Nullity of municipal agreement for lack of reasoning when suspending road signaling plan citing acquired rightsNulidad de acuerdo municipal por falta de motivación al suspender plan de señalización vial alegando derechos adquiridos

No. 395 -2011 THIRD SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Anexo A, Goicoechea, at nine thirty-five hours on October fourteenth, two thousand eleven.

This Tribunal hears, in its capacity as improper municipal hierarchical superior, the veto filed by Giovanny Arguedas Quesada, of legal age, married, identity card CED78159, resident of Santa Gertrudris Norte, de Grecia, in his capacity as MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF GRECIA, against the agreement adopted by the Council of that local corporation, in Article II, Subsection 3 of Minutes number 031, of the regular session held on August thirty-first, two thousand ten.

Authored by Judge Fernández Brenes; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- PROVEN FACTS.- Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following list is deemed duly accredited: 1.) That in Article II of regular session number 275, held on July thirtieth, two thousand nine, the Municipal Mayor presents the Road Planning and Signage Plan for the canton, prepared jointly by Traffic engineers, the members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Municipality of Grecia; such that the Council, unanimously and definitively, agrees to approve it, as well as "b.) Request Mr. Municipal Mayor, Giovanny Arguedas Quesada, to prepare the Loading and Unloading Regulations, in coordination with the Local Road Safety Council (COLOSEVI) and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) to be ratified by the Municipal Council. c) Request Mr. Giovanny Arguedas Quesada, Municipal Mayor, to present a cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Municipality of Grecia, for the implementation of actions and tasks regarding roadways, of the second stage" (folios 80 to 108, 274 to 286); 2.) That in execution of the foregoing, by official letter DGT-RSR-0431-2009, of August seventh, two thousand nine, the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering of the San Ramón Region presents to the Council the road reorganization proposal for the central core of the canton of Grecia, with the following recommendations: "- Implementation of this project in the short term, considering that roadways constantly vary and the proposed solution is specific. - Execute funds through COLOSEVI. - Commitment of the local government and community stakeholders to provide continuity to the project and to ensure that the restrictions established in the project are respected. - Sign the Interinstitutional Agreement for future road signage projects. - Coordinate the publicity of the reorganization with the MOPT Press Office. - Coordinate with the COSEVI Projects Directorate additional projects such as: - Safe Businesses - Safe Schools - COLOSEVI project training - Community reorganization dissemination project" (folios 109 to 122); 3.) That by agreement of Article VII, Subsection 5), Minutes 290, of the regular session of October fifth, two thousand nine, corrected by decision of Article V, Subsection 3, of minutes 293, of the regular session of October nineteenth following, the Council of Grecia declares the company Sur Química Sociedad Anónima the awardee of the abbreviated bidding process number 2009LA-000007-01, "purchase of paint and solvent for horizontal road signage in the canton of Grecia", for an amount of exactly fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty-one colones, indicating to the supplier that the product received must be submitted to the analysis of the laboratory of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and until that occurs, no conforming receipt will be issued (minutes at folios 127 to 128 and 129 to 130); 4.) That by official letter PRO-2009-134, of October twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, the Municipal Supplier delivers to the Treasury Coordinator an original copy and receipt with the payment for the stamp duty of the following contracts, in what is relevant: Coordination of transport services for hauling materials for district road repair and purchase of paint and solvent for horizontal road signage in the canton of Grecia (folio 133); 5.) That on October twenty-third, two thousand nine, the Mayor of the Municipality -Alexander Gutiérrez Monge- and the legal representative of the company Sur Química Sociedad Anónima -Danisio Fernández Jiménez- sign a contract for the purchase of paint and solvent for horizontal road signage in the canton of Grecia (folios 139 to 143); 6.) That by agreement of Article V, Subsection 1), minutes 296, of the regular session of November second following, at the request of the Supply Coordinator, the body of council members authorizes the following payments to suppliers, in what is relevant to this matter: "a) Company 3M Costa Rica, for the supply of black ink for vertical road signage in Grecia for an amount of ¢3,300,584.00 (exactly three million five hundred eighty-four thousand colones), according to purchase order No. Placa16840. b). Company Sur Químicas S.A for the supply of paints and solvents for horizontal road signage in Grecia, for an amount of ¢14,930,180.00 (exactly fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty colones), according to purchase order No. 29585" (folios 136 and 137); 7.) That by agreement of Article I, Subsection 3), Minutes number 025, of August ninth, two thousand ten, unanimously, the Council hears and approves the procedural motion of council member Rolando Alpízar Oviedo which states: "To modify the agenda of the municipal session of today, so that the document I attach to this motion can be reviewed, which concerns the prohibition of parking in certain sectors of our central core. Likewise, if this motion is accepted, I request now that the floor be granted to Mr. Ricardo González Díaz, Legal Advisor of this Fraction, for up to twenty minutes, so that he can provide a clear and specific explanation of the scope of what Municipal Autonomy means, and of the authority this Council has to render without effect the prohibition of being able to park on the streets and avenues that are under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Grecia" (folio 242); 8.) That by agreement of Article I, Subsection 3), Minutes number 025, of August ninth, two thousand ten, the deliberative body of Grecia agrees: "a) Approve the motion presented, consequently, what was established by minutes 275, article II, sole subsection, sub-subsection a) of July thirtieth, two thousand nine, is rendered without effect, regarding the prohibition of being able to park where demarcated with a yellow line on those streets that are under the jurisdiction of the municipal corporation, or those that are not a national route, likewise, the Municipal Mayor is instructed to make the respective notification to the General Directorate of Traffic, so that the prohibition of parking ceases and the respective citations are no longer issued, with it being clearly defined that as of this agreement, said prohibition is totally without application. Furthermore, the Road Safety Council (COSEVI), a dependency of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, is warned that according to current legislation, it shall have six months to pronounce on the demarcation in the portions of the national route, the entrance to Grecia, passing through the Central Park and turning one hundred meters after Dirección11526 reaching the HSBC bank, then reaching the local ICE agency, and continuing to the Sarchí highway, this with the effect that if within the next six months no pronouncement is made regarding said demarcation, said prohibition shall be rendered without any effect. b.) The Mayor is requested to carry out the necessary steps as soon as possible and present a report on said steps within a peremptory period, with no right to extension, on the next August twenty-third, two thousand ten" (by reference in the brief submitting the veto, at folio 249); 9.) That said motion originates from an official letter submitted by Mr. Juan Marín Quirós, Executive President, Minister of Decentralization and Local Development, addressed to deputy Luis Alberto Rojas Valerio and without Committee study or waiver of procedure (uncontested fact, by reference in the brief submitting the veto, at folio 249); 10.) That against the foregoing agreement, the Mayor formulates a veto on grounds of legality, for infringement of the procedure set forth in the Municipal Code for the adoption of municipal agreements (folios 247 to 250); 11.) That in the regular session held on August sixteenth, two thousand ten, the Council receives a group of merchants who oppose the demarcation of the yellow line in the city of Grecia, who allege the violation and affectation of acquired rights by that measure (uncontested fact; by reference in the veto filed by the Mayor, at folio 260); 12.) That upon hearing the veto, by agreement of Article V, Subsection 2, of Minutes number 029, of August twenty-third, two thousand ten, the body of council members decides to leave the document pending for the next session; the veto being accepted in a subsequent session (session minutes at folios 251 to 254; and hearing response brief of the Council President at folio 325); 13.) That by agreement of Article II, Subsection 3, Minutes number 031, of August thirtieth, two thousand ten, the Council approves the motion presented by council member Jorge Gómez Valverde, President of the chamber, which states: "In view of the veto filed (sic) and accepted regarding the Agreement that eliminates the yellow line at the Dirección11527, and in order to favor the residents of the canton and not cause irreparable harm, as permitted by law. Additionally, it is important to bear in mind that, according to our legal system, it was initiated against the initial Agreement instituting the yellow line for the parking of motor vehicles, and insofar as Acquired Rights have been generated on behalf of third parties, an Administrative Procedure Directing Body must be formed to determine the validity of the initial agreement and the possibility of eliminating the entire Road Planning Process, I Move: So that during the time the Directing Body carries out the corresponding investigation, the demarcation of the YELLOW LINE at Dirección11528 is RENDERED WITHOUT ANY EFFECT, and COSEVI and the TRAFFIC POLICE are communicated, immediately, the entry into force of this agreement. Given that it is urgent and to avoid greater damages, it is requested to DISPENSE WITH COMMITTEE REVIEW of this agreement and APPROVE IT AS A FIRM AGREEMENT, so that it enters into force as of tomorrow. NOTIFY THE MAYOR SO THAT HE IMMEDIATELY MAKES THE CORRESPONDING MOTION" (folios 256 to 257); 14.) That against the foregoing agreement, the Mayor formulates a veto (by reference in the agreement of Article IV, Subsection 17), Minutes number 034, of the regular session held on September thirteenth, two thousand ten, at folios 258 to 266): and, 15.) That with reference to the report of the legal advisor of the deliberative body -Licenciado Ronald Ramírez Garita-, by agreement of Article IV, Subsection 17), Minutes number 034, of the regular session held on September thirteenth, two thousand ten, the Council rejects the veto filed, considering that "the arguments raised are not shared insofar as the brief does not reliably demonstrate that those reasons of legality or opportunity exist to veto said agreement"; and consequently, elevates the matter to the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (folios 258 to 266).

II. - OF THE UNPROVEN FACTS.- Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are deemed not accredited: 1.) That a review appeal (recurso de revisión) was filed against Article II Sole Subsection, Minutes number 275, of the regular session held by the Council of Grecia on July thirtieth, two thousand nine; and 2.) That the vetoed agreement is supported by a technical opinion. There is no evidence in this regard).

III.- OF THE GROUNDS FOR THE VETO.- The Mayor of the Municipality of Grecia vetoes the agreement adopted by the Council of that municipal corporation in Article II, Subsection 3, Minutes number 031, of the regular session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten, based on the following grounds: a.) That the decision violates the provisions of article 169 of the Political Constitution and numeral 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, by failing to protect local interests, inasmuch as it is intended to favor only those of a group of merchants, thus disregarding the constitutional mandate to ensure the political, social, economic, and cultural development of the canton as a whole: and b.) That the agreement intended to be suspended approved the Road Planning and Regulation Plan for the city of Grecia, a proposal supported by a cooperation study prepared by Municipality officials, involving the COLOSEVI and the Traffic Engineering Directorate, as well as the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, with the participation of the Road Safety Council and the Public Transportation Council, coordinated by the Mayor's Office, under the terms permitted in numeral 6 of the Municipal Code and without infringement of municipal autonomy, in response to signage needs due to the reform of the Traffic Law that entered into force on September ninth, two thousand nine; c.) That the road reorganization proposal for the central core of the canton of Grecia is backed by a technical study, thereby respecting the unequivocal rules of science and technique, pursuant to article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration; so that prior to the suspension or annulment of that plan, an agreement should have been made to coordinate with the Traffic Engineering Directorate to review the yellow demarcation on the routes under its jurisdiction, "and not proceed to render it without effect for a matter of convenience to please some merchants who appeared before the Municipal Council to exert pressure" on the adopted measure; c.) That for the implementation of that Plan, the local corporation proceeded to make a public investment of fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty colones, for the purchase of the paint that served to demarcate the canton's roadways, which is a significant amount to render without effect; and d.) That the vetoed act lacks the element of "cause" or "motive", "which is nothing more than the set of factual and legal circumstances that are found missing in the agreement challenged here, which merely limits itself to indicating that 'in order to favor the residents of the canton and not cause irreparable harm ... the demarcation of the yellow line be rendered without any effect'", consequently, it alleges infringement of articles 132 and 133 of the General Law of Public Administration. (Folios 258 to 263, 334 to 340 and 342 to 343.)

IV.- MUNICIPAL VETO AND THE COMPETENCE OF THIS TRIBUNAL, ACTING AS IMPROPER MUNICIPAL HIERARCHICAL SUPERIOR.- It is necessary to recall that our Fundamental Law in subsection 1) of article 173, establishes an internal control within the essential organization of local government, which, we recall, is composed of the Municipal Council (as the deliberative body) and by the executive official (article 169 of the Constitution), who in current legislation is called "Municipal Mayor", which is instituted as a mechanism inherent to the system of checks and balances, in some way, similar to that which governs among the Powers of the State (Executive-Legislative, regarding the power held by the President of the Republic to interpose a veto against laws issued by the Legislative Power). Thus, pursuant to the indicated constitutional numeral 173, the Municipal Mayor is granted the authority to exercise the veto against the agreements of the Municipal Council, an option that we must understand more as an objection than as an appeal, insofar as the latter is rather specific to and exclusive of the administered parties. It is, then, an officious disapproval, which the law attributes to the Mayor, in his character as executive official, an integral part of the local government, so that within its bosom he may exercise opposition to the agreements derived from the collegiate body, in which he has not participated -insofar as notwithstanding that he attends Council sessions, he has no right to vote -subsection c) of article 17 of the Municipal Code)-, but which can undoubtedly interfere negatively in his work as "general manager" of the local entity and, above all, in his government plan, which the same current legislation demands of him. The Municipal Code, in article 17, subsection d), establishes it within the list of attributions of that municipal executive, and in numerals 153, 158, 159 and 160 of the same legal body, it regulates the prerequisites for its filing, term and form, as well as the effects of the use of that authority. By virtue of which, pursuant to article 160 of the Municipal Code, the following agreements of the Council are excluded from the veto:

"a) Those not definitively approved.

• b)Those in which the municipal mayor has a personal, direct or indirect interest.
• c)Repealed by article 202 subsection 5) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, number 8508, of June twenty-second, two thousand six.
• d)Those that must be approved by the Comptroller General of the Republic or the Legislative Assembly or those authorized by it.
• e)Those appealable before the Comptroller General of the Republic.
• f)Those of mere procedure or those of ratification, confirmation, or execution of previous ones" To this list, we can add the provision in article 19 of the Code on the matter, according to which the decision taken by the Municipal Council regarding the calling of a plebiscite, where the removal or not of the Mayor will be decided, which for obvious reasons is outside the possibility of veto by that official. As provided in the first paragraph of article 158 of the cited Municipal Code, the veto may be filed before the Council, both for reasons of legality and opportunity; it being necessary to clarify in this regard, that pursuant to the cited numeral 173 of the Political Constitution, the competence conferred upon the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, according to the development of the law (articles 156 and the final paragraph of the cited 158 of the Municipal Code), is acting as an improper hierarchical superior, which, pursuant to numeral 181 of the General Law of Public Administration, restricts it to exercising an eminently legality-based control over municipal administrative decisions, prior to jurisdictional control; therefore, such grounds of "opportunity" or "discretion" are not susceptible to review in this instance, but only regarding their parameters or elements of control, such as the purpose of the Administration, respect for fundamental rights, the reasonableness of actions ("prohibition of arbitrariness"), and the rules of science and technique, which, under the tenor of article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration, make up the legality block, because entering into an analysis of such value judgments would imply not only distorting the figure of the improper hierarchical superior, but also an overflow of the constitutionally and legally assigned competencies of the judges hearing this matter, thus converting them, because it is matter proper and exclusive to the "active Administration". (In the same sense, this Tribunal previously ruled in resolutions number 425-2010, of twelve hours ten minutes of February eighth and 947-2010, of fifteen hours forty minutes of March eleventh, both of two thousand ten.)

V. - OF THE ADMISSIBILITY FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW OF THE VETOED AGREEMENT.- Pursuant to what was indicated in the preceding Whereas Clause, it is necessary to determine the content and legal nature of the vetoed act. In it, the partial suspension of the Road Planning and Signage Plan of the canton of Grecia is ordered, prepared jointly by Traffic engineers, the members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Municipality of Grecia; approved unanimously and definitively by the Council in Article II, Sole Subsection, Minutes number 275, of the regular session held on July thirtieth, two thousand nine, only in relation to the demarcation of "the yellow line at the Dirección11527", while the Procedural Directing Body is formed to hear the validity of the approval of said plan, as provided in the vetoed agreement (folios 256 to 257). As can be clearly observed, it is a precautionary measure suspending the effects of a previous administrative act, supposedly challenged in a review appeal (recurso de revisión), not the annulment of the plan. Thus, it is a procedural act, not a final one, but insofar as it has its own effects, it is susceptible to the disagreement or objection by the Mayor, under the terms permitted in article 163.2 of the General Law of Public Administration, of supplementary application under the tenor of article 9 of the reference Law. Finally, regarding the grounds supporting the veto formulated by the Mayor of the Municipality of Grecia, as all of them are based on legality, its analysis and control by this Authority is procedurally appropriate.

VI.- OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN CHARACTER OF PUBLIC ROADS.- Due to its connection with the content of the vetoed agreement, it is deemed pertinent to make a few brief considerations regarding the special legal nature of public roads. In the national legal jargon, the concepts "public road", "road" and "street" are used interchangeably, understood as any land of public domain and common use, which by disposition of the administrative and judicial authorities is destined for free transit in accordance with the provisions of the laws and their regulations on the subject in question. Thus, it is with the enactment of the General Law of Public Roads, number 5060, of August eighth, nineteen sixty-two, that two national networks are established; the national one, formed by primary, secondary, and tertiary highways, which shall be defined and administered by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and the cantonal, local, or municipal one, formed by neighborhood streets, whose administration is delegated to local governments; and which, in turn, is classified into neighborhood roads, which are those that provide direct access to farms and other economically rural activities, connect hamlets and towns with the national road network, and are characterized by having low traffic volumes and high proportions of short-distance local trips; local streets, which are those included within the quadrant of an urban area, not classified as urban crossings of the National Road Network; and finally unclassified roads, which include those routes not included in the categories described above, such as bridle paths, paths, footpaths, that provide access to very few users, who shall bear the costs of maintenance and improvement, as provided in article first of Law 6678, of September eighteenth, nineteen eighty-one. It is precisely due to the destination or vocation that these accesses have, under the terms of numeral 261 of the Civil Code, namely the free access of pedestrians and motor vehicles, and the subject who is responsible for their administration (the Public Administration, whether the Ministry of Public Works and Transport -Executive Power- or the Municipalities -entity decentralized by territory), that these are public domain assets, and therefore, the characteristics inherent to this type of asset are applicable to them, such that they are imprescriptible, inalienable, unattachable, and subject to police power regarding their administration, as our Constitutional Court has previously considered, in judgment number 2306-91:

"Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the roads of the Capital City, be they municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them beyond the commerce of men, and therefore, the permits that are granted shall always be on a precarious basis and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so dictate.-" Thus, the teleological element is provided for in articles 44 and 45 of the Urban Planning Law, which, as relevant, literally and respectively state:

"Public domain over areas of streets, plazas, gardens, parks, or other open spaces for general public use, is constituted by that same use and its registration in the Property Registry may be dispensed with, if it appears on the Official Map..." "The properties referred to in the previous article may be transferred to another public use, in accordance with the determinations of the Regulating Plan, but if they have a destination indicated in the law, the change must be approved by the Legislative Assembly." Regarding the ownership of these assets, article 2 of the General Law of Roads states:

"All lands occupied by public highways and roads; existing or that may be built in the future, are property of the State. The municipalities hold ownership of the streets under their jurisdiction. Public highways and roads may only be built and improved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. However, with prior authorization from said Ministry, the municipalities and the decentralized institutions of the State that have functions related to the construction of public roads may execute them directly or through third parties..." Furthermore, article 28 of this same Law (General Law of Public Roads) contains the following statement regarding their disposition and their special regime of affectation:

"It is strictly prohibited for the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and for the Municipalities to grant permits or rights of occupation, enjoyment, use, or simple possession of the right-of-way of public roads or to exercise acts that imply in any form the same by individuals. Those who exercise such acts on public lands under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport or the Municipalities shall be administratively evicted by them within the following fifteen days counted from the written warning made to the responsible party; all without prejudice to the applicable fine and the compensation for the damages and losses that may have been caused." For its part, Decree-Law number 833, of November fourth, nineteen forty-nine, issued by the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, which enacted the Construction Law, stipulates in article 5:

"Public roads are inalienable and imprescriptible and, therefore, no mortgage, lien, use, usufruct, or easement may be constituted over them for the benefit of a specific person, under the terms of common law. The rights of transit, illumination and aeration view, access, runoff, and other similar rights, inherent to the destination of public roads, shall be governed exclusively by the Administrative Laws and Regulations." Thus, only permits or concessions for the use of the roads may be granted; however, these do not create any right in favor of the permittee or concessionaire, as stipulated by ordinal 6 of the Construction Law. These permits or concessions must be temporary and may be revoked at any time by the Municipality, under the tenor of the provisions of article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration. Furthermore, it must be added that they cannot be granted to the detriment of free, safe, and expeditious transit or, in general, to the detriment of any of the purposes for which such roads, according to their class, were destined.

VII.OF THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS.- Likewise, it must be remembered that the existence and validity of every administrative act depends on the concurrence of several essential elements, imposed by the legal system, which for greater understanding can be classified into material elements, relating to subjective elements (competence, standing, and investiture), objective elements (purpose, content, and grounds - articles 131, 132, and 133 of the General Law of Public Administration and 49 of the Political Constitution), and formal elements, comprising the form in which the act is adopted, that is, the means of expression or manifestation (instrumentation), the reasoning or justification (article 136 of the aforementioned General Law), and the procedure followed for its adoption (articles 214 and 308 of the General Law of Public Administration, constituted by "the background, assumptions, or legal (de jure) and factual reasons that make the issuance of the administrative act possible or necessary, and upon which the Public Administration intends to sustain the legitimacy, opportunity, or advisability thereof." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p. 370). Thus, they are the causes or assumptions, legal and factual backgrounds that induce the Administration to adopt the specific act; and which denotes the conformity that must exist between it and the purpose assigned to it by the legal system, that is, the satisfaction of a public interest to be fulfilled in each case. Therefore, the aforementioned numeral 133 requires it to be legitimate, since it is subject to the legal system, as a corollary of the principle of legality that governs Administrative action (articles 11 of the Political Constitution and of the General Law of Public Administration); and furthermore, it must exist just as the Administration invokes it, and precisely support the decision adopted, which denotes its intimate relationship with the other element of the act, also of a substantial but formal order, namely, the reasoning of the act. This (the reasoning) consists

"... in a declaration of what the circumstances of fact and law are that have led the respective public administration to the dictation or issuance of the administrative act. The reasoning is the formal expression of the grounds and, normally, in any administrative resolution, it is contained in what are called 'recitals' - the recital section -. The reasoning, consisting of a statement of the facts and the legal basis that the public administration took into account to issue its decision or will, constitutes a means of proof of its intentionality and an indispensable guideline for interpreting and applying the respective administrative act." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera Edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p 388.)

Thus, the reasoning must determine the application of a concept to the specific factual circumstances in question (according to the development of Spanish jurisprudence, specifically in the judgment of May 18, 1991, RA 4120, accepting a recital from the appealed decision, which cites SSTS of September 23, 1969, RA 6078, and October 7, 1970, RA 4251, cited by author Marcos M. Fernando Pablo in his work La motivación del acto administrativo. (Editorial Tecnos, S.A Madrid. 1993, page 190); that is, it is a concrete decision that links the facts with the normative support; so that when there is a brief allusion to general norms and non-specific facts, it can be concluded that there is insufficient justification provided, insofar as it is not possible to deduce the elements evaluated by the governmental authority to make the decision, which acquires greatest significance when dealing with acts that limit or restrict subjective rights or those in which a sanction is imposed on the administered party. By its content, it constitutes a determining factor of due process and the right of defense, which has full application in the administrative sphere, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber starting from ruling 15-90, at sixteen hours and forty-five minutes on January five, nineteen ninety, when stating the minimum elements of this constitutional principle.

"(...) a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purpose of the proceedings; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence deemed pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to the case file and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and of the grounds on which it is based; and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued..." (Highlighting is not from the original.)

That is why, pursuant to article 136 of the General Law of Public Administration, the Administration is required to provide reasoning for acts that impose obligations; limit, suppress, or deny subjective rights; resolve appeals; those issued departing from the criterion followed in previous actions or from the opinion of advisory bodies; those that maintain the execution of an act being challenged; general acts of a normative nature (regulations); and general discretionary acts. Thus, if there is no reasoning, a defect of form is incurred that seriously affects the act, rendering it absolutely null. Likewise, the content must correspond to the grounds. The content, as its name indicates, is the definition of the effect of the administrative act, as its immediate legal result, so that it is what the act declares, disposes, orders, certifies, or judges, and is usually expressed in the operative part of administrative resolutions. Therefore, it must be in close relation or correspondence with the grounds, and for this reason, "it must be lawful, possible, clear, and cover all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds," as required by article 132.1 of the General Law of Public Administration. Finally, the purpose, "is the meta-legal result and the ultimate objective pursued by the administrative act, in relation to the grounds" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Op. Cit. p. 378). This element is always regulated, as the law fixes it expressly and specifically, and failing that, its determination will correspond to the judge, based on the other elements of the act (grounds and content), with no discretion existing for the Administration in its determination. Thus, the purpose is not, nor can it be, for the personal benefit of the public servant or a third party. Consequently, if there are irregularities in the grounds and content, this irremediably translates into an inadequacy of the act to its purpose, manifesting as a defect due to excess of power, as provided for in article 131 of the aforementioned General Law of Public Administration.

VIII.OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE VETOED AGREEMENT.- Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court proceeds to analyze the legality of the agreement adopted by the Council of the Municipality of Grecia in Article II, Item 3, Minutes Number 031, of the ordinary session held on August thirty, two thousand ten, taking as a basis the grounds of the formulated veto:

First: The agreement lacks grounds and, consequently, the other material elements of the act: The Council bases the decision for the partial suspension of the Road Planning and Signage Plan of the canton of Grecia, solely regarding the demarcation of "the yellow line in the Dirección11527 ", on the existence of an extraordinary appeal for review filed against the approval of that plan. It should be remembered that said plan was approved by the council of aldermen by Article II, Sole Item, Minutes Number 275, of the ordinary session held on July thirty, two thousand nine, unanimously and definitively. It strikes these judges that no indication is made of when or by whom said appeal was filed, and despite having made a meticulous review of the case file, no document or record of its filing is found, which evidences the defect in this substantial element, it not existing in the manner indicated by the Council (article 133.1 of the General Law of Public Administration). This necessarily leads to an erroneous reasoning of the act, and consequently, a defect in the content and purpose of the agreement, insofar as what can be glimpsed is the favoring of a group of merchants, who argued before the deliberative body the affectation of acquired rights over the road, by restricting the activity they carry out. It cannot go unnoticed that the agreement which ordered the approval – definitively and unanimously – of the road reorganization plan for the city of Grecia is supported by a technical study, prepared jointly and in coordination by Traffic engineers, the members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and the Municipality of Grecia, under the terms empowered by the governmental autonomy granted to the Municipalities by the Political Constitution (article 170), as the Constitutional Chamber clarified in ruling number 5445-99, and as empowered by article 6 of the Municipal Code. Likewise, it is necessary to warn that, if the alleged extraordinary appeal for review exists, it is not admissible for analysis by the mere filing, since article 157 of the Municipal Code states an appeal is applicable regarding those decisions for which the filing of the respective appeal for reversal was omitted, and which are taking effect, but its grounds can only be that which gives rise to the absolute nullity of the act. In this sense, the plan has already been executed regarding the road demarcation, which had a cost to the municipal budget of exactly fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty colones (¢14,930,180.00), and the only disagreement evident in the record is the alleged affectation of acquired rights of the merchants over the public road, which in no way constitutes grounds for nullity – which will be analyzed next – and hence the illegality of the vetoed decision.

Second: On the matter of affecting the rights of third parties: An allegation that seeks to imply the ensurance of third-party rights – in this case, we assume those of the merchants – on the occasion of the road demarcation of the city of Grecia is clearly inadmissible, precisely in light of the special nature of public roads, which includes both the space where motor vehicles circulate and the sidewalks, intended for the free transit of persons. As indicated, our national legal system establishes that roads are public domain assets, and as such, they are indispensable, due to their essential characteristics of imprescriptibility, inalienability, and unattachability, for both the administered parties and the Administration, and the generation of any right regarding this type of asset cannot be generated or alleged, whether of occupancy or possession, much less to carry out a lucrative activity, as it appears in the case under study.

IX.CONCLUSION.- Having accredited the violation of all the material elements of the vetoed agreement – adopted by the Council of the Municipality of Grecia in Article II, Item 3, Minutes Number 031, of the ordinary session held on August thirty, two thousand ten – this Court has no choice but to accept the objection formulated by the Mayor of that local corporation, proceeding in consequence, to declare it absolutely null due to defect of absolute nullity.

POR TANTO

The veto filed is accepted.- Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Evelyn Solano Ulloa Eduardo González Segura Additionally, it is important to bear in mind that, according to our legal system, an action was filed against the initial Agreement that established the yellow line for the parking of motor vehicles, and since Acquired Rights have been generated for third parties, a Directing Body of the Administrative Procedure must be formed to determine the validity of the initial agreement and the possibility of eliminating the entire Road Management process. I move: That for the duration of the Directing Body's corresponding investigation, the declaration of the YELLOW LINE on Dirección11528 be LEFT WITHOUT ANY EFFECT, and that COSEVI and the TRANSIT POLICE be immediately notified of the entry into force of this agreement. Given that it is urgent and to avoid further damages, it is requested that this agreement be DISPENSED FROM COMMITTEE REVIEW and APPROVED AS A FINAL AGREEMENT, so that it takes effect as of tomorrow. LET IT BE COMMUNICATED TO THE MAYOR SO THAT HE IMMEDIATELY MAKES THE CORRESPONDING MOTION" (folios 256 to 257); 14.) That against the previous agreement, the Mayor formulates a veto (by reference in the agreement of Article IV, Section 17), Minute number 034, of the ordinary session held on September thirteenth, two thousand ten, on folios 258 to 266): and, 15.) That with reference to the report of the legal advisor to the deliberative body - Licenciado Ronald Ramírez Garita -, by agreement of Article IV, Section 17), Minute number 034, of the ordinary session held on September thirteenth, two thousand ten, the Council rejects the veto interposed, considering that "the arguments put forth are not shared insofar as it is not reliably demonstrated in the brief that those reasons of legality or opportunity exist to veto said agreement"; and consequently, it elevates the matter to the Contentious Administrative Court (folios 258 to 266).

II. - OF THE UNPROVEN FACTS.- Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are considered unsubstantiated: 1.) That an appeal for review was filed against Article II, Sole Section, Minute number 275, of the ordinary session held by the Council of Grecia on July thirtieth, two thousand nine; and 2.) That the vetoed agreement is supported by technical criteria. There is no proof in this regard).

III.- OF THE GROUNDS FOR THE VETO.- The Mayor of the Municipality of Grecia vetoes the agreement adopted by the Council of that municipal corporation in Article II, Section 3, Minute number 031, of the ordinary session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten, based on the following grounds: a.) That the decision violates the provisions of article 169 of the Political Constitution and numeral 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, by failing to protect local interests, insofar as it is designed to favor only those of a group of merchants, thus disregarding the constitutional mandate to ensure the political, social, economic, and cultural development of the canton as a whole: and b.) That the agreement intended to be suspended approved the Road Management and Regulation Plan for the city of Grecia, a proposal supported by a cooperation study prepared by officials of the Municipality, involving COSEVI and the Traffic Engineering Directorate, as well as the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, with the participation of the Road Safety Council and the Public Transport Council, coordinated by the Mayor's Office, under the terms permitted in numeral 6 of the Municipal Code and without infringement of municipal autonomy, in response to signage needs due to the reform of the Traffic Law that entered into force on September ninth, two thousand nine; c.) That the road reorganization proposal for the central area of the canton of Grecia is supported by a technical study, thus respecting the univocal rules of science and technique, pursuant to article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration; such that prior to the suspension or annulment of that plan, an agreement should have been made to coordinate with the Traffic Engineering Directorate to review the yellow demarcation on the routes under its jurisdiction, "and not proceed to leave it without effect for a matter of convenience to please some merchants who appeared before the Municipal Council to exert pressure" on the measure adopted; c.) That for the implementation of that Plan, the local corporation proceeded to make a public investment of fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty colones, for the purchase of the paint used for the demarcation of the canton's roads, which is a significant amount to render it without effect; and d.) That the vetoed act lacks the element "cause" or "motive", "which is nothing more than the set of factual and legal circumstances that is found wanting in the agreement challenged here, which merely limits itself to indicating that 'for the sake of favoring the residents of the canton and not causing damage of impossible reparation ... the demarcation of the yellow line be left without any effect whatsoever'", consequently, it alleges an infringement of articles 132 and 133 of the General Law of Public Administration. (Folios 258 to 263, 334 to 340, and 342 to 343.)

IV.- MUNICIPAL VETO AND THE COMPETENCE OF THIS COURT, ACTING AS IMPROPER MUNICIPAL HIERARCH.- It is necessary to recall that our Fundamental Law, in subsection 1) of article 173, establishes an internal control mechanism for the essential organization of local government, which, we recall, is composed of the Municipal Council (as the deliberative body) and the executive official (article 169 of the Constitution), who in current legislation is called "Municipal Mayor", which constitutes a mechanism inherent to the system of checks and balances, in some way similar to that which governs between the Powers of the State (Executive-Legislative, regarding the power held by the President of the Republic to interpose a veto against laws issued by the Legislative Power). Thus, pursuant to the indicated constitutional numeral 173, the Municipal Mayor is granted the power to exercise a veto against the agreements of the Municipal Council, an option we must understand more as an objection than as an appeal, insofar as the latter is rather proper and exclusive to the administered parties. It is, therefore, an official disapproval that the law attributes to the Mayor, in his capacity as the executive official, an integral part of the local government, so that within the same he may exercise opposition to the agreements emanating from the collegiate body, in which he has not participated—since, although he attends Council sessions, he does not have the right to vote (subsection c) of article 17 of the Municipal Code)—but which can undoubtedly interfere negatively in his work as "general manager" of the local entity and, above all, in his government plan, which is required of him by the same current legislation. The Municipal Code, in article 17, subsection d), establishes it within the list of attributions of that municipal executive, and in numerals 153, 158, 159, and 160 of the same legal body, regulates the prerequisites for its filing, term, and form, as well as the effects of the use of that power. By virtue of which, pursuant to article 160 of the Municipal Code, the following Council agreements are excluded from the veto:

"a) Those not definitively approved. b) Those in which the municipal mayor has a personal, direct, or indirect interest. c) Repealed by article 202, subsection 5) of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code, number 8508, of June twenty-second, two thousand six. d) Those that must be approved by the Comptroller General of the Republic or the Legislative Assembly, or those authorized by it. e) Those appealable before the Comptroller General of the Republic. f) Those of mere procedure or those of ratification, confirmation, or execution of previous ones" To this list, we can add the provision in article 19 of the Code on the matter, according to which the decision taken by the Municipal Council regarding the call for a plebiscite, where the dismissal or not of the Mayor will be decided, is, for obvious reasons, outside the possibility of veto by this official. As provided in the first paragraph of article 158 of the cited Municipal Code, the veto may be filed before the Council for reasons of both legality and opportunity; it must be clarified in this regard that, pursuant to the cited numeral 173 of the Political Constitution, the competence conferred upon the Contentious Administrative Court, according to the development of the law (articles 156 and the final paragraph of the cited 158 of the Municipal Code), is acting as an improper hierarch, which, pursuant to numeral 181 of the General Law of Public Administration, limits it to exercising an eminently legality-based control of municipal administrative decisions, prior to jurisdictional control; therefore, such motives of "opportunity" or "discretion" are not susceptible to review in this instance, but only in their parameters or elements of control, such as the purpose of the Administration, respect for fundamental rights, the reasonableness of the actions ("prohibition of arbitrariness"), and the rules of science and technique, which, according to article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration, integrate the block of legality, since entering to analyze such evaluations would imply not only distorting the figure of the improper hierarch but also an overflow of the competences constitutionally and legally assigned to the judges who hear this matter, becoming a matter proper and exclusive to the "active Administration". (This Court previously ruled in the same sense, in resolutions number 425-2010, of twelve hours ten minutes on February eighth, and 947-2010, of fifteen hours forty minutes on March eleventh, both of two thousand ten.)

V. - ON THE ADMISSIBILITY FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE STUDY OF THE VETOED AGREEMENT.- Pursuant to what was indicated in the preceding Considering, it is necessary to determine the content and legal nature of the vetoed act. In it, the partial suspension of the Road Management and Signaling Plan for the canton of Grecia, jointly prepared by Traffic engineers, the members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and the Municipality of Grecia, is ordered; approved unanimously and definitively by the Council in Article II, Sole Section, Minute number 275, of the ordinary session held on July thirtieth, two thousand nine, only with respect to the demarcation of "the yellow line on Dirección11527", while the Directing Body of the procedure is formed to hear the validity of the approval of said plan, as provided in the vetoed agreement (folios 256 to 257). As can be clearly observed, it is a precautionary measure of suspension of the effects of a prior administrative act, supposedly questioned in an appeal for review, not the annulment of the plan. Therefore, it is a procedural act, not a final one, but insofar as it has its own effects, it is susceptible to the disagreement or objection of the Mayor, under the terms permitted in article 163.2 of the General Law of Public Administration, of supplementary application according to article 9 of the aforementioned Law. Finally, regarding the grounds that support the veto formulated by the Mayor of the Municipality of Grecia, since all are of legality, it is appropriate for its analysis and control by this Authority.

VI.- ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN NATURE OF PUBLIC ROADS.- Due to the link with the content of the vetoed agreement, it is deemed pertinent to make some brief considerations regarding the special legal nature of public roads. In national legal jargon, the concepts "public road (vía pública)", "road (camino)", and "street (calle)" are used interchangeably, understanding these to mean any land of public domain and common use, which by disposition of the administrative and judicial authorities is destined for free transit in accordance with the provisions of the laws and their regulations on the subject in reference. Thus, it is with the enactment of the General Law of Public Roads, number 5060, of August eighth, nineteen sixty-two, that two national networks are established; the national one, comprised of primary, secondary, and tertiary roads, which will be defined and administered by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and the cantonal, local, or municipal one, comprised of local streets, whose administration is delegated to local governments; and which, in turn, is classified into local roads (caminos vecinales), which are those that provide direct access to farms and other economically rural activities, connect hamlets and towns with the national road network, and are characterized by having low traffic volumes and high proportions of short-distance local trips; local streets (calles locales), which are those included within the quadrant of an urban area, not classified as urban crossings of the National Road Network; and finally unclassified roads (caminos no clasificados), which comprise those roads not included in the categories described above, such as bridle paths, trails, footpaths, that provide access to very few users, who will bear the maintenance and improvement costs, as provided in article one of Law 6678, of September eighteenth, nineteen eighty-one. It is precisely due to the destination or vocation that these accesses have, under the terms of numeral 261 of the Civil Code, namely the free access of passersby and motor vehicles, and the subject to whom their administration corresponds (the Public Administration, be it the Ministry of Public Works and Transport - Executive Power - or the Municipalities - entity decentralized by territory), that they constitute public domain assets, and therefore, the characteristics proper to this type of asset apply to them, as they are imprescriptible, inalienable, unseizable, and subject to police power with respect to their administration, as our Constitutional Court has previously considered, in ruling number 2306-91:

"Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the roads of the Capital City, whether municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them outside the commerce of men, and therefore the permits granted will always be on a precarious basis and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so indicate.-" Thus, the teleological element is provided for in articles 44 and 45 of the Urban Planning Law, which, in what is of interest, literally and respectively state:

"The public domain over the areas of streets, squares, gardens, parks, or other open spaces of general public use is constituted by that same use, and its registration in the Property Registry may be dispensed with if it is recorded on the Official Map..." "The properties referred to in the previous article may be transferred to another public use, in accordance with the determinations of the Regulatory Plan, but if they have a destination established by law, the change must be approved by the Legislative Assembly." Regarding the ownership of these assets, article 2 of the General Law of Roads states:

"All lands occupied by existing public highways and roads or those built in the future are property of the State. The municipalities own the streets within their jurisdiction. Public highways and roads may only be built and improved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. However, with prior authorization from said Ministry, the municipalities and decentralized institutions of the State that have functions related to the construction of public roads may execute them directly or through third parties..." Furthermore, article 28 of this same Law (General Law of Public Roads) contains the following statement regarding their disposition and their special regime of encumbrance:

"It is strictly forbidden for the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Municipalities to grant permits or rights of occupation, enjoyment, use, or simple possession of the right-of-way of public roads, or to perform acts that imply, in any form, the same by individuals. Those who perform such acts on public lands under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport or the Municipalities shall be administratively evicted by them within the following fifteen days counted from the written warning made to the responsible party; all without prejudice to the applicable fine and the compensation for damages and losses that may have been caused." For its part, Decree-Law number 833, of November fourth, nineteen forty-nine, issued by the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, which enacted the Construction Law, states in article 5:

"Public roads are inalienable and imprescriptible, and therefore, no mortgage, seizure, use, usufruct, or easement (servidumbre) may be constituted over them for the benefit of a specific person, under the terms of common law. The rights of transit, illumination and ventilation, view, access, runoff, and other similar rights, inherent to the destination of public roads, shall be governed exclusively by the laws and Administrative Regulations." Therefore, only permits or concessions for the use of the roads may be granted; however, these do not create any right in favor of the permit holder or the concessionaire, as provided in numeral 6 of the Construction Law. These permits or concessions must be temporary and may be revoked at any time by the Municipality, according to the provisions of article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration. In addition, it must be added that they cannot be granted to the detriment of free, safe, and expeditious transit, or in general to the detriment of any of the purposes for which such roads, according to their class, had been destined.

**VII.- THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS.-** Likewise, it must be remembered that the existence and validity of every administrative act depends on the concurrence of several essential elements, imposed by the legal system, which for a better understanding can be classified as **material,** relating to the ***subjective elements*** *(competence, standing, and investiture),* ***objective*** *(purpose, content, and grounds* -articles 131, 132 and 133 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and 49 of the Political Constitution) and ***formal*** , comprising the form in which the act is adopted, that is, the *means of expression* or *manifestation* (instrumentation), the *reasoning* or *grounds* (article 136 of the aforementioned General Act) and the *procedure followed for its adoption* (articles 214 and 308 of the General Public Administration Act, constituted by *"the antecedents, assumptions, or legal (de jure) and factual reasons that make the issuance of the administrative act possible or necessary, and upon which the Public Administration understands to sustain its legitimacy, timeliness, or advisability."* (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p. 370). Thus, they are the causes or assumptions, legal and factual antecedents that induce the Administration to adopt the specific act; and which denotes the conformity that must exist between the act and the purpose assigned to it by the legal system, that is, the satisfaction of a public interest to be met in each case. Therefore, the cited numeral 133 requires that the grounds be **legitimate,** as they are subject to the legal system, as a corollary of the principle of legality governing Administrative action (articles 11 of the Political Constitution and of the General Public Administration Act); and furthermore, **they must exist just as the Administration invokes them,** and precisely support the decision adopted, which denotes their intimate relationship with the other element of the act, also of a substantial but formal nature, namely the reasoning of the act. This **(the reasoning)** consists of *"... a declaration of what the circumstances of fact and law are that have led the respective public Administration to dictate or issue the administrative act. The reasoning is the formal expression of the grounds and, normally, in any administrative resolution, it is contained in the so-called 'whereas clauses' (considerandos) -the operative part-. The reasoning, by consisting of an enunciation of the facts and the legal basis that the Public Administration took into account to issue its decision or will, constitutes a means of proof of the latter's intentionality and an indispensable guideline for interpreting and applying the respective administrative act."* (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera Edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p 388.)

So, the reasoning must ***determine the application of a concept to the singular factual circumstances in question*** (according to the development of Spanish jurisprudence, specifically in the judgment of 18 May 1991, RA 4120, accepting a whereas clause (considerando) of the appealed decision, which cites the SSTS of 23 September 1969, RA 6078, and 7 October 1970, RA 4251, cited by the author Marcos M. Fernando Pablo, in his work La motivación del acto administrativo. (Editorial Tecnos, S.A Madrid. 1993, page 190); that is, it is a concrete decision that links the facts with the normative support; so that when there is a brief allusion to general norms and unspecific facts, it can be concluded that there is insufficient justification, to the extent that it is impossible to deduce the elements evaluated by the governmental authority to make the decision, which acquires the greatest importance when it concerns acts that limit or restrict subjective rights or in which a sanction is imposed on the administered party. By its content, it constitutes a determining factor of due process (debido proceso) and the right of defense, which has full application in the administrative field, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) starting with judgment 15-90, at four forty-five p.m. on the fifth of January of nineteen ninety, when stating the minimum elements of this constitutional principle.

*"(...) a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence they deem pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to the proceedings and administrative records linked to the matter in question; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and of the grounds on which it is based and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision made..."* (The highlighting is not from the original.)

It is for this reason that under the terms of article 136 of the General Public Administration Act, the Administration is required to state the reasoning for acts that impose obligations; limit, suppress, or deny subjective rights; resolve appeals; those issued in separation from the criteria followed in previous proceedings or from the opinion of advisory bodies; those that maintain the execution of an appealed act; those of a general normative nature (regulations) and those of a general discretionary nature. Thus, ***if there is no reasoning, it incurs a defect of form that seriously affects the act, rendering it absolutely null and void.** * Likewise, **the content must correspond with the grounds.** ** ** The **content,** as its name indicates, is the definition of the effect of the administrative act, as its immediate juridical result, such that it is what it declares, disposes, orders, certifies, or judges, and is usually expressed in the operative part of administrative resolutions. Therefore, it must be in close relationship or correspondence with the grounds, and for this reason, *"it must be lawful, possible, clear, and cover all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds", * as required by article 132.1 of the General Public Administration Act. Finally, the **purpose,** *"is the meta-juridical result and ultimate objective pursued by the administrative act, in relation to the grounds"* (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Op. Cit. p. 378). This element is always regulated, insofar as the law fixes it expressly and specifically, and failing that, it will be up to the judge to determine it, based on the other elements of the act (grounds and content) with no discretion existing for the Administration to determine it. Thus, the purpose is not and cannot be for the personal benefit of the public servant or a third party. So that, if there are irregularities in the grounds and content, this inevitably translates into an inadequacy of the act for its purpose, manifesting as a defect due to excess of power, as provided for in article 131 of the cited General Public Administration Act.

**VIII.- THE ILLEGALITY OF THE VETOED AGREEMENT.-** Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court proceeds to analyze the legality of the agreement adopted by the Council (Concejo) of the Municipality of Grecia in Article II, Section 3, Record number 031, of the ordinary session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten, taking as a basis the grounds of the veto formulated:

**First: The agreement lacks grounds and, consequently, the other material elements of the act:** The Council bases the decision of partial suspension of the Roadway Planning and Signaling Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento y Señalización Vial) of the canton of Grecia, solely regarding the demarcation of "*the yellow line in the Dirección11527 *", on the existence of an extraordinary review appeal (recurso extraordinario de revisión) filed against the approval of that plan. It should be remembered that said plan was approved by the body of council members through Article II Sole Section, Record number 275, of the ordinary session held on July thirtieth, two thousand nine, unanimously and definitively. It draws the attention of these judges that no indication is made of when or by whom said appeal was filed and, despite a meticulous review of the case file having been made, no document or proof of its filing is found, which demonstrates the defect in this substantial element, it not existing in the manner indicated by the Council (article 133.1 of the General Public Administration Act). This necessarily leads to an erroneous reasoning of the act, and consequently, a defect in the content and purpose of the agreement, insofar as what is glimpsed is the favoring of a group of merchants, who alleged before the deliberative body the impairment of acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) over the road, by restricting the activity they carry out. It cannot go unnoticed that the agreement by which the definitive and unanimous approval of the roadway reorganization plan for the city of Grecia was ordered, is supported by a technical study, prepared jointly and in coordination by Traffic engineers, the members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, MOPT) and the Municipality of Grecia, in the terms authorized by the governmental autonomy granted to the Municipalities by the Political Constitution (article 170), as clarified by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 5445-99, and authorized by article 6 of the Municipal Code. Likewise, it is necessary to warn that, if the alleged extraordinary review appeal existed, it would not be admissible for analysis upon mere filing, since article 157 of the Municipal Code states that an appeal is appropriate, regarding those decisions for which the filing of the respective appeal motion (recurso de apelación) was omitted, and that is taking effect, but its grounds can only be that which gives rise to the absolute nullity of the act. In this sense, the plan has already been executed regarding roadway demarcation, which had a cost to the municipal budget of exactly fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty colones (¢14,930,180.00), and the only disagreement on record is the alleged impairment of acquired rights of the merchants over the public road, which in no way constitutes grounds for nullity - which will be analyzed next - and hence the illegality of the vetoed decision.

**Second: On the significance of impairing third-party rights:** An allegation is clearly improper that seeks the impairment of third-party rights - in this case, we assume those of the merchants - due to the roadway demarcation of the city of Grecia, precisely in light of the special nature of public roads, which includes both the space where motor vehicles circulate and the sidewalks, intended for the free transit of individuals. As indicated, our national legal system establishes that roads are public domain assets, and as such, are **indispensable, due to their essential characteristics of imprescriptibility, inalienability, and unseizability,** both for the administered parties and for the Administration, and no right can be generated or alleged regarding this type of assets, whether of occupation or possession, and much less to carry out a lucrative activity, as appears to be the case under study.

IX.- CONCLUSION.- Having established the violation of all the material elements of the vetoed agreement - adopted by the Council of the Municipality of Grecia in Article II, Section 3, Act number 031, of the regular session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten -, this Court has no choice but to uphold the objection filed by the Mayor of that local corporation, consequently proceeding to its declaration due to a defect of absolute nullity (vicio de nulidad absoluta).

POR TANTO

The veto filed is upheld.

Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Evelyn Solano Ulloa Eduardo González Segura Those cited cannot be considered for this purpose, because by containing subject matter that is either identical or of a heterogeneous nature, they are not strictly applicable to the present case since they do not address the claim that this case has been filed under a different instance, nor do they refer to the specific issues raised, and they do not derive from records identical to those in this file but rather from different ones, nor does this Judgment attribute to them the character of binding precedent to the extent of considering them mandatory and compelling, since - on the contrary - with the subsequent entry into force of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (Contentious Administrative Procedure Code), under a new procedural paradigm in this jurisdiction of a predominantly oral nature, by express provision of the transitory provision I of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the previous jurisprudential criteria have lost, it is understood, any binding nature for the resolution of new disputes submitted to the Courts, in which evidentiary elements are offered and produced, either through declarations by parties and witnesses, or expert opinions, which are entirely different from those that were had in view in those cited cases and, precisely, refer to the specific case and, specifically, to the claim asserted in this process." EXTRACTO DE VOTO QUE SE ACOMPAÑA: Voto No. 00036-2011 de la Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, de 14:35 hrs. del 14 de octubre del 2011. (Extractado de voto escaneado del expediente judicial):

En virtud de la expuesto, sea mediante la argumentación facilitada en el extracto del voto de este momento y la consideración de los extractos facilitados anteriormente por mi persona para el presente caso, solicito que sea evaluada esta consulta a la luz y con el fondo no solo de los principios constitucionales ya citados, sino también de los elementos probatorios y de jurisprudencia recién aportados. En ese sentido, reitero la solicitud de que, en vía de excepción y dado que las circunstancias propias de la amplia protección y claro mandato constitucional de protección ambiental de la zona implicada, se autorice la segregación de la propiedad familiar en favor de los hijos del gestionante, sin que dicha segregación esté sujeta a una nueva evaluación de impacto ambiental, sino que se entienda que tal requisito ya fue satisfecho con la aprobación del plan regulador original de la finca matriz. Esto en el entendido de que la división que se propone es exclusivamente con fines de transmisión de dominio familiar y no con fines de desarrollo comercial lucrativo ulterior. Es decir, se trata de una medida de pura administración de bienes y planificación patrimonial familiar, sin incrementar en lo absoluto el impacto ambiental previsto originalmente. Por lo tanto, se está ante un acto de administración que no altera la sustancia, uso ni destino de los terrenos, ni constituye un desarrollo o construcción de nuevas obras, siendo indispensable la aplicación del principio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad que evite imponer requisitos desproporcionados a un acto meramente civil y familiar, como el que nos ocupa. Solicito finalmente que todas las comunicaciones y notificaciones futuras relacionadas con esta gestión sean dirigidas al correo electrónico señalado en el expediente administrativo y que se me tenga por apoderado especial administrativo de los beneficiarios de la segregación, mis hijos, para todos los efectos legales correspondientes.EXCERPT FROM THE JUDGMENT ATTACHED: Judgment No. 00036-2011 of the Sixth Section of the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, at 2:35 p.m. on October 14, 2011. (Excerpted from a scanned judgment in the judicial file):

By virtue of the foregoing, that is, through the argumentation provided in the judgment excerpt at this time and the consideration of the excerpts previously provided by me for this case, I request that this inquiry be evaluated in light of and on the merits of not only the constitutional principles already cited, but also the evidentiary elements and jurisprudence recently provided. In that sense, I reiterate the request that, by way of exception and given that the circumstances inherent to the broad protection and clear constitutional mandate of environmental protection for the area involved, the segregation of the family property in favor of the petitioner's children be authorized, without said segregation being subject to a new environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental), but rather that such requirement be understood to have already been satisfied with the approval of the original regulatory plan for the parent property. This on the understanding that the proposed division is exclusively for the purpose of transferring family ownership and not for subsequent lucrative commercial development purposes. That is, it involves a measure of pure asset management and family estate planning, without increasing in the least the originally foreseen environmental impact. Therefore, this is an act of administration that does not alter the substance, use, or destination of the lands, nor does it constitute development or construction of new works, the application of the principle of proportionality and reasonableness being indispensable to avoid imposing disproportionate requirements on a merely civil and family act, such as the one at hand. I finally request that all future communications and notifications related to this proceeding be directed to the email address indicated in the administrative file and that I be considered as special administrative representative for the beneficiaries of the segregation, my children, for all corresponding legal purposes.

Tomado de: "Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p. 370, 388." **“III.- GROUNDS FOR THE VETO.-** The Mayor of the Municipality (la Municipalidad) of Grecia vetoes the agreement adopted by the Council of that municipal corporation in Article II, Item 3, Minutes number 031, of the regular session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten, based on the following grounds: **a.)** That the decision violates the provisions of Article 169 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and numeral 113 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), by failing to protect local interests, as it is arranged to favor only those of a group of merchants, thus neglecting the constitutional mandate to ensure the political, social, economic, and cultural development of the canton as a whole: and **b.)** That the agreement intended to be suspended approved the Road Planning and Regulation Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento y regulación vial) for the city of Grecia, a proposal based on a cooperation study prepared by officials of the Municipality (Municipalidad), involving COLOSEVI and the Traffic Engineering Directorate (Dirección de Ingeniería de Tránsito), as well as the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, with the participation of the Road Safety Council and the Public Transport Council, coordinated by the Mayor's Office (Alcaldía), under the terms permitted in numeral 6 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) and without infringement of municipal autonomy, in response to signage needs due to the reform of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) that came into effect on September ninth, two thousand nine; **c.)** That the proposal for road reordering for the central core of the canton of Grecia is supported by a technical study, thus respecting the univocal rules of science and technique, pursuant to Article 16 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); so that prior to the suspension or annulment of that plan, an agreement should have been made to coordinate with the Traffic Engineering Directorate (Dirección de Ingeniería de Tránsito) to review the yellow marking on the routes under its jurisdiction, *"and not proceed to render it null and void as a matter of convenience to please some merchants who appeared before the Municipal Council to exert pressure"* on the adopted measure; **c.)** That for the implementation of that Plan, the local corporation proceeded to make a public investment of fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty colones, for the purchase of paint used for the demarcation of the canton's roads, which is a significant amount to render null and void; and **d.)** That the vetoed act lacks the element "*cause"* or *"motive", "which is nothing more than the set of factual and legal circumstances that are sorely missed in the agreement challenged here, which merely limits itself to indicating that 'in order to favor the residents of the canton and not cause irreparable harm ... let the yellow line demarcation be rendered without effect'*, consequently, it alleges infringement of Articles 132 and 133 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). (Folios 258 a 263, 334 a 340 and 342 a 343.)

**IV.- MUNICIPAL VETO AND THE JURISDICTION (COMPETENCIA) OF THIS COURT, ACTING AS IMPROPER MUNICIPAL HIERARCH (JERARCA IMPROPIO MUNICIPAL)** .- It is necessary to recall that our Fundamental Law, in subsection 1) of Article 173, establishes an internal control within the essential organization of the local government, which, let us remember, is composed of the Municipal Council (as a deliberative body) and by the executive official (Article 169 of the Constitution (Constitución)), who in current legislation is called *"Municipal Mayor"*, which is established as a mechanism inherent to the system of checks and balances, in some way, similar to that which governs between the Branches of State (Executive-Legislative, regarding the power held by the President of the Republic (Presidente de la República) to interpose the veto against laws issued by the Legislative Branch). Thus, in accordance with the indicated constitutional numeral 173, the Municipal Mayor is granted the power to exercise the veto against the agreements of the Municipal Council, **an option that we must understand more as an objection than as an appeal**, insofar as the latter is, rather, proper to and exclusive of the administered parties. It is therefore an official disapproval, which the law attributes to the Mayor, in his capacity as executive official, an integral part of the local government, so that within its heart he can exercise opposition to the agreements derived from the collegiate body, in which he has not participated—inasmuch as, even though he attends Council sessions, he has no right to vote—subsection c) of Article 17 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)—but which can undoubtedly interfere negatively with his work as *"general manager"* of the local entity and, above all, with his government plan, which the same current legislation demands of him. The Municipal Code (Código Municipal), in Article 17, subsection d), establishes it within the list of powers of that municipal executive, and in numerals 153, 158, 159, and 160 of the same legal body, regulates the prerequisites for its interposition, term, and form, as well as the effects of the use of that power. By virtue of which, in accordance with Article 160 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), the following agreements of the Council are excluded from the veto:

*a) Those not definitively approved.* *b) Those in which the municipal mayor has a personal, direct, or indirect interest.* *c) Repealed by Article 202, subsection 5) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, number 8508, of June twenty-second, two thousand six.* *d) Those that must be approved by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) or the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) or those authorized by it.* *e) Those appealable before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República).* *f) Those of a mere procedural nature or those of ratification, confirmation, or execution of previous others"* To this list, we can add the provisions of Article 19 of the Code on the matter, according to which the decision taken by the Municipal Council regarding the call for a plebiscite, where the dismissal or non-dismissal of the Mayor will be decided, is, for obvious reasons, outside the possibility of veto by this official. As provided in the first paragraph of Article 158 of the cited Municipal Code (Código Municipal), the veto may be interposed before the Council, both for reasons of legality and of opportunity; it being necessary to clarify in this regard, that in accordance with the cited numeral 173 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), the jurisdiction (competencia) conferred upon the Contentious Administrative Court, according to the development of the law (Articles 156 and final paragraph of the cited 158 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)), is acting as **improper hierarch (jerarca impropio),** which, in accordance with numeral 181 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), **limits it to exercising an eminently legality control of municipal administrative decisions, prior to judicial control;** therefore, such grounds of *"opportunity" or "discretion"* are not susceptible to review at this instance, **but only in their parameters or elements of control, such as the purpose of the Administration (Administración), respect for fundamental rights, the reasonableness of the actions ("prohibition of arbitrariness"), and the rules of science and technique,** which, pursuant to Article 16 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), make up the legality block, inasmuch as analyzing such valuations would imply, not only distorting the figure of the improper hierarch (jerarca impropio), but also an overflow of the constitutional and legally assigned jurisdictions (competencias) to the judges who hear this matter, thereby becoming a matter proper to and exclusive of the **"active Administration".** (This Court ruled in the same sense previously, in resolutions number 425-2010, of twelve hours ten minutes of February eighth and 947-2010, of fifteen hours forty minutes of March eleventh, both of two thousand ten.)

**V.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE VETOED AGREEMENT.-** Pursuant to what was indicated in the preceding Considerando, it is necessary to determine the content and legal nature of the vetoed act. In it, the partial suspension is ordered of the Road Planning and Signage Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento y Señalización Vial) for the canton of Grecia, prepared jointly by Traffic engineers, the members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and the Municipality (Municipalidad) of Grecia; approved unanimously and definitively by the Council in Article II, Sole Item, Minutes number 275, of the regular session held on July thirtieth, two thousand nine, only with respect to the demarcation of *"the yellow line on the Municipal streets of the Central District of the canton of Grecia"*, while the Directing Body of the procedure is formed to hear the validity of the approval of said plan, as ordered by the vetoed agreement (folios 256 to 257). As is clearly observed, it is a precautionary measure of suspension of the effects of a previous administrative act, supposedly challenged in a motion for review, not the annulment of the plan. With which, it is a procedural act, not a final one, but insofar as it has its own effects, it is susceptible to the disagreement or objection by the Mayor, under the terms permitted in Article 163.2 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), of suppletory application pursuant to Article 9 of the reference Law (Ley). Finally, regarding the grounds that support the veto formulated by the Mayor of the Municipality (Municipalidad) of Grecia, as all are of legality, it is admissible for its analysis and control by this Authority.

**VI.- ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN STATUS (DEMANIALIDAD) OF PUBLIC ROADS.-** Due to the connection with the content of the vetoed agreement, it is deemed pertinent to make some brief considerations regarding the special legal nature of public roads. In national legal jargon, the concepts *"public road", "road" and "street"* are used interchangeably, understanding by such, **all terrain of public domain and common use,** which by disposition of the administrative and judicial authorities is destined for free transit in accordance with the provisions of the laws and their regulations on the subject at hand.

Thus, it was with the enactment of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), number 5060, of August 8, 1962, that two national networks were established; the national network, made up of primary, secondary, and tertiary roads, which shall be defined and administered by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), and the cantonal, local, or municipal network, made up of neighborhood streets, the administration of which is delegated to local governments; and which in turn is classified into neighborhood roads (caminos vecinales), which are those that provide direct access to farms and other economically rural activities, connect hamlets and towns with the national road network, and are characterized by having low traffic volumes and high proportions of short-distance local trips; local streets (calles locales), which are those included within the quadrant of an urban area, not classified as urban crossings of the National Road Network; and finally unclassified roads (caminos no clasificados), which include those roads not included in the categories described above, such as bridle paths, footpaths, trails, that provide access to very few users, who shall bear the costs of maintenance and improvement, as provided in Article 1 of Law 6678, of September 18, 1981. It is precisely because of the purpose or vocation (destino o vocación) of these access ways, under the terms of Article 261 of the Civil Code, namely the free access of passersby and motor vehicles, and the entity responsible for their administration (la Administración Pública, whether the Ministry of Public Works and Transport -Executive Branch- or the Municipalities -entity decentralized by territory), that they are public domain assets (bienes de dominio público), and for this reason, the characteristics inherent to this type of assets apply to them, meaning they are imprescriptible, inalienable, unseizable, and subject to police power with respect to their administration, as our Constitutional Court has previously considered, in ruling number 2306-91:

"Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the roads of the Capital City, whether municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public places, places them outside the commerce of men, and therefore the permits granted shall always be on a precarious and revocable basis by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so indicate.-" Thus, the teleological element is provided for in Articles 44 and 45 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), which, in what is relevant, state literally and respectively:

"Public domain over areas of streets, squares, gardens, parks, or other open spaces for general public use is constituted by that very use, and its registration in the Property Registry may be dispensed with, if it is recorded on the Official Map..." "The properties referred to in the previous article may be transferred to another public use, in accordance with the determinations of the Regulatory Plan, but if their purpose is designated by law, the change must be approved by the Legislative Assembly." Regarding the ownership of these assets, Article 2 of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos) provides:

"All land occupied by existing or future public roads and highways is property of the State. The municipalities own the streets within their jurisdiction. Public roads and highways may only be constructed and improved by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. However, with prior authorization from said Ministry, municipalities and decentralized State institutions that have functions related to the construction of public roads may execute them directly or through third parties..." Furthermore, Article 28 of this same Law (General Public Roads Law) contains the following statement regarding their disposition and their special regime of affectation:

"It is strictly prohibited for the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Municipalities to grant permits or rights of occupation, enjoyment, use, or simple possession of the right-of-way of public roads, or to carry out acts that imply in any way the same by individuals. Those who carry out such acts on public land under the care of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport or the Municipalities shall be administratively evicted by them within the following fifteen days from the written warning made to the responsible party; all without prejudice to the applicable fine and the compensation for the damages that may have been caused." For its part, Decree-Law number 833, of November 4, 1949, issued by the Founding Junta (Junta Fundadora) of the Second Republic, which enacted the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), provides in Article 5:

"Public roads are inalienable and imprescriptible, and therefore, no mortgage, lien, use, usufruct, or easement (servidumbre) for the benefit of a specific person may be constituted over them, under the terms of common law. The rights of transit, illumination and ventilation, view, access, overflows, and other similar rights, inherent to the purpose of public roads, shall be governed exclusively by the laws and Administrative Regulations." Therefore, only permits or concessions may be granted for the use of the roads; however, these do not create any right in favor of the permit holder or the concessionaire, as provided in Article 6 of the Construction Law. These permits or concessions must be temporary and may be revoked at any time by the Municipality, pursuant to the provisions of Article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Furthermore, it must be added that they cannot be granted to the detriment of free, safe, and expeditious transit, or in general to the detriment of any of the purposes for which such roads, according to their class, had been intended.

VII.- OF THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS.- Likewise, it must be remembered that the existence and validity of every administrative act depends on the concurrence of various essential elements, imposed by the legal system, which, for a better understanding, can be classified into material elements (elementos materiales), relating to the subjective elements (competence, standing, and investiture), objective elements (purpose, content, and grounds - Articles 131, 132, and 133 of the General Law of Public Administration and 49 of the Political Constitution) and formal elements (elementos formales), encompassing the form in which the act is adopted, that is, the means of expression or manifestation (instrumentation), the statement of reasons or substantiation (Article 136 of the aforementioned General Law), and the procedure followed for its adoption (Articles 214 and 308 of the General Law of Public Administration), constituted by "the background, assumptions, or legal (of law) and factual reasons that make the issuance of the administrative act possible or necessary, and upon which the Public Administration intends to base the legitimacy, timeliness, or expediency thereof." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p. 370). Thus, these are the causes or assumptions, legal and factual background that induce the Administration to the adoption of the specific act; and which denotes the conformity that must exist between the latter and the purpose that the legal system assigns to it, that is, the satisfaction of a public interest to be satisfied in each case. Therefore, the cited Article 133 requires that it be legitimate, insofar as it is subject to the legal system, as a corollary of the principle of legality that governs Administrative action (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and of the General Law of Public Administration); and furthermore, it must exist exactly as the Administration invokes it, and precisely, it supports the decision adopted, which denotes its intimate relationship with the other element of the act, also of a substantial order, but formal, namely the statement of reasons for the act. This (the statement of reasons) consists of "... a declaration of what the factual and legal circumstances are that have led the respective public administration to the issuance or emanation of the administrative act. The statement of reasons is the formal expression of the grounds and, normally, in any administrative resolution, it is contained in the so-called 'whereas clauses' ('considerandos') - the recital part. The statement of reasons, consisting of an enunciation of the facts and the legal basis that the public administration took into account to issue its decision or will, constitutes a means of proof of its intentionality and an indispensable guideline for interpreting and applying the respective administrative act." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera Edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p 388.)

Thus, the statement of reasons must determine the application of a concept to the specific factual circumstances in question (according to the development of Spanish jurisprudence, specifically in the judgment of May 18, 1991, RA 4120, accepting the recital of the appealed decision, which cites SSTS of September 23, 1969, RA 6078, and October 7, 1970, RA 4251, cited by the author Marcos M. Fernando Pablo, in his work La motivación del acto administrativo. (Editorial Tecnos, S.A Madrid. 1993, page 190)); that is, it is a concrete decision that links the facts with the normative support; so that when there is a brief allusion to general norms and non-specific facts, it can be concluded that there is insufficient justification provided, insofar as it is not possible to deduce from them the elements assessed by the governmental authority to make the decision, which acquires the greatest importance when dealing with acts that limit or restrict subjective rights or those in which a sanction is imposed on the individual. By its content, it constitutes a determining factor of due process and the right of defense, which has full application in the administrative sphere, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) starting from ruling 15-90, at sixteen forty-five hours on January 5, 1990, when setting forth the minimum elements of this constitutional principle.

"(...) a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceedings; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence they deem pertinent; c) opportunity for the individual to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to the file and administrative background, linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the individual to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and the reasons on which it is based, and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued..." (The highlighting is not from the original.)

It is for this reason that, under the terms of Article 136 of the General Law of Public Administration, the Administration is required to state reasons for acts that impose obligations; limit, suppress, or deny subjective rights; resolve appeals; those issued in departure from the criteria followed in previous proceedings or from the opinion of advisory bodies; those that maintain the execution of the act being challenged; general acts of a normative nature (regulations); and discretionary acts of a general nature. Thus, if there is no statement of reasons, a defect of form is incurred that seriously affects the act, rendering it absolutely null and void. Likewise, the content must correspond with the grounds. The content (contenido), as its name indicates, is the definition of the effect of the administrative act, as the immediate legal result thereof, so that it is what it declares, disposes, orders, certifies, or judges, and is usually expressed in the operative part of administrative resolutions. Therefore, it must be in close relationship or correspondence with the grounds, and because of this, "it must be lawful, possible, clear, and encompass all the questions of fact and law arising from the grounds," requires Article 132.1 of the General Law of Public Administration. Finally, the purpose (fin), "is the meta-legal result and ultimate objective pursued by the administrative act, in relation to the grounds" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Op. Cit. p. 378). This element is always regulated, insofar as the law establishes it expressly and specifically, and failing that, its determination shall fall to the judge, based on the other elements of the act (grounds and content), there being no discretion for the Administration in its determination. Thus, the purpose is not and cannot be for the personal benefit of the public servant or a third party. Consequently, if there are irregularities in the grounds and content, this inevitably translates into an inadequacy of the act to its purpose, manifesting itself as a defect due to excess of power (exceso de poder), as provided in Article 131 of the cited General Law of Public Administration.

VIII.- OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE VETOED AGREEMENT.- Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court proceeds to analyze the legality of the agreement adopted by the Municipal Council of Grecia in Article II, Section 3, Minutes number 031, of the ordinary session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten, taking as a basis the reasons for the veto formulated:

First: The agreement lacks grounds and, consequently, the other material elements of the act: The Council bases the decision to partially suspend the Road Planning and Signage Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento y Señalización Vial) for the canton of Grecia, solely with respect to the demarcation of "the yellow line on the Municipal streets of the Central District of the canton of Grecia," on the existence of an extraordinary appeal for review filed against the approval of said plan. It should be remembered that said plan was approved by the council of aldermen by Article II Single Section, Minutes number 275, of the ordinary session held on July thirtieth, two thousand nine, unanimously and definitively. It strikes these judges that no indication is given of when or by whom said appeal was filed, and despite a thorough review of the case file, no document or proof of its filing is found, which evidences the defect in this substantial element, it does not exist in the manner indicated by the Council (Article 133.1 of the General Law of Public Administration). This leads, necessarily, to an erroneous statement of reasons for the act, and consequently, a defect in the content and purpose of the agreement, insofar as what can be glimpsed is the favoring of a group of merchants, who alleged before the deliberative body the affectation of vested rights on the road, by restricting the activity they carry out. It cannot go unnoticed that the agreement which ordered the definitive and unanimous approval of the road reorganization plan for the city of Grecia is supported by a technical study, prepared jointly and in coordination by Traffic engineers, the members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and the Municipality of Grecia, under the terms authorized by the autonomy of government granted to Municipalities by the Political Constitution (Article 170), as clarified by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling number 5445-99, and authorized by Article 6 of the Municipal Code. Likewise, it is necessary to warn that, if the alleged extraordinary appeal for review exists, it is not admissible for analysis upon mere filing, since Article 157 of the Municipal Code, in which such an appeal is applicable, relates to those decisions regarding which the filing of the respective appeal for review was omitted, and which are taking effect, but its grounds can only be those that give rise to the absolute nullity of the act. In this sense, the plan has already been executed in terms of the road demarcation, which cost the municipal budget fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty colones exactos (¢14,930,180.00), and the only nonconformity that is recorded in the case file is the alleged affectation of the vested rights of the merchants over the public road, which in no way constitutes grounds for nullity – which will be analyzed below – and hence the illegality of the vetoed decision.

Second: On the importance of the affectation of third-party rights: An allegation that intends the avoidance of third-party rights – in this case, we assume those of the merchants – on the occasion of the road demarcation of the city of Grecia is clearly inappropriate, precisely in view of the special nature of public roads, which includes both the space where motor vehicles circulate and the sidewalks, set aside for the free transit of individuals.

As indicated, our national legal system establishes that roads are public domain assets, and as such, are <b>indispensable, due to their essential characteristics of imprescriptibility, inalienability, and unattachability,</b> both for the administered parties and for the Administration, and no right can be generated or alleged regarding this type of asset, whether of occupation or possession, much less to exercise a lucrative activity, as appears to be the case under study.

**IX.- CONCLUSION.-** Having accredited the violation of all the material elements of the vetoed agreement—adopted by the Municipal Council of Grecia in Article II, Subsection 3, Minutes number 031, of the ordinary session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten—this Court has no other recourse but to uphold the objection filed by the Mayor of that local corporation, consequently proceeding with its declaration due to a defect of absolute nullity." Thus, in accordance with the aforementioned constitutional numeral 173, the Municipal Mayor is granted the power to exercise a veto against the agreements of the Municipal Council, an option we must understand more as an objection than as an appeal (recurso), since the latter is rather characteristic of and exclusive to those subject to the administration. It is therefore an ex officio disapproval, which the law attributes to the Mayor, in his capacity as the executive official, an integral part of the local government, so that within it, he may oppose agreements emanating from the collegiate body, in which he has not participated—since although he attends the Council sessions, he has no right to vote (subsection c) of Article 17 of the Código Municipal)—but which may undoubtedly interfere negatively with his work as the "general manager" of the local entity and, above all, with his government plan, which is required of him by current legislation. The Código Municipal, in Article 17, subsection d), establishes this power within the list of attributions of that municipal executive, and in numerals 153, 158, 159, and 160 of the same legal body, regulates the prerequisites for its filing, the term and form, as well as the effects of the use of this power. By virtue of which, in accordance with Article 160 of the Código Municipal, the following agreements of the Council are excluded from the veto:

"a) Those not definitively approved. b) Those in which the municipal mayor has a direct or indirect personal interest. c) Repealed by Article 202, subsection 5) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, number 8508, of the twenty-second of June, two thousand six. d) Those that must be approved by the Contraloría General de la República or the Asamblea Legislativa, or those authorized by the latter. e) Those appealable before the Contraloría General de la República. f) Those of mere procedure or those for the ratification, confirmation, or execution of previous ones." To this list, we can add the provisions of Article 19 of the Código on the matter, according to which the decision made by the Municipal Council regarding the call for a plebiscite, to decide on the removal or not of the Mayor, is, for obvious reasons, outside the possibility of veto by this official. As provided in the first paragraph of Article 158 of the cited Código Municipal, the veto may be interposed before the Council for reasons of both legality and opportunity; it must be clarified in this regard that, in accordance with the cited numeral 173 of the Constitución Política, the competence conferred upon the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, as developed by law (Articles 156 and the final paragraph of the cited 158 of the Código Municipal), is by acting as an improper hierarch (jerarca impropio), which, in accordance with numeral 181 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, limits it to exercising an eminently legality-based control of municipal administrative decisions, prior to jurisdictional control; therefore, such reasons of "opportunity" or "discretion" are not susceptible to review at this instance, but only in their parameters or elements of control, such as the purpose of the Administration, respect for fundamental rights, the reasonableness of actions ("prohibition of arbitrariness"), and the rules of science and technique, which, in accordance with Article 16 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, make up the legality block, since to begin analyzing such assessments would imply not only distorting the figure of the improper hierarch, but also an overstepping of the constitutionally and legally assigned competencies of the judges who hear this matter, thereby becoming, as it is the proper and exclusive domain of the "active Administration." (This Tribunal has previously ruled in the same sense, in resolutions number 425-2010, at twelve hours ten minutes of February eighth, and 947-2010, at fifteen hours forty minutes of March eleventh, both of two thousand ten.)

**V.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY FOR THE MERITS REVIEW OF THE VETOED AGREEMENT.-** In accordance with what is indicated in the preceding Considerando, it is necessary to determine the content and legal nature of the vetoed act. The act provides for the partial suspension of the Road Planning and Signaling Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento y Señalización Vial) of the canton of Grecia, prepared jointly by traffic engineers, members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, and the Municipalidad de Grecia; approved unanimously and definitively by the Council in Article II, Sole Subsection, Minute number 275, of the regular session held on July thirtieth, two thousand nine, only regarding the demarcation of "the yellow line on Dirección11527", while the Directing Body for the procedure to determine the validity of said plan's approval is being formed, as ordered by the vetoed agreement (folios 256 to 257). As can be clearly observed, this is a precautionary measure to suspend the effects of a prior administrative act, allegedly questioned in an appeal for review (recurso de revisión), not the annulment of the plan. Therefore, it is a procedural act, not a final one, but insofar as it has its own effects, it is susceptible to disagreement or objection by the Mayor, under the terms permitted in Article 163.2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, of supplementary application by virtue of Article 9 of the referenced Law. Finally, regarding the reasons supporting the veto formulated by the Mayor of the Municipalidad de Grecia, all being based on legality, it is appropriate for analysis and control by this Authority.

**VI.- ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN STATUS OF PUBLIC ROADS.-** Due to the connection with the content of the vetoed agreement, it is deemed pertinent to make some brief considerations regarding the special legal nature of public roads (vías públicas). In national legal jargon, the concepts "vía pública", "camino", and "calle" are used interchangeably, understanding them to be all land in the public domain (dominio público) and for common use, which by disposition of administrative and judicial authorities is destined for free transit in accordance with the provisions of the laws and their regulations on the referenced subject. Thus, it is with the enactment of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, number 5060, of August eighth, nineteen sixty-two, that two national networks are established; the national network, made up of primary, secondary, and tertiary highways, which shall be defined and administered by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, and the cantonal, local, or municipal network, made up of neighborhood streets (calles vecinales), whose administration is delegated to local governments; and which, in turn, is classified into local roads (caminos vecinales), which are those that provide direct access to farms and other economically rural activities, connect hamlets and towns with the national road network, and are characterized by having low traffic volumes and high proportions of short-distance local trips; local streets (calles locales), which are those included within the quadrant of an urban area, not classified as urban crossings of the National Road Network; and finally, unclassified roads (caminos no clasificados), which include those roads not included in the categories described above, such as bridle paths, footpaths, trails, that provide access to very few users, who shall bear the costs of maintenance and improvement, as provided in Article one of Law 6678, of September eighteenth, nineteen eighty-one. It is precisely because of the purpose or vocation (destino o vocación) that these accesses have, under the terms of numeral 261 of the Código Civil, namely the free access of pedestrians and motor vehicles, and the subject to whom their administration corresponds (the Public Administration, whether the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes -Executive Branch- or the Municipalities -entity decentralized by territory), that they are public domain property (bienes de dominio público), and therefore, the inherent characteristics of this type of property are applicable to them, meaning they are imprescriptible, inalienable, unseizable and subject to police power with respect to their administration, as our Constitutional Tribunal has previously considered, in judgment number 2306-91:

"Consequently, the national regime of public domain property, such as the roads of the Capital City, whether municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public places, places them outside of commerce, and therefore, the permits granted shall always be on a precarious basis and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so dictate.-" Thus, the teleological element is provided for in Articles 44 and 45 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which, as relevant, literally and respectively state:

"The public domain over areas of streets, plazas, gardens, parks, or other open spaces for general public use is constituted by that same use and its registration in the Property Registry may be dispensed with, if it appears on the Official Map..." "The properties referred to in the previous article may be transferred to another public use, in accordance with the determinations of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), but if they have a purpose established by law, the change must be approved by the Asamblea Legislativa." Regarding the ownership of these properties, Article 2 of the Ley General de Caminos provides:

"All lands occupied by existing public highways and roads, or those to be built in the future, are property of the State. The municipalities have ownership of the streets within their jurisdiction. Public highways and roads may only be built and improved by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. However, with prior authorization from said Ministry, municipalities and decentralized State institutions, which have functions related to the construction of public roads, may execute them directly or through third parties..." Furthermore, Article 28 of this same Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos) contains the following statement regarding their disposition and their special regime of affectation:

"It is strictly forbidden for the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and the Municipalities to grant permits or rights of occupation, enjoyment, use, or simple possession of the right-of-way (derecho vía) of public roads or to perform acts that imply in any form the granting of the same to individuals. Those who perform such acts on public lands under the care of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes or the Municipalities shall be administratively evicted by them within the following fifteen days counted from the written notice given to the responsible party; all without prejudice to the applicable fine and the compensation for the damages and losses that may have been caused." For its part, Decree-Law number 833, of November fourth, nineteen forty-nine, issued by the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, which enacted the Ley de Construcciones, provides in Article 5:

"Public roads (vías públicas) are inalienable and imprescriptible, and therefore, no mortgage, seizure, use, usufruct, or easement (servidumbre) may be constituted over them for the benefit of a specific person, under the terms of common law. Rights of passage, illumination and ventilation, view, access, water runoff, and other similar rights, inherent to the purpose of public roads, shall be governed exclusively by administrative laws and regulations." Therefore, only permits or concessions for the use of roads may be granted; however, these do not create any right in favor of the permittee or the concessionaire, as provided in ordinal 6 of the Ley de Construcciones. These permits or concessions must be temporary and may be revoked at any time by the Municipality, in accordance with the provisions of Article 154 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Furthermore, it must be added that they cannot be granted to the detriment of free, safe, and expeditious transit or, in general, to the detriment of any of the purposes for which such roads, according to their class, have been designated.

**VII.- ON THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS.-** Likewise, it must be remembered that the existence and validity of every administrative act depends on the concurrence of several essential elements, imposed by the legal system, which, for better understanding, can be classified into material elements, relating to the subjective elements (competence, standing, and investiture), objective elements (purpose, content, and motive—Articles 131, 132, and 133 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 49 of the Constitución Política), and formal elements, comprising the form in which the act is adopted, that is, the means of expression or manifestation (instrumentation), the motivation (motivación) or grounding (Article 136 of the cited Ley General), and the procedure followed for its adoption (Articles 214 and 308 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, consisting of "the antecedents, presuppositions, or legal (de derecho) and factual reasons that make the issuance of the administrative act possible or necessary, and upon which the Public Administration intends to base its legitimacy, opportunity, or convenience." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tome I. (General Part). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. First edition. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p. 370). Thus, these are the causes or presuppositions, the legal and factual antecedents that induce the Administration to adopt the specific act; and which denotes the conformity that must exist between the act and the purpose that the legal system assigns to it, that is, the satisfaction of a public interest to be met in each case. Therefore, the cited numeral 133 requires that it be legitimate, since it is subject to the legal system, as a corollary of the principle of legality that governs Administrative action (Articles 11 of the Constitución Política and of the Ley General de la Administración Pública); and furthermore, it must exist just as the Administration invokes it, and precisely these grounds support the adopted decision, which denotes its intimate relationship with the other element of the act, also of a substantial but formal nature, namely, the motivation of the act. This (motivation) consists "... in a declaration of what are the circumstances of fact and law that have led the respective public administration to the issuance or emanating of the administrative act. Motivation is the formal expression of the motive and, normally, in any administrative resolution, is contained in the so-called 'considerandos'—recital part—. Motivation, consisting of a statement of the facts and the legal ground that the public administration took into account to issue its decision or will, constitutes a means of proof of its intentionality and an indispensable guideline for interpreting and applying the respective administrative act." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tome I. (General Part). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. First Edition. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p 388.)

Thus, the motivation must determine the application of a concept to the singular factual circumstances in question (according to the development of Spanish jurisprudence, specifically in the judgment of May 18, 1991, RA 4120, accepting a recital of the appealed decision, which cites SSTS of September 23, 1969, RA 6078, and October 7, 1970, RA 4251, cited by the author Marcos M. Fernando Pablo, in his work La motivación del acto administrativo. (Editorial Tecnos, S.A Madrid. 1993, page 190); that is to say, it is a concrete decision, linking the facts with the normative support; so that when there is a brief allusion to general norms and unspecific facts, it can be concluded that there is insufficient contribution of justification, to the extent that it is not possible to deduce the elements assessed by the governmental authority to make the decision, which takes on the greatest significance when dealing with acts that limit or restrict subjective rights or in which a sanction is imposed on the individual. By its content, it constitutes a determining factor of due process and the right of defense, which has full application in the administrative sphere, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional starting with judgment 15-90, at sixteen hours forty-five minutes of January fifth, nineteen ninety, by enunciating the minimum elements of this constitutional principle.

"(...) a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; b) the right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present the arguments and produce the evidence deemed pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare its argument, which necessarily includes access to the case file and the administrative records, linked to the matter in question; ch) the right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and of the reasons on which it is based, and e) the right of the interested party to appeal the decision rendered..." (The highlighting is not from the original.)

It is for this reason that, in accordance with Article 136 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the Administration is required to motivate acts that impose obligations; limit, suppress, or deny subjective rights; resolve appeals (recursos); those issued with a separation from the criteria followed in preceding actions or from the opinion of consultative bodies; those that maintain the execution of an act being challenged; general acts of a normative nature (regulations); and discretionary acts of a general nature. Thus, if there is no motivation, it incurs a defect of form that seriously affects the act, rendering it absolutely null. Likewise, the content must correspond with the motive. The content, as its name indicates, is the definition of the effect of the administrative act, as its immediate legal result, such that it is what it declares, disposes, orders, certifies, or judges, and is usually expressed in the operative part of administrative resolutions. Therefore, it must be in close relationship or correspondence with the motive, and thus, "it must be licit, possible, clear, and encompass all questions of fact and law arising from the motive," as required by Article 132.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Finally, the purpose (fin), "is the meta-legal result and ultimate objective pursued by the administrative act, in relation to the motive" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Op. Cit. p. 378). This element is always regulated, insofar as the law fixes it expressly and specifically, and in its absence, its determination shall correspond to the judge, based on the other elements of the act (motive and content), with no discretion existing for the Administration in its determination. Thus, the purpose is not and cannot be for the personal benefit of the public servant or a third party.

So that, if there are irregularities in both the motive and the content, this inevitably translates into an inadequacy of the act to its purpose, manifesting as a defect of excess of power, as provided for in Article 131 of the aforementioned Ley General de la Administración Pública.

**VIII.- OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE VETOED AGREEMENT.-** Based on the foregoing considerations, this Tribunal proceeds to conduct the legality analysis of the agreement adopted by the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Grecia in Article II, Item 3, Minutes number 031, of the ordinary session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten, taking as a basis the reasons for the veto formulated:

**First: The agreement lacks a motive and, consequently, the other material elements of the act:** The Council bases the decision for the partial suspension of the Road Planning and Signaling Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento y Señalización Vial) of the canton of Grecia, solely concerning the demarcation of "*the yellow line on Dirección11527*," on the existence of an extraordinary review remedy (recurso extraordinario de revisión) filed against the approval of that plan. It should be remembered that said plan was approved by the council of aldermen under Article II Sole Item, Minutes number 275, of the ordinary session held on July thirtieth, two thousand nine, unanimously and definitively. It draws the attention of these judges that no indication is made of when nor by whom said remedy was filed and, despite a meticulous review of the case file, no document or record of its filing is found, which evidences the defect in this substantial element, as it does not exist in the manner indicated by the Council (Article 133.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). This necessarily leads to an erroneous motivation of the act, and consequently, a defect in the content and the purpose of the agreement, insofar as what can be glimpsed is the favoring of a group of merchants, who alleged before the deliberative body the impact on acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) over the road, by restricting the activity they carry out. It cannot go unnoticed that the agreement which provided for the approval—definitively and unanimously—of the road reordering plan of the city of Grecia, is supported by a technical study, prepared jointly and coordinated by Traffic engineers, the members of the Local Road Safety Committee, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT) and the Municipality of Grecia, under the terms authorized by the governmental autonomy granted to Municipalities by the Constitución Política (Article 170), as clarified by the Sala Constitucional in ruling number 5445-99, and authorized by Article 6 of the Código Municipal. Likewise, it is necessary to warn that, should the alleged extraordinary review remedy exist, it is not admissible for analysis upon mere filing, since Article 157 of the Código Municipal, states that a remedy is appropriate regarding those decisions for which the filing of the respective appeal remedy (recurso de apelación) was omitted, and which are taking effect, but its motive can only be that which originates the absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the act. In this sense, the plan has already been executed regarding road demarcation, which had a cost from the municipal budget of fourteen million nine hundred thirty thousand one hundred eighty exact colones (¢14,930,180.00), and the only disagreement on file is the alleged impact on acquired rights of the merchants over the public road, which is in no way a ground for nullity—which will be analyzed next—and hence the illegality of the vetoed decision.

**Second: On the importance of affecting the rights of third parties:** An allegation that seeks to avoid the rights of third parties—in this case, we assume of the merchants—on the occasion of the road demarcation of the city of Grecia, is clearly improper, precisely in attention to the special nature of public roads, which includes both the space where motor vehicles circulate, as well as the sidewalks, provided for the free transit of persons. As indicated, our national legal system establishes that roads are public domain assets (bienes de dominio público), and as such, are **indispensable, due to their essential characteristics of imprescriptibility, inalienability, and unattachability,** both for the governed and for the Administration, and no right can be generated or alleged regarding this type of asset, whether of occupation or possession, and much less, to exercise a lucrative activity, as seems to be the case under study.

**IX.- CONCLUSION.-** Having proven the violation of all the material elements of the vetoed agreement—adopted by the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Grecia in Article II, Item 3, Minutes number 031, of the ordinary session held on August thirtieth, two thousand ten—this Tribunal has no alternative but to accept the disagreement formulated by the Mayor of that local corporation, consequently proceeding to its declaration as vitiated by absolute nullity.

**POR TANTO** The veto filed is accepted.- **Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes** **Evelyn Solano Ulloa** **Eduardo González Segura**

No. 395 -2011 SECCIÓN TERCERA DEL TRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Goicoechea, a las nueve horas treinta y cinco minutos del catorce de octubre de l dos mil once.

Conoce este Tribunal, en su condición de jerarca impropio municipal, del veto interpuesto por Giovanny Arguedas Quesada , mayor, casado, con cédula CED78159, vecino de Santa Gertrudris Norte, de Grecia en su condición de ALCALDE MUNICIPAL DE LA MUNICIPALIDAD DE GRECIA , contra el acuerdo adoptado por el Concejo de esa corporación local, en el Artículo II, Inciso 3 del Acta número 031, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada el treinta y uno de agosto del dos mil diez.

Redacta la Juez Fernández Brenes; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS.- De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tiene como debidamente acreditado el siguiente elenco: 1.) Que en el Artículo II de la sesión ordinaria número 275, celebrada el treinta de julio del dos mil nueve, el Alcalde municipal presenta el Plan de Ordenamiento y Señalización Vial del cantón, preparado de manera conjunta por ingenieros de Tránsito, los miembros del Comité Local de Seguridad Vial, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y la Municipalidad de Grecia; de manera que el Concejo, por unanimidad y de manera definitiva, acuerda aprobarlo, así como "b.) Solicitar al señor Alcalde Municipal, Giovanny Arguedas Quesada, elabore el Reglamento de Carga y Descarga, en coordinación con el Concejo Local de Seguridad Vial (COLOSEVI) y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT) para ser ratificado por el Concejo Municipal. c) Solicitar al señor Giovanny Arguedas Quesada, Alcalde Municipal, presente convenio de cooperación entre el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y la Municipalidad de Grecia, para la implementación de acciones y tareas en materia de vialidad, de la segunda etapa" (folios 80 a 108, 274 a 286); 2.) Que en ejecución de lo anterior, por oficio DGT-RSR-0431-2009, del siete de agosto del dos mil nueve, la Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito Regional de San Ramón presenta ante el Concejo la propuesta de reordenamiento vual para el casco central del cantón de Grecia, con las siguientes recomendaciones: "- Implementación de este proyecto a corto plazo, considerando que la viallidad varía constantemente y la solución propuesta es puntual. - Ejecutar fondos a través del COLOSEVI. - Compromiso del gobierno local y fuerzas vivas para darle continuidad al proyecto y que sean respetadas las restricciones establecidas en el proyecto. - Firmar el Convenio Interinstitucional para próximos proyectos de señalamiento vial. - Coordinar la publicidad del reordenamiento con oficina de Prensa del MOPT. - Coordinar con la Dirección de Proyectos del COSEVI, proyectos adicionales como: - Empresas Seguras - Escuelas Seguras - Capacitación proyectos COLOSEVI - Proyecto de divulgación de reordenamiento en comunidad" (folios 109 a 122); 3.) Que por acuerdo del Artículo VII, Inciso 5), Acta 290, de la sesión ordinaria del cinco de octubre del dos mil nueve, corregido mediante decisión del Artículo V, Inciso 3, del acta 293, de la sesión ordinaria del diecinueve de octubre siguiente, el Concejo de Grecia declara a la empresa Sur Química Sociedad Anónima adjudicataria del proceso de licitación abreviada número 2009LA-000007-01, "compra de pintura y solvente para la señalización vial horizontal en el cantón de Grecia", por un monto de catorce millones novecientos treinta mil ciento ochenta y un colones exactos, indicándole a la proveedora que el producto recibido deberá someterse al análisis del laboratorio del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, y hasta que eso no pase, no se emitirá recibo conforme (actas a folios 127 a 128 y 129 a 130); 4.) Que por oficio PRO-2009-134, del veintiséis de octubre del dos mil nueve, el Proveedor municipal entrega al Coordinador de Tesorería copia original y recibo con el pago de entero de timbres de los siguientes contratos, en lo que interesa: Coordinación de servicios de transporte para acarreo de materiales de reparación vial distrital y compra de pintura y solvente para señalización vial horizontal en el cantón de Grecia (folio 133); 5.) Que el veintitrés de octubre del dos mil nueve, el Alcalde de la Municipalidad -Alexander Gutiérrez Monge- y el personero de la empresa Sur Química Sociedad Anónima -Danisio Fernández Jiménez- suscriben contrato de compra de pintura y solvente para la señalización vial horizontal en el cantón de Grecia (folios 139 a 143); 6.) Que por acuerdo del Artículo V, Inciso 1), acta 296, de la sesión ordinaria del dos de noviembre siguiente, a petición del Coordinador de Proveeduría, el cuerpo de ediles autoriza los siguientes pagos a proveedores, en lo que interesa a este asunto: "a) Empresa 3M Costa Rica, por concepto de suministro de tinta negra para señalización vial vertical en Grecia por un monto de ¢3.300.584 ,00 (tres millones quinientos ochenta y cuatro mil colones exactos), según orden de compra No. Placa16840. b). Empresa Sur Químicas S.A por concepto de suministro de pinturas y solventes para la señalización vial horizontal de Grecia, por un monto de ¢14.930.180, 00 (catorce millones novecientos treinta mil ciento ochenta colones exactos), según orden de compra No. 29585" (folios 136 y 137); 7.) Que por acuerdo del Artículo I, Inciso 3), Acta número 025, del nueve de agosto del dos mil diez, por unanimidad, el Concejo conoce y aprueba la moción de orden del regidor Rolando Alpízar Oviedo que dice: "Para que se modifique el orden del día de la sesión municipal del día de hoy, y se pueda ver el documento que adjunto a la presente moción, que es referente, a la prohibición de aparcarse en ciertos sectores de nuestro casco central. Asimismo si la presente moción fue aceptada, solicito desde ya se le pueda otorgar la palabra al Licenciado Ricardo González Díaz, Asesor de esta Fracción, por hasta veinte minutos, y este pueda realizar una explicación clara, y específica de los alcances de lo que significa la Autonomía Municipal, y de la facultad que tiene este Concejo para dejar sin efecto, la prohibición de poder aparcarse en las calles y avenidas que están bajo la jurisdicción de la Municipalidad de Grecia" (folio 242); 8.) Que por acuerdo del Artículo I, Inciso 3), Acta número 025, del nueve de agosto del dos mil diez, el órgano deliberativo de Grecia acuerda: "a) Aprobar la moción presentada, en consecuencia, se deja sin efecto lo establecido mediante acta 275, artículo II, inciso único, sub inciso a) de fecha treinta de julio del dos mil nueve, en lo referente a la prohibición de poder aparcarse donde esté demarcado con raya amarilla en aquellas calles que estén bajo la jurisdicción de la corporación municipal, o aquellas que no sean ruta nacional, asimismo, se instruye al señor Alcalde municipal para que realice la notificación respectiva a la Dirección General de Tránsito, para que cese la prohibición de aparcarse y no se confeccionen más los partes respectivos, quedando claramente definido que a partir del presente acuerdo, dicha prohibición queda totalmente sin aplicación. Además se prevenga al Consejo de Seguridad Vial (COSEVI) dependencia del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, que de acuerdo a la legislación vigente, ésta tendrá seis meses para que se refiera a la demarcación en las partes de ruta nacional, entrada a Grecia, pasando por el parque Central y doblando cien metros después de Dirección11526 llegando hasta el banco HSBC, llegando luego a la agencia local del ICE, y tomando hasta la carretera de Sarchí, esto con el efecto que si en los próximos seis meses no se diere pronunciamiento al respecto sobre dicha demarcación, dicha prohibición quedará sin efecto alguno. b.) Se le solicita al señor Alcalde realizar las gestiones del caso a la brevedad posible y presente informe de dichas gestiones en el tiempo perentorio sin derecho a prórroga el próximo veintitrés de agosto del dos mil diez" (por referencia en memorial de interposición del veto, a folio 249); 9.) Que dicha moción es originada en oficio presentado por el Licenciado Juan Marín Quirós, Presidente Ejecutivo, Ministro de Descentralización y Desarrollo Local, dirigido al diputado Luis Alberto Rojas Valerio y sin estudio de Comisión ni dispensa de trámite (hecho no controvertido, por referencia en memorial de interposición del veto, a folio 249); 10.) Que contra el acuerdo anterior, el Alcalde formula veto por motivos de legalidad, por infracción del procedimiento dispuesto en el Código Municipal para la adopción de acuerdos municipales (folios 247 a 250); 11.) Que en sesión ordinaria celebrada el dieciséis de agosto del dos mil diez, el Concejo recibe a un grupo de comerciantes que se oponen a la demaración de línea amarilla en la ciudad de Grecia, quienes alegan la violación y afectación de derechos adquiridos con esa medida (hecho no controvertido; por referencia en el veto interpuesto por el Alcalde, a folio 260); 12.) Que al conocer del veto, por acuerdo del Artículo V, Inciso 2, del Acta número 029, del veintitrés de agosto del dos mil diez, el cuerpo de ediles decide dejar pendiente el documento para la próxima sesión; siendo acogido el veto en sesión posterior (acta de sesión a folios 251 a 254; y memorial de contestación de audiencia del Presidente del Concejo a folio 325); 13.) Que por acuerdo del Artículo II, Inciso 3, Acta número 031, del treinta de agosto del dos mil diez, el Concejo aprueba la moción presentada por el regidor Jorge Gómez Valverde, Presidente de la cámara, que dice: "En vista del veto planteamiento (sic) y acogido sobre el Acuerdo que elimina la raya amarilla en las Dirección11527 , y en aras de favorecer a los vecinos del cantón y no provocar un daño de imposible reparación, tal y como lo permite la ley. Adicionalmente es importante tener presente que de acuerdo con nuestro ordenamiento jurídico fue incoado en contra del Acuerdo inicial que instituye la línea amarilla para el aparcamiento de vehículos automotores, y en el tanto al haberse producido Derechos Adquiridos por parte de terceros, se debe conformar un Órgano Director del Procedimiento Administrativo, que determine la validez del acuerdo inicial y la posibilidad de eliminar todo el proceso de Ordenamiento Vial, Mociono: Para que durante el tiempo que el Órgano Director lleve a cabo la investigación correspondiente, se DEJE SIN EFECTO ALGUNO la demaración de la LÍNEA AMARILLA en Dirección11528 , y se comunique al COSEVI y a la POLICÍA DE TRÁNSITO, de forma inmediata la entrada en vigencia del presente acuerdo. En vista de que es urgente y de evitar daños mayores, se solicita DISPENSAR DE CONOCIMIENTO DE COMISIÓN el presente acuerdo y APROBARLO COMO ACUERDO FIRME, para que entre a regir a partir del día de mañana. COMUNÍQUESE AL SEÑOR ALCALDE PARA QUE DE INMEDIATO HAGA LA CORRESPONDIENTE MOCIÓN" (folios 256 a 257); 14.) Que contra el acuerdo anterior, el Alcalde formula veto ( por referencia en acuerdo del Artículo IV, Inciso 17), Acta número 034, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada el trece de setiembre del dos mil diez, a folios 258 a 266): y, 15.) Que con referencia en el informe del asesor legal del órgano deliberativo -Licenciado Ronald Ramírez Garita-, por acuerdo del Artículo IV, Inciso 17), Acta número 034, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada el trece de setiembre del dos mil diez, el Concejo rechaza el veto interpuesto por estimar que "los argumentos esgrimidos no son compartidos en el tanto, no se demuestra fehacientemente en el memorial que existan esas razones de legalidad u oportunidad para vetar dicho acuerdo" ; y consecuentemente, eleva el asunto para ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo (folios 258 266).

II. - DE LOS HECHOS NO PROBADOS.- De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tiene como no acreditado los siguientes: 1.) Que se haya formulado recurso de revisión contra el Artículo II Inciso Único, Acta número 275, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada por el Concejo de Grecia el treinta de julio del dos mil nueve; y 2.) Que el acuerdo vetado esté sustentado en criterio técnico. No hay prueba al respecto).

III.- DE LOS MOTIVOS DEL VETO.- El Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Grecia veta el acuerdo adoptado por el Concejo de esa corporación municipal en el Artículo II, Inciso 3, Acta número 031, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada el treinta de agosto del dos mil diez, con base en los siguientes motivos: a.) Que la decisión violenta lo dispuesto en el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política y el numeral 113 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, al desproteger los intereses locales, en tanto está dispuesta para favorecer únicamente los de un grupo de comerciantes, desatendiendo así, el mandato constitucional de velar por el desarrollo político, social, económico y cultural del cantón en su conjunto: y b.) Que el acuerdo que se pretende dejar en suspenso, aprobó el Plan de Ordenamiento y regulación vial de la ciudad de Grecia, propuesta sustentado en un estudio de cooperación elaborado por funcionarios de la Municipalidad, involucrándose al COLOSEVI y la Dirección de Ingeniería de Tránsito, así como el Ministerio de Obras Pública y Trasnportes, con la participación del Consejo de Seguridad Vial y el Consejo de Transporte Público, coordinado por la Alcaldía, en los términos permitidos en el numeral 6 del Código Municipal y sin infracción de la autonomía municpal, en respuesta a las necesidades de señalización debido a la reforma de la Ley de Tránsito que entró en vigencia el nueve de setiembre del dos mil nueve; c.) Que la propuesta de reordenamiento vial para el casco central del cantón de Grecia está respaldada en un estudio técnico, respetándose así las reglas unívocas de la ciencia y la técnica, conforme al artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; de manera que previo a la suspensión o anulación de ese plan. se debió tomar un acuerdo para coordinar con la Dirección de Ingeniería de Tránsito para revisar la demarcación amarilla en las rutas de su jurisdicción, "y no proceder dejarla sin efecto por un asunto de conveniencia para complacer a unos comerciantes que se presentaron al Concejo Municipal a ejercer presión" sobre la medida adoptada; c.) Que para la implementación de ese Plan, la corporación local procedió a hacer una inversión pública de catorce millones novecientos treinta mil ciento ochenta colones, para la compra de la pintura que sirvió para la demarcación de las vías del cantón, que es un monto significativo para dejarlo sin efecto; y d.) Que el acto vetado carece del elemento "causa" o "motivo", "que no es más que el conjunto de circunstancias de hecho y de derecho que se echa de menos en el acuerdo aquí impugnado, mismo que solamente se limita a indicar que "en aras de favorecer a los vecinos del cantón y no provocar un daño de imposible reparación ... se deje sin efecto alguno de demarcación de la línea amarilla", consecuentemente, alega infracción de los artículo 132 y 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. (Folios 258 a 263, 334 a 340 y 342 a 343.)

IV.- VETO MUNICIPAL Y LA COMPETENCIA DE ESTE TRIBUNAL, ACTUANDO COMO JERARCA IMPROPIO MUNICIPAL .- Resulta necesario recordar que nuestra Ley Fundamental en el inciso 1) del artículo 173, establece un control a lo interno de la organización esencial del gobierno local, que recordemos, se compone por el Concejo Municipal (como cuerpo deliberativo) y por el funcionario ejecutivo (artículo 169 de la Constitución), que en la actual legislación se denomina "Alcalde Municipal", que se estatuye en un mecanismo propio del sistema de pesos y contrapesos, de alguna manera, similar al que rige entre los Poderes del Estado (Ejecutivo- Legislativo, respecto de la potestad que ostenta el Presidente de la República, de interponer el veto contra las leyes emitidas por el Poder Legislativo). Así, conforme al indicado numeral 173 constitucional, se le concede al Alcalde Municipal, la facultad de ejercer el veto contra los acuerdos del Concejo Municipal, opción que debemos entenderlo más como una objeción que como un recurso, en tanto este último, es más bien propio y exclusivo de los administrados. Se trata entonces de una desaprobación oficiosa, que la ley le atribuye al Alcalde, en su carácter de funcionario ejecutivo, parte integrante del gobierno local, para que en l seno del mismo pueda ejercer oposición a los acuerdos que deriven del órgano colegiado, de los cuales no han participado -en tanto no obstante que asiste a las sesiones del Concejo, no tiene derecho al voto -inciso c) del artículo 17 del Código Municipal)-, pero que sin duda pueden interferir negativamente en su labor de "gerente general" de la entidad local y sobre todo en su plan de gobierno, que le exige la misma legislación actual. El Código Municipal, en el artículo 17, inciso d) la establece dentro del elenco de atribuciones de ese ejecutivo municipal, y en los numerales 153, 158, 159 y 160 del mismo cuerpo legal, regula los presupuestos para su interposición, plazo y forma, así como los efectos del uso de esa facultad. En virtud de lo cual, conforme al artículo 160 del Código Municipal, se excluyen del veto los siguientes acuerdos del Concejo:

"a) Los no aprobados definitivamente.

• b)Aquellos en que el alcalde municipal tenga interés personal, directo o indirecto.
• c)Derogado por el artículo 202 inciso 5) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, número 8508, del veintidós de junio del dos mil seis.
• d)Los que deban aprobar la Contraloría General de la República o la Asamblea Legislativa o los autorizados por esta.
• e)Los apelables ante la Contraloría General de la República.
• f)Los de mero trámite o los de ratificación, confirmación o ejecución de otros anteriores" A esta lista, podemos agregar lo dispuesto en el artículo 19 del Código de la materia, según el cual la decisión tomada por el Concejo Municipal, en cuanto a la convocatoria a un plebiscito, donde se decidirá sobre la destitución o no del Alcalde, que por razones obvias, está afuera de la posibilidad de veto por parte de este funcionario. Conforme lo prevé el párrafo primero del artículo 158 del citado Código Municipal, puede interponerse el veto ante el Concejo, tanto por motivos de legalidad como de oportunidad; debiendo de aclararse al respecto, que conforme al citado numeral 173 de la Constitución Política, la competencia que se le confiere al Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, según desarrollo de la ley (artículos 156 y párrafo final del citado 158 del Código Municipal), es actuando como jerarca impropio, lo cual, conforme al numeral 181 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, lo circunscribe a ejercer un control eminentemente de legalidad de las decisiones administrativas municipales, previo al control jurisdiccional; por lo que, tales motivos de "oportunidad" o "discrecionalidad" no son susceptibles de ser revisados en esta instancia, sino únicamente en sus parámetros o elementos de control, tales como la finalidad de la Administración, el respeto de los derechos fundamentales, la razonabilidad de las actuaciones ("interdicción de la arbitrariedad"), y las reglas de la ciencia y de la técnica, que al tenor del artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, integran el bloque de legalidad, por cuanto entrar a analizar tales valoraciones implicarían, no sólo desnaturalizar la figura del jerarca impropio, sino además, un desbordamiento de las competencias constitucional y legalmente asignadas a los jueces que conocen de esta materia, convirtiéndose, por ser materia propia y exclusiva de la "Administración activa". (En igual sentido se pronunció este Tribunal con anterioridad, en resoluciones número 425-2010, de las doce horas diez minutos del ocho de febrero y 947-2010, de las quince horas cuarenta minutos del once de marzo, ambas del dos mil diez.)

V. - DE LA ADMISIBILIDAD PARA EL ESTUDIO DE FONDO DEL ACUERDO VETADO.- Conforme a lo indicado en el Considerando anterior, resulta necesario determinar el contenido y naturaleza jurídica del acto vetado. En el mismo, se dispone la suspensión parcial del Plan de Ordenamiento y Señalización Vial del cantón de Grecia, preparado de manera conjunta por ingenieros de Tránsito, los miembros del Comité Local de Seguridad Vial, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y la Municipalidad de Grecia; aprobado por unanimidad y de manera definitiva por el Concejo en el Artículo II, Inciso Único, Acta número 275, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada el treinta de julio del dos mil nueve, únicamente en lo relativo a la demarcación de "la raya amarilla en las Dirección11527 ", mientras se conforma el Órgano Director del procedimiento para conocer de la validez de la aprobación de dicho plan, según dispone el acuerdo vetado (folios 256 a257). Como se observa con claridad, se trata de una medida cautelar de suspensión de los efectos de un acto administrativo anterior, supuestamente cuestionado en un recurso de revisión, no de la anulación del plan. Con lo cual, se trata de un acto de trámite, no final, pero en tanto el mismo tiene efectos propios, es susceptible de la inconformidad u objeción de parte del Alcalde, en los términos permitidos en el artículo 163.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, de aplicación supleatoria al tenor del artículo 9 de la Ley de referencia. Finalmente, en cuanto a los motivos que sustentan el veto formulado por el Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Grecia, al ser todos de legalidad, resulta procedente para su análisis y control por esta Autoridad.

VI.- DE LA DEMANIALIDAD DE LAS VÍAS PÚBLICAS.- Por la vinculación con el contenido del acuerdo vetado, se estima pertinente hacer unas breves consideraciones respecto de la especial naturaleza jurídica de las vías públicas. En la jerga jurídica nacional, se usan indistintamente los conceptos "vía pública", "camino" y "calle" , entendiendo por tales, todo terreno de dominio público y uso común, que por disposición de las autoridades administrativas y judiciales se destinare al libre tránsito de conformidad con lo establecido en las leyes y sus reglamentos del tema en referencia. Así, es con la promulgación de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos, número 5060, del ocho de agosto de mil novecientos sesenta y dos, que se establecen dos redes nacionales; la nacional, conformada por las carreteras primarias, secundarias y terciarias, las cuales serán definidas y administradas por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, y la cantonal, local o municipal, conformada por las calles vecinales, cuya administración está delegada en los gobiernos locales; y que a su vez, se clasifica en caminos vecinales, que son aquellos que suministran acceso directo a fincas y a otras actividades económicamente rurales, unen caseríos y poblados con la red vial nacional, y se caracterizan por tener bajos volúmenes de tránsito y altas proporciones de viajes locales a corta distancia; calles locales, que son las incluidas dentro del cuadrante de un área urbana, no clasificadas como travesías urbanas de la Red Vial Nacional; y finalmente los caminos no clasificados, que comprende aquellas vías no incluidas en las categorías descritas anteriormente, tales como caminos de herradura, sendas,veredas, que proporcionen acceso a muy pocos usuarios, quienes sufragarán los costos de mantenimiento y mejoramiento, según lo dispone el artículo primero de la Ley 6678, del dieciocho de setiembre de mil novecientos ochenta y uno. Es cabalmente por el destino o vocación que tienen estos accesos, en los términos del numeral 261 del Código Civil, a saber el libre acceso de los transeúntes y vehículos automotores, y el sujeto a quien corresponde su administración (la Administración Pública, ya sea el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes -Poder Ejecutivo- o las Municipalidades -entidad descentralizada por el territorio), que se trata de bienes de dominio público, y por ello, le son aplicables las características propias de este tipo de bienes, por lo que son imprescriptibles, inalienables, inembargables y están sujetos al poder de policía en lo que respecta a su administración, como lo ha considerado con anterioridad nuestro Tribunal Constitucional, en sentencia número 2306-91:

"En consecuencia, el régimen patrio de los bienes de dominio público, como las vías de la Ciudad Capital, sean calles municipales o nacionales, aceras, parques y demás sitios públicos, los coloca fuera del comercio de los hombres y por ello los permisos que se otorguen serán siempre a título precario y revocables por la Administración, unilateralmente, cuando razones de necesidad o de interés general así lo señale.-" Así, el elemento teleológico está previsto en los artículos 44 y 45 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, que en lo que interesa dispones literal y respectivamente:

"El dominio público sobre las áreas de calles, plazas, jardines, parques u otros espacios abiertos de uso públicos general, se constituye por ese mismo uso y puede prescindirse de su inscripción en el Registro de la Propiedad, si consta en el Mapa Oficial..." "Los inmuebles a que se refiere el artículo anterior, podrán ser transferidos a otro uso público, conforme a las determinaciones del Plan Regulador, más si tuvieren destino señalado en la ley, el cambio deberá ser aprobado por la Asamblea Legislativa." En cuanto a la titularidad de estos bienes, el artículo 2 de la Ley General de Caminos, dispone:

"Son propiedad del Estado todos los terrenos ocupados por carreteras y caminos públicos; existentes o que se construyan en el futuro. Las municipalidades tienen la propiedad de las calles de su jurisdicción. Las carreteras y caminos públicos únicamente podrán ser construidos y mejorados por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Trasportes. Sin embargo, con previa autorización de dicho Ministerio, las municipalidades y las instituciones descentralizadas del Estado, que tengan funciones relacionadas con la construcción de vías públicas, podrán ejecutarlas directamente o a través de terceros..." Además el artículo 28 de esta misma Ley (General de Caminos Públicos) contiene el siguiente enunciado en materia de su disposición y de su régimen especial de afectación:

"Queda terminantemente prohibido al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transporte y a las Municipalidades otorgar permisos o derechos de ocupación, disfrute, uso o simple posesión del derecho vía de los caminos públicos o ejercer actos que impliquen en cualquier forma de los mismos por parte de las personal. Los que ejercieren tales actos sobre terrenos públicos al cuidado del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes de las Municipalidades serán desalojados administrativamente por éstos dentro de los siguientes quince días contados a partir de la prevención escrita que se efectúe al responsable; todo sin perjuicio de la multa aplicable y del resarcimiento o de los daños y perjuicios que se hubieren causado." Por su parte, en el Decreto- Ley número 833, del cuatro de noviembre de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, dictado por la Junta Fundadora de la segunda República, que promulgó la Ley de Construcciones, dispone en el artículo 5:

"Las vías públicas son inalienables e imprescriptibles y por lo tanto, no podrá constituirse sobre ellas hipoteca, embargo, uso, usufructo ni servidumbre en beneficio de una persona determinada, en los términos del derecho común. Los derechos de tránsito, iluminación y aereación vista, acceso, derrames y otros semejantes, inherentes al destino de las vías públicas, se regirán exclusivamente por las leyes y Reglamentos Administrativos.

Con lo cual, solamente se podrán otorgar permisos o concesiones para el aprovechamiento de las vías, no obstante, éstos no crean ningún derecho a favor del permisionario o el concesionario, tal y como lo dispone el ordinal 6 de la Ley de Construcciones. Estos permisos o concesiones deben ser temporales y podrán ser revocador en cualquier tiempo por la Municipalidad, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 154 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Además hay que agregar que no pueden ser otorgados en perjuicio del libre seguro y expedito tránsito o en general en perjuicio de cualquiera de los fines a que tales vías, según su clase, hubieren sido destinadas.

VII.- DE LOS ELEMENTOS MATERIALES DE LOS ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS.- Asimismo, debe recordarse que la existencia y validez de todo acto administrativo depende de la concurrencia de varios elementos esenciales, impuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico, que para una mayor comprensión, puedan clasificarse en materiales, relativos a los elementos subjetivos (competencia, legitimación e investidura), objetivos (fin, contenido y motivo -artículos 131,132 y 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 49 de la Constitución Política) y formales, comprensivos de la forma en que se adopta el acto, sea, el medio de expresión o manifestación (instrumentación), la motivación o fundamentación (artículo 136 de la citada Ley General) y el procedimiento seguido para su adopción (artículos 214 y 308 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, constituido por "los antecedentes, presupuestos o razones jurídicas (de derecho) y fácticas, que hacen posible o necesaria la emisión del acto administrativo, y sobre las cuales la Administración Pública entiende sostener la legitimidad, oportunidad o conveniencia de éste." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto.Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p. 370). Así, son las causas o presupuestos, antecedentes jurídicos y fácticos que inducen a la Administración a la adopción del acto concreto; y que denota la conformidad que debe existir entre éste y el propósito que el ordenamiento jurídico le asigna, ya sea, la satisfacción de un interés público a satisfacer en cada caso. Por ello, el citado numeral 133 exige que sea legítimo, por cuanto está supeditado al ordenamiento jurídico, como corolario del principio de legalidad que rige la actuación Administrativa (artículos 11 de la Constitución Política y de la Ley General de la Administración Pública); y además, debe existir tal y como la Administración lo invoca, y que precisamente, sustentan la decisión adoptada, lo que denota su íntima relación con el otro elemento del acto, también de orden sustancial, pero formal, a saber la motivación del acto. Ésta (la motivación) consiste "... en una declaración de cuáles son las circunstancias de hecho y de derecho que han llevado a la respectiva administración pública al dictado o emanación del acto administrativo. La motivación es la expresión formal del motivo y, normalmente, en cualquier resolución administrativa, está contenida en los denominados "considerandos" -parte considerativa-. La motivación, al consistir en una enunciación de los hechos y del fundamento jurídico que la administración pública tuvo en cuenta para emitir su decisión o voluntad, constituye un medio de prueba de la intencionalidad de esta y una pauta indispensable para interpretar y aplicar el respectivo acto administrativo." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Biblioteca Jurídica Dike. Primera Edición. Medellín, Colombia. 2002. p 388.)

De manera que la motivación debe determinar la aplicación de un concepto a las circunstancias de hecho singulares de que se trate (según desarrollo de la jurisprudencia española, propiamente en la sentencia del 18 de mayo de 1991, RA 4120, aceptando considerando de la apelada, que cita las SSTS de 23 de setiembre de 1969, RA 6078, y 7 de octubre de 1970, RA 4251, citado por el autor Marcos M. Fernando Pablo, en su obra La motivación del acto administrativo. (Editorial Tecnos, S.A Madrid. 1993, página 190); es decir, se trata de una decisión concreta, que liga los hechos con el sustento normativo; de manera que cuando hay una breve alusión a normas generales y hechos inespecíficos, se puede concluir que no hay aporte suficiente de justificación, en la medida en que ellos no es posible deducir los elementos valorados por la autoridad gubernativa para tomar la decisión, lo cual adquiere la mayor trascendencia cuando se trata de actos limitativos o restrictivos de derechos subjetivos o en lo que se impone una sanción al administrado. Por su contenido, se constituye en factor determinante del debido proceso y derecho de defensa, que tiene plena aplicación en el ámbito administrativo, según lo señaló la Sala Constitucional a partir de la sentencia 15-90, de las dieciséis horas y cuarenta y cinco minutos del cinco de enero de mil novecientos noventa, al enunciar los elementos mínimos de este principio constitucional.

"(...) a) Notificación al interesado del carácter y fines del procedimientos; b) derecho de ser oído, y oportunidad del interesado para presentar los argumentos y producir las pruebas que entienda pertinentes; c) oportunidad para el administrado de preparar su alegación, lo que incluye necesariamente el acceso a la formación y a los antecedentes administrativos, vinculados con la cuestión de que se trate; ch) derecho del administrado de hacerse representar y asesorar por abogados, técnicos y otras personas calificadas; d) notificación adecuada de la decisión que dicta la administración y de los motivos en que ella se funde y e) derecho del interesado de recurrir la decisión dictada..." (El resaltado no es del original.)

Es por ello que al tenor del artículo 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, resulta exigido para la Administración motivar los actos que imponen obligaciones; limiten, supriman o denieguen derechos subjetivos; resuelvan recursos; los que se dictan con separación del criterio seguido en actuaciones precedentes o del dictamen de los órganos consecutivos; los que mantienen la ejecución del que es impugnado; los generales de carácter normativo (reglamentos) y los discrecionales de carácter general. Así, si no hay motivación, se incurre en un vicio de forma que afecta gravemente el acto, viciándolo de nulidad absoluta. Asimismo, el contenido debe ser correspondiente con el motivo. El contenido, como su denominación lo indica, es la definición del efecto del acto administrativo, como resultado jurídico inmediato del mismo, de manera que es lo que declara, dispone ordena, certifica o juzga, y suele expresarse en la parte dispositiva de las resoluciones administrativas. Por ello, debe estar en estrecha relación o correspondencia con el motivo, y por ello, "debe ser lícito, posible, claro y abarcar todas las cuestiones de hecho y derecho surgidas del motivo", exige el artículo 132.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Finalmente, el fin, "es el resultado metajurídico y objetivo último que persigue el acto administrativo, en relación con el motivo" (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Op. Cit. p. 378). Este elemento siempre es reglado, en tanto la ley lo fija de manera expresa y específica, y en su defecto, corresponderá al juez su determinación, sobre la base de los otros elementos del acto (motivo y contenido) no existiendo discrecionalidad para la Administración para su determinación. Así, el fin no es ni puede ser en beneficio personal del servidor público o de un tercero. De suerte que, si hay irregularidades y en el motivo y contenido, irremediablemente ello se traduce en una inadecuación del acto a su fin, manifestándose como un vicio por exceso de poder, como lo prevé el artículo 131 de la citada Ley General de la Administración Pública.

VIII.- DE LA ILEGALIDAD DEL ACUERDO VETADO.- Con fundamento en las anteriores consideraciones, este Tribunal procede a hacer el análisis de legalidad del acuerdo adoptado por el Concejo de la Municipalidad de Grecia en el Artículo II, Inciso 3, Acta número 031, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada el treinta de agosto del dos mil diez, teniéndose como base los motivos del veto formulado:

Primero: El acuerdo carece de motivo y en consecuencia, de los otros elementos materiales del acto: Fundamenta el Concejo la decisión de suspensión parcial del Plan de Ordenamiento y Señalización Vial del cantón de Grecia, únicamente en lo relativo a la demarcación de "la yaya amarilla en las Dirección11527 ", en la existencia de un recurso extraordinario de revisión interpuesto contra la aprobación de ese plan. Recuérdese que dicho plan fue aprobado por el colegio de ediles por el Artículo II Inciso Único, Acta número 275, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada el treinta de julio del dos mil nueve, de manera unánime y definitiva. Llama la atención a estos juzgadores que no se hace indicación de cuando ni por quien fue interpuesto dicho recurso y, no obstante haberse hecho una revisión minuciosa del expediente, no se encuentra ningún documento ni constancia de su interposición, lo que evidencia el vicio en este elemento sustancial, no existir en la forma en que ha sido indicado por el Concejo (artículo 133.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Ello conlleva, necesariamente, a una errónea motivación del acto, y consiguientemente, un vicio en el contenido y en el fin del acuerdo, en tanto lo que se logra vislumbrar, es el favorecimiento a un grupo de comerciantes, quienes alegaron ante el órgano deliberativo la afectación de derechos adquiridos sobre la vía, al restringir la actividad que desarrollan. No puede pasar inadvertido que el acuerdo en el que se dispuso la aprobación -definitiva y de manera unánime- del plan de reordenamiento vial de la ciudad de Grecia, está respaldado en un estudio técnico, preparado de manera conjunta y coordinada por ingenieros de Tránsito, los miembros del Comité Local de Seguridad Vial, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y la Municipalidad de Grecia, en los términos que faculta la autonomía de gobierno de que le dota la Constitución Política a las Municipalidades (artículo 170), como lo ha aclarado la Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 5445-99, y faculta el artículo 6 del Código Municipal. Asimismo, resulta necesario advertir que, en caso de existir el alegado recurso extraordinario de revisión, el mismo no es admisible para su análisis con la sola interposición, toda vez que el artículo 157 del Código Municipal, en un recurso procede, respecto de aquellas decisiones respecto de las se omitió la interposición del respectivo recurso de apelación, y ue esté surtiendo efectos, pero su motivo únicamente puede ser el que origine la nulidad absoluta del acto. En este sentido, el plan ya ha sido ejecutado en lo que la demarcación vial se refiere, que tuvo un costo del presupuesto municipal de catorce millones novecientos treinta mil ciento ochenta colones exactos (¢14.930.180,00), y la única inconformidad que consta en autos es la alegada afectación de derechos adquiridos de los comerciantes sobre la vía pública, la que modo alguno es motivo de nulidad -lo que se analizará de seguido-, y de ahí la ilegalidad de la decisión vetada.

Segundo: De la importancia de afectación de derechos de terceros: Resulta a todas luces improcedente una alegación que pretenda la evitación de derechos de terceros -en este caso, suponemos que de los comerciantes- con ocasión de la demarcación vial de la ciudad de Grecia, cabalmente en atención a la especial naturaleza de las vías públicas, que comprende tanto el espacio por donde circulan los vehículos automotores, como las aceras, dispuestas para el tránsito libre de las personal. Según se indicó, nuestro ordenamiento jurídico nacional establece que las vías son bienes de dominio público, y como tal, son indispensables, por sus características esenciales de imprescriptibilidad, inalienabilidad o inembargabilidad, tanto para los administrados como para la Administración, y no puede generar ni alegarse la generación de ningún derecho respecto de este tipo de bienes, ya sea de ocupación o posesión, y mucho menos, para ejercer una actividad lucrativa, como pareciera en el caso en estudio.

IX.- CONCLUSIÓN.- Habiéndose acreditado la violación de todos los elementos materiales del acuerdo vetado -adoptado por el Concejo de la Municipalidad de Grecia en el Artículo II, Inciso 3, Acta número 031, de la sesión ordinaria celebrada el treinta de agosto del dos mil diez-, no le queda más remedio a este Tribunal que acoger la inconformidad formulada por el Alcalde de esa corporación local, procediendo en consecuencia, su declaratoria por vicio de nulidad absoluta.

POR TANTO

Se acoge el veto interpuesto.- Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Evelyn Solano Ulloa Eduardo González Segura