Extensive effect of cassation appeal on civil liability actionEfecto extensivo del recurso de casación en la acción civil resarcitoria

Res: [Telf1] CRIMINAL CASSATION COURT. Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Goicoechea, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on February twenty-fourth, two thousand six.

Cassation appeal filed in this case against [Name1], adult, Costa Rican, with identity card number CED1, married, native of Guàcimo, Limón, taxi driver by trade, for the crime of CULPABLE INJURIES (LESIONES CULPOSAS) to the detriment of [Name2]. Judges Ronald Salazar Murillo, [Name3], and [Name4] are involved in the decision on the appeal. Appearing in cassation were the private defense attorney Lic. [Name1] and the victim's attorney Licda. [Name5].

WHEREAS:

1. That by judgment at twelve hours thirty minutes on September seventh, two thousand five, the Trial Court of the Southern Zone, Golfito Seat, resolved: THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing, articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 1, 4, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 30, 45, 50, 51, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 71, 75, and 128 of the Penal Code; 122, 123, 124, 125, 126 of the 1941 Penal Code, still in force, 1, 85 et seq. and concordant articles of the Traffic Law; 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 37, 40, 45, 111, 113, 116, 119, 141, 142, 363, 364, 365, and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, [Name1] is DECLARED the perpetrator and sole person responsible for the crime of CULPABLE INJURIES (LESIONES CULPOSAS), to the detriment of [Name2], and in that regard, he is sentenced to the term of ONE MONTH OF IMPRISONMENT, a penalty that he shall serve in the places and forms determined by the respective penitentiary regulations. Once the judgment is final, register it in the Judicial Registry. He is ordered to provide a certified copy of the judgment to the Sentence Enforcement Court and the National Institute of Criminology. As he meets the legal requirements, the convict is granted the benefit of Conditional Suspension of the Sentence for a period of three years, during which period he shall not commit a new intentional crime punishable by a prison sentence exceeding six months. Costs are at his expense. Notify by reading. REGARDING THE CIVIL ACTION FILED BY MR. [Name2] against the defendants [Name1] AND [Name6], in his capacity as a civilly liable third party (tercero civil demandado), the compensatory civil claim filed is upheld, and both are obligated to pay, as moral damages (daño moral), the sum of ONE MILLION COLONES, and as material damages (daño material), the sum of FIVE MILLION TWO HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TEN COLONES AND ELEVEN CENTIMOS, for a total of: SIX MILLION TWO HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TEN COLONES AND ELEVEN CENTIMOS, IN FAVOR OF THE CIVIL PLAINTIFF. Procedural and personal costs are at the expense of the civil defendants. Notify by reading. [Name7], TRIAL JUDGE.

2. That against the preceding ruling, Lic. [Name8] filed a Cassation Appeal.

3. That having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the Appeal.

4. That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge [Name9]; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- FIRST GROUND (form): lack of legal reasoning (fundamentación). Citing articles 142, 363, 369, 444, and 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's private attorney files a cassation appeal against the trial court's conviction, alleging that even though the defense attorney argued the existence of concurrent fault (culpa concurrente) because the garbage truck was parked in the wrong lane and partially encroached on the lane where the defendant was driving (the testimony of evidence against its driver was requested); that said truck lacked flashing warning lights or reflectors; that it was parked in such a way that it forced the victim to cross almost the entire road to deliver the garbage bags; that the victim's conduct was also negligent, as he ran out and crossed the lane where the defendant was driving, despite the defendant sounding his horn (this was heard by all witnesses, and the victim is not deaf). Despite the foregoing, the judge resolved absolutely nothing in this regard, even though a reduction in the amounts corresponding to moral and material damages was also requested. The ground must be declared without merit. The appellant's argument is based on several factual premises that do not arise from the appealed decision, which completely undermines its legitimacy. Indeed, from the content of the conviction being contested, it is noted that, contrary to what the appellant claims, although the garbage truck was parked in the left lane, this was not the cause of, nor did it influence, the production of the accident, to the point that even if one hypothetically assumes its orientation had been the reverse, i.e., that instead of having its front facing west, it had it facing east, the result would have been the same. The same conclusion would be reached even assuming, as the appellant asserts, that said garbage collection truck did not have its warning lights on or did not have reflective devices. In this regard, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the presence of that truck (it was parked in the lane the defendant was traveling in) had no influence on the striking of the victim, who was also stopped at the time of the incident, so it is also not true that he ran across the road. From reading the decision, it is apparent that, once the evidence was examined, the following was proven: "... On October twenty-seventh, two thousand three, at five-thirty in the morning, the victim [Name10] was performing duties inherent to his work, regarding garbage collection ... getting off to collect the garbage from the lane opposite where the garbage truck was parked ... At that same time, on a straight stretch of road, with no rain, good visibility, dry road, and light traffic, the defendant was driving ... in his taxi-type vehicle ... who, failing in his duty of care and foresight (deber de cuidado y previsión), observing that the garbage truck was partially parked in his lane, as well as the victim crossing the road with some garbage bags toward the truck, did not exercise the due duty of care (deber de cuidado), as he continued driving without being certain of the maneuver the victim was going to make, limiting himself to sounding the vehicle's horn, when he could have stopped or significantly reduced his speed and thereby avoided striking the victim; 3) That the striking of the victim occurred in the right lane, that is, in the lane where the defendant was driving; 4) That the taxi driven by the defendant impacted the left leg of the victim with the right side of the front bumper, while the victim was finishing crossing the road; 5) That at the time of the collision, no vehicle was traveling in the opposite direction to the defendant, and the defendant was traveling at approximately forty kilometers per hour ... 7) As a result of the collision suffered by the victim, he had the following injuries ... with an incapacity of 60 days for his usual work ..." (cf. folio 124, line 20 et seq.). As inferred from the transcribed text, according to the factual framework proven at trial, it is observed that the place where the accident occurred is a straight stretch of road, and the garbage collection truck did not obstruct the defendant's visibility at any time, as he had already observed the victim on the road before the collision occurred (he even sounded his horn at least three times), nevertheless, he did not take the necessary precaution to reduce the speed at which he was traveling, even though he was not clear on what the victim was going to do, all of which was duly reasoned by the judge (cf. folio 130, line 25 et seq.). Within this context, it is clear that the presence of the truck at the scene had no influence on the result, as it was directly produced by Mr. [Name11]'s conduct violating the duty of care, the result being foreseeable and avoidable, which was also expressly and correctly reasoned in the judgment (cf. folio 132, line 7 et seq.). Based on the foregoing, the ground is rejected in its entirety.

II.- SECOND GROUND (form): Regarding the facts, the judgment is illogical. In the second ground of his appeal, based on the same regulations cited in the preceding ground, it is argued that the Court held it proven that the defendant was driving at about 40 kilometers per hour and that he first saw the victim when he was about 20 or 30 meters away, so "the conduct" was totally foreseeable and avoidable. The defense attorney argues that he does not share this "aspect," since any road safety manual sets a driver's reaction time at one second, during which a vehicle traveling at 40 kilometers per hour advances about eleven meters, so the reaction and braking distance is 16 to 20 meters (depending on the condition of the tires, brakes, and road), all of which establishes a stopping distance of 27 to 31 meters. In the defense attorney's opinion, and according to this, even if the defendant had braked, the accident would still have occurred. The complaint is not admissible. The data upon which the appellant structures his claim are not accredited in the judgment, making it unfounded. In any case, even assuming they are correct, it is noted that the analysis based on them presented in the appeal is erroneous, as it overlooks that, according to what was proven in the judgment, the accused observed the victim with considerable anticipation and distance, to the point that foreseeing a dangerous situation, he proceeded to sound his taxi's horn on several occasions (the accused himself said "at least three"), which allowed the judge to establish that even though he was not sure what the victim would do, he did not reduce his speed when he could have done so, this being the reason that sustained the violation of the duty of care (cf. folio 130, line 25 et seq.). On the other hand, by way of further elaboration, this Cassation Court notes that in the sketch made by the traffic inspector (documentary and written evidence that can be assessed in this venue without compromising the accusatorial principles that apply during the trial's plenary phase, i.e., orality and immediacy), no skid marks appear, which in principle would allow concluding that the defendant never performed that defensive action. Furthermore, and as expressly analyzed by the trial judge, the defendant himself stated in the hearing that once he honked his vehicle's horn, he thought the victim was going to stop, and for that reason he decided to continue driving (cf. folio 130 already cited), it being clear that he continued his path without being certain of the maneuver the victim would perform. This factual framework is openly incompatible with the thesis advanced by the appellant, who seeks to imply that: (i) The defendant first saw the victim when the latter was about 30 meters away; (ii) It took him one second to react, during which time he advanced 11 meters; (iii) He applied the brakes, but even so, the vehicle advanced another 16 to 20 meters. It is clarified that this sequence finds no support or basis in the content of the judgment, as the factual premises on which it rests were completely discarded by the Court, as explained. Based on the foregoing, the claim is rejected in its entirety.

III.- THIRD GROUND (form): Lack of legal reasoning regarding the civil action. Based on the provisions of articles 142, 363, 369, 444, and 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defense attorney for the defendant [Name1] (who also holds the status of co-civil defendant) argues that the civil conviction lacks reasoning (motivación). His complaint is sustained by the following: a) The judge verbatim refers to the expert reports, the civil plaintiff's request, or the medical-legal opinion. Given that the content of such documentary evidence, its assessment, and the reasons determining the setting of the sums corresponding to moral and material damages are ignored; b) The judge departs from the expert report and sets the sum of ¢1,000,000.00 for moral damages, the content of said expert report and its assessment being unknown, as well as whether that evidence can demonstrate the damages since it merely serves to set its value and not "its authorship or even its existence." Obviously, expert reports do not prove moral and material damages but simply estimate them in monetary sums, so their existence must be proven. The witnesses referred to circumstances unrelated to the damages, i.e., the defendant's authorship. Nor was it proven whether permanent incapacity exists or existed, only the temporary incapacity (60 days), nor expenses for medical treatments, which were in any case covered by the INS; c) By ignoring the content of the expert reports and their assessment, the reasons why the amounts the judge indicates were set are ignored; d) The judgment indicates that, in principle, the judge is precluded from granting more than what is requested, implying that the plaintiff's request was for ¢5,000,000.00 for material damages. Despite saying this, in the "Por tanto" section, it set a higher amount for that item, namely, ¢5,296,910, violating that procedural aspect. The appellant's claim is that the judgment be annulled and a retrial ordered regarding the part that upheld the compensatory civil action and condemned the civil defendants to pay moral and material damages, in the order of ¢1,000,000.00 and ¢5,000,000.00 or ¢5,296,910. He requests that the sum set for moral damages be rejected for lack of evidence, and that the sum for material damages be reduced to ¢206,160.00 (two months of incapacity to work). In the latter case, he requests that the judgment be partially annulled "in the aspects deemed pertinent" (cf. folio 142, lines 24 to 26). For the reasons to be stated, the complaint is admissible. Regarding the civil conviction handed down against the two defendants (the defendant here and also the registered owner of the vehicle, that is, Mr. [Name6]), the trial judge stated the following: "... In the case under trial, it was amply demonstrated that the defendant, with his illicit conduct, caused injuries to the victim, since the thesis must be accepted that moral damages (daño moral) are of the so-called 'in re ipsa' type, that is, they are necessarily inferred or deduced from the facts from which the liability arises, and therefore they need not be the subject of special proof, but it is for the judge to carry out the assessment (Juan [Name12], Responsabilidad Civil, Curso de Derecho Privado, Volume 1, pp. 85-110). Material damages (daño material) are likewise proven according to the expert reports provided in the case file, as this judge departs from the one carried out by Mr. [Name13] considering it exorbitant, and also because the civil plaintiff's request is less than the same ... in its place, the second expert report provided in the case file is accepted, regarding material damages, considering it more closely reflects the reality of the facts, such as the injuries suffered by the victim, the duration of his incapacity, and the sequelae produced, as derived from the medical-legal opinion assessed in this proceeding. Regarding moral damages, the Court departs from said report and sets it at one million colones, the remaining items are accepted in full ..." (cf. folio 135, line 15 et seq.). In order to issue the corresponding ruling, thus resolving the appellant's allegations, the matter relating to material damages will be analyzed first, and then moral damages will be considered. (1). MATERIAL DAMAGES (DAÑO MATERIAL). Regarding the existence of the material or physical damage, the previously cited excerpt from the judgment only mentions (without further explanation) that with his illicit conduct, the defendant caused "injuries" (which are not specified) to the victim, this being "according to the expert reports provided in the case file" (which are also not specifically cited or analyzed). However, upon holistically assessing and considering the judgment, which in reality constitutes a logical-legal unit, this Cassation Court notes that in the substantive recital dedicated to analyzing the defendant's criminal responsibility and the penalty to be imposed, the trial court judge did address justifying that aspect (existence of material damage for the victim), as he states: "... From the medical-legal opinion, sufficient evidentiary elements are obtained to hold the injuries suffered by the victim as proven, resulting from the acts committed by the defendant ... This judge also considers, for the purpose of imposing the penalty on the defendant, the injuries suffered by the victim, which are described in the medical-legal opinion provided in the case file and are considerable ..." (cf. folio 133, lines 21 to 23; and folio 134, line 21 et seq.). Meanwhile, in the section of proven facts, it is indicated that the injuries received by the victim were the following: "... cranioencephalic trauma with loss of consciousness, superficial wound at the right parietal level, superficial wound on the right thigh, wound that crosses the cartilage of the right earlobe, mild abrasion on the right shoulder, comminuted fracture of the middle third of the left tibia, with an incapacity of sixty days for his usual work ..." (cf. folio 125, line 17 et seq.). Note then how the Court held it proven that the victim's physical or material damage (injuries) resulted in a temporary incapacity of 60 days, without anything being mentioned regarding alleged sequelae or permanent decrease in general organic capacity. Despite being laconic and brief, this reasoning is sufficient and allows understanding what the reasons were, then, from which the existence of the material damage suffered by the victim as a result of these events was accredited, and the extent of it is also clear, such that regarding this aspect, the error denounced by the appellant is not observed. In this regard, one must not lose sight of the fact that the evidence cited by the judge is documentary, such that considering its written nature, the determination of its content does not depend on the orality and immediacy of the debate (Article 334 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Thus, the conclusions of the medical opinion mentioned by the judge are well known to the parties, without the need for the judgment to record or transcribe the content of said document again (descriptive reasoning). This implies, then, that regarding the existence of the material damage, the defects denounced by the appellant are not apparent. Regarding the amount to be compensated for said item, the situation is different, as the judgment does not comply with adequate reasoning, but rather with confusing, omitted, and contradictory reasoning. In this regard, it is noted that the judge directly and expressly states that "... the second expert report provided in the case file is accepted, regarding material damages, considering it more closely reflects the reality of the facts, such as the injuries suffered by the victim, the duration of his incapacity, and the sequelae produced, as derived from the medical-legal opinion assessed in this proceeding ...". At this point, the court's reasoning is lacking and presents serious defects that determine its illegitimacy, as it does not explain in what sense or in relation to which aspects "the second expert report provided in the case file," that is, the one prepared by Licenciada [Name14] and attached at folios 69 to 71 of the civil action bundle, more closely reflects the reality of the facts, or why it assures that said expert study is more in line with the injuries, the duration of the incapacity, and the sequelae suffered by the victim, given that - as indicated supra - the same judge only held it accredited that, as a result of the events, the defendant suffered several injuries that incapacitated him for 60 days, so it is not understood which sequelae are being referred to, and what evidentiary elements accredit them. Likewise, the trial judge does not even cite a single excerpt from the content of said expert report, which makes its reasoning even more obscure and confusing, to the point that it is impossible to understand where the amount of the compensation agreed upon for material damages comes from. (2).- MORAL DAMAGES (DAÑO MORAL). Regarding this point, the judgment also fails to provide adequate reasoning, as - according to the excerpt transcribed - it does not explain what it consisted of, where it arose from or what evidentiary elements determined it, nor why it was assessed at the sum of ¢1,000,000.00. All these serious omissions determine the nullity of the judgment regarding the aspects indicated. Thus, this ground of cassation is partially upheld, by virtue of which the trial court's judgment is partially annulled, only insofar as it civilly condemned the defendant and co-civil defendant [Name1], in relation to the following aspects: (i) Regarding the setting of the amount corresponding to material damages; (ii) Regarding the very existence of moral damages, and also regarding the monetary amount derived therefrom. In all other respects, the appealed decision remains intact, that is, regarding the existence of material damages (the victim's injuries derived from the defendant's illicit conduct), and regarding the judgment of criminal responsibility of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime of Culpable Injuries. The judgment also remains unalterable in that it civilly condemned the co-defendant [Name6], in his capacity as a civilly liable third party (registered owner of the vehicle that caused the collision), who holds and participates in this proceeding with an individual legal representation independent from that of [Name11], and did not file any appeal against the decision. A retrial is ordered to the court of origin for a new substantiation in accordance with the Law.

IV.- ON THE EXTENSIVE EFFECT OF APPEALS IN CIVIL MATTERS. As indicated in the preceding recital, the partial annulment of the decision and the corresponding retrial ordered operate only in relation to the civil condemnation issued against the co-defendant [Name1], who was the only one who challenged the trial court's judgment. The situation of the other defendant ([Name15] Enoc) is different, as he did not file any challenge against the decision that condemned him to financially compensate the plaintiff, thereby conforming to such adverse decision, which would prevent this Court from officially being able to benefit him with the effects derived from [Name11]'s appeal, as this concerns a civil matter (of a patrimonial nature) where the principle of party disposition applies. This has been the solution adopted in prior cases by the jurisprudence of this Cassation Court: "... In this matter, an extensive effect of the annulment of the judgment corresponding to the civil action filed in favor of [Name17] is not applied in favor of the civil plaintiff [Name16], since such extensive effect is not provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure for appeals by the civil plaintiff (Art. 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In addition, the same civil procedural law does not allow an extensive effect to operate regarding an appeal filed by another person, and Article 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, concerning the cassation appeal, also provides that the cassation judgment cannot encompass points other than those that were the subject of the appeal. Particular consideration must be given to what civil procedural doctrine has called the principle of personality of the challenge. In this regard, [Name18] states: 'As for the so-called principle of personality of the appeal, it is but another particular form of the same general rules that have already been set forth. The situation giving rise to the application of this principle is as follows: A and [Name19], heirs of C, sue D for compensation for an illicit act that caused the death of the plaintiffs' father; the judgment absolves D; A does not appeal the judgment and [Name19] does so in a timely manner; the second instance judgment reverses the first instance judgment and orders compensation to [Name19] for the damage suffered. Does the decision issued in favor of [Name19] benefit A, who has consented to the absolving judgment? Doctrine and jurisprudence pronounce in the negative: the condemnation obtained by [Name19] does not benefit A because the effects of the appeal are personal. There is no common benefit, as in Roman law, but rather a unilateral advantage. The solution of the real or objective nature of the appeal was rejected by [Name21] and by the authors of the French Code, which later doctrine has followed in this area without any effort. The prestige of this solution is not diminished by the circumstance that two contradictory things judged may appear: that while [Name19] has a right to compensation, A is deprived of it. The reason is not so much logical as systemic. Its foundations are scattered throughout all the principles of civil procedural law. In the first place, the principle that the will creates and extinguishes rights. He who consented to the first instance judgment did so because he considered it just; the aggrieved party had two paths: consent or appeal; if he chose the first, his will binds him definitively to that consent. A second reason emanates from the very principle of res judicata. Nothing in law excludes the possibility of two contradictory judgments; the very evolutions of jurisprudence demonstrate that this risk is inherent in the concept of res judicata. A third reason flows from the very principle of the appeal. The superior court has no more powers than those assigned to it by the appeal filed; nothing authorizes it to change the part of the judgment that dismisses the claim as it refers to A if no appeal has been filed in this regard. A different solution is reserved, however, in cases of solidarity or material indivisibility of the thing in litigation, since in these cases the judgment benefits or harms the joint debtor or the co-owner. But this circumstance, imposed by the very force of things, does not alter the scope of the principle of personality of the appeal.' ([Name22], [Name23], op cit., pp. 369-370). This has been the criterion maintained in various rulings by the Cassation Court, for example, ruling 865-2003 of August 29, 2003, reiterated in other subsequent rulings, for example, ruling 1222-2003 of November 27, 2003 ...", Criminal Cassation Court, ruling No. [Telf2] of 11:08 a.m. on March 11, 2004. In accordance with the above, it must be understood that, as a general principle, the effects of an appeal in civil matters are personal, so there is no common or objective benefit for all subjects who are in the same procedural situation as the appellant, as in Roman law, but rather a unilateral or subjective advantage. This is so because it must be interpreted that whoever consented to the first instance judgment (not appealing it despite having full power to do so) did so because they considered it just, and their decision in this regard completely binds the second instance Court. In this same vein, the same Cassation Court resolved the following: "... Such reasoning is insufficient, as it does not explain in a clear and convincing manner what specifically are the reasons why it can be considered that Mr. [Name24] had plausible reason to litigate, for the purpose of exempting him from costs. Note that the a quo fails to describe the specific content of the series of circumstances evaluated to base the acquittal, which could very well not have been taken into consideration at the time of filing the civil action in this matter. Due to this defect in the reasoning, this claim must be upheld, ordering the partial annulment of the judgment and ordering a retrial, solely regarding the setting of costs, between the plaintiff [Name25] and the defendant [Name26].

The rest of the judgment remains unaltered, including the imposition of costs ordered with respect to the other defendants, since none of them challenged the ruling of the judge a quo on this point, which, being essentially civil in nature, is left to the disposition of the parties, by application of the party disposition principle (principio dispositivo), according to which "...in those matters in which only a private interest is elucidated, the organs of public power must not go beyond what the private parties themselves desire" (COUTURE, [Nombre23]: Fundamentos del derecho procesal civil, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Depalma, 1978, p. 186) …” Tribunal de Casación Penal, vote No. [Telf3] of 11:00 hours on October 31, 2002. As can be deduced from the foregoing transcript, the jurist [Nombre22] defends the principle of personality in matters of remedies, for which he maintains that as a general rule in civil procedural matters, the principle called personality of the appeal governs, such that a subject who did not challenge the sentence of the ad-quo could not benefit from what was resolved by the ad-quem. However, and according to the bibliographic citation transcribed, it is noted that said author makes an exception for the case of material indivisibility of the res litigiosa (thing in dispute), when indicating that: “… A different solution from this one is reserved, however, in cases of joint and several liability (solidaridad) or material indivisibility of the res litigiosa, since in these cases the sentence benefits or prejudices the jointly and severally liable debtor or the co-owner. But this circumstance, imposed by the very force of things, does not alter the scope of the principle of personality of the appeal” ([Nombre22], [Nombre23], op cit., pp. 369-370). It is thus how, for a substantive reason, the general principle of personality of the remedy is broken, such that as an exception to the rule it must be understood that in those cases where the legal question object of the proceeding is indivisible or inseparable, what was resolved could not be maintained, even when this implies benefiting the subject who did not exercise any remedy. This position is even clearer in [Nombre27], who points out the following: "... This principle (extensive or communicative effect of the challenge), also called the principle of reality, is opposed to that of the personality of the challenge act. The phenomenon occurs both in the civil proceeding, where, as we have said, the challenge by one necessary joinder of parties (litisconsorcio necesario) favors the others, and in the criminal proceeding ... The question becomes more debatable when such an express norm does not exist, with the most modern doctrine concluding that it is admissible to admit said extensive effect when the substantive relationship, object of the proceeding, is indivisible, in cases of a plurality of holders of it who have been parties in the proceeding ... the favorable arguments of the cited authors seem to carry greater weight, as they speak to the very essence of the reasons of procedural economy and above all to the essential principle of avoiding contradictory decisions, for which purpose the proceeding creates several institutes (lis pendens, joinder of actions and proceedings, res judicata, etc.) …” [Nombre27] (Enrique), “LOS RECURSOS JUDICIALES Y DEMÁS MEDIOS impugnativos en Iberoamérica”, ediciones De Palma, Buenos Aires. 1st edition, 1988. Pages 58 and 59. In accordance with the foregoing, it is clear that in cases where that indivisibility of the legal question object of the proceeding is not present, as occurs in the present case (as will be analyzed), the application of the extensive effect would not be appropriate, as one would not be facing the difficulty of falling into judicial decisions contradictory in their essence. In this regard, it must be taken into account that, pursuant to Article 187 of the Ley de Tránsito, the civil liability of the registered owner is of a joint and several (solidario) type, as even the jurisprudence of the Sala Tercera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has understood it: "... The legislator in Articles 187 subsection b of the Ley de Tránsito, 106 of the Código Penal, and 1048 paragraph 5 of the Código Civil has considered that in the mere driving of vehicles, and even more so of large and heavy vehicles, a situation of risk exists. An analysis of subjective aspects of the vehicle driver (intent or fault) is thus dispensed with for the determination of the civil liability of the company or person that operates the transport activity, and an objective, indirect, and joint and several liability for a third party's act is generated for the latter, with the purpose of guaranteeing better protection in favor of third parties, against the damages caused by an activity, considered, as already stated, inherently dangerous. Unlike the subjective civil liability contemplated in Article 1045 of the Código Civil, objective liability is generated for the company or person operating a vehicle, when the transport activity it carries out, legally considered a source of danger or risk, results in damage to a person; this without the need for the activity generating those damages to constitute an illicit act in a criminal sense. Thus, even when the existence or authorship of a punishable act has not been demonstrated, in cases such as the one contemplated in paragraph 5 of Article 1048 of the Código Civil, a declaration of civil liability may exist … In support of this thesis, it is appropriate to cite Vote of Sala Primera #578-F-03. of ten hours forty-five minutes of September seventeen, two thousand three, in which it was indicated: 'Article 187 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas y Terrestres, No. 7331, establishes: "The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: ... b) Natural or legal persons who, by any title, operate vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transport." This rule prescribes what the doctrine has called objective liability or liability for created risk. In it "... the element of fault as a criterion of imputation is dispensed with, focusing on a conduct or activity of a physical or legal subject, characterized by the setting in motion of a dangerous activity, or the mere possession of a dangerous object. The element of imputation for this liability is the created risk, or the risk-creating conduct. For this reason, it is affirmed, the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and unlawfulness ..." (No. 376, Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, at 14 hours 40 minutes of July 9, 1999) …”, Sala 3ª de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, vote No. 383-05 of 8:40 hours on May 13, 2005. Notwithstanding this joint and several nature, in the case of the registered owner, one is not facing a material indivisibility of the res litigiosa (in the terms proposed by [Nombre22]), as it is not a matter of a necessary joinder of parties (litis consorcio necesario), as noted and required by [Nombre27] for purposes of applying the extensive effect of remedies. In this regard, it is held that in cases such as the one at hand, the civil plaintiff (direct victim) could very well choose to direct their claim only against the direct author of the negligent conduct that generated the damage, or only against the registered owner (third party civilly liable), without necessarily having to bring an action against both or join them in their action, since—it is insisted—one is not facing a necessary passive joinder of parties. So true is the foregoing that in this proceeding, the two civil co-defendants have acted with independent representation, which makes sense if one considers that in certain circumstances, conflicting interests could even arise between both procedural subjects. From this, it follows then that, just as occurs in the species, in the cases that have been cited, the jurisprudence of this Tribunal de Casación has not seen any impediment to denying the extensive effect of the cassation appeal regarding the civil question, since in those matters one was not facing the hypothesis analyzed by the doctrine. The same solution has been adopted by the Sala Tercera, also in a case where the substantive indivisibility of the legal question object of the proceeding was not compromised: "... Licentiate [Nombre28]., in his capacity as defender and representative of the accused and civil defendant [Nombre29]., within the term of three days requests the Chamber that, based on numeral 428 of the Código Procesal Penal,'[...] the benefits derived from the cassation appeal be granted—with extensive character—to Engineer [Nombre30]. and to Mrs. [Nombre31]., who appeared as accused in this case[...]'. He refers to resolution 1058-03 of 10:50 hours on November 21 of the previous year, in which this Chamber declared with merit the cassation appeal filed by the petitioner in association with Licentiate [Nombre32]., in their capacity as representatives of [Nombre29]., civil defendant, for whom they also acted as criminal defenders. The appeal questioned the sentence only regarding the civil aspect and in relation to the exoneration from the payment of the corresponding costs, which was made in favor of the civil plaintiff and complainant, because the sentence did not adequately reason why it exempted them from said obligation. As can be deduced from the transcript, in the first place, it concerns a matter outside the strictly criminal realm and relates to the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) instituted by the complainant, as civil plaintiff within the criminal proceeding. Within the criminal case, besides Mr. [Nombre33]., [Nombre30]. and [Nombre34]. also appeared as accused, who were also civilly sued. Of these three parties, who were in turn represented independently—[Nombre35]. was represented, in his dual condition of accused and civil defendant, by Licentiate [Nombre36]. and [Nombre37]. was so by Licentiate [Nombre38].—, only [Nombre33]. appealed in cassation. While it is true that in the resolution of this Chamber it is not expressly stated that the sentence is annulled regarding the exemption from costs only in relation to the appellant, it must be understood so, and for such purposes, the resolution is clarified ex officio in this sense, because even though the error refers to that issue and the exoneration affected the three civil defendants, we are facing interests of a strictly patrimonial nature, where the party disposition principle (principio dispositivo) fully governs, such that if the other civil co-defendants did not appeal, it must be understood that they conformed to what was resolved and cannot benefit from the individual action of the other co-defendant, as it would be granting gratuitously an additional patrimonial benefit to one who has not requested it and at the expense of the party whom the ruling benefited without the interested party having claimed it. As an initial reason to deny the request, it is held that the person who promotes it lacks standing (legitimación) since they do not act as a representative of the parties in whose favor they are acting. As indicated, the other civil co-defendants had their own representative and did not appeal in cassation, without it being proven that a special judicial power of attorney (poder especial judicial) was granted in favor of Licentiate [Nombre39]. or that they have appointed them as their representative, such that they are not legitimized to act in their name. Despite what has been said, it is appropriate to point out that the extensive effect contemplated in Article 428 of the Código Procesal Penal is legally structured, as also in the doctrine that informs it, to benefit the other co-defendants in a criminal case, in whom the same nature of affectation occurs as that presented in relation to the one who has claimed. This is so because we are facing restrictive matters of fundamental rights such as criminal law, so that for those same reasons and by virtue of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legality, and equality, it would be unsustainable in a State of Law that the benefits derived from the verification of defects or errors in a sentence could be denied to other co-defendants, with the argument that they were not claimed in their favor, even though they are in the same situation as the one who did exercise the right to challenge. There are, of course, fundamental values at stake that would make inequality intolerable in the face of the reliable verification of a procedural error with such serious consequences for a person's rights. Additionally, it is also provided that the appeal of the civil defendant benefits—by extensive effect—the accused, when it impacts criminal liability. As can be seen, the entire philosophy that inspires the extensive effect originates in the constitutional principles and fundamental rights already indicated and are aimed at protecting the subject over whom the repressive power of the State has been exercised. The extensive effect is, for these reasons, of an exceptional nature, precisely to the principle of personality and autonomy of the remedy, since in this matter the rule is the non-communicability of the challenge, such that it proceeds only when the law expressly grants it. '[...]The law only authorizes the communication of the remedy of one accused in favor of the co-defendants [...] and of the civil defendant in favor of the accused [...] In both cases, the situation of the accused is favored in protection of the interest that the latter asserts in the proceeding, seeking to avoid—as we have seen—the existence of diverse situations in the face of the same procedural object. No other cases of extension can be presented, with which the subjective scope of the effect is duly delimited[...]' (Ayán, [Nombre40]. Recursos en materia penal. Principios generales. Marcos Lerner Editora Córdoba. p.186). The civil defendant within the criminal proceeding enjoys broad possibilities of defense but obviously—in the civil aspect and independently of the identity between accused and civil defendant—their interests are those typical of the action instituted against them—patrimonial—and therefore, entirely dispositivos. For this reason, if the party aggrieved by a resolution adverse to them in this matter does not claim, it is understood that they waived their right to do so or simply conformed, without the State being able to exercise a tutelary function over their patrimony, over and above their own diligence, extending to them benefits recognized to the party that did claim them. Article 428 on which the petitioner relies is not useful for their claim, and regarding the co-defendants [Nombre35]. and [Nombre37]., the party disposition principle (principio dispositivo) operated, and what was resolved does not cover them, for having conformed to the decision by not having challenged it in due time …”, Sala 3ª de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, vote No. 218-04, of 10:15 hours on March 12, 2004. In this same sense, this Tribunal de Casación indicated: "... It must be taken into account that Article 428 of the Código Procesal Penal regulates the extensive effect of remedies, mentioning in this regard the extensive effect of the remedy of one accused with respect to another accused who is in the same circumstances, but it does not refer to an extensive effect of the remedies of the Ministerio Público in relation to the civil plaintiff party. This is important since the independence that exists between the criminal action and the civil action must be taken into account …” Vote No. [Telf4] of 09:55 hours on November 27, 2003. Finally, although Article 645 of the Código Civil establishes: "The acts or omissions of any of the jointly and severally liable debtors benefit or prejudice their co-debtors in the legal consequences that such acts or omissions may have regarding the debt, without prejudice to the right of indemnification against the debtor who, through fault or intent, prejudices the others", it must be interpreted that this rule refers not to procedural actions of the jointly and severally liable co-debtors (as would be in this case the filing of a cassation appeal), but rather to substantive actions verified outside the proceeding, which does not occur in the species.

POR TANTO:

The third ground of the cassation appeal filed by the defender of the accused and civil co-defendant [Nombre1] is partially granted. By virtue thereof, the trial court’s sentence is partially annulled, in that it civilly condemned the latter, and in relation to the following points: (i). Regarding the setting of the amount corresponding to material damages; (ii). Regarding the very existence of moral damages, and also regarding the economic amount derived therefrom. In all other respects, the challenged ruling remains unaltered, that is, regarding the existence of material damages, and regarding the judgment of criminal responsibility of the accused as the author of the crime of negligent injury. The sentence also remains unchanged in that civil co-defendant [Nombre6] was civilly condemned, in his capacity as third party civilly liable (registered owner of the vehicle with which the pedestrian accident was caused). Remand is ordered to the office of origin for a new proceeding in accordance with the Law. Notify.- RONALD SALAZAR MURILLO [Nombre3] [Nombre4] JUDGES OF CASSATION Marle.

Citing articles 142, 363, 369, 444, and 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's private defense attorney files a cassation appeal against the condemning judgment of the trial court, where he argues that, despite the fact that the defense attorney alleged the existence of </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">contributory negligence (culpa concurrente)</span><span style="font-weight:normal">, because the garbage truck was parked in the wrong lane and partially invaded the lane in which the defendant was driving (testimony of pieces against its driver was requested); that said truck lacked luminous or reflective warning signals; that it was parked in such a way that it forced the victim to cross almost the entire street to hand over the garbage bags; that the victim's conduct was also negligent, since he ran out and crossed the lane in which the accused was driving, even though the latter honked the horn (all the witnesses heard this, and the victim is not deaf). Despite the foregoing, the judge resolved absolutely nothing in this regard, given that</span><span style="font-weight:normal">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> —even—</span><span style="font-weight:normal">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> a reduction in the amounts corresponding to moral and material damages was requested. </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">The ground must be dismissed</span><span style="font-weight:normal">. The appellant's argument is based on several factual premises that do not derive from the trial court's judgment, which would completely delegitimize it. Indeed, from the content of the condemning decision being challenged, it is noted that, contrary to what the appellant claims, although the garbage truck was parked in the left lane, this was not the cause of, nor did it influence, the accident's occurrence, to such an extent that, even hypothetically assuming its orientation had been the reverse, that is, that instead of having its front end facing west, it had faced east, the outcome would have been the same. The same conclusion would be reached even assuming that, as the appellant claims, said garbage collection truck had not had its warning lights on, or had not had reflective mechanisms. In this regard, it should not be overlooked that the presence of that truck (it was parked in the lane in which the defendant was traveling) had no influence on the striking of the victim, who was also stopped at the time of the incident; therefore, it is also not true that the victim ran crossing the road. From a reading of the judgment, it is noted that, once the evidence was examined, the following was demonstrated: “… </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">On October twenty-seventh, two thousand and three, at five thirty in the morning, the victim [Name10] was performing his work duties, concerning garbage collection … getting out to collect garbage from the opposite lane where the garbage truck was parked (sic) … At that same time, on a straight road, without rain, good visibility, dry road, and with little traffic, the defendant … was driving his taxi-type vehicle … who, failing in his duty of care and precaution, observing that the garbage truck was partially parked in his lane, as well as the victim crossing the roadway with garbage bags towards the truck, did not maintain due care, since he continued his journey without being sure of the maneuver the victim was going to perform, merely honking the vehicle's horn, when he could have stopped or significantly reduced his speed and thus avoided striking the victim; 3) That the striking of the victim occurred in the right lane, that is, in the lane in which the accused was driving; 4) That the taxi driven by the defendant struck the victim's left leg with the right side of the front bumper, while the victim was finishing crossing the roadway; 5) That at the moment of the collision, no vehicle was traveling in the opposite direction to the defendant, and the defendant was traveling at approximately forty kilometers per hour … 7) As a result of the collision suffered by the victim, he sustained the following injuries … with an incapacity of 60 days for his usual duties</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> …” (cf. page 124, line 20 onward). As deduced from the transcribed text, according to the factual scenario demonstrated at trial, it is observed that the place where the accident occurred is a straight road, and the garbage collection truck did not at any time obstruct the defendant's visibility, who, even before the collision occurred, had already observed the victim on the road (he even honked at him at least three times), despite which he did not take the precaution of reducing his speed, even though it was unclear what the victim was going to do, all of which was duly reasoned by the judge (cf. page 130, line 25 onward). Within this context, it is clear that the truck's presence at the location had no influence on the </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">outcome (resultado)</span><span style="font-weight:normal">, since it was directly caused by the conduct of Mr. [Name11] that violated the duty of care, and it was foreseeable and avoidable, which was also expressly and correctly reasoned in the judgment (cf. page 132, line 7 onward). Based on the foregoing, the ground is rejected in its entirety.</span> **II.-** SECOND GROUND (form): *Regarding the facts, the judgment is illogical.* In the second ground of his appeal, based on the same legislation cited in the preceding ground, it is argued that the Court demonstrated that the defendant was driving at about 40 kilometers per hour, and that he first observed the victim when he was about 20 or 30 meters away, therefore "*the conduct*" was entirely foreseeable and avoidable. The defense attorney argues that he does not share this "*aspect*," since any road safety manual sets a driver's reaction time at one second, during which a vehicle traveling at 40 kilometers per hour advances about eleven meters, so the reaction and braking distance is 16 to 20 meters (depending on the condition of the tires, brakes, and the road), all of which establishes a stopping distance of 27 to 31 meters. In the defense attorney's opinion, and according to this, even if the defendant had braked, the accident would still have occurred. *The complaint is not admissible.* The data from which the appellant structures his claim are not accredited in the judgment, making it unfounded. In any case, even assuming they are correct, it is noted that the analysis based on them as presented in the appeal is erroneous, as it overlooks that, as demonstrated in the judgment, the accused observed the victim with considerable anticipation and distance, to such an extent that, foreseeing a dangerous situation, he proceeded to honk his taxi's horn several times (the accused himself said "at least three"), which allowed the judge to establish that even though it was unclear what the victim was going to do, he did not reduce his speed when he could have done so, this being the reason that supported the violation of the duty of care (cf. page 130, line 25 onward). On the other hand, as an additional point, this Court of Cassation notes that in the sketch drawn up by the traffic inspector (documentary and written evidence that can be assessed at this stage without compromising the accusatory principles that apply during the plenary phase of the trial, that is, orality and immediacy) no skid marks appear, which would, in principle, allow the conclusion that the defendant never performed this defensive action. Furthermore, and as expressly analyzed by the trial judge, the defendant himself stated in the debate that once he sounded his vehicle's horn, he thought the victim was going to stop, and for that reason, he decided to continue on his way (cf. page 130 already cited), it being clear that he continued his journey without being sure of the maneuver the victim would perform. This factual scenario is openly incompatible with the thesis put forward by the appellant, who seeks to imply that: (i). The defendant first observed the victim when the latter was about 30 meters away; (ii). It took him one second to react, during which time he advanced 11 meters; (iii). He applied the brakes, but the vehicle still advanced another 16 to 20 meters. It is clear that this sequence finds no support or basis in the content of the judgment, as the factual premises on which it rests were completely discarded by the Court, as explained. Based on the foregoing, the claim is rejected in its entirety.

**III.-** THIRD GROUND (form): *Lack of substantiation regarding the civil action.* Based on the provisions of articles 142, 363, 369, 444, and 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defense attorney for the defendant [Name1] (who also holds the status of co-civil defendant) argues that there is a lack of reasoning regarding the civil judgment. His complaint is based on the following: **a)** The judge textually refers to the expert reports, the civil plaintiff's petition, or the medico-legal report. The content of such documentary evidence, its assessment, and the reasons determining the setting of *the sums* corresponding to moral and material damages are ignored; **b)** The judge departs from the expert report and sets the sum of ₡1,000,000.00 for moral damage, with the content of said expert report and its assessment being unknown, as well as whether that evidence can prove the damages, as it merely serves to set its value and not "*its authorship or even its existence*." Obviously, expert reports do not prove moral and material damages but merely estimate them in sums of money, so their existence must be proven. The witnesses referred to circumstances unrelated to the damage, i.e., the accused's authorship. It was also not demonstrated whether permanent incapacity exists or existed, only temporary (60 days), nor were medical treatment expenses demonstrated, which were in any case covered by the INS; **c)** By ignoring the content of the expert reports and their assessment, the reasons why the amounts indicated by the judge were set are ignored; **d)** The judgment indicates that, in principle, the judge is prohibited from granting more than what is requested, implying that the plaintiff's petition was for ₡5,000,000.00 for material damage. Despite saying this, in the operative part, a higher sum was set for that concept, i.e., ₡5,296,910.00, violating this procedural aspect. The appellant's claim is to annul the judgment and order a remand of the case to the trial court insofar as the civil damages action was upheld and the civil defendants were ordered to pay moral and material damages, respectively, of ₡1,000,000.00 and ₡5,000,000.00 or ₡5,296,910.00. He requests that the sum set for moral damages be rejected for lack of evidence, and that the sum for material damages be reduced to ₡206,160.00 (two months of incapacity to work). In the latter case, he requests that the judgment be partially annulled "*in those respects deemed pertinent*" (cf. page 142, lines 24 to 26). *For the reasons that will be stated, the complaint is admissible.* Concerning the civil judgment issued against both defendants (the accused here and also the registered owner of the vehicle, that is, Mr. [Name6]), the trial judge stated the following: "*... In the case judged, it was amply demonstrated that the defendant, by his unlawful conduct, caused injuries to the victim, since the thesis must be accepted that moral damage is of the type called 'in re ipsa,' that is, it follows or is necessarily deduced from the facts from which liability derives, and therefore it need not be subject to specific proof, but rather it is up to the judge to carry out the assessment (Juan [Name12], Responsabilidad Civil, Curso de Derecho Privado, Volume 1, pp. 85-110). Similarly, material damage has been demonstrated according to the expert reports provided in the case file, with this judge departing from that carried out by Mr. [Name13] considering it excessive, as well as because the civil plaintiff's petition is less than it ... in its place, the second expert report provided in the case file is accepted, regarding material damages, considering it to be more consistent with the reality of the facts, such as the injuries suffered by the victim, the victim's incapacity time, and the permanent partial disability (secuelas) produced, as deduced from the medico-legal report assessed in this proceeding. Regarding moral damage, the Court departs from it and sets it at one million colones, the other items are accepted in their entirety ...*" (cf. page 135, line 15 onward). For the purpose of issuing the corresponding ruling, thereby resolving the appellant's arguments, we will first analyze the question relating to material damage, and then consider moral damage. (1). MATERIAL DAMAGE. Regarding the *existence* of material or physical damage, in the excerpt of the judgment cited above, it only *mentions* (without further explanation) that with his unlawful conduct, the defendant caused "*injuries*" (which are not specified) to the victim, this "*according to the expert reports provided in the case file*" (which are also not specifically cited or analyzed). However, upon assessing and considering the judgment comprehensively, which in reality constitutes a logical-legal unit, this Court of Cassation notes that in the substantive recital dedicated to analyzing the criminal liability of the accused and the penalty to be imposed, the trial judge did indeed address the justification of that point (existence of material damage to the victim), as he states: "*... For its part, the medico-legal report provides sufficient evidence to demonstrate the injuries suffered by the victim as a result of the acts committed by the defendant ... Likewise, this judge considers important for the purpose of imposing the penalty on the defendant, the injuries suffered by the victim, which are described in the medico-legal report provided in the case file and which are considerable ...*" (cf. page 133, lines 21 to 23; and page 134, line 21 onward). For its part, the section of proven facts indicates that the injuries received by the victim were the following: "*... cranioencephalic trauma with loss of consciousness, superficial wound at the right parietal level, superficial wound on the right thigh, wound passing through the cartilage of the right earlobe, mild excoriation on the right shoulder (sic), comminuted fracture of the middle third of the left tibia, with an incapacity of sixty days for his usual duties ...*" (cf. page 125, line 17 onward). Note then how the Court demonstrated that the victim's physical or material damage (injuries) resulted in a temporary incapacity of 60 days, with no mention of any supposed permanent partial disability (secuelas) or permanent decrease in overall organic capacity. Despite being laconic and concise, this reasoning is sufficient and allows an understanding of the reasons from which the existence of the material damage suffered by the victim as a result of these events was accredited, and it is also clear what the extent of it was, with no error being observed in this regard as alleged by the appellant. In this respect, it should not be overlooked that the evidence cited by the judge is documentary, so taking into account its written nature, the determination of its content does not depend on the orality and immediacy of the debate (article 334 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Thus, the conclusions of the medical report mentioned by the judge are well known to the parties, without the need for the judgment to again record or transcribe the content of that document (descriptive substantiation). This implies, then, that regarding the *existence* of material damage, the defects alleged by the appellant are not observed. Regarding the *amount* to be compensated for that concept, the situation is different, since the judgment does not comply with adequate reasoning, but rather with confusing, omitted, and contradictory reasoning. In this regard, it is noted that the judge directly and expressly points out that "*... the second expert report provided in the case file is accepted, regarding material damages, considering it to be more consistent with the reality of the facts, such as the injuries suffered by the victim, the victim's incapacity time, and the permanent partial disability (secuelas) produced, as deduced from the medico-legal report assessed in this proceeding ...*" At this point, the court's reasoning is omitted and presents serious defects that determine its illegitimacy, since it does not explain in what sense or regarding which aspects "*the second expert report provided in the case file*", that is, the one prepared by Licda. [Name14] and which appears added to pages 69 to 71 of the civil action file, is more consistent with the reality of the facts, or why it asserts that said expert study is more consistent with the injuries, the incapacity time, and *the permanent partial disability (secuelas)* suffered by the victim, given that —as indicated above— the same judge only accredited that, as a result of the events, the defendant suffered several injuries that incapacitated him for 60 days, so it is not understood what permanent partial disabilities (secuelas) are being referred to, and what evidentiary elements accredit them. Likewise, the trial judge does not even cite a single excerpt from the content of that expert report, which makes his reasoning even more obscure and confusing, to such an extent that it is impossible to understand where the amount of compensation agreed upon for material damage comes from. (2).- MORAL DAMAGE. Regarding this point, the judgment also does not comply with adequate reasoning, since —according to the excerpt transcribed— it does not explain what it consisted of, where it arose from, or what evidentiary elements determine it, nor why it was valued at the sum of ₡1,000,000.00. All these serious omissions determine the annulment of the judgment regarding the respects indicated. Thus, this ground of cassation is upheld *in part*, by virtue of which the trial court's judgment is partially annulled, only insofar as it civilly convicted the defendant and co-civil defendant [Name1], this in relation to the following respects: (i). Regarding the setting of the *amount* corresponding to material damage; (ii). Regarding the very *existence* of moral damage, and also regarding the *economic amount* derived therefrom. In all other respects, the challenged judgment remains intact, that is, regarding the *existence* of material damage (injuries to the victim derived from the unlawful conduct of the defendant), and regarding the judgment of criminal liability of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime of negligent injury (lesiones culposas). The judgment also remains unchanged insofar as it civilly convicted the co-defendant [Name6], in his capacity as a third-party civilly liable party (registered owner of the vehicle with which the collision was caused), who holds and participates in this proceeding with an individual and independent legal representation from that of [Name11], and did not file any appeal against the judgment. A remand to the office of origin is ordered for a new proceeding in accordance with the Law.

**IV.-** CONCERNING THE EXTENSIVE EFFECT OF APPEALS IN CIVIL MATTERS. As indicated in the preceding recital, the partial annulment of the judgment and the corresponding remand proceeding that were ordered, operate only in relation to the civil judgment issued against the co-defendant [Name1], who was the only one who challenged the trial court's judgment. The situation of the other defendant (Enoc [Name15]) is different, since by not filing any challenge against the judgment that ordered him to economically compensate the plaintiff, he acquiesced to that decision that was adverse to him, which would prevent this Court from officially benefiting him with the effects derived from [Name11]'s appeal, this being a civil matter (of a patrimonial nature) in which the principle of party disposition applies. This has been the solution opted for in previous cases by the jurisprudence of this Court of Cassation: "*... In this matter, an extensive effect of the annulment of the judgment regarding the civil action filed in favor of [Name17] is not applied in favor of the civil plaintiff [Name16], since in matters of appeals by the civil plaintiff, such extensive effect is not provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Art. 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).* *In addition, the same civil procedural legislation does not allow an extensive effect to function with respect to an appeal filed by another, with Article 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding the cassation appeal, further providing that the cassation judgment may not encompass points other than those that were the subject of the appeal. In particular, account must be taken of what civil procedural doctrine has called the principle of personality of the challenge. In this regard [Name18] indicates:* *"Regarding the so-called principle of personality of the appeal, it is simply another particular form of the same general rules that have already been set forth. The situation that gives rise to the application of this principle is the following: A and [Name19], heirs of C, sue D for reparation for an unlawful act that caused the death of the plaintiffs' father; the judgment acquits D; A does not appeal the judgment and [Name19] does so in time and form; the second instance judgment revokes the first instance judgment and orders compensation to [Name19] for the damage suffered. Does the ruling handed down in favor of [Name19] benefit [Name20], who consented to the acquittal judgment? Doctrine and jurisprudence pronounce in the negative: the conviction obtained by [Name19] does not benefit [Name20] because the effects of the appeal are personal. There does not exist, as in Roman law, common benefit, but rather unilateral advantage. The solution of the real or objective nature of the appeal was rejected by [Name21] and by the authors of the French Code, which in this matter subsequent thought has followed without any effort.* *The prestige of this solution is not diminished by the circumstance that two contradictory res judicata may appear: that while [Name19] has a right to compensation, A is deprived of it. The reason is not so much logical as systematic.* *Its foundations are scattered throughout all the principles of civil procedural law.* *In the first place, the principle that will creates and extinguishes rights.* *He who consented to the first instance judgment did so because he considered it just; the aggrieved party had two paths: to consent or to appeal; if he chose the former, his will binds him definitively to that consent. A second reason emanates from the very principle of res judicata.* *Nothing in law excludes the possibility of two contradictory judgments; the very evolutions of jurisprudence demonstrate that this risk is inherent in the concept of res judicata.* *A third reason flows from the very principle of the appeal.* *The superior court has no more powers than those assigned to it by the appeal that was introduced; nothing authorizes it to change the part of the judgment that dismisses the claim as it refers to A if no appeal has been filed in this respect.* *A different solution than this, however, is reserved for cases of joint and several liability or material indivisibility of the litigated thing, since in these cases the judgment benefits or prejudices the joint and several debtor or the co-owner. But this circumstance, imposed by the very force of things, does not alter the scope of the principle of personality of the appeal" ([Name22], [Name23], op cit., pp. 369-370).* *This has been the criterion maintained in various opinions by the Court of Cassation, for example* *865-2003 of August 29, 2003, reiterated in other subsequent opinions, for example opinion 1222-2003 of November 27, 2003* ...", Tribunal de Casación Penal, opinion No. [Telf2] of 11:08 a.m. on March 11, 2004.

In accordance with the foregoing, it must be understood that, as a general principle, the effects of an appeal in civil matters are personal, meaning that there is no common or objective benefit, as in Roman law, for all parties in the same procedural situation as the appellant, but rather a unilateral or subjective advantage. This is so because it must be interpreted that anyone who consented to the first-instance judgment (by not appealing it despite having full authority to do so) did so because they considered it fair, and their decision in that regard completely binds the second-instance Court. In this same sense, the same Court of Cassation resolved the following: "… <span style="font-style:italic">Such reasoning is insufficient, because it does not actually explain in a clear and convincing manner what the specific reasons are for which it can be considered that Mr. [Name24] had plausible reason to litigate, in order to exempt him from costs.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> Note that the lower court omits describing the specific content of the series of circumstances, which may well not have been considered at the time of filing the civil action in this matter, that it evaluated to support the acquittal.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> Due to this defect in the reasoning, this claim must be granted, ordering the partial annulment of the judgment and ordering remand, solely with respect to the setting of costs, between the complainant [Name25] and the defendant [Name26].</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> The remainder of the judgment remains unaltered, including the setting of costs ordered with respect to the other defendants, since none of them challenged what was resolved by the lower court judge on this issue, which, being of an essentially civil nature, is left to the disposition of the parties, by application of the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo), according to which '...in those matters in which only a private interest is elucidated, the organs of public power should not go beyond what the private parties themselves desire' (COUTURE, [Name23]: Fundamentos del derecho procesal civil, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Depalma, 1978, p. 186) </span><span>…" Criminal Court of Cassation, vote No. [Telf3] of 11:00 am on October 31, 2002. As can be deduced from the foregoing transcription, the jurist [Name22] defends the principle of personality in matters of appeals, for which he maintains that, as a general rule in civil procedural matters, the principle called </span><span style="font-style:italic">personality of the appeal</span><span> governs, in such a way that a party who did not challenge the lower court's judgment could not benefit from what was resolved by the higher court. However, and according to the transcribed bibliographic citation, it is noted that said author makes an exception for the case of material indivisibility of the litigated matter, indicating that: "… </span><span style="font-style:italic">A different solution is reserved, however, for cases of joint and several liability (solidaridad) or material indivisibility of the litigated matter, since in these cases the judgment benefits or harms the joint debtor or the co-owner. But this circumstance, imposed by the very force of things, does not alter the scope of the principle of personality of the appeal"</span><span> ([Name22], [Name23], op cit., pp. 369-370). It is thus how, for a substantial reason, the general principle of personality of the appeal is broken, in such a way that, as an exception to the rule, it must be understood that in those cases where the legal issue subject to the proceeding is indivisible or inseparable, what was resolved could not be maintained, even if that implies benefiting the party who did not file any appeal. This position is even clearer in [Name27], who points out the following: "… </span><span style="font-style:italic">This principle (extensive or communicating effect of the challenge), also called the principle of reality, is opposed to that of the personality of the challenging act. The phenomenon occurs both in civil proceedings, where, as we have said, the challenge by one necessary joint litigant (litisconsorcio necesario) benefits the others, and in criminal proceedings … The question becomes more debatable when there is no such express rule, with the most modern doctrine concluding that said extensive effect can be admitted when the substantial relationship, the subject of the proceeding, is indivisible, in cases of a plurality of holders thereof who have been parties to the proceeding … the favorable arguments of the cited authors seem to carry greater weight, as regards the very essence of the reasons of procedural economy</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> and above all the essential principle of avoiding contradictory decisions, for which several institutions are created in the process (lis pendens, joinder of actions and proceedings, res judicata, etc.)</span><span> …" [Name27] (Enrique), "</span><span style="text-decoration:underline">LOS RECURSOS JUDICIALES Y DEMÁS MEDIOS impugnativos en Iberoamérica</span><span>", ediciones De Palma, Buenos Aires. 1st edition, 1988. Pages 58 and 59. According to the foregoing, it is clear that in cases where this indivisibility of the legal issue subject to the proceeding is not present, as occurs in the present case (as will be analyzed), the application of the extensive effect would not be appropriate, since one would not be facing the difficulty of issuing judicial decisions that are contradictory in their essence. In this regard, it must be taken into account that, pursuant to Article 187 of the Ley de Tránsito, the civil liability of the registered owner is of a joint and several nature (solidario), as even the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has understood it: "… </span><span style="font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt">The legislator in Articles 187 subsection b of the Ley de Tránsito, 106 of the Penal Code, and 1048 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code has considered that in the mere driving of vehicles, and even more so of large and heavy vehicles, there is a situation of risk. An analysis of subjective aspects of the vehicle driver (intent or negligence) is thus dispensed with for the determination of the civil liability of the company or person that operates the transport activity, and an objective, indirect, and joint and several liability for the act of another is generated for the latter,</span><span style="font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt"> in order to guarantee better protection in favor of third parties, against damages caused by an activity considered, as already stated, dangerous in itself. Unlike the subjective civil liability contemplated in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, objective liability is generated for the company or person operating a vehicle when the transport activity it carries out, legally considered a source of danger or risk, results in damage to a person; this without the activity generating such damages needing to constitute a criminal offense. Thus, even when the existence or authorship of a punishable act has not been demonstrated, in cases such as that contemplated in paragraph 5</span><span style="font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt"> of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, a declaration of civil liability can exist</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>… </span><span style="font-style:italic">In support of this thesis, it is appropriate to cite vote of the First Chamber #578-F-03, of ten hours forty-five minutes on September 17, 2003, in which it was indicated: “Article 187 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas y Terrestres, No. 7331, establishes: 'The following shall be jointly and severally (solidariamente) liable with the driver: ... b) Individuals or legal entities that, by any title, operate vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation.' This rule prescribes what the doctrine has called objective liability or liability for created risk. In it, '... the element of fault is dispensed with as a criterion for imputation, focusing on a conduct or activity of an individual or legal entity, characterized by the initiation of a dangerous activity, or the mere possession of a dangerous object. The element of imputation of that liability is the created risk, or the risk-creating conduct. Therefore, it is affirmed, the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and unlawfulness ...' (No. 376, First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, San José, at 14 hours 40 minutes on July 9, 1999)</span><span> …", 3rd Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote No. 383-05 of 8:40 am on May 13, 2005.</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> Notwithstanding this joint and several nature (carácter solidario), in the case of the registered owner, one is not facing a </span><span style="font-style:italic">material indivisibility of the litigated matter</span><span> (in the terms proposed by [Name22]), because it is not a case of a necessary joint litigation (litis consorcio necesario), as pointed out and required by [Name27] for the purpose of applying the extensive effect of appeals. In this regard, it is observed that in cases such as the one before us, the civil plaintiff (directly injured party) could very well choose to direct their claim only against the direct perpetrator of the negligent conduct that caused the damage, or only against the registered owner (civilly liable third party), without necessarily having to sue both or join them in their action, since</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> -it is reiterated-</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> one is not facing a necessary passive joint litigation (litis consorcio pasivo necesario). This is so true that in this proceeding, the two civil co-defendants have acted with independent representation, which makes sense if one considers that, in certain cases, conflicting interests could even arise between the two procedural parties. From this, it then follows that, just as occurred in the present case, in the cited cases, the jurisprudence of this Court of Cassation has not seen any impediment to denying the extensive effect of the cassation appeal regarding the civil matter, because in those matters one was not facing the hypothesis that the doctrine analyzes. The Third Chamber has adopted the same solution, also in a case where the substantial indivisibility of the legal issue subject to the proceeding was not compromised: "… </span><span style="font-style:italic">Mr. [Name28]., in his capacity as defense counsel and representative of the accused and civil defendant [Name29]., within the three-day term requests the Chamber, based on numeral 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to “[...] grant </span><span style="font-style:italic">&#x2011;</span><span style="font-style:italic">on an extensive basis- the benefits derived from the cassation appeal</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> to Engineer [Name30]. and Mrs. [Name31]., who appeared as accused in this case[...]”. He refers to resolution 1058-03 of 10:50 am on November 21 of the previous year, in which this Chamber granted the cassation appeal filed by the petitioner in association with Mr. [Name32]., in their capacity as representatives of [Name29]., civil defendant, for whom they also acted as defense counsel in the criminal matter. The appeal challenged the judgment solely regarding the civil aspect and in relation to the exoneration from payment of the corresponding costs, which was granted in favor of the civil plaintiff and complainant, because the judgment did not adequately explain why she was exempted from said obligation. As can be seen from the foregoing, first, this is a matter alien to criminal law strictly speaking and is related to the civil action for damages brought by the complainant, as a civil plaintiff within the criminal proceeding. Within the criminal case, in addition to Mr. [Name33]., [Name30]. and [Name34]. also appeared as accused, who were also civilly sued. Of these three parties, who were in turn represented independently –[Name35]. was represented, in his dual capacity as accused and civil defendant, by Mr. [Name36]. and [Name37]. was represented by Mr. [Name38]. -, only [Name33]. appealed in cassation. While it is true that this Chamber's resolution does not expressly state that the judgment is annulled regarding the costs exemption only in relation to the appellant, it must be so understood, and for such purposes, the resolution is hereby clarified ex officio in that sense, because although the error refers to that issue and the exoneration affected the three civil defendants, we are dealing with interests of a strictly patrimonial nature, where the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo) fully applies, such that if the other civil co-defendants did not appeal, it must be understood that they accepted what was resolved and cannot benefit from the individual action of the other co-defendant, as it would be granting an additional gratuitous patrimonial benefit to one who did not request it and at the expense of the party whom the ruling benefited without a claim from the interested party. As an initial reason for denying the request, the person promoting it lacks standing since they do not act as the representative of the parties in whose favor they are acting. As indicated, the other civil co-defendants had their own representative and did not appeal in cassation, without evidence that a special power of attorney has been granted in favor of Mr. [Name39]. or that they have appointed them as their representative, such that they are not legitimized to act on their behalf. Despite the foregoing, it should be noted that the extensive effect contemplated in Article 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code is legally structured, as also in the doctrine that informs it, to benefit the </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">other co-accused in a criminal case,</span><span style="font-style:italic"> in whom the same nature of the impact that exists in relation to the one who has claimed is present. This is so because we are dealing with a matter restrictive of fundamental rights, such as criminal law, so that for those same reasons and by virtue of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legality, and equality, it would be unsustainable in a State of Law to deny other co-accused the benefits derived from the finding of flaws or defects in a judgment, with the argument that they were not claimed on their behalf, even though they are in the same situation as the one who did exercise the right to challenge. There are, of course, fundamental values at stake that would make the inequality intolerable in the face of the reliable finding of a procedural error with such serious consequences for a person's rights. Additionally, it is also contemplated that the appeal of the civil defendant benefits –by extensive effect- the accused, when it affects criminal liability. As can be seen, the entire philosophy that inspires the extensive effect originates from the constitutional principles and fundamental rights already mentioned and is aimed at protecting the subject against whom the repressive power of the State has been exercised. The extensive effect is, for those reasons, of an </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">exceptional</span><span style="font-style:italic"> nature, precisely to the principle of personality and autonomy of the appeal, because in this matter the rule is the non-transferability of the challenge, so it applies only when the law expressly provides for it. "[...]The law only authorizes the transferability of the appeal of one accused in favor of the co-accused [...] and of the civil defendant in favor of the accused [...] In both cases, the situation of the accused is favored in protection of the interest that the accused asserts in the proceeding, seeking to avoid –as we have seen- the existence of diverse situations regarding the same procedural object. Other cases of extension cannot be presented, with which the subjective scope of the effect is duly delimited[...]” (Ayán, [Name40]. </span><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Recursos en materia penal. Principios generales</span><span style="font-style:italic">. Marcos Lerner Editora Córdoba. p. 186). The civil defendant within the criminal proceeding enjoys ample defense possibilities but obviously </span><span style="font-style:italic">&#x2011;</span><span style="font-style:italic">in the civil aspect and regardless of the identity between accused and civil defendant- their interests are those specific to the action brought against them </span><span style="font-style:italic">&#x2011;</span><span style="font-style:italic">patrimonial- and therefore, entirely of a party disposition nature (dispositivos). Therefore, if the party injured by a resolution that is adverse to them in this matter does not claim, it is understood that they waived their right to do so or simply accepted it, without the State being able to exercise a tutelary function over their patrimony, beyond their own diligence, by extending benefits recognized to the party that did claim them. Article 428 on which the petitioner relies is not useful for his claim, and as for the co-defendants [Name35]. and [Name37]., the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo) operated, and what was resolved does not cover them, because they accepted the decision as it was not challenged in a timely manner </span><span>…", 3rd Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote No. 218-04, of 10:15 am on March 12, 2004. In this same sense, this Court of Cassation indicated: "… </span><span style="font-style:italic">It must be borne in mind that Article 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code regulates the extensive effect of appeals, mentioning in this regard the extensive effect of the appeal of one accused with respect to another accused who is in the same circumstances, but it does not refer to an extensive effect of the Public Prosecutor's Office's appeals regarding the civil plaintiff.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> This is important since the independence that exists between the criminal action and the civil action must be taken into account</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> …" Vote No. [Telf4] of 09:55 am on November 27, 2003. Finally, although Article 645 of the Civil Code establishes:</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> "</span><span style="font-style:italic">The acts or omissions of any of the joint and several debtors (deudores solidarios) benefit or harm their co-debtors in the legal consequences that such acts or omissions have with respect to the debt, subject to the right of indemnity against the debtor who through fault or intent harms the others</span><span>", it must be interpreted that this rule refers not to procedural actions of the joint and several co-debtors (as would be, in this case, the filing of a cassation appeal), but rather to substantive actions verified outside the proceeding, which does not occur in the present case.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><h3 style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"><span>POR TANTO:</span></h3><h2 style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-weight:normal">The third ground of the cassation appeal filed by the defense counsel of the accused and civil co-defendant [Name1] is partially granted. By virtue thereof, the trial court's judgment is </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">partially</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> annulled, insofar as it civilly convicted him, and in relation to the following aspects: (i). Regarding the setting of the amount corresponding to material damage (daño material); (ii). Regarding the very existence of moral damage (daño moral), and also regarding the economic amount derived therefrom. In all other respects, the challenged ruling remains unaltered, that is, regarding the existence of material damage, and regarding the judgment of criminal liability of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime of negligent injury. The judgment also remains unchanged insofar as it civilly convicted the civil co-defendant [Name6], in his capacity as a civilly liable third party (registered owner of the vehicle with which the pedestrian accident was caused). Remand is ordered to the office of origin for a new proceeding in accordance with the Law.</span></h2> Notify.-</span></h2><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; line-height:24pt"><span style="font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:-0.15pt">RONALD SALAZAR MURILLO</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid"><span style="font-weight:bold">[Nombre3]</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> [Nombre4]</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; line-height:24pt"><span style="font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:-0.15pt">CASSATION JUDGES</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:24pt"><span style="letter-spacing:-0.15pt">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:24pt"><span style="font-size:8pt">Marle.</span></p></div></body></html>" It refers to resolution 1058-03 of 10:50 a.m. on November 21 of the previous year, in which this Chamber granted the appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the petitioner together with attorney [Nombre20], in their capacity as representatives of [Nombre17], civil defendant (demandado civil), for whom they also acted as defense counsel in the criminal matter. The appeal challenged the judgment solely regarding the civil aspect and in relation to the exoneration from payment of the corresponding costs (costas), which was granted in favor of the civil plaintiff (actora civil) and complainant (querellante), since the judgment did not adequately reason why it exempted them from said obligation. As can be gleaned from the transcribed text, firstly, this is a matter outside the strictly criminal realm and relates to the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought by the complainant, as civil plaintiff within the criminal process. Within the criminal case, in addition to Mr. [Nombre21], [Nombre18] and [Nombre22] also appeared as accused, who were also civilly sued. Of these three parties, who were represented independently—[Nombre23] was represented, in his dual capacity as accused (imputado) and civil defendant, by attorney [Nombre24], and [Nombre25] was represented by attorney [Nombre26]—only [Nombre21] filed an appeal (recurso de casación). While it is true that this Chamber's resolution does not expressly state that the judgment is annulled regarding the cost exemption only in relation to the appellant (impugnante), it must be understood as such, and for these purposes, the resolution is hereby clarified ex officio (de oficio) in that sense, because even though the error refers to that issue and the exoneration affected all three civil defendants, we are dealing with interests of a strictly proprietary nature, where the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo) applies fully, such that if the other co-defendants (codemandados) civil did not appeal, it must be understood that they acquiesced to the decision and cannot benefit from the individual action of the other co-defendant, as it would be granting an additional proprietary benefit free of charge to someone who did not request it, at the expense of the party whom the judgment favored without any claim from the interested party. As an initial reason to deny the petition, it is noted that the person promoting it lacks standing (legitimación) because he does not act as the representative of the parties in whose favor he petitions. As indicated, the other civil co-defendants had their own representative and did not file an appeal, and there is no record that a special power of attorney (poder especial judicial) was granted in favor of attorney [Nombre27] or that they appointed him as their representative, such that he lacks standing to act on their behalf. Despite the foregoing, it is pertinent to note that the extensive effect (efecto extensivo) contemplated in Article 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) is legally structured, as well as in the doctrine that informs it, to benefit the <span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">other co-accused (co imputados) in a criminal case,</span><span style="font-style:italic"> who are affected by the same nature of defect as that presented in relation to the one who has claimed. This is so because we are dealing with a matter restrictive of fundamental rights, as is criminal law, so that for these same reasons and by virtue of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legality, and equality, it would be untenable in a Rule of Law State for the benefits derived from the verification of defects or flaws in a judgment to be denied to other co-accused, with the argument that they were not claimed on their behalf, even though they are in the same situation as the one who did exercise the right to challenge. There are, of course, fundamental values at stake that would make the inequality intolerable in the face of the reliable verification of a procedural error with such serious consequences for a person's rights. Additionally, it is also provided that the appeal of the civil defendant benefits—by extensive effect—the accused, when it affects criminal liability. As can be seen, the entire philosophy that inspires the extensive effect originates in the constitutional principles and fundamental rights already mentioned and is aimed at protecting the subject upon whom the State's repressive power has been exercised. The extensive effect is, for these reasons, of an </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">exceptional</span><span style="font-style:italic"> nature, precisely to the principle of personality and autonomy of the appeal, since in this matter the rule is the non-communicability of the challenge, such that it only proceeds when the law expressly provides for it. “[...]The law only authorizes the communication of the appeal of one accused in favor of the co-accused [...] and of the civil defendant in favor of the accused [...] In both cases, the situation of the accused is favored in safeguarding the interest that the latter asserts in the process, seeking to avoid—as we have seen—the existence of diverse situations regarding the same procedural object. Other cases of extension cannot be presented, with which the subjective scope of the effect is duly delimited[...]” (Ayán, [Nombre28]. </span><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Resources in Criminal Matters. General Principles (Recursos en materia penal. Principios generales)</span><span style="font-style:italic">. Marcos Lerner Editora Córdoba. p.186). The civil defendant within the criminal process enjoys broad possibilities of defense but obviously </span><span style="font-style:italic">&#x2011;</span><span style="font-style:italic">in the civil aspect and independently of the identity between accused and civil defendant- his interests are those typical of the action brought against him </span><span style="font-style:italic">&#x2011;</span><span style="font-style:italic">proprietary- and therefore, entirely subject to party disposition. For this reason, if the party harmed by a resolution that is adverse in this matter does not claim, it is understood that he waived his right to do so or simply acquiesced, without the State being able to exercise a tutelary function over his patrimony, beyond his own diligence, by extending benefits recognized to the party who did claim them. Article 428 on which the petitioner relies is not useful for his claim, and regarding co-defendants [Nombre23] and [Nombre25], the principle of party disposition operated and the decided matter does not cover them, having acquiesced to the decision because it was not challenged in due time </span><span>…”, Third Chamber (Sala 3ª) of the Supreme Court of Justice, decision (voto) Nº 218-04, of 10:15 a.m. on March 12, 2004. In this same sense, this Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) indicated: “… </span><span style="font-style:italic">It must be considered that Article 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code regulates the extensive effect of appeals, mentioning in this regard the extensive effect of the appeal of one accused with respect to another accused who is in the same circumstances, but it makes no reference to an extensive effect of the appeals of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) in relation to the civil plaintiff.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> This is important because the independence that exists between the criminal action and the civil action must be taken into account</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> …” Decision (Voto) Nº [Telf3] of 9:55 a.m. on November 27, 2003. Finally, although Article 645 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) establishes:</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> \"</span><span style="font-style:italic">The acts or omissions of any of the joint and several debtors (deudores solidarios) benefit or harm their co-debtors (codeudores) in the legal consequences that such acts or omissions have with respect to the debt, without prejudice to the right of indemnity against the debtor who, through fault or fraud, harms the others</span><span>\", it must be interpreted that this norm refers not to procedural actions of the joint and several co-debtors (as would be in this case the filing of an appeal), but rather to substantive actions verified outside the process, which is not the case here.\"</span></p></div></body></html>" In any event, even assuming they are correct, it is noted that the analysis based on them set forth in the appeal is erroneous, as it overlooks that, as was demonstrated in the judgment, the accused observed the victim with considerable anticipation and distance, to the point that, foreseeing a dangerous situation, he proceeded to sound the horn of his taxi on multiple occasions (the defendant himself stated "at least three times"), which allowed the adjudicator to establish that even though he was unsure what the victim would do, he did not reduce his speed even though he could have done so, this being the reason that supported the breach of the duty of care (cf. page 130, line 25 onwards). On the other hand, for the sake of further elaboration, this Court of Cassation observes that in the sketch prepared by the traffic inspector (documentary and written evidence that can be assessed at this stage without thereby compromising the accusatory principles that apply in the plenary phase of the trial, i.e., orality and immediacy), no skid marks appear, which in principle would allow establishing that the accused never performed that defensive action. Moreover, and as expressly analyzed by the trial judge, the accused himself stated during the debate that once he sounded his vehicle's horn, he thought the victim would stop, and for that reason he decided to continue on his way (cf. page 130 already cited), it being clear that he continued his course without being certain of the maneuver the victim would perform. This factual framework is openly incompatible with the thesis set forth by the appellant, who seeks to imply that: (i). The accused first observed the victim when the latter was about 30 meters away; (ii). He took one second to react, during which time he traveled 11 meters; (iii). He applied the brakes, but even so the vehicle traveled approximately 16 to 20 more meters. It is clarified that this sequence finds no support or basis whatsoever in the content of the ruling, because the factual premises on which it relies were completely discarded by the Tribunal, as was explained. Based on the foregoing, the claim is rejected in its entirety.</span></h2><h2 style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"><span>III.-</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> THIRD GROUND (form): </span><span style="font-style:italic">Failure to state reasons with respect to the civil action</span><span>.</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> Based on the provisions of Articles 142, 363, 369, 444, and 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defense counsel for the accused [Name1] (who also holds the status of civil co-defendant) argues that the civil judgment lacks reasoning. His complaint is based on the following: </span><span>a)</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> The judge refers verbatim to the expert reports, to the civil plaintiff's petition, or to the medicolegal opinion, whereby the content of such documentary evidence, its assessment, and the reasons determining the setting of </span><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">the sums</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> corresponding to moral and material damages are unknown; </span><span>b)</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> The judge departs from the expert report and sets</span><span style="font-weight:normal">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> the sum of ¢1,000,000.00 for moral damages, the content of said expert report and its assessment being unknown, as well as whether that evidence can prove the damages, since it simply serves to set their value and not “</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">their authorship or even their existence</span><span style="font-weight:normal">”. Obviously, expert reports do not prove moral and material damages, but merely estimate them in monetary sums, so their existence must be proven. The witnesses referred to circumstances unrelated to the damage, i.e., the authorship of the accused. Nor was it demonstrated whether permanent disability exists or existed, only temporary disability (60 days), nor were medical treatment expenses demonstrated, which in any case were covered by the INS; </span><span>c)</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> By ignoring the content of the expert reports and their assessment, the reasons why the amounts indicated by the judge were set are unknown; </span><span>d)</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> The judgment indicates that, in principle, the adjudicator is barred from granting more than what is requested, implying that the plaintiff's petition was for ¢5,000,000.00 for material damages. Despite stating this, in the operative part (por tanto) it set a larger sum for that heading, namely ¢5,296,910, thereby violating that procedural aspect. The appellant's request is that the judgment be annulled and a remand ordered with respect to the granting of the civil liability action (acción civil resarcitoria) and the order that the civil defendants pay moral and material damages, respectively, in the amounts of ¢1,000,000.00 and ¢5,000,000.00 or ¢5,296,910. It requests that the sum set for moral damages be rejected due to lack of evidence, and that the sum for material damages be reduced to ¢206,160.00 (two months of inability to work). In the latter case, it requests that the judgment be partially annulled “</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">in the aspects deemed pertinent</span><span style="font-weight:normal">” (cf. page 142, lines 24 to 26). </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">For the reasons to be stated, the complaint is admissible</span><span style="font-weight:normal">. Regarding the civil judgment issued against the two defendants (the accused here and also the registered owner of the vehicle, i.e., Mr. [Name6]), the trial judge stated the following: “… </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">In the case on trial, it was amply demonstrated that the accused, through his unlawful conduct, caused injuries to the victim, as the thesis must be admitted that moral damage is of the type called “in re ipsa”, that is, it necessarily follows or is deduced from the facts from which the liability derives, and therefore need not be the subject of specific proof; rather, it falls to the judge to carry out the assessment (Juan [Name12], Civil Liability, Private Law Course, Volume 1, pp. 85-110). Likewise, material damage is taken as proven according to the expert reports contributed to the case file (autos), with this adjudicator departing from the one prepared by Mr. [Name13] considering it exorbitant, and also because the civil plaintiff’s request is less than it … in its place, the second expert report contributed to the case file, with respect to material damages, is accepted, considering it better conforms to the reality of the facts, such as the injuries suffered by the victim, his time of disability, and the sequelae produced, as derived from the medicolegal opinion assessed in the present proceeding. Regarding moral damages, the Tribunal departs from it [the report] and sets it at one million colones, the other items being accepted in their entirety</span><span style="font-weight:normal">…” (cf. page 135, line 15 onwards). For purposes of issuing the corresponding ruling, thereby resolving the appellant's allegations, the issue regarding material damage will first be analyzed, and then moral damage will be considered. (1). MATERIAL DAMAGE. Regarding the </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">existence</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> of material or physical damage, in the excerpt of the judgment cited above, it merely </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">mentions</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> (without further explanation) that through his unlawful conduct the accused caused “</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">injuries</span><span style="font-weight:normal">” (which are not specified) to the victim, this “</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">according to the expert reports contributed to the case file</span><span style="font-weight:normal">” (which are also not specifically cited, nor analyzed). However, when comprehensively assessing and considering the judgment, which in reality constitutes a logical-juridical unit, this Court of Cassation notes that in the substantive Whereas Clause (Considerando) dedicated to analyzing the criminal responsibility of the accused and the penalty to be imposed, the trial judge did address the justification of that point (existence of material damage to the victim), stating: “… </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">For its part, the medicolegal opinion yields sufficient evidentiary elements to take as proven the injuries suffered by the victim as a result of the acts committed by the accused … Likewise, this adjudicator considers it important for purposes of imposing the penalty on the accused, the injuries suffered by the victim, the same that are described in the medicolegal opinion contributed to the case file and which are considerable</span><span style="font-weight:normal">…” (cf. page 133, lines 21 to 23; and page 134, line 21 onwards). In turn, in the section on proven facts, it is indicated that the injuries received by the victim were the following: “… </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">craniocerebral trauma with loss of consciousness, superficial wound at the right parietal level, superficial wound on the right thigh, wound traversing the cartilage of the right earlobe, minor abrasion on the right shoulder ([sic]), comminuted fracture of the middle third of the left tibia, with a disability of sixty days for his usual tasks</span><span style="font-weight:normal">…” (cf. page 125, line 17 onwards). Note then how the Tribunal took it as proven that the physical or material damage of the victim (injuries) resulted in a temporary disability of 60 days, without mentioning anything regarding alleged permanent sequelae or diminution of general organic capacity. Despite being laconic and concise, this reasoning is sufficient and allows understanding what the reasons were based on which the existence of the material damage suffered by the victim as a result of these facts was accredited, and the extent thereof is also clear, meaning that with respect to that point, the error denounced by the appellant is not observed. In this regard, it should not be overlooked that the evidence cited by the adjudicator is documentary, so that, considering its written nature, the determination of its content does not depend on the orality and immediacy of the debate (Article 334 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Thus, the conclusions of the medical opinion mentioned by the adjudicator are amply known by the parties, without the judgment needing to reiterate or transcribe the content of said document (descriptive reasoning). This implies, then, that with respect to the </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">existence</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> of the material damage, the defects denounced by the appellant are not perceived. Regarding the </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">amount</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> to be indemnified for that heading, the situation is different, because the ruling fails to provide adequate reasoning, but rather presents confusing, omitted, and contradictory reasoning. In this regard, it is noted that directly and expressly, the adjudicator indicates that “… </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">the second expert report contributed to the case file is accepted, with respect to material damages, considering it better conforms to the reality of the facts, such as the injuries suffered by the victim, his time of disability, and the sequelae produced, as derived from the medicolegal opinion assessed in the present proceeding...”</span><span style="font-weight:normal">. On this point, the tribunal’s reasoning is omitted and presents serious defects that determine its illegitimacy, because it does not explain in what sense or with respect to which aspects “</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">the second expert report contributed to the case file</span><span style="font-weight:normal">”, i.e., the one prepared by Lic. [Name14] and which appears attached at pages 69 to 71 of the civil action file (legajo de acción civil), better conforms to the reality of the facts, or why it asserts that said expert study better conforms to the injuries, the time of disability, and </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">the sequelae</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> suffered by the victim, given that</span><span style="font-weight:normal">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> -as indicated above- the same adjudicator only took it as proven that, as a result of the facts, the victim suffered several injuries that disabled him for 60 days, so it is not understood what sequelae are being referred to, and what evidentiary elements accredit them. Likewise, the trial judge does not even cite a single excerpt from the content of said expert report, which makes his reasoning even more obscure and confusing, to the point that it is impossible to understand from where the amount of compensation agreed upon with respect to the material damage arises. (2).- MORAL DAMAGE. Regarding this point, the ruling also fails to provide adequate reasoning, because</span><span style="font-weight:normal">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> -according to the excerpt transcribed-</span><span style="font-weight:normal">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> it does not explain what it consisted of, from where it arose, or what evidentiary elements determine it, nor why it was valued at the sum of ¢1,000,000.00. All these serious omissions determine the nullity of the ruling insofar as the indicated points are concerned. Thus, the present ground of cassation is </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">partially</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> accepted, by virtue of which the trial judgment is partially annulled, only insofar as it civilly condemned the accused and civil co-defendant [Name1], this with respect to the following aspects: (i). Regarding the setting of the </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">amount</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> corresponding to material damage; (ii). Regarding the very </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">existence</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> of the moral damage, and also regarding the financial </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">amount</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> derived therefrom. In all other respects, the challenged judgment remains intact, i.e., regarding the </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">existence</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> of the material damage (the victim's injuries derived from the accused's unlawful conduct), and regarding the criminal liability judgment of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime of negligent bodily harm (lesiones culposas). The judgment also remains unaltered insofar as it civilly condemned the co-defendant [Name6], in his capacity as a civilly liable third party (registered owner of the vehicle with which the pedestrian accident was caused), who holds and participates in this proceeding with individual legal representation independent from that of [Name11], and did not exercise any recourse against the ruling. A remand is ordered to the office of origin for a new proceeding conforme a Derecho.</span></h2><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-weight:bold">IV.-</span><span> REGARDING THE EXTENSIVE EFFECT OF RECOURSES IN CIVIL MATTERS. As indicated in the preceding Whereas Clause (Considerando), the partial annulment of the ruling and the corresponding remand proceeding (juicio de reenvío) that were ordered, operate only with respect to the civil judgment entered against the co-defendant [Name1], who was the only one who challenged the trial judgment. The situation of the other defendant (Enoc [Name15]) is different, because by not raising any challenge against the ruling that condemned him to economically compensate the plaintiff, he came to acquiesce in that decision which was adverse to him, which would prevent this Tribunal from officially benefiting him with the effects derived from the recourse of [Name11], this being a civil matter (of a patrimonial nature) in which the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo) governs. This has been the solution adopted in prior cases by the jurisprudence of this Court of Cassation: “… </span><span style="font-style:italic">In this matter, an extensive effect of the annulment of the judgment, regarding the civil action filed in favor of [Name17], is not applied in favor of the civil plaintiff [Name16], since in matters of recourses for the civil plaintiff, such extensive effect is not provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Art. 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> In addition, civil procedural law itself does not allow an extensive effect to operate with respect to a recourse filed by another, and furthermore, Article 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure, concerning the recourse of cassation, provides that the cassation judgment may not embrace points other than those that were the subject of the recourse. Particular note must be taken of what civil procedural doctrine has called the principle of personality of the challenge (principio de personalidad de la impugnación). In this regard, [Name18] states:</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> “As for the so-called principle of personality of the appeal, it is merely another particular form of the same general rules already set forth. The situation giving rise to the application of this principle is the following: A and [Name19], heirs of C, sue D for reparation of an unlawful act that caused the death of the plaintiffs’ father; the judgment acquits D; A does not appeal the judgment and [Name19] does so in due time and form; the second-instance judgment reverses the first-instance judgment and orders D to indemnify [Name19] for the damage suffered. Does the ruling rendered in favor of [Name19] benefit [Name20], who consented to the acquittal judgment? Doctrine and jurisprudence pronounce in the negative: the condemnation obtained by [Name19] does not benefit [Name20] because the effects of the appeal are personal. There does not exist, as in Roman law, a common benefit, but rather a unilateral advantage. The solution of the real or objective character of the appeal was rejected by [Name21] and by the authors of the French Code, which subsequent thinking has followed without any difficulty in this matter.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> The circumstance that two contradictory res judicata might appear—that while [Name19] has a right to indemnification, A is deprived thereof—does not diminish the prestige of this solution. The reason is not so much logical as systemic.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> Its foundations are scattered throughout all the principles of civil procedural law.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> In the first place, the principle that the will creates and extinguishes rights.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> He who consented to the first-instance judgment did so because he considered it just; the aggrieved party had two paths: to consent or to appeal; if he chose the former, his will binds him definitively to that consent. A second reason emanates from the very principle of res judicata.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> Nothing in law excludes the possibility of two contradictory judgments; the very evolution of jurisprudence demonstrates that this risk is inherent to the concept of res judicata.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> A third reason flows from the very principle of appeal.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> The superior tribunal has no powers other than those assigned to it by the recourse filed; nothing authorizes it to change the part of the judgment that rejects the claim insofar as it refers to A, if no recourse has been filed in that respect.</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> A different solution is reserved, however, in cases of solidary liability or material indivisibility of the litigious matter (cosa litigiosa), since in those cases the judgment benefits or prejudices the solidary debtor or the co-owner. But this circumstance, imposed by the force of things themselves, does not alter the scope of the principle of personality of the appeal” ([Name22], [Name23], op cit., pp. 369-370).</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> This has been the criterion maintained in various decisions (votos) by the Court of Cassation, for example,</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> 865-2003 of August 29, 2003, reiterated in other later decisions, for example, decision 1222-2003 of November 27, 2003</span><span>…”, Criminal Court of Cassation, decision No. [Telf2] of 11:08 hours on March 11, 2004. In accordance with the foregoing, it must be understood that as a general principle, the effects of a recourse in civil matters are personal, such that there exists no, as in Roman law, common or objective benefit for all subjects in the same procedural situation as the appellant, but rather a unilateral or subjective advantage. This is so because it must be interpreted that he who consented to the first-instance judgment (by not appealing it despite having full authority to do so) did so because he considered it just, his decision in that regard completely conditioning the second-instance Tribunal. In the same vein, the same Court of Cassation resolved the following: “… </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Such reasoning is insufficient, because it does not actually explain, in a clear and convincing manner, what specifically the reasons are for which it can be considered that Mr. [Name24] had plausible reason (razón plausible para litigar) to litigate, in order to exempt him from costs.</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> Note that the a quo omits describing the specific content of the series of circumstances—which might well not have been taken into consideration at the time of filing the civil action in this matter—that it evaluated to justify the acquittal.</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> Due to this defect in the reasoning, this claim must be granted, ordering the partial annulment of the judgment and ordering the remand, solely regarding the fixing of costs, between the private prosecutor (querellante) [Name25] and the defendant (querellada) [Name26].</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> The remainder of the judgment remains intact, including the fixing of costs ordered regarding the other defendants, since none of them challenged the ruling of the a quo judge on this issue, which, being essentially civil in nature, is left to the parties’ disposition, by application of the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo), pursuant to which «...in those matters in which only a private interest is at stake, the organs of public power must not go beyond what the parties themselves desire» (COUTURE, [Name23]: Fundamentos del derecho procesal civil, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Depalma, 1978, p. 186) </span><span>…” Criminal Court of Cassation, decision No. [Telf3] of 11:00 hours on October 31, 2002. As deduced from the foregoing transcription, the author [Name22] defends the principle of personality in matters of recourses, for which he argues that as a general rule in civil procedural matters, the principle called </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">of personality of the appeal</span><span> governs, such that a subject who did not challenge the a quo judgment could not benefit from the ad quem ruling. However, and according to the bibliographic citation transcribed, it is noted that said author excepts the case of material indivisibility of the litigious matter, stating that: “… </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">A different solution is reserved, however, in cases of solidary liability or material indivisibility of the litigious matter, since in those cases the judgment benefits or prejudices the solidary debtor or the co-owner. But this circumstance, imposed by the force of things themselves, does not alter the scope of the principle of personality of the appeal”</span><span> ([Name22], [Name23], op cit., pp. 369-370). It is thus how, for a reason of a substantive nature, the general principle of personality of the recourse is broken, such that as an exception to the rule, it must be understood that in those instances where the juridical question that is the subject of the proceeding is inseparable or indivisible (inescindible), the ruling could not be upheld, even if this implies benefiting the subject who exercised no recourse. This position is even clearer in [Name27], who states the following: “… </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">This principle (extensive or communicating effect of the challenge), also called the principle of reality, is opposed to that of the personality of the challenge act. The phenomenon occurs both in civil proceedings, where, as we have said, the challenge by a necessary joint litigant (litisconsorcio necesario) favors the others, and in criminal proceedings … The question becomes more debatable when no such express rule exists, with more modern doctrine concluding that it is appropriate to admit such extensive effect when the substantive relationship, the subject of the proceeding, is inseparable, in cases of plurality of its holders who have been parties to the proceeding … the arguments in favor by the cited authors seem stronger, regarding the very essence of reasons of procedural economy</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> and above all the essential principle of avoiding contradictory decisions, for which the process creates several institutions (lispendencia, accumulation of actions and proceedings, res judicata, etc.)</span><span>…” [Name27] (Enrique), “</span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">LOS RECURSOS JUDICIALES Y DEMÁS MEDIOS IMPUGNATIVOS en Iberoamérica</span><span>”, ediciones De Palma, Buenos Aires. 1st edition, 1988. Pages 58 and 59. Pursuant to the foregoing, it is clear that in cases where such indivisibility of the juridical question that is the subject of the proceeding does not arise, as occurs in the present case (as shall be analyzed), the application of the extensive effect would not be appropriate, as there would not be the difficulty of falling into essentially contradictory judicial decisions. In this regard, it must be taken into account that, pursuant to Article 187 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), the civil liability of the registered owner is of a solidary type, as even the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has understood: “… </span><span style=\"font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">The legislator, in Articles 187 subparagraph b of the Traffic Law, 106 of the Penal Code, and 1048 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, has considered that in the mere driving of vehicles, and even more so of vehicles of great size and weight, a situation of risk exists. An analysis of the subjective aspects of the vehicle's driver (intent or negligence) is thus dispensed with, for determining the civil liability of the company or person that operates the transportation activity, and an objective, indirect, and solidary liability for the acts of another is generated for the latter,</span><span style=\"font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> for the purpose of guaranteeing better protection in favor of third parties, against damages caused by an activity considered, as already stated, dangerous in itself. Unlike the subjective civil liability contemplated in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, objective liability is generated for the company or person operating a vehicle when the transportation activity they carry out, legally considered a source of danger or risk, results in damage to some person; this without the need for the activity generating such damages to constitute an offense in the criminal sense.</span> Thus, even when the existence or authorship of a punishable act has not been demonstrated, in scenarios such as the one contemplated in paragraph 5 of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, a declaration of civil liability may exist … In support of this thesis, it is appropriate to cite the vote of the First Chamber #578-F-03, at ten forty-five on September seventeenth, two thousand three, in which it was stated: “Article 187 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas y Terrestres, N° 7331, establishes: ‘The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: ... b) Natural or legal persons who, by any title, operate vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation.’ This provision mandates what legal doctrine has termed strict liability or liability for created risk. Under it, ‘... the element of fault as a criterion of imputation is dispensed with, focusing instead on a conduct or activity of a natural or legal person characterized by the undertaking of a dangerous activity or the mere possession of a dangerous object. The element of imputation for this liability is the risk created, or the risk-creating conduct. Therefore, it is affirmed, the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and unlawfulness ...’ (No. 376, First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, San José, at 14 hours 40 minutes on July 9, 1999) …”, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote No. 383-05 at 8:40 hours on May 13, 2005. Notwithstanding this joint and several nature, in the case of the registered owner, one is not facing a material indivisibility of the litigious matter (in the terms proposed by [Nombre22]), because it does not constitute a necessary joinder of parties, as indicated and required by [Nombre27] for the purpose of applying the extensive effect of appeals. In this regard, it is understood that in cases such as the one at hand, the civil plaintiff (direct victim) could well choose to direct their claim only against the direct author of the negligent conduct causing the damage, or only against the registered owner (third-party civilly liable), without necessarily having to sue both or join them in their action, because—it is reiterated—it is not a case of necessary passive joinder of parties. This is so true that in this proceeding, the two civil co-defendants have acted with independent representation, which is logical if one considers that, in certain situations, the interests of these two procedural subjects could even come to conflict. From this, it follows then, that just as occurs in the present case, the jurisprudence of this Court of Cassation has found no impediment to denying the extensive effect of the cassation appeal regarding the civil matter, as in those cases the scenario analyzed by the doctrine was not present. The Third Chamber has adopted the same solution, also in a case where the substantial indivisibility of the legal issue subject to the proceeding was not at stake: “… Mr. [Nombre28], in his capacity as defender and representative of the accused and civil defendant [Nombre29], within a three-day period requested that the Chamber, based on numeral 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ‘[...] grant—with extensive effect—the benefits derived from the cassation appeal to Engineer [Nombre30] and to Mrs. [Nombre31], who appeared as accused in this case[...]’. He refers to resolution 1058-03 at 10:50 hours on November 21 of the previous year, in which this Chamber granted the cassation appeal filed by the petitioner in association with Mr. [Nombre32], in their capacity as representatives of [Nombre29], civil defendant, for whom they also acted as defenders in the criminal aspect. The appeal challenged the judgment solely regarding the civil aspect and in relation to the exemption from paying the corresponding costs made in favor of the civil plaintiff and complainant, because the judgment did not adequately reason why it was exempted from said obligation. As can be inferred from the foregoing, it firstly concerns a matter alien to the strictly criminal aspect and relates to the civil compensatory action brought by the complainant, as civil plaintiff within the criminal proceeding. Within the criminal case, apart from Mr. [Nombre33], [Nombre30] and [Nombre34] also appeared as accused, who were also civilly sued. Of these three parties, who were, in turn, independently represented—[Nombre35] was represented in his dual capacity as accused and civil defendant by Mr. [Nombre36], and [Nombre37] was represented by Mr. [Nombre38]—only [Nombre33] filed a cassation appeal. While it is true that this Chamber’s resolution does not expressly state that the judgment is annulled regarding the cost exemption only in relation to the appellant, it must be so understood, and for such purposes, the resolution is hereby clarified ex officio in that sense. Even though the error refers to that issue and the exoneration affected all three civil defendants, we are dealing with interests of a strictly patrimonial nature, where the dispositive principle fully applies, such that if the other civil co-defendants did not appeal, it must be understood that they acquiesced to the decision and cannot benefit from the individual action of another co-defendant, as this would gratuitously grant an additional patrimonial benefit to someone who did not request it, at the expense of the party whom the ruling favored without a claim from the interested party. As an initial reason to deny the request, the person promoting it lacks standing because they do not act as a representative of the parties in whose favor they are managing. As indicated, the other civil co-defendants had their own representative and did not file a cassation appeal, and there is no record that a special judicial power of attorney was granted in favor of Mr. [Nombre39] or that they appointed him as their representative, such that he is not legally authorized to act in their name. Despite the above, it is appropriate to note that the extensive effect contemplated in Article 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code is legally structured, as also in supporting doctrine, to benefit the other co-accused in a criminal case, who are affected by the same nature of issue presented with respect to the person who filed the claim. This is so because we are dealing with a matter restrictive of fundamental rights, such as criminal law, so that for these same reasons and by virtue of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legality, and equality, it would be unsustainable in a State of Law to deny other co-accused the benefits derived from the finding of defects or flaws in a judgment, with the argument that they were not claimed in their favor, even though they are in the same situation as the person who exercised the right to challenge. There are, of course, fundamental values at stake that would make inequality intolerable in the face of the reliable verification of a procedural error with such serious consequences for a person's rights. Additionally, it is also provided that the appeal of the civil defendant benefits—by extensive effect—the accused, when it has an impact on criminal liability. As can be seen, the entire philosophy inspiring the extensive effect originates from the constitutional principles and fundamental rights already mentioned and is aimed at protecting the subject upon whom the punitive power of the State has been exercised. The extensive effect is, for these reasons, of an exceptional nature, precisely to the principle of personality and autonomy of the appeal, for in this matter the rule is the non-communicability of the challenge, such that it only proceeds when the law expressly so stipulates. “[...]The law only authorizes the communication of an appeal from one accused in favor of the co-accused [...] and from the civil defendant in favor of the accused [...] In both cases, the situation of the accused is favored to safeguard the interest that the accused asserts in the proceeding, seeking to avoid—as we have seen—the existence of different situations regarding the same procedural object. No other cases of extension can arise, with which the subjective scope of the effect is duly delimited[...]” (Ayán, [Nombre40]. Recursos en materia penal. Principios generales. Marcos Lerner Editora Córdoba. p. 186). The civil defendant within the criminal proceeding enjoys broad possibilities of defense but obviously—in the civil aspect and independent of the identity between accused and civil defendant—their interests are those inherent to the action brought against them—patrimonial—and therefore, entirely disposable. Thus, if the party aggrieved by a resolution adverse to them in this matter does not contest it, it is understood they waived their right to do so or simply acquiesced, without the State being able to exercise a tutelary function over their patrimony, beyond their own diligence, by extending to them benefits recognized to the party who did claim them. Article 428 on which the petitioner relies is not useful to their pretension, and as for the co-defendants [Nombre35] and [Nombre37], the dispositive principle operated and the ruling does not cover them, having acquiesced to the decision by not having been challenged in due course …”, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote No. 218-04, at 10:15 hours on March 12, 2004. In this same vein, this Court of Cassation indicated: “… It must be considered that Article 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code regulates the extensive effect of appeals, mentioning in this regard the extensive effect of an appeal by an accused with respect to another accused in the same circumstances, but it does not refer to an extensive effect of the Public Prosecutor's Office's appeals with respect to the civil plaintiff party. This is important because the independence existing between the criminal action and the civil action must be taken into account …” Vote No. [Telf4] at 09:55 hours on November 27, 2003. Finally, although Article 645 of the Civil Code establishes: "The acts or omissions of any of the joint and several debtors benefit or prejudice their co-debtors in the legal consequences that such acts or omissions may have regarding the debt, without prejudice to the right of indemnification against the debtor who, through fault or fraud, prejudices the others", it must be interpreted that this provision refers not to procedural acts of the joint and several co-debtors (such as, in this case, the filing of a cassation appeal), but rather to substantive acts verified out of court, which does not occur in this case.

POR TANTO:

The third ground of the cassation appeal filed by the defender of the accused and civil co-defendant [Nombre1] is partially granted. By virtue of this, the trial court’s judgment is partially annulled, insofar as it civilly condemned the latter, and with respect to the following aspects: (i). Regarding the determination of the amount corresponding to material damage; (ii). Regarding the very existence of moral damage, and also regarding the economic amount derived therefrom. In all other respects, the challenged judgment remains intact, that is, regarding the existence of material damage, and regarding the criminal liability judgment of the accused as the author of the crime of negligent injury. The judgment also remains unaltered inasmuch as the civil co-defendant [Nombre6] was civilly condemned, in his capacity as a third-party civilly liable (registered owner of the vehicle with which the collision was caused). The case is remanded to the trial court for a new proceeding according to law. Notify.- RONALD SALAZAR MURILLO [Nombre3] [Nombre4] JUECES DE CASACIÓN Marle.

Res: [Telf1] TRIBUNAL DE CASACION PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Goicoechea, a las catorce horas con treinta minutos del veinticuatro de febrero de dos mil seis.

Recurso de casación interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1], mayor, costarricense, con cédula N. CED1, casado, nativo de Guàcimo, Limón, de oficio taxista, por el delito de LESIONES CULPOSAS en perjuicio de [Nombre2]. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los jueces Ronald Salazar Murillo, [Nombre3] y [Nombre4]. Se apersonaron en casación, el defensor particular Lic. [Nombre1] y la defensora del ofendido Licda. [Nombre5].

RESULTANDO:

1. Que mediante sentencia de las doce horas treinta minutos del siete de setiembre de dos mil cinco, el Tribunal de Juicio de la Zona Sur, Sede Golfito, resolvió: POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto artítculos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política 1, 4, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 30, 45, 50, 51, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 71, 75 y 128 del Código Penal; 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, del Código Penal de 1941 aún vigente, 1, 85 siguientes y condordantes de la Ley de Tránsito; 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 37, 40, 45, 111, 113, 116, 119, 141, 142, 363, 364, 365, y 367 del Código Procesal Penal, se DECLARA A [Nombre1] autor y único responsable del delito de LESIONES CULPOSAS, en perjuicio de [Nombre2] y en tal sentido se le impone el tanto de UN MES DE PRISIÓN, pena que deberá descontar en los sitios y formas que determinen los respectivos reglamentos penitenciarios. Firme la sentencia, inscríbase en el Registro Judicial. Se le ordena testimonio de la sentencia ante el Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena y el Instituto Nacional de Criminología. Por cumplir con los requisitos de ley, se le confiere al convicto por un plazo de tres años, el beneficio de Ejecución Condicional de la Pena, plazo en el cual no deberá cometer nuevo delito doloso, sancionado con pena superior a seis meses. Son las costas a su cargo. Mediante lectura notifíquese. EN CUANTO A LA ACCIÓN CIVIL INCOADA POR EL SEÑOR [Nombre2], contra los demandados [Nombre1] Y [Nombre6] en su condición de tercero civil demandado, se acoge la pretensión civil resarcitoria ejercida y se obliga a ambos a cancelar como daño moral la suma de UM MILLÓN DE COLONES Y POR DAÑO MATERIAL LA SUMA DE CINCO MILLONES DOSCIENTOS NOVENTA Y SEIS MIL NOVECIENTOS DIEZ COLONES CON ONCE CÉNTIMOS PARA UN TOTAL DE: SEIS MILLONES DOSCIENTOS NOVENTA Y SEIS MIL NOVECIENTOS DIEZ COLONES CON ONCE CÉNTIMOS. A FAVOR DEL ACTOR CIVIL. Son las costas procesales y personales a cargo de los demandados civiles. Mediante lectura notifíquese. [Nombre7], JUEZ DE JUICIO.

2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento el Lic. [Nombre8] interpuso Recurso de Casación.

3. Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 450 del Código de Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el Recurso.

4. Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el juez [Nombre9]; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- PRIMER MOTIVO (forma): falta de fundamentación. Con cita de los artículos 142, 363, 369, 444 y 445 del Código Procesal Penal, el defensor particular del imputado plantea recurso de casación contra el fallo condenatorio de instancia, donde aduce que a pesar de que el defensor alegó la existencia de una culpa concurrente, debido a que el camión de basura estaba estacionado en el carril que no le correspondía, e invadía parcialmente el carril por el cual conducía el imputado (se pidió el testimonio de piezas contra su conductor); que dicho camión carecía de avisos luminosos o reflectantes; que el mismo estaba estacionado de forma tal que obligaba al ofendido a atravesar casi toda la calle para entregar las bolsas de basura; que la actuación del ofendido también es culposa, pues se lanzó corriendo y atravesó el carril por el cual conducía el encartado, pese a que éste pitó (esto lo oyeron todos los testigos, y el ofendido no es sordo). No obstante lo anterior, el juez no resolvió absolutamente nada al respecto, siendo que -incluso- se solicitó una rebaja en los montos correspondientes al daño moral y material. El motivo debe declararse sin lugar. El planteamiento de quien recurre parte de varias premisas fácticas que no se derivan del fallo de instancia, lo que vendría a deslegitimarlo por completo. En efecto, del contenido de la decisión condenatoria que se objeta se advierte que, contrario a lo que afirma el recurrente, si bien el camión de basura se encontraba estacionado en el carril izquierdo, ello no fue causa ni tampoco influyó en la producción del accidente, a tal punto que aún incluyendo hipotéticamente que su orientación hubiera sido la inversa, es decir, que en vez de tener la parte frontal hacia el oeste, la hubiera tenido hacia el este, el resultado igual se habría dado. A la misma conclusión se llegaría aún asumiendo que, conforme lo afirma el impugnante, dicho camión recolector de basura no hubiera tenido encendidas las luces de advertencia, o no hubiera contado con mecanismos reflectantes. Al respecto no podría perderse de vista que la presencia de ese camión (se encontraba estacionado en el carril por el que viajaba el imputado) no tuvo ninguna incidencia en el atropello del ofendido, quien se encontraba también detenido en el momento del percance, por lo que tampoco es cierto que el mismo haya atravesado corriendo la carretera. De la lectura del fallo se advierte que, una vez evacuada la prueba, se tuvo por demostrado lo siguiente: “… El día veintisiete de octubre del dos mil tres, al ser las cinco y media de la mañana el ofendido [Nombre10], se encontraba en labores propias de su trabajo, concerniente a la recolección de basura … bajándose a tomar la basura del carril contrario donde se parqueo (sic) el camión de la basura … A esa misma hora tratándose de una recta, sin lluvia, buena visibilidad, carretera seca y con escaso tránsito, circulaba el imputado …en su vehículo tipo taxi … quien faltando al deber de cuidado y previsión, observando que se encontraba el camión de la basura parqueado parcialmente en su carril, así como el ofendido cruzando la calzada con unas bolsas de basura hacia el camión, no guardó el debido deber de cuidado, ya que continuó su marcha sin estar seguro de la maniobra que iba a realizar el ofendido, limitándose a sonar el pito del vehículo, cuando pudo haberse detenido o bajar la velocidad significativamente y evitar de esa forma el atropello del ofendido; 3) Que el atropello del ofendido se dio en el carril derecho, sea en el carril en que circulaba el encartado; 4) Que el taxi conducido por el imputado impactó con el costado derecho del bumper delantero, la pierna izquierda del ofendido, mientras éste terminaba de cruzar la calzada; 5) Que al momento del atropello no circulaba ningún vehículo en sentido contrario al imputado y el imputado viajaba a aproximadamente cuarenta kilómetros por hora … 7) Producto del atropello sufrido por el ofendido tuvo las siguientes lesiones … con una incapacidad de 60 días para sus labores habituales …” (cfr. folio 124, línea 20 en adelante). Conforme se colige de lo transcrito, de acuerdo al cuadro fáctico que se tuvo demostrado en juicio se aprecia que el lugar donde ocurrió el accidente es una recta, siendo que el camión recolector de basura no le obstaculizó en ningún momento la visibilidad al imputado, quien desde antes de que se diera el atropello, ya había observado al ofendido en vía (incluso le pitó al menos tres veces), no obstante lo cual no tomó la previsión de disminuir la velocidad a la que circulaba, ello a pesar de que no tenía claro qué iba a hacer aquel, todo lo cual fue debidamente razonado por el juzgador (cfr. folio 130, línea 25 en adelante). Dentro de este contexto es claro que la presencia del camión en el lugar no tuvo ninguna influencia en el resultado, pues el mismo se produjo directamente por la conducta violatoria al deber de cuidado del señor [Nombre11], siendo aquel previsible y evitable, lo que también fue expresa y correctamente razonado en la sentencia (cfr. folio 132, línea 7 en adelante). Con base en lo anterior, se rechaza el motivo en todos sus extremos.

II.- SEGUNDO MOTIVO (forma): Con respecto a los hechos, la sentencia es ilógica. En el segundo motivo de su recurso, con base en la misma normativa que se citó en el precedente, se argumenta que el Tribunal tuvo por demostrado que el imputado conducía a unos 40 kilómetros por hora, y que observó por primera vez al ofendido cuando estaba como a 20 o 30 metros de distancia, por lo que “la conducta” era totalmente previsible y evitable. El defensor argumenta que no comparte este “aspecto”, por cuanto cualquier manual de seguridad vial fija el tiempo de reacción de un conductor en un segundo, durante el cual un vehículo viajando a 40 kilómetros por hora avanza unos once metros, por lo que el espacio de reacción y de frenado es de 16 a 20 metros (dependiendo del estado de las llantas, de los frenos y de la carretera), todo lo cual establece un espacio de parada de 27 a 31 metros. En criterio del defensor, y de acuerdo con esto, aún y cuando el imputado hubiera frenado, siempre se habría producido el accidente. La queja no es de recibo. Los datos a partir de los cuales el recurrente estructura su reclamo, no están acreditados en el fallo, de donde el mismo es infundado. En todo caso, aún asumiendo que los mismos sean correctos, se advierte que el análisis que con base en ellos se expone en el recurso es erróneo, pues deja de lado que, según se tuvo por demostrado en sentencia, el acusado observó con bastante anticipación y distancia al ofendido, a tal punto que previendo una situación peligrosa procedió a tocar el pito de su taxi en varias oportunidades (el mismo encartado dijo que “al menos tres”), lo que permitió al juzgador establecer que aún y cuando no tenía claro qué iba a hacer el ofendido, no disminuyó la velocidad pudiendo haberlo hecho, siendo esta la razón que sustentó la violación al deber de cuidado (cfr. folio 130, línea 25 en adelante). Por otro lado, a título de mayor abundamiento, aprecia este Tribunal de casación que en el croquis levantado por el inspector de tránsito (prueba documental y escrita que puede valorarse en esta sede sin que con ello se vean comprometidos los principios acusatorios que rinden en la fase plenaria del juicio, esto es, la oralidad y la inmediación) no aparecen huellas de frenado, lo que en principio permitiría establecer que el imputado nunca realizó esa acción defensiva. Además, y según lo analizó de modo expreso el juez de mérito, el propio imputado dijo en debate que una vez que accionó la bocina de su vehículo, él pensó que el ofendido se iba a detener, y por ese motivo decidió continuar su paso (cfr. folio 130 ya citado), siendo claro que continuó su marcha sin estar seguro de la maniobra que realizaría la víctima. Este cuadro fáctico es abiertamente incompatible con la tesis que esgrime el recurrente, quien pretende dar a entender que: (i). El imputado observó por primer vez al ofendido cuando el mismo se hallaba a unos 30 metros de distancia; (ii). Tardó un segundo en reaccionar, tiempo durante el cual avanzó 11 metros; (iii). Aplicó los frenos, pero aún así el vehículo avanzó unos 16 a 20 metros más. Es aclaro que esta secuencia no encuentra ningún respaldo ni fundamento en el contenido del fallo, pues las premisas fácticas en las que se apoya fueron descartadas por completo por el Tribunal, según se explicó. Con base en lo anterior, se rechaza el reclamo en todos sus extremos.

III.- TERCER MOTIVO (forma): Falta de fundamentación en cuanto a la acción civil. Con base en lo dispuesto por los artículos 142, 363, 369, 444 y 445 del Código Procesal Penal, el defensor del imputado [Nombre1] (quien también ostenta la condición de co-demandado civil) argumenta que falta motivación en cuanto a la condenatoria civil. Su queja se sustenta en lo siguiente: a) El juez remite textualmente a las pericias, a la petición del actor civil, o al dictamen médico legal. Siendo que se ignora el contenido de tales pruebas documentales, su valoración, y las razones que determinan la fijación de las sumas correspondientes al daño moral y material; b) El juez se aparta del peritaje y fija la suma de ¢1.000.000.ºº por daño moral, desconociéndose el contenido de dicha pericia y su valoración, así como si esa prueba puede demostrar los daños, ya que simplemente sirve para fijar su valor y no “su autoría o incluso su existencia”. Como es obvio, las pericias no prueban los daños moral y material, sino que simplemente los estiman en sumas de dinero, por lo que su existencia debe probarse. Los testigos se refirieron a circunstancias ajenas al daño, esto, la autoría del encartado. Tampoco se demostró si existe o existió incapacidad permanente, sólo la temporal (60 días), ni gastos por tratamientos médicos, que de todos modos fueron cubiertos por el INS; c) Al ignorarse el contenido de los peritajes y su valoración, se ignoran las razones por las cuales se fijaron los montos que el juez indica; d) La sentencia indica que, en principio, le está vedado al juzgador otorgar más de lo que se pide, dando a entender que la petición del actor fue por ¢5.000.000,ºº por daño material. Pese a decirlo, en el por tanto fijó una suma mayor por dicho concepto, sean ¢5.296.910, violándose ese aspecto procesal. La pretensión del impugnante es que se anule la sentencia y se ordene el reenvío en cuanto se declaró con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria y se condenó a los demandados civiles al pago del daño moral y material, en su orden, en ¢1.000.000,ºº y ¢5.000.000,ºº o ¢5.296.910. Pide que se rechace la suma fijada por daño moral por falta de pruebas, y que se reduzca la suma por daño material a ¢206.160,ºº (dos meses de incapacidad para laborar). El último caso solicita que se anule parcialmente la sentencia “en los extremos que se estimen pertinentes” (cfr. folio 142, líneas 24 a 26). Por las razones que se dirán, la queja es atendible. En lo que atañe a la condenatoria civil que se dictó contra los dos demandados (el aquí imputado y también el propietario registral del vehículo, esto es, el señor [Nombre6]), el juez de mérito expuso lo siguiente: “… En el caso enjuiciado quedó de sobra demostrado que el imputado, con su actuar ilícito le causó lesiones al ofendido, ya que debe admitirse la tesis de que el daño moral es de los llamados “in re ipsa”, esto es, que se desprende o deduce necesariamente de los hechos de los que se deriva la responsabilidad, por lo que no debe ser objeto de prueba en especial, sino que compete al juez llevar a cabo la valoración (Juan [Nombre12], Responsabilidad Civil, Curso de Derecho Privado, Volumen 1, pp. 85-110). De igual forma se tiene por demostrado el daño material según las pericias aportadas a los autos, siendo que este juzgador se aparta de la realizada por el señor [Nombre13] por considerarla exhorbitante, así como por ser la petición del actor civil menos a la misma … en su lugar se acoge la segunda pericia aportada a los autos, en cuanto a los daños materiales, por considerar que se ajusta más a la realidad de los hechos, como lo son las lesiones sufridas por el ofendido, el tiempo de incapacidad del mismo y las secuelas producidas, tal y como se desprende del dictamen médico legal valorado en el presente proceso. En cuanto al daño moral el Tribunal se aparta de la misma y se fija en un millón de colones, los demás rubros se acogen en su totalidad …” (cfr. folio 135, línea 15 en adelante). A efectos de emitir el pronunciamiento que corresponde, resolviendo así los alegatos del recurrente, se procederá a analizar primero la cuestión relativa al daño material, para luego entrar a considerar el moral. (1). DAÑO MATERIAL. Con relación a la existencia del daño material o físico, en el extracto de la sentencia antes citado sólo se menciona (sin mayor explicación) que con su actuar ilícito el imputado le produjo “lesiones” (las que no se precisan) al ofendido, ello “según las pericias aportadas a los autos” (las que tampoco se citan en concreto, ni se analizan). No obstante, al valorar y considerar de modo integral la sentencia, que en realidad consiste en una unidad lógico jurídica, este Tribunal de Casación advierte que en el considerando de fondo dedicado a analizar la responsabilidad penal del encartado y la pena a imponer, el juez de instancia sí se ocupó de justificar tal extremo (existencia del daño material para el ofendido), pues refiere: “… Por su parte el dictamen médico legal, se obtienen los elementos de prueba suficientes para tener por demostradas las lesiones sufridas por el ofendido producto de los hechos realizados por el imputado … De igual forma considera este juzgador importante para efectos de imponer la pena al imputado, las lesiones sufridas por el ofendido, mismas que se encuentran descritas en el dictamen médico legal aportado a los autos y que son considerables …” (cfr. folio 133, líneas 21 a 23; y folio 134, línea 21 en adelante). Por su parte, en el apartado de hechos probados se indica que las lesiones que recibió el ofendido fueron las siguientes: “… traumatismo cráneo encefálico con pérdida de conocimiento, herida superficial a nivel parietal derecho, herida superficial en muslo derecho, herida que atraviesa el cartílago del lóbulo de la oreja derecha, excoriación leve en hombre (sic) derecho, fractura conminuta de tercio medio de tibia izquierda, con una incapacidad de sesenta días para sus labores habituales …” (cfr. folio 125, línea 17 en adelante). Nótese entonces cómo el Tribunal tuvo por demostrado que el daño físico o material del ofendido (lesiones) le deparó una incapacidad temporal de 60 días, sin que se mencionara nada en torno a supuestas secuelas o disminución permanente de la capacidad general orgánica. A pesar de ser lacónica y puntual, esta fundamentación es suficiente y permite comprender cuáles fueron entonces las razones a partir de las cuales se acreditó la existencia del daño material que sufrió el ofendido a raíz de estos hechos, y también queda claro hasta dónde llegó el mismo, siendo que en cuanto dicho extremo no se advierte el yerro que denuncia el recurrente. Al respecto no debe perderse de vista que la prueba que cita el juzgador es documental, de tal modo que tomando en cuenta su naturaleza escrita, la determinación de su contenido no depende de la oralidad y la inmediación del debate (artículo 334 del Código Procesal Penal). Así, las conclusiones del dictamen médico que menciona el juzgador son de sobra conocidas por las partes, sin necesidad de que en la sentencia se vuelva a consignar o transcribir el contenido de dicho documento (fundamentación descriptiva). Esto implica, entonces, que en cuanto a la existencia del daño material, no se aprecian los defectos que denuncia el recurrente. En cuanto al monto a indemnizar por dicho concepto, la situación resulta diversa, pues en el fallo no se cumple con una adecuada motivación, sino más bien con un razonamiento confuso, omiso y contradictorio. Al respecto se tiene que de manera directa y expresa, el juzgador señala que “… se acoge la segunda pericia aportada a los autos, en cuanto a los daños materiales, por considerar que se ajusta más a la realidad de los hechos, como lo son las lesiones sufridas por el ofendido, el tiempo de incapacidad del mismo y las secuelas producidas, tal y como se desprende del dictamen médico legal valorado en el presente proceso …”. En este punto el razonamiento del tribunal es omiso y presenta graves defectos que determinan su ilegitimidad, pues no explica en qué sentido o con relación a cuáles aspectos es que “la segunda pericia aportada a los autos”, esto es, la que confeccionó la licenciada [Nombre14] y que aparece agregada a folios 69 a 71 del legajo de acción civil, se ajusta más a la realidad de los hechos, o por qué asegura que dicho estudio pericial se ajusta más a las lesiones, al tiempo de incapacidad y a las secuelas, que sufrió el ofendido, siendo que -conforme se indicó supra- el mismo juzgador sólo tuvo por acreditado que, a raíz de los hechos, se le produjeron al imputado varias lesiones que lo incapacitaron por 60 días, de modo que no se comprende a cuáles se secuelas se hace referencia, y qué elementos probatorios las acreditan. Asimismo, el juez de mérito ni siquiera cita un solo extracto del contenido de dicha pericia, lo que torna aún más oscura y confusa su fundamentación, a tal punto que no se logra comprender de dónde surge el monto de la indemnización que con respecto al daño material acordó. (2).- DAÑO MORAL. En cuanto a este punto, el fallo tampoco cumple con una adecuada motivación, pues -según el extracto que se transcribió- no se explica en qué consistió el mismo, de dónde surgió o cuáles elementos probatorios lo determinan, ni tampoco por qué fue valorado en la suma de ¢1.000.000,ºº. Todos estas graves omisiones determinan la nulidad del fallo en cuanto a los extremos que se indicaron. Así las cosas, se acoge en parte el presente motivo de casación, en virtud de lo cual se anula parcialmente la sentencia de instancia, sólo en cuanto condenó civilmente al imputado y codemandado civil [Nombre1], ello con relación a los siguientes extremos: (i). En cuanto a la fijación del monto correspondiente al daño material; (ii). En cuanto a la existencia misma del daño moral, y también en cuanto al monto económico de ahí derivado. En lo demás, el fallo impugnado permanece incólume, esto es, en cuanto a la existencia del daño material (lesiones del ofendido derivadas de la conducta ilícita del imputado), y en cuanto al juicio de responsabilidad penal del imputado como autor del delito de lesiones culposas. La sentencia también permanece inalterable en cuanto se condenó civilmente al codemandado [Nombre6], en su condición de tercero civilmente responsable (propietario registral del vehículo con el que se causó el atropello), quien ostenta e interviene en este proceso con una representación legal individual e independiente a la de [Nombre11], y no ejerció recurso alguno contra el fallo. Se ordena el reenvío a la oficina de origen para una nueva sustanciación conforme a Derecho.

IV.- ACERCA DEL EFECTO EXTENSIVO DE LOS RECURSOS EN MATERIAL CIVIL. Tal y como se indicó en el anterior considerando, la anulación parcial del fallo y el correspondiente juicio de reenvío que se ordenaron, operan sólo con relación a la condenatoria civil que se dictó contra el codemandado [Nombre1], quien fue el único que impugnó la sentencia de instancia. La situación del otro demandado (Enoc [Nombre15]) resulta diversa, pues al no plantear ninguna impugnación contra el fallo que le condenó a resarcir económicamente al actor, vino a conformarse con tal decisión que le resultaba adversa, lo que impediría que oficiosamente este Tribunal pudiera beneficiarlo con los efectos derivados del recurso de [Nombre11], ello por estar ante la cuestión civil (de naturaleza patrimonial) en la cual rige el principio dispositivo. Esta ha sido la solución por la que en casos precedentes ha optado la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal de Casación: “… En este asunto no se aplica a favor del actor civil [Nombre16]. un efecto extensivo de la anulación de la sentencia en lo correspondiente a la acción civil presentada a favor de [Nombre17]., ya que en materia de recursos de la parte actora civil no se prevé ese efecto extensivo por el Código Procesal Penal (Art. 428 del Código Procesal Penal). Se agrega a ello que la misma legislación procesal civil no permite que funcione un efecto extensivo con respecto al recurso presentado por otro, disponiéndose además en el artículo 608 del Código Procesal Civil, referente al recurso de casación, que la sentencia de casación no puede abrazar otros puntos que no sean los que hubieran sido objeto del recurso. Debe tenerse en cuenta en particular lo que la doctrina procesalista civil ha llamado el principio de personalidad de la impugnación. Al respecto indica [Nombre18]: “En cuanto al principio llamado de personalidad de la apelación, no es sino otra forma particular de las mismas normas generales que ya han sido expuestas. La situación que da motivo a la aplicación de este principio es el siguiente: A y [Nombre19], herederos de C, demandan a D por reparación de un acto ilícito que ha causado la muerte del padre de los actores; la sentencia absuelve a D; A no apela de la sentencia y [Nombre19] lo hace en tiempo y forma; la sentencia de segunda instancia revoca la sentencia de primera instancia y condena a indemnizar a [Nombre19] el daño sufrido ¿Aprovecha a [Nombre20], que ha consentido la sentencia absolutoria, el fallo dictado a favor de [Nombre19]? La doctrina y la jurisprudencia se pronuncian por la negativa: la condena obtenida por [Nombre19] no beneficia a [Nombre20] porque los efectos de la apelación son personales. No existe, como en el derecho romano, beneficio común, sino ventaja unilateral. La solución del carácter real u objetivo de la apelación fue rechazada por [Nombre21] y por los autores del Código francés, al que en esta materia ha seguido el pensamiento posterior sin esfuerzo alguno. No disminuye el prestigio de esta solución la circunstancia de que aparezcan dos cosas juzgadas contradictorias: que mientras para [Nombre19] haya derecho a indemnización, A se ve privado de él. La razón no es tanto de carácter lógico como sistemático. Sus fundamentos se hallan esparcidos a lo largo de todos los principios del derecho procesal civil. En primer término, el principio de que la voluntad crea y extingue derechos. Quien consintió la sentencia de primera instancia es porque la consideraba justa; el agraviado tenía dos caminos: consentir o apelar; si optó por el primero su voluntad lo liga definitivamente a ese consentimiento. Una segunda razón emana del principio mismo de la cosa juzgada. Nada excluye en derecho la posibilidad de dos sentencias contradictorias; las propias evoluciones de la jurisprudencia demuestran que este riesgo es connatural con el concepto de cosa juzgada. Una tercera razón fluye del principio mismo de la apelación. El tribunal superior no tiene más poderes que los que le ha asignado el recurso introducido, nada le autoriza a cambiar la parte de la sentencia que desecha la demanda en lo que se refiere a A si no ha mediado recurso a este respecto. Se reserva, sin embargo, una solución distinta de ésta, en los casos de solidaridad o de indivisibilidad material de la cosa litigiosa, ya que en estos casos la sentencia beneficia o perjudica al deudor solidario o al comunero. Pero esta circunstancia impuesta por la fuerza misma de las cosas, no altera el alcance del principio de personalidad de la apelación” ([Nombre22], [Nombre23], op cit., pp. 369-370). Este ha sido el criterio que ha mantenido en diversos votos el Tribunal de Casación, por ejemplo el 865-2003 del 29 de agosto del 2003, reiterado en otros votos posteriores, por ejemplo el voto 1222-2003 del 27 de noviembre del 2003 …”, Tribunal de Casación Penal, voto Nº [Telf2] de las 11:08 horas del 11 de marzo de 2004. Conforme con lo anterior, debe entenderse que por principio general los efectos del recurso en materia civil son personales, por lo que no existe, como en el derecho romano, un beneficio común u objetivo para todos los sujetos que se hallen en la misma situación procesal del recurrente, sino una ventaja unilateral o de tipo subjetivo. Ello es así debido a que debe interpretarse que quien consintió la sentencia de primera instancia (no recurriéndola a pesar de que tenía toda la facultad de hacerlo) es porque la consideraba justa, siendo que su decisión en tal sentido condiciona por completo al Tribunal de segunda instancia. En este mismo sentido el mismo Tribunal de Casación resolvió lo siguiente: “… Tal motivación es insuficiente, pues en realidad no se explica de manera clara y convincente cuáles son específicamente los motivos por los que cabe estimar que el señor [Nombre24] tuvo razón plausible para litigar, a efecto de eximirlo de las costas. Nótese que el a quo omite describir el contenido concreto de la serie de circunstancias que bien podían no haberse tomado en consideración para el momento de plantear la acción civil en este asunto, que evaluó para fundamentar la absolutoria. Por ese defecto en la fundamentación se debe declarar con lugar este reclamo, disponiendo la anulación parcial de la sentencia y ordenando el reenvío, únicamente en cuanto a la fijación de las costas, entre el querellante [Nombre25] y la querellada [Nombre26]. El resto de la sentencia se mantiene incólume, incluyendo la fijación de costas dispuesta en lo que concierne a los demás querellados, ya que ninguno de ellos impugnó lo resuelto por el juez a quo, en punto a esta cuestión, que por ser de índole esencialmente civil, queda librada a la disposición de las partes, por aplicación del principio dispositivo, conforme al cual «...en aquellos asuntos en los cuales sólo se dilucida un interés privado, los órganos del poder público no deben ir más allá de lo que desean los propios particulares» (COUTURE, [Nombre23]: Fundamentos del derecho procesal civil, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Depalma, 1978, pág. 186) …” Tribunal de Casación Penal, voto Nº [Telf3] de las 11:00 horas del 31 de octubre de 2002. Como se deduce de lo antes transcrito, el tratadista [Nombre22] defiende el principio de personalidad en materia de recursos, para lo cual sostiene que por regla general en material procesal civil rige el principio llamado de personalidad de la apelación, de tal modo que no podría beneficiarse de lo resuelto por el ad-quem aquel sujeto que no impugnó la sentencia del ad-quo. No obstante, y de acuerdo a la cita bibliográfica transcrita, se advierte que dicho autor excepciona el caso de la indivisibilidad material de la cosa litigiosa, al indicar que: “… Se reserva, sin embargo, una solución distinta de ésta, en los casos de solidaridad o de indivisibilidad material de la cosa litigiosa, ya que en estos casos la sentencia beneficia o perjudica al deudor solidario o al comunero. Pero esta circunstancia impuesta por la fuerza misma de las cosas, no altera el alcance del principio de personalidad de la apelación” ([Nombre22], [Nombre23], op cit., pp. 369-370). Es así cómo, por una razón de índole sustancial, se quiebra el principio general de personalidad del recurso, de tal modo que como excepción a la regla debe entenderse que en aquellos supuestos donde resulte inescindible o inseparable la cuestión jurídica objeto del proceso, no podría mantenerse lo resuelto, aún y cuando ello implique que se esté beneficiando al sujeto que no ejerció recurso alguno. Esta posición resulta aún más clara en [Nombre27], quien señala lo siguiente: “… Este principio (efecto extensivo o comunicante de la impugnación), llamado también de la realidad, se opone al de la personalidad del acto impugnativo. El fenómeno se da tanto en el proceso civil, donde, como hemos dicho, la impugnación de un listisconsorcio necesario favorece a los demás, como en el proceso penal … La cuestión se hace más discutible cuando no existe tal norma expresa, concluyendo la doctrina más moderna que cabe admitir dicho efecto extensivo cuando la relación sustancial, objeto del proceso, resulta inescindible, en los casos de pluralidad de titulares de ella que han sido partes en el proceso … parecen de mayor peso los argumentos favorables de los autores citados, en cuanto dice a la propia esencia de las razones de economía procesal y sobre todo al principio esencial de evitar decisiones contradictorias, para lo cual varios institutos crea el proceso (lispendencia, acumulación de acciones y proceso, cosa juzgada, etc.) …” [Nombre27] (Enrique), “LOS RECURSOS JUDICIALES Y DEMÁS MEDIOS impugnativos en Iberoamérica”, ediciones De Palma, Buenos Aires. 1ª edición, 1988. Páginas 58 y 59. De acuerdo con lo anterior, es claro que en casos donde no se presente esa indivisibilidad de la cuestión jurídica objeto del proceso, como ocurre en el presente caso (según se analizará), no resultaría procedente la aplicación del efecto extensivo, pues no se estaría ante la dificultad de caer en decisiones judiciales contradictorias en su esencia. Al respecto debe tomarse en cuenta que, conforme al artículo 187 de la Ley de Tránsito, la responsabilidad civil del propietario registral es de tipo solidario, según así lo ha entendido incluso la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: “… El legislador en los artículos 187 inciso b de la Ley de Tránsito, 106 del Código Penal y 1048 párrafo 5º del Código Civil ha considerado que en la sola conducción de vehículos, y más aun de vehículos de gran tamaño y peso, existe una situación de riesgo. Se prescinde así de un análisis de aspectos subjetivos del conductor del vehículo (dolo o culpa), para la determinación de la responsabilidad civil de la empresa o persona que explota la actividad de transporte, y se genera para ésta última una responsabilidad objetiva, indirecta y solidaria por un hecho ajeno, con el fin de garantizar una mejor tutela en favor de terceros, contra los daños ocasionados por una actividad, considerada, como ya se dijo, en sí misma peligrosa. A diferencia de la responsabilidad civil subjetiva contemplada en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil, la responsabilidad objetiva se genera para la empresa o persona explotadora de un vehículo, cuando la actividad de transporte que desarrolla, considerada legalmente como fuente de peligro o riesgo, se verifica en un daño a alguna persona; esto sin necesidad de que la actividad generadora de esos daños configure un ilícito en sentido penal. De manera que, aun cuando no se haya demostrado la existencia o autoría de un hecho punible, en supuestos como el contemplado en el párrafo 5º del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, puede existir una declaratoria de responsabilidad civil … En apoyo de esta tesis conviene citar el voto de la Sala Primera #578-F-03. de las diez horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del diecisiete de setiembre del dos mil tres, en el cual se indicó: “Establece el artículo 187 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas y Terrestres, N° 7331: “Responderán solidariamente con el conductor: ... b) Las personas físicas o jurídicas que, por cualquier título, exploten vehículos con fines comerciales o industriales, incluyendo el transporte público”. Esta norma preceptúa lo que la doctrina ha denominado responsabilidad objetiva o por riesgo creado. En ella “... se prescinde del elemento culpa como criterio de imputación, enfocándose en una conducta o actividad de un sujeto físico o jurídico, caracterizada por la puesta en marcha de una actividad peligrosa, o la mera tenencia de un objeto de peligro. El elemento de imputación de esa responsabilidad es el riesgo creado, o la conducta creadora de riesgo. Por ello, se afirma, la noción de riesgo sustituye los conceptos de culpa y antijuricidad ...” (N° 376, Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, a las 14 horas 40 minutos del 9 de julio de 1999) …”, Sala 3ª de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto Nº 383-05 de las 8:40 horas del 13 de mayo de 2005. No obstante este carácter solidario, en el caso del propietario registral no se está frente a una indivisibilidad material de la cosa litigiosa (en los términos que propone [Nombre22]), pues no se trata de un litis consorcio necesario, según lo apunta y exige [Nombre27] a efectos de aplicar el efecto extensivo de los recursos. Al respecto se tiene que en casos como el que nos ocupa el actor civil (ofendido directo) bien podría optar por enderezar su demanda sólo contra el autor directo de la conducta culposa generadora del daño, o bien sólo contra el propietario registral (tercero civilmente responsable), sin que necesariamente tenga que accionar contra ambos o integrarlos en su acción, pues -se insiste- no se está frente a un litis consorcio pasivo necesario. Tan cierto es lo anterior que en este proceso los dos codemandados civiles han actuado con una representación independiente, lo que encuentra sentido si se piensa que en determinados supuestos hasta podrían llegar a existir interesas contrapuestos entre ambos sujetos procesales. De ello se tiene, entonces, que tal y como ocurre en la especie, en los casos que se han citado la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal de Casación no han visto impedimento alguno para negar el efecto extensivo del recurso de casación en cuanto a la cuestión civil, pues en dichos asuntos no se estaba frente a la hipótesis que analiza la doctrina. Igual solución ha adoptado la Sala Tercera, también en un caso donde no se estaba viendo comprometida la indivisibilidad sustancial de la cuestión jurídica objeto del proceso: “… El licenciado [Nombre28]., en su condición de defensor y representante del imputado y demandado civil [Nombre29]., dentro del término de tres días solicita a la Sala que, con fundamento en el numeral 428 del Código Procesal Penal “[...]se concedan ‑con carácter extensivo- los beneficios derivados del recurso de casación, al Ingeniero [Nombre30]. y a la señora [Nombre31]., quienes figuraron como imputados en esta causa[...]”. Se refiere a la resolución 1058-03 de las 10:50 horas del 21 de noviembre del año anterior, en la cual esta Sala declaró con lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el gestionante en asocio del licenciado [Nombre32]., en su condición de representantes de [Nombre29]., demandado civil, del que además fungían como defensores en lo penal. El recurso cuestionaba la sentencia únicamente en cuanto al aspecto civil y con relación a la exoneración que del pago de las costas correspondientes, se hizo en favor de la actora civil y querellante, pues la sentencia no razonaba en forma adecuada por qué se eximía de dicha obligación. Como se desprende de lo transcrito, en primer lugar se trata de materia ajena a la penal propiamente y se relaciona con la acción civil resarcitoria instaurada por la querellante, como actora civil dentro del proceso penal. Dentro de la causa penal además del señor [Nombre33]., también figuraron como acusados [Nombre30]. y [Nombre34]., quienes también fueron civilmente demandados. De estas tres partes, que fueron representadas a su vez en forma independiente –[Nombre35]. fue representado, en su doble condición de imputado y demandado civil por el licenciado [Nombre36]. y [Nombre37]. lo fue por el licenciado [Nombre38]. -, solamente recurrió en casación [Nombre33].. Si bien es cierto en la resolución de esta Sala no se dice expresamente que se anula la sentencia en cuanto a la exención de costas únicamente con relación al impugnante, así debe entenderse y para tales efectos de oficio se aclara la resolución en tal sentido, pues pese a que el yerro se refiere a ese tema y la exoneración afectó a los tres demandados civiles, estamos frente a intereses de índole estrictamente patrimonial, donde rige a plenitud el principio dispositivo, de modo tal que si los otros codemandados civiles no recurrieron, debe entenderse que se conformaron con lo resuelto y no pueden beneficiarse de la gestión individual del otro codemandado, pues sería conceder gratuitamente un beneficio patrimonial adicional a quien no lo ha pedido y a cargo de la parte a quien el fallo benefició sin que mediara reclamo del interesado. Como razón inicial para denegar la gestión se tiene que quien la promueve carece de legitimación pues no funge como representante de las partes en cuyo favor gestiona. Según se indicó los otros codemandados civiles tenían su propio representante y no accionaron en casación, sin que conste que se haya otorgado poder especial judicial a favor del licenciado [Nombre39]. o que le hayan nombrado su representante, de manera tal que no está legitimado para accionar en su nombre. Pese a lo dicho, conviene señalar que el efecto extensivo que contempla el artículo 428 del Código Procesal Penal está estructurado legalmente, como también en la doctrina que lo informa, para beneficiar a los otros co imputados en una causa penal, en quienes se da la afectación de la misma naturaleza de la que se presenta con relación a quien ha reclamado. Esto es así porque estamos frente a materia restrictiva de derechos fundamentales como es la penal, de modo que por esas mismas razones y en virtud de los principios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, legalidad e igualdad, sería insostenible en un Estado de Derecho que pudieran negarse a otros coimputados, los beneficios derivados de la constatación de vicios o defectos en una sentencia, con el argumento de que en su favor no fueron reclamados, pese a que se encuentra en la misma situación del que sí ejerció el derecho a impugnar. Hay, por supuesto, valores fundamentales de por medio que harían intolerable la desigualdad frente a la constatación fehaciente de un error procesal con consecuencias tan graves para los derechos de una persona. Adicionalmente, también está previsto que el recurso del demandado civil beneficie –por efecto extensivo- al acusado, cuando incida sobre la responsabilidad penal. Como se ve, toda la filosofía que inspira al efecto extensivo, tiene origen en los principios constitucionales y derechos fundamentales ya señalados y se dirigen a tutelar al sujeto sobre el que se ha ejercido la potestad represiva del Estado. El efecto extensivo es por esas razones, de naturaleza excepcional, precisamente al principio de personalidad y autonomía del recurso, pues en esta materia la regla es la no comunicabilidad de la impugnación, de modo que procede sólo cuando la ley expresamente lo acuerda. “[...]La ley sólo autoriza la comunicación del recurso de un imputado a favor de los coimputados [...] y del demandado civil a favor del imputado [...] En ambos casos, se favorece la situación del imputado en resguardo del interés que éste hace valer en el proceso, procurando evitar –como hemos visto- la existencia de situaciones diversas frente a un mismo objeto procesal. No pueden presentarse otros casos de extensión, con lo cual queda debidamente delimitado el ámbito subjetivo del efecto[...]” (Ayán, [Nombre40]. Recursos en materia penal. Principios generales. Marcos Lerner Editora Córdoba. p.186). El demandado civil dentro del proceso penal goza de amplias posibilidades de defensa pero obviamente ‑en el aspecto civil y con independencia de la identidad entre acusado y demandado civil- sus intereses son de los propios de la acción que en su contra se instaura ‑patrimonial- y por ende, enteramente dispositivos. Por ello, si la parte perjudicada con una resolución que le es adversa en esta materia no reclama, se comprende que renunció a su derecho de hacerlo o simplemente se conformó, sin que pueda el Estado ejercer una función tutelar de su patrimonio, por encima de su propia diligencia, extendiéndole beneficios reconocidos a la parte que sí los reclamó. El articulo 428 en que se apoya el gestionante no es útil a su pretensión y en cuanto a los codemandados [Nombre35]. y [Nombre37]., operó el principio dispositivo y lo resuelto no los cobija, por haberse conformado con la decisión al no haber sido impugnada en su oportunidad …”, Sala 3ª de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto Nº 218-04, de las 10:15 horas del 12 de marzo de 2004. En este mismo sentido indicó este Tribunal de Casación: “… Debe tenerse en cuenta que el artículo 428 del Código Procesal Penal regula el efecto extensivo de los recursos, mencionando al respecto el efecto extensivo del recurso de un imputado con respecto a otro imputado que esté en las mismas circunstancias, pero no hace referencia a un efecto extensivo de los recursos del Ministerio Público con relación a la parte actora civil. Ello es importante ya que debe tenerse en cuenta la independencia que existe entre la acción penal y la civil …” Voto Nº [Telf4] de las 09:55 horas del 27 de noviembre de 2003. Por último, si bien el artículo 645 del Código Civil establece: "Los hechos u omisiones de cualquiera de los deudores solidarios aprovechan o perjudican a sus codeudores en las consecuencias legales que tales hechos o omisiones tengan respecto de la deuda, salvo derecho de indemnización contra el deudor que por culpa o dolo perjudique a los demás", debe interpretarse que esta norma se refiere no a actuaciones procesales de los codeudores solidarios (como sería en este caso la formulación de un recurso de casación), sino más bien a actuaciones sustantivas verificadas extraproceso, lo que no ocurre en la especie.

POR TANTO:

Se acoge en parte el tercer motivo del recurso de casación que formula el defensor del imputado y co-demandado civil [Nombre1]. En virtud de ello se anula parcialmente la sentencia de instancia, en cuanto condenó civilmente a éste, y con relación a los siguientes extremos: (i). En cuanto a la fijación del monto correspondiente al daño material; (ii). En cuanto a la existencia misma del daño moral, y también en cuanto al monto económico de ahí derivado. En lo demás, el fallo impugnado permanece incólume, esto es, en cuanto a la existencia del daño material, y en cuanto al juicio de responsabilidad penal del imputado como autor del delito de lesiones culposas. La sentencia también permanece inalterable en cuanto se condenó civilmente al codemandado civil [Nombre6], en su condición de tercero civilmente responsable (propietario registral del vehículo con el que se causó el atropello). Se ordena el reenvío a la oficina de origen para una nueva sustanciación conforme a Derecho. Notifíquese.- RONALD SALAZAR MURILLO [Nombre3] [Nombre4] JUECES DE CASACIÓN Marle.