Domestic Violence and Human Rights Prevail over Extradition for Child AbductionViolencia doméstica y derechos humanos prevalecen sobre extradición por sustracción de menor

PODER JUDICIAL PODER JUDICIAL CRIMINAL CASSATION COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN Tel: [Telf1] [...] Fax: [Telf2] _______________________________________________________________________________________ Case File: 08-000033-0016-PE Resolution: 2009-00246 CRIMINAL CASSATION COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, San Ramón, at seventeen hundred hours on the twenty-sixth of June, two thousand nine.

APPEAL filed in this extradition proceeding brought in this case by the Government of the United States of America against [Nombre1], of legal age, a United States citizen, born in the State of California on the seventeenth of March, nineteen hundred eighty, twenty-eight years of age, art teacher, in a common-law union. Participating in the decision on the appeal are Judges [Nombre2], Jazmín Rodríguez Hernández, and Judge Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas. Appearing in cassation are Attorney [Nombre3], representative of the Procuraduría General de la República; Attorney [Nombre4], prosecutor of the Oficina de Asesoría Técnica y Relaciones Internacionales; Attorney [Nombre5], Fiscal General de la República; and Attorney [Nombre6], private counsel for the extraditable person [Nombre1]; the Defensoría de los Habitantes, represented by [Nombre7], Defensora de los Habitantes de la República, and by Attorney [Nombre8] in his capacity as Deputy Defender of the Inhabitants; the Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INAMU, represented by [Placa1] [Nombre9], Executive President, acting as an intervening party.

WHEREAS

1. In judgment 130-P-2009, the Trial Court of Puntarenas, by resolution at thirteen hundred hours on the twentieth of April, 2009, granted the extradition of [Nombre1], requested by the Government of the United States of America, to stand trial for the acts with which she is charged and that have been heard in this proceeding, and for the offenses of international child abduction. The requesting State must take custody of the accused within two months following the finality of this judgment, running from the moment they are notified that the prisoner is at their disposal; should it fail to do so within that time, the release of the requested person shall be ordered. Prior to her surrender, the State of the United States of America must present a formal undertaking that it will not impose the death penalty or life imprisonment on the defendant, and also that she will not be subjected to sanctions other than for the acts for which extradition is being granted here. The costs of detention and surrender of the accused shall be borne by the requesting State. The imprisonment imposed on [Nombre1] is ordered to be maintained, pursuant to the resolution at fourteen hours and ten minutes on the seventh of November, two thousand eight, of the Criminal Cassation Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, First Section. Once this resolution is final, [Nombre10] shall be placed at the disposal of the United States authorities so that the procedure for her departure from the country may be carried out, for which purpose said authorities have two months. No specific pronouncement on property is necessary, as no requests on that point were submitted to the record; therefore, the accused shall be surrendered only with her personal belongings and identification documents in her possession as of this date. Notify this resolution to all parties. [Nombre11] Judge.

2. That against the preceding ruling, appeals were filed by Attorney [Nombre6], private counsel for the extraditable person [Nombre1]; Attorney [Nombre12], acting prosecutor of the Oficina de Asesoría Técnica y Relaciones Internacionales; Attorney [Nombre5], Fiscal General de la República; and the Defensoría de los Habitantes, represented by [Nombre7], Defensora de los Habitantes de la República.

3. That having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the appeal.

4. That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Cassation Judge [Nombre2]; and,

WHEREAS:

I.Content of the challenge: A. Appeal by the Defense. Attorney [Nombre6], in his capacity as private counsel for the extraditable person, sets forth in briefs on folios 1619 et seq., and in the oral defense before this Court, the following grievances: 1) Ground: violation of due process, which affects the judgment of the trial judge due to an absolutely defective procedural act. Absence of requirements and defects in the judgment. Basis: the trial judge did not assess the actions of the Public Prosecutor's Office or its arguments, despite the Public Prosecutor's Office having oversight of criminal legality. By failing to resolve the issues raised during deliberation, substantive law and due process are violated, resulting in non-compliance with the requirements of the judgment. 2) Erroneous assessment of the facts. It was not established as proven that the minor [Nombre13] was in the physical custody of the mother, the person requested here, this having been one of the debated points. A fact that is extensively demonstrated, even by the testimony of FBI Agent [Nombre14], which is determinative given that, under our legal system, the action committed by a person who maintains the minor under their physical control and material custody is not classified as the crime of child abduction, since the statute refers to the action of removing or displacing the minor or incapacitated person from their physical location, which constitutes a judicial error in the appreciation and assessment of the evidence, by not establishing as proven that the mother maintained that right at the time of the minor's transfer. 3) Erroneous application of substantive law. Failure to comply with the principle of double criminality. The central argument put forward by the Public Prosecutor's Office is not resolved or analyzed—that the mother had physical custody of the minor when she left the United States, which does not constitute the crime of child abduction but rather the crime of disobeying authority, meaning that extradition is not appropriate due to the absence of a fundamental principle. He considers that the act of abduction consists of removing the child from the sphere of physical custody, which did not occur because the mother had physical custody; he gives the example of a Costa Rican parent who decides to travel abroad because they have physical custody of a minor—they do not commit the crime of child abduction. 4) Lack of reasoning and analysis of the principle of double criminality. The trial judge's resolution does not contain an assessment of each statute of the requesting and requested country; it merely transcribes each one without indicating why both statutes are equivalent and coincident. 5) Overstepping of the trial judge's jurisdiction. The official commits a disobedience to authority by proceeding to assess the existence of the act, even though this Court expressly indicated that such assessments should not be made. He requests that the appealed resolution be declared ineffective and that the appellate court proceed to apply the Law and the legal system and issue the corresponding resolution, declaring the non-existence of the principle of double criminality. He requests that the release of his client, who has been imprisoned for one year and two months, be ordered.

B. Appeal by the Public Prosecutor's Office. In the briefs on folios 1610 et seq., Prosecutor [Nombre15], and in the oral presentation before this Cassation Chamber by Dr. [Nombre16], they indicate the following grievances: 1) Failure to comply with the principle of double criminality. The requesting State did not comply with the principle of double criminality; thus, on folio 65, it is shown that [Nombre17] left the house where she lived with the minor's father in 2004, and it was in August 2005 that the father initiated proceedings to define the guardianship of the minor, insofar as the charged acts did not constitute the offense for which [Nombre17] was requested, as is evident from the analysis of several resolutions of the Cassation Court of San José, such as resolutions 465-f-98, of July 1, 1998; resolution 662-2002 of nine hours thirty minutes on August 29, 2002; and resolution 141-2009 issued by the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which was read at the oral hearing in its relevant parts, in addition to other judgments of the aforementioned court in which it is explained what the crime of abduction of a minor consists of. In light of that analysis, it is asserted that in the present case there would be only a disobedience to authority, for which reason they request that the filed appeal be dismissed. For the prosecutorial body, there must be a substantive analysis and not one based on the nomen iuris, as the elements provided for in the criminal statute must be analyzed, since those were the aspects that needed to be verified, and extradition should not be converted into a mere paperwork formality. He stated that what the United States of America calls "abduction" does not coincide with the statute provided for in Costa Rica, since the woman did not "abduct" her daughter, and the verbs contemplated in our system to punish these acts could not be interpreted broadly. According to the documentation provided, [Nombre17] was requested for disobeying a court order, and this description does not correspond to what is provided in Article 184 of the Penal Code. The present case involves a disobedience to authority provided for in Article 307 of the Penal Code, punishable by up to one year in prison, and therefore it is not appropriate to grant extradition, as it provides for an insignificant penalty. At the oral hearing, the Attorney General expanded on the grounds and reasoning and stated: 2) Absence of assessment of the International Conventions on the Human Rights of Women and Children. He points out that the trial judge's resolution does not assess that the Costa Rican State has a policy choice of protecting victims of sexual and domestic violence. In the present case, it was established that the extraditable person [Nombre17] is a victim of domestic violence by her partner and father of the minor [Nombre18], and that her departure from the United States was to protect her life and that of her daughter, who is Costa Rican and has a human right to happiness and peace. It concerns the judicial protection of a human being, that women have rights, and the protection of a Costa Rican minor. He requests the protection of Costa Rican legislation, that the appealed resolution be revoked, and that the extradition be dismissed. He requests that this request be resolved orally because she has been imprisoned for fourteen months, and that it be resolved by granting her immediate release.

C. Appeal by the Defensoría de los Habitantes. Dr. [Nombre7], in her capacity as Defensora de los Habitantes, in a brief on folios 1635 et seq., and Attorney [Nombre19], in his capacity as Deputy Defender of the Inhabitants, at the oral hearing, stated that the institution they represent is authorized to act in these cases, as provided in Articles 1 and 13 of Law No. 7319, Ley de la Defensoría de Los Habitantes, which empowers them to bring actions in the administrative or judicial spheres. They indicated the following grievances: 1) Regarding the extradition process and the duty to guarantee respect for the rights and guarantees of the persons involved in the extradition process. The judge's task is important insofar as he becomes the body responsible for fulfilling the international obligation to the requesting State, but also for ensuring compliance with the application of fundamental human rights principles that guarantee the administration of justice. For the Defensoría, the judges' work must go beyond the formal verification of requirements to an analysis of the grounds for justification in each specific case that account for the conflicts and needs of the persons who are the reason for the system's existence; the State holds a power-duty in the exercise of justice, within the framework of a sovereign State. The jurisdictional function involves assessments that the judge may and must make. 2) Violation of the principle of double criminality. The ground was based on the fact that the conduct that led to the extradition request does not constitute the crime of international child abduction, but rather the offense of disobeying authority, as the Public Prosecutor's Office has stated in this proceeding; hence, this is not an extraditable offense. The conduct for which extradition is requested is not a criminal offense, and the extradition must be denied due to the absence of objective and normative elements. She points out that the Humboldt Court's prohibition was against removing the minor from the limits of the State and not from the United States, for which reason there is no international child abduction. The challenge also states that the minor's father gave authorization for the minor [Nombre18] to leave the country; while there was a change of destination, the truth is that [Nombre1] had paternal authorization. Furthermore, the crime of disobedience does not constitute a basis for extraditing a person. The Juvenile Court, in judgment 60-2009, denied the international return of the child [Nombre18], considering the best interests of the minor and considering that the father granted permission to leave the country in April 2005 to travel to Mexico, which did not indicate the date on which she had to return, meaning it was an open-ended permission. In this case, the minor was placed in a substitute home because, for that court, there was no international child abduction. Thus, according to the narration of the facts, which is the factual framework charged, it would not be applicable as a crime subject to extradition. Moreover, if this Cassation instance were to grant extradition, the principle of a dual instance would be violated. [Nombre17] has been imprisoned since April 2008; during her detention in the Buen Pastor, she must also care for her other minor child—also Costa Rican and the product of another relationship—in prison. 3) Absence of assessment of the Human Rights of the Child [Nombre18]. The minor was transferred to Costa Rica, the country where she was born and of which she is a citizen. The trial judge's resolution does not assess the rights of either the mother or the daughter and proceeds to render invisible the result that will be obtained with the effective extradition of the extraditable person: the delivery of the child to a father who has not been considered suitable by Costa Rican courts. Additionally, the extradited person has another Costa Rican child, the minor [Nombre20], who is located with his mother in the El Buen Pastor center and will be left unprotected once the extradition is final. This will directly affect the human rights of the Costa Rican child [Nombre18], which violates her physical and emotional integrity, her dignity, her right to a life free of violence, her right to family, and places her in a situation of special vulnerability, in flagrant violation of children's rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, extending also to the Costa Rican minor son of [Nombre1], named [Nombre20]. 4) Erroneous assessment of International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments and international judicial cooperation between States, and respect for Human Rights. [Nombre17]'s action originated from a well-founded fear due to the domestic violation she was suffering. She asserted that overturning the ruling would have dire consequences for this woman by separating her from her daughter. In support of their thesis, after citing some provisions of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, or the Guidelines on International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as some resolutions of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, they assert that domestic violence is a circumstance under which a person may be granted refugee status and that this is the situation with [Nombre1]. The well-founded fear of persecution exercised by [Nombre17]'s partner was what caused the latter's objective and subjective state of necessity to leave her country for Costa Rica, seeking refuge from fear. The refugee situation is based on persecution by a non-state agent and not on the exhaustion of measures existing in her country of origin. [Nombre17] is seeking protection from her situation of domestic violence, not to remove the minor from the father's sphere of custody. The situation of domestic violence was even reported by [Nombre17] herself on August 23, 2005, before the Superior Court of California, County of Humboldt. [Nombre17] recounts how fear took hold of her, being present in different episodes of her life, such as: "in 2001 when Tierra was just walking, she was crying about something and was walking into our room. [Nombre21] yelled at her and slammed the door in her face so hard that he made a hole in the door (…) after drinking a lot he screamed every morning, he traumatized Tierra, I had to take her to my neighbors’ (even before breakfast) so we could get away from his violence. He would scream and Tierra would start screaming in fright (…) he called me 'whore and slut' in front of my daughter. He verbally abused me while Tierra was with me on many occasions." She also states that she went to [Nombre22]'s mother for help and told her about the situation of domestic violence that she and her daughter faced; when he found out, "he would shout and threaten to do bad things to me if I ever told his mother again that he wasn't taking care of Tierra" (see folio 1640). In this way, invoking the existence of a well-founded fear, the principle of in dubio pro agredida, and the best interests of the minor involved in this situation, she requests that the possibility of justifiable conduct on the part of the extraditable person in coming to Costa Rica be assessed, that the best interests of the child be ensured, and that re-victimization within the framework of justice and the national legal system be avoided. The case file contains a psychological report prepared by INAMU which accounts for the symptomatology of a victim of domestic violence on the part of [Nombre17]. In addition to the above, they argue that the rejection of the refugee application filed on behalf of [Nombre17] is currently under appeal before the Minister of Public Security, and if granted, it would end the existing extradition proceeding. The principle of non-refoulement of refugees must be applied. Finally, she considered that the Hague Convention, related to the interpretation of International Treaties or Conventions in strict respect for human rights, should be applied. 5) Commitment of the Costa Rican State to respect Human Rights. She opposes the statements of the Procuraduría, which refer to the existence of a fellowship of institutions. The Costa Rican State has undertaken a commitment to respect human rights by ratifying various International Conventions protecting against violence against women. Also, [Nombre17] is the mother of two Costa Ricans; from a Human Rights perspective, the integrity of the family must be protected. The specificity of women and of those judged within the framework of Human Rights must be assessed; it requires respect for and guarantee of all institutes of the right of Access to Justice. It is requested that the appeal be granted, and that the release of [Nombre1] be ordered for exceeding reasonable time limits; in the event the request is not granted, it is requested that the counting of the prison time served in this proceeding be guaranteed, as well as the Procuraduría's obligation to follow up through consular channels. D. Intervention by the Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres. The Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, through its Executive President, MSc. [Nombre9], has appeared as an intervening party in the three appeals filed in defense of Women's Rights and stated, in a brief on folios 1727 and at the hearing, represented by Attorney [Nombre23], that in light of the absence of the principle of double criminality regarding the acts she was accused of, they have opposed the granting of extradition in this case at all times, since [Nombre1] did not abduct the minor from parental custody, as her mother had her under her sphere of protection and guardianship; hence, they maintain the view that what exists is merely a disobedience to authority, and since this offense does not carry a penalty exceeding one year in prison, the extradition could not be authorized. They request that the serious situation of domestic violence faced by [Nombre17] and her daughter at the hands of the aggressor, [Nombre21], be assessed; he has used one of the mechanisms often utilized in such situations to maintain control over the victims, namely the instrumentalization of the children. [Nombre1] was subjected to domestic violence in a systematic and daily manner; she lived in a difficult situation with acute post-traumatic stress, which is what women subjected to domestic violence suffer from. There is a psychological report prepared by INAMU personnel, which is in the record and must be assessed, and which reveals the torture of [Nombre17]; it is a professional and technical report, analyzing verbal statements over several sessions, with a content analysis. The importance of the fight in our country against domestic violence and in protection of persons who are victims of this type of aggression was indicated, also pointing out that the extraditable person was precisely a victim of this social problem. She added that [Nombre17] did not commit the crime of international abduction of a minor, given that she did not do so with the intention of separating her daughter from the father, but rather to avoid the situation of domestic violence she was experiencing, a decision she made as a consequence of not having been duly heard by the authorities of her country, that is, the United States of America. She also stated that [Nombre17] came to the country to start a life project and that this is only a crime of disobeying authority, for which reason she requested that the judgment be confirmed and her immediate release be ordered. E. Statements of the Extraditable Person. At the oral hearing, [Nombre1] stated that for four years she suffered domestic violence at the hands of [Nombre21]; he beat her, verbally assaulted her, and what she feared most happened: he told her he would lie to the authorities to take her daughter away from her; he would tell the authorities that she had no fixed address and thereby have custody of the child granted to him. The police could not protect her in California because the law only provides for one day of imprisonment for domestic violence. She did not kidnap her daughter; they separated due to the aggressions before the move; then she came to this country because she had lived here before; [Nombre18] was born here; she had physical and legal custody of her daughter; her daughter's father signed a permission for her to come to Costa Rica, so he knew she was coming and therefore she could not have kidnapped her daughter, since she already had permission to bring her. She stated that her daughter wants to be with her, as does the son she now has; they need their mother, to the point that a Costa Rican judge granted her custody of her daughter. She has suffered for being in jail, as has her daughter. She came to Costa Rica seeking protection. Her children are Costa Ricans and deserve the right to be with their mother, and she only wants to be with her family under Costa Rican law. I was able to leave, and I came to Costa Rica; he is very violent; one day he threw a chair at the girl and it came within two inches of hitting the child.

II.Opposition of the Procuraduría General de la República to the Appeal. Attorney [Nombre3], in his capacity as Director Procurador, opposed the grievances of the parties and stated that the appealed resolution must be confirmed. He considers that the extradition request was made by the Government of the United States of America against [Nombre1], a citizen of that country, who is being prosecuted for the crime of international child abduction. He considers that in this case, the extradition of [Nombre17] was appropriate, given that all the requirements, rules, and principles for which such requests are admissible are met. Regarding the argument in the appeals that there is no double criminality, the appellants fail to consider that this is the crime of international child abduction, as the trial judge did. There is no right to give a different connotation to the acts contained in the extradition request. The appellants improperly modify the request of the requesting State and gave a different connotation to the acts for which the surrender of [Nombre17] was requested; the appellants involve other acts that are not contained in the extradition request, by stating that the required factual scenario fits the crime of disobeying authority, without considering that the extradition request expressly indicates that [Nombre17] abducted her daughter from the United States of America to prevent her father from obtaining custody, and not as a consequence of having disobeyed a court order.

Based on existing case law on this matter, which he cites, the appellant argues that the judging authority should have limited itself to verifying whether in this case the requirements were met and the principles recognized by International Law under which it is admissible to grant an extradition were respected, since it is not a criminal matter, but a procedural mechanism through which the surrender of the requested or extraditable person is guaranteed.

He states in his argument that Article 184 of the Penal Code is placed among the offenses related to the protection of the family, which means that its interpretation must be done to safeguard the existing family rights, which is the legal interest to be protected, as indicated by the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in Resolutions No. 456-F-98 of 3:30 p.m. on July 1, 1998, No. [Telf3] of 9:30 a.m. on August 29, 2002, and No. [Telf4] of 2:15 p.m. on May 8, 2008. He states that the normative element "abduct" contained in the requesting State's statute must be understood as the Royal Spanish Academy defines it, with various meanings such as to rob and steal, and as to remove or separate; and in the present case, [Nombre17] removed or separated the minor [Nombre18] from the parental rights that corresponded to the father. There does not need to be a similarity or exactness between the criminal offenses of both countries; it is sufficient that it be a crime in both legislations, without this implying that the criminal statute must be absolutely identical. According to the evidence provided by the requesting country, the extraditable person [Nombre1] had over her daughter, naturally, a joint and equal right with her father, [Nombre21], and that regardless of the custody she had over this minor, the father also had the same right; it was precisely in the proceeding instituted in the United States of America where the legal custody corresponding to each of them was to be discussed. He further adds that the Superior Court of the County of Humboldt not only provided the requested person with the order for the hearing where the custody of her daughter would be discussed, but also an order expressly prohibiting her from moving the child outside the County of Humboldt in the State of California; and that in said proceeding, legal custody of the child was ultimately granted to [Nombre21].

He indicated that there is no dispute whatsoever regarding the typification of the acts for which extradition is sought under our legislation, as it was amply demonstrated that the requested party indeed illegitimately removed the minor child, and now that the contentious point has been resolved—namely, the possibility that one of the parents could be considered the active subject of the crime—it is the opinion of this Office that the acts for which the extraditable person is sought fit within the crime termed “child abduction” (sustracción de menor), regulated by our substantive criminal law in Article 184, thus fulfilling the double criminality principle or principle of identity.

He finally indicates that domestic violence and the situation of the minor should not be considered in the extradition process; it was noted that in the United States of America, sufficient protection could be given to the extradited person’s rights not to be subjected to violence and to live in peace, as well as to the minor child.

He requests the rejection of each and every one of the appeals and that the resolution of the lower court (Juez a quo) be declared in accordance with the law.

III. ON THE MERITS

This Court hears three appeals filed by the private defense counsel for the extraditable person [Name1], the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público), and the Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes), appeals that were filed in a timely and proper manner in accordance with the provisions of the Extradition Law. The joinder of the National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INAMU) was also accepted. For reasons of procedural economy and considering that the appeal of the Ombudsman’s Office encompasses all the grievances argued by the parties in the different means of challenge, as well as includes the statements from the INAMU’s joinder, this Court will refer solely to this appeal. This Chamber, after assessing the grievances indicated by the Ombudsman’s Office, grants the grievances in the manner set forth below, noting that, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights indicates, remedies must be rapid, de-formalized, and fair (Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. [Name24], International responsibility of the state for denial and challenge of justice and violation of judicial guarantees”, in, CIDH: The Court and the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 1994, p. 588.):

• A)The duty to guarantee Human Rights in the Extradition process The appeal of the Ombudsman’s Office indicates as grievance 1) The extradition process must guarantee respect for the rights and guarantees of the persons involved in the extradition process. The work of the judge is important insofar as they become the body responsible for complying with the international obligation towards the requesting State, but also for ensuring the application of the fundamental principles of human rights that guarantee the administration of justice. For the Ombudsman’s Office, the work of judges must go beyond the formal verification of requirements to include the analysis of the justification causes in each specific case that account for the conflicts and needs of the people, which is the raison d'être of the system; the State holds a power-duty in the exercise of justice, within the framework of a sovereign State. The jurisdictional function implies assessments that the judge can and must make. The grievance is granted for partially different reasons. This Court has assessed whether, in addition to complying with the formal requirements and general principles established by the bilateral extradition treaty between Costa Rica and the United States, other aspects related to the prevailing legality framework in the Costa Rican State, characterized as a democratic Republic of Law, should be analyzed. In this sense, this Chamber considers that Constitutional Law, which is comprised of the norms, principles, constitutional values, and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), binds all public powers and citizens. It follows that Constitutional Law forms part of the legality framework or parameter that the ordinary judge must interpret and apply when exercising the jurisdictional function, in accordance with the provisions of Article 154 of the Political Constitution.

Even though a concentrated constitutional review system persists in our legal system, this circumstance does not inhibit the ordinary jurisdiction from its duty to guarantee the observance and application of the Constitution, which is the foundation of the legal system. Therefore, the ordinary judge, when applying any norm or act, cannot disregard constitutional precepts, values, and principles given the judicial function of ensuring the supremacy of law and the preservation of the legal system.

The extradition process has been characterized by our constitutional and legal jurisprudence as a special procedure of international collaboration or assistance through which one State (requesting State) requests another State (requested State) to hand over a person in order to subject them to a criminal proceeding pending in their country, or to serve a sentence imposed as a result of a criminal proceeding brought against them, thereby making the administration of justice of the requesting State effective. In response, the requested State must evaluate, according to the requirements and principles that govern this matter, whether the formulated request is appropriate to hand over the requested person.

Even the Constitutional Chamber indicates that it is a special procedure different from the criminal process and states to that effect in SC voto 08261-2008 of May 14, 2008, the following:

" This Chamber, on different occasions, has indicated that extradition is an act of international legal assistance and is nothing other than a means of making possible the presence of the accused in a criminal proceeding in another country that requires it. Its basis, therefore, lies in the solidarity of States and the need to overcome the limitations imposed on the prosecution and punishment of crimes by the principle of territoriality, which prevents applying criminal law to acts that occurred outside the country where the alleged offender has sought refuge. This act of international cooperation between States, due to problems of territoriality, distance, differences in cultures and legal systems, is endowed with a series of procedures and regulations that seek to overcome the obstacles that may arise due to these differences, while seeking to reconcile and ensure respect for the legal systems of both countries, including the rules protecting the rights of the alleged offender. Precisely these noted differences mean that the detention and transfer of the accused person to the courts of justice is regulated in a manner distinct from the detention of an alleged offender within the country itself." This Court considers that although it might initially seem that the Judge of the requested State should limit themselves to verifying only the formal requirements and principles that govern extradition (among them: double criminality, the principle of speciality, provided the act carries a prison sentence of more than one year, does not involve the death penalty, and is not a political crime, etc.) because it is a matter of international cooperation between States in which the requested State serves as a conduit for the action of the other State; we must emphasize that this procedure implies, in the requested State, both a jurisdictional and constitutional review, including: the subjection of powers to the Constitution, the hierarchy and publicity of norms, the prohibition of arbitrariness, and legal certainty.

Although extradition is not an institute for defending or imposing a particular legal system, in the face of extradition, which is an instrument in the fight against impunity and for the right of potential crime victims, we must also observe the rights of the person affected by the procedure. This is undoubtedly the role of the Rule of Law in the face of acts by the powers of other States, and as the Constitutional Chamber indicates in the previously cited vote, “the rules protecting the rights of the alleged offender” must be respected.

On the rights of foreigners In the present case, the application of a set of Human Rights to a foreign citizen, [Name1], is sought, so the legal regime for foreigners in our current legal system must be examined.

The Political Constitution, in Article 19, states that:

“Foreigners have the same individual and social duties and rights as Costa Ricans, with the exceptions and limitations that this Constitution and the laws establish.” This norm has been elaborated upon by the Constitutional Chamber in multiple votes, it being valid, as constitutional doctrine, to establish differences between nationals and foreigners when they are grounded, both in constitutional-level norms and in legal-level norms, provided the latter are logical, reasonable, consistent with the principle of proportionality, and not contrary to human dignity (see SC voto 01684-91, of 4:00 p.m. on August 28, 1991; SC voto 1440-92 of 3:30 p.m. on June 2, 1992; SC voto 01282-90, of 3:00 p.m. on October 16, 1990, and it has reiterated this in the following rulings: see rulings SC voto 02093-93, of 2:06 p.m. on May 19, 1993; SC voto 02754-93, of 2:36 p.m. on June 15, 1993; SC voto 04601-94, of 9:33 a.m. on August 26, 1994; SC voto 05965-94, of 3:51 p.m. on October 11, 1994; SC voto 00319-95, of 2:42 p.m. on January 17, 1995; 05670-95, of 3:39 p.m. on October 17, 1995; and CED1, of 10:48 a.m. on July 31, 1998).

In SC voto 02570-97, of May 13, 1997, the High Court stated:

"Certainly, the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Constitution establishes that: ‘Foreigners have the same individual and social duties and rights as Costa Ricans, with the exceptions and limitations that this Constitution and the laws establish,’ which means that, regarding the set of fundamental rights, differences between nationals and non-nationals would only be valid if they have constitutional and legal standing, and in the latter case, only to the extent that the differentiation fully conforms to the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality that guide the legislative function, and of course, as long as it is not contrary to human dignity. This Chamber, in developing the content of the norm under analysis, has eliminated as unconstitutional a series of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights by foreigners, whose sole basis was the criterion of nationality, which has been repeatedly rejected as a validating reason for differentiations between them.- " From the above, it can be inferred that foreigners in our Law are bearers of Human Rights and fundamental rights, of those contemplated by the Political Constitution and international instruments, and that foreigners must be treated according to their dignity as persons and with respect for their Human Rights.

Value of Human Rights in the Costa Rican State Human Rights constitute a universal legal framework of mandatory observance for States. They are recognized based on the dignity of every human being, in all the ontological sense that this implies; by the very fact of being a human being, a person has a series of rights, and discriminatory treatment is prohibited. In this recognition, all human beings possess dignity, and one cannot speak of a greater dignity of some compared to others, which leads to the prohibition of any type of discrimination.

The constitutional doctrine emanating from the specialized Chamber is extensive and early on recognized that Human Rights conventions and instruments have supra-constitutional validity and self-executing application. In this sense, all state activity must be developed within these parameters.

The validity in the Costa Rican State of Human Rights instruments as a source of applicable law derives from the Political Constitution itself and is complemented by Article 1 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. Thus, with regard to international Human Rights instruments in force in the country, the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution do not apply, as Article 48 provides a special rule for Conventions referring to Human Rights, granting them normative force at the constitutional level itself and placing them as a parameter for interpreting the text of the Constitution itself and its derived principles. Consequently, the interpretation and application of secondary legislation are linked to them.

The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber has recognized that Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but also, to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution (see, SC voto 3435-92 of November 11, 1992 and its clarification, SC voto 5759-93 and SC voto 2313-95 of 4:18 p.m. of May 9, 1995).

In the same manner, SC voto 3173-93 has indicated the existence of the pro libertate and pro homine principles, as the hard core or essence of Human Rights, the content of which is as follows:

“…the pro libertate principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitutes the core of the human rights doctrine; according to the first, everything that favors liberty must be interpreted extensively, and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the second, law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that most favors the human being.” Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have full value in the Costa Rican State and that, regarding Human Rights, its decisions bind the Costa Rican State. Thus, in SC voto 2313-95 of 4:18 p.m. of May 9, 1995, and when resolving the mandatory constitutional review inquiry formulated by the Board of Directors of the Legislative Assembly concerning the draft law approving the “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” it expressly referred to the efficacy granted in Costa Rica to international Human Rights instruments not formally signed or approved according to the constitutional procedure, as follows:

“In this aspect, it is necessary to highlight the specific reference that the Constitution now makes to ‘international instruments,’ meaning that not only conventions, treaties, or agreements formally signed and approved according to the constitutional procedure itself (such as the case now before us), but any other instrument having the nature of protecting Human Rights, even if it has not undergone that procedure, is in force and applicable in the country.” Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, December 10, 1948), by its character and nature, has not required the constitutional approval procedures to be understood as in force and with the normative force granted by the matter it regulates. The same can be said of the “Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners” of the United Nations Organization, which, even though they are the product of expert meetings or the work of a department of that organization, by virtue of our country belonging to it, and because they refer to fundamental rights, have the same value as any international regulation formally incorporated into Costa Rican domestic law.” Finally, in SC voto 2002-10693 of November 7, 2002, the Constitutional Chamber reiterates that, in accordance with Article 48 of the Political Constitution:

“all international instruments on human rights have been elevated to constitutional status, and consequently, these must be incorporated in the interpretation of the Constitution.” Regarding the self-executing application of Human Rights Conventions, two positions are usually distinguished in legal doctrine: the first posits the programmatic character of Human Rights conventions. According to this position, the articles of the Conventions are not directly applied but rather leave substantive implementation to domestic legislation and jurisdiction (in this sense, Report of the United States delegation to the San José conference where the American Convention on Human Rights was approved, in: JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, The American Convention as Domestic Law, 1988, pp. 40-41).

The second position admits, as a general rule, the self-executing character of the norms contained in Human Rights conventions, meaning their norms can be invoked as applicable law by courts once ratified, as an effect of the norms binding the States-Parties, not only their governments, but are also directed at the other legislative and judicial branches, which are compelled to give effect to the conventions in domestic law. (See in this sense, the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights OC-7/86 of August 26, 1986, and the vote of Judge [Name25] in the case of [Name26] and [Name27] vs. Colombia, in the ruling on reparations of January 29, 1997, sections 6, 7, and 9; Case of [Name28] vs. Costa Rica of July 2, 2004, in which the self-executing nature of the American Convention on Human Rights is recognized).

The position of the Constitutional Chamber on the self-executing character of Human Rights is manifest. First, in a Habeas Corpus appeal, and later in an unconstitutionality appeal, it recognized the self-executing character of Human Rights, which produces as an effect the setting aside of lower-ranking norms that conflict with a Human Rights treaty. In this sense, see SC voto 282-90 of March 3, 1990 and the precedent SC voto 719-90 of June 26, 1990, both regarding the right to appeal a guilty verdict, and SC voto 1319-97 of March 4, 1997, consolidating the constitutional interpretation of the self-executing character of the norms of International Human Rights Law.

“…the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers interested parties to file an action of unconstitutionality against legal provisions that conflict with those of an international treaty, considering that by doing so they violate the higher normative hierarchy of the latter, in accordance with Article 7 of the Political Constitution. This does not prevent, however, that when treaty provisions are enforceable and executable by themselves without need of other norms to develop them in domestic law, the legal provisions that contradict them must simply be deemed repealed, precisely by virtue of the higher rank of the treaty. In this way, the antimony between law and treaty, following the reform of Articles 10, 48, 105, and 128 of the Constitution (Law No. 7128 of August 18, 1989, in force since September 1) and, above all, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (No. 7135 of October 11, 1989, in force since its publication on the 19th), is resolved, firstly and as far as possible, by the automatic repeal of the former insofar as it conflicts with the latter, without prejudice to it also being resolved through a declaration of unconstitutionality of the law.” This position is also followed in other pronouncements, such as SC voto 3435-92 of November 11, 1992; SC voto 2313-95 of May 9, 1995, among others.

Position in the hierarchy of norms of International Human Rights Treaties and others It is important to point out here the hierarchy of International Human Rights Treaties and other International Treaties, given that, on the one hand, we have in the case sub judice the application of an Extradition Treaty with the United States of America, and on the other, the application of International Human Rights Treaties invoked by the Ombudsman’s Office and extendable to the rest of the appellants.

We find that traditional normative sources have been enriched by a current that grants treaties on human rights matters a distinct normative hierarchy from that granted to treaties on matters not directly related to Human Rights (such as treaties on international cooperation, those regulating external relations between States, the law of war, etc.). In the case of our country, the distinction the Constitution makes between the rank it gives to treaties not related to human rights and those dealing with this matter is very clear. Article 7 of the Political Constitution grants public treaties and international agreements authority superior to laws, while Article 48 of that same normative body elevates the Human Rights instruments in force in the Republic to constitutional status.

When faced with the normative succession posed by the application of an international Human Rights treaty and a bilateral treaty, which come into conflict because the former grants express recognition of Human Rights and therefore greater guarantees, it is not a problem of doubt regarding the constitutionality of the latter but of legality, and as the Constitutional Chamber has stated in multiple votes, Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution but also, to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution.

National legal doctrine has stated in the identical sense that a constitutional inquiry will only be necessary:

“when it is not possible, through interpretation, to reach a solution that eliminates the contradictions between the legal text and the Constitution or international instrument.” (LLOBET, Human Rights in Criminal Justice, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, p. 241).

Application of constitutional principles and respect for Human Rights in Extradition In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, in a recent case related to the assessments of legality and compliance with constitutional guarantees and those derived from international Human Rights treaties concerning the surrender of the extraditable person, has referred to the assessment grounded in Human Rights that courts of justice must carry out.

Thus, in response to the constitutionality inquiry filed by the Court of Cassation of San Ramón in vote [Telf5] of 10:45 a.m. on May 30, 2008, in which a pronouncement was requested on whether the “ne bis in idem” guarantee established in Article 42 of the Political Constitution acquires the character of a principle of general or even universal application in extradition proceedings.

Through SC voto 2008-013432 of 2:03 p.m. on September 3, 2008, the High Court indicated that, faced with a normative gap where the cases in which the requested person was being tried or had been tried in a third State are not regulated, judges must resolve by applying both the principles and norms of the Political Constitution and those in the International Instruments. Specifically, the Chamber stated:

“it is clear that if one is faced with a case where the person whose surrender is requested is being tried or has already been tried in a third country, the detention and surrender are not legitimate, since the cause that legitimizes the collaboration of the requested country and the legitimacy of the requesting country to punish has disappeared. Judges, when resolving matters submitted to their knowledge, are obliged to apply the norms and principles contained both in the Political Constitution and in the international instruments applicable in Costa Rica. The Constitution is the supreme norm of the legal system; it operates not only as a criterion of validity for all others but also as a superior legal norm, immediately binding on all public powers and authorities and, of course, on individuals, above any other consideration. V.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, this Court concludes that the norm consulted is not unconstitutional. It is for the judges to interpret the norms in light of the fundamental principles and rights provided for in the Political Constitution and international instruments.” In this sense, it can be concluded that even legal gaps regarding judicial guarantees must be filled with content from the norms and principles derived from international Human Rights Conventions and Instruments.

Similarly, in another vote concerning extradition and the application of an international convention, and although not with erga omnes effect but for the specific case, the Constitutional Chamber has assessed the application of International Conventions. Thus, in ruling SC voto 011576-2008 of July twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, it reviewed the application of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, incorporated into our Legal System through Law [Name1]° 6079 of August 28, 1977, and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of November 22, 1984, as well as the derived Costa Rican legislation and applied the principle of non-refoulement (non refoulment), which constitutes the cornerstone of the international system for refugee protection, and which protects the refugee from expulsion or any form of return to the borders of territories where their life or freedom would be in danger; and this principle benefits not only those persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention on Refugees, but also those covered by the regional definition of refugee contained in the Cartagena Declaration.

Without a doubt, constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that International Human Rights Conventions are a source of the legal system in the case of extradition proceedings (a matter also manifested in many specific cases distinct from international judicial cooperation), which, because they are carried out in the Costa Rican Rule of Law, must observe the legality framework contained in the Political Constitution and the International Conventions on Human Rights in force in Costa Rica. This aligns with the position of this Court which, accepting the arguments of the Ombudsman’s Office, considers that human rights must be applied in the extradition process.

This is shared by majority legal doctrine and the jurisprudence of international courts. In this sense, it is affirmed by [Name29], : Extradition and Fundamental Rights, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p. 237:

“the person who is the subject of extradition possesses the human rights recognized by the constitutional system, including due process, liberty, integrity, life, etc., but not as specifically defined in each country, but rather as consensuated in the international declarations of rights, in a certain ius cogens, that is, by the universally accepted norms of law expressed in international declarations and decisions of the corresponding courts.” For its part, the European Court of Human Rights, expressly in the case of [Name30] (ECHR judgment of July 7, 1989), does not excuse States-Parties from all responsibility for the foreseeable consequences that an extradition may entail beyond their borders. Certainly, this case referred to the extradition of a citizen to the United States to be tried for murder with the possibility of being sentenced to the death penalty. However, important consequences for the extradition process and respect for human rights are derived from the resolution of the case; among them, it is highlighted by [Name31] cited by [Name32], [Name33]: Extradition in the Spanish, International and Community Domestic System, Comares, Granada, 2005, p.

first, the Contracting Parties cannot ignore the fate that the persons subject to extradition will face in the receiving country; second, it assigns a preponderant role to Article 3 as an unconditional and non-derogable provision intimately linked to the principles of human dignity and a democratic society; third, it demonstrates a manifestation of the internationalization of the human rights issue, revealing a relativization of national and regional coverage limits in favor of human dignity; in its view, fourth, the judgment enshrines the normative and singular character of the European Convention on Human Rights, applying preferentially over a subsequent treaty (the 1972 extradition treaty) entered into by a country outside the European system, the United States, showing the dynamic and progressive character of the Convention." Consequently, the State cannot excuse itself by invoking sovereignty to avoid acting in defense of Human Rights, a point reiterated in other decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (cases [Nombre34] and [Nombre35]) and by the Human Rights Committee (in the case [Nombre36], [Nombre37], and [Nombre38] regarding the right to life and inhuman and degrading treatment).

Likewise, the majority doctrine understands that there is a connection between the act of the requesting State and the requested State in the protection of Human Rights: "the violation of a fundamental right that may be incurred by the action of a foreign public authority renders the action of the judicial or administrative body that facilitates it unconstitutional, since it allows said violation to materialize by complying with it or granting it validity." (See, [Nombre29], Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p.33.)

Arguing to the contrary can lead to liability arising from the application of international norms; an indirect violation of Human Rights could occur, which is that facilitated by the action or omission of the extradition body.

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court has accepted the argument of the Defensoría de los Habitantes and considers that the Judge A quo should have globally assessed the factual and legal situation in accordance with the principles of the Rule of Law (Estado de Derecho) and the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución), which resulted in an erroneous assessment of substantive law since our legal system grants a preponderant value to International Human Rights Treaties, which hold supra-constitutional value. Departing from other non-binding decisions of highly respected national Courts of Cassation from a legal standpoint, this Chamber has chosen to assess the International Human Rights Conventions signed and ratified by Costa Rica that are directly related to the disputed points in this case. At the same time, our State is bound to compliance and observance not only from a formal scope, but also in the real scope and in the results of the application of Human Rights Treaties, which definitively have not been ratified by the requesting State.

Our country has signed and ratified, among others, multiple human rights conventions, including: the CEDAW Convention, the Belem do Pará Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which imply a broader spectrum regarding the guarantees derived from Human Rights, such as the recognition of women's rights as Human Rights, the right of women not to be subjected to violence, the guardianship of the best interest and comprehensive protection of the Minor, the right to family and to peace. With these, the country has acquired a commitment to special guardianship of the rights of Women and Girls, especially considering that the constitutional and democratic Rule of Law cannot disregard the consequences that its actions may bring; the act of surrendering the extraditable person can indirectly materialize the violation of Human Rights.

In an extradition process such as the one at hand, the judicial authorities cannot limit ourselves to verifying compliance with requirements; rather, the Costa Rican State must act within the parameters of constitutionality and legality, which, in this specific case, oblige it to protect the Human Rights of two female victims of domestic violence: one of legal age, mother of two Costa Rican children, and the other, a female child, a minor, who holds dual Costa Rican nationality by birth and North American. From the study of the present process, it is clearly inferred from the evidence that was produced and partially reproduced in the oral hearing that a situation of violence against women was indeed verified. It must be clarified that in the present case, the judicial authorities of the requested country are not prejudging the act for which the extraditable person is being prosecuted in the requesting country; although no pronouncement is issued on these acts, the violation of Human Rights such as violence against women and girls must be assessed.

• B)On the rights of the girl and the boy, the right to family, and the right to live a life free from violence.

The appeal filed by the Defensoría de los Habitantes indicates as grievance 3) the absence of assessment of the Human Rights of the Costa Rican girl [Nombre18], and argues as grounds that the minor was transferred to Costa Rica, the country in which she was born and of which she is a citizen. The decision of the Judge a quo does not assess the rights of either the mother or the daughter and proceeds to render invisible the result that will be obtained with the effective extradition of the extraditable person: the delivery of the girl to a father who has not been considered suitable by the Costa Rican courts; furthermore, the minor [Nombre20], who is located with his mother in the El Buen Pastor center, will be left unprotected once the extradition is final. The human rights of the Costa Rican girl [Nombre18] will be directly affected, which violates her physical and emotional integrity, her dignity, her right to a life free from violence, her right to family, and places her in a situation of special vulnerability, in flagrant violation of the rights of children and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, extensible also to the Costa Rican minor son of [Nombre1] named [Nombre20].

This Court accepts the grievance. As we have set forth, our constitutional legislation, by accepting the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is a Human Rights instrument, assumed the commitment that in processes where the rights of a minor person are directly or indirectly involved, the authorities responsible for resolving the case, whether administrative or judicial, must assess in the corresponding decision what relates to the children and their best interest. Even if these circumstances appear foreign to the specific situation, since an indirect violation of fundamental rights could occur, which is that facilitated by the omissive action of the extradition body. In the sub judice case, it is impossible to sever —as the judge a quo has done— the consideration of the extradition, whose facts and grounds correspond to an international kidnapping of a minor, from the situation of the extraditable person [Nombre17] and her children: a girl [Nombre18] and a boy [Nombre20], both Costa Rican by birth, and the reported situation of domestic violence, which must be assessed in accordance with the general principles that govern the democratic Rule of Law and inform the Law of the Constitution.

Various international instruments recognize the state duty to provide special protection to the rights of boys and girls, starting from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself, and particularly, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (approved and ratified by our country through Law [Nombre1] No. 7184 of July eighteen, nineteen ninety, which entered into force, according to numeral 2 of that legal instrument, on the day of its publication in La Gaceta [Nombre1] No. 149 of August nine, nineteen ninety), which provides protection to this age group. Ensuring that adequate assistance and respect for the rights recognized therein are provided at all times, among which stand out, inter alia: the promotion of the necessary conditions for family coexistence, as well as the right of children to stay together with their parents (Article 7) —particularly with their mother (Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of San Salvador); the right to a standard of living adequate for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development (Article 27).

In the same vein, this international instrument establishes a series of obligations for the States Parties or signatories, among them: to ensure that the child is not separated from his or her parents against their will, except when, subject to judicial review, such separation is necessary in the best interest of the child" (Article 9, paragraph 1) and to address any request, made by a child or by his or her parents, to enter a State Party or leave it positively, humanely, and expeditiously (Article 10, paragraph 1).

It follows from these international Human Rights instruments that States have as fundamental duties the protection of the best interest of the child, avoiding the dismemberment of the family nucleus and promoting the necessary conditions for them to enjoy the permanent presence of parental authority, while also indicating that in some cases separation is necessary and is authorized in the best interest of the minor.

In the infra-constitutional order, laws that protect the best interest of the minor have also been developed. Thus, the Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia (Childhood and Adolescence Code) (Law [Nombre1] No. 7739) specifies that the interpretive north of any public or private action must be the best interest of the child (Article 5). Article 17 indicates that minors cannot be subject, among other circumstances, to deportation from the national territory, except to safeguard their own interest, according to the criteria determined by the best interest of this group. Also, Article 30 establishes the Right to family life, indicating that minors shall have the right to know their father and mother; likewise, to grow and develop at their side and be cared for by them, and precept 33 regulates the Right to permanence with the family by providing that minors shall not be separated from their family, except under special circumstances established by law.

The Sala Constitucional recognizes the best interest of the child as a guiding general principle of all state activity; thus, in SC vote 15461-2008 of October 15, 2008, it stated: In this sense, as a recognized and fully applicable general principle, the best interest of the child cannot be opposed by any rule or decision —administrative or judicial— that contradicts it, unless, in certain circumstances, the applicability of some other general principle of a higher level is at stake, in which case the legal operator must adhere to the balancing test and the role of each principle in the particular case. Thus, ignoring the principal character of the best interest of the child, by disregarding its strict application in cases involving minors, is contrary to the recognitions that the Law of the Constitution makes on this matter, while also giving rise to placing oneself in a position of vulnerability against the mandate of Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

Likewise, the Law of the Constitution extends "special protection of the State" to the family, whether de facto or de jure. Article 51 of the Constitution proclaims that this institution is the "natural element and foundation of society." The family nucleus is basic and essential for the free development of the personality of the individuals who form or comprise it and, consequently, of the entire social conglomerate. However, sometimes the family is not a safe place, due to domestic violence, and in these cases, the vulnerability and the possibility of affecting the personal integrity—physical and mental—of its members are protected.

In the case under examination, this Chamber has analyzed in the preceding considering A) that Mrs. [Nombre17] reported domestic violence to the authorities, and also that she opposed paternal custody, arguing that the minor was in danger. Likewise, in the repeatedly cited technical report of INAMU, it was indicated that domestic violence was suffered by Mrs. [Nombre17] and her own daughter [Nombre18], with current manifestations carried out in our country. Since the girl's father did not want the girl to visit her mother in prison and tried to take her out of the country in contravention of the order of the Juzgado de Niñez y Adolescencia. Moreover, the minor [Nombre18] manifests emotional consequences from the separation from her mother, and the mother is equally impacted, suffering deterioration in her emotional state (see folios 1071 to 1076), and also that Mrs. [Nombre17] gave birth to another child in our country. Thus, from the evidence provided, it is inferred that both the mother and the girl have suffered domestic violence, and even at this moment, the violence is manifest, and, as the Defensoría de los Habitantes has pointed out, granting the extradition of Mrs. [Nombre17] could worsen the situation and leave the minor [Nombre18] and her brother [Nombre20] unprotected.

This Chamber cannot ignore that the mother entered the national territory with the girl [Nombre39] and has requested refuge based on domestic violence, which, at the time of this decision, has not been definitively resolved. Regarding the situation of minors who have been abducted by their mothers and who suffer domestic violence within the family, it must be considered that the interests of the children and the mother are indissolubly linked. In addition to the special protection for children, including the right to be with their mother and their family, understanding that the extradition will result in the separation of the girl from her mother and her brother, while also implying the placement of the girl, as has occurred now, in a substitute home, or ultimately, the risk of return to the paternal side, which, as was proven, is also immersed in violence against the minor person.

National constitutional jurisprudence and comparative international jurisprudence on the return of minors have rejected the return of minors according to the provisions of Article 13(1)(b) of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (of October twenty-five, nineteen eighty, and approved by Law number 7746 of February twenty-three, nineteen ninety-eight), if the minors are at risk of physical or psychological danger, or in any other way the minor is placed in an intolerable situation, regardless of whether the taking parent has requested refuge in the country; thus, cases SC vote 15461-2008 of October 15, 2008, and SC vote 17639-2008 of December five, 2008. Also, in SC vote 11576-2008 of July 25, 2008, in the additional reasons of Judge Calzada, the situation of not requesting refuge was assessed, and she stated: "that the fact that the petitioner had not requested refugee status in the country since her entry could well have been part of the same fear based on the situation from which she was fleeing, since she would publicly expose her location to the alleged aggressor. Furthermore, it is to be expected that she did not feel sufficiently protected by the existing legal means, which she estimated —even in the United States— had been insufficient, and in our country, have also not been sufficiently effective in all cases." Regarding international cases, see cases [Nombre40] v. [Nombre40], [2001] O.J. No. 2849 (Ontario), ordering the return to Kenya of triplet girls was refused. The girls had traveled to Canada with their mother, to whom Canadian authorities in Nairobi had granted a refugee visa; the Judge concluded that the mother and the girls were living in a dangerous and hostile environment attributable to the conduct of their father and that consequently, referring to the Pollastro case, there was a basis for the exception provided by Article 13(1)(b). Other cases are [Nombre41], [2001] O.J. No. 3074 (Ontario), where ordering the return of a 3-year-old boy to Hungary was refused. Upon arriving in Canada, the mother claimed refugee status. The same as in the case A.K. v. E.F., [2001] R.D.F. 334 (Québec).

Further, as national authors point out, in line with authorized foreign doctrine, [Nombre42] and [Nombre43], La Sustracción Internacional de Personas Menores de Edad en el Derecho de Familia Costarricense, IJSA, 2008, p.60, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or Hague Convention: "is a set of binding provisions that do not establish the legal regime of the specific case, so it is not a Convention on judicial competence, applicable law, or recognition of foreign decisions. It only contemplates systems of cooperation between authorities and an action for the immediate return of the minor person to the country of his or her habitual residence. Therefore, the core point of the process is not the suitability for exercising personal custody of the minor persons but, rather, the existence or not of grounds for non-return. This point is of utmost importance since the international restitution process for minor persons is not a procedure to decide on custody nor to determine or rule out the suitability of the requested father or mother." As a corollary to the preceding analysis, it must be concluded that when it concerns substantial aspects involving the best interest of the minor, his or her Human Rights shall prevail over the application of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, and in this, the higher precedence or hierarchy of Human Rights treaties is imposed. As the Sala Constitucional has anticipated in SC vote 15461-2008 of October 5, 2008, which we previously cited, where the nationality of the possibly affected children is also important; if it concerns a Costa Rican minor, the principle of the best interest of the child must preponderantly be integrated into the decision; the Chamber indicated: "In this way, if the minor upon whom the possibility of an international return is proposed turns out to be a Costa Rican who is in national territory, the administrative and judicial authorities that must resolve the matter shall take into consideration the existence of express general principles recognized by the country; (...) for not doing so will result in an illegitimate pronouncement for contradicting principles, values, and specific norms established in the entirety of the Law of the Constitution and that have been defined herein." C) Domestic violence as a basis for recognition to obtain international protection of refugee status and the necessary assessment in the extradition procedure.

The Defensoría de los Habitantes expressed as grievance 4) Erroneous assessment of International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments and international judicial cooperation between States and respect for Human Rights. They indicate that Judge A quo did not assess that the action of Mrs. [Nombre17] originated from a well-founded fear due to the domestic violence she suffered. They asserted that revoking the judgment would bring disastrous consequences for this lady by separating her from her daughter. In support of their thesis, after citing some norms of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, or the Guidelines on International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as some resolutions of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, they affirm that domestic violence is a circumstance for which a person can be granted refugee status, and that this is the situation presented with Mrs. [Nombre1]. The grievance is accepted, but on different grounds. Indeed, it is evident from the extradition process conducted against Mrs. [Nombre17] that she submitted a request for asylum before the corresponding migration authority, based on the domestic violence suffered by her and her minor daughter [Nombre18], according to a report from the Defensoría de los Habitantes visible at folios 1097 et seq., which has not been challenged as invalid by the opposing party.

As reported, the migration authorities denied the application in the first instance, and it was appealed to the Minister of Security, without the final decision being communicated at the time this case was decided by the Court of Cassation. This Chamber considers that, notwithstanding the constitutional obligation to address these issues, to which we have referred because they derive from Human Rights, these aspects were not considered in the decision that granted the extradition, with an erroneous application of substantive law.

From the International Human Rights Conventions and Declarations, it is considered that the right to asylum is a Human Right, and our legal system has recognized this by incorporating these various instruments at the infra-constitutional level.

In accordance with Article 1, section A, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, incorporated into our Legal System by Law [Nombre1] No. 6079 of August 28, 1977, the term refugee applies to any person who: "as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." This criterion was taken up by domestic law in Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo [Nombre1] No. 32195 of September 22, 2004, according to which: "A refugee is considered to be any person who, owing to well-founded fears of being persecuted, is outside the country of his or her nationality, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country." For its part, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of November 22, 1984 (recognized and reaffirmed in the San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons of December 7, 1994, Costa Rica), which embodies the best Latin American tradition on the matter, extends this condition to those persons: "who have fled their countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order" (part III, Third).

But it is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that has consistently indicated that one of the reasons for which a request for asylum is appropriate is, precisely, when a woman suffers domestic violence (Executive Committee Conclusions number 87 of October 1999; No. 39 of the Executive Committee, Refugee Women and International Protection; No. 73, Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, 1993; No. 77, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1995; No. 79, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1996; and No. 81, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1997).

In the sub judice case, the migration authority, in accordance with Articles 111 and 112 of the Ley de Migración y Extranjería, heard the request for asylum and denied it; however, the administrative decision was not final as it was appealed to the corresponding Ministry. Therefore, in application of the mentioned Article 112, given this request, what is appropriate is the suspension of the execution of extradition until the pertinent matter is resolved. This is an expression of the so-called principle of non-refoulement; the article states the following:

Article 112.- The filing of an application for recognition of refugee or asylee status shall have a suspensive effect on the execution of the extradition of the foreign person, until the corresponding procedure has been completed, by means of a final and unappealable decision. The recognition of refugee or asylee status shall have the effect of terminating any extradition proceeding initiated against the refugee or asylee person, at the request of the Government of the country where the alleged crime was committed, based on the same facts that justified said recognition.

The factual situations of the examined case should not be viewed in isolation, but linked to the situation of violence against women and girls and the best interest of the Costa Rican minors; therefore, the interests must be weighed and the greatest respect for Human Rights must be sought. We will not repeat what has already been stated, only emphasize that the Judge A quo, by granting the extradition of a person under the conditions we have analyzed, exposes Mrs. [Nombre17] and her daughter to greater physical and emotional harm derived from the domestic violence that was proven. Therefore, without prejudging or invading the sphere of competence of administrative bodies, which will be responsible for deciding on the refuge, when there are probable violations of personal integrity and, in short, probable unjustified attacks on the human rights of the woman and the girl, as well as the best interest of the girl, including the right to be with her mother and her family, these aspects must be assessed in the extradition in accordance with the postulates of the Law of the Constitution.

The Human Rights of Women The Costa Rican State has ratified international instruments concerning the advancement of the Human Rights of women, which oblige their application because it has ratified them, and the Conventions themselves contain norms that include both the commitment by the respective State not to violate Human Rights, and also positive action to guarantee the "full and total exercise" of these rights, as is the case of Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention.

Among the international normative sources on the Human Rights of Women, we have the following: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948, Article 1); American Convention on Human Rights (1969, Article 5); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979, Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 9); General Recommendations adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution number 48/104 of December 20, 1993, Article 4); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women or Belém do Pará Convention (1994, Articles 1 to 3, 7, and 9); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1999). From this body of norms, as expressly stated in the Declaration and Plan of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993), it follows that:

"the human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights" Of all these international instruments, it is relevant to note that they recognize as fundamental principles equality, dignity, the right to a life free from violence, and the right to live in peace for Women.

The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, approved by Law No. 7499 of June 9, 1994, obliges the Costa Rican State to analyze the situation of violence suffered by a woman in a case submitted to its knowledge, such as the one now before us. Thus, in its Articles 2, 4, and 9, it is provided:

Article 2-. Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual, and psychological violence: a.

...that takes place within the family or domestic unit or in any other interpersonal relationship, whether the aggressor shares or has shared the same domicile as the woman, and that includes, among others, rape, battery (maltrato), and sexual abuse(...).

Article 4. Every woman has the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise, and protection of all human rights and to the freedoms enshrined in regional and international human rights instruments. These rights include, among others:

a. the right to have her life respected; b. the right to have her physical, mental, and moral integrity respected; c. the right to personal liberty and security; d. the right not to be subjected to torture; e. the right to have the inherent dignity of her person respected and her family protected; f. the right to equal protection before the law and of the law; g. the right to a simple and prompt recourse before competent courts, which protects her against acts that violate her rights (…).

Article 9. In adopting the measures referred to in this chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the situation of vulnerability to violence that a woman may suffer by reason of, among others, her race or her ethnic condition, her status as a migrant, refugee, or displaced person. In the same sense, consideration shall be given to a woman who is subjected to violence while pregnant, disabled, a minor, elderly, or is in a disadvantaged socioeconomic situation or affected by situations of armed conflict or deprivation of her liberty." Regarding the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, or the Belém do Pará Convention, it constitutes the first international legal instrument that recognizes women's right to live a life free of violence, and considers violence against women as a violation of Human Rights. Articles 1 to 3, 7, and 9 state:

Article 1. For the purposes of this Convention, violence against women shall be understood as any action or conduct, based on her gender, that causes death, harm, or physical, sexual, or psychological suffering to the woman, whether in the public or private sphere.

Article 2. Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual, and psychological violence:

a. that takes place within the family or domestic unit or in any other interpersonal relationship, whether the aggressor shares or has shared the same domicile as the woman, and that includes, among others, rape, battery (maltrato), and sexual abuse; b. that takes place in the community and is perpetrated by any person and that includes, among others, rape, sexual abuse, torture, human trafficking, forced prostitution, kidnapping, and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in educational institutions, health facilities, or any other place, and c. that is perpetrated or tolerated by the State or its agents, wherever it occurs.

Article 3. Every woman has the right to a life free of violence, both in the public and private spheres.

Article 7. The States Parties condemn all forms of violence against women and agree to adopt, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies aimed at preventing, punishing, and eradicating such violence and to carry out the following:

a. refrain from any action or practice of violence against women and ensure that the authorities, their officials, personnel, agents, and institutions behave in accordance with this obligation; b. act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish violence against women; c. include in their domestic legislation criminal, civil, and administrative norms, as well as those of any other nature that are necessary to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence against women, and adopt the appropriate administrative measures that may be applicable; d. adopt legal measures to compel the aggressor to refrain from harassing, intimidating, threatening, harming, or endangering the life of the woman in any way that threatens her integrity or harms her property; e. take all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to modify or abolish existing laws and regulations, or to modify legal or customary practices that support the persistence or tolerance of violence against women; f. establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to violence, which include, among others, protective measures, a timely trial, and effective access to such procedures; g. establish the necessary judicial and administrative mechanisms to ensure that women subjected to violence have effective access to restitution, reparation for the harm, or other fair and effective means of compensation, and h. adopt the legislative or other provisions that are necessary to make this Convention effective.

Article 9. In adopting the measures referred to in this chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the situation of vulnerability to violence that a woman may suffer by reason of, among others, of her race or her ethnic condition, of her status as a migrant, refugee, or displaced person (…).

In the extradition procedure of Ms. [Name17], as the Defensoría de los Habitantes has set forth in its appeal, the grievance of which has been upheld, Ms. [Name17] was immersed in the cycle of violence against women, as was the minor child [Name18], which was accredited by the complaint that Ms. [Name17] filed in the United States (visible at folio 736 and its translation at folios 747 to 749), as well as by a study conducted by the Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (visible at folios 1050 to 1069) and the very statements of Ms. [Name17] in the exercise of her material defense at the oral hearing.

These evidentiary elements were not controverted by the opposing party, namely, the Procuraduría General de la República representing the requesting State; rather, this government body indicated that in the United States of America, sufficient protection could be given to the rights of the extradited person to not be violated and to live in peace, as well as to the minor child. Given that its opposition to the appeal focused on arguing that domestic violence and the situation of the minor person, as well as the evidence provided, should not be considered in the extradition process, neither in this case nor in any other case; in an unsustainable formalism that could even violate other guarantees beyond those alleged by the appellants' appeal, such as access to justice and the extraditable person's right of defense, and as we shall see, indirectly, the human rights of the minor person.

This Chamber considers that in the case sub-judice, in accordance with the international commitments adopted by Costa Rica upon signing and ratifying the aforementioned International Human Rights Conventions and by virtue of the application of the Political Constitution, a ruling on this matter is necessarily required. For, as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, CIDH) has already pointed out in the case of [Name44] vs. Brazil (2001), a duty of the States is to prevent practices of violence against women, in addition to preventing any state agent from violating, through their actions, the rights of women. In that case, the Belém do Pará Convention was applied for the first time, and the CIDH decided that the State had undermined its obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, and eradicate domestic violence. In turn, violations were found of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (for violation of the victim's rights to effective judicial guarantees and protections) and Article 7 of the Belém do Pará Convention, and it was established that among the most important principles is the obligation of States in cases of violence against women, which includes the duties to prosecute and convict those responsible, as well as the duty to “prevent these degrading practices.” It follows that, faced with the demonstration of violence against women, the lower-court judge (Juez a quo) in this case, and every judge in general, must assess and not simply ignore or transfer to other spheres of competence the violence against women, if the measure or resolution taken directly or indirectly affects, by omission, the human rights of the woman and the girl.

In the case at hand, the requesting State is charging Ms. [Name1] with removing a minor from the United States with the intent to obstruct the legitimate exercise of the paternal rights of the minor's father; that she did so while the legal proceedings were underway to define parental authority (patria potestad) regarding the minor in the Superior Court of Humboldt County, and that in said process, an order had been issued not to remove the minor from the County. This is typified in U.S. law under Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1204. That request for extradition did not include, on the part of the requesting State, any other assessment, nor did the resolution of the lower-court judge, regarding the allegations timely made by the technical and material defense, as well as by INAMU, the Defensoría de los Habitantes, and the Ministerio Público. It did not specifically consider the complaint filed by [Name1] in the United States for domestic violence on August 23, 2005 (visible at folio 736 and its translation at folios 747 to 749); that the physical custody of the minor child [Name18] was held by the mother, who had left the de facto marital home due to domestic violence (see statement by F.B.I. Special Agent [Name45] at folios 124 to 127 and evidentiary document B translation at folio 747); the statement of [Name1] before the Superior Court of California, County of Humboldt, in which [Name17] opposed a visitation regime for the minor because the petitioner endangered the minor (see folio 750); that the father of the minor child [Name18] had signed an exit permit for the child destined for Mexico on April 26, 2005 (folio 373); that the Superior Court of California conferred, on November 10, 2005, physical custody of [Name18] to her father [Name21] (folio 278 et seq. and its translation at folios 284 et seq.); as well as the Technical Criteria Report prepared by psychologist [Name46], an official of the Women's Delegation (Delegación de la Mujer), the evidence provided by INAMU (visible at folios 1050 to 1069); the witness statement of Ms. [Name17] (at folio 758 and its translation at folio 762 et seq.); that Ms. [Name17] filed a refugee application before the immigration authorities based on domestic violence, a proceeding that was denied in the first instance by the immigration authority but was on appeal before the Minister of Security (see Criteria presented by the Defensoría de los Habitantes at folios 1097 et seq.), and that Ms. [Name17] had also given birth to another child, a Costa Rican by birth (see birth registration certificate folio 372) and had been detained for 14 months, which is why the minor [Name18] was placed in a foster home (see Criteria presented by the Defensoría de los Habitantes at folios 1097 et seq.).

That evidence was not assessed by the lower-court judge under the argument that in the extradition process, only compliance with the requirements and principles set forth in the bilateral Costa Rica-United States extradition treaty must be verified. As we have advanced, a situation of domestic violence and violence against women underlies the present case, and in consideration of the Human Rights of the woman and the girl, the entire factual environment must be assessed, in addition to the legal system, in a hermeneutic manner. Lest the State itself contribute by its omission to a violation of Human Rights and thereby incur international responsibility for non-compliance with its international commitments to respect Human Rights before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which evaluate the effectiveness of domestic judicial processes in remedying human rights violations. An examination that covers the processes in their entirety and at different levels to determine whether the procedures and the evidence produced were fair. (In this regard, see OEA/Ser.L/II.Doc 68, January 20, 2007, marginal numbers 35, 36, and 39).

According to the technical criteria of psychologist [Name46], an official of the Women's Delegation (Delegación de la Mujer), and the evidence provided by INAMU (visible at folios 1050 to 1069), [Name1] suffered physical violence consisting of blows delivered with a fist to the head, arms, and back; throwing of various objects such as ceramic cups or milk cartons, among others. She experienced psychological violence in the form of constant insults such as "piece of shit, bag of shit, you're worthless, stupid, crack whore, witch, whore" (pedazo de mierda, bolsa de mierda, no vales nada, estúpida, prostituta de crack, bruja, puta); stalking consisting of accusations of infidelity, threats of legal action in which lies would be told about her maternal role to separate her from her daughter; creation of a climate of terror through reckless driving, cornering her in the shower or in corners of the house, mistreatment of animals (he injured a kitten by throwing it against a fence); isolation from her family environment and her friends. Likewise, she endured economic violence (violencia patrimonial), which manifested as a lack of contribution to the family economy; breaking objects of immediate need such as the child's chair; preventing her from working; controlling her personal expenses. The report indicates that the aggressive behavior became increasingly frequent. Ms. [Name17] was constantly beaten, especially when she was in situations of greater vulnerability: with her child in her arms (thus placing the minor in the "line of fire"), naked in the shower, before getting out of bed in the mornings, in the car driven at high speed by the aggressor. These blows often warranted medical attention that was not sought. Other events highlighted by Ms. [Name1] are the long periods when she left the house with her daughter in her arms, without shelter and without food, waiting for [Name22]'s aggressiveness to subside. On this matter, there was the sworn statement of a neighbor of [Name1], Ms. [Name17], who relates that she met [Name1] and [Name47] one morning when they came to her door seeking help because [Name21] was furious and was throwing objects at her. On various occasions, the aggressor threatened to take the child away from her. The witness [Name17], the romantic partner of [Name22] until 2007, corroborated that version. [Name48] believes that both [Name22] and his family are controlling and wealthy, and at a certain point they decided, to the exclusion of [Name17], to obtain the absolute custody of the child.

The technical report points out that the situation of violence continues with the aggressor's attempts to separate the minor person from her mother; he attempted to take the child to the United States against the order of the Childhood and Adolescence authority. The report in Annex 1 (Anexo 1), folios 1071 et seq., also points out the emotional risk to the minor child [Name18] given Mr. [Name22]'s refusal to bring the child to see her mother imprisoned in El Buen Pastor prison, the impact on the minor due to maternal separation, the weak bond between the minor and Mr. [Name22], and the mother's pain at the separation from her daughter.

In the exercise of her material defense, Ms. [Name17] recounted episodes of domestic violence against her and her child by Mr. [Name22], and her statements were not refuted or rebutted. Furthermore, the INAMU report indicates that an instrument with 19 criteria was applied to the account of Ms. [Name17], and based on the account, it was deemed to appear reliable.

All the indicated evidentiary elements allow this Chamber to conclude that Ms. [Name17] and her daughter were victims of domestic violence, and this situation must prevail in the assessment of the extradition.

• D)Access to Justice and Effective Judicial Protection As grievance 5), the Defensoría de los Habitantes set forth the Costa Rican State's commitment to respect Human Rights. It opposes the statements of the Procuraduría that refer to the existence of a fraternity of institutions. The Costa Rican State has assumed a commitment to respect Human Rights by ratifying different International Conventions that protect against violence against women. Also, Ms. [Name17] is the mother of two Costa Ricans; from the perspective of Human Rights, the integrity of the family must be protected. The specificity of women and those who are judged within the framework of Human Rights must be assessed, and it also requires respect for and guarantee of all the institutes of the right of Access to Justice. The grievance is upheld. This Chamber has extensively referred to the respect for Human Rights that the Costa Rican State lavishly provides through various manifestations and concretions. It remains to analyze the grievance regarding access to justice, which is an undeniable manifestation of effective judicial protection and encompasses several contents, among them an effective recourse in courts of justice—not referring to means of appeal but to the effective defense of individuals' rights—, the access of particularly vulnerable groups, and justice in the specific case.

Access to Justice is recognized in various international instruments for the protection of Human Rights, among them: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14, paragraph 3), the American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 25), in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, and in infra-constitutional legislation, creating a normative framework that guarantees access to justice without discrimination, to judicial instances, both de jure and de facto access.

In Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987, which developed the contours of the topic of judicial protection, the opinion is exceedingly broad and stated, regarding Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the following:

“This article, equally, in broad terms, establishes the obligation of the States to provide all persons subject to their jurisdiction with an effective judicial recourse against acts that violate their fundamental rights. It further provides that the guarantee enshrined therein applies not only to the rights contained in the Convention but also to those recognized by the Constitution or by law. (…) the States Parties undertake to supply effective judicial recourses to victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), recourses that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process (Art. 8.1), all within the general obligation of those same States to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every person under their jurisdiction (…) According to this principle, the non-existence of an effective recourse against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of the same by the State Party in which such a situation takes place. In this sense, it should be emphasized that for such a recourse to exist, it is not sufficient that it is provided for by the Constitution or by law or that it is formally admissible, but it is required that it be truly suitable to establish whether a violation of human rights has been incurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it. Those recourses cannot be considered effective which, due to the general conditions of the country or even due to the particular circumstances of a given case, prove to be illusory.” Another important step is derived from Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999, by which access to justice under equal conditions was guaranteed. The Inter-American Court indicated:

“119. To achieve its objectives, the process must recognize and resolve the factors of real inequality of those brought before the justice system. It is thus that the principle of equality before the law and the courts and the correlative prohibition of discrimination is addressed. The presence of conditions of real inequality obligates the adoption of compensation measures that contribute to reducing or eliminating the obstacles and deficiencies that impede or reduce the effective defense of one's own interests. If these means of compensation, widely recognized in various aspects of procedure, did not exist, it would be difficult to say that those who find themselves in disadvantaged conditions enjoy true access to justice and benefit from a due process under conditions of equality with those who do not face such disadvantages." Our country has also assumed a commitment to respect access to justice for vulnerable populations, with the approval of the 100 Brasilia Rules regarding access to justice for people in vulnerable conditions (2008), which represent a joint effort of the XIV Ibero-American Judicial Summit, and it is worth recalling here the recognition it effects in the Law of the Constitution of declarations that recognize Human Rights. From its text, both substantive and procedural norms are deduced in pursuit of promoting the necessary conditions for protection to be effective, adopting those measures that best adapt to their condition of vulnerability (Rule 25), and the following are defined as especially vulnerable groups: minor persons (Rule 5), the situation of migrant and refugee persons (Rules 13 and 14), and the situation of women (Rules 17 to 20), with special reference in Rule 20 to women victims of violence.

Well then, access to justice does not only refer, therefore, to those who initiated a judicial process, but also includes those who become procedural parties, for example, the extraditable person, and also, as we have referred to in this case, those whom the result of a judicial decision affects indirectly, such is the case of minor persons, all of whom are covered by that effective defense of individuals' rights, and particularly when they are in a condition of vulnerability, as we have sufficiently analyzed.

The refusal to resolve and consider in the extradition process the situation of these vulnerable persons, as occurred in the case of the lower-court judge's resolution, in the opinion of this Tribunal, violates the observance of Human Rights by omission and gives rise to state responsibility for failure to observe international commitments. Especially in cases such as the one before us, in which violence against the woman and the girl and the refugee situation based on that very violence were alleged. By reason of the above, it is appropriate to uphold the grievance, due to the violation of the access to justice of the extraditable person [Name1] and her minor daughter [Name18].

• E)The Defensoría de los Habitantes claims as grievance 2) the violation of the principle of double criminality (doble incriminación). The reason was based on the fact that the conduct that motivated the extradition request does not constitute the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores), but the offense of disobedience to authority, as the Ministerio Público has referred to in this process; hence, we are not faced with an extraditable crime. It argues that the conduct for which extradition is requested is not typical and the extradition must be rejected for absence of the objective and normative elements. Due to the manner in which we are resolving the merits of this appeal, this Tribunal considers that it lacks procedural interest to expressly refer to the pointed-out grievance, given that we have resolved on the merits issues related to Human Rights.
• F)Regarding the arguments of the Procuraduría General de la República Regarding the arguments put forth by Licentiate [Name3], in his capacity as Director of the Procuraduría, by which it is considered that the judgment contains an adequate grounding and that consequently the contested decision should be confirmed, this Criminal Cassation Chamber (Cámara de Casación) considers that these are not tenable, as set forth in the preceding considering clauses (considerandos). On the other hand, Mr. Procurador, in his opposition, argued basically regarding compliance with formal requirements such as the principle of double criminality or identity of the norm, referring to the objective criminality of the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores) contemplated in Article 184 of the Costa Rican Penal Code and the norm for which extradition was requested by the government of the United States, concluding with extensive constitutional and legal jurisprudence that the facts constituted a crime in the legal systems of the United States and Costa Rica. However, regarding the remaining arguments of the parties and specifically the challenge by the Defensoría de los Habitantes, it made no further references than a general rejection, because according to the position of the Procuraduría General de la República, the domestic violence supposedly suffered by Ms. [Name17] and the situation of the minor person [Name18] should not be considered in the extradition process, and they are within the competence of the requesting State, and that in the United States of America, sufficient protection could be given to the rights of the extradited person to not be violated and to live in peace, as well as to the minor child [Name49]. As we have had occasion to analyze in the preceding considering clause (considerando), this Chamber has carried out a hermeneutic interpretation of the Costa Rican legal system that grants the international Human Rights treaties a supra-constitutional value, prioritizing respect for human dignity and the Human Rights of the woman and the girl to not be discriminated against or violated, to enjoy a family free of violence. The best interests of the minor, their comprehensive protection, must be assessed when issuing the corresponding resolution, and no State body, administrative or judicial, is released from this obligation. Consequently, this Chamber postponed the further analysis of the extradition procedure with all its fundamental principles and institutes, in the face of that universal set of rights that are recognized to human beings by the mere fact of being so. In the case sub-judice, it is not possible to cleave the Human Rights situation of the requested woman and the girl from the extradition process, given the situation of domestic violence and the necessary respect for human dignity that the Costa Rican legal system recognizes. In this sense, the argumentation regarding compliance with double criminality, upon which the Procuraduría General de la República, representing the government of the United States of America, directed all its efforts, has lost legal interest, by reason of the application of the constitutional norms, principles, and values that inspire Costa Rican Law of the Constitution, in addition to the principle of normative hierarchy, and that imply a bundle of guarantees regarding the respect for Human Rights that, as extensively set forth, prevent the surrender. Consequently, the appeal filed by [Name50], in her capacity as Defender of the Inhabitants of the Republic (Defensora de los Habitantes de la República), is granted. Judgment No. 130-P-2009 of the Trial Court of Puntarenas (Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas), issued at one o'clock in the afternoon on April 20, two thousand nine, is overturned. Consequently, the extradition of Ms. [Name1], requested by the United States of America, is declared without merit. Ms. [Name1] is to be immediately released, barring any other cause preventing it. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the other appeals that were filed is omitted. Through the corresponding channel, communicate this to the Government of the United States.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The appeal filed by [Name50], in her capacity as Defender of the Inhabitants of the Republic (Defensora de los Habitantes de la República), is granted. Judgment No. 0130-P-2009 of the Trial Court of Puntarenas (Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas), issued at one o'clock in the afternoon on April 20, two thousand nine, is overturned. Consequently, the extradition of Ms. [Name1], requested by the United States of America, is declared without merit. Ms. [Name1] is to be immediately released, barring any other cause preventing it. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the other appeals that were filed is omitted. Let this be notified.

Dr. [Name51] Msc. Jazmín Rodríguez Hernández Msc.

Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas Judges of Criminal Cassation Extradition proceedings Extraditable person: [Nombre1].

Requesting Party: United States of America PODER JUDICIAL CRIMINAL CASSATION COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN Tel: [Telf1] [...] Fax: [Telf2] _______________________________________________________________________________________ Res: 2009-00246 CRIMINAL CASSATION COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, San Ramón, at seventeen hours on the twenty-sixth of June, two thousand nine.

APPEAL filed in the present extradition proceeding that the Government of the United States of America brought in this case against [Nombre1], of legal age, U.S. citizen, born in the State of California on the seventeenth of March, one thousand nine hundred eighty, twenty-eight years old, art teacher, in a common-law marriage. Participating in the decision of the appeal are the judges [Nombre2], Jazmín Rodríguez Hernández, and Judge Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas. Appearing in cassation are attorney [Nombre3], representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, attorney [Nombre4], prosecutor of the Oficina de Asesoría Técnica y Relaciones Internacionales, attorney [Nombre5], Fiscal General de la República, and attorney [Nombre6], private defense counsel for the extraditable person [Nombre1]; the Defensoría de los Habitantes represented by [Nombre7], Defensora de los Habitantes de la República and by attorney [Nombre8] in his capacity as deputy defender of the Habitantes; the Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INAMU, represented by [Placa1], [Nombre9], Executive President, as coadjuvant.

WHEREAS:

1. In judgment 130-P-2009, the Trial Court of Puntarenas, by resolution at thirteen hours on the twentieth of April, 2009, declared the extradition of [Nombre1] to be granted. Requested by the government of the United States of America, so that she may be subjected to trial for the acts she is charged with and that have been heard in this proceeding, and for the crimes of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menor). The requesting state must take charge of the accused within two months following the finality of this judgment, which period runs from the moment it is communicated to them that the prisoner is at their disposal; if they fail to do so within that time, the release of the requested person shall be ordered. Prior to her surrender, the State of the United States of America must present a formal promise that it will not impose the death penalty or life imprisonment (prisión perpetua) on the defendant, and also that she will not be subjected to sanctions different from the acts for which extradition is being granted here. The costs of detention and surrender of the accused are to be borne by the requesting state. It is ordered that the imprisonment imposed on [Nombre1] be maintained, according to the resolution at fourteen hours ten minutes on the seventh of November, two thousand eight, of the Criminal Cassation Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, Section One. Once this resolution is final, Ms. [Nombre10] will be placed at the disposal of the U.S. authorities to carry out the procedure for leaving the country, for which purpose said authorities have two months. No special pronouncement on assets is necessary since no requests on that point were contributed to the record, so the accused will be surrendered only with her personal belongings and identification documents she has at the date. Notify this resolution to all parties. [Nombre11], Judge.

2. That against the preceding pronouncement, attorney [Nombre6], private defense counsel for the extraditable person [Nombre1], attorney [Nombre12], acting prosecutor of the Oficina de Asesoría Técnica y Relaciones Internacionales, attorney [Nombre5], Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensoría de los Habitantes represented by [Nombre7], Defensora de los Habitantes de la República, filed an appeal.

3. That having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the questions raised in the appeal.

4. That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge of Cassation [Nombre2]; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- Content of the challenge: A. Appeal of the Defense. Attorney [Nombre6], in his capacity as private defense counsel for the extraditable person, refers in briefs at pages 1619 et seq., and in oral defense before this Court, to the following grievances: 1) Reason: violation of due process, which affects the judgment of the lower court (Juez a quo) as an absolutely defective procedural action. Absence of requirements and flaws in the judgment. Basis: the lower court judge did not assess the action of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) or its arguments even though the Public Prosecutor's Office has control over criminal legality. By not resolving the questions raised in the deliberation, substantive law and due process are violated, generating a breach of judgment requirements. 2) Erroneous assessment of the facts. The physical custody (custodia física) of the minor [Nombre13] was not held to be accredited in the mother, the person requested here, this being one of the debated points. A fact that is extensively proven, even with the statement of FBI officer [Nombre14], which is decisive given that in our legal system the action committed by someone who maintains a minor under their physical power and material custody is not classified as the crime of child abduction (sustracción de menor), since the criminal type refers to the action of removing or displacing a minor or incapable person from their physical location, which constitutes a judicial error in the appreciation and assessment of the evidence, by not holding it proven that the mother maintained this right at the time of moving the minor. 3) Erroneous application of substantive law. Non-compliance with the principle of double criminality (principio de doble incriminación). The core argument established by the Public Prosecutor's Office is not resolved or analyzed, which is that the mother had physical custody of the minor when leaving the United States, which does not constitute the crime of child abduction but rather the crime of disobedience to authority, meaning extradition is not appropriate due to the absence of a fundamental principle. He assesses that the act of abduction consists of removing the girl from the sphere of physical custody, which did not occur because the mother had physical custody; he exemplifies the case of a Costa Rican parent who decides to travel abroad because they have physical custody of a minor, they do not commit the crime of child abduction. 4) Absence of reasoning and analysis of the principle of double criminality. The resolution of the lower court judge does not contain an assessment of each norm of the requesting and requested country, it merely transcribes each one of them, it does not indicate why both norms are equivalent and matching. 5) Overstepping of the lower court judge's jurisdiction. The official commits a disobedience to authority by entering to value the existence of the fact despite the fact that this Court expressly told him he should not venture into that type of assessment. He requests that the appealed resolution be declared ineffective and that the Ad quem proceed to apply the Law and the legal system and issue the corresponding resolution, declaring the non-existence of the principle of double criminality. He requests that the release of his client, who has been imprisoned for 1 year and two months, be ordered.

B. Appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office. In briefs at pages 1610 et seq.

The prosecutor [Name15] and in the oral presentation before this Court of Cassation by Dr. [Name16] indicate the following grievances. 1) Noncompliance with the principle of dual criminality. The requesting State did not comply with the principle of dual criminality, as seen on folio 65, Mrs. [Name17] left the house where she lived with the minor's father in 2004, and it was in August 2005 when the father began procedures to define the minor's guardianship, insofar as the alleged acts did not constitute the crime for which Mrs. [Name17] was requested, as is clear from the analysis of several resolutions of the Court of Cassation of San José, namely resolutions 465-f-98 of July 1, 1998; resolution 662-2002 of nine thirty hours on August 29, 2002, and resolution 141-2009 issued by the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which was read at the oral hearing to the extent relevant, in addition to other judgments of the referred court explaining what the crime of child abduction (sustracción de persona menor de edad) consists of. Faced with this analysis, it is asserted that in the present case we would only be facing a disobedience to authority, which is why they request that the appeal filed be declared without merit. For the prosecutorial body, there must be a substantial analysis and not one of the nomen iuris, requiring an analysis of the elements provided for in the criminal definition (tipo penal), since those were the aspects that had to be verified and not to turn the extradition into a mere paperwork formality. He stated that what the United States of America calls "abduction" does not coincide with the rule provided for in Costa Rica, since the lady did not "abduct" (sustrajo) her daughter, and the verbs contemplated in our system to punish these acts could not be interpreted broadly. According to the documentation provided, Mrs. [Name17] was requested for disobeying a judicial order, and this description does not correspond to what is provided in Article 184 of the Criminal Code. This case is about a disobedience to authority provided for in Article 307 of the Criminal Code, punishable by up to one year in prison, and therefore extradition should not be granted because it provides for an insignificant penalty. At the oral hearing, the prosecutor general expanded on the grounds and arguments and indicated: 2) Failure to assess International Human Rights Conventions on Women and Children. He notes that the resolution of the lower court judge (A quo) fails to assess that the Costa Rican State has a policy option to protect victims of sexual and domestic violence. In this case, it was proven that the extraditable person [Name17] is a victim of domestic violence by her partner and the minor's father [Name18], and that her departure from the United States was to protect her life and that of her daughter, who is Costa Rican and has a human right to happiness and peace; it concerns the judicial protection of a human being, that women have rights, and the protection of a Costa Rican minor. He requests the protection of Costa Rican law, that the appealed resolution be revoked, and that the extradition be declared without merit. That this request be resolved orally due to her having been in prison for fourteen months, resolved by granting her immediate release.

**C. Appeal of the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes)**. Dr. [Name7], in her capacity as Ombudsperson (Defensora de los Habitantes), in the brief on folios 1635 et seq., and attorney [Name19], in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsperson, at the oral hearing, indicated that the institution they represent is authorized to act in these cases, as provided in Articles 1 and 13 of Law No. 7319, the Law of the Ombudsman's Office (Ley de la Defensoría de Los Habitantes), which empowers them to bring actions in the administrative or judicial sphere. They indicated the following as grievances: 1) Regarding the extradition process, the duty to guarantee respect for the rights and guarantees of the persons involved in the extradition process. The work of the judge is important as he/she becomes the body responsible for fulfilling the international obligation to the requesting State, but also for complying with the application of the fundamental principles of human rights that guarantee the administration of justice. For the Ombudsman's Office, the work of judges must go beyond the formal verification of the requirements to move on to the analysis of the justification causes in each specific case that account for the conflicts and needs of the persons, the reason for the system's existence; the state holds a power-duty of the exercise of justice within the framework of a sovereign State. The jurisdictional function implies assessments that the judge can and must make. 2) Violation of the principle of dual criminality. The ground was based on the fact that the conduct motivating the extradition request does not constitute the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores), but rather the offense of disobedience to authority, as the Public Prosecutor's Office has referred to in this process; hence, this is not an extraditable crime. The conduct for which extradition is requested is not criminal (atípica) and the extradition must be rejected due to the absence of the objective and normative elements. It points out that the prohibition from the Humboldt Court was to remove the minor from the state limits and not from the United States, therefore there is no international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores). The challenge also states that the minor's father gave authorization for the departure of the minor [Name18] from the country; although there was a change of destination, the truth is that [Name1] had paternal authorization. Furthermore, the crime of disobedience does not constitute a parameter for extraditing a person. The Juvenile Court (Juzgado de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia), in judgment 60-2009, rejected the international restitution of the girl [Name18] in consideration of the best interests of minors and considering that the father granted permission to leave the country in April 2005 to travel to Mexico, which did not indicate the date she had to return, so it was an open-ended permit; in this case, the minor was placed in a foster home because for said court there was no international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores). Thus, according to the narration of the facts, which is the factual framework (cuadro fáctico) charged, it would not apply as an extraditable crime. Furthermore, if extradition were granted in this Cassation instance, the principle of double instance would be violated. Mrs. [Name17] entered prison in April 2008; during her detention in Buen Pastor, she must care for her other minor son—also Costa Rican and the product of another relationship—in prison. 3) Failure to assess the Human Rights of Girl [Name18]; the minor was moved to Costa Rica, the country where she was born and of which she is a citizen. The resolution of the lower court judge (A quo) does not assess the rights of either the mother or the daughter and proceeds to make invisible the result to be obtained with the effective extradition of the extraditable person, the delivery of the girl to a father who has not been deemed suitable by the Costa Rican courts; additionally, the extradited person has another Costa Rican child, the minor [Name20], who is located with his mother in the El Buen Pastor center and will be left helpless once the extradition is final. This will directly affect the human rights of the Costa Rican girl [Name18], which threatens her physical and emotional integrity, her dignity, her right to a life without violence, her right to a family, and places her in a situation of special vulnerability, in flagrant violation of the rights of children and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, also applicable to the Costa Rican minor son of [Name1], named [Name20]. 4) Erroneous assessment of International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments and international judicial cooperation between States and respect for Human Rights. Mrs. [Name17]'s actions originated from a well-founded fear due to the domestic violence she suffered. He stated that revoking the ruling would bring dire consequences for this lady by separating her from her daughter. In support of their thesis, after citing some norms from the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, or the Guidelines on International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as some resolutions of the Directorate General of Migration and Foreigners (Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería), they affirm that domestic violence is a situation for which a person can be granted refugee status, and that this is the situation presented by Mrs. [Name1]. The well-founded fear of persecution exerted by Mrs. [Name17]'s sentimental partner was what caused the objective and subjective state of necessity of the latter to leave her country for Costa Rica, seeking refuge from fear. The refugee situation is based on persecution by the non-state agent and not on the exhaustion of the existing measures in her country of origin. Mrs. [Name17] seeks a safe haven from her situation of domestic violence, not to remove the minor from the father's custody. The situation of domestic violence was even reported by Mrs. [Name17] herself on August 23, 2005, before the Superior Court of California, Humboldt County. Mrs. [Name17] relates how fear took hold of her, being present in different episodes of her life such as: "in 2001 when Tierra was just walking, she was crying for something and was walking into our room. [Name21] yelled at her and slammed the door in her face so hard that it made a hole in the door (…) after drinking a lot, he yelled every morning; he traumatized Tierra. I had to take her to my neighbors (even before breakfast) so we could get away from his violence. He would yell and Tierra would start screaming, scared (…) he called me 'whore and slut' in front of my daughter. He verbally abused me while Tierra was with me on many occasions." She also states that she went to the mother of Mr. [Name22] seeking help and told her about the domestic violence situation she and her daughter faced; when he found out, "he would yell at her and threaten to do bad things to her if she ever told his mother again that he wasn't taking care of Tierra" (see folio 1640). Thus, invoking the existence of a well-founded fear, the principle of in dubio pro agredida (in favor of the victim of aggression), and the best interests of the minor involved in this situation, they request that the possibility of a justifying conduct on the part of the extraditable person by coming to Costa Rica be assessed, that the best interests of the girl be ensured, and that revictimization within the framework of justice and the national legal system be avoided. The file contains a psychological report prepared by INAMU which accounts for the symptomatology of a domestic violence victim concerning Mrs. [Name17]. In addition to the above, they argue that the rejection of the refugee request filed on behalf of Mrs. [Name17] is currently under appeal before the Minister of Public Security; if granted, it would conclude the existing extradition procedure. The principle of non-refoulement of refugees must be applied. Finally, he considered that the Hague Treaty related to the interpretation of International Treaties or Conventions in strict respect for human rights should be applied. 5) Commitment of the Costa Rican State to respect for Human Rights. He opposes the statements of the Attorney General's Office regarding the existence of a confraternity of institutions. The Costa Rican State has assumed a commitment to respect human rights by ratifying different International Conventions that protect against violence against women. Mrs. [Name17] is also the mother of two Costa Ricans; from a Human Rights perspective, the integrity of the family must be protected. The specificity of women and of those who are judged within the framework of Human Rights must be assessed; it requires respect and guarantee of all the institutions of the right of Access to Justice. It is requested that the appeal be upheld, that [Name1]'s release be ordered for exceeding reasonable time limits; in the event that the petition is not granted, it is requested to guarantee the calculation of the prison time served during this proceeding and the obligation of the Attorney General's Office to follow up through consular channels.

**D. Joinder by the National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres).** The National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres), through its Executive President, Msc. [Name9], has appeared as a co-adjuvant for the three appeals filed for the defense of Women's Rights and indicated in the brief on folios 1727 and at the hearing, represented by attorney [Name23], that given the absence of the principle of dual criminality regarding the acts of which she was accused, they have opposed granting extradition in this case at all times, since Mrs. [Name1] did not abduct (no sustrajo) the minor from parental custody, as her mother had her under her sphere of protection and guardianship, hence they maintain the view that what exists is merely a disobedience to authority, and since this offense does not carry a penalty exceeding one year in prison, extradition could not be authorized. They request that the serious situation of domestic violence faced by Mrs. [Name17] and her daughter by the aggressor Mr. [Name21] be assessed; he has used one of the mechanisms often used in these types of situations to maintain control over the victims, namely the instrumentalization of sons or daughters. [Name1] was subjected to systematic and daily domestic violence; she lived through a difficult situation with acute post-traumatic stress, which is what women subjected to domestic violence suffer. There is a psychological report prepared by INAMU personnel that is in the case file and must be assessed, which reveals the torture of Mrs. [Name17]; it is a professional and technical report, in which verbal statements from several sessions are analyzed, with a content analysis. The importance of the fight that has been waged in our country against domestic violence and in protection of people who are victims of this type of aggression was indicated, pointing out at the same time that the extraditable person was precisely a victim of this social problem. She added that Mrs. [Name17] did not commit the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de persona menor de edad), since she did not do it with the intention of separating her daughter from her father, but rather with the purpose of avoiding the domestic violence situation she was living, a decision she also made because she was not properly heard by the authorities of her country, that is, the United States of America. She also stated that Mrs. [Name17] came to the country to start a life project and that this is only a crime of disobedience to authority, which is why she requested that the judgment be confirmed and her immediate release be ordered.

**E. Statements of the Extraditable Person**. At the oral hearing, Mrs. [Name1] stated that for four years she suffered domestic violence from Mr. [Name21]; he beat her, verbally assaulted her; what she feared most happened: he told her he would lie to the authorities to take away her daughter, he would tell the authorities that she did not have a domicile and thus have the girl's custody given to him. The police could not protect her in California because the law only gives one day of jail for domestic violence. She did not kidnap her daughter; they separated due to the aggressions before the move; later she came to this country because she had lived here before; [Name18] was born here; she had physical and legal custody of her daughter; her daughter's father signed a permit for her to come to Costa Rica, so he knew she would come, and therefore she could not have kidnapped her daughter, as she already had the permit to bring her. She indicated that her daughter wants to be with her, as does the son she now has; they need their mother, to the point that a Costa Rican judge gave her custody of her daughter. She has suffered for being in prison, as has her daughter. She came to Costa Rica seeking protection. Her children are Costa Rican and deserve the right to be with their mother, and she only wants to be with her family under Costa Rican law. I could come and I came to Costa Rica; he is very violent; one day he threw a chair at the girl and it came within two inches of hitting the girl.

**II.- Opposition of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) to the Appeal.** Attorney [Name3], in his capacity as Directing Attorney (Procurador Director), opposed the grievances of the parties and indicated that the challenged resolution must be confirmed. He considers that the extradition request was made by the Government of the United States of America against [Name1], a citizen of that country, who is being prosecuted for the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores). He considers that in this case the extradition of Mrs. [Name17] was warranted, since all the requirements, rules, and principles by which this type of request is admitted are met. Regarding the argument in the appeals that there is no dual criminality, the appellants omit to assess that it concerns the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores), as the lower court judge (A quo) did. There is no right to give a different connotation to the facts contained in the extradition request. The appellants improperly modify the claim of the requesting State and gave a different connotation to the facts for which the surrender of Mrs. [Name17] was requested; the appellants involve other facts not contained in the extradition request by indicating that the factual species requested fits the crime of disobedience to authority, without considering that the extradition request expressly indicates that Mrs. [Name17] abducted her daughter from the United States of America to prevent her father from obtaining custody, and not as a consequence of having disobeyed a judicial order.

Based on the existing jurisprudence on this matter, which he cites, the appellant indicates that the judging authority should have been limited to verifying whether in this case the requirements were met and the principles recognized by International Law under which it is admissible to grant an extradition were respected, since it is not a matter of a criminal nature, but a procedural institution through which the surrender of the requested or extraditable person is guaranteed.

He points out in his argument that Article 184 of the Criminal Code is located within the offenses related to family protection, which means its interpretation must be made in safeguarding the existing family rights, which is the legal interest (bien jurídico) to be protected, as indicated by the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in resolutions No. 456-F-98 at 15:30 hours on July 1, 1998, No. [Telf3] at 9:30 hours on August 29, 2002, and No. [Telf4] at 14:15 hours on May 8, 2008. He states that the normative element "abduct" (sustraer) contained in the rule of the requesting State must be understood as the Real Academia Española defines it: sustraer in several meanings such as to rob and steal, and as to remove or separate; and in the present case, Mrs. [Name17] removed or separated the minor [Name18] from the parental rights corresponding to the father. There need not be a similarity or exactness between the criminal figures of both countries; it is sufficient that it is a crime in both legislations, without this implying that the criminal definition (tipo penal) must be absolutely identical.

According to the evidence provided by the requesting country, the extraditable individual [Nombre1] naturally had a joint and equitable right over her daughter with her father, Mr. [Nombre21], and that regardless of the custody she had over this minor, the father also held the same right, it being precisely in the process instituted in the United States of America where the legal custody corresponding to each of them was to be discussed. It further adds that the Superior Court of Humboldt County not only provided the requested person with the order for the hearing where the custody of her daughter would be discussed, but also an order expressly prohibiting her from moving the latter outside of Humboldt County in the State of California, and in said process, Mr. [Nombre21] was ultimately granted legal custody of the girl. It noted that there is no discussion whatsoever regarding the typification of the facts for which extradition is requested within our legislation, since it was amply demonstrated that the requested person indeed illegitimately abducted the girl, and the controversial point, that is, the possibility that one of the parents could be considered the active subject of the crime, having been resolved; it is the consideration of this Office that the facts for which the extraditable individual is requested fit within the crime termed “child abduction (sustracción de menor)”, regulated by our substantive criminal law in Article 184; thus satisfying the principle of double criminality (principio de doble incriminación) or principle of identity.

Finally, it notes that domestic violence and the situation of the minor should not be considered in the extradition process; it was indicated that in the United States of America, sufficient protection could be provided for the rights of the extradited person not to be violated and to live in peace, as well as for the girl.

It requests the rejection of each and every appeal and that the resolution of the lower court judge (Juez a quo) be declared in accordance with the law.

III. ON THE MERITS

This Court hears three appeals filed by the private defense of the extraditable individual [Nombre1], the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), and the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes), appeals that were filed in a timely manner and in proper form in accordance with the provisions of the Extradition Law (Ley de extradición); the coadjuvancy of the National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INAMU) was also accepted. For reasons of procedural economy and considering that the appeal of the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) encompasses the totality of the grievances argued by the parties in the different means of challenge, as well as includes the statements of the coadjuvancy of INAMU, this Court will refer only to this appeal. This Chamber, after assessing the grievances indicated by the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes), grants the grievances in the manner to be set forth below, noting that, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights indicates, remedies must be rapid, informal, and fair (Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. [Nombre24], International liability of the state for denial and challenge of justice and violation of judicial guarantees,” in, IACHR: The Court and the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 1994, p. 588.):

**A)** **The duty to guarantee Human Rights in the Extradition process** The appeal of the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) indicates as grievance 1) That the extradition process must guarantee respect for the rights and guarantees of the persons involved in the extradition process. The work of the judge is important insofar as they become the body responsible for complying with the international obligation towards the requesting State, but also with compliance with the application of the fundamental principles of human rights that guarantee the administration of justice. For the Office of the Ombudsman, the work of the judges must go beyond the formal verification of the requirements to move on to the analysis of the causes of justification in each specific case that account for the conflicts and needs of persons, the reason for being of the system. The State holds a power-duty in the exercise of justice, within the framework of a sovereign State. The jurisdictional function implies assessments that the judge can and must make. **The grievance is granted for partially different reasons.** This Court has assessed whether, in addition to compliance with the formal requirements and general principles established by the bilateral Costa Rica-United States extradition treaty, other aspects related to the prevailing legality framework (bloque de legalidad) in the Costa Rican State, which is characterized as a democratic Republic of Law, must be analyzed. In that sense, this Chamber considers that the Law of the Constitution, which is composed of the norms, principles, constitutional values, and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), binds all public powers and citizens. It follows that the Law of the Constitution forms part of the legality framework or parameter that the ordinary judge must interpret and apply when exercising the jurisdictional function, in accordance with the provisions of Article 154 of the Political Constitution.

Even though a concentrated constitutional review system subsists in our legal system, such circumstance does not inhibit the ordinary jurisdiction from the duty to guarantee the observance and application of the Constitution, which is the foundation of the legal system. Therefore, the ordinary judge, when applying any norm or act, cannot disregard the constitutional precepts, values, and principles, given the judicial function of ensuring the supremacy of the law and the preservation of the legal system.

The extradition process has been characterized by our constitutional and legal jurisprudence as a special procedure of international collaboration or assistance through which one State (requesting) requests another State (requested) to surrender a person in order to subject them to a criminal process underway in its country, or to serve a sentence imposed as a consequence of a criminal process followed against them, thereby making the administration of justice of the requesting State effective. In response, the requested State must assess, in accordance with the requirements and principles that inform this matter, whether the formulated request is appropriate for the surrender of the requested person.

Even the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) points out that it is a special procedure different from the criminal process and states in this regard in SC vote 08261-2008 of May 14, 2008, the following:

“This Chamber, on different occasions, has indicated that extradition is an act of international legal assistance and is nothing other than the means of making possible the presence of the accused in a criminal process in another country that requests them. Its foundation, therefore, lies in the solidarity of States and the need to overcome the limitations that the principle of territoriality imposes on the prosecution and punishment of crimes, which prevents applying criminal law to acts occurring outside the country where the alleged criminal has sought refuge. This act of international cooperation between States, due to the problems of territoriality, distance, difference in cultures and legal systems, is endowed with a series of procedures and regulations that seek to overcome the obstacles that may arise due to these differences, while also seeking to reconcile and ensure respect for the legal systems of both countries, including the norms protecting the rights of the alleged criminal. Precisely these noted differences mean that the detention and sending of the accused person to the courts of justice is regulated differently from the detention of an alleged criminal in one's own country.” This Court considers that although, at first glance, it might seem that the Judge of the requested State should limit themselves to verifying only the formal requirements and principles that inform extradition (among them: double criminality (doble incriminación), the principle of specialty, which in turn requires a prison sentence of more than one year, does not provide for the death penalty, nor involves political crimes, etc.) because it is a matter of international cooperation between States where a requested State serves as a conduit for the action of the other State; we must highlight that this procedure implies, in the requested State, jurisdictional and constitutional control, including: the subjection of powers to the Constitution, the hierarchy and publicity of norms, the prohibition of arbitrariness, and legal certainty.

Although extradition is not an institute for defending or imposing a particular legal system, in the face of extradition, which is an instrument in the fight against impunity and the rights of the potential victims of crime, we also have that the rights of the person affected by the procedure must be observed; this is undoubtedly the role of the Rule of Law State (Estado de Derecho) regarding the acts of the powers of other States, and as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) indicates in the aforementioned vote, the “norms protecting the rights of the alleged criminal” must be respected.

**On the rights of foreigners** In the present case, the application of a set of Human Rights to a foreign citizen [Nombre1] is intended, so the legal regime of foreigners in our current legal system must be examined.

The Political Constitution, in Article 19, states that:

«Foreigners have the same individual and social duties and rights as Costa Ricans, with the exceptions and limitations that this Constitution and the laws establish».

This norm has been dimensioned by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in multiple votes, it being valid, as constitutional doctrine, to establish differences between nationals and foreigners when they are founded, both on norms of constitutional rank and on those of legal rank, provided that the latter are logical, reasonable, and consistent with the principle of proportionality, and are not contrary to human dignity (see SC vote 01684-91, at 16:00 hours on August 28, 1991; SC vote 1440-92 at 15:30 hours on June 2, 1992; SC vote 01282-90, at 15:00 hours on October 16, 1990, and it has reiterated this in the following judgments: see judgments SC vote 02093-93, at 14:06 hours on May 19, 1993; SC vote 02754-93, at 14:36 hours on June 15, 1993; SC vote 04601-94, at 9:33 hours on August 26, 1994; SC vote 05965-94, at 15:51 hours on October 11, 1994; SC vote 00319-95, at 14:42 hours on January 17, 1995; 05670-95, at 15:39 hours on October 17, 1995; and CED1, at 10:48 hours on July 31, 1998).

In SC vote 02570-97, of May 13, 1997, the High Court stated:

"Certainly, the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Constitution establishes that: «Foreigners have the same individual and social duties and rights as Costa Ricans, with the exceptions and limitations that this Constitution and the laws establish», which means that, regarding the set of fundamental rights, differences between nationals and those who are not would only be valid if these have constitutional and legal rank, and in the latter case, always to the extent that the differentiation fully conforms to the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality that guide the legislative function, and of course, as long as it is not contrary to human dignity. This Chamber, in developing the content of the norm under analysis, has eliminated as unconstitutional a series of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights by foreigners, whose sole basis was the criterion of nationality, which has been repeatedly rejected as a validating reason for differentiations between one and the other.- " From the foregoing, it can be inferred that foreigners in our Law are the holders of Human Rights and fundamental rights, of those contemplated by the Political Constitution and international instruments, and that foreigners must be treated in accordance with their dignity as persons and with respect for their Human Rights.

**Value of Human Rights in the Costa Rican State** Human Rights constitute a universal legal framework of mandatory observance for States; these are recognized based on the dignity of every human being, in all the ontological sense that this implies; by the very fact of being human, the human being has a series of rights, and discriminatory treatment is prohibited. In that recognition, all human beings have dignity, and one cannot speak of a greater dignity of some compared to others, which leads to the prohibition of any type of discrimination.

The constitutional doctrine emanating from the specialized Chamber is profuse, and it early on recognized that Human Rights conventions and instruments have supra-constitutional validity and self-executing application; in that sense, all state activity must be developed within those parameters.

The validity in the Costa Rican State of Human Rights instruments as a source of applicable law derives from the Political Constitution itself and is complemented by Article 1 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Thus, in the case of international Human Rights instruments in force in the country, the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution do not apply, as there is a special norm in Article 48 for Conventions referring to Human Rights, granting them a normative force at the constitutional level itself and placing them as a parameter for the interpretation of the text of the Constitution itself, as well as its derived principles; consequently, the interpretation and application of secondary legislation is linked with respect to them.

The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has recognized that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica have not only a value similar to the Political Constitution, but that to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution (vid., SC vote 3435-92 of November 11, 1992 and its clarification, SC vote 5759-93 and SC vote 2313-95 at 16:18 hrs. on May 9, 1995).

In the same manner, it has been indicated in SC vote 3173-93 the existence of the pro libértate and pro homine principles, as the hard core or essence of Human Rights, the content of which is as follows:

“…the pro libértate principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitutes the core of the doctrine of human rights; according to the first, everything that favors liberty must be interpreted extensively and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the second, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that most favors the human being.” Likewise, it has been recognized by the Highest Court that the Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have full value in the Costa Rican State and that, regarding Human Rights, its decisions bind the Costa Rican State. Thus, in SC vote 2313-95 at 16:18 hrs. on May 9, 1995, and when resolving the mandatory constitutionality consultation formulated by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly on the bill for the approval of the “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, it expressly referred to the efficacy granted in Costa Rica to international instruments on Human Rights not formally signed or approved according to constitutional procedure, in the following manner:

“In this aspect, one must highlight the specific reference that the Constitution now makes to “international instruments”, meaning that not only conventions, treaties, or agreements, formally signed and approved in accordance with the constitutional procedure itself (such is the case that now concerns us), but any other instrument that has the nature proper to the protection of Human Rights, even if it has not undergone that procedure, is valid and applicable in the country. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, December 10, 1948), by its character and nature, has not needed the constitutional approval procedures to be understood as in force and with the normative force granted by the subject matter it regulates. The same can be said of the “Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners”, of the United Nations Organization, which even though they are the product of meetings of experts or the work of some department of that organization, because our country belongs to it, and because they refer to fundamental rights, have both the value of any international norm that had been formally incorporated into Costa Rican domestic law”.

Finally, in SC vote 2002-10693 of November 7, 2002, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) reiterates that, in accordance with Article 48 of the Political Constitution:

“all international instruments on human rights have been elevated to constitutional rank, and consequently these must be incorporated into the interpretation of the Constitution”.

Regarding the self-executing application of Human Rights Conventions, two positions are usually distinguished in the doctrine: the first posits the programmatic character of Human Rights conventions; according to this position, the articles of the Conventions are not applied directly but rather leave substantive implementation to domestic legislation and jurisdiction (in that sense, the Report of the United States delegation to the San José conference where the American Convention on Human Rights was approved, in: JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, The American Convention as Domestic Law, 1988, p.40-41).

The second position admits as a general rule the self-executing character of the norms contained in Human Rights conventions, that is, their norms can be invoked as applicable law by the courts once ratified, as an effect that the norms bind the States-Parties and not only their governments but also are directed at the remaining legislative and judicial powers, who are compelled to give efficacy to the conventions in domestic law. (See in that sense, the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights OC-7/86 of August 26, 1986, and the vote of Judge [Nombre25] in case [Nombre26] and [Nombre27] vs. Colombia, in the judgment on reparations of January 29, 1997, paragraphs 6, 7, and 9; Case [Nombre28] vs. Costa Rica of July 2, 2004, in which the self-executing nature of the American Convention on Human Rights is recognized).

The position of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on the self-executing character of Human Rights is manifest; first, in a Habeas Corpus recourse and subsequently in an unconstitutionality recourse, it recognized the self-executing character of Human Rights, which produces as an effect the disapplication of lower-ranking norms that oppose a Human Rights treaty. In that sense, see SC vote 282-90 of March 3, 1990 and the precedent SC vote 719-90 of June 26, 1990, both on the right to appeal the condemnatory sentence, and SC vote 1319-97 of March 4, 1997, consolidating the constitutional interpretation of the self-executing character of the norms of the International Law of Human Rights.

"...the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers interested parties to bring an unconstitutionality action against legal provisions that contradict those of an international treaty, considering that in doing so they violate the higher normative hierarchy of the latter, in accordance with Article 7 of the Political Constitution; this does not preclude that, when the treaty provisions are self-executing and enforceable by themselves, without the need for other norms to develop them in domestic law, the laws that contradict them should simply be considered repealed, precisely by virtue of the superior rank of the treaty. In this way, the antinomy between law and treaty, following the reform of Articles 10, 48, 105, and 128 of the Constitution (Ley No. 7128 of August 18, 1989, effective since September 1) and, above all, the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (No. 7135 of October 11, 1989, effective since its publication on the 19th), is resolved, first and as far as possible, by the automatic repeal of the former insofar as it opposes the latter, without prejudice to the possibility of also resolving it through a declaration of unconstitutionality of the law." This position is also followed in other pronouncements, thus, SC voto 3435-92 of November 11, 1992; SC voto 2313-95 of May 9, 1995, among others.

**Position in the hierarchy of norms of International Human Rights Treaties** It is important to point out here the hierarchy of International Human Rights Treaties and other International Treaties, given that on one hand we have in the sub judice case the application of an Extradition Treaty with the United States of America and the application of International Human Rights Treaties invoked by the Defensoría de los Habitantes and extendable to the rest of the challengers.

We find that traditional normative sources have been enriched by a current that grants human rights treaties a different normative hierarchy than that granted to treaties not directly related to Human Rights (such as, for example, international cooperation treaties, those regulating external relations between States, law of war, etc.). In the case of our country, the difference made by the Constitution between the rank it gives to treaties not related to human rights, compared to those that do deal with this matter, is very clear. Article 7 of the Political Constitution grants public treaties and international agreements authority superior to laws, while Article 48 of that same normative body elevates the human rights instruments in force in the Republic to constitutional rank.

Faced with the normative succession posed by the application of an International Human Rights treaty and a bilateral treaty, which come into conflict because the former grants an express recognition of Human Rights and therefore greater guarantees, this is not a problem of doubt about the constitutionality of the latter, but one of legality, and as the Constitutional Chamber has referred to in multiple votes, the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution.

The national doctrine has stated in identical terms that the constitutionality consultation will only be necessary:

"...when by way of interpretation a solution cannot be reached that eliminates the contradictions between the legal text and the Constitution or international instrument." (LLOBET, Derechos Humanos en la Justicia Penal, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, p. 241).

**Application of constitutional principles and respect for Human Rights in Extradition** In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, in a recent case related to the assessments of legality and compliance with constitutional guarantees and those derived from International Human Rights treaties concerning the surrender of the extraditable person, has referred to the assessment based on Human Rights that the courts of justice must perform.

Thus, faced with the constitutionality consultation brought by the Tribunal de Casación de San Ramón in voto [Telf5] of 10:45 a.m. on May 30, 2008, in which a pronouncement was requested regarding whether the guarantee of "ne bis in idem" established in numeral 42 of the Political Constitution acquires the character of a generally or even universally applicable principle in the extradition process.

By means of SC voto 2008-013432 of 2:03 p.m. on September 3, 2008, the High Court indicated that, faced with a normative gap where the circumstances under which the requested person is being tried or has been tried in a third State are not regulated, judges must resolve the matter by applying both the principles and norms of the Political Constitution and the International Instruments. Specifically, the Chamber stated:

"...it is clear that if one is facing a case where the person whose surrender is requested is being tried or has already been tried in a third country, the detention and surrender are not legitimate, as the cause that legitimizes the collaboration of the requested country and the legitimacy of the requesting country to punish has disappeared. Judges, when resolving matters submitted to their knowledge, are obligated to apply the norms and principles contained both in the Political Constitution and in the international instruments applicable in Costa Rica. The Constitution is the supreme norm of the legal system; it operates not only as a criterion of validity for all others, but also as a superior legal norm, immediately binding for all public powers and authorities, and of course for individuals, above any other consideration. V.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, this Tribunal concludes that the consulted norm is not unconstitutional. It is the responsibility of the judges to interpret the norms in light of the fundamental principles and rights provided for in the Political Constitution and international instruments." In that sense, it can be concluded that even legal gaps regarding judicial guarantees must be filled with content from the norms and principles derived from International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments.

Similarly, in another vote regarding extradition and the application of an international convention, and although not with erga omnes effect but for the specific case, the Constitutional Chamber has assessed the application of International Conventions, as in judgment SC voto 011576-2008 of July twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, which outlined the application of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, incorporated into our Legal System through Ley No. 6079 of August 28, 1977, and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of November 22, 1984, as well as the derived Costa Rican legislation, and applied the principle of non-refoulement (non refoulement) which constitutes the cornerstone of the international refugee protection system, and which protects the refugee against expulsion or any form of return to the borders of territories where their life or freedom would be in danger, and this principle benefits not only those persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution in the sense of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, but also those covered by the regional refugee definition contained in the Cartagena Declaration.

Without a doubt, the constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that International Human Rights Conventions are a source of the legal system when dealing with the extradition procedure (which has also been manifested in multiple specific cases distinct from international judicial cooperation) because, being carried out in the Costa Rican Rule of Law, it must observe the block of legality contained in the Political Constitution and the International Human Rights Conventions in force in Costa Rica. Thus, the position of this Tribunal is linked, which, accepting the arguments of the Defensoría de los Habitantes, considers that human rights must be applied in the extradition process.

This is shared by the majority doctrine and the jurisprudence of international tribunals. In this sense, it is affirmed by [Nombre29], : Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p. 237:

"...the person who is the subject of extradition has the human rights recognized by the constitutional order, among them due process, liberty, integrity, life, etc., but not as concretized in each country but as agreed upon in international declarations of rights, in a certain jus cogens, that is, by the norms of universally accepted law and which are expressed in international declarations and decisions of the corresponding tribunals." For its part, the European Court of Human Rights, expressly in the case [Nombre30] (ECHR judgment of July 7, 1989), does not excuse the States Parties from all responsibility for the foreseeable consequences that an extradition may entail beyond their borders. Certainly this case referred to an extradition of a citizen to the United States to be tried for murder with the possibility of being sentenced to the death penalty. However, important consequences are obtained from the solution of the case for the extradition process and respect for human rights; among them, it is highlighted by [Nombre31] cited by [Nombre32], [Nombre33]: La extradición en el ordenamiento Interno español, Internacional y Comunitario, Comares, Granada, 2005, p. 157:

"...firstly, the Contracting Parties cannot forget the fate that the persons subject to extradition will face in the host country; secondly, it assigns a preponderant function to Article 3 as an unconditional and non-derogable provision intimately linked to the principles of human dignity and a democratic society; thirdly, it demonstrates a manifestation of the internationalization of the subject of human rights, leading to a relativization of national and regional coverage limits in favor of human dignity; in his opinion, fourthly, the judgment enshrines the normative and singular character of the European Convention on Human Rights, applying preferentially to a subsequent treaty (the extradition treaty of 1972), concluded by a country outside the European system, the United States, showing the dynamic and progressive character of the Convention." Consequently, the State cannot excuse itself based on sovereignty to avoid acting in defense of Human Rights, which has been reiterated in other votes of the European Court of Human Rights (case [Nombre34] and [Nombre35]) and by the Human Rights Committee (in case [Nombre36], [Nombre37], and [Nombre38] on the right to life and inhuman and degrading treatment).

Likewise, it is understood by the majority doctrine that there is a connection between that act of the requesting State and the requested State in the protection of Human Rights:

"...the injury to a fundamental right that the action of a foreign public power may incur vitiates the constitutionality of the act of the own judicial or administrative body that facilitates it, since it causes said injury to materialize when complying with it or granting it validity." (Vid., [Nombre39], : Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p.33.)

Arguing the opposite can lead to a responsibility arising from the application of international norms; an indirect violation of Human Rights could occur, which is that facilitated by the action or omission of the extradition body.

For all the foregoing reasons, this Tribunal has accepted the argument of the Defensoría de los Habitantes and considers that the Judge A quo should have globally assessed the factual and legal situation in accordance with the principles of the Rule of Law and the Law of the Constitution, which implied an erroneous assessment of substantive law since our legal regime grants a preponderant value to International Human Rights Treaties, which have a supra-constitutional value. Departing from other non-binding votes of very legally respectable national Tribunales de Casación, this Chamber has opted to assess the International Human Rights Conventions signed and ratified by Costa Rica that are directly related to the controversial points in this case. At the same time, our State is bound to compliance and observance not only from the formal scope, but also in the real scope and in the results of the application of the Human Rights Treaties, which definitively have not been ratified by the requesting State.

Our country has signed and ratified, among others, multiple human rights conventions, the following: the CEDAW Convention, the Belém do Pará Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which imply a broader spectrum regarding the guarantees derived from Human Rights, such as the recognition of women's rights as Human Rights, the right of women not to be subjected to violence, the protection of the best interest and the comprehensive protection of the Minor, the right to family and peace. With these, the country has acquired a commitment to the special protection of the rights of Women and Girls, especially considering that the constitutional and democratic State of Law cannot ignore the consequences that its actions may bring; the act of surrendering an extraditable person can indirectly materialize a violation of Human Rights.

In an extradition process such as the one before us, the judicial authorities cannot limit themselves to verifying the fulfillment of requirements; rather, the Costa Rican State must act within the parameters of constitutionality and legality, which in this specific case oblige it to protect the Human Rights of two women victims of domestic violence: one of them of legal age, mother of two Costa Rican children, and the other, a female child, a minor, who holds dual nationality, Costa Rican by birth and North American. From the study of the present process, it is clearly inferred from the evidence that was obtained and partially reproduced in the oral hearing that a situation of violence against women was indeed verified. It must be clarified that in the present case, the judicial authorities of the requested country do not prejudge the fact for which the extraditable person is being prosecuted in the requesting country; although no pronouncement is issued on these facts, the violation of Human Rights such as violence against women and girls must be assessed.

**B) On the rights of boys and girls, the right to a family, and to live a life free from violence.** The appeal brief of the Defensoría de los Habitantes points out as grievance 3) the absence of assessment of the Human Rights of the Costa Rican girl [Nombre18] and as grounds argues that the minor was transferred to Costa Rica, the country in which she was born and of which she is a citizen. The resolution of the Judge a quo does not assess the rights of either the mother or the daughter and proceeds to render invisible the result that will be obtained with the effective extradition of the extraditable person, the handing over of the girl to a father who has not been considered suitable by the Costa Rican courts; furthermore, the minor [Nombre20], who is located with her mother in the El Buen Pastor center, will be left destitute once the extradition is final. The human rights of the Costa Rican girl [Nombre18] will be directly affected, which threatens her physical and emotional integrity, her dignity, her right to a life free from violence, her right to a family, and places her in a situation of special vulnerability, in flagrant violation of the rights of the child and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, extendable also to the Costa Rican minor son of [Nombre1] named [Nombre20].

**This Tribunal accepts the grievance.** As we have explained, our constitutional legislation, upon adopting the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is a Human Rights instrument, assumed the commitment that in processes where the rights of a minor person are directly or indirectly involved, the authorities responsible for resolving the case, be they administrative or judicial, must assess in the corresponding resolution matters relating to children and their best interest. Even if these circumstances appear to be extraneous to the specific situation, since an indirect violation of fundamental rights could occur, which is that facilitated by the omitted action of the extradition body. In the sub judice case, it is impossible to separate — as the Judge a quo has done — the knowledge of the extradition, the facts and grounds of which correspond to an international child abduction, from the situation of the extraditable person [Nombre17] and her children: a girl [Nombre18] and a boy [Nombre20], both Costa Rican by birth, and the reported situation of domestic violence, which must be assessed in accordance with the general principles governing the democratic State of Law and informing the Law of the Constitution.

Different international instruments recognize the state duty to provide particular protection to the rights of boys and girls, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself, and in particular, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (approved and ratified by our country through Ley No. 7184 of July eighteenth, nineteen ninety, which entered into force, pursuant to numeral 2 of that legal instrument, on the day of its publication in La Gaceta No. 149 of August ninth, nineteen ninety), which provides protection for this age group. Striving to ensure that adequate assistance and respect for the rights recognized to the child are provided at all times, among which stand out, among others: the promotion of the necessary conditions for family coexistence, as well as the right of children to remain with their parents (Article 7) — particularly with their mother (Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of San Salvador); the right to a standard of living adequate for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development (Article 27).

In the same manner, that international instrument sets a series of obligations for the States Parties or signatories, among them: to ensure that the child is not separated from his or her parents against their will, except when, subject to judicial review, such separation is necessary in the best interests of the child (Article 9, paragraph 1) and to treat any application made by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party in a positive, humane, and expeditious manner (Article 10, paragraph 1).

From these International Human Rights instruments, it is derived that States have as fundamental duties the protection of the best interest of the child, avoiding the dismemberment of the family nucleus and promoting the necessary conditions for them to enjoy the permanent presence of parental authority, while also indicating that in some instances separation is necessary and is authorized in the best interest of the minor.

At the infra-constitutional level, laws have also been developed that protect the best interest of the minor. Thus, the Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia (Ley No. 7739), specifies that the interpretative north of all public or private action must be the best interest of the child (Article 5).

Article 17 provides that minors cannot be subject, among other scenarios, to deportation from the national territory, except in protection of their own interest, in accordance with the criteria determined by the best interest of this group. Likewise, Article 30 establishes the Right to family life, by indicating that minors shall have the right to know their father and mother; also, to grow and develop alongside them and be cared for by them, and precept 33 regulates the Right to remain with the family by providing that minors may not be separated from their family, except in special circumstances established by law.

The Constitutional Chamber recognizes the best interest of the child as a general guiding principle for all state activity, as stated in SC voto 15461-2008 of, October 15, 2008, which has referred:

*In this regard, as a recognized and fully applicable general principle, no rule or decision—administrative or judicial—that contradicts the best interest of the child may be opposed to it, unless in certain circumstances the applicability of some other general principle of a higher level is at stake, in which case the legal operator must adhere to the balancing test and the role of each principle in the particular case. Thus, ignoring the principal character of the best interest of the child by disregarding its strict application in those cases involving minors is contrary to the recognitions that Constitutional Law makes on this matter, while also giving rise to a position of vulnerability before the mandate of Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights.* Likewise, Constitutional Law bestows a *"special protection of the State"* upon the family, whether de facto or de jure. Article 51 of the Constitution proclaims that this institution is the *"natural element and foundation of society."* The family nucleus is basic and essential for the free development of the personality of the individuals that comprise or make it up and, consequently, of the entire social conglomerate. However, on occasions the family is not a safe place, due to domestic violence, and in these cases the vulnerability and the possibility of harm to the personal integrity: physical and mental, of its members is protected.

In the case under review, this Chamber has analyzed in the preceding recital A), that Mrs. [Nombre17] reported domestic violence to the authorities, and also opposed paternal custody, arguing that the minor was in danger. Likewise, in the repeatedly cited technical report from INAMU, it was indicated that domestic violence was suffered by Mrs. [Nombre17] and her own daughter [Nombre18]., with current manifestations carried out in our country. Since the girl's father did not want the girl to visit her mother in prison and tried to take her out of the country in contravention of the order from the Juzgado de Niñez y Adolescencia. Furthermore, the minor [Nombre18]. manifests emotional sequelae from the separation from her mother, just as the mother is equally impacted, suffering deterioration in her emotional state (see folios 1071 to 1076) and also that Mrs. [Nombre17] gave birth to another child in our country. Thus, from the evidence provided it is inferred that both the mother and the girl have suffered domestic violence and even at this moment, the violence is manifest and that, as the Defensoría de los Habitantes has pointed out, granting the extradition of Mrs. [Nombre17] could aggravate the situation and leave the minor [Nombre18]. and her brother [Nombre20] unprotected.

This Chamber cannot ignore that the mother entered the national territory with the girl [Nombre39] and has requested refuge based on domestic violence, which at the time of this resolution, has not been definitively resolved. Regarding the situation of minors who have been abducted by their mothers and who suffer domestic violence within the family, it must be taken into account that the interests of the children and the mother are inextricably linked. In addition to the special protection for children, among them that of having their mother and their family, it being understood that extradition will result in the separation of the girl from her mother, and from her brother, while at the same time it will imply the placement of the girl, as has occurred now, in a substitute home or, ultimately, the risk of return to the paternal side which, as was proven, is also immersed in violence against the minor.

National constitutional jurisprudence and the jurisprudence of international comparative law on the return of minors, has rejected the return of minors pursuant to Article 13(1)(b) of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (of October twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and eighty, and approved by Law number 7746 of February twenty-third, nineteen hundred and ninety-eight), if the minors are at risk of physical or psychological danger, or are otherwise placed in an intolerable situation, regardless of whether the abducting parent has requested refuge in the country, as in the cases SC voto 15461-2008 of October 15, 2008 and SC voto 17639-2008 of December 5, 2008. Also, in SC voto 11576-2008 of July 25, 2008, in the additional reasons of Magistrate Calzada, the situation of not requesting refuge was assessed and it was indicated:

*"that the fact that the amparo petitioner did not request refugee status in the country upon her entry, could well have been part of the same fear based on the situation from which she was fleeing, since she would publicly expose her location to the alleged aggressor. Furthermore, it is to be expected that she did not feel sufficiently protected by the existing legal means, which she considered had been insufficient—even in the United States—and, in our country, have also not proven sufficiently effective in all cases."* Regarding international cases, see the cases *[Nombre40] v. [Nombre40]*, [2001] O.J. No. 2849 (Ontario), where the court refused to order the return to Kenya of triplet girls. The girls had traveled to Canada with their mother, to whom Canadian authorities in Nairobi had granted a refugee visa; the Judge concluded that the mother and the girls were living in a dangerous and hostile environment attributable to the conduct of their father and that consequently, referring to the Pollastro case, there was a basis for the exception provided for by Article 13(1)(b). Further cases are *[Nombre41]*., [2001] O.J. No. 3074 (Ontario), where the court refused to order the return of a 3-year-old child to Hungary. Upon arriving in Canada, the mother claimed refugee status. The same as in the case A.K. v. E.F., [2001] R.D.F. 334 (Quebec).

For greater abundance, as national authors point out, in consonance with authorized foreign doctrine, [Nombre42] and [Nombre43], La sustracción Internacional de Personas Menores de Edad en el Derecho de Familia Costarricense, IJSA, 2008, p.60, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or The Hague Convention:

*"is a set of binding provisions that do not establish the legal regime of the specific case and therefore it is not a convention on judicial competence, applicable law, or recognition of foreign decisions. It only contemplates systems of authority cooperation and an action for the immediate return of the minor to the country of their habitual residence. Therefore, the core point of the process is not the suitability for the exercise of personal care of the minors, but rather the existence or not of grounds for non-return. This point is of utmost importance since the international return process for minors is not a procedure to decide on custody nor to determine or rule out the suitability of the requested parent."* As a corollary of the preceding analysis, it must be concluded that when dealing with substantial aspects in which the best interest of the minor is immersed, it is their Human Rights that will prevail over the application of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, in accordance with Constitutional Law, and in this, the prelacy or higher hierarchy of Human Rights treaties is imposed. As the Constitutional Chamber has advanced in SC voto 15461-2008 of October 5, 2008, which we previously cited, where the nationality of the possibly affected children is also important, if it concerns a minor Costa Rican, what concerns the principle of the best interest of the child must predominantly be integrated into the decision, the Chamber indicated:

*"In this manner, if the minor regarding whom the possibility of an international return is raised happens to be a Costa Rican who is in national territory, the administrative and judicial authorities that must resolve the matter shall take into consideration the existence of express general principles recognized by the country; (…) for failure to do so will result in an illegitimate pronouncement for contradicting principles, values, and specific norms established in the entirety of Constitutional Law and that have been defined herein."* **C) Domestic violence as a ground for recognition to obtain international protection of refugee status and the necessary assessment in the extradition procedure.** The Defensoría de los Habitantes expressed as grievance 4) Erroneous assessment of International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments and international judicial cooperation between States and respect for Human Rights. They point out that the lower court judge did not assess that the action of Mrs. [Nombre17] originated in a well-founded fear due to the domestic violation she was suffering. It asserted that revoking the ruling would bring dire consequences for this lady by separating her from her daughter. In support of their thesis, after citing some norms from the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, or from the Guidelines on International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as some resolutions from the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, they affirm that domestic violence is a scenario by which refugee status can be granted to a person and that this is the situation presented with Mrs. [Nombre1]. **The grievance is accepted, but with different reasoning.** Indeed, it emerges from the extradition process followed against Mrs. [Nombre17], that she requested refuge before the corresponding migration authority, based on the domestic violence suffered by her and by her minor daughter [Nombre18]., according to a report from the Defensoría de los Habitantes visible at folios 1097 et seq., which has not been challenged as invalid by the opposing party.

As noted, the migration authorities denied the request in the first instance and it was appealed before the Minister of Security, without the final decision having been communicated at the time of resolving this case by the Tribunal de Casación. This Chamber considers that, notwithstanding the constitutional obligation to refer to these issues, to which we have referred as deriving from Human Rights, these aspects were not considered in the resolution that granted the extradition, with an erroneous application of the substantive law.

From the International Human Rights Conventions and Declarations, it is considered that the right to refuge is a Human Right and this has been recognized by our legal system by incorporating these various instruments at the infra-constitutional level.

In accordance with Article 1, Section A, paragraph 2, of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, incorporated into our Legal System by Law [Nombre1]° 6079 of August 28, 1977, the term refugee applies to any person who:

*"as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."* This criterion was taken up by domestic law in Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo [Nombre1]° 32195 of September 22, 2004, according to which, it:

*"Considers a refugee to be any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country."* For its part, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of November 22, 1984 (recognized and reaffirmed in the San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Costa Rica, of December 7, 1994), which captures the best Latin American tradition on the matter, extends this condition to those persons:

*"who have fled their countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order"* (part III, Third).

But it is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that has consistently pointed out that one of the reasons for which a refuge request is appropriate is, precisely, when a woman suffers domestic violence (Executive Committee Conclusions number 87 of October 1999, No. 39 of the Executive Committee, Refugee Women and International Protection; No. 73, Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, 1993; No. 77, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1995; number 79, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1996; and No. 81, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1997).

In the sub judice case, the migration authority, in accordance with Articles 111 and 112 of the Ley de Migración y Extranjería, heard the refuge request and denied it; however, the administrative decision was not final as it was appealed before the corresponding Ministry, so that in application of the mentioned Article 112, in the face of this request what corresponds is the suspension of the execution of the extradition, until the pertinent matter is resolved. Which is an expression of the so-called principle of non-refoulement, the article states the following:

*Article 112.- The filing of a request for recognition of refugee or asylee status shall have a suspensive effect on the execution of the extradition of the foreign person, until the corresponding procedure has been completed, by means of a firm and unappealable resolution. The recognition of refugee or asylee status shall have the effect of terminating any extradition procedure initiated against the refugee or asylee, at the request of the Government of the country where the alleged crime was committed, based on the same facts that justified said recognition.* The factual situations of the examined case must not be seen in isolation, but rather linked to the situation of violence against the woman and the girl and the best interest of the Costa Rican minors, so the interests must be weighed and the greatest respect for Human Rights sought. We will not repeat what has already been stated, only emphasize that the lower court judge, by granting the extradition of a person in the conditions we have analyzed, exposes Mrs. [Nombre17] and her daughter to greater physical and emotional harm derived from the accredited intrafamily violence. Therefore, without prejudging or invading the sphere of competence of administrative bodies, to which it will correspond to decide on the refuge; when probable violations of personal integrity are at stake and, in sum, probable unjustified attacks on the human rights of the woman and the girl as well as the best interest of the girl, among them that of having her mother and her family, those aspects must be assessed in the extradition in accordance with the postulates of Constitutional Law.

**The Human Rights of Women** The Costa Rican State has ratified international instruments referring to the advancement of the Human Rights of women that obligate their application because it has ratified them, just as the same Conventions contain norms that include not only the commitment on the part of the respective State not to violate Human Rights, but also a positive action to guarantee the "full and total exercise" of these rights, as is the case of the American Convention, Articles 1 and 2.

Among the international normative sources on the Human Rights of Women we have the following: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948, Article 1); American Convention on Human Rights (1969, Articles 5); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979, Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 9); General Recommendations adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, (proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution number 48/104 of December 20, 1993, Article 4); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women or Convention of Belém do Pará (1994, Articles 1 to 3, 7 and 9); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1999). From this normative set, as the Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993) expressly stated, it is derived that:

*"the human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights"* From all these international instruments, it is of interest to note that they recognize as fundamental principles equality, dignity, the right to a life free from violence, and the right to live in peace of Women.

The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, approved by Law No. 7499 of June 9, 1994, obligates the Costa Rican State to analyze the situation of violence suffered by a woman in a case submitted for its consideration, such as the one now before us. Thus, in its Articles 2, 4, and 9, it is provided:

*Article 2-. Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual and psychological violence:* *a. that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the woman, and that includes, among others, rape, battery and sexual abuse(...).* *Article 4-. Every woman has the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise and protection of all human rights and freedoms embodied in regional and international human rights instruments. These rights include, among others:* *a. the right to have her life respected;* *b.* the right to have her physical, mental, and moral integrity respected;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">c. the right to personal liberty and security;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">d. the right not to be subjected to torture;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">e. the right to have the inherent dignity of her person respected and her family protected;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">f. the right to equal protection before the law and of the law;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">g. the right to simple and prompt recourse to a competent court for protection against acts that violate her rights (…).</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 9-. In adopting the measures referred to in this chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, among others, their race or ethnic condition, their status as migrants, refugees, or displaced persons. Similarly, consideration shall be given to women subjected to violence while pregnant, disabled, minors, elderly, in a disadvantaged socioeconomic situation, affected by armed conflict, or deprived of their liberty."</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">Regarding the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, or Convention of Belém do Pará, it constitutes the first international legal instrument that recognizes women's right to a life free of violence, and considers violence against women as a violation of Human Rights. Articles 1 to 3, 7, and 9 state:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 1-. For the purposes of this Convention, violence against women shall be understood as any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 2-. Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual, and psychological violence: </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">a. that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the woman, and that includes, among others, rape, battery, and sexual abuse;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">b. that occurs in the community and is perpetrated by any person and that includes, among others, rape, sexual abuse, torture, trafficking in persons, forced prostitution, kidnapping, and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in educational institutions, health facilities, or any other place, and</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">c. that is perpetrated or tolerated by the State or its agents, wherever it occurs.</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 3-. Every woman has the right to a life free of violence, both in the public and private spheres.</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 7-. The States Parties condemn all forms of violence against women and agree to adopt, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies aimed at preventing, punishing, and eradicating such violence and to undertake the following: </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">a. refrain from engaging in any act or practice of violence against women and ensure that the authorities, their officials, personnel, agents, and institutions act in conformity with this obligation;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">b. act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish violence against women;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">c. include in their domestic legislation penal, civil, and administrative norms, as well as those of any other nature that are necessary to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence against women and adopt the appropriate administrative measures where required;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">d. adopt legal measures to require the perpetrator to refrain from harassing, intimidating, threatening, harming, or endangering the life of the woman in any way that threatens her integrity or damages her property;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">e. take all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to amend or abolish existing laws and regulations, or to modify legal or customary practices that support the persistence or tolerance of violence against women;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">f. establish fair and effective legal procedures for women subjected to violence, including, among others, protective measures, a timely trial, and effective access to such procedures;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">g. establish the necessary judicial and administrative mechanisms to ensure that women subjected to violence have effective access to restitution, reparations for harm, or other just and effective means of compensation, and</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">h. adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to this Convention.</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 9-. In adopting the measures referred to in this chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, among others, their race or ethnic condition, their status as migrants, refugees, or displaced persons (…).</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">In the extradition procedure of Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> as the Defensoría de los Habitantes has set forth in its appeal, the grievance of which has been upheld, Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> was immersed in the cycle of violence against women, as was the girl [Nombre18]., which was demonstrated through the complaint that Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> filed in the United States (visible at folio 736 and its translation from folio 747 to 749), as well as through a study conducted by the Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (visible at folio 1050 to 1069) and the statements made by Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> in the exercise of her material defense at the oral hearing. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">These evidentiary elements were not controverted by the opposing party, namely, the Procuraduría General de la República representing the requesting State; rather, this governmental body indicated that in the United States of America sufficient protection could be provided for the rights of the extradited person not to be subjected to violence and to live in peace, as well as those of the girl. Its opposition to the appeal was centered on the argument that domestic violence and the situation of the minor, as well as the evidence provided, should not be considered in the extradition process, neither in this case nor in any other; an untenable formalism, which could even violate other guarantees beyond those alleged in the appellants' appeal, such as access to justice and the right to defense of the person sought for extradition, and as we shall see, indirectly, the human rights of the minor.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">This Chamber considers that in the sub judice, in accordance with the international commitments undertaken by Costa Rica upon signing and ratifying the referenced International Human Rights Conventions and by virtue of the application of the Political Constitution, a ruling on this issue is necessarily required, since, as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has already noted in the case of </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">[Nombre44]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\="">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\="">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">vs. Brazil (2001), a duty of the States is to prevent practices of violence against women, in addition to preventing any state agent from violating women's rights through their actions.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In this case, the Belém do Pará Convention was applied for the first time, and the IACHR decided that the State had failed in its obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, and eradicate domestic violence.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In turn, violations were found of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (for violation of the victim's rights to effective judicial guarantees and protections) and Article 7 of the Belém do Pará Convention, and it was established that among the most important principles is the obligation of States regarding cases of violence against women,</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> which includes the duties to prosecute and convict those responsible, as well as the duty to “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">prevent these degrading practices</span><span style="font-family:Arial">”.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> It follows, therefore, that in the face of demonstrated violence against women, the a quo judge in this case, and indeed every adjudicator, must assess and not simply disregard or transfer violence against women to other spheres of competence, if the measure or resolution taken directly or indirectly affects, through omission, the human rights of the woman and the girl. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In the case at hand, the requesting State seeks Mrs. [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> for removing a minor from the United States with the intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights by the minor's father, which she did while legal proceedings were underway to define parental authority (patria potestad) regarding the girl in the Superior Court of Humboldt County, and in which proceeding the order had been issued not to remove the minor from the County. This is criminalized under United States law in Title 18 United States Code, Section 1204. That request for extradition did not include from the requesting State any other assessment, nor did the a quo judge's resolution, regarding the allegations timely made by the technical and material defense, as well as by INAMU, the Defensoría de los Habitantes, and the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público). It did not specifically contemplate the complaint filed by [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> in the United States for domestic violence on August 23, 2005 (visible at folio 736 and its translation from folio 747 to 749); that the physical custody of the girl [Nombre18]. was held by the mother, who had left the de facto marital domicile due to domestic violence (see statement by FBI Special Agent [Nombre45]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\="">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">folio 124 to 127 and evidentiary document B translation folio 747); statement by [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> before the Superior Court of California, Humboldt County, in which [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> opposes a visitation arrangement for the girl because the plaintiff endangers the girl (see folio 750);</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> that the father of the girl [Nombre18]. had signed an exit permit for her to travel to Mexico on April 26, 2005 (folio 373); that the Superior Court of California granted physical custody of [Nombre18] to her father [Nombre21]. on November 10, 2005</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (folio 278 et seq. and its translation at folio 284 et seq.); as well as the Technical Criteria Report prepared by psychologist [Nombre46]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\="">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">an official of the Delegación de la Mujer, the evidence provided by INAMU (visible at folio 1050 to 1069); the testimony of witness</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (at folio 758 and its translation at folio 762 et seq.); that Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> filed a refugee application with the immigration authorities based on domestic violence, a proceeding denied in the first instance by the immigration authority, but which was under appeal before the Minister of Security (see Criteria presented by the Defensoría de los Habitantes at folio 1097 et seq.), and Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> had also given birth to another child, Costa Rican by birth (see birth registration certificate folio 372) and had been detained for 14 months, which is why the girl [Nombre18] was placed in a foster home (see Criteria presented by the Defensoría de los Habitantes at folio 1097 et seq.).</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">That evidence was not assessed by the a quo judge, based on the argument that in the extradition process it is only necessary to verify compliance with the requirements and principles set forth in the bilateral extradition treaty between Costa Rica and the United States. As we have advanced, in the present case there is an underlying situation of domestic violence and violence against women, and in consideration of the Human Rights of the woman and the girl, the entire factual environment must be assessed, in addition to the legal system, in a hermeneutic manner. Lest the State itself contribute, through its omission, to a violation of Human Rights and thereby incur international responsibility for non-compliance with its international commitments to respect Human Rights before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which evaluate the effectiveness of domestic judicial processes to remedy human rights violations. An examination that encompasses the processes in their entirety and at different levels to determine if the procedures and the evidence produced were fair. (In this regard, see OEA/Ser.L/II.Doc 68 January 20, 2007, margin notes 35, 36, and 39).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> According to the technical criteria of psychologist [Nombre46]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\="">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">an official of the Delegación de la Mujer, and the evidence provided by INAMU (visible at folio 1050 to 1069), [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> suffered physical violence consisting of blows inflicted with fists to the head, arms, and back;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> throwing of various objects such as ceramic mugs or milk cartons, among others. She experienced psychological violence in the form of constant insults such as "piece of shit, bag of shit, you're worthless, stupid, crack whore, witch, whore"); stalking consisting of accusations of infidelity, threats of legal actions where lies would be told about her maternal role to distance her from her daughter; creation of a climate of terror through reckless driving, cornering her in the shower or in corners of the house, mistreatment of animals (he injured a kitten by throwing it against a fence); isolation from her family environment and friends. She also endured economic violence (violencia patrimonial), manifested by a lack of contribution to the family economy; breaking objects of immediate necessity such as the girl's chair; preventing her from working; controlling her personal expenses. </span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The report indicates that the aggressive behavior became increasingly frequent. Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> was constantly beaten, especially when she was in situations of greater vulnerability: with her girl in her arms (thus placing the minor in the "line of fire"), naked in the shower, before getting out of bed in the mornings, in the car driven at high speed by the aggressor. These beatings often warranted medical attention that was not sought. Other events that Mrs. [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> highlights are the long periods she left the house with her daughter in her arms, without shelter and without food, waiting for [Nombre22]'s aggressiveness to subside. In this regard, there was the sworn statement of a neighbor of [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Mrs. [Nombre17], who relates that she met [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and [Nombre47]. one morning when they came to her door seeking help because [Nombre21]. was furious and throwing objects at her. On various occasions, the aggressor threatened to take the girl away from her. The witness [Nombre17], the romantic partner of [Nombre22].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> until 2007, corroborated that version. [Nombre48] believes that both [Nombre22].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and his family are controlling and wealthy and at a certain point decided, to the exclusion of [Nombre17], to obtain sole custody of the girl.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">The technical report indicates that the situation of violence continues with the aggressor's attempts to distance the minor from her mother; he attempted to take the girl to the United States against the order of the Childhood and Adolescence authority. The report also, in Anexo 1, folios 1071 et seq., points out the emotional risk to the girl [Nombre18]. in light of Mr. [Nombre22].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> refusing to bring the girl to see her mother imprisoned in El Buen Pastor prison, the impact on the minor due to maternal separation, the limited bond between the minor and Mr. [Nombre22].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and the mother's pain facing separation from her daughter.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">In the exercise of her material defense, Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> recounted episodes of domestic violence against her and her girl by Mr. [Nombre22]. , and her statements were neither challenged nor refuted, and furthermore, the INAMU report indicates that an instrument with 19 criteria was applied to Mrs. [Nombre17]'s account, and it was estimated from the account that it appeared credible. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">All the evidentiary elements indicated allow this Chamber to conclude that Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and her daughter were victims of domestic violence, and this situation must prevail in the assessment of the extradition.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">D) Access to justice and effective judicial protection</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">As ground of appeal 5), the Defensoría de los Habitantes set forth the Costa Rican State's commitment to respect Human Rights. It opposes the statements of the Procuraduría that refer to a fraternity of institutions. The Costa Rican State has assumed a commitment to respect Human Rights by ratifying various International Conventions in which violence against women is protected.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Also, Mrs. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> is the mother of two Costa Ricans; from the Human Rights perspective, the integrity of the family must be protected. The specificity of women and of those tried within the framework of Human Rights must be assessed, and it also</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> requires respect for and guarantee of all the institutes of the right of Access to Justice. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">The grievance is upheld</span><span style="font-family:Arial">.</span> This Chamber has extensively referred to the respect for Human Rights that the Costa Rican State provides through various manifestations and concrete actions. It remains to analyze the grievance regarding access to justice, which is an undeniable manifestation of effective judicial protection and encompasses several elements, including an effective remedy in the courts of justice—which does not refer to means of appeal, but to the effective defense of individuals' rights—access for particularly vulnerable groups, and justice in the specific case.

Access to Justice is recognized in various international instruments for the protection of Human Rights, among them: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14(3)), the American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 25), in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, and in infra-constitutional legislation, creating a normative framework that guarantees access to justice without discrimination to judicial bodies, both *de iure* and *de facto*.

In Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987, which developed the contours of the issue of judicial protection, the opinion is extremely broad and indicated, with respect to Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the following:

*"This article likewise establishes, in broad terms, the obligation of the States to offer, to all persons subject to their jurisdiction, an effective judicial remedy against acts violating their fundamental rights. It further provides that the guarantee enshrined therein applies not only to the rights contained in the Convention, but also to those recognized by the Constitution or by law. (…) the States Parties undertake to provide effective judicial remedies to the victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art. 8.1), all within the general obligation of those same States to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every person subject to their jurisdiction (…) According to this principle, the non-existence of an effective remedy against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of it by the State Party in which such a situation occurs. In this sense, it must be emphasized that, for such a remedy to exist, it is not enough that it is provided for by the Constitution or the law or that it is formally admissible, but it is required that it be truly suitable to establish whether a human rights violation has occurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it. Those remedies that, due to the general conditions of the country or even the particular circumstances of a given case, prove illusory cannot be considered effective."* Another important step is deduced from Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999, through which access to justice under conditions of equality was guaranteed. The Inter-American Court indicated:

*"119. To achieve its objectives, the process must recognize and resolve the factors of real inequality affecting those who are brought before the justice system. It is in this way that the principle of equality before the law and the courts, and the correlative prohibition of discrimination, is addressed. The presence of conditions of real inequality requires the adoption of compensatory measures that contribute to reducing or eliminating the obstacles and deficiencies that impede or reduce the effective defense of one's own interests. If such compensatory measures, widely recognized in various procedural aspects, did not exist, it would be difficult to say that those in disadvantaged conditions enjoy true access to justice and benefit from due legal process under conditions of equality with those who do not face such disadvantages."* Our country has also undertaken a commitment to respect access to justice for vulnerable populations, with the approval of the 100 Brasilia Rules regarding access to justice for people in vulnerable conditions of 2008, which represent a joint effort of the XIV Ibero-American Judicial Summit. It is worth recalling here the recognition that the Constitutional Law gives to declarations that recognize Human Rights. From its text, both substantive and procedural norms are deduced, seeking the promotion of conditions necessary for effective protection, adopting those measures that best adapt to their vulnerable condition (Rule 25), and defining as particularly vulnerable groups: minors (Rule 5), the situation of migrants and refugees (Rules 13 and 14), and the situation of women (Rules 17 to 20), with special reference in Rule 20 to women victims of violence.

Thus, access to justice does not refer only to the person who initiated a judicial process but includes those who become procedural parties, for example, the person subject to extradition, and also, as we have referred to in this case, those who are indirectly affected by the outcome of a judicial resolution, such is the case of minors, all of whom are covered by that effective defense of individuals' rights, particularly when they are in a vulnerable condition, as we have sufficiently analyzed.

The refusal to resolve and hear, within the extradition process, the situation of these vulnerable persons, as occurred in the decision of the trial judge (juez a quo), in the opinion of this Tribunal violates the observance of Human Rights by omission and gives rise to State responsibility for failure to observe international commitments. Especially in cases like the one before us, where violence against the woman and the girl and a situation of refuge due to that same violence were alleged. Based on the foregoing, the grievance is upheld, due to the violation of access to justice for the extraditable person [Nombre1] and her minor daughter [Nombre18].

**E)** The Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) claims as grievance 2) the violation of the principle of dual criminality (doble incriminación). The argument was based on the fact that the conduct that motivated the extradition request does not constitute the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores), but rather the unlawful act of disobedience to authority, as the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) has stated in this process; hence, this is not an extraditable crime. It argues that the conduct for which extradition is requested is not typical and that the extradition must be rejected due to the absence of objective and normative elements. Due to the manner in which we are resolving the merits of this appeal, this Tribunal considers that there is no procedural interest in expressly referring to the mentioned grievance, given that we have resolved on the merits issues related to Human Rights.

**F) Regarding the arguments of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República)** Regarding the arguments presented by Licentiate [Nombre3], in his capacity as Directing Attorney, by which it is considered that the judgment contains adequate reasoning and that, consequently, the contested decision must be confirmed, this Chamber of Cassation (Cámara de Casación) considers that they are not acceptable, as set forth in the preceding recitals (considerandos). Moreover, the Attorney General in his opposition argued basically regarding the fulfillment of formal requirements, such as the principle of dual criminality (doble incriminación) or identity of the norm; he referred to the objective typicality of the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores) contemplated in Article 184 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code and the norm for which extradition was requested by the government of the United States, concluding with abundant constitutional and legal case law that the acts were crimes under both United States law and Costa Rican law. However, regarding the remaining arguments of the parties, and specifically the challenge by the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes), he made no further references beyond general rejection, because according to the position of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), the domestic violence allegedly suffered by Mrs. [Nombre17] and the situation of the minor [Nombre18] should not be considered in the extradition process, and they are matters of competence for the requesting State, and that in the United States of America, sufficient protection could be given to the rights of the extradited person not to be violated and to live in peace, as well as to the girl [Nombre49]. As we have had occasion to analyze in the preceding recital, this Chamber has carried out a hermeneutical interpretation of the Costa Rican legal system that grants international Human Rights treaties a supra-constitutional value, prioritizing respect for human dignity and the Human Rights of the woman and the girl not to be discriminated against or violated, to enjoy a family free from violence. The best interests of the minor (interés superior del menor) and her comprehensive protection must be assessed at the time of pronouncing the corresponding resolution, and no administrative or judicial State body is exempt from this obligation. Consequently, this Chamber postponed the further analysis of the extradition procedure with all its fundamental principles and institutions, in light of that universal set of rights that are recognized to human beings by the mere fact of being human. In the case sub judice, it is not possible to separate the Human Rights situation of the requested woman and the girl from the extradition process given the situation of domestic violence and the necessary respect for human dignity that the Costa Rican legal system recognizes. In that sense, the argument concerning the fulfillment of dual criminality (doble incriminación), upon which all the efforts of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), representing the government of the United States of America, were focused, has lost legal interest, due to the application of the constitutional norms, principles, and values that inspire Costa Rican Constitutional Law, in addition to the principle of normative hierarchy, and which imply a bundle of guarantees regarding respect for Human Rights that, as extensively set forth, prevent the surrender. Consequently, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by [Nombre50], in her capacity as Ombudsperson of the Republic (Defensora de la Habitantes de la República), is granted. Judgment No. 130-P-2009 of the Trial Court of Puntarenas (Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas), issued at one o'clock in the afternoon on April twentieth, two thousand nine, is reversed. Consequently, the extradition of Mrs. [Nombre1], requested by the United States of America, is declared without merit. Mrs. [Nombre1] is to be released immediately, if no other cause prevents it. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the other appeals that were filed is omitted. Communicate this to the Government of the United States through the appropriate channel.

**POR TANTO:** The appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by [Nombre50], in her capacity as Ombudsperson of the Republic (Defensora de la Habitantes de la República), is granted. Judgment No. 0130-P-2009 of the Trial Court of Puntarenas (Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas), issued at one o'clock in the afternoon on April twentieth, two thousand nine, is reversed. Consequently, the extradition of Mrs. [Nombre1], requested by the United States of America, is declared without merit. Mrs. [Nombre1] is to be released immediately, if no other cause prevents it. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the other appeals that were filed is omitted. Notify.

**Dra. [Nombre51]** **Msc. Jazmín Rodríguez Hernández** **Msc.** Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas **Judges of the Criminal Cassation Panel** Extradition proceedings Extraditable person: [Name1].

Requesting party: United States of America 77, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1995; No. 79, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1996; and No. 81, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1997OEA/Ser.L/II.Doc 68 January 20, 2007, marginal numbers 35, 36, and 39Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People, rules 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25", "doctrine": "JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, The American Convention as Domestic Law, 1988, p.40-41LLOBET, Human Rights in Criminal Justice, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, p. 241ROLDÁN BABERO cited by GARCÍA, Beatriz: Extradition in the Spanish Domestic, International, and Community Legal System, Comares, Granada, 2005, p. 157: ROVIRA, Antonio: Extradition and Fundamental Rights, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p. 237:Mauren Solís and Mauricio Chacón, The International Abduction of Minors in Costa Rican Family Law, IJSA, 2008, p.60VILLAGRÁN KRAMER, Francisco. 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content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Style-Type\" content=\"text/css\" /><meta name=\"generator\" content=\"Aspose.Words for .NET 23.6.0\" /><title></title></head><body style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\"><div><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>“III. ON THE MERITS: This Tribunal hears three appeals filed by the private defense of the extraditable individual [Name1], the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Office of the Ombudsman, appeals that were filed in a timely manner and in proper form in accordance with the provisions of the Extradition Law; the joinder of the</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> National Institute for Women (INAMU) was also accepted.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> For reasons of procedural economy and considering that the appeal of the Office of the Ombudsman encompasses all the grievances argued by the parties in the different challenges, as well as including the statements of the joinder of INAMU, this Tribunal will refer only to this appeal. This Chamber, after evaluating the grievances indicated by the Office of the Ombudsman, grants the grievances in the manner set forth below, noting that, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights points out, remedies must be rapid, informal, and fair (Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. [Name2] ,</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span>International Responsibility of the state for denial and obstruction of justice and violation of judicial guarantees", in, IACHR: The Court and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 1994, p. 588.):</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>The duty to guarantee Human Rights in the Extradition process</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>The appeal of the Office of the Ombudsman indicates as grievance 1) Regarding the extradition process, respect for the rights and guarantees of the persons involved in the extradition process must be ensured. The work of the judge is important insofar as they become the body responsible for complying with the international obligation to the requesting State, but also with compliance with the application of the fundamental principles of human rights that guarantee the administration of justice. For the Office of the Ombudsman, the work of judges must go beyond the formal verification of requirements to the analysis of the justifications in each specific case that account for the conflicts and needs of the people, the very reason for the system's existence; the State holds a power-duty in the exercise of justice, within the framework of a sovereign State. The jurisdictional function implies assessments that the judge can and must make.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> The grievance is granted for partially different reasons. This Tribunal has assessed whether, in addition to compliance with the formal requirements and general principles established by the bilateral extradition treaty between Costa Rica and the United States, other aspects related to the binding legal framework prevailing in the Costa Rican State, which is characterized as a democratic Republic of Law, must be analyzed. In that sense, this Chamber considers that Constitutional Law, which is composed of norms, principles, constitutional values, and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, binds all public powers and citizens. It follows that Constitutional Law forms part of the legal framework or parameter of legality that the ordinary judge must interpret and apply when exercising the jurisdictional function, in accordance with the provisions of Article 154 of the Constitución Política. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>Even though a concentrated system of constitutional review subsists in our legal system, this circumstance does not inhibit the ordinary jurisdiction from the duty to ensure the observance and application of the Constitution, which is the foundation of the legal system; therefore, the ordinary judge, when applying any norm or act, cannot disregard constitutional precepts, values, and principles given the judicial function of ensuring the supremacy of law and the preservation of the legal order. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>The extradition process has been characterized by our constitutional and legal jurisprudence as a special procedure of international collaboration or assistance through which one State (requesting) asks another State (requested) for the surrender of a person in order to subject them to a criminal proceeding being conducted in its country, or else, to serve a sentence imposed on them as a result of a criminal proceeding conducted against them, thereby making the administration of justice of the requesting State effective.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> In response, the requested State must assess, according to the requirements and principles governing this matter, whether the formulated request for the surrender of the requested person is appropriate. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>Even the Constitutional Chamber indicates that it is a special procedure different from the criminal process and, to that effect, states in SC voto 08261-2008 of May 14, 2008, the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>“This Chamber, on different occasions, has indicated that extradition is an act of international legal assistance and is nothing other than the means of making possible the presence of the accused in a criminal proceeding in another country that requires them. Its basis, therefore, lies in the solidarity of States and the need to overcome the limitations imposed on the prosecution and punishment of crimes by the principle of territoriality, which prevents the application of criminal law to events occurring outside the country in which the alleged offender has sought refuge. This act of international cooperation between States, due to the problems of territoriality, distance, difference of cultures and legal systems, is endowed with a series of procedures and regulations that seek to overcome the obstacles that may arise due to these differences, while seeking to reconcile and enforce the legal systems of both countries, including the norms for protecting the rights of the alleged offender. Precisely these noted differences mean that the detention and sending of the accused person to the courts of justice is regulated differently from the detention of an alleged offender in the country itself.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>This Tribunal considers that although initially it might seem that the Judge of the requested State should limit themselves to verifying only the formal requirements and principles governing extradition (among them: dual criminality, principle of specialty, which in turn carries a prison sentence of more than one year, does not foresee the death penalty, nor involves political crimes, etc.) because it is a matter of international cooperation between States in which a requested State serves as a conduit for the action of the other State; we must highlight that this procedure implies, in the requested State, jurisdictional and constitutional control, including: the subjection of powers to the Constitution, the hierarchy and publicity of norms, the prohibition of arbitrariness, and legal certainty.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>Although extradition is not an institution to defend or impose a specific legal system, against extradition, which is an instrument in the fight against impunity and the right of the potential victims of crime, we must also observe the rights of the person affected by the procedure; this, undoubtedly, is the role of the Rule of Law in the face of acts of powers of other States, and as the Constitutional Chamber points out in the previously cited vote, "the norms of protection for the rights of the alleged offender" must be respected.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>On the rights of foreigners</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>In the present case, the application of a set of Human Rights to a foreign citizen [Name1] is sought.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> Therefore, the legal regime for foreigners in our current legal system must be examined. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>The Constitución Política, in Article 19, states that:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>"Foreigners have the same individual and social duties and rights as Costa Ricans, with the exceptions and limitations that this Constitution and the laws establish." </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>This norm has been elaborated upon by the Constitutional Chamber in multiple votes, it being valid, as constitutional doctrine, to establish differences between nationals and foreigners when they are based on both constitutional and legal norms, provided the latter are logical, reasonable, and consistent with the principle of proportionality, and are not contrary to human dignity (see SC voto 01684-91, of 4:00 p.m. on August 28, 1991; SC voto 1440-92 of 3:30 p.m. on June 2, 1992; SC voto 01282-90, of 3:00 p.m. on October 16, 1990, and has reiterated it in the following judgments: see judgments SC voto 02093-93, of 2:06 p.m. on May 19, 1993; SC voto 02754-93, of 2:36 p.m. on June 15, 1993; SC voto 04601-94, of 9:33 a.m. on August 26, 1994; SC voto 05965-94, of 3:51 p.m. on October 11, 1994; SC voto 00319-95, of 2:42 p.m. on January 17, 1995; 05670-95, of 3:39 p.m. on October 17, 1995; and CED1, of 10:48 a.m. on July 31, 1998). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>In SC voto 02570-97,</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> of May 13, 1997, the High Court stated: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>"Certainly, the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Constitution establishes that: 'Foreigners have the same individual and social duties and rights as Costa Ricans, with the exceptions and limitations that this Constitution and the laws establish,' which means that, regarding the set of fundamental rights, only differences between nationals and non-nationals would be valid if they have constitutional and legal standing, and in the latter case, only to the extent that the differentiation fully complies with the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality that guide the legislative function, and of course, as long as it is not contrary to human dignity. This Chamber, in developing the content of the norm under analysis, has eliminated, as unconstitutional, a series of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights by foreigners, whose sole basis was the criterion of nationality, which has been repeatedly discarded as a valid reason for differentiations between the two.- " </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>From the foregoing, it can be inferred that foreigners in our Law are holders of Human and fundamental rights, of those contemplated in the Constitución Política and international instruments, and that foreigners must be treated according to their dignity as persons and with respect for their Human Rights. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> Value of Human Rights in the Costa Rican State</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>Human Rights constitute a universal legal framework of mandatory compliance for States; they are recognized based on the dignity of every human being, in all the ontological sense that this implies; by the mere fact of being human, the human being has a series of rights and discriminatory treatment is prohibited. In that recognition, all human beings have dignity and one cannot speak of a greater dignity of some over others, which leads to the prohibition of any type of discrimination. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>The constitutional doctrine emanating from the specialized Chamber is profuse and early on recognized that Human Rights conventions and instruments have supra-constitutional validity and self-executing application; in that sense, all state activity must be developed within those parameters.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>The validity in the Costa Rican State of Human Rights instruments as a source of applicable law derives from the Constitución Política itself and is complemented by Article 1 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Thus, in the case of international Human Rights instruments in force in the country, the provisions of Article 7 of the Constitución Política do not apply, as there is a special norm in Article 48 for Conventions referring to Human Rights, granting them normative force at the constitutional level itself and placing them as a parameter for interpreting the text of the Constitution itself, as well as its derived principles; consequently, the interpretation and application of secondary legislation is linked to those. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber has recognized that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica have not only a value similar to the Constitución Política, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution (cf., SC voto 3435-92 of November 11, 1992 and its clarification, SC voto 5759-93 and SC voto 2313-95 of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>Likewise, it has been indicated in SC voto 3173-93, the existence of the pro libertate and pro homine principles, as the hard core or essence of Human Rights, the content of which is as follows:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>"…the pro libertate principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitute the core of the human rights doctrine; according to the first, everything that favors freedom must be interpreted extensively and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the second, law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that most favors the human being."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>Likewise, the Highest Tribunal has recognized that the Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have full value in the Costa Rican State and that, regarding Human Rights, its decisions bind the Costa Rican State, thus in SC voto 2313-95 of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, and when resolving the mandatory constitutional review requested by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly on the bill approving the "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," it expressly referred to the effectiveness granted in Costa Rica to international instruments on Human Rights not formally signed or approved according to the constitutional procedure, as follows: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>"In this aspect, it is necessary to highlight the specific reference that the Constitution now makes to 'international instruments,' meaning that not only conventions, treaties, or agreements, formally signed and approved in accordance with the constitutional procedure itself (such as the case now before us), but any other instrument having the nature of the protection of Human Rights, even if it has not undergone that procedure, is in force and applicable in the country."</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, December 10, 1948), by its character and nature, has not needed the constitutional approval procedures to be understood as in force and with the normative force granted by the matter it regulates. The same can be said of the "Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners," of the United Nations, which, though they are the product of expert meetings or the work of some department of that organization, since our country belongs to it, and because they refer to fundamental rights, have the same value as any international regulation that had been formally incorporated into Costa Rican domestic law." </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>Finally, in SC voto 2002-10693 of November 7, 2002, the Constitutional Chamber reiterates that, pursuant to Article 48 of the Constitución Política:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>"all international instruments on human rights have been elevated to constitutional rank, and consequently these must be incorporated into the interpretation of the Constitution." </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>Regarding the self-executing application of Human Rights Conventions, two positions are usually distinguished in the doctrine: the first posits the programmatic nature of Human Rights conventions; according to this position, the articles of the Conventions do not apply directly but rather leave substantive implementation to domestic legislation and jurisdiction (in that sense, Report of the United States delegation to the San José conference where the American Convention on Human Rights was approved, in: JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, The American Convention as Domestic Law, 1988, p.40-41). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>The second position admits, as a general rule, the self-executing nature of the norms contained in Human Rights conventions, meaning their norms can be invoked as applicable law by the courts once ratified, as an effect of the norms binding the States-Parties, not only their governments, but also being directed at the other legislative and judicial powers, which are compelled to give effect to the conventions in domestic law.</span></p> (See in this regard, the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights OC-7/86 of August 26, 1986, and the vote of Judge [Nombre3] in the case of [Nombre4] and [Nombre5] vs. Colombia, in the judgment on reparations of January 29, 1997, paragraphs 6, 7, and 9; Case of [Nombre6] vs. Costa Rica of July 2, 2004, in which the self-executing nature of the American Convention on Human Rights is recognized).

The position of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on the self-executing nature of Human Rights is manifest; first in a Habeas Corpus appeal and later in an unconstitutionality appeal, it recognized the self-executing nature of Human Rights, which produces the effect of the disapplication of lower-ranking norms that oppose a Human Rights treaty. In this sense, see SC vote 282-90 of March 3, 1990, and the precedent SC vote 719-90 of June 26, 1990, both on the right to appeal a conviction, and SC vote 1319-97 of March 4, 1997, consolidating the constitutional interpretation of the self-executing nature of the norms of International Human Rights Law.

"...the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers interested parties to bring an action of unconstitutionality against legal provisions that oppose those of an international treaty, considering that by doing so they violate the superior normative hierarchy of the latter, in accordance with Article 7 of the Political Constitution. This does not preclude that, when the provisions of the treaty are self-executing and enforceable by themselves, without the need for other norms to develop them in domestic law, the legal provisions that contradict them should simply be deemed repealed, precisely by virtue of the superior rank of the treaty. In this way, the antinomy between a law and a treaty, following the reform of Articles 10, 48, 105, and 128 of the Constitution (Law No. 7128 of August 18, 1989, effective since September 1) and, above all, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (No. 7135 of October 11, 1989, effective since its publication on the 19th), is resolved, first and as far as possible, by the automatic repeal of the former insofar as it opposes the latter, without prejudice to its also being resolvable through the declaration of unconstitutionality of the law." This position is also followed in other pronouncements, thus, SC vote 3435-92 of November 11, 1992; SC vote 2313-95 of May 9, 1995, among others.

Position in the hierarchy of norms of International Human Rights Treaties and It is important to point out here the hierarchy of International Human Rights Treaties and other International Treaties, given that, on one hand, we have in the case at bar (subjúdice) the application of an Extradition Treaty with the United States of America and the application of International Human Rights Treaties invoked by the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría de los Habitantes) and extensible to the rest of the challengers.

We find that traditional normative sources have been enriched by a current that grants human rights treaties a different normative hierarchy than that granted to treaties on matters not directly related to Human Rights (such as, for example, international cooperation treaties, those regulating external relations between States, law of war, etc.). In the case of our country, the distinction the Constitution makes between the rank it gives to treaties not related to human rights, with respect to those that do deal with this matter, is very clear. Article 7 of the Political Constitution grants public treaties and international conventions authority superior to laws, while Article 48 of that same normative body elevates the Human Rights instruments in force in the Republic to constitutional rank.

Faced with the normative succession posed by the application of an international Human Rights treaty and a bilateral treaty, which conflict because the former grants an express recognition of Human Rights and therefore greater guarantees, this is not a problem of doubt about the constitutionality of the latter, but of legality. As the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has stated in multiple votes, the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to individuals, they prevail over the Constitution.

In the identical sense, national doctrine has stated that the consultation of constitutionality will only be necessary:

"when by way of interpretation a solution cannot be reached that eliminates the contradictions between the legal text and the Constitution or international instrument." (LLOBET, Derechos Humanos en la Justicia Penal, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, p. 241).

Application of constitutional principles and respect for Human Rights in Extradition In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in a recent case regarding the assessments of legality and compliance with constitutional guarantees and those derived from international Human Rights treaties concerning the surrender of the extraditable person, has referred to the assessment based on Human Rights that courts of justice must carry out.

Thus, regarding the consultation of constitutionality raised by the Court of Cassation of San Ramón in vote [Telf1] at 10:45 a.m. on May 30, 2008, in which a ruling was requested on whether the guarantee of "ne bis in idem" established in numeral 42 of the Political Constitution acquires the character of a principle of general or even universal application in the extradition process.

Through vote SC 2008-013432 at 2:03 p.m. on September 3, 2008, the High Court indicated that, faced with a normative gap in which the cases where the requested person was being tried or had been tried in a third State are not regulated, judges must resolve by applying both the principles and norms of the Political Constitution and the International Instruments. Specifically, the Chamber stated:

"it is clear that if one is faced with a case where the person whose surrender is requested is being tried or has already been tried in a third country, the detention and surrender are not legitimate, as the cause that legitimizes the cooperation of the requested country and the legitimacy of the requesting country to punish has disappeared. Judges, when resolving matters submitted to their knowledge, are under the obligation to apply the norms and principles contained both in the Political Constitution and in the international instruments applicable in Costa Rica. The Constitution is the supreme norm of the legal system, operating not only as a criterion of validity for all others, but also as a superior legal norm, immediately binding for all public powers and authorities and, of course, for private individuals, above any other consideration. V.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, this Court concludes that the consulted norm is not unconstitutional. It is the responsibility of the judges to interpret the norms in light of the fundamental principles and rights provided for in the Political Constitution and international instruments." In this sense, it can be concluded that even legal gaps regarding judicial guarantees must be filled with content from the norms and principles derived from International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments.

Likewise, in another vote related to extradition and the application of an international convention, and although not with erga omnes character but for the specific case, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has assessed the application of International Conventions. Thus, in judgment SC vote 011576-2008 of July 25, 2008, it outlined the application of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, incorporated into our Legal System through Law [Nombre1]° 6079 of August 28, 1977, and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of November 22, 1984, as well as derived Costa Rican legislation, and applied the principle of non-refoulement (non refoulment) which constitutes the cornerstone of the international refugee protection system, and which protects the refugee against expulsion or any form of return to the borders of territories where their life or freedom would be in danger. This principle benefits not only those persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution within the sense of the 1951 Convention on Refugees, but also those covered by the regional definition of refugee contained in the Cartagena Declaration.

Without a doubt, constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that International Human Rights Conventions are a source of the legal system in the case of extradition proceedings (which has also been manifested in multiple specific cases distinct from international judicial cooperation). Because it is carried out in the Costa Rican Rule of Law State, the extradition proceeding must observe the block of legality contained in the Political Constitution and the International Conventions on Human Rights in force in Costa Rica. The position of this Court is thus linked, accepting the arguments of the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría de los Habitantes), considering that human rights must be applied in the extradition process.

This is shared by the majority doctrine and the jurisprudence of international tribunals. In this sense, it is affirmed by [Nombre7], : Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p. 237:

"the person who is the subject of extradition has the human rights recognized by the constitutional order, among them due process, liberty, integrity, life, etc., but not as concretized in each country but as agreed upon in international human rights declarations, in a certain jus cogens, that is, by universally accepted norms of law expressed in international declarations and decisions of the corresponding tribunals." For its part, the European Court of Human Rights expressly in the case of [Nombre8] (ECHR judgment of July 7, 1989) does not excuse States Parties from all responsibility for the foreseeable consequences that an extradition may entail beyond their borders. Certainly, this case referred to the extradition of a citizen to the United States to be tried for murder with the possibility of being sentenced to the death penalty. However, important consequences for the extradition process and respect for human rights are obtained from the solution of the case. Among them, it is highlighted by [Nombre9] cited by [Nombre10] , : La extradición en el ordenamiento Interno español, Internacional y Comunitario, Comares, Granada, 2005, p. 157:

"firstly, the Contracting Parties cannot forget the fate that persons subject to extradition will suffer in the receiving country; secondly, it assigns Article 3 a preponderant function as an unconditional and non-derogable provision intimately linked to the principles of human dignity and a democratic society; thirdly, it demonstrates a manifestation of the internationalization of the issue of human rights, revealing a relativization of national and regional coverage limits in favor of human dignity; in his opinion, fourthly, the judgment consecrates the normative and singular character of the European Convention on Human Rights, applying preferentially to a subsequent treaty (the 1972 extradition treaty), concluded by a country outside the European system, the United States, showing the dynamic and progressive character of the Convention." Consequently, the State cannot excuse itself by invoking sovereignty to not act in defense of Human Rights, which has been reiterated in other votes of the European Court of Human Rights (cases of [Nombre11] and [Nombre12]) and by the Human Rights Committee (in the case of [Nombre13], [Nombre14] and [Nombre15] on the right to life and inhuman and degrading treatment).

Likewise, it is understood by the majority doctrine that a connection exists between that act of the requesting State and the requested State in the protection of Human Rights:

"the violation of the fundamental right in which the action of a foreign public power may incur vitiates with unconstitutionality the action of the domestic judicial or administrative body that facilitates it, since it causes said violation to materialize upon complying with it or granting it validity." (See, [Nombre7] , : Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p.33.)

Arguing otherwise could lead to responsibility stemming from the application of international norms; an indirect violation of Human Rights could occur, which is that facilitated by the action or omission of the extradition body.

It is for all the foregoing that this Court has accepted the argument of the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría de los Habitantes) and considers that the Judge A quo should have comprehensively assessed the factual and legal situation in accordance with the principles of the Rule of Law and the Law of the Constitution, which implied an erroneous assessment of the substantive Law, since in our legal regime preponderant value is granted to International Human Rights Treaties, which have a supra-constitutional value. Departing from other non-binding votes of national Courts of Cassation that are very respectable from a legal standpoint, this Chamber has opted to assess the International Human Rights Conventions signed and ratified by Costa Rica that are directly related to the disputed points in this case. At the same time, our State is bound to compliance and observance not only from the formal sphere but in the real sphere and in the results of the application of Human Rights Treaties, which have definitively not been ratified by the requesting State.

Our country has signed and ratified, among others, multiple human rights conventions, such as the following: CEDAW Convention, Belém do Pará Convention, Convention on the Rights of the Child, which imply a broader spectrum regarding guarantees derived from Human Rights, such as the recognition of women's rights as Human Rights, the right of women not to be violated, the protection of the best interest and the comprehensive protection of the Minor, the right to family and to peace. With these, the country has acquired a commitment of special protection of the rights of Women and the Girl Child, especially considering that the constitutional and democratic Rule of Law State cannot disregard the consequences that its actions may bring. The act of surrender of the extraditable person can indirectly materialize the violation of Human Rights.

In an extradition process such as the one before us, judicial authorities cannot limit ourselves to verifying the fulfillment of requirements; rather, the Costa Rican State must act within the parameters of constitutionality and legality, which in this specific case oblige it to protect the Human Rights of two female victims of domestic violence: one of legal age, mother of two Costa Rican children, and the other, a girl child, a minor, who holds dual Costa Rican nationality by birth and North American. From the study of the present process, it is clearly inferred from the evidence that was produced and partially reproduced in the oral hearing that a situation of violence against women was effectively verified. It must be clarified that in the present case, the judicial authorities of the requested country do not prejudge the act for which the extraditable person is being prosecuted in the requesting country. Even if no pronouncement is issued on these acts, the violation of Human Rights such as violence against women and the girl child must be assessed.

• B)On the rights of the girl child and the boy child, the right to family, and to live a life free from violence.

The appeal of the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría de los Habitantes) points out as grievance 3) the lack of assessment of the Human Rights of the Costa Rican Girl [Nombre16], and as grounds it is argued that the minor was moved to Costa Rica, the country where she was born and of which she is a citizen. The resolution of Judge a quo does not assess the rights of either the mother or the daughter and proceeds to make invisible the result that will be obtained with the effective extradition of the extraditable person: the surrender of the girl to a father who has not been considered suitable by the Costa Rican courts. In addition, the minor child [Nombre17], who is located with her mother in the El Buen Pastor center, will be left helpless once the extradition is final. The human rights of the Costa Rican girl [Nombre16] will be directly affected, which threatens her physical and emotional integrity, her dignity, her right to a life free from violence, her right to family, and places her in a situation of special vulnerability, in flagrant violation of the rights of children and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, also extensible to the Costa Rican minor child of [Nombre1], named [Nombre17].

This Court accepts the grievance. As we have explained, our constitutional legislation, upon adopting the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is a Human Rights instrument, assumed the commitment that in processes where the rights of a minor person are directly or indirectly involved, the authorities responsible for resolving the case, be they administrative or judicial, must assess in the corresponding resolution matters relating to the children and their best interest. Even if these circumstances appear to be unrelated to the specific situation, as an indirect violation of fundamental rights could occur, which is that facilitated by the omissive action of the extradition body. In the case at bar (subjúdice), it is impossible to separate—as Judge a quo has done—the knowledge of the extradition, whose facts and basis are consistent with an international child abduction, from the situation of the extraditable person [Nombre18] and her children: a girl [Nombre16] and a boy [Nombre17], both Costa Rican by birth, and the reported situation of domestic violence, which must be assessed in accordance with the general principles governing the democratic Rule of Law State and informing the Law of the Constitution.

Different international instruments recognize the State's duty to provide particular protection to the rights of boys and girls, which originate from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself, and particularly, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (approved and ratified by our country through Law [Nombre1]° 7184 of July 18, 1990, which entered into force, according to numeral 2 of that legal instrument, on the day of its publication in La Gaceta [Nombre1]° 149 of August 9, 1990), in which protection is provided for this age group. Striving at all times to provide adequate assistance and respect for the rights recognized therein, among which stand out, among others: the promotion of the necessary conditions for family coexistence, as well as the right of children to remain with their parents (Article 7)—particularly with their mother (Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of San Salvador); the right to an adequate standard of living for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development (Article 27).

In the same manner, this international instrument sets a series of obligations for the States parties or signatories, among them: to ensure that the child is not separated from his or her parents against their will, except when, subject to judicial review, such separation is necessary in the best interest of the child (Article 9, paragraph 1) and to handle any application, made by a child or by his or her parents, to enter or leave a State party in a positive, humane, and expeditious manner (Article 10, paragraph 1).

From these international Human Rights instruments, it follows that States have as fundamental duties the protection of the best interest of the child, avoiding the dismemberment of the family nucleus and promoting the necessary conditions for them to enjoy the permanent presence of parental authority, while also indicating that on some occasions separation is necessary and authorized in the best interest of the minor.

In the infra-constitutional order, laws have also been developed that protect the best interest of the minor. Thus, the Code of Childhood and Adolescence (Law [Nombre1]° 7739) specifies that the interpretive north of all public or private action must be the best interest of the child (Article 5). Article 17 states that minors cannot be subject, among other cases, to deportation from the national territory, except in protection of their own interest, in accordance with the criteria determined by the best interest of this group. Likewise, Article 30 establishes the right to family life, indicating that minors shall have the right to know their father and mother; likewise, to grow and develop at their side and be cared for by them, and precept 33 regulates the right to permanence with the family by providing that minors may not be separated from their family, except in special circumstances established by law.

The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) recognizes the best interest of the child as a general guiding principle of all state activity, as referred to in SC vote 15461-2008 of October 15, 2008:

"In this sense, as a recognized and fully applicable general principle, no norm or decision—administrative or judicial—that contradicts the best interest of the child is opposable to it, except when, in certain circumstances, the applicability of some other general principle of the highest level is at stake, in which case the legal operator must adhere to the balancing test and the role of each principle in the particular case. Thus, ignoring the principal character of the best interest of the child by neglecting its strict application in cases involving minors is contrary to the recognitions that the Law of the Constitution makes in this regard, while also giving rise to a position of vulnerability against the mandate of Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights." Likewise, the Law of the Constitution lavishes "special protection of the State" upon the family, whether de facto or de jure. Constitutional Article 51 proclaims that this institution is the "natural element and foundation of society." The family nucleus is basic and primordial for the free development of the personality of the individuals that comprise or integrate it and, consequently, of the entire social conglomerate. However, on occasions the family is not a safe place due to domestic violence, and in these cases, the vulnerability and the possibility of affecting the personal integrity—physical and mental—of its members are protected.

In the case under examination, this Chamber has analyzed in the preceding considering paragraph A) that Mrs. [Nombre18] reported domestic violence to the authorities, and also opposed paternal custody, arguing that the minor was in danger. Likewise, in the technical report of INAMU of repeated citation, it was indicated that Mrs. [Nombre18] and her own daughter [Nombre16] suffered domestic violence, with current manifestations carried out in our country, as the girl's father did not want the girl to visit her mother in prison and tried to take her out of the country contravening the order of the Court of Childhood and Adolescence. Additionally, the minor [Nombre16] manifests emotional sequelae from the separation from her mother, just as the mother is equally impacted, suffering deterioration in her emotional state (see folios 1071 to 1076), and also that Mrs. [Nombre18] procreated another child in our country. Thus, from the evidence provided, it is inferred that both the mother and the girl have suffered domestic violence and, even at this moment, the violence is manifest. As the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría de los Habitantes) has pointed out, granting the extradition of Mrs. [Nombre18] could aggravate the situation and leave the minor [Nombre16] and her brother [Nombre17] unprotected.

This Chamber cannot ignore that the mother entered the national territory with the girl [Nombre19] and has requested refuge, taking shelter under the domestic violence, which, at the time of this ruling, has not been definitively resolved. Regarding the situation of minors who have been abducted by their mothers and who suffer domestic violence within the family, it must be taken into account that the interests of the children and the mother are indissolubly linked.

In addition to the special protection of children, including that of having their mother and their family, it being understood that extradition will result in the separation of the girl from her mother and from her brother, while also implying the placement of the girl, as has occurred now, in a substitute home or ultimately the risk of return to the paternal side, which, as was demonstrated, is also immersed in violence against the minor person.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>National constitutional jurisprudence and international comparative law jurisprudence on the return of minors have rejected the return of minors pursuant to Article 13(1)(b) of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (of October twenty-fifth, nineteen eighty, and approved by Law No. 7746 of February twenty-third, nineteen ninety-eight), if the minors are at risk of physical or psychological danger, or in any other way the minor is placed in an intolerable situation, regardless of whether the taking parent has applied for refuge in the country,</span><span> </span><span> thus the cases SC Voto 15461-2008 of October 15, 2008, and SC Voto 17639-2008 of December 5, 2008. Also, SC Voto 11576-2008 of July 25, 2008, in the additional reasons of Magistrate [Name20], the situation of not applying for refuge was assessed and it was stated:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span><span>“that the fact that the amparo petitioner has not applied for refugee status in the country since her entry could well have been part of the same fear based on the situation she was fleeing, since she would publicly expose her location to the alleged aggressor. Furthermore, it is to be expected that she did not feel sufficiently protected by the existing legal means, which she considered had been insufficient—even in the United States—and, in our country, have also not proven sufficiently effective in all cases.” </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Regarding international cases, see the cases [Name21] v. [Name21], [2001] O.J. No. 2849 (Ontario), where the return of triplet girls to Kenya was refused. The girls had traveled to Canada with their mother, to whom Canadian authorities in Nairobi had granted a refugee visa; the Judge concluded that the mother and the girls were living in a dangerous and hostile environment attributable to the conduct of their father and that consequently, referring to the Pollastro case, there was a basis for the exception provided for in Article 13(1)(b). Further cases are [Name22] . , [2001] O.J. No. 3074 (Ontario), where the return of a 3-year-old boy to Hungary was refused. Upon arriving in Canada, the mother claimed refugee status. The same occurred in the case A.K. v. E.F., [2001] R.D.F. 334 (Québec).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Furthermore, as national authors point out, in keeping with authoritative foreign doctrine, [Name23]</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces"> </span><span>and [Name24], International Child Abduction by Minors in Costa Rican Family Law, IJSA, 2008, p. 60, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or The Hague Convention:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>“is a set of binding provisions that do not establish the legal regime for the specific case; therefore, it is not a convention on judicial competence, applicable law, or recognition of foreign decisions. It only contemplates systems of authority cooperation and an action for the immediate return of the minor person to the country of their habitual residence.</span><span> </span><span> For this reason, the core point of the process is not the suitability for the exercise of personal care of the minor persons but rather the existence or not of grounds for non-return. This point is of the utmost importance since the international return process for minor persons is not a procedure to decide on custody nor to determine or rule out the suitability of the requested father or mother.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>As a corollary of the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that when substantial aspects involving the best interests of the minor are at stake, it is their Human Rights that will prevail over the application of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, and in this, the pre-eminence or higher hierarchy of Human Rights treaties is imposed. As the Constitutional Chamber has advanced in SC Voto 15461-2008 of</span><span> </span><span> October 5, 2008, which we previously cited, wherein the nationality of the possibly affected children is also important; if it concerns a minor Costa Rican, the principle of the best interests of the child must be preponderantly integrated into the decision. The Chamber stated:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>“Thus, if the minor person regarding whom the possibility of international return is raised turns out to be a Costa Rican who is in national territory, the administrative and judicial authorities that must resolve the matter must take into consideration the existence of express general principles recognized by the country; (…) for failure to do so will result in an illegitimate pronouncement for contradicting specific principles, values, and norms established in the entirety of the Law of the Constitution and which have been defined herein.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>C)</span><span> </span><span> Domestic violence as a ground for recognition to obtain international refugee status protection and the necessary assessment in the extradition procedure.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>The Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría de los Habitantes) expressed as grievance 4) Erroneous assessment of International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments and international judicial cooperation between States and respect for Human Rights. They point out that the lower court judge did not assess that the actions of Mrs. [Name18]</span><span> </span><span> originated from a well-founded fear due to the domestic rape she was suffering.</span><span> </span><span> They asserted that revoking the judgment would bring disastrous consequences for this lady by separating her from her daughter. In support of their thesis, after citing certain norms from the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, or the Guidelines on International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as certain resolutions of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, they affirm that domestic violence is a scenario for which a person can be granted refugee status and that this is the situation presented by Mrs. [Name1]. The grievance is upheld, but on different grounds.</span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> Indeed, it emerges from the extradition proceedings pursued against Mrs. [Name18], that she submitted a refugee application to the corresponding immigration authority, based on the domestic violence suffered by her and her minor daughter [Name16], according to a report from the Defensoría de los Habitantes, visible at folios 1097 et seq., which has not been challenged as invalid by the opposing party. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>As reported, the immigration authorities denied the petition in the first instance, and it was appealed to the Minister of Security, without the final decision having been communicated at the time this case was decided by the Court of Cassation. This Chamber considers that, notwithstanding the constitutional obligation to address these issues, to which we have referred as deriving from Human Rights, these aspects were not considered</span><span> </span><span> in the resolution that granted extradition, with an erroneous application of substantive law. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>From International Human Rights Conventions and Declarations, it is considered that the right to refuge is a Human Right, and our legal system has recognized this by incorporating these various instruments at the infra-constitutional level.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>In accordance with Article 1, Section A, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, incorporated into our Legal System through Law [Name1] No. 6079 of August 28, 1977, the term refugee applies to any person who:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>“as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>This criterion was taken up by domestic law in Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo [Name1] No. 32195 of September 22, 2004, according to which:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>“A refugee is considered any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>For its part, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of November 22, 1984 (recognized and reaffirmed in the San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons of December 7, 1994, Costa Rica), which embodies the best Latin American tradition on the matter, extends this condition to those persons:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>“who have fled their countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order” (Part III, Third). </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>But it is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees who has consistently indicated that one of the grounds on which a refugee application proceeds is, precisely, when a woman suffers domestic violence (Executive Committee Conclusions No. 87 of October 1999, No. 39 of the Executive Committee, Refugee Women and International Protection; No. 73, Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, 1993; No. 77, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1995; number</span><span> </span><span> 79, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1996; and No. 81, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1997).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>In the sub judice case, the immigration authority, in accordance with Articles 111 and 112 of the Ley de Migración y Extranjería, considered the refugee application and denied it; however, the administrative decision was not final as it was appealed to the corresponding Ministry. Therefore, in application of the aforementioned Article 112, given this application, what is appropriate is the suspension of the execution of the extradition until the pertinent matter is resolved. This is an expression of the so-called principle of non-refoulement; the article states the following:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Article 112.- The filing of an application for recognition of refugee or asylee status shall have a suspensive effect on the execution of the extradition of the foreign person, until the corresponding procedure has been completed, by means of a final and unappealable resolution. Recognition of refugee or asylee status shall have the effect of terminating any extradition procedure initiated against the refugee or asylee, at the request of the Government of the country where the alleged crime was committed, based on the same facts that justified said recognition.</span><span> </span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>The factual situations of the examined case must not be seen in isolation but rather linked to the situation of violence against the woman and the girl and the best interests of the minor Costa Ricans; therefore, the interests must be weighed and the greatest respect for Human Rights must be ensured. We shall not repeat what has already been set forth, only emphasize that the lower court judge, by granting the extradition of a person under the conditions we have analyzed, exposes Mrs. [Name18]</span><span> </span><span> and her daughter to greater physical and emotional harm derived from the demonstrated domestic violence.</span><span> </span><span> Therefore, without prejudging or invading the sphere of competence of administrative bodies, which will be responsible for deciding on the refuge; yes, when probable violations of personal integrity and, in sum, probable unjustified attacks on the human rights of the woman and the girl as well as the best interests of the girl are at stake, including that of having her mother and her family, those aspects must be assessed in the extradition according to the postulates of the Law of the Constitution. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>The Human Rights of Women</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>The Costa Rican State has ratified international instruments concerning the advancement of the Human Rights of women that obligate their application because it has ratified them, just as the Conventions themselves contemplate norms that include both the commitment on the part of the respective State not to violate Human Rights, and also a positive action to guarantee the “full and total exercise” of these rights, as is the case of the American Convention, Articles 1 and 2. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Among the international normative sources of Women's Human Rights, we have the following: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948, Article 1); American Convention on Human Rights (1969, Articles 5); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979, Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 9); General Recommendations adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution No. 48/104 of December 20, 1993, Article 4); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women or Convention of Belém do Pará (1994, Articles 1 to 3, 7 and 9); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1999). From this normative set, as expressly stated by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993), it follows that: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>“the rights of women and the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Of all these international instruments, we are interested in noting that they recognize equality, dignity, the right to a life free from violence, and the right to live in peace for Women as fundamental principles.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, approved by Law No. 7499 of June 9, 1994, obligates the Costa Rican State to analyze the situation of violence suffered by a woman in a case submitted for its consideration, such as the one now before us. Thus, in its Articles 2, 4 and 9, it is provided:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span><span>Article 2-. Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual and psychological violence:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>a. that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the woman, and that includes, among others, rape, battery and sexual abuse (…).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Article 4-. Every woman has the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise and protection of all human rights and freedoms embodied in regional and international human rights instruments. These rights include, among others:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>a. the right to have her life respected;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>b. the right to have her physical, mental and moral integrity respected;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>c. the right to personal liberty and security;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>d. the right not to be subjected to torture;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>e. the right to have the inherent dignity of her person respected and her family protected;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>f. the right to equal protection before the law and of the law;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>g. the right to simple and prompt recourse to a competent court for protection against acts that violate her rights (…).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Article 9-. For the adoption of the measures referred to in this chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, among others, their race or ethnic condition, their status as migrants, refugees or displaced persons. In similar regard, consideration shall be given to women subjected to violence while pregnant, disabled, minors, elderly, or in a disadvantaged socioeconomic situation or affected by situations of armed conflict or deprivation of their liberty.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>As for the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women or Convention of Belém do Pará, it constitutes the first international legal instrument that recognizes women's right to live a life free from violence, as well as considers violence against women as a violation of Human Rights; Articles 1 to 3, 7 and 9 state:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Article 1-. For the purposes of this Convention, violence against women shall be understood as any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span><span>Article 2-. Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual and psychological violence: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>a. that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the woman, and that includes, among others, rape, battery and sexual abuse;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>b. that occurs in the community and is perpetrated by any person and includes, among others, rape, sexual abuse, torture, trafficking in persons, forced prostitution, kidnapping and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in educational institutions, health facilities or any other place, and</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>c. that is perpetrated or condoned by the state or its agents regardless of where it occurs.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Article 3-. Every woman has the right to be free from violence in both the public and private spheres.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Article 7-. The States Parties condemn all forms of violence against women and agree to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate such violence and to undertake the following: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>a. refrain from engaging in any act or practice of violence against women and to ensure that their authorities, officials, personnel, agents, and institutions act in conformity with this obligation;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>b. apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence against women;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>c. include in their domestic legislation penal, civil, administrative and any other type of provisions that may be needed to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women and to adopt appropriate administrative measures where necessary;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>d. adopt legal measures to require the perpetrator to refrain from harassing, intimidating, threatening, harming or endangering the life of the woman in any way that harms her integrity or diminishes her property;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>e. take all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to amend or repeal existing laws and regulations or to modify legal or customary practices which sustain the persistence and tolerance of violence against women;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>f. establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to violence which include, among others, protective measures, a timely trial and effective access to such procedures;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>g. establish the necessary judicial and administrative mechanisms to ensure that women subjected to violence have effective access to restitution, reparations or other just and effective means of compensation, and</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>h. adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to this Convention.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>Article 9-. For the adoption of the measures referred to in this chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, among others, their race or ethnic condition or their status as migrants, refugees or displaced persons (…).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>In the extradition procedure of Mrs. [Name18]</span><span> </span><span> as has been stated by the Defensoría de los Habitantes in its appeal, the grievance of which has been upheld, Mrs. [Name18]</span><span> </span><span> was immersed in the cycle of violence against women, as was the girl [Name16], which was demonstrated by the complaint that Mrs. [Name18]</span><span> </span><span> filed in the United States (visible at folio 736 and its translation at folios 747 to 749), as well as by a study conducted by the Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (visible at folios 1050 to 1069) and the very statements of Mrs. [Name18]</span><span> </span><span> in exercise of her material defense at the oral hearing. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>These evidentiary elements were not controverted by the opposing party, namely, the Procuraduría General de la República representing the requesting State; rather, it was indicated by this governmental body that in the United States of North America sufficient protection could be given to the rights of the extraditee not to be violated and to live in peace, as well as to the girl. Since their opposition to the appeal was centered on the fact that domestic violence and the situation of the minor person, as well as the evidence provided, should not be considered in the extradition process, neither in this nor in any other case; in an unsustainable formalism that could even violate other guarantees beyond those alleged by the appellants' appeal, such as access to justice and the right of defense of the extraditable person, and as we shall see, indirectly, the human rights of the minor person.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>This Chamber considers that in the sub judice case, in accordance with the international commitments adopted by Costa Rica upon signing and ratifying the referenced International Human Rights Conventions and by virtue of the application of the Political Constitution, a pronouncement on this matter is necessarily required, because as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has already pointed out in the case of [Name25]</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces"> </span><span>vs. Brazil (2001), a duty of the States is to prevent practices of violence against women, in addition to preventing any state agent from violating the rights of Women through their actions.</span><span> </span><span> In this case, the Convention of Belém do Pará was applied for the first time, and the IACHR decided that the State had breached its obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, sanction, and eradicate domestic violence.</span><span> </span><span> In turn, violations were found of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (for violation of the victim's rights to effective judicial guarantees and protections) and Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, and it was established that among the most important principles is the obligation of States in cases of violence against women,</span><span> </span><span> which includes the duties to prosecute and convict those responsible, as well as the duty to “prevent these degrading practices.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> It follows from this that, given the demonstration of violence against women, the lower court judge in this case, and indeed any judge, must assess and not simply ignore or transfer violence against women to other spheres of competence, if the measure or resolution taken directly or indirectly affects, through omission, the human rights of the woman and the girl child. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> In the case at hand, the requesting State claims against Mrs. [Name1]</span><span> </span><span> for removing a minor from the United States with the intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights, of the minor's father, that she did this while the legal proceedings to define parental authority (patria potestad) in relation to the girl were being processed in the Superior Court of Humboldt County, and that it was in said process that the order had been issued not to remove the minor outside the County. This is penalized in U.S. law under Title 18 United States Code, Section 1204. That extradition request did not contemplate, on the part of the requesting State, any other assessment, nor did the resolution of the lower court judge, regarding the allegations timely made by the technical and material defense, as well as by INAMU, the Defensoría de los Habitantes, and the Public Ministry.</span></p> It did not specifically consider the complaint filed by [Name1] in the United States for domestic violence on August 23, 2005 (visible at folio 736 and its translation at folios 747 to 749); that the physical custody of the girl [Name16] was held by the mother, who had de facto abandoned the marital home due to domestic violence (see the statement of FBI Special Agent [Name26] at folios 124 to 127 and evidentiary document B translation at folio 747); the statement of [Name1] before the Superior Court of California, County of Humboldt, in which [Name18] opposed a visitation arrangement for the girl because the plaintiff endangered the girl (see folio 750); that the father of the girl [Name16] had signed a permit for her departure to Mexico on April 26, 2005 (folio 373); that the Superior Court of California conferred physical custody of [Name16] to her father [Name27] on November 10, 2005 (folio 278 et seq. and its translation at folios 284 et seq.); as well as the Technical Criterion Report prepared by psychologist [Name28], an official of the Women's Delegation, the evidence provided by INAMU (visible at folios 1050 to 1069); the testimony of witness [Name18] (at folio 758 and its translation at folio 762 et seq.); that Mrs. [Name18] filed a refugee application before the immigration authorities based on domestic violence, a proceeding that was denied in the first instance by the immigration authority but was under appeal before the Minister of Security (see the Criterion presented by the Defensoría de los Habitantes at folios 1097 et seq.), and Mrs. [Name18] had also given birth to another Costa Rican child by birth (see birth registration record at folio 372) and had been detained for 14 months, which is why the girl [Name16] was placed in a foster home (see the Criterion presented by the Defensoría de los Habitantes at folios 1097 et seq.).

That evidence was not assessed by the trial judge under the argument that, in the extradition process, only compliance with the requirements and principles set forth in the bilateral extradition treaty between Costa Rica and the United States must be verified. As we have previously noted, an underlying situation of domestic violence and violence against women exists in the present case, and in consideration of the Human Rights of the woman and the girl, the entire factual environment must be assessed, in addition to the legal system, in a hermeneutical manner. Lest the State itself contribute, through its omission, to a violation of Human Rights and thereby incur international responsibility for failing to comply with its international commitments to respect Human Rights before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which evaluate the effectiveness of domestic judicial processes in remedying human rights violations. An examination that encompasses the processes in their entirety and at different levels to determine whether the procedures and the evidence produced were fair. (In this regard, see OEA/Ser.L/II.Doc 68, January 20, 2007, marginal numbers 35, 36, and 39).

According to the technical criterion of psychologist [Name28], an official of the Women's Delegation, and the evidence provided by INAMU (visible at folios 1050 to 1069), [Name1] suffered physical violence consisting of blows delivered with a fist to the head, arms, and back; the throwing of various objects such as ceramic mugs or milk cartons, among others. She experienced psychological violence in the form of constant insults such as "piece of shit, bag of shit, you're worthless, stupid, crack whore, witch, whore"; stalking consisting of accusations of infidelity; threats of judicial actions where he would lie about her maternal role to distance her from her daughter; creation of a climate of terror through reckless driving, cornering her in the shower or in the corners of the house, animal abuse (he severely injured a kitten by throwing it against a fence); and isolation from her family environment and her friends. Likewise, she endured economic violence, which manifested itself through a lack of contribution to the family economy; breaking objects of immediate necessity, such as the girl's chair; preventing her from working; and controlling her personal expenses. The report indicates that the aggressive behavior became increasingly frequent. Mrs. [Name18] was constantly beaten, especially when she was in situations of greater vulnerability: with her girl in her arms (thus placing the minor in the "line of fire"), naked in the shower, before getting out of bed in the mornings, in the car driven at high speed by the aggressor. These blows often warranted medical attention that was not sought. Other events that Mrs. [Name1] highlights are the long periods she left the house with her daughter in her arms, without shelter and without food, waiting for [Name29]'s aggressiveness to subside. In this regard, there was the sworn statement of a neighbor of [Name1], Mrs. [Name18], who relates that she met [Name1] and [Name30] one morning when they came to her door seeking help because [Name27] was furious and throwing objects at her. On various occasions, the aggressor threatened to take the girl away from her. The witness [Name18], the romantic partner of [Name29] until 2007, corroborated that account. [Name31] believes that both [Name29] and his family are controlling and wealthy, and at a certain point they decided, excluding [Name18], to obtain absolute custody of the girl.

The technical report states that the situation of violence continues with the aggressor's attempts to distance the minor from her mother; he attempted to take the girl to the United States against the order of the Childhood and Adolescence authority. The report also, in Annex 1, folios 1071 et seq., points to the emotional risk to the girl [Name16] due to Mr. [Name29]'s refusal to bring the girl to see her mother imprisoned in the El Buen Pastor jail, the impact on the minor from the maternal separation, the scarce bond between the minor and Mr. [Name29], and the mother's pain in the face of separation from her daughter.

In exercising her material defense, Mrs. [Name18] referred to episodes of domestic violence against her and her girl by Mr. [Name29], and her statements were neither refuted nor rebutted, in addition to the INAMU report indicating that an instrument with 19 criteria was applied to Mrs. [Name18]'s account, deeming the account to appear reliable based on the narrative.

All of the evidentiary elements indicated allow this Chamber to conclude that Mrs. [Name18] and her daughter were victims of domestic violence, and this situation must take precedence in the assessment of the extradition.

• D)Access to Justice and Effective Judicial Protection As grievance 5), the Defensoría de los Habitantes set forth the Costa Rican State's commitment to respecting Human Rights. It opposes the statements of the Procuraduría, which refers to the existence of a confraternity of institutions. The Costa Rican State has undertaken a commitment to respect Human Rights by ratifying various International Conventions that protect against violence against women. Mrs. [Name18] is also the mother of two Costa Ricans; from a Human Rights perspective, the integrity of the family must be protected. The specificity of women and of those who are judged within the framework of Human Rights must be assessed, and it also demands respect for and guarantee of all the institutes of the right of Access to Justice. The grievance is upheld. This Chamber has extensively referred to the respect for Human Rights that the Costa Rican State fosters through various manifestations and concrete actions. It remains to analyze the grievance regarding access to justice, which is an undeniable manifestation of effective judicial protection and encompasses various contents, among them an effective remedy in the courts of justice—which does not refer to means of appeal, but to the effective defense of the rights of individuals—the access of particularly vulnerable groups, and justice in the specific case.

Access to Justice is recognized in the various international instruments for the protection of Human Rights, among them: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14(3)), the American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 25), in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, and in sub-constitutional legislation, creating a normative framework through which access to justice without discrimination to judicial instances, de jure and de facto access, is guaranteed.

In Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987, in which the contours of the issue of judicial protection were developed, the opinion is extremely broad and indicated, with respect to Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the following:

"Article 25, also, establishes, in broad terms, the obligation of the States to offer, to all persons subject to their jurisdiction, an effective judicial remedy against acts that violate their fundamental rights. It further provides that the guarantee enshrined therein applies not only with respect to the rights contained in the Convention, but also to those recognized by the Constitution or by law. (…) the States Parties undertake to provide effective judicial remedies to the victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art. 8.1), all within the general obligation of those same States to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every person under their jurisdiction (…) According to this principle, the inexistence of an effective remedy against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of the same by the State Party in which such a situation occurs. In this sense, it must be emphasized that, for such a remedy to exist, it is not enough that it is provided for by the Constitution or by law or that it is formally admissible, but rather it is required that it be truly suitable to establish whether a human rights violation has occurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it. Those remedies that, due to the general conditions of the country or even due to the particular circumstances of a given case, prove illusory cannot be considered effective." Another important step is deduced from Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999, by which access to justice under conditions of equality was guaranteed; the Inter-American Court indicated:

"119. To achieve its objectives, the process must recognize and resolve the factors of real inequality of those brought before justice. It is in this way that the principle of equality before the law and the courts and the correlative prohibition of discrimination are attended. The presence of conditions of real inequality obliges the adoption of compensatory measures that contribute to reducing or eliminating the obstacles and deficiencies that impede or reduce the effective defense of one's own interests. If these means of compensation did not exist, widely recognized in various aspects of the procedure, it could hardly be said that those who find themselves in conditions of disadvantage enjoy true access to justice and benefit from due process of law under conditions of equality with those who do not face such disadvantages." Our country has also undertaken a commitment to respect access to justice for vulnerable populations, with the approval of the 100 Brasilia Regulations regarding access to justice for people in vulnerable conditions of 2008, which represent a joint effort of the XIV Ibero-American Judicial Summit, and it is worth recalling here the recognition given in the Law of the Constitution to declarations that recognize Human Rights. From its text, both substantive and procedural norms are deduced in pursuit of promoting the necessary conditions for the protection to be effective, adopting those measures that best adapt to their condition of vulnerability (rule 25), and minors (rule 5), the situation of migrants and refugees (rules 13 and 14), and the situation of women (rules 17 to 20) are defined as especially vulnerable groups, with special reference in rule 20 to women victims of violence.

Therefore, access to justice does not refer, then, only to the person who initiated a judicial process, but includes those who become procedural parties, for example, the extraditable person, and also, as we have referred to in this case, those who are indirectly affected by the result of a judicial resolution, such is the case of minors, all those covered by that effective defense of the rights of individuals, and particularly when they find themselves in a condition of vulnerability, as we have sufficiently analyzed.

The refusal to resolve and address the situation of these vulnerable persons in the extradition process, as occurred in the case of the trial judge's resolution, in the criterion of this Tribunal violates the observance of Human Rights by omission and gives rise to state responsibility for non-observance of international commitments. Especially in cases such as the one before us, where violence against the woman and the girl was alleged, as well as the refugee situation due to that same violence. By reason of the foregoing, the grievance must be upheld, for violation of the access to justice of the extraditable person [Name1] and her minor daughter [Name16].

• E)The Defensoría de los Habitantes claims as grievance 2) the violation of the principle of dual criminality. The ground was based on the fact that the conduct that motivated the extradition request does not constitute the crime of international child abduction but rather the offense of disobedience to authority, as the Public Prosecutor's Office has referred to in this process, hence we are not before an extraditable crime. It argues that the conduct for which extradition is requested is not criminal and that the extradition must be rejected due to the absence of the objective and normative elements. Due to the manner in which we are resolving the merits of this appeal, this Tribunal considers that it lacks procedural interest to refer expressly to the indicated grievance, given that we have resolved on the merits issues related to Human Rights.
• F)On the Arguments of the Procuraduría General de la República Regarding the arguments presented by Attorney [Name32], in his capacity as Deputy Procurator Director, by which it is deemed that the ruling contains adequate reasoning and that consequently the challenged decision must be confirmed, this Chamber of Cassation deems that they are not admissible, as set forth in the preceding recitals. Moreover, Mr. Procurator, in his opposition, argued basically regarding compliance with formal requirements such as the principle of dual criminality or identity of the norm, made reference to the objective definition of the crime of international child abduction contemplated in Article 184 of the Costa Rican Penal Code and the norm for which extradition was requested by the government of the United States, concluding with profuse constitutional and legal jurisprudence that the facts constituted a crime in the legal system of the United States and in Costa Rica. However, regarding the remaining arguments of the parties, and specifically the challenge by the Defensoría de los Habitantes, he made no greater remarks than general rejection, because according to the position of the Procuraduría General de la República, the domestic violence allegedly suffered by Mrs. [Name18] and the situation of the minor [Name16] should not be considered in the extradition process, and are the competence of the requesting State, and that in the United States of America, sufficient protection could be given to the rights of the person subject to extradition to not be violated and to live in peace, as well as to the girl [Name33]. As we have had the occasion to analyze in the preceding recital, this Chamber has carried out a hermeneutical interpretation of the Costa Rican legal system that grants international Human Rights treaties supra-constitutional value, placing the respect for human dignity and the Human Rights of the woman and the girl not to be discriminated against or violated, to enjoy a family free of violence, the best interest of the minor, and their integral protection as needing to be assessed at the moment of issuing the corresponding resolution, and no administrative or judicial State organ is exempt from this obligation. Consequently, this Chamber postponed the further analysis of the extradition procedure with all its fundamental principles and institutes, in the face of that universal set of rights that are recognized to human beings for the mere fact of being so. In the case sub judice, it is not possible to separate the Human Rights situation of the requested woman and the girl from the extradition process given the situation of domestic violence and the necessary respect for human dignity that the Costa Rican legal system recognizes. In that sense, the argument regarding compliance with dual criminality, upon which the Procuraduría General de la República, representing the government of the United States of America, directed all its efforts, has lost legal interest, by reason of the application of the constitutional norms, principles, and values that inspire the Law of the Costa Rican Constitution, in addition to the principle of normative hierarchy, and which imply a bundle of guarantees regarding the respect for Human Rights that, as extensively set forth, prevent the surrender. Consequently, the appeal filed by [Name34], in her capacity as Defensora de los Habitantes de la República, is granted. Judgment No. 130-P-2009 of the Puntarenas Trial Court, issued at thirteen hours on April twenty, two thousand nine, is revoked. Consequently, the extradition of Mrs. [Name1], requested by the United States of America, is denied. Immediately release Mrs. [Name1], if no other cause prevents it. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the other appeals that were filed is omitted.

Through the appropriate channel, communicate this to the Government of the United States.” **Exp:** 08-000033-0016-PE **Res:** 2009-00246 **CRIMINAL APPEALS COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA,** San Ramón, at seventeen hundred hours on June twenty-sixth, two thousand nine.

**APPEAL** filed in the present extradition proceeding brought in this case by the Government of the United States of America against [Name1], an adult, a United States citizen, born in the State of California on March seventeenth, nineteen hundred eighty, twenty-eight years of age, art teacher, in a common-law union. Participating in the decision on the appeal are Judges [Name2], Jazmín Rodríguez Hernández, and Judge Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas. Appearing in cassation are Attorney [Name3], representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), Attorney [Name4], prosecutor of the Office of Technical Advice and International Relations (Oficina de Asesoría Técnica y Relaciones Internacionales), Attorney [Name5], Attorney General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and Attorney [Name6], private defense counsel for the extraditable [Name1]; the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) represented by [Name7], Ombudsman (Defensora de los Habitantes) of the Republic, and by Attorney [Name8] in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman (defensor adjunto de los Habitantes); the National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INAMU) represented by [Placa1]. [Name9], Executive President, in the capacity of coadjuvant.

**WHEREAS** **1.** In judgment 130-P-2009, the Puntarenas Trial Court, by resolution at thirteen hundred hours on April twentieth, 2009, granted the extradition of [Name1], requested by the government of the United States of America, to stand trial for the acts with which she is charged and which have been heard in this proceeding, for the offense of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menor). The requesting state must take custody of the accused within two months following the finality of this judgment, which runs from the moment they are notified that the prisoner is at their disposal; failure to do so within that time will result in an order for the release of the person sought. Prior to her surrender, the State of the United States of America must present a formal undertaking that it will not impose a death penalty or life imprisonment on the accused, and that she will not be subjected to penalties different from the acts for which extradition is being granted here. The costs of detention and surrender of the accused are the responsibility of the requesting state. The order is made to maintain the imprisonment imposed on [Name1], pursuant to the resolution of fourteen hundred ten minutes on November seventh, two thousand eight, of the Criminal Appeals Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, Section One. Once this resolution is final, Ms. [Name10] shall be placed at the disposal of the United States authorities so that the procedure for her departure from the country may be carried out, for which purpose said authorities have two months. It is not necessary to make a special pronouncement on assets, as no requests on this point were submitted to the record; therefore, the accused will be surrendered only with her personal belongings and identification documents she possesses at the time. Notify all parties of this resolution. [Name11], Judge.

**2.** That the previous pronouncement was appealed by Attorney [Name6], private defense counsel for the extraditable [Name1], Attorney [Name12], interim prosecutor of the Office of Technical Advice and International Relations, Attorney [Name5], Attorney General of the Republic, and the Office of the Ombudsman represented by [Name7], Ombudsman of the Republic.

**3.** That, having carried out the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código de Procesal Penal), the Court addressed the questions raised in the appeal.

**4.** That the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

Written by Judge of Cassation [Name2]; and, **CONSIDERING:** **I.- Content of the challenge:** A. Defense’s Appeal. Attorney [Name6], in his capacity as private defense counsel for the extraditable person, sets forth in the briefs on folios 1619 et seq., and in oral argument before this Court, the following grievances: 1) Grounds: violation of due process, which affects the judgment of the lower court judge due to an absolutely defective procedural action. Absence of requirements and defects in the judgment. Basis: the lower court judge did not assess the actions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) or its arguments, despite the fact that the Public Prosecutor’s Office exercises control over criminal legality. By failing to resolve the issues raised during deliberation, substantive law and due process are violated, resulting in a failure to meet the requirements of the judgment. 2) Erroneous assessment of the facts. The physical custody of the minor [Name13] was not considered proven to be held by the mother, the person sought here, this being one of the debated points. A fact that is amply demonstrated, even by the declaration of FBI officer [Name14], which is determinative given that in our legal system, an action committed by someone who maintains a minor in their physical power and material custody is not classified as the offense of child abduction (sustracción de menor), since the crime refers to the act of separating or displacing a minor or incapacitated person from their physical location, which constitutes a judicial error in the appreciation and assessment of the evidence, by not considering it proven that the mother retained that right at the time of the minor's removal. 3) Erroneous application of substantive law. Failure to comply with the principle of double criminality (doble incriminación). The central argument established by the Public Prosecutor’s Office is not resolved or analyzed, namely that the mother had physical custody of the minor when leaving the United States, which does not constitute the offense of child abduction but rather the offense of disobedience to authority, meaning extradition is not appropriate due to the absence of a fundamental principle. It is assessed that the act of abducting (sustraer) consists of taking the girl from the sphere of physical custody, which did not occur because the mother had physical custody; he exemplifies the case of a Costa Rican parent who decides to travel abroad because they have physical custody of a minor, who does not commit the offense of child abduction. 4) Absence of reasoning and analysis of the principle of double criminality.

The resolution of the lower court (juez a quo) does not contain an assessment of each norm of the requesting and requested country; it merely limits itself to transcribing each one of them, without explaining why both norms are equivalent and coincident. 5) Overreach of the lower court’s (juez A quo) competence. The official commits disobedience to authority by assessing the existence of the facts despite this Court expressly instructing him not to engage in such assessments. The appellant requests that the appealed resolution be declared ineffective and that the appellate court (Ad quem) proceed to apply the law and the legal system and issue the corresponding ruling, declaring the non-existence of the principle of dual criminality. The release of her client, who has been in prison for one year and two months, is requested.

**B. Appeal by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público)**. In the filings at folios 1610 et seq., Prosecutor [Name15] and in the oral presentation before this Chamber of Cassation (Cámara de Casación) by Dr. [Name16], the following grievances are indicated. 1) Non-compliance with the principle of dual criminality. The requesting State did not comply with the principle of dual criminality; thus, at folio 65, it is established that Mrs. [Name17] left the house where she lived with the minor’s father in 2004, and it was in August 2005 that the father initiated proceedings to define the guardianship of the minor, insofar as the facts alleged did not constitute the crime for which Mrs. [Name17] was requested, as is evident from the analysis of various resolutions of the Court of Cassation of San José, such as resolutions 465-f-98, of July 1, 1998; resolution 662-2002 of nine-thirty hours on August 29, 2002; and resolution 141-2009 issued by the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), which was read aloud during the relevant portion of the oral hearing, in addition to other judgments of the aforementioned court that explain what the crime of child abduction (sustracción de persona menor de edad) consists of. Given this analysis, it is asserted that the present case would merely involve disobedience to authority, which is why they request that the appeal filed be dismissed. In the view of the prosecutorial body, there must be a substantial analysis, not one based on the *nomen iuris*, and the elements provided for in the criminal statute must be analyzed, since those were the aspects to be verified, and extradition must not be converted into a mere paperwork formality. He stated that what the United States of America calls "abduction" ("sustracción") does not coincide with the norm provided for in Costa Rica, as the woman did not "abduct" ("sustrajo") her daughter, and the verbs contemplated in our legal system to punish these acts could not be interpreted broadly. According to the documentation provided, Mrs. [Name17] was requested for disobeying a judicial order, and this description does not correspond to what is stipulated in Article 184 of the Penal Code. The present case involves a disobedience to authority, as provided for in Article 307 of the Penal Code, punishable by up to one year in prison, and therefore, extradition should not be granted given that it carries an insignificant penalty. At the oral hearing, the Attorney General expanded on the grounds and arguments and indicated: 2) Lack of assessment of the International Human Rights Conventions on Women and Children. He notes that the resolution of the lower court (juez A quo) does not assess the fact that the Costa Rican State has a policy option of protecting victims of sexual and domestic violence. In this case, it was established that the extraditable person, [Name17], is a victim of domestic violence at the hands of her partner and father of the minor, [Name18], and that her departure from the United States was to protect her life and that of her daughter, who is Costa Rican and has a human right to happiness and peace. This concerns the judicial protection of a human being, the rights of women, and the protection of a Costa Rican minor. He requests the protection of Costa Rican legislation, that the appealed resolution be revoked, and that the extradition be declared without merit. This request is to be resolved orally due to her fourteen months of imprisonment, to be resolved by granting her immediate release.

**C. Appeal by the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría de los Habitantes)**. Dr. [Name7], in her capacity as Ombudsperson (Defensora de los Habitantes), in the filing at folios 1635 et seq., and Mr. [Name19], in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsperson (Defensor Adjunto de los Habitantes), at the oral hearing, indicated that the institution they represent has standing to act in these cases, as provided for in Articles 1 and 13 of Law No. 7319, the Law of the Office of the Ombudsperson (Ley de la Defensoría de Los Habitantes), which empowers them to bring actions in the administrative or judicial sphere. They indicated the following grievances: 1) Regarding the extradition process, the duty to guarantee respect for the rights and guarantees of the persons involved in the extradition process. The work of the judge is important as the body responsible not only for fulfilling the international obligation to the requesting State but also for ensuring the application of the fundamental principles of human rights that guarantee the administration of justice. For the Ombudsperson's Office, the work of judges must go beyond the formal verification of requirements to an analysis of the grounds of justification in each specific case that reflect the conflicts and needs of individuals—the reason for the system's existence. The State holds a power-duty regarding the exercise of justice within the framework of a sovereign State. The jurisdictional function implies assessments that the judge can and must make. 2) Violation of the principle of dual criminality. The ground was based on the fact that the conduct that motivated the extradition request does not constitute the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores) but rather the offense of disobedience to authority, as the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) has already indicated in this proceeding; hence, this is not an extraditable crime. The conduct for which extradition is requested is not a criminal offense and extradition must be rejected due to the absence of objective and normative elements. The appeal notes that the order from the Humboldt County Court was to not remove the minor from the state limits, not from the United States, for which reason there is no international child abduction. The challenge also argues that the minor’s father gave authorization for the minor [Name18] to leave the country; although there was a change of destination, [Name1] indeed had paternal authorization. Moreover, the crime of disobedience does not constitute a basis for extraditing a person. The Childhood and Adolescence Court (Juzgado de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia), in judgment 60-2009, denied the international return of the child [Name18], considering the best interests of minors and taking into account that the father granted permission to leave the country in April 2005 to travel to Mexico, which did not indicate a return date, so it was an open-ended permission. In this case, the minor was placed in a foster home because, for that court, no international child abduction had occurred. Thus, according to the narrative of facts, which is the alleged factual framework, it would not be applicable as a crime subject to extradition. Furthermore, if extradition were granted at this instance of Cassation, the principle of double instance would be violated. Mrs. [Name17] entered prison in April 2008; in detention at El Buen Pastor (El Buen Pastor) she must also care for her other minor child—also Costa Rican and from another relationship—while in prison. 3) Lack of assessment of the Human Rights of the Child [Name18]. The minor was transferred to Costa Rica, the country where she was born and of which she is a citizen. The resolution of the lower court (juez a quo) does not assess the rights of either the mother or the daughter and proceeds to render invisible the outcome that would result from the effective extradition of the extraditable person: the delivery of the child to a father who has not been deemed suitable by Costa Rican courts. Furthermore, the extradited woman has another Costa Rican child, the minor [Name20], who is currently placed with his mother at the El Buen Pastor center and will be left in a state of abandonment once the extradition becomes final. The human rights of the Costa Rican child [Name18] will be directly affected, which violates her physical and emotional integrity, her dignity, her right to a life free from violence, her right to a family, and places her in a situation of special vulnerability, in flagrant violation of children's rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which also extends to the Costa Rican minor son of [Name1], named [Name20]. 4) Erroneous assessment of International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments and international judicial cooperation between States and respect for Human Rights. Mrs. [Name17]’s actions originated from a well-founded fear of the domestic violence she suffered. The appeal argues that revoking the decision would bring disastrous consequences for this woman by separating her from her daughter. In support of their argument, after citing certain norms of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, or the Guidelines on International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as some resolutions of the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners (Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería), they affirm that domestic violence is a ground on which a person can be granted refugee status and that this is the situation presented by Mrs. [Name1]. The well-founded fear of persecution exercised by Mrs. [Name17]'s intimate partner was what caused the objective and subjective state of necessity for the latter to leave her country for Costa Rica, seeking refuge from fear. The refugee situation is based on persecution by a non-state agent and not on the exhaustion of existing measures in her country of origin. Mrs. [Name17] seeks refuge from her situation of domestic violence, not to remove the minor from the father's sphere of custody. The domestic violence situation was even reported by Mrs. [Name17] herself on August 23, 2005, before the Superior Court of California, County of Humboldt. Mrs. [Name17] recounts how fear took hold of her, being present in different episodes of her life, for example: “*in 2001 when Tierra was just walking, she was crying about something and was walking into our room. [Name21] yelled at her and slammed the door in her face so hard that it made a hole in the door (…) after drinking a lot, he yelled every morning, he traumatized Tierra; I had to take her to my neighbors' house (even before breakfast) so we could get away from his violence. He would yell and Tierra would start screaming, scared (…) he called me a 'whore and a slut' in front of my daughter. He verbally abused me while Tierra was with me on many occasions.*” She also relates that she went to Mr. [Name22]’s mother seeking help and told her about the domestic violence situation she and her daughter faced, and when he found out, “*he yelled at me and threatened to do bad things to me if I told his mother again that he wasn't taking care of Tierra*” (see folio 1640). Thus, invoking the existence of a well-founded fear, the principle of *in dubio pro agredida* (presumption in favor of the aggrieved woman), and the best interests of the minor involved in this situation, they request that the possibility of a justifying conduct on the part of the extraditable person in coming to Costa Rica be assessed, that the best interests of the child be ensured, and that re-victimization within the framework of justice and the national legal system be avoided. The case file contains a psychological report prepared by INAMU that documents the symptomatology of Mrs. [Name17] as a victim of domestic violence. In addition to the above, they argue that the rejection of the refugee application filed on behalf of Mrs. [Name17] is currently on appeal before the Minister of Public Security (Ministra de Seguridad Pública), and if granted, it would terminate the ongoing extradition proceeding. The principle of non-refoulement of refugees must be applied. Finally, it considered that the Hague Treaty related to the interpretation of international treaties or conventions should be applied in strict respect of human rights. 5) The Costa Rican State’s commitment to respect for Human Rights. It opposes the statements by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) that refer to the existence of a confraternity of institutions. The Costa Rican State has assumed a commitment to respect human rights by ratifying various International Conventions that protect women against violence. Mrs. [Name17] is also the mother of two Costa Ricans; from a Human Rights perspective, the integrity of the family must be protected. The specificity of women and of those being judged within the framework of Human Rights must be assessed; respect and guarantee of all institutions of the right of Access to Justice are required. It is requested that the appeal be granted and that [Name1]’s release be decreed because the reasonable time limits have been exceeded. In the event the petition is not granted, it is requested that the deduction of pre-trial detention time served in this proceeding be guaranteed, and the obligation of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) to monitor her situation through consular channels.

**D. Joinder by the National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres).** The National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres), through its Executive President, Msc. [Name9], has appeared as a supporting party to the three appeals filed, on the grounds of defending Women's Rights. They stated in the filing at folios 1727 and at the hearing, represented by Ms. [Name23], that given the absence of the principle of dual criminality regarding the facts of which she was accused, they have opposed the granting of extradition in this case at all times, because Mrs. [Name1] did not abduct the minor from parental custody, as her mother had her under her sphere of protection and guardianship. Hence, they maintain the view that what exists is merely a disobedience to authority, and since this offense does not carry a penalty exceeding one year of imprisonment, extradition could not be authorized. They request that the serious situation of domestic violence faced by Mrs. [Name17] and her daughter at the hands of the aggressor, Mr. [Name21], be assessed; he has used one of the mechanisms commonly used in these types of situations to maintain control over the victims, namely the instrumentalization of the children. [Name1] was subjected to systematic and daily domestic violence; she lived in a difficult situation with acute post-traumatic stress, which is what women subjected to domestic violence suffer. There is a psychological report prepared by INAMU staff that is in the record and must be assessed, which reveals the torture of Mrs. [Name17]; it is a professional and technical report, analyzing verbal statements over several sessions with a content analysis. The importance of the fight against domestic violence and in protection of persons who are victims of this type of aggression in our country was indicated, while also noting that the extraditable woman was precisely a victim of this social problem. She added that Mrs. [Name17] did not commit the crime of international child abduction, as she did not do so with the intention of separating her daughter from the father, but with the purpose of avoiding the domestic violence situation she was experiencing—a decision she made as a consequence of not being duly heard by the authorities of her country, that is, the United States of America. She also stated that Mrs. [Name17] came to this country to start a life project and that this is only a crime of disobedience to authority, for which reason she requested that the judgment be confirmed and that her immediate release be ordered.

**E. Statements by the Extraditable Person**. At the oral hearing, Mrs. [Name1] stated that she suffered domestic violence for four years from Mr. [Name21]; he hit her, verbally assaulted her, and what she feared most happened: he told her he would lie to the authorities to take her daughter away, he would tell the authorities she had no fixed address and with that they would give him custody of the child. The police could not protect her in California because the law only gives one day of imprisonment for domestic violence. She did not kidnap her daughter; they separated because of the assaults before the relocation, and then she came to this country because she had lived here before. [Name18] was born here; she had physical and legal custody of her daughter. Her daughter's father signed a permission for her to come to Costa Rica, so he knew she would come and therefore she could not have kidnapped her daughter, as she already had permission to bring her. She indicated that her daughter wants to be with her, as does the son she now has; they need their mother, to the point that a Costa Rican judge granted her custody of her daughter. She has suffered from being in prison, as has her daughter. She came to Costa Rica seeking protection. Her children are Costa Rican and deserve the right to be with their mother; she only wants to be with her family under the law of Costa Rica. She stated, “I could leave and I came to Costa Rica. He is very violent; one day he threw a chair at the child, and it came within two inches of hitting her.” **II.- Opposition of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) to the Appeal.** Mr. [Name3], in his capacity as Attorney General Director (Procurador Director), opposed the grievances of the parties and indicated that the challenged resolution must be confirmed. He considers that the extradition request was made by the Government of the United States of America against [Name1], a citizen of that country, who is being prosecuted for the crime of international child abduction. He considers that in this case, the extradition of Mrs. [Name17] was appropriate, as all the requirements, rules, and principles by which such requests are admitted are met. Regarding the argument in the appeals that dual criminality does not exist, the appellants fail to assess that this involves the crime of international child abduction, as the lower court (juez A quo) does. There is no right to give a different connotation to the facts contained in the extradition request. The appellants improperly modify the requesting State's claim and gave a different connotation to the facts for which the surrender of Mrs. [Name17] was requested; the appellants involve other facts not contained in the extradition request by asserting that the required factual scenario fits the crime of disobedience to authority, without considering that the extradition request expressly indicates that Mrs. [Name17] abducted her daughter from the United States of America to prevent her father from obtaining custody, and not as a consequence of having disobeyed a judicial order.

Based on existing jurisprudence on this matter, which he cites, the appellant argues that the judging authority should have limited itself to verifying whether, in this case, the requirements were met and the principles recognized by International Law, by which it is admissible to grant an extradition, were respected, as this is not a matter of a criminal nature but rather a procedural institution through which the surrender of the requested or extraditable person is guaranteed.

In his argument, he notes that Article 184 of the Penal Code is located among the offenses related to the protection of the family, which means its interpretation must be made in safeguard of the existing family rights, which is the legal interest to be protected, as stated by the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José) in Resolutions No. 456-F-98 of 15:30 hours on July 1, 1998, No. [Telf3] of 9:30 hours on August 29, 2002, and No. [Telf4] of 14:15 hours on May 8, 2008. He argues that the normative element “sustraer” contained in the requesting State's norm must be understood as the Real Academia Española defines it, in several senses such as to steal and to purloin, and as to remove or separate; and in the present case, Mrs. [Name17] removed or separated the minor [Name18] from the parental rights that corresponded to the father. There need not be an exact similarity between the criminal statutes of both countries; it is sufficient that it is a crime in both legislations, without this implying that the criminal statute must be absolutely identical.

According to the evidence provided by the requesting country, the extraditable individual [Name1]. had naturally a joint and equitable right over her daughter with her father, Mr. [Name21], and that regardless of the custody she had over this minor, the father also had the same right, it being precisely in the proceeding instituted in the United States of America where the legal custody that would correspond to each of them was to be discussed. It further adds that the Superior Court of the County of Humboldt not only served the requested party with the order for the hearing where the custody of her daughter would be discussed, but also an order expressly prohibiting her from moving the latter outside the County of Humboldt in the State of California, and in that proceeding, legal custody of the girl was ultimately granted to Mr. [Name21]. It indicated that there is no discussion whatsoever regarding the characterization of the facts for which extradition is requested within our legislation, since it was amply demonstrated that the requested party indeed wrongfully removed (sustrajo) the girl, and the controversial point being resolved, that is, the possibility that one of the parents could be considered an active subject of the crime; it is the consideration of this Office that the facts for which the extraditable individual is requested fit within the crime termed "child abduction (sustracción de menor)", regulated by our substantive criminal law in article 184; thus complying with the principle of double criminality or principle of identity.

Finally, it notes that domestic violence and the situation of the minor should not be considered in the extradition process; it was indicated that in the United States of America, sufficient protection could be given to the rights of the extradited person not to be violated and to live in peace, as well as to the girl. It requests the rejection of each and every appeal and that the resolution of the lower court judge (Juez a quo) be declared in accordance with the law.

III. ON THE MERITS

This Court hears three appeals filed by the private defense of the extraditable individual [Name1], the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), and the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes), appeals which were filed in a timely and proper manner in accordance with the provisions of the Extradition Law; the coadjuvancy of the National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INAMU) was also accepted. For reasons of procedural economy and considering that the appeal of the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) encompasses the entirety of the grievances argued by the parties in the different means of challenge, as well as collects the statements of the coadjuvancy of INAMU, this Court will refer solely to this appeal. This Chamber, after evaluating the grievances indicated by the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes), grants the grievances in the manner set forth below, highlighting that, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights indicates, remedies must be rapid, informal, and fair (articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. [Name24], International [responsibility] of the state for denial and challenge of justice and violation of judicial guarantees", in, IACHR: The Court and the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 1994, p. 588.):

• A)The duty to guarantee Human Rights in the Extradition process The appeal of the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) indicates as grievance 1) The extradition process must guarantee respect for the rights and guarantees of the persons involved in the extradition process. The work of the judge is important insofar as they become the body responsible for fulfilling the international obligation towards the requesting State, but also for complying with the application of the fundamental principles of human rights that guarantee the administration of justice. For the Ombudsman's Office, the work of judges must go beyond the formal verification of requirements to proceed to the analysis of the grounds for justification in each specific case that account for the conflicts and needs of the persons, which is the reason for being of the system; the State holds a power-duty in the exercise of justice, within the framework of a sovereign State. The jurisdictional function implies evaluations that the judge can and must carry out. The grievance is granted for partially different reasons. This Court has assessed whether, in addition to compliance with the formal requirements and general principles established by the bilateral extradition treaty between Costa Rica and the United States, other aspects related to the prevailing block of legality in the Costa Rican State, which is characterized as a democratic Republic of Law, must be analyzed. In this sense, this Chamber considers that the Law of the Constitution, which is composed of the norms, principles, constitutional values, and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), binds all public powers and citizens. It follows that the Law of the Constitution forms part of the block or parameter of legality that the ordinary judge must interpret and apply when exercising their jurisdictional function, in accordance with the provisions of article 154 of the Political Constitution.

Even though a concentrated system of constitutionality control subsists in our legal system, such circumstance does not inhibit the ordinary jurisdiction from the duty to guarantee the observance and application of the Constitution, which is the foundation of the legal system; therefore, the ordinary judge, when applying any norm or act, cannot disregard the constitutional precepts, values, and principles given the judicial function of ensuring the supremacy of the law and the preservation of the legal system.

The extradition process has been characterized by our constitutional and legal jurisprudence as a special procedure of international collaboration or assistance through which one State (requesting) requests from another State (requested) the surrender of a person in order to subject them to a criminal proceeding being conducted in its country, or to serve a sentence imposed as a consequence of a criminal proceeding conducted against them, thereby making the administration of justice of the requesting State effective. Faced with this, the requested State must assess, in accordance with the requirements and principles that inform this matter, whether the request made for the surrender of the requested person is appropriate.

Even the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) indicates that it is a special procedure different from the criminal process and, to that effect, states in SC vote 08261-2008 of May 14, 2008, the following:

"This Chamber, on different occasions, has indicated that extradition is an act of international legal assistance and is nothing other than the means of making possible the presence of the accused in a criminal proceeding in another country that requires them. Its foundation, then, lies in the solidarity of States and the need to overcome the limitations that the principle of territoriality imposes on the prosecution and punishment of crimes, which prevents applying criminal law to events occurring outside the country where the alleged offender has sought refuge. This act of international cooperation between States, due to the problems of territoriality, distance, difference in cultures and legal systems, is endowed with a series of procedures and regulations that seek to overcome the obstacles that may arise due to these differences, while seeking to reconcile and ensure respect for the legal systems of both countries, including the norms for the protection of the rights of the alleged offender. Precisely these noted differences mean that the detention and sending of the accused person to the courts of justice is regulated differently from the detention of an alleged offender in one's own country." This Court considers that although it might initially seem that the Judge of the requested State should limit themselves to verifying only the formal requirements and principles that inform extradition (among them: double criminality, principle of specialty, which in turn carries a penalty of imprisonment of more than one year, does not provide for the death penalty, nor involves political crimes, etc.) because it is a matter of international cooperation between States in which a requested State serves as a passage for the action of the other State; we must highlight that this procedure implies, in the requested State, a jurisdictional and constitutional control, including: the subjection of powers to the Constitution, the hierarchy and publicity of norms, the prohibition of arbitrariness, and legal certainty.

Although extradition is not an institution for defending or imposing a particular legal system, in the face of extradition, which is an instrument in the fight against impunity and the right of the potential victims of crime, we also have the obligation to observe the rights of the person affected by the procedure; this, undoubtedly, is the role of the Rule of Law State in the face of the acts of the powers of other States, and as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) indicates in the previously cited vote, "the norms for the protection of the rights of the alleged offender" must be respected.

On the rights of foreigners In the present case, the application of a set of Human Rights to a foreign citizen [Name1] is sought. Therefore, the legal regime for foreigners in our current legal system must be examined.

The Political Constitution, in Article 19, states that:

«Foreigners have the same individual and social duties and rights as Costa Ricans, with the exceptions and limitations that this Constitution and the laws establish.» This norm has been dimensioned by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in multiple votes, it being valid, as constitutional doctrine, to establish differences between nationals and foreigners when they are founded, both in norms of constitutional rank and in those of legal rank, provided that the latter are logical, reasonable, and consistent with the principle of proportionality, and are not contrary to human dignity (see SC vote 01684-91, at 4:00 p.m. on August 28, 1991; SC vote 1440-92 at 3:30 p.m. on June 2, 1992; SC vote 01282-90, at 3:00 p.m. on October 16, 1990, and it has reiterated this in the following rulings: see rulings SC vote 02093-93, at 2:06 p.m. on May 19, 1993; SC vote 02754-93, at 2:36 p.m. on June 15, 1993; SC vote 04601-94, at 9:33 a.m. on August 26, 1994; SC vote 05965-94, at 3:51 p.m. on October 11, 1994; SC vote 00319-95, at 2:42 p.m. on January 17, 1995; 05670-95, at 3:39 p.m. on October 17, 1995; and CED1, at 10:48 a.m. on July 31, 1998).

In SC vote 02570-97, of May 13, 1997, the High Court stated:

"Certainly, the first paragraph of article 19 of the Constitution establishes that: «Foreigners have the same individual and social duties and rights as Costa Ricans, with the exceptions and limitations that this Constitution and the laws establish», which means that, regarding the set of fundamental rights, differences between nationals and non-nationals would only be valid if they have constitutional and legal rank, and in the latter case, always insofar as the differentiation fully conforms to the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality that guide the legislative function, and of course, as long as it is not contrary to human dignity. This Chamber, in developing the content of the norm under analysis, has eliminated as unconstitutional a series of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights by foreigners, whose sole basis was the criterion of nationality, which has been repeatedly discarded as a valid reason for differentiations between them." From the foregoing, it can be inferred that foreigners in our Law are holders of Human and fundamental rights, of those contemplated by the Political Constitution and international instruments, and that foreigners must be treated according to their dignity as persons and with respect for their Human Rights.

Value of Human Rights in the Costa Rican State Human Rights constitute a universal legal framework of mandatory compliance for States; these are recognized based on the dignity of every human being, in all the ontological sense that this implies; by the mere fact of being human, the human being has a series of rights and discriminatory treatment is prohibited. In that recognition, all human beings have a dignity, and one cannot speak of a greater dignity of some with respect to others, which leads to the prohibition of any type of discrimination.

The constitutional doctrine emanating from the specialized Chamber is profuse and early on recognized that human rights conventions and instruments have supra-constitutional validity and self-executing application; in that sense, all state activity must develop within those parameters.

The validity in the Costa Rican State of Human Rights instruments as a source of applicable law derives from the Political Constitution itself and is complemented by article 1 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Thus, in the case of international Human Rights instruments in force in the country, the provisions of article 7 of the Political Constitution do not apply, as a special norm exists in article 48 for Conventions referring to Human Rights, granting them a normative force of the constitutional level itself and placing them as a parameter for the interpretation of the text of the Constitution, as well as its derived principles; consequently, the interpretation and application of secondary legislation are linked to them.

The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has recognized that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica have not only a value similar to the Political Constitution, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution (vid., SC vote 3435-92 of November 11, 1992, and its clarification, SC vote 5759-93 and SC vote 2313-95 at 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995).

In the same manner, the existence of the pro libertate and pro homine principles has been indicated in SC vote 3173-93, as the hard core or essence of Human Rights, the content of which is as follows:

"…the pro libertate principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitute the core of the human rights doctrine; according to the first, everything that favors liberty must be interpreted extensively and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the second, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that most favors the human being." Likewise, it has been recognized by the Highest Court that the Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have full value in the Costa Rican State and that, regarding Human Rights, its decisions bind the Costa Rican State; thus, in SC vote 2313-95 at 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, and when resolving the mandatory constitutional inquiry formulated by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly on the bill for the approval of the "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", it expressly referred to the effectiveness granted in Costa Rica to international instruments on Human Rights not formally signed or approved according to the constitutional procedure, as follows:

"In this aspect, we must highlight the specific reference that the Constitution now makes to 'international instruments', meaning that not only conventions, treaties, or agreements, formally signed and approved in accordance with the constitutional procedure itself (such is the case that now concerns us), but any other instrument having the proper nature of human rights protection, even if it has not undergone that procedure, is in force and applicable in the country. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, December 10, 1948), by its character and nature, has not required the constitutional approval procedures to be understood as in force and with the normative force granted by the matter it regulates. The same can be said of the 'Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners', of the United Nations Organization, which, although they are the product of expert meetings or the work of some department of that organization, because our country belongs to it, and because they refer to fundamental rights, have the value of any international norm that has been formally incorporated into Costa Rican domestic law." Finally, in SC vote 2002-10693 of November 7, 2002, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) reiterates that, in accordance with article 48 of the Political Constitution:

"all international instruments on human rights have been elevated to constitutional rank, and consequently, these must be incorporated into the interpretation of the Constitution." Regarding the self-executing application of Human Rights Conventions, two positions are usually distinguished in the doctrine: the first posits the programmatic character of human rights conventions; according to this position, the articles of the Conventions are not applied directly but leave substantive implementation to domestic legislation and jurisdiction (in that sense, Report of the United States delegation to the San José conference where the American Convention on Human Rights was approved, in: JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, The American Convention as Domestic Law, 1988, p.40-41).

The second position admits, as a general rule, the self-executing character of the norms contained in human rights conventions, that is, their norms can be invoked as applicable law by the courts once ratified, as an effect of the norms binding the States-Parties and not only their governments but also being directed at the remaining legislative and judicial powers, which are compelled to give effect to the conventions in domestic law. (See, in that sense, the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights OC-7/86 of August 26, 1986, and vote of Judge [Name25] in case [Name26] and [Name27] vs. Colombia, in the judgment on reparations of January 29, 1997, sections 6, 7 and 9; Case [Name28] vs. Costa Rica of July 2, 2004, in which the self-executing nature of the American Convention on Human Rights is recognized).

The position of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on the self-executing character of Human Rights is manifest; first in a Habeas Corpus appeal and later in an unconstitutionality appeal, it recognized the self-executing character of Human Rights, which produces as an effect the non-application of lower-ranking norms that oppose a human rights treaty; in that sense, see SC vote 282-90 of March 3, 1990, and the precedent SC vote 719-90 of June 26, 1990, both on the right to appeal a conviction, and SC vote 1319-97 of March 4, 1997, consolidating the constitutional interpretation of the self-executing character of the norms of International Human Rights Law.

"...the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers interested parties to file an unconstitutionality action against legal provisions that conflict with those of an international treaty, considering that by doing so they violate the higher normative hierarchy of the latter, in accordance with Article 7 of the Political Constitution; this does not preclude that, when the treaty provisions are self-executing and enforceable by themselves, without the need for other norms to develop them in domestic law, the legal provisions that contradict them must simply be deemed repealed, precisely by virtue of the superior rank of the treaty. In this manner, the antinomy between law and treaty, following the reform of Articles 10, 48, 105, and 128 of the Constitution (Law No. 7128 of August 18, 1989, effective since September 1) and, above all, the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (No. 7135 of October 11, 1989, effective since its publication on the 19th), is resolved, first and as far as possible, by the automatic repeal of the former insofar as it conflicts with the latter, without prejudice to its also being able to be resolved through a declaration of unconstitutionality of the law." This position is also followed in other pronouncements, thus, SC vote 3435-92 of November 11, 1992; SC vote 2313-95 of May 9, 1995, among others.

**Position in the hierarchy of norms of International Human Rights Treaties and** It is important to point out here the hierarchy of International Human Rights Treaties and other International Treaties, given that, on one hand, we have in the case sub judice the application of an Extradition Treaty with the United States of America and the application of International Human Rights Treaties invoked by the Defensoría de los Habitantes and extendable to the rest of the challengers.

We find that traditional normative sources have been enriched by a current that grants human rights treaties a normative hierarchy distinct from that granted to treaties not directly related to Human Rights (such as, for example, international cooperation treaties, those regulating external relations between States, the law of war, etc.). In the case of our country, the difference made by the Constitution is very clear between the rank given to treaties not related to human rights, with respect to those that do deal with this matter. Article 7 of the Political Constitution grants public treaties and international agreements authority superior to laws, while Article 48 of that same normative body elevates the Human Rights instruments in force in the Republic to constitutional rank.

Faced with the normative succession posed by the application of an international Human Rights treaty and a bilateral treaty, which come into conflict because the former grants an express recognition of Human Rights and therefore greater guarantees, it is not a problem of doubt about the constitutionality of the latter, but one of legality, and as the Constitutional Chamber has referred to in multiple votes, the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution.

In an identical sense, national doctrine has stated that the consultation of constitutionality will only be necessary:

"when through interpretation a solution cannot be reached that eliminates the contradictions between the legal text and the Constitution or international instrument." (LLOBET, Derechos Humanos en la Justicia Penal, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, p. 241).

**Application of constitutional principles and respect for Human Rights in Extradition** In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, in a recent case regarding the assessments of legality and compliance with constitutional guarantees and those derived from international Human Rights treaties concerning the surrender of the extraditable person, has referred to the assessment based on Human Rights that the courts of justice must carry out.

Thus, before the consultation of constitutionality raised by the Court of Cassation of San Ramón in vote [Telf5] of 10:45 a.m. on May 30, 2008, in which a pronouncement was requested as to whether the guarantee of "non bis in idem (ne bis in ídem)" established in numeral 42 of the Political Constitution acquires the character of a principle of general or even universal application, in the extradition process.

Through vote SC 2008-013432 of 2:03 p.m. on September 3, 2008, the High Court indicated that, faced with a normative gap in which the scenarios where the requested person is being tried or has been tried in a third State are not regulated, judges must resolve by applying both the principles and norms of the Political Constitution and those in International Instruments. Specifically, the Chamber stated:

"it is clear that if one is faced with a case where the person whose surrender is requested is being tried or has already been tried in a third country, the detention and surrender are not legitimate, as the cause that legitimizes the collaboration of the requested country and the legitimacy to punish of the requesting country has disappeared. Judges, when resolving matters submitted to their knowledge, are obligated to apply the norms and principles contained both in the Political Constitution and in the international instruments applicable in Costa Rica. The Constitution is the supreme norm of the legal order; it operates not only as a criterion of validity for all others, but also as a superior legal norm, immediately binding for all powers and public authorities and of course for individuals, above any other consideration. V.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, this Court concludes that the consulted norm is not unconstitutional. It is the responsibility of the judges to interpret the norms in light of the fundamental principles and rights provided for in the Political Constitution and international instruments." In that sense, it can be concluded that even legal gaps regarding judicial guarantees must be filled with content from the norms and principles derived from International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments.

Similarly, in another vote related to extradition and the application of an international convention, and although not with erga omnes (erga hommes) character but for the specific case, the Constitutional Chamber has assessed the application of International Conventions. Thus, in judgment SC vote 011576-2008 of July twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, it outlined the application of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, incorporated into our Legal Order through Law [Nombre1]° 6079 of August 28, 1977, and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of November 22, 1984, as well as the derived Costa Rican legislation, and applied the principle of non-refoulement (non refoulment) which constitutes the cornerstone of the international refugee protection system, and which protects the refugee against expulsion or any form of return to the borders of territories where their life or freedom would be in danger, and this principle benefits not only those persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution in the sense of the 1951 Convention on Refugees, but also those covered by the regional refugee definition contained in the Cartagena Declaration.

Without a doubt, constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that International Human Rights Conventions are a source of the legal order in the case of the extradition procedure (which has also been stated in multiple specific cases distinct from international judicial cooperation) which, because it is carried out in the Costa Rican Rule of Law, must observe the block of legality contained in the Political Constitution and the International Human Rights Covenants in force in Costa Rica. Thus, the position of this Court links up, which, accepting the arguments of the Defensoría de los Habitantes, considers that human rights must be applied in the extradition process.

Which is shared by the majority doctrine and the jurisprudence of international tribunals. In this sense, it is affirmed by [Nombre29], : Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p. 237:

"the person who is the subject of extradition possesses the human rights recognized by the constitutional order, among them due process, liberty, integrity, life, etc., but not as they are concretized in each country but as they are consensually agreed upon in international declarations of rights, in a determined jus cogens (ius cogens), that is, by the norms of universally accepted law and which are expressed in international declarations and decisions of the corresponding tribunals." For its part, the European Court of Human Rights expressly in the case [Nombre30] (ECHR judgment of July 7, 1989) does not excuse the State Parties from all responsibility for the foreseeable consequences that an extradition may entail beyond their borders. Certainly, this case referred to the extradition of a citizen to the United States, to be tried for murder with the possibility of being sentenced to the death penalty. However, important consequences for the extradition process and respect for human rights are obtained from the solution of the case; among them, it is highlighted by [Nombre31] cited by [Nombre32], [Nombre33]: La extradición en el ordenamiento Interno español, Internacional y Comunitario, Comares, Granada, 2005, p. 157:

"firstly, the Contracting Parties cannot forget the fate that the persons subject to extradition will meet in the host country; secondly, it assigns a preponderant function to Article 3 as an unconditional and non-derogable provision intimately linked to the principles of human dignity and a democratic society; thirdly, it demonstrates a manifestation of the internationalization of the human rights issue, implying a relativization of national and regional coverage limits in favor of human dignity; in its judgment, fourthly, the judgment enshrines the normative and singular character of the European Convention on Human Rights, applying preferentially to a subsequent treaty (the extradition treaty of 1972), concluded by a country outside the European system, the United States, showing the dynamic and progressive character of the Convention." Consequently, the State cannot excuse itself in sovereignty to not act in defense of Human Rights, which has been reiterated in other votes of the European Court of Human Rights (case [Nombre34] and [Nombre35]) and by the Human Rights Committee (in the case [Nombre36], [Nombre37] and [Nombre38] on the right to life and inhuman and degrading treatment).

Likewise, it is understood by the majority doctrine that there is a connection between that act of the requesting State and the requested State, in the protection of Human Rights:

"the injury to the fundamental right that may be incurred by the action of a foreign public authority taints the action of our own judicial or administrative body that facilitates it with unconstitutionality, since it leads to said injury materializing by complying with it or granting it validity." (Vid., [Nombre29], : Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p.33.)

Arguing to the contrary can lead to responsibility arising from the application of international norms; an indirect violation of Human Rights could occur, which is one that is facilitated by the action or omission of the extradition body.

It is for all the above reasons that this Court has accepted the argument of the Defensoría de los Habitantes and considers that the Judge A quo should have globally assessed the factual and legal situation in accordance with the principles of the Rule of Law and the Law of the Constitution, which implied an erroneous assessment of substantive Law since our legal regime grants a preponderant value to International Human Rights Treaties, which have supra-constitutional value. Departing from other non-binding votes of highly respected national Courts of Cassation from a legal point of view, this Chamber has opted to assess the International Human Rights Conventions signed and ratified by Costa Rica and that are directly related to the points in dispute in this case. At the same time, our State is bound to compliance and observance not only from the formal scope, but also in the real scope and in the results of the application of Human Rights Treaties, which have definitively not been ratified by the requesting State.

Our country has signed and ratified, among others, multiple Human Rights conventions, the following: the CEDAW Convention, the Belém do Pará Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which imply a broader spectrum regarding the guarantees derived from Human Rights, such as the recognition of women's rights as Human Rights, the right of women not to be subjected to violence, the protection of the best interest and the comprehensive protection of the Minor, the right to family and to peace. With which the country has acquired a commitment to special protection of the rights of Women and Girls, especially considering that the constitutional and democratic Rule of Law State cannot ignore the consequences that its actions may bring; the act of surrendering the extraditable person can indirectly materialize the violation of Human Rights.

In an extradition process such as the one at hand, the judicial authorities cannot limit themselves to verifying compliance with requirements; rather, the Costa Rican State must act within the parameters of constitutionality and legality, which in this specific case obligate it to protect the Human Rights of two female victims of domestic violence: one of them of legal age, mother of two Costa Rican children, and the other, a girl child, a minor, who holds dual Costa Rican nationality by birth and North American. From the study of the present process, it is clearly inferred from the evidence that was produced and that was partially reproduced in the oral hearing that a situation of violence against women was effectively verified. It must be clarified that in the present case, the judicial authorities of the requested country do not prejudge the fact for which the extraditable person is being prosecuted in the requesting country; although no pronouncement is made on these facts, the violation of Human Rights such as violence against women and girls must be assessed.

**B) On the rights of girls and boys, the right to family, and to live a life free from violence.** The appeal of the Defensoría de los Habitantes points out as grievance 3) the absence of assessment of the Human Rights of the Costa Rican Girl [Nombre18] and as grounds argues that the minor was transferred to Costa Rica, a country in which she was born and of which she is a citizen. The resolution of the Judge a quo does not assess the rights of the mother or the daughter and proceeds to render invisible the result that will be obtained with the effective extradition of the extraditable person, the delivery of the girl to a father who has not been considered suitable by the Costa Rican courts; furthermore, the minor [Nombre20], who is located with her mother in the El Buen Pastor center, will be left helpless once the extradition is firm. The human rights of the Costa Rican girl [Nombre18] will be directly affected, which threatens her physical and emotional integrity, her dignity, her right to a life without violence, her right to family, and places her in a situation of special vulnerability, in flagrant violation of the rights of children and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, also extendable to the Costa Rican minor son of [Nombre1], named [Nombre20].

**This Court accepts the grievance.** As we have stated, our constitutional legislation, by accepting the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is a Human Rights instrument, assumed the commitment that in processes where the rights of a minor are directly or indirectly involved, the authorities responsible for resolving the case, whether administrative or judicial, must assess in the corresponding resolution matters relating to children and their best interest. Even if these circumstances appear to be alien to the specific situation, since an indirect violation of fundamental rights could occur, which is one that is facilitated by the omissive action of the extradition body. In the case sub judice, it is impossible to sever, -as the judge a quo has done- the knowledge of the extradition whose facts and basis are consistent with an international child abduction, from the situation of the extraditable person [Nombre17] and her children: a girl [Nombre18] and a boy [Nombre20], both Costa Rican by birth, and the reported situation of domestic violence, which must be assessed in accordance with the general principles governing the democratic Rule of Law State and informing the Law of the Constitution.

Various international instruments recognize the state duty to provide particular protection to the rights of boys and girls, which stem from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself, and particularly, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (approved and ratified by our country, through Law [Nombre1]° 7184 of July eighteenth, nineteen ninety, which entered into force, according to numeral 2 of that legal instrument, on the day of its publication in La Gaceta [Nombre1]° 149 of August nine, nineteen ninety), in which protection is provided to this age group. Ensuring that adequate assistance and respect for the rights recognized therein are provided at all times, among which stand out, among others: the promotion of the necessary conditions for family coexistence, as well as the right of children to remain with their parents (Article 7) -particularly with their mother (Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of San Salvador); the right to an adequate standard of living for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development (Article 27).

In the same manner, that international instrument sets a series of obligations for the State parties or signatories, among them: to ensure that the child is not separated from their parents against their will, except when, subject to judicial review, such separation is necessary in the best interest of the child (Article 9, paragraph 1) and to address any request, made by a child or by their parents, to enter a State party or to leave it in a positive, humanitarian, and expeditious manner (Article 10, paragraph 1).

From these international Human Rights instruments, it is derived that States have as fundamental duties the protection of the best interest of the child, avoiding the break-up of the family nucleus and promoting the necessary conditions for them to enjoy the permanent presence of parental authority, while at the same time, they indicate that on some occasions separation is necessary and is authorized in the best interest of the minor.

At the infra-constitutional level, laws have also been developed that protect the best interest of the minor. Thus, the Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia (Law [Nombre1]° 7739) specifies that the interpretive guiding principle of all public or private action must be the best interest of the child (Article 5).

Article 17 indicates that minors cannot be subject, among other scenarios, to deportation from the national territory, except in protection of their own interest, in accordance with the criteria determined by the best interest of this group. Likewise, Article 30 establishes the Right to family life, by indicating that minors will have the right to know their father and mother; likewise, to grow and develop at their side and be cared for by them, and precept 33 regulates the Right to remain with the family by providing that minors may not be separated from their family, except in special circumstances established by law.

The Constitutional Chamber recognizes the best interest of the child as a general guiding principle for all state activity, as stated in SC voto 15461-2008 of October 15, 2008:

*In this sense, as a recognized and fully applicable general principle, no rule or decision – administrative or judicial – that contradicts the best interest of the child is enforceable against it, unless in specific circumstances the applicability of some other general principle of a higher level is at stake, in which case the legal operator must adhere to the balancing test and the role of each principle in the particular case. Thus, ignoring the principal character of the best interest of the child by disregarding its strict application in cases involving minors is contrary to the recognitions that Constitutional Law makes on the matter, while also giving room to place oneself in a position of vulnerability regarding the mandate of Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights.* Likewise, Constitutional Law bestows a *"special protection of the State"* upon the family, whether it is a de facto or de jure union. Constitutional Article 51 proclaims that this institution is the *"natural element and foundation of society."* The family nucleus is basic and paramount for the free development of the personality of the individuals who form or integrate it and, consequently, of the entire social conglomerate. However, on occasions the family is not a safe place, due to domestic violence, and in these cases, the vulnerability and the possibility of harm to the personal integrity – physical and mental – of its members are protected.

In the case under examination, this Chamber has analyzed in the previous recital A), that Mrs. [Name17] denounced domestic violence to the authorities, and also opposed paternal custody, arguing that the minor was in danger. Likewise, in the technical report of INAMU repeatedly cited, it was indicated that domestic violence was suffered by Mrs. [Name17] and her own daughter [Name18]., with current manifestations carried out in our country. Since the girl's father did not want the girl to visit her mother in prison and tried to take her out of the country in violation of the order of the Court of Childhood and Adolescence. Furthermore, the minor [Name18] shows emotional consequences from the separation from her mother, just as the mother is equally impacted, suffering deterioration in her emotional state (see folios 1071 to 1076), and also that Mrs. [Name17] gave birth to another child in our country. Thus, with the evidence provided, it is deduced that both the mother and the girl have suffered domestic violence and even at this moment, the violence is manifest, and that, as the Ombudsman's Office has pointed out, granting the extradition of Mrs. [Name17] could aggravate the situation and leave the minor [Name18] and her brother [Name20] unprotected.

This Chamber cannot ignore that the mother entered the national territory with the girl [Name39] and has requested asylum based on domestic violence, which at the time of this decision has not been definitively resolved. Regarding the situation of minors who have been removed by their mothers and who suffer domestic violence within the family, it must be taken into account that the interests of the children and the mother are inextricably linked. In addition to the special protection for children, including that of having their mother and their family, it being understood that extradition will result in the separation of the girl from her mother and her brother, while also implying the placement of the girl, as has happened now, in a substitute home or, ultimately, the risk of return to the paternal side, which, as was proven, is also immersed in violence against the minor.

National constitutional jurisprudence and international comparative law jurisprudence on the return of minors have rejected the return of minors according to the provisions of Article 13(1)(b) of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (of October twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and eighty, and approved by law number 7746 of February twenty-third, nineteen hundred and ninety-eight), if the minors are at risk of physical or psychological danger, or are otherwise placed in an intolerable situation, regardless of whether the taking parent has requested asylum in the country, as in the cases SC voto 15461-2008 of October 15, 2008, and SC voto 17639-2008 of December 5, 2008. Also, SC voto 11576-2008 of July 25, 2008, in the additional reasons of Magistrate Calzada, the situation of not requesting asylum was assessed and indicated:

*"that the fact that the petitioner had not requested refugee status in the country since her entry could well have been part of the same fear based on the situation she was fleeing, since she would publicly expose her location to the alleged aggressor. Moreover, it is to be expected that she did not feel sufficiently protected by the existing legal means, which she considered had been insufficient - even in the United States - and, in our country, have not been sufficiently effective in all cases either."* Regarding international cases, see the cases *[Name40] v. [Name40]*, [2001] O.J. No. 2849 (Ontario), where ordering the return of triplet girls to Kenya was refused. The girls had traveled to Canada with their mother, to whom Canadian authorities in Nairobi had granted a refugee visa. The Judge concluded that the mother and the girls were living in a dangerous and hostile environment attributable to the conduct of their father and that consequently, referring to the Pollastro case, there was a basis for the exception provided for in Article 13(1)(b). Further cases include *[Name41]*., [2001] O.J. No.3074 (Ontario), where ordering the return of a 3-year-old child to Hungary was refused. Upon arriving in Canada, the mother claimed refugee status. As in the case A.K. v. E.F., [2001] R.D.F. 334 (Québec).

Moreover, as national authors point out, in line with authorized foreign doctrine, [Name42] and [Name43], International Child Abduction in Costa Rican Family Law, IJSA, 2008, p.60, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or The Hague Convention:

*"is a set of binding provisions that do not establish the legal regime of the specific case, as it is not a Convention on judicial competence, applicable law, or recognition of foreign decisions. It only contemplates systems of authority cooperation and an action for the immediate return of the minor to the country of their habitual residence. Therefore, the core point of the process is not the suitability for the exercise of personal care of the minors, but rather the existence or not of grounds for non-return. This point is of utmost importance since the international return process for minors is not a procedure to decide on custody nor to determine or rule out the suitability of the requested father or mother."* As a corollary of the preceding analysis, it must be concluded that when substantial aspects involve the best interest of the minor, their Human Rights will prevail over the application of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, in accordance with Constitutional Law, and in this, the higher precedence or hierarchy of human rights treaties is imposed. As the Constitutional Chamber advanced in SC voto 15461-2008 of October 5, 2008, which we previously cited, where the nationality of the potentially affected children is also important; if it concerns a Costa Rican minor, the principle of the best interest of the child must predominantly be integrated into the decision. The Chamber indicated:

*"In this way, if the minor on whom the possibility of an international return is raised turns out to be a Costa Rican who is in national territory, the administrative and judicial authorities that must resolve the matter shall take into consideration the existence of express general principles recognized by the country; (...) because not doing so will result in an illegitimate pronouncement for contradicting principles, values, and specific norms established in the totality of Constitutional Law and that have been defined herein."* **C) Domestic violence as a ground for recognition to obtain international protection of refugee status and the necessary assessment in the extradition procedure.** The Ombudsman's Office expressed as grievance 4) Erroneous assessment of International Human Rights Conventions and Instruments and international judicial cooperation between States and respect for Human Rights. They point out that the judge A quo did not assess that the action of Mrs. [Name17] originated from a well-founded fear due to the domestic violation she was suffering. They asserted that revoking the ruling would bring dire consequences for this lady by separating her from her daughter. In support of their thesis, after citing some norms of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, or the Guidelines on International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as some resolutions of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, they affirm that domestic violence is a scenario for which a person can be granted refugee status and that this is the situation presented with Mrs. [Name1]. **The grievance is accepted, but with different reasoning.** Indeed, it emerges from the extradition process followed against Mrs. [Name17] that she filed a request for asylum before the corresponding immigration authority, based on the domestic violence suffered by her and her minor daughter [Name18]., according to a report from the Ombudsman's Office visible on folios 1097 et seq., which has not been challenged as invalid by the opposing party.

According to what is stated, the immigration authorities denied the request in the first instance, and it was appealed before the Minister of Security, without the final decision being communicated at the time this case was resolved by the Court of Cassation. This Chamber considers that, nevertheless, the constitutional obligation to refer to these issues, which we have referred to as deriving from Human Rights, these aspects were not considered in the resolution that granted the extradition, with an erroneous application of substantive law.

From International Human Rights Conventions and Declarations, it is considered that the right to asylum is a Human Right, and our legal system has recognized this by incorporating those various instruments at the infra-constitutional level.

In accordance with Article 1, section A, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, incorporated into our Legal System through Law [Name1]° 6079 of August 28, 1977, the term refugee applies to any person who:

*"as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."* This criterion was adopted by domestic law in Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo [Name1]° 32195 of September 22, 2004, according to which:

*"Considers a refugee any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable or unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country."* For its part, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of November 22, 1984 (recognized and reaffirmed in the San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons of December 7, 1994, Costa Rica), which captures the best Latin American tradition on the matter, extends this condition to those persons:

*"who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order"* (part III, Third).

But it is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that has consistently indicated that one of the reasons for which a request for asylum is appropriate is, precisely, when a woman suffers domestic violence (Conclusions of the Executive Committee number 87 of October 1999, No. 39 of the Executive Committee, Refugee Women and International Protection; No. 73, Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, 1993; No. 77, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1995; number 79, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1996; and No. 81, General Conclusion on International Protection, 1997).

In the case sub judice, the immigration authority, in accordance with Articles 111 and 112 of the Ley de Migración y Extranjería, heard the request for asylum and denied it; however, the administrative decision was not final as it was appealed before the corresponding Ministry. Therefore, in application of the aforementioned Article 112, given this request, what is appropriate is the suspension of the execution of the extradition until the pertinent matter is resolved. This is an expression of the so-called principle of non-refoulement. The article refers to the following:

*Article 112.- The filing of a request for the recognition of refugee or asylee status shall have a suspensive effect on the execution of the extradition of the foreign person, until the corresponding procedure has been completed by way of a firm and unappealable resolution. The recognition of refugee or asylee status shall have the effect of terminating any extradition proceeding initiated against the refugee or asylee person, at the request of the Government of the country where the alleged crime was committed, based on the same facts that justified said recognition.* The factual situations of the examined case should not be viewed in isolation, but rather linked to the situation of violence against the woman and the girl and the best interest of the Costa Rican minors. Therefore, the interests must be weighed and the greatest respect for Human Rights sought. We will not repeat what has already been stated, only emphasize that the Judge a quo, by granting the extradition of a person in the conditions we have analyzed, exposes Mrs. [Name17] and her daughter to greater physical and emotional harm derived from the domestic violence that was proven. Therefore, without prejudging or invading the sphere of competence of administrative bodies, which will be responsible for deciding on the asylum; when probable violations of personal integrity and, in sum, probable unjustified attacks on the human rights of the woman and the girl, as well as the best interest of the girl, including that of having her mother and her family, are at stake, these aspects must be assessed in the extradition according to the postulates of Constitutional Law.

**The Human Rights of Women** The Costa Rican State has ratified international instruments concerning the advancement of the Human Rights of women that compel their application because it has ratified them, just as the Conventions themselves contain norms that include not only the commitment by the respective State not to violate Human Rights, but also a positive action to guarantee the "full and total exercise" of these rights, as is the case with the American Convention, Articles 1 and 2.

Among the international normative sources on the Human Rights of Women, we have the following: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948, Article 1); American Convention on Human Rights (1969, Articles 5); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979, Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 9); General Recommendations adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, (proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution number 48/104 of December 20, 1993, Article 4); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women or Convention of Belém do Pará (1994, Articles 1 to 3, 7, and 9); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1999). From this normative set, as expressly stated by the Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993), it is derived that:

*"the rights of women and the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights"* Of all these international instruments, we are interested in noting that they recognize equality, dignity, the right to a life free from violence, and the right to live in peace as fundamental principles for Women.

The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, approved by Law No. 7499 of June 9, 1994, obliges the Costa Rican State to analyze the situation of violence suffered by a woman in a case submitted to its knowledge, such as the one now before us. Thus, in its Articles 2, 4, and 9, it is provided:

*Article 2-. Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual and psychological violence:* *a. that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the woman, and includes, among others, rape, battery and sexual abuse(...).* *Article 4-. Every woman has the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise and protection of all human rights and freedoms enshrined in regional and international human rights instruments. These rights include, among others:* *a. the right to have her life respected;* *b.

the right to have her physical, mental, and moral integrity respected;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">c. the right to personal liberty and security;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">d. the right not to be subjected to torture;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">e. the right to have the inherent dignity of her person respected and her family protected;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">f. the right to equal protection before the law and of the law;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">g. the right to simple and rapid recourse before competent courts, which shall protect her against acts that violate her rights (…).</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 9-. In adopting the measures referred to in this chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, among others, their race or ethnic condition, their status as migrants, refugees, or displaced persons. Similarly, consideration shall be given to women who are subjected to violence when they are pregnant, disabled, minors, elderly, or in an unfavorable socioeconomic situation or affected by situations of armed conflict or deprivation of their liberty.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">Regarding the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, or Convention of Belém do Pará, it constitutes the first international legal instrument that recognizes the right of women to live a life free of violence, and considers violence against women as a violation of Human Rights. Articles 1 to 3, 7, and 9 state:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 1-. For the purposes of this Convention, violence against women shall be understood as any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 2-. Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual, and psychological violence: </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">a. that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the woman, and which includes, among others, rape, battery, and sexual abuse;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">b. that occurs in the community and is perpetrated by any person and which includes, among others, rape, sexual abuse, torture, trafficking in persons, forced prostitution, kidnapping, and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in educational institutions, health establishments, or any other place, and</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">c. that is perpetrated or tolerated by the State or its agents, wherever it occurs.</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 3-. Every woman has the right to a life free of violence, both in the public and private spheres.</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 7-. The States Parties condemn all forms of violence against women and agree to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies to prevent, punish, and eradicate such violence and to carry out the following: </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">a. to refrain from any action or practice of violence against women and to ensure that the authorities, their officials, personnel, agents, and institutions behave in conformity with this obligation;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">b. to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish violence against women;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">c. to include in their domestic legislation criminal, civil, and administrative provisions, as well as any others of a different nature that may be necessary to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence against women, and to adopt the appropriate administrative measures where applicable;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">d. to adopt legal measures to compel the perpetrator to refrain from harassing, intimidating, threatening, harming, or endangering the life of the woman in any way that affects her integrity or damages her property;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">e. to take all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to modify or abolish existing laws and regulations, or to modify legal or customary practices that support the persistence or tolerance of violence against women;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">f. to establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to violence, which shall include, among others, protective measures, a timely trial, and effective access to such procedures;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">g. to establish the necessary judicial and administrative mechanisms to ensure that women subjected to violence have effective access to restitution, reparation for harm, or other fair and effective means of compensation, and</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">h. to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to this Convention.</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Article 9-. In adopting the measures referred to in this chapter, the States Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, among others, their race or ethnic condition, their status as migrants, refugees, or displaced persons (…).</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 46.15pt 0pt 28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">In the extradition proceeding of Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> as the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) has explained in its appeal, the grievance of which has been upheld, Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> was immersed in the cycle of violence against women, as was the minor child [Nombre18]., which was established by the complaint that Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> filed in the United States (visible at folio 736 and its translation at folios 747 to 749), as well as by a study conducted by the National Institute for Women (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres) (visible at folios 1050 to 1069) and the statements of Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> herself in the exercise of her material defense at the oral hearing. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">These evidentiary elements were not challenged by the opposing party, namely, the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) representing the requesting State. Rather, this governmental body indicated that in the United States of America, the extradited person’s rights not to be subjected to violence and to live in peace, as well as those of the minor child, could be sufficiently protected. Its opposition to the appeal centered on the argument that domestic violence, the situation of the minor, and the evidence provided should not be considered in the extradition proceeding, neither in this nor in any other case; an untenable formalism that could even violate guarantees beyond those alleged by the appellants' appeal, such as access to justice and the right of defense of the extraditable person, and, as we shall see, indirectly, the human rights of the minor.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">This Chamber considers that in the sub judice, in accordance with the international commitments adopted by Costa Rica upon signing and ratifying the referenced International Human Rights Conventions and by virtue of the application of the Political Constitution, a ruling on this matter is necessarily required, for as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has already indicated in the case </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">[Nombre44]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">vs. Brazil (2001), a duty of States is to prevent practices of violence against women, in addition to ensuring that no state agent can, through their actions, violate the rights of women.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In that case, the Convention of Belém do Pará was applied for the first time, and the IACHR decided that the State had failed in its obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, and eradicate domestic violence.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In turn, violations of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (for violation of the victim’s rights to effective judicial guarantees and protection) and Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará were found, and it was established that among the most important principles is the obligation of States in cases of violence against women,</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> which includes the duties to prosecute and convict those responsible, as well as the duty to “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">prevent these degrading practices</span><span style="font-family:Arial">”.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> It follows, therefore, that when faced with a demonstrated case of violence against women, the lower court judge (Juez a quo) in this case, and indeed every adjudicator, must assess, and not simply disregard or shift to other areas of competence, the violence against women, if the measure or decision taken directly or indirectly affects, by omission, the human rights of the woman and the girl. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In the case before us, the requesting State is seeking Ms. [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> for abducting a minor from the United States with the intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of the father’s parental rights over the minor, and that she did so while legal proceedings were underway to define custody (patria potestad) regarding the girl in the Superior Court of Humboldt County, and that within that proceeding, an order had been issued not to remove the minor from the County. This is classified under U.S. law in Title 18 United States Code, Section 1204. That extradition request did not contemplate, on the part of the requesting State, any other assessment, nor did the lower court judge’s decision, regarding the allegations timely made by the technical and material defense, as well as by INAMU, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Public Ministry. It did not specifically consider the complaint filed by [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> in the United States for domestic violence on August 23, 2005 (visible at folio 736 and its translation at folios 747 to 749); that the physical custody of the minor child [Nombre18]. was held by the mother, who had abandoned the marital home in fact due to domestic violence (see the statement of FBI Special Agent [Nombre45]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">folios 124 to 127 and evidence document B translation folio 747); the statement of [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> before the Superior Court of California, Humboldt County, in which [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> opposes a visitation arrangement for the child because the plaintiff endangers the child (see folio 750);</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> that the father of the minor child [Nombre18]. had signed an exit permit for the child to travel to Mexico on April 26, 2005 (folio 373); that the Superior Court of California awarded physical custody of [Nombre18] to her father [Nombre21].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> on November 10, 2005 (folio 278 et seq. and its translation at folios 284 et seq.); as well as the Technical Criteria Report prepared by psychologist [Nombre46]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">an official of the Women’s Delegation, the evidence provided by INAMU (visible at folios 1050 to 1069); the testimony of the witness</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (at folio 758 and its translation at folio 762 et seq.); that Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> filed an application for refuge before the immigration authorities based on domestic violence, a proceeding that was denied in the first instance by the immigration authority but was under appeal before the Minister of Security (see the Opinion presented by the Office of the Ombudsman at folios 1097 et seq.) and Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> had also given birth to another child, a Costa Rican citizen by birth (see birth registration certificate folio 372) and had been detained for 14 months, which is why the minor child [Nombre18] was placed in a foster home (see the Opinion presented by the Office of the Ombudsman at folios 1097 et seq.).</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">This evidence was not assessed by the lower court judge under the argument that in an extradition proceeding, only compliance with the requirements and principles set forth in the bilateral extradition treaty between Costa Rica and the United States must be verified. As we have indicated, in the present case there is an underlying situation of domestic violence and violence against women, and in consideration of the Human Rights of the woman and the girl, the entire factual context must be assessed in addition to the legal framework in a hermeneutical manner. Lest the State itself, through its omission, contribute to a violation of Human Rights and thereby incur international responsibility for the breach of its international commitments to respect Human Rights before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which evaluate the effectiveness of domestic judicial processes in remedying human rights violations. This examination covers the processes in their entirety and at different levels to determine whether the procedures and the evidence produced were fair. (In this regard, see OEA/Ser.L/II.Doc 68 January 20, 2007, marginal numbers 35, 36, and 39).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> According to the technical criteria of psychologist [Nombre46]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">an official of the Women’s Delegation, and the evidence provided by INAMU (visible at folios 1050 to 1069), [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> suffered physical violence consisting of punches to the head, arms, and back;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> the throwing of various objects such as ceramic mugs or milk cartons, among others. She experienced psychological violence in the form of constant insults such as "piece of shit, bag of shit, you're worthless, stupid, crack whore, witch, whore"); stalking consisting of accusations of infidelity, threats of legal action where he would lie about her maternal role to separate her from her daughter; creation of a climate of terror through reckless driving, cornering in the shower or in corners of the house, animal abuse (he injured a kitten by throwing it against a fence); isolation from her family and friends. She also endured economic violence, manifested by a lack of contribution to the family economy; breaking objects of immediate necessity such as the child's highchair; preventing her from working; controlling her personal expenses. </span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> The report indicates that the aggressive behavior became increasingly frequent. Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> was constantly beaten, especially when she was in situations of greater vulnerability: with her child in her arms (thus placing the minor in the "line of fire"), naked in the shower, before getting out of bed in the mornings, in the car driven at high speed by the aggressor. These beatings often warranted medical attention that was not sought. Other events that Ms. [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> highlights are the long periods she left the house with her daughter in her arms, without shelter and without food; waiting for [Nombre22]'s aggressiveness to subside. On this matter, there was a sworn statement from a neighbor of [Nombre1]., Ms. [Nombre17], who relates that she met [Nombre1].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and [Nombre47]. one morning when they came to her door seeking help because [Nombre21]. was furious and was throwing objects at her. On various occasions, the aggressor threatened to take the child away from her. The witness [Nombre17], [Nombre22].'s</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> romantic partner until 2007, corroborated that version. [Nombre48] considers that both [Nombre22].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and his family are controlling and wealthy, and at a certain point they decided, to the exclusion of [Nombre17], to obtain absolute custody of the girl.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">The technical report indicates that the situation of violence continues with the aggressor's attempts to separate the minor from her mother; he attempted to take the girl to the United States against the order of the Child and Adolescent Authority. The report also, in Annex 1 (anexo 1), folios 1071 et seq., notes the emotional risk to the minor child [Nombre18]. given [Nombre22].'s</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> refusal to bring the girl to see her mother imprisoned in El Buen Pastor prison, the impact on the minor due to maternal separation, the tenuous bond between the minor and [Nombre22]., and the mother's pain at the separation from her daughter.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:3.55pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">In the exercise of her material defense, Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> recounted episodes of domestic violence against her and her daughter by [Nombre22]., and her statements were neither refuted nor rebutted, in addition to the INAMU report indicating that an instrument with 19 criteria was applied to Ms. [Nombre17]'s account, and based on the account, it is deemed reliable. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">All the evidentiary elements indicated allow this Chamber to conclude that Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and her daughter were victims of domestic violence, and this situation must prevail in the assessment of the extradition.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">D) Access to justice and effective judicial protection</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:Arial">As ground of grievance 5), the Office of the Ombudsman set forth the Costa Rican State's commitment to respect Human Rights. It opposes the statements of the Attorney General's Office, which refers to the existence of a fraternity of institutions. The Costa Rican State has undertaken a commitment to respect Human Rights by ratifying various International Conventions in which violence against women is protected.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Also, Ms. [Nombre17].</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> is the mother of two Costa Ricans; from a Human Rights perspective, the integrity of the family must be protected. The specificity of women and of those who are judged within the framework of Human Rights must be assessed, and this also</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> demands respect and guarantee of all the institutions of the right of Access to Justice. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">The grievance is upheld</span><span style="font-family:Arial">.</span></p> This Chamber has extensively addressed the respect for Human Rights that the Costa Rican State provides through various manifestations and concretions. It remains to analyze the complaint regarding access to justice, which is an undeniable manifestation of effective judicial protection and encompasses several elements, including an effective remedy in the courts of justice—which does not refer to means of challenge, but to the effective defense of individuals' rights—access for particularly vulnerable groups, and justice in the specific case.

Access to Justice is recognized in various international instruments for the protection of Human Rights, among them: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14, paragraph 3), the American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 25), Article 41 of the Political Constitution, and in infra-constitutional legislation, creating a normative framework through which access to justice without discrimination to judicial instances is guaranteed, both *de jure* and *de facto*.

In Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987, which developed the contours of the topic of judicial protection, the opinion is extremely broad and indicated, regarding Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the following:

*"This article likewise establishes, in broad terms, the obligation of the States to provide all persons subject to their jurisdiction with an effective judicial remedy against acts that violate their fundamental rights. It further provides that the guarantee enshrined therein applies not only to the rights contained in the Convention, but also to those recognized by the Constitution or by law. (…) the States Parties undertake to provide effective judicial remedies to victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art. 8.1), all within the general obligation of those same States to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every person under their jurisdiction (…) According to this principle, the absence of an effective remedy against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression thereof by the State Party in which such a situation occurs. In this sense, it must be emphasized that, for such a remedy to exist, it is not enough for it to be provided for by the Constitution or by law or for it to be formally admissible; it is required that it be truly suitable to establish whether a human rights violation has occurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it. Those remedies that, due to the general conditions of the country or even the particular circumstances of a given case, prove illusory cannot be considered effective."* Another important step is deduced from Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999, through which access to justice under conditions of equality was guaranteed. The Inter-American Court indicated:

*"119. To achieve its objectives, the process must recognize and resolve the factors of real inequality faced by those brought before justice. It is thus that the principle of equality before the law and the courts, and the correlative prohibition of discrimination, are addressed. The presence of conditions of real inequality obliges the adoption of compensatory measures that contribute to reducing or eliminating the obstacles and deficiencies that impede or reduce the effective defense of one's own interests. If such compensatory means, widely recognized in various procedural aspects, did not exist, it would be difficult to say that those in disadvantaged conditions enjoy true access to justice and benefit from due process of law under conditions of equality with those who do not face such disadvantages."* Our country has also assumed a commitment to respect access to justice for vulnerable populations, with the approval of the 100 Brasilia Rules regarding access to justice for persons in vulnerable conditions of 2008, which represent a joint effort of the XIV Ibero-American Judicial Summit. It is worth recalling here the recognition that the Constitution's Right carries out through declarations that recognize Human Rights. From its text, both substantive and procedural rules are deduced, seeking to promote the necessary conditions for effective protection, adopting those measures that best adapt to their condition of vulnerability (Rule 25). Minors are defined as particularly vulnerable groups (Rule 5), along with the situation of migrants and refugees (Rules 13 and 14) and the situation of women (Rules 17 to 20), with special reference in Rule 20 to women victims of violence.

Thus, access to justice does not refer only to the person who initiated a judicial proceeding but includes those who become procedural parties, for example, the person subject to extradition (extraditable), and also, as we have noted in this case, those indirectly affected by the outcome of a judicial resolution. Such is the case of minors, all of whom are covered by that effective defense of individuals' rights, particularly when they are in a condition of vulnerability, as we have sufficiently analyzed.

The refusal to resolve and hear, within the extradition process, the situation of these vulnerable persons, as occurred in the case of the lower court judge's (juez a quo) resolution, in this Tribunal's opinion, violates the observance of Human Rights by omission and gives rise to state responsibility for non-compliance with international commitments. This is especially so in cases such as the one before us, where violence against the woman and the girl, and the refugee situation due to that same violence, were alleged. Based on the foregoing, the complaint is upheld due to violation of access to justice for the extraditable person [Nombre1] and her minor daughter [Nombre18].

**E)** As complaint 2), the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes) claims violation of the principle of dual criminality (doble incriminación). The claim was based on the fact that the conduct that motivated the extradition request does not constitute the crime of international child abduction (sustracción internacional de menores), but rather the offense of disobedience to authority, as the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) has stated in this process; therefore, this is not an extraditable offense. They argue that the conduct for which extradition is requested is not typical and that the extradition must be rejected due to the absence of objective and normative elements. Due to the manner in which we are resolving the merits of this appeal (recurso), this Tribunal considers that it lacks procedural interest in expressly addressing the noted complaint, given that we have resolved on the merits issues related to Human Rights.

**F) Regarding the arguments of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República)** Regarding the arguments presented by Lic. [Nombre3], in his capacity as Directing Attorney (Procurador Director), by which it is considered that the judgment contains adequate reasoning and that consequently the challenged decision should be confirmed, this Chamber of Cassation (Cámara de Casación) considers that these are not admissible, as set forth in the preceding recitals (considerandos). Moreover, in his opposition, the Attorney General (Procurador) argued mainly regarding compliance with formal requirements, such as the principle of dual criminality or identity of the norm; he referred to the objective elements of the crime of international child abduction provided for in Article 184 of the Costa Rican Penal Code and the norm under which extradition was requested by the government of the United States, concluding with abundant constitutional and legal jurisprudence that the acts constituted a crime under the laws of both the United States and Costa Rica. However, regarding the other arguments of the parties, specifically the challenge by the Ombudsman's Office, he made no further references beyond outright rejection, because, according to the position of the Office of the Attorney General, the domestic violence supposedly suffered by Ms. [Nombre17] and the situation of the minor [Nombre18] should not be considered in the extradition proceeding and are matters for the competence of the requesting State, and that in the United States of America, sufficient protection could be provided for the rights of the person sought for extradition (extraída) not to be violated and to live in peace, as well as for the girl [Nombre49]. As we have had occasion to analyze in the preceding recital, this Chamber has conducted a hermeneutic interpretation of the Costa Rican legal system that grants international Human Rights treaties supra-constitutional value, placing respect for human dignity and the Human Rights of the woman and the girl—to not be discriminated against or violated, to enjoy a family free of violence, the best interests of the child (interés superior del menor), their comprehensive protection—above other considerations. These must be assessed when issuing the corresponding resolution, and no state organ, whether administrative or judicial, is exempt from this obligation. Consequently, this Chamber postponed the subsequent analysis of the extradition procedure with all its fundamental principles and institutions, in light of that universal set of rights recognized to human beings by the mere fact of being human. In the case sub judice, it is not possible to separate the Human Rights situation of the woman sought for extradition and the girl from the extradition process, given the situation of domestic violence and the necessary respect for human dignity that the Costa Rican legal system recognizes. In this sense, the argument regarding compliance with dual criminality, on which all efforts of the Office of the Attorney General representing the government of the United States of America were directed, has lost legal interest due to the application of the constitutional norms, principles, and values that inspire Costa Rican Constitutional Law, in addition to the principle of normative hierarchy, which imply a bundle of guarantees regarding respect for Human Rights that, as extensively set forth, prevent the surrender. Consequently, the appeal filed by [Nombre50], in her capacity as Ombudsperson of the Republic (Defensora de los Habitantes de la República), is granted. Judgment No. 130-P-2009 of the Trial Court of Puntarenas (Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas), issued at one o'clock in the afternoon on April 20, 2009, is reversed. As a result, the extradition of Ms. [Nombre1], requested by the United States of America, is declared without merit. Ms. [Nombre1] shall be released immediately, if no other cause prevents it. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the other appeals filed is omitted. By the corresponding means, notify the Government of the United States.

**THEREFORE:** The appeal filed by [Nombre50], in her capacity as Ombudsperson of the Republic, is granted. Judgment No. 0130-P-2009 of the Trial Court of Puntarenas, issued at one o'clock in the afternoon on April 20, 2009, is reversed. As a result, the extradition of Ms. [Nombre1], requested by the United States of America, is declared without merit. Ms. [Nombre1] shall be released immediately, if no other cause prevents it. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the other appeals filed is omitted. Let it be notified.

**Dra. [Nombre51]** **Msc. Jazmín Rodríguez Hernández** ** Msc. Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas** **Judges of Criminal Cassation** Extradition proceedings Extraditable person: [Nombre1]. Requesting Party: United States of America

PODER JUDICIAL PODER JUDICIAL TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN PENAL DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, SAN RAMÓN Tel: [Telf1] [...] Fax: [Telf2] _______________________________________________________________________________________ Res: 2009-00246 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN PENAL DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, San Ramón, a las diecisiete horas del veintiséis de junio de dos mil nueve.

RECURSO DE APELACIÓN interpuesto en el presente procedimiento de extradición que en esta causa formuló el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica contra [Nombre1] , mayor, ciudadana estadounidense, nacida en el Estado de California el diecisiete de marzo de mil novecientos ochenta, de veintiocho años de edad, maestra de arte, en unión libre. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, las juezas [Nombre2] . , Jazmín Rodríguez Hernández y el juez Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas. Se apersonan en casación el licenciado [Nombre3] , representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, la licenciada [Nombre4] , fiscal de la Oficina de Asesoría Técnica y Relaciones Internacionales, el licenciado [Nombre5] " , Fiscal General de la República y el licenciado [Nombre6] defensor particular de la extraditable [Nombre1]; la Defensoría de los Habitantes representada [Nombre7] Defensora de los Habitantes de la República y por el licenciado [Nombre8] su condición de defensor adjunto de los Habitantes; el Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres INAMU representado por la [Placa1]. [Nombre9] Presidenta Ejecutiva en calidad de coadyuvante.

RESULTANDO

1. En sentencia 130-P-2009, el Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas mediante resolución de las trece horas del veinte de abril de 2009, declaró con lugar la extradición de [Nombre1]. solicitada por el gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, para que sea sometida a juicio por los hechos que se le están imputado y que han sido conocidos en este proceso y por los delitos de sustracción internacional de menor. Deberá el estado requirente disponer de la imputada dentro de los dos meses siguientes a la firmeza de esta sentencia que corren a partir del momento que se les comunique que el reo queda a sus órdenes, de no hacerlo en ese tiempo se ordenará la libertad del requerido. Previo a su entrega deberá el Estado de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, presentar formal promesa de que no impondrá una pena de muerte o prisión perpetua a la justiciable, así como que tampoco será sometida a sanciones distintas a los hechos por los que aquí se está concediendo la extradición. Son los gastos de detención entrega de la imputada a cargo del estado requirente. Se ordena mantener la prisión que le fue impuesta a [Nombre1], según la resolución de las catorce horas diez minutos del siete de noviembre del dos mil ocho del Tribunal de Casación Penal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, sección primera. Firme esta resolución la señora [Nombre10]. será puesta a disposición de las autoridades estadounidenses para que se lleve a cabo e trámite de salida del país, par o cual cuentan dichas autoridades con dos meses. No es necesario hacer especial pronunciamiento sobre bienes pues no se aportaron a los autos solicitudes sobre ese extremo, por lo que la imputada será entregada únicamente con sus pertenencias personales y documentos de identificación con que cuente a la fecha. Notifíquese la presente resolución a todas las partes. [Nombre11] Juez.

2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento interpusieron recurso de apelación el licenciado [Nombre6] defensor particular de la extraditable [Nombre1], la licenciada [Nombre12] fiscal a.i fiscal de la Oficina de Asesoría Técnica y Relaciones Internacionales, el licenciado [Nombre5] " , Fiscal General de la República y la Defensoría de los Habitantes representada [Nombre7] Defensora de los Habitantes de la República.

3.- Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 450 del Código de Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso de casación.

4- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta la Jueza de Casación [Nombre2] . ; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Contenido de la impugnación: A. Recurso de Apelación de la Defensa. El licenciado [Nombre6] , en su condición de defensor particular de la extraditable, refiere en escritos de folios 1619 y ss., y en la defensa oral ante este Tribunal, los siguientes agravios: 1) Motivo: violación al debido proceso lo que afecta la sentencia del Juez a quo de una actividad procesal defectuosa absoluta. Ausencia de requisitos y vicios de la sentencia. Fundamento: no se valoró por el Juez A quo la actuación del Ministerio Público ni sus alegatos pese a que el Ministerio Público tiene el control de la legalidad penal. Al no resolver las cuestiones planeadas en la deliberación se viola la ley sustantiva y el debido proceso generando un incumplimiento de requisitos de la sentencia. 2) Errónea valoración de los hechos. No se tuvo por acreditada la custodia física de la menor [Nombre13] . . ha sido la madre aquí requerida, siendo que este ha sido uno de los puntos debatidos. Hecho que esta profusamente demostrado incluso con la declaración del oficial del F.B.I. [Nombre14] , lo cual es determinante dado que en nuestro ordenamiento no se califica como delito de sustracción de menor la acción cometida por quien mantiene bajo su poder físico y custodia material al menor, dado que el tipo se refiere a la acción de apartar de desplazar de su ubicación física a la persona menor o incapaz, lo que constituye un error judicial en la apreciación y valoración de la prueba, al no tener por demostrado que la madre mantenía ese derecho en el momento del traslado de la menor. 3) Errónea aplicación del derecho sustantivo. Incumplimiento del principio de doble incriminación. No se resuelve ni analiza el argumento central fijado por el Ministerio Público, que la madre tenía la custodia física de la menor al salir de los Estados Unidos lo que no constituye el delito de sustracción de menor sino el delito de desobediencia a la autoridad, de forma que no procede la extradición por ausencia de un principio fundamental. Valora que el acto de sustraer consiste en apartar a la niña de la esfera de custodia física, lo que no se dio pues la madre tenía la custodia física, ejemplifica el caso de un progenitor costarricense que decide viajar al extranjero por tener la custodia física de una menor, no comete el delito de sustracción de menor. 4) Ausencia de fundamentación y análisis del principio de doble incriminación. La resolución del juez a quo no contiene una valoración de cada norma del país requirente y requerido, solamente se limita a transcribir cada una de ellas, no señala porque ambas normas son equivalentes y coincidentes. 5) Extralimitación en la competencia del juez A quo. El funcionario realiza una desobediencia a la autoridad por entrar a valorar la existencia del hecho pese a que este Tribunal expresamente le señaló que no debía incursionar en ese tipo de valoraciones. Solicita se declare ineficaz la resolución recurrida y que el Ad quem proceda aplicar el Derecho y el ordenamiento jurídico y a dictar la resolución que corresponda, declare la inexistencia del principio de doble incriminación. Se ordene la libertad de su defendida quien lleva 1 año y dos meses de prisión.

B. Recurso de apelación del Ministerio Público. En los escritos de folios 1610 y ss. La fiscal [Nombre15] y en la exposición oral ante esta Cámara de Casación realizada por el Dr. [Nombre16] señalan como agravios los siguientes. 1) Incumplimiento del principio de doble incriminación. No se cumplió por el Estado requirente con el principio de doble incriminación, así a folio 65 se tiene que la señora [Nombre17]. abandonó la casa en la que vivía con el padre de la menor en el año 2004 y es en agosto 2005, cuando el padre inicia tramites para definir la tutela de la menor, en la medida en que los hechos acusados no constituían el delito por el que se solicitó a la señora [Nombre17], tal y como se desprende del análisis de varias resoluciones del tribunal de Casación de San José, así las resoluciones 465-f-98, del 1 de julio de 1998; resolución 662-2002 de las nueve horas y treinta minutos del 29 de agosto de 2002 y la resolución 141-2009 dictada por el Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, la cual fue leída en la audiencia oral en lo que interesa, además de otras sentencias del tribunal referido y en las que se explica en qué consiste el delito de sustracción de persona menor de edad. Frente a dicho análisis, se asegura que en el presente caso se estaría tan solo ante una desobediencia a la autoridad, motivo por el que solicitan se declare sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto. Para el órgano fiscal debe existir un análisis sustancial y no del nomen iuris, debiendo analizarse los elementos previstos en el tipo penal, pues tales aspectos eran los que se tenían que verificar y no convertir la extradición en un mero trámite de papeles. Afirmó que lo que los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica denomina “sustracción” no coincide con la norma que está prevista en Costa Rica, ya que la señora no “sustrajo” a su hija y no podría interpretarse de manera extensiva los verbos que se encuentran contemplados en nuestro medio para sancionar estos hechos. De acuerdo con la documentación aportada, la señora [Nombre17]. fue requerida por desobedecer una orden judicial y esta descripción no corresponde a lo que está dispuesto en el artículo 184 del Código Penal. El presente caso se trata de una desobediencia a la autoridad prevista en el artículo 307 del Código Penal, se castiga hasta con un año de prisión y por ello no corresponde otorgar la extradición al prever una pena insignificante. En la audiencia oral el fiscal general amplio los motivos y fundamentos y señaló: 2) Ausencia de valoración de los Convenios Internacionales de Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres y de la Niñez. Señala que la resolución del juez A quo no valora que el estado costarricense tiene una opción política de protección a las víctimas de la violencia sexual y doméstica. En el presente caso se acreditó que la extraditable [Nombre17]. es víctima de violencia doméstica por parte de su compañero y padre de la menor [Nombre18]. y que la salida de los Estados Unidos fue para proteger su vida y la de su hija que es costarricense y que tiene un derecho humano a la felicidad y a la paz, se trata de la tutela judicial un ser humano, que las mujeres tienen derechos y de la protección de una menor costarricense. Solicita el amparo de la legislación costarricense, se revoque la resolución apelada y se declare sin lugar la extradición. Se resuelva oralmente esta solicitud por tener catorce meses de prisión, se resuelva otorgándole la libertad inmediatamente.

C. Recurso de apelación de la Defensoría de los Habitantes. La doctora [Nombre7] , en su calidad de Defensora de los Habitantes, en escrito de folios 1635 y ss., y el licenciado [Nombre19] , en su condición de Defensor Adjunto de los Habitantes, en la vista oral, señalaron que la institución que representan está legitimada para actuar en estos casos, conforme lo prevén los artículos 1 y 13 de la Ley No. 7319, Ley de la Defensoría de Los Habitantes, que los faculta a interponer acciones en el ámbito administrativo o judicial. Señalaron como agravios los siguientes: 1) Sobre el proceso de extradición deber de garantizar el respeto de los derechos y garantías de las personas involucradas en el proceso de extradición. Resulta de importancia la labor del juzgador en tanto se convierte en el órgano responsable de cumplir con la obligación internacional para con el Estado requirente, sino también con el cumplimiento de la aplicación de los principios fundamentales de derechos humanos que garantizan la administración de justicia. Para la defensoría la labor de los jueces debe superar la verificación formal de los requisitos para pasar al análisis de las causas de justificación en cada caso concreto que dan cuenta de los conflictos y necesidades de las personas razón de ser del sistema, el estado ostenta un poder-deber del ejercicio de la justicia, en el marco de un Estado soberano. La función jurisdiccional implica valoraciones que puede y debe realizar el juzgador. 2) Violación al principio de doble incriminación. Se fundamentó el motivo en que la conducta que motivó la solicitud de extradición no constituye el delito de sustracción internacional de menores, sino el ilícito de desobediencia a la autoridad, tal y como lo ha referido en este proceso el Ministerio Público, de ahí que no se está ante un delito extraditable. La conducta por la que se solicita la extradición no es típica y debe ser rechazada la extradición por ausencia de los elementos objetivos y normativos. Señala que la prohibición del Juzgado de Humbolt era de sacar la menor de los límites del Estado y no de los Estados Unidos, en razón de lo cual no existe una sustracción internacional de menores. Asimismo refiere la impugnación que el padre de la menor dio una autorización para la salida de la menor [Nombre18]. del país, si bien existió un cambio de destino, lo cierto es que [Nombre1]. contaba con la autorización paterna. Además el delito de desobediencia no constituye parámetro para extraditar a una persona. El Juzgado de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia, en sentencia 60-2009 rechazó la restitución internacional de la niña [Nombre18]. en atención al interés superior de las personas menores de edad y en consideración a que el padre otorgó un permiso de salida del país en abril de 2005 para viajar a México, el cual no indicaba la fecha en que debía regresar, por lo que era un permiso abierto en este caso se colocó a la menor en un hogar sustituto pues para dicho juzgado no hubo sustracción internacional de menores. Así, conforme a la narración de los hechos, que es el cuadro fáctico acusado, no aplicaría como delito posible de extraditar. Además, si en esta instancia de Casación se otorgara la extradición, se violaría el principio de doble instancia. La señora [Nombre17]. ingresó a prisión desde abril de 2008, que en la detención en el Buen Pastor debe velar por su otro hijo menor -también costarricense y producto de otra relación- en la prisión. 3) Ausencia de valoración de los Derechos Humanos de la Niña [Nombre18] la menor fue trasladada a Costar Rica, país en el que nació y del cual es ciudadana. La resolución del Juez a quo no valora los derechos ni de la madre ni de la hija y procede a invisibilizar el resultado que se obtendrá con la extradición efectiva de la extraditable, la entrega de la niña a un padre que no ha sido considerado idóneo por parte de los tribunales costarricenses, además la extraditada tiene otro hijo costarricense el menor de edad [Nombre20]., que se encuentra ubicado con su madre en el centro El Buen Pastor quedará en desamparo una vez firme la extradición. Se afectará directamente los derechos humanos de la niña costarricense [Nombre18]. lo que atenta contra su integridad física y emocional, su dignidad, su derecho a una vida sin violencia, su derecho a la familia y la ubica en una situación de especial vulnerabilidad, en flagrante violación de los derechos de los niños y de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño, extensible también al menor costarricense hijo de [Nombre1], de nombre [Nombre20]. 4) Errónea valoración de las Convenciones e Instrumentos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos y la Cooperación judicial internacional entre los Estados y respeto de los Derechos Humanos. La actuación de la señora [Nombre17]. se originó en un temor fundado por la violación doméstica que sufría. Aseguró que de revocarse el fallo, traería consecuencias nefastas para esta señora al separarla de su hija. En apoyo a su tesis, luego de citar algunas normas del Convenio sobre el Estatuto de Refugiados, o de las Directrices sobre Protección Internacional del Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, lo mismo que algunas resoluciones de la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, afirman que la violencia doméstica es un supuesto por el cual se puede otorgar la condición de refugiada a una persona y que esa es la situación que se presenta con la señora [Nombre1]. El temor fundado de persecución que ejerció el compañero sentimental de la señora [Nombre17]. fue lo que provocó el estado de necesidad objetivo y subjetivo de esta última para salir de su país hacia Costa Rica, buscando refugio al miedo. La situación de refugio se fundamenta en la persecución por parte del agente no estatal y no en el agotamiento de las medidas existentes en su país de origen. La señora [Nombre17]. busca un resguardo a su situación de violencia doméstica, no sacar de la esfera de custodia del padre a la menor. Que la situación de violencia doméstica incluso fue denunciada por la propia señora [Nombre17]. el 23 de agosto de 2005 ante el Tribunal Superior de California, Condado de Humboldt. La señora [Nombre17]. relata como el miedo se apoderaba de ella, estando presente en diferentes episodios de su vida como por ejemplo: “en el 2001 cuando Tierra apenas caminaba ella estaba llorando por algo y estaba caminando entrando a nuestro cuarto. [Nombre21]. le gritó y le tiró la puerta en la cara tan duro que hizo un hueco en la puerta (…) después de beber mucho gritaba todas las mañanas él traumatizo a Tierra yo tenía que llevarla donde mis vecinos (aun antes del desayuno) para que pudiéramos alejados de su violencia. El gritaba y Tierra empezaba a gritar asustada (…) él me llamaba “prostituta y mujerzuela” enfrente de mi hija. Abusaba verbalmente de mí, mientras Tierra estaba conmigo en muchas ocasiones.” También refiere que acudía a la madre del señor [Nombre22]. en busca de ayuda y le contaba su situación de violencia doméstica que enfrentaban ella y su hija cuando él se enteraba “le gritaba y amenazaba con hacerle cosas malas si le volvía a decir a su madre que él no atendía a Tierra” (ver folio 1640). De esta forma, invocando la existencia de un temor fundado, el principio de in dubio pro agredida y el interés superior de la menor involucrada en esta situación, pide se valore la posibilidad de una conducta justificante de parte de la extraditable al venir a Costa Rica, se vele por el interés superior de la niña y se evite la revictimización en el marco de la justicia y del ordenamiento jurídico nacional. Consta en el expediente un dictamen psicológico elaborado por el INAMU en el que se da cuenta de la sintomatología de víctima de violencia doméstica de la señora [Nombre17]. Aunado a lo anterior, argumentan que en la actualidad se encuentra en apelación ante la Ministra de Seguridad Pública el rechazo de la solicitud de refugiada que se presentó a favor de la señora [Nombre17], la cual de concederse terminaría el procedimiento de extradición existente. Se debe aplicar el principio de no retorno de los refugiados. Finalmente, estimó que debería aplicarse el Tratado de la Haya relacionado con la interpretación de los Tratados o Convenios Internacionales en estricto respeto de los derechos humanos. 5) Compromiso del Estado costarricense de respeto a los Derechos Humanos. Se opone a las manifestaciones de la Procuraduría que refiere la existencia de una confraternidad de instituciones. El Estado costarricense ha asumido un compromiso de respeto de los derechos humanos al ratificar diferentes Convenciones Internacionales en los que se tutela la violencia contra la mujer. También la señora [Nombre17]. es madre de dos costarricenses desde los Derechos Humanos se debe tutelar la integralidad de la familia. Se debe valorar la especificidad de las mujeres y de quienes son juzgados en el marco de los Derechos Humanos exige el respeto y garantía de todos los institutos del derecho de Acceso a la Justicia. Se solicita acoger el recurso, decretar la libertad de [Nombre1]. por exceder los plazos razonables en caso de no ser acogida la petición se solicita garantizar el computo de la prisión descontada en este trámite y la obligación de la Procuraduría de darle seguimiento por la vía consular. D. Coadyuvancia del Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres. El Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, a través de su Presidenta Ejecutiva Msc. [Nombre9] se ha apersonado como coadyuvante de los tres recursos de apelación interpuestos en razón de la defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer y señalaron en escrito de folios 1727 y en la audiencia representada por la licenciada [Nombre23] , que ante la ausencia del principio de doble incriminación en torno a los hechos que se le acusaban, se han opuesto en este caso en todo momento a que se conceda la extradición, ya que la señora [Nombre1]. no sustrajo a la menor de la custodia de los padres, ya que su madre la la tenía bajo su esfera de protección y tutela, de ahí que mantengan el criterio de que lo que existe es tan solo una desobediencia a la autoridad, y que al no tener esta ilicitud una pena superior al año de prisión, no podría autorizarse la extradición. Solicitan se valore la grave situación de violencia doméstica que enfrenta la señora [Nombre17]. y su hija por parte del agresor el señor [Nombre21], quien se ha valido de uno de los mecanismos que suelen utilizarse en este tipo de situaciones para mantener control sobre las víctimas, como lo es la instrumentalización de los hijos o hijas. [Nombre1]. estuvo sometida a violencia doméstica en forma sistemática y cotidiana, ella vivía una situación difícil con stress agudo postraumático que es el que sufren las mujeres sometidas a violencia doméstica. Existe un dictamen psicológico realizado por el personal del INAMU que consta en autos y que debe valorarse, y en el que se hace ver la tortura de la señora [Nombre17], se trata de un dictamen profesional y técnico, en el que se analizan las declaraciones verbales en varias sesiones, con un análisis de contenidos. Se indicó la importancia de la lucha que en nuestro país se ha dado contra la violencia doméstica y en protección a las personas que son víctimas de este tipo de agresión, señalando a la vez que precisamente la extraditable era víctima de este problema social. Agregó que la señora [Nombre17]. no cometió el delito de sustracción internacional de persona menor de edad, toda vez que no lo hizo con la intención de separar a su hija del padre, sino con el propósito de evitar la situación de violencia doméstica que vivía, decisión que además la tomó como consecuencia a que no fue debidamente escuchada por las autoridades de su país, es decir, de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica. Manifestó también que la señora [Nombre17]. vino al país para iniciar un proyecto de vida y que se está únicamente ante un delito de desobediencia a la autoridad, motivo por el que pidió se confirme la sentencia y se ordene de inmediato la libertad de aquella. E. Manifestaciones de la Extraditable. En la audiencia oral la señora [Nombre1]. manifestó que durante cuatro años sufrió violencia doméstica por el señor [Nombre21], él la golpeaba, la agredía verbalmente sucedió lo que más miedo le daba le dijo que le mentiría a las autoridades para quitarme a mi hija, él le diría a las autoridades que ella no tenía un domicilio y que con eso le entregaran la custodia de la niña. La policía no podría protegerme en California porque la ley solo da un día de prisión por violencia domestica. No secuestro a su hija se separaron debido a las agresiones antes del traslado, luego se vino a este país porque antes había vivido aquí, [Nombre18]. nació aquí, tenía la custodia física y legal de su hija, el padre de su hija le firmó un permiso para venir a Costa Rica, por lo que él sabía que vendría y que por tanto no pudo secuestrar a su hija, pues ya tenía el permiso para traerla. Señaló que su hija quiere estar con ella, al igual que el hijo que ahora tiene, ellos necesitan de su madre, al punto que un juez de Costa Rica le dio a su hija en custodia. Ha sufrido por estar en la cárcel, lo mismo que su hija. Vino a Costa Rica en busca de protección. Sus hijos son costarricenses y merecen el derecho de estar con su madre, y que solo quiere estar con su familia bajo el derecho de Costa Rica. Yo me podía venir y me vine a Costa Rica, él es muy violento un día le tiró a la niña una silla y quedó a dos pulgadas de que la silla le pegara a la niña.

II.- Oposición de la Procuraduría General de la República al Recurso de Apelación. El licenciado [Nombre3] , en su condición de Procurador Director, se opuso a los agravios de las partes e indicó que debe confirmarse la resolución impugnada. Considera que la petición de extradición la formuló el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica contra [Nombre1], ciudadana de ese país, a quien se le sigue causa por el delito de sustracción internacional de menores. Considera que en este caso procedía la extradición de la señora [Nombre17], toda vez que se cumple con todos los requisitos, reglas y principios por los que se admite este tipo de solicitudes. En cuanto al argumento de los recursos de apelación que no existe doble incriminación los impugnantes omiten valorar que se trata del delito de sustracción internacional de menores, tal y como la hace el juez A quo. No existe un derecho darle una connotación distinta a los hechos contenidos en la petición de extradición. Los impugnantes modifican de manera indebida la pretensión del Estado requirente y le dio una connotación distinta a los hechos por los cuales se solicitó la entrega de la señora [Nombre17], los apelantes involucran otros hechos que no están contenidos en la petición de extradición, al señalar que la especie fáctica requerida encuadra en el delito de desobediencia a la autoridad, sin tomar en consideración que de manera expresa la petición de extradición indica que la señora [Nombre17]. sustrajo a su hija de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica para impedir que su padre obtuviera la custodia, y no como consecuencia por haber desobedecido una orden judicial.

Con fundamento en la jurisprudencia existente sobre esta materia, la cual cita, indica el recurrente que la autoridad juzgadora se debió limitar a verificar si en este caso se daban los requisitos y se respetaban los principios reconocidos por el Derecho Internacional por los que resulta admisible conceder una extradición, ya que no se trata de un asunto de naturaleza penal, sino de un instituto procesal por medio del cual se garantiza la entrega de la persona requerida o extraditable.

Señala en su alegato que el artículo 184 del Código Penal está ubicado dentro de los ilícitos relacionados con la protección a la familia, lo que significa que su interpretación se debe hacer en salvaguarda de los derechos familiares que existen, que es el bien jurídico a tutelar, como lo señaló el Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, en las resoluciones No. 456-F-98 de las 15:30 horas del 1º de julio de 1998, No. [Telf3] de las 9:30 horas 29 de agosto de 2002 y No. [Telf4] de las 14:15 horas del 8 de mayo de 2008. Refiere que el elemento normativo “sustraer” que contiene la norma del Estado requirente debe entenderse tal y como lo hace la Real Academia Española que define sustraer en varias acepciones como robar y hurtar, y como apartar o separar y en el presente caso la señora [Nombre17]. apartó o separó a la menor [Nombre18]. de los derechos parenterales que le correspondían al padre. No debe existir una similitud o exactitud entre las figuras penales de ambos países, basta que sea delito en ambas legislaciones, sin que ello implique que el tipo penal deba ser absolutamente idéntico. Según las probanzas que fueron aportadas por el país requirente, la extraditable [Nombre1]. tenía sobre su hija de manera natural un derecho conjunto y equitativo con su padre, el señor [Nombre21], y que independientemente de la custodia que aquella tenía sobre esta menor, el padre también contaba con el mismo derecho, siendo precisamente en el proceso que se instauró en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica en donde se iba a discutir la custodia legal que le correspondería a cada uno de ellos. Agrega además que el Tribunal Superior del Condado de Humboldt no sólo le adjuntó a la requerida la orden para la audiencia en donde se discutiría la custodia de su hija, sino también una orden en la que se le prohibía expresamente trasladar a esta última fuera del Condado de Humboldt en el Estado de California, siendo que en dicho proceso finalmente se le otorgó al señor [Nombre21]. la custodia legal de la niña. Señaló al no existir discusión alguna en cuanto a la tipicidad de los hechos por los que solicita la extradición dentro de nuestra legislación, ya que quedó ampliamente demostrado que efectivamente la requerida sustrajo a la niña en forma ilegítima, y al encontrarse resuelto el punto polémico, sea la posibilidad de que uno de los padres pudiera ser considerado sujeto activo del delito; es consideración de este Despacho que los hechos por los que se solicitan a la extraditable encuadran dentro del delito denominado “sustracción de menor”-, regulado por nuestra ley sustantiva penal en el artículo 184; cumpliéndose con el principio de doble incriminación o principio de identidad.

Finalmente señala que la violencia doméstica y la situación de la persona menor de edad no deben ser consideradas en el proceso de extradición, se indicó que en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica se le podría dar suficiente protección a los derechos de la extraída a no ser violentada y a vivir en paz, lo mismo que a la niña.

Solicita el rechazo de todos y cada uno de los recursos y que se declare que la resolución del Juez a quo está ajustada a derecho.

III. SOBRE EL FONDO

Conoce este Tribunal tres recursos de apelación interpuestos por la defensa particular de la extraditable [Nombre1], el Ministerio Público y la Defensoría de los Habitantes, recursos que fueron presentados en tiempo y forma de conformidad con lo dispuesto por la Ley de extradición, se aceptó asimismo la coadyuvancia del Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (INAMU). Por razones de economía procesal y considerando que el recurso de apelación de la Defensoría de los Habitantes comprende la totalidad de agravios argumentados por las partes en los diferentes medios de impugnación, así como recoge las manifestaciones de la coadyuvancia del INAMU, este Tribunal se referirá únicamente a este recurso. Esta Cámara luego de valorar los agravios señalados por la Defensoría de los Habitantes declara con lugar los agravios de la forma que se expondrá a continuación, haciendo ver que, como lo señala la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, lo recursos deben ser rápidos, desformalizados y justos (artículos 8 y 25 de Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. [Nombre24] , Internacional del estado por denegación y desafío de justicia y violación de garantías judiciales”, en, CIDH: La Corte y el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 1994, p. 588.):

• A)El deber de garantía de los Derechos Humanos en el proceso de Extradición El recurso de la Defensoría de los Habitantes señala como agravio 1) Sobre el proceso de extradición debe de garantizar el respeto de los derechos y garantías de las personas involucradas en el proceso de extradición. Resulta de importancia la labor del juzgador en tanto se convierte en el órgano responsable de cumplir con la obligación internacional para con el Estado requirente, sino también con el cumplimiento de la aplicación de los principios fundamentales de derechos humanos que garantizan la administración de justicia. Para la Defensoría la labor de los jueces debe superar la verificación formal de los requisitos para pasar al análisis de las causas de justificación en cada caso concreto que dan cuenta de los conflictos y necesidades de las personas razón de ser del sistema, el Estado ostenta un poder-deber del ejercicio de la justicia, en el marco de un Estado soberano. La función jurisdiccional implica valoraciones que puede y debe realizar el juzgador. El agravio se declara con lugar por razones parcialmente distintas. Este Tribunal ha valorado si además del cumplimiento de los requisitos formales y principios generales que establece el tratado bilateral de extradición Costa Rica- Estados Unidos deben analizarse otros aspectos relacionados con el bloque de legalidad imperante en el Estado costarricense que se caracteriza por ser una República democrática de Derecho. En ese sentido, estima esta Cámara que el Derecho de la Constitución, que está conformado por las normas, principios, valores constitucionales y la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, vincula a todos los poderes públicos y a los ciudadanos. Siguiéndose que, el Derecho de la Constitución forma parte del bloque o parámetro de legalidad que le corresponde interpretar y aplicar al juez ordinario al ejercer la función jurisdiccional, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 154 de la Constitución Política.

Aún cuando en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico subsiste un sistema de control de constitucionalidad concentrado, tal circunstancia no inhibe a la jurisdicción ordinaria del deber de garantizar la observancia y la aplicación de la Constitución que es el fundamento del sistema jurídico, por lo que el juez ordinario, al momento de aplicar cualquier norma o acto, no puede marginar los preceptos, valores y principios constitucionales dada la función judicial de asegurar la supremacía del derecho y la preservación del ordenamiento jurídico.

El proceso de extradición se ha caracterizado por nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional y legal como un procedimiento especial de colaboración o de asistencia internacional por medio del cual un Estado (requirente) solicita a otro Estado (requerido) la entrega de una persona a fin de someterla a un proceso penal que se sigue en su país, o bien, para que cumpla la pena que le fue impuesta como consecuencia de un proceso de naturaleza penal, que se siguió en su contra, haciendo de esta manera efectiva la administración de justicia del Estado requirente. Frente a ello, el Estado requerido deberá valorar, conforme a los requisitos y principios que informan esta materia, si procede la solicitud formulada para hacer entrega de la persona requerida.

Incluso la Sala Constitucional señala que se trata de un procedimiento especial diferente del proceso penal y al efecto señala en el SC voto 08261-2008 del 14 de mayo de 2008, lo siguiente:

“Esta Sala, en diferentes oportunidades ha señalado que la extradición es un acto de asistencia jurídica internacional y no es otra cosa que el medio de hacer posible la presencia del imputado en un proceso penal en otro país que lo requiere. Su fundamento pues, está en la solidaridad de los Estados y la necesidad de superar las limitaciones que impone a la persecución y castigo de los delitos el principio de territorialidad, que impide aplicar la ley penal a hechos ocurridos fuera del país en que ha buscado refugio el presunto delincuente. Este acto de cooperación internacional entre Estados, debido a los problemas de territorialidad, distancia, diferencia de culturas y sistemas jurídicos, está dotado de una serie de trámites y regulaciones que buscan superar los obstáculos que se puedan presentar debido a estas diferencias, a la vez que se busca conciliar y hacer respetar los ordenamientos jurídicos de ambos países, incluyendo las normas de protección a los derechos del presunto delincuente. Precisamente estas diferencias anotadas, hacen que la detención y envío de la persona acusada a los tribunales de justicia, esté regulada en forma distinta a la detención de un presunto delincuente en el propio país”.

Estima este Tribunal que aunque de entrada pareciera que el Juez del Estado requerido debe limitarse a constatar sólo los requisitos formales y principios que informan la extradición (entre ellos: doble incriminación, principio de especialidad, que a su vez tiene conminada pena de prisión de más de un año, no tiene prevista la pena de muerte ni se trata de delitos políticos, etc.) porque se trata de una cooperación internacional entre los Estados en el que un Estado requerido sirve de pasaje para la actuación del otro Estado; debemos resaltar que este procedimiento, implica en el Estado requerido, un control jurisdiccional y constitucional, entre ellos: la sujeción de los poderes a la Constitución, la jerarquía y publicidad de las normas, la interdicción de la arbitrariedad, seguridad jurídica.

Si bien, la extradición no es un instituto para defender o imponer un determinado sistema jurídico, frente a la extradición que es un instrumento en la lucha contra la impunidad y el derecho de las posibles víctimas del delito tenemos también que se deben observar los derechos de la persona afectada con el procedimiento, este indudablemente, es el papel del Estado de Derecho frente a los actos de los poderes de otros Estados y como lo señala la Sala Constitucional en el voto anteriormente citado se deben respetar “las normas de protección a los derechos del presunto delincuente”.

Sobre los derechos de los extranjeros En el presente caso, se pretende la aplicación de un conjunto de Derechos Humanos a una ciudadana extranjera [Nombre1]. por lo que debe examinarse cuál es el régimen jurídico de los extranjeros en nuestro ordenamiento vigente.

La Constitución Política en el artículo 19, señala que:

«Los extranjeros tienen los mismos deberes y derechos individuales y sociales que los costarricenses, con las excepciones y limitaciones que esta Constitución y las leyes establecen».

Esta norma ha sido dimensionado por la Sala Constitucional en múltiples votos, resultando válido, como doctrina constitucional, establecer diferencias entre nacionales y extranjeros cuando estén fundadas, tanto en las normas de rango constitucional, como en las de rango legal, siempre y cuando, éstas últimas resulten lógicas, razonables y sean acordes con el principio de proporcionalidad, y no resulten contrarias a la dignidad humana (ver SC voto 01684-91, de las 16:00 horas del 28 de agosto de 1991; SC voto 1440-92 de las 15:30 horas del 2 de junio de 1992; SC voto 01282-90, de las 15:00 horas del 16 de octubre de 1990, y lo ha reiterado en las siguientes sentencias: ver las sentencias SC voto 02093-93, de las 14:06 horas del 19 de mayo de 1993; SC voto 02754-93, de las 14:36 horas del 15 de junio de 1993; SC voto 04601-94, de las 9:33 horas del 26 de agosto de 1994; SC voto 05965-94, de las 15:51 horas del 11 de octubre de 1994; SC voto 00319-95, de las 14:42 horas del 17 de enero de 1995; 05670-95, de las 15:39 horas del 17 de octubre de 1995; y CED1, de las 10:48 horas del 31 de julio de 1998).

En el SC voto 02570-97, del 13 de mayo de 1997, el Alto Tribunal señaló:

"Ciertamente, el párrafo primero del artículo 19 constitucional, establece que: «Los extranjeros tienen los mismos deberes y derechos individuales y sociales que los costarricenses, con las excepciones y limitaciones que esta Constitución y las leyes establecen», lo cual significa que, en lo que al conjunto de derechos fundamentales se refiere, sólo serían válidas las diferencias entre los nacionales y quienes no lo sean, si éstas tienen rango constitucional y legal, y en este último caso, siempre en la medida en que la diferenciación se ajuste plenamente a los parámetros de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que orientan la función legislativa, y por supuesto, en tanto no sea contraria a la dignidad humana. Esta Sala, en desarrollo del contenido de la norma en análisis, ha eliminado por inconstitucionales, una serie de restricciones al ejercicio de derechos fundamentales por parte de los extranjeros, cuyo único fundamento lo fue el criterio de la nacionalidad, el cual se ha desechado reiteradamente, como motivo validante de diferenciaciones entre unos y otros.- " De lo anterior puede inferirse que los extranjeros en nuestro Derecho son titulares de Derechos Humanos y fundamentales, de aquéllos que contemplan la Constitución Política y los instrumentos internacionales y que, a los extranjeros deberá tratárseles de acuerdo a su dignidad de persona y respetándoles sus Derechos Humanos.

Valor de los Derechos Humanos en el Estado costarricense Los Derechos Humanos constituyen un marco jurídico universal de acatamiento obligatorio para los Estados, éstos se reconocen a partir de la dignidad de todo ser humano, en todo el sentido ontológico que ello implica; por el hecho de serlo, el ser humano tiene una serie de derechos y se prohíbe el trato discriminatorio. En ese reconocimiento todos los seres humanos tienen una dignidad y no puede hablarse de una mayor dignidad de unos con respecto a otros, lo que lleva a la prohibición de cualquier tipo de discriminación.

La doctrina constitucional emanada de la Sala especializada es profusa y en forma temprana reconoció que las convenciones e instrumentos de Derechos Humanos tienen validez supra-constitucional y aplicación auto-ejecutable, en ese sentido, toda actividad estatal debe desarrollarse dentro de esos parámetros.

La validez en el Estado costarricense de los instrumentos de Derechos Humanos como fuente del derecho aplicable deriva de la propia Constitución Política y se complementa con el artículo 1 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Así tratándose de instrumentos internacionales de Derechos Humanos vigentes en el país, no se aplica lo dispuesto por el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, al existir norma especial en el artículo 48 para las Convenciones que se refieren a Derechos Humanos, otorgándoles una fuerza normativa del propio nivel constitucional y colocándolos como un parámetro de interpretación del texto mismo de la Constitución, así como de sus principios derivados, en consecuencia se vincula la interpretación y aplicación de la legislación secundaria respecto de aquellos.

La jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional ha reconocido que los instrumentos de Derechos Humanos vigentes en Costa Rica, tienen no solamente un valor similar a la Constitución Política, sino que en la medida en que otorguen mayores derechos o garantías a las personas, priman por sobre la Constitución (vid., SC voto 3435-92 del 11 de noviembre de 1992 y su aclaración, SC voto 5759-93 y SC voto 2313-95 de las 16:18 hrs. de 9 de mayo de 1995).

De la misma manera se ha indicado en SC voto 3173-93, la existencia de los principios pro libértate y pro homine, como el núcleo duro o esencia de los Derechos Humanos, cuyo contenido es el siguiente:

“…el principio pro libértate, el cual, junto con el principio pro homine, constituyen el meollo de la doctrina de los derechos humanos; según el primero, debe interpretarse extensivamente todo lo que favorezca y restrictivamente todo lo que limite la libertad; según el segundo, el derecho debe interpretarse y aplicarse siempre de la manera que más favorezca al ser humano.” Asimismo, se ha reconocido por el Máximo Tribunal que las Opiniones Consultivas de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos tienen en el Estado costarricense pleno valor y que, tratándose de Derechos Humanos sus decisiones vinculan al Estado costarricense, así en SC voto 2313-95 de las 16:18 hrs. de 9 de mayo de 1995 y al resolver la consulta preceptiva de constitucionalidad formulada por el Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa sobre el proyecto de ley de aprobación del “Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional”, expresamente se refirió a la eficacia de que se dota en Costa Rica a los instrumentos internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos no formalmente suscritos o aprobados conforme al trámite constitucional, del siguiente modo:

“En este aspecto hay que rescatar la referencia específica que hoy la Constitución hace de los “instrumentos internacionales”, significando que no solamente convenciones, tratados o acuerdos, formalmente suscritos y aprobados conforme al trámite constitucional mismo (tal el caso que ahora nos ocupa), sino cualquier otro instrumento que tenga la naturaleza propia de la protección de los Derechos Humanos, aunque no haya sufrido ese trámite, tiene vigencia y es aplicable en el país”. Así, la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (París, 10 de diciembre de 1948), por su carácter y naturaleza, no ha necesitado de los trámites constitucionales de aprobación, para entenderse como vigente y con la fuerza normativa que le otorga la materia que regula. Otro tanto cabe decir de las “Reglas Mínimas para el tratamiento de los reclusos”, de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, que aunque sean producto de reuniones de expertos o el trabajo de algún departamento de esa organización, por pertenecer nuestro país a ella, y por referirse a derechos fundamentales, tienen tanto el valor de cualquier normativa internacional que formalmente se hubiera incorporado al derecho interno costarricense”.

Finalmente, en el SC voto 2002-10693 de 7 de noviembre de 2002, la Sala Constitucional reitera que, conforme al artículo 48 de la Constitución Política:

“todos los instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos han sido elevados a rango constitucional, y por consiguiente estos deben ser incorporados en la interpretación de la Constitución”.

En cuanto la aplicación autoejecutable de las Convenciones de Derechos Humanos suelen distinguirse dos posiciones en la doctrina: la primera plantea el carácter programático de las convenciones de Derechos Humanos, según esta posición los artículos de las Conveciones no se aplican directamente sino que dejan la implementación sustantiva a la legislación y a la jurisdicción doméstica (en ese sentido, Informe de la delegación de Estados Unidos a la conferencia de San José en donde se aprobó la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, en: JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, La Convención Americana como Derecho Interno,1988, p.40-41).

La segunda posición admite como regla general el carácter autoejecutivo de las normas contenidas en las convenciones de Derechos Humanos, es decir, sus normas pueden ser invocadas como derecho aplicable por los tribunales una vez ratificadas, como efecto de que las normas vinculan a los Estados-Partes y no sólo a sus gobiernos sino también se dirige a los restantes poderes legislativo y judicial, los que se ven compelidos a dar eficacia a las convenciones en el derecho interno. (Ver en ese sentido, la opinión consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de Derecho Humanos OC-7/86 de 26 de agosto de 1986, y voto Juez [Nombre25] caso [Nombre26] y [Nombre27] vs. Colombia, en la sentencia sobre reparaciones del 29 de enero de 1997, apartados 6, 7 y 9; Caso [Nombre28] vs. Costa Rica del 2 de julio de 2004 en la que se reconoce la autoejecutoridad de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos).

La posición de Sala Constitucional sobre el carácter autoejecutable de los Derechos Humanos es manifiesta, primero en un recurso de Habeas Corpus y posteriormente en un recurso de inconstitucionalidad reconoció el carácter autoejecutable de los Derechos Humanos que produce como efecto la desaplicación de las normas de rango inferior que se opongan a un tratado de Derechos Humanos, en ese sentido ver SC voto 282-90 del 3 de marzo de 1990 y el precedente SC voto 719-90 del 26 de junio de 1990 ambos sobre derecho a recurrir la sentencia condenatoria y SC voto 1319-97 del 4 de marzo de 1997, consolidando la interpretación constitucional del carácter autoejecutivo de las normas del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos.

“...la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a los interesados a plantear la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra las disposiciones legales que se opongan a las de un tratado internacional, considerando que al hacerlo violan la jerarquía normativa superior del segundo, de conformidad con el artículo 7° de la Constitución Política, ello no obsta a que, cuando las disposiciones del tratado resulten ejecutivas y ejecutables por sí mismas, sin necesidad de otras normas que las desarrollen en el derecho interno, las legales que las contradigan deban tenerse simplemente por derogadas, en virtud precisamente del rango superior del tratado. De esta manera, la antinomia entre ley y tratado, a partir de la reforma de los artículos 10, 48,105 y 128 de la Constitución (Ley No. 7128 de 18 de agosto de 1989, vigente desde el 1° de setiembre) y, sobre todo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (No. 7135 del 11 de octubre de 1989, vigente desde su publicación el 19), se resuelve, en primer lugar y en lo posible, con la derogación automática de la primera en cuanto se oponga al segundo, sin perjuicio de que también pueda serlo mediante la declaración de inconstitucionalidad de la ley”.

Esta posición es también seguida en otros pronunciamientos, así, SC voto 3435-92 del 11 de noviembre de 1992; SC voto 2313-95 del nueve de mayo de 1995, entre otros.

Posición en la jerarquía de las normas de los Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos y Es importante señalar aquí cual es la jerarquía de los Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos y otros Tratados Internacionales, dado que de una parte tenemos en el caso subjúdice la aplicación de un Tratado de Extradición con los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica y la aplicación de Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos invocada por la Defensoría de los Habitantes y extensible al resto de los impugnantes.

Encontramos que las fuentes normativas tradicionales se han visto enriquecidas por una corriente que le otorga a los tratados en materia de derechos humanos una jerarquía normativa distinta otorgada a los tratados en materias no relacionadas directamente con los Derechos Humanos (como por ejemplo, los tratados de la cooperación internacional, los que regulan las relaciones externas entre los Estados, derecho de la guerra, etc.). En el caso de nuestro país, es muy clara la diferencia que hace la Constitución, entre el rango que le da a los tratados no relacionados con derechos humanos, con respecto a los que sí tratan esta materia. El artículo 7 de la Constitución Política le otorga a los tratados públicos y convenios internacionales autoridad superior a las leyes, mientras que el artículo 48 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, eleva a rango constitucional los instrumentos de Derechos humanos vigentes en la República.

Frente a la sucesión normativa que plantea la aplicación de un tratado internacional de Derechos Humanos y un tratado bilateral, que entran en conflicto por conceder el primero un reconocimiento expreso de Derechos Humanos y por ende mayores garantías, no se trata de un problema de duda sobre la constitucionalidad del segundo, sino de legalidad y como lo ha referido la Sala Constitucional en múltiples votos, los instrumentos de Derechos Humanos vigentes en Costa Rica, tienen no solamente un valor similar a la Constitución Política, sino que en la medida en que otorguen mayores derechos o garantías a las personas, priman por sobre la Constitución.

En idéntico sentido se ha manifestado la doctrina nacional al señalar que, la consulta de constitucionalidad sólo será necesaria:

“cuando por vía de interpretación no se pueda llegar a una solución que elimine las contradicciones entre el texto legal y la Constitución o instrumento internacional”. (LLOBET, Derechos Humanos en la Justicia Penal, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, p. 241).

Aplicación de principios constitucionales y respeto de Derechos Humanos en la Extradición Al respecto la Sala Constitucional en un caso de reciente data en relación con las valoraciones de la legalidad y del cumplimiento de garantías constitucionales y derivadas de los tratados internacionales de Derechos Humanos acerca de la entrega del extraditable, se ha referido a la valoración fundada en los Derechos Humanos que deben realizar los tribunales de justicia.

Así, ante la consulta de constitucionalidad planteada por el Tribunal de Casación de San Ramón en el voto [Telf5] de las 10:45 horas del 30 de mayo de 2008, en la que se solicitó un pronunciamiento acerca de si la garantía de “ne bis in ídem” establecida en ese numeral 42 de la Constitución Política, adquiere el carácter de un principio de aplicación general o hasta universal, en el proceso de extradición.

Mediante voto SC 2008-013432 de las 14:03 horas del 3 de setiembre de 2008, el Alto Tribunal indicó que, frente a una laguna normativa en la que no se regula los supuestos en que la persona reclamada estuviera siendo juzgada o hubiere sido juzgada en un tercer Estado, los jueces deben resolver aplicando tanto los principios y normas de la Constitución Política como en los Instrumentos Internacionales. Concretamente, la Sala expuso:

"es claro que si se está frente a un caso donde la persona cuya entrega se solicita, está siendo juzgada o ya lo ha sido en un tercer país, la detención y entrega no resulta legítima, pues ha desaparecido la causa que legitima la colaboración del país requerido y la legitimidad de reprimir del país requirente. Los jueces al resolver los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento, se encuentran en la obligación de aplicar las normas y principios contenidos tanto en la Constitución Política como en los instrumentos internacionales aplicables en Costa Rica. La Constitución es la norma suprema del ordenamiento jurídico, opera no sólo, como criterio de validez de todas las demás, sino también como norma jurídica superior, inmediatamente vinculante para todos los poderes y autoridades públicas y desde luego para los particulares, por encima de cualquier otra consideración. V.- Conclusión. En virtud de lo expuesto, concluye este Tribunal que la norma consultada no es inconstitucional. Corresponde a los jueces la interpretación de las normas a la luz de los principios y derechos fundamentales previstos en la Constitución Política e instrumentos internacionales”.

En ese sentido, puede concluirse que incluso los vacíos legales frente a garantías judiciales deben llenarse de contenido con las normas y principios derivados de las Convenciones e Instrumentos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos.

De igual forma en otro voto relativo a la extradición, y la aplicación de un convenio internacional y aunque no con carácter erga hommes sino para el caso concreto, la Sala Constitucional ha valorado la aplicación de las Convenciones Internacionales, así en la sentencia SC voto 011576-2008 del veinticinco de julio del dos mil ocho, reseñó la aplicación de la Convención de Ginebra sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados de 1951, incorporada a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico mediante la Ley [Nombre1]° 6079 del 28 de agosto de 1977, y la Declaración de Cartagena sobre Refugiados de 22 de noviembre de 1984, así como la legislación derivada costarricense y aplicó el principio de no devolución (non refoulment) que constituye la piedra angular del sistema internacional de protección al refugiado, y que, protege al refugiado contra la expulsión o cualquier forma de devolución a las fronteras de territorios donde su vida o su libertad estarían en peligro y este principio beneficia no sólo a aquellas personas que tienen un miedo fundado de persecución en el sentido de la Convención de 1951 sobre Refugiados, sino también a las cubiertas por la definición regional de refugiado contenida en la Declaración de Cartagena.

Sin lugar a dudas, la jurisprudencia constitucional reconoce que las Convenciones Internacionales de Derechos Humanos son fuente del ordenamiento jurídico tratándose del procedimiento de extradición (lo que también se ha manifestado en múltiples casos concretos distintos de la cooperación judicial internacional) que por cumplirse en el Estado de Derecho costarricense debe observar el bloque de legalidad contenido en la Constitución Política y los Convenios Internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos vigentes en Costa Rica. Se enlaza así, la posición de este Tribunal que acogiendo los argumentos de la Defensoría de los Habitantes considera que los derechos humanos deben aplicarse en el proceso de extradición.

Lo cual es compartido por la doctrina mayoritaria y la jurisprudencia de los tribunales internacionales, en ese sentido se afirma por [Nombre29] , : Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p. 237:

“la persona que es sujeto de la extradición dispone de los derechos humanos que le reconoce el ordenamiento constitucional, entre ellos al debido proceso, a la libertad, a la integridad, a la vida, etc., pero no tal y como viene concretado en cada país sino como viene consensuado en las declaraciones internacionales de derechos, en un determinado ius cogens, es decir, por las normas de derecho universalmente aceptadas y que vienen expresadas en las declaraciones internacionales y decisiones de los correspondientes tribunales”.

Por su parte el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos expresamente en el caso [Nombre30] (sentencia del TEDH del 7 de julio de 1989) no excusa a los Estados Parte de toda responsabilidad por las consecuencias previsibles que una extradición pueda extrañar mas allá de sus fronteras. Ciertamente este caso se refería a una extradición de un ciudadano hacia los Estados Unidos, para ser juzgado por asesinato con posibilidad de ser condenado a la pena muerte. Empero se obtiene de la solución del caso importantes consecuencias para el proceso extradicional y el respeto de los derechos humanos, entre ellas, se destaca por [Nombre31] citado por [Nombre32], [Nombre33]: La extradición en el ordenamiento Interno español, Internacional y Comunitario, Comares, Granada, 2005, p. 157:

“en primer lugar, las Partes Contratantes no pueden olvidar la suerte que correrán en el país de acogida las personas objeto de extradición; en segundo lugar asigna al artículo 3 una función preponderante en tanto que disposición incondicional y no derogable e íntimamente ligada a los principios de la dignidad humana y de una sociedad democrática; en tercer lugar, demuestra una manifestación de la internacionalización del tema de los derechos humanos desprendiéndose una relativización de los límites nacionales y regionales de cobertura a favor de la dignidad humana; a su juicio, en cuarto lugar, la sentencia consagra el carácter normativo y singular del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, aplicándose preferentemente a un tratado posterior (el de extradición de 1972), celebrado por un país, ajeno al sistema europeo, Estados Unidos, mostrando el carácter dinámico y progresivo del Convenio”.

Consecuentemente el Estado no puede excusarse en la soberanía para no actuar en defensa de los Derechos Humanos, lo que ha sido reiterado en otros votos del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (caso [Nombre34] y [Nombre35]) y por el Comité de Derechos Humanos (en el caso [Nombre36], [Nombre37] y [Nombre38] sobre el derecho a la vida y a los tratos inhumanos y degradantes).

Asimismo, se entiende por la doctrina mayoritaria que existe una conexión entre ese acto del Estado requirente y el Estado requerido, en la protección de los Derechos Humanos:

“la lesión del derecho fundamental en que pueda incurrir la actuación de un poder público extranjero vicia de inconstitucionalidad la del órgano judicial o administrativo propio que la facilita, ya que da lugar a que dicha lesión se materialice al cumplimentarla u otorgarle validez.” (Vid., [Nombre29] , : Extradición y Derechos Fundamentales, Civitas, Madrid, 2005, p.33.)

Argumentar en contrario puede llevar a una responsabilidad dimanante de la aplicación de las normas internacionales, podría darse una violación indirecta de los Derechos Humanos, que es aquella que resulta facilitada por la actuación u omisión del órgano extradicional.

Es por todo lo expuesto que este Tribunal ha acogido el argumento de la Defensoría de los Habitantes y considera que el Juez A quo debió valorar en forma global la situación fáctica y jurídica de acuerdo con los principios del Estado de Derecho y el Derecho de la Constitución que implicaron una errónea valoración del Derecho sustantivo ya que en nuestro régimen jurídico se le otorga un valor preponderante a los Tratados Internacionales sobre Derechos umanos, los que tienen un valor supra-constititucional. Apartándose de otros votos no vinculantes de Tribunales de Casación nacionales muy respetables desde el punto de vista jurídico, esta Cámara ha optado por valorar las Convenciones Internacionales de Derechos Humanos suscritas y ratificadas por Costa Rica y que están directamente relacionadas con los puntos controvertidos en este caso. A la vez que nuestro Estado está vinculado al cumplimiento y observancia no sólo desde el ámbito formal, sino en el ámbito real y en los resultados de la aplicación de los Tratados de Derechos Humanos, los que definitivamente no han sido ratificados por el Estado requirente.

Nuestro país ha firmado y ratificado, entre otras, múltiples convenciones de Derechos Humanos las siguientes: Convención CEDAW, Convención Belem do Pará, Convención de Derechos del Niño que implican un mayor espectro en cuanto a las garantías derivadas de los Derechos Humanos, tales como el reconocimiento de los derechos de la mujer como Derechos Humanos, el derecho de la mujer de no ser violentada, la tutela de interés superior y la protección integral del Menor, el derecho a la familia y a la paz. Con los cuales el país ha adquirido un compromiso de tutela especial de los derechos de la Mujer y de la Niña, sobre todo considerando que el Estado constitucional y democrático de Derecho, no puede desentenderse de las consecuencias que puedan traer sus actuaciones, el acto de entrega de la persona extraditable puede materializar de forma indirecta la vulneración de Derechos Humanos.

En un proceso de extradición como el que nos ocupa, las autoridades judiciales no podemos limitarnos a la constatación del cumplimiento de requisitos, sino que, el Estado costarricense debe actuar dentro de los parámetros de constitucionalidad y legalidad, que en este caso concreto le obligan a tutelar lo Derechos Humanos de dos mujeres víctimas de violencia doméstica: una de ellas mayor de edad, madre de dos hijos costarricenses, y la otra, mujer niña, menor de edad, que ostenta doble nacionalidad costarricense por nacimiento y norteamericana. Del estudio del presente proceso se colige con claridad por la prueba que se evacuó y que se reprodujo parcialmente en la audiencia oral que efectivamente se verifico una situación de violencia contra la mujer. Debe aclararse que en el presente caso, las autoridades judiciales del país requerido no prejuzgan sobre el hecho por el que se le sigue causa a la extraditable en el país requirente, aunque no se emita pronunciamiento sobre estos hechos, la vulneración de Derechos Humanos como la violencia contra la mujer y la niña deben ser valorados.

• B)Sobre los derechos de la niña y el niño, el derecho a la familia y a vivir una vida sin violencia.

El recurso de apelación de la Defensoría de los Habitantes señala como agravio 3) la ausencia de valoración de los Derechos Humanos de la Niña costarricense [Nombre18] y como motivos se argumenta que la menor fue trasladada a Costar Rica, país en el que nació y del cual es ciudadana. La resolución del Juez a quo no valora los derechos ni de la madre ni de la hija y procede a invisibilizar el resultado que se obtendrá con la extradición efectiva de la extraditable, la entrega de la niña a un padre que no ha sido considerado idóneo por parte de los tribunales costarricenses, además el menor de edad [Nombre20]., que se encuentra ubicada con su madre en el centro El Buen Pastor quedará en desamparo una vez firme la extradición. Se afectará directamente los derechos humanos de la niña costarricense [Nombre18]. lo que atenta contra su integridad física y emocional, su dignidad, su derecho a una vida sin violencia, su derecho a la familia y la ubica en una situación de especial vulnerabilidad, en flagrante violación de los derechos de los niños y de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño, extensible también al menor costarricense hijo de [Nombre1]. de nombre [Nombre20].

Este Tribunal acoge el agravio. Conforme hemos expuesto nuestra legislación constitucional, al acoger la Convención de los Derechos del Niño que es un instrumento de Derechos Humanos, asumió el compromiso de que en los procesos donde en forma directa o indirecta se encuentren involucrados los derechos de una persona menor de edad, las autoridades encargadas de la solución del caso, sean éstas administrativas o judiciales, deben valorar en la resolución correspondiente lo relativo a los niños y a su interés superior. Aunque estas circunstancias aparenten ser ajenas a la situación específica, ya que podría darse una violación indirecta de los derechos fundamentales, que es aquella que resulta facilitada por la actuación omisiva del órgano extradicional. En el subjúdice resulta imposible escindir, -como lo ha hecho el juez a quo- el conocimiento de la extradición cuyos hechos y fundamento de la misma se adecuan a un secuestro internacional de menor, de la situación de la extraditable [Nombre17]. y sus hijos: una niña [Nombre18]. y un niño [Nombre20]., ambos costarricenses por nacimiento y la situación de violencia doméstica denunciada, lo que debe valorarse de conformidad con los principios generales que rigen el Estado democrático de Derecho e informan al Derecho de la Constitución.

Diferentes instrumentos internacionales reconocen el deber estatal de prestar particular protección a los derechos de los niños y las niñas, los que parten de la misma Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, y en particular, la Convención Internacional de los Derechos del Niño (aprobada y ratificada por nuestro país, mediante, la Ley [Nombre1]° 7184 del dieciocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa, la cual entró en vigencia, a tenor del numeral 2° de ese instrumento legal, el día de su publicación en La Gaceta [Nombre1]° 149 del nueve de agosto de mil novecientos noventa), en la que se brinda una protección a este grupo etario. Procurando que en todo momento se dispense la adecuada asistencia y respeto de los derechos a él reconocidos, dentro de los que sobresalen, entre otros: la promoción de las condiciones necesarias para la convivencia familiar, así como el derecho de los niños a permanecer junto a sus padres (artículo 7º) -particularmente junto a su madre (artículo 16 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, o Protocolo de San Salvador); el derecho a un nivel de vida adecuado para su desarrollo físico, mental, espiritual, moral y social (artículo 27).

De la misma manera, ese instrumento internacional le fija una serie de obligaciones a los Estados parte o signatarios, entre ellas: la de velar porque el niño no sea separado de sus padres contra la voluntad de éstos, excepto cuando, a reserva de revisión judicial, tal separación es necesaria en el interés superior del niño” (artículo 9° párrafo 1º) y atender toda solicitud, formulada por un niño o por sus padres, para entrar en un Estado parte o para salir de él en forma positiva, humanitaria y expedita (artículo 10, párrafo 1°).

De estos instrumentos internacionales de Derechos Humanos se deriva que los Estados tienen como deberes fundamentales la protección del interés del superior del niño, evitando la desmembración del núcleo familiar y promover las condiciones necesarias para que gocen de la presencia permanente de la autoridad parental, a la vez que, señalan que en algunas ocasiones la separación es necesaria y está autorizada en el interés superior del menor.

En el orden infraconstitucional, también se han desarrollado leyes que tutelan eL interés superior del menor. Así, el Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia (Ley [Nombre1]° 7739), puntualiza que el norte interpretativo de toda acción pública o privada debe ser el interés superior del niño (artículo 5º). El artículo 17 señala que los menores de edad no pueden ser sujetos, entre otros supuestos, de deportación del territorio nacional, salvo en resguardo de su propio interés, de acuerdo con los criterios determinados por el interés superior de este grupo. Así como el artículo 30 establece el Derecho a la vida familiar, al indicar que los menores de edad tendrán derecho a conocer a su padre y madre; asimismo, a crecer y desarrollarse a su lado y ser cuidadas por ellos y el precepto 33 regula el Derecho a la permanencia con la familia al disponer que los menores de edad no podrán ser separados de su familia, salvo en circunstancias especiales establecidas por la ley.

La Sala Constitucional reconoce el interés superior del niño como principio general orientador de toda actividad estatal, así en el SC voto 15461-2008 de, 15 de octubre de 2008 ha referido:

En este sentido, como principio general reconocido y plenamente aplicable, al interés superior del niño no le es oponible norma o decisión alguna –administrativa o judicial- que le contradiga, salvo que en circunstancias determinadas se encuentre en liza la aplicabilidad de algún otro principio general del mayor nivel, en cuyo caso el operador jurídico deberá atenerse a la prueba de ponderación y al rol de cada principio en el caso particular. De tal forma, ignorar el carácter principal del interés superior del niño desatendiendo su aplicación estricta en aquellos casos que involucren a personas menores de edad, resulta contrario a los reconocimientos que sobre el particular efectúa el Derecho de la Constitución, a la vez que da margen para situarse en una posición de vulnerabilidad frente al mandato del artículo 2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.

Asimismo, el Derecho de la Constitución prodiga una “protección especial del Estado” a la familia, sea ésta de hecho o de derecho. El artículo 51 Constitucional proclama que esa institución es el “elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad”. El núcleo familiar es básico y primordial para el libre desarrollo de la personalidad de los individuos que lo conforman o integran y, por consiguiente, de todo el conglomerado social. Sin embargo, en ocasiones la familia no es un sitio seguro, por la violencia doméstica y en estos casos se tutela la vulnerabilidad y la posibilidad de afectación de la integridad personal: física y mental de sus miembros.

En el caso bajo examen, esta Cámara ha analizado en el considerando anterior A), la señora [Nombre17]. denunció ante las autoridades la violencia doméstica, además que se opuso a la custodia paterna, aduciendo que la menor corría peligro. Asimismo, en el informe técnico del INAMU de repetida cita, se indicó que la violencia doméstica la sufrió la señora [Nombre17]. y su propia hija [Nombre18]., con manifestaciones actuales llevadas a cabo en nuestro país. Ya que el padre de la niña no quería que la niña visitase a su madre en prisión y trató de sacarla del país contraviniendo la orden del Juzgado de Niñez y Adolescencia. Además, la menor [Nombre18]. manifiesta secuelas emocionales de la separación de su madre, así como la madre está igualmente impactada sufriendo deterioro en su estado emocional (ver folios 1071 a 1076) y también que la señora [Nombre17]. procreó otro niño en nuestro país. De forma tal, que con la prueba aportada se colige que tanto la madre como la niña han sufrido de violencia doméstica y aún en este momento, la violencia es manifiesta y que, como lo ha señalado la Defensoría de los Habitantes, conceder la extradición de la señora [Nombre17]. puede agudizar la situación y dejar en desprotección a la menor [Nombre18]. y su hermano [Nombre20].

Esta Cámara no puede obviar que la madre ingresó al territorio nacional con la niña [Nombre39]. y ha solicitado un refugio amparándose en la violencia doméstica, que al momento de esta resolución, no ha sido resuelto en forma definitiva. Sobre la situación de los menores que han sido sustraídos por sus madres y que sufren en el seno familiar violencia doméstica debe tomarse en cuenta que los intereses de los niños y de la madre están indisolublemente unidos. Además de la protección especial a los niños, entre ellos el de contar con su madre y su familia, entendiéndose que la extradición producirá como resultado la separación de la niña de su madre, y de su hermano, a la vez que, implicará la ubicación de la niña como ha ocurrido ahora en un hogar sustituto o en última instancia el riesgo de devolución al lado paterno que según se acreditó está también inmerso en la violencia contra la persona menor.

La jurisprudencia constitucional nacional y la jurisprudencia del derecho comparado internacional sobre el retorno de los menores, ha rechazado el retorno de los menores según lo dispuesto por el artículo 13(1) (b) de la Convención sobre los Aspectos Civiles de la Sustracción Internacional de Menores (de veinticinco de octubre de mil novecientos ochenta, y aprobado mediante ley número 7746 de veintitrés de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y ocho), si los menores corren riesgo de peligro físico o psíquico, o de cualquier otra manera se ponga al menor en una situación intolerable, independientemente de si el padre sustractor ha solicitado un refugio en el país, así los casos SC voto 15461-2008 de 15 de octubre de 2008 y SC voto 17639-2008 de cinco de diciembre de 2008. También, el SC voto 11576-2008 de 25 de julio de 2008 en las razones adicionales de la magistrada Calzada se valoró la situación de no solicitud del refugio y se indicó:

“que el hecho de que la amparada no haya solicitado la condición de refugiada en el país desde su ingreso, bien pudo haber sido parte del mismo temor basado en la situación de la que huía, toda vez que expondría públicamente su ubicación al supuesto agresor. Además, es de esperar que no se sintiera suficientemente resguardada por los medios legales existentes, los cuales estimaba que -incluso que en Estados Unidos- habían sido insuficientes y, en nuestro país, tampoco han resultado suficientemente efectivos en todos los casos.” En cuanto a los casos internacionales véase los casos [Nombre40] v. [Nombre40], [2001] O.J. No. 2849 (Ontario), se rehusó ordenar el retorno a Kenya de unas niñas trillizas. Las niñas habían viajado a Canadá con su madre, a quien las autoridades canadienses en Nairobi habían otorgado un visado de refugiado se concluyó por el Juez que la madre y las niñas estaban viviendo en un ambiente peligroso y hostil atribuible a la conducta de su padre y que consecuentemente, refiriéndose al caso de Pollastro, había una base para la excepción prevista por el artículo 13(1)(b). Otros casos más, son [Nombre41] . , [2001] O.J. No.3074 (Ontario), se rehusó ordenar el retorno de un niño de 3 años a Hungría. Al llegar a Canadá, la madre reclamó la condición de refugiado. Al igual que en el caso A.K. v. E.F., [2001] R.D.F. 334 (Québec).

A mayor abundamiento, como lo señalan los autores nacionales, en consonancia con la doctrina autorizada extranjera, [Nombre42] y [Nombre43] , La sustracción Internacional de Personas Menores de Edad en el Derecho de Familia Costarricense, IJSA, 2008, p.60, la Convención sobre los Aspectos Civiles de la Sustracción Internacional de Menores o Convención de La Haya:

“se trata de un conjunto de disposiciones vinculantes que no establecen el régimen jurídico del caso concreto por lo que no se trata de un Convenio de competencia judicial, el derecho aplicable, ni de reconocimiento de decisiones extranjeras. Solamente contempla sistemas de cooperación de autoridades y una acción para el retorno inmediato de la persona menor de edad al país de su residencia habitual. Por ello, el punto medular del proceso no es la idoneidad para el ejercicio del cuidado personal de las personas menores de edad sino, la existencia o no de causales de no restitución. Este punto es de suma importancia puesto que el proceso de restitución internacional de personas menores de edad no es un trámite para decidir sobre la custodia ni para determinar o descartar la idoneidad del padre o de la madre requerido(a)”.

Como corolario del análisis anterior, cabe concluir que cuando se trate de aspectos sustanciales en los que se encuentre inmerso el interés superior del menor, serán sus Derechos Humanos los que prevalecerán frente a la aplicación de la Convención sobre los Aspectos Civiles de la Sustracción Internacional de Menores, de acuerdo al Derecho de la Constitución y en esto, la prelación o jerarquía mayor de los tratados de Derechos Humanos se impone. Como lo ha adelantado la Sala Constitucional en el SC voto 15461-2008 de 5 de octubre de 2008, que anteriormente citamos, en donde también es importante la nacionalidad de los niños posiblemente afectados, si se trata de un costarricense menor de edad, debe -de manera preponderante- integrarse en la decisión lo concerniente al principio del interés superior del niño, la Sala indicó:

“De esta manera, si el menor de edad sobre el cual se plantea la posibilidad de una restitución internacional resulta ser un costarricense que se encuentra en territorio nacional, las autoridades administrativas y judiciales que deban resolver lo concerniente deberán tomar en consideración la existencia de principios generales expresos reconocidos por el país; (…) pues no hacerlo así dará como resultado un pronunciamiento ilegítimo por contradecir principios, valores y normas concretas establecidos en la globalidad del Derecho de la Constitución y que aquí han sido definidas”.

• C)La violencia doméstica como causal de reconocimiento para obtener la protección internacional del estatus de refugiada y la necesaria valoración en el procedimiento de la extradición.

La Defensoría de los Habitantes expreso como agravio 4) Errónea valoración de las Convenciones e Instrumentos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos y la Cooperación judicial internacional entre los Estados y respeto de los Derechos Humanos. Señalan que el juez A quo no valoró que la actuación de la señora [Nombre17]. se originó en un temor fundado por la violación doméstica que sufría. Aseguró que de revocarse el fallo, traería consecuencias nefastas para esta señora al separarla de su hija. En apoyo a su tesis, luego de citar algunas normas del Convenio sobre el Estatuto de Refugiados, o de las Directrices sobre Protección Internacional del Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, lo mismo que algunas resoluciones de la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, afirman que la violencia doméstica es un supuesto por el cual se puede otorgar la condición de refugiada a una persona y que esa es la situación que se presenta con la señora [Nombre1]. El agravio se acoge, pero con distinta fundamentación. Efectivamente se desprende del proceso de extradición seguido contra la señora [Nombre17], que ella solicitó ante la autoridad migratoria correspondiente una solicitud de refugio, sustentándose en la violencia doméstica sufrida por ella y por su hija menor [Nombre18]., según un informe de la Defensoría de los Habitantes visible a folios 1097 y ss., que no ha sido cuestionado de inválido por la parte contraria.

Según se refiere, las autoridades migratorias denegaron en primera instancia la gestión y la misma se apeló ante la Ministra de Seguridad, sin que al momento de resolver esta causa por el Tribunal de Casación se comunicara la decisión final. Estima esta Cámara que no obstante, la obligación constitucional de referirse a estos temas, a que hemos hecho referencia por derivarse de los Derechos Humanos, estos aspectos no fueron considerados en la resolución que acogió la extradición, con una aplicación errónea del derecho sustantivo.

De las Convenciones y Declaraciones Internacionales de Derechos Humanos se considera que el derecho al refugio es un Derecho Humano y así lo ha reconocido nuestro ordenamiento al incorporar esos diversos instrumentos en el plano infraconstitucional.

De conformidad con el artículo 1°, sección A, párrafo 2°, de la Convención de Ginebra sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados de 1951, incorporada a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico mediante la Ley [Nombre1]° 6079 del 28 de agosto de 1977, el término refugiado se aplica a toda persona que:

“como resultado de acontecimientos ocurridos antes del 1.º de enero de 1951 y debido a fundados temores de ser perseguida por motivos de raza, religión, nacionalidad, pertenencia a determinado grupo social u opiniones políticas, se encuentre fuera del país de su nacionalidad y no pueda o, a causa de dichos temores, no quiera acogerse a la protección de tal país; o que, careciendo de nacionalidad y hallándose, a consecuencia de tales acontecimientos, fuera del país donde antes tuviera su residencia habitual, no pueda o, a causa de dichos temores, no quiera regresar a él”.

Este criterio que fue retomado por el derecho interno en el artículo 1° del Decreto Ejecutivo [Nombre1]° 32195 de 22 de septiembre de 2004, según el cual, se:

“Considera refugiado a toda persona que debido a fundados temores de ser perseguida, se encuentra fuera del país de su nacionalidad, y no pueda o no quiera acogerse a la protección de ese país.” Por su parte, la Declaración de Cartagena sobre Refugiados de 22 de noviembre de 1984 (reconocida y reafirmada en la Declaración de San José, Costa Rica, sobre los Refugiados y personas desplazadas de 7 de diciembre de 1994), que recoge la mejor tradición latinoamericana en la materia, y extiende esta condición a aquellas personas:

“que han huido de sus países porque su vida, seguridad o libertad han sido amenazadas por la violencia generalizada, la agresión extranjera, los conflictos internos, la violencia masiva de los derechos humanos u otras circunstancias que hayan perturbado gravemente el orden público” (parte III, Tercera).

Pero es el Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, el que en forma consistente ha señalado que uno de los motivos por los cuales procede la solicitud de refugio es, precisamente, cuando una mujer sufre de violencia doméstica (Conclusiones del Comité Ejecutivo número 87 de octubre de 1999, núm. 39 del Comité Ejecutivo, Mujeres refugiadas y protección internacional; núm.73, Protección de los refugiados y violencia sexual, 1993; núm. 77, Conclusión general sobre la protección internacional, 1995; número 79, Conclusión general sobre la protección internacional, 1996; y núm. 81, Conclusión general sobre la protección internacional, 1997).

En el caso subjúdice, la autoridad migratoria de conformidad con los artículos 111 y 112 de la Ley de Migración y Extranjería conoció de la solicitud de refugio y la denegó, sin embargo la decisión administrativa no estaba firme pues se apeló ante el Ministerio correspondiente, por lo que en aplicación del mencionado artículo 112, frente a esta solicitud lo que corresponde es la suspensión de la ejecución de la extradición, hasta que se resuelva lo pertinente. Lo cual es expresión del denominado principio de no devolución, refiere el artículo lo siguiente:

Artículo 112.- La interposición de una solicitud para el reconocimiento de la condición de refugiado o de asilado, tendrá efecto suspensivo sobre la ejecución de la extradición de la persona extranjera, hasta que el procedimiento correspondiente haya sido completado, mediante resolución firme e inapelable. El reconocimiento de la condición de refugiado o de asilado tendrá el efecto de terminar cualquier procedimiento de extradición iniciado contra la persona refugiada o asilada, a petición del Gobierno del país donde se haya cometido el supuesto delito, basado en los mismos hechos que justificaron dicho reconocimiento.

Las situaciones fácticas del caso examinado no deben verse en forma aislada, sino ligadas a la situación de violencia contra la mujer y la niña y el interés superior de los menores costarricenses por lo que deben ponderarse los intereses y procurarse el mayor respeto a los Derechos Humanos. No repetiremos lo ya expuesto, solamente recalcar que el Juez a quo al conceder la extradición de una persona en las condiciones que hemos analizado, expone a la señora [Nombre17]. y a su hija a mayores daños físicos y emocionales derivados de la violencia intrafamiliar que se acreditó. Por lo que sin prejuzgar ni invadir la esfera de competencia de órganos administrativos, a los que les corresponderá decidir sobre el refugio; sí cuando estén de por medio probables vulneraciones a la integridad personal y en suma, probables ataques injustificados a los derechos humanos de la mujer y la niña así como el interés superior de la niña, entre ellos el de contar con su madre y su familia deben valorarse en la extradición esos aspectos conforme los postulados del Derecho de la Constitución.

Los Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres El Estado costarricense ha ratificado instrumentos internacionales referentes al avance de los Derechos Humanos de las mujeres que obligan a su aplicación debido a que los ha ratificado, así como las mismas Convenciones contemplan normas que, incluyen, tanto el compromiso por parte del Estado respectivo de no violar los Derechos Humanos, sino también una acción positiva para garantizar el “pleno y total ejercicio” de estos derechos, como es el caso de la Convención Americana artículos 1 y 2.

Entre las fuentes normativas internacionales de Derechos Humanos de la Mujer tenemos las siguientes: Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (1948); Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre (1948, artículo 1); Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (1969, artículos 5); Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación Contra la Mujer (CEDAW) (1979, artículos 1, 2, 4, 5, 9); Recomendaciones Generales adoptadas por el Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer; la Declaración sobre la Eliminación de la Violencia Contra la Mujer, (proclamada por la Asamblea General de la Naciones Unidas en resolución número 48/104 de 20 de diciembre de 1993 artículo 4); Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia Contra las Mujer o Convención Belem do Pará (1994, artículos 1 a 3, 7 y 9); Protocolo Facultativo de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación Contra la Mujer (1999). De este conjunto normativo como lo señaló expresamente la Declaración y plan de Acción de l Conferencia Mundial sobre Derechos Humanos (Viena 1993), se deriva que:

“los derechos de la mujer y la niña, son parte inalienable e indivisible de los derechos humanos universales” De todos estos instrumentos internacionales nos interesa reseñar que reconocen como principios fundamentales la igualdad, la dignidad, el derecho a una vida libre de violencia y el derecho a vivir en paz de la Mujer.

La Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia Contra la Mujer, aprobada por Ley No 7499 de 9 de junio de 1994, obliga al Estado costarricense a analizar la situación de violencia que sufra una mujer en un caso sometido a su conocimiento, como lo es el que ahora nos ocupa. Así, en sus artículos 2, 4 y 9, se dispone:

Artículo 2-. Se entenderá que violencia contra la mujer incluye la violencia física, sexual y psicológica:

a. que tenga lugar dentro de la familia o unidad doméstica o en cualquier otra relación interpersonal, ya sea que el agresor comparta o haya compartido el mismo domicilio que la mujer, y que comprende, entre otros, violación, maltrato y abuso sexual(...).

Artículo 4-.Toda mujer tiene derecho al reconocimiento, goce, ejercicio y protección de todos los derechos humanos y a las libertades consagradas por los instrumentos regionales e internacionales sobre derechos humanos. Estos derechos comprenden, entre otros:

a. el derecho a que se respete su vida; b. el derecho a que se respete su integridad física, psíquica y moral; c. el derecho a la libertad y a la seguridad personales; d. el derecho a no ser sometida a torturas; e. el derecho a que se respete la dignidad inherente a su persona y que se proteja a su familia; f. el derecho a igualdad de protección ante la ley y de la ley; g. el derecho a un recurso sencillo y rápido ante los tribunales competentes, que la ampare contra actos que violen sus derechos (…).

Artículo 9-. Para la adopción de las medidas a que se refiere este capítulo, los Estados Partes tendrán especialmente en cuenta la situación de vulnerabilidad a la violencia que pueda sufrir la mujer en razón, entre otras, de su raza o de su condición étnica, de migrante, refugiada o desplazada. En igual sentido se considerará a la mujer que es objeto de violencia cuando está embarazada, es discapacitada, menor de edad, anciana, o está en situación socioeconómica desfavorable o afectada por situaciones de conflictos armados o de privación de su libertad.” En cuanto a la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia Contra las Mujer o Convención Belem do Pará constituye el primer instrumento legal internacional que reconoce el derecho de las mujeres a vivir una vida libre de violencia, así como considera la violencia contra las mujeres como una violación a los Derechos Humanos, los artículos 1 a 3, 7 y 9, señalan:

Artículo 1-.Para los efectos de esta Convención debe entenderse por violencia contra la mujer cualquier acción o conducta, basada en su género, que cause muerte, daño o sufrimiento físico, sexual o psicológico a la mujer, tanto en el ámbito público como en el privado.

Artículo 2-. Se entenderá que violencia contra la mujer incluye la violencia física, sexual y psicológica:

a. que tenga lugar dentro de la familia o unidad doméstica o en cualquier otra relación interpersonal, ya sea que el agresor comparta o haya compartido el mismo domicilio que la mujer, y que comprende, entre otros, violación, maltrato y abuso sexual; b. que tenga lugar en la comunidad y sea perpetrada por cualquier persona y que comprende, entre otros, violación, abuso sexual, tortura, trata de personas, prostitución forzada, secuestro y acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo, así como en instituciones educativas, establecimientos de salud o cualquier otro lugar, y c. que sea perpetrada o tolerada por el Estado o sus agentes, dondequiera que ocurra.

Artículo 3-.Toda mujer tiene derecho a una vida libre de violencia, tanto en el ámbito público como en el privado.

Artículo 7-. Los Estados Partes condenan todas las formas de violencia contra la mujer y convienen en adoptar, por todos los medios apropiados y sin dilaciones, políticas orientadas a prevenir, sancionar y erradicar dicha violencia y en llevar a cabo lo siguiente:

a. abstenerse de cualquier acción o práctica de violencia contra la mujer y velar por que las autoridades, sus funcionarios, personal y agentes e instituciones se comporten de conformidad con esta obligación; b. actuar con la debida diligencia para prevenir, investigar y sancionar la violencia contra la mujer; c. incluir en su legislación interna normas penales, civiles y administrativas, así como las de otra naturaleza que sean necesarias para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra la mujer y adoptar las medidas administrativas apropiadas que sean del caso; d. adoptar medidas jurídicas para conminar al agresor a abstenerse de hostigar, intimidar, amenazar, dañar o poner en peligro la vida de la mujer de cualquier forma que atente contra su integridad o perjudique su propiedad; e. tomar todas las medidas apropiadas, incluyendo medidas de tipo legislativo, para modificar o abolir leyes y reglamentos vigentes, o para modificar prácticas jurídicas o consuetudinarias que respalden la persistencia o la tolerancia de la violencia contra la mujer; f. establecer procedimientos legales justos y eficaces para la mujer que haya sido sometida a violencia, que incluyan, entre otros, medidas de protección, un juicio oportuno y el acceso efectivo a tales procedimientos; g. establecer los mecanismos judiciales y administrativos necesarios para asegurar que la mujer objeto de violencia tenga acceso efectivo a resarcimiento, reparación del daño u otros medios de compensación justos y eficaces, y h. adoptar las disposiciones legislativas o de otra índole que sean necesarias para hacer efectiva esta Convención.

Artículo 9-. Para la adopción de las medidas a que se refiere este capítulo, los Estados Partes tendrán especialmente en cuenta la situación de vulnerabilidad a la violencia que pueda sufrir la mujer en razón, entre otras, de su raza o de su condición étnica, de migrante, refugiada o desplazada (…).

En el procedimiento de extradición de la señora [Nombre17]. como lo ha expuesto la Defensoría de los Habitantes en su recurso cuyo agravio se ha acogido, la señora [Nombre17]. estaba inmersa en el ciclo de la violencia contra la mujer, al igual que la niña [Nombre18]., lo que se acreditó con la denuncia que la señora [Nombre17]. interpuso en los Estados Unidos (visible a folio 736 y su traducción de folio 747 a 749), así como con un estudio que realizó el Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (visible a folio 1050 a 1069) y las mismas manifestaciones de la señora [Nombre17]. en ejercicio de su defensa material en la vista oral.

Estos elementos probatorios no fueron controvertidos por la parte contraria, a saber, la Procuraduría General de la República en representación del Estado requirente, antes bien, se indicó por este órgano gubernamental que en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica se le podría dar suficiente protección a los derechos de la extraída a no ser violentada y a vivir en paz, lo mismo que a la niña. Dado que su oposición al recurso de apelación se centró en que, la violencia doméstica y la situación de la persona menor de edad, así como las pruebas aportadas, no deben ser considerados en el proceso de extradición, ni en este, ni en ningún otro caso; en un insostenible formalismo, que podría incluso vulnerar otras garantías más que las alegadas por el recuso de apelación de los impugnantes, tales como el acceso a la justicia y el derecho de defensa de la extraditable y como veremos, por vía indirecta, los derechos humanos de la persona menor de edad.

Considera esta Cámara que en el subjúdice, conforme los compromisos internacionales adoptados por Costa Rica al suscribir y ratificar las referidas Convenciones Internacionales de Derechos Humanos y en virtud de la aplicación de la Constitución Política, se impone necesariamente un pronunciamiento sobre este tema, pues como ya lo ha señalado la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) en el caso [Nombre44] vs. Brasil (2001), un deber de los Estados es prevenir las prácticas de la violencia contra la mujer, además de evitar que cualquier agente estatal pueda con sus actuaciones vulnerar los derechos de la Mujer. En este caso se aplicó por primera vez la Convención Belém do Pará y la CIDH decidió que el Estado había menoscabado su obligación de ejercer la debida diligencia para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia doméstica. A su vez, se encontraron violaciones a los artículos 8 y 25 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (por violación a los derechos de la víctima a garantías y protecciones judiciales efectivas) y 7 de la Convención Belem do Pará y se estableció que entre los principios más importantes, está la obligación de los Estados frente a los casos de violencia contra las mujeres, que incluye los deberes de procesar y condenar a los responsables, así como el deber de “prevenir estas prácticas degradantes”.

De lo que se sigue, que frente a la demostración de la violencia contra la mujer, el Juez a quo en este caso y en general todo juzgador, debe valorar y no simplemente obviar o trasladar a otros ámbitos de competencia la violencia contra la mujer, si la medida o resolución que se toma afecta directa o indirectamente por omisión los derechos humanos de la mujer y de la niña.

En el caso que nos ocupa se reclama por el Estado requirente a la señora [Nombre1]. por sustraer a una menor de los Estados Unidos con la intención de impedir el ejercicio legítimo de los derechos de padre, al progenitor de la menor, que eso lo hizo mientras se tramitaban las actuaciones legales para definir la patria potestad en relación con la niña en el Tribunal Superior del Condado de Humbodlt y que en dicho proceso era que se había impartido la orden de no trasladar a la menor fuera del Condado. Lo cual está tipificado en la ley norteamericana en el Título 18 Código de los Estados Unidos, artículo 1204. Esa petición para la extradición no contempló por parte del Estado requirente ninguna otra valoración, como tampoco lo hizo la resolución del juez a quo, sobre las alegaciones que hizo oportunamente la defensa técnica y material, así como el INAMU, la Defensoría de los Habitantes y el Ministerio Público. No contempló específicamente la denuncia interpuesta por [Nombre1]. en los Estados Unidos por violencia doméstica del 23 de agosto de 2005 (visible a folio 736 y su traducción de folio747 a 749); que la custodia física de la niña [Nombre18]. la tenía la madre que había abandonado el domicilio conyugal de hecho por violencia doméstica (ver declaración del agente especial del F.B.I. [Nombre45] folio 124 a 127 y documento de prueba de prueba B traducción folio 747); manifestación de [Nombre1]. ante el Tribunal Superior de California, Condado de Humbolt, en el que [Nombre17]. se opone a un régimen de visitas a la niña porque el demandante pone en peligro a la niña (ver folio 750); que el padre de la niña [Nombre18]. había firmado un permiso de salida de la misma con destino a México, el 26 de abril de 2005 (folio 373); que el Tribunal Superior de California confirió el 10 de noviembre de 2005, la custodia física de [Nombre18] a su padre [Nombre21]. (folio 278 y ss. y su traducción a folios 284 y ss.); así como el Informe de Criterio Técnico elaborado por la psicóloga [Nombre46] funcionaria de la delegación de la Mujer, la prueba aportada por el INAMU (visible a folio 1050 a 1069); la declaración de la testigo [Nombre17]. (a folio 758 y su traducción a folio 762 y ss.); que señora [Nombre17]. presentó una solicitud de refugio ante las autoridades migratorias sustentándose en la violencia doméstica, diligencia fue denegada en primera instancia por la autoridad migratoria, pero que se encontraba en apelación ante la Ministra de Seguridad (ver Criterio presentado por la Defensoría de los Habitantes a folios 1097 y ss.) y la señora [Nombre17]. además había procreado otro hijo costarricense por nacimiento (ver acta de declaración de nacimiento folio 372) y tenía 14 meses de detención, razón por la cual la niña [Nombre18] fue puesta en un hogar sustituto (ver Criterio presentado por la Defensoría de los Habitantes a folios 1097 y ss.).

Esa prueba no fue valorada por el juez a quo bajo el argumento de que en el proceso de extradición debe solamente constatarse el cumplimiento de requisitos y principios contemplados en el tratado bilateral de extradición Costa Rica-Estados Unidos. Como hemos adelantado, en el presente caso subyace una situación de violencia doméstica y contra la mujer y en atención a los Derechos Humanos de la mujer y la niña, debe valorase todo el entorno fáctico además del ordenamiento jurídico en forma hermenéutica. No sea que el propio Estado contribuya con su omisión a una vulneración de Derechos Humanos y por ello adquiera responsabilidad internacional ante el incumplimiento de sus compromisos internacionales de respeto de Derechos Humanos en la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos o en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que evalúan la efectividad de los procesos judiciales internos para remediar violaciones a los derechos humanos. Examen que abarca los procesos en su totalidad y en los diferentes niveles para determinar si los procedimientos y la evidencia producida fueron justos. (En ese sentido, vid., OEA/Ser.L/II.Doc 68 20 de enero de 2007, números marginales 35, 36 y 39).

Según el criterio técnico de la psicóloga [Nombre46] funcionaria de la Delegación de la Mujer, la prueba aportada por el INAMU (visible a folio 1050 a 1069) [Nombre1]. sufrió violencia física consistente en golpes efectuados con el puño sobre la cabeza, los brazos y la espalda; lanzamientos de objetos diversos como vasos de cerámica o cartones de leche, entre otros. Experimentó violencia psicológica en la modalidad de insultos constantes como "pedazo de mierda, bolsa de mierda, no vales nada, estúpida, prostituta de crack, bruja, puta); seguimientos consistentes en acusaciones de infidelidad, amenazas con acciones judiciales en donde se mentiría sobre su rol materno para alejarla de su hija; creación de un clima de terror mediante conducción temeraria, acorralamientos en la ducha o en las esquinas de la casa, maltrato de animales (malhirió a un gatito lanzándolo contra una cerca); aislamiento de su entorno familiar y de sus amigos. Asimismo, soportó violencia patrimonial, que se manifestó con falta de aporte a la economía familiar; el romper objetos de necesidad inmediata como la silla de la niña; el impedirle trabajar; el controlar sus gastos personales. Se indica en el informe que la conducta agresiva se tornaba cada vez más frecuente. La señora [Nombre17]. era constantemente golpeada sobre todo cuando se encontraba en situaciones de mayor vulnerabilidad: con su niña en brazos (colocada así la menor en la "línea de fuego"), desnuda en la ducha, antes de levantarse de la cama por las mañanas, en el automóvil conducido a toda velocidad por el agresor. Esos golpes a menudo ameritaron atención médica que no fue requerida. Otros eventos que doña [Nombre1]. destaca son los largos períodos que salió de la casa con su hija en brazos, sin abrigo y sin comida; a la espera de que mermara la agresividad de [Nombre22]. Sobre el particular se contó con la declaración jurada de una vecina de [Nombre1]. señora [Nombre17]. quien relata que conoció a [Nombre1]. y a [Nombre47]., una mañana en que acudieron a su puerta en busca de ayuda porque [Nombre21]. estaba furioso y le lanzaba objetos. En diversas ocasiones, el agresor la amenazó con llevarse a la niña de su lado. La testigo [Nombre17], compañera sentimental de [Nombre22]. hasta el 2007, corroboró esa versión. [Nombre48] estima que tanto [Nombre22]. como su familia son controladores y adinerados y en determinado momento decidieron con exclusión de [Nombre17], el obtener la absoluta custodia de la niña.

Señala el informe técnico que la situación de violencia continúa con los intentos del agresor de alejar a la persona menor de edad de su madre; pretendió llevarse a la niña hacia los Estados Unidos contra la orden del la autoridad de Niñez y Adolescencia. También el informe en el anexo 1, folios 1071 y ss., señala el riesgo emocional de la niña [Nombre18]., ante la negativa del señor [Nombre22]. de llevar a la niña a ver a su madre presa en la cárcel El Buen Pastor, el impacto de la menor por la separación materna, sobre el escaso vinculo de la menor con el señor [Nombre22]. y el dolor de la madre frente a la separación de la hija.

En ejercicio de su defensa material la señora [Nombre17]. refirió episodios de violencia doméstica contra ella y su niña por parte del señor [Nombre22]. , sin que sus manifestaciones no fueron refutadas ni rebatidas, además de que el informe del INAMU señala que se aplicó un instrumento con 19 criterios aplicados al relato de la señora [Nombre17], estimándose a partir del relato que el mismo impresiona confiable.

Todos los elementos de prueba indicados permiten a esta Cámara concluir que la señora [Nombre17]. y su hija fueron víctimas de violencia doméstica y esta situación debe primar en la valoración de la extradición.

• D)El acceso a la justicia y la tutela judicial efectiva Como motivo de agravio 5) se expuso por la Defensoría de los Habitantes el compromiso del Estado costarricense de respeto a los Derechos Humanos. Se opone a las manifestaciones de la Procuraduría que refiere la existencia de una confraternidad de instituciones. El Estado costarricense ha asumido un compromiso de respeto de los Derechos Humanos al ratificar diferentes Convenciones Internacionales en los que se tutela la violencia contra la mujer. También la señora [Nombre17]. es madre de dos costarricenses, desde los Derechos Humanos se debe tutelar la integralidad de la familia. Se debe valorar la especificidad de las mujeres y de quienes son juzgados en el marco de los Derechos Humanos, asimismo exige el respeto y garantía de todos los institutos del derecho de Acceso a la Justicia. El agravio se acoge. Ampliamente esta Cámara se ha referido al respeto a los Derechos Humanos que prodiga el Estado costarricense con varias manifestaciones y concreciones. Resta analizar el agravio sobre el acceso a la justicia que es una manifestación indudable de la tutela judicial efectiva y que engloba varios contenidos entre ellos un recurso efectivo en los tribunales de justicia -que no se trata de medios de impugnación, sino de la defensa efectiva de los derechos de las personas-, el acceso de grupos particularmente vulnerables y la justicia del caso concreto.

El Acceso a la Justicia es reconocido en los diversos instrumentos internacionales de protección de los Derechos Humanos, entre ellos: Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (artículo 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 y 11), el Pacto de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (articulo 14 inc. 3), la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (artículos 8 y 25), en el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política y en la legislación infraconstitucional creando un marco normativo por el que se garantiza el acceso a la justicia sin discriminación a instancias judiciales acceso de iure y de facto.

En la Opinión Consultiva OC, 9/87 de 6 de octubre de 1987, en la que se desarrollaron los contornos del tema de la protección judicial, la opinión es sumamente amplia e indicó respecto del art. 25 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, lo siguiente:

“Establece este artículo, igualmente, en términos amplios, la obligación a cargo de los Estados de ofrecer, a todas las personas sometidas a su jurisdicción, un recurso judicial efectivo contra actos violatorios de sus derechos fundamentales. Dispone, además, que la garantía allí consagrada se aplica no sólo respecto de los derechos contenidos en la Convención, sino también de aquéllos que estén reconocidos por la Constitución o por la ley. (…) los Estados Partes se obligan a suministrar recursos judiciales efectivos a las víctimas de violación de los derechos humanos (art. 25), recursos que deben ser sustanciados de conformidad con las reglas del debido proceso legal ( art. 8.1 ), todo ello dentro de la obligación general a cargo de los mismos Estados, de garantizar el libre y pleno ejercicio de los derechos reconocidos por la Convención a toda persona que se encuentre bajo su jurisdicción (…) Según este principio, la inexistencia de un recurso efectivo contra las violaciones a los derechos reconocidos por la Convención constituye una transgresión de la misma por el Estado Parte en el cual semejante situación tenga lugar. En ese sentido debe subrayarse que, para que tal recurso exista, no basta con que esté previsto por la Constitución o la ley o con que sea formalmente admisible, sino que se requiere que sea realmente idóneo para establecer si se ha incurrido en una violación a los derechos humanos y proveer lo necesario para remediarla. No pueden considerarse efectivos aquellos recursos que, por las condiciones generales del país o incluso por las circunstancias particulares de un caso dado, resulten ilusorios”.

Otro importante paso se deduce de la Opinión Consultiva OC, 16/99 de 1 de octubre de 1999, por el que se garantizó el acceso a la justicia en condiciones de igualdad, la Corte Interamericana indicó:

“119. Para alcanzar sus objetivos, el proceso debe reconocer y resolver los factores de desigualdad real de quienes son llevados ante la justicia. Es así como se atiende el principio de igualdad ante la ley y los tribunales y a la correlativa prohibición de discriminación. La presencia de condiciones de desigualdad real obliga a adoptar medidas de compensación que contribuyan a reducir o eliminar los obstáculos y deficiencias que impidan o reduzcan la defensa eficaz de los propios intereses. Si no existieran esos medios de compensación, ampliamente reconocidos en diversas vertientes del procedimiento, difícilmente se podría decir que quienes se encuentran en condiciones de desventaja disfrutan de un verdadero acceso a la justicia y se benefician de un debido proceso legal en condiciones de igualdad con quienes no afrontan esas desventajas”.

También nuestro país ha asumido un compromiso de respeto al acceso a la justicia de poblaciones vulnerables, con la aprobación de las 100 Reglas de Brasilia, sobre el acceso a la justicia de las personas en condición de vulnerabilidad de 2008, que significan un esfuerzo conjunto de la XIV Cumbre Judicial Iberoamericana y valga recordar aquí el reconocimiento que efectúa en el Derecho de la Constitución de declaraciones que reconocen Derechos Humanos. De cuyo texto se deducen tanto normas de fondo como procesales en procura de la promoción de condiciones necesarias para que la tutela sea efectiva, adoptando aquellas medidas que mejor se adapten a su condición de vulnerabilidad (regla 25), y se definen como grupos especialmente vulnerables las personas menores de edad (regla5), la situación de las personas migrantes y refugiadas (reglas 13 y 14) y la situación de las mujeres (reglas 17 a 20), con especial referencia en la regla 20 a la mujer víctima de violencia.

Pues bien, el acceso a la justicia, no se refiere entonces, sólo a quien instó un proceso judicial, sino que incluye a quienes resultan partes procesales por ejemplo la extraditable, y también como hemos referido en este caso, a quienes en forma indirecta les afecta el resultado de una solución judicial, tal es el caso de las personas menores a todos los que cubre esa efectiva defensa de los derechos de las personas y particularmente cuando se encuentren en condición de vulnerabilidad como hemos analizado suficientemente.

La negativa a resolver y conocer en el proceso extradicional sobre la situación de estas personas vulnerables, como ocurrió en el caso de la resolución del juez a quo, en criterio de este Tribunal violenta la observancia de los Derechos Humanos por omisión y da lugar a la responsabilidad estatal por inobservancia de los compromisos internacionales. Máxime en casos como el que nos ocupa en que se alegó la violencia contra la mujer y la niña y la situación de refugio en razón de la misma violencia. En razón de lo anterior, cabe acoger el agravio, por vulneración al acceso a la justicia de la extraditable [Nombre1]. y de su hija menor [Nombre18].

• E)Reclama como agravio 2) la Defensoría de los Habitantes la violación al principio de doble incriminación. Se fundamentó el motivo en que la conducta que motivó la solicitud de extradición no constituye el delito de sustracción internacional de menores, sino el ilícito de desobediencia a la autoridad, tal y como lo ha referido en este proceso el Ministerio Público, de ahí que no se está ante un delito extraditable. Aduce que la conducta por la que se solicita la extradición no es típica y debe ser rechazada la extradición por ausencia de los elementos objetivos y normativos. Por la forma en que estamos resolviendo el fondo de este recurso, este Tribunal considera que carece de interés procesal referirse expresamente al agravio apuntado, dado que hemos resuelto por el fondo cuestiones relacionadas con los Derechos Humanos.
• F)Sobre los alegatos de la Procuraduría General de la República En cuanto a los argumentos expuestos por el licenciado [Nombre3] , en su condición de Procurador Director, por el que se estima que el fallo contiene una adecuada fundamentación y que en consecuencia debe confirmarse la decisión impugnada, esta Cámara de Casación estima que los mismos no resultan atendibles, como se expuso en los anteriores considerandos. Por otra parte, el señor Procurador en su oposición argumento básicamente en cuanto al cumplimiento de requisitos formales tales como el principio de doble incriminación o identidad de la norma hizo referencia a la tipicidad objetiva del delito de sustracción internacional de menores contemplado en el artículo 184 del Código Penal costarricense y la norma por la que se solicitaba la extradición por parte del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, concluyendo con profusa jurisprudencia constitucional y legal que los hechos eran delito en el ordenamiento de los Estados Unidos y en Costa Rica. Empero respecto de los restantes argumentos de las partes y en concreto de la impugnación de la Defensoría de los Habitantes, no hizo mayores referencias que el rechazo en general, porque según la posición de la Procuraduría General de la República, la violencia doméstica supuestamente sufrida por la señora [Nombre17]. y la situación de la persona menor de edad [Nombre18]. no deben ser considerados en el proceso de extradición, y son de competencia del Estado requirente y que en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica se le podría dar suficiente protección a los derechos de la extraída a no ser violentada y a vivir en paz, lo mismo que a la niña [Nombre49]. Como hemos tenido ocasión de analizar en el considerando precedente, esta Cámara ha realizado una interpretación hermenéutica del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense que le otorga a los tratados internaciones de Derechos Humanos un valor supra constitucional anteponiendo el respeto a la dignidad humana y los Derechos Humanos de la mujer y de la niña a no ser discriminada ni violentada, a gozar de una familia libre de violencia, el interés superior del menor, su protección integral deben ser valorados al momento de pronunciar la resolución correspondiente y de esta obligación no se desvincula ningún órgano del Estado administrativo o judicial. En consecuencia, esta Cámara postergó el ulterior análisis del procedimiento de la extradición con todos sus principios fundamentales e institutos, frente a ese conjunto universal de derechos que son reconocidos a los seres humanos por el solo hecho de serlo. En el caso subjúdice no es posible escindir la situación de los Derechos Humanos de mujer requerida y de la niña del proceso de la extradición ante la situación de la violencia doméstica y el necesario respeto de la dignidad humana que el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense reconoce. En ese sentido, la argumentación del cumplimiento de la doble incriminación sobre la que dirigió todos los esfuerzos de la Procuraduría General de la República en representación del gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica ha perdido interés jurídico, en razón de la aplicación de las normas, principios y valores constitucionales que inspiran el Derecho de la Constitución costarricense, además del principio de jerarquía normativa y que implican un haz de garantías en cuanto al respeto de los Derechos Humanos que, como se expuso ampliamente, impiden la entrega. En consecuencia, se declara con lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por [Nombre50] , en su condición de Defensora de la Habitantes de la República. Se revoca la sentencia No. 130-P-2009 del Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas, de las trece horas del veinte de abril de dos mil nueve. Consecuentemente, se declara sin lugar la extradición de la señora [Nombre1]. requerida por los Estados Unidos de Norte América. Póngase inmediatamente en libertad a la señora [Nombre1], si otra causa no lo impide. Por innecesario, se omite pronunciamiento de los otros recursos de apelación que fueron interpuestos. Por la vía correspondiente comuníquese al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos.

POR TANTO:

Se declara con lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por [Nombre50] , en su condición de Defensora de la Habitantes de la República. Se revoca la sentencia No. 0130-P-2009 del Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas, de las trece horas del veinte de abril de dos mil nueve. Consecuentemente, se declara sin lugar la extradición de la señora [Nombre1], requerida por los Estados Unidos de Norte América. Póngase inmediatamente en libertad a la señora [Nombre1], si otra causa no lo impide. Por innecesario, se omite pronunciamiento de los otros recursos de apelación que fueron interpuestos. Notifíquese.

Dra. [Nombre51] Msc. Jazmín Rodríguez Hernández Msc. Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas Juezas y Juez de Casación Penal Diligencias de extradición Extraditable: [Nombre1].

Solicitante: Estados Unidos de Norte América