasoning that authorizes the demolition of the property. Both lawyers point out that the judgment does not support the factual-legal analysis that authorizes the demolition of the building, in addition to not extracting the specific point of the demolition area or dwelling house that is intended to be demolished, and that the fact that, prior to ordering the demolition or destruction, there must be a management plan approved by the refuge administration was not discredited, so as not to affect the people who benefit from the resources the area provides. The grounds are resolved jointly because they are related. The claims are without merit. As a first aspect, it must be stated that the judgment does expressly indicate, in Recital II, point A, in the section called "Proven Facts" (Hechos Probados), 3 and 4, the location of the lands and constructions that must be demolished: "THIRD) Approximately in the month of January of the year two thousand seven, the accused [Nombre11] and [Nombre4], without being authorized, built a dwelling between the vertical coordinate 352729 and horizontal coordinate 215776 in the Ostional wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre) with wooden posts, chains, zinc, and plastic, approximately six meters wide and nine meters long, a site they currently hold. FOURTH) Approximately in the month of May of the year 2007, the accused [Nombre7], without being authorized, built a wooden house on Peladas de Nosara beach within the Ostional wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre) between the vertical coordinates 0352727 and horizontal coordinates 0215765 of map sheet [Placa1], six meters long by four meters wide and two and a half meters high..." There is therefore no imprecision regarding the properties, which are clearly identified. As for the alleged lack of a regulatory plan in the area as a requirement to be able to proceed with the eviction, it must be noted that the Constitutional Chamber resolved the following in this regard: "IV.- ON THE PRECARIOUS OCCUPATION OF THE OSTIONAL NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE. The Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Tempisque) of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, MINAE), in his report rendered under the solemnity of oath, with the timely warning of the consequences, even criminal ones, that the obstruction of the administration of justice in this venue can bring, pursuant to the provisions of Article 44 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), assured that, currently, there are 198 natural persons and 190 legal persons occupying, in a precarious manner, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge. Additionally, it draws this Chamber's attention that the referred official added that the occupants located in some sectors composed of mangroves and the estuaries' rias remain to be counted, since, in accordance with the regulations governing the matter and the multiple pronouncements of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), such extensions of land are public zone, regardless of their extension. The factual framework raised by the respondent authority is worrying and denotes a neglect by the State of its functions as the main guarantor of the environment. As highlighted in the previous recital, in accordance with the provisions of Transitory Provision 1 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 235 of December 7, 1992, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge of the Tempisque Conservation Area is located in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) extending from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste, for which reason it is undeniable that it is a public domain asset (bien de dominio público), a state-owned refuge in accordance with the terminology used by Article 82 of that Law. In addition to the above, according to Article 13 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, published in the supplement to La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996, it forms part of the State's Forestry Heritage. On the other hand, numeral 14 of the same regulatory body reiterates, as such, its inalienability, unattachability, and imprescriptibility. Due to its public domain nature (naturaleza demanial) and its correlative dedication to the protection of the zone's flora and fauna, the lands that make up the reserve cannot be appropriated by private individuals. In other words, no natural or legal person can claim any possession right, much less a property right, over any property located within the reserve, except for lands occupied by private individuals prior to the declaration of the Protected Wildlife Area, through Law No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, regarding which the expropriation procedures must be initiated, should the owner oppose subjecting the property to the regime, in compliance with the provisions of Articles 84 and 87 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre). Similarly, authorities may only authorize activities within refuges such as Ostional that are aimed at research, protection, training, and ecotourism, as established by Article 14 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). In the present matter, it is clear that the Administration has not fulfilled its duty to safeguard the integrity of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge and to guarantee respect for its public domain status, since it is asserted with certainty that 388 persons, both natural and legal, precariously occupy lands that, according to the foregoing, must be exclusively dedicated to the protection of the flora and fauna of the zone. It is obvious that their presence in the place alters the natural harmony that the creation of the refuge intended to preserve intact, especially given the fragility of the environment, since it is a place where massive turtle nesting cyclically occurs. The situation is further aggravated if one considers that the Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area implied that there could be more occupants in the mangrove sectors and the estuaries' rias, places that are essential, as is well known, for maintaining the balance of the maritime habitat. This being the case, this Constitutional Tribunal must intervene to reinstate the enjoyment and exercise of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.

V.- ON THE LACK OF A MANAGEMENT PLAN IN THE OSTIONAL NATIONAL WILDLIFE RESERVE. Article 2 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre), Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 32633-MINAE of March 10, 2005, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005, defines a management plan (plan de manejo) as: “[…] a set of technical norms that will regulate the actions to be executed in a zoo, breeding farm, nursery, aquarium, hunting farm, rescue center, botanical garden, or wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre), with the purpose of managing and conserving wildlife, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources that will guarantee the sustainability of the resource […].” The importance of a management plan as a tool for the protection of the natural resource in this type of refuge is evident, as well as for channeling the research, protection, training, and ecotourism activities that can be carried out in a state-owned refuge. Therefore, it is possible to establish a causal link between the lack of a management plan in the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge and the disorder that prevails in it. Finally, it is important to clarify to the respondent authority that, although it is true the approval process of the Management Plan has been difficult – a third attempt is being made –, such fact does not justify that after 25 years since the creation of the Refuge (through Law No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, repealed but, in turn, maintained by Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992), it still does not have a management plan, which, undoubtedly, results, as seen, in a constant state of threat to the environment." (Judgment 2020-09 of 08:30 hrs. on 02-13-09). The management plan is a legal imperative as the Constitutional Chamber points out in the cited judgment; however, this does not mean that evictions are subject to its existence, given that it is a wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre), which cannot be the object of private occupation, and the constructions are located in the public zone. Finally, regarding the basis for the eviction and demolition, although the tribunal does not provide an extensive development on the matter, it is sufficient to accredit that “[...] the defendants do not have the status of occupants or settlers of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) of Peladas de Nosara beach or of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge. The construction of the reported works occurred in the first half of the year 2007 and did not involve necessary repairs or remodeling but rather new construction. Regardless of whether the father of the accused [Nombre28] had the status of occupant or settler in that sector of Peladas de Nosara beach, as the accused argue, this situation is not transferable, inheritable, nor the object of a contract transferring ownership. Consequently, even though there is a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición), or alternatively a mistake of fact (error de tipo), depending on how it is analyzed, the fact of the case is that the accused cannot remain in the Ostional wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre) as possessors or occupants, and therefore, the eviction (desalojo) of the property and demolition (demolición) of the works constructed in this matter must be ordered once the judgment becomes final.” (folios 453 front and back). This Tribunal considers that the assessment of these elements is sufficient to justify the eviction and demolition of the works constructed in the Ostional Wildlife Refuge. For all the above, the appeals filed are declared without merit.

POR TANTO

The appeals filed by the public defenders of the accused are declared without merit. NOTIFÍQUESE.

LUCILA MONGE PIZARRO LUIS GUILLERMO ARAYA VALLEJOS GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS JUEZA Y JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1], Teléfonos: [Telf3]. Fax: [Telf4]. Correo electrónico: [...]

The judge [Nombre25] was not present at that hearing; however, no evidence was taken and no new arguments were raised.

**4.-** Having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

**5.-** The pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

*Drafted by Judge [Nombre26]; and,* **CONSIDERANDO** **I- Appeal by attorney [Nombre10] .** The public defender for the accused [Nombre11] filed an appeal against the judgment that acquitted his client on the grounds that an **erroneous application of substantive law** had occurred. He argues that the trial court finds a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición) has been established, insofar as it considers that his client believed she was acting under the protection of a document—a cadastral map (plano catastrado)—and the belief that her father's possession as an occupant or settler (poblador) was transmitted to her by tradition, when the truth is that his client acted without intent (dolo)—as to the objective and subjective elements of the offense—despite which the court ordered the demolition of the accused's dwelling, without indicating the reasons or legal basis for doing so. He argues that his client at no time acted based on a false assessment of the circumstances or because she was unaware of any or all of the objective elements of the offense, but rather because she claims she lived in the area before the law existed. At the oral hearing, the defender stated that the accused and her family came to the area as settlers (pobladores), that she has had to endure errors by the Administration, and that foreigners living in the area have even been allowed to build an airport. **The appeal is dismissed.** The accused [Nombre11] stated in her declaration that she has been living for twelve years on the land her father left her, that before it was a refuge he had this land, and that he was a pioneer around the year 1957. She stated that she is unjustly accused of being an invader and has fought for this property. Likewise, she says she has a map that makes her the owner of the property, that she has a right to that land, and that her family fought to survive there (folio 450). Regarding the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge, this Court stated: *"The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly ruled that the Ostional Wildlife Refuge is natural heritage of the State, has the character of public domain property (bien demanial) and cannot be subject to private ownership; it has also clarified the use of the concept of 'public zone' contained in the Maritime Zone Law (Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), as applied to Refuges. In this regard, we can cite Rulings No. 5976-93 at 15:42 hours on November 16, 1993, No. [Telf1] at 08:52 hours on August 22, 2003, No. 2008-013655 at 11:55 hours on September 5, 2008, No. 2009-002020 at 8:30 hours on February 13, 2009, in addition to the one analyzed in the contested judgment, No. 13558-2003 at 12:28 hours on November 28, 2003. Our Constitutional Court has stated: '...in accordance with the provisions of Transitory Provision 1 of the Wildlife Conservation Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 235 of December 7, 1992, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge of the Tempisque Conservation Area is located within the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste, making it undeniable that it is a public domain asset, a state-owned refuge according to the terminology used by Article 82 of that Law. In addition to the above, pursuant to Article 13 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, published in the supplement to La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996, it forms part of the State Forestry Heritage. Furthermore, section 14 of the same regulatory body reiterates, as such, its inalienability, unattachability, and imprescriptibility. Given its public domain nature and its corresponding designation for the protection of the area's flora and fauna, the lands that make up the reserve cannot be appropriated by private parties. In other words, no natural or legal person may claim any right of possession, much less a right of ownership, over any property located within the reserve, except for lands occupied by private parties prior to the declaration of the Protected Wildlife Area, through Law No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, for which expropriation proceedings must be initiated, should there be opposition from the owner to submitting the property to the regime, in accordance with Articles 84 and 87 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. Correspondingly, authorities may only authorize activities within refuges such as Ostional that are aimed at research, protection, training, and ecotourism, as established by Article 14 of the Ley Forestal' (Constitutional Chamber, Resolution No. 2009-002020 at 8:30 hours on February 13, 2009, underlining supplied)."* (Judgment of this Court, number 62-15 at 13:35 hrs. on 04-14-15). Likewise, the Third Chamber of the Court ruled regarding settlers (pobladores) and occupants (ocupantes): *"**III.- On the settler (poblador) and the occupant (ocupante) in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone.** Law 6043 on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre) of March 2, 1977 (published in Supplement 35 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta 52 of March 16, 1977, and effective as of the latter date, hereinafter LZMT) establishes in Article 12, generally regarding the maritime-terrestrial zone, that 'it is prohibited, without the due legal authorization, to exploit the existing flora and fauna, to demarcate with fences, tracks, or in any other form, to erect buildings or installations, cut down trees, extract products, or carry out any other type of development, activity, or occupation.' And specifically regarding the public zone, it determines in section 20: 'Save for the exceptions established by law, the public zone cannot be the object of occupation under any title or in any case. No one may claim any right over it. It shall be dedicated to public use and especially to the free transit of persons. The entities and authorities indicated in Article 18 shall issue and enforce the necessary provisions to guarantee the free and safe transit of persons and the public use of this zone.' The exceptions referred to in this section 20 of the LZMT are: A) Those sections that, due to their geographic configuration, topography, or special conditions, cannot be used for public use, in which case their development is authorized by the respective municipality and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo), provided they are not alienated and a free transit zone is established that facilitates the public use and enjoyment of the beaches, cliffs, and estuaries and guarantees pedestrian safety (Article 21 LZMT). B) Infrastructure and construction works approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (INVU), and the respective municipality, considering the public use for which they are intended, or when they involve the establishment and operation of state tourism facilities of notable convenience for the country (Article 22 LZMT). And C) Cases contained in laws that regulate special aspects of the maritime-terrestrial zone, for example, the case contained in Law 7744, on Concession and Operation of Marinas and Tourist Docks, of December 19, 1997 (published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 26, of February 6, 1998). However, it is appropriate to clarify that Law 6043 on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone and its Regulations (Reglamento) (issued by Executive Decree 7841-P, of December 16, 1977, published in Supplement 16, of the Official Gazette La Gaceta 20, of January 27, 1978, and effective as of this latter date; hereinafter RLZMT) establish two categories of natural persons who carry out acts of occupation in the maritime-terrestrial zone: settler (poblador) and occupant (ocupante). The figure of the settler (poblador) is regulated in Articles 70 of the LZMT and 75 of the RLZMT; that of the occupant (ocupante) is found in Articles 44 and Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT. Article 70 of the LZMT reads: 'Settlers (pobladores) of the maritime-terrestrial zone, Costa Rican by birth, with more than ten years of residence in it, according to information from the local Rural Assistance Guard authority or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property. However, they must comply with the zoning plan, for which purpose they may be relocated and their improvements (mejoras) compensated in accordance with this law. In any case, the public zone must be respected.' Section 75 of the RLZMT indicates: 'Settlers (pobladores) of the maritime-terrestrial zone, Costa Rican by birth, with more than ten years of continuous residence in it, according to information from the local Rural Assistance Guard authority or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property, and may be relocated in accordance with the zoning plan, upon compensation for the improvements (mejoras). In any case, the public zone must be respected. When the period of residence is less than ten years, the settlers may apply for a concession over the property, provided no part of the public zone is included. If there are improvements in the public zone, the provisions of subsection e), Article 73 of the regulations shall apply, and the provisions of Article 74 of the regulations if the improvements are located in the restricted zone. Those who, not being settlers (pobladores), have built or constructed in the restricted zone on illegally possessed properties shall not have the right to payment for improvements. However, they may apply for a concession over the property and, if granted, they will not be charged for the use and enjoyment of those improvements. Applications for concessions made by occupants (ocupantes) of the maritime-terrestrial zone shall have priority over others.' Article 44 of the LZMT reads: 'Concessions shall be granted observing the principle that first in time is first in right. However, the regulations of this law may establish an order of priorities considering the nature of the exploitation and its greater public convenience; but, under equal conditions, the occupant (ocupante) of the land who has possessed it quietly, publicly, and peacefully in a continuous manner shall be preferred.' And Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT states: 'Municipalities with jurisdiction in the maritime-terrestrial zone shall collect the fee established by this law for occupants (ocupantes) of the same. The collection shall be made in accordance with the use and the current appraisal by the Directorate General of Direct Taxation. This authorization shall be provisional in nature, until the development plan for the respective zone enters into force, and creates no right for the occupants (ocupantes) with respect to the concession.' From the reading of the transcribed regulations, it is concluded that there are requirements that any person must meet to hold the condition of settler (poblador): a) continuous possession of at least 10 years prior to the entry into force of the LZMT —March 16, 1977—, that is, possession that began at least by 1967; b) being born before 1949, in order to be of legal age when the indicated 10 years of possession began; c) being Costa Rican by birth; d) not being the owner of another piece of land; e) having a report from the Public Force (Fuerza Pública) or a certification from the Civil Registry, serving as proof of the aforementioned possession. Regarding the category of occupant (ocupante), the requirements to hold such a condition are: i) possession of less than 10 years prior to the entry into force of the LZMT (March 16, 1977), that is, possession that began after 1967; b) being born before 1959; c) being Costa Rican by birth; d) not being the owner of another piece of land; e) having a report from the Public Force or a certification from the Civil Registry serving as proof of the aforementioned possession. Thus, unless there is a special legal provision, persons who 1) entered the maritime-terrestrial zone before the validity of the LZMT and are neither settlers (pobladores) nor occupants (ocupantes), and 2) entered after March 16, 1977, are in a situation of illegal occupation. By harmonizing Articles 70, 44, and Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT and 75 of the RLZMT with sections 12 and 20 of the LZMT, it is concluded that settlers (pobladores) and occupants (ocupantes) are not within the exception cases provided for in the latter article (that is, section 20 by the same law), so it must be understood that the recognitions granted by the LZMT are limited to the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, and not to the public zone. Thus, the allegation of contradictory precedents raised by Public Defender [Nombre27] is resolved, in the sense that regarding the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone a) the eviction of settlers (pobladores) and occupants (ocupantes) and the destruction of the constructions used by them is indeed appropriate when they lack a permit or concession that legally enables them to exercise such possession, and b) that eviction and that destruction of the constructions may be suspended for 24 months as provided in Articles 1 and 7 of Law 9073 on Protection of Occupants (Ocupantes) of Zones Classified as Special of September 19, 2012, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 206, of October 25, 2012, Supplement 163 (on which relevant elements are set forth in Considerando V infra)."* (Judgment 1617-14 at 8:43 hours on 10-10-14 of the Third Chamber of the Court). As this Court correctly pointed out in judgment number 380-12 at 13:22 hrs. on 10-24-12, *"[...] the areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves may be located within the maritime-terrestrial zone, without this zone losing its name due to such a circumstance (in fact, the very recently transcribed rule so states). They continue to be part of the zone, but they are assigned a different management or treatment than that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the point of view of their administrative handling (different institutions in charge of their administration), but also considering the use and purposes to which they must respond, so that projects that could be carried out in accordance with the provisions on the maritime-terrestrial zone may not be executed in accordance with the wildlife conservation law or other special regulations and, conversely, the purposes of the reserves would allow for the design of projects that are unrelated to the purposes of the maritime-terrestrial zone law and pave the way for community participation, as promoted in Article 17 of the Wildlife Conservation Law; while Article 83 of that same text provides: 'The Directorate General of Wildlife (Dirección General de Vida Silvestre) shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, with respect to National Wildlife Refuges that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone.' The very law that created the Ostional Refuge (Law on Wildlife Conservation, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it '... within the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Río Nosara to Punta India...' (highlighting is supplied); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (wildlife conservation law), expanded it, situating it '... within the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste...' (bold does not appear in the original). Moreover, the issue has been the subject of multiple pronouncements by the Constitutional Chamber, some cited by the appellant himself, and in Ruling No. [Telf2], at 8:30 hours on February 13, 2009, the said Chamber expressly emphasized that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge is a 'public domain asset' that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private parties who occupy that public domain property (bien demanial) in a precarious manner lack a right of ownership. It is not superfluous to emphasize that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas included in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons set forth herein, could never be the object of acquisition by private parties."* From the foregoing, it is clear that the area over which the Ostional Wildlife Refuge extends is part of the maritime-terrestrial zone and is also a reserve created by law for the protection of flora and fauna, which is natural and forestry heritage of the State. Due to its character as a public domain property (bien demanial), it is inalienable, unattachable, and imprescriptible. Hence, the lands cannot be subject to appropriation by private parties. In the partially transcribed jurisprudential precedent from the Third Chamber of the Court, which this Court fully shares, reference is made to the legal requirements that occupants (ocupantes) and settlers (pobladores) must meet to be recognized as such; however, it is noted that, in the case of the public zone—as applies in this case—they cannot hold any right, permit, or concession, and what is appropriate is the eviction and demolition of the constructions. The accused does not have the status of occupant (ocupante) or settler (pobladora), as what she indicates is that she has been living for twelve years on the land her father left her, and that he, in turn, had it since 1957, and also that she has a map that makes her the owner of the property. None of these situations grants her any right over the public domain property (bien demanial), given that the status of occupant (ocupante) or settler (poblador) is not transferable (in the event her father may have met the requirements) and the creation of a cadastral map (plano catastrado) does not grant any right, which is why her possession is illegitimate, and as it involves public domain property, what is appropriate is to order the eviction and demolition of the works, to restore the public use of the zone, as decided by the a quo. Among other aspects, the trial court held the following: *"The accused have stated at trial that their family has resided in that sector for a long time and that today it is part of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge; they maintain that decades ago the father of [Nombre28] held the status of settler (poblador) or occupant (ocupante) of the maritime-terrestrial zone where the Ostional wildlife refuge was created. The map mentioned was registered in the name of [Nombre11] in 1999, indicating that the property is under the administration of the Ministry of Environment. This situation makes the accused believe that they have the standing to carry out repairs or constructions on the property, which has given basis to a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición) or of fact (error de tipo). The maritime-terrestrial zone in the public or restricted zone, the former comprising 50 meters and the latter 150 meters, is a public domain state asset (bien estatal demanial) that is imprescriptible and not subject to usucaption or possession. The Ostional Wildlife Refuge extends beyond the maritime-terrestrial zone as it is not limited to the indicated dimension of 200 meters. The status of settler (poblador) or occupant (ocupante) may be recognized administratively, but these cases are exceptional and must be recognized as such, it being inadmissible for this status to be determined by a court, rather than administratively. The accused have not documented their status as settlers (pobladores) or occupants (ocupantes), and this status is non-transferable through inheritance or contract, precisely because of the public domain nature of the property. On the other hand, the status of occupant (ocupante) or settler (poblador) is only recognized for those individuals whose permanence was prior to the establishment of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge or the maritime-terrestrial zone law. Having a cadastral map (plano catastrado) in the Public Property Registry was considered an authorization by the legal system to carry out the denounced constructions."* (folio 452 recto and verso). This Chamber considers that, as qualified by the a quo, in this case we are dealing with a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición), given that the accused [Nombre11] stated she has a map that makes her the owner of the land, that she has a right because her father, who was the possessor of those lands, gave it to her, and that the map bears her name, which is why she believes the land is hers (folio 450). From these statements, the trial court inferred that this is a case of mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición) because the defendants falsely believed that the circumstances existed that would justify their conduct. The court states: *"There is a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición) when the active subject assumes a defective interpretation of the fact or the rule itself. This leads the active subject to falsely believe that, in the specific case, the circumstances exist that would justify their typical conduct. In another sense, there is a mistake of prohibition when the active subject considers that there is an authorization from the legal system to carry out the action provided for by the criminal statute (indirect mistake of prohibition) or that the act committed is not subject to penalty; in this case, the error does not fall upon the circumstances but upon the prohibition itself (direct mistake of prohibition). The case could also be approached as a mistake of fact (error de tipo), when it is assumed that this false representation leads the subject to believe that, in the specific case, the necessary circumstances that would give rise to the action provided for in the criminal statute are not present, which would exclude intent (dolo).* It is said that a mistake regarding the circumstances provided for in the objective elements of the offense (tipo objetivo) that must be known at the level of subjective elements of the offense (tipo subjetivo) is a phenomenon that determines the absence of intent (dolo) when, there being objective elements of the offense, knowledge of the elements required by the objective elements of the offense (tipo objetivo) does not exist or is false. If there is a mistake of fact (error de tipo), the typical purpose disappears, that is, the will to carry out the objective elements of the offense, and without that intent there is no intent (dolo) and therefore the conduct would be atypical." (folios 451 vuelto and 452 frente). Regarding mistake of law (error de prohibición), the Third Chamber of the Court has resolved: "[...] the scholars [Nombre29] and [Nombre30] state: 'A mistake of law (error de prohibición) exists not only when the actor believes he is acting lawfully, but also when he does not even consider the unlawfulness of his act. The mistake of law (error de prohibición) can refer to the existence of the prohibitive norm as such (direct mistake of law - error de prohibición directo) or to the existence, limits, or objective preconditions of a ground for justification (causa de justificación) that authorizes the action, generally prohibited, in a specific case (indirect mistake of law - error de prohibición indirecto or mistake regarding grounds for justification). In the first case, the actor is unaware of the existence of a norm that prohibits his conduct; in the second, the actor knows that his conduct is generally prohibited, but erroneously believes that in the specific case a ground for justification exists that permits it, that he acts within its limits, or that its objective preconditions exist.' (Derecho Penal, Parte General, 7th revised edition, Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2007, pp. 382 and 383). Likewise, this Chamber has indicated on the subject: '… the mistake of law (error de prohibición) implies a defective interpretation of the fact or of the norm itself, which leads the active subject to falsely believe that in this instance the circumstances exist that would justify his typical conduct, that is, that there is an authorization from the legal system to carry out the action provided for by the criminal offense (tipo penal) (indirect mistake of law - error de prohibición indirecto), or that the act he performs is not subject to penalty, in which case the mistake does not fall on the circumstances but on the prohibition itself (direct mistake of law - error de prohibición directo). On the contrary, the mistake of fact (error de tipo) rather implies that this false representation leads the subject to believe that in this instance the necessary circumstances that would give rise to the action provided for by the criminal offense (tipo penal) do not exist, which would exclude intent (dolo): "(...) a mistake of law (error de prohibición) can stem from a false knowledge or ignorance of the fact that generates a situation we believe justified or about the norm that prohibits the conduct. Therefore, the doctrine prefers to refer to mistake of fact (error de tipo) (its analysis located in the elements of the offense - tipicidad) and mistake of law (error de prohibición) (its analysis located in culpability) (...) When the Criminal Code states in Article 35 that the insurmountable mistake must fall on the situation or 'fact' being performed that is not subject to penalty, it directly means that the subject must falsely believe that the act is not subject to penalty, which can happen when: a) The subject acts without knowing that what he is doing falls within the prohibitive scope of the Norm; b) the subject who acts considers that the Legal System grants him permission for his action; c) The subject who acts thinks he is within the scope of a ground for justification (causa de justificación) when in reality he is not. These three scenarios are included in the legal formula conceived by the Code, so there seems to be no problem in including here the elements of direct and indirect mistake of law (error de prohibición). In this nomenclature, fully compatible with our Code, the direct mistake falls on the knowledge of the prohibitive Norm (the 'Thou shalt not take land from another citizen', a criminal norm placed before the criminal offense (tipo penal) of usurpation, for example), while the indirect mistake comes to signify the false assumption of the existence of a permission that the law does not grant, and the problems of putative justification.' Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Ruling No. 446-F-92, of 15:25 hours on September 25, 1992 (…) In accordance with the above, it would be clear that if in this case it had been established at trial that the accused always acted under the false belief that the property he possessed was not the State's but his own, we would be facing a mistake of fact (error de tipo) and not a mistake of law (error de prohibición)." (Third Chamber, Judgment No. 758-2005, of ten hours ten minutes on July eight, two thousand five)." Third Chamber of the Court, judgment number 1779-13 of 2:42 hrs. on December 3, 2013. Thus, one is in the presence of a direct mistake of law (error de prohibición directo), as the accused falsely believed that the acts she performed are not subject to penalty because they are not prohibited by any norm. This means that the existence of a typical and unlawful (antijurídico) act that is not culpable was proven, and therefore cannot be reproachable, pursuant to the provisions of Article 35 of the Criminal Code. Although the trial court does not determine if this is a surmountable or insurmountable mistake, which is necessary to determine whether or not the application of a penalty is appropriate, the truth is that this Chamber does not proceed to assess such an aspect, because it was not alleged by the defense, the sole appellant of the judgment. In any case, it must be noted that both in the case of a mistake of law (error de prohibición) and in that of a mistake of fact (error de tipo), the truth is that in both scenarios the eviction and demolition order is appropriate, given that these are public domain assets (bienes demaniales), over which no private individual holds or can hold or be recognized any right whatsoever, it being irrelevant whether one faces one or the other.

II.- Appeal by Attorneys [Nombre31] and [Nombre13] . The public defenders of the accused [Nombre32] and [Nombre7] filed respective appeals because they consider that the appealed judgment incurs in non-observance of procedural rules in the reasoning that authorizes the demolition of the property. Both attorneys state that the judgment does not support the factual-legal analysis that authorizes the demolition of the building, and also that the specific point of the demolition zone or dwelling to be demolished is not extracted, and that the fact that prior to ordering the demolition or destruction there must be a management plan approved by the refuge administration was not discredited, so as not to affect the people who benefit from the resources provided by the zone. The grounds are resolved jointly as they are found to be related. The claims are dismissed. As a first aspect, it must be stated that the judgment does expressly indicate in Considering II, point A, in the section called "Proven Facts" ("Hechos Probados"), items 3 and 4, the location of the lands and the constructions that must be demolished: "THIRD) Approximately in the month of January of the year two thousand seven, the accused [Nombre11] and [Nombre4], without being authorized, built a dwelling between the vertical coordinate 352729 and horizontal coordinate 215776 in the Ostional wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre) with wooden posts, chains, zinc, and plastic approximately six meters wide and nine meters long, a site they currently hold. FOURTH) Approximately in the month of May of the year 2007, the accused [Nombre7], without being authorized, built a wooden house on Peladas beach in Nosara within the Ostional wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre) between the vertical coordinates 0352727 and horizontal coordinates 0215765 of map sheet [Placa1], six meters long by four meters wide and two and a half high..." There is, therefore, no imprecision regarding the properties, which are clearly identified. With regard to the alleged lack of a regulatory plan in the zone as a requirement to proceed with the eviction, it must be noted that the Constitutional Chamber resolved the matter as follows: "IV.- ON THE PRECARIOUS OCCUPATION OF THE OSTIONAL NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE. The Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Tempisque) of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in his report rendered under the solemnity of the oath, with the timely warning of the consequences, including criminal ones, that the obstruction of the administration of justice in this venue can bring, pursuant to the provisions of Article 44 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, assured that, currently, there are 198 natural persons and 190 legal entities occupying, precariously, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge. Furthermore, it calls this Chamber's attention that the referred official added that the occupants located in some sectors composed of mangroves and the mouths of estuaries still need to be counted, because, in accordance with the regulations governing the matter and the multiple pronouncements of the Attorney General's Office, such land extensions are public zone (zona pública), regardless of their extension. The factual framework presented by the respondent authority is worrying and denotes a neglect, on the part of the State, of its functions as the main guarantor of the environment. As highlighted in the preceding considering, in line with the provisions of Transitory Provision 1 of the Wildlife Conservation Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 235 of December 7, 1992, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge of the Tempisque Conservation Area is located within the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste, which makes it undeniable that it is a public domain asset (bien de dominio público), a state-owned refuge (refugio de propiedad estatal) according to the terminology used by Article 82 of that Law. In addition to the above, according to Article 13 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, published in the supplement to La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996, it forms part of the State Forestry Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal de Estado). On the other hand, numeral 14 of the same normative body reiterates its inalienability, unseizability, and imprescriptibility. By virtue of its public domain nature (naturaleza demanial) and its correlative dedication for the safeguarding of the flora and fauna of the zone, the lands that make up the reserve cannot be appropriated by private individuals. In other words, no natural or legal person can claim any right of possession, much less a right of property over any property located within the reserve, except for lands occupied by private individuals prior to the declaration of the Protected Wildlife Area (Área Silvestre Protegida), through Law No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, regarding which the procedures for expropriation must be initiated, if there is opposition from the owner to submit the property to the regime, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 84 and 87 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. Relatedly, the authorities may only authorize, within refuges such as Ostional, activities aimed at research, protection, training, and ecotourism, as established by Article 14 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). In the present matter, it is clear that the Administration has not fulfilled its duty to safeguard the integrity of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge and to guarantee respect for its public domain status (condición demanial), as it is stated with certainty that 388 persons, both natural and legal, precariously occupy lands that, according to the above, must be dedicated exclusively to the protection of the flora and fauna of the zone. It is obvious that their presence in the place alters the natural harmony that the creation of the refuge intended to keep intact, especially given the fragility of the environment, as it is a place where the massive nesting of turtles cyclically occurs. The situation is further aggravated considering that the Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area implied that there could be more occupants in the mangrove and estuary mouth sectors, places that are essential, as is well known, for maintaining the balance of the maritime habitat. Therefore, this Constitutional Court must intervene to reinstate the enjoyment and exercise of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.

V.- ON THE LACK OF A MANAGEMENT PLAN IN THE OSTIONAL NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE. Article 2 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 32633-MINAE of March 10, 2005, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005, a management plan (plan de manejo) is: “[…] a set of technical norms that will regulate the actions to be carried out in a zoo, breeding farm (zoocriadero), nursery, aquarium, hunting farm (finca cinegética), rescue center, botanical garden, or wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre), with the aim of managing and conserving wildlife, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources that will guarantee the sustainability of the resource […].” The importance of a management plan (plan de manejo) as a tool for safeguarding the natural resource in this type of refuge, as well as for channeling the research, protection, training, and ecotourism activities that can be carried out in a state-owned refuge, is patent. It is then possible to establish a causal link between the lack of a management plan (plan de manejo) in the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge and the disorder that prevails in it. Finally, it is important to clarify to the respondent authority that, although it is true the approval process for the Management Plan has been difficult – the third attempt is being made – such a fact does not justify that 25 years after the creation of the Refuge (through Law. No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, repealed but, in turn, the refuge maintained by Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992), it does not have a management plan (plan de manejo), which undoubtedly, as seen, results in a constant state of threat to the environment." (Judgment 2020-09 of 08:30 hrs. on 13-02-09). The management plan (plan de manejo) is an imperative of the law as noted by the Constitutional Chamber in the cited judgment; however, this does not mean that evictions are contingent upon its existence, given that it is a wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre), which cannot be the object of private occupation, and the constructions are located in the public zone (zona pública). Finally, regarding the grounds for the eviction and demolition, although the trial court does not make an extensive development on the matter, it is sufficient to prove that "[...] the accused do not have the status of occupants or residents of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) of Peladas de Nosara beach or of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge. The construction of the denounced works took place (sic) in the first half of the year 2007 and it was not a matter of necessary repairs or remodeling but of new work. Regardless of whether the father of the accused [Nombre28] had the status of occupant or resident in that sector of Peladas de Nosara beach, as the accused argue, that situation is not transferable, inheritable, nor the object of a contract transferring ownership. Consequently, despite the fact that there is a mistake of law (error de prohibición), or else a mistake of fact (error de tipo), depending on how it is analyzed, the truth of the matter is that the defendants cannot remain in the Ostional wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre) as possessors or occupants, and therefore, the eviction of the property and demolition of the works built must be ordered once this judgment becomes final." (folios 453 frente and vuelto). This Court considers that the assessment of these elements is sufficient to justify the eviction and demolition of the works built in the Ostional Wildlife Refuge. For all the foregoing reasons, the appeals filed are dismissed.

POR TANTO

The appeals filed by the public defenders of the accused are dismissed. NOTIFÍQUESE.

LUCILA MONGE PIZARRO LUIS GUILLERMO ARAYA VALLEJOS GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS APPELLATE JUDGE AND JUDGES OF SENTENCE Judicial Circuit of Santa Cruz, [Dirección1], Telephones: [Telf3]. Fax: [Telf4].

**"I- Appeal of attorney [Name1] .** The public defender of the accused [Name2] filed an appeal against the judgment that acquitted his client, arguing that there was an **erroneous application of the substantive law.** He states that the court considered a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición) to be proven because it considered that his client believed she was acting under the protection of a document—a cadastral map—and in the belief that the possession as an occupant or settler of her father was transmitted to her by tradition, when the truth is that his client acted without intent—regarding the objective and subjective elements of the offense—despite which the court ordered the demolition of the accused's dwelling, without indicating the reasons or basis for it. He states that his client has never acted based on a false assessment of the circumstances or because she was unaware of some or all of the objective elements of the offense, but rather because she claims she lived in the area before the existence of the law. At the oral hearing, the public defender pointed out that the accused and her family arrived in the area as settlers, that she has had to endure errors by the Administration, and that foreigners who inhabit the area have even been allowed to build an airport. **The appeal is dismissed.** The accused [Name2] stated in her declaration that she has lived for twelve years on the land her father left her, that before it was a refuge he had this land, that he was a pioneer around the year 1957. She stated that they unjustly accuse her of being an invader and she has fought for this property. Likewise, that she has a map that makes her the owner of the property, that she has a right to that land and that her family fought to survive there (folio 450). Regarding the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional), this Court indicated: *"The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly ruled to the effect that the Ostional Wildlife Refuge is a natural heritage asset of the State, has the character of public domain property (bien demanial) and cannot be the object of private appropriation; it has also clarified the use of the concept of "public zone" (zona pública) contained in the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), applied to the Refuges. In this regard, we can cite rulings No. **5976-93** of 15:42 hours on November 16, 1993 **,** No. **[Telf1]** of 08:52 hours on August 22, 2003 **,** No. **2008-013655** of 11:55 hours on September 5, 2008, No. **2009-002020** of 8:30 hours on February 13, 2009, in addition to the one analyzed in the appealed judgment, No. **13558-2003** of 12:28 hours on November 28, 2003. Our Constitutional Court has stated: '…in accordance with the provisions of Temporary Provision 1 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 235 of December 7, 1992, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge of the Tempisque Conservation Area is located **within the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre)** that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste, therefore it is undebatable that it is a public domain asset, a state-owned refuge in accordance with the terminology used by Article 82 of that Law. In addition to the above, according to Article 13 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, published in the supplement to La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996, it forms part of the State's Forestry Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado). On the other hand, section 14 of the same regulatory body reiterates, as such, its inalienability, unattachability, and imprescriptibility. **By virtue of its public domain nature and its corresponding designation for the protection of the flora and fauna of the area, the lands that make up the reserve cannot be appropriated by private individuals.** In other words, no natural or legal person may claim any possessory right, much less any property right, over any property located within the reserve, except for lands occupied by private individuals prior to the declaration of the Protected Wildlife Area (Área Silvestre Protegida) through Law No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, for which expropriation procedures must be initiated if the owner opposes subjecting the property to the regime, in compliance with the provisions of Articles 84 and 87 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. Connectedly, the authorities may only authorize activities within refuges such as Ostional that are aimed at research, protection, training, and ecotourism, as established by Article 14 of the Forestry Law' (Constitutional Chamber, Resolution **No. 2009-002020** of 8:30 hours on February 13, 2009, underlining supplied)."* (Judgment of this Court, number 62-15 of 13:35 hours on 14-04-15). Likewise, the Third Chamber of the Court resolved regarding settlers (pobladores) and occupants (ocupantes): *"**III.- On the settler and the occupant in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone**. The Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre) 6043, of March 2, 1977 (published in Supplement 35 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta 52 of March 16, 1977, and effective as of this latter date, hereinafter LZMT) establishes in Article 12, in general regarding the maritime-terrestrial zone, that 'it is prohibited, without proper legal authorization, to exploit the existing flora and fauna, to demarcate with fences, trails, or in any other way, to erect buildings or installations, to cut trees, extract products, or carry out any other type of development, activity, or occupation.' And specifically regarding the public zone, it determines in section 20: 'Except for the exceptions established by law, the public zone may not be the object of occupation under any title or in any case. No one may claim any right over it. It shall be dedicated to public use and especially to the free transit of persons. The entities and authorities indicated in Article 18 shall issue and enforce the necessary provisions to guarantee the free and safe transit of persons and the public use of this zone.' The exceptions referred to in this section 20 of the LZMT are: A) Those sections that, due to their geographical configuration, topography, or special conditions, cannot be used for public use, in which case their development is authorized by the respective municipality and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo), provided they are not alienated and a free transit zone is established that facilitates the public use and enjoyment of the beaches, cliffs, and estuaries, and pedestrian safety is guaranteed (Article 21 LZMT). B) Infrastructure and construction works approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, MOPT), the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, INVU), and the respective municipality, considering the public use for which they are intended, or that they involve the establishment and operation of state tourist facilities of notable convenience for the country (Article 22 LZMT). And C) Cases contained in laws that regulate special aspects of the maritime-terrestrial zone, for example, the case contained in Law 7744, on the Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas and Docks (Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos) of December 19, 1997 (published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 26, of February 6, 1998). However, it is appropriate to specify that Law 6043, on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone and its Regulations (issued by Decree 7841-P, of December 16, 1977, published in Supplement 16, of the Official Gazette La Gaceta 20, of January 27, 1978, and effective as of this latter date; hereinafter RLZMT) establish two categories of natural persons who exercise acts of occupation in the maritime-terrestrial zone: settler (poblador) and occupant (ocupante). The figure of the settler is regulated in Articles 70 of the LZMT and 75 of the RLZMT; that of the occupant is found in Articles 44 and Temporary Provision VII of the LZMT. Article 70 of the LZMT reads: 'Settlers of the maritime-terrestrial zone, Costa Ricans by birth, with more than ten years of residence in it, according to information from the authority of the local Rural Assistance Guard (Guardia de Asistencia Rural) or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property. However, they must adhere to the zoning plan, for which purpose they may be relocated and their improvements compensated in accordance with this law. In all cases, the public zone must be respected.' Section 75 of the RLZMT states: 'Settlers of the maritime-terrestrial zone, Costa Ricans by birth, with more than ten years of continuous residence in it, according to information from the authority of the local Rural Assistance Guard or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property, and may be relocated in accordance with the zoning plan, upon prior compensation for improvements. In all cases, the public zone must be respected. When the period of residence is less than ten years, the settlers may apply for a concession (concesión) over the property, provided that no part of the public zone is included. If there are improvements in the public zone, the provisions of subsection e), Article 73 of the regulations, and the provisions of Article 74 of the regulations shall apply if the improvements are located in the restricted zone (zona restringida). Those who, not being settlers, have constructed or built in the restricted zone on illegally possessed properties shall not have the right to payment for improvements. However, they may apply for a concession over the property and, if granted, they shall not be charged for the use and enjoyment of these improvements. Concession applications made by occupants of the maritime-terrestrial zone shall have priority over others.' Article 44 of the LZMT reads: 'Concessions shall be granted following the principle of first in time, first in right. However, the regulations of this law may establish an order of priorities considering the nature of the exploitation and its greater public convenience; but under equal conditions, the occupant of the land who has possessed it quietly, publicly, and peacefully in a continuous manner shall be preferred.' And Temporary Provision VII of the LZMT states: 'Municipalities with jurisdiction in the maritime-terrestrial zone shall collect the canon established by this law for the occupants thereof. The collection shall be made according to the use and the current appraisal by the General Directorate of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de la Tributación Directa). This authorization shall be provisional in nature, until the development plan for the respective zone comes into effect, and does not produce any right for the occupants regarding a concession.' From a reading of the transcribed norms, it can be concluded that there are requirements that every person must meet to hold the status of settler: a) continuous possession of at least 10 years prior to the entry into force of the LZMT—March 16, 1977—that is, possession that began at least in 1967; b) born before 1949, to be of legal age at the start of the 10 years of indicated possession; c) being Costa Rican by birth; d) not being the owner of another land; e) having a report from the Public Force (Fuerza Pública) or a certification from the Civil Registry, serving as proof of the possession in question. In relation to the category of occupant, the requirements to hold such status are: i) possession of less than 10 years prior to the entry into force of the LZMT (March 16, 1977), that is, possession that began after 1967; b) born before 1959; c) being Costa Rican by birth; d) not being the owner of another land; e) having a report from the Public Force or a certification from the Civil Registry serving as proof of the possession in question. Thus, except for special legal provision, persons who 1) entered the maritime-terrestrial zone before the LZMT came into force and are neither settlers nor occupants, and 2) entered after March 16, 1977, are in a situation of illegal occupation. By reconciling Articles 70, 44, and Temporary Provision VII of the LZMT and 75 of the RLZMT with sections 12 and 20 of the LZMT, it is concluded that settlers and occupants are not within the exception cases provided in the latter article (that is, section 20 ibidem), so it must be understood that the recognitions granted by the LZMT are limited to the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, and not to the public zone. The allegation of contradictory precedents formulated by the Public Defender [Name3] is thus resolved, to the effect that regarding the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone a) the eviction of settlers and occupants and the destruction of the constructions used by them does proceed when they lack a permit or concession that legally enables them to exercise such possession, and b) said eviction and destruction of the constructions may be suspended for 24 months as provided in Articles 1 and 7 of Law 9073, on the Protection of Occupants of Zones Classified as Special (Ley de Protección a los Ocupantes de Zonas Clasificadas como Especiales) of September 19, 2012, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 206, of October 25, 2012, Supplement 163 (on which relevant elements are set forth in Considering V below)."* (Judgment 1617-14 of 8:43 hours on 10-10-14 of the Third Chamber of the Court).

As this Court rightly pointed out in judgment number 380-12 of 13:22 hours on 24-10-12, *"[...] the areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves may be located within the maritime-terrestrial zone, without this circumstance causing that zone to lose its name (in fact, the very recently transcribed rule says so). They continue to be part of the zone, but they are assigned a different management or treatment from that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the point of view of their administrative management (different institutions in charge of their administration), but also according to the use and purposes to which they must respond, so that projects that could be carried out under the provisions on the maritime-terrestrial zone may not be executed under the wildlife conservation law or other special regulations, and, conversely, the specific purposes of the reserves would allow the design of projects unrelated to the purposes of the law on the maritime-terrestrial zone and open the way for community participation, fostered in Article 17 of the Wildlife Conservation Law; while Article 83 of that same text provides: 'The General Directorate of Wildlife (Dirección General de Vida Silvestre) shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, regarding National Wildlife Refuges that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone.' The very law that created the Ostional Refuge (Fauna Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it '... within the two hundred meters of the **maritime-terrestrial zone** that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Nosara River to Punta India...' (highlighting supplied); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (wildlife conservation law), expanded it, locating it '... within the two hundred meters of the **maritime-terrestrial zone** that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste...' (bold text does not appear in the original). Moreover, the issue has been the subject of multiple pronouncements by the Constitutional Chamber, some cited by the appellant themselves, and in ruling No. [Telf2], of 8:30 hours on February 13, 2009, the said Chamber expressly emphasized that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge is a 'public domain asset' that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy that public domain property lack any property right. It is worth emphasizing that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas included in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons set forth here, could never have been subject to acquisition by private individuals."* From the foregoing, it is clear that the area over which the Ostional Wildlife Refuge extends is a maritime-terrestrial zone and, furthermore, it is a reserve created by law for the protection of flora and fauna, the State's natural and forestry heritage. Due to its character as a public domain property (bien demanial), it is inalienable, unattachable, and imprescriptible. Hence, the lands cannot be subject to appropriation by private individuals. In the partially transcribed jurisprudential precedent of the Third Chamber of the Court, which this Court fully shares, reference is made to the legal requirements that occupants (ocupantes) and settlers (pobladores) must meet to be recognized as such; however, it is noted that in the case of the public zone—as applies to this case—they cannot hold any right, permit, or concession, and what is appropriate is the eviction (desalojo) and demolition (derribo) of the constructions.

The accused does not have the status of occupant or settler, as what she indicates is that she has lived for twelve years on the land her father left her, and that he, in turn, had it since 1957, and also that she has a map that makes her the owner of the property. None of these suppositions grants her any right over the public domain property, given that the status of occupant or settler cannot be transmitted (in the event that her father had met the requirements), and the making of a cadastral map does not grant any right, which is why her possession is illegitimate, and since these are public domain properties, what is appropriate is to order the eviction and demolition of the works, to recover the public use of the zone, as resolved by the *a quo* court.

Among other aspects, the trial court held the following: *"The defendants have stated at trial that their family has resided in that sector for a long time and that today it is part of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge; they maintain that decades ago, the father of [Name4] held the status of settler or occupant of the maritime-terrestrial zone where the Ostional wildlife refuge was created. The map mentioned was registered in the name of [Name2] in 1999, indicating that the property is under the administration of the Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente). This situation makes the defendants believe that they have the legitimacy to carry out repairs or constructions on the property, which has given rise to a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición) or of type (error de tipo). The maritime-terrestrial zone in the public or restricted zone, the former 50 meters and the latter 150 meters, is a public domain state asset and imprescriptible, not susceptible to usucapion or possession. The Ostional Wildlife Refuge extends beyond the maritime-terrestrial zone, as it is not limited to the indicated dimension of 200 meters. Administratively, the status of settler or occupant can be recognized, but these cases are exceptional and must be recognized as such, it not being admissible for that status to be determined in a judicial venue, but rather administratively."* The defendants have not documented their status as a settler or occupant, and this status is non-transferable via succession or contract, precisely because of the public domain nature of the property. Furthermore, the status of occupant or settler is recognized only for those individuals whose presence predates the establishment of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge or the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law. Having a cadastral plan registered with the Public Property Registry was considered an authorization under the legal system to carry out the reported constructions."</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span>(folio 452, front and back). This Chamber considers that, as qualified by the <span style="font-style:italic">a quo</span>, this case presents an error of prohibition (error de prohibición), given that the accused [Name2] stated that she has a plan that makes her the owner of the land, that she has a right because her father, who was the possessor of those lands, gave it to her, and that the plan bears her name, leading her to believe the land is hers (folio 450). From these statements, the trial court inferred that an error of prohibition exists because the defendants falsely believed that the circumstances justifying their conduct were present. The court states: <span style="font-style:italic">"An error of prohibition exists when the active subject makes a faulty interpretation of the fact or the norm itself. This leads the active subject to falsely believe that, in this specific case, the circumstances that would justify their criminal conduct exist. In another sense, an error of prohibition exists when the active subject considers that there is an authorization from the legal system to carry out the action set forth in the criminal statute (indirect error of prohibition), or that the act they are committing is not subject to punishment; in this case, the error does not concern the circumstances but the prohibition itself (direct error of prohibition). The case could also be viewed as an error of type, when it is assumed that this false representation leads the subject to believe that the circumstances necessary to give rise to the action set forth in the criminal statute do not exist in this case, which would exclude intent. It is said that an error regarding the circumstances provided for in the objective type that must be known at the subjective type level is a phenomenon that determines the absence of intent when, despite the existence of objective criminality, there is no or false knowledge of the elements required by the objective type; if an error of type exists, the criminal purpose disappears, that is, the will to realize the objective type, and without that will, there is no intent, and therefore the conduct would be considered not criminal."</span> (folios 451 back and 452 front). Regarding the error of prohibition, the Third Chamber of the Court has ruled: <span style="font-style:italic">"[...] the legal scholars [Name5] and [Name6] state: 'An error of prohibition exists not only when the author believes they are acting lawfully, but also when they do not even consider the unlawfulness of their act. The error of prohibition can refer to the existence of the prohibitive norm as such (direct error of prohibition) or to the existence, limits, or objective prerequisites of a cause of justification that authorizes the act, generally prohibited, in a specific case (indirect error of prohibition or error regarding causes of justification). In the first case, the author is unaware of the existence of a norm prohibiting their conduct; in the second, the author knows that their conduct is generally prohibited, but erroneously believes that in the specific case a cause of justification permits it, that they are acting within its limits, or that its objective prerequisites are present.'" </span>( <span style="text-decoration:underline">Derecho Penal, </span>Parte General, 7th revised edition, [Name7], Valencia, 2007, pp. 382 and 383). Likewise, this Chamber has indicated on the subject: <span style="font-style:italic">'… an error of prohibition presupposes a faulty interpretation of the fact or the norm itself, which leads the active subject to falsely believe that the circumstances that would justify their criminal conduct exist in this case, that is, that there is an authorization from the legal system to carry out the action set forth in the criminal statute (indirect error of prohibition), or that the act they commit is not subject to punishment, in which case the error does not concern the circumstances but the prohibition itself (direct error of prohibition). Conversely, an error of type rather presupposes that this false representation leads the subject to believe that the circumstances necessary to give rise to the action set forth by the criminal statute do not exist in this case, which would exclude intent: "(...) an error of prohibition can arise from false knowledge or ignorance of the fact that generates a situation we believe is justified, or about the norm that prohibits the conduct. Therefore, doctrine prefers to refer to error of type (with its analysis located in criminality) and error of prohibition (with its analysis located in culpability) (...) When the Penal Code states in Article 35 that the insurmountable error must concern the situation or 'fact' being committed is not subject to punishment, it directly means that the subject must falsely believe that the fact is not subject to punishment, which can occur when: a) The subject acts without knowing that what they are doing falls within the prohibitive scope of the Norm; b) the acting subject considers that the Legal System grants them permission for their action; c) The acting subject believes they are within the scope of a cause of justification when in reality they are not. These three scenarios are included in the legal formula conceived by the Code, so there seems to be no problem including the elements of direct and indirect error of prohibition here. In this terminology, fully compatible with our Code, direct error concerns knowledge of the prohibitive Norm (the 'Thou shalt not take land from another citizen,' a criminal norm preceding the criminal statute of usurpation, for example), while indirect error signifies the false assumption of the existence of a permission that the law does not grant, and the problems of putative justification."' Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Voto N°446-F-92, at 15:25 hours on September 25, 1992 (...) According to the above, it would be clear that if in this case it had been established at trial that the defendant always acted under the false belief that the property they possessed was not the State's but their own, we would be facing an error of type and not an error of prohibition."</span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span>( <span style="font-style:italic">Sala Tercera, judgment N°758-2005, at ten hours ten minutes on July eighth, two thousand five)."</span> Third Chamber of the Court, judgment number 1779-13 at 2:42 hrs. on December 3, 2013. Thus, this is a case of direct error of prohibition, as the accused falsely believed that the acts she committed were not subject to punishment because they were not prohibited by any norm. This means that the existence of a criminal and unlawful act that is not culpable, and therefore cannot be reproachable, has been proven, pursuant to the provisions of Article 35 of the Penal Code. While the court does not determine whether this is a surmountable or insurmountable error—a determination necessary to decide whether the application of a penalty is appropriate—this Chamber does not proceed to assess that aspect, because it was not raised by the defense, the sole appellant of the judgment. In any case, it must be noted that both in the scenario of error of prohibition and error of type, the order for eviction and demolition proceeds, as these are public domain properties (bienes demaniales), over which no private individual holds or can hold, or be recognized as holding, any right, making it irrelevant whether one or the other is faced. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">II.- Appeal by Attorneys [Name8] and [Name9].</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span>The public defenders for the accused [Name10] and [Name11] each filed appeals, arguing that the challenged judgment incurs a </span><span style="font-weight:bold">failure to observe procedural rules in the reasoning authorizing the demolition of the property.</span><span> Both attorneys point out that the judgment does not support the factual-legal analysis authorizing the demolition of the property, that it does not extract the specific point of the demolition zone or the dwelling to be demolished, and that it did not discredit the fact that, prior to ordering demolition, there must be a management plan approved by the refuge administration, so as not to affect the people who benefit from the resources provided by the zone.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> The grounds are resolved jointly as they are related. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">The claims are dismissed. </span><span>As a first point, it must be noted that the judgment does expressly state, in Considerando II, point A, in the section titled </span><span style="font-style:italic">"Hechos Probados"</span><span>, 3 and 4, the location of the lands and the constructions that must be demolished: </span><span style="font-style:italic">"THIRD) Approximately in the month of January of the year two thousand seven, the accused [Name2] and [Name12], without being authorized, built a dwelling between vertical coordinate 352729 and horizontal coordinate 215776 in the Ostional Wildlife Refuge using wooden posts, chains, zinc, and plastic, approximately six meters wide and nine meters long, a site they currently hold. FOURTH) Approximately in the month of May of the year 2007, the accused [Name11], without being authorized, built a wooden house at Peladas Beach in Nosara within the Ostional Wildlife Refuge between vertical coordinates 0352727 and horizontal coordinates 0215765 of the map sheet [Placa1], six meters long by four meters wide and two and a half meters high..."</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span>Therefore, there is no imprecision regarding the properties, which are clearly identified. As for the alleged lack of a regulatory plan in the zone as a prerequisite for proceeding with the eviction, it must be noted that the Constitutional Chamber resolved the matter as follows: </span><span style="font-style:italic">"</span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">IV.- ON THE PRECARIOUS OCCUPATION OF THE OSTIONAL NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE. </span><span style="font-style:italic">The Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area of the National System of Conservation Areas of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in his report rendered under oath, with due warning of the consequences, including criminal ones, that obstructing the administration of justice in this venue may bring, pursuant to the provisions of Article 44 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, assured that, currently, there are 198 natural persons and 190 legal persons occupying, in a precarious manner, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge. Moreover, this Chamber is struck by the fact that the aforementioned official added that the occupants located in some sectors comprising mangroves and the estuaries' tidal inlets remain to be counted, because, in accordance with the regulations governing the matter and multiple pronouncements of the Attorney General's Office, such land extensions are public zone (zona pública), regardless of their size. The factual framework presented by the respondent authority is concerning and denotes a neglect, on the part of the State, of its duties as the primary guarantor of the environment. As emphasized in the preceding considerando, in accordance with the provisions of Transitorio 1° of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 235 of December 7, 1992, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge of the Tempisque Conservation Area is located within the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) extending from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Cantón of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste; therefore, it is indisputable that it is a public domain property, a state-owned refuge according to the terminology used by Article 82 of that Law. In addition to the above, according to Article 13 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, published in the supplement to La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996, it forms part of the State Forestry Heritage. Furthermore, numeral 14 of the same regulatory body reiterates its inalienability, unattachability, and imprescriptibility as such. Due to its public domain nature (naturaleza demanial) and its corresponding designation for the protection of the area's flora and fauna, the lands that make up the reserve cannot be appropriated by private individuals. In other words, no natural or legal person may claim any right of possession, much less a right of property, over any property located within the reserve, except for lands occupied by private individuals prior to the declaration of the Protected Wildlife Area through Law No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, for which expropriation proceedings must be initiated if the titleholder opposes subjecting the property to the regime, in compliance with the provisions of Articles 84 and 87 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre. Correspondingly, authorities may only authorize activities within refuges such as Ostional that tend towards research, protection, training, and ecotourism, as established by Article 14 of the Ley Forestal. In the present matter, it is clear that the Administration has not fulfilled its duty to safeguard the integrity of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge and to guarantee respect for its public domain status (condición demanial), since it is affirmed with certainty that 388 persons, both natural and legal, precariously occupy lands that, according to the foregoing, must be dedicated exclusively to the protection of the area's flora and fauna. It is obvious that their presence in the place alters the natural harmony that the creation of the refuge sought to preserve intact, especially given the fragility of the environment, as this is a place where mass turtle nesting cyclically occurs. The situation is further aggravated if one considers that the Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area implied that there could be more occupants in the mangrove and estuary inlet sectors, places that are essential, as is well known, for maintaining the balance of the maritime habitat. That being the case, this Constitutional Court must intervene to reinstate the enjoyment and exercise of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">V.- ON THE LACK OF A MANAGEMENT PLAN IN THE OSTIONAL NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE. </span><span style="font-style:italic">Article 2 of the Regulation to the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 32633-MINAE of March 10, 2005, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005, defines a management plan as:</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> “[…] a set of technical rules that will regulate the actions to be executed in a zoo, breeding center, nursery, aquarium, hunting farm, rescue center, botanical garden, or wildlife refuge, in order to manage and conserve wildlife, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources that will guarantee the sustainability of the resource […].”</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> The importance of a management plan as a tool for safeguarding the natural resource in this type of refuge, as well as for channeling the research, protection, training, and ecotourism activities that can be carried out in a state-owned refuge, is evident. Thus, it is possible to establish a causal link between the lack of a management plan in the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge and the disorder prevailing within it. Finally, it is important to clarify to the respondent authority that, although it is true the approval process for the Management Plan has been difficult –the third attempt is underway–, this fact does not justify that, 25 years after the creation of the Refuge (through Ley. No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, repealed but, in turn, the refuge maintained by Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992), it does not have a management plan, which undoubtedly results, as seen, in a constant state of threat to the environment." </span><span>(Judgment 2020-09 at 08:30 hrs. on 02-13-09). The management plan is a legal imperative, as highlighted by the Constitutional Chamber in the cited judgment; however, this does not mean that evictions are contingent upon its existence, given that this is a wildlife refuge, which cannot be subject to private occupation, and the constructions are located in the public zone. Finally, regarding the grounds for eviction and demolition, although the court does not elaborate extensively on the matter, it is sufficient to prove that </span><span style="font-style:italic">"[...] the defendants do not have the status of occupants or settlers of the maritime-terrestrial zone of Peladas Beach, Nosara, nor of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge. The construction of the reported works occurred (sic) in the first half of 2007 and involved new works, not necessary repairs or remodeling. Regardless of whether the father of the accused [Name4] had the status of occupant or settler in that sector of Peladas Beach, Nosara, as the defendants claim, that situation is not transferable, inheritable, nor subject to a contract transferring ownership. Consequently, despite the existence of an error of prohibition, or an error of type, depending on the analysis, the fact remains that the accused cannot remain in the Ostional Wildlife Refuge as possessors or occupants, and therefore the eviction from the property and demolition of the works constructed must be ordered once the judgment becomes final." </span><span>(folios 453, front and back). This Court considers that the assessment of these elements is sufficient to justify the eviction and the demolition of the works constructed in the Ostional Wildlife Refuge. For all the foregoing reasons, the appeals filed are dismissed."</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html> Appearing at this venue were Mr. [Name10], public defender of the accused [Name11]; Mr. [Name12], public defender of the accused [Name4]; Ms. [Name13], public defender of the accused [Name7]; the State Attorneys (procuradores de la República) Mr. [Name14] and Mr. [Name15]; and representing the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), Mr. [Name16] and Mr. [Name17].

**WHEREAS (RESULTANDO)**

**1.-** By judgment no. 134-2015 of seven-fifteen hours on twenty-six May two thousand fifteen, the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio) of the Second Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Nicoya venue, resolved: "**THEREFORE (POR TANTO):** Based on the foregoing, articles 39, 41 of the Political Constitution, 1, 2, 9, 31, 32, 33, 142, 265, 267, 360, 361, 364, 365, 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), 1, 24, 30, 31, 34, 35, 45, 225 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), 58 of the Ley Forestal, **[Name18], [Name19] AND [Name20] ARE ACQUITTED OF PENALTY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIMES OF VIOLATION OF THE LEY FORESTAL IN THE MODE OF INVASION OF CONSERVATION AREAS AND USURPATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN PROPERTY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE STATE.** Once the judgment is final, the eviction (desalojo) of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional) and demolition of the constructed works that gave rise to this complaint are ordered. The execution and fulfillment of the eviction and demolition shall be the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación) of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre de Ostional) jointly with the Municipality of Nicoya. The civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) filed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) is dismissed, and the matter is resolved without an award of personal and procedural costs. Once the judgment is final and the eviction and demolition have been carried out, the archiving of the case is ordered; the costs of the criminal proceedings are to be borne by the State. Notify by reading. [Name21] Trial Judge (Juez de Juicio)" (sic).

**2.-** Against the preceding ruling, Mr. [Name10], public defender of the accused [Name22]; Mr. [Name12], public defender of the accused [Name23]; and Ms. [Name13], public defender of the accused [Name24]; filed appeals (recursos de apelación).

**3.-** An oral hearing was held at ten hours twelve minutes on ten September two thousand fifteen, at which were present the public defenders Mr. [Name12], Mr. [Name10], and Ms. [Name13]; the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, Mr. [Name17]; and the representative of the Office of the Attorney General, Mr. [Name15]. Judge [Name25] was not present at said hearing; however, no evidence was produced nor were new arguments raised therein.

**4.-** Having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court took up the matters raised in the appeal.

**5.-** The pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge **[Name26]** ; and, **CONSIDERING (CONSIDERANDO)** **I- Appeal (Recurso) of Mr. [Name10].** The public defender of the accused [Name11] filed an appeal against the judgment that acquitted his client, on the grounds that an **erroneous application of substantive law** occurred. He states that the court finds a mistake of law (error de prohibición) proven, in that it considers his client believed she was acting under the authority of a document—a cadastral map (plano catastrado)—and in the belief that the possession (posesión) as an occupant or settler (poblador) of her father was transmitted to her by tradition, when the truth is that his client acted without criminal intent (dolo)—regarding the objective and subjective elements of the offense—despite which the court ordered the demolition of the accused's home, without indicating the reasons or the legal basis for doing so. He states that his client has at no time acted based on a false assessment of the circumstances or because she was unaware of any or all of the objective elements of the offense, but rather because she claims she was living in the area before the existence of the law. At the oral hearing, the defender stated that the accused and her family arrived in the area as settlers (pobladores), that she has had to endure errors by the Administration, and that foreigners who inhabit the area have even been allowed to build an airport. **The appeal is dismissed.** The accused [Name11] stated in her declaration that she has lived for twelve years on the land her father left her, that before it was a refuge he had this land, that he was a pioneer around the year 1957. She stated that she is unjustly accused of being an invader (invasora) and has fought for this property. Likewise, that she has a map (plano) that entitles her to the property, that she has a right to that land, and that her family fought to survive there (folio 450). Regarding the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge, this Court stated: *"The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled repeatedly that the Ostional Wildlife Refuge is a natural heritage of the State, has the character of public domain property (bien demanial), and cannot be the object of private appropriation; it has also clarified the use of the concept of 'public zone (zona pública)' contained in the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), as applied to Refuges. In this regard, we can cite rulings (votos) No.* ***5976-93*** *of 15:42 hours on 16 November 1993,* *No.* ***[Telf1]*** *of 08:52 hours on 22 August 2003,* *No.* ***2008-013655*** *of 11:55 hours on 5 September 2008, No.* ***2009-002020*** *of 8:30 hours on 13 February 2009, in addition to the one analyzed in the appealed judgment, No.* ***13558-2003*** *of 12:28 hours on 28 November 2003. Our Constitutional Court has stated: '…in accordance with the provisions of Transitory Provision 1 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) No. 7317 of 30 October 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 235 of 7 December 1992, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge of the Tempisque Conservation Area is located* *on the two hundred meters of the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre)* *extending from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste, making it indisputable that it is a public domain property, a state-owned refuge in accordance with the terminology used by Article 82 of that Law. In addition to the above, pursuant to Article 13 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575 of 13 February 1996, published in the supplement to La Gaceta No. 72 of 16 April 1996, it forms part of the Forest Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Forestal de Estado). Furthermore, numeral 14 of the same regulatory body reiterates, as such, its inalienability, unattachability (inembargabilidad), and imprescriptibility.* *By virtue of its public domain nature and its corresponding designation for the protection of the flora and fauna of the area, the lands that make up the reserve cannot be appropriated by private individuals.* *In other words, no natural or legal person may claim any possessory right (derecho de posesión), much less a right of ownership (derecho de propiedad), over any property (inmueble) located within the reserve, except in the case of lands occupied by private individuals prior to the declaration of the Protected Wildlife Area (Área Silvestre Protegida), by Law No. 6919 of 17 November 1983, for which expropriation proceedings must be initiated, if the owner opposes subjecting the property to the regime, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 84 and 87 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. Correspondingly, the authorities may only authorize activities within refuges such as Ostional that are intended for research, protection, training, and ecotourism, as established by Article 14 of the Ley Forestal' (Constitutional Chamber, Resolution* ***N°2009-002020*** *of 8:30 hours on 13 February 2009, underlining supplied)."* (Judgment of this Court, number 62-15 of 13:35 hrs. on 14-04-15). Likewise, the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Court ruled on settlers (pobladores) and occupants (ocupantes): *"* ***III.- On the settler (poblador) and the occupant (ocupante) in the public zone of the maritime terrestrial zone.** *The Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre) 6043, of 02 March 1977 (published in Supplement 35 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta 52 of 16 March 1977, and effective as of this latter date, hereinafter LZMT) establishes in Article 12, generally regarding the maritime terrestrial zone, that 'it is prohibited, without the due legal authorization, to exploit the existing flora and fauna, to demarcate with fences, tracks, or in any other way, to erect buildings or installations, to cut trees, extract products, or carry out any other type of development, activity, or occupation.' And specifically regarding the public zone, it determines in numeral 20: 'Except for the exceptions established by law, the public zone cannot be the object of occupation under any title or in any case. No one may claim any right over it. It shall be dedicated to public use and especially to the free transit of persons. The entities and authorities indicated in Article 18 must issue and enforce the necessary provisions to guarantee the free and safe transit of persons and the public use of this zone.' The exceptions referred to in this numeral 20 of the LZMT are: A) Those sections that, due to their geographical configuration, topography, or special conditions, cannot be used for public use, in which case their development is authorized by the respective municipality and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo), provided they are not alienated and a zone of free transit is established that facilitates the public use and enjoyment of the beaches, cliffs, and estuaries and guarantees the safety of pedestrians (Article 21 LZMT). B) Infrastructure and construction works approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo), and the respective municipality, in view of the public use for which they are intended, or because they involve the establishment and operation of state tourism facilities of clear convenience for the country (Article 22 LZMT). And C) The cases contained in laws that regulate special aspects of the maritime terrestrial zone, for example, the case contained in Law 7744, on the Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas and Docks (Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos) of 19 December 1997 (published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 26, of 06 February 1998). However, it is appropriate to specify that Law 6043, on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and its Regulation (issued by Decree 7841-P, of 16 December 1977, published in Supplement 16 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta 20, of 27 January 1978, and effective as of this latter date; hereinafter RLZMT) establish two categories of natural persons who carry out acts of occupation in the maritime terrestrial zone: settler (poblador) and occupant (ocupante). The figure of the settler is regulated in Articles 70 of the LZMT and 75 of the RLZMT; that of the occupant is found in Articles 44 and Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT. Article 70 of the LZMT reads: 'Settlers (pobladores) of the maritime terrestrial zone, Costa Rican by birth, with more than ten years of residence therein, according to information from the authority of the local Rural Assistance Guard (Guardia de Asistencia Rural) or certification from the Electoral Registry (Registro Electoral) regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession (posesión) of their respective lots provided it is their only property. However, they must comply with the zoning plan (planificación) for the area, for which purpose they may be relocated and their improvements (mejoras) compensated in accordance with this law. In all cases, the public zone must be respected.' Numeral 75 of the RLZMT indicates: 'Settlers of the maritime terrestrial zone, Costa Rican by birth, with more than ten years of continuous residence therein, according to information from the authority of the local Rural Assistance Guard or certification from the Electoral Registry regarding the applicant's domicile, may continue in possession of their respective lots provided it is their only property, and may be relocated in accordance with the zoning plan for the area, after compensation for improvements. In all cases, the public zone must be respected. When the period of residence is less than ten years, the settlers may apply for a concession (concesión) over the property (predio), provided no part of the public zone is included. If improvements exist in the public zone, the provisions of subsection e), Article 73 of the regulation shall apply, and the provisions of Article 74 of the regulation if the improvements are located in the restricted zone (zona restringida). Those who, not being settlers, have constructed or built in the restricted zone on illegally possessed properties shall not have the right to payment for improvements. However, they may apply for a concession over the property and, if granted, they shall not be charged for the use and enjoyment of those improvements. Concession applications made by occupants (ocupantes) of the maritime terrestrial zone shall have priority over others.' Article 44 of the LZMT reads: 'Concessions shall be granted in accordance with the principle that first in time is first in right. However, the regulation to this law may establish an order of priorities in view of the nature of the exploitation and its greater public convenience; but under equal conditions, preference shall be given to the occupant (ocupante) of the land who has possessed it quietly, publicly, and peacefully in a continuous manner.' And Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT states: 'The municipalities with jurisdiction over the maritime terrestrial zone shall collect the fee (canon) established by this law from the occupants (ocupantes) thereof. The collection shall be made in accordance with the use and the current appraisal of the Directorate General of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de la Tributación Directa). This authorization shall be provisional in nature, until the development plan (plan de desarrollo) for the respective zone comes into effect, and does not create any right for the occupants as far as the concession is concerned.' From a reading of the transcribed norms, it is concluded that there are requirements that any person must meet to hold the status of settler (poblador): a) a continuous possession (posesión) of at least 10 years prior to the entry into force of the LZMT—16 March 1977—that is, a possession that began at least by 1967; b) to have been born before 1949, to have attained the age of majority at the start of the indicated 10-year possession; c) to be Costa Rican by birth; d) not to be the owner of another piece of land; e) to have a report from the Public Force (Fuerza Pública) or a certification from the Civil Registry (Registro Civil), serving as proof of the possession in question. In relation to the category of occupant (ocupante), the requirements to hold such status are: i) a possession of less than 10 years prior to the entry into force of the LZMT (16 March 1977), that is, a possession that began after 1967; b) to have been born before 1959; c) to be Costa Rican by birth; d) not to be the owner of another piece of land; e) to have a report from the Public Force or a certification from the Civil Registry serving as proof of the possession in question.

Thus, except as otherwise provided by special law, persons who 1) entered the maritime-terrestrial zone before the entry into force of the LZMT and are neither settlers (pobladores) nor occupants (ocupantes), and 2) entered after March 16, 1977, find themselves in a situation of illegal occupation. By harmonizing Articles 70, 44, and Transitory Provision VII of the LZMT and Article 75 of the RLZMT with numerals 12 and 20 of the LZMT, it is concluded that settlers (pobladores) and occupants (ocupantes) do not fall within the exceptions provided for in the latter article (that is, Article 20 ibidem), and therefore it must be understood that the recognitions granted under the LZMT are limited to the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, and not to the public zone. Consequently, the argument of contradictory precedents put forward by Public Defender [Nombre27] is hereby resolved, in the sense that regarding the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone a) the eviction (desalojo) of settlers (pobladores) and occupants (ocupantes) and the destruction of the constructions used by them is indeed appropriate when they lack a permit or concession that legally enables them to exercise such possession, and b) such eviction (desalojo) and destruction of the constructions may be suspended for 24 months pursuant to Articles 1 and 7 of Law 9073, for the Protection of Occupants of Zones Classified as Special, of September 19, 2012, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 206, of October 25, 2012, Supplement 163 (regarding which relevant elements are set forth in Considering V below)." (Judgment 1617-14 of 8:43 a.m. of 10-10-14 of the Third Chamber of the Court). As this Tribunal rightly pointed out in judgment number 380-12 of 1:22 p.m. of 10-24-12, "[...] the areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves may be located within the maritime-terrestrial zone, without such circumstance causing that zone to lose its name (in fact, the very provision just transcribed so states). They continue to be part of the zone, but are assigned a distinct management or treatment from that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the standpoint of their administrative management (different institutions in charge of their administration), but also regarding the use and purposes to which they must respond, so that projects that could be carried out in accordance with the provisions on the maritime-terrestrial zone, may not be executed according to the wildlife conservation law or other special regulations, and, conversely, the specific purposes of the reserves would allow the design of projects foreign to the purposes of the law on the maritime-terrestrial zone and open the way to community participation, promoted in Article 17 of the Wildlife Conservation Law; while Article 83 of that same text provides 'The General Directorate of Wildlife shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, with respect to National Wildlife Refuges that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone.' The very law that created the Ostional Refuge (Fauna Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it '... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone extending from the right bank of the mouth of the Nosara River to Punta India...' (emphasis added); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (wildlife conservation law), expanded it, locating it '... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone extending from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste...' (bold not in original). Moreover, the issue has been the subject of multiple pronouncements by the Constitutional Chamber, some cited by the appellant himself and in ruling No. [Telf2], of 8:30 a.m. of February 13, 2009, the said Chamber expressly highlighted that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge is a 'public domain asset (bien de dominio público)' that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy this public domain asset lack any property right. It is worth emphasizing that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas comprised in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons set forth herein, could never be acquired by private individuals." From the foregoing, it is clear that the area over which the Ostional Wildlife Refuge extends is a maritime-terrestrial zone and is also a reserve created by law for the protection of flora and fauna, natural and forest heritage of the State. By its nature as a public domain asset (bien demanial), it is inalienable, unseizable, and imprescriptible. Hence, the lands cannot be appropriated by private individuals. In the jurisprudential precedent of the Third Chamber of the Court, partially transcribed above, which this Tribunal fully shares, reference is made to the legal requirements that occupants (ocupantes) and settlers (pobladores) must meet to be recognized as such; however, it is made clear that with regard to the public zone – as is the case here – they cannot hold any right, permit, or concession, and what is appropriate is eviction (desalojo) and demolition of the constructions.

The accused does not have the status of occupant (ocupante) or settler (pobladora), since what she indicates is that she has been living for twelve years on the land her father left her, and that he, in turn, had it since 1957, and also that she has a cadastral map (plano) that makes her the owner of the property. None of these assumptions grants her any right over the public domain asset (bien demanial), given that the status of occupant (ocupante) or settler (poblador) cannot be transferred (even if her father had met the requirements) and the preparation of a cadastral map (plano catastrado) does not grant any right, which is why her possession is illegitimate and, as these are public domain assets (bienes demaniales), what is appropriate is to order the eviction (desalojo) and demolition of the works, to recover the public use of the zone, as resolved by the a quo.

Among other aspects, the trial court held the following: "The defendants have stated at trial that their family has resided in that sector for a long time and that today it is part of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge; they maintain that for decades the father of [Nombre28] had the status of settler (poblador) or occupant (ocupante) of the maritime-terrestrial zone where the Ostional wildlife refuge was created. The aforementioned cadastral map (plano) was registered in the name of [Nombre11] in the year 1999, indicating that the property is under the administration of the Ministry of Environment. This situation leads the defendants to believe that they have the legitimacy to carry out repairs or constructions on the property, which has provided a basis for a mistake of law (error de prohibición) or a mistake of fact (error de tipo). The maritime-terrestrial zone, whether in the public zone or the restricted zone, the former being 50 meters and the latter 150 meters, is a state public domain asset (bien estatal demanial) and imprescriptible, not susceptible to adverse possession (usucapión) or possession. The Ostional Wildlife Refuge extends beyond the maritime-terrestrial zone, as it is not limited to the indicated dimension of 200 meters. Administratively, the status of settler (poblador) or occupant (ocupante) may be recognized, but these cases are exceptional and must be recognized as such, it not being admissible for that status to be assessed in a judicial venue, but rather administratively. The defendants have not demonstrated, through documentation, the status of settler (poblador) or occupant (ocupante), and this is a non-transferable status, whether via inheritance or contract, precisely due to the public domain nature (condición demanial) of the property. On the other hand, the status of occupant (ocupante) or settler (poblador) is recognized only for those subjects whose permanence predates the creation of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge or the law on the maritime-terrestrial zone. Having a cadastral map (plano catastrado) in the Public Property Registry was considered an authorization from the legal system to carry out the denounced constructions." (folio 452 front and back). This Chamber considers that, as qualified by the a quo, in this case we are facing a mistake of law (error de prohibición), given that the accused [Nombre11] stated that she has a cadastral map (plano) that makes her the owner of the land, that she has a right because her father, who was the possessor of those lands, gave it to her, and that the cadastral map (plano) bears her name so she believes the land is hers (folio 450). From these statements, the trial court inferred that a mistake of law (error de prohibición) exists because the defendants falsely believed that the circumstances that would justify their conduct existed. The court states: "A mistake of law (error de prohibición) exists when the active subject makes a defective interpretation of the fact or the norm itself. This leads the active subject to falsely believe that, in the specific case, the circumstances that would justify their typical conduct are present. In another sense, a mistake of law (error de prohibición) exists when the active subject considers that there is an authorization from the legal system to carry out the action provided for by the criminal type (indirect mistake of law, error de prohibición indirecto) or that the act they commit is not subject to penalty; in this case, the error does not fall on the circumstances but on the prohibition itself (direct mistake of law, error de prohibición directo). The case could also be approached as a mistake of fact (error de tipo), when it is assumed that this false representation leads the subject to believe that, in the specific case, the necessary circumstances that would give rise to the action provided for in the criminal type do not exist, which would exclude intent. It is said that a mistake regarding the circumstances provided for in the objective type that must be known at the subjective type level is a phenomenon that determines the absence of intent when, given objective typicality, the knowledge of the elements required by the objective type does not exist or is false; if a mistake of fact (error de tipo) exists, the typical purpose disappears, that is, the will to carry out the objective type, and since there is no such intent, there is no dolus, and therefore the conduct would be atypical." (folios 451 back and 452 front). Regarding the mistake of law (error de prohibición), the Third Chamber of the Court has resolved: "[...] the scholars [Nombre29] and [Nombre30] state: 'A mistake of law (error de prohibición) exists not only when the actor believes they are acting lawfully, but also when they do not even contemplate the unlawfulness of their act. The mistake of law (error de prohibición) can refer to the existence of the prohibitive norm as such (direct mistake of law, error de prohibición directo) or to the existence, limits, or objective conditions of a justification defense that authorizes the action, generally prohibited, in a specific case (indirect mistake of law or mistake regarding justification defenses, error de prohibición indirecto). In the first case, the actor is unaware of the existence of a norm that prohibits their conduct; in the second, the actor knows that their conduct is generally prohibited, but erroneously believes that in the specific case there is a justification defense that permits it, that they are acting within its limits, or that its objective conditions are met.'" (Derecho Penal, Parte General, 7th revised edition, Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2007, pp. 382 and 383). Likewise, this Chamber has indicated on the subject: "… a mistake of law (error de prohibición) presupposes a defective interpretation of the fact or of the norm itself, which leads the active subject to falsely believe that in the specific case the circumstances that would justify their typical conduct are present, that is, that there is an authorization from the legal system to carry out the action provided for by the criminal type (indirect mistake of law, error de prohibición indirecto), or that the act they commit is not subject to penalty, in which case the error does not fall on the circumstances but on the prohibition itself (direct mistake of law, error de prohibición directo). On the contrary, a mistake of fact (error de tipo) rather presupposes that this false representation leads the subject to believe that in the specific case the necessary circumstances that would give rise to the action provided for by the criminal type do not exist, which would exclude intent: '(...) a mistake of law (error de prohibición) can stem from a false knowledge or ignorance of the fact that generates a situation we believe is justified or about the norm that prohibits the conduct. Therefore, doctrine prefers to refer to mistake of fact (error de tipo) (with its analysis located in the element of typicality) and mistake of law (error de prohibición) (with its analysis located in the element of culpability) (...) When the Penal Code states in Article 35 that the insurmountable mistake must fall on the situation or "act" being committed is not subject to penalty, it means directly that the subject must falsely believe that the act is not subject to penalty, which can happen when: a) The subject acts without knowing that what they are doing falls within the prohibitive scope of the Norm; b) the acting subject considers that the Legal System grants them permission for their action; c) The acting subject thinks they are within the scope of a justification defense when in reality they are not. These three assumptions are included in the legal formula conceived by the Code, so there seems to be no problem in including here the elements of direct and indirect mistake of law (error de prohibición). In this nomenclature, fully compatible with our Code, the direct error falls on the knowledge of the prohibitive Norm (the "Thou shalt not take land from another citizen," a criminal norm placed before the criminal type of usurpation, for example), while the indirect error comes to mean the false assumption of the existence of a permission that the law does not grant, and the problems of putative justification.' Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote N°446-F-92, of 3:25 p.m. on September 25, 1992 (…) According to the above, it would be clear that if in this case it had been established at trial that the defendant always acted under the false belief that the property they possessed was not the State's but their own, we would be facing a mistake of fact (error de tipo) and not a mistake of law (error de prohibición)." (Third Chamber, judgment N°758-2005, of ten hours and ten minutes of July eighth, two thousand five)." Third Chamber of the Court, judgment number 1779-13 of 2:42 p.m. of December 3, 2013. So, we are in the presence of a direct mistake of law (error de prohibición directo), because the accused falsely believed that the acts she committed are not subject to penalty as they are not prohibited by any norm. This means that the existence of a typical and unlawful act that is not culpable and therefore cannot be reproachable was proven, pursuant to Article 35 of the Penal Code. Although the court does not determine whether we are facing a surmountable (vencible) or insurmountable (invencible) mistake, which is necessary to determine whether or not a penalty applies, the truth is that this Chamber does not proceed to assess that aspect, because it was not alleged by the defense, the only appellant of the judgment. In any case, it must be noted that both under the assumption of mistake of law (error de prohibición) and mistake of fact (error de tipo), the truth is that in both scenarios the order of eviction (desalojo) and demolition is appropriate, because these are public domain assets (bienes demaniales), over which no private individual holds or can hold, or have any right recognized, it being irrelevant whether we are facing one or the other.

II.- Appeal of the attorneys [Nombre31] and [Nombre13]. The public defenders of the defendants [Nombre32] and [Nombre7] filed separate appeals, considering that the contested judgment incurs in non-observance of procedural rules in the reasoning that authorizes the demolition of the property. Both attorneys point out that the judgment does not support the legal-factual analysis that authorizes the demolition of the property, in addition to the fact that the specific location within the zone of the demolition or dwelling to be demolished is not extracted, and that the fact that prior to ordering the demolition or destruction there must be a management plan approved by the refuge administration was not discredited, so as not to affect the people who benefit from the resources provided by the zone. The grounds are resolved jointly because they are related. The claims are dismissed. As a first aspect, it must be indicated that the judgment does expressly indicate in Considering II, point A, in the section called "Proven Facts," 3 and 4, the location of the lands and the constructions that must be demolished: "THIRD) Approximately in the month of January of the year two thousand seven, the defendants [Nombre11] and [Nombre4], without being authorized, built a dwelling between vertical coordinate 352729 and horizontal coordinate 215776 in the Ostional wildlife refuge, with wooden posts, chains, zinc, and plastic, approximately six meters wide and nine meters long, a site they currently hold. FOURTH) Approximately in the month of May of the year 2007, the defendant [Nombre7], without being authorized, built a wooden house in Peladas beach of Nosara within the Ostional wildlife refuge between vertical coordinates 0352727 and horizontal coordinates 0215765 of cartographic sheet [Placa1], six meters long by four meters wide and two and a half meters high..." There is therefore no imprecision regarding the properties, which are clearly identified. As for the alleged lack of a regulatory plan in the zone as a requirement to be able to proceed with the eviction (desalojo), it must be noted that the Constitutional Chamber resolved the following in this regard: "IV.- ON THE PRECARIOUS OCCUPATION OF THE OSTIONAL NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE. The Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area of the National System of Conservation Areas of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in his report rendered under the solemnity of the oath, with the timely warning of the consequences, even criminal ones, that may result from obstructing the administration of justice in this venue, pursuant to Article 44 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, assured that there are currently 198 natural persons and 190 legal entities occupying, in a precarious manner, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge. Furthermore, this Chamber draws attention to the fact that the referred official added that the occupants located in some sectors composed of mangroves and the estuaries of the saltwater inlets remain to be counted, since, in accordance with the regulations governing the matter and the multiple pronouncements of the Attorney General's Office, such extensions of land are public zone, regardless of their size. The factual framework presented by the respondent authority is concerning and denotes a neglect, on the part of the State, of its functions as the primary guarantor of the environment. As highlighted in the preceding considering, in line with Transitory Provision 1 of the Wildlife Conservation Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 235 of December 7, 1992, the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge of the Tempisque Conservation Area is located in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone extending from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste, so it is undeniable that it is a public domain asset (bien de dominio público), a state-owned refuge according to the terminology used by Article 82 of that Law. In addition to the above, according to Article 13 of the Forestry Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, published in the supplement to La Gaceta No. 72 of April 16, 1996, it forms part of the State Forestry Heritage. Furthermore, numeral 14 of the same regulatory body reiterates, as such, its inalienability, unseizability, and imprescriptibility. Given its public domain nature (naturaleza demanial) and its correlative dedication to the protection of the flora and fauna of the zone, the lands that make up the reserve cannot be appropriated by private individuals. In other words, no natural or legal person can claim any right of possession, much less any right of property, over any property located within the reserve, except for lands occupied by private individuals prior to the declaration of the Protected Wildlife Area, through Law No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, in respect of which expropriation proceedings must be initiated, if the holder opposes submitting the property to the regime, in accordance with Articles 84 and 87 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. Relatedly, authorities may only authorize within refuges such as Ostional, activities aimed at research, protection, training, and ecotourism, as established by Article 14 of the Forestry Law. In the present matter, it is clear that the Administration has not fulfilled its duty to safeguard the integrity of the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge and to guarantee respect for its public domain status (condición demanial), since it is affirmed with certainty that 388 persons, both natural and legal, precariously occupy lands that, as stated, must be dedicated exclusively to the protection of the flora and fauna of the zone. It is obvious that their presence in the place alters the natural harmony that the creation of the refuge was intended to conserve intact, especially given the fragility of the environment, given that it is a place where massive nesting of turtles cyclically occurs. The situation is further aggravated if it is considered that the Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area implied that there could be more occupants in the mangrove sectors and the estuaries of the saltwater inlets, which are essential places, as is well known, for maintaining the balance of the maritime habitat. Thus, this Constitutional Tribunal must intervene to reinstate the enjoyment and exercise of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.

V.- ON THE LACK OF A MANAGEMENT PLAN IN THE OSTIONAL NATIONAL WILDLIFE RESERVE. Article 2 of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Executive Decree No. 32633-MINAE of March 10, 2005, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005, a management plan is: "[…] a set of technical standards that will regulate the actions to be executed in a zoo, breeding farm, nursery, aquarium, hunting farm, rescue center, botanical garden, or wildlife refuge, in order to manage and conserve wildlife, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources that will guarantee the sustainability of the resource […]." It is clear how important a management plan is as a tool for safeguarding the natural resource in this type of refuge, as well as for channeling the research, protection, training, and ecotourism activities that can be carried out in a state-owned refuge. It is then possible to establish a causal link between the lack of a management plan in the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge and the disorder that prevails there. Finally, it is important to clarify to the respondent authority that, although it is true the approval process for the Management Plan has been difficult – a third attempt is being made – such a fact does not justify that after 25 years of the Refuge's creation (through Law No. 6919 of November 17, 1983, repealed but, in turn, the refuge maintained by Law No.

7317 of 30 October 1992), it does not have a management plan (plan de manejo), which, undoubtedly, results, as seen, in a constant state of threat to the environment." (Sentencia 2020-09 of 08:30 hrs. of 13-02-09). The management plan is a legal imperative as the Constitutional Chamber points out in the cited judgment; however, this does not mean that evictions are contingent on the existence of one, given that it is a wildlife refuge (refugio de vida silvestre), which cannot be the object of private occupation, and the constructions are located in the public zone. Finally, regarding the basis for the eviction and demolition, although the court does not provide an extensive discussion on the matter, it is sufficient to establish that "[...] the defendants do not have the status of occupants or inhabitants (pobladores) of the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playa Peladas de Nosara or of the Ostional Wildlife Refuge. The construction of the reported works takes place (sic) in the first half of 2007 and did not involve necessary repairs or renovations but rather new construction. Regardless of whether the accused's father [Name28] had the status of occupant or inhabitant in that sector of Playa Peladas de Nosara, as the defendants allege, that situation is not transferable, inheritable, or the subject of any contract transferring ownership. Consequently, even though there is a mistake of law (error de prohibición), or a mistake of fact (error de tipo), depending on the analysis, the fact remains that the accused cannot remain in the Ostional Wildlife Refuge as possessors or occupants, and therefore, the eviction from the property and the demolition of the works built must be ordered once this judgment becomes final." (folios 453 front and back). This Court considers that the assessment of those elements is sufficient to justify the eviction and the demolition of the works built in the Ostional Wildlife Refuge. For all the foregoing reasons, the appeals filed are declared without merit.

**POR TANTO** Se declaran sin lugar los recursos de apelación interpuestos por los defensores públicos de los imputados. **NOTIFÍQUESE**.

**LUCILA MONGE PIZARRO** **LUIS GUILLERMO ARAYA VALLEJOS** ** GERARDO** ** RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS** **JUEZA Y JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA** Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: [Telf3]. Fax: [Telf4]. Correo electrónico: [...]

* 070001170414PE * * 070001170414PE * VOTO 217-15 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, Santa Cruz, a las trece horas treinta minutos de veintinueve de octubre de dos mil quince.

Recurso de apelación interpuesto en la causa 07-000117-0414-PE seguida contra [Nombre1] , cédula CED1, nacida el 8 de noviembre de 1959, hija de [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] ; [Nombre4] , cédula CED2, nacido el 25 de agosto de 1952, hijo de [Nombre5] y [Nombre6] y [Nombre7] , cédula CED3, nacida el 5 de octubre de 1985, hija de [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] , por el delito de INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY FORESTAL EN LA MODALIDAD DE INVASIÓN DE AREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN Y USURPACIÓN DE BIENES DE DOMINIO PÚBLICO en perjuicio de LOS RECURSOS NATURALES. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso la jueza Lucila Monge Pizarro y los jueces Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas y Luis Guillermo Araya Vallejos. Se apersonaron en esta sede, el licenciado [Nombre10] , defensor público de la imputada [Nombre11] , licenciado [Nombre12] , defensor público del imputado [Nombre4] , licenciada [Nombre13] , defensora pública de la imputada [Nombre7] , los procuradores de la República licenciado [Nombre14] y licenciado [Nombre15] y como representantes del Ministerio Público el licenciado [Nombre16] y el licenciado [Nombre17] .

RESULTANDO

1.- Mediante sentencia n.° 134-2015 de siete horas quince minutos de veintiséis de mayo de dos mil quince, el Tribunal de Juicio del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, sede Nicoya, resolvió: "POR TANTO: Por lo expuesto, artículos 39, 41 de la Constitución Política, 1, 2, 9, 31, 32, 33, 142, 265, 267, 360, 361, 364, 365, 366 del Código Procesal Penal, 1, 24, 30, 31, 34, 35, 45, 225 del Código Penal, 58 de la Ley Forestal, se ABSUELVE DE PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD A [Nombre18] , [Nombre19] Y [Nombre20] POR LOS DELITOS DE INFRACCION A LA LEY FORESTAL EN LA MODALIDAD DE INVASION DE AREAS DE CONSERVACION Y USURPACION DE BIENES DE DOMINIO PUBLICO EN PERJUICIO DEL ESTADO. Firme la sentencia se ordena el desalojo del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional y demolición de las obras construídas que motivaron esta denuncia. La ejecución y cumplimiento del desalojo y demolición corresponderá al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre de Ostional en conjunto con la Municipalidad de Nicoya. Se declara sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria establecida por la Procuraduría General de la República y se resuelve sin condenatoria en costas personales y procesales. Firme la sentencia y ejecutado el desalojo y demolición se ordena el archivo del caso, son las costas del proceso penal a cargo del Estado. Notifíquese mediante lectura. [Nombre21] Juez de Juicio". (sic).

2.- Contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el licenciado [Nombre10] , defensor público de la imputada [Nombre22] , licenciado [Nombre12] , defensor público del imputado [Nombre23] , licenciada [Nombre13] , defensora pública de la imputada [Nombre24] , interpusieron recursos de apelación.

3.- Se celebró audiencia oral a las diez horas doce minutos de diez de setiembre de dos mil quince, en la que estuvieron presentes los defensores públicos licenciado [Nombre12] , licenciado [Nombre10] , la licenciada [Nombre13] , el representante del Ministerio Público, licenciado [Nombre17] y el representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, licenciado [Nombre15] . El juez [Nombre25] no estuvo presente en dicha audiencia, no obstante, en la misma no se evacuó prueba ni se plantearon nuevos argumentos.

4.- Verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

5.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta la jueza [Nombre26] ; y,

CONSIDERANDO

I- Recurso del licenciado [Nombre10] . El defensor público de la imputada [Nombre11] interpuso recurso de apelación contra la sentencia que absolvió a su defendida por estimar que se produjo una errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva. Refiere que el tribunal tiene por acreditado un error de prohibición por cuanto considera que su defendida creyó actuar amparada en un documento -plano catastrado- y en la creencia de que la posesión como ocupante o poblador de su padre, le fue transmitida a ella por tradición, cuando lo cierto es que su defendida actuó sin dolo -sobre los elementos objetivos y subjetivos del tipo- a pesar de lo cual el tribunal ordenó la demolición de la vivienda de la encartada, sin indicar las razones o la fundamentación para ello. Refiere que su defendida en ningún momento ha actuado con base en una falsa apreciación de las circunstancias o bien porque desconocía alguno o todos los elementos objetivos del tipo, sino porque ella alega que vivía en la zona antes de la existencia de la ley. En la vista oral señaló el defensor que la imputada y su familia llegaron a la zona como pobladores, que la misma ha tenido que soportar errores de la Administración y que a los extranjeros que habitan la zona inclusive los han dejando construir un aeropuerto. Sin lugar el recurso. La imputada [Nombre11] señaló en su declaración que tiene doce años de vivir en el terreno que su padre le dejó, que antes de que fuera un refugio él tenía este terreno, que fue pionero como en el año 1957. Manifestó que la acusan de invasora injustamente y ha luchado por esta propiedad. Asimismo, que tiene un plano que la hace acreedora del inmueble, que tiene derecho a esa tierra y que su familia luchó por sobrevivir ahí (folio 450). Sobre el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional, este Tribunal indicó: "La Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia se ha pronunciado en forma reiterada, en el sentido de que el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional es patrimonio natural del Estado, tiene carácter de bien demanial y no puede ser objeto de apropiación privada, además ha esclarecido el uso del concepto de “zona pública” contenido en la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, aplicado a los Refugios. Al respecto podemos citar los votos No.5976-93 de 15:42 horas del 16 de noviembre de 1993, No. [Telf1] de 08:52 horas del 22 de agosto de 2003, Nº 2008-013655 de 11:55 horas del 5 de septiembre de 2008, N° 2009-002020 de 8:30 horas del 13 de febrero de 2009, además del que se analiza en la sentencia impugnada, No. 13558-2003 de las 12:28 horas del 28 de noviembre de 2003. Ha expuesto nuestro Tribunal Constitucional: “…en consonancia con lo dispuesto por el Transitorio 1° de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre No. 7317 de 30 de octubre de 1992, publicada en La Gaceta No. 235 del 7 de diciembre de 1992, el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional del Área de Conservación Tempisque está ubicado en los doscientos metros de la zona marítimo terrestre que se extiende desde Punta India hasta Punta Guiones, Cantón de Nicoya, Provincia de Guanacaste, por lo que resulta indebatible que es un bien de dominio público, un refugio de propiedad estatal de acuerdo con la terminología utilizada por el artículo 82 de esa Ley. Aunado a lo anterior, según el artículo 13 de la Ley Forestal No. 7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, publicada en el alcance a La Gaceta No. 72 de 16 de abril de 1996, forma parte del Patrimonio Forestal de Estado. De otra parte, el numeral 14 del mismo cuerpo normativo, reitera, como tal, su inalienabilidad, inembargabilidad e imprescriptibilidad. En función de su naturaleza demanial y su correlativa afectación para el resguardo de la flora y fauna de la zona, los terrenos que integran la reserva no pueden ser apropiados por los particulares. En otras palabras, ninguna persona física o jurídica puede alegar algún derecho de posesión ni mucho menos un derecho de propiedad sobre algún inmueble ubicado dentro de la reserva, salvo, que se traten de terrenos ocupados por particulares con anterioridad a la declaratoria del Área Silvestre Protegida, mediante la Ley No. 6919 del 17 de noviembre de 1983, respecto de los cuales deberán iniciarse los trámites para la expropiación, si mediara oposición del titular para someter el bien al régimen, en apego a lo dispuesto por el artículo 84 y 87 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre. Conexamente, las autoridades sólo podrán autorizar dentro de refugios como el de Ostional, actividades que tiendan a la investigación, protección, capacitación y ecoturismo, según lo establece el artículo 14 de la Ley Forestal”(Sala Constitucional Resolución N°2009-002020 de 8:30 horas del 13 de febrero de 2009, los subrayados son suplidos)." (Sentencia de este Tribunal, número 62-15 de 13:35 hrs. de 14-04-15). Asimismo, la Sala Tercera de la Corte resolvió sobre los pobladores y ocupantes: "III.- Del poblador y del ocupante en la zona pública de la zona marítimo terrestre. La Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre 6043, de 02 de marzo de 1977 (publicada en el Alcance 35 del Diario Oficial La Gaceta 52 de 16 de marzo de 1977, y vigente a partir de ésta última fecha, en adelante LZMT) establece en el artículo 12, en general sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, que “es prohibido, sin la debida autorización legal, explotar la flora y fauna existentes, deslindar con cercas, carriles o en cualquier otra forma, levantar edificaciones o instalaciones, cortar árboles, extraer productos o realizar cualquier otro tipo de desarrollo, actividad u ocupación.”. Y en forma específica sobre la zona pública determina en el numeral 20: “Salvo las excepciones establecidas por la ley, la zona pública no puede ser objeto de ocupación bajo ningún título ni en ningún caso. Nadie podrá alegar derecho alguno sobre ella. Estará dedicada al uso público y en especial al libre tránsito de las personas. Las entidades y autoridades que indica el artículo 18 deberán dictar y hacer cumplir las disposiciones necesarias para garantizar el libre y seguro tránsito de las personas y el uso público de esta zona.”. Las excepciones a las que se refiere este numeral 20 de la LZMT son: A) Aquellas secciones que por su configuración geográfica, su topografía o sus condiciones especiales, no pueden aprovecharse para uso público, en cuyo caso se autoriza su desarrollo por la municipalidad respectiva y el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, siempre que no se enajenen y se establezca una zona de libre tránsito que facilite el uso y disfrute públicos de las playas, riscos y esteros y se garantice la seguridad de los peatones (artículo 21 LZMT). B) Las obras de infraestructura y construcción que aprueben el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, y la respectiva municipalidad, atendiendo al uso público a que se destinen, o que se trate del establecimiento y operación de instalaciones turísticas estatales de notoria conveniencia para el país (artículo 22 LZMT). Y C) Los casos contenidos en leyes que regulan aspectos especiales de la zona marítimo terrestre, verbigracia, el caso contenido en la Ley 7744, de Concesión y Operación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos de 19 de diciembre de 1997 (publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta 26, de 06 de febrero de 1998). Sin embargo, conviene precisar que la Ley 6043, sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre y su Reglamento (dictado por Decreto 7841-P, de 16 de diciembre de 1977, publicado en el Alcance 16, del Diario Oficial La Gaceta 20, de 27 de enero de 1978, y vigente a partir de esta última fecha; en adelante RLZMT) establecen dos categorías de personas físicas que ejercen actos de ocupación en la zona marítima terrestre: poblador y ocupante. La figura del poblador se halla regulada en los artículos 70 de la LZMT y 75 del RLZMT; la del ocupante se encuentra en los artículos 44 y Transitorio VII de la LZMT. El artículo 70 de la LZMT se lee: “Los pobladores de la zona marítimo terrestre, costarricenses por nacimiento, con más de diez años de residencia en ella, según información de la autoridad de la Guardia de Asistencia Rural local o certificación del Registro Electoral sobre el domicilio del solicitante, podrán continuar en posesión de sus respectivos lotes siempre que fuere su única propiedad. Sin embargo, deberán sujetarse a la planificación de la zona, a cuyo efecto podrán ser reubicados e indemnizadas sus mejoras de acuerdo con esta ley. En todo caso deberá respetarse la zona pública”. El numeral 75 del RLZMT indica: “ Los pobladores de la zona marítimo terrestre, costarricenses por nacimiento, con más de diez años de residencia continua en ella, según información de la autoridad de la Guardia de Asistencia Rural local o certificación del Registro Electoral sobre el domicilio del solicitante podrán continuar en posesión de sus respectivos lotes siempre que fuere su única propiedad, pudiendo ser reubicados de acuerdo con la planificación de la zona, previa indemnización de las mejoras. En todo caso deberá respetarse la zona pública. Cuando el período de residencia sea inferior a diez años, los pobladores podrán solicitar concesión sobre el predio, siempre que no se incluya parte alguna de la zona pública. Si existiesen mejoras en la zona pública, se aplicará lo dispuesto en el inciso e), artículo 73 del reglamento, y las disposiciones del artículo 74 del reglamento si las mejoras estuvieren ubicadas en la zona restringida. Quienes no siendo pobladores hayan construido o edificado en la zona restringida en predios ilegalmente poseídos, no tendrán derecho al pago de mejoras. Sin embargo, podrán solicitar concesión sobre el predio y, si se les otorgare, no se les cobrará por el uso, y disfrute de esas mejoras. Las solicitudes de concesiones que hagan los ocupantes de la zona marítimo terrestre tendrán prioridad sobre las demás.”. El artículo 44 de la LZMT se lee: “ Las concesiones se otorgarán atendiendo al principio de que el primero en tiempo es primero en derecho. Sin embargo, el reglamento de esta ley podrá establecer un orden de prioridades atendiendo a la naturaleza de la explotación y a la mayor conveniencia pública de ésta; pero en igualdad de condiciones se ha de preferir al ocupante del terreno que la haya poseído quieta, pública y pacíficamente en forma continua.”. Y el Transitorio VII de la LZMT señala: “Las municipalidades con jurisdicción en la zona marítimo-terrestre cobrarán el canon que establece esta ley para los ocupantes de la misma. El cobro se hará de acuerdo con el uso y con el avalúo actual de la Dirección General de la Tributación Directa. Esta autorización tendrá carácter provisional, hasta tanto no entre en vigencia el plan de desarrollo para la respectiva zona, y no produce derecho alguno para los ocupantes en lo que a concesión se refiere.”.De la lectura de las normas transcritas se concluye la existencia de requisitos que debe cumplir toda persona para ostentar la condición de poblador: a) una posesión continua de al menos 10 años de antigüedad anterior a la entrada en vigencia de la LZMT –16 de marzo de 1977–, es decir, una posesión que iniciara al menos desde 1967; b) nacer antes de 1949, para tener mayoría de edad al iniciar los 10 años de la posesión indicada; c) ser costarricense por nacimiento; d) no ser propietario de otro terreno, e) contar con un informe de la Fuerza Pública o una certificación del Registro Civil, que sirvan de prueba sobre la posesión de marras. En relación con la categoría de ocupante, los requisitos para ostentar tal condición son: i) una posesión inferior a 10 años con anterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de la LZMT (16 de marzo de 1977), es decir, una posesión que iniciara con posterioridad a 1967; b) nacer antes de 1959; c) ser costarricense por nacimiento; d) no ser propietario de otro terreno, e) contar con un informe de la Fuerza Pública o una certificación del Registro Civil que sirvan de prueba sobre la posesión de marras. De esta forma, salvo disposición legal especial, las personas que 1) ingresaron a la zona marítimo terrestre antes de la vigencia de la LZMT y no son pobladores ni ocupantes, y 2) ingresaron después del 16 de marzo de 1977, se hallan en una situación de ocupación ilegal. Al concordar los artículos 70, 44 y Transitorio VII de la LZMT y 75 del RLZMT con los numerales 12 y 20 de la LZMT, se concluye que los pobladores y los ocupantes no se hallan en los casos de excepción previstos en el último artículo (sea, el 20 iusidem), por lo que debe entenderse que los reconocimientos que se dan por la LZMT se reducen a la zona restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre, y no a la zona pública. Se tiene por resuelto, entonces, el alegato de precedentes contradictorios formulado por el Defensor Público [Nombre27] en el sentido de que respecto de la zona pública de la zona marítimo terrestre a) sí procede el desalojo de los pobladores y los ocupantes y la destrucción de las construcciones por ellos utilizadas cuando no cuenten con permiso o concesión que les habiliten legalmente para ejercer tal posesión, y b) ese desalojo y esa destrucción de las construcciones pueden ser suspendidos por 24 meses según lo previsto en los artículos 1 y 7 de la Ley 9073, de Protección a los Ocupantes de Zonas Clasificadas como Especiales de 19 de septiembre de 2012, publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta 206, de 25 de octubre de 2012 Alcance 163 (sobre la que se exponen elementos relevantes en el Considerando V infra)." (Sentencia 1617-14 de 8:43 horas de 10-10-14 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte). Como bien señaló este Tribunal en la sentencia número 380-12 de las 13:22 hrs. de 24-10-12, "[...] las áreas de parques nacionales, refugios y reservas pueden hallarse dentro de la zona marítimo terrestre, sin que por tal circunstancia esa zona pierda su nombre (de hecho, así lo expresa la propia norma recién transcrita). Continúan siendo parte de la zona, pero se les asigna un manejo o trato distinto del aplicable al resto de esa zona en el territorio nacional, no solo desde el punto de vista de su gestión administrativa (instituciones diversas a cargo de su administración), sino atendiendo al uso y las finalidades a los que deben responder, de modo que proyectos que podrían realizarse con arreglo a las disposiciones sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, no podrán ejecutarse de acuerdo con la ley de conservación de la vida silvestre u otras normativas especiales y, a la inversa, las finalidades propias de las reservas permitirían el diseño de proyectos ajenos a los propósitos de la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre y abren paso a la participación comunitaria, fomentada en el artículo 17 de la Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre; mientras que el artículo 83 de ese mismo texto dispone "La Dirección General de Vida Silvestre tendrá las facultades y deberes que establece la Ley No. 6043, respecto de los Refugios Nacionales de Vida Silvestre que incluyen áreas de la zona marítimo terrestre". La propia ley que creó el Refugio de Ostional (Ley de Conservación de la fauna silvestre, No. 6919 de 17 de noviembre de 1983) lo ubicó "... en los doscientos metros de la zona marítimo-terrestre que se extiende desde la margen derecha de la desembocadura del Río Nosara hasta la Punta India..." (el resaltado es suplido); en tanto que la Ley No. 7317, de 30 de octubre de 1992 (ley de conservación de la vida silvestre), lo amplió, situándolo "... en los doscientos metros de la zona marítimo terrestre que se extiende desde Punta India hasta Punta Guiones, Cantón de Nicoya, Provincia de Guanacaste..." (la negrita no aparece en el original). Por lo demás, el tema ha sido objeto de múltiples pronunciamientos de la Sala Constitucional, algunos citados por el propio impugnante y en el fallo No. [Telf2], de 8:30 horas de 13 de febrero de 2009, la referida Sala destacó de forma expresa que el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional es un "bien de dominio público" que se extiende sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, añadiendo que el Estado tiene el deber de protegerlo y que los particulares que ocupan de modo precario ese bien demanial carecen de derecho de propiedad. No sobra recalcar que la restitución ordenada en la sentencia de mérito se refiere a las áreas comprendidas en la zona pública de la zona marítimo terrestre, las cuales, por las razones aquí expuestas, nunca pudieron ser objeto de adquisición por los particulares." De lo anteriormente expuesto, es claro que el área sobre la que se extiende el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional, es zona marítimo terrestre y además se trata de una reserva creada por ley para el resguardo de la flora y fauna, patrimonio natural y forestal del Estado. Por su carácter de bien demanial es inalienable, inembargable e imprescriptible. De ahí que los terrenos no pueden ser objeto de apropiación por los particulares. En el antecedente jurisprudencial parcialmente transcrito de la Sala Tercera de la Corte, que comparte en un todo este Tribunal, se hace alusión a los requisitos legales que deben tener los ocupantes y pobladores para ser reconocidos como tales, no obstante, se hace ver que tratándose de la zona pública -como corresponde a este caso- no pueden detentar ningún derecho, permiso o concesión y lo que corresponde es el desalojo y derribo de las construcciones. La encartada no tiene la condición de ocupante ni pobladora, pues lo que indica es que tiene doce años de vivir en el terreno que su padre le dejó, y que a su vez éste lo tenía desde el año 1957, además que tiene un plano que la hace acreedora del inmueble. Ninguno de esos supuestos le otorga derecho alguno sobre el bien demanial, dado que la condición de ocupante o poblador no puede ser transmitida (en caso de que su padre hubiere reunido los requisitos) y la confección de un plano catastrado no otorga derecho alguno, razón por la cual su posesión es ilegítima y por tratarse de bienes demaniales lo que corresponde es ordenar el desalojo y derribo de las obras, para recuperar el uso público de la zona, conforme lo resolvió el a quo. Entre otros aspectos, el tribunal de juicio sostuvo lo siguiente: "Los acusados han manifestado en juicio que su familia ha residido en ese sector desde hace mucho tiempo y que hoy es parte del refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre de Ostional, sostienen que hace décadas que el padre de [Nombre28] tenía la condición de poblador u ocupante de la zona marítimo terrestre donde se creó el refugio de vida silvestre de Ostional. El plano mencionado fue inscrito a nombre de [Nombre11] en el año 1999 indicándose que el inmueble está bajo la administración del Ministerio de Ambiente. Esta situación hace creer a los acusados que tienen la legitimación para realizar reparaciones o construcciones en el bien lo cual ha dado sustento a un error de prohibición o de tipo. La zona marítimo terrestre en la zona pública o restringida, la primera de 50 metros y la segunda de 150 metros es un bien estatal demanial e imprescriptible no susceptible de usucapión o posesión. El refugio de Vida Silvestre de Ostional se extiende más allá de la zona marítimo terrestre pues no está limitada a la dimensión indicada de los 200 metros. Administrativamente puede reconocerse la condición de poblador u ocupante pero estos casos son excepcionales y debe reconocerse como tal no siendo admisible que se estime esa condición en sede judicial, sino administrativa. Los acusados no han demostrado documentalmente la condición de poblador u ocupante y esta es una condición no transferible vía sucesoria o contractual, precisamente por la condición demanial del bien. Por otro lado, la condición de ocupante o poblador se reconoce solo a aquellos sujetos cuya permanencia sea anterior a la constitución del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional o la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre. El tener un plano catastrado en el Registro Público de la Propiedad se consideró una autorización del ordenamiento para realizar las construcciones denunciadas." (folio 452 frente y vuelto). Estima esta Cámara que tal y como lo calificó el a quo en la especie se está frente a un error de prohibición, dado que la imputada [Nombre11] señaló que ella tiene un plano que la hace acreedora del terreno, que tiene derecho porque se lo dio su papá que era poseedor de esas tierras, que el plano tiene su nombre por lo que estima que el terreno es suyo (folio 450). De esas manifestaciones infirió el tribunal de juicio que se está ante un error de prohibición porque los imputados creyeron falsamente que se daban las circunstancias que justificarían su conducta. Refiere el tribunal: "Existe error de prohibición cuando el sujeto activo supone una defectuosa interpretación del hecho o la norma en sí misma. Esto lleva al sujeto activo a creer falsamente, que en la especie se dan las circunstancias que justificarían su conducta típica. En otro sentido, existe error de prohibición, cuando el sujeto activo, considera que existe una autorización del ordenamiento jurídico para realizar la acción prevista por el tipo penal (error de prohibición indirecto) o bien que el hecho que realiza no está sujeto a pena, en este caso, el error no recae sobre las circunstancias sino sobre la prohibición misma (error de prohibición directo). Podría también enfocarse el caso como un error de tipo, cuando se supone que esa falsa representación conlleva a que el sujeto cree que en la especie no se dan las circunstancias necesarias que harían surgir la acción prevista en el tipo penal, lo que vendría a excluir el dolo. Se dice que un error sobre las circunstancias previstas en el tipo objetivo que tienen que conocerse a nivel de tipo subjetivo, es un fenómeno que determina la ausencia del dolo cuando habiendo una tipicidad objetiva, no existe o es falso el conocimiento de los elementos requeridos por el tipo objetivo, si existe error de tipo, desaparece la finalidad típica, es decir, la voluntad de realizar el tipo objetivo y al no haber ese querer no hay dolo y por ende la conducta resultaría atípica." (folios 451 vuelto y 452 frente). Sobre el error de prohibición ha resuelto la Sala Tercera de la Corte: "[...] los tratadistas [Nombre29] y [Nombre30] señalan: “Existe error de prohibición no sólo cuando el autor cree que actúa lícitamente, sino también cuando ni siquiera se plantea la ilicitud de su hecho. El error de prohibición puede referirse a la existencia de la norma prohibitiva como tal (error de prohibición directo) o a la existencia, límites o presupuestos objetivos de una causa de justificación que autorice la acción, generalmente prohibida, en un caso concreto (error de prohibición indirecto o error sobre las causas de justificación). En el primer caso, el autor desconoce la existencia de una norma que prohíbe su conducta; en el segundo, el autor sabe que su conducta está prohibida en general, pero cree erróneamente que en el caso concreto se da una causa de justificación que lo permite, que actúa dentro de los límites de la misma o que se dan sus presupuestos objetivos.” ( Derecho Penal, Parte General, 7ma. edición revisada, Tirand Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2007, pp. 382 y 383). Asimismo, esta Cámara ha indicado sobre el tema: “… el error de prohibición supone una defectuosa interpretación del hecho o de la norma en sí misma, lo que lleva al sujeto activo a creer falsamente que en la especie se dan las circunstancias que justificarían su conducta típica, es decir, que existe una autorización del ordenamiento jurídico para realizar la acción prevista por el tipo penal (error de prohibición indirecto), o que el hecho que realiza no está sujeto a pena, en cuyo caso el error no recae sobre las circunstancias sino sobre la prohibición misma (error de prohibición directo). Por el contrario, el error de tipo más bien supone que esa falsa representación conlleva a que el sujeto cree que en la especie no se dan las circunstancias necesarias que harían surgir la acción prevista por el tipo penal, lo que vendría a excluir el dolo: “(...) un error de prohibición puede provenir de un falso conocimiento o ignorancia del hecho que genera una situación que creemos justificada o sobre la norma que prohíbe la conducta. Por ello, la doctrina prefiere referirse al error de tipo (ubicado su análisis en la tipicidad) y el error de prohibición (ubicado su análisis en la culpabilidad) (...) Cuando el Código Penal dice en el artículo 35 que el error invencible debe recaer sobre la situación o "hecho" que se realiza no está sujeta a pena, quiere significar directamente que el sujeto debe creer falsamente que el hecho no está sujeto a pena, lo que puede suceder cuando: a) El sujeto actúa sin saber que lo que realiza se encuentra dentro del ámbito prohibitivo de la Norma; b) el sujeto que actúa considera que el Ordenamiento Jurídico le concede un permiso para su actuación; c) El sujeto que actúa piensa que está dentro del ámbito de una causa de justificación cuando en realidad no lo está. Estos tres supuestos están incluidos en la fórmula legal concebida por el Código, por lo que no parece haber problema alguno para incluir aquí los elementos del error de prohibición directo e indirecto. En esta nomenclatura, plenamente compatible con nuestro Código, el error directo recae sobre el conocimiento de la Norma prohibitiva (el "No quitarás el terreno a otro ciudadano", norma penal antepuesta al tipo penal de usurpación, por ejemplo), mientras que el error indirecto, viene a significar la falsa suposición de la existencia de un permiso que la ley no otorga, y los problemas de justificación putativa.” Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto N°446-F-92, de las 15:25 horas del 25 de setiembre de 1992 (…) De acuerdo con lo anterior, resultaría claro que si en este caso se hubiera llegado a establecer en juicio que el imputado siempre actuó bajo la falsa creencia de que el bien que poseía no era del Estado sino suyo, estaríamos ante un error de tipo y no uno de prohibición.” ( Sala Tercera, sentencia N°758-2005, de las diez horas diez minutos del ocho de julio de dos mil cinco)." Sala Tercera de la Corte, sentencia número 1779-13 de las 2:42 hrs. de 3 de diciembre de 2013. De manera que se está en presencia de un error de prohibición directo, por creer falsamente la imputada que los hechos que realizó no están sujetos a pena por no estar prohibidos por ninguna norma. Esto hace que se acreditara la existencia de un hecho típico y antijurídico que no es culpable y por ende no puede ser reprochable, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 35 del Código Penal. Si bien el tribunal no determina si se está ante un error vencible o invencible, lo cual resulta necesario para determinar si procede o no la aplicación de una pena, lo cierto es que esta Cámara no ingresa a valorar tal aspecto, debido a que no fue alegado por la defensa, única apelante de la sentencia. En todo caso, debe señalarse que tanto en el supuesto del error de prohibición como en el de error de tipo, lo cierto es que en ambos escenarios procede la orden de desalojo y demolición, pues se trata de bienes demaniales, sobre los que ningún particular ostenta ni puede ostentar o reconocérseles derecho alguno, siendo irrelevante que se esté frente a uno u otro.

II.- Recurso de los licenciados [Nombre31] y [Nombre13] . Los defensores públicos de los imputados [Nombre32] y [Nombre7] interpusieron sendos recursos de apelación por considerar que la sentencia impugnada incurre en inobservancia de normativa procesal en la fundamentación que autoriza la demolición del bien. Señalan ambos letrados que la sentencia no sustenta el análisis fáctico jurídico que autoriza el derribo del inmueble, además que no se extrae el punto específico de la zona de derribo o casa de habitación que se pretende demoler y que no se desacreditó el hecho de que previo a ordenar el derribo o demolición debe existir un plan de manejo aprobado por la administración del refugio, para no afectar a las personas que se benefician de los recursos que proveé la zona. Se resuelven los motivos en forma conjunta por encontrarse relacionados. Sin lugar los reclamos. Como primer aspecto debe indicarse que la sentencia sí indica en forma expresa en el considerando II, punto A, en el apartado denominado "Hechos Probados", 3 y 4 la ubicación de los terrenos y las construcciones que deben ser demolidas: "TERCERO) Aproximadamente en el mes de enero del año dos mil siete los imputados [Nombre11] y [Nombre4] , sin estar autorizados, construyeron una vivienda entre las coordenadas vertical 352729 y horizontal 215776 en el refugio de vida silvestre de Ostional con horcones de madera, cadenas, zinc y plástico de aproximadamente seis metros de ancho y nueve de largo sitio que detentan en la actualidad. CUARTO) Aproximadamente en el mes de mayo del año 2007 la imputada [Nombre7] , sin estar autorizada, construyó una casa de madera en playa Peladas de Nosara dentro del refugio de vida silvestre de Ostional entre las coordenadas verticales 0352727 y horizontales 0215765 de la hoja cartográfica [Placa1] de seis metros de largo por cuatro metros de ancho y dos y medio de altura..." No existe entonces ninguna imprecisión en cuanto a los inmuebles los cuales están claramente identificados. En cuanto a la alegada falta de un plan regulador en la zona como requisito para poder proceder al desalojo debe señalarse que la Sala Constitucional resolvió al respecto lo siguiente: "IV.- SOBRE LA OCUPACIÓN PRECARIA DEL REFUGIO NACIONAL DE VIDA SILVESTRE OSTIONAL. El Director del Área de Conservación Tempisque del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, en su informe rendido bajo la solemnidad del juramento, con el oportuno apercibimiento de las consecuencias, incluso penales, que puede traer la obstaculización de la administración de justicia en esta sede, a tenor de lo establecido por el artículo 44 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, aseguró que, actualmente, existen 198 personas físicas y 190 jurídicas ocupando, de forma precaria, el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional. Además, llama la atención de esta Sala que, el referido funcionario, agregó que faltan de contabilizar los ocupantes ubicados en algunos sectores compuestos por manglares y las rías de los esteros, por cuanto, de conformidad con la normativa que rige la materia y los múltiples pronunciamientos de la Procuraduría General de la República, tales extensiones de tierra son zona pública, sin importar su extensión. El marco fáctico planteado por la autoridad recurrida, resulta preocupante y denota un descuido, por parte del Estado, de sus funciones como el principal garante del medio ambiente. Tal y como se subrayó en el considerando anterior, en consonancia con lo dispuesto por el Transitorio 1° de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre No. 7317 de 30 de octubre de 1992, publicada en La Gaceta No. 235 del 7 de diciembre de 1992, el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional del Área de Conservación Tempisque está ubicado en los doscientos metros de la zona marítimo terrestre que se extiende desde Punta India hasta Punta Guiones, Cantón de Nicoya, Provincia de Guanacaste, por lo que resulta indebatible que es un bien de dominio público, un refugio de propiedad estatal de acuerdo con la terminología utilizada por el artículo 82 de esa Ley. Aunado a lo anterior, según el artículo 13 de la Ley Forestal No. 7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, publicada en el alcance a La Gaceta No. 72 de 16 de abril de 1996, forma parte del Patrimonio Forestal de Estado. De otra parte, el numeral 14 del mismo cuerpo normativo, reitera, como tal, su inalienabilidad, inembargabilidad e imprescriptibilidad. En función de su naturaleza demanial y su correlativa afectación para el resguardo de la flora y fauna de la zona, los terrenos que integran la reserva no pueden ser apropiados por los particulares. En otras palabras, ninguna persona física o jurídica puede alegar algún derecho de posesión ni mucho menos un derecho de propiedad sobre algún inmueble ubicado dentro de la reserva, salvo, que se traten de terrenos ocupados por particulares con anterioridad a la declaratoria del Área Silvestre Protegida, mediante la Ley No. 6919 del 17 de noviembre de 1983, respecto de los cuales deberán iniciarse los trámites para la expropiación, si mediara oposición del titular para someter el bien al régimen, en apego a lo dispuesto por el artículo 84 y 87 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre. Conexamente, las autoridades sólo podrán autorizar dentro de refugios como el de Ostional, actividades que tiendan a la investigación, protección, capacitación y ecoturismo, según lo establece el artículo 14 de la Ley Forestal. En el presente asunto resulta claro que la Administración, no ha cumplido con su deber de salvaguardar la integridad del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional y de garantizar el respeto de su condición demanial, por cuanto con certeza se afirma que 388 personas, tanto físicas como jurídicas ocupan de forma precaria terrenos que, según lo expuesto, deben dedicarse exclusivamente a la protección de la flora y la fauna de la zona. Resulta obvio que su presencia en el lugar altera la armonía natural que con la creación del refugio se pretendía conservar íntegra, máxime la fragilidad del medio, dado que se trata de un lugar donde cíclicamente se da el desove masivo de tortugas. La situación se agrava aún más si se considera que el Director del Área de Conservación Tempisque dio a entender que podrían haber más ocupantes en los sectores del manglar y de las rías de los esteros, lugares imprescindibles, como es bien conocido, para el mantenimiento del equilibrio del hábitat marítimo. Así las cosas, este Tribunal Constitucional debe intervenir para reintegrar el goce y ejercicio del derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado.

V.- SOBRE LA FALTA DE UN PLAN DE MANEJO EN LA RESERVA NACIONAL DE VIDA SILVESTRE OSTIONAL. El artículo 2 del Reglamento a la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 32633-MINAE del 10 de Marzo de 2005, publicado en La Gaceta No. 180 del 20 de Setiembre del 2005, un plan de manejo es: “[…] un conjunto de normas técnicas que regularán las acciones por ejecutar en un zoológico, zoocriadero, vivero, acuario, finca cinegética, centro de rescate, jardín botánico o refugio de vida silvestre, con el fin de manejar y conservar la vida silvestre, de acuerdo con el principio de uso racional de los recursos naturales renovables que garantizarán la sostenibilidad del recurso […].” Es patente la importancia que reviste un plan de manejo como herramienta para el resguardo del recurso natural en este tipo de refugios, así como para encausar las actividades de investigación, protección, capacitación y ecoturismo que se pueden llevar a cabo en un refugio propiedad del estado. Entonces, es posible establecer un nexo causal entre la falta de un plan de manejo en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional y el desorden que en éste impera. Finalmente, es importante aclarar a la autoridad recurrida que, si bien es cierto el proceso de aprobación del Plan de Manejo ha sido difícil –se está haciendo el tercer intento-, tal hecho no justifica que luego de 25 años de creación del Refugio (mediante la Ley. No. 6919 del 17 de noviembre de 1983, derogada pero, a su vez, mantenido el refugio por la Ley No. 7317 de 30 de octubre de 1992), éste no cuente con un plan de manejo, lo que, indudablemente, redunda, como se vio, en un estado constante de amenaza para el medio ambiente." (Sentencia 2020-09 de las 08:30 hrs. de 13-02-09). El plan de manejo es un imperativo de la ley como lo hace ver la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia citada, no obstante, esto no significa que los desalojos estén supeditados a la existencia de este, dado que se trata de un refugio de vida silvestre, que no puede ser objeto de ocupación privada y las construcciones se encuentran en la zona pública. Por último, en cuanto al fundamento del desalojo y derribo, si bien el tribunal no hace un amplio desarrollo sobre el particular, basta con la acreditación de que "[...] los encartados no tienen la condición de ocupantes o pobladores de la zona marítimo terrestre de playa peladas de Nosara ni del Refugio de Vida Silvestre de Ostional. La construcción de las obras denunciadas se dan (sic) en el primer semestre del año 2007 y no se trató de reparaciones o remodelaciones necesarias sino de obra nueva. Independientemente que el padre de la imputada [Nombre28] tuviese la condición de ocupante o poblador en ese sector de playa peladas de Nosara, tal y como lo aducen los imputados, esa situación no es transferible, heredable ni objeto de contrato traslativo de dominio. Consecuentemente, pese a que existe un error de prohibición, o bien error de tipo, según se analice, lo cierto del caso es que no pueden los acusados permanecer en el refugio de vida silvestre de Ostional como poseedores u ocupantes y por ende debe ordenarse el desalojo del inmueble y demolición de las obras construidas en este asunto firme la sentencia." (folios 453 frente y vuelto). Estima este Tribunal que la valoración de esos elementos resulta suficiente para motivar el desalojo y la demolición de las obras construidas en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional. Por todo lo antes expuesto, se declaran sin lugar los recursos de apelación planteados.

POR TANTO

Se declaran sin lugar los recursos de apelación interpuestos por los defensores públicos de los imputados. NOTIFÍQUESE.

LUCILA MONGE PIZARRO LUIS GUILLERMO ARAYA VALLEJOS GERARDO RUBÉN ALFARO VARGAS JUEZA Y JUECES DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA Circuito Judicial de Santa Cruz, [Dirección1] , Teléfonos: [Telf3]. Fax: [Telf4]. Correo electrónico: [...]