Consultation on the constitutionality of unlimited re-trial in criminal review proceedingsConsulta de constitucionalidad sobre el reenvío ilimitado en la revisión penal

**CRIMINAL CASSATION COURT OF SAN JOSÉ** **PRISONER IN CUSTODY** **Res. : [Telf1]** **Exp. : 09-023693-042-PE (7)** **DISCRETIONARY CONSTITUTIONAL CONSULTATION** **CRIMINAL CASSATION COURT. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea,** at fourteen hours and forty minutes on the fifteenth of March, two thousand eleven.

Having reviewed the prior review procedure (procedimiento de revisión) that the sentenced individual [Nombre1] brings against the judgment issued by the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, No. 695-10 at 15:05 hours on the twenty-fourth of June, two thousand ten, which condemns her, through an abbreviated process, as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of homicide.

Authored by Judge [Nombre2] and, **WHEREAS:** **I.- On the standing to consult:** The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in its Article 102, establishes the power of every court to formulate discretionary constitutional consultations when it has well-founded doubts about the constitutionality of a norm it must apply in a matter submitted to its knowledge. By virtue of this, this Court proceeds to formulate a discretionary constitutional consultation so that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) may determine whether **Articles 416 and 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), which permit ordering remand (reenvío) for a new determination of whether the act was committed and by whom, within the framework of a review procedure (procedimiento de revisión), violate the principle of *ne bis in idem*** established in Article 14.7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the present case, the petitioner alleges a series of procedural defects that led to the conviction. The court must resolve the matter, and one of the possibilities, also proposed by the petitioner, is to annul the judgment and order a remand trial (juicio de reenvío) so that it can be determined, again, whether the now-sentenced individual is responsible for the acts. This would lead to applying, in this specific case, the cited norms. However, for the reasons that will now be set forth, this Chamber has well-founded doubts about the constitutionality of those provisions, and therefore, a prior definition of the point must be requested from the Constitutional Chamber.

**II.- On the grounds on which the consultation is based:** The reasons why this court doubts the constitutionality of those normative provisions are set forth below. Articles 416 and 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) permit ordering remand (reenvío) for a new trial when a review procedure (procedimiento de revisión) is granted. To this effect, they state, in order and in the relevant parts:

"*ARTICLE 416.- Judgment. The court shall reject the review or shall annul the judgment. If it annuls it, it shall refer to a new trial when the case so requires* or shall directly pronounce the judgment that corresponds in law..." *ARTICLE 417.- Remand. If a referral to a new trial is made*, none of the judges who were involved in the previous trial may participate in the new one. The provisions of the preceding article shall govern the remand trial and a more severe penalty than that established in the reviewed judgment may not be imposed, nor may benefits that it has granted be disregarded." (emphasis supplied).

Jurisprudentially, in a practically uniform manner by all the cassation bodies of the country, although not without dissenting votes (see votes of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) numbers 464-2007, [Telf2], 2007-48, 2007-464, 2007-602, [Telf3], [Telf4], [Telf5], [Telf6], [Telf7], 2010-208, 2010-346, [Telf8], [Telf9], among others; the remaining review bodies of the country have pronounced in the same sense), it has been interpreted that this remand (reenvío) is unlimited, that is, it can be ordered even to re-establish the criminal liability of the previously sentenced person if there were defects in the process or in the judgment for the trial. However, those norms and this interpretation seem to violate the *ne bis in idem* principle. It is true that Article 42 of the Political Constitution establishes: "*...No one may be tried more than once for the same punishable act. It is prohibited to reopen concluded criminal cases and trials adjudicated with the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada), except when the remedy of review (recurso de revisión) proceeds.*" (emphasis supplied) and that, by virtue of that, one possible interpretation of those articles is that the Political Constitution itself exempts the possibility of trying the case twice if one of them arises through the review procedure (procedimiento de revisión), for the benefit of the defendant, and that benefit is not overshadowed by a new trial if it results in the determination of an act of lesser punitive magnitude. However, **that interpretation overlooks a very important aspect**: that **through binding and reiterated jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), it has been indicated that, to the extent that international instruments grant greater rights than those given by the Magna Carta itself, such international instruments must prevail over it** (see, in this regard, votes of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 3435-92, 2313-95, 1319-97, 4356-98 and 6830-98 in relation to Article 73(d) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)).

Based on this premise, section 14.7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, without any exception, that "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country". That norm, then, has authority superior to the Constitution itself and would prevent a new trial, understanding by such a new determination of whether the act was committed or who committed it, because, once the judgment has become final (firme), that remand for the determination of whether the act existed or was committed by the accused person would violate the ne bis in idem principle. That is, once a final (firme) conviction has been handed down, no one may be tried again for that same act and, in this way, the special review procedure (procedimiento especial de revisión) would allow, only, directly correcting the defects from the reviewing court itself or ordering remand only when the act does not need to be tried again (for example, when the crime and its authorship remain intact, but it is necessary to determine the sanction, thereby protecting the right to appeal). Therefore, the possibility of generalized remand (even for a new determination of whether the act was committed or whether it was caused by the previously sentenced person) that these norms provide, and that ordinary jurisprudence has accepted, would be unconstitutional, and the review procedure would have to be limited to declaring the defect, even a procedural one, and resolving the matter on its merits from that same court, without the possibility of ordering a new trial. National doctrine has expressed itself in a similar sense, indicating:

¬"...Article 42 prohibits a new prosecution for the same punishable act, regardless of whether this new prosecution may result in prejudice or benefit to the prosecuted individual (...) The exceptions it allows to the 'ne bis in idem' principle are those established by the review appeal (recurso de revisión) as it was regulated at the time the Constitution was issued. And the 1910 code of criminal procedures did not permit a review aimed at demonstrating that the committed act falls under a more favorable norm" (CASTILLO [Nombre3], . El recurso de revisión en materia penal. Colegio de Abogados, San José, 1st edition, 1980, p. 49).

Similarly, international doctrine has stated:

¬"The main effect of the rule thus conceived consists of absolutely preventing any possibility of establishing a review appeal (recurso de revisión) against the accused (...) the formula extends its influence to the procedural process itself, declaring both the return to an already exhausted criminal prosecution inadmissible (...) It goes without saying that it does not inhibit the review appeal, for unjust conviction, in favor of the convicted person: (...) reviewing the conviction to achieve acquittal or a more benign sanction does not mean prosecuting him criminally (...) The fundamental idea...is that the State, with all its resources and power, should not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged crime..." (MAIER, [Nombre4]. Derecho procesal penal. Tomo I. Fundamentos, Editores del Puerto, Buenos Aires, 2nd edition, 1996, pp. 599-602, emphasis supplied).

¬"If due to deficiencies in the investigation (...), because important procedural pieces were not shown to him during the inquiry, because his rights were not made known to him there, or for any other reason not attributable to the accused, a nullity has been caused, the courts are barred from turning back the process to a stage already precluded. Doing so is not only a violation of the right to a speedy criminal proceeding—included in the guarantee of defense in trial—but also of the constitutional principle that prohibits subjecting the accused to double jeopardy (doble juzgamiento) for a single act (...) if the instructional defect is only noticed at the time of sentencing and it was not caused by the accused, the guarantee against double jeopardy will make it unlawful to declare a nullity at this stage" (CARRIÓ, [Nombre5]. Garantías constitucionales en el proceso penal. Hammurabi, 1st reprint of the 3rd edition, 1997. By the same author: Nulidad, proceso penal y doble juzgamiento).

This interpretation is coherent with what is regulated, at the international level in human rights instruments in force in the country and at the doctrinal level, on the subject of ne bis in idem and on the extraordinary procedure or review appeal (recurso de revisión), although it is not coherent with the legal regulation and jurisprudential application of the institute, as has been evidenced. For all the reasons stated, this Court considers that the norms that enable this unlimited remand and the prevailing jurisprudential interpretation of them could be unconstitutional and, in light of such reasonings, submits the issue for consultation to our country's concentrated constitutional controller, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), so that it may rule in this regard, given that the final resolution of the case submitted to this Chamber's knowledge depends on it.

III.- Procedural matters and precautionary measures: Due to the foregoing, this matter must be referred to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) so that it may define the constitutionality or not of the referred norms and interpretations, and the parties must be summoned so that, within three days, they appear before that Chamber to express their allegations, convert—if they deem it appropriate—the consultation into an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) as established by Article 105 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), and indicate a means or place, the latter within the perimeter of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, to receive their notifications. Likewise, the processing of the case must be suspended, including the computation of statute of limitation periods, until the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) resolves this consultation (Articles 34(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) and 104 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)).

POR TANTO:

An optional consultation on constitutionality is formulated so that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) determines whether Articles 416 and 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) and the reiterated ordinary jurisprudence, both of this Court and of the cited Third Chamber, which allow ordering remand for a new trial in a review procedure (procedimiento de revisión), violate the ne bis in idem principle established in Article 14.7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The parties are summoned so that, within three days, they appear before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to express their allegations, eventually convert the consultation into an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), and indicate a means or place, the latter within the perimeter of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, to receive their notifications. The processing of the case, and with it the running of the statute of limitations, is suspended until the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) resolves this consultation. NOTIFÍQUESE and the case file be sent to that body as promptly as possible.

Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón Edwin Salinas Durán Lilliana García Vargas JUDGE and JUDGES File No.: 09-023693-042-PE Accused: [Nombre6]. : [Nombre7]. Offense: Simple homicide 3 **I.- On standing to consult:** The Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, in its Article 102, establishes the power of every court to formulate optional consultations on constitutionality when it has well-founded doubts about the constitutionality of a norm that it must apply in a matter submitted to its cognizance. By virtue of this, this Court proceeds to formulate an optional consultation on constitutionality so that the Constitutional Chamber may determine whether **Articles 416 and 417 of the Código Procesal Penal, which allow ordering remand for a new determination of whether the act was committed and by whom, within the framework of a review procedure (procedimiento de revisión), violate the principle of *ne bis in idem* established in Article 14.7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.** In the present case, the petitioner alleges a series of defects in the proceeding that led to the conviction. The court must resolve the issue, and one of the possibilities, also proposed by the petitioner, is to annul the conviction and order a new trial (juicio de reenvío) so that it is determined, once again, whether the now-sentenced person bears responsibility for the acts. This would lead to applying, in this specific case, the cited norms. However, for the reasons that will be set forth, this Chamber has well-founded doubts about the constitutionality of those provisions, and therefore must request a prior definition of the point from the Constitutional Chamber.

**II.- On the grounds on which the consultation is based:** The reasons for which this court doubts the constitutionality of those normative provisions are set forth below. Articles 416 and 417 of the Código Procesal Penal allow ordering remand for a new trial when a review procedure (procedimiento de revisión) is granted. To that effect, they state, in order and as relevant:

"*ARTICLE 416.- Judgment. The court will reject the review **or will annul the conviction.** **If it annuls it, it will remand for a new trial when the case requires it** or it will directly pronounce the judgment that corresponds in law...*" "*ARTICLE 417.- Remand. **If a remand to a new trial is made**, none of the judges who heard the previous one may participate in it. The provisions of the preceding article will govern in the new trial **and a more severe sanction than that fixed in the reviewed conviction may not be imposed, nor may benefits that it had granted be disregarded.*" (emphasis supplied).

Jurisprudentially, in a practically uniform manner by all the cassation bodies of the country, although not without dissenting votes (see votes of the Third Chamber numbers 464-2007, [Telf1], 2007-48, 2007-464, 2007-602, [Telf2], [Telf3], [Telf4], [Telf5], [Telf6], 2010-208, 2010-346, [Telf7], [Telf8], among others; the remaining review bodies of the country have pronounced in the same sense), it has been interpreted that such remand is unlimited, that is, it can be ordered even to re-establish the criminal liability of the previously sentenced person if there were defects in the process or the conviction for the trial. However, those norms and this interpretation seem to violate the principle ***ne bis in idem***. It is true that Article 42 of the Political Constitution establishes: "*...No one may be tried more than once for the same punishable act. The reopening of terminated criminal cases and trials decided with the authority of **res judicata** is prohibited, **except when the review appeal (recurso de revisión) is appropriate.**"* (emphasis supplied) and that, by virtue of this, one possible interpretation of those articles is that the Political Constitution itself allows for the possibility of trying the case twice if one arises from the review procedure (procedimiento de revisión), for the benefit of the accused, and that benefit is not overshadowed by a new trial if it results in the determination of an act with lesser punitive weight. However, *that interpretation overlooks a very important aspect*: that **through binding and reiterated jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, it has been indicated that, to the extent that international instruments grant greater rights than those given by the Magna Carta itself, such international instruments must prevail over it** (see, in this sense, the votes of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 3435-92, 2313-95, 1319-97, 4356-98 and 6830-98 in relation to Article 73(d) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Based on this premise, Article 14.7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, **without any exception**, that "*No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted by a **final judgment** in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country*." *That norm, therefore, has authority superior to the Constitution itself* and would prevent a new trial, understanding such to be a new determination of whether the act was committed or who committed it because, the conviction having become final, that remand for the determination of whether the act existed or was committed by the accused person would violate the *ne bis in idem*. That is, once a final conviction has been handed down, no one can be tried again for that same act and, in this way, the special review procedure (procedimiento de revisión) would only allow for directly correcting the defects from the same reviewing venue or ordering remand **only when the act does not have to be tried again** (for example, when the offense and its authorship remain intact, but it is necessary to set the sanction, thereby safeguarding the right to appeal).

Therefore, the possibility of a generalized remittal (even for a new determination of whether the act was committed or whether it was caused by the formerly sentenced person) provided for in those rules, and accepted by ordinary jurisprudence, would be unconstitutional, and the revision procedure would have to be limited to declaring the defect, even a procedural one, and resolving the matter on its merits from that same venue, without the possibility of ordering a new trial. National doctrine has expressed itself in a similar vein, stating: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">¬\"...Article 42 prohibits a new prosecution for the same punishable act, regardless of whether this new prosecution could result in prejudice or benefit to the prosecuted person </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">The exceptions allowed to the 'ne bis in idem' principle are those established by the remedy of revision as it was regulated at the time the Constitution was issued. And the 1910 code of criminal procedure did not permit a revision aimed at demonstrating that the act committed fits a more favorable rule\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(CASTILLO [Nombre1] , . </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">El recurso de revisión en materia penal</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">. Colegio de Abogados, San José, 1st edition, 1980, p. 49). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Similarly, international doctrine has stated: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">¬\"The principal effect of the rule thus conceived consists in absolutely preventing any possibility of establishing a remedy of revision against the accused (...) the formula extends its influence to the procedural process itself, declaring inadmissible both the return to a criminal prosecution already exhausted (...) It goes without saying that it does not inhibit the remedy of revision, for unjust conviction, in favor of the defendant: (...) reviewing the conviction </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">to achieve acquittal or a more benign sanction</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> does not mean prosecuting them criminally (...) The fundamental idea...is that the State, with all its resources and power, should not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged crime...\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(MAIER, [Nombre2] . </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Derecho procesal penal. Tomo I. Fundamentos</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">, Editores del Puerto, Buenos Aires, 2nd edition, 1996, pp. 599-602, emphasis supplied).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">¬\"If due to deficiencies in the investigation (...), because important procedural pieces were not shown to the accused during the preliminary hearing, because they were not informed of their rights there, or for any other reason not attributable to the accused, a nullity has been caused, the courts are inhibited from rolling back the process to a stage already precluded. Doing so is not only a violation of the right to a speedy criminal procedure -included within the guarantee of defense in court-, but also of the constitutional principle that prohibits subjecting the accused to a double trial for a single act (...) if the defect in the preliminary investigation is only noticed at the time of sentencing and it was not caused by the accused, the guarantee against double trial will make it unlawful to declare a nullity at this stage\"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(MAIER, [Nombre3] . </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Garantías constitucionales en el proceso penal</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">. Hammurabi, 1st reprint of the 3rd edition, 1997. By the same author: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Nulidad, proceso penal y doble juzgamiento</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">This interpretation is consistent with what is regulated, at the international level in human rights instruments in force in the country and at the doctrinal level, on the subject of </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">non bis in idem</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> and on the extraordinary procedure or remedy of revision, although it is not consistent with the legal regulation and the jurisprudential application of the institute, as has been evidenced. For all the reasons indicated, this Court considers that the rules that enable this unlimited remittal and the jurisprudential interpretation of them that has prevailed could be unconstitutional and, in light of such reasoning, submits the issue for consultation to the concentrated constitutional controller of our country, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), so that it may rule in this regard, since the final resolution of the case under this Chamber's knowledge depends on it.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>" *Criminal procedural law. Volume I. Fundamentals*, Editores del Puerto, Buenos Aires, 2nd edition, 1996, pp. 599-602, emphasis supplied).

*¬"If due to deficiencies in the investigation (...), because the accused was not shown important procedural documents during the preliminary statement (indagatoria), because he was not informed of his rights at that time, or for any other reason not attributable to the accused, a nullity has been caused, the courts are prohibited from rolling back the proceedings to a stage already precluded. Doing so is not only a violation of the right to a speedy criminal procedure —included within the guarantee of defense in court— but also of the constitutional principle that prohibits subjecting the accused to double jeopardy (doble juzgamiento) for a single act (...) if the investigative defect is only noticed at the time of sentencing and it was not caused by the accused, the guarantee against double jeopardy will make it unlawful to declare a nullity at this stage"* (CARRIÓ, [Name5]. *Constitutional Guarantees in Criminal Procedure*. Hammurabi, 1st reprint of the 3rd edition, 1997. By the same author: *Nullity, Criminal Procedure, and Double Jeopardy*).

That interpretation is consistent with what is regulated, at the international level in human rights instruments in force in the country and at the doctrinal level, regarding the subject of *non bis in idem* and the extraordinary review procedure or remedy (recurso extraordinario de revisión), although it is not consistent with the legal regulation and jurisprudential application of the institute, as has been demonstrated. For all the foregoing, this Court considers that the norms that enable that unlimited remand and the prevailing jurisprudential interpretation thereof could be unconstitutional and, in accordance with such reasoning, submits the matter for consultation to the concentrated constitutional controller of our country, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), so that it may rule on the matter, given that the final resolution of the case submitted to this Chamber's knowledge depends on it.

**III.- Procedural matters and precautionary measures:** For the foregoing reasons, this matter must be referred to the Constitutional Chamber for it to define the constitutionality or not of the referred norms and interpretations, and the parties must be summoned so that, within three days, they appear before said Chamber to present their arguments, convert—if they see fit—the consultation into an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) as established by Article 105 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), and indicate a means or place, the latter within the perimeter of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, for receiving notifications. Likewise, the processing of the case must be suspended, including the computation of prescriptive deadlines, until the Constitutional Chamber resolves this consultation (articles 34, subsection a) of the Criminal Procedural Code (Código Procesal Penal), and 104 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

**THEREFORE (POR TANTO):** A facultative consultation of constitutionality is formulated so that the Constitutional Chamber determines whether articles 416 and 417 of the Criminal Procedural Code and the reiterated ordinary jurisprudence, both of this Court and of the cited Third Chamber (Sala Tercera), which allow ordering remand for a new trial in a review proceeding, violate the *ne bis in idem* principle established in Article 14.7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The parties are summoned so that, within three days, they appear before the Constitutional Chamber to present their arguments, eventually convert the consultation into an action of unconstitutionality, and indicate a means or place, the latter within the perimeter of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, for receiving notifications. The processing of the case, and with it the statute of limitations, is suspended until the Constitutional Chamber resolves this consultation. **NOTIFY (NOTIFÍQUESE)** and send the case file (expediente) to said body as promptly as possible.

**Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón** **Edwin Salinas Durán** Lilliana García Vargas **JUDGE (JUEZ)** **and JUDGES (JUEZAS)** Accused (Imputada) : [Name6]. : [Name7]. Crime (Delito) : Simple homicide (Homicidio simple) 3

Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José REO PRESO Res. : [Telf1] CONSULTA FACULTATIVA DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Goicoechea, a las catorce horas con cuarenta minutos del quince de marzo de dos mil once.

Visto el anterior procedimiento de revisión que la sentenciada [Nombre1]. interpone contra la sentencia dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Nº 695-10 de las 15:05 horas del veinticuatro de junio de dos mil diez que la condena, a través de un proceso abreviado, como autora responsable de un delito de homicidio.

Redacta la jueza [Nombre2] y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Sobre la legitimación para consultar: La Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en su artículo 102, establece la potestad de todo tribunal para formular consultas facultativas de constitucionalidad cuando tuviere dudas fundadas sobre la constitucionalidad de una norma que deba aplicar en un asunto sometido a su conocimiento. En virtud de ello, este Tribunal procede a formular consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad a fin de que la Sala Constitucional determine si los artículos 416 y 417 del Código Procesal Penal que permiten ordenar el reenvío para una nueva determinación de si el hecho se cometió y por quién, en el marco de un procedimiento de revisión, vulneran el principio de ne bis in ídem establecido en el artículo 14.7 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. En el presente caso, la gestionante alega una serie de vicios en el procedimiento que condujo a la sentencia condenatoria. El tribunal debe resolver la cuestión y una de la posibilidades, también propuesta por la gestionante, es la de anular la sentencia y ordenar el juicio de reenvío para que se determine, nuevamente, si la ahora sentenciada tiene responsabilidad en los hechos. Ello conduciría a aplicar, en este caso concreto, las normas citadas. No obstante, por los motivos que se pasan a exponer, esta Cámara tiene fundadas dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de esas disposiciones, por lo que debe solicitarse ante la Sala Constitucional, la definición previa del punto.

II.- Sobre los motivos en que se basa la consulta: Los motivos por los cuales este tribunal duda de la constitucionalidad de aquellas disposiciones normativas se exponen enseguida. Los numerales 416 y 417 del Código Procesal Penal permiten ordenar el reenvío para un nuevo juzgamiento cuando se declare con lugar un procedimiento de revisión. Al efecto señalan, en su orden y en lo que interesan:

"ARTICULO 416.- Sentencia. El tribunal rechazará la revisión o anulará la sentencia. Si la anula, remitirá a nuevo juicio cuando el caso lo requiera o pronunciará directamente la sentencia que corresponda en derecho..." ARTICULO 417.- Reenvío. Si se efectúa una remisión a un nuevo juicio, en este no podrá intervenir ninguno de los jueces que conocieron del anterior. En el juicio de reenvío regirán las disposiciones del artículo anterior y no se podrá imponer una sanción más grave que la fijada en la sentencia revisada, ni desconocer beneficios que esta haya acordado." (el destacado es suplido).

Jurisprudencialmente, de modo prácticamente uniforme por todos los órganos de casación del país, aunque no sin votos salvados (ver votos de la Sala Tercera números 464-2007, [Telf2], 2007-48, 2007-464, 2007-602, [Telf3], [Telf4], [Telf5], [Telf6], [Telf7], 2010-208, 2010-346, [Telf8], [Telf9], entre otros; en igual sentido se han pronunciado los restantes órganos de revisión del país) se ha interpretado que ese reenvío es ilimitado, es decir, puede ordenarse incluso para volver a sentar la responsabilidad penal del antes sentenciado si en el proceso o en la sentencia hubo vicios para el juzgamiento. No obstante, aquellas normas y esta interpretación parecen vulnerar el principio ne bis in idem. Es cierto que el artículo 42 de la Constitución Política establece: "...Nadie podrá ser juzgado más de una vez por el mismo hecho punible. Se prohíbe reabrir causas penales fenecidas y juicios fallados con autoridad de cosa juzgada, salvo cuando proceda el recurso de revisión." (el destacado es suplido) y que, en virtud de eso, una posible interpretación de aquellos numerales es que la misma Constitución Política deja a salvo la posibilidad de juzgar dos veces la causa si una de ellas surge por el procedimiento de revisión, en beneficio del encartado y ese beneficio no es opacado por un nuevo juzgamiento si de éste se deriva la determinación de un hecho de menor calibre punitivo. Empero, esa interpretación obvia un aspecto muy importante: que mediante jurisprudencia vinculante y reiterada de la Sala Constitucional, se ha indicado que, en la medida que los instrumentos internacionales otorguen mayores derechos que los que da la misma Carta Magna, tales instrumentos internacionales deben prevalecer por sobre ella (ver, en tal sentido, los votos de la Sala Constitucional números 3435-92, 2313-95, 1319-97, 4356-98 y 6830-98 en relación con el numeral 73 inciso d de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). A partir de esta premisa, el numeral 14.7 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos señala, sin excepción alguna, que "Nadie podrá ser juzgado ni sancionado por un delito por el cual haya sido ya condenado o absuelto por una sentencia firme de acuerdo con la ley y el procedimiento penal de cada país". Esa norma, entonces, tiene autoridad superior a la misma Constitución e impediría un nuevo juzgamiento, entendiendo por tal una nueva determinación de si el hecho se cometió o quién lo cometió pues, habiendo adquirido firmeza la sentencia, aquel reenvío para la determinación de si el hecho existió o lo cometió la persona acusada violaría el ne bis in ídem. Es decir, una vez recaída una sentencia condenatoria firme nadie puede ser juzgado nuevamente por ese mismo hecho y, de esta forma, el procedimiento especial de revisión permitiría, únicamente, enmendar directamente los vicios desde la misma sede revisoria u ordenar el reenvío únicamente cuando no deba volverse a juzgar el hecho (por ejemplo cuando permanezca incólume el delito y su autoría, pero sea necesario para fijar la sanción, tutelando así el derecho al recurso). Por ello, la posibilidad de reenvío generalizado (aún para una nueva determinación de si el hecho se cometió o si lo causó el otrora sentenciado) que prevén esas normas, y ha aceptado la jurisprudencia ordinaria, sería inconstitucional y el procedimiento de revisión tendría que limitarse a declarar el vicio, aún de procedimiento, y resolver, por el fondo, desde esa misma sede, el asunto, sin posibilidad de ordenar un nuevo juzgamiento. En similar sentido se ha expresado la doctrina nacional, indicando:

¬"...El artículo 42 prohíbe una nueva persecución por el mismo hecho punible, independientemente del hecho de que esta nueva persecución pueda redundar en perjuicio o en beneficio del perseguido (...) Las excepciones que permite al principio del 'ne bis in idem' son aquellas que establecía el recurso de revisión tal y como estaba regulado al momento de la emisión de la Constitución. Y el código de procedimientos penales de 1910 no permitía una revisión tendiente a demostrar que el hecho cometido encuadra en una norma más favorable" (CASTILLO [Nombre3] , . El recurso de revisión en materia penal. Colegio de Abogados, San José, 1ª edición, 1980, pág. 49).

De igual manera, la doctrina internacional ha referido:

¬"El principal efecto de la regla así concebida consiste en impedir absolutamente toda posibilidad de establecer el recurso de revisión en contra del imputado (...) la fórmula extiende su influencia al mismo trámite procesal, declarando inadmisible tanto el regreso sobre una persecución penal ya agotada (...) Va de suyo que ella no inhibe el recurso de revisión, por condena injusta, a favor del reo: (...) revisar la condena para lograr la absolución o una sanción más benigna no significa perseguirlo penalmente (...) La idea fundamental...es que no se debe permitir que el Estado, con todos sus recursos y poder, haga repetidos intentos para condenar a un individuo por un supuesto delito..." (MAIER, [Nombre4]. Derecho procesal penal. Tomo I. Fundamentos, Editores del Puerto, Buenos Aires, 2ª edición, 1996, págs. 599-602, el destacado es suplido).

¬"Si por deficiencias en la investigación (...), por no habérsele exhibido a aquel en la indagatoria piezas procesales de importancia, por no habérsele saber allí sus derechos, o por cualquier otra razón no imputable al procesado se ha dado causa a una nulidad, los tribunales están inhibidos de retrotraer el proceso a una etapa ya precluida. Hacerlo, no es sólo violatorio del derecho a un procedimiento penal rápido -incluido éste en la garantía de la defensa en juicio-, sino además del principio constitucional que prohíbe someter al imputado a un doble juzgamiento por un único hecho (...) si el vicio instructorio es recién advertido en la oportunidad de sentenciar y el mismo no ha sido causado por el imputado, la garantía contra el doble juzgamiento hará que no sea lícito declarar a esta altura una nulidad" (CARRIÓ, [Nombre5]. Garantías constitucionales en el proceso penal. Hammurabi, 1ª reimpresión de la 3ª edición, 1997. Del mismo autor: Nulidad, proceso penal y doble juzgamiento).

Esa interpretación tiene coherencia con lo regulado, a nivel internacional en instrumentos sobre derechos humanos vigentes en el país y a nivel doctrinal, sobre el tema del non bis in idem y sobre el procedimiento o recurso extraordinario de revisión, aunque no la tiene con la regulación legal y la aplicación jurisprudencial del instituto, conforme ha quedado evidenciado. Por todo lo indicado estima este Tribunal que las normas que posibilitan ese reenvío ilimitado y la interpretación jurisprudencial que de ellas ha prevalecido podrían ser inconstitucionales y, al tenor de tales razonamientos, somete el tema a consulta del contralor constitucional concentrado de nuestro país, la Sala Constitucional, a fin de que se pronuncie al respecto, toda vez que, de ello depende la solución final del caso sometido a conocimiento de esta Cámara.

III.- Cuestiones de trámite y medidas cautelares: Por lo anterior, debe remitirse este asunto a la Sala Constitucional para que defina la constitucionalidad o no de las normas e interpretaciones referidas y se debe emplazar a las partes para que, dentro de tercer día, comparezcan ante dicha Sala a fin de que expresen sus alegatos, conviertan –si lo tienen a bien- la consulta en acción de inconstitucionalidad conforme lo establece el artículo 105 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y señalen medio o lugar, éste último dentro del perímetro del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, para atender sus notificaciones. Asimismo, se debe suspender la tramitación del proceso, incluyendo el cómputo de los plazos prescriptivos, hasta tanto la Sala Constitucional evacue la presente consulta (artículos 34 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal y 104 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

POR TANTO:

Se formula consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad para que la Sala Constitucional determine si los artículos 416 y 417 del Código Procesal Penal y la reiterada jurisprudencia ordinaria, tanto de este Tribunal como de la Sala Tercera citada, que permiten ordenar el reenvío para nuevo juzgamiento en un procedimiento de revisión, vulneran el principio ne bis in idem establecido en el artículo 14.7 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. Se emplaza a las partes para que, dentro de tercer día, comparezcan ante la Sala Constitucional a fin de que expresen sus alegatos, eventualmente conviertan la consulta en acción de inconstitucionalidad y señalen medio o lugar, éste último dentro del perímetro del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, para atender sus notificaciones. Se suspende la tramitación del proceso, y con ella de la prescripción, hasta tanto la Sala Constitucional evacue la presente consulta. NOTIFÍQUESE y remítase a la mayor brevedad el expediente ante dicho órgano.

Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón Edwin Salinas Durán Lilliana García Vargas JUEZ y JUEZAS Imputada : [Nombre6] .

: [Nombre7].

Delito : Homicidio simple 3