Dismissal claim fails due to statute of limitations on disciplinary powerImprocedencia de despido por prescripción de potestad disciplinaria

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Second Judicial Circuit of San José – Address 18225 Central: 2545-0003 Ÿ Fax: 2545-0033 Ÿ Email: ...01 Process: Pure law Plaintiff: Nombre126897 Defendant: The State No. 80-2013-VII CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL (SEVENTH SECTION). Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at fourteen hours and fifty minutes on the twenty-first of November of two thousand thirteen.- Ordinary proceeding declared purely of law, followed before this Tribunal by Nombre126897, does not indicate marital status, profession or occupation, or domicile, with identity card number CED118465 (f. 1 and 85); against THE STATE, appearing on its behalf by Procurador B Lic. Guillermo Bonilla Herrera, married, lawyer, resident of Tres Ríos, with identity card number CED116459 (f. 93 and 94). Also intervening in the process, representing the plaintiff, is his special judicial attorney Licda. Karen Carvajal Loaiza, single, lawyer, does not indicate domicile, with identity card number CED118070 (f. 1 and 85). The cited natural persons are of legal age.-

WHEREAS:

1.- That the plaintiff, based on the facts and citations of law that he set forth, in a brief filed on January 23, 2013 (f. 69-84) and clarified by the one on f. 87-88, filed a lawsuit whose claim –in summary and taking into account the adjustments made during the preliminary hearing– consists of requesting that the judgment declare that the administrative procedure followed against him had prescribed at the time the dismissal resolution was issued, which is consequently null; a defect from which the latter also suffers for having applied a regulation that is not appropriate in the specific case. As a consequence of the foregoing, that the plaintiff be reinstated to his job position, with payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) broken down as follows: for subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo), three million colones; for psychological damage (daño psicológico), three million colones; and as compensation for damages (perjuicios) (sic), the lost wages from the dismissal, which he estimates at three million five hundred thousand colones up to the date of filing the lawsuit, without prejudice to those that additionally apply until his effective reinstatement.- 2.- The defendant answered the action negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. Furthermore, it expressed its reluctance to conciliate in this matter (f. 94-115).- 3.- In the preliminary hearing held starting at 8:30 hours on July 4, 2013, with the attendance of both parties, the claim was clarified in the manner described in the first whereas above. Furthermore, as there was no more evidence to receive apart from the documentary evidence, the case management judge Licda. Godelieve López Salas declared the process to be purely of law, in accordance with Article 98 paragraph 2) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), whereupon the parties proceeded to orally present their conclusions (hearing recorded and attached to the case file on its corresponding electronic medium; minute at f. 141-142).- 4.- This resolution is issued after deliberation. No grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the proceedings are noted.- Drafted by Judge Hess Araya, with the affirmative vote of Judge Fernández Brenes and Judge Córdoba Ramírez; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- PROVEN FACTS. The following relevant facts are taken as such:

1. That the plaintiff began his work at the Ministry of Justice and Peace starting on July 16, 1979. At the time of his dismissal effective January 1, 2013, he was appointed with tenure (propiedad) in position No. 002844, job class Administrator 2, a position located at the Centro de Atención Institucional Adulto Joven (f. 116 and 118 of the judicial file; f. 391, 394 to 396, 439, and 441 of the personnel file).- 2. That, among his duties, the plaintiff was responsible for supervising and controlling at the administrative level everything related to the management of movable and immovable property assigned to the penitentiary center, as well as exercising control of inventories, petty cash, "Comité de Internos account," minipulpería lease, food, and others (f. 119-122 of the judicial file).- 3. That in the year 2009, the plaintiff worked as Administrator 2 of the Centro de Atención Institucional Nombre5571, where his responsibilities included acting as Treasurer of the center, in charge of controlling the disbursement and income invoices and the funds of the Comité de Privados de Libertad, as well as payment to suppliers (deemed confession (confesión ficta) contained in fact 1 of the lawsuit, not disputed as to what is indicated; f. 11 and 247 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 4. That by official letter No. DGAU-70 of April 2, subsequently expanded by No. DGAU-111 of June 30, both of 2009, the Internal Audit of the Ministry of Justice communicated to the Dirección General de Adaptación Social a series of anomalies in the handling of funds attributable –as relevant– to the plaintiff here (f. 2-7 and 14-20 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 5. That by official letter No. D.G.-948-2009 of April 22, 2009, the Dirección General de Adaptación Social requested the Dirección Jurídica to conduct the corresponding investigation (f. 1 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 6. That by official letter D.J. 2011-550 of February 18, 2011, the result of the preliminary investigation was made known to the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, recommending the opening of an administrative procedure against the official Nombre126897 and another (f. 155-157 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 7. That by official letter DG-136-2011 of March 7, 2011, the recently mentioned Directorate ordered proceeding with the opening of the disciplinary procedure (f. 158 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 8. That by resolution number 001-142-2009 at 9:00 hours on March 11, 2011, the Dirección Jurídica of the Ministry of Justice ordered the formal opening of administrative procedure number 142-2009 against the plaintiff and another, designating the directing body (órgano director) (f. 164 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 9. That by resolution No. 002-142-2009 at 8:00 hours on April 6, 2011, the directing body carried out the "Imputation and Intimation of Charges" (Imputación e Intimación de Cargos) to the plaintiff, summoning the oral and private appearance for 8:00 hours on May 31 following. The foregoing was notified to him on May 4 of the same year (f. 165-192 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 10. That by resolution No. 006-142-2009 at 9:00 hours on September 2, 2011, the directing body of the procedure issued its "Final Recommendation" (Recomendación final) to the Director General de Adaptación Social, proposing the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff and another (f. 262-289 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 11. That by official letter DG-2037-10-2011 of October 4, 2011, the Director General de Adaptación Social requested the Minister of Justice to urge the dismissal proceeding before the Dirección General del Servicio Civil, against the official Nombre126897 (f. 290-306 and 308 of the file "Legajo Prueba 2").- 12. That on November 4, 2011, the dismissal proceeding promoted by the Ministry of Justice and Peace against Mr. Nombre126897 was filed before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil (fact 3 of the lawsuit, not disputed; f. 1-23 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 13. That by resolution AJD-RES-511-2011 at 14:30 hours on that same November 4, 2011, the Dirección General de Servicio Civil made the transfer and imputation of charges to Mr. Nombre126897, granting him the legal deadlines for the purpose of opposing the charges leveled and offering exculpatory evidence. The notification was made on day 7 of the same month and year (f. 60-66 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 14. That by a brief filed on November 14, 2011, the plaintiff here formulated the exception of prescription (excepción de prescripción) of the disciplinary procedure (f. 76-82 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 15. That by resolution AJD-RES-524-2011 at 10:00 hours on November 16, 2011, and considering it a matter for prior and special ruling, the Dirección General de Servicio Civil referred the case to the Tribunal de Servicio Civil, for it to resolve regarding the alleged prescription (f. 83-87 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 16. That the Tribunal de Servicio Civil, by resolution of 7:25 hours on December 15, 2011, rejected the exception of prescription raised beforehand (f. 117-125 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 17. That once the respective procedure was processed, the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, through resolution No. AJD-RES-074-2012 at 11:10 hours on February 3, 2012, referred the case to the Tribunal de Servicio Civil for the issuance of the respective resolution (f. 183-187 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 18. That by resolution No. 11896 at 8:05 hours on March 21, 2012, the Tribunal de Servicio Civil declared the proceeding promoted by the Ministry of Justice admissible, the Executive Branch being authorized to dismiss the now plaintiff without employer liability (f. 205-239 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 19. That Mr. Nombre126897 filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) against the resolution indicated in the preceding fact (f. 240-244 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 20. That by resolution No. 037-2012-TASC at 10:00 hours on September 12, 2012, the Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil rejected the appeal filed and confirmed the resolution appealed, exhausting the administrative channel (f. 259-290 of the administrative file of dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 21. That the dismissal of the plaintiff was executed pursuant to official letter DGIRH-PGAL-472-2012 of November 22, 2012, issued by the Proceso de Gestión del Ambiente Laboral area of the Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos of the Ministry of Justice and Peace; received by the former the following day (f. 117 of the judicial file).- II.- UNPROVEN FACTS. None of relevance.- III.- ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES. The special judicial attorney of the plaintiff argues, in summary, that her client has worked for the Ministry of Justice and Peace since July 16, 1979, protected under the Servicio Civil regime. In recent years, he has worked as Administrator 2 at the Centro de Atención Institucional Gerardo Rodríguez Echeverría, as Treasurer. She adds that, as an overload of duties, he was asked to keep control of the disbursement and income invoices of the Comité de Privados de Libertad, whose funds come from the activities they carry out within the Center. Pursuant to Article 9 of the "Reglamento de valores en custodia y fondo de ayuda a privados de libertad del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional", Executive Decree number 28030-J of July 28, 1999, the provisions of the "Instructivo para regular la organización de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con la Administración Penitenciaria", published in La Gaceta number 88 of May 9, 1997, apply insofar as relevant to the custody of the monies of the cited Committees. From those regulations, it follows, on the one hand, that the funds belong to the persons deprived of liberty and, on the other, that there must be a person responsible for the proper operation of the Committees. She goes on to explain that in November 2011, a dismissal proceeding was filed before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil against her principal, for allegedly committing serious faults in the handling of the monies of the Comité de privados de libertad during the first quarter of 2009, from which a shortage of eighteen million one hundred fifty-two thousand two hundred eighty-one colones and sixty-six céntimos (¢18,152,281.66) resulted. Said proceeding was preceded by an administrative procedure, initiated, in turn, based on a preliminary report issued on July 14, 2010. However, it was not until February 18, 2011, that the Director General de Adaptación Social was requested to open the process, whose resolution of transfer of charges was issued on the following May 4. In the procedure, she points out that the plaintiff alleged the prescription of the disciplinary power, because more than one month had elapsed between the time the preliminary report was submitted and the opening and notification of the proceeding. Said allegation was rejected, alleging the application of the preclusive five-year period established in the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, considering that the funds of the Comité de privados de libertad are public. She considers that said criterion is erroneous, and that the prescription period contemplated in Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo should rather be applied, since the monies of the cited Committees are not part of the public treasury (hacienda pública). Consequently, the administrative procedure processed against her client is null, given that at the time of its commencement, the disciplinary sanctioning power of the Administration had already prescribed, a defect which in turn invalidates the final dismissal act.- IV.- For its part, to the arguments of the plaintiff, the defendant responds, in summary, that in March 2009, the Audit Department of the Ministry of Justice conducted a visit to the CAI Nombre5571, in response to the Work Program for that same year and at the request of the Directorate of that center, following the report of an apparent embezzlement. At the time of the audit, the plaintiff held the position of Treasurer of the Center and was in charge of the registry of the books and the disbursements and income of the fund of the Comité de Privados de Libertad. As a result of the foregoing, the Audit communicated to the Dirección General de Adaptación Social a series of anomalies attributable to the plaintiff, including delays and inconsistencies in the registry of the Committee's funds, multiple payments for the same invoice, supported by copies thereof or its corresponding money receipt or copies issued for credit processing; disbursements covered by invoices without letterhead, without supplier name, dates, signatures, and makeshift documents. It was thus demonstrated a shortage of ¢18,152,281.66 in reference to the money recorded in the valued documents, a fact that initiated the proceedings that culminated in the dismissal of the plaintiff. The state representative considers that there is no prescription of the administrative sanctioning power in this case. The plaintiff accuses an undue application of Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR) in his case and that based on the provisions of Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo, the fault committed –which he never denies– is prescribed. He explains that in the public employment regime, there are different prescription periods for disciplinary power, duly differentiated. In the first place, is Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo, which applies as a general rule, unless there is a special provision to the contrary. Said rule provides that prescription operates in one month. On the other hand, Article 71 of the LOCGR establishes a period of 5 years when it involves transgressions of the control and oversight regulations. In the same sense, numeral 43 of the Ley General de Control Interno and 44 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública establish the 5-year period when dealing with transgressions of the control and oversight regulations. Based on the foregoing, it can be affirmed, in general terms, that there are two prescription periods, applicable to public officials, regarding the exercise of disciplinary power, without prejudice to other special regulations that have their own periods, as is the case of the Ley General de Policía. From the mentioned numerals, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when there exists a transgression of the control and oversight regulations or relating to the public treasury, these being concrete rules which, as special ones, prevail over the general regulation, for the purpose of applying the five-year prescription period of disciplinary power. He estimates that the simple concept of "servant of the Hacienda Pública" is outdated. As relevant to the present case, the plaintiff occupied the position of Administrator 2, located at the Centro de Atención Institucional Adulto Joven; he was Treasurer and among his duties were those of recording the disbursements and income of the fund of the Comité de Privados de Libertad. Pursuant to the provisions of the Reglamento de Valores en Custodia y Fondo de Ayuda a Privados de Libertad del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional (Executive Decree No. 28030-J of July 28, 1999), the Administrator of the Center or the person in charge had to record the money deposits and the disbursements; needing to implement due control of records (Articles 5 and 8). And it is clearly established that, in what corresponds to the custody of monies of Committees of persons deprived of liberty, the provisions of the "Instructivo para regular las organizaciones de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con la Administración Penitenciaria" and the directives issued to that effect apply insofar as appropriate (Article 9 ibid). According to that Instructivo, published in La Gaceta No. 88 of May 9, 1997, the economic fund, the control and supervision of the economic fund of the Committee must be carried out by the Administration and Directorate of the Center in compliance with the Reglamento de Valores en Custodia (Article 31); the collection of cash money needing to be entered immediately into the administration (Article 33). It is evident that the aforementioned regulation and instruction respond to the control and supervision requirements ordered by the legislator in the Ley de Control Interno. According to the report of the Institutional Audit, there existed a series of irregularities attributable to the plaintiff, who committed them in the performance of the duties inherent to the public position he held and on the occasion thereof, using the means and opportunities offered by his position (Art. Placa30722), all in flagrant violation of internal control administrative rules and violating the duty of probity, by failing to demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of legally conferred public powers. Among his duties was ensuring the due and correct control of the fund of the Committee of persons deprived of liberty, regardless of whether or not they were public funds (control and oversight rules), as he was the primary guarantor before the Administration regarding the management and supervision of the established internal control systems. Then, continues the state representative, if the reproached conducts do not correspond to a simple disciplinary responsibility, but the implication and scope of the intimated behaviors relate to alleged infractions of the internal control and oversight regulations, as well as the duty of probity, undoubtedly, the applicable period in this case is the five-year period provided for by ordinal 71 of the LOCGR and not the general one contemplated in ordinal 603 of the Código de Trabajo. It should be noted that according to subparagraph b) of the cited numeral 71, when dealing with facts that are not notorious, the five-year period will run from the date on which the report about the possible irregularity is made known to the hierarchy or the person competent to order the commencement of the administrative dismissal proceeding. For which reason that peremptory five-year period did not elapse in this case, especially considering that the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption set forth in Article 876 of the Código Civil, by reference made by ordinal 601, first paragraph, of the Código de Trabajo. The sanctioning regulation applied to the plaintiff is congruent with what was intimated in the act of opening or beginning of the procedure, which contemplated dismissal as the punitive consequence of the imputed conducts. The resolution being questioned applied said regulation related to dismissal, as it considered that the conducts were deserving of the most severe sanction, especially since Article 4 of Law No. 8422 establishes that any infringement of the duty of probity, duly proven, constitutes just cause for separation from public office without employer liability. Regarding the reasoning of the act and the proportionality of the imposed sanction, the state representative states that in the present case, the adduced facts undeniably constitute administrative faults against functional duties previously imposed by the legal system, and as such, they are fully demonstrated. And regarding the grievance formulated, there undeniably exists a fittingness of the sanction to the committed fact; which allows concluding a due and just proportionality between the gravity of the imposed sanction of dismissal and the objective and subjective circumstances present in the fault being sanctioned and the purpose pursued with said penalty. In this case, from the resolutions of the Tribunal de Servicio Civil and the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, the motive for the dismissal act is amply demonstrated. Concerning the indemnity claim, Mr. Procurador estimates that the mere fact that the substantive claim of the lawsuit is rejected is sufficient basis to deny the formulated pecuniary claim, as it is accessory to the former. He concludes requesting that the lawsuit be rejected in all its aspects, with the corresponding order of costs against the plaintiff.- V.- ON THE MERITS. In the present matter, the procedural claim wielded consists of a request for annulment, from which derives a petition for reinstatement and others for economic reparation, it being clear that the last two are secondary or accessory to the first, to the extent that their success depends on that of the first. To begin, then, this Tribunal is required to declare the nullity of the resolution that ordered the dismissal of the plaintiff, because the latter considers that the sanctioning power had prescribed. As a basis for this, he alleges –in summary– that the preclusive period applicable to his case is that of Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo and not that of numeral 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), which was incorrectly invoked, estimating that the funds whose irregular management was reproached to him were not public and, therefore, the prescriptive regime specific to officials of the public treasury (hacienda pública) is inapplicable. Thus, the correct decision of this matter requires establishing whether or not the aforementioned regime was applicable to the plaintiff, an issue on which depends, in turn, the determination of the preclusion period and, as a consequence, whether the lawsuit becomes admissible or inadmissible. It is worth noting, before continuing, that both from the arguments of both parties in the file and from the conclusions they presented at the preliminary hearing, it is clear that in this case, the substance of the charges that were at the time directed against the plaintiff is not under discussion, and no analysis of them will be undertaken.- VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED PRESCRIPTION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE SANCTIONING POWER. On this particular point, it is appropriate to begin by recalling that prescription, in general terms, supposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) passage of the time fixed by the legal system for such effect; and, c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting the prescription. This supposes that there is no liberatory effect if, despite the first two conditions being met, the articulation is not formulated. This is because prescription follows a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Regarding specifically employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the superior against officials who have committed sanctionable faults is subject to this temporality factor, after which, such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be stated, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of ordinal 102 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that for finalistic aspects are considered imprescriptible, those referring to internal sanctioning exercise –such as the one examined in this case– are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they may expire due to the lapse of the time established by the legal system without being carried out. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative superior and the passive subject is the public official, who to that extent is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period that the applicable regulations expressly fix, after which his power to demand recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power arises.- VII.- Now, for the purposes of the present case, it is necessary to discriminate between various scenarios that occur in this type of disciplinary proceedings, in which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, with diverse nuances. It involves the necessary establishment, for purposes of clarity, of demarcation criteria that permit addressing the discussed issues, according to the scenario in question. Along these lines, the temporal lapse of diverse stages must be distinguished. In the first place, the prescription of the exercise of disciplinary power must be analyzed, which refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow them to issue the final decision. At this level, it concerns the maximum period allowed by the legal system for the administrative superior to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, aimed at establishing the relevance or not of imposition of a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure seeking the establishment of the facts (material truth) serving as the basis for the reason for the act, generates an interrupting effect on that margin of temporality, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited period for the exercise of the power is interrupted only with the issuance of the final act since, as a derivation of the due process principle, it is necessary that the Administration order the opening of an administrative cause –it is insisted– to establish if the sanction is applicable, as a derivation of what is established in ordinals 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. Generically (and, in the specific case of servants subject to the Servicio Civil regime, by express remittal of Article 51 of the Statute of that matter), the referenced period is regulated by numeral 603 of the Código de Trabajo (CT), which indicates that "The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which will begin to run from when cause arose for the separation or, where appropriate, from when the facts giving rise to disciplinary correction were known." However, it must be noted that this is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. Such is the case, for example, of the Ley General de Policía, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose numeral 83 sets a particular prescriptive regime, namely: "Minor faults will prescribe in one month and serious ones, at two years. The prescription will be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure begins." The same occurs in matters of oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). For this type of proceeding, the applicable period is that regulated by laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112). It is a regulatory system that is constituted as a sectoral regulation containing concrete rules which, as special ones, prevail over the general regulation.- In substance, these rules refer to the regime provided in article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, which states in substance:

“The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as that act which requires an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity – liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report of the respective investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the head or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure.” (Emphasis added.)

Now, it is clear that the expiration of the term granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the causes for interruption established by article 876 of the Civil Code, by remission made by article 601, first paragraph, of the CT. It must be clarified that the causes for interruption – which cause the prescriptive period to start anew – can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the term to be interrupted, since even if they occurred, if the term has expired, the mere allegation of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded due to inertia in its exercise. Nevertheless, it must be insisted that the interruption does not occur with the mere issuance of the act opening the procedure, but with the proper communication of the order that deems the case substantiated, in accordance with articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP.- VIII.- Now, it is determinative to establish precisely the starting point for computing the prescriptive period. On this matter (and momentarily setting aside cases regulated by special rule), article 603 of the CT states that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or, in its absence, from when the acts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the fault and, therefore, undertaking the exercise of their power. Thus, when the particularities of the case require the carrying out of a preliminary investigation, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment in which the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the head. Nevertheless, the necessity or not of that phase must be discriminated in each case, since otherwise, it could be used as a dilatory strategy to evade prescription, given that said investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure or to gather indications that tend to clarify its necessity or not.- IX.- The second factor that must be analyzed is that of the prescription of the power to order the sanction within the procedure, which refers to the maximum time limit available to the holder of the corrective power to adopt the sanction, once the file has been submitted to their knowledge by the directing body (that is, when only the issuance of the final act remains). In this scenario and unless the exception of article 319 of the LGAP applies (regarding the need to hold a second hearing), the head or holder again has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, counted from the moment in which the directing body of the case formally brings its recommendation to their attention; upon expiration of which, the prescription of that power would inevitably occur, and therefore, the final act would be null due to injury to the competency element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such scenario, in the specific dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning-type procedures, given the content of article 603 of the CT, constitutes a special treatment that overrides what is established by canon 329.3 of the LGAP.- X.- In the third term, the prescription of the power to execute the imposed sanction refers to the period available to the administrative head to order the application or material execution of the dictated sanction. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, unless a special rule exists, would again be the monthly period provided in article 603 of the CT. The denial of such a period would imply the perpetual possibility of the head to apply the sanction previously ordered, under the claim of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, one thing is the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body is issued, and another is the period to materialize the final sanction ordered. On this point, the period is to be computed from the finality of that act, which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals that may be filed against the act as applicable, or if, after the period established by the legal system to file those appeals has elapsed, they have not been filed, in which case, administrative finality occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct.- XI.- Finally, another element subject to temporality rules is that referring to the processing of the procedure. It refers to the maximum time the administrative procedure instituted to establish the facts that allow the final decision of the holder of the public repressive power can last. This issue, unless a special rule exists, is regulated by article 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of the LGAP. However, the two-month period provided therein is of an ordination, not peremptory, nature, which of course does not include nor permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid for injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice (on this matter, see judgment No. 199-2011-VI of the Sixth Section of this Court, of 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011). On this point, reference must also be made to what is established by article 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institution of the caducity of the procedure, in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. In this scenario, caducity applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, since the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited article 340, regarding the impossibility of caducity when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the request of a party, given that the next stage is solely the Administration's responsibility, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it was processed ex officio, since in that case, the delay does benefit the administrated person, to the extent that it would then be a delay solely attributable to the public instance.- IX.- ON THE PRESCRIPTION OF THE SANCTIONING POWER IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. Having established the foregoing, from what was stated by the plaintiff in facts 8 and 9 of the complaint – reiterated at the time of presenting his conclusions during the preliminary hearing – it is evident that his prescription claim is limited to the stage of initiation of the disciplinary administrative procedure established against him. Thus, he states:

“In this procedure, the peremptory one-month period has lapsed, since from the review of the administrative file, it can be corroborated that the report of the preliminary investigation was brought to attention since July 14, 2010, and it was not until February 18, 2011, that a communication was sent to the Director General of Social Adaptation requesting that he indicate the procedure to follow in the case and subsequently, by Official Communication DG-136-2011 of March 7, 2011, he requested to proceed with the opening of the procedure, which began with the notification of the order of imputation and notification of charges (Resolution 002-142-2009 dated April 6, 2011), however, it was notified to me until May 4, 2011.” (see page 79.)

Now, this Court does not observe the expiration of the referred period nor, consequently, the occurrence of the preclusive effect argued. To this effect, we must begin by establishing which period is applicable, a topic in which it is considered that the State representation is correct when it claims that it is the five-year period contemplated in article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (LOCGR), as the plaintiff is an official who is reproached for committing unlawful conduct related to the internal control and oversight rules to which he was clearly subject. Indeed, while it is true that a restrictive or limited conceptualization of the concept of “servant of the public treasury” applies in principle only to one who is in charge of managing public funds, this Chamber shares the thesis put forward by the State – which in this sense would rather give rise to a broad understanding of the referred concept – that, ultimately, the origin of the funds is a factor that, while not irrelevant, is also not exclusive or excluding, to the extent that the analysis should focus more on whether the official in question is or is not immersed in the internal control and oversight regime and whether the fault or faults attributed to them are or are not related to the duties they are responsible for performing within that framework. In this sense, the precedents of this Court have stated, commenting on the rules that configure the indicated regime:

“From the mentioned articles, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when the mentioned prescription applies to a fault against the Public Treasury. In that sense, if there is a transgression of the control and oversight framework or related to the Public Treasury, the 5-year prescription period of the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows differentiating the applicable prescription in cases of a labor nature of one month, in accordance with the provisions of article 603 of the Labor Code. With the reform of article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, upon changing the valuation criterion to determine the applicable prescription period, a shift occurs from a subjective to an objective regime. Previously, it was necessary to carry out an exercise to determine, for the purpose of applying the prescription period, if the person was a servant of the Public Treasury (subjective aspect). As mentioned supra, the criterion prevailing today is an objective material one, which is determined by the transgression of the control and oversight framework, which is composed of, among others, the mentioned laws, as well as the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets, No. 8131 and its Regulation, the Law of Administrative Procurement No. 7494 and its Regulation. Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of the cited regulations allows applying the prescription period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they hold a Public Treasury position, incurs a breach of the control and oversight framework; if this occurs, the 5-year period applies to them.” (Fifth Section, No. 101-2011 (sic) at 3:30 p.m. on October 24, 2012).

X.- In our case, it is accredited (proven fact 3) that, at the time of the relevant facts here, the plaintiff worked as Administrator 2 of the Nombre5571 Institutional Care Center, where his responsibilities included acting as Treasurer of the center, in charge of controlling outgoing and incoming invoices and the funds of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty, as well as payment to suppliers; and, in that sense, the conduct attributed to him was related, precisely, to aspects of that function. The “Regulation on Valuables in Custody and Aid Fund for Persons Deprived of Liberty of the National Penitentiary System”, executive decree No. 28030-J of July 28, 1999, regulates the management of the property of persons deprived of liberty in the National Penitentiary System, in order to guarantee respect for their rights and maintain security and order, avoiding abuses and inadequate handling of valuables in custody. It establishes that the deposit of the referred valuables is made through forms that must be filled out by the Center Administrator or the person in charge of receiving the deposit (Article 5). In the case of cash deposits, the Administration is obligated to implement proper control through records of income and expenses of money made by persons deprived of liberty for their expenses (Article 8). And further on, it is indicated:

“Article 9.- Regarding the custody of the monies of Committees of persons deprived of liberty, the provisions of the 'Instructions to regulate the organizations of persons deprived of liberty and their relationship with the Penitentiary Administration', and the guidelines issued to that effect by the respective instances, shall apply as pertinent.” For its part, the alluded Instructions, dated November 27, 1996, and published in La Gaceta No. 88 of May 9, 1997, are provided to regulate the various organizations without legal status of persons deprived of liberty in the Centers of the National Penitentiary System, as well as the relationship of the Penitentiary Administration with all organizations of persons deprived of liberty (Article 1). It establishes:

“Article 31.- The control and supervision over the activities of the Committee in the Technical Area regarding order, discipline, and institutional security shall be exercised by the Center Director, the coordinating official, and the Technical Council of the Center or Area. In the Economic Area, control and supervision must be carried out by the Administration and Direction of the Center in compliance with the Regulation on Valuables in Custody.” (Emphasis added.)

And also:

“Article 33.- The cash collected by the committee, product of activities duly authorized by the Technical Council of the Center, must be deposited immediately with the administration, by the person deprived of liberty designated for these purposes, in compliance with institutional and regulatory procedures.

(...)” As can be appreciated from the factual and normative framework outlined thus far, the plaintiff here had among his responsibilities administering the fund of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty, so that regardless of whether the money deposited in it is public or private, the truth is that said function derived directly from the responsibilities assigned to him by provisions directed at implementing internal control and oversight mechanisms within the penitentiary center. In this way, there is no doubt that the prescription period applicable to the faults committed in the exercise of his position is not the generic one of article 603 of the CT, but the special one of article 71 of the LOCGR. In particular, as a prior investigation by the Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Justice took place in the case (see proven fact 5), we must abide by the provisions of subsection b) of the cited rule, which states that the beginning of the preclusive period occurs from the date on which the respective report was brought to the knowledge of the head or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. In this case, said report reached the hands of the Director General of Social Adaptation on February 18, 2011 (proven fact 6). And considering that the respective notice of charges was notified to the now plaintiff on May 4 of that same year (proven fact 9), it is obvious that the five-year period established for that purpose had not expired – not even remotely. What is established in Article 125 of the Autonomous Service Regulation of the Ministry of Justice (which the plaintiff invokes in fact 9 of the complaint, at page 77 of the judicial file) has no relevance to this effect, since not only is the one-month period provided there for imposing suspension or dismissal sanctions intended for common disciplinary actions (that is, those to which the special public treasury control regime is not applicable), but also because, in any case, it must be remembered that, according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (see, for example, judgment No. 3783-96 at 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 1996), regulatory rules cannot create prescription or caducity periods, since only a provision of legal rank can do so. Consequently, as this Chamber does not observe that the preclusive period the plaintiff considers applicable has elapsed in this case, this aspect of the claim is denied.- XI.- ON THE ACCESSORY CLAIMS. As noted supra, in addition to the primary claim, of an annulment nature, the plaintiff requests that, by virtue of the invalidity with which he considers the act of his dismissal is vitiated, he be reinstated in his position and paid the respective back-pay, as well as subjective moral and psychological damages. In this sense, the mere fact that the substantive claim of the complaint has been rejected is sufficient basis to deny the remaining claims formulated, as they are accessory to the former. Reinstatement would only have been possible had the nullity of the dismissal act been verified, which has not been the case. For its part, to the extent that no illegitimate action by the Administration has been verified, no patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injury that the plaintiff is not obligated to bear has materialized either. Administrative liability, under the regime of the LGAP, requires not only establishing the existence of damaging administrative conduct and a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injury, but also that a causal link exists between them, that is, a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act imputed and the damage produced; a link that must not be broken by the presence of any of the exoneration conditions provided in article 190 ibidem. In this case, for all the reasons already set forth, this Court does not consider that the State's action in this case was illegitimate, which irremediably eliminates one of the critical elements for the configuration of eventual extracontractual administrative liability, which is the verification of the existence of damaging conduct originating a material or moral injury that the administrated person is not obligated to bear (article 194 of the LGAP). In addition to the above, the fault of the victim, which in this case lies in the commission of the faults attributable to the plaintiff (and which he, as indicated, never questioned on the merits), breaks the eventual causal link that could have arisen, which only contributes to the inadmissibility of the economic claim outlined.- XII.- ON THE INTERPOSED DEFENSE. The defendant raised the defense of lack of right, which, based on the legal reasons developed supra, must be granted, declaring the complaint without merit in all its aspects.- XIII.- ON COSTS. Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, in accordance with that same rule, in conjunction with article 119.2 ibidem. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable: a) when there has been, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is issued based on evidence unknown to the opposing party; or c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between what was claimed and what was definitively obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the claim are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (article 194 ibidem). In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and to break the principle of condemnation to the losing party. Therefore, both costs are imposed on the plaintiff.-

THEREFORE:

The defense of lack of right is granted. The complaint filed by Nombre126897 against the State is declared WITHOUT MERIT. Both costs are borne by the plaintiff. NOTIFY.- CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA SILVIA CONSUELO FERNÁNDEZ BRENES FELIPE CÓRDOBA RAMÍREZ 94-115).- **3.-** In the preliminary hearing held starting at 8:30 a.m. on July 4, 2013, with both parties present, the claim was clarified as set forth in the first resultando *supra*. Furthermore, as there was no further evidence to receive apart from the documentary evidence, the presiding judge, Licda. Godelieve López Salas, declared the process to be one of pure law, in accordance with Article 98, subsection 2) of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA), whereupon the parties proceeded to orally present their conclusions (hearing recorded and attached to the case file on its corresponding electronic medium; minute at f. 141-142).- **4.-** This decision is rendered after deliberation. No grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the proceedings are noted.- *Drafted by Judge* ***Hess Araya***, *with the affirmative vote of Judge* ***Fernández Brenes*** *and Judge* ***Córdoba Ramírez***; *and,* **WHEREAS:** **I.- PROVEN FACTS.** The following relevant facts are deemed as such:

1. That the plaintiff began working at the Ministry of Justice and Peace on July 16, 1979. At the time of his dismissal effective January 1, 2013, he was permanently appointed to position No. 002844, job class Administrator 2, a position located at the Centro de Atención Institucional Adulto Joven (f. 116 and 118 of the judicial file; f. 391, 394 to 396, 439 and 441 of the personnel file).- 2. That, among his duties, the plaintiff was responsible for supervising and controlling, at the administrative level, everything related to the management of movable and immovable property assigned to the penitentiary center, as well as exercising control over inventories, petty cash, the “Inmate Committee account”, the mini-grocery lease, food, and others (f. 119-122 of the judicial file).- 3. That in 2009, the plaintiff worked as Administrator 2 of the Centro de Atención Institucional Nombre5571, where his responsibilities included acting as Treasurer of the center, in charge of controlling expense and income invoices and the funds of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty, as well as making payments to suppliers (deemed confession contained in fact 1 of the complaint, uncontroverted as to the foregoing; f. 11 and 247 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 4. That by official memorandum No. DGAU-70 of April 2, subsequently expanded by No. DGAU-111 of June 30, both of 2009, the Internal Audit Office of the Ministry of Justice communicated to the Dirección General de Adaptación Social a series of anomalies in the handling of funds attributable—as relevant here—to the defendant herein (f. 2-7 and 14-20 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 5. That through official memorandum No. D.G.-948-2009 of April 22, 2009, the Dirección General de Adaptación Social requested the Legal Directorate to conduct the corresponding investigation (f. 1 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 6. That by official memorandum D.J. 2011-550 of February 18, 2011, the result of the preliminary investigation was made known to the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, recommending the opening of an administrative procedure against the official Nombre126897 and another (f. 155-157 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 7. That through official memorandum DG-136-2011 of March 7, 2011, the aforementioned Directorate ordered to proceed with the opening of the disciplinary procedure (f. 158 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 8. That by resolution number 001-142-2009 at 9:00 a.m. on March 11, 2011, the Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Justice ordered the formal opening of administrative procedure number 142-2009 against the plaintiff and another, appointing the directing body (f. 164 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 9. That by resolution No. 002-142-2009 at 8:00 a.m. on April 6, 2011, the directing body made the “Imputation and Notification of Charges” to the plaintiff, scheduling the oral and private hearing for 8:00 a.m. on May 31 following. The foregoing was notified to him on May 4 of the same year (f. 165-192 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 10. That through resolution No. 006-142-2009 at 9:00 a.m. on September 2, 2011, the directing body of the procedure rendered its “Final Recommendation” to the Director General of Adaptación Social, proposing the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff and another (f. 262-289 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 11. That by official memorandum DG-2037-10-2011 of October 4, 2011, the Director General of Adaptación Social requested the Minister of Justice to instigate the dismissal process before the Dirección General del Servicio Civil, against the official Nombre126897 (f. 290-306 and 308 of the file “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 12. That on November 4, 2011, the dismissal petition promoted by the Ministry of Justice and Peace against Mr. Nombre126897 was filed before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil (fact 3 of the complaint, uncontroverted; f. 1-23 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 13. That by resolution AJD-RES-511-2011 at 2:30 p.m. on the same November 4, 2011, the Dirección General de Servicio Civil made the transfer and imputation of charges to Mr. Nombre126897, granting him the legal deadlines for the purpose of opposing the charges brought and offering exculpatory evidence. The notification was made on the 7th of the same month and year (f. 60-66 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 14. That by a brief filed on November 14, 2011, the defendant herein raised the exception of the statute of limitations (prescripción) on the disciplinary procedure (f. 76-82 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 15. That through resolution AJD-RES-524-2011 at 10:00 a.m. on November 16, 2011, and considering it a matter for prior and special ruling, the Dirección General de Servicio Civil referred the case record to the Tribunal de Servicio Civil, for it to resolve the alleged statute of limitations (f. 83-87 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 16. That the Tribunal de Servicio Civil, by resolution at 7:25 a.m. on December 15, 2011, rejected the exception of the statute of limitations raised as a preliminary matter (f. 117-125 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 17. That once the respective procedure was processed, the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, through resolution No. AJD-RES-074-2012 at 11:10 a.m. on February 3, 2012, referred the case record to the Tribunal de Servicio Civil for the issuance of the respective resolution (f. 183-187 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 18. That by resolution No. 11896 at 8:05 a.m. on March 21, 2012, the Tribunal de Servicio Civil granted the petition promoted by the Ministry of Justice, authorizing the Executive Branch to dismiss the now plaintiff without employer liability (f. 205-239 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 19. That Mr. Nombre126897 filed an appeal against the resolution indicated in the preceding fact (f. 240-244 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 20. That through resolution No. 037-2012-TASC at 10:00 a.m. on September 12, 2012, the Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil rejected the appeal filed and upheld the resolution appealed from, deeming the administrative channel exhausted (f. 259-290 of the administrative file for dismissal case No. 15357).- 21. That the dismissal of the plaintiff was executed pursuant to official memorandum DGIRH-PGAL-472-2012 of November 22, 2012, issued by the Labor Environment Management Process area of the Directorate of Institutional Human Resources Management of the Ministry of Justice and Peace; received by the former on the following day (f. 117 of the judicial file).- **II.- UNPROVEN FACTS.** None of relevance.- **III.- PARTIES' ARGUMENTS.** *The plaintiff's special judicial representative argues*, in summary, that her client has worked for the Ministry of Justice and Peace since July 16, 1979, under the Civil Service regime. In recent years, he worked as Administrator 2 at the Centro de Atención Institucional Gerardo Rodríguez Echeverría, in the capacity of Treasurer. She adds that, as an additional duty, he was asked to keep control of the expense and income invoices of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty, whose funds come from the activities they carry out within the Center. Pursuant to Article 9 of the “Reglamento de valores en custodia y fondo de ayuda a privados de libertad del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional”, executive decree number 28030-J of July 28, 1999, the provisions established in the “Instructivo para regular la organización de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con la Administración Penitenciaria”, published in La Gaceta number 88 of May 9, 1997, apply to the custody of the funds of said Committees. From these regulations, it follows, on one hand, that the funds belong to the persons deprived of liberty and, on the other, that there must be a person responsible for the proper operation of the Committees. She goes on to explain that in November 2011, a dismissal petition was filed before the Dirección General de Servicio Civil against her client, for allegedly having incurred serious misconduct in the handling of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty's funds during the first four-month period of 2009, from which a shortfall of eighteen million one hundred fifty-two thousand two hundred eighty-one colones and sixty-six céntimos (¢18,152,281.66) resulted. Said petition was preceded by an administrative procedure, initiated, in turn, based on a preliminary report issued on July 14, 2010. However, it was not until February 18, 2011, that the Director General of Adaptación Social was requested to open the process, the resolution of notification of charges for which was issued on May 4 following. In the procedure, she points out that the plaintiff alleged the statute of limitations on the disciplinary power, as more than one month had elapsed between the time the preliminary report was presented and the opening and notification of the proceeding. Said claim was rejected, citing the application of the five-year preclusive period established in the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, on the grounds that the funds of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty are public. She considers this criterion erroneous, and that the statute of limitations period set forth in Article 603 of the Labor Code should instead be applied, since the monies of said Committees are not part of the public treasury. Consequently, the administrative procedure processed against her client is null, given that at the time of its initiation, the Administration's disciplinary sanctioning power had already expired, a defect which in turn invalidates the final dismissal act.- **IV.-** For its part, *the defendant responds* to the plaintiff's arguments, in summary, that in March 2009, the Audit Department of the Ministry of Justice conducted a visit to the CAI Nombre5571, in accordance with the Work Program for that same year and at the request of the Directorate of that center, in response to a report of an apparent embezzlement. At the time of the audit, the plaintiff held the position of Treasurer of the Center and was in charge of the bookkeeping and the expenses and income of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty's fund. As a result of the foregoing, the Audit Office communicated to the Dirección General de Adaptación Social a series of anomalies attributable to the plaintiff, including delays and inconsistencies in recording the Committee's funds, multiple payments of the same invoice, supported by copies thereof or its corresponding money receipt or copies issued for credit processing; expenses covered by invoices without letterhead, without supplier name, dates, signatures, and makeshift documents. It was thus that a shortfall of ¢18,152,281.66 was evidenced in relation to the money recorded in the official documents, a fact which initiated the proceedings that culminated in the plaintiff's dismissal. The State representative considers that there is no statute of limitations on the administrative sanctioning power in this case. The plaintiff alleges an improper application of Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR) in his case and that, based on the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code, the misconduct committed—which he never denies—is time-barred. He explains that in the public employment regime, there are different, properly differentiated, statute-of-limitations periods for disciplinary power. First, there is Article 603 of the Labor Code, which applies as a general rule, unless a special provision provides otherwise. Said rule provides that the statute of limitations operates in one month. On the other hand, Article 71 of the LOCGR establishes a 5-year period when it involves transgressions of the control and oversight legal framework. In the same vein, Article 43 of the Ley General de Control Interno and Article 44 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública establish the 5-year period when it involves transgressions of the control and oversight legal framework. Based on the foregoing, it can be affirmed, in general terms, that there are two statute-of-limitations periods applicable to public officials regarding the exercise of disciplinary power, without prejudice to other special regulations that have their own periods, such as the Ley General de Policía. From the aforementioned articles, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when there is a transgression of the control and oversight legal framework or related to public finances, as they are concrete rules which, as special provisions, prevail over the general rule, for the purpose of applying the five-year statute-of-limitations period for disciplinary power. He considers that the simple concept of “public finance servant” is outdated. As relevant to the present case, the plaintiff held the position of Administrator 2, located at the Centro de Atención Institucional Adulto Joven; he was Treasurer and among his duties was that of recording the expenses and income of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty’s fund.

In accordance with the provisions of the Regulation on Securities in Custody and the Assistance Fund for Persons Deprived of Liberty of the National Penitentiary System (Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) N° 28030-J of July 28, 1999), the Administrator of the Center or the person in charge had to record money deposits and expenditures, and was required to implement proper record control (Articles 5 and 8). And it is clearly established that, regarding the custody of monies of Committees of persons deprived of liberty, the provisions of the "Instructivo para regular las organizaciones de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con la Administración Penitenciaria" and the guidelines issued for that purpose apply as appropriate (Article 9 ibid.). According to that Instructivo, published in La Gaceta N° 88 of May 9, 1997, the financial treasury, control, and supervision of the Committee's economic fund must be carried out by the Administration and Management of the Center in compliance with the Regulation on Securities in Custody (Article 31); and the collection of cash monies must be deposited immediately with the administration (Article 33). It is evident that the aforementioned regulation and the aforementioned Instructivo respond to the control and supervision requirements ordered by the legislator in the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno). According to the Institutional Audit report, there were a series of irregularities attributable to the plaintiff, who committed them in the performance of the duties inherent to the public position he held and on the occasion thereof, using the means and opportunities offered to him by his position (Art. Placa30722 ), all of this in clear violation of internal control administrative norms and breaching the duty of probity, by failing to demonstrate rectitude and good faith in exercising the legally conferred public powers. His duties included ensuring the due and proper control of the fund of the Committee of persons deprived of liberty, completely regardless of whether or not they were public funds (control and oversight norms), since he was the principal guarantor before the Administration regarding the management and supervision of the established internal control systems. Therefore, the State representative continues, the reproached conducts do not correspond to a simple disciplinary liability, but rather the implication and scope of the charged behaviors relate to alleged infractions of the internal control and oversight legal system, as well as the duty of probity; without a doubt, the applicable limitation period in this case is the five-year term provided for by section 71 of the LOCGR and not the general one contemplated in section 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). It should be noted that according to subsection b) of the cited numeral 71, when dealing with facts that are not notorious, the five-year period will run from the date on which the report about the possible irregularity is brought to the attention of the hierarchy or the person competent to order the initiation of the administrative dismissal management procedure. This is the reason why that peremptory five-year period did not elapse in this case, especially considering that the expiration of the term granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the interruption grounds established by Article 876 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), by remittance of section 601, first paragraph, of the Labor Code. The sanctioning legal provisions applied to the plaintiff are consistent with what was charged in the opening or initial act of the procedure, which contemplated dismissal as the punitive consequence of the imputed conducts. The questioned resolution applied said legal provisions related to dismissal, as it considered that the conducts warranted the most severe sanction, especially since Article 4 of Law (Ley) No. 8422 establishes that any violation of the duty of probity, duly proven, constitutes just cause for separation from public office without employer liability. Regarding the motivation of the act and the proportionality of the imposed sanction, the State representative states that in this case, the attributed facts indisputably constitute administrative faults against functional duties previously imposed by the legal system, and as such, are fully demonstrated. And regarding the formulated grievance, there is indisputably an adaptation of the sanction to the committed act, which allows concluding a due and just proportionality between the severity of the imposed dismissal sanction, the concurrent objective and subjective circumstances in the fault being sanctioned, and the purpose pursued with that penalty. In this case, the resolutions of the Tribunal de Servicio Civil and the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil amply demonstrate the reason for the dismissal act. Regarding the compensation claim, the State Attorney considers that the mere fact that the substantive grounds of the lawsuit are rejected is sufficient basis to deny the pecuniary claim formulated, as it is accessory to the former. He concludes by requesting that the lawsuit be rejected in its entirety, with the corresponding award of costs against the plaintiff.- **V.- REGARDING THE MERITS.** In this matter, the procedural claim asserted consists of an annulment claim, from which derive a petition for reinstatement and others for economic reparation; it being clear that the latter two are secondary or accessory to the first, to the extent that their success depends on that of the first. To begin, then, this Tribunal is required to declare the nullity of the resolution that ordered the plaintiff's dismissal, because he considers that the sanctioning power had expired due to the statute of limitations. As a basis for this, he alleges –in summary– that the preclusive limitation period applicable to his case is that of Article 603 of the Labor Code and not that of numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (LOCGR), which was incorrectly invoked, considering that the funds whose irregular handling was reproached to him were not public and, therefore, the prescriptive regime specific to public treasury officials is inapplicable. Thus, the correct decision in this matter requires establishing whether or not the aforementioned regime was applicable to the plaintiff, a question upon which depends, in turn, the determination of the limitation period and, as a consequence of the above, whether the lawsuit becomes admissible or inadmissible. It should be noted, before continuing, that from the arguments of both parties in the file and from the conclusions they presented at the preliminary hearing, it is clear that in this case the substance of the charges that were at the time directed against the plaintiff is not under discussion, and no analysis thereof will be undertaken.- **VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXPIRATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE SANCTIONING POWER DUE TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN).** On this point, it is necessary to begin by recalling that the statute of limitations (prescripción), in general terms, requires the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inaction of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) passage of the time set by the legal system for that purpose; and, c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, invoking the statute of limitations. This means that there is no releasing effect if, despite the first two conditions concurring, the articulation is not formulated. This is because the statute of limitations responds to a rogatory principle and, unlike lapse (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Specifically regarding public employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power by the hierarchical superior against officials who have committed sanctionable faults is subject to this time factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be discussed, varies depending on the regulated subject matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relations. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of section 102 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP)) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that are considered imprescriptible due to finalistic aspects, those relating to internal sanctioning exercise –like the one examined in this case– are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they can expire due to the passage of the time established by the legal system without being exercised. Therefore, in this type of relations, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior and the passive subject is the public official, who to that extent is subject to the internal corrective power only for the term expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, his faculty to request the recognition of the loss of hierarchical power emerges.- **VII.-** Now, for the purposes of this case, it is necessary to discriminate between various scenarios that arise in this type of disciplinary procedures, in which rules for the temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, with diverse nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for clarity's sake, of demarcation criteria that allow addressing the discussed issues, according to the scenario in question. Along these lines, the temporal course of various stages must be distinguished. In the first place, it is pertinent to analyze the **expiration of the exercise of the disciplinary power due to the statute of limitations (prescripción)**, which refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow him to issue the final decision. At this level, it concerns the maximum period admitted by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical superior to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, aimed at establishing the pertinence or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure that seeks to establish the facts (material truth) that serve as the basis for the reason of the act generates an interrupting effect on that temporal margin, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure directly aimed at the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the aforementioned period for exercising the power is interrupted only with the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative proceeding –it is insisted– to establish if the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of what is established in sections 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. Generically (and, in the specific case of employees subject to the Civil Service regime, by express remittance of Article 51 of its Statute), the referred period is regulated by numeral 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo, CT), which indicates that *"The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults shall expire by statute of limitations (prescribirán) in one month, which shall begin to run from when the cause for separation arose or, as applicable, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known."* However, it must be warned that this is a norm that yields before particular and special regulations that incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. This is the case, for example, of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose numeral 83 establishes a particular prescriptive regime, namely: *"Minor faults shall expire by statute of limitations (prescribirán) in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated."* The same occurs in matters of public treasury oversight (fiscalización). For this type of procedure, the applicable period is that regulated by Laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112). This is a regulatory system constituted as a sectoral legal order containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over the general regulations. In essence, these norms remit to the regime provided for in section 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, which fundamentally states:

"*The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal system shall expire by statute of limitations (prescribirá) according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, liability shall expire by statute of limitations (prescribirá) in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious –understood as that fact requiring an investigation or an audit study to report on its possible irregularity– liability shall expire by statute of limitations (prescribirá) in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure."* (The underlining is ours.)

Now, it is clear that the expiration of the term granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the interruption grounds established by section 876 of the Civil Code, by remittance of section 601, first paragraph, of the CT. It should be specified that the interruption grounds –which cause the prescriptive period to start anew– can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, as even if they occur, if it is after the period has expired, the simple allegation of a negative statute of limitations leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inaction in its exercise. Moreover, it must be insisted that the interruption does not occur with the simple issuance of the act opening the procedure, but with the due communication of the order that formally initiates the proceedings, in accordance with sections 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP.- **VIII.-** Now, it is decisive to establish precisely the starting point for calculating the prescriptive period. On this matter (and momentarily setting aside the cases regulated by special norm), numeral 603 of the CT states that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the fault and, therefore, undertaking the exercise of his power. Thus, when the particularities of the case require a preliminary investigation, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment when the results of that exercise are brought to the knowledge of the hierarchical superior. Moreover, the necessity or not of that phase must be discriminated in each case, as otherwise, it could be used as a delaying strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure or to gather indications aimed at clarifying its necessity or not.- **IX.-** The second factor to analyze is that of the **expiration of the power to decide the sanction within the procedure due to the statute of limitations (prescripción)**, which refers to the maximum temporal limit available to the holder of the corrective power to adopt the sanction, once the case file has been submitted for his knowledge by the directing body (that is, when only the issuance of the final act remains). In this hypothesis, and unless the exception of numeral 319 of the LGAP applies (relating to the need to hold a second hearing), the hierarchical superior or holder once again has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, counted from the moment when the directing body of the proceedings formally brings its recommendation to his attention; after which, the expiration of that power due to the statute of limitations would inevitably occur, and therefore, the final act would be null and void due to injury to the competence element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such a scenario, in the concrete dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of section 603 of the CT, constitutes a special treatment that overrides what is established by canon 329.3 of the LGAP.- **X.-** In third place, the **expiration of the power to execute the imposed sanction due to the statute of limitations (prescripción)** refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application or material execution of the dictated sanction. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, unless otherwise provided by a special norm, would again be the monthly period provided for in numeral 603 of the CT. The denial of such a period would entail the perennial possibility for the hierarchical superior to apply the sanction previously ordered, under the claim of a kind of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body has been issued is one thing, and the period to materialize the ordered firm sanction is another. At this point, the period must be computed from the firmness of that act, which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary recourse that may apply against the act, as appropriate, or if, after the period established by the legal system to formulate such recourse has elapsed, they have not been filed, in which event, administrative firmness occurs due to the inaction of the recipient of the effects of the conduct.- **XI.-** Finally, another element subject to temporality rules is that concerning the **processing of the procedure**. It refers to the maximum time that the administrative procedure initiated to establish the facts allowing the holder of the public repressive power to adopt the final decision can take. This subject, unless otherwise provided by special norm, is regulated by section 261, in relation to sections 319 and 340, all of the LGAP. However, the two-month period established therein possesses an ordering nature, not a peremptory one, which certainly does not include or permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice (on this point, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of the Sixth Section of this Tribunal, at 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011). At this point, reference must also be made to what is established by section 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institution of the lapse (caducidad) of the procedure, in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months due to causes attributable to it. In this scenario, the lapse applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, since the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited Article 340, regarding the impossibility of lapsing when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure has been initiated at the request of a party, given that the following stage only corresponds to the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inaction. This does not occur when it has been initiated ex officio, because in that case, the delay does benefit the administered party, to the extent that it would involve, in that case, a delay only attributable to the public instance.- **IX.- REGARDING THE EXPIRATION OF THE SANCTIONING POWER DUE TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.** Having established the above, from what is stated by the plaintiff in facts 8 and 9 of the lawsuit –reiterated when presenting his conclusions during the preliminary hearing– it follows that his allegation of prescription is constrained to the initiation stage of the disciplinary administrative procedure established against him. Thus, he states:

*"In this procedure, the peremptory period of one month has elapsed, as from the review of the administrative file it can be corroborated that the preliminary investigation report was brought to attention since July 14, 2010, and it is not until February 18, 2011, that a note is sent to the Director General of Adaptación Social requesting that he indicate the course to follow in the case, and subsequently by Official Letter DG-136-2011 of March 7, 2011, he requests to proceed with the opening of the procedure, which began with the notification of the order of imputation and notification of charges (Resolution 002-142-2009 dated April 6, 2011), however it was not notified to me until May 4, 2011."* (see folio 79.)

Now, this Tribunal does not observe the expiration of the referred period nor, consequently, the occurrence of the preclusive effect argued. To this effect, we must begin by establishing which period is applicable, a matter in which it is considered that the State representation is right when it alleges that it is the five-year period contemplated in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (LOCGR), because the plaintiff is an official who is reproached for committing unlawful behaviors related to the internal control and oversight norms to which he was clearly subject. Indeed, while it is true that a restrictive or limited conceptualization of the concept of "public treasury employee (servidor de la hacienda pública)" applies in principle only to one who is in charge of handling public funds, this Chamber shares the thesis put forth by the State –which in this sense would rather give rise to a broad meaning of the referred concept– that, ultimately, the origin of the funds is a factor that, while not irrelevant, is not exclusive or excluding either, to the extent that the analysis should rather focus on whether or not the official in question is immersed in the internal control and oversight regime and whether the fault or faults attributed to him have to do or not with the duties he is responsible for performing within that legal system. In this sense, the precedents of this Tribunal, commenting on the norms that configure the indicated regime, have stated:

*"From the mentioned numerals, an objective material criterion can be deduced that allows determining when the mentioned statute of limitations applies to a fault against the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). In that sense, if there is a transgression against the control and oversight legal system or relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year statute of limitations period for the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows differentiating the applicable statute of limitations in cases of a labor nature of one month, in accordance with the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code. With the reform that Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic underwent, by changing the assessment criterion to determine the applicable statute of limitations period, a shift was made from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out an exercise to determine, for purposes of applying the statute of limitations period, if one was an employee of the Public Treasury (subjective aspect). As mentioned supra, the currently governing criterion is objective material, determined by the transgression against the control and oversight legal system, which is composed, among others, of the mentioned laws, as well as the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), No. 8131 and its Regulation (Reglamento), the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) No. 7494 and its Regulation."* Thus, it is clear that the intent of the cited regulations allows the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) to be applied to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they hold a position in the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), incurs a breach of the control and oversight system; if this occurs, the 5-year period applies." (Section Five, No. 101-2011 (sic) of 3:30 p.m. on October 24, 2012).

**X.-** In our case, it is proven (proven fact 3) that, at the time of the relevant events here, the plaintiff worked as Administrator 2 of the Institutional Care Center Nombre5571, where his responsibilities included acting as Treasurer of the center, in charge of controlling expenditure and income invoices and the funds of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty (Comité de Privados de Libertad), as well as payment to suppliers; and, in that sense, the conduct attributed to him pertained precisely to aspects of that role. The "Regulation of Assets in Custody and Assistance Fund for Persons Deprived of Liberty of the National Penitentiary System" (Reglamento de Valores en Custodia y Fondo de Ayuda a Privados de Libertad del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional), Executive Decree No. 28030-J of July 28, 1999, regulates the management of the belongings of persons deprived of liberty in the National Penitentiary System, in order to guarantee respect for their rights and maintain security and order, avoiding abuses and improper handling of assets in custody. It establishes that the deposit of the referred assets is made through forms that must be filled out by the Center Administrator or the person responsible for receiving the deposit (Article 5). In the case of money deposits, the Administration is obliged to implement proper control through records of the income and expenditures of money made by the persons deprived of liberty for their expenses (Article 8). And further on, it states:

"Article 9.- Regarding the custody of the monies of Committees of persons deprived of liberty, the provisions of the 'Instruction for regulating the organizations of persons deprived of liberty and their relationship with the Penitentiary Administration' (Instructivo para regular las organizaciones de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con la Administración Penitenciaria), and the guidelines issued for this purpose by the respective bodies, shall apply as relevant." For its part, the aforementioned Instruction, dated November 27, 1996, and published in La Gaceta No. 88 of May 9, 1997, is intended to regulate the various organizations without legal personality of persons deprived of liberty in the Centers of the National Penitentiary System, as well as the relationship of the Penitentiary Administration with all organizations of persons deprived of liberty (Article 1). It establishes:

"Article 31.- The control and supervision over the activities of the Committee in the Technical Area regarding order, discipline, and institutional security shall be exercised by the Center Director, the coordinating official, and the Technical Council (Consejo Técnico) of the Center or Area. In the Economic Area, control and supervision must be carried out by the Administration and Management of the Center in compliance with the Regulation of Assets in Custody." (Our emphasis.)

And also:

"Article 33.- The cash money collected by the committee, as a result of activities duly authorized by the Technical Council of the Center, must be deposited immediately with the administration, by the person deprived of liberty designated for these purposes, in compliance with the institutional and regulatory procedures.

(...)" As can be seen from the factual and normative framework outlined so far, the plaintiff here had among his responsibilities the administration of the fund of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty, so that regardless of whether the monies deposited therein are public or private, the truth is that this function derived directly from the responsibilities assigned to him by provisions aimed at implementing internal control and oversight mechanisms (mecanismos de fiscalización y control interno) within the penitentiary center. Thus, there is no doubt that the statute of limitations applicable to the offenses committed in the exercise of his position is not the generic one of article 603 of the Labor Code (CT), but the special one of article 71 of the LOCGR. In particular, since the case involved the conduct of a preliminary investigation (indagación previa) by the Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Justice (see proven fact 5), we must adhere to what is prescribed in subsection b) of the cited rule, which indicates that the start of the limitation period occurs from the date on which the respective report was brought to the attention of the head or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. In this case, said report reached the hands of the Director General of Social Adaptation (Director General de Adaptación Social) on February 18, 2011 (proven fact 6). And considering that the respective statement of charges (traslado de cargos) was notified to the now plaintiff on May 4 of that same year (proven fact 9), it is clear that the five-year period set for this purpose had not expired—not even remotely. What is established in Article 125 of the Autonomous Service Regulation of the Ministry of Justice (which the plaintiff invokes in fact 9 of the complaint, on page 77 of the judicial file) has no relevance for this purpose, because not only is the one-month period provided therein for imposing sanctions of suspension or dismissal intended for common disciplinary actions (that is, those where the special regime of control of the public treasury (hacienda pública) is not applicable), but also because, in any case, it should be remembered that, according to the case law of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (see, for example, judgment No. 3783-96 of 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 1996), regulatory provisions cannot create statutes of limitations or expiration periods, since only a provision with the status of law can do so. Consequently, as this Chamber finds that the limitation period that the plaintiff believes applies in his case has not elapsed, this point of the complaint is denied.- **XI.- ON THE ACCESSORY CLAIMS.** As noted supra, in addition to the primary annulment claim, the plaintiff petitions that, by virtue of the invalidity he considers vitiates the act of his dismissal, he be reinstated in his position and paid the respective back wages (salarios caídos), as well as subjective and psychological moral damages (daños de índole moral subjetiva y psicológica). In this regard, the mere fact that the substantive claim of the complaint has been rejected is sufficient grounds to deny the remaining claims formulated, as they are accessory to it. Reinstatement would only have been possible had the nullity of the dismissal act been verified, which was not the case. Furthermore, to the extent that no illegitimate action by the Administration has been verified, neither has a pecuniary (patrimonial) or non-pecuniary (extrapatrimonial) injury that the plaintiff is not obligated to bear been configured. Administrative responsibility, under the regime of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), requires not only establishing the existence of a harmful administrative conduct (conducta administrativa dañosa) and a pecuniary or non-pecuniary injury (lesión patrimonial o extrapatrimonial), but also that there is a causal nexus (nexo causal) between them, that is, a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act attributed and the damage produced; a nexus that must not be broken by the presence of any of the exoneration conditions provided for in article 190 ibidem. In this case, for all the reasons already stated, this Court does not consider that the State's action in this case was illegitimate, which irretrievably eliminates one of the critical elements stated for the configuration of a potential extracontractual administrative responsibility, which is the verification of the existence of a harmful conduct originating from a material or moral injury that the citizen (administrado) is not obligated to bear (Article 194 of the LGAP). In addition to the foregoing, the victim's fault (culpa de la víctima), which in this case lies in the commission of the offenses attributable to the plaintiff (and which, as indicated, he never challenged on the merits), breaks any potential causal nexus that might have arisen, which only supports the inadmissibility of the economic claim outlined.- **XII.- REGARDING THE DEFENSE RAISED.** The defendant raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho), which, based on the legal reasons developed supra, must be granted, declaring the complaint without merit in all its respects.- **XIII.- ON COSTS.** Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA) establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party for the sole fact of being so, a pronouncement that must even be made ex officio, in accordance with the provisions of that same rule, in concordance with article 119.2 ibidem. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable: a) when, in the opinion of the Court, there was sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between the amount claimed and the amount definitively obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the complaint are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (article 194 ibidem). In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and to break the principle of condemnation to the losing party. Therefore, the payment of both costs is imposed on the plaintiff.- **THEREFORE:** The defense of lack of right is granted. The complaint filed by Nombre126897 against the State is declared WITHOUT MERIT (IMPROCEDENTE). Both costs are the responsibility of the plaintiff.

NOTIFY.- CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA SILVIA CONSUELO FERNÁNDEZ BRENES FELIPE CÓRDOBA RAMÍREZ “VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXPIRATION (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE EXERCISE OF THE SANCTIONING POWER. On this particular point, it is worth beginning by recalling that expiration (prescripción), in general terms, presupposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia on the part of the holder of a right in exercising it; b) passage of the time set by the legal system for that purpose; and, c) pleading or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting the expiration (prescripción).

This implies that there is no liberatory effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two prerequisites, the pleading is not formulated. This is because the statute of limitations (prescripción) responds to a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Regarding specifically employment relationships (relaciones funcionariales), the exercise of the corrective authority of the hierarchical superior against officials who have committed punishable offenses is subject to this temporality factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This time limit, as will be discussed, varies depending on the regulated subject matter and the existence of a special legal regime establishing particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration, LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that are considered imprescriptible due to finalistic aspects, those referring to the exercise of internal sanctioning authority – such as that examined in this case – are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they may lapse due to the passage of time established by the legal system without being realized. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective authority only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which his power to request recognition of the loss of hierarchical authority arises.- **VII.-** Now, for the purposes of this case, it is necessary to distinguish between various scenarios that arise in this type of disciplinary proceedings, in which rules of temporary exercise of faculties or powers apply, with different nuances. This refers to the necessary establishment, for clarity's sake, of demarcation criteria that allow the issues discussed to be addressed, according to the scenario in question. In this line, the passage of time in different stages must be distinguished. Firstly, the statute of limitations for the exercise of the disciplinary power (prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria) must be analyzed, which refers to the period established by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective authority to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow them to issue the final decision. On this plane, it concerns the maximum period allowed by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical superior to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, aimed at determining the appropriateness or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure seeking the establishment of the facts (substantive truth) that serve as the basis for the grounds of the act, generates an interrupting effect on that time margin, insofar as it constitutes an express act and a measure directly aimed at the exercise of that authority. It could not be considered that the cited period for the exercise of authority is interrupted only with the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary that the Administration order the opening of an administrative case – it is reiterated – to establish whether the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions of articles 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. In a generic manner (and, in the specific case of servants subject to the Civil Service regime, by express reference of Article 51 of the Statute on that matter), the referred period is regulated by article 603 of the Labor Code (CT), which indicates that *“The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their offenses prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when cause for the separation was given or, as applicable, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known”*. However, it should be noted that this is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate different rules regarding that point. This is the case, for example, of the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose article 83 establishes a particular statute of limitations regime, namely: *“Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month and serious ones in two years. The prescription shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated”*. The same occurs in the matter of the supervision of the public treasury. For this type of procedure, the applicable period is that regulated by laws No. 8292 (in its article 43), 8422 (article 44), and 8131 (article 112). This is a regulatory system constituted as a sectoral ordinance containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over the general regulations. At its core, these rules refer to the regime provided for in article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, which states at its core:

*“The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and supervision ordinances, shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as one that requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity – the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure.”* (The underlining is ours.)

Now, it is clear that the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective authority is subject to the grounds for interruption established by article 876 of the Civil Code, by reference made by article 601, first paragraph, of the CT. It is necessary to specify that the grounds for interruption – which cause the limitation period to start anew – can only produce that effect insofar as they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, for even if they occurred, if this is after the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inertia in its exercise. Nevertheless, it must be insisted that the interruption is not produced by the simple issuance of the act opening the procedure, but rather by the due communication of the order deeming the case to have been instructed, in accordance with articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP.- **VIII.-** Now, it is decisive to precisely establish the starting point for the computation of the limitation period. On this point (and momentarily setting aside cases regulated by a special rule), article 603 of the CT indicates that the period runs from when the cause for the separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment the holder of the corrective authority is in an objective position to know of the offense and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of their authority. Thus, when the particularities of the case require a preliminary investigation, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior. However, the necessity or not of that phase must be distinguished in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a dilatory strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that such an investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the appropriateness or not of opening the sanctioning procedure or to gather evidence that tends to clarify its necessity or not.- **IX.-** The second factor that must be analyzed is the statute of limitations for the power to agree on the sanction within the procedure (prescripción de la potestad para acordar la sanción dentro del procedimiento), which refers to the maximum time limit available to the holder of the corrective authority to adopt the sanction, once the file has been submitted for their consideration by the directing body (that is, when only the issuance of the final act remains). In this hypothesis, and unless the exception of article 319 of the LGAP applies (concerning the need to hold a second hearing), the hierarchical superior or holder again has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, counted from the moment the directing body of the case formally brings its recommendation to their attention; after which period, the statute of limitations for that power would indefectibly occur and, therefore, the final act would be null due to injury to the jurisdictional element, conditioned in that case by factors of preclusion. Such a scenario, in the specific dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of article 603 of the CT, constitutes a special treatment that overrides what is stipulated by canon 329.3 of the LGAP.- **X.-** Thirdly, the statute of limitations for the power to execute the imposed sanction (prescripción de la potestad para ejecutar la sanción impuesta) refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application or material execution of the dictated sanction. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, unless a special rule exists, would again be the monthly period provided for in article 603 of the CT. The denial of such a period would imply the perpetual possibility for the hierarchical superior to apply the previously ordered sanction, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that authority. Thus, the deadline for ordering the final act once the final report of the directing body has been issued is one thing, and the deadline for materializing the firm sanction ordered is another. On this point, the period must be computed from the moment that act becomes final, which may originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals that may be filed against the act, as appropriate, or if, after the period established by the legal system to file those appeals has elapsed, they have not been filed, in which eventuality, administrative finality occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct.- **XI.-** Finally, another element subject to temporality rules is that concerning the processing of the procedure (tramitación del procedimiento). It refers to the maximum time the administrative procedure established to determine the facts allowing the holder of the public repressive power to adopt the final decision may last. This matter, unless a special rule exists, is regulated by article 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of the LGAP. However, the two-month period established therein possesses an ordering, not peremptory, nature, which certainly does not include or permit proceedings with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice (on this point, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of the Sixth Section of this Court, at 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011). On this point, reference must also be made to what is stipulated by article 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institute of expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento), in cases where the proceeding Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. In this scenario, expiration of the procedure applies even in cases where the proceeding is ready for the dictation of the final act, because the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited article 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the dictation of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the instance of a party, given that the following stage only belongs to the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it has been initiated ex officio, because in that case, the delay does benefit the administrated party, insofar as it would be a delay solely attributable to the public instance.- **IX.-** **ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE SANCTIONING POWER IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.** Having established the foregoing, from what was stated by the plaintiff in facts 8 and 9 of the complaint – reiterated when presenting his conclusions during the preliminary hearing – it is evident that his statute of limitations argument is confined to the initiation stage of the disciplinary administrative procedure established against him. He thus states:

*“In this procedure, the peremptory one-month period has lapsed, since from the review of the administrative file it can be corroborated that the report of the preliminary investigation was made known since July 14, 2010, and it was not until February 18, 2011, that a note was sent to the Director General of Social Adaptation requesting that he indicate the procedure to be followed in the case, and subsequently by Official Letter DG-136-2011 of March 7, 2011, he requests to proceed with the opening of the procedure, which began with the notification of the statement of charges and formal accusation (Resolution 002-142-2009 dated April 6, 2011); however, it was not notified to me until May 4, 2011.”* (see f. 79.)

Now, this Court does not observe the expiration of the referred period nor, consequently, the occurrence of the preclusive effect argued. To that end, we must begin by establishing which period is applicable, a topic on which it is considered that the State's representation is correct when it alleges that it is the five-year period contemplated in article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (LOCGR), because the plaintiff is an official accused of committing unlawful conduct related to the supervision and internal control regulations to which he was clearly subject. Indeed, while it is true that a restrictive or limited conceptualization of the concept of "public treasury servant" applies in principle only to one who is in charge of handling public funds, this Chamber shares the thesis argued by the State – which in this sense would rather give rise to a broad meaning of the referred concept – that, ultimately, the origin of the funds is a factor that, while not irrelevant, is also not exclusive or excluding, insofar as the analysis must focus rather on whether the official in question is or is not immersed in the supervision and internal control regime and whether the offense(s) attributed to them are or are not related to the functions they are to perform within that framework. In this regard, the precedents of this Court have indicated, commenting on the rules that configure the mentioned regime:

*“From the mentioned articles, an objective material criterion follows that allows determining when the mentioned statute of limitations applies to an offense against the Public Treasury. In that sense, if there is a transgression of the control and supervision regulations or those relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year statute of limitations for the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows differentiating the applicable statute of limitations in cases of a labor nature of one month, in accordance with the provisions of article 603 of the Labor Code. With the reform that article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic underwent, by changing the assessment criterion to determine the applicable limitation period, it moved from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out the exercise to determine, for purposes of applying the limitation period, whether someone was a servant of the Public Treasury (subjective aspect). As mentioned above, the criterion currently in force is an objective material one, which is determined by the transgression of the control and supervision regulations, which are composed of, among others, the mentioned laws, as well as the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, No. 8131 and its Regulations, the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its Regulations. Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of the cited regulations allows applying the limitation period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they hold a position in the Public Treasury, incurs a breach of the control and supervision regulations; if this occurs, the 5-year period applies to them.”* (Fifth Section, No. 101-2011 (sic) at 3:30 p.m. on October 24, 2012).

**X.-** In our case, it is accredited (proven fact 3) that, at the time of the relevant events here, the plaintiff worked as Administrator 2 of the Gerardo Rodríguez Echeverría Institutional Care Center, where his responsibilities included acting as Treasurer of the center, in charge of controlling outgoing and incoming invoices and the funds of the Prisoner Committee, as well as payment to suppliers; and, in that sense, the conduct attributed to him was precisely related to aspects inherent to that function. The “Regulation on Values in Custody and the National Penitentiary System Prisoner Assistance Fund,” Executive Decree No. 28030-J of July 28, 1999, regulates the handling of the assets of persons deprived of liberty in the National Penitentiary System, in order to guarantee respect for their rights and maintain security and order, avoiding abuses and improper handling of values in custody. It establishes that the deposit of the referred values is carried out through forms that must be filled out by the Center's Administrator or the person in charge of receiving the deposit (Article 5). In the case of cash deposits, the Administration is obliged to implement due control through records of income and expenditure of money made by persons deprived of liberty for their expenses (Article 8). And later it indicates:

*“Article 9- Regarding the custody of monies belonging to Committees of persons deprived of liberty, the provisions of the ‘Instructions to regulate the organizations of persons deprived of liberty and their relationship with the Penitentiary Administration,’ and the guidelines issued to that effect by the respective authorities, shall apply as pertinent.”* For its part, the referred Instructions, dated November 27, 1996, and published in La Gaceta No. 88 of May 9, 1997, are provided to regulate the various organizations without legal personality of persons deprived of liberty in the Centers of the National Penitentiary System, as well as the relationship of the Penitentiary Administration with all organizations of persons deprived of liberty (Article 1). This document establishes:

*“Article 31.- The control and supervision over the Committee's activities in the Technical Area regarding order, discipline, and institutional security shall be exercised by the Center's Director, the coordinating official, and the Center or Area's Technical Council. In the Economic Area, control and supervision must be carried out by the Center's Administration and Management in compliance with the Regulation on Values in Custody.”* (The underlining is ours.)

And also:

*“Article 33.- The cash money collected by the committee, as a result of activities duly authorized by the Center's Technical Council, must be deposited immediately with the administration, by the person deprived of liberty designated for these purposes, in compliance with institutional and regulatory procedures.* *(...)”* As can be seen from the factual and normative picture outlined so far, the plaintiff here had among his responsibilities administering the fund of the Prisoner Committee, so that regardless of whether the monies deposited therein are public or private, the truth is that said function derived directly from the responsibilities assigned to him by provisions aimed at implementing supervision and internal control mechanisms within the penitentiary center. Therefore, there is no doubt that the statute of limitations applicable to the offenses committed in the exercise of his position is not the generic one of article 603 of the CT, but rather the special one of article 71 of the LOCGR. In particular, since a prior inquiry was conducted in the case by the Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Justice (see proven fact 5), we must adhere to the provisions of subsection b) of the cited rule, which indicates that the start of the preclusive period occurs from the date on which the respective report was brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. In this case, said report reached the hands of the Director General of Social Adaptation on February 18, 2011 (proven fact 6).

And considering that the corresponding statement of charges was notified to the now plaintiff on May 4 of that same year (proven fact 9), it is clear that the five-year period set for that purpose had not expired—not even remotely. What is established in Article 125 of the Autonomous Service Regulations of the Ministry of Justice (which the plaintiff invokes in fact 9 of the complaint, at f. 77 of the judicial file) has no relevance whatsoever, since not only is the one-month period provided therein for imposing suspension or dismissal sanctions intended for ordinary disciplinary actions (that is, those in which the special system of control of public finances is not applicable), but also because, in any case, it is worth recalling that, according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (see, for example, judgment No. 3783-96 of 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 1996), regulatory rules cannot create limitation periods or statutes of repose (plazos de prescripción o caducidad), since only a provision of legal rank can do so. Consequently, as this Chamber does not observe that the preclusive period (plazo preclusivo) that the plaintiff believes applies in his case has operated here, this aspect of the claim is denied." 183-187 of administrative file for dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 18. That by resolution No. 11896 of 8:05 a.m. on March 21, 2012, the Civil Service Tribunal declared the proceeding filed by the Ministry of Justice to be well-placed, authorizing the Executive Branch to dismiss the now plaintiff without employer liability (f. 205-239 of administrative file for dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 19. That Mr. Nombre126897 filed an appeal against the resolution indicated in the preceding fact (f. 240-244 of administrative file for dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 20. That by resolution No. 037-2012-TASC of 10:00 a.m. on September 12, 2012, the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service rejected the filed appeal and confirmed the resolution subject to appeal, thereby exhausting the administrative remedy (f. 259-290 of administrative file for dismissal proceeding No. 15357).- 21. That the plaintiff's dismissal was executed pursuant to official letter DGIRH-PGAL-472-2012 of November 22, 2012, issued by the Office of Labor Environment Management Process of the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources of the Ministry of Justice and Peace; received by the former on the following day (f. 117 of the judicial file).- **II.- UNPROVEN FACTS.** None of relevance.- **III.- PARTIES' ARGUMENTS.** The plaintiff's special judicial representative argues, in summary, that her client has worked for the Ministry of Justice and Peace since July 16, 1979, covered by the Civil Service regime. In recent years, he has worked as Administrator 2 at the Gerardo Rodríguez Echeverría Institutional Care Center, in the capacity of Treasurer. She adds that, as an overload of duties, he was asked to keep control of the expense and income invoices of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty, whose funds come from the activities these persons carry out within the Center. According to Article 9 of the "Regulation for Valuables in Custody and Aid Fund for Persons Deprived of Liberty of the National Penitentiary System," Executive Decree No. 28030-J of July 28, 1999, the provisions established in the "Instructions to regulate the organization of persons deprived of liberty and their relationship with the Penitentiary Administration," published in La Gaceta No. 88 of May 9, 1997, apply to the custody of the funds of the said Committees. From these regulations, it follows, on the one hand, that the funds belong to the persons deprived of liberty and, on the other, that there must be a person responsible for the proper operation of the Committees. She continues explaining that in November 2011, a dismissal proceeding was filed before the General Directorate of the Civil Service against her client, for allegedly incurring serious faults in the handling of the funds of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty during the first four-month period of 2009, from which a shortfall of eighteen million one hundred fifty-two thousand two hundred eighty-one colones and sixty-six cents (¢18,152,281.66) derived. This proceeding was preceded by an administrative procedure, initiated, in turn, based on a preliminary report issued on July 14, 2010. However, it was not until February 18, 2011, that the opening of the proceeding was requested from the Director General of Social Adaptation, whose resolution formulating charges was issued on May 4 of the following year. In the proceeding, she points out that the plaintiff alleged the statute of limitations on the disciplinary power, as more than one month had passed between the time the preliminary report was presented and the opening and notification of the proceeding. This allegation was rejected, alleging the application of the five-year preclusive period established in the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, considering that the funds of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty are public funds. She considers this criterion erroneous, stating that the statute of limitations period contemplated in Article 603 of the Labor Code should apply instead, since the monies of the said Committees are not part of the public treasury (hacienda pública). Consequently, the administrative procedure processed against her client is null and void, given that at the time of its initiation, the Administration's sanctioning disciplinary power had already prescribed, a defect that in turn invalidates the final act of dismissal.- **IV.-** In turn, to the plaintiff's arguments, the defendant responds, in synthesis, that in March 2009, the Audit Department of the Ministry of Justice conducted a visit to the CAI Nombre5571, in response to the Work Program for that same year and at the request of the Directorate of that center, following a report of an apparent embezzlement. At the time of the audit, the plaintiff held the position of Center Treasurer and was in charge of recording the books and the outflows and inflows of the fund of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty. As a result of the foregoing, the Audit Department informed the General Directorate of Social Adaptation of a series of anomalies attributable to the plaintiff, including delays and inconsistencies in the record-keeping of the Committee's funds, multiple payments of the same invoice, supported by copies thereof or by their corresponding receipt of money or copies issued for credit transactions; and outflows supported by invoices without letterhead, without supplier name, dates, signatures, and forged documents. It was thus that a shortfall of ¢18,152,281.66 was evidenced in reference to the money recorded in the valued documents, a fact that initiated the proceedings that culminated in the plaintiff's dismissal. The State representative considers that the administrative sanctioning power is not time-barred in this case. The plaintiff accuses an improper application of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (LOCGR) in his case and alleges that based on the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code, the fault committed—which he never denies—is barred by the statute of limitations. He explains that in the public employment regime, there are different statute of limitations periods for disciplinary power, duly differentiated. In the first place, there is Article 603 of the Labor Code, which applies as a general rule, unless there is a special provision to the contrary. This rule provides that the statute of limitations operates in one month. On the other hand, Article 71 of the LOCGR establishes a period of 5 years when it involves transgressions of the control and oversight regulations. In the same sense, numeral 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and 44 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office establish the 5-year period when it involves transgressions of the control and oversight regulations. Based on the foregoing, it can be generally affirmed that there are two statute of limitations periods applicable to public officials regarding the exercise of disciplinary power, without prejudice to other special legal frameworks that have their own periods, as is the case with the General Police Law. From the mentioned numerals, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when there is a transgression of the control and oversight regulations or relating to the public treasury, as they are concrete rules which, being special, prevail over the general norm, for purposes of applying the five-year statute of limitations period for disciplinary power. He esteems that the simple concept of "servant of the Public Treasury (servidor de la Hacienda Pública)" is outdated. As relevant to the present case, the plaintiff held the position of Administrator 2, located at the Young Adult Institutional Care Center; he was the Treasurer, and his duties included recording the outflows and inflows of the fund of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty. As provided by the Regulation for Valuables in Custody and Aid Fund for Persons Deprived of Liberty of the National Penitentiary System (Executive Decree No. 28030-J of July 28, 1999), the Center's Administrator or the person in charge was required to record cash deposits and outflows; needing to implement a due record control (Arts. 5 and 8). And it is clearly established that, regarding the custody of monies of Committees of persons deprived of liberty, the provisions of the "Instructions to regulate the organizations of persons deprived of liberty and their relationship with the Penitentiary Administration" and the directives issued for that purpose apply as appropriate (Art. 9 ibid). According to those Instructions, published in La Gaceta No. 88 of May 9, 1997, the cash drawer (arca económica), the control, and the supervision of the Committee's economic fund must be carried out by the Center's Administration and Directorate in compliance with the Regulation for Valuables in Custody (Art. 31); the collection of cash monies must be deposited immediately with the administration (Art. 33). It is evident that the abovementioned regulation and instructions respond to the control and supervision requirements ordered by the legislator in the Internal Control Law. According to the Institutional Audit report, a series of irregularities existed attributable to the plaintiff, who committed them in the performance of the duties inherent to the public position he held and on the occasion thereof, using the means and opportunities offered by his position (Art. Placa30722), all in clear violation of internal control administrative norms and violating the duty of probity, by failing to demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of legally conferred public powers. His duties included ensuring the due and correct control of the fund of the Committee of persons deprived of liberty, entirely independent of whether these were public funds or not (control and oversight regulations), since he was the primary guarantor before the Administration regarding the handling and supervision of the established internal control systems. Therefore, the State representative continues, if the reprimanded conducts do not correspond to a simple disciplinary responsibility, but rather the implication and scope of the alleged behaviors relate to presumed infractions of the internal control and oversight regulations, as well as the duty of probity, without a doubt, the applicable period in this case is the five years provided by ordinal 71 of the LOCGR and not the general rule contemplated in ordinal 603 of the Labor Code. It should be noted that according to subparagraph b) of numeral 71 cited, in cases of non-notorious facts, the five-year period will run from the date on which the report about the possible irregularity is brought to the attention of the hierarchy or the competent person to order the initiation of the administrative procedure leading to dismissal. Reason for which that peremptory five-year period did not elapse in this case, especially considering that the expiry of the period granted to exercise corrective power is subject to the interruption grounds established by Article 876 of the Civil Code, by remission of ordinal 601, first paragraph, of the Labor Code. The sanctioning regulations applied to the plaintiff are consistent with what was made known in the opening or initial act of the proceeding, which contemplated dismissal as the punitive consequence for the alleged conducts. The resolution being challenged applied said regulations related to dismissal, as it considered that the conducts warranted the most severe sanction, especially since Article 4 of Law No. 8422 establishes that any duly proven infraction of the duty of probity constitutes just cause for separation from public office without employer liability. Regarding the statement of reasons for the act and the proportionality of the imposed sanction, the State representative states that in the present case, the attributed acts indisputably constitute administrative offenses against functional duties previously imposed by the legal system, and as such, are fully proven. And concerning the grievance asserted, there indisputably exists an appropriateness of the sanction to the committed act; which allows concluding a due and just proportionality between the severity of the dismissal sanction imposed, the objective and subjective circumstances concurrent in the offense being sanctioned, and the purpose pursued with that penalty. In this case, the reason for the dismissal act is amply proven from the resolutions of the Civil Service Tribunal and the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service. Regarding the claim for compensation, the Prosecutor deems that the simple fact that the substantive claim of the lawsuit is rejected is sufficient basis to deny the pecuniary claim made, as it is accessory to the former. He concludes requesting that the lawsuit be rejected in all its aspects, with the respective award of costs against the plaintiff.- **V.- ON THE MERITS.** In the present matter, the procedural claim asserted consists of a claim for annulment, from which derive a claim for reinstatement and others for financial reparation, it being clear that the latter two are secondary or accessory to the first, to the extent that their success depends on that of the first. To begin, then, this Tribunal is requested to declare the nullity of the resolution that ordered the plaintiff's dismissal, as he considers that the sanctioning power had prescribed. As a basis for this, he alleges—in synthesis—that the preclusive period applicable to his case is that of Article 603 of the Labor Code and not that of numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (LOCGR), which was incorrectly invoked, estimating that the funds whose irregular handling was attributed to him were not public and, therefore, the statute of limitations regime characteristic of public treasury (hacienda pública) officials is inapplicable. Thus, the correct decision on this matter requires determining whether or not the aforementioned regime was applicable to the plaintiff, a question upon which depends, in turn, the determination of the preclusion period and, consequently, whether the lawsuit becomes well-placed or ill-placed. It should be noted, before proceeding, that from the arguments of both parties in the file as well as the conclusions they presented in the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar), it is clear that in this case, the substance of the charges that were at the time directed against the plaintiff is not under discussion, and no analysis whatsoever will be undertaken on them.- **VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF SANCTIONING POWER.** On this particular, it is fitting to begin by recalling that the statute of limitations, generally speaking, requires the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia by the holder of a right in its exercise; b) lapse of the time period set by the legal system for this purpose; and, c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting the statute of limitations. This implies that there is no liberatory effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two conditions, the assertion is not made. This is because the statute of limitations responds to a principle requiring a party's request and, unlike expiration (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Regarding specifically employment relationships (relaciones funcionariales), the exercise of the corrective power of the superior against officials who have committed sanctionable offenses is subject to this temporality factor, after which such exercise cannot be undertaken. This time limit, as will be stated, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, this disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of ordinal 102 of the General Law of Public Administration, LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, for finalistic aspects, are considered imprescriptible, those referring to internal sanctioning exercise—such as the one examined in this case—are subject to temporality rules under which they may lapse due to the passage of the time period established by the legal system without materializing them. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative superior, and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which his power to request recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges.- **VII.-** Now, for the purposes of the present case, it is necessary to distinguish between various scenarios that arise in this type of disciplinary proceedings, in which rules for the temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, with diverse nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for clarity purposes, of demarcation criteria that allow addressing the discussed topics, depending on the scenario at issue. In this line, the temporal course of different stages must be distinguished. First, it is appropriate to analyze the statute of limitations on the exercise of disciplinary power (prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria), which refers to the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the relevant procedural measures that will enable them to issue the final decision. On this level, it concerns the maximum period allowed by the legal system for the administrative superior to order the opening of the pertinent proceeding, aimed at establishing the relevance or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that notification of the opening of the proceeding seeking to establish the facts (material truth) that serve as the basis for the act's reason, generates an interrupting effect on that temporality margin, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited period for exercising the power is interrupted only with the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary that the Administration order the opening of an administrative case—it bears repeating—to establish if the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of what is established in ordinals 214, 221, 297, and 308 of the LGAP. Generically (and, in the specific case of employees subject to the Civil Service regime, by express remission of Article 51 of the Statute on that matter), the referred period is regulated by numeral 603 of the Labor Code (CT), which indicates that "The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults shall prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the acts giving rise to the disciplinary correction became known." However, it must be noted that this is a norm that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. This is the case, for example, of the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose numeral 83 sets a particular statute of limitations regime, namely: "Minor faults shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated." The same occurs in matters of oversight of the public treasury (fiscalización de la hacienda pública). For this type of proceeding, the applicable period is that regulated by Laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112). This is a regulatory system constituted as a sectorial legal framework containing concrete rules which, being special, prevail over the general norm. At its core, these norms remit to the regime provided in ordinal 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, which states essentially:

"The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight regulations (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización), shall be time-barred in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as that act which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report on its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the superior or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding." (Underlining is ours.)

Now, it is clear that the expiry of the period granted to exercise corrective power is subject to the interruption grounds established by ordinal 876 of the Civil Code, by remission of ordinal 601, first paragraph, of the CT. It is necessary to specify that the interruption grounds—which cause the prescriptive period to begin anew—can only produce that effect to the extent they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occur, if the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded due to inertia in its exercise. Nonetheless, it must be insisted that interruption does not occur with the simple issuance of the act opening the proceeding, but with the due notification of the decree formally initiating the case, in accordance with ordinals 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP.- **VIII.-** Now, it is crucial to precisely establish the starting point for computing the prescriptive period. On this matter (and momentarily setting aside cases regulated by special norm), numeral 603 of the CT indicates that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or failing that, from when the acts giving rise to the disciplinary correction became known. In this sense, the one-month period is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is objectively able to become aware of the fault and, therefore, undertake the exercise of their power.

Thus, when the particularities of the case require a preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar), the referenced monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior (jerarca). Nevertheless, the necessity of that phase must be determined in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a delaying tactic to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that such an investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the disciplinary procedure (procedimiento sancionatorio) or to gather evidence that tends to clarify its necessity.

**IX.-** The second factor to be analyzed is the statute of limitations for the power to order the sanction within the procedure (prescripción de la potestad para acordar la sanción dentro del procedimiento), which refers to the maximum time limit the holder of the corrective power has to adopt the sanction, once the case file has been submitted for their consideration by the directing body (órgano director) (that is, when only the issuance of the final act remains). In this hypothesis, and unless the exception of numeral 319 of the LGAP applies (concerning the need to hold a second hearing), the hierarchical superior or holder again has a maximum period of one month to decide the applicable sanction, counted from the moment the directing body of the case formally brings its recommendation to their attention; after which, the statute of limitations for that power would unfailingly occur and, therefore, the final act would be null and void for injury to the element of competence, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. Such a scenario, in the concrete dynamics of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, given the content of article 603 of the CT, constitutes a special treatment that overrides what is established by canon 329.3 of the LGAP.

**X.-** Thirdly, the statute of limitations for the power to execute the imposed sanction (prescripción de la potestad para ejecutar la sanción impuesta) refers to the period the administrative hierarchical superior has to order the application or material execution of the dictated sanction. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, unless a special rule exists, would again be the monthly period provided in numeral 603 of the CT. Denying such a period would imply the perpetual possibility of the hierarchical superior applying the previously ordered sanction, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body has been issued is one thing, and the period to materialize the firm sanction ordered is another. At this point, the period must be computed from the finality (firmeza) of that act, which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals that may be filed against the act as appropriate, or if, after the period established by the legal system to file those appeals has elapsed and they have not been filed, in which event administrative finality occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct.

**XI.-** Finally, another element that is subject to temporality rules is the one referring to the processing of the procedure (tramitación del procedimiento). It refers to the maximum time the administrative procedure established to determine the facts that allow the final decision of the holder of the public repressive power to be adopted can last. This matter, unless a special rule exists, is regulated by article 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of the LGAP. However, the two-month period provided therein is directory in nature, not peremptory, which of course does not include or permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid for injury to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice (on this point, see ruling N° 199-2011-VI of the Sixth Section of this Court, at 16:20 hours on September 12, 2011). At this point, reference must also be made to what is established by article 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institution of the lapsing of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento), in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. In this scenario, lapsing applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, because the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited article 340, regarding the impossibility of lapsing when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the request of a party, given that the next stage is solely the responsibility of the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it was initiated ex officio, because in that case, the delay does benefit the administered party, to the extent that it would, in that case, be a delay solely attributable to the public body.

**IX.-** **ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE SANCTIONING POWER IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.** Having established the foregoing, from what the plaintiff stated in facts 8 and 9 of the complaint—reiterated when presenting his conclusions during the preliminary hearing—it is clear that his statute of limitations argument is confined to the initiation stage of the disciplinary administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo disciplinario) established against him. He states as follows:

*“In this procedure, the peremptory one-month period has elapsed, because from the review of the administrative file it can be corroborated that the report of the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) was brought to attention on July 14, 2010, and it was not until February 18, 2011, that a note is sent to the Director General of Social Adaptation requesting that they indicate the procedure to follow in the case, and subsequently, by Official Communication DG-136-2011 of March 7, 2011, they requested to proceed with the opening of the procedure, which began with the notification of the order of imputation and formulation of charges (Resolución 002-142-2009 dated April 6, 2011), however, it was not notified to me until May 4, 2011.”* (see f. 79.)

However, this Court does not observe the expiration of the referred period or, consequently, the occurrence of the preclusive effect being argued. To this effect, we must begin by establishing what the applicable period is, a matter in which it is considered that the State's representation is correct when it alleges that it is the five-year period contemplated in Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), because the plaintiff is an official who is reproached for committing unlawful conduct relating to the oversight and internal control (fiscalización y control interno) rules to which he was clearly subject. Indeed, while it is true that a restrictive or limited conceptualization of the concept of “public treasury servant (servidor de la hacienda pública)” applies, in principle, only to one who is in charge of managing public funds, this Chamber shares the thesis put forward by the State—which in this sense would rather give rise to a broad meaning of the referred concept—that, ultimately, the origin of the funds is a factor that, while not irrelevant, is also not exclusive or excluding, to the extent that the analysis should rather focus on whether the official in question is or is not immersed in the oversight and internal control regime and whether the fault or faults attributed to them have to do or not with the functions they are responsible for performing within that system. In this regard, the precedents of this Court have indicated, commenting on the rules that make up the indicated regime:

*“From the mentioned numerals, an objective material criterion emerges that allows determining when the mentioned statute of limitations applies to a fault against the Public Treasury. In that sense, if there is a transgression of the control and oversight regulations or relating to the Public Treasury, the 5-year statute of limitations period for the disciplinary power applies. This criterion allows differentiating the applicable statute of limitations in cases of a labor nature of one month, in accordance with the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code. With the reform that Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República underwent, by varying the evaluation criterion to determine the applicable statute of limitations period, it moved from a subjective regime to an objective one. Previously, it was necessary to carry out the exercise to determine, for the purposes of applying the statute of limitations period, if one was a public treasury servant (subjective aspect). As mentioned supra, the criterion that currently governs is objective material, which is determined by the transgression of the control and oversight regulations, which are composed of, among others, the mentioned laws, as well as the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, No. 8131 and its Regulations, the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its Regulations. Thus, it is clear that the interpretation of the cited regulations allows applying the statute of limitations period to any public official who, regardless of whether or not they occupy a Public Treasury position, incurs a breach of the control and oversight regulations; if this occurs, the 5-year period applies to them.”* (Fifth Section, N° 101-2011 (sic) at 15:30 hours on October 24, 2012).

**X.-** In our case, it is accredited (proven fact 3) that, at the time of the facts relevant here, the plaintiff worked as Administrator 2 of the Centro de Atención Institucional Nombre5571, where his responsibilities included acting as Treasurer of the center, in charge of controlling expense and income invoices and the funds of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty, as well as payment to suppliers; and, in that sense, the conduct attributed to him had to do, precisely, with aspects inherent to that function. The “Regulations on Valuables in Custody and Aid Fund for Persons Deprived of Liberty of the National Penitentiary System (Reglamento de Valores en Custodia y Fondo de Ayuda a Privados de Libertad del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional)”, Executive Decree No. 28030-J of July 28, 1999, regulates the handling of the property of persons deprived of liberty in the National Penitentiary System, in order to guarantee respect for their rights and maintain security and order, avoiding abuses and inadequate handling of the valuables in custody. It establishes that the deposit of the referred valuables is made through forms that must be filled out by the Center Administrator or the person in charge of receiving the deposit (Article 5). In the case of cash deposits, the Administration is obliged to implement due control through records of the income and expenses of money made by persons deprived of liberty for their expenses (Article 8). And later it indicates:

*“Article 9- Regarding the custody of the monies of Committees of persons deprived of liberty, the provisions of the ‘Instructions for regulating the organizations of persons deprived of liberty and their relationship with the Penitentiary Administration’, and the guidelines issued for that purpose by the respective authorities, shall be applied where appropriate.”* For its part, the referenced Instructions, dated November 27, 1996, and published in La Gaceta No. 88 of May 9, 1997, are intended to regulate the various organizations without legal personality of persons deprived of liberty in the Centers of the National Penitentiary System, as well as the relationship of the Penitentiary Administration with all organizations of persons deprived of liberty (Article 1). This establishes:

*“Article 31.- The control and supervision over the activities of the Committee in the Technical Area regarding order, discipline, and institutional security shall be exercised by the Center Director, the coordinating official, and the Technical Council of the Center or Area. In the Economic Area, control and supervision must be carried out by the Center Administration and Direction in compliance with the Regulations on Valuables in Custody (Reglamento de Valores en Custodia).”* (Emphasis added.)

And also:

*“Article 33.- Cash collected by the committee, product of activities duly authorized by the Technical Council of the Center, must be deposited immediately with the administration, by the person deprived of liberty designated for these purposes, in compliance with institutional and regulatory procedures.”* *"(...)"* As can be seen from the factual and normative picture outlined so far, the plaintiff herein had among his responsibilities administering the fund of the Committee of Persons Deprived of Liberty, so that regardless of whether the monies deposited in it are public or private, the truth is that said function derived directly from the responsibilities assigned to him by provisions aimed at implementing oversight and internal control (fiscalización y control interno) mechanisms within the penitentiary center. In this way, there is no doubt that the statute of limitations (prescripción) period applicable to the faults committed in the exercise of his position is not the generic one of numeral 603 of the CT, but the special one of article 71 of the LOCGR. In particular, given that a prior inquiry (indagación previa) was carried out in the case by the Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Justice (see proven fact 5), we must adhere to what is prescribed in subsection b) of the cited norm, which indicates that the start of the preclusive period occurs from the date on which the respective report was brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. In this case, said report reached the hands of the Director General of Social Adaptation on February 18, 2011 (proven fact 6). And considering that the respective notification of charges (traslado de cargos) was notified to the now plaintiff on May 4 of that same year (proven fact 9), it is evident that the five-year period established for that effect had not expired—not even remotely. What is established in Article 125 of the Autonomous Service Regulations of the Ministry of Justice (which the plaintiff invokes in fact 9 of the complaint, at f. 77 of the judicial file) holds no relevance in this regard, since not only is the one-month period provided therein for imposing suspension or dismissal sanctions intended for common disciplinary actions (that is, those in which the special public treasury control regime is not applicable), but also because, in any case, it must be remembered that, according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (see, for example, judgment No. 3783-96 at 9:00 hours on July 26, 1996), regulatory norms cannot create statute of limitations or lapsing periods, as only a provision of legal rank can do so. Consequently, because this Chamber does not observe that the preclusive period the plaintiff believes applies in his case has elapsed in the instant matter, this part of the claim is denied.

**XI.-** **ON THE ACCESSORY CLAIMS.** As noted supra, in addition to the primary, annulment-type claim, the plaintiff petitions that, by virtue of the invalidity he believes vitiates the act of his dismissal, he be reinstated in his position and paid the respective back pay (salarios caídos), as well as damages of a subjective moral and psychological nature. In this sense, the mere fact that the merits of the claim have been rejected is sufficient grounds to deny the remaining claims made, as they are accessory to it. Reinstatement would only have been possible had the nullity of the dismissal act been verified, which has not been the case. For its part, to the extent that no illegitimate action by the Administration has been verified, no patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injury that the plaintiff is not obliged to bear has been configured either. Administrative liability, under the LGAP regime, requires not only establishing the existence of harmful administrative conduct (conducta administrativa dañosa) and patrimonial or extra-patrimonial injury (lesión patrimonial o extrapatrimonial), but also that there is a causal link (nexo causal) between both, that is, a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act imputed and the damage produced; a link that must not be broken by the presence of any of the exoneration conditions provided in article 190 ibidem. In this case, for all the reasons already stated, this Court does not consider that the State's action in this case was illegitimate, which irremediably eliminates one of the critical elements listed for the configuration of a potential extra-contractual administrative liability, which is the verification of the existence of harmful conduct originating from a material or moral injury that the administered party is not obliged to bear (Article 194 of the LGAP). In addition to the foregoing, the fault of the victim, which in this case lies in the commission of the faults attributable to the plaintiff (and which he, as indicated, never challenged on the merits), breaks the potential causal link that could have arisen, which only contributes to the impropriety of the economic claim outlined.

**XII.-** **REGARDING THE OBJECTION FILED.** The defendant filed an objection for lack of legal standing (falta de derecho), which, based on the legal reasons developed supra, must be upheld, declaring the claim without merit in all its aspects.

**XIII.-** **ON COSTS.** Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to that same rule, in accordance with numeral 119.2 ibidem. Waiver of this condemnation is only viable: a) when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between the amount claimed and the amount definitively obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the claim are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (article 194 ibidem). In the instant case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions set by the applicable regulations and break the postulate of condemning the losing party. Therefore, the payment of both costs is imposed on the plaintiff.

**POR TANTO:** The objection for lack of legal standing (falta de derecho) is upheld. The claim filed by Nombre126897 against the State is declared **IMPROCEDENTE**. Both costs are charged to the plaintiff. NOTIFÍQUESE.

**CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA** **SILVIA CONSUELO FERNÁNDEZ BRENES** **FELIPE CÓRDOBA RAMÍREZ**

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Central: 2545-0003 Ÿ Fax: 2545-0033 Ÿ Correo electrónico: ...01 Proceso: Puro derecho Actor: Nombre126897 Demandado: El Estado N° 80-2013-VII TRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA (SECCIÓN SÉTIMA). Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, a las catorce horas con cincuenta minutos del veintiuno de noviembre del dos mil trece.- Proceso de conocimiento declarado de puro derecho, seguido ante este Tribunal por Nombre126897 , no indica estado civil, profesión u oficio ni domicilio, con cédula de identidad número CED118465 (f. 1 y 85); contra EL ESTADO , por el cual comparece el Procurador B Lic. Guillermo Bonilla Herrera, casado, abogado, vecino de Tres Ríos, con cédula de identidad número CED116459 (f. 93 y 94). Intervino también en el proceso, en representación del actor, su apoderada especial judicial Licda. Karen Carvajal Loaiza, soltera, abogada, no indica domicilio, con cédula de identidad número CED118070 (f. 1 y 85). Las personas físicas citadas son mayores.-

RESULTANDO:

1.- Que el actor, con base en los hechos y citas de derecho que expuso, en escrito presentado el 23 de enero del 2013 (f. 69-84) y precisado por el que corre a f. 87-88, formuló demanda cuya pretensión –en resumen y teniendo en cuenta los ajustes realizados durante la audiencia preliminar– consiste en solicitar que en sentencia se declare que el procedimiento administrativo seguido en su contra estaba prescrito al momento de dictarse la resolución de despido, la cual resulta consecuentemente nula; vicio de que adolece además esta última por haber aplicado una normativa que no es procedente en el caso concreto. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, que se reinstale al actor en su puesto de trabajo, con pago de daños y perjuicios que desglosa así: por daño moral subjetivo, tres millones de colones; por daño psicológico, tres millones de colones; y en concepto de perjuicios (sic), los salarios dejados de percibir desde el despido, los cuales estima en tres millones quinientos mil colones hasta la fecha de presentación de la demanda, sin perjuicio de los que adicionalmente procedan hasta su efectiva reinstalación.- 2.- El demandado contestó negativamente la acción y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho. Además, manifestó su renuencia a conciliar en este asunto (f. 94-115).- 3.- En la audiencia preliminar efectuada a partir de las 8:30 horas del 4 de julio del 2013, con asistencia de ambas partes, se aclaró la pretensión del modo que quedó reseñado en el resultando primero supra. Además, al no haber más prueba que recibir aparte de la documental, la jueza tramitadora Licda. Godelieve López Salas declaró el proceso como de puro derecho, de conformidad con el artículo 98 inciso 2) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), por lo que las partes procedieron a rendir oralmente sus conclusiones (audiencia grabada y que consta adjunta al expediente en su correspondiente soporte electrónico; minuta a f. 141-142).- 4.- Esta resolución se dicta previa deliberación. No se notan causales de nulidad capaces de invalidar lo actuado.- Redacta el juez Hess Araya, con el voto afirmativo de la jueza Fernández Brenes y del juez Córdoba Ramírez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- HECHOS PROBADOS. Como tales se tiene los siguientes de relevancia:

1. Que el actor inició sus labores en el Ministerio de Justicia y Paz, a partir del 16 de julio de 1979. Al momento de su despido a partir del 1 de enero del 2013, se encontraba nombrado en propiedad en el puesto N° 002844, clase de puesto Administrador 2, puesto ubicado en el Centro de Atención Institucional Adulto Joven (f. 116 y 118 del expediente judicial; f. 391, 394 al 396, 439 y 441 del expediente personal).- 2. Que, entre sus funciones, el actor era responsable de supervisar y controlar a nivel administrativo todo lo relacionado con el manejo de bienes muebles e inmuebles asignados al centro penitenciario, así como ejercer control de inventarios, caja chica, “cuenta Comité de Internos”, arrendamiento minipulpería, alimentación y otros (f. 119-122 del expediente judicial).- 3. Que en el año 2009, el accionante laboraba como Administrador 2 del Centro de Atención Institucional Nombre5571 , donde sus responsabilidades incluían la de ejercer como Tesorero del centro, a cargo del control de las facturas de egresos e ingresos y los fondos del Comité de Privados de Libertad, así como el pago a los proveedores (confesión ficta contenida en el hecho 1 de la demanda, no controvertido en cuanto a lo indicado; f. 11 y 247 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 4. Que por oficio N° DGAU-70 del 2 de abril, ampliado posteriormente por el N° DGAU-111 del 30 de junio, ambos del 2009, la Auditoría Interna del Ministerio de Justicia comunicó a la Dirección General de Adaptación Social una serie de anomalías en el manejo de fondos atribuibles –en cuanto interesa– al aquí demandante (f. 2-7 y 14-20 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 5. Que mediante oficio N° D.G.-948-2009 del 22 de abril del 2009, la Dirección General de Adaptación Social solicitó a la Dirección Jurídica realizar la investigación correspondiente (f. 1 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 6. Que por oficio D.J. 2011-550 del 18 de febrero del 2011, se hizo de conocimiento de la Dirección General de Adaptación Social el resultado de la investigación preliminar, recomendándose la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo en contra del funcionario Nombre126897 y otro (f. 155-157 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 7. Que mediante oficio DG-136-2011 del 7 de marzo del 2011, la recién mencionada Dirección ordenó proceder con la apertura del procedimiento disciplinario (f. 158 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 8. Que mediante resolución número 001-142-2009 de las 9:00 horas del 11 de marzo de 2011, la Dirección Jurídica del Ministerio de Justicia ordenó la apertura formal del procedimiento administrativo número 142-2009 en contra del actor y otro, designando al órgano director (f. 164 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 9. Que por resolución N° 002-142-2009 de las 8:00 horas del 6 de abril de 2011, el órgano director efectuó la “Imputación e Intimación de Cargos” al actor, convocando la comparecencia oral y privada para las 8:00 horas del 31 de mayo siguiente. Lo anterior le fue notificado el 4 de mayo del mismo año (f. 165-192 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 10. Que mediante resolución N° 006-142-2009 de las 9:00 horas del 2 de setiembre del 2011, el órgano director del procedimiento rindió su “Recomendación final” al Director General de Adaptación Social, proponiendo el despido sin responsabilidad patronal del actor y otro (f. 262-289 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 11. Que por oficio DG-2037-10-2011 del 4 de octubre de 2011, el Director General de Adaptación Social solicitó al Ministro de Justicia instar la gestión de despido ante la Dirección General del Servicio Civil, en contra del funcionario Nombre126897 (f. 290-306 y 308 del expediente “Legajo Prueba 2”).- 12. Que el 4 de noviembre de 2011 fue presentada ante la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, la gestión de despido promovida por el Ministerio de Justicia y Paz en contra del señor Nombre126897 (hecho 3 de la demanda, no controvertido; f. 1-23 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 13. Que por resolución AJD-RES-511-2011 de las 14:30 horas del mismo 4 de noviembre del 2011, la Dirección General de Servicio Civil hizo el traslado e imputación de cargos al señor Nombre126897 , concediéndole los plazos de ley para efectos de oponerse a los cargos endilgados y ofrecer prueba de descargo. La notificación se realizó el día 7 del mismo mes y año (f. 60-66 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 14. Que por escrito presentado el 14 de noviembre del 2011, el aquí demandante formuló la excepción de prescripción del procedimiento disciplinario (f. 76-82 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 15. Que mediante resolución AJD-RES-524-2011 de las 10:00 horas del 16 de noviembre del 2011 y por considerarlo cuestión de previo y especial pronunciamiento, la Dirección General de Servicio Civil remitió los autos al Tribunal de Servicio Civil, a efectos de que resolviera acerca de la alegada prescripción (f. 83-87 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 16. Que el Tribunal de Servicio Civil, por resolución de las 7:25 horas del 15 de diciembre del 2011, rechazó la excepción de prescripción opuesta de previo (f. 117-125 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 17. Que una vez tramitado el procedimiento respectivo, la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, a través de resolución N° AJD-RES-074-2012 de las 11:10 horas del 3 de febrero del 2012, remitió los autos al Tribunal de Servicio Civil para el dictado de la respectiva resolución (f. 183-187 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 18. Que por resolución N° 11896 de las 8:05 horas del 21 de marzo del 2012, el Tribunal de Servicio Civil declaró con lugar la gestión promovida por el Ministerio de Justicia, quedando autorizado el Poder Ejecutivo para despedir al ahora actor sin responsabilidad patronal (f. 205-239 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 19. Que el señor Nombre126897 interpuso recurso de apelación en contra de la resolución indicada en el hecho precedente (f. 240-244 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 20. Que mediante resolución N° 037-2012-TASC de las 10:00 horas del 12 de setiembre del 2012, el Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil rechazó el recurso de apelación interpuesto y confirmó la resolución venida en alzada, dando por agotada la vía administrativa (f. 259-290 del expediente administrativo de gestión de despido N° 15357).- 21. Que el despido del accionante fue ejecutado conforme al oficio DGIRH-PGAL-472-2012 del 22 de noviembre de 2012, emitido por el área de Proceso de Gestión del Ambiente Laboral de la Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Justicia y Paz; recibido por el primero el día siguiente (f. 117 del expediente judicial).- II.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS. Ninguno de relevancia.- III.- ALEGATOS DE LAS PARTES. Arguye la apoderada especial judicial del actor, resumidamente, que su representado ha trabajado para el Ministerio de Justicia y Paz desde el 16 de julio de 1979, amparado al régimen de Servicio Civil. En los últimos años, ha laborado como Administrador 2 en el Centro de Atención Institucional Gerardo Rodríguez Echeverría, en calidad de Tesorero. Agrega que, como recargo de funciones, se le solicitó llevar un control de las facturas de egresos e ingresos del Comité de Privados de Libertad, cuyos fondos provienen de las actividades que éstos realizan a lo interno del Centro. Conforme al artículo 9 del “Reglamento de valores en custodia y fondo de ayuda a privados de libertad del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional”, decreto ejecutivo número 28030-J del 28 de julio de 1999, a la custodia de los dineros de los citados Comités se aplica lo establecido en el “Instructivo para regular la organización de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con la Administración Penitenciaria”, publicado en La Gaceta número 88 del 9 de mayo de 1997. De esas regulaciones se desprende, por una parte, que los fondos pertenecen a las personas privadas de libertad y, por otra, que debe existir una persona responsable de la adecuada operación de los Comités. Sigue explicando que en noviembre del 2011, fue interpuesta ante la Dirección General de Servicio Civil una gestión de despido contra su mandante, por haber incurrido supuestamente en faltas graves en el manejo de los dineros del Comité de privados de libertad durante el primer cuatrimestre del 2009, de las cuales derivó un faltante de dieciocho millones ciento cincuenta y dos mil doscientos ochenta y un colones con sesenta y seis céntimos (¢18.152.281,66). Dicha gestión estuvo precedida de un procedimiento administrativo, iniciado, a su vez, con base en un informe preliminar emitido el 14 de julio de 2010. No obstante, no fue sino hasta el 18 de febrero de 2011 que se solicitó al Director General de Adaptación Social la apertura del proceso, cuya resolución de traslado de cargos se dictó el 4 de mayo siguiente. En el procedimiento, señala que el actor alegó la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, por haber transcurrido más de un mes entre el momento que el informe preliminar fue presentado y la apertura y notificación del trámite. Dicho alegato fue rechazado, alegando la aplicación del plazo preclusivo de cinco años establecido en la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, por considerar que los fondos del Comité de privados de libertad son públicos. Considera que dicho criterio es erróneo, debiendo aplicarse más bien el plazo de prescripción contemplado en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, pues los dineros de los citados Comités no son parte de la hacienda pública. En consecuencia, el procedimiento administrativo tramitado contra su representado es nulo, dado que al momento de su inicio ya había prescrito el poder disciplinario sancionatorio de la Administración, vicio que a su vez invalida el acto final de despido.- IV.- Por su parte, a los argumentos del actor, responde el demandado, en síntesis, que en marzo del 2009, el Departamento de Auditoría del Ministerio de Justicia realizó una visita al CAI Nombre5571 , en atención al Programa de Trabajo para ese mismo año y a solicitud de la Dirección de ese centro, ante la denuncia de un aparente desfalco. Al momento de la auditoría, el actor tenía la condición de Tesorero del Centro y estaba a cargo del registro de los libros y de los egresos e ingresos del fondo del Comité de Privados de Libertad. Como resultado de lo anterior, la Auditoría comunicó a la Dirección General de Adaptación Social una serie de anomalías imputables al accionante, incluyendo atrasos e inconsistencias en el registro de los fondos del Comité, pagos múltiples de una misma factura, sustentados en copias de esta o en su correspondiente recibo de dinero o copias emitidas para trámite a crédito; egresos amparados en facturas sin membrete, sin nombre de proveedor, fechas, firmas y documentos hechizos. Fue así que se evidenció un faltante de ¢18,152,281.66 en referencia al dinero registrado en los documentos valorados, hecho que dio inicio a los trámites que culminaron con el despido del actor. Considera el representante estatal que no existe prescripción de la potestad sancionadora administrativa en este caso. Acusa el demandante una indebida aplicación del artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR) en su caso y que con base en lo dispuesto por el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo la falta cometida –la cual nunca niega– se encuentra prescrita. Explica que en el régimen de empleo público existen distintos plazos de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, debidamente diferenciados. En primer término, se encuentra el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, que aplica como norma de carácter general, salvo disposición especial contraria. Dicha norma dispone que la prescripción opera en un mes. Por otro lado, el artículo 71 de la LOCGR establece un plazo de 5 años cuando se trata de transgresiones al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización. En el mismo sentido, el numeral 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y 44 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública establecen el plazo de los 5 años cuando se trata de transgresiones al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización. Con base en lo anterior, se puede afirmar, en términos generales, que existen dos plazos de prescripción, aplicables a los funcionarios públicos, en cuanto al ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, sin perjuicio de otros ordenamientos especiales que tienen sus propios plazos, como lo es el caso de la Ley General de Policía. De los numerales mencionados se desprende un criterio material objetivo que permite determinar cuándo existe una transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización o relativo a la hacienda pública, por ser reglas concretas que, en tanto especiales, prevalecen sobre la normativa general, a efecto de aplicar el plazo quinquenal de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. Estima que el simple concepto de “servidor de la Hacienda Pública” está superado. En lo que interesa al presente caso, el accionante ocupaba el puesto de Administrador 2, ubicado en el Centro de Atención Institucional Adulto Joven; era Tesorero y entre sus funciones tenía las de registrar los egresos e ingresos del fondo del Comité de Privados de Libertad. Conforme a lo dispuesto por el Reglamento de Valores en Custodia y Fondo de Ayuda a Privados de Libertad del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional (decreto ejecutivo N° 28030-J de 28 de julio de 1999), el Administrador del Centro o la persona encargada debían de registrar los depósitos de dinero y los egresos; debiendo implementar un debido control de registros (arts. 5 y 8). Y claramente se establece que, en lo correspondiente a la custodia de dineros de Comités de personas privadas de libertad, se aplican en lo conducente las disposiciones del “Instructivo para regular las organizaciones de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con la Administración Penitenciaria” y las directrices que al efecto se emitan (art. 9 ibídem). Según ese Instructivo, publicado en La Gaceta N° 88 de 9 de mayo de 1997, el arca económica, el control y supervisión del fondo económico del Comité debe llevarlo la Administración y Dirección del Centro en cumplimiento del Reglamento de Valores en Custodia (art. 31); debiendo ingresarse de forma inmediata en la administración la recaudación de dineros en efectivo (art. 33). Resulta evidente que el mencionado reglamento y el instructivo aludidos, responden a las exigencias de control y supervisión ordenadas por el legislador en la Ley de Control Interno. Según el informe de la Auditoría Institucional, existió una serie de irregularidades imputables al actor, quien las cometió en el desempeño de las funciones propias del puesto público que ocupaba y con ocasión del mismo, utilizando los medios y oportunidades que le ofrecía su cargo (art. Placa30722 ), todo ello en franca violación a normas administrativas de control interno y violentando el deber de probidad, al no demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades públicas legalmente conferidas. Dentro de sus funciones se encontraba velar por el debido y correcto control del fondo del Comité de personas privadas de libertad, con total independencia de que fueran o no fondos públicos (normas de control y fiscalización), pues él era el principal garante frente a la Administración respecto del manejo y supervisión de los sistemas de control interno establecidos. Entonces, sigue manifestando el representante estatal, si las conductas reprochadas no se corresponden a una responsabilidad disciplinaria simple, sino que la implicación y alcance de los comportamientos intimados se relacionan con presuntas infracciones al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización internos, así como al deber de probidad, sin lugar a dudas, el plazo aplicable en este caso es el de cinco años previsto por el ordinal 71 de la LOCGR y no la general contemplada en el ordinal 603 del Código de Trabajo. Cabe advertir que según el inciso b) del numeral 71 citado, cuando se trate de hechos que no son notorios, el plazo de cinco años correrá a partir de la fecha en que el informe acerca de la posible irregularidad es puesto en conocimiento de la jerarquía o de la persona competente para disponer el inicio del procedimiento administrativo de gestión de despido. Razón por la cual aquel plazo quinquenal perentorio no transcurrió en este caso, máxime si se considera que el fenecimiento del plazo conferido para ejercer la potestad correctiva, se encuentra sujeto a las causales de interrupción que fija el artículo 876 del Código Civil, por remisión que hace el ordinal 601, párrafo primero, del Código de Trabajo. L a normativa sancionatoria aplicada al accionante es congruente con lo que fue intimado en el acto de apertura o inicial del procedimiento, que contemplaba el despido como consecuencia punitiva de las conductas imputadas. La resolución que se cuestiona, aplicó dicha normativa relacionada con el despido, pues consideró que las conductas eran acreedoras de la sanción más gravosa, máxime que el artículo 4 de la Ley N° 8422 establece que toda infracción al deber de probidad, debidamente comprobada, constituye justa causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad patronal. En cuanto a la motivación del acto y la proporcionalidad de la sanción impuesta, expresa el personero estatal que en el presente caso los hechos endilgados constituyen indiscutiblemente faltas administrativas a deberes funcionales previamente impuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico, y como tales, se encuentran plenamente demostrados. Y en lo que interesa al agravio formulado, indiscutiblemente existe una adecuación de la sanción al hecho cometido; lo que permite concluir una debida y justa proporcionalidad entre la gravedad de la sanción de despido impuesta, con las circunstancias objetivas y subjetivas concurrentes en la falta que se sanciona y el fin que se persigue con esa pena. En este caso, de las resoluciones del Tribunal de Servicio Civil y del Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil está sobradamente demostrado el motivo del acto de despido. Acerca de la pretensión indemnizatoria, estima el señor Procurador que el solo hecho de que el planteamiento de fondo de la demanda sea rechazado, es base suficiente para denegar el reclamo pecuniario formulado, en tanto resulta accesorio de aquél. Concluye solicitando que se rechace en todos los extremos la demanda, con la respectiva condenatoria en costas a la parte accionante.- V.- SOBRE EL FONDO. En el presente asunto, la pretensión procesal esgrimida consiste de un reclamo de carácter anulatorio, del cual deriva una petitoria de reinstalación y otras de reparación económica, siendo claro que las dos últimas resultan secundarias o accesorias de la primera, en la medida en que su éxito depende del de la primera. Para comenzar, entonces, se requiere a este Tribunal declarar la nulidad de la resolución que dispuso el despido del actor, por considerar éste que la potestad sancionatoria estaba prescrita. Como fundamento de ello, alega –en síntesis– que el plazo preclusivo aplicable a su caso es el del artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo y no el del numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), el cual fue incorrectamente invocado, estimando que los fondos cuyo manejo irregular se le reprochó no eran públicos y, por ende, es inaplicable el régimen prescriptivo propio de los funcionarios de la hacienda pública. Así las cosas, la correcta decisión de este asunto pasa por establecer si al actor resultaba aplicable o no el susodicho régimen, cuestión de la cual depende, a su vez, la determinación del plazo de preclusión y, como consecuencia de lo anterior, si la demanda deviene procedente o improcedente. Cabe advertir, antes de continuar, que tanto de los alegatos de ambas partes en el expediente como de las conclusiones que expusieron en la audiencia preliminar, está claro que en este caso no está en discusión el fondo de los cargos que en su momento fueron direccionados contra el actor, sobre los cuales no se ingresará a realizar análisis alguno.- VI.- ACERCA DE LA ALEGADA PRESCRIPCIÓN DEL EJERCICIO DE LA POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA. Sobre este particular, cabe comenzar recordando que la prescripción, en términos generales, supone la concurrencia de tres elementos fundamentales: a) inercia del titular de un derecho en su ejercicio; b) transcurso del tiempo fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico al efecto; y, c) alegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica, haciendo valer la prescripción. Ello supone que no existe efecto liberatorio si, pese a concurrir los dos primeros presupuestos, la articulación no se formula. Ello porque la prescripción atiende a un principio rogatorio y a diferencia de la caducidad (en términos procesales), no puede ser considerada de oficio. En lo que toca específicamente a las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad correctiva del jerarca frente a los funcionarios que han cometido faltas sancionables, se encuentra sujeto a este factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal, según se dirá, varía según se trate de la materia regulada y de la existencia de un régimen jurídico especial que configure reglas particulares para tipos específicos de relaciones de empleo público. En consecuencia, esa potestad disciplinaria (que se basa en la doctrina del ordinal 102 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) no es irrestricta en el tiempo. A diferencia de otras potestades públicas que por aspectos finalistas se consideran imprescriptibles, las que se refieren al ejercicio sancionatorio interno –como el que se examina en este caso– están sujetas a reglas de temporalidad en virtud de las cuales pueden fenecer por el decurso del tiempo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico sin concretarlas. Por ende, en este tipo de relaciones, el titular del poder correctivo es el jerarca administrativo y el sujeto pasivo es el funcionario público, quien en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa aplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica.- VII.- Ahora bien, para los efectos del presente caso es necesario discriminar entre diversos supuestos que se producen en este tipo de procedimientos disciplinarios, en los cuales aplican reglas de ejercicio temporal de facultades o potestades, con matices diversos. Se trata del establecimiento necesario, para fines de claridad, de criterios de demarcación que permitan el abordaje de los temas discutidos, según el supuesto de que se trate. En esta línea, ha de distinguirse el decurso temporal de etapas diversas. En primer término, cabe analizar la prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria , que se refiere al plazo que fija el ordenamiento jurídico para que el titular de la potestad correctiva interna adopte las medidas procedimentales del caso que le permitan emitir la decisión final. En este plano, se trata del plazo máximo admitido por el ordenamiento jurídico para que el jerarca administrativo disponga la apertura del procedimiento pertinente, direccionado a establecer la pertinencia o no de la imposición de una sanción. En este caso, es claro que la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento que busca el establecimiento de los hechos (verdad real) que sirven de base al motivo del acto, genera un efecto interruptor de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida en que constituye un acto expreso y una medida que directamente propende al ejercicio de esa potestad. No podría considerarse que el citado plazo del ejercicio de la potestad se interrumpe solo con el dictado del acto final pues, como derivación del principio del debido proceso, es menester que la Administración disponga la apertura de una causa administrativa –se insiste– para establecer si corresponde la sanción, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297 y 308 de la LGAP. De manera genérica (y, en el caso específico de los servidores sujetos al régimen de Servicio Civil, por remisión expresa del artículo 51 del Estatuto de esa materia), el referido plazo se regula por el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo (CT), que indica que “Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria”. Sin embargo, ha de advertirse que se trata de una norma que cede frente a regulaciones particulares y especiales, que incorporan reglas diversas en cuanto a ese extremo. Es el caso, por ejemplo, de la Ley General de Policía, N° 7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994, cuyo numeral 83 fija un régimen de prescripción particular, a saber: “Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario”. Lo mismo se presenta en materia de fiscalización de la hacienda pública. Para este tipo de procedimientos, el plazo aplicable es el regulado por las leyes N° 8292 (en su artículo 43), 8422 (artículo 44) y 8131 (artículo 112). Se trata de un sistema normativo que se constituye como un ordenamiento sectorial que contiene reglas concretas, que en tanto especiales, prevalecen sobre la normativa general. En lo medular, estas normas remiten al régimen previsto en el ordinal 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, N° 7428, que señala en lo medular:

“La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad– la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo.” (Los subrayados son nuestros.)

Ahora bien, es claro que el fenecimiento del plazo conferido para ejercer la potestad correctiva se encuentra sujeto a las causales de interrupción que fija el ordinal 876 del Código Civil, por remisión que hace el ordinal 601, párrafo primero, del CT. Cabe precisar, las causales de interrupción –que hacen que el plazo prescriptivo inicie de nuevo– solo pueden producir ese efecto en la medida en que ocurran antes del vencimiento del plazo a interrumpir, pues aún ocurridas, si lo es vencido el plazo, la simple alegación de prescripción negativa lleva a la pérdida del ejercicio del derecho precluido por inercia en su ejercicio. Con todo, se debe insistir en que la interrupción no se produce con el simple dictado del acto de apertura del procedimiento, sino con la debida comunicación del auto que tiene por instruida la causa, de conformidad con los ordinales 140, 239, 240, 243 de la LGAP.- VIII.- Ahora bien, resulta determinante establecer con precisión el punto de partida del cómputo del plazo prescriptivo. Sobre el particular (y dejando momentáneamente a salvo los casos regulados por norma especial), el numeral 603 del CT señala que el plazo corre desde que se dio la causa para la separación o en su defecto, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria. En este sentido, el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y, por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad. Así las cosas, cuando las particularidades del caso exija la realización de una investigación preliminar, el plazo mensual aludido corre desde el momento en que se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase, pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia dilatoria para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios sería necesaria esa investigación, sino solo en aquellos en que, por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar la pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio o bien para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su necesidad o no.- IX.- El segundo factor que cabe analizar es el de la prescripción de la potestad para acordar la sanción dentro del procedimiento, que se refiere al límite máximo temporal con que cuenta el titular de la potestad correctiva para adoptar la sanción, una vez que el expediente ha sido sometido a su conocimiento por el órgano director (es decir, cuando solo resta la emisión del acto final). En esta hipótesis y a menos que aplique la excepción del numeral 319 de la LGAP (relativa a la necesidad de celebrar una segunda comparecencia), el jerarca o titular nuevamente dispone del plazo máximo de un mes para decidir la sanción aplicable, contado desde el momento en que el órgano director de la causa le ponga formalmente en conocimiento de su recomendación; vencido el cual, ocurría indefectiblemente la prescripción de esa potestad y por ende, el acto final sería nulo por lesión al elemento competencial, condicionado en ese caso por factores de preclusión. Tal supuesto, en la dinámica concreta de los procedimientos de corte sancionatorio disciplinario, dado el contenido del ordinal 603 del CT, constituye un tratamiento especial que se sobrepone a lo estatuido por el canon 329.3 de la LGAP.- X.- En tercero término, la prescripción de la potestad para ejecutar la sanción impuesta refiere al plazo con que cuenta el jerarca administrativo para disponer la aplicación o ejecución material de la sanción dictada. En este caso, por integración analógica, el plazo aplicable, salvo norma especial, sería de nuevo el plazo mensual previsto en el numeral 603 del CT. La negación de semejante plazo supondría la posibilidad perenne del jerarca de aplicar la sanción dispuesta de antemano, bajo el alegato de una suerte de imprescriptibilidad de esa potestad. Así, una cosa es el plazo para disponer el acto final una vez emitido el informe final del órgano director y otro el plazo para materializar la sanción firme dispuesta. En este punto, el plazo ha de computarse desde la firmeza de ese acto, lo que puede originarse por la confirmación de la sanción luego del ejercicio y resolución de los recursos ordinarios que quepan contra el acto según corresponda o bien si, transcurrido el plazo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico para formular esos recursos, no han sido planteados, en cuya eventualidad, la firmeza administrativa se produce por la inercia del destinatario de los efectos de la conducta.- XI.- Finalmente, otro elemento que se encuentra sujeto a reglas de temporalidad es el referente a la tramitación del procedimiento. Se refiere al tiempo máximo que puede demorar el procedimiento administrativo instaurado para establecer los hechos que permitan adoptar la decisión final del titular de la potestad represiva pública. Este tema, salvo norma especial, se encuentra regulado por el ordinal 261, en relación con el 319 y el 340, todos de la LGAP. Sin embargo, el plazo bimensual que allí se dispone posee naturaleza ordenatoria, no perentoria, lo que desde luego no incluye ni permite procedimientos con dilaciones injustificadas, arbitrarias y desproporcionadas, los que serían inválidos por lesión a la máxima de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida (sobre el particular, puede verse el fallo N° 199-2011-VI de la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal, de las 16: 20 horas del 12 de setiembre del 2011). En este punto ha de remitirse además a lo estatuido por el ordinal 340 de la LGAP, que regula el instituto de la caducidad del procedimiento, en los casos en que la Administración instructora que lo inició lo someta a un estado de abandono por un plazo igual o superior de seis meses por causas imputables a aquélla. En este supuesto, la caducidad aplica incluso en los casos en que el procedimiento se encuentre listo para el dictado del acto final, pues la restricción del inciso 2 del citado artículo 340, en cuanto a la imposibilidad de la caducidad cuando el asunto se encuentra listo para el dictado de ese acto final, solo aplica cuando el procedimiento ha iniciado a instancia de parte, dado que la etapa siguiente solo compete a la Administración, la que no podría escudarse en su inercia. Esto no ocurre cuando se ha instruido de oficio, pues en ese caso, la dilación sí beneficia al administrado, en la medida en que se trataría en ese caso, de un retraso solo imputable a la instancia pública.- IX.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA EN EL CASO CONCRETO. Establecido lo anterior, de lo manifestado por el accionante en los hechos 8 y 9 de la demanda –reiterado al momento de exponer sus conclusiones durante la audiencia preliminar– se desprende que su alegato de prescripción se constriñe a la etapa de inicio del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario establecido en su contra. Es así que manifiesta:

“En este procedimiento ha operado el plazo perentorio de un mes, pues de la revisión del expediente administrativo puede corroborarse que el informe de la investigación preliminar fue puesto en conocimiento desde el día 14 de julio del 2010, siendo que es hasta el día 18 de febrero del 2011 que se envía nota al Director General de Adaptación Social solicitando que señale el trámite a seguir en el caso y posteriormente por Oficio DG-136-2011 del 7 de marzo del 2011 solicita proceder con la apertura del procedimiento, misma (sic) que dio inicio con la notificación del auto de imputación e intimación de cargos (Resolución 002-142-2009 con fecha 6 de abril del 2011) sin embargo la misma me fue notificada hasta el día 4 de mayo del 2011.” (véase f. 79.)

Ahora bien, este Tribunal no observa el vencimiento del referido lapso ni, consecuentemente, el acaecimiento del efecto preclusivo que se arguye. Al efecto, debemos comenzar por establecer cuál es el lapso aplicable, tema en el cual se estima que lleva razón la representación estatal cuando alega que se trata del quinquenal contemplado en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), por tratarse el actor de un funcionario a quien se reprocha la comisión de conductas antijurídicas relativas a las normas de fiscalización y control interno a las que se encontraba claramente sujeto. En efecto, si bien es cierto que una conceptualización restrictiva o limitada del concepto de “servidor de la hacienda pública” aplica en principio solo a aquel que tiene a su cargo el manejo de fondos públicos, esta Cámara comparte la tesis esgrimida por el Estado –que en este sentido daría lugar más bien a una acepción amplia del referido concepto– de que, en definitiva, el origen de los fondos viene siendo un factor que, no irrelevante, tampoco resulta exclusivo o excluyente, en la medida en que el análisis debe centrarse más bien en si el funcionario en cuestión está o no inmerso en el régimen de fiscalización y control interno y si la falta o faltas que se le achaca tienen que ver o no con las funciones que le corresponde desempeñar dentro de ese ordenamiento. En este sentido, han señalado los precedentes de este Tribunal, comentando las normas que configuran el señalado régimen:

“De los numerales mencionados, se desprende un criterio material objetivo que permite determinar cuándo aplica la prescripción mencionada a una falta en contra de la Hacienda Pública. En ese sentido, si existe una transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización o relativo a la Hacienda Pública, aplica el plazo de los 5 años de prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. Este criterio permite diferenciar la prescripción aplicable en casos de naturaleza laboral de un mes, de acuerdo con lo que dispone el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. Con la reforma que sufrió el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, al variar el criterio de valoración, para determinar el plazo de prescripción aplicable, se pasa de un régimen subjetivo a uno objetivo. Anteriormente era necesario llevar a cabo el ejercicio para determinar, a efectos de aplicar el plazo de prescripción, si era un servidor de la Hacienda Pública (aspecto subjetivo). Como se mencionó supra, el criterio que rige en la actualidad es material objetivo, que se determina con la transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización, que lo componen entre otras las leyes mencionadas, así como la Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, n.º 8131 y su Reglamento, la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.º 7494 y su Reglamento. Así pues, es claro que la inteligencia de la normativa citada, permite aplicar el plazo de prescripción, a cualquier funcionario público que, independientemente que ocupe o no un cargo de la Hacienda Pública, incurre en un quebrantamiento al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización, si esto se produce, le aplica el plazo de los 5 años.” (Sección Quinta, N° 101-2011 (sic) de las 15:30 horas del 24 de octubre del 2012).

X.- En nuestro caso, está acreditado (hecho probado 3) que, al momento de los hechos que son relevantes aquí, el demandante laboraba como Administrador 2 del Centro de Atención Institucional Nombre5571 , donde sus responsabilidades incluían la de ejercer como Tesorero del centro, a cargo del control de las facturas de egresos e ingresos y los fondos del Comité de Privados de Libertad, así como el pago a los proveedores; y, en ese sentido, las conductas que le fueron achacadas tenían que ver, precisamente, con aspectos propios de esa función. El “Reglamento de Valores en Custodia y Fondo de Ayuda a Privados de Libertad del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional”, decreto ejecutivo N° 28030-J del 28 de julio de 1999, regula el manejo de los bienes de las personas privadas de libertad en el Sistema Penitenciario Nacional, a efecto de garantizar el respeto de sus derechos y mantener la seguridad y el orden, evitando abusos y manejos inadecuados de los valores en custodia. En él se establece que el depósito de los referidos valores se efectúa por medio de formularios que deben ser llenados por el Administrador del Centro o la persona encargada de recibir el depósito (artículo 5). En el caso de depósitos de dinero, la Administración está obligada a implementar el debido control mediante registros de los ingresos y egresos de dinero realizados por las personas privadas de libertad para sus gastos (artículo 8). Y más adelante se indica:

“Artículo 9º- En lo correspondiente a la custodia de los dineros de Comités de las personas privadas de libertad, se aplicarán en lo conducente las disposiciones del ‘Instructivo para regular las organizaciones de personas privadas de libertad y su relación con la Administración Penitenciaria’, y las directrices que al efecto emitan las instancias respectivas.” Por su parte, el Instructivo aludido, de fecha 27 de noviembre de 1996 y publicado en La Gaceta N° 88 de 9 de mayo de 1997, está previsto para regular las diversas organizaciones sin personería jurídica de las personas privadas de libertad en los Centros del Sistema Penitenciario Nacional, así como la relación de la Administración Penitenciaria con todas las organizaciones de las personas privadas de libertad (artículo 1). En éste se establece:

“Artículo 31.-EI control y supervisión sobre las actividades del Comité en el Área Técnica en cuanto al orden, la disciplina y la seguridad institucional será ejercido por el Director del Centro, el funcionario coordinador y el Consejo Técnico del Centro o Ámbito. En el Área económica, el control y supervisión debe llevarlo la Administración y Dirección del Centro en cumplimiento del Reglamento de Valores en Custodia.” (El subrayado es nuestro.)

Y también:

“Artículo 33.- EI dinero en efectivo que recaude el comité, producto de actividades debidamente autorizadas por el Consejo Técnico del Centro, debe depositarse en forma inmediata en la administración, por parte de la persona privada de libertad designada para estos efectos, en cumplimiento de los procedimientos institucionales y reglamentarios.

(...)” Como se puede apreciar del cuadro fáctico y normativo esbozado hasta aquí, el aquí actor tenía dentro de sus responsabilidades administrar el fondo del Comité de Privados de Libertad, de modo que independientemente de si los dineros depositados en este son públicos o privados, lo cierto es que dicha función derivaba directamente de las responsabilidades asignadas a él por disposiciones dirigidas a implementar mecanismos de fiscalización y control interno dentro del centro penitenciario. De esta suerte, no hay duda de que el plazo de prescripción aplicable a las faltas cometidas en el ejercicio de su cargo no es el genérico del numeral 603 del CT, sino el especial del ordinal 71 de la LOCGR. En particular, habiendo mediado en el caso la realización de una indagación previa por parte de la Dirección Jurídica del Ministerio de Justicia (ver hecho probado 5), debemos estarnos a lo preceptuado en el inciso b) de la citada norma, que señala que el inicio del plazo preclusivo ocurre a partir de la fecha en que el informe respectivo fue puesto en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. En este caso, dicho informe llegó a manos del Director General de Adaptación Social el 18 de febrero del 2011 (hecho probado 6). Y considerando que el traslado de cargos respectivo fue notificado al ahora demandante el 4 de mayo de ese mismo año (hecho probado 9), es palmario que no había vencido –siquiera lejanamente– el lapso de cinco años fijado al efecto. Ninguna relevancia posee al efecto lo establecido en el artículo 125 del Reglamento Autónomo de Servicio del Ministerio de Justicia (que el accionante invoca en el hecho 9 de la demanda, a f. 77 del expediente judicial), puesto que no solo el plazo de un mes allí dispuesto para imponer sanciones de suspensión o despido está previsto para acciones disciplinarias comunes (es decir, en las que no resulte aplicable el régimen especial de control de la hacienda pública), sino además porque, en todo caso, cabe recordar que, conforme a la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional (véase, por ejemplo, la sentencia N° 3783-96 de las 9:00 horas del 26 de julio de 1996), las normas reglamentarias no pueden crear plazos de prescripción o caducidad, pues ello solo puede hacerlo una disposición de rango legal. En consecuencia, por no observar esta Cámara que en la especie haya operado el plazo preclusivo que estima el actor aplica en su caso, se deniega este extremo de la demanda.- XI.- SOBRE LAS PRETENSIONES ACCESORIAS. Según se advirtió supra, en adición a la pretensión primaria, de índole anulatoria, el demandante peticiona que, en virtud de la invalidez de que considera está viciado el acto de su despido, se le reinstale en su cargo y se le pague los respectivos salarios caídos, así como daños de índole moral subjetiva y psicológica. En este sentido, el solo hecho de que el planteamiento de fondo de la demanda haya sido rechazado es base suficiente para denegar los restantes reclamos formulados, en tanto resultan accesorios de aquél. La reinstalación solo habría sido posible en caso de que se hubiese constatado la nulidad del acto de despido, que no ha sido el caso. Por su parte, en la medida en que no se ha constatado actuación ilegítima alguna de la Administración, no se ha configurado tampoco una lesión patrimonial o extrapatrimonial que el accionante no esté obligado a soportar. La responsabilidad administrativa, en el régimen de la LGAP, exige que no solo se establezca la existencia de una conducta administrativa dañosa y una lesión patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, sino además, que entre ambas se dé un nexo causal, es decir, que exista relación directa de causa a efecto entre el hecho que se imputa y el daño producido; nexo que no debe verse roto por la presencia de alguna de las condiciones de exoneración previstas en el ordinal 190 ibídem. En este caso, por todas las razones ya expuestas, este Tribunal no considera que la actuación del Estado en este caso haya sido ilegítima, lo cual hace desaparecer irremediablemente uno de los enunciados elementos críticos para la configuración de una eventual responsabilidad administrativa extracontractual, cual es la constatación de la existencia de una conducta dañosa originaria de una lesión material o moral que el administrado no esté obligado a soportar (artículo 194 de la LGAP). En adición a lo anterior, la culpa de la víctima, que en este caso radica en la comisión de las faltas achacables al accionante (y que éste, como se indicó, nunca cuestionó en cuanto al fondo), hace romper el eventual nexo causal que podría haber surgido, lo cual solo abona a la improcedencia del reclamo económico esbozado.- XII.- ACERCA DE LA EXCEPCIÓN INTERPUESTA. El accionado opuso la de falta de derecho, la cual, con base en las razones jurídicas desarrolladas supra, se debe acoger, declarando sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos.- XIII.- SOBRE LAS COSTAS. El artículo 193 del CPCA establece que las costas procesales y personales son impuestas al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor de lo dispuesto en esa misma norma, en concordancia con el numeral 119.2 ibídem. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable: a) cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar; b) cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas que desconociera la parte contraria; o bien, c) cuando se incurra en plus petitio, esto es, cuando la diferencia entre lo reclamado y lo obtenido en definitiva sea de un quince por ciento (15%) o más, a no ser que las bases de la demanda sean expresamente consideradas provisionales o su determinación dependa del arbitrio judicial o dictamen de peritos (ordinal 194 ibídem ). En la especie, no encuentra este órgano colegiado motivo para aplicar las excepciones que fija la normativa aplicable y quebrar el postulado de condena al vencido. Por ende, se impone el pago de ambas costas al actor.-

POR TANTO:

Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho. Se declara IMPROCEDENTE la demanda interpuesta por Nombre126897 contra el Estado. Son ambas costas a cargo del actor. NOTIFÍQUESE.- CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA SILVIA CONSUELO FERNÁNDEZ BRENES FELIPE CÓRDOBA RAMÍREZ