Veterinary regency requirement for sausage factories is lawfulExigencia de regencia veterinaria para fábricas de embutidos es legal

Docket CED114053° (to which docket CED114054° was consolidated) Consolidated ordinary proceedings of Nombre145585 and Nombre145586 against the State and the National Animal Health Service N° 63-2015 Eighth Section of the Contentious Administrative Tribunal. Goicoechea, at two o'clock in the afternoon of July thirteenth, two thousand fifteen.- Consolidated ordinary proceedings of Nombre145585, represented by Nombre145587, resident of Alajuela, occupation not indicated, identity card CED114055°, in her capacity as unlimited general proxy, and Nombre145588, identity card CED114056°, in his capacity as special judicial proxy, and Nombre145586, single, food technologist, resident of Alajuela, identity card CED114057°, against the State, represented by the Procurator Julio César Mesén Montoya, identity card CED21866°, and the National Animal Health Service (hereinafter "SENASA"), represented by Nombre145589, veterinarian, resident of Heredia, identity card CED114058°, in his capacity as General Director, and Nombre145590, identity card CED98° Badge28946, in his capacity as special judicial proxy. The aforementioned persons are of legal age, and Mr. Nombre145588, Mr. Mesén, and Mr. Nombre145590 are attorneys and residents of San José.-

Whereas:

• 1)Nombre145585 establishes the following claims in docket N° 13-8325-1027-CA (listen to the preliminary hearing and observe the minute on folio 480 verso):

"1. That the non-conformity with the legal system of the administrative act embodied in official communication DIPO-A-112-11 and official communication SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirms it, as well as official communication SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, which indicated that the annual registration update of the CVO of Nombre145585 would not proceed, be declared.

2. That the absolute nullity of the administrative act embodied in official communication DIPOA-A-112-11 and official communication SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirms it, be declared solely insofar as it requires having a veterinary physician as regent, and that in its place, my principal be permitted to maintain her food technologist regent.

3. That the absolute nullity of the administrative act embodied in official communication SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, which indicated to us that the annual registration update of our CVO would not proceed, be declared, and that in its place, the immediate annual registration of our Veterinary Operation Certificate be ordered.

4. That the Administration be ordered to pay, in the abstract, the amounts ceased to be received from August 25, 2013, until the date on which the effects of the administrative act SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, which indicated that the annual registration update of the CVO of Embutidos Doro would not proceed, are provisionally or definitively suspended.

5. That the payment of interest on the amounts owed from their inception until effective payment be ordered.

6. That the Administration be ordered to pay both costs of this action." 2) By brief dated March 3, 2014, the State answered the action negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (see folios 182-198 and 201-231).- 3) By libel dated March 4, 2014, SENASA answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (see folios 232-248).- 4) Nombre145586 establishes the following claims in docket N° 13-8331-1027-CA (listen to the preliminary hearing and observe the minute on folio 481):

"1. That the non-conformity with the legal system of the administrative act embodied in official communication DIPOA-A-112-11 and official communication SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirms it, as well as official communication SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, which indicated that the annual registration update of the CVO of Embutidos Doro would not proceed, be declared.

2. That the absolute nullity of the administrative act embodied in official communication DIPOA-A-211-11 and official communication SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirms it, be declared solely insofar as it requires having a veterinary physician as regent, and that in its place, professionals in food technology be permitted to exercise said regency.

3. That the absolute nullity of the administrative act embodied in official communication SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, which indicated that the annual registration update of our CVO would not proceed, be declared, and that in its place, the immediate annual registration of the referenced Veterinary Operation Certificate be ordered.

4. That the Administration be ordered to pay both costs of this action." 5) By brief dated March 10, 2014, the State answered the action negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) (see folios 406-416).- 6) By libel dated March 14, 2014, SENASA answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) (see folios 417-435).- 7) That the Procedural Judge, José Iván Salas Leitón, by resolution N° 1267-2014 at ten hours and forty minutes on June third, two thousand fourteen, ordered the consolidation of dockets numbers 13-8331-1027-CA and 13-8325-1027-CA, with the latter prevailing (folios 442-443).- 8) That with the presence of representatives of the parties, the preliminary hearing was held starting at eight hours and fifty-five minutes on March third of this year, presided over by the Procedural Judge Luis Mariano Argüello Rojas. At that time, the claims of the parties were analyzed and the documentary evidence was admitted. Furthermore, the matter was declared to be one of pure law, and the conclusions of the parties were received (listen to the corresponding recording and observe the minute appearing on folios 480-482 of the judicial file); 9) In the proceedings, the legal prescriptions have been observed, and no grounds for nullity of the actions taken have been found. This judgment is issued after deliberation and unanimously by the members of the Tribunal, Judge Rosa María Cortés Morales, and Judges Paulo André Alonso Soto and Jonatán Canales Hernández.- Judge Canales Hernández writes;

Considering:

• I)The following facts and procedural situations are deemed proven as relevant to the resolution of this matter:
• 1)That SENASA issued in favor of the plaintiff company a Veterinary Operation Certificate (hereinafter, "COV"), effective as of August 25, 2009, for its plant located in the hamlet of Barranca, district of San José, canton of Naranjo. The authorized activities were the storage and distribution of products of animal origin; storage and distribution of meat and meat products, processing and preservation of meat products, and sausage making. In said document, the update date was established as August 25, 2013 (folios 1-3 of the administrative file); 2) That SENASA, by means of official communication N° DIPOA-PG-002-RE-002 of February 2, 2009, established several non-conformities regarding the operation of the plant belonging to the plaintiff company herein, among them, that the plant requires a veterinary regent to operate, invoking to that effect the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud). That official communication gave rise to sanitary order DO-PG-002-RE-003 of that same date, addressed to that same company, stating therein that: "The establishment is based on official communication DIPOA-A-112-11. The establishment must send, within a period of 6 days, concrete and definitive responses" (folios 9-10 of the administrative file); 3) That the plaintiff Nombre145586 appeared as the responsible professional (Regent) for Embutidos Doro, as of August 23, 2013, in her capacity as Bachelor in Food Technology, under number 15 (folios 12-13 of the administrative file); 4) That by brief received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of SENASA on February 11, 2011, the plaintiff company challenged the aforementioned sanitary order, arguing that Nombre145586 is registered as regent of the sausage factory, before the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, under the protection of Article 21 of Law N° 8412, "(...) which (sic) protects her according to her professional profile to work as a regent in any sausage processing company, and since that date she was accepted by Mr. Nombre145591, head of this department, proof of this (sic) being that we were granted the Veterinary Operation Certificate (CVO)" (folio 11 of the administrative file); 5) That by brief received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of SENASA on June 4, 2012, the plaintiff company requested the application of the positive silence (silencio positivo) provided for in Article 7 of the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from the Excess of Requirements (N° 8220), with respect to the petition for the food technologist Nombre145586 to be recognized as regent at Embutidos Doro and Industrias Blanco Castro, S.A., even submitting a sworn statement before a notary public (folios 22-31 of the administrative file); 6) That by brief received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of SENASA on May 31, 2013, the plaintiff company requested that the appeal filed be resolved (folios 49-50 of the administrative file); 7) That Dr. Nombre145591, Director of the Central Western Region of SENASA, by official communication SENASA-RCOC # 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, indicated to the plaintiff company that for the issuance of the annual registration, veterinary physician regency is essential, and until such regency is presented, "(...) it will not have the respective permit (Veterinary Operation Certificate) for its operation." In said document, reference was made to official communication DRCOC #240-12 Office of the Ombudsman (see folio 53, regarding the first official communication, and folios 43-44, regarding the second official communication; both from the administrative file); 8) That in a document indicating neither date of issuance nor date of receipt, addressed to the General Director of SENASA, the plaintiff company filed an appeal against official communication SENASA-RCOC No 129-2013. It requests that while the challenge is resolved, what is indicated therein be suspended (folio 54 of the administrative file); 9) That the plaintiff company initiated an amparo de legalidad proceeding against the State, which was processed under docket N° 13-005915-1027-CA of this Tribunal. This situation led the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) to address the Minister of Agriculture and the Director of SENASA, by official communication of October 1, 2013, so that the appeal against the sanitary order of February 2, 2011, be resolved promptly (folios 55-62 of the administrative file); 10) That Dr. Nombre145591, Director of the Central Western Region of SENASA, by official communication SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 at 14:20 hours on October 10, 2013, rejected the motion for reconsideration "(...) issued by SENASA on February 2, 2011, official communication DIPOA-A-112-11, and therefore it is valid and effective, and must be complied with and fulfilled immediately" (folios 63-68 and 71-73 of the administrative file); 11) That the General Directorate of SENASA, by official communication SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013 at 8:50 hours on October 22, 2013, rejected the appeal filed by the plaintiff company (folios 79-85 of the administrative file); 12) Once the preceding administrative act was notified and upon a request for clarification, the Director of the Central Western Region of SENASA, by official communication N° SENASA-RCOC # 195-2013 of October 28, 2013, indicated to the plaintiff company that the period established to comply with the regency of a veterinary physician in the sausage factory was one month from the notification of that official communication (folios 85-87 of the administrative file); 13) That according to a visit conducted by the Operations Directorate of SENASA on February 25, 2014, the sausage factory of the plaintiff company continued operating (folio 89 of the administrative file).- II) The following facts and procedural situations are deemed not proven as relevant to the resolution of this matter:
• 1)That the Embutidos Doro sausage factory ceased operating due to the administrative requirement to have a Veterinary Regent (there is no information in the record to that effect); 2) That the administrative requirement to have a Veterinary Regent as an indispensable condition for issuing the COV necessarily implies that the food technologist Nombre145586 has to be dismissed (there is no information in the record to that effect).
• III)Arguments presented in docket N° 13-8325-1027-CA: In its lawsuit brief (folios 105-143), Nombre145585 alleges that the Public Administration has acted arbitrarily, in that SENASA has attempted to impose, through formal conduct and without any normative basis, the hiring of a veterinary regent, despite the fact that the hiring of a professional regent in Food Technology had previously been authorized, given that in this production process, there is no involvement of live animals, making the hiring of a veterinary physician unreasonable. It recalls that the business line of the plaintiff company is to purchase pork, chicken, and beef from duly registered slaughterhouses to manufacture a wide range of sausages in its plant, with the finished product then sold to wholesalers and retail food outlets, which are responsible for placement to the final consumer. It discredits the decision of SENASA because it lacks legal basis and does not take into account the public interests at stake. It affirms that it does not question the competence of SENASA to exercise control over the activity being carried out, but rather the scope of its powers and the interpretation of the norm, stating that the administrative acts that deny the registration of its Veterinary Operation Certificate (CVO) are illegal (official communications DIPOA-A-112-11 and SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirmed the former) and in which it was communicated that the annual registration update of the CVO requested on August 26, 2013, would not proceed (official communication SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12 of that year). It argues that the sole reason for non-conformity with the decisions of SENASA stems from the requirement to have veterinary regency, despite the fact that the activity carried out by the plaintiff company does not involve the handling or manipulation of live animals, the proper field of the veterinary physician being the care and preservation of animal health, given that "(...) even though they may attend to other topics by connection, this is not their fundamental axis." It outlines that at all times, the meat purchased for manufacturing sausages comes from slaughterhouses that have veterinarians for the livestock rearing phase, leaving the subjective criterion of the responding agency that orders the replacement of the food technologist with the veterinarian for the regency without any supporting norm. It argues that the problem is not solved by substituting the food technologist with the veterinarian, given that the first professional is essential, making it materially impossible to carry out the industrial processes, whose specialist responsible for planning, execution, and supervision is the food technologist. It says that for a micro-enterprise, substituting the food technologist would make it impossible to remain in the market against large producers of national and international recognition, with hundreds of other small producers being in that same situation, thus affecting the public interest. It attacks the administrative acts as follows: -resolution DIPOA-A-112-11, which is a sanitary order requiring a veterinary regent, because from the application of Article 221 of the General Health Law, the scope that SENASA makes is not derived, rendering the interpretation and application made an illegal act, given that what this norm provides is the performance of a veterinary inspection, carried out by some public authority, and not the establishment of a regency; -resolution SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which dismisses the motion for reconsideration against the prior act, which took 30 months to be issued and adds new elements to those set forth in the challenged act, intended to demonstrate uncontested facts and invoking the application of Law 8495 (which is an issue not in dispute); -resolution SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, which denies the renewal of the CVO registration in favor of the plaintiff company, given that it lacks proper reasoning of its own, but rather refers to other prior pronouncements. It alleges that the actions taken violate the principles of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), reasonableness, legal certainty, intangibility of one's own acts, as well as "(...) the basic norms of legal-normative hermeneutics, a frank violation of the non-juridical norms of the act," and injury to collective public and individual interests. It affirms that the violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness is configured because there is a notorious and total absence of motive as an essential material element, understanding motive as the reasons of fact and law by virtue of which the issuance of an administrative act is necessary, the foregoing because the inadequate interpretation made of Article 221 of the General Health Law, as well as numeral 7 of the Regulations for the Granting of the CVO, this interpretation being made by the Western Regional Director of SENASA, created differences where the enabling norm does not, violating the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, invoking to that effect what was stated in constitutional vote N° 2004-14421 of the Sala Constitucional. In this regard, it argues that: "The CVO is more akin to a license than to a permit or an authorization. The jurisprudential doctrine of this same chamber has been clear in establishing that a permit is the state consent to carry out an activity that is in principle prohibited. Thus, the CVO could not, in principle, be subject to a permit because agricultural production and the marketing of the resulting products is a lawful activity that finds support in the freedom of enterprise enshrined in numeral 46 of the Political Constitution. Authorization is the empowerment to carry out an activity that, although not prohibited, is at the Administration's discretion to carry out or not. Finally, a license is a regulated authorization insofar as the parameters for its granting are previously established and the Administration only has to verify their fulfillment. That is, the Administration cannot extend such parameters or give an interpretation that restricts the approval of said license. The CVO is clearly a license because it is granted for public and open commercialization, as opposed to closed or private commercialization, of products derived from animals. However, the Administration cannot freely decide whether to grant it or not, because it is sufficient that the petitioner satisfies the requirements of Executive Decree N° 34859-MAG (...) for its approval. It is, therefore, a regulated power." It mentions that despite the foregoing, applying Article 7 of the General Regulations for the Granting of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, which does not require it, it is ordered that the regent be a veterinarian. It argues that even in act SENASA-RCOC 145-2013, resort is made to the expedient of invoking Article 106 of the Regulation to the Organic Law of the College of Veterinary Physicians, when the truth is that this norm is inapplicable, because it is a norm that imposes a duty but does not establish a sanction, this being a matter of legal reserve in accordance with Articles 9 and 11 of the Constitution and 6, 11, 19, and 59 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP). It argues that in any case, the regulatory norm issued within the framework of organic relations by a non-state public entity is not opposable to the plaintiff herein, it being the case that the aforementioned Regulation dates from 1989 and Executive Decree N° 34859 is from 2008. It concludes this argument by stating that the Administration's procedural opportunity to set forth its arguments precluded with the issuance of the initial act (DIPOA-A-112-11), "(...) reason for which, and in accordance with the principle of no reformatio in peius, it lacks the possibility of putting forth new arguments in the resolution that confirms an ablative act. Said norm is not cited directly in SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 but in any case, it is worth saying that it would not be applicable in it either." It alleges that the principle of reasonableness has been violated because the obligation imposed by SENASA to have a veterinary regent does not comply with the trilogy of sub-principles that comprise said principle (necessity, suitability, and proportionality). The foregoing, because: "The first of these is that a norm must be necessary, that is, there must exist a social cause that makes its appearance in the legal system necessary. A norm should not come into legal life at the mere whim of the legislator or whoever issued it, but out of proven necessity. The second is that the norm be suitable, that is, that in qualitative terms it satisfies the reason that originated it, and finally, that it be proportional, that is, that from a quantitative perspective it manages to satiate expectations and not exceed them; for example, when a norm establishes a restriction of fundamental rights in the face of a social problem, it must be verified that this restriction is the least burdensome for the administered party and their fundamental guarantees." It affirms that with a food technologist, the safety (inocuidad) of the sausage manufacturing process is adequately supervised, making the supervision of a veterinarian unnecessary, which could instead affect the plant's safety due to the constant contact that person has with live animals, which can carry diseases. It says that even if the supervision of a veterinarian were necessary and suitable, it is not proportional to require a veterinary regent, and Article 221 of the General Health Law should be dimensioned by establishing the duty of the plaintiff's plant, and of all the plaintiffs, to pay for private external audits to entities like the Institute of Technical Standards of Costa Rica (INTECO), thus safeguarding public health without excessively affecting the business line of the plaintiff and allowing it to retain its regent in food technology, who is essential. It concludes that the requirement made by SENASA and questioned here becomes contrary to the principle of logic, because it would imply that all butcher shops and supermarkets have a veterinary regent, because they make artisanal sausages, their own ground meat, and their own chorizo. It argues that the non-juridical norms of the administrative act are violated, because the technical parameters to which the formal activity of the Administration must be subject, in order to avoid deviations and abuses of power, as established in Articles 15, 16, 17, and 160 of the LGAP, as well as the unequivocal norms of technique, science, logic, justice, experience, and common sense, were disregarded. It says that the principle of legal certainty and intangibility of one's own acts was also disregarded, invoking to that effect Considering VI of vote N° 051-2010 of the Sixth Section of this Tribunal. It argues that the same Dr. Nombre145591 of SENASA granted the CVO Registration Certificate with number Badge28947 in August 2009, valid until August 25, 2013, with a regent professional in food technology, thus endorsing the regent they had, later changing position without any substantial normative change. In this way, SENASA had "(...) given external signs to presume the legality of our actions and is not authorized to arbitrarily 'change the rules of the game.' Thus, there is a violation of both the principle of legal certainty and that of 'non venire contra factum proprium' extracted from constitutional canon 34, a situation that imposes the need to invalidate the contested acts." It ends the exposition by stating that there was an improper interpretation of Article 221 of the General Health Law, which is not harmonious with Articles 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (protection and progress of fundamental guarantees); 5 of the Constitution (which imposes the duty to ensure the progress and development of the nation with the well-being of the greatest number as its guiding light), a hermeneutics tending towards the protection of the public interest and fundamental rights having been required in this case, which was not verified here, as the Administration rather opted to give a prohibitive connotation to the norm, curtailing freedom of enterprise, which cannot be done except for reasons of public interest. It affirms that the interpretation made harms public health, by preferring a veterinarian over a food technologist, which affects the levels of safety and efficiency of the processes, "(...) even though Article 4 of the General Law of SENASA indicates that in interpreting the norm, one must abide by what is most favorable for the human being, well, what is most favorable is that a specialist be the regent of these food manufacturing processes for public consumption. // The interpretation given does not benefit anyone other than the veterinarians themselves, for whom a myriad of job options are created, but the rest of the population is negatively affected by this criterion. Not only is there a contra hominem interpretation but also contra societas. As this is the integrating element of the motive of the contested acts, it is appropriate to declare the absolute nullity of all of them." SENASA answers the action negatively (folios 182-198 and 232-248), fundamentally arguing that the contested acts do not suffer from any nullity. It begins its exposition by outlining the constituent elements of the administrative act, citing Nombre21604. Further on, it argues that the requirement of veterinary physician inspection for establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals and the industrialization of meat-based food products derives first from the provisions of Article 221 of the General Health Law, the concept of veterinary physician inspection being developed in Executive Decree N° 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2011, specifically in Article 3, which defines the inspecting veterinary physician (a licensed veterinarian who has under his responsibility the technical and sanitary direction of the establishments regulated in that Regulation, encompassing the functions established in said regulatory body and related legislation) and the official veterinary physician (a veterinarian who is an official of the Ministries of Agriculture and Health). It points out that this distinction between the concepts of inspecting veterinary physician and official veterinary physician means that the plaintiff company's interpretation, to the effect that veterinary inspection must be carried out by a public authority, must be discarded, given that the inspecting veterinary physician must even have a constant presence in the product manufacturing process, which is only possible if a regency is exercised in said establishment, according to the regulation established in Articles 8 and 33 ejusdem, even affirming that "(...) the same Decree 29588-MAG-S indicates that the owners of establishments covered under this regulation must have an office equipped and so forth (sic) for the Inspecting Veterinary Physician, it is because the same must be, clearly, an official distinct from the Official Veterinary Physicians of this National Service or any other authority of administrative rank." It continues arguing to the effect that the legal basis that supports SENASA in requesting the hiring of a regent veterinary physician is found in Article 20 of the ejusdem Decree, this provision being consistent with the content of Articles 105 and 106 of the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinary Physicians (Executive Decree N° 19184), which define the concept of veterinary physician regent and establish the obligation for sausage factories and factories and plants that manufacture products and by-products of animal origin intended for consumption by the human population. In accordance with the foregoing, the contested acts are duly reasoned, meeting all their constituent elements.

It then makes a lengthy consideration, affirming that according to the profile of the veterinary doctor, he is the most suitable professional to manage a sausage manufacturing establishment, concluding that although Article 21, subsection h) of the Organic Law of the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (No. 8412) establishes that members of that College must serve as consultants, advisors, experts, or responsible professionals in process industries, the veterinary doctor performs a fundamental role in the production of products and byproducts of animal origin, following the occurrence of events such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), dioxin contamination, and other diseases, and that in any case, the veterinarian’s work is not limited to the care and preservation of the health of live animals, but also extends to the production of sausages, since a matter of public health and safety of foods consumed daily is at stake. In another vein, it alleges that there is no administrative liability, of two types: no-fault or special sacrifice, or lack of service or abnormal functioning. It again cites the author Nombre21604, regarding the definition of lack of service or normal functioning, rejecting in passing that if the Public Administration does not commit said lack of service or abnormal functioning, the imposition of pecuniary liability is not possible, also stating, "(...) that it has eventually been the Administered Party who has placed itself in a condition of disadvantage by failing to comply with objective rules, rules which it should have complied with and taken any other actions the legal system permitted it." It rejects the claim for payment in the abstract of amounts not received since August 25, 2013, because there is no evidence whatsoever that reliably proves the damages claimed, the pleaded claim being devoid of evidentiary support.- The State answers the action negatively (folios 201-231), arguing that although the plaintiff company was authorized by Nombre20662 to engage in the activity of storage and distribution of products of animal origin, the sanitary order issued on February 2, 2011, requiring it to hire a veterinary manager is in accordance with law because, pursuant to the General Law of Nombre20662 (No. 8495 of April 6, 2006), there is a police power that empowers said body to require the Veterinary Operation Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO). To this effect, it invokes numerals 5, 6 subsections b) and t), as well as articles 37, 38, 40, 59, 89, and 91 of the aforementioned Law. It asserts that Nombre20662 holds a police power to guarantee the population the fulfillment of the guarantee of protection of the right to health, being authorized to order and execute sanitary measures it deems pertinent, even having the power to order the cancellation or suspension of the CVO, with the respective closure of the establishment, as well as any measure it deems appropriate. It indicates that pursuant to subsections b) and c) of article 56 of the General Law of SENASA, establishments that manufacture, import, clear customs, fraction, store, transport, and sell products or byproducts of animal origin, or that industrialize, package, refrigerate, process, or sell at the wholesale level, products, byproducts, or derivatives of animals, for human or animal consumption, must have a CVO. Regarding the legal nature of the CVO, it says it is "(...) the document granted by SENASA, through which authorization is given for a natural or legal person to engage in the aforementioned activities. Said authorization obliges compliance with the sanitary requirements established by SENASA to carry out the activity," pursuant to Article 57 ejúsdem, and it may even withdraw the CVO if it is demonstrated that the duly established sanitary requirements are not met, according to the power set forth in numerals 58 and 59 of the SENASA Law. It argues that in the specific case of the plaintiff company, that company is engaged in the storage and distribution of products of animal origin, their distribution and processing, in the sausage sector, and to exercise that activity it must have the CVO, finding that requirement not only in the SENASA Law but also in the General Health Law, the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing, the General Regulation for Granting the CVO, as well as the Regulation of the Organic Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors. Regarding the General Health Law, it recalls that pursuant to Article 221, establishments dedicated to the industrialization of meat foods are required to have veterinary medical inspection approved by the Ministry, with numeral 229 prohibiting the commerce or distribution of meats and derivatives originating from premises or establishments not authorized by the health authority or that operate without veterinary inspection. These provisions are consistent with the provisions in Articles 20, subsection a), 3, 7, 8, and 78 of the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses; numerals 3.23, 6, and 7 of the General Regulation for Granting the CVO, as well as articles 105 and 106, subsection a). It alleges that even when the sausage manufacturing process does not involve the handling or manipulation of live animals, veterinary medical inspection is required, as held by the Attorney General's Office itself in its opinions C-071-2006. It argues that the plaintiff party makes a forced interpretation of Article 221 of the General Health Law, also failing to explain why the food technologist can replace the veterinary doctor and, moreover, on which rule that substitution is based. It says that the administrative acts issued (SENASA DIPOA-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013) do not violate the principles of prohibition of arbitrariness, reasonableness, legal certainty, intangibility of one's own acts, observance of the non-legal rules of the act, nor in any way violate collective, public, and individual interests, but rather are based on the public interest, on the protection of public health and human life, and the rules invoked above. It argues that official letter No. DIPOA-A-112-11 is a preparatory act that supports the sanitary order issued, ordering the plaintiff company to include a veterinary doctor as manager; that resolution No. SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 details the reasons that led to the issuance of the sanitary measure, having the necessary technical and legal basis; that resolution No. SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 decided to proceed with updating the annual registration of the plaintiff company, because operating the sausage plant requires the presence of a veterinary medical manager, said provision being accompanied by the regulatory and technical analysis, in accordance with the requirements of Article 136 of the General Law of Public Administration. It is further argued that in this case, there is a failure to meet the requirements for compensation for damages to proceed, in the specific case. The foregoing, because none of the requirements of ordinal 190 of the General Law of Public Administration are met, invoking to this effect ruling No. 273-2012 of November 21, 2012, of the Sixth Section of this Court. It affirms that it is indispensable that the alleged injury be an immediate and necessary consequence of the administrative action, a situation that does not occur in this case, and that in any case it is not verified that there is damage that is effective, assessable, and individualizable and not eventual or hypothetical. It argues that there is no cause-and-effect relationship between the specific manifestation of the administrative function and the unlawful injury that demonstrates the existence of reparable damage or harm, no evidence being provided that meets the requirements as demanded in Articles 58 CPCA and 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. It also rejects the payment of interest because first, a specific amount must be granted in a final judgment, invoking to this effect ruling No. 1072-2010 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, also recalling that interest only proceeds when monetary obligations exist and not regarding obligations of value. It requests that the State not be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, as the lawsuit is unfounded. It concludes what is indicated in this brief, stating that in accordance with Article 8 of the General Law of the National Animal Health Service, No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, Nombre20662 is a body with minimum deconcentration and instrumental legal personality to carry out the powers provided for in that law, having independence of criteria in its capacity as a technical body for the performance of its duties. It argues that the acts challenged in this case were issued by Nombre20662 in the exercise of its exclusive legal powers, the State having no participation or responsibility whatsoever in the events. It argues that pursuant to Article 12, subsection c) CPCA and what has been stated by case law (rulings No. 1360-2010 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and 251-2011 of the Sixth Section of this Court), if the challenged conduct originates from the exercise of any of the powers attributed to the body with instrumental legal personality, the appropriate course is to declare lack of right with respect to the State.- IV) Arguments given in case file No. 13-8331-1027-CA: The plaintiff Nombre145586, in her lawsuit brief (folios 365-396), fundamentally states that in her capacity as a food technologist, the decision by Nombre20662 to require the hiring of a veterinary medical manager has curtailed her possibility of continuing to be hired as manager of the sausage factory owned by Embutidos Doro, and that this is not only illegal but has caused her economic harm. With similar arguments to those given in the company's lawsuit, she states that the Administration's acts of requiring the hiring of a veterinary doctor as manager, and not proceeding to update the annual CVO registration, are illegal and cause her indirect harm, legitimizing her to appeal in court to seek the annulment of said acts and achieve reparation for the damages suffered. She affirms that once the decree regulating the granting of the CVO came into effect, a contractual relationship was formalized with Embutidos Doro, and for a sausage manufacturing company, dismissing a food technology professional implies a material impossibility to carry out the industrial processes, this being the specialist in charge of the planning, execution, and supervision of those processes. She affirms that the principle of intangibility of one's own acts was violated because Dr. Nombre145591 authorized her hiring as a professional manager, she being a food technologist, the previous manager having already been approved, and then, without justification, the criteria was changed even though there was no substantial regulatory change, violating what is established in Article 34 of the Constitution. Regarding the nullity of the challenged administrative acts, she says that the situation must be returned to the state of affairs before the dismissal was decreed, the order to hire a veterinary manager must be withdrawn, and the immediate registration of the CVO must proceed.- Nombre20662 answers the action negatively (folios 417-435), affirming that regarding the case of the co-plaintiff here, what the Administration has maintained is that plants that manufacture sausages must have a veterinary doctor as manager for their operation, thereby disallowing the substitution of the veterinarian with a food technologist, as verified in an audit inspection conducted on February 2, 2011, which gave rise to the issuance of official letter No. DIPOA-A-112-11 of that date, in which three non-conformities were established, among them the requirement of a veterinary doctor as manager for the operation of the plant. It argues that there is no evidence in the record that "(...) the plaintiff party has been afflicted by the risk of being dismissed from her duties. Note also that in none of the administrative acts whose nullity is sought in this process, is it ordered, not in the least, that the plaintiff Nombre145586 must be dismissed from her duties, the decision to terminate the existing contract - if it occurred - being that of the contracting parties." The State answers the action negatively (folios 406-416), opposing first the exception of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa), given that if Mrs. Nombre145586 was hired by Nombre145585 for the provision of professional services, that is, she was an employee of that company, she would not have standing to request the nullity of actions directly related to the company and not to her in particular. Then, it opposes the exception of lack of right, arguing that it is false that the actions taken by Nombre20662 are illegal and arbitrary, and that rather the actions taken are consistent with the provisions of the General Health Law.

• V)At the preliminary hearing held in this Court on March 3 of this year, the different parties expressed the conclusions summarized below:

Conclusions of the co-plaintiffs: Embutidos Doro is a company responsible for stuffing previously processed meat. To perform these functions, a CVO is needed, which was previously granted by the Ministry of Health, but as of 2006, it is the responsibility of SENASA. By the year 2008, the requirement to appoint a permanent manager or advisor was requested. Later, officials Nombre6487 and Nombre139513 of SENASA conducted an inspection, where the need to hire a veterinary manager was determined, against which revocation appeals, a legality appeal (amparo de legalidad), and even this process were filed. It notes that Miss Nombre145586 performs the management function, being a food technologist, and is suitable for the purposes of the rule, which is why the party disagrees with the challenged acts.- Conclusions of the State: The lawsuit is unfounded because there is a legal basis to require veterinary management in establishments that manufacture sausages. It points out that Article 221 of the General Health Law clearly establishes, without room for interpretation, that a veterinary doctor is required. Then, the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors (numeral 106, subsection a), clearly establishes the participation of veterinarians in the management of establishments that manufacture sausages. The same is done by the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing, Executive Decree No. 29588, in its Article 20, subsection a).- There is no doubt that an establishment of the nature of the plaintiff's requires a veterinary doctor as manager. There is also a technical basis, as veterinarians are the only ones who can guarantee the safety of meat foods. No nullity is observed, there is no invalidity whatsoever. The manner in which said rules can be disapplied is not proven, nor why a technologist can assume that function.

It is affirmed that Mrs. Nombre145586 does not have active standing to challenge the mentioned administrative acts, because although she claims to have been an "employee" of Nombre145585, she does not prove the harm caused. The payment of damages is requested, but it is not clarified what the damages consist of, since at no time was the establishment closed by Nombre20662, evidence in this sense appearing at folio 89. It must be made clear that in this file, the request for a precautionary measure was rejected as unfounded. According to Article 8 of the SENASA Law, it has instrumental legal personality and, in this case, acted in the exercise of its powers; therefore, if any claim against that body is upheld, it requests that the lawsuit against the State be declared without merit.- Conclusions of Nombre20662: It affirms that the challenged acts are duly motivated factually and legally. It cites the same rules mentioned by the State's representation to support the need for sausage processing establishments to be managed by veterinary doctors. Article 3 of the General Regulation for Granting the Veterinary Operation Certificate establishes the difference between the inspector veterinary doctor and the veterinary doctor inspector.

Veterinarians are the suitable professionals to attend not only to live animals but also to dead animals, because they can detect the existence of diseases, bacteria, and medications that may be harmful to human health.

Regarding damages, no evidence whatsoever of their existence has been provided, given that the company has not even been closed by the authorities, and if the company has closed, it was by decision of its owners. It points out that the company is currently operating with a veterinary doctor.

It says that the indicated administrative decisions are duly based on Article 89 of the SENASA Law. It requests that the lawsuit be declared without merit and that the parties be ordered to pay both costs of the action.- VI) ON THE MERITS: Legal regime of authorization for the activity of sausage production: The Court considers that, in the exercise of police power in sanitary matters, the activity of production and storage of sausages is subject to an administrative authorization regime, under the competence of Nombre20662, it being an indispensable requirement to access said authorization to have a veterinary doctor as manager for each of the establishments that carry out these activities.- This conclusion is reached from the reading and relationship between the rules indicated below, which regulate: (a) the obligation to obtain administrative authorization and the body responsible for granting it, and (b) veterinary medical management as an indispensable requirement to issue the Veterinary Operation Certificate (CVO):

• a)Obligation to obtain administrative authorization for the production of sausages, exclusive competence of Nombre20662: This derives from the provisions in Article 221 of the General Health Law (Law No. 5395 of February 24, 1974), as well as the General Animal Health Law (Law No. 8495 of April 6, 2006), in its numerals 5, 6, subsections j), ñ), and o), 56 subsections b) and c), 57, and 58, which we also cite below:

"ARTICLE 221.- Establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals and to the industrialization of meat foods from different species, intended for consumption by the population, must also have veterinary medical inspection approved by the Ministry.

Factories and plants producing products of animal origin are subject to the same requirement." "Article 5-Competent body. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG), through Senasa, shall be responsible for the regulation, planning, administration, coordination, execution, and application of official activities at the national, regional, and international levels, relating to the health of the animal population, residues, veterinary public health, veterinary control of zoonoses, traceability/trackability, protection and safety of foods of animal origin, animal feed, veterinary medications, animal genetic material, products and byproducts, the production, use, release, or commercialization of genetically modified organisms that may affect animal health or its environment, and hazardous substances of animal origin." "Article 6-Powers. Nombre20662 shall have the following powers:

• j)Control and guarantee the health of domestic, aquatic, wild, or other animals of different species, as well as the safety of products, byproducts, and derivatives for human or animal consumption, as well as establish sanitary controls in all slaughter, processing, and industrialization plants.
• ñ)Establish authorization criteria for natural and legal persons for each specific activity, the responsibilities assumed, and their limitations.
• o)Establish quality control and technical audit procedures, both for Nombre20662 itself and for authorized or approved natural and legal persons; likewise, ensure the administration, control, and use of the resources obtained by applying this Law." "Article 56.- Establishments subject to control. Nombre20662 shall grant or withdraw the veterinary operation certificate for the following establishments:

(...) b) Those that manufacture, import, clear customs for, fraction, store, transport, and sell products and byproducts of animal origin.

• c)Those destined for the slaughter of animals or that industrialize, package, refrigerate, process, or sell, at the wholesale level, products, byproducts, or derivatives of animals, for human or animal consumption. (...)" "Article 57.-Veterinary operation certificate. Veterinary operation certificate shall be understood as the document granted by Senasa, through which authorization is recorded so that the requesting natural or legal person engages in one or several of the activities mentioned in Article 56 of this Law.

A single certificate may indicate authorization to exercise different activities; it shall be requested and granted only once and shall not need to be renewed, as long as the sanitary requirements are constantly met.

Said authorization shall imply compliance with the sanitary requirements established by Senasa to carry out the activity." In the above sense, even the Constitutional Chamber has considered that from the entry into force of Law No. 8495, the power to issue sanitary authorizations in establishments that kill animals, or process and market meat products, and of course that manufacture and market sausages, is the exclusive competence of SENASA, displacing in this area the competence of the Ministry of Health to issue sanitary operating permits for this type of establishment. Thus, in Considerando III of ruling No. 2012-01965 of nine hours and thirty-one minutes on February seventeen, two thousand twelve, it was stated: "As can be appreciated from reading this entire set of norms of formal legal rank, the legislator structured a control and surveillance system under the charge of the National Animal Health Service with the purpose of ensuring a degree of protection for society. In this way, it designed not only the structure that provides the service but also the existence of an equivalent to the sanitary operating permit called a Veterinary Operation Certificate (Article 57 of the Law) that all establishments set forth in numeral 56 of said legal body must have."- In any case, it should be remembered that the case law of this Court (see Considerando VI of ruling No. 163-2012-VI of 14:20 hours on August 20, 2012, of the Sixth Section) has conceptualized (and differentiated) the concepts of authorization, permit, and license, in the following manner: "(...) Authorization can be defined as the removal of a legal obstacle for the exercise of a due conduct. For its part, a permit consists of the administrative enablement for the development of a conduct, in principle prohibited. While a license consists of an authorization with regulated content" (underlining is ours), and it can be affirmed according to the foregoing, that the Veterinary Operation Certificate is a permit, understood as the administrative enablement for the development of a conduct, in principle prohibited, due to the risk that the production and storage of sausages implies for the health and life of animals and humans. A consequence of conceptualizing the CVO as a permit is that the administrative act granting it is composed not only of regulated acts but also of discretionary elements, the Administration being able to even deny the granting of the permit even if the requirements are met, if despite that, said act affects the legal interests so often mentioned.- b) Veterinary medical management as an indispensable requirement to issue the Veterinary Operation Certificate (CVO): It is also the criterion of this Court that for the issuance of the CVO, it is indispensable that a veterinary doctor be designated as manager in the corresponding establishment, it being legally impossible for the participation of veterinarians to be supplanted by other professionals, even a food technologist, as the plaintiff Nombre145586 is. This conclusion is reached from the reading of numerals 3, 7, and 8 of the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing (Executive Decree No. 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2001), as well as articles 105 and 106, subsections a) and c) of the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors (19184 of July 10, 1989), which, as relevant, indicate the following:

"Article 3- The words, names, terms, and phrases used in the provisions of this regulation shall be understood as follows: (...)

Inspector Veterinary Doctor:

Professional in Veterinary Medicine incorporated into the College of Veterinary Doctors, who has under their responsibility the technical and sanitary direction of the establishments regulated herein, encompassing the functions assigned by this regulation and other related legislation." "Article 7- The establishments that shall be subject to the provisions of this regulation are: those dedicated to the slaughter, deboning, stuffing, packaging, storage, processing, sale, as well as the transport vehicles for meats from bovine, caprine, equine, ovine, porcine species, and others authorized by MAG and MS." "Article 8- To ensure the safety of meat products, these shall be subjected to organoleptic examinations performed by the Inspector Veterinary Doctor and their team of inspection auxiliaries, and to physical, chemical, and microbiological tests performed in situ or in official laboratories or laboratories duly accredited for that purpose." "Article 105.- Manager (regente) is understood to be the professional, a member of the College of Veterinary Doctors, who in accordance with the legislation assumes the technical and scientific direction and the professional responsibility of any of the establishments mentioned in the following article.

Article 106.- The establishments that must be managed or directed technically and scientifically by a veterinary doctor are:

• a)Factories and plants producing products and byproducts of animal origin intended for consumption by the human population." (...)
• c)Establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals, processing, and industrialization of meat products from different species, without prejudice to the competence of zootechnical agronomist engineers in the fields of processing and industrialization." (the underlining does not correspond to the original) In accordance with the aforementioned rules, the argument is not acceptable that pursuant to Article 21, subsection h) of the Organic Law of the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, Law No. 8412 of April 22, 2004, which establishes that: "Active or emeritus members of the College shall have the following duties and competencies:// h) Serve as a consultant, advisor, expert, or responsible professional in process industries," a related professional incorporated into said professional corporation, that is, a food technologist, can be in charge of an establishment intended for the manufacture of sausages, because there is a legal norm of even later validity (those of the General Animal Health Law) that establishes that this professional work is proper to the veterinary doctor.- VII) Analysis of the claims of Nombre145585 : Given the foregoing framework on the authorization regime for the activity of sausage manufacturing, we will refer to the claims and arguments given by the parties:

First, second, and third claims: In which the annulment of official letters DIPO-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, is requested, also questioning, insofar as it was indicated that the annual registration update of our CVO would not proceed, ordering instead the immediate annual registration of the veterinary operation certificate.- These claims are not acceptable in the opinion of this Court, for the reasons set forth below: 1) The requirement to have a veterinary doctor in charge is determined by the authorization regime for the activity of manufacturing and storing sausages, as indicated in the preceding whereas clause. It must also be noted that the fact that a professional in food technology was in charge, based on Law No. 8412, cannot supplant the participation of veterinary doctors; 2) Nor is the argument acceptable that prior to the issuance of these administrative acts, it had been accepted that a food technologist was in charge and under those conditions the Veterinary Operation Certificate was issued and kept valid, because that irregular situation cannot go against an express norm that establishes the legal obligation to have a veterinary doctor, and it even constitutes a violation of the principle of singular non-derogability of the norm. Likewise, from the fact that prior to the sanitary order of February 2, 2009, it was tolerated that the charge was not held by a veterinary doctor but by another professional, it does not follow that this situation cannot be corrected, as was done in effect; 3) The position of the plaintiff cannot be accepted either, in the sense that it was not taken into account that the sausage production plant does not work with live animals, but with meat purchased from authorized slaughterhouses, given that pursuant to Article 56 of the SENASA Law, the control involves not only establishments where live animals are handled, but also the transformation processes into sausages, as well as their storage and distribution; 4) It must also be said that the legal obligation to have a veterinary doctor as a regent does not in any way impede the activity that a food technologist can perform, as a professional incorporated into the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, to perform functions in a process industry (as sausage manufacturing would eventually be), pursuant to Article 21, subsection h) of Law No. 8412, but rather implies only that the veterinary doctor cannot be substituted by another professional who handles another branch of knowledge and is incorporated into another professional college, for the functions that are technically and legally their own; 5) The principles of reasonableness and proportionality are not violated by the normative interpretation carried out by SENASA on the content of the General Health Law and the General Animal Health Law, nor was it resolved arbitrarily, but rather at all times it was done in accordance with the legal text and seeking the effective protection of the public interest, which is precisely to guarantee the safety of products of animal origin intended for human consumption; in this way, the interpretation was also made in compliance with the fundamental guarantees in favor of consumer rights, established in Article 46 of the Constitution. In this case, the invocation made by the administrative authority of an executive regulation (the Regulation of the Organic Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors, Executive Decree No. 19184 of July 10, 1989), in resolutions SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 and SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013, is correct, because in that normative body, the concept of a veterinary doctor inspector or regent of a specific establishment intended for the transformation of products of animal origin is developed, and that provision is even consistent with Articles 56 and 57 of Law No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, which was issued later; 6) It is not true that the normative interpretation establishing that the regent of the establishments must necessarily be a veterinary doctor and that this is an indispensable requirement for the issuance of the Veterinary Operation Certificate is contrary to the principle of reasonableness and its sub-principles (necessity, suitability, and proportionality), given that it is necessary, suitable, and completely proportionate to the case to require the participation of a professional with specialized knowledge in animal health and the effects that animal health may have on human health, in an activity that can seriously affect the health and life of people, and it is not reasonable, rather, for that professional to be substituted by another who does not have specialized knowledge in that matter; 7) Regarding the argument that the requirement is not reasonable because it would imply having a veterinary regent for all butcher shops and supermarkets, because they prepare creole sausages, ground meat, and chorizo, this being contrary to the principle of logic, it must also be rejected because this abstract situation is not being tried in this expediente, but rather what is analyzed here is the specific situation of a sausage factory owned by the plaintiff company, in a specific place and with its own characteristics; 8) Nor is it true that the questioned acts were issued disregarding the rules of science or technique (doctrine of Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration), because with what is stated in administrative acts SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, the technical and scientific reasons why the veterinary doctor is the most suitable to guarantee animal and human health and food safety are made clear; 9) It is not true either that the Administration has been precluded from the opportunity to sufficiently motivate the acts contrary to the claims of the plaintiff company, after the issuance of the sanitary order of February 2, 2002, rather, the extensive argumentation given in acts SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 and SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013 adequately responds to the questions raised by the plaintiff on appeal; thus, it is necessary to argue in the way it was done, and no normative violation or infringement of due process or the right of defense is observed; 10) The power to withdraw the Veterinary Operation Certificate when any requirement for its maintenance is lacking derives from the application of Article 58 of Law No. 8495, which provides: "The Nombre20662 may withdraw the veterinary operation certificate if it determines, after prior inspection, that the establishment does not meet the sanitary requirements established for the authorized activities. If the certificate is withdrawn, the interested party must request it again," and for that reason the third claim of the plaintiff company must be denied; 11) Finally, the Court considers that the normative application challenged here is contrary to business freedom or Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (progressivity of fundamental guarantees), because the fact of establishing a requirement such as sanitary medical regency, prior to issuing the Veterinary Operation Certificate, does not curtail that freedom, but rather harmonizes it with interests of a higher nature, namely the health and life of the population.- Fourth and fifth claims: They must be dismissed for one reason: it was not verified that at any time the sausage manufacturing establishment was closed due to the order to have a veterinary medical regency to obtain the Veterinary Operation Certificate, and therefore the damage sought to be compensated was not verified.- VIII) Analysis of the claims of Nombre145586 : If the claims of Ms. Nombre145586 are observed, it is observed that they derive from those deduced by Embutidos Doro. The foregoing is because Ms. Nombre145586 has the profession of food technologist duly incorporated into the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals and had a regency contract with said company, duly registered before the corresponding professional corporation, and would have been harmed in her interests when it was ordered that to maintain the validity of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, a veterinary medical regency must be registered. Also, the arguments presented by said person are basically the same as those presented by the co-plaintiff company, and her claims must meet the same fate, in which the annulment of the same administrative acts is requested, also requesting that food technology professionals be allowed to exercise said regency. Based on the reasons given above, the claims for annulment must be rejected, as well as the petition aimed at allowing food technology professionals to exercise the regency in sausage production establishments, complying with the requirements of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, because as we saw, the authorization to act as a regent given in Article 21, subsection h) of Law No. 8412, cannot supplant, either technically or legally, the participation of the veterinary doctor. In any case, the fact that incorporation into the College of Veterinary Doctors is required did not determine any damage to Ms. Nombre145586, because it was not even proven that this situation determined her dismissal by the company, rather it could be thought that she could continue working for it, exercising her work as a food technologist, within the scope of her specialized knowledge. As there is no proven relationship between the requirement of incorporation into the College of Veterinary Doctors and any harm to the plaintiff Nombre145586 , the exception of lack of standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) must be upheld.- IX) Analysis of the exceptions and award of costs: Regarding the State: The State's representation is correct when it affirms that the administrative resolutions issued by the Nombre20662 in this case have been issued within the scope of its own competencies derived from the General Law of the National Animal Health Service, No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, and that for this reason, pursuant to the instrumental legal personality attributed to that body with minimum deconcentration, the claim against the State must be dismissed for lack of standing to be sued (legitimación ad causam pasiva). The foregoing is affirmed because the plaintiffs jointly sued the larger entity (the State) and the body with deconcentration and instrumental legal personality (SENASA), as imposed by Article 12, subsection c) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, with the claims even directed at the annulment of the deconcentrated body. Due to the foregoing, since the action of no centralized State body is directly questioned, the exception of lack of standing to be sued must be upheld and the claim against the State dismissed in all its aspects. Due to the manner in which it is resolved, a ruling on the exceptions of lack of right regarding the claims filed by Nombre145585 and Nombre145586 is omitted, as well as the exception of lack of standing to sue, regarding the action of the latter person. Given that the action was filed against the State, as imposed by law, it is found that there was sufficient reason to litigate, placing us within one of the hypotheses for exoneration from the award of costs for both plaintiffs in favor of the State (Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code), and this must be resolved in that manner.- Regarding the Nombre20662: In accordance with the reasons given in the preceding whereas clauses, the defense of lack of right regarding the action of Nombre145585 must be upheld, and the claim declared without merit. The exceptions of lack of standing to sue and to be sued (legitimación ad causam activa and pasiva) must also be upheld regarding the claim of Nombre145586 , as there is no effective harm from the questioned administrative actions within the scope of her legal sphere, and her action must be declared inadmissible.- Both co-defendants being unsuccessful in this matter against SENASA, they must be ordered to pay said deconcentrated body both sets of costs of the action, as there is no circumstance for exoneration, in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned norm.-

Therefore:

• 1)The exception of lack of standing to be sued (legitimación ad causam pasiva) raised by the State is upheld, and the claims filed by both plaintiffs against the former are declared inadmissible. Due to the manner in which it is resolved, a ruling on the exceptions of lack of standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa), which were raised by the entity, is omitted. Both plaintiffs are exonerated from the payment of both sets of costs in favor of the State; 2) The exceptions of lack of standing to sue and to be sued (legitimación ad causam activa and pasiva) raised against the action of Nombre145586 are upheld, and the claim regarding her is also declared inadmissible; the exception of lack of right raised against the plaintiff company's action is upheld. Consequently, the claims of Nombre145585 , Limitada against the National Animal Health Service are declared without merit in all their aspects. The co-plaintiffs are ordered to pay personal and procedural costs in favor of the deconcentrated body.- Jonatán Canales Hernández Rosa María Cortés Morales Paulo André Alonso Soto The authorized activities were the storage and distribution of products of animal origin; storage and distribution of meat and meat products, processing and preservation of meat products, and sausage production. In said document, the update date was established as August 25, 2013 (folios 1-3 of the administrative file); **2)** That Nombre20662, through official letter No. DIPOA-PG-002-RE-002 of February 2, 2009, established several non-conformities regarding the operation of the plant belonging to the plaintiff company here, among them, that the plant requires a veterinary regent (Regente) to operate, invoking for this purpose the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud). That official letter gave rise to health order DO-PG-002-RE-003 of that same date, addressed to that same company, indicating therein that: "The establishment is made based on official letter DIPOA-A-112-11. The establishment must send, within a period of 6 days, concrete and definitive responses" (folios 9-10 of the administrative file); **3)** That the plaintiff Nombre145586 appeared as the responsible professional (Regente) for Embutidos Doro, as of August 23, 2013, in her capacity as a Bachelor in Food Technology (Bachiller en Tecnología de Alimentos), under number 15 (folios 12-13 of the administrative file); **4)** That by a writing received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of Nombre20662 on February 11, 2011, the plaintiff company challenged the previous health order, arguing that Nombre145586 is registered as the regent (regente) of the sausage factory before the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines), under the protection of Article 21 of Law No. 8412, **"(...) which (sic) protects her according to her professional profile to work as a regent in any sausage processing company, and from that date she was accepted by Nombre145591, head of this department, as proof of this (sic) we were granted the Veterinary Operating Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO)"** (folio 11 of the administrative file); **5)** That by a writing received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of Nombre20662 on June 4, 2012, the plaintiff company requests the application of the positive silence (silencio positivo) provided for in Article 7 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements (Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos) (No. 8220), with respect to the petition to have the food technologist Nombre145586 recognized as the regent at Embutidos Doro and Industrias Blanco Castro, S.A., even submitting an affidavit (declaración jurada) before a notary public (folios 22-31 of the administrative file); **6)** That by a writing received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of Nombre20662 on May 31, 2013, the plaintiff company requested that the filed appeal (recurso de apelación) be resolved (folios 49-50 of the administrative file); **7)** That Dr. Nombre145591, Director of the Central Western Region of SENASA, by official letter SENASA-RCOC # 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, indicated to the plaintiff company that for the issuance of the annual registration, a veterinary medical regency (regencia médico veterinaria) is indispensable, and that until that is presented, "(...) it will not have the respective permit (Veterinary Operating Certificate) for its operation." Said document made reference to official letter DRCOC #240-12 Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los habitantes) (see folio 53, regarding the first official letter and folios 43-44, regarding the second official letter; both from the administrative file); **8)** That in a document that indicates neither a date of issuance nor a date of receipt, addressed to the Director General of SENASA, the plaintiff company files an appeal (recurso de apelación) against official letter SENASA-RCOC No 129-2013. It requests that while the challenge is being resolved, what is indicated therein be suspended (folio 54 of the administrative file); **9)** That the plaintiff company initiated an amparo de legalidad proceeding against the State, which was processed in file No. 13-005915-1027-CA of this Court. That situation led the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) to address the Minister of Agriculture and the Director of SENASA, by official letter of October 1, 2013, so that the appeal against the health order of February 2, 2011, be resolved as soon as possible (folios 55-62 of the administrative file); **10)** That Dr. Nombre145591, Director of the Central Western Region of SENASA, by official letter SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 at 2:20 p.m. on October 10, 2013, rejected the motion for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) **"(...) issued by Nombre20662 on February 2, 2011, official letter DIPOA-A-112-11 and therefore in force and effective and for which it must be obeyed and fulfilled immediately"** (folios 63-68 and 71-73 of the administrative file); **11)** That the General Directorate of SENASA, by official letter SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013 at 8:50 a.m. on October 22, 2013, rejected the appeal filed by the plaintiff company (folios 79-85 of the administrative file); **12)** Once the previous administrative act was notified and upon a request for clarification, the Director of the Central Western Region of Nombre20662, by official letter No. SENASA-RCOC # 195-2013 of October 28, 2013, indicated to the plaintiff company that the established period for it to comply with the regency (regencia) of a veterinary doctor (médico veterinario) in the sausage factory was one month from the notification of that official letter (folios 85-87 of the administrative file); **13)** That according to a visit conducted by the Operations Directorate of SENASA on February 25, 2014, the sausage factory of the plaintiff company continued to operate (folio 89 of the administrative file).- **II)** Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following facts and procedural situations are considered as not proven:

**1)** That the sausage factory of Embutidos Doro ceased to operate due to the administrative requirement to have a Veterinary Regent (Regente Veterinario) (there is no information in the case file to that effect); **2)** That the administrative requirement to have a Veterinary Regent as an indispensable prerequisite to issue the CVO necessarily implies that the food technologist Nombre145586 must be dismissed (there is no information in the case file to that effect).

**III)** **Arguments given in file No. 13-8325-1027-CA**: In its lawsuit brief (folios 105-143), **Nombre145585 alleges** that the Public Administration has acted arbitrarily, as Nombre20662 has attempted to impose, through formal conduct and without any normative basis, the hiring of a veterinary regent (regente veterinario), despite the fact that the hiring of a professional regent in Food Technology had previously been authorized, given that live animals do not participate in that production process, making the hiring of a veterinary doctor unreasonable. It recalls that the commercial activity of the plaintiff company is to buy pork, chicken, and beef from duly registered slaughterhouses to produce a wide range of sausages in its plant, with the finished product then sold to wholesalers and retail food outlets, which are responsible for placement to the final consumer. It discredits the decision of Nombre20662 because it lacks legal basis and does not take into account the public interests at stake. It states that the competence of Nombre20662 to exercise control over the activity being carried out is not questioned, but rather the scope of its powers and the interpretation of the rule, arguing that the administrative acts that deny the registration of its Veterinary Operating Certificate (CVO) are illegal (official letters DIPOA-A-112-11 and SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirmed the former) and in which it was communicated that the annual renewal of the CVO registration that had been requested on August 26, 2013, would not proceed (official letters SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12 of that year). It argues that the sole reason for disagreement with the decisions of Nombre20662 stems from the requirement to have veterinary regency (regencia veterinaria), despite the fact that the activity carried out by the plaintiff company does not involve the treatment or handling of live animals, the proper field of the veterinary doctor being the care and preservation of animal health, given that "(...) even if they can attend to other issues by connection, this is not their fundamental axis." It outlines that at all times the meat acquired for sausage manufacturing comes from slaughterhouses that have veterinary doctors for the livestock breeding phase, leaving the subjective criterion of the respondent body that orders the replacement of the food technologist with the veterinary doctor for the regency (regencia) without any supporting regulation. It argues that the problem is not solved by substituting the food technologist with the veterinary doctor, given that the first professional is indispensable, materially making it impossible to carry out the industrial processes, whose specialist in charge regarding planning, execution, and supervision is the food technologist. It says that for a microenterprise, substituting the food technologist would make it impossible to remain in the market against large producers of national and international recognition, with hundreds of other small producers being in the same situation, thus causing an impact on the public interest. It attacks the administrative acts in the following manner: - **resolution DIPOA-A-112-11**, which is a health order that demands a veterinary regent, because the application of Article 221 of the General Health Law does not derive the scope that Nombre20662 makes, with the interpretation and application carried out becoming an illegal act, given that what said regulation provides is the conducting of a veterinary inspection, carried out by some public authority and not the establishment of a regency (regencia); - **resolution SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013**, which dismisses the motion for reversal against the previous act, which took 30 months to be issued and adds new elements to those set forth in the appealed act, aimed at demonstrating non-controversial facts and invoking the application of Law 8495 (which is an issue not under discussion); - **resolution SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013**, which denies the renewal of the CVO registration in favor of the plaintiff company, given that its own argumentation is lacking, instead referring to other prior pronouncements. It alleges that the actions taken have violated the principles of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), reasonableness (razonabilidad), legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), and intangibility of one's own acts (intangibilidad de actos propios), as well as "(...) the basic rules of legal-normative exegesis, a clear violation of the non-legal rules of the act" and the harm to collective public and individual interests. It affirms that the violation **of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness** is configured because there is a notorious and total absence of motive as an essential material element, understanding motive as the reasons of fact and law by virtue of which the issuance of an administrative act becomes necessary, the foregoing because of the inadequate interpretation made of Article 221 of the General Health Law, as well as numeral 7 of the Regulations for the Granting of the CVO (Reglamento para el Otorgamiento del CVO), this interpretation being made by the Western Regional Director of SENASA, creating differences where the enabling regulation does not, thus violating the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, invoking to this effect what was stated in vote No. 2004-14421 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). In this regard it argues that: "The CVO is more akin to a license (licencia) than to a permit or an authorization. The jurisprudential doctrine of this same chamber has been clear in establishing that a permit is the state's consent to carry out an activity that is in principle prohibited. Thus, the CVO could not in principle be subject to a permit because agricultural production and the commercialization of the resulting products is a lawful activity that finds support in the business freedom (libertad empresarial) enshrined in numeral 46 of the Political Constitution. An authorization is the enabling to carry out an activity which, although not prohibited, is at the Administration's discretion to carry out or not. Finally, a license is a regulated authorization insofar as the parameters for its granting are previously fixed and the Administration only needs to verify their compliance. That is, the Administration cannot extend such parameters or give an interpretation that restricts the approval of said license. The CVO is clearly a license because it is granted for public and open commercialization, as opposed to closed or private, of products derived from animals. However, the Administration cannot freely decide whether to grant it or not, since it is sufficient for the applicant to satisfy the requirements of Executive Decree No. 34859-MAG **"(...) for its approval. It is then a regulated power (potestad tasada)"**. It mentions that notwithstanding the foregoing, applying Article 7 of the General Regulation for the Granting of the Veterinary Operating Certificate (Reglamento General para el Otorgamiento del Certificado Veterinario de Operación), which does not require it, it is ordered that the regent be a veterinary doctor. It argues that even in act SENASA-RCOC 145-2013, recourse is made to the expedient of invoking Article 106 of the Regulations to the Organic Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors (Reglamento a la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios), when the truth is that this regulation is inapplicable, because it is a rule that imposes a duty but does not contemplate a sanction, this matter being subject to legal reserve (reserva legal) in accordance with Articles 9 and 11 of the Constitution (Carta Fundamental) and 6, 11, 19 and 59 of the LGAP. It argues that in any case, the regulatory norm issued within the framework of organic relations by a non-state public entity is not enforceable against the plaintiff here, and that in any event, the aforementioned Regulation dates back to 1989 and Executive Decree No. 34859 is from 2008. It finishes this argument by saying that the Administration's procedural opportunity to present its arguments precluded (precluyó) with the issuance of the first act (DIPOA-A-112-11), "(...) reason for which and in accordance with the principle of non-reform in detriment (principio de no reforma en perjuicio) it lacks the possibility of putting forward new arguments in the resolution that confirms an ablatory act. Said norm is not directly cited in SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 but in any case it is worth stating that it would not be applicable to it either." It alleges that **the principle of reasonableness (principio de razonabilidad)** has been violated because the obligation imposed by Nombre20662 to have a veterinary regent does not fulfill the trilogy of sub-principles that comprise said principle (necessity, suitability, and proportionality). The foregoing, because: **"The first of them is that a norm must be necessary, that is, that there exists a social cause that makes its appearance in the legal system essential. A norm should not be born into legal life by the mere whim of the legislator or the one who issues it, but by proven necessity. The second is that the norm be suitable, that is, that in qualitative terms it satisfies the motive that originated it, and finally that it be proportional, that is, that from a quantitative perspective it manages to satisfy the expectations and not exceed them; for example, when a norm establishes a restriction of fundamental rights in the face of a social problem, it must be verified that this restriction is the least burdensome for the administered party and their fundamental guarantees"**. It affirms that by having a food technologist, the safety (inocuidad) of the sausage-making process is adequately supervised, making the supervision of a veterinary doctor unnecessary, which could actually affect the plant's safety (inocuidad) due to the constant contact with live animals, which can present diseases. It says that even if the supervision of a veterinary doctor were necessary and suitable, demanding a veterinary regent is not proportional, and Article 221 of the General Health Law should be dimensioned, establishing the duty of the plaintiff's plant and all the plaintiffs to pay for external private audits to entities such as the Institute of Technical Standards of Costa Rica (Instituto de Normas Técnicas de Costa Rica, INTECO), thus safeguarding public health without overly affecting the plaintiff's commercial activity and allowing it to retain its regent in food technology, who is indispensable. It finishes by stating that the requirement made by Nombre20662 and questioned here becomes contrary to the principle of logic (principio de logicidad), because it would imply that all butcher shops and supermarkets have a veterinary regent, as they make homemade sausages, their ground meat, and their own chorizo. It argues that **the non-legal rules of the administrative act are violated**, because the technical parameters to which the formal activity of the Administration must be subject in order to avoid deviations and abuses of power were disregarded, as established by Articles 15, 16, 17, and 160 of the LGAP, as well as the univocal rules of technique, science, logic, justice, experience, and common sense. It says that **the principle of legal certainty (principio de seguridad jurídica) and of intangibility of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios)** were also disregarded, invoking to this effect the sixth Considerando of vote No. 051-2010 of the Sixth Section of this Court. It argues that Dr. Nombre145591 of Nombre20662 himself granted the CVO Registration Certificate with plate number Placa28947 in August 2009, valid until August 25, 2013, with a professional regent in food technology, thus endorsing the regent that was in place, and then later changing position, without any substantial regulatory change. In this way, Nombre20662 had **"(...) given external signs to presume the legality of our actions and is not empowered to arbitrarily 'change the rules of the game'. Thus, there is a violation of both the principle of legal certainty and the principle of 'not going against one's own acts' (non venire contra factum proprium) extracted from constitutional canon 34, a situation that imposes the need to invalidate the appealed acts"**. It ends the exposition by stating that **an improper interpretation of Article 221 of the General Health Law was made**, which is not harmonious with Articles 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (protection and progress of fundamental guarantees); 5 of the Constitution (which imposes the duty to ensure the progress and development of the nation with the well-being of the greatest number as its guiding principle, an interpretation tending towards the protection of public interest and fundamental rights having been required in this case, which was not verified, as the Administration rather opted to give a prohibitive connotation to the norm, curtailing business freedom, which cannot be done except for reasons of public interest). It affirms that the interpretation made harms public health by preferring a veterinary doctor over a food technologist, which affects the safety (inocuidad) and efficiency levels of the processes, **"(...) despite Article 4 of the General Law of Nombre20662 indicating that in the interpretation of the norm, one must abide by what is most favorable for the human being, because well, what is most favorable is that a specialist be the regent of these food manufacturing processes for citizen consumption. // The interpretation given benefits no one more than the veterinary doctors themselves for whom a myriad of job options are created, but it negatively affects the rest of the population. This constitutes an interpretation not only contra homine but contra societas. As this is an integrating element of the motive of the challenged acts, it is appropriate to declare the absolute nullity of all of them"**.

**Nombre20662 responds negatively to the action** (folios 182-198 and 232-248), fundamentally arguing that the challenged acts do not suffer from any nullity. It begins its exposition by outlining the constitutive elements of the administrative act, citing Nombre21604. Further on, it argues that the requirement for veterinary medical inspection for establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals and the industrialization of meat foods derives, in the first place, from what is established in Article 221 of the General Health Law, the concept of **veterinary medical inspection (inspección médico veterinaria)** being developed in Executive Decree No. 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2011, specifically in Article 3, which defines the inspecting veterinary doctor (veterinario colegiado who has under his responsibility the technical and sanitary direction of the establishments regulated in that Regulation, covering the functions established in said regulatory body and related legislation) and the official veterinary doctor (veterinario funcionario of the Ministries of Agriculture and Health). It points out that this distinction between the concepts of inspecting veterinary doctor and official veterinary doctor means that the interpretation of the plaintiff company that the veterinary inspection must be carried out by a public authority must be discarded, given that the inspecting veterinary doctor must even have a constant presence in the product elaboration process, which is only possible if a regency (regencia) is exercised in said establishment, according to the regulation in Articles 8 and 33 ejúsdem, even affirming that **"(...) the same Decree 29588-MAG-S indicates that the owners of establishments covered under this regulation must have an equipped office and so forth (sic) for the Inspecting Veterinary Doctor, it is because the same must be, clearly, an official different from the Official Veterinary Doctors of this National Service or any other authority of administrative rank"**. It continues arguing that the legal foundation that supports Nombre20662 to request the hiring of a regent veterinary doctor is found in Article 20 of the Decree ejúsdem, this provision being coherent with the content of Articles 105 and 106 of the Regulations to the Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors (Executive Decree No. 19184), which define the concept of veterinary medical regent (regente médico veterinario) and establish the obligation for sausage factories and factories and plants producing products and by-products of animal origin intended for human consumption. In accordance with the foregoing, the challenged acts are duly motivated, complying with all their constitutive elements. It then makes a lengthy consideration affirming that according to the profile, the veterinary doctor is the most suitable to be the regent of a sausage-making establishment, concluding that although Article 21, subsection h) of the Organic Law of the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (No. 8412) establishes that the members of that College shall serve as consultants, advisors, experts, or responsible professionals in process industries, the veterinary doctor performs a fundamental role in the production of products and by-products of animal origin, starting from the occurrence of events such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), dioxin contamination, and other diseases, and that in any case, the veterinary doctor's work is not limited to the care and preservation of the health of live animals, but also to sausage production, as an issue of public health and food safety (inocuidad) of what is consumed daily is at stake.

In another line of argument, it alleges that there is no administrative liability, of two types: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">without fault or for special sacrifice</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> or </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">for lack of service or abnormal functioning</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">. It again cites the author Nombre21604, regarding the definition of lack of service or normal functioning, rejecting in passing that if the Public Administration does not perform said lack of service or abnormal functioning, the imposition of pecuniary liability is not possible, also pointing out, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">"(...) that it has eventually been the Administered party who has placed themselves in a condition of disadvantage by being in breach of objective norms, the same norms they were required to comply with and to perform any other actions that the Legal System permitted them"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">. It rejects the claim for the abstract payment of amounts not received since August 25, 2013, because there is no evidence whatsoever that reliably demonstrates the damages claimed, the petitionary claim raised being devoid of evidentiary support.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">The State answers the action negatively</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (folios 201-231), arguing that although the plaintiff corporation was authorized by the Nombre20662 to engage in the activity of storage and distribution of products of animal origin, the sanitary order issued on February 2, 2011, requiring it to hire a veterinary regent is in accordance with the law because, in accordance with the General Law of the Nombre20662 (No. 8495 of April 6, 2006), there is a police power that empowers said body to require the Veterinary Operation Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO). To this effect, it invokes numerals 5, 6 subsections b) and t), as well as articles 37, 38, 40, 59, 89, and 91 of the mentioned Law. It affirms that the Nombre20662 has a police power to guarantee the population compliance with the guarantee of protection of the right to health, being authorized to order and execute the sanitary measures it deems pertinent, even having the power to order the cancellation or suspension of the CVO, with the respective closure of the establishment, as well as any measure it deems pertinent. It indicates that in accordance with subsections b) and c) of article 56 of the General Law of SENASA, establishments that elaborate, import, customs-clear, fraction, store, transport, and sell products or subproducts of animal origin, or that industrialize, package, refrigerate, process, or sell at wholesale, products, subproducts, or derivatives of animals, for human or animal consumption, must have a CVO. Regarding the legal nature of the CVO, it says it is </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">"(...) the document granted by SENASA, through which authorization is given, so that the natural or legal person may engage in the aforementioned activities. Said authorization obliges compliance with the sanitary requirements established by SENASA, to carry out the activity"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, in accordance with article 57 ejúsdem, being able even to withdraw the CVO, if it is demonstrated that the duly established sanitary requirements are not met, according to the power set forth in numerals 58 and 59 of the SENASA Law. It argues that in the specific case of the plaintiff corporation, this company is engaged in the storage and distribution of products of animal origin, their distribution and processing, in the sausage branch, requiring a CVO to exercise this activity, finding this requirement not only in the SENASA Law, but also in the General Health Law, the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing, the General Regulation for the Granting of the CVO, as well as the Regulation of the Organic Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors. Regarding the General Health Law, it recalls that in accordance with article 221, it is required that establishments dedicated to the industrialization of meat foods must have medical-veterinary inspection approved by the Ministry, with numeral 229 prohibiting the trade or distribution of meats and derivatives from premises or establishments not authorized by the health authority or that operate without veterinary inspection. These provisions are consistent with what is provided in articles 20, subsection a), 3, 7, 8, and 78 of the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses; numerals 3.23, 6, and 7 of the General Regulation for the Granting of the CVO, as well as articles 105 and 106, subsection a). It contends that even if the sausage processing does not involve the handling or manipulation of live animals, medical-veterinary inspection is required, as the Attorney General's Office itself has held in its opinions C-071-2006. It argues that the plaintiff party makes a strained interpretation of article 221 of the General Health Law, also not explaining why a food technologist can replace the veterinary doctor and, furthermore, on which norm such a substitution is based. It says that the administrative acts issued (SENASA DIPOA-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013), do not violate the principles of interdiction of arbitrariness, reasonableness, legal certainty, intangibility of one's own acts, observance of non-juridical norms of the act, nor in any way violate collective, public, and individual interests, but rather are based on public interest, the protection of public health and human life, and the aforementioned norms. It argues that official communication No. DIPOA-A-112-11 is a preparatory act that supports the sanitary order issued, ordering the plaintiff company to include a veterinary regent; that in resolution No. SENASA-RCOC 145-2013, the reasons that led to the issuance of the sanitary measure are detailed, having the necessary technical and legal basis; that in resolution No. SENASA-RCOC 129-2013, it was decided to proceed with the annual registration update of the plaintiff company, because to operate the sausage plant, the presence of a veterinary regent is required, this provision being accompanied by the regulatory and technical analysis, in accordance with the requirements of article 136 of the General Law of Public Administration. Later, it is argued that in this case there is a failure to comply with the requirements for a claim for damages and losses to proceed, in the specific case. This is because none of the requirements of ordinal 190 of the General Law of Public Administration are met, invoking to this effect ruling No. 273-2012 of November 21, 2012, of the Sixth Section of this Tribunal. It affirms that it is essential that the alleged injury is an immediate and necessary consequence of the administrative action, a situation that does not occur in this case, and that in any event, it is not verified that there is damage that is effective, assessable, and individualizable and not eventual or hypothetical. It argues that there is no cause-effect relationship between the specific manifestation of the administrative function and the unlawful injury that demonstrates the existence of a reparable damage or loss, no evidence being provided that meets the requirements as demanded in articles 58 CPCA and 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. It also rejects that interest must be paid because a specific amount must first be awarded in a final judgment, invoking to this effect ruling No. 1072-2010 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, also recalling that interest is only applicable when there are monetary obligations and not regarding value obligations. It requests that the State not be condemned to pay personal and procedural costs, as the claim is inadmissible. It concludes what is indicated in this brief stating that in accordance with article 8 of the General Law of the National Animal Health Service, No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, the Nombre20662 is a body with minimum deconcentration and instrumental legal personality to carry out the competencies provided in that law, having independence of criterion in its capacity as a technical body for the performance of its attributions. It argues that the acts questioned in this case were issued by Nombre20662 in the exercise of its exclusive legal powers, the State having no participation or responsibility whatsoever in the facts. It contends that in accordance with article 12, subsection c) CPCA and what has been stated by jurisprudence (rulings No. 1360-2010 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and 251-2011 of the Sixth Section of this Tribunal), if the challenged conduct comes from the exercise of any of its competencies attributed to the body with instrumental legal personality, the proper course is to declare lack of right with respect to the State.-</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">IV)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Arguments given in case file No. 13-8331-1027-CA</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">The plaintiff Nombre145586</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; -aw-import:spaces\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, in her statement of claim (folios 365-396), fundamentally states that in her capacity as a food technologist, the decision of the Nombre20662 to require the hiring of a veterinary regent has curtailed the possibility of continuing to be hired as the regent of the sausage factory owned by Embutidos Doro and that this is not only illegal, but has caused her economic harm. With similar arguments to those given in the company's claim, she states that the Administration's acts of compelling the hiring of a veterinary doctor as regent, and not proceeding to update the annual registration of the CVO, are illegal and cause her a reflected injury, legitimizing her to appear in court, to achieve the annulment of said acts and obtain reparation for the damages and losses suffered. She affirms that once the decree regulating the granting of the CVO entered into force, a contractual relationship was formalized with Embutidos Doro, and that for a sausage manufacturing company to dismiss a food technology professional implies a material impossibility to carry out the industrial processes, this being the specialist in charge of planning, execution, and supervision of these processes. She affirms that the principle of intangibility of one's own acts was violated because Dr. Nombre145591 authorized her hiring as a professional regent, she being a food technologist, the previously existing regent having already been endorsed, and then, without justification, the criterion was changed although there was no substantial regulatory change, violating what is established in article 34 of the Constitution. Regarding the nullity of the challenged administrative acts, she says that the situation must be returned to the state of affairs existing before the dismissal was decreed, and the order to hire a veterinary regent must be withdrawn and the immediate registration of the CVO must proceed.-</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">The Nombre20662 answers the action negatively</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (folios 417-435), affirming that regarding the case of the co-plaintiff herein, what the Administration has held is that plants that produce sausages must have a veterinary regent for their operation, the substitution of the veterinarian with a food technologist being thereby disallowed, as was verified in an audit inspection conducted on February 2, 2011, which led to the issuance of official communication No. DIPOA-A-112-11 of that date, in which three non-conformities were established, among them the requirement of a veterinary doctor as regent for the operation of the plant. It contends that there is no evidence in the record that "(...) the plaintiff party has been distressed by the risk of being dismissed from her functions. Note also that in none of the administrative acts whose nullity is sought in this process is it ordered, not in the slightest, that the plaintiff Nombre145586 must be dismissed from her functions, the decision to terminate the existing contract - if it occurred - being proper to the contracting parties. </span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">The State answers the action negatively</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (folios 406-416), opposing firstly the exception of lack of active standing (legitimación <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">ad causam</span>), given that if Mrs. Nombre145586 was hired by Nombre145585 for the provision of professional services, that is, was an employee of that company, she would not have standing to request the annulment of the actions that relate directly to the company and not to her in particular. Then, it opposes the exception of lack of right, arguing that it is false that what was done by the Nombre20662 is illegal and arbitrary, and that what was done is rather consistent with what is established in the General Health Law</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">V</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) In the preliminary hearing held in this Tribunal, on March 3 of this year, the different parties expressed the conclusions summarized below:</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Conclusions of the co-plaintiffs</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: Embutidos Doro is a company engaged in stuffing previously processed meat. To be able to perform these functions, a CVO is needed, which was previously provided by the Ministry of Health, but as of 2006, is the competence of SENASA. By 2008, the requirement to appoint a permanent regent or advisor is requested. Later, officials Nombre6487 and Nombre139513 of SENASA, conducted an inspection, where the need to hire a veterinary regent was determined, against which appeals for reconsideration and a legality remedy were filed, and even this process. It points out that Miss Nombre145586 performs the regency function as a food technologist, which is adequate for the purposes of the norm, which is why the party disagrees with the challenged acts.-</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Conclusions of the</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\"> State</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> :</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> The claim is inadmissible, because there is a legal basis to require veterinary regency in establishments manufacturing sausages. It points out that article 221 of the General Health Law clearly establishes, and without room for interpretation, that a veterinary doctor is required. Then, the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors (numeral 106, subsection a), clearly establishes the participation of veterinarians in the regency of establishments that produce sausages. The same is done by the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing, Decreto Ejecutivo No. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">29588, in its article 20, subsection a).-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial\">There is no doubt that for an establishment of the nature of the plaintiff's, the regency of a veterinary doctor is required. There is also a technical basis, since veterinarians are the only ones who can guarantee the safety of meat foods. No nullity is noted, there is no invalidity whatsoever. It is not demonstrated how these norms can be disapplied, nor why a technologist can assume this function.</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial\">It is affirmed that Mrs. Nombre145586, does not have active standing to challenge the mentioned administrative acts, because even if she claims to have been an "employee" of Nombre145585, she does not demonstrate the injury incurred. The payment of damages and losses is requested. Regarding that, the lack of right of the claim is reiterated because it is not clarified what the damages consist of, given that at no time has the Nombre20662 closed the establishment, evidence to this effect appearing at folio 89. It must be made clear that in this case file, the request for a precautionary measure was rejected as inadmissible. In accordance with article 8 of the SENASA Law, it has instrumental legal personality and in this case, it acted in the exercise of its competencies, therefore, should any claim of the lawsuit be upheld regarding that body, it requests that the claim be declared without merit with respect to the State.- </span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Conclusions of the Nombre20662</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: It affirms that the challenged acts are indeed duly reasoned both factually and legally. It cites the same norms mentioned by the State's representation, to substantiate the need for sausage processing establishments to have their regency performed by veterinary doctors. In article 3 of the General Regulation for the Granting of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">the difference between the inspecting veterinary doctor and the inspecting veterinary doctor is established</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Veterinarians are the professionals suitable to attend not only to live animals, but also to dead animals, because they can detect the existence of diseases, bacteria, and medications that can be harmful to human health. </span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Regarding the damages, no evidence whatsoever of their existence has been provided, and the closure of the company has not even been carried out by the authorities, and if the company has closed, it has been by decision of its owners. It points out that at this moment, operations are being conducted with a veterinary doctor. </span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial\">It says that the aforementioned administrative decisions are duly based on article 89 of the SENASA Law. It requests that the claim be declared without merit and that the parties be condemned to pay both costs of the action.- </span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">VI</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">ON THE MERITS</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Legal regime for the authorization of the sausage production activity</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: The Tribunal considers that in the exercise of the police power in sanitary matters, the activity of production and storage of sausages is subject to a regime of administrative authorization, a competence of the Nombre20662, an indispensable requirement to access this authorization being to have the regency performed by a veterinary doctor for each of the establishments that conduct these activities.-</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial\">This conclusion is reached from the reading and interrelation of the norms noted below, which regulate: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">(a)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> the obligation to have the administrative authorization and the body responsible for granting it and </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">(b)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> the medical-veterinary regency as an indispensable requirement to issue the Veterinary Operation Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO):</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">a)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Obligation to have administrative authorization for the production of sausages, exclusive competence of the Nombre20662</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: This derives from what is prescribed in article 221 of the General Health Law (Law </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">No. 5395 of February 24, 1974), as well as from</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> the General Animal Health Law (Law No. 8495 of April 6, 2006), in its numerals 5, 6, subsections j), ñ) and o), 56 subsections b) and c), 57, and 58, which we also cite below:</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">"ARTICLE 221.- Establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals and to </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the industrialization of meat foods </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">of the different species, destined for consumption by the population, must also have medical-veterinary inspection approved by the Ministry.

</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Subject to the same requirement are </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">factories and plants producing products of animal origin</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">."</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Article 5- Competent Body. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG), through Senasa, shall be responsible for the regulation, planning, administration, coordination, execution, and application of official activities of a national, regional, and international nature, relating to the health of the animal population, residues, veterinary public health, veterinary control of zoonoses, traceability, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">the protection and safety of foods of animal origin</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, animal feed, veterinary medicines, animal genetic material, products and by-products, the production, use, release, or commercialization of genetically modified organisms that may affect animal health or its environment, and hazardous substances of animal origin."</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Article 6- Competencies. The Nombre20662 shall have the following competencies:

</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">j) Control and guarantee the health of domestic, aquatic, wild, or other animals of the different species, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">as well as the safety of products, by-products, and derivatives for human</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> or animal consumption, and establish sanitary controls in all slaughter, processing, and industrialization plants.

</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">ñ) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">Establish criteria for the authorization of natural and legal persons for each specific activity</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, the responsibilities assumed, and their limitations.

</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">o) Establish quality control and technical audit procedures, both for the Nombre20662 itself and for officialized or authorized natural and legal persons; likewise, ensure the administration, control, and use of the resources obtained when applying this Law."</span> <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Article 56.- Establishments subject to control.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">The Nombre20662 shall grant or withdraw the veterinary operation certificate to the following establishments:

</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">(...) b) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">Those that elaborate</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, import, customs-clear, fraction, store, transport, and sell </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">products and by-products of animal origin</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">.

</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">c) Those destined for the slaughter of animals </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">or that industrialize</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, package, refrigerate, process, or sell at wholesale, products, by-products, or derivatives of animals, for human or animal consumption. (...)"</span><br /><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Article 57.- Veterinary operation certificate.

"Veterinary operation certificate" shall be understood as the document issued by Senasa, by which authorization is recorded so that the requesting natural or legal person may engage in one or more of the activities mentioned in article 56 of this Law.

A single certificate may indicate authorization to carry out different activities; it shall be requested and issued only once and shall not need to be renewed, as long as the sanitary requirements are constantly met.

Said authorization shall imply compliance with the sanitary requirements established by Senasa to carry out the activity." In that regard, even the Constitutional Chamber has considered that as of the entry into force of Law No. 8495, the authority to issue sanitary authorizations for establishments that slaughter animals, or process and market meat products and, of course, produce and market sausages (embutidos), is the exclusive competence of SENASA, displacing in that area the competence of the Ministry of Health to issue sanitary operating permits (permisos sanitarios de funcionamiento) for that type of establishment. Thus, in Considerando III of Vote No. 2012-01965 of nine thirty-one hours on February 17, 2012, it was stated: "As can be seen from reading this entire set of norms of formal legal rank, the legislature structured a system of control and surveillance under the charge of the National Animal Health Service with the aim of ensuring a degree of protection for society. Thus, it designed not only the structure providing the service but also the existence of an equivalent to the sanitary operating permit called Veterinary Operation Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de operación) (article 57 of the Law) that all the establishments set forth in numeral 56 of that legal body must have."- In any case, recall that the case law of this Court (see Considerando VI of Vote No. 163-2012-VI of 14:20 hours on August 20, 2012, of the Sixth Section), has conceptualized (and differentiated) the concepts of authorization, permit, and license, as follows "(...) Authorization (La autorización) may be defined as the removal of a legal obstacle to the exercise of a required conduct. For its part, the permit (el permiso) consists of the administrative enabling for the development of a conduct, in principle prohibited. While the license (la licencia) consists of an authorization of regulated content" (underscoring ours), it being affirmable according to the above, that the Veterinary Operation Certificate is a permit, understood as the administrative enabling for the development of a conduct in principle prohibited, due to the risk that the production and storage of sausages (embutidos) entails for the health and life of animals and humans. A consequence of the conceptualization of the CVO as a permit is that the administrative act granting it is composed not only of regulated acts but also of discretionary elements, the Administration being able even to deny the granting of the permit even when the requirements are met, if despite that, said act affects the legal rights mentioned so many times.- b) Veterinary medical supervision (regencia) as an indispensable requirement to issue the Veterinary Operation Certificate (CVO): It is also the criterion of this Court that for the issuance of the CVO, it is indispensable that it be a veterinarian (médico veterinario) who is designated as the supervisor in the corresponding establishment, it being legally impossible for the participation of veterinarians to be substituted with other professionals, even a food technologist, as the plaintiff Nombre145586 is. This conclusion is reached based on the reading of numerals 3, 7, and 8 of the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing (Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos, Producción y Procesamiento de Carnes) (Executive Decree No. 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2001), as well as articles 105 and 106, subsections a) and c) of the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinarians (Reglamento a la Ley del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios) (19184 of July 10, 1989), which, as relevant, state the following:

"Article 3º- The words, names, terms, and phrases used in the provisions of this regulation shall be understood as follows: (...) Inspector Veterinarian (Médico Veterinario Inspector): Professional in Veterinary Medicine, incorporated into the College of Veterinarians, who has under his responsibility the technical and sanitary direction of the establishments regulated herein, covering the functions assigned to him by this regulation and other related legislation." "Article 7º- The establishments that shall be subject to the provisions of this regulation are: those engaged in the slaughter, deboning, sausage-making (embutido), packing, storage (almacenamiento), processing, retail sale (expendio), as well as the transport vehicles for meats from bovine, caprine, equine, ovine, porcine species and others authorized by MAG and MS." "Article 8º- To monitor the safety of meat products, these shall be subjected to organoleptic examinations carried out by the Inspector Veterinarian and his team of inspection assistants, to physical, chemical, and microbiological tests carried out in situ or in official laboratories or laboratories duly accredited for such purpose." "Article 105.- Supervisor (regente) is understood to be the professional, a member of the College of Veterinarians, who in accordance with the legislation assumes the technical, scientific direction and professional responsibility of any of the establishments mentioned in the following article.

Article 106.- The establishments that must be supervised or technically and scientifically directed by a veterinarian are: a) Factories and processing plants for products and by-products of animal origin intended for human consumption. (...) c) Establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals, processing and industrialization of meat foods of different species, without prejudice to the competence of zootechnical agricultural engineers in the fields of processing and industrialization." (underscoring does not correspond to the original) In accordance with the norms indicated above, the argument that under the terms of article 21, subsection h) of the Organic Law of the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, No. 8412 of April 22, 2004, which establishes that: "Active or emeritus members of the College shall have the following duties and competencies:// h) Serve as consultant, advisor, expert, or responsible professional in process industries," a related professional incorporated into said professional corporation, that is, a food technologist, can supervise an establishment intended for the manufacture of sausages (embutidos), is not receivable, given that there exists a norm of legal rank and even later in its entry into force (those of the General Law of Animal Health), which establish that this professional task is proper to the veterinarian.- VII) Analysis of the claims of Nombre145585: Given the previous framework on the authorization regime for the activity of manufacturing sausages (embutidos), we will refer to the claims and arguments given by the parties:

First, second, and third claims: In which the annulment of official letters DIPO-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, is requested, also questioning, insofar as it was indicated that the annual update of registration of our CVO would not proceed, ordering instead the immediate annual registration of the veterinary operation certificate.- Those claims are not receivable according to this Court's consideration, for the reasons set forth below: 1) The requirement of having a veterinary supervision (regencia) is determined by the authorization regime for the activity of manufacturing and storing sausages (embutidos), as indicated in the preceding considerando. It must also be noted that the fact that there was a supervision (regencia) by a professional in food technology, based on Law No. 8412, cannot substitute the participation of veterinarians; 2) Nor is the argument receivable that prior to the issuance of those administrative acts, it had been accepted that a food technologist, and under those conditions the Veterinary Operation Certificate had been issued and kept current, because that irregular situation cannot go against an express norm that establishes the legal obligation to have a veterinarian, it even constituting a violation of the principle of singular non-derogability of the norm. Likewise, from the fact that prior to the sanitary order of February 2, 2009, it was tolerated that the supervision (regencia) was not carried out by a veterinarian but by another professional, it does not follow that this situation cannot be corrected, as it was; 3) The plaintiff's position cannot be accepted either, in the sense that it was not taken into account that the sausage (embutidos) production plant does not work with live animals, but with meat acquired in authorized slaughterhouses, given that in accordance with article 56 of the SENASA Law, the control involves not only establishments where live animals are handled, but also involves the transformation processes into sausages, as well as their storage and distribution; 4) It must also be said that the legal obligation to have a veterinary supervisor (regente) does not in any way impede the activity that a food technologist may perform, as a professional incorporated into the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, to perform functions in a process industry (as the manufacture of sausages (embutidos) would eventually be), in accordance with article 21, subsection h) of Law No. 8412, but merely implies that the veterinarian cannot be substituted by another professional who handles another branch of knowledge and is incorporated into another professional college, for the functions that are technically and legally his own; 5) Nor are the principles of reasonableness and proportionality violated by the normative interpretation made by SENASA, on the content of the General Health Law and the General Law of Animal Health, nor was it resolved arbitrarily, but at all times it was done in accordance with the legal text and seeking the effective protection of the public interest, which is precisely to guarantee the safety of products of animal origin intended for human consumption; in this way, the interpretation was also made in compliance with the fundamental guarantees in favor of consumer rights, established in article 46 of the Constitution. In this case, the invocation made by the administrative authority of an executive regulation (the Regulation of the Organic Law of the College of Veterinarians, Executive Decree No. 19184 of July 10, 1989), in resolutions SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 and SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013, is correct, because in that normative body, the concept of inspector veterinarian or supervisor (regente) of a particular establishment intended for the transformation of products of animal origin is developed, that provision even being consistent with articles 56 and 57 of Law No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, which was issued subsequently; 6) It is not true that the normative interpretation establishing that the supervisor (regente) of the establishments must necessarily be a veterinarian and that this is an indispensable requirement for the issuance of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, is contrary to the principle of reasonableness and its sub-principles (necessity, suitability, and proportionality), given that it is necessary, suitable, and completely proportionate to the case to require the participation of a professional with specialized knowledge in animal health and in the effects that animal health may have on human health, in an activity that can seriously affect the health and life of people, it not being reasonable rather that this professional be substituted by another who does not have specialized knowledge in this matter; 7) Regarding the argument that the requirement is not reasonable since it would imply that there must be a veterinary supervisor (regente) for all butcher shops and supermarkets, because they make homemade sausages (embutidos criollos), ground meat, and chorizo, that being contrary to the principle of logic, it must also be rejected because this abstract situation is not being judged in this case file (expediente), but rather what is analyzed here is the concrete situation of a sausage factory owned by the plaintiff company, in a specific place and with its own characteristics; 8) Nor is it true that the challenged acts were issued disregarding the rules of science or technique (doctrine of article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration), because what is set forth in administrative acts SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, makes clear the technical and scientific reasons for which the veterinarian is the most suitable to guarantee animal and human health and food safety; 9) It is also not true that the Administration's opportunity to sufficiently motivate the acts contrary to the plaintiff company's claims had expired, after the issuance of the sanitary order of February 2, 2002, it being instead the case that the extensive argumentation given in acts SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 and SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013, adequately respond to the questions raised by the plaintiff through appeals; thus, it was necessary to argue in the manner done, no normative violation being observed, nor any infraction of due process or the right of defense; 10) The power to withdraw the Veterinary Operation Certificate when any requirement for its maintenance is lacking derives from the application of article 58 of Law No. 8495, which provides: "The Nombre20662 may withdraw the veterinary operation certificate, if it determines, upon prior inspection, that the establishment does not meet the sanitary requirements set for the authorized activities. In the event that the certificate is withdrawn, the interested party must request it again," the third claim of the plaintiff company therefore having to be denied; 11) Finally, the Court considers that the normative application challenged here is contrary to business freedom or to article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (progressivity of fundamental guarantees), because establishing a requirement such as veterinary sanitary supervision (regencia médica sanitaria), prior to issuing the Veterinary Operation Certificate, does not curtail that freedom, but rather harmonizes it with interests of a superior nature, namely the health and life of the population.- Fourth and fifth claims: Must be dismissed for one reason: it was not verified that at any time the sausage (embutidos) production establishment was closed due to the order to have a veterinary medical supervision (regencia), in order to have the Veterinary Operation Certificate, thus the damage sought to be compensated was not verified.- VIII) Analysis of the claims of Nombre145586: If the claims of Mrs. Nombre145586 are observed, it is seen that they derive from those brought by Embutidos Doro. The foregoing is because Mrs. Nombre145586 has the profession of food technologist, duly incorporated into the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, and had a supervision (regencia) contract with said company, duly registered before the corresponding professional corporation, and would have been harmed in her interests when it was ordered that to maintain the validity of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, a veterinary medical supervision (regencia) must be registered. Also, the arguments presented by said person are basically the same as those presented by the co-plaintiff company, and her claims must suffer the same fate, in which the annulment of the same administrative acts is requested, also asking that professionals in food technology be allowed to exercise said supervision (regencia). Based on the reasons given above, the claims of an annulment nature must be rejected, as well as the petitionary finding aimed at allowing professionals in food technology to exercise the supervision (regencia) in sausage (embutidos) production establishments, complying with the requirements of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, because, as we have seen, the enabling to act as a supervisor (regente) given in article 21, subsection h) of Law No. 8412, can neither technically nor legally substitute the participation of the veterinarian. In any case, the fact that incorporation into the College of Veterinarians is required did not determine any damage for Mrs. Nombre145586, since it was not even proven that this situation caused her dismissal by the company, it being possible instead to think that she could have continued working for it, exercising her work as a food technologist, in the ambit of her specialized knowledge. Since there is no proven relationship between the requirement of incorporation into the College of Veterinarians and some prejudice for the plaintiff Nombre145586, the defense of lack of active legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) must be upheld.- IX) Analysis of the defenses and award of costs: Regarding the State: The State's representation is correct when it states that the administrative resolutions issued by Nombre20662 in this case have been issued within the scope of its own competencies derived from the General Law of the National Animal Health Service, No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, and that for that reason, according to the instrumental legal personality attributed to that body with minimal deconcentration, the claim against the State must be dismissed for lacking passive legal standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva). The foregoing is stated because the plaintiffs jointly sued the main entity (the State) and the body with deconcentration and instrumental legal personality (SENASA), as required by article 12, subsection c) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, the claims made even being directed at the annulment of the deconcentrated body's decision. Due to the foregoing, as the action of no organ of the centralized State is being directly challenged, the defense of lack of passive legal standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) must be upheld and the claim dismissed in all its aspects against the State. Due to the manner of deciding, a ruling is omitted on the defense of lack of right regarding the claims presented by Nombre145585 and Nombre145586, as well as the defense of lack of active legal standing (legitimación ad causam activa), regarding the action of this latter person. Given that the action was brought against the State, as required by law, it is found that there was a sufficient reason to litigate, placing us in one of the hypotheses for exoneration from the award of costs for both plaintiffs in favor of the State (article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code), and it must be resolved in that way.- Regarding Nombre20662: According to the reasons given in the preceding considerandos, the defense of lack of right must be upheld regarding the action of Nombre145585 and the claim declared without merit.

The exceptions of lack of standing (falta de legitimación ad causam) both active and passive must also be upheld with respect to the claim of Nombre145586, since there is no effective harm in the challenged administrative actions within the scope of their legal sphere, and their action must be declared inadmissible.- Since both co-defendants are the losing parties in this matter with respect to SENASA, they must be ordered to pay both sets of costs of the action to said deconcentrated body, as there are no circumstances for exoneration, in accordance with the aforementioned rule.-

Therefore:

• 1)The exception of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam) raised by the State is upheld, and the claims filed by both plaintiffs are declared inadmissible with respect to the first one. Due to the manner in which this is resolved, no ruling is made on the exceptions of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación ad causam) that were raised by the entity. Both plaintiffs are exonerated from paying both sets of costs in favor of the State; 2) The exceptions of lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam) raised against the action of Nombre145586 are upheld, and the claim is also declared inadmissible with respect to it; the exception of lack of right raised against the action of the plaintiff company is upheld. Consequently, the claims of Nombre145585, Limitada against the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal are dismissed in all their aspects. The co-plaintiffs are ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs in favor of the deconcentrated body.- &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Jonatán Canales Hernández &nbsp; &nbsp; Rosa María Cortés Morales Paulo André Alonso Soto &nbsp; Thus, in recital (considerando) III of vote (voto) Nº 2012-01965 of nine hours and thirty-one minutes of February seventeen, two thousand twelve, it was stated: <b>"As can be appreciated from a reading of this entire body of norms of formal legal rank, the legislator structured a system of control and surveillance under the charge of the National Animal Health Service (Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal) with the purpose of ensuring a degree of protection for society.- In this manner, it designed not only the structure that provides the service but also the existence of an equivalent to the sanitary operating permit called a Veterinary Operating Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO) (Article 57 of the Law) that all establishments set forth in numeral 56 of said legal body must have".-</b> In any case, it should be remembered that the jurisprudence of this Court (see recital (considerando) VI of vote (voto) N° 163-2012-VI of 14:20 hours of August 20, 2012, of the Sixth Section (Sección Sexta)), has conceptualized (and differentiated) the concepts of authorization, permit, and license, in the following manner <b>"(...) <u>Authorization</u> can be defined as the removal of a legal obstacle for the exercise of a due conduct. For its part, <u>the permit</u> consists of the administrative enablement for the development of a conduct, in principle prohibited. While <u>the license</u> consists of an authorization of regulated content" </b>(the underlining is our own), it being possible to affirm, in accordance with the foregoing, that the Veterinary Operating Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO) is a permit, understood as the administrative enablement for the development of a conduct, in principle prohibited, by reason of the risk that the production and storage of sausages implies for the health and life of animals and humans. A consequence of the conceptualization of the CVO as a permit is that the administrative act granting it is not only composed of regulated acts but also of discretionary elements, the Administration being able to even deny the granting of the permit even when the requirements are met, if despite that, said act affects the legal interests so often mentioned.- **b) The veterinary medical directorship (regencia médica veterinaria) as an indispensable requirement to issue the Veterinary Operating Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO)**: It is also the criterion of this Court that for the issuance of the CVO, it is indispensable that a veterinary doctor (médico veterinario) be designated as director (regente) in the corresponding establishment, it being legally impossible for the participation of veterinarians to be substituted with other professionals, even if it is a food technologist, as is the plaintiff Blanco Castro. This conclusion is reached from a reading of numerals 3, 7, and 8 of the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing (Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos, Producción y Procesamiento de Carnes) (Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) N° 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2001), as well as Articles 105 and 106, subsections a) and c) of the Regulation of the Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors (Reglamento a la Ley del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios) (19184 of July 10, 1989), which, insofar as they are of interest, indicate the following:

**"Article 3º-** **The words, names, terms, and phrases used in the provisions of this regulation shall be understood in the following manner: (...)** **Inspecting Veterinary Doctor (Médico Veterinario Inspector):** **Professional in Veterinary Medicine incorporated into the College of Veterinary Doctors (Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios), who has under their responsibility the technical and sanitary direction of the establishments regulated herein, encompassing the functions that this regulation and others that the related legislation assign to them."** **"Article 7º-** **The establishments that shall be subject to the provisions of this regulation are: those dedicated to the slaughter, deboning, <u>sausage-making</u>, packing, <u>storage</u>, processing, <u>retail sale</u>, as well as the vehicles for transporting meats coming from bovine, caprine, equine, ovine, porcine species and others authorized by the MAG and MS."** **"Article 8º-** **To monitor the safety (inocuidad) of meat products, these shall be subjected to organoleptic examinations carried out by <u>the Inspecting Veterinary Doctor (Médico Veterinario Inspector)</u>** **and their team of inspection assistants, to physical, chemical, and microbiological tests carried out in situ or in official laboratories or laboratories duly accredited for said purpose."** **"Article 105.-Regent is understood to mean the professional, member of the College of Veterinary Doctors (Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios), who, in accordance with the legislation, assumes the technical, scientific direction and professional responsibility of any of the establishments mentioned in the following article.** **Article 106.-The establishments that must be directed (regentados) or technically and scientifically managed by a veterinary doctor (médico veterinario) are:** **a) <u>Factories and plants producing products and by-products of animal origin destined for consumption by the human population</u>. (...)** **c) <u>Establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals, processing, and industrialization of meat foods from different species, without prejudice to the competence of zootechnical agronomist engineers in the fields of processing and industrialization</u>."** (the underlining does not correspond to the original) In accordance with the norms indicated above, the argument that pursuant to Article 21, subsection h) of the Organic Law of the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines), N° 8412 of April 22, 2004, which establishes that: **"The active or emeritus members of the College shall have the following offices and competences:// h) Serve as consultant, advisor, expert, or responsible professional in process industries"**, a related professional incorporated into said professional corporation, that is, a food technologist, can direct (regentar) an establishment dedicated to the manufacture of sausages, is not receivable, given that there exists a norm of legal rank, even later in its effectiveness (those of the General Animal Health Law (Ley General de Salud Animal)), which establish that this professional task is proper to the veterinary doctor (médico veterinario).- VII) **Analysis of the claims of Embutidos Doro**: Given the previous framework on the authorization regime for sausage manufacturing activity, we shall refer to the claims and arguments given by the parties:

**First, second, and third claims**: In which the annulment (nulidad) of official letters DIPO-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, is requested, furthermore questioning, insofar as it was indicated that the annual registration update of our CVO would not proceed, ordering instead the immediate annual registration of the veterinary operating certificate.- **These claims are not receivable according to the consideration of this Court**, for the reasons set forth below: **1)** The requirement to have a veterinary doctor (médico veterinario) directorship (regencia) is determined by the authorization regime for the activity of manufacturing and storing sausages, as indicated in the previous recital (considerando). It must also be indicated that the fact that a directorship (regencia) by a professional in food technology was had, based on Law N° 8412, cannot substitute the participation of veterinary doctors; **2)** The argument that prior to the issuance of these administrative acts, it had been accepted that a food technologist, and under those conditions, the Veterinary Operating Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO) had been issued and maintained in force, is also not receivable, because that irregular situation cannot go against an express norm that establishes the legal obligation to have a veterinary doctor (médico veterinario), it even constituting a violation of the principle of singular non-derogability of the norm. Likewise, from the fact that prior to the sanitary order of February 2, 2009, it was tolerated that the directorship (regencia) was not carried out by a veterinary doctor (médico veterinario), but by another professional, it does not derive that this situation cannot be corrected, as was done to that effect; **3)** The position of the plaintiff cannot be accepted either, in the sense that it was not taken into account that the sausage production plant does not work with live animals, but with meat acquired in authorized slaughterhouses, given that in accordance with Article 56 of the SENASA Law, the control involves not only the establishments where live animals are handled but also involves the transformation processes into sausages, such as their storage and distribution; **4)** It must also be said that the legal obligation to have a veterinary doctor serving as director (regente médico veterinario) does not in any way impede the activity that a food technologist may carry out, as a professional incorporated into the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines), to perform functions in a process industry (as the manufacture of sausages would eventually be), in accordance with Article 21, subsection h) of Law N° 8412, but rather it only implies that the veterinary doctor (médico veterinario) cannot be substituted by another professional who handles another branch of knowledge and is incorporated into another professional college, for the functions that are technically and legally proper to them**; 5)** The principles of reasonableness and proportionality are not violated either, by the normative interpretation carried out by SENASA on the content of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) and the General Animal Health Law (Ley General de Salud Animal), nor was it resolved arbitrarily, but rather it was done at all times in accordance with the legal text and seeking the effective protection of public interest, which is precisely to guarantee the safety (inocuidad) of products of animal origin destined for human consumption; in this way, the interpretation was also carried out in compliance with the fundamental guarantees in favor of consumer rights, established in Article 46 of the Constitution. In this case, the invocation made by the administrative authority of an executive regulation (the Regulation of the Organic Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors (Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios), Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) N° 19184 of July 10, 1989), in resolutions SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 and SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013, is correct, because in that normative body, the concept of inspecting veterinary doctor or director (regente) of a specific establishment destined for the transformation of products of animal origin is developed, this provision even being consistent with Articles 56 and 57 of Law N° 8495 of April 6, 2006, which was issued later; **6)** It is not true that the normative interpretation establishing that the director (regente) of establishments must necessarily be a veterinary doctor (médico veterinario) and that this is an indispensable requirement for the issuance of the Veterinary Operating Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO), is contrary to the principle of reasonableness and its sub-principles (necessity, suitability, and proportionality), given that it is necessary, suitable, and completely proportionate to the case, to require the participation of a professional with specialized knowledge in animal health and in the effects that animal health may have on human health, in an activity that can seriously affect the health and life of people, it not being reasonable, rather, that this professional be substituted by another who does not have specialized knowledge in this matter; **7)** Regarding the argument that the requirement is not reasonable because it would imply that a veterinary director (regente veterinario) must be had for all butcher shops and supermarkets, because they produce creole sausages, ground meat, and chorizo, this being contrary to the principle of logic, it must also be rejected because this abstract situation is not being judged in this expedient, rather what is analyzed here is the concrete situation of a sausage factory owned by the plaintiff company, in a specific place and with its own characteristics; **8)** It is also not true that the questioned acts were issued disregarding the rules of science or technique (doctrine of Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), because with what is stated in administrative acts SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, the technical and scientific reasons why the veterinary doctor (médico veterinario) is the most suitable to guarantee animal and human health and food safety (inocuidad de los alimentos) are made clear;** 9) **It is not true either that the Administration was precluded from the opportunity to sufficiently motivate the acts contrary to the claims of the plaintiff company, after the issuance of the sanitary order of February 2, 2002, it being rather that the ample argumentation given in acts SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 and SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013, adequately respond to the questions given by the plaintiff through recourse channels; thus, it was necessary to argue in the manner it was done, with no normative violation being observed, nor any infringement of due process or the right of defense; **10)** The power to withdraw the Veterinary Operating Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO) when some requirement for its maintenance is lacking, derives from the application of Article 58 of Law N° 8495, which provides: **"SENASA may withdraw the veterinary operating certificate (certificado veterinario de operación), if it determines, after an inspection, that the establishment does not meet the sanitary requirements set for the authorized activities. In the event that the certificate is withdrawn, the interested party must request it again"**, the third claim of the plaintiff company thus needing to be denied for that reason; **11)** Finally, the Court considers that the normative application challenged here is contrary to business freedom or to Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos) (progressiveness of fundamental guarantees), because the fact of establishing a requirement such as the medical-sanitary directorship (regencia médica sanitaria), prior to issuing the Veterinary Operating Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, CVO), does not curtail that freedom, but rather harmonizes it with interests of a superior character, namely the health and life of the population [...].” Condemn the Administration to pay both sets of costs of this action.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">2)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> By brief of March 3, 2014, the State answered the action negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (see folios 182-198 and 201-231).-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">3)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> By pleading of March 4, 2014, Nombre20662 answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (see folios 232-248).-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">4)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> Nombre145586</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">establishes the following claims in case file No. 13-8331-1027-CA (listen to the preliminary hearing and see the minute at folio 481):</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">\"1. That the non-conformity of the administrative act embodied in official letter DIPOA-A-112-11 and official letter SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirms it, as well as official letter SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, which indicated that the annual registration update of the CVO of Embutidos Doro would not proceed, with the legal system be declared.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">2. That the absolute nullity of the administrative act embodied in official letter DIPOA-A-211-11 and official letter SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirms it, be declared solely insofar as it requires having a veterinary medical regent (regente médico veterinario) and that instead, professionals in food technology be allowed to exercise said regency (regencia).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">3. That the absolute nullity of the administrative act embodied in official letter SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, which indicated that the annual registration update of our CVO would not proceed, be declared and that instead, the immediate annual registration of the referred veterinary operation certificate be ordered.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">4. That the Administration be condemned to pay both sets of costs of this action.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">5)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> By brief of March 10, 2014, the State answered the action negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam) (see folios 406-416).-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">6)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> By pleading of March 14, 2014, Nombre20662 answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam) (see folios 417-435).-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">7) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">That the Processing Judge, José Iván Salas Leitón, by resolution No. 1267-2014 of ten hours and forty minutes of June third, two thousand fourteen, ordered the joinder (acumulación) of case files numbers 13-8331-1027-CA and 13-8325-1027-CA, with the latter prevailing (folios 442-443).-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">8) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">That with the presence of representatives of the parties, the preliminary hearing was held starting at eight hours and fifty-five minutes on March third last, presided over by the Processing Judge Luis Mariano Argüello Rojas. On that occasion, the claims of the parties were analyzed and the documentary evidence was admitted. Furthermore, the matter was declared one of pure law and the conclusions of the parties were received (listen to the corresponding recording and see the minute appearing at folios 480-482 of the judicial file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">9) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">In the proceedings, the legal prescriptions have been followed, with no grounds found that determine nullity of the actions taken. This judgment is issued after deliberation and by unanimity of the members of the Tribunal, Judge Rosa María Cortés Morales, and Judges Paulo André Alonso Soto and</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Jonatán Canales Hernández.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Drafted by Judge Canales Hernández;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Considering</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">I)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> The following facts and procedural situations are deemed proven as important for the resolution of this matter:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">1</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That Nombre20662 issued a Veterinary Operation Certificate (Certificado Veterinario de Operación, hereinafter \"COV\") in favor of the plaintiff company, effective as of August 25, 2009, for its plant located in the hamlet (caserío) of Barranca, district of San José, canton of Naranjo. The authorized activities were the storage and distribution of products of animal origin; storage and distribution of meat and meat products, processing and preservation of meat products, and production of sausages (embutidos). Said document established August 25, 2013, as the update date (folios 1-3 of the administrative file);</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">2</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That Nombre20662, by means of official letter No. DIPOA-PG-002-RE-002 of February 2, 2009, established several non-conformities regarding the operation of the plant of the plaintiff's company, among them, that the plant requires a veterinary regent (regente veterinario) to operate, invoking for that purpose the General Health Law. That official letter gave rise to sanitary order DO-PG-002-RE-003 of that same date, addressed to that same company, indicating therein that: \"The establishment is made based on official letter DIPOA-A-112-11. The establishment must send, within a period of 6 days, concrete and definitive responses\" (folios 9-10 of the administrative file); </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">3</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That the plaintiff Nombre145586</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">appeared as the responsible professional (Regent) of Embutidos Doro, as of August 23, 2013, in her capacity as Bachelor in Food Technology, under number 15</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (folios 12-13 of the administrative file); </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">4</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That by brief received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of Nombre20662 on February 11, 2011, the plaintiff company challenged the previous sanitary order, arguing that Nombre145586</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, is registered as regent of the sausage factory, before the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, under the protection of Article 21 of Law No. 8412, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">\"(...) that (sic) protects her according to her professional profile to work as a regent in any sausage processing company, and from that date she was accepted by Nombre145591. , head of this department, as proof of this (sic) that we were granted the Veterinary Operation Certificate (CVO)\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (folio 11 of the administrative file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">5</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That by brief received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of Nombre20662 on June 4, 2012, the plaintiff company requested the application of the positive silence (silencio positivo) provided for in Article 7 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements (No. 8220), with respect to the petition to have the food technologist Nombre145586</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, as regent in Embutidos Doro and Industrias Blanco Castro, S.A., even submitting a sworn statement (declaración jurada) before a notary public (folios 22-31 of the administrative file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">6</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That by brief received by the Central Western Regional Directorate of Nombre20662 on May 31, 2013, the plaintiff company requested that the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed be resolved (folios 49-50 of the administrative file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">7</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That Dr. Nombre145591</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, Director of the Central Western Region of SENASA, by official letter SENASA-RCOC # 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, indicated to the plaintiff company that for the issuance of the annual registration, veterinary medical regency is indispensable, and that until it is presented, \"(...) it will not have the respective permit (Veterinary Operation Certificate) for its operation.\" In said document, reference was made to official letter DRCOC #240-12 Office of the Ombudsman (see folio 53, regarding the first official letter, and folios 43-44, regarding the second official letter; both from the administrative file); </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">8</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That in a document indicating neither date of issuance nor date of receipt, addressed to the Director General of SENASA, the plaintiff company files an appeal (recurso de apelación) against official letter SENASA-RCOC No. 129-2013. It requests that while the challenge is being resolved, what is indicated therein be suspended (folio 54 of the administrative file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">9</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That the plaintiff company initiated a legal protection (amparo de legalidad) proceeding against the State, which was processed in case file No. 13-005915-1027-CA of this Tribunal. That situation led the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) to address the Minister of Agriculture and the Director of SENASA, by official letter of October 1, 2013, so that the appeal against the sanitary order of February 2, 2011, be resolved promptly (folios 55-62 of the administrative file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">10</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That Dr. Nombre145591</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, Director of the Central Western Region of SENASA, by official letter SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 of 14:20 hours of October 10, 2013, rejected the revocation appeal (recurso de revocatoria) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">\"(...) filed against the order issued by Nombre20662 on February 2, 2011, official letter DIPOA-A-112-11 and therefore it is valid and effective and for which reason it must be obeyed and complied with immediately\" (</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">folios 63-68 and 71-73 of the administrative file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">11</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That the General Directorate of SENASA, by official letter SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013 of 8:50 hours of October 22, 2013, rejected the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the plaintiff company (folios 79-85 of the administrative file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">12)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Once the previous administrative act was notified and upon a request for clarification, the Director of the Central Western Region of Nombre20662, by official letter No. SENASA-RCOC # 195-2013 of October 28, 2013, indicated to the plaintiff company that the period established to comply with the regency of a veterinary doctor in the sausage factory was one month from the notification of that official letter (folios 85-87 of the administrative file);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">13</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That according to a visit carried out by the Operations Directorate of SENASA on February 25, 2014, the sausage factory of the plaintiff company continued operating (folio 89 of the administrative file).-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">II)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> The following facts and procedural situations are deemed not proven as important for the resolution of this matter:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">1</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That the sausage factory of Embutidos Doro has ceased to operate due to the administrative requirement of having a Veterinary Regent (no information in that sense is found in the record); </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">2</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) That the administrative requirement of having a Veterinary Regent as an indispensable requirement to issue the COV necessarily implies that the food technologist Nombre145586</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> must be dismissed (no information in that sense is found in the record).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">III</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Arguments given in case file No. 13-8325-1027-CA</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: In its lawsuit brief (folios 105-143), </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Nombre145585</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">alleges</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> that the Public Administration has acted arbitrarily, given that Nombre20662 has attempted to impose, through formal conduct and without any regulatory basis, the hiring of a veterinary regent (regente veterinario), despite the fact that the hiring of a professional regent in Food Technology had previously been authorized, considering that in this production process, no live animals are involved, making the hiring of a veterinary doctor unreasonable. It recalls that the corporate purpose of the plaintiff company is to buy pork, chicken, and beef from duly registered slaughterhouses, to produce a wide range of sausages (embutidos) in its plant, with the finished product then being sold to wholesalers and retail food outlets, which are responsible for placement with the final consumer. It disqualifies the decision of Nombre20662</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> because it lacks legal basis and does not take into account the public interests at stake. It affirms that the competence of Nombre20662 to exercise control over the activity being carried out is not questioned, but rather the scope of its powers and the interpretation of the rule, with the administrative acts that deny the registration of its Veterinary Operation Certificate (CVO) being illegal (official letters DIPOA-A-112-11 and SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, which confirmed the first) and in which it was communicated that the annual registration update of the CVO requested on August 26, 2013, would not proceed (official letters SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12 of that year). It argues that the sole reason for non-conformity with the decisions of Nombre20662 stems from the requirement raised to have veterinary regency, even though the activity carried out by the plaintiff company does not involve the handling or manipulation of live animals, the proper field of the veterinary doctor being the care and preservation of animal health, considering that \"(...) even though they may attend to other matters by connection, this is not their fundamental focus.\" It outlines that at all times, the meat acquired to manufacture sausages comes from slaughterhouses that have veterinarians for the livestock breeding phase, leaving the subjective criterion of the defendant body that orders the replacement of the food technologist with the veterinarian for the regency without a supporting rule. It argues that the problem is not solved by substituting the food technologist with the veterinarian, considering that the first professional is indispensable, making it materially impossible to carry out the industrial processes, whose specialist in charge regarding planning, execution, and supervision is the food technologist. It says that for a microenterprise, replacing the food technologist would make it impossible to remain in the market against large producers of national and international recognition, with hundreds of other small producers being in the same situation, thus affecting the public interest. It attacks the administrative acts in the following manner: - </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">resolution DIPOA-A-112-11</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, which is a sanitary order requiring a veterinary regent, because the scope that Nombre20662 makes does not derive from the application of Article 221 of the General Health Law, with the interpretation and application carried out becoming an illegal act, considering that what this rule provides is the performance of a veterinary inspection, carried out by some public authority and not the establishment of a regency; - </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">resolution SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, which dismisses the revocation appeal (recurso de revocatoria) against the previous act, which took 30 months to be issued and which adds new elements to those set forth in the appealed act, intended to demonstrate undisputed facts and invoking the application of Law 8495 (which is a point that is not discussed); - </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">resolution SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, which denies the renewal of the CVO registration in favor of the plaintiff company, considering that its own reasoning is lacking, but rather it refers to other previous pronouncements. It alleges that through these actions, the principles of prohibition of arbitrariness, reasonableness, legal certainty, and intangibility of one's own acts have been violated, as well as \"(...) the basic rules of legal-normative exegesis, a clear violation of the non-legal norms of the act\" and injury to collective public and individual interests. It affirms that the violation </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> is configured because there is a notorious and total absence of motive as an essential material element, understanding motive as the reasons of fact and law by virtue of which the issuance of an administrative act becomes necessary, the foregoing because the inadequate interpretation made of Article 221 of the General Health Law, as well as numeral 7 of the Regulation for the Granting of the CVO, with this interpretation made by the Regional Director of the West of SENASA, created differences where the enabling rule does not, thereby violating the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, invoking for this purpose what was stated in constitutional vote No. 2004-14421 of the Constitutional Chamber. In this regard, it argues that: \"The CVO resembles a license more than a permit or an authorization. The jurisprudential doctrine of this same chamber has been clear in establishing that a permit is the state's consent to carry out an activity that is initially prohibited. Thus, the CVO could not, in principle, be subject to a permit because agricultural production and the marketing of the resulting products is a lawful activity that finds support in the business freedom enshrined in numeral 46 of the Political Constitution. An authorization is the enabling to carry out an activity which, although not prohibited, is at the Administration's discretion whether or not to carry out said activity. Finally, a license is a regulated authorization insofar as the parameters for its granting are previously fixed and it corresponds to the Administration only to verify its compliance. That is, the Administration cannot extend such parameters or give an interpretation that restricts the approval of said license. The CVO is clearly a license because it is granted for the public and open marketing, as opposed to closed or private marketing, of products derived from animals. However, the Administration cannot freely decide whether or not to grant it, as it is sufficient for the applicant to satisfy the requirements of Executive Decree No. 34859-MAG </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">\"(...) for its approval. It is therefore a regulated power\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">. It mentions that notwithstanding the foregoing, applying Article 7 of the General Regulation for the Granting of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, which does not require it, it is ordered that the regent be a veterinarian. It argues that even in act SENASA-RCOC 145-2013, recourse is</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> had to the expedient of invoking Article 106 of the Regulation to the Organic Law of the College of Veterinary Doctors, when the truth is that this rule is inapplicable, because it is a rule that imposes a duty but does not contemplate a sanction, this being a matter of legal reserve in accordance with Articles 9 and 11 of the Fundamental Charter and 6, 11, 19, and 59 of the LGAP. It argues that in any case, the regulatory rule issued within the framework of organic relations by a non-state public entity is not enforceable against the plaintiff here, and that in any case, the aforementioned Regulation dates from 1989 and Executive Decree No. 34859 is from 2008. It concludes this argument by saying that the Administration's procedural opportunity to present its arguments precluded with the issuance of the first act (DIPOA-A-112-11), \"(...) reason for which and in accordance with the principle of no prejudicial amendment, it lacks the possibility of putting forward new arguments in the resolution confirming a restrictive act. Said rule is not cited directly in SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 but in any case, it should be said that it would not be applicable to it either\". It alleges that </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the principle of reasonableness</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> has been violated because the obligation imposed by Nombre20662 to have a veterinary regent does not comply with the trilogy of subprinciples that make up said principle (necessity, suitability, and proportionality). The foregoing, because: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">\"The first of them is that a rule must be necessary, that is, there must be a social cause that necessitates its appearance in the legal system. A rule should not come into legal life by mere whim of the legislator or whoever dictates it, but out of proven necessity. The second is that the rule be suitable, that is, that in qualitative terms it satisfies the reason that originated it, and finally, that it be proportional, that is, that from a quantitative perspective it manages to satiate the expectations and not exceed them; for example, when a rule establishes a restriction of fundamental rights in the face of a social problem, it must be verified that this restriction is the least burdensome for the administered party and their fundamental guarantees\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">. It affirms that with a food technologist, the safety of the sausage production process is adequately monitored, making the supervision of a veterinarian unnecessary, which could even affect the safety of the plant due to the constant contact the veterinarian has with live animals, which may carry diseases. It says that even if veterinary supervision were necessary and suitable, it is not proportional to require a veterinary regent, with Article 221 of the General Health Law needing to be interpreted by establishing the duty of the plaintiff's plant and all the plants to pay for external private audits to entities such as the Costa Rican Institute of Technical Standards (INTECO), thus safeguarding public health without unduly affecting the plaintiff's business activity and allowing it to retain its regent in food technology, who is indispensable. It ends by stating that the requirement made by Nombre20662 and questioned here becomes contrary to the principle of logicality, because it would imply that all butcher shops and supermarkets have a veterinary regent, since they make traditional sausages, their ground meat, and their own chorizo. It argues that </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the non-legal norms of the administrative act are violated</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, because the technical parameters to which the formal activity of the Administration must be subject in order to avoid deviations and abuses of power were disregarded, as established in Articles 15, 16, 17, and 160 LGAP, as well as the univocal norms of technique, science, logic, justice, experience, and common sense. It says that </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the principle of legal certainty and intangibility of one's own acts</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> was also disregarded, invoking for this purpose recital VI of vote No. 051-2010 of the Sixth Section of this Tribunal. It argues that the same Dr.

of Nombre145591 of Nombre20662 granted the CVO Registration Certificate with number Placa28947 in August 2009, valid until August 25, 2013, with a professional food technology regent, thereby endorsing the regent that was in place, later changing position, without any substantial regulatory change. In this way, Nombre20662 had "(...) given external signs to presume the legality of our actions and is not authorized to arbitrarily 'change the rules of the game.' Thus, there is a violation of both the principle of legal certainty and that of 'no venire contra factum propium' derived from constitutional canon 34, a situation that imposes the need to invalidate the appealed acts." The presentation ends by stating that an improper interpretation was given of article 221 of the General Health Law, which is not harmonious with articles 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (protection and progress of fundamental guarantees); 5 of the Constitution (which imposes the duty to ensure the progress and development of the nation having as its north the well-being of the greatest number, having been required in this case a hermeneutic tending to the protection of the public interest and fundamental rights, which was not verified in this case, given that the Administration rather opted to give a prohibitive connotation to the norm, curtailing business freedom, which cannot be done except for reasons of public interest. It affirms that the interpretation carried out harms public health, by preferring a veterinarian over a food technologist, which affects the levels of safety and efficiency of the processes, "(...) despite the fact that article 4 of the General Law of Nombre20662 indicates that in the interpretation of the norm, one must abide by what is most favorable for the human being, because well, what is most favorable is that a specialist be the regent of these food manufacturing processes for citizen consumption.// The interpretation given benefits no one more than the veterinarians themselves for whom a myriad of job options are created, but the rest of the population is negatively affected by this criterion. Not only is an exegesis contra homine given, but contra societas. As this is an integrating element of the motive for the contested acts, it is appropriate to declare their absolute nullity." Nombre20662 answers the action negatively (folios 182-198 and 232-248), fundamentally arguing that the contested acts do not suffer from any nullity. It begins its presentation, outlining the constitutive elements of the administrative act, citing Nombre21604. Further on, it argues that the requirement for veterinary medical inspection for establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals and the industrialization of meat foods, derives first from the provisions of article 221 of the General Health Law, developing the concept of veterinary medical inspection, in Executive Decree No. 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2011, specifically in article 3, which defines the inspecting veterinarian (licensed veterinarian who has under his responsibility the technical and sanitary direction of the establishments regulated in that Regulation, encompassing the functions established in said regulatory body and in related legislation) and the official veterinarian (veterinarian official of the ministries of Agriculture and Health). It points out that this distinction between the concepts of inspecting veterinarian and official veterinarian, means that the interpretation of the plaintiff corporation, in the sense that veterinary inspection must be carried out by a public authority, must be discarded, given that the inspecting veterinarian must even have a constant presence in the product elaboration process, which is only possible if a regency is exercised in said establishment, according to the regulation carried out in articles 8 and 33 ejúsdem, even affirming that "(...) the same Decree 29588-MAG-S indicates that the owners of establishments that are covered under this regulation, must have an office equipped and so forth (sic) for the Inspecting Veterinarian, it is because the same must be, clearly, an official distinct from the Official Veterinarians of this National Service or of any other authority of administrative rank." It continues arguing in the sense that the legal basis that protects Nombre20662 to request the contracting of a regent veterinarian, is in article 20 of the Decree ejúsdem, this provision being coherent with the content of articles 105 and 106 of the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinarians (Executive Decree No. 19184), which define the concept of regent veterinarian and establish the obligation for sausage factories and factories and processing plants for products and by-products of animal origin destined for human consumption. In accordance with the above, the contested acts are duly motivated, complying with all their constitutive elements. It then makes a lengthy consideration affirming that according to the profile of the veterinarian, he is the most suitable to regent a sausage processing establishment, concluding that while article 21, subsection h) of the Organic Law of the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (No. 8412), establishes that the members of that College must serve as consultants, advisors, experts, or responsible professionals in process industries, the veterinarian performs a fundamental task in the elaboration of products and by-products of animal origin, based on the occurrence of events such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), contamination with dioxins, and other diseases, given that in any case the veterinarian's work is not limited to the care and preservation of the health of live animals, but also to the preparation of sausages, as a matter of public health and safety of the foods consumed daily is at stake. In another order, it alleges that there is no administrative liability, of two types: without fault or due to special sacrifice or due to lack of service or abnormal functioning. It again cites the author Nombre21604, regarding the definition of lack of service or normal functioning, rejecting in passing that if the Public Administration does not realize said lack of service or abnormal functioning, the imposition of pecuniary liability is not possible, also pointing out, "(...) that it has been eventually the Administrated who has placed himself in a condition of disadvantage by being non-compliant with objective norms, the same ones he was required to comply with and carry out any other actions that the legal System allowed him." It rejects the claim for the abstract cancellation of the amounts ceased to be received since August 25, 2013, because there is no proof whatsoever that demonstrates in a reliable manner the damages claimed, the requested petitionary extreme lacking evidentiary support.- The State answers the action negatively (folios 201-231), arguing that although the plaintiff corporation was authorized by Nombre20662 to engage in the activity of storage and distribution of products of animal origin, the sanitary order issued on February 2, 2011, requiring it to hire a veterinary regent is in accordance with law, because according to the General Law of Nombre20662 (No. 8495 of April 6, 2006), there is a police power that empowers said body to require the Veterinary Operation Certificate (CVO). To this effect, it invokes numerals 5, 6 subsections b) and t), as well as articles 37, 38, 40, 59, 89 and 91 of the mentioned Law. It affirms that Nombre20662 holds a police power to guarantee the population compliance with the guarantee of protection to the right of health, being authorized to order and execute the sanitary measures it deems pertinent, even having the power to order the cancellation or suspension of the CVO, with the respective closure of the establishment, as well as any measure it deems pertinent. It indicates that according to subsections b) and c) of article 56 of the General Law of SENASA, establishments that elaborate, import, clear customs, fraction, store, transport, and sell products or by-products of animal origin, or that industrialize, package, refrigerate, process or sell at the wholesale level, products, by-products or derivatives of animals, for human or animal consumption, must have a CVO. Regarding the legal nature of the CVO, it says it is "(...) the document granted by SENASA, by means of which authorization is made, so that the natural or legal person engages in the aforementioned activities. Said authorization obliges compliance with the sanitary requirements established by SENASA, to carry out the activity," according to article 57 ejúsdem, even being able to withdraw the CVO, if it is demonstrated that the duly established sanitary requirements are not met, according to the power set forth in numerals 58 and 59 of the SENASA Law. It argues that in the specific case of the plaintiff corporation, this company is dedicated to the storage and distribution of products of animal origin, its distribution and processing, in the sausage branch, and to carry out this activity must have the COV, finding this requirement, not only in the SENASA Law, but also in the General Health Law, the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing, the General Regulation for the Granting of the CVO, as well as the Regulation of the Organic Law of the College of Veterinarians. Regarding the General Health Law, it recalls that according to article 221, it is required that establishments dedicated to the industrialization of meat foods must have veterinary medical inspection approved by the Ministry, with numeral 229 prohibiting the trade or distribution of meat and derivatives coming from premises or establishments not authorized by the health authority or that operate without veterinary inspection. These provisions are consistent with the provisions of articles 20, subsection a), 3, 7, 8 and 78 of the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses; numerals 3.23, 6 and 7 of the General Regulation for the Granting of the CVO, as well as articles 105 and 106, subsection a). It argues that even when the sausage production process does not involve the handling or manipulation of live animals, veterinary medical inspection is required, as the Attorney General's Office itself has held, in its opinions C-071-2006. It argues that the plaintiff party makes a forced interpretation of article 221 of the General Health Law, also not explaining why the food technologist can replace the veterinarian and, even more so, on which norm this substitution is based. It says that the administrative acts issued (SENASA DIPOA-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013), do not violate the principles of prohibition of arbitrariness, reasonableness, legal certainty, intangibility of one's own acts, observance of the non-legal norms of the act, nor in any way are collective, public, and individual interests violated, but rather are based on the public interest, on the protection of public health and human life and the norms invoked above. It argues that official letter No. DIPOA-A-112-11 constitutes a preparatory act that supports the sanitary order issued, ordering the requesting company to include a regent veterinarian; that resolution No. SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 details the reasons that led to the issuance of the sanitary measure, having the necessary technical and legal basis; that resolution No. SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 decided to proceed with the update of the annual registration of the plaintiff company, because to operate the sausage plant, the presence of the regent veterinarian is required, said provision being accompanied by the regulatory and technical analysis, in accordance with the requirements of article 136 of the General Law of Public Administration. Further on, it is argued that in this case there is a failure to comply with the requirements for compensation for damages to proceed, in the specific case. The foregoing, because none of the requirements of ordinal 190 of the General Law of Public Administration are met, invoking to this effect vote No. 273-2012 of November 21, 2012, of the Sixth Section of this Tribunal. It affirms that it is essential that the alleged injury be an immediate and necessary consequence of the administrative action, a situation that does not occur in this case, given that in any case it is not established that there is damage that is effective, evaluable, and individualizable and not eventual or hypothetical. It argues that there is no cause-effect relationship between the specific manifestation of the administrative function and the unlawful injury that demonstrates that there is a repairable damage or harm, with no evidence provided that meets the requirements as demanded in articles 58 CPCA and 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. It also rejects that interest must be paid because first a specific amount must be granted in a final judgment, invoking to this effect vote No. 1072-2010 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, also recalling that interest only proceeds when there are monetary obligations and not regarding obligations of value. It requests that the State not be condemned to pay personal and procedural costs, as the claim is inadmissible. It finalizes what is indicated in this brief stating that in accordance with article 8 of the General Law of the National Animal Health Service, No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, Nombre20662 is a body with minimum deconcentration and instrumental legal personality to carry out the competencies provided for in that law, having independence of criteria in its capacity as a technical body for the performance of its attributes. It argues that the acts questioned in this case were issued by Nombre20662 in the exercise of its exclusive legal powers, with the State having no participation or responsibility whatsoever in the facts. It argues that according to article 12, subsection c) CPCA and what has been said by jurisprudence (votes No. 1360-2010 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and 251-2011 of the Sixth Section of this Tribunal), if the contested conduct comes from the exercise of some of its competencies attributed to the body with instrumental legal personality, the appropriate action is to declare the lack of right with respect to the State.- IV) Arguments given in file No. 13-8331-1027-CA: The plaintiff Nombre145586, in her claim brief (folios 365-396), fundamentally states that in her condition as a food technologist, the decision of Nombre20662 to demand the contracting of a regent veterinarian, has curtailed her possibility of continuing to be contracted as regent of the sausage factory owned by Embutidos Doro and that this is not only illegal, but has caused her economic harm. With similar arguments to those given in the company's claim, she states that the Administration's acts of forcing the hiring of a veterinarian as regent, not proceeding to update the annual CVO registration, are illegal and cause her a reflective harm, legitimizing her to appeal in court, to achieve the annulment of said acts and achieve reparation for the damages suffered. She affirms that once the decree regulating the granting of the CVO came into effect, a contractual relationship was formalized with Embutidos Doro, given that for a sausage manufacturing company to dismiss a food technology professional implies a material impossibility to carry out the industrial processes, this being the specialist in charge of the planning, execution, and supervision of those processes. She affirms that the principle of intangibility of one's own acts was violated because Dr. Nombre145591 authorized her contracting as a professional regent, she being a food technologist, having already endorsed the regent previously held and then, without justification, the criterion was changed although there was no substantial regulatory change, violating the provisions of constitutional article 34. Regarding the nullity of the contested administrative acts, she says that the situation must be returned to the state of affairs before the dismissal was decreed, the order to contract a veterinary regent must be withdrawn, and the immediate inscription and registration of the CVO must proceed.- Nombre20662 answers the action negatively (folios 417-435), affirming that regarding the case of the co-plaintiff here, what the Administration has maintained is that plants that process sausages must have a regent veterinarian for their operation, authorizing in passing the substitution of the veterinarian for a food technologist, as was proven in an audit inspection carried out on February 2, 2011, which gave rise to the issuance of official letter No. DIPOA-A-112-11 of that date, in which three non-conformities were established, among them the requirement of a veterinarian as regent for the plant operation. It argues that no evidence whatsoever appears in the file in the sense that "(...) the plaintiff party has been afflicted by the risk of being dismissed from her functions. Note also that in none of the administrative acts whose nullity is sought in this process, is it ordered, not in the least, that the plaintiff Nombre145586 must be dismissed from her functions, given that the decision to leave without effect the existing contract -if it occurred- is the responsibility of the contracting parties." The State answers the action negatively (folios 406-416), opposing in the first place the defense of lack of active ad causam standing, given that if Mrs. Nombre145586 was contracted by Nombre145585 for the provision of professional services, that is, she was an employee of that corporation, she would not be legitimized to request the nullity of the actions that relate directly to the company and not to her in particular. Then, it opposes the defense of lack of right arguing that it is false that the actions of Nombre20662 are illegal and arbitrary, given that rather the actions are consistent with the provisions of the General Health Law V) In the preliminary hearing held in this Tribunal, on March 3 of this year, the different parties expressed the conclusions that are summarized below:

Conclusions of the co-plaintiffs: Embutidos Doro is a company responsible for stuffing previously processed meat. To be able to perform these functions, a CVO is needed, which was previously provided by the Ministry of Health, but as of 2006, is the competence of SENASA. By 2008, the requirement to appoint a regent or permanent advisor was requested. Then, officials Nombre6487 and Nombre139513 of SENASA, carried out an inspection, where the need to contract a veterinary regent was determined, in response to which appeals for revocation and a writ of amparo de legalidad and even this process were filed. It points out that Miss Nombre145586 performs the regency function being a food technologist, being adequate for the purposes of the norm, which is why the party disagrees with the contested acts.- Conclusions of the State: The claim is inadmissible, because there is a legal basis to demand veterinary regency in establishments manufacturing sausages. It points out that article 221 of the General Health Law, clearly and without margin for interpretation establishes that a veterinarian is required. Then, the Regulation to the Law of the College of Veterinarians (numeral 106, subsection a), clearly establishes the participation of veterinarians in the regency in establishments that process sausages. In the same way, the Sanitary and Veterinary Inspection Regulation for Slaughterhouses, Meat Production and Processing, Executive Decree No. 29588, in its article 20, subsection a) does so.- There is no doubt whatsoever that an establishment of the nature of the plaintiff requires the regency of a veterinarian. There is also a technical basis, because veterinarians are the only ones who can guarantee the safety of meat foods. No nullity is noticed, there is no invalidity whatsoever. The way in which said norms can be disapplied is not accredited, nor why a technologist can assume that function.

It is affirmed that Mrs. Nombre145586 does not have active standing to challenge the mentioned administrative acts, because although she claims to have been an "employee" of Nombre145585, she does not demonstrate the harm caused. The payment of damages is requested, because what the damages consist of is not clarified, given that at no time has Nombre20662 closed the establishment, proof in this sense being on folio 89. It must be made clear that in this file, the request for a precautionary measure was rejected as inadmissible. According to article 8 of the SENASA Law, it has instrumental legal personality and in this case, it acted in the exercise of its competencies, therefore, in the event that any extreme of the claim regarding that body is accepted, it requests that the claim be declared without merit regarding the State.- Conclusions of Nombre20662: It affirms that the contested acts are indeed duly factually and legally motivated. It cites the same norms mentioned by the State's representation, to support the need for the processing of sausage establishments to be carried out by veterinarians. Article 3 of the General Regulation for the Granting of the Veterinary Operation Certificate establishes the difference between the inspecting veterinarian and the inspecting veterinarian Veterinarians are the ideal professionals to attend not only to live animals, but also to dead animals, because they can detect the existence of diseases, bacteria, and medications that can be harmful to human health.

Regarding damages, no proof whatsoever of their existence has been provided, given that even the closure of the company has not been carried out by the authorities and if the company has closed it has been by decision of its owners. It points out that at this moment operations are being carried out with a veterinarian.

It says that the indicated administrative decisions are duly based on article 89 of the SENASA Law.

It requests that the claim be dismissed and that the parties be ordered to pay both sets of costs of the action.- </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">VI</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">ON THE MERITS</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Legal regime for authorization of the sausage production activity</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: The Court considers that in the exercise of sanitary police power, the activity of sausage production and storage is subject to an administrative authorization (autorización) regime, under the competence of Nombre20662, with a mandatory requirement to obtain that authorization being the oversight (regencia) performed by a veterinarian for each of the establishments that carry out these activities.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">This conclusion is reached from the reading and relationship of the norms indicated below, which regulate: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">(a)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> the obligation to have the administrative authorization (autorización) and the body responsible for granting it, and </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">(b)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> the veterinary oversight (regencia) as an indispensable requirement to issue the Certificado Veterinario de Operación (CVO):</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">a)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Obligation to have administrative authorization (autorización) for the production of sausages, exclusive competence of Nombre20662</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: This derives from what is prescribed in Article 221 of the Ley General de Salud (Ley </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">N° 5395 of February 24, 1974), as well as from</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">the Ley General de Salud Animal (Ley N° 8495 of April 6, 2006), in its numerals 5, 6, subsections j), ñ) and o), 56 subsections b) and c), 57 and 58, which we also cite below:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">"ARTICULO 221.- Establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals and to </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">the industrialization of meat-based foods </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">of different species, intended for consumption by the population, must also have veterinary medical inspection approved by the Ministry.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">The same requirement applies to </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">factories and processing plants for animal-origin products</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Artículo 5º-Competent body. The Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG), through Senasa, shall be responsible for the regulation, planning, administration, coordination, execution, and application of official activities at the national, regional, and international levels, relating to the health of the animal population, residues, veterinary public health, veterinary control of zoonoses, traceability/tracking, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">the protection and safety of animal-origin foods</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, animal feed, veterinary medications, animal genetic material, products and by-products, the production, use, release, or marketing of genetically modified organisms that may affect animal health or its environment, and dangerous substances of animal origin."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Artículo 6º-Competences. Nombre20662 shall have the following competences:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">j) To control and guarantee the health of domestic, aquatic, wild, or other animals of different species, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">as well as the safety (inocuidad) of products, by-products, and derivatives for human</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> or animal consumption, and to establish sanitary controls in all slaughter, processing, and industrialization plants.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">ñ) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">To establish criteria for the authorization (autorización) of natural and legal persons for each specific activity</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, the responsibilities assumed, and their limitations.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">o) To establish quality control and technical audit procedures, both for Nombre20662 itself and for the officialized or authorized natural and legal persons; likewise, to ensure the administration, control, and use of the resources obtained when applying this Ley."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Artículo 56.- Establishments subject to control.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">Nombre20662 shall grant or withdraw the Certificado Veterinario de Operación to the following establishments: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">(...) b) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">Those that produce</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, import, clear from customs, fraction, store, transport, and sell </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">animal-origin products and by-products</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">c) Those intended for the slaughter of animals </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">or that industrialize</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, package, refrigerate, process, or sell, at the wholesale level, animal products, by-products, or derivatives, for human or animal consumption. (...)"</span><br /><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Artículo 57.-Certificado Veterinario de Operación. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">Certificado Veterinario de Operación shall be understood as the document issued by Senasa, through which the authorization (autorización) is recorded, so that the requesting natural or legal person may engage in one or more of the activities mentioned in Article 56 of this Ley</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">A single certificate may indicate the authorization to perform different activities; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">it shall be requested and granted only once and shall not need to be renewed, as long as the sanitary requirements are constantly met</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">Said authorization shall imply compliance with the sanitary requirements established by Senasa to carry out the activity."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">In the above sense, it is noted that even the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has considered that, as of the entry into force of Ley N° 8495,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">the power to issue sanitary authorizations (autorizaciones) for establishments that slaughter animals, or process and market meat products, and of course, produce and market sausages, is the exclusive competence of SENASA, displacing in that area the competence of the Ministry of Health to issue sanitary operating permits (permisos sanitarios de funcionamiento) for that type of establishment. Thus, in Considerando III of Voto Nº 2012-01965 of nine hours and thirty-one minutes of February 17, 2012, it was stated:</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"As can be seen from reading this entire set of formal legal norms, the legislator structured a control and surveillance system under the responsibility of the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal with the aim of ensuring a degree of protection for society.- In this way, it designed not only the structure that provides the service but also the existence of an equivalent to the sanitary operating permit (permiso sanitario de funcionamiento) called Certificado Veterinario de Operación (Article 57 of the Ley) that all the establishments specified in numeral 56 of said legal body must have".-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">In any case, it should be remembered that the jurisprudence of this Court (see Considerando VI of Voto N° 163-2012-VI of 14:20 hours of August 20, 2012, of the Sixth Section (Sección Sexta)), has conceptualized (and differentiated) the concepts of authorization (autorización), permit (permiso), and license (licencia) as follows </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"(...) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">Authorization (autorización)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> can be defined as the removal of a legal obstacle for the exercise of a required conduct. In turn, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">permit (permiso)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> consists of the administrative enablement for the development of a conduct, in principle prohibited. While </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">license (licencia)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> consists of an authorization of strictly regulated content" </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(underlining added), it being possible to affirm, in accordance with the above, that the Certificado Veterinario de Operación is a permit (permiso), understood as the administrative enablement for the development of a conduct in principle prohibited, due to the risk that the production and storage of sausages implies for the health and life of animals and humans. A consequence of the conceptualization of the CVO as a permit (permiso) is that the administrative act granting it is composed not only of strictly regulated acts but also of discretionary elements, with the Administration having the ability to even deny the granting of the permit (permiso), even when the requirements are met, if despite that, said act affects the legal interests mentioned so many times.- </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">b)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Veterinary oversight (regencia) as an indispensable requirement to issue the Certificado Veterinario de Operación (CVO)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: It is also the criterion of this Court that for the issuance of the CVO, it is indispensable that a veterinarian be appointed as the regente in the corresponding establishment, it being legally impossible for the participation of veterinarians to be substituted by other professionals, even if they are a food technologist, as is the plaintiff Nombre145586. This conclusion is reached from the reading of numerals 3, 7, and 8 of the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos, Producción y Procesamiento de Carnes (</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29588-MAG-S of May 28, 2001), as well as Articles 105 and 106, subsections a) and c) of the Reglamento a la Ley del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios (</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">19184 of July 10, 1989), </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">which, as pertinent, state:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Artículo 3º-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">The words, names, terms, and phrases used in the provisions of this regulation shall be understood as follows: (...)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">Inspector Veterinarian:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">Professional in Veterinary Medicine incorporated into the Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios, who is under his/her responsibility the technical and sanitary direction of the establishments regulated herein, encompassing the functions assigned by this regulation and other related legislation."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Artículo 7º-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">The establishments that shall be subject to the provisions of this regulation are: those dedicated to slaughtering, deboning, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">sausage-making</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, packaging, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">storage</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, processing, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">retail sale</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">, as well as vehicles for transporting meat from bovine, caprine, equine, ovine, porcine species, and others authorized by MAG and MS."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Artículo 8º-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">To monitor the safety (inocuidad) of meat products, these shall be subjected to organoleptic tests performed by </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">the Inspector Veterinarian</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">and his team of inspection assistants, and to physical, chemical, and microbiological tests performed in situ or in official laboratories or duly accredited laboratories for this purpose." </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Artículo 105.-Regente is understood to mean the professional, member of the Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios, who, in accordance with the legislation, assumes the technical, scientific direction and professional responsibility for any of the establishments mentioned in the following article.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">Artículo 106.-The establishments that must be regentados or technically and scientifically directed by a veterinarian are:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">a) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">Factories and plants producing animal-origin products and by-products intended for human population consumption</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">. (...)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">c) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">Establishments dedicated to the slaughter or butchering of animals, processing, and industrialization of meat-based foods of different species, without prejudice to the competence of zootechnical agricultural engineers in the fields of processing and industrialization</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">." </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(underlining not in the original)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">In accordance with the norms indicated above, the argument is not admissible that, under Article 21, subsection h) of the Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines, N° 8412 of April 22, 2004, which establishes that: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">"Active or emeritus members of the Colegio shall have the following offices and competences:// h) To serve as consultant, advisor, expert, or responsible professional in process industries"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> an affiliated professional incorporated into that professional corporation, that is, a food technologist, can serve as regente of an establishment intended for the manufacture of sausages, because there exists a norm of legal rank, and even later in its entry into force (those of the Ley General de Salud Animal), which establishes that this professional task is the proper domain of the veterinarian.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">VII</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Analysis of the claims of Nombre145585 </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: Given the above framework regarding the authorization (autorización) regime for the sausage manufacturing activity, we will refer to the claims and arguments presented by the parties:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">First, second, and third claims</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">: In which the nullity of official letters DIPO-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, is requested</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">, questioning further, it having been indicated that the annual registration update of our CVO would not be processed, ordering instead the immediate annual registration of the Certificado Veterinario de Operación.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">These claims are not admissible according to this Court</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, for the reasons indicated below:</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> The requirement to have a veterinarian overseeing (regencia), is determined by the authorization (autorización) regime for the sausage manufacturing and storage activity, as indicated in the preceding considerando. It must also be stated that the fact that there was oversight (regencia) by a food technology professional, based on Ley N° </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">8412, cannot substitute for the participation of veterinarians; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">2)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> Nor is the argument admissible that, prior to the issuance of these administrative acts, it had been accepted that a food technologist, and under those conditions, the Certificado Veterinario de Operación was issued and kept valid, because that irregular situation cannot prevail against an express norm that establishes the legal obligation to have a veterinarian, even constituting a violation of the principle of singular non-derogability (inderogabilidad singular) of the norm. Likewise, from the fact that before the sanitary order of February 2, 2009, it was tolerated that the oversight (regencia) was not performed by a veterinarian, but by another professional, it does not follow that this situation cannot be corrected, as was effectively done; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">3)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> The position of the plaintiff cannot be accepted either, in the sense that it was not taken into account that the sausage production plant does not work with live animals, but with meat acquired from authorized slaughterhouses, given that in accordance with Article 56 of the Ley del SENASA, the control involves not only establishments where live animals are handled, but also involves the transformation processes into sausages, as well as their storage and distribution; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">4)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> It must also be said that the legal obligation to have a veterinarian regente in no way prevents the activity that a food technologist may carry out, as a professional incorporated into the Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines, to perform functions in a process industry (as sausage manufacturing would eventually be), in accordance with Article 21, subsection h) of Ley N° 8412, but only implies that the veterinarian cannot be substituted by another professional who handles another branch of knowledge and is incorporated into another professional association, for the functions that are technically and legally proper to them</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">; 5)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> The principles of reasonableness and proportionality are not violated by the regulatory interpretation made by SENASA regarding the content of the Ley General de Salud and the Ley General de Salud Animal, nor was the decision made arbitrarily, but rather it was done at all times in accordance with the legal text and seeking the effective protection of the public interest, which is precisely to guarantee the safety (inocuidad) of animal-origin products intended for human consumption; thus, the interpretation was also made in compliance with the fundamental guarantees in favor of consumer rights, established in Article 46 of the Constitution.</span></p> In this case, the administrative authority's invocation of an executive decree (the Regulation of the Organic Law of the College of Veterinary Physicians, Executive Decree No. 19184 of July 10, 1989), in resolutions SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 and SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013, is correct, because that regulatory body develops the concept of a veterinary physician inspector or manager (regente) of a given establishment intended for the transformation of products of animal origin, and that provision is even concordant with articles 56 and 57 of Law No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, which was issued subsequently; 6) It is not true that the regulatory interpretation establishing that the manager (regente) of the establishments must necessarily be a veterinary physician and that this is an indispensable requirement for the issuance of the Veterinary Operation Certificate is contrary to the principle of reasonability and its sub-principles (necessity, suitability, and proportionality), given that it is necessary, suitable, and completely proportionate to the case to require the participation of a professional with specialized knowledge in animal health and the effects animal health can have on human health, in an activity that can seriously affect people's health and lives, it being unreasonable rather that this professional be substituted by another who does not have specialized knowledge in that matter; 7) Regarding the argument that the requirement is not reasonable because it would imply having a veterinary manager for all butcher shops and supermarkets, because they make local sausages, ground meat, and chorizo, being contrary to the principle of logic, this must also be rejected because this abstract situation is not being judged in this case file (expediente); rather, what is being analyzed here is the specific situation of a sausage factory owned by the plaintiff company, in a specific place and with its own characteristics; 8) It is also not true that the challenged acts were issued disregarding the rules of science or technique (doctrine of article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration), because what is set forth in administrative acts SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 of October 10, 2013, and SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 of September 12, 2013, clarifies the technical and scientific reasons why the veterinary physician is the most suitable to guarantee animal and human health and food safety; 9) It is also not true that the Administration's opportunity to sufficiently justify the acts contrary to the plaintiff company's claims was precluded after the issuance of the sanitary order of February 2, 2002; rather, the extensive argumentation given in acts SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 and SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013 adequately responds to the questions raised by the plaintiff through appeals; thus, it was necessary to argue in the manner done, no regulatory violation being observed, nor any infringement of due process or the right of defense; 10) The power to withdraw the Veterinary Operation Certificate when any requirement for its maintenance is missing derives from the application of article 58 of Law No. 8495, which provides: "El Nombre20662 may withdraw the veterinary operation certificate if it determines, after a prior inspection, that the establishment does not meet the sanitary requirements established for the authorized activities. In case the certificate is withdrawn, the interested party must request it again," for which reason the third claim of the plaintiff company must be denied; 11) Finally, the Tribunal considers that the regulatory application being challenged here is contrary to business freedom or to article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (progressiveness of fundamental guarantees), because establishing a requirement such as the medical veterinary management (regencia médica veterinaria) prior to issuing the Veterinary Operation Certificate does not curtail that freedom, but rather harmonizes it with interests of a superior nature, namely the health and life of the population.- Fourth and fifth claims: They must be dismissed for one reason: it was not verified that the sausage manufacturing establishment was at any time closed due to the order to have a veterinary medical management to obtain the Veterinary Operation Certificate, the damage for which compensation is sought not being verified in that manner.- VIII) Analysis of the claims of Nombre145586 : If the claims of Ms. Nombre145586 are observed, it is noted that they derive from those brought by Embutidos Doro. The foregoing is because Ms. Nombre145586 has the profession of food technologist duly registered with the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals and had a management contract (contrato de regencia) with said company, duly registered with the corresponding professional corporation, and her interests would have been harmed when it was ordered that, to maintain the validity of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, a veterinary medical management must be registered. Also, the arguments presented by said person are basically the same as those presented by the co-plaintiff company, and her claims must suffer the same fate, in which the annulment of the same administrative acts is requested, also requesting that food technology professionals be allowed to exercise said management (regencia). Based on the reasons given above, the claims of an annulment nature must be rejected, as well as the petitionary conclusion aimed at allowing food technology professionals to exercise management (regencia) in sausage production establishments, fulfilling the requirements of the Veterinary Operation Certificate, because, as we have seen, the authorization to act as manager (regente) given in article 21, subsection h) of Law No. 8412, cannot technically or legally substitute the participation of the veterinary physician. In any case, the fact that registration with the College of Veterinary Physicians was required did not determine any damage for Ms. Nombre145586, because it was not even proven that this situation led to her dismissal by the company; rather, one might think she could have continued working for it, performing her work as a food technologist, within the scope of her specialized knowledge. As there is no proven relationship between the requirement of registration with the College of Veterinary Physicians and any harm to the plaintiff Nombre145586 , the exception of lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) must be upheld.- IX) Analysis of the exceptions and award of costs: Regarding the State: The State's representation is correct when it affirms that the administrative resolutions issued by Nombre20662 in this case were issued within the scope of its own competencies derived from the General Law of the National Animal Health Service, No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, and that for this reason, according to the instrumental legal personality attributed to that body with minimal deconcentration (desconcentración mínima), the lawsuit regarding the State must be dismissed for lacking passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva). The foregoing is affirmed because the plaintiffs jointly sued the larger entity (the State) and the body with deconcentration and instrumental legal personality (SENASA), as mandated by article 12, subsection c) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, with the claims made even directed at the annulment of the deconcentrated body. Due to the foregoing, as the action of no centralized State body is directly questioned, the exception of lack of passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) must be upheld and the lawsuit dismissed in all its aspects regarding the State. Due to the way it is resolved, a ruling is omitted on the exceptions of lack of right regarding the lawsuits filed by Nombre145585 and Nombre145586 , as well as the exception of lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa), regarding the action of this latter person. Given that the action was brought against the State, as mandated by law, it is found that there was sufficient motive to litigate, placing us in one of the hypotheses for exemption from the award of costs for both plaintiffs in favor of the State (article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code), and it must be resolved in this manner.- Regarding Nombre20662 : In accordance with the reasons given in the previous recitals (considerandos), the defense of lack of right regarding the action of Nombre145585 must be upheld and the lawsuit declared without merit. The exceptions of lack of active and passive standing (legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva) must also be upheld regarding the lawsuit of Nombre145586 , as there is no effective harm from the challenged administrative actions within the scope of her legal sphere, and her action must be declared inadmissible.- Both co-plaintiffs having been defeated in this matter by SENASA, they must be ordered to pay said deconcentrated body both costs of the action, there being no circumstance for exemption, as established in the aforementioned rule.-

Therefore:

• 1)The exception of lack of passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) raised by the State is upheld, and the lawsuits brought by both plaintiffs are declared inadmissible regarding the first. Due to the way it is resolved, a ruling is omitted on the exceptions of lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) that were raised by the entity. Both plaintiffs are exempted from the payment of both costs in favor of the State; 2) The exceptions of lack of active and passive standing (legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva) raised against the action of Nombre145586 are upheld, and the lawsuit is also declared inadmissible regarding her; the exception of lack of right raised against the action of the plaintiff company is upheld. Consequently, the lawsuits of Nombre145585 , Limitada against the National Animal Health Service are declared without merit in all their aspects. The co-plaintiffs are ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs in favor of the deconcentrated body.- Jonatán Canales Hernández Rosa María Cortés Morales Paulo André Alonso Soto

Procesos de conocimiento acumulados de Nombre145585 y Nombre145586 contra el Estado y el Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal N° 63-2015 Sección Octava del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo . Goicoechea, a las catorce horas del trece de julio del dos mil quince.- Procesos de conocimiento acumulados de Nombre145585 , representada por Nombre145587 , vecina de Alajuela, de ocupación no indicada, cédula de identidad CED114055° , en su condición de apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma y Nombre145588 , cédula de identidad CED114056° , en su condición de apoderado especial judicial y Nombre145586 , soltera, tecnóloga de alimentos, vecina de Alajuela, cédula de identidad CED114057° , contra el Estado, representada por el Procurador Julio César Mesén Montoya, cédula de identidad CED21866° y el Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal (en adelante "el SENASA"), representada por Nombre145589 , médico veterinario, vecino de Heredia, cédula de identidad CED114058° , en su condición de Director General y Nombre145590 , cédula de identidad CED98° Placa28946, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial. Las personas mencionadas son mayores de edad y los señores Nombre145588, Mesén y Nombre145590, son abogados y vecinos de San José.-

Resultando:

• 1)Nombre145585 establece las siguientes pretensiones en el expediente N° 13-8325-1027-CA (escúchese la audiencia preliminar y obsérvese la minuta a folio 480 vuelto):

"1. Se declare la disconformidad del acto administrativo plasmado en el oficio DIPO-A-112-11 y el oficio SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 del 10 de octubre del año 2013 que lo confirma, así como el oficio SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del año 2013 que indicó que no se procedería con la utilización de registro anual del CVO de Nombre145585 con el ordenamiento jurídico .

2. Se declare la nulidad absoluta del acto administrativo plasmado en el oficio DIPOA-A-112-11 y el oficio SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 del 10 de octubre del año 2013 que lo confirma únicamente en cuanto exige contar con un regente médico veterinario y que en su lugar se permita a mi poderdante mantener su regente tecnólogo en alimentos.

3. Se declare la nulidad absoluta del acto administrativo plasmado en el oficio SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del año 2013 que nos indicó que no se procedería con la actualización de registro anual de nuestro CVO y que en su lugar se ordene el inmediato registro anual de nuestro certificado veterinario de operación.

4. Se ordene a la Administración a cancelar en abstracto los montos dejados de percibir desde el 25 de agosto del año 2013 hasta la fecha en que se suspenda provisional o definitivamente los efectos del acto administrativo SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del año 2013 que indicó que no se procedería con la actualización de registro anual del CVO de Embutidos Doro.

5. Se ordene el pago de intereses sobre los montos adeudados desde su nacimiento hasta el efectivo pago.

6. Se condene a la Administración al pago de ambas costas de esta acción." 2) Por escrito del 3 de marzo del 2014, el Estado contestó negativamente la acción y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho (véanse folios 182-198 y 201-231).- 3) Por libelo del 4 de marzo del 2014, el Nombre20662 contestó negativamente la demanda y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho (véanse folios 232-248).- 4) Nombre145586 establece las siguientes pretensiones en el expediente N° 13-8331-1027-CA (escúchese la audiencia preliminar y obsérvese la minuta a folio 481:

"1. Se declare la disconformidad del acto administrativo plasmado en el oficio DIPOA-A-112-11 y el oficio SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 del 10 de octubre del año 2013 que lo confirma, así como el oficio SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del año 2013 que indicó que no se procedería con la actualización de registro anual del CVO de Embutidos Doro con el ordenamiento jurídico.

2. Se declare la nulidad absoluta del acto administrativo plasmado en el oficio DIPOA-A-211-11 y el oficio SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 del 10 de octubre del año 2013 que lo confirma únicamente en cuanto exige contar con un regente médico veterinario y que en su lugar se permita que profesionales en tecnología de los alimentos podamos ejercer dicha regencia.

3. Se declare la nulidad absoluta del acto administrativo plasmado en el oficio SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del año 2013 que indicó que no se procedería con la actualización de registro anual de nuestro CVO y que en su lugar se ordene el inmediato registro anual del referido certificado veterinario de operación.

4. Se condene a la Administración al pago de ambas costas de esta acción." 5) Por escrito del 10 de marzo del 2014, el Estado contestó negativamente la acción y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y de falta de legitimación ad causam activa (véanse folios 406-416).- 6) Por libelo del 14 de marzo del 2014, el Nombre20662 contestó negativamente la demanda y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y de falta de legitimación ad causam activa (véanse folios 417-435).- 7) Que el Juez Tramitador, José Iván Salas Leitón por resolución N° 1267-2014 de las diez horas y cuarenta minutos del tres de junio del dos mil catorce dispuso la acumulación de los expedientes números 13-8331-1027-CA y 13-8325-1027-CA, prevaleciendo este último (folios 442-443).- 8) Que con presencia de representantes de las partes, se realizó la audiencia preliminar a partir de las ocho horas y cincuenta y cinco minutos del tres de marzo pasado, presidida por el Juez de Trámite Luis Mariano Argüello Rojas. En esa oportunidad se analizaron las pretensiones de las partes y se admitió la prueba documental. Además, se declaró el asunto de puro derecho y se recibieron las conclusiones de las partes (escúchese la grabación correspondiente y obsérvese la minuta que aparece a folios 480-482 del expediente judicial); 9) En los procedimientos se han seguido las prescripciones legales, no encontrándose motivos que determinen nulidad de lo actuado. El presente fallo se emite previa deliberación y por unanimidad de los integrantes del Tribunal, la jueza Rosa María Cortés Morales, y los Jueces Paulo André Alonso Soto y Jonatán Canales Hernández.- Redacta el Juez Canales Hernández;

Considerando:

• I)De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tienen como probados los siguientes hechos y situaciones procesales:
• 1)Que el Nombre20662 emitió a favor de la sociedad actora un Certificado Veterinario de Operación (en adelante, "COV"), con vigencia a partir del día 25 de agosto del 2009, para su planta ubicada en el caserío de Barranca, distrito de San José, del cantón de Naranjo. Las actividades autorizadas fueron el almacenamiento y distribución de productos de origen animal; almacenamiento y distribución de carne y productos cárnicos, procesamiento y conservación de cárnicos y elaboración de embutidos. En dicho documento se estableció como fecha de actualización, el 25 de agosto del 2013 (folios 1-3 del expediente administrativo); 2) Que Nombre20662, por medio del oficio N° DIPOA-PG-002-RE-002 del 2 de febrero del 2009 estableció varias inconformidades sobre la operación de la planta de la sociedad de la aquí actora, entre ellas, que la planta requiere un regente veterinario para operar, invocando al efecto la Ley General de Salud. Ese oficio dio lugar a la orden sanitaria DO-PG-002-RE-003 de esa misma fecha, dirigida a esa misma empresa, indicándose ahí que: "El establecimiento se hace en base al oficio DIPOA-A-112-11. El establecimiento debe enviar en un plazo de 6 días, respuestas concretas y definitivas" (folios 9-10 del expediente administrativo); 3) Que la actora Nombre145586 aparecía como profesional responsable (Regente) de Embutidos Doro, para el 23 de agosto del 2013, en su condición de Bachiller en Tecnología de Alimentos, bajo el número 15 (folios 12-13 del expediente administrativo); 4) Que por escrito recibido por la Dirección Regional Central Occidental del Nombre20662 el día 11 de febrero del 2011, la sociedad actora impugnó la orden sanitaria anterior, aduciendo que Nombre145586 , está registrada como regente de la fábrica de embutidos, ante el Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines, al amparo del artículo 21 de la Ley N° 8412, "(...) q (sic) la ampara según su perfil profesional para laborar como regente en cualquier empresa procesadora de embutidos, y desde esa fecha fue aceptada por el Nombre145591. , jefe de este departamento, de prueba esta (sic) que nos fue otorgado el Certificado Veterinario de Operación (CVO)" (folio 11 del expediente administrativo); 5) Que por escrito recibido por la Dirección Regional Central Occidental del Nombre20662 el día 4 de junio del 2012, la sociedad actora pide la aplicación del silencio positivo previsto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos (N° 8220), con respecto a la petición para que se tuviera a la tecnóloga de alimentos Nombre145586 , como regente en Embutidos Doro e Industrias Blanco Castro, S.A., presentando incluso una declaración jurada ante notario público (folios 22-31 del expediente administrativo); 6) Que por escrito recibido por la Dirección Regional Central Occidental del Nombre20662 el día 31 de mayo del 2013, la sociedad actora solicitó que se resolviera el recurso de apelación presentado (folios 49-50 del expediente administrativo); 7) Que el Dr. Nombre145591 , Director de la Región Central Occidental del SENASA, por oficio SENASA-RCOC # 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del 2013, se le indicó a la sociedad actora, que para la emisión del registro anual, es indispensable la regencia médico veterinaria, siendo que hasta que no se presente aquella, "(...) no contará con el permiso respectivo (Certificado Veterinario de Operación) para su funcionamiento". En dicho documento se hizo referencia al oficio DRCOC #240-12 Defensoría de los habitantes (véanse folio 53, en cuanto al primer oficio y folios 43-44, en cuanto al segundo oficio; ambos del expediente administrativo); 8) Que en documento que no indica ni fecha de emisión ni fecha de recibido, dirigido al Director General del SENASA, la sociedad actora establece recurso de apelación contra el oficio SENASA-RCOC No 129-2013. Pide que mientras se resuelve la impugnación se suspenda lo ahí indicado (folio 54 del expediente administrativo); 9) Que la sociedad actora estableció proceso de amparo de legalidad en contra del Estado, que se tramitó en el expediente N° 13-005915-1027-CA de este Tribunal. Esa situación dio lugar a que la Procuraduría General de la República, se dirigiera a la Ministra de Agricultura y al Director del SENASA, por oficio del 1° de octubre del 2013, para que se resolviera a la brevedad el recurso de apelación contra la orden sanitaria del 2 de febrero del 2011 (folios 55-62 del expediente administrativo); 10) Que el Dr. Nombre145591 , Director de la Región Central Occidental del SENASA, por oficio SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 de las 14:20 horas del 10 de octubre del 2013, rechazó el recurso de revocatoria "(...) girada por el Nombre20662 el 2 de febrero de 2011, oficio DIPOA-A-112-11 y por ello vigente y eficaz y por lo que debe ser acatada y cumplida en forma inmediata" (folios 63-68 y 71-73 del expediente administrativo); 11) Que la Dirección General del SENASA, por oficio SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013 de las 8:50 horas del 22 de octubre del 2013, rechazó el recurso de apelación presentado por la sociedad actora (folios 79-85 del expediente administrativo); 12) Una vez que se notificó el anterior acto administrativo y ante solicitud de aclaración, el Director de la Región Central Occidental del Nombre20662 por oficio N° SENASA-RCOC # 195-2013 del 28 de octubre del 2013, le indicó a la sociedad actora, que el plazo establecido para que cumpliera con la regencia de un médico veterinario en la fábrica de embutidos, era de un mes a partir de la notificación de ese oficio (folios 85-87 del expediente administrativo); 13) Que según visita realizada por la Dirección de Operaciones del SENASA, el día 25 de febrero del 2014, la fábrica de embutidos de la sociedad actora siguió operando (folio 89 del expediente administrativo).- II) De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tienen como no probados los siguientes hechos y situaciones procesales:
• 1)Que la fábrica de embutidos de Embutidos Doro haya dejado de operar por la exigencia administrativa de contar con un Regente Veterinario (no consta en los autos información en ese sentido); 2) Que la exigencia administrativa de contar con un Regente Veterinario como un requisito indispensable para emitir el COV, implique necesariamente que se tenga que despedir a la tecnóloga de alimentos Nombre145586 (no consta en los autos información en ese sentido).
• III)Argumentos dados en el expediente N° 13-8325-1027-CA: En su escrito de demanda (folios 105-143), Nombre145585 alega que la Administración Pública ha actuado arbitrariamente, siendo que el Nombre20662 ha pretendido imponer por medio de conductas formales y sin fundamento normativo alguno, la contratación de un regente veterinario, lo anterior a pesar que antes se había autorizado la contratación de un regente profesional en Tecnología de Alimentos, habida cuenta que en ese proceso productivo, no se da participación de animales vivos, volviéndose irrazonable la contratación de un médico veterinario. Recuerda que el giro mercantil de la sociedad actora es comprar carne de cerdo, pollo y res de mataderos debidamente registrados, para realizar una múltimple gama de embutidos en su planta, siendo luego el producto terminado vendido a mayoristas y expendios de alimentos al detalle, los cuales se encargan de la colocación al consumidor final. Descalifica la decisión del Nombre20662 porque carece de asidero jurídico y no toma en cuenta los intereses públicos en juego. Afirma que no se cuestiona la competencia del Nombre20662 para ejercer control sobre la actividad que se desarrolla, sino el dimensionamiento de sus facultades y la interpretación de la norma, siendo ilegales los actos administrativos que niegan el registro de su Certificado Veterinario Operativo (CVO) (oficios DIPOA-A-112-11 y SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 del 10 de octubre del 2013, que confirmó al primero) y en que se comunicó que no se procedería con la actualización del registro anual del CVO que se había solicitado el 26 de agosto del 2013 (oficios SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre de ese año). Argumenta que el único motivo de disconformidad con las decisiones del Nombre20662 parte de la exigencia planteada de contar con regencia veterinaria, a pesar que la actividad realizada por la empresa actora, no involucra el trato o manipulación de animales vivos, siendo el campo propio del médico veterinario, el cuidado y la preservación de la salud animal, habida cuenta que "(...) aun y cuando por conexidad puedan atender otros temas, no es este su eje fundamental". Reseña que en todo momento la carne que se adquiere para fabricar embutidos, se hace de mataderos que cuentan con veterinarios para la fase de cría del ganado, quedando sin norma de respaldo el criterio subjetivo del órgano accionando que ordena el reemplazo del tecnólogo de alimentos por el veterinario, para la regencia. Aduce que el problema no se soluciona sustituyendo al tecnólogo de alimentos con el veterinario, habida cuenta que el primer profesional resulta indispensable, imposibilitándose materialmente llevar a cabo los procesos industriales, cuyo especialista encargado en cuanto a planeación, ejecución y supervisión es el tecnólogo de alimentos. Dice que para una microempresa sustituir al tecnólogo de alimentos haría imposible mantenerse en el mercado frente a grandes productores de reconocimiento nacional e internacional, estando en esa misma situación otros cientos de pequeños productores, dándose esa manera una afectación al interés público. Ataca los actos administrativos de la siguiente manera: -resolución DIPOA-A-112-11, que es una orden sanitaria que exige un regente veterinario, por cuanto de la aplicación del artículo 221 de la Ley General de Salud, no se deriva el dimensionamiento que el Nombre20662 hace, deviniendo la interpretación y aplicación realizada un acto ilegal, habida cuenta que esa norma lo que dispone es la realización de una inspección veterinaria, realizada por alguna autoridad pública y no el establecimiento de una regencia; -resolución SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 del 10 de octubre del 2013, que desestima el recurso de revocatoria contra el acto anterior, que duró 30 meses para ser emitido y que añade nuevos elementos a los expuestos en el acto recurrido, destinada a demostrar hechos no controvertidos e invocándose la aplicación de la Ley 8495 (que es un extremo que no se discute); -resolución SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del 2013, que deniega la renovación del registro del CVO a favor de la sociedad actora, habida cuenta que se echa de menos una argumentación propia, sino que se remite a otros pronunciamientos previos. Alega que con lo actuado se han quebrantado los principios de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, de razonabilidad, de seguridad jurídica, de intangibilidad de actos propios, así como "(...) las normas básicas de la exégesis jurídico-normativo, un franco quebranto a las normas no jurídicas del acto" y la lesión a los intereses colectivos públicos e individuales. Afirma que la violación del principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, se configura porque existe una ausencia notoria y total de motivo como elemento material esencial, entendiendo motivo como las razones de hecho y derecho en virtud de las cuales se hace necesaria la emisión de un acto administrativo, lo anterior porque la interpretación inadecuada que se hizo del artículo 221 de la Ley General de Salud, lo mismo que el numeral 7 del Reglamento para el Otorgamiento del CVO, siendo esta interpretación realizada por el Director Regional de Occidente del SENASA, realizó diferencias, allí donde la norma habilitante no lo hace, quebrantándose el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, invocándose al efecto lo dicho en voto N° 2004-14421 de la Sala Constitucional. Al respecto aduce que: "El CVO se asemeja más a una licencia que a un permiso o a una autorización. La doctrina jurisprudencial de esta misma cámara ha sido clara al establecer que un permiso es la venia estatal para llevar a cabo una actividad en principio vedada. Así las cosas el CVO no podría ser en principio sujeto de permiso pues la producción agropecuaria y la comercialización de los productos resultantes es una actividad lícita que halla respaldo en la libertad empresarial consagrada en el numeral 46 de la Constitución Política. La autorización es la habilitación para llevar a cabo una actividad que aunque no está vedada es discreción de la Administración llevar a cabo o no dicha actividad. Finalmente la licencia es una autorización tasada en el tanto los parámetros para su otorgamiento están previamente fijados y corresponde a la Administración tan solo verificar su cumplimiento. Es decir, la Administración no puede extender tales ni dar una interpretación que restrinja la aprobación de dicha licencia. El CVO es claramente una licencia pues se otorga para la comercialización pública y abierta, en contraposición a la cerrada o particular, de productos derivados de animales. Empero la Administración no puede decidir libremente si lo otorga o no, pues basta que el petente satisfaga los requisitos del decreto ejecutivo N° 34859-MAG "(...) para su aprobación. Es entonces una potestad tasada". Menciona que no obstante lo anterior, aplicando el artículo 7 del Reglamento General para el Otorgamiento del Certificado Veterinario de Operación, que no lo exige, se dispone que el regente sea veterinario. Arguye que incluso en el acto SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 se recurre al expediente de invocar el artículo 106 del Reglamento a la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios, cuando lo cierto es que esta norma es inaplicable, por cuanto es una norma que impone un deber pero no contempla sanción, siendo esta materia de reserva legal conforme con los artículos 9 y 11 de la Carta Fundamental y 6, 11, 19 y 59 de LGAP. Aduce que en todo caso, la norma reglamentaria dictada en el marco de relaciones orgánicas por en un ente público no estatal, no es oponible a la aquí actora, siendo que en todo caso el Reglamento antes mencionado data del año 1989 y el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 34859 es del año 2008. Finaliza este argumento diciendo que a la Administración le precluyó el momento procedimental para verter sus argumentos con la emisión del primer acto (DIPOA-A-112-11), "(...) motivo por el cual y de conformidad con el principio de no reforma en perjuicio carece de la posibilidad de esgrimir nuevos argumentos en la resolución que confirma un acto ablatorio. Dicha norma no se cita directamente en el SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 pero en todo caso vale decir que tampoco resultaría de aplicación en el mismo". Alega que se ha violado el principio de razonabilidad porque la obligación impuesta por Nombre20662 de contar con un regente veterinario, no cumple con la trilogía de subprincipios que integran dicho principio (necesidad, idoneidad y proporcionalidad. Lo anterior, por cuanto: "El primero de ellos es que una norma debe ser necesaria, es decir, que exista una causa social que haga precisa su aparición en el ordenamiento jurídico. Una norma no debe nacer a la vida jurídica por mero antojo del legislador o de quien la dicte sino por necesidad comprobada. El segundo es que la norma sea idónea, es decir, que en términos cualitativos satisfaga el motivo que la originó y finalmente que sea proporcional, es decir, que desde una perspectiva cuantitativa logre saciar las expectativas y no las sobrepase; verbigracia, cuando una norma establece una restricción de derechos primigenios ante una problemática social, debe verificarse que esta restricción sea la menos gravosa para el administrado y sus garantías fundamentales". Afirma que contando con un tecnólogo de alimentos, se fiscaliza adecuadamente la inocuidad del proceso de elaboración de embutidos, siendo innecesario la supervisión de un veterinario, que más bien puede afectar la inocuidad de la planta por el contacto constante que tiene con animales vivos, los cuales pueden presentar enfermedades. Dice que aun y cuando la supervisión de veterinario sea necesaria e idónea, no es proporcional exigir un regente veterinario, debiéndose dimensionar el artículo 221 de la Ley General de Salud, estableciendo el deber de la planta de la actora y de todas las actoras de pagar auditorías externas privadas a entidades como el Instituto de Normas Técnicas de Costa Rica (INTECO), resguardándose así la salud público sin afectar sobremanera el giro mercantil de la actora y permitiéndose conservar su regente en tecnología de alimentos, que es indispensable. Finaliza que la exigencia hecha por el Nombre20662 y que aquí se cuestiona, se convierte en contraria al principio de logicidad, porque implicaría que todas las carnicerías y supermercados tengan un regente veterinario, por cuanto realizan embutidos criollos, su carne molida y su propio chorizo. Arguye que se quebrantan las normas no jurídicas del acto administrativo, porque se inobservaron los parámetros técnicos a los cuales debe sujetarse la actividad formal de la Administración con el fin de evitar desviaciones y abusos de poder, conforme lo establecen los artículos 15,16, 17 y 160 LGAP, lo mismo que las normas unívocas de la técnica, la ciencia, la lógica, la justicia, la experiencia y el sentido común. Dice que también se inobservó el principio de seguridad jurídica y de intangibilidad de los actos propios, invocando al efecto el considerando VI del voto N° 051-2010 de la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal. Aduce que el mismo Dr. Nombre145591 del Nombre20662 otorgó el Certificado de Registro de CVO con el número Placa28947 en agosto del 2009, válido hasta el día 25 de agosto del 2013, con un regente profesional en tecnología de alimentos, avalándose de esa forma el regente que se tenía, cambiándose luego de posición, sin ningún cambio normativo sustancial. De esa forma, el Nombre20662 había "(...) dado signos externos para presumir la legalidad de nuestras acciones y no está habilitado para arbitrariamente "variar las reglas del juego". Así las cosas se tiene una violación tanto al principio de seguridad jurídica como al de "no venire contra factum propium" extraídos del canon 34 constitucional, situación que impone la necesidad de invalidar los actos recurridos". Termina la exposición diciendo que se dio una indebida interpretación del artículo 221 de la Ley General de Salud, que no es armónica con los artículos 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (tutela y progreso de las garantías fundamentales); 5 de la Constitución (que impone el deber de velar por el progreso y desarrollo de la nación teniendo como norte el bienestar del mayor número, debiéndose haber realizado en este caso una hermenéutica tendiente a la tutela del interés público y los derechos fundamentales, lo que no se verificó en este caso, siendo que más bien la Administración de decantó por dar una connotación prohibitiva a la norma, coartándose la libertad empresarial, lo que no se puede hacer sino es por motivos de interés público. Afirma que la interpretación realizada lesiona la salud pública, al preferir un veterinario a un tecnólogo de alimentos, lo que afecta los niveles de inocuidad y eficiencia de los procesos, "(...) a pesar que el artículo 4 de la Ley General del Nombre20662 indica que en la interpretación de la norma debe estarse ante lo más favorable para el ser humano, pues bueno, lo más favorable es que un especialista sea el regente de estos procesos de fabricación de alimentos para el consumo ciudadano.// La interpretación dada no beneficia a nadie más que a los propios veterinarios a quienes se les crea un sinfín de opciones laborales, pero al resto de la población le afecta negativamente este criterio. No solo se da una exégesis contra homine sino contra societas. Al ser éste elemento integrador del motivo de los actos impugnados procede declarar la nulidad absoluta de todos ellos".

El Nombre20662 contesta negativamente la acción (folios 182-198 y 232-248), argumentado fundamentalmente que los actos impugnados no adolecen de nulidad alguna. Inicia su exposición, reseñando los elementos constitutivos del acto administrativo, citando a Nombre21604 . Más adelante aduce que la exigencia de inspección médico veterinaria para los establecimientos dedicados al sacrificio o destace de animales y a la industrialización de alimentos cárneos, se deriva en primer término de lo establecido en artículo 221 de la Ley General de Salud, desarrollándose el concepto de inspección médico veterinaria , en el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29588-MAG-S del 28 de mayo del 2011, específicamente en el artículo 3, que define el médico veterinario inspector (veterinario colegiado que tiene bajo su responsabilidad la dirección técnica y sanitaria de los establecimientos regulados en ese Reglamento, abarcando las funciones establecidas en el dicho cuerpo normativo y en la legislación relacionada) y al médico veterinario oficial (veterinario funcionario de los ministerios de Agricultura y de Salud). Señala que esa distinción entre los conceptos de médico veterinario inspector y médico veterinario oficial, hace que se deba descartar la interpretación de la sociedad actora en el sentido que la inspección veterinaria, debe ser realizada por una autoridad pública, siendo que incluso el médico veterinario inspector debe tener presencia constante en el proceso de elaboración de productos, lo cual solo es posible si se ejerce una regencia en dicho establecimiento, según la regulación realizada en los artículos 8 y 33 ejúsdem, afirmando incluso que "(...) el mismo Decreto 29588-MAG-S indica que los propietarios de establecimientos que estén cubiertos bajo este reglamento, deben tener una oficina equipada y demás (sic) al Médico Veterinario Inspector, es porque el mismo debe ser, claramente, un funcionario distinto a los Médicos Veterinarios Oficiales de este Servicio Nacional o de cualquier otra autoridad de rango administrativo". Continúa argumentando en el sentido que el fundamento legal que ampara al Nombre20662 para solicitar la contratación de un médico veterinario regente, está en el artículo 20 del Decreto ejúsdem, siendo esa disposición coherente con el contenido de los artículos 105 y 106 del Reglamento a la Ley del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 19184), que definen el concepto de regente médico veterinario y establecen la obligación que las fábricas de embutidos y las fábricas y plantas elaboradoras de productos y subproductos de origen animal destinados al consumo de la población humana. Conforme con lo anterior, los actos impugnados están debidamente motivados, cumpliéndose con todos sus elementos constitutivos. Luego realiza una larga consideración afirmando que conforme con el perfil del médico veterinario es el más adecuado para regentar un establecimiento de elaboración de embutidos, concluyendo que si bien el artículo 21, inciso h) de la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines (N° 8412), establece que los miembros de ese Colegio deberán fungir como consultores, asesores, peritos o profesionales responsables en industrias de proceso, el médico veterinario cumple una labor fundamental en la elaboración de productos y subproductos de origen animal, a partir del acontecimiento de eventos como la encefalopatía espongiforme bovina (EEB), la contaminación con dioxinas y otras enfermedades, siendo que en todo caso la labor del veterinario no se limita al cuido y la preservación de la salud de animales vivos, sino también a la elaboración de embutidos, al estar de por medio un tema de salud pública e inocuidad de los alimentos que día a día se consumen. En otro orden alega que no existe responsabilidad administrativa, de dos tipos: sin falta o por sacrificio especial o por falta de servicio o funcionamiento anormal. Vuelve a citar al autor Nombre21604 , en cuanto a la definición del falta de servicio o funcionamiento normal, rechazando de paso que si la Administración Pública no realiza dicha falta de servicio o funcionamiento anormal, no es posible la imposición de una responsabilidad pecuniaria, señalando también, "(...) que ha sido eventualmente el Administrado quien se ha puesto en condición de desventaja al ser incumpliente de normas objetivas, mismas que debió cumplir y realizar cualesquiera otras acciones que el Ordenamiento jurídico le permitiera". Rechaza la pretensión para que se cancelen en abstracto los montos dejados de percibir desde el 25 de agosto del 2013, por cuanto no existe prueba alguna que demuestre de manera fehaciente los daños que se reclaman, estando ayuno de sustento probatorio el extremo petitorio planteado.- El Estado contesta negativamente la acción (folios 201-231), aduciendo que si bien la sociedad actora fue autorizada por el Nombre20662 para dedicarse a la actividad de almacenamiento y distribución de productos de origen animal, la orden sanitaria emitida el 2 de febrero del 2011, para que contrate un regente veterinario es conforme a derecho por cuanto conforme con la Ley General del Nombre20662 (N° 8495 del 6 de abril del 2006), existe un poder de policía que faculta a dicho órgano para exigir el Certificado Veterinario de Operación (CVO). Al efecto invoca los numerales 5, 6 incisos b) y t), lo mismo que los artículos 37, 38, 40, 59, 89 y 91 de la Ley mencionada. Firma que existe en cabeza del Nombre20662 un poder de policía para garantizar a la población el cumplimiento de garantía de protección al derecho de la salud, quedando autorizado para ordenar y ejecutar las medidas sanitarias que considere pertinentes, teniendo incluso la potestad de ordenar la cancelación o suspensión del CVO, con el respectivo cierre del establecimiento, así como cualquier medida que estime pertinente. Indica que conforme con los incisos b) y c) del artículo 56 de la Ley General del SENASA, los establecimientos que elaboren, importen, desalmacen, fraccionen, almacenen, transporten y venda productos o subproductos de origen animal, o que industrialicen, empaquen, refrigeren, procesen o expendan en el nivel mayorista, productos, subproductos o derivados de animales, para consumo humano o animal, deberán contar con un CVO. En cuanto a la naturaleza jurídica del CVO dice que es "(...) el documento otorgado por el SENASA, mediante el cual se hace la autorización, a fin de que la persona física o jurídica se dedique a las actividades antes citadas. Dicha autorización obliga a cumplir con los requisitos sanitarios establecidos por el SENASA, para llevar a cabo la actividad", conforme con el artículo 57 ejúsdem, pudiendo incluso retirar el CVO, si se demuestra que no se cumplen con los requisitos sanitarios debidamente establecidos, según potestad fijada en los numerales 58 y 59 de la Ley SENASA. Arguye que en el caso concreto de la sociedad actora, esa empresa se dedica al almacenamiento y distribución de productos de origen animal, su distribución y procesamiento, en el ramo de los embutidos, debiendo para ejercer esa actividad contar con el COV, encontrando esa exigencia, no solo en la Ley SENASA, sino también en la Ley General de Salud, el Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos, Producción y Procesamiento de Carnes, el Reglamento General para el Otorgamiento del CVO, lo mismo que el Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios. En cuanto a la Ley General de Salud, recuerda que conforme con el artículo 221, se exige que en los establecimientos dedicados a la industrialización de alimentos cárneos deberán contar con la inspección médico veterinaria aprobada por el Ministerio, prohibiéndose en el numeral 229, el comercio o distribución de carnes y derivados provenientes de locales o establecimiento no autorizados por la autoridad de salud o que funcionen sin inspección veterinaria. Esas disposiciones son contestes con lo dispuesto en los artículos 20, inciso a), 3, 7, 8 y 78 del Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos; los numerales 3.23, 6 y 7 del Reglamento General para el Otorgamiento del CVO, lo mismo que los artículos 105 y 106, inciso a). Aduce que an y cuando el proceso de elaboración de embutidos no involucre el trato o manipulación de animales vivos, se debe contar con inspección médico veterinaria, según lo ha sostenido la propia Procuraduría General de la República, en sus dictámenes C-071-2006. Argumenta que la parte actora realiza una interpretación forzada del artículo 221 de la Ley General de Salud, no explicándose tampoco porque el tecnólogo de alimentos puede reemplazar al médico veterinario y más aún, en cuál norma se sustenta esa permuta. Dice que los actos administrativos dictados (SENASA DIPOA-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 y SENASA-RCOC 129-2013), no quebrantan los principios de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, de razonabilidad, de seguridad jurídica, de intangibilidad de los actos propios, de observancia de las normas no jurídicas del acto, ni de ninguna forma se violentan los intereses colectivos, públicos e individuales, sino que más bien se sustentan en el interés público, en la protección de la salud pública y la vida humana y las normas antes invocadas. Aduce que el oficio N° DIPOA-A-112-11 resulta un acto preparatorio que sustenta la orden sanitaria dictada, ordenándose a la sociedad demandante incluir un regente médico veterinario; que en la resolución N° SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 se detallan las razones que llevaron al dictado de medida sanitaria, contando con la fundamentación técnica y jurídica necesaria; que en la resolución N° SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 se decidió proceder a la actualización del registro anual de la empresa actora, debido a que para operar la planta de embutidos, se requiere la presencia del regente médico veterinario, acompañándose dicha disposición del análisis normativo y técnico, conforme con las exigencias del artículo 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Más adelante se argumenta que en este caso existe un incumplimiento de los requisitos para que proceda la indemnización de daños y perjuicios, en el caso concreto. Lo anterior, por no cumplirse ninguno de los requisitos del ordinal 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública e invocando al efecto el voto N° 273-2012 del 21 de noviembre del 2012 de la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal. Afirma que es indispensable que la supuesta lesión sea consecuencia inmediata y necesaria del actuar administrativo, situación que no se da en este caso, siendo que en todo caso no se constata que exista daño que sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable y no eventual o hipotético. Arguye que no existe una relación de causa-efecto entre la manifestación específica de la función administrativa y la lesión antijurídica que demuestre que exista un daño o perjuicio reparable, no aportándose probanzas que cumplan con los requisitos conforme lo exigido en los artículos 58 CPCA y 317 del Código Procesal Civil. También rechaza que se deban pagar intereses por cuanto primeramente se tiene que conceder en sentencia firme un monto específico, invocando al efecto el voto N° 1072-2010 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, recordando también que los intereses únicamente procedente cuando existan obligaciones dinerarias y no respecto a obligaciones de valor. Solicita que no se condene al Estado al pago de las costas personales y procesales, por ser improcedente la demanda. Finaliza lo indicado en este escrito manifestando que de conformidad con el artículo 8 de la Ley General de Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal, N° 8495 de 6 abril de 2006, el Nombre20662 es un órgano con desconcentración mínima y personalidad jurídica instrumental para realizar las competencias previstas en esa ley, contando un independencia de criterio en su calidad de órgano técnico para el desempeño de sus atribuciones. Argumenta que los actos que se cuestionan en este caso fueron emitidos por Nombre20662 en ejercicio de su potestades exclusivas de carácter legal, no teniendo el Estado no tuvo participación ni responsabilidad alguna en los hechos. Aduce que conforme con el artículo 12, inciso c) CPCA y lo dicho por la jurisprudencia (votos N° 1360-2010 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y 251-2011 de la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal), si la conducta impugnada proviene del ejercicio de alguna de sus competencias atribuidas al órgano con personalidad jurídica instrumental, lo procedente es declarar la falta de derecho con respecto al Estado.- IV) Argumentos dados en el expediente N° 13-8331-1027-CA: La actora Nombre145586 , en su escrito de demanda (folios 365-396), manifiesta fundamentalmente que en su condición de tecnóloga de alimentos, la decisión del Nombre20662 de exigir la contratación de un regente médico veterinario, le ha cercenado la posibilidad de seguir siendo contratada como regente de la fábrica de embutidos propiedad de Embutidos Doro y que eso no solo es ilegal, sino que le ha causado un perjuicio económico. Con parecidos argumentos a los dados en la demanda de la la empresa, manifiesta que los actos de la Administración de obligar contratar a un médico veterinario como regente, no procediendo a actualizar el registro anual del CVO, son ilegales y le causan un perjuicio reflejo legitimándola para recurrir en estrados, para lograr la anulación de dichos actos y lograr la reparación de los daños y perjuicios sufridos. Afirma que una vez que entró en vigencia el decreto que regula el otorgamiento del CVO, que se formalizó una relación contractual con Embutidos Doro, siendo que para una empresa fabricante de embutidos renunciar a un profesional el tecnología de alimentos implica una imposibilidad material para llevar a cabo los procesos industriales, siendo este el especialista encargado de la planeación, ejecución y supervisión de esos procesos. Afirma que se violentó el principio de intangibilidad de actos propios porque el Dr. Nombre145591 autorizó su contratación como regente profesional, siendo ella tecnóloga de alimentos, ya habiéndose avalado al regente que se tenía con anterioridad y luego, sin justificación, se cambió de criterio aunque no había ningún cambio normativo sustancial, violentándose lo establecido en el artículo 34 constitucional. En cuanto a la nulidad de los actos administrativos impugnados, dice que se debe devolver la situación al estado de cosas antes que se decretara el despido, debiéndose retirar la orden de contratar un regente veterinario y se proceda con la inmediata inscripción y registro del CVO.- El Nombre20662 contesta negativamente la acción (folios 417-435), afirmando que en cuanto al caso de la aquí coactora, lo que ha sostenido la Administración es que las plantas que elaboran embutidos, deben contar con un médico veterinario regente para su funcionamiento, desautorizándose de paso la sustitución del veterinario por un tecnólogo de alimentos, tal y como se comprobó en una inspección de auditoría realizada el 2 de febrero del 2011, que dio lugar a la emisión del oficio N° DIPOA-A-112-11 de esa fecha, en que se establecieron tres no conformidades, entre ellas la exigencia de un médico veterinario como regente para la operación de la planta. Aduce que no consta en autos ninguna prueba en el sentido que "(...) la parte actora se haya visto afligida por el riesgo de ser cesada de sus funciones. Nótese también que en ninguno de los actos administrativos sobre los que se pretende la nulidad en este proceso, se ordena, ni en lo más mínimo, que debe cesarse de sus funciones a la actora Nombre145586 , siendo que la decisión de dejar sin efectos el contrato existente -si se dio- es propia de las partes contratantes.

El Estado contesta negativamente la acción (folios 406-416), oponiendo en primer término la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa, habida cuenta que si la señora Nombre145586 fue contratada por Nombre145585 para la prestación de servicios profesionales, sea, fue empleada de esa sociedad no estaría legitimada para solicitar la nulidad las actuaciones que se relacionan directamente con la empresa y no con ella en particular. Luego, opone la excepción de falta de derecho aduciendo que es falso que lo actuado por el Nombre20662 sea ilegal y arbitrario, siendo que más bien lo actuado es conteste con lo establecido en la Ley General de Salud V) En la audiencia preliminar celebrada en este Tribunal, el día 3 de marzo del presente año, las diferentes partes expresaron la conclusiones que a continuación se reseñan:

Conclusiones de los coactores: Embutidos Doro es una empresa encargada de embutir carne previamente procesada. Para poder realizar esas funciones se necesita un CVO, que antes brindaba el Ministerio de Salud, pero a partir del 2006, es competencia del SENASA. Para el año 2008, es que se pide el requisito de nombrar un regente o asesor permanente. Luego, los funcionarios Nombre6487 y Nombre139513 del SENASA, realizaron una inspección, donde se determinó la necesidad de contratar un regente veterinario, ante lo cual se presentaron recursos de revocatoria y un amparo de legalidad e incluso este proceso. Señala que la señorita Nombre145586 realiza la función de regencia siendo tecnóloga de alimentos, siendo adecuada para los efectos de la norma, por eso es que la parte está disconforme con los actos impugnados.- Conclusiones del Estado : La demanda es improcedente, porque existe fundamento jurídico para exigir la regencia veterinaria en establecimientos fabricantes de embutidos. Señala que el artículo 221 de la Ley General de Salud, establece claramente y sin margen de interpretación que se requiere de un médico veterinario. Luego, el Reglamento a la Ley del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios (numeral 106, inciso a), establece de forma clara la participación de los veterinarios en la regencia en establecimientos que elaboren embutidos. De la misma forma lo hace, el Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos, Producción y Procesamiento de Carnes, Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29588, en su artículo 20, inciso a).- No existe ninguna duda que un establecimiento de la naturaleza del actor, que se requiere la regencia de un médico veterinario. Existe también un fundamento técnico, por cuanto los veterinarios son los únicos que pueden garantizar la inocuidad de alimentos cárnicos. No se advierte ninguna nulidad, no hay invalidez alguna. No se acredita la forma en que se pueden desaplicar dichas normas, ni porqué un tecnólogo puede asumir esa función.

Se afirma que la señora Nombre145586 , no está legitimada activamente para impugnar los actos administrativos mencionados, porque si bien afirma haber sido "funcionaria" de Nombre145585 , no demuestra el perjuicio realizado. Se solicita el pago de daños y perjuicios, porque no se aclaran en qué consisten los daños, siendo que en ningún momento por parte del Nombre20662 se ha cerrado el establecimiento, constando a folio 89 prueba en este sentido. Hay que dejar claro que en este expediente, la solicitud de medida cautelar fue rechazada por improcedente. De acuerdo con el artículo 8 de la Ley del SENASA, tiene personalidad jurídica instrumental y en este caso, actuó en el ejercicio de sus competencias, por lo que en caso de acogerse algún extremo de la demanda en cuanto a ese órgano, pide que se declare sin lugar la demanda en cuanto al Estado.- Conclusiones del Nombre20662: Afirma que los actos impugnados sí estan debidamente motivos fáctica y jurídicamente. Cita las mismas normas mencionadas por la representación del Estado, para fundamentar la necesidad de que los establecimientos de procesamiento de embutidos, sea realizada por médicos veterinarios. En el artículo 3 del Reglamento General para el Otorgamiento del Certificado Veterinario de Operación, se establece la diferencia entre el médico veterinario inspector y el médico veterinario inspector Los veterinarios son los profesionales idóneos para atender no solo animales vivos, sino también en animales muertos, porque pueden detectar la existencia de enfermedades, bacterias y medicamentos que pueden ser dañinos para la salud humana.

En cuanto a los daños, no se ha aportado prueba alguna de su existencia, siendo que incluso no se ha procedido al cierre de la empresa por las autoridades y si la empresa ha cerrado ha sido por decisión de sus propietarios. Señala que en estos momentos se está operando con un médico veterinario.

Dice que las decisiones administrativas señaladas están debidamente fundamentadas en el artículo 89 de la Ley del SENASA. Pide que se declare sin lugar la demanda y se condene a las partes al pago de ambas costas de la acción.- VI) SOBRE EL FONDO: Régimen jurídico de autorización para la actividad de producción de embutidos: El Tribunal considera que en ejercicio del poder de policía en materia sanitaria, la actividad de producción y almacenamiento de embutidos está sometido a un régimen de autorización administrativa, competencia del Nombre20662 siendo requisito indispensable para acceder a esa autorización, contar con la regencia realizada por médico veterinario para cada uno de los establecimientos que realicen esas actividades.- Se llega a esa conclusión a partir de la lectura y relación entre las normas que a continuación se apuntan, en las que se regula: (a) la obligación de contar con la autorización administrativa y el órgano a quién le corresponde concederla y (b) la regencia médica veterinaria como requisito indispensable para emitir el Certificado Veterinario de Operación (CVO):

• a)Obligación de contar con la autorización administrativa para la elaboración de embutidos, competencia exclusiva del Nombre20662: Se deriva de lo prescrito en el artículo 221 de la Ley General de Salud (Ley N° 5395 del 24 de febrero de 1974), lo mismo que de la Ley General de Salud Animal (Ley N° 8495 del 06 de abril del 2006), en sus numerales 5, 6, incisos j), ñ) y o), 56 incisos b) y c), 57 y 58, que también citamos a continuación:

"ARTICULO 221.- Los establecimientos dedicados al sacrificio o destace de animales y a la industrialización de alimentos cárneos de las diferentes especies, destinados al consumo de la población, deberán contar, además, con inspección médica veterinaria aprobada por el Ministerio.

Quedan sujetos a la misma exigencia las fábricas y plantas elaboradoras de productos de origen animal." "Artículo 5º-Órgano competente. Corresponderá al Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG), mediante el Senasa, la reglamentación, planificación, administración, coordinación, ejecución y aplicación de las actividades oficiales con carácter nacional, regional e internacional, relativas a la salud de la población animal, los residuos, la salud pública veterinaria, el control veterinario de la zoonosis, la trazabilidad/rastreabilidad, la protección y la seguridad de los alimentos de origen animal, los alimentos para los animales, los medicamentos veterinarios, el material genético animal, los productos y los subproductos, la producción, el uso, la liberación o la comercialización de los organismos genéticamente modificados que puedan afectar la salud animal o su entorno, y las sustancias peligrosas de origen animal." "Artículo 6º-Competencias. El Nombre20662 tendrá las siguientes competencias:

• j)Controlar y garantizar la salud de los animales domésticos, acuáticos, silvestres u otros de las diferentes especies, así como la inocuidad de los productos, subproductos y derivados para consumo humano o animal, así como establecer controles sanitarios en todas las plantas de sacrificio, proceso e industrialización.
• ñ)Establecer criterios de autorización de personas físicas y jurídicas para cada actividad específica, las responsabilidades asumidas y sus limitaciones.
• o)Establecer procedimientos de control de calidad y auditoría técnica, tanto para el propio Nombre20662 como para las personas físicas y jurídicas oficializadas o autorizadas; asimismo, velar por la administración, el control y el uso de los recursos obtenidos al aplicar esta Ley." "Artículo 56.- Establecimientos sujetos a control. El Nombre20662 otorgará o retirará el certificado veterinario de operación a los siguientes establecimientos:

(...) b) Los que elaboren, importen, desalmacenen, fraccionen, almacenen, transporten y vendan productos y subproductos de origen animal.

• c)Los destinados al sacrificio de animales o que industrialicen, empaquen, refrigeren, procesen o expendan, en el nivel mayorista, productos, subproductos o derivados de animales, para consumo humano o animal. (...)" "Artículo 57.-Certificado veterinario de operación. Por certificado veterinario de operación se entenderá el documento otorgado por el Senasa, mediante el cual se hará constar la autorización, a fin de que la persona física o jurídica solicitante se dedique a una o varias actividades de las mencionadas en el artículo 56 de esta Ley.

En un solo certificado podrá indicarse la autorización para ejercer diferentes actividades; será solicitado y otorgado por una única vez y no será necesario renovarlo, mientras se cumpla, constantemente, con los requisitos sanitarios.

Dicha autorización implicará cumplir los requisitos sanitarios establecidos por el Senasa, para llevar a cabo la actividad." En el sentido anterior, se tiene que incluso la Sala Constitucional, ha considerado que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 8495, la potestad de emitir autorizaciones sanitarias en establecimientos que maten animales, o procesen y comercialicen productos cárnicos y que por supuesto elaboren y comercialicen embutidos, es competencia exclusiva del SENASA, desplazándose en ese ámbito la competencia del Ministerio de Salud de emitir para ese tipo de establecimientos, los permisos sanitarios de funcionamiento. Así, en el considerando III del voto Nº 2012-01965 de las nueve horas con treinta y un minutos del diecisiete de febrero de dos mil doce, se dijo: "Como puede apreciarse de la lectura de todo este conjunto de normas de rango legal formal, el legislador estructuró un sistema de control y vigilancia a cargo del Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal con la finalidad de asegurar un grado de protección para la sociedad.- De tal modo, diseñó no solo la estructura de que brinda el servicio sino también la existencia de un equivalente al permiso sanitario de funcionamiento llamado Certificado Veterinario de operación (artículo 57 de la Ley) que deberán tener todos los establecimientos que fija el numeral 56 de dicho cuerpo legal".- En todo caso, recuérdese que la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal (véase considerando VI del voto N° 163-2012-VI de las 14:20 horas del 20 de agosto del 2012 de la Sección Sexta), ha conceptualizado (y diferenciado) los conceptos de autorización, permiso y licencia, de la siguiente manera "(...) La autorización puede definirse como la remoción de un obstáculo legal para el ejercicio de una conducta debida. Por su lado, el permiso consiste en la habilitación administrativa para el desarrollo de una conducta, en principio vedada. En tanto que la licencia consiste en una autorización de contenido reglado" (los subrayados son propios), pudiéndose afirmar conforme a lo anterior, que el Certificado Veterinario de Operación es un permiso, entendido como la habilitación administrativa para el desarrollo de una conducta en principio vedada, en razón del riesgo que la producción y almacenamiento de embutidos implica, para la salud y la vida de animales y humanos. Consecuencia de la conceptualización del CVO como un permiso, es que el acto administrativo que lo concede no solo está integrado de actos reglados, sino también de elementos discrecionales, pudiendo la Administración incluso denegar la concesión del permiso aun y cuando se cumplan con los requisitos, si a pesar de eso, dicho acto afecta los bienes jurídicos tantas veces mencionados.- b) La regencia médica veterinaria como requisito indispensable para emitir el Certificado Veterinario de Operación (CVO): También es criterio de este Tribunal que para la emisión del CVO, es indispensable que sea un médico veterinario, al que se designe como regente en el establecimiento correspondiente, siendo imposible jurídicamente que la participación de los veterinarios, se supla con otros profesionales, así sea una tecnóloga de alimentos, como lo es la actora Nombre145586 . Se llega a esa conclusión a partir de la lectura de los numerales 3, 7 y 8 del Reglamento Sanitario y de Inspección Veterinaria de Mataderos, Producción y Procesamiento de Carnes (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29588-MAG-S del 28 de mayo del 2001), lo mismo que los artículos 105 y 106, incisos a) y c) del Reglamento a la Ley del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios (19184 del 10 de julio de 1989), que en lo que interesan, indican lo siguiente:

"Artículo 3º- Las palabras, nombres, términos y frases que se emplean en las disposiciones de este reglamento se entenderán de la siguiente forma: (...)

Médico Veterinario Inspector:

Profesional en Medicina Veterinaria incorporado al Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios, que tiene bajo su responsabilidad la dirección técnica y sanitaria de los establecimientos aquí regulados, abarcando las funciones que este reglamento y otras que la legislación relacionada le asigne." "Artículo 7º- Los establecimientos que quedarán sujetos a las disposiciones del presente reglamento son: los que se dediquen al sacrificio, deshuese, embutido, empaque, almacenamiento, proceso, expendio, así como los vehículos de transporte de las carnes provenientes de las especies bovina, caprina, equina, ovina, porcina y otras autorizadas por el MAG y MS." "Artículo 8º- Para vigilar la inocuidad de los productos cárnicos, estos se someterán a exámenes organolépticos realizados por el Médico Veterinario Inspector y su equipo de auxiliares de inspección, a pruebas físicas, químicas y microbiológicas realizadas in situ ó en laboratorios oficiales o bien laboratorios debidamente acreditados para dicho fin." "Artículo 105.-Se entiende por regente el profesional, miembro del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios, que de conformidad con la legislación asume la dirección técnica, científica y la responsabilidad profesional de cualquiera de los establecimientos que se mencionan en el artículo siguiente.

Artículo 106.-Los establecimientos que deben ser regentados o dirigidos técnica y científicamente por un médico veterinario son:

• a)Las fábricas y plantas elaboradoras de productos y subproductos de origen animal destinados al consumo de la población humana. (...)
• c)Los establecimientos dedicados al sacrificio o destace de animales, procesamiento y a la industrialización de alimentos cárnicos de las diferentes especies, sin perjuicio de la competencia de los ingenieros agrónomos zootecnistas en los campos del procesamiento y la industrialización." (los subrayados no corresponden al original) Conforme con las normas antes indicadas, no es de recibo la argumentación que al tenor del artículo 21, inciso h) de la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines, N° 8412 del 22 de abril del 2004, que establece que: "Los miembros activos o eméritos del Colegio tendrán los siguientes oficios y competencias:// h) Fungir como consultor, asesor, perito o profesional responsable en las industrias de proceso", un profesional afín incorporado a dicha corporación profesional, sea, un tecnólogo de alimentos, pueda regentar un establecimiento destinado a la fabricación de embutidos, en razón que existe norma de rango legal e incluso posterior en su vigencia (las de la Ley General de Salud Animal), que establecen que esa labor profesional, es propia del médico veterinario.- VII) Análisis de las pretensiones de Nombre145585 : Dado el anterior marco sobre el régimen de autorización de la actividad de fabricación de embutidos, nos referiremos a las pretensiones y argumentos dados por las partes:

Pretensiones primera, segunda y tercera: En que se pide la nulidad de los oficios DIPO-A-112-11, SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 del 10 de octubre del año 2013 y SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del año 2013, cuestionándose además, en tanto se indicó que no se procedería con la actualización de registro anual de nuestro CVO, disponiéndose en su lugar que se ordene el inmediato registro anual del certificado veterinario de operación.- Esas pretensiones no son de recibo según considera este Tribunal , por las razones que a continuación de apuntan: 1) La exigencia de contar con una regencia de médico veterinario, está determinada por el régimen de autorización de la actividad de fabricación y almacenamiento de embutidos, conforme lo indicado en el considerando anterior. También hay que indicar que el hecho que se contara con una regencia de una profesional en tecnología de alimentos, con base en la Ley N° 8412, no puede suplir la participación de los médicos veterinarios; 2) Tampoco es de recibo el argumento de que con anterioridad a la emisión de esos actos administrativos, se haya aceptado que una tecnóloga de alimentos y en esas condiciones se haya emitido y mantenido vigente el Certificado Veterinario de Operación, porque esa situación irregular, no puede ir en contra de norma expresa que establece la obligación legal contar con el médico veterinario, siendo incluso que constituye una violación del principio de inderogabilidad singular de la norma. Asimismo, del hecho que con anterioridad a la orden sanitaria del 2 de febrero del 2009, se haya tolerado que la regencia no haya sido realizada por un médico veterinario, sino por otro profesional, no se deriva que esa situación no pueda ser corregida, como al efecto se hizo; 3) No se puede aceptar tampoco la posición de la parte actora, en el sentido que no se tomó en cuenta que en la planta productora de embutidos no se trabaja con animales vivos, sino con carne adquirida en mataderos autorizados, habida cuenta que conforme con el artículo 56 de la Ley del SENASA, el control involucra no solamente los establecimientos donde se traten animales vivos, sino que también involucra los procesos de transformación en embutidos, como su almacenamiento y distribución; 4) También hay que decir que la obligación legal de contar con un regente médico veterinario no impide de ninguna forma la actividad que pueda desempeñar un tecnólogo de alimentos, como profesional incorporado al Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines, para desempeñar funciones en una industria de proceso (como lo sería eventualmente la fabricación de embutidos), conforme con el artículo 21, inciso h) de la Ley N° 8412, sino que implica únicamente que el médico veterinario, no puede ser sustituido por otro profesional que maneje otra rama del conocimiento y esté incorporado a otro colegio profesional, para las funciones que técnica y legalmente le son propias; 5) Tampoco se violentan los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, con la interpretación normativa realizada por el SENASA, sobre el contenido de la Ley General de Salud y la Ley General de Salud Animal, ni se resolvió arbitrariamente, sino que en todo momento se hizo conforme al texto legal y buscando la tutela efectiva del interés público, que es precisamente garantizar la inocuidad de productos de origen animal destinados al consumo humano; de esta forma, la interpretación se hizo también en cumplimiento de las garantías fundamentales a favor de los derechos de los consumidores, establecidas en el artículo 46 constitucional. En este caso es correcta la invocación que hizo la autoridad administrativa de un reglamento ejecutivo (el Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios, Decreto Ejecutivo N° 19184 del 10 de julio de 1989), en las resoluciones SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 y SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013, por cuanto en ese cuerpo normativo, se desarrolla el concepto de médico veterinario inspector o regente de un determinado establecimiento destinado a la transformación de productos de origen animal, siendo incluso esa disposición conteste con los artículos 56 y 57 de la Ley N° 8495 del 06 de abril del 2006, que fue emitida posteriormente; 6) No es cierto que con la interpretación normativa que establece que el regente de los establecimientos debe ser necesariamente médico veterinario y que esto es requisito indispensable para la emisión del Certificado Veterinario de Operación, sea contraria al principio de razonabilidad y a sus subprincipios (necesidad, idoneidad y proporcionalidad), habida cuenta que es necesario, idóneo y completamente proporcionado al caso, que se exija la participación de un profesional con conocimiento especializado en la salud animal y en los efectos que la salud animal pueda tener en la salud humana, en una actividad que puede afectar gravemente la salud y la vida de las personas, no siendo razonable más bien, que ese profesional sea sustituido por otro, que no tiene conocimiento especializado en esa materia; 7) En cuanto al argumento de que la exigencia no es razonable por cuanto implicaría que se debe contar con un regente veterinario para todas las carnicerías y supermercados, porque ellos elaboran embutidos criollos, carne molida y chorizo, siendo eso contrario al principio de logicidad, también debe ser rechazado porque esta situación abstracta, no se está enjuiciando en este expediente, sino que lo que aquí se analiza es la situación concreta de una fábrica de embutidos propiedad de la sociedad actora, en un lugar determinado y con características propias; 8) Tampoco es cierto que los actos cuestionados se hayan emitido inobservando las reglas de la ciencia o de la técnica (doctrina del artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), porque con lo expuesto en los actos administrativos SENASA-RCOC 145-2013 del 10 de octubre del año 2013 y SENASA-RCOC 129-2013 del 12 de setiembre del año 2013, se deja claro las razones técnicas y científicas por las cuales el médico veterinario es el más adecuado para garantizar la salud animal y humana y la inocuidad de los alimentos; 9) No es cierto que tampoco que a la Administración le haya precluido la oportunidad de motivar suficientemente los actos contrarios a las pretensiones de la sociedad actora, luego de la emisión de la orden sanitaria del 2 de febrero del 2002, siendo más bien que la amplia argumentación dada en los actos SENASA-RCOC-145-2013 y SENASA-DG-AJ-079-2013, responden adecuadamente a los cuestionamientos dados por la accionante por vía recursiva; así, es necesario argumentar de la forma en que se hizo, no observándose violación normativa alguna, ni vulneración al debido proceso o al derecho de defensa; 10) La potestad de retirar el Certificado Veterinario de Operación cuando falte algún requisito para su mantenimiento, deriva de la aplicación del artículo 58 de la Ley N° 8495, que dispone: "El Nombre20662 podrá retirar el certificado veterinario de operación, si determina, previa inspección, que el establecimiento no cumple los requisitos sanitarios fijados para las actividades autorizadas. En caso de que el certificado se retire, el interesado deberá solicitarlo de nuevo", debiéndose por esa razón denegar la pretensión tercera de la sociedad actora; 11) Finalmente, considera el Tribunal que la aplicación normativa que aquí se combate sea contraria a la libertad empresarial o al artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (progresividad de las garantías fundamentales), por cuanto el hecho de establecer un requisito como la regencia médica sanitaria, previo a emitir el Certificado Veterinario de Operación, no cercena esa libertad, sino que la pone en armonía con intereses de carácter superior, a saber la salud y la vida de la población.- Pretensiones cuarta y quinta: Deben desestimarse por una razón: no se constató que en ningún momento el establecimiento de elaboración de embutidos haya sido cerrado con motivo de la orden de disponer de una regencia médico veterinaria, para contar con el Certificado Veterinario de Operación, no constatándose de esa forma, el daño que se pide indemnizar.- VIII) Análisis de las pretensiones de Nombre145586 : Si se observan las pretensiones de doña Nombre145586, se observa que derivan de las deducidas por Embutidos Doro. Lo anterior en razón que la señora Nombre145586 tiene la profesión de tecnóloga de alimentos debidamente incorporada al Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Afines y tenía un contrato de regencia con dicha empresa, debidamente inscrito ante la corporación profesional correspondiente y se habría visto perjudicada en sus intereses cuando se dispuso que para mantener la vigencia del Certificado Veterinario de Operación se requiere que esté inscrita una regencia médico veterinaria. También, se tiene que los argumentos presentados por dicha persona son básicamente los mismos presentados por la sociedad coactora, debiendo correr la misma suerte sus pretensiones, en las que se solicita la nulidad de los mismos actos administrativos, pidiéndose además que se permita los profesionales en tecnología de alimentos puedan ejercer dicha regencia. Con base en las razones antes dadas, las pretensiones de carácter anulatorio deben ser rechazadas, lo mismo que el extremo petitorio destinado a que se permita a los profesionales en tecnología de alimentos ejercer la regencia en los establecimientos de producción de embutidos, cumpliéndose con los requisitos del Certificado Veterinario de Operación, en razón que como vimos, la habilitación para ejercer como regente dada en el artículo 21, inciso h) de la Ley N° 8412, no puede suplir ni técnica, ni legalmente, la participación del médico veterinario. En todo caso, el hecho que se exija la incorporación al Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios, no determinó ningún daño para doña Nombre145586, por cuanto ni siquiera se probó que esa situación determinara su despido por parte de la empresa, pudiéndose más bien pensar que pudo seguir laborando para ella, ejerciendo su trabajo como tecnóloga de alimentos, en el ámbito de su conocimiento especializado. Al no existir una relación comprobada entre la exigencia de incorporación al Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios y algún perjuicio para la demandante Nombre145586 , se debe acoger la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa.- IX) Análisis de las excepciones y condenatoria en costas: En cuanto al Estado: Lleva razón la representación estatal cuando afirma que las resoluciones administrativas emitidas por el Nombre20662 en este caso, se han emitido en el ámbito de sus competencias propias derivadas de la Ley General de Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal, N° 8495 de 6 abril de 2006 y que por esa razón, al tenor de la personalidad jurídica instrumental atribuida a ese órgano con desconcentración mínima, debe desestimarse la demanda en cuanto al Estado por carecer de legitimación ad causam pasiva. Se afirma lo anterior porque las actoras demandaron conjuntamente al ente mayor (el Estado) y órgano con desconcentración y personalidad jurídica instrumental (el SENASA), por así imponerlo el artículo 12, inciso c) del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, dirigiéndose incluso las pretensiones realizadas a la anulación del órgano desconcentrado. En razón de lo anterior, al no cuestionarse directamente la actuación de ningún órgano del Estado centralizado, debe acogerse la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y desestimar en todos sus extremos la demanda en cuanto al Estado. Por la forma en que se resuelve se omite pronunciamiento sobre las excepción de falta de derecho sobre las demandas presentadas por Nombre145585 y Nombre145586 , lo mismo que la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa, sobre la acción de esta última persona. Visto que la acción fue planteada contra el Estado, por así imponerlo la ley, se encuentra que existió un motivo suficiente para litigar, encontrándonos en una de las hipótesis de exoneración de la condenatoria en costas para ambos actores a favor del Estado (artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), debiéndose resolver de esa forma.- En cuanto al Nombre20662: Conforme a las razones dadas en los considerandos anteriores, se debe acoger la defensa de falta de derecho en cuanto a la acción de Nombre145585 y declarar sin lugar la demanda. También deben acogerse las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva, en cuanto a la demanda de Nombre145586 , por no existir perjuicio efectivo en las actuaciones administrativas cuestionadas, en el ámbito de su esfera jurídica y declarar inadmisible su acción.- Siendo ambas codemandadas vencidas en este asunto por parte del SENASA, se les debe condenar pagar a dicho órgano desconcentrado, ambas costas de la acción, por no existir ninguna circunstancia de exoneración, conforme lo establecido en la norma antes mencionada.-

Por tanto:

• 1)Se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva opuesta por el Estado y se declaran inadmisibles las demandas opuestas por ambos actores, en cuanto al primero. Por la forma en que se resuelve, se omite pronunciamiento sobre las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam activa, que fueron opuestas por el ente. Se exonera a ambos demandantes del pago de ambas costas a favor del Estado; 2) Se acogen las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva opuestas contra la acción de Nombre145586 , declarándose también en cuanto a ella, inadmisible la demanda; se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta contra la acción de la empresa actora. En consecuencia, se declaran sin lugar en todos sus extremos las demandas de Nombre145585 , Limitada contra el Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal. Se condena a los codemandantes al pago de las costas personales y procesales, en favor del órgano desconcentrado.- Jonatán Canales Hernández Rosa María Cortés Morales Paulo André Alonso Soto