Appeals against statute of limitations rejection of indemnity claim against IDA are dismissedAgravios del apelante sobre prescripción de indemnización contra el IDA son rechazados

VOTO Nº 216-F-03 AGRARIAN TRIBUNAL OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. GOICOECHEA, AT FOURTEEN HOURS FORTY-TWO MINUTES ON THE TWENTY-FOURTH OF APRIL OF TWO THOUSAND THREE.- Ordinary Proceeding, processed before the Agrarian Court of Limón, filed by COMPAÑÍA AGROPECUARIA DEL CARIBE S.A., against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, with qualities known in the record. This Tribunal hears the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the ruling of eight o'clock on the sixth of May of two thousand two.- Drafted by Superior Judge ULATE CHACÓN; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.The Tribunal shares what is set forth regarding the facts deemed accredited by the lower court, numbered 1 through 3, as they are relevant for resolving the preliminary defenses invoked by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. Facts No. 4 and 5 are not shared, as they are not facts but rather considerations or legal conclusions of the lower court that should be contained in the substantive reasoning. Fact 6 is adopted solely as to the fact itself, up to the expression “…the administrative remedy was deemed exhausted.”, because the rest of it, when it states “…said institution disregarding the scope of Article 94 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización and Constitutional Case Law”, is a value judgment by the lower court, which must be contained in the substantive reasoning. Furthermore, for the purposes of resolving at this instance, the following is deemed accredited: 7). That the plaintiff's representative, when filing the complaint for Usurpation and damages on October 15, 1987, relied on the “tacit administrative consent (silencio administrativo)” of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (See certification on folios 286-295); 8) That the appeal for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff's attorney-in-fact on December 13, 1988, against the IDA's ruling of 8:30 a.m. on October 18, 1988, which declared the existence of a conflict of precarious land occupation (ocupación precaria de tierras), was resolved by the administrative ruling of the Junta Directiva at 5:20 p.m. on October 14, 1992. In said ruling, it was agreed to grant the appeal for reversal and reconsideration, given that the aforementioned declaration was issued outside the legal deadline provided for in Article 94 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. Additionally, it resolved: “…With regard to the overlap, it is not appropriate to settle it within these proceedings, since this avenue is specifically to determine whether or not a conflict of precarious land possession exists; consequently, the ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY IS EXHAUSTED in proceedings numbered one thousand four hundred one, in which Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima and [Name1] and others appear as parties as occupants” (See certified ruling on folios 327 to 329). 9) The aforementioned ruling that deemed the administrative remedy exhausted was notified to Mr. Julio Calleja Tamayo, then representative of Agropecuaria del Caribe S.A., on January 6, 1993 (See notification on folio 329). 10) That after said final administrative act, the representative of the aforementioned Company continued, through the new Attorney-in-Fact Ana Isabel Brenes Castro, to carry out steps before the Institute, through purchase offers for the aforementioned property, for which the Institute proceeded to conduct various appraisals, without this committing the Entity to the acquisition of the properties, according to what the purchase option document indicated (See documents from folio 61 to 64). 11) That on September 23, 1997, Mrs. [Name2], as Attorney-in-Fact for Agropecuaria del Caribe S.A., filed an administrative claim with the Presidency of the Republic, expressly stating that the Institute deemed the administrative remedy exhausted in its ruling of October 14, 1992, and claims that, upon failing to reach an administrative solution to the matter, she has suffered damages and lost profits (daños y perjuicios) for not having been able to recover the farm, expressly requesting the recognition of her property right and indemnification for it according to the market price (See certification on folios 94 to 97). 12) Based on said request, the Executive President of the IDA, through official letter of October 23, 1997, ordered the Legal Department to address the claim filed by the plaintiff. In his legal report of March 5, 1988, Lic. Carlos García Anchía recommends deeming the administrative procedure exhausted so that Agropecuaria del Caribe S.A. may settle its claims through judicial channels, or else the conflict be resolved through an extrajudicial settlement (See legal report on folios 84-86). 13) The Junta Directiva of the IDA, in Agreement No. XXIV of Session 035-98 of May 4, 1998, agreed to “Deem the administrative remedy exhausted for Mrs. [Name3] in her capacity as Attorney-in-Fact for Compañía Agropecuaria del Caribe S.A., so that she may resort to judicial channels in defense of her rights.” (see certification on folio 22). 14) The plaintiff was deemed notified of said Agreement, and in a brief filed on August 13, 1998, she filed an Appeal for Reconsideration and Reversal, insisting on reaching an extrajudicial settlement (See appeal on folios 24-26). 15) That the aforementioned appeal was rejected by agreement No. XIX of session No. 071-99 of October 6, 1999 (See certification of Agreement on folio 1). 16) The present ordinary agrarian lawsuit, through which an indemnification for administrative liability is claimed, was filed with the judicial courts on June 15, 2000 (See receipt on folio 423).

II.The lower court, in the appealed ruling of May 6, 2001, when resolving the preliminary defenses of necessary passive joinder of parties (litisconsorcio pasivo necesario) and statute of limitations (prescripción), rejected the former and granted the statute of limitations defense, based on the provisions of the Ley General de Administración Pública. It declared the action barred by the statute of limitations as of November 28, 1993, for which it counted one year from when the tacit administrative consent of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario occurred by failing to resolve the conflict of precarious land occupation. It based its decision on Constitutional Case Law and Articles 127 and 37.2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.

III.The appellant company alleges that the lower court did not study the entire administrative file through which an attempt has been made to resolve the conflict of precarious occupation. It accuses the ruling of lacking reasoning and failing to assess the evidence, because, on the one hand, it does not analyze the entirety of the evidentiary element and, on the other hand, it does not clearly explain which statute of limitations rules it applies, nor from when the statute of limitations period begins to run. It points out as an error “of form” that the lower court proceeds to assess the evidence from the plaintiff's appearance in the administrative process, without considering the date on which the conflict of precarious occupation was declared; it also accuses the lower court of not following the recommendations made by the tribunal and rather disregarding what was stated, especially with regard to the interruption of the statute of limitations. It accuses a violation of Article 155 of the Código Procesal Civil for failing to meet the requirements for a judgment. It claims that the action prescribes, as the lower court states, but that what is subject to the statute of limitations is the right, thus a major error of terminological confusion occurs. It states that the lower court relies on a Report from the IDA's Legal Department, which it ultimately neither cites nor considers, since had it done so, the ruling would be different. Furthermore, it points out that the lower court should have justified further why it rejected the defense of necessary passive joinder of parties. Moreover, it argues various substantive errors, starting with the list of dates, whose analysis is incorrect, as it failed to analyze other proven facts, such as the date of the declaration of the conflict of precarious occupation and the appeal for reconsideration, which was resolved affirmatively. Additionally, it points out that the Constitutional Case Law cited by the lower court, rather than harming it, favors it. It argues that the unjustified delay on the part of the administration cannot prejudice the private party, since to the extent the administration fails to comply, a violation of its rights occurs. It states that the statute of limitations period should be counted from January 6, 1993, when the IDA's ruling that resolved the appeal for reversal and reconsideration was notified, and therefore the matter could not have become time-barred on November 29, 1993, as the lower court indicates. Furthermore, it states that after January 6, 1993, procedural activity within the administrative venue continued uninterrupted until 1998. It points out that the plaintiff submitted a purchase offer and option to purchase for those farms, for which the IDA requested the corresponding appraisal that appears on folio 62 of the administrative file, dated June 26, 1996. This was followed by three reports from the Legal Department, including one dated March 5, 1998, regarding the “RECLAMO AGROPECUARIA DEL CARIBE S.A.”, and that this favors its claims, as there is an express acknowledgment by the Institute. It adds that there are contradictions in the lower court's judgment regarding the proven facts and regarding the moment at which the administrative remedy was deemed exhausted. Finally, it claims that the IDA, by acknowledging the plaintiff's right to be indemnified, is practically expressly waiving any statute of limitations that could run in its favor, but furthermore, there was a constant interruption of the statute of limitations as the administrative procedure continued. It contends that the lower court's attitude “conspires” with the Administration to reward the dispossession of the land that belonged to the plaintiff” and that it does not act as an Agrarian Judge, an attitude more befitting a contentious-administrative judge than an agrarian specialist. Finally, it adds the need for a legal opinion to deem the administrative remedy exhausted, in accordance with subsection 1) of Article 356 of the Ley General de Administración Pública. For the foregoing reasons, it requests the ruling be revoked and it be declared that the action and the right have never been subject to the statute of limitations.

IV.Regarding the general regime of the statute of limitations (prescripción), our case law has indicated the purposes for which this institution was established, especially to avoid situations of legal uncertainty or insecurity: “…The dominant position, at present, attributes the foundation of the statute of limitations to the need to create a state of legal certainty in the face of an objective situation of uncertainty produced by the failure to exercise a right in a timely manner. It can be affirmed, therefore, that the value protected by law in these cases is legal certainty, for which reason the surprising exercise of a right is sought to be avoided. In any case, the statute of limitations emerges as a means to create certainty, which promotes order and social tranquility. However, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which the statute of limitations may serve, in a certain way, to protect injustices and prevent the exercise of rights that truly existed. In this regard, it should be noted that law, as a vehicle for the realization of justice, must necessarily operate within a framework of certainty and security. Failing this, the aforementioned ultimate goal would be frustrated in its practical or functional dimension. Justice cannot operate in the midst of situations of uncertainty and instability. That is why certainty inevitably stands, along with justice, as an essential value of law. Neither of the two, as an end of law, is absolute in legal practice. At some point, one of them, for the sake of the other's survival, must give way. This is what happens in the case of the statute of limitations when, in favor of certainty, justice gives way. Were it not so, justice, as an essential end of law, would be endangered by the enthronement of uncertainty and disorder in the social environment, factors that make it unattainable. Such a phenomenon does not mean ignoring justice, but rather the legislator setting a deadline within which its protection finds a place; but, once this has elapsed, and in deference to certainty, it yields to the need to avoid lawsuits and controversies raised untimely, and therefore difficult to resolve, whose potential impact would maintain an unnerving feeling of uncertainty in human relations (See, among others, Sala Primera de Casación, No. 120 of 3:00 p.m. on July 29, 1992, Considering IV and No. 119 of 2:30 p.m. on October 20, 1995, Considering VI).

V.In the public law realm, the statute of limitations regime has been much stricter, departing from the general rules, especially regarding deadlines, of civil law. Both administrative law and public-sector agrarian law have designed different rules on the statute of limitations. Indeed, the Ley General de la Administración Pública, establishes in its Article 196, that “The right to claim indemnification from the Administration shall be subject to a statute of limitations of four years, counted from the act that gives rise to the liability…” (pursuant to the amendment introduced by Ley No. 7611 of July 12, 1996, since previously it was 3 years). Now, this regime is equally applicable to public agrarian entities, as has been established by this Agrarian Tribunal (See decision of 3:10 p.m. on August 29, 1995, regarding the Centros Agrícolas Cantonales) and confirmed repeatedly by the Case Law of Sala I de Casación. In particular, referring to the Centros Agrícolas Cantonales, the Sala de Casación stated: “…In such a situation, regarding the statute of limitations, a specific regulation must be applied, the one regulated in the Ley General de Administración Pública. The ordinary civil statute of limitations is not applicable to this case because a public entity is involved. The rules of the Ley General de la Administración Pública contain shorter statute of limitations periods for both non-contractual and contractual matters. Thus, if the lawsuit was filed on August 14, 1991, and the sublease contract was rescinded in March 1987, by the date the action was filed, the right claimed, which was extinguished in just three years, had already lapsed (Sala I de Casación No. 132 of 2:25 p.m. on December 20, 1996; see, for greater abundance, decisions No. 56 of 3:00 p.m. on July 4, 1997). In another case, very similar to the one at hand, Sala I stated: “I.-The appellant, as owner of several farms in the province of Limón, seeks recognition of the right to be indemnified for their value, as well as payment for the damages and lost profits caused, as a consequence of said properties having been included in the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Barra del Colorado. This act implies for the owners, as the appellant claims, a de facto expropriation…Indeed, the administrative proceeding requesting indemnification was filed 3 years, 1 month, and 16 days after the publication of the Decree; the exhaustion of the administrative remedy occurred 3 years, 3 months, and 20 days after the Decree; and the lawsuit was filed 3 months and 27 days after requesting the exhaustion of the administrative remedy. It is clear, from the chronological analysis carried out, that the appellant pursued action before the Public Administration more than three years after the publication of the Decreto Ejecutivo…” (Sala I de Casación, No. 26 of 11:15 a.m. on May 13, 1994).

VI.In the present case, we are faced with a lawsuit, among other claims, for patrimonial liability against the State, specifically against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, which is an “...autonomous institution of public law, with legal personality, its own patrimony, and administrative independence...” (Art. 1 of its Ley de Creación), and has as one of its main functions the capacity to purchase land and distribute it in order to promote the agrarian development of the country (Arts. 2 and 3 of the Ley de Creación del IDA). As one of its priorities, the Law establishes the following: “The Institute shall, with priority, seek the resolution of problems resulting from the occupation of national reserves and the precarious occupation (ocupación en precario) of privately owned lands. The Institute is empowered, when appropriate, to redistribute and reorganize the areas that were the subject of the conflict, after its conclusion.” In this sense, the Institute has the duty to intervene in conflicts of precarious land occupation and to seek to provide a solution within the terms established by the same Law, to give legal certainty to the parties involved in the conflict. In that regard, the same Ley de Tierras y Colonización, in Chapter IV, referring to the “Regulation of conflicts between owners and precarious possessors,” provides for those mechanisms and the deadlines to implement them. Such mechanisms may be voluntary, through the direct purchase of land, or compulsory, through the expropriation and payment to the private parties for their properties. All of this is regulated in Article 94 of the Law, which establishes: “ARTÍCULO 94.- The resolution of conflicts arising from the precarious possession (posesión precaria) of land shall fundamentally be sought through direct sale-and-purchase agreements between the owner and the occupants, with the intervention of the Institute, and in the manner indicated in the following articles. Prior to the filing of any judicial action in which a problem of precarious land possession may be involved, the owners must submit their claim to the Institute, in accordance with the procedures mentioned in this Chapter. Once three months have elapsed from the receipt of the respective request without the Institute having declared the existence of a land possession conflict, or one year from said declaration without the conflict having been resolved, the administrative procedure shall be deemed exhausted, and the claimants may resort to the Courts. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any of the interested parties may request the Judge or Alcalde of the jurisdiction where the farm is located to carry out a judicial ocular inspection, with notice to the parties, to verify any facts or signs that may change or disappear over time. While the matter is before the Institute, the statute of limitations period shall not run for any of the parties. Once the conflict is resolved by the Institute with the owner's agreement or expropriation is ordered by the Poder Ejecutivo, the owner shall lack any judicial action, whether civil or criminal, against the possessors in their capacity as such. Otherwise, the occupants shall be subject to the ordinary legal penalties that may be applicable.

Briefs submitted by the parties before the Institute, in proceedings for the resolution of conflicts of precarious land possession and other matters related to agrarian issues, shall be exempt from authentication and the use of fiscal stamps.” (The underlining is ours). From the foregoing provision, we can extract the following elements relevant to the decision of this matter: 1) Prior to filing any judicial action, owners of farms with precarious possession problems must exhaust the agrarian administrative procedure provided for in the Ley de Tierras; 2) The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario has three months to declare, or not, the existence of the conflict; 3) Upon the declaration of the conflict, the Institute has one more year to intervene seeking a peaceful resolution, either through the direct purchase of the property or through expropriation. Consequently, there are two ways to exhaust the administrative remedy: the first operates through the tacit administrative consent of the Institute; the second operates one year after the existence of the conflict is declared, as this is the deadline that the agrarian legislator granted the Entity to attempt to resolve the aforementioned conflict. In this latter case, evidently, the legislator's purpose was to leave the “judicial avenue open,” that is, to give the owner or the possessors the opportunity to debate the defense of their rights through judicial channels. Likewise, the interpretation of the norm leads to the conclusion that any owner who feels disturbed, threatened, or harmed by the administrative action of the Institute, upon not reaching any administrative solution (through sale-purchase or expropriation), within the year, could resort to the corresponding judicial avenue to claim an indemnification against the State itself.

VII.From another perspective, it could happen that both the owner and the precarious occupants themselves, after that year has elapsed, decide to voluntarily submit to an administrative process, with a view to avoiding judicial channels. But that wait is entirely voluntary, because if the owner considers, as in this case, the possibility of selling the property or being indemnified by the Institute, they run the risk that, in the end, their patrimonial interest may not be satisfied. The State is not obliged, under the cited legal provisions, to provide a patrimonial solution to the owner, nor is it the only avenue available to the owner to claim their property right. On the contrary, every owner, once the year from the declaration has elapsed, has the judicial avenue open to pursue the corresponding ordinary and patrimonial actions in defense of their ownership rights. But if the owners let the deadline pass, subject to the hope that “someday” the Institute might pay them for the property, they would be incurring a situation of legal insecurity, of legal uncertainty, which could cause, over time, the loss of their right to claim an indemnification against the State. Therefore, the agrarian legislator, when regulating how to reach a resolution of the conflict, sets very specific, and generally very short, deadlines so that the Administration can act promptly in seeking a peaceful resolution to the land conflict. In this sense, the interpretation of the paragraph in Article 94 of the Ley de Tierras that establishes, “While the matter is before the Institute, the statute of limitations period shall not run for any of the parties,” must be restrictive, as it is presumed that the Institute must seek a resolution to the conflict within the year and, if it does not do so, the administrative remedy is deemed exhausted, and therefore the statute of limitations periods begin to run again. It is not, consequently, an act interrupting the statute of limitations, but rather a temporary suspension, of one year, during which the statute of limitations period does not run. This is also confirmed by the reading of the TRANSITORIO of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which provides as follows: “…At the request of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, the Courts, in a reasoned ruling, may suspend the proceedings established against any person who has been declared a precarious possessor of land by said agency. Said suspension may be decreed at any phase or stage of the trial in question, and for such time as is prudently necessary for the Institute to achieve a satisfactory resolution of the conflict, and may be extended, following the same indicated procedure. Once the conflict is resolved in the manner indicated in the third paragraph of Article 94, the Institute shall notify the Courts so that they may declare the civil actions lapsed and extinguish both the criminal actions and the penalties that may have been imposed against the precarious possessors, in their capacity as such. Otherwise, the owners may resort again to the ordinary Courts, for which no term shall run against them during the suspension of the proceedings…” From this norm, two important conclusions are also drawn, in relation to the provisions of Article 94: First, that after the administrative remedy is deemed exhausted under the conditions established by Article 94, the owners have the right to resort to judicial channels. Second, if the Institute continues to intervene in the resolution of the conflict, after the year has elapsed or the 3 months causing the tacit administrative consent have passed, by submission of the interested parties involved, the Institute may request the suspension of the judicial process, a period during which the statute of limitations time limit would not run; conversely, if the claim was not filed in the judicial venue, the statute of limitations period continues to run, since in such a case the Institute cannot request the Courts to suspend the process.

As can be concluded from the foregoing, we are faced with a special regime (of the Agrarian Public Sector), applicable to both public and private subjects, where the deadlines and methods for exhausting the administrative remedy are regulated, as well as the causes for interruption or suspension of the potential statute of limitations to which the rights of the parties may be subject, and this special regime must be applied to the case at hand.

VIII.In the present case, although some of the appellant's objections to the lower court's interlocutory judgment-sentence are valid, since the evidence was indeed not properly assessed, nor were clear criteria established to determine the period in which the statute of limitations term began to run, this cannot, in any way, be grounds for nullity, as these are aspects perfectly correctable at this instance, as has indeed been done, with the Tribunal proceeding to reconstruct the list of proven facts, according to what appears in the file. On the other hand, it is evident that the case requires a deep study of “public” agrarian regulations, and their application both before the Administration, in this case before the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and with respect to private subjects, such as the plaintiff Company, without this meaning that the analysis is typical of an “administrative law specialist” and not an “agrarian specialist,” as the specific case demands a comprehensive understanding of the norms of both public law and private agrarian law.

IX.In the case at bar, it is evident that the statute of limitations has operated in favor of the Public Administration and, particularly, in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. The plaintiff Company, since 1986, submitted the land conflict to the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario for its cognizance. On October 15, 1987, the plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for usurpation and damages, relying on the tacit administrative consent of the Institution. On October 18, 1988, when the three months of tacit administrative consent had amply elapsed (an opportunity at which the judicial avenue was already open in favor of the owners), the Institute declared the existence of the conflict of precarious land occupation. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested reconsideration and reversal, and such request was addressed until October 14, 1992, when the same Institute revoked the declaration, considering that the resolution had been untimely, and in this second ruling, it indicated “the ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY IS EXHAUSTED in proceedings numbered one thousand four hundred one, in which Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima and [Name1] appear as parties” (see folios 327-329). Said ruling was notified to the Representative of Agropecuaria del Caribe on January 6, 1993 (notification on folio 329). That was the administrative act that exhausted the applicable remedy for the conflict of precarious land occupation. According to the doctrine, “The act that exhausts the administrative remedy (acto que agota la vía administrativa) or that 'creates a final state' (causa estado) is the one that closes the administrative procedure, having been issued by the highest competent authority –the hierarch–, once the remedies established in the rules governing the administrative instance have been exhausted.” (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Diké, 2002, p. 303). Therefore, from the moment this procedural prerequisite is configured, the plaintiff company had the jurisdictional avenue open to file any claim against the State. It was a final act that was not annulled, revoked, or modified, leaving the judicial avenue fully available for its challenge. The plaintiff Company was aware of the facts that gave rise to the State's liability since 1986 and, having exhausted the administrative procedure in 1993, did not resort to judicial channels. On the contrary, the claimant Company, as it admits in its own appeal, continued to pursue action before the Institute for payment for the property, but this time no longer through the avenue of the conflict of precarious occupation, but rather by offering its properties for sale to the Administration (see documents on folios 61 to 64).

X.In the case at hand, it is evident that if the statute of limitations (prescripción) period began to run from the date on which the administrative remedy was deemed exhausted, a circumstance notified to the party on 6 January 1993, and the four years were completed on 6 January 1997, the subsequent administrative claim before the Presidency of the Republic could not have the virtue of “interrupting” that fatal term which had already been fulfilled. The plaintiff Company, instead of resorting to the judicial route in pursuit of its rights, continued to wait for an administrative solution, thereby generating a situation of legal uncertainty and insecurity both for the Institute and for the owner itself. In this way, more than 4 YEARS elapsed, from January 1993 until September 1997. On 13 August 1998, the Institute decided to refer the plaintiff Company to the judicial route. But by that date, as indicated, the fatal statute of limitations term set forth in Article 196 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) had already more than elapsed. Even following the plaintiff’s line of reasoning, in the sense that the applicable statute of limitations rule was that of the Civil Code, that is, 10 years, one could conclude that if the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario became aware of the conflict in 1986, a fact giving rise to possible liability also known to the plaintiff, and did not issue a ruling within three months, from that date the plaintiff Company had the possibility open to file any claim against the State through the judicial route, but by failing to do so, the decennial statute of limitations period was completed in 1997. It is therefore inconceivable that, for so many years, the plaintiff Company in this proceeding allowed so much time to elapse before filing its claim through the judicial route. Its own negligence makes it deserving of that sanction.

XI.For the reasons stated, the appellant's grievances must be rejected. The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario at no time waived the statute of limitations; on the contrary, it expressly invoked it as a defense when answering the present ordinary lawsuit. Nor can it be considered that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario's reports derived from its last administrative claim favor its claims or nullify the statute of limitations period, because, as has been stated, it had already more than elapsed when the claim for compensation was filed in both the administrative and judicial venues. Finally, regarding the application of Article 356, subsection 1 of the General Public Administration Law, it must be indicated that this rule is not applicable in these cases, since the Law itself excluded the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) from its application regarding administrative procedures (see Article 367.2 General Public Administration Law, Decree number 8979-P of 18 December 1978); consequently, if the Land and Colonization Law establishes the ways in which the administrative remedy is deemed exhausted, the legal opinion could not be demanded, as the appellant intends. Even so, in both cases where the Institute deemed the administrative remedy exhausted (1993 and 1998), the Legal Department was always heard, but with the particularity that in the second case (1998), the statutory limitation period favorable to the administration had already elapsed.-

XII. For the reasons stated in this instance, the appealed ruling-sentence is affirmed

THEREFORE:

The appealed ruling-sentence is affirmed.

[Nombre4] [Nombre5] [Nombre6] CBM ORDINARIO ACT:// COMPAÑÍA AGROPECUARIA DEL CARIBE S.A DEM:// I.D.A Otherwise the occupants will be exposed to the ordinary legal sanctions that may apply.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial">The documents submitted by the parties to the Institute, in proceedings for the resolution of conflicts regarding precarious possession of lands (posesión precaria de tierras) and other matters related to agrarian issues, shall be exempt from authentication and from the use of fiscal stamps.” (Our underlining). From the foregoing provision, we can extract the following elements relevant to the decision in this matter: 1) Prior to initiating any judicial action, the owners of properties with problems of precarious possession must exhaust the agrarian administrative procedure contemplated in the Land Law (Ley de Tierras); 2) The Institute of Agrarian Development has three months to declare, or not, the existence of the conflict; 3) Upon the declaration of the conflict, the Institute has one more year to intervene seeking a peaceful solution to it, either through the direct purchase of the property, or through expropriation. There are, consequently, two ways to exhaust the administrative channel: the first operates by the administrative silence of the Institute; the second operates one year after the existence of the conflict has been declared, as this is the term that the agrarian legislator granted to the Entity to try to resolve the said conflict. In this latter case, evidently, the purpose of the legislator was to leave “open the judicial channel”, that is, to give the owner or the possessors the opportunity to debate the defense of their rights in the judicial channel. Likewise, the interpretation of the norm leads to the conclusion that any owner who feels disturbed, threatened, or harmed by the administrative action of the Institute, having not reached any administrative solution (through purchase-sale or expropriation), within the year, could resort to the corresponding judicial channel to claim compensation against the State itself.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">VII.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> From another perspective, it could occur that both the owner and the precarious occupants themselves, after that year has elapsed, decide to voluntarily submit to an administrative process, with a view to avoiding the judicial channel. But that wait is entirely voluntary, because if the owner thinks, as in this case, of the possibility of selling the property or being compensated by the Institute, there is a risk that, in the end, their patrimonial interest will not be satisfied. The State is not obligated, according to the cited legal provisions, to provide a patrimonial solution to the owner, nor is it the only channel the owner has to claim their right of property. On the contrary, every owner, once the year from the declaration has elapsed, has open the judicial channel to undertake the corresponding ordinary and patrimonial actions in defense of the attributes of ownership (atributos dominicales). But if the owners let the term expire, subjected to the hope that “someday” the Institute may pay them for the property, they would be incurring a situation of legal insecurity, of legal uncertainty, which could cause, with the passage of time, the loss of their right to claim compensation against the State. For this reason, the agrarian legislator, when regulating the way to reach a solution to the conflict, sets very specific deadlines, and generally very short ones, so that the Administration can act promptly in the search for a peaceful exit to the land conflict. In that sense, the interpretation of the paragraph of Article 94 of the Land Law that establishes “While the matter is before the Institute, the statute of limitations period shall not run for any of the parties”, must be restrictive, because it is assumed that the Institute must seek a solution to the conflict within the year and, if it does not do so, the administrative channel is exhausted, and therefore the statute of limitation periods begin to run again. It is not, consequently, an act that interrupts the statute of limitations, but rather a temporary suspension, of one year, during which the statute of limitations period does not run. This is also confirmed by the reading of the TRANSITIONAL PROVISION of the Land and Colonization Law which provides the following: “…At the request of the Institute of Agrarian Development, the Courts, in a considered resolution, may suspend the proceedings established against any person who has been declared by the cited body to be a precarious possessor of lands. Said suspension may be decreed at any phase or stage of the respective lawsuit, and for the time prudentially necessary for the Institute to achieve a satisfactory solution to the conflict, and may be extended, following the same indicated procedure. Once the conflict is resolved in the manner indicated in the third paragraph of Article 94, the Institute shall bring it to the knowledge of the Courts so that these may declare the civil actions lapsed and extinguished, both the criminal actions and the penalties that may have been issued against the precarious possessors, in their capacity as such. Otherwise, the owners may again address the ordinary Courts for which no term whatsoever shall run against them during the suspension of the proceedings…” From this norm, two important conclusions are also extracted, in relation to the provisions of Article 94: First, that after the administrative channel is deemed exhausted under the conditions established by Article 94, the owners have the right to resort to the judicial channel. Second, if the Institute continues intervening in the resolution of the conflict, after the year has elapsed or after the 3 months causing the administrative silence have passed, by submission of the interested parties therein, it may request the suspension of the judicial process, a term during which the statute of limitations period would not run; conversely, if the claim was not filed in the judicial venue, the statute of limitations period continues to run, because in such a case the Institute cannot request the Courts to suspend the process.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial">As can be concluded from the above, we are facing a special regime (of the agrarian Public Sector), applicable to both public and private subjects, where the deadlines and modes for exhausting the administrative channel are regulated, as well as the causes for interruption or suspension of the eventual statute of limitations to which the rights of the parties may be subject, this special regime having to be applied to the case at hand.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">VIII.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In the present case, although some objections of the appellant against the mixed judgment-sentence of the lower instance are admissible, because indeed the evidence was not adequately assessed, nor were clear criteria established to determine the period in which the statute of limitations term began to run, this cannot be, in any way, grounds for nullity, as these are aspects perfectly correctable in this instance, as has effectively been done, when the Court proceeded to reconstruct the account of proven facts, according to what is on record in the case file. On the other hand, it is evident that the case requires a deep study of the agrarian “publicist” regulations, and their application both against the Administration, in this case against the Institute of Agrarian Development, and with respect to private subjects such as the plaintiff Company, without this meaning that the analysis is specific to an “administrativist”, and not an “agrarist”, because the specific case requires a global understanding of the norms of both public law and private agrarian law.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">IX.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In the case at hand, it is evident that the statute of limitations has operated in favor of the Public Administration and, particularly, in favor of the Institute of Agrarian Development. The plaintiff Company, since 1986, submitted the land conflict to the knowledge of the Institute of Agrarian Development. On October 15, 1987, the plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for usurpation and damages, relying on the administrative silence of the Institution. On October 18, 1988, when the three months of administrative silence had amply elapsed (an opportunity in which the judicial channel was already open in favor of the owners), the Institute declared the existence of the conflict of precarious occupation of lands. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested a reconsideration and reversal, and such request was addressed until October 14, 1992, when the same Institute revoked the declaration, considering that the resolution had been untimely, and in this second resolution indicated “the ADMINISTRATIVE CHANNEL IS EXHAUSTED for the proceedings numbered one thousand four hundred one, in which Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima and [Name1] intervene as parties (see folios 327-329). Said resolution was notified to the Representative of Agropecuaria del Caribe on January 6, 1993 (notification at folio 329). That was the administrative act that exhausted the channel corresponding to the conflict of precarious occupation of lands. According to the doctrine: “The act that exhausts the administrative channel or that ‘causes state’ is the one that closes the administrative procedure, having been issued by the highest competent authority –the hierarch–, once the remedies established in the norms governing the administrative instance have been exhausted.” (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Diké, 2002, pág. 303). Therefore, from the moment that this procedural precondition is configured, the plaintiff Company had the jurisdictional channel open to file any claim against the State. It was a final act that was not annulled, revoked, or modified, leaving the judicial channel clear for its challenge. The plaintiff Company had knowledge of the facts that motivated the State's responsibility since 1986 and, having exhausted the administrative procedure in 1993, did not resort to the judicial channel. On the contrary, the claiming Company, as it admits in its own appeal, continued to process the payment of the property before the Institute, but this time no longer through the channel of the precarious occupation conflict, but rather by offering its properties for sale to the Administration (see documents at folios 61 to 64). This in no way committed the Institute of Agrarian Development to buy the property and therefore was not an act that could interrupt the statute of limitations in the judicial venue, as it is a unilateral offer from the owner, as was indicated in that same document of sale offer. The statute of limitations period continued its course, until it was definitively and inexorably completed on January 6, 1997, the date on which the 4 years established in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration were fulfilled. After this date, no acts interrupting a statute of limitations already completed could be produced, except for the waiver of the statute of limitations, which expressly or tacitly made by the Institute of Agrarian Development, which, as we shall see, did not make such a waiver; on the contrary, it alleged the statute of limitations. Subsequent to that date, January 6, 1997, the Representative of the Company, at that time, Mrs. Brenes Castro, addressed a document dated September 23, 1997 (that is, 7 months after the statute of limitations had taken effect), to the Presidency of the Republic, alleging the supposed responsibility of the Institute, alleging damages and losses and requesting compensation from the State. That proceeding opened a new administrative file before the Institute of Agrarian Development, but based on the same facts that supposedly motivated the State's responsibility, originating from 1987. Consequently, the referred administrative claim could in no way “reopen” a new statute of limitations period. This is how the First Chamber of Cassation has interpreted it, when in a similar factual situation it ordered:</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> “VII.- In the case at hand, it is established that the falsehood of the document in question was declared by criminal judgment dated October 13, 1986, a moment from which the fatal term of three years began to run, which was at that time the statute of limitations period contemplated in Article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration, to claim the eventual patrimonial responsibility of the State for the specific act. Once the term provided by law has been fulfilled, it is obvious, and more than that illogical, that the statute of limitations period can be interrupted. To interrupt is, says the Royal Spanish Academy, ‘to cut the continuity of something in place or in time’… A period is interrupted while it is in progress, never when it has already expired. Thus, in the sub-lite, the statute of limitations having taken effect since October 13, 1989, it is impossible to think of an ‘interruption’. Consequently, the administrative claim could not constitute, in any way, an act interrupting the statute of limitations period…” (First Chamber of Cassation, No. 861-F-2000 of 3:15 p.m. on November 16, 2000).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> X.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> In the case at hand, it is evident that if the statute of limitations period began to run from the date on which the administrative channel was deemed exhausted, a circumstance notified to the party on January 6, 1993, and the four years were fulfilled on January 6, 1997, the subsequent administrative claim, before the Presidency of the Republic, could not have the virtue of “interrupting” that fatal term that had already been fulfilled. The plaintiff Company, instead of resorting to the judicial channel to claim its rights, remained waiting for an administrative solution, thereby generating a situation of legal insecurity and uncertainty, both for the Institute and for the owner herself. In this way, MORE THAN 4 YEARS elapsed, from January 1993 to September 1997. On August 13, 1998, the Institute decided to refer the plaintiff Company to the judicial channel. But by that date, as indicated, the fatal statute of limitations term indicated in Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration had amply elapsed. Even following the plaintiff's approach, in the sense that the applicable statute of limitations norm would be that of the Civil Code, that is, 10 years, it could be concluded that if the Institute of Agrarian Development knew of the conflict since 1986, a fact that motivated the possible responsibility also known by the plaintiff, and did not rule within three months, from that date the possibility was open for the plaintiff Company to file any claim against the State, in the judicial channel, but by not doing so, the ten-year statute of limitations period was completed in 1997. It is inconceivable, consequently, that for so many years, the plaintiff Company in this process has allowed so much time to pass to file its claim in the judicial channel. Its own negligence makes it deserving of that sanction.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">XI.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> For the reasons stated, the appellant's grievances must be rejected. The Institute of Agrarian Development at no time waived the statute of limitations; on the contrary, it expressly invoked it as an exception when answering the present ordinary lawsuit. Neither can it be considered that the reports of the Institute of Agrarian Development derived from its last administrative claim favor its pretensions or nullify the statute of limitations period, because as has been said, it had already taken effect, amply, when the compensation claim was filed both in the administrative and judicial venues. Finally, regarding the application of Article 356 subsection 1 of the General Law of Public Administration, it must be indicated that this norm is not applicable in these cases, because the same Law excluded the Land and Colonization Law from its application, regarding administrative procedures (see Article 367.2 General Law of Public Administration, Decree number 8979-P of December 18, 1978); consequently, if the Land and Colonization Law establishes the modes in which the Administrative Channel is deemed exhausted, the legal opinion could not be required, as the appellant intends.

Even so, in both cases in which the Institute deemed the administrative remedy exhausted (1993 and 1998), the Legal Department was always heard, but with the particularity that for the second case (1998) the prescriptive period in favor of the administration had already run.

**XII.** For the reasons set forth in this instance, the appealed judgment-order is confirmed.

**POR TANTO:** The appealed judgment-order is confirmed.

[Name4] [Name5] [Name6] **CBM** **ORDINARIO** **EXPN1** **ACT:// COMPAÑÍA AGROPECUARIA DEL CARIBE S.A** **DEM:// I.D.A** For this reason, the agrarian legislator, when regulating how to reach a solution to the conflict, sets very specific deadlines, generally very short, so that the Administration can act promptly in seeking a peaceful resolution to the land conflict. In that sense, the interpretation of the paragraph of Article 94 of the Ley de Tierras that establishes "While the matter is before the Institute, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period will not run for either party," must be restrictive, as it is assumed that the Institute must seek a solution to the conflict within one year and, if it does not, the administrative channel is exhausted (agotada la vía administrativa), and therefore the statute of limitations (prescripción) periods begin to run again. Consequently, it is not an act interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción), but rather a temporary suspension of one year, during which the statute of limitations (prescripción) period does not run. This is also confirmed by reading the TRANSITORY provision of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which provides as follows: "...At the request of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, the Courts, in a reasoned resolution, may suspend the proceedings established against any person who has been declared by said agency to be a precarious possessor of lands. Said suspension may be decreed at any phase or stage of the trial in question, and for the time prudentially necessary for the Institute to achieve a satisfactory solution to the conflict, and it may be extended, following the same indicated procedure. Once the conflict is resolved in the manner indicated in the third paragraph of Article 94, the Institute shall inform the Courts so that they declare the civil actions lapsed and both the criminal actions and the penalties that may have been imposed against the precarious possessors, in that capacity, extinguished. Otherwise, the owners may again resort to the ordinary Courts, for which no period will run against them during the suspension of the proceedings..." From this norm, two important conclusions can also be drawn in relation to the provisions of Article 94: Firstly, that after the administrative channel is deemed exhausted under the conditions established by Article 94, the owners have the right to resort to the judicial channel. Secondly, if the Institute continues to intervene in the resolution of the conflict, after the lapse of one year or after the 3 months causing the administrative silence (silencio administrativo), due to the submission of the interested parties therein, it may request the suspension of the judicial process, a period during which the statute of limitations (prescripción) period would not run; conversely, if the claim was not filed in court, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period continues to run, since in such a case the Institute cannot request the Courts to suspend the process. As can be concluded from the above, we are facing a special regime (of the Agrarian Public Sector), applicable to both public and private subjects, which regulates the deadlines and methods for exhausting the administrative channel, as well as the causes for interruption or suspension of the potential statute of limitations (prescripción) to which the rights of the parties may be subject, and this special regime must be applied to the case at hand.[...]

**IX.** In the case at bar, it is evident that the statute of limitations (prescripción) has operated in favor of the Public Administration and, particularly, in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. The Plaintiff Company, since 1986, submitted the land conflict to the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario for its knowledge. On October 15, 1987, the plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for usurpation and damages, relying on the Institute's administrative silence (silencio administrativo). On October 18, 1988, when the three months of administrative silence (silencio administrativo) had amply elapsed (an opportunity at which the judicial channel was already open in favor of the owners), the Institute declared the existence of a land precarious occupation (ocupación precaria de tierras) conflict. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested reconsideration and reversal, and this request was not addressed until October 14, 1992, when the same Institute revoked the declaration, considering that the resolution had been untimely, and in this second resolution stated: "the ADMINISTRATIVE CHANNEL IS HEREBY EXHAUSTED (SE AGOTA LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA) for proceedings numbered fourteen hundred one, in which Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima and [Name1] are involved as parties" (see folios 327-329). Said resolution was notified to the Representative of Agropecuaria del Caribe on January 6, 1993 (notification on folio 329). That was the administrative act that exhausted the channel corresponding to the land precarious occupation (ocupación precaria de tierras) conflict. According to the doctrine, "The act that exhausts the administrative channel or that 'becomes final' is the one that closes the administrative procedure, having been issued by the highest competent authority – the highest-ranking official – once the remedies established in the rules governing the administrative instance have been exhausted." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Diké, 2002, p. 303). Therefore, from the moment that procedural prerequisite is configured, the plaintiff company had the jurisdictional channel open to file any claim against the State. It was a final act that was not annulled, revoked, or modified, leaving the judicial channel clear for its challenge.

The Plaintiff Company had knowledge of the facts that gave rise to the State's liability since 1986, and having exhausted the administrative procedure in 1993, it did not resort to the judicial channel. On the contrary, the claimant Company, as it admits in its own appeal, continued to negotiate with the Institute for the payment of the property, but this time no longer through the channel of the precarious occupation (ocupación precaria) conflict, but by offering to sell its properties to the Administration (see documents on folios 61 to 64). This in no way obligated the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario to buy the property and, therefore, was not an act that could interrupt the statute of limitations (prescripción) in court, since it is a unilateral offer by the owner, as was indicated in that same sale offer document.

The statute of limitations (prescripción) period continued its course, finally and inexorably expiring on January 6, 1997, the date on which the 4 years established in Article 196 of the Ley General de Administración Pública were completed. After this date, no acts could interrupt a statute of limitations (prescripción) already consummated, except for a waiver of the statute of limitations (prescripción), which the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario could have made expressly or tacitly, and which, as we shall see, it did not make; on the contrary, it alleged the statute of limitations (prescripción).

After that date, January 6, 1997, the Company's Representative at the time, Ms. Brenes Castro, filed a brief dated September 23, 1997 (that is, 7 months after the statute of limitations (prescripción) had taken effect), with the Presidency of the Republic, alleging the Institute's supposed liability, claiming damages, and requesting compensation from the State. This action opened a new administrative file before the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, but based on the same facts that supposedly gave rise to the State's liability, originating from 1987. Consequently, the referred administrative claim could in no way "reopen" a new statute of limitations (prescripción) period. This is how the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala I de Casación) has interpreted it when, in a similar factual situation, it ruled:

"VII.- In the case under consideration, it is established that the falsity of the document in question was declared by a criminal judgment dated October 13, 1986, a moment from which the fatal three-year period began to run, which was at that time the statute of limitations (prescripción) period contemplated in Article 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, for claiming the State's potential patrimonial liability for the specific act. Once the deadline provided by law has expired, it is obvious, and more than that, illogical, that the statute of limitations (prescripción) period can be interrupted. To interrupt is, says the Real Academia Española, 'to cut the continuity of a thing in place or time'... A period is interrupted while it is in progress, never when it has already expired. Thus, in the instant case, the statute of limitations (prescripción) having become effective since October 13, 1989, it is impossible to think of an 'interruption'. Consequently, the administrative claim could not, in any way, constitute an act interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción) period..." (Sala I de Casación, No. 861-F-2000 of 3:15 p.m. on November 16, 2000).

**X.** In the case at bar, it is evident that if the statute of limitations (prescripción) period began to run from the date on which the administrative channel was deemed exhausted (agotada la vía administrativa), a circumstance notified to the party on January 6, 1993, and the four years were completed on January 6, 1997, the subsequent administrative claim, before the Presidency of the Republic, could not have the virtue of "interrupting" that fatal period that had already expired. The Plaintiff Company, instead of resorting to the judicial channel to claim its rights, remained waiting for an administrative solution, thereby generating a situation of legal insecurity and uncertainty, both for the Institute and for the owner herself. In this way, more than 4 YEARS elapsed from January 1993 to September 1997. On August 13, 1998, the Institute decided to refer the Plaintiff Company to the judicial channel. But by that date, as indicated, the fatal statute of limitations (prescripción) deadline set by Article 196 of the Ley General de Administración Pública had amply elapsed. Even following the plaintiff's reasoning, in the sense that the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) rule was that of the Civil Code, that is, 10 years, it could be concluded that if the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario was aware of the conflict since 1986, a fact that gave rise to the possible liability also known by the plaintiff, and did not rule within three months, from that date the possibility was open for the Plaintiff Company to file any claim against the State in the judicial channel, but by not doing so, the ten-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period was completed in 1997. It is therefore inconceivable that, for so many years, the Plaintiff Company in this process has allowed so much time to pass before filing its claim in court. Its own negligence makes it deserving of that sanction.

**XI.** For the reasons stated, the grievances of the appellant must be rejected. The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, at no time, waived the statute of limitations (prescripción); on the contrary, it expressly invoked it as an exception when answering this ordinary lawsuit. Nor can it be considered that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario's reports derived from its last administrative claim favor its claims or negate the statute of limitations (prescripción) period, since, as stated, it had already, more than amply, taken effect when the claim for compensation was filed, both in the administrative and judicial venues. Finally, regarding the application of Article 356, subsection 1, of the Ley General de Administración Pública, it must be indicated that this rule is not applicable in these cases, because the same Law excluded the Ley de Tierras y Colonización from its application, concerning administrative procedures (see Article 367.2 Ley General de Administración Pública, Decreto número 8979-P of December 18, 1978); consequently, if the Ley de Tierras y Colonización establishes the methods by which the Administrative Channel is exhausted, the legal opinion could not be demanded, as the appellant intends. Even so, in both cases where the Institute deemed the administrative channel exhausted (1993 and 1998), the Legal Department was always heard, but with the particularity that for the second case (1998), the statute of limitations (prescripción) period favorable to the administration had already elapsed." It is for this reason that security inevitably stands, alongside justice, as an essential value of law. Neither of the two, as an end thereof, is absolute in legal practice. At some point, one of them, for the sake of the other's survival, must yield. This occurs in the case of the statute of limitations (prescripción) when, in favor of security, justice yields. Were it not so, justice, as an essential end of law, would be endangered, as uncertainty and disorder would be enthroned in the social environment, factors that render it unattainable. Such a phenomenon does not mean ignoring justice, but rather the legislator setting a time limit within which its protection finds a place; but, once this period has elapsed, and in deference to security, it yields before the need to avoid lawsuits and disputes raised untimely, and therefore difficult to resolve, whose possible incidence would maintain an unnerving sensation of uncertainty in human relations (See, among others, First Chamber of Cassation, No. 120 of 3:00 p.m. on July 29, 1992, Considering IV and No. 119 of 2:30 p.m. on October 20, 1995, Considering VI).

**V.** In the public law sphere, the statute of limitations regime has been much stricter, departing from the general rules, especially regarding time limits, of civil law. Both administrative law and public agricultural sector law have designed different rules on the statute of limitations. Indeed, the General Law of Public Administration, in its article 196, establishes that “The right to claim compensation from the Administration shall prescribe in four years, counted from the act giving rise to the liability…” (according to the reform introduced by Law No. 7611 of July 12, 1996, as previously it was 3 years). Now, this regime is equally applicable to public agricultural entities, as has been established by this Agrarian Tribunal (See ruling of 3:10 p.m. on August 29, 1995, regarding the Cantonal Agricultural Centers) and confirmed by the Jurisprudence of the First Chamber of Cassation on repeated occasions. Specifically, the Chamber of Cassation, referring to the Cantonal Agricultural Centers, indicated “…In such a situation, regarding the statute of limitations, specific regulations must be applied, those regulated in the General Law of Public Administration. The ordinary civil statute of limitations is not applicable to the case because a public entity is involved. The rules of the General Law of Public Administration contain shorter prescription periods for both non-contractual and contractual matters. Thus, if the lawsuit was filed on August 14, 1991, and the sublease contract was terminated in March 1987, by the date of filing the action, the claimed right had already prescribed, which was extinguished in only three years. (First Chamber of Cassation No. 132 of 2:25 p.m. on December 20, 1996; see, for greater abundance, rulings No. 56 of 3:00 p.m. on July 4, 1997). In another case, very similar to the one at hand, the First Chamber stated: “I.-The appellant, as owner of several farms in the province of Limón, seeks recognition of the right to be compensated for their value, as well as payment for the damages caused, as a consequence of said properties having been included in the Barra del Colorado Wildlife Refuge. This act implies for the owners, according to what the appellant alleges, a de facto expropriation… Indeed, the administrative request seeking compensation was filed 3 years, 1 month, and 16 days after the Decree was published; the exhaustion of administrative remedies 3 years, 3 months, and 20 days after the Decree; and the lawsuit 3 months and 27 days after managing the exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is clear, from the chronological analysis verified, that the appellant requested action from the Public Administration more than three years after the publication of the Executive Decree…” (First Chamber of Cassation, No. 26 of 11:15 a.m. on May 13, 1994).

**VI.** In the present case, we are in the presence of a lawsuit, among other claims, for patrimonial liability against the State, specifically against the Institute of Agrarian Development, which is a “...autonomous institution of public law, with legal personality, its own patrimony, and administrative independence...” (art. 1 of its Law of Creation), and has as one of its main functions the capacity to buy lands and distribute them in order to promote the country's agrarian development (art. 2 and 3 of the Law of Creation of the IDA). As one of its priorities, the Law establishes the following: “The Institute shall, with priority, seek to solve the problems resulting from the occupation of national reserves and the precarious occupation of privately owned lands. The Institute is empowered, when appropriate, to redistribute and reorganize the areas that were the subject of conflict, subsequent to its conclusion.” In this regard, the Institute has the duty to intervene in conflicts of precarious land occupation, and to seek a solution within the terms established by the Law itself, to provide legal certainty to the parties involved in the conflict. In this sense, the Land and Colonization Law itself, in chapter IV referring to the “Regulation of conflicts between owners and precarious possessors,” provides which are those mechanisms and the time limits to put them into practice. Such mechanisms can be voluntary, through the direct purchase of lands, or compulsory, through expropriation and payment of the properties to the individuals. All of this is regulated in article 94 of the Law, which establishes: “ARTICLE 94.- The solution of conflicts arising from precarious land possession shall be fundamentally sought through direct purchase-sale contracts between the owner and the occupants, with the intervention of the Institute, and in the manner indicated in the following articles. Prior to the establishment of any judicial action in which a precarious land possession problem may be involved, the owners must file their claim before the Institute, in accordance with the procedures mentioned in this Chapter. After three months have elapsed from the receipt of the respective request without the Institute having declared the existence of a land possession conflict, or one year from said declaration without the conflict having been solved, the administrative procedure shall be deemed exhausted, and the plaintiffs may address the Courts. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any interested party may request the Judge or Mayor of the Jurisdiction where the property is located to carry out an ocular inspection, with summons of the parties, to verify any facts or signs that might change or disappear over time. While the matter is before the Institute, the statute of limitations period shall not run for either party. Once the conflict is solved by the Institute with the owner's conformity, or the expropriation is ordered by the Executive Branch, the owner shall lack any judicial action, whether civil or criminal, against the possessors in such capacity. Otherwise, the occupants shall be exposed to the ordinary legal sanctions that may apply.

The writings submitted by the parties before the Institute, in proceedings for solving precarious land possession conflicts and others related to agrarian matters, shall be exempt from authentication and from the use of fiscal stamps.” (The underlining is ours). From the foregoing provision, we can extract the following elements relevant to the decision of the present matter: 1) Prior to establishing any judicial action, the owners of properties with precarious possession problems must exhaust the agrarian administrative procedure contemplated in the Land Law; 2) The Institute of Agrarian Development has three months to declare, or not, the existence of the conflict; 3) Upon the declaration of the conflict, the Institute has one more year to intervene seeking a peaceful solution to it, whether through the direct purchase of the property, or through expropriation. Consequently, there are two ways to exhaust administrative remedies: the first operates through the administrative silence of the Institute; the second operates one year after the existence of the conflict is declared, as this is the period that the agrarian legislator granted to the Entity to try to resolve the referred conflict. In this latter case, evidently, the legislator's purpose was to leave “the judicial avenue open,” that is, to give the owner or the possessors the opportunity to debate the defense of their rights in court. Likewise, the interpretation of the rule leads one to conclude that any owner who feels disturbed, threatened, or harmed by the administrative actions of the Institute, having reached no administrative solution (through purchase-sale or expropriation) within the year, could resort to the corresponding judicial avenue to claim compensation against the State itself.

**VII.** From another perspective, it could happen that both the owner and the precarious occupants themselves, after that year has elapsed, decide to voluntarily submit to an administrative proceeding, in order to avoid the judicial avenue. But that wait is entirely voluntary, because if the owner thinks, as in this case, about the possibility of selling the property or being compensated by the Institute, they run the risk that, in the end, their patrimonial interest may not be satisfied. The State is not obliged, according to the cited legal provisions, to provide a patrimonial solution to the owner, nor is it the only avenue the owner has to claim their property right. On the contrary, any owner, once the year from the declaration has elapsed, has the judicial avenue open to undertake the corresponding ordinary and patrimonial actions in defense of their ownership attributes. But if the owners let the period elapse, subjected to the hope that “someday” the Institute may pay them for the property, they would be incurring a situation of legal insecurity, of legal uncertainty, which could cause, with the passage of time, the loss of their right to claim compensation against the State. For this reason, the agrarian legislator, when regulating the way to reach a solution to the conflict, sets very specific, and generally very short, time limits so that the Administration can act promptly in the search for a peaceful resolution to the land conflict. In this sense, the interpretation of the paragraph of article 94 of the Land Law that establishes “While the matter is before the Institute, the statute of limitations period shall not run for either party,” must be restrictive, as it is assumed that the Institute must seek a solution to the conflict within the year and, if it does not do so, administrative remedies are exhausted, and therefore the prescription periods begin to run again. Consequently, it is not an act that interrupts the statute of limitations, but rather a temporary suspension, of one year, during which the prescription period does not run. This is also confirmed by reading the TRANSITORY provision of the Land and Colonization Law, which provides the following: “…At the request of the Institute of Agrarian Development, the Courts, in a reasoned resolution, may suspend the proceedings established against any person who has been declared by said body as a precarious possessor of lands. Said suspension may be decreed at any phase or stage of the proceeding in question, and for the time prudentially necessary for the Institute to achieve a satisfactory solution to the conflict, and may be extended, following the same indicated procedure. Once the conflict is resolved in the manner indicated in the third paragraph of article 94, the Institute shall notify the Courts so that they declare the civil actions expired and extinguish both the criminal actions and the penalties that may have been imposed against the precarious possessors, as such. Otherwise, the owners may address the ordinary Courts again, for which no time period shall run against them during the suspension of the proceedings…” Two important conclusions are also drawn from this rule, in relation to the provisions of article 94: First, that after deeming administrative remedies exhausted under the conditions established by article 94, the owners have the right to resort to the judicial avenue. Second, if the Institute continues to intervene in the solution of the conflict, after the year has elapsed or the 3 months causing administrative silence have passed, by submission of the interested parties thereto, it may request the suspension of the judicial proceeding, a period during which the statute of limitations period would not run; conversely, if no claim was filed in court, the prescription period continues to run, since in such case the Institute cannot request the Courts to suspend the proceeding.

As can be concluded from the foregoing, we are facing a special regime (of the public agricultural sector), applicable to both public and private subjects, where the time limits and modes for exhausting administrative remedies are regulated, as well as the causes for interruption or suspension of the eventual statute of limitations to which the parties’ rights may be subject; this special regime must be applied to the case at hand.

**VIII.** In the present case, although some of the appellant's objections to the lower court's judgment are receivable, since the evidence was indeed not adequately assessed, nor were clear criteria established to determine the period in which the statute of limitations period began to run, this cannot, under any circumstances, constitute grounds for nullity, as these are aspects perfectly correctable at this instance, as has effectively been done, with the Tribunal proceeding to reconstruct the recital of proven facts, in accordance with what appears in the case file. Moreover, it is evident that the case requires a deep study of the “public law” agrarian regulations, and their application both against the Administration, in this case against the Institute of Agrarian Development, and with respect to private subjects such as the plaintiff corporation, without this meaning that the analysis is proper to an “administrative law specialist” and not an “agrarian law specialist,” as the concrete case requires a comprehensive understanding of the rules of both public law and private agrarian law.

**IX.** In the case at bar, it is evident that the statute of limitations has operated in favor of the Public Administration and, particularly, in favor of the Institute of Agrarian Development. The plaintiff corporation, since 1986, submitted the land conflict to the knowledge of the Institute of Agrarian Development. On October 15, 1987, the plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for usurpation and damages, availing itself of the administrative silence of the Institution. On October 18, 1988, when the three months of administrative silence had amply elapsed (at which time the judicial avenue was already open in favor of the owners), the Institute declared the existence of the precarious land occupation conflict. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested reconsideration and reversal, and such request was addressed until October 14, 1992, when the same Institute revoked the declaration, considering that the resolution had been untimely, and in this second resolution it indicated “ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARE EXHAUSTED for proceedings number one thousand four hundred one, in which Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima and [Name1] participate as parties (see folios 327-329). Said resolution was notified to the Representative of Agropecuaria del Caribe on January 6, 1993 (notification on folio 329). That was the administrative act that exhausted the avenue corresponding to the precarious land occupation conflict. According to the doctrine, “The act that exhausts administrative remedies or that ‘defines the matter’ is the one that closes the administrative procedure, having been issued by the highest competent authority – the hierarch – once the remedies established in the rules governing the administrative instance have been exhausted.” (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Diké, 2002, p. 303). Therefore, from the moment this procedural requirement was fulfilled, the plaintiff corporation had the jurisdictional avenue open to bring any claim against the State. It was a final act that was not annulled, revoked, or modified, leaving the judicial avenue clear for its challenge. The plaintiff corporation had knowledge of the facts that gave rise to the State's liability since 1986 and, having exhausted the administrative procedure in 1993, did not resort to the judicial avenue. On the contrary, the claimant corporation, as it admits in its own appeal, continued to seek payment for the property from the Institute, but this time no longer through the avenue of the precarious occupation conflict, but rather offering its properties for sale to the Administration (see documents on folios 61 to 64). This in no way obligated the Institute of Agrarian Development to buy the property and therefore was not an act that could interrupt the statute of limitations in court, as it is a unilateral offer by the owner, as was indicated in that same sale offer document. The statute of limitations period continued its course, until being definitively and inexorably completed on January 6, 1997, the date on which the 4 years established in article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration were completed. After this date, no interrupting acts could occur for a prescription already completed, except for a waiver of the statute of limitations, which the Institute of Agrarian Development expressly or tacitly made—and, as we shall see, it did not make such a waiver; on the contrary, it pled the statute of limitations. It was after that date, January 6, 1997, that the Representative of the Corporation, at that time, Mrs. Brenes Castro, directed a writing dated September 23, 1997 (that is, 7 months after the statute of limitations had run), to the Presidency of the Republic, alleging the Institute's supposed liability, alleging damages, and requesting compensation from the State. That request opened a new administrative file before the Institute of Agrarian Development, but based on the same facts that supposedly gave rise to the State's liability, originating in 1987. Consequently, the referred administrative claim could in no way “reopen” a new prescription period. This is how the First Chamber of Cassation has interpreted it when, in a similar factual situation, it provided: “VII.- In the instant case, it is established that the falsity of the document in question was declared by criminal judgment dated October 13, 1986, the moment from which the fatal period of three years began to run, which was the statute of limitations period contemplated at that time in article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration, for claiming the State's eventual patrimonial liability for the specific act. Once the term provided by law has expired, it is obvious, and more than that illogical, that the prescription period could be interrupted. To interrupt is, says the Royal Spanish Academy, ‘to cut the continuity of something in place or time’… A period is interrupted while it is in course, never when it has already expired. Thus, in the sub-lite case, the statute of limitations having taken effect since October 13, 1989, it is impossible to think of an ‘interruption’. Consequently, the administrative claim could in no way constitute an interrupting act of the prescription period…” (First Chamber of Cassation, No. 861-F-2000 of 3:15 p.m. on November 16, 2000).

**X.** In the case at bar, it is evident that if the statute of limitations period began to run from the date on which administrative remedies were deemed exhausted, a circumstance notified to the party on January 6, 1993, and the four years were completed on January 6, 1997, the subsequent administrative claim, before the Presidency of the Republic, could not have the virtue of “interrupting” that fatal period that had already elapsed. The plaintiff corporation, instead of resorting to the judicial avenue to claim its rights, remained waiting for an administrative solution, thereby generating a situation of legal insecurity and uncertainty, both for the Institute and for the owner herself. In this way, MORE THAN 4 YEARS elapsed, from January 1993 to September 1997. On August 13, 1998, the Institute decided to refer the plaintiff corporation to the judicial avenue. But by that date, as indicated, the fatal prescription period indicated by article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration had amply elapsed. Moreover, even following the plaintiff's approach, in the sense that the applicable prescription rule was that of the Civil Code, that is, 10 years, it could be concluded that if the Institute of Agrarian Development was aware of the conflict since 1986—a fact that motivated the possible liability also known by the plaintiff—and did not rule within three months, from that date the possibility was open for the plaintiff corporation to bring any claim against the State in court, but upon not doing so, the ten-year statute of limitations period was completed in 1997. It is inconceivable, therefore, that for so many years, the plaintiff corporation in this process allowed so much time to pass before bringing its claim in court. Its own inaction makes it deserving of that sanction.

**XI.** For the reasons set forth, the grievances of the appellant must be rejected. The Institute of Agrarian Development at no time waived the statute of limitations; on the contrary, it expressly invoked it as a defense when answering the present ordinary lawsuit. Nor can it be considered that the reports of the Institute of Agrarian Development derived from its last administrative claim favor its pretensions or bar the prescription period, since as has been stated, it had already, amply, run its course when the claim for compensation was filed both in administrative and judicial proceedings. Finally, regarding the application of article 356, subsection 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, it must be noted that this rule is not applicable in these cases, because the Law itself excluded the Land and Colonization Law from its application, regarding administrative procedures (see article 367.2 General Law of Public Administration, Decree number 8979-P of December 18, 1978); consequently, if the Land and Colonization Law establishes the ways in which Administrative Remedies are deemed exhausted, the legal opinion could not be required, as the appellant intends.

Even so, in both cases where the Institute deemed the administrative remedy exhausted (1993 and 1998), the Legal Department was always heard, but with the particularity that in the second case (1998) the prescriptive period favorable to the administration had already run.- **XII.** For the reasons set forth in this instance, the appealed auto-sentencia is confirmed.

**POR TANTO:** The appealed auto-sentencia is confirmed.

[Nombre4] [Nombre5] [Nombre6] **CBM** **ORDINARIO** **EXPN1** **ACT:// COMPAÑÍA AGROPECUARIA DEL CARIBE S.A** **DEM:// I.D.A**

VOTO Nº 216-F-03 TRIBUNAL AGRARIO DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOE. GOICOECHEA, A LAS CATORCE HORAS CUARENTA Y DOS MINUTOS DEL VEINTICUATRO DE ABRIL DEL DOS MIL TRES.- Proceso Ordinario, tramitado ante el Juzgado Agrario de Limón, planteado por COMPAÑÍA AGROPECUARIA DEL CARIBE S.A., contra INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO de calidades conocidas en autos. Conoce este Tribunal del recurso de apelación interpuesto por la parte actora en contra de la resolución de las ocho horas del seis de mayo de dos mil dos.- Redacta el Juez Superior ULATE CHACÓN; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.El Tribunal comparte lo dispuesto en cuanto a hechos tenidos por acreditados por el a-quo, enumerados del 1 al 3, pues resultan de relevancia para resolver las defensas previas invocadas por el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. No se comparte los hechos No. 4 y 5, por no tratarse de hechos sino de consideraciones o conclusiones jurídicas del a-quo que deben estar contenidas en las motivaciones de fondo. El hecho 6 se prohija únicamente el hecho, hasta la expresión “…se tuvo por agotada la vía administrativa”., pues el resto del mismo, cuando se indica “…desconociendo dicha institución los alcances del artículo 94 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización y de la Jurisprudencia Constitucional”, es un juicio de valor del a-quo, que debe estar contenido en las motivaciones de fondo. Además, para efectos de resolver en esta instancia, se tiene por acreditado lo siguiente: 7). Que el representante de la actora, al plantear la denuncia por Usurpación y daños, el 15 de octubre de 1987, se amparó al “silencio administrativo” del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (Ver certificación de folios 286-295); 8) Que el recurso de reconsideración interpuesto por el apoderado de la actora, el 13 de diciembre de 1988, contra la resolución del IDA de las 8:30 horas del 18 de octubre de 1988 por la cual declaraba la existencia del conflicto de ocupación precaria de tierras, fue resuelto mediante la resolución administrativa de la Junta Directiva de las 17:20 horas del 14 de octubre de 1992. En dicha resolución se acordó declarar con lugar el recurso de reposición y reconsideración por cuanto la referida declaratoria se dictó fuera del plazo legal previsto por el artículo 94 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización. Además, resolvió “…En lo que respecta al traslape, no corresponde dilucidarse dentro de estas diligencias, puesto que esta vía es específicamente determinar si existe o no conflicto de posesión precaria de tierras, consecuentemente, se AGOTA LA VIA ADMINISTRATIVA en diligencias numeradas mil cuatrocientos uno, en que intervienen como partes Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima y [Nombre1] y otros como ocupantes” (Ver resolución certificada a folios 327 a 329). 9) La referida resolución que tuvo por agotada la vía administrativa fue notificada al señor Julio Calleja Tamayo, en ese entonces representante de Agropecuaria del Caribe S.A., el 6 de enero de 1993 (Ver notificación de folio 329). 10) Que luego de dicho acto administrativo final, el representante de la referida Sociedad continuó, mediante la nueva Apoderada Ana Isabel Brenes Castro, realizando gestiones ante el Instituto, mediante ofertas de venta de la referida propiedad, para lo cual el Instituto procedió a efectuar diversos avalúos, sin que ello comprometiera al Ente a la adquisición de los inmuebles, de acuerdo a lo que indicaba el documento de la opción de venta (Ver documentos de folio 61 a 64). 11) Que en fecha 23 de setiembre de 1997, la señora [Nombre2] , como Apoderada de Agropecuaria del Caribe S.A., presentó a la Presidencia de la República, un reclamo administrativo, indicando en forma expresa que el Instituto dio por agotada la vía administrativa en su resolución del 14 de octubre de 1992, y reclama que al no darse una solución administrativa al asunto se le han causado daños y perjuicios por no haber podido recuperar la finca, solicitando en forma expresa el reconocimiento de su derecho de propiedad y se le indemnice la misma de acuerdo al precio del mercado (Ver certificación de folios 94 a 97). 12) Con base en dicha solicitud, el Presidente Ejecutivo del IDA, mediante oficio de 23 de octubre de 1997 ordenó a la Dirección Jurídica referirse al reclamo planteado por la actora. En su informe jurídico, del 5 de marzo de 1988, el Lic. Carlos García Anchía recomienda dar por agotado el procedimiento administrativo para que Agropecuaria del Caribe S.A. dirima sus pretensiones en la vía judicial, o bien se solucione el conflicto por la vía de un arreglo extrajudicial (Ver informe jurídico de folios 84-86). 13) La Junta Directiva del IDA, en Acuerdo No. XXIV de la Sesión 035-98 del 4 de mayo de 1998 acordó “Dar por agotada la vía administrativa a la señora [Nombre3] en su condición de Apoderada de la Compañía Agropecuaria del Caribe S.A., para que pueda acudir a la vía judicial en defensa de sus derechos”. (ver certificación de folio 22) 14) De dicho Acuerdo se dio por notificada la actora y en escrito presentado el 13 de agosto de 1998 interpuso Recurso de reconsideración y reposición, insistiendo en llegar a un arreglo extrajudicial (Ver recurso de folios 24-26). 15) Que el referido recurso fue rechazado mediante acuerdo No. XIX de la sesión No. 071-99 del 6 de octubre de 1999 (Ver certificación de Acuerdo a folio 1). 16) La presente demanda ordinaria agraria, mediante la cual se reclama una indemnización por responsabilidad de la administración, fue presentada a estrados judiciales el 15 de junio del 2000 (Ver recibido a folio 423).

II.El a-quo, en la resolución apelada del 6 de mayo del 2001, al resolver las defensas previas de litisconsorcio pasivo necesario y prescripción, rechazó la primera y declaró con lugar la de prescripción, con fundamento en lo dispuesto en la Ley General de Administración Pública. Declaró prescrita la acción el 28 de noviembre de 1993, para lo cual contabilizó un año a partir de que operó el silencio administrativo del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario al no dar solución al conflicto de ocupación precaria de tierras. Se fundamentó en la Jurisprudencia Constitucional y en los artículos 127 y 37.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.

III.La sociedad recurrente alega que el a-quo no estudió todo el expediente administrativo mediante el cual se ha tratado de dar solución al conflicto de ocupación precaria. Acusa la falta de motivación de la resolución y falta de valoración de la prueba, pues, por un lado, no analiza la totalidad del elemento probatorio y, por otra parte, no explica en forma clara cuáles son las reglas de prescripción que aplica, ni a partir de cuándo es que comienza a correr el término de la prescripción. Señala como un error “de forma”, que el a-quo entra a valorar las pruebas desde el apersonamiento de la actora al proceso administrativo, sin considerar la fecha en que se declaró el conflicto de ocupación precaria, también acusa que el a-quo no siguió las recomendaciones realizadas por el tribunal y más bien desacata lo dicho, sobre todo en lo referido a la interrupción de la prescripción. Acusa violación del artículo 155 del Código Procesal Civil por falta de requisitos del fallo. Alega que la acción de prescribe, como lo indica el aquo, que lo que prescribe es el derecho, por lo que se produce un gran error de confusión terminológica. Manifiesta que el a-quo se basa en un Informe del Departamento Legal del IDA, que al final no lo cita ni lo considera, pues si lo hubiere hecho el fallo sería diferente. Además, señala, que el aquo debía justificar más porqué rechazó la excepción de litisconsorcio pasivo necesario. Además, argumenta diversos errores de fondo, comenzando por el elenco de fechas, cuyo análisis no es correcto, pues dejó de analizar otros hechos probados, tales como la fecha de la declaratoria del conflicto de ocupación precaria, el recurso de reconsideración, que fue resuelto afirmativamente. Además, señala que la Jurisprudencia Constitucional citada por el a-quo, en vez de perjudicarle, le favorece. Aduce que el retraso injustificado de la administración no puede ir en perjuicio del particular, pues en la medida en que la administración incumpla se produce una violación de sus derechos. Señala que el plazo de prescripción debería contarse a partir del 6 de enero de 1993, cuando se notificó la resolución del IDA donde se resolvió el recurso de reposición y reconsideración, y por ende no pudo haber prescrito el asunto en fecha 29 de noviembre de 1993, como lo indica el a-quo. Además, manifiesta, después del 6 de enero de 1993, se mantuvo ininterrumpida la actividad procesal en sede administrativa hasta 1998. Señala que la actora presentó una oferta de venta y opción de compra sobre esas fincas, por lo que el IDA solicitó el correspondiente avalúo que consta a folio 62 del expediente administrativo, de fecha 26 de junio de 1996. A ello le sucedieron tres informes del Departamento Legal, entre ellos el de fecha 5 de marzo de 1998 sobre el “RECLAMO AGROPECUARIA DEL CARIBE S.A.”. y que le favorece en sus pretensiones, al existir un reconocimiento expreso por parte del Instituto. Agrega que existen contradicciones en la sentencia del a-quo en cuanto a los hechos probados y en cuanto al momento en el cual se tuvo por agotada la vía administrativa. Finalmente, alega que el IDA, al reconocer el derecho de la actora a ser indemnizada, prácticamente está renunciando de manera expresa a cualquier prescripción que podía correr a su favor, pero además se dio la interrupción constante de la prescripción al continuar el procedimiento administrativo. Sostiene que la actitud del a-quo, se “confabula” con la Administración para premiar la desposesión de la tierra que le pertenecía al accionante” y que no actúa como un Juez Agrario, actitud que obedece más bien a un juez contencioso administrativo que a un agrarista. Finalmente, agrega la necesidad de un dictamen legal, para tener por agotada la vía administrativa, de conformidad con el inciso 1) del artículo 356 de la Ley General de Administración Pública. Por las anteriores razones, solicita se revoca la resolución y se declare que la acción y el derecho nunca han prescrito.

IV.Sobre el régimen general de la prescripción, nuestra jurisprudencia ha indicado los fines para los cuáles se estableció dicho instituto, especialmente para evitar situaciones de incerteza o inseguridad jurídica: “…La posición dominante, en la actualidad, atribuye el fundamento de la prescripción a la necesidad de crear un estado de seguridad jurídica ante una situación objetiva de incertidumbre producida por el no ejercicio oportuno del derecho. Puede afirmarse, por ende, que el valor tutelado por el derecho en estos casos es la seguridad jurídica, por lo cual se pretende evitar el ejercicio sorpresivo de un derecho. En todo caso, la prescripción emerge como un medio para crear seguridad, lo cual propende al orden y a la tranquilidad social. Empero, no resulta difícil imaginar situaciones en las cuales la prescripción pueda servir, en cierto modo, para tutelar injusticias e impedir el ejercicio de derechos los cuales verdaderamente existieron. Al respecto, es de señalar, que el derecho, como vehículo para la realización de la justicia, precisa actuar, necesariamente, dentro de un marco de certeza y seguridad. De no ser así, el fin último enunciado, se vería frustrado, en su dimensión práctica o funcional. La justicia no puede operar en medio de situaciones de incertidumbre e inestabilidad. Es por ello que la seguridad yergue, inevitablemente, junto con la justicia, como valor esencial del derecho. Ninguno de los dos, como fin de éste, es absoluto en el quehacer jurídico. En algún momento, uno de ellos, en aras de la supervivencia del otro, tiene que ceder. Eso ocurre en el caso de la prescripción cuando, a favor de la seguridad, cede la justicia. De no ser así, ésta, como fin esencial del derecho, peligraría, al entronizarse la incertidumbre y el desorden en el medio social, factores que la tornan inalcanzable. Tal fenómeno significa no ignorar la justicia, sino fijar un plazo por parte del legislador, dentro del cual la tutela de ella halla cabida; pero, una vez transcurrido éste, y en obsequio a la seguridad, cede ante la necesidad de evitar litigios y controversias suscitados a destiempo, y por ende de difícil solución, cuya posible incidencia mantendría una enervante sensación de incertidumbre en las relaciones humanas (Ver, entre otros, Sala Primera de Casación, No. 120 de las 15 horas del 29 de julio de 1992, Considerando IV y No. 119 de las 14:30 horas del 20 de octubre de 1995, Considerando VI).

V.En el ámbito iuspublicista, el régimen de la prescripción ha sido mucho más estricto, apartándose de las reglas generales, sobre todo en cuanto a plazos se refiere, del derecho civil. Tanto el derecho administrativo, como el derecho del sector público agrario, han diseñado normas distintas sobre la prescripción. En efecto, la Ley General de la Administración Pública, establece en su artículo 196, que “El derecho de reclamar la indemnización a la Administración prescribirá en cuatro años, contados a partir del hecho que motiva la responsabilidad…”(conforme a la reforma introducida por Ley No. 7611 de 12 de julio de 1996, pues anteriormente era de 3 años). Ahora bien, ese régimen es igualmente aplicable a los Entes públicos agrarios, como ha sido establecido por éste Tribunal Agrario (Véase voto de las 15:10 horas del 29 de agosto de 1995, sobre los Centros Agrícolas Cantonales) y confirmado por la Jurisprudencia de la Sala I de Casación en reiteradas ocasiones. En particular, refiriéndose la Sala de Casación a los Centros Agrícolas Cantonales indicó “…En tal situación, en materia de prescripción se debe aplicar una normativa específica, la regulada en la Ley General de Administración Pública. La prescripción ordinaria civil no es aplicable al caso por estar involucrado un ente público. Las normas de la Ley General de la Administración Pública contiene plazos más cortos de prescripción tanto para la materia extracontractual como contractual. Así las cosas, si la demanda fue presentada el 14 de agosto de 1991 y el contrato de subarriendo fue rescindido en marzo de 1987 a la fecha de presentación de la acción ya había prescrito el derecho reclamado el cual se extinguía en tan solo tres años. (Sala I de Casación No. 132 de las 14:25 hrs del 20 de diciembre de 1996; véase, a mayor abundamiento los votos No. 56 de las 15 horas del 4 de julio de 1997). En otro caso, muy similar al que nos ocupa, la Sala I señaló: “I.-El recurrente, como propietario de varias fincas de la provincia de Limón, pretende se le reconozca el derecho a ser indemnizado en el valor de ellas, así como el pago de los daños y perjuicios irrogados, como consecuencia de haber sido incluidos dichos inmuebles en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Barra del Colorado. Este acto implica para los propietarios, según lo alega el recurrente, una expropiación de hecho…Efectivamente la gestión administrativa solicitando la indemnización fue planteada 3 años 1 mes y 16 días después de publicado el Decreto, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa 3 años 3 meses 20 días después del Decreto, y el juicio 3 meses y 27 días después de gestionar el agotamiento de la vía administrativa. Queda claro, del análisis cronológico verificado, como el recurrente gestionó ante la Administración Pública transcurrido más de tres años desde la publicación del Decreto Ejecutivo…” (Sala I de Casación, No. 26 de las 11:15 horas del 13 de mayo de 1994).

VI.En el presente caso, estamos en presencia de una demanda entre otras pretensiones, por responsabilidad patrimonial contra el Estado, concretamente contra el Instituto de Desarrollo agrario, que es una “...institución autónoma de derecho público, con personalidad jurídica, patrimonio propio e independencia administrativa...” (art. 1 de su Ley de Creación), y tiene como una de sus funciones principales la capacidad de comprar tierras y distribuirlas a fin de promover el desarrollo agrario del país (art. 2 y 3 de la Ley de Creación del IDA). Como una de sus prioridades la Ley establece lo siguiente: “El Instituto deberá, con prioridad, procurar la solución de los problemas que resulten de la ocupación de las reservas nacionales y de la ocupación en precario de tierras de dominio privado. El Instituto queda facultado cuando proceda para redistribuir y reordenar las áreas que fueren objeto de conflicto, posteriormente a su finalización”. En ese sentido, el Instituto tiene el deber de intervenir en los conflictos de ocupación precaria de tierras, y procurar darles una solución dentro de los términos que la misma Ley establece, para dar seguridad jurídica a las partes que están involucradas en el conflicto. En ese sentido, la misma Ley de Tierras y Colonización, en el capítulo IV referido a la “Regulación de conflictos entre propietarios y poseedores en precario”, dispone cuáles son esos mecanismos y los plazos para ponerlos en práctica. Tales mecanismos pueden ser voluntarios, mediante la compra directa de tierras, o forzosos, mediante la expropiación y pago de las propiedades a los particulares. Todo ello está regulado en el artículo 94 de la Ley, que establece: “ARTICULO 94.- La solución de conflictos derivados de la posesión precaria de tierras, se buscará fundamentalmente a través de contratos directos de compraventa entre el propietario y los ocupantes, con intervención del Instituto, y en la forma en que se indica en los artículos siguientes. Previamente al establecimiento de una acción judicial cualquiera en que pueda estar comprendido un problema de posesión precaria de tierras, los propietarios deberán presentar su reclamo ante el Instituto, conforme a los procedimientos mencionados en este Capítulo. Transcurridos tres meses a partir del recibo de la gestión respectiva sin que el Instituto haya declarado la existencia de un conflicto de posesión de tierras, o un año desde esa declaratoria sin que el conflicto haya sido solucionado, se tendrá por agotado el procedimiento administrativo, y los accionantes podrán dirigirse a los Tribunales. No obstante lo anterior, cualquiera de los interesados podrá solicitar al Juez o Alcalde de la Jurisdicción en que esté situada la finca, que lleve a cabo una inspección ocular, con citación de partes, para comprobar cualesquiera hechos o señales que pudieren variar o desaparecer con el tiempo. Mientras el asunto esté en el Instituto, no correrá el término de la prescripción para ninguna de las partes. Solucionado el conflicto por el Instituto con la conformidad del propietario u ordenada la expropiación por el Poder Ejecutivo, el propietario carecerá de toda acción judicial, sea civil o penal, contra los poseedores en calidad de tales. Caso contrario los ocupantes quedarán expuestos a las sanciones legales comunes que puedan proceder.

Los escritos presentados por las partes ante el Instituto, en diligencias de solución de conflictos de posesión precaria de tierras y otras relacionados con cuestiones agrarias, estarán exentas de autenticación y del uso de especies fiscales.” (Lo subrayado es nuestro). De la anterior disposición, podemos extraer los siguientes elementos relevantes para la decisión del presente asunto: 1) Previo a establecer cualquier acción judicial, los propietarios de fincas con problemas de posesión precaria deben agotar el procedimiento administrativo agrario contemplado en la Ley de Tierras; 2) El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario tiene tres meses para declarar, o no, la existencia del conflicto; 3) Ante la declaratoria del conflicto, el Instituto tiene un año más, para poder intervenir buscando una solución pacífica al mismo, sea mediante la compra directa de la propiedad, o mediante la expropiación. Existen, en consecuencia, dos modos de agotar la vía administrativa: el primero, opera por el silencio administrativo del Instituto; el segundo, opera un año después de declarada la existencia del conflicto, pues es el plazo que el legislador agrario otorgó al Ente para tratar de solucionar el referido conflicto. En éste último caso, evidentemente, el propósito del legislador fue dejar “abierta la vía judicial”, es decir, darle al propietario o a los poseedores, la oportunidad de debatir en la vía judicial la defensa de sus derechos. De igual manera, la interpretación de la norma lleva a concluir que cualquier propietario que se sienta perturbado, amenazado o perjudicado con la actuación administrativa del Instituto, al no haber llegado a ninguna solución administrativa (mediante compraventa o expropiación), dentro del año, podría acudir a la vía judicial correspondiente para reclamar una indemnización contra el mismo Estado.

VII.Desde otra perspectiva, podría ocurrir que tanto el propietario, como los mismos ocupantes en precario, luego de transcurrido ese año, decidan someterse en forma voluntaria a un trámite administrativo, con miras a evitar la vía judicial. Pero esa espera, es totalmente voluntaria, pues si el propietario piensa, como en éste caso, en la posibilidad de vender el inmueble o ser indemnizado por el Instituto, se corre el riesgo de que, al final, no sea satisfecho su interés patrimonial. El Estado no está obligado, conforme a las disposiciones legales citadas, a dar una solución patrimonial al propietario, ni es la única vía que tiene el propietario para reclamar su derecho de propiedad. Por el contrario, todo propietario, una vez transcurrido el año de la declaratoria, tiene abierta la vía judicial para emprender las acciones ordinarias y patrimoniales correspondientes en defensa de los atributos dominicales. Pero si los propietarios dejan transcurrir el plazo, sometidos a la esperanza de que “algún día” el Instituto les pueda pagar el inmueble, estarían incurriendo en una situación de inseguridad jurídica, de incerteza jurídica, que podría provocar, con el transcurso del tiempo, la pérdida de su derecho a reclamar una indemnización contra el Estado. Por ello el legislador agrario, al regular la forma de llegar a una solución del conflicto, fija plazos muy determinados, y generalmente muy cortos, para que la Administración pueda actuar con prontitud en la búsqueda de una salida pacífica al conflicto de tierras. En ese sentido, la interpretación del párrafo del artículo 94 de la Ley de Tierras que establece “Mientras el asunto esté en el Instituto no correrá el término de la prescripción para ninguna de las partes”, debe ser restrictiva, pues se supone que el Instituto debe buscar una solución al conflicto dentro del año y, si no lo hace, queda agotada la vía administrativa, y por ende comienzan a correr de nuevo los plazos de prescripción. No se trata, en consecuencia, de un acto interruptor de la prescripción, sino de una suspensión temporal, de un año, durante el cual no corre el plazo de la prescripción. Ello se confirma también de la lectura del TRANSITORIO de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización que dispone lo siguiente: “…A petición del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, los Tribunales, en resolución considerada, podrán suspender los procedimientos establecidos contra cualquier persona que hubiere sido declarada por el citado organismo poseedora en precario de tierras. Dicha suspensión podrá decretarse en cualquier fase o estado del juicio de que se trate, y por el tiempo que sea prudencialmente necesario para que el Instituto logre una solución satisfactoria del conflicto, y podrá prorrogarse, siguiendo el mismo procedimiento indicado. Solucionado el conflicto en la forma que indica el párrafo tercero del artículo 94, el Instituto lo pondrá en conocimiento de los Tribunales para que estos declaren caducas las acciones civiles y extinguidas, tanto las penales como las penas que hubieren sido dictadas contra los poseedores en precario, en condición de tales. Caso contrario, los propietarios podrán dirigirse de nuevo a los Tribunales comunes para lo cual no les correrá término alguno en su contra durante la suspensión de los procedimientos…” De ésta norma también se extraen dos conclusiones importantes, en relación con lo dispuesto en el artículo 94: En primer lugar, que luego de darse por agotada la vía administrativa en las condiciones establecidas por el artículo 94, los propietarios tienen el derecho a acudir a la vía judicial. En segundo lugar, si el Instituto continúa interviniendo en la solución del conflicto, después de transcurrido el año o pasados los 3 meses causantes del silencio administrativo, por sometimiento de las partes interesadas en el mismo, éste puede solicitar la suspención del proceso judicial, término durante el cual no correría el plazo de la prescripción; en sentido contrario, si no se interpuso el reclamo en sede judicial, sigue corriendo el plazo de la prescripción, pues en tal caso el Instituto no puede solicitarle a los Tribunales la suspención del proceso.

Como se puede concluir de lo anterior, estamos frente a un régimen especial (del Sector Público agrario), aplicable tanto a los sujetos públicos como privados, donde se regulan los plazos y modos para agotar la vía administrativa, así como las causas de interrupción o de suspensión a la eventual prescripción a que puedan estar sujetos los derechos de las partes, debiendo aplicarse éste régimen especial al caso que nos ocupa.

VIII.En el presente caso, si bien algunos reparos del recurrente contra el auto-sentencia de la parte son de recibo, pues efectivamente no se valoró adecuadamente la prueba, ni se establecen criterios claros en cuanto a determinar el período en el cual comenzó a correr el término de la prescripción, ello no puede ser, de manera alguna, motivo de nulidad, pues son aspectos perfectamente subsanables en ésta instancia, como efectivamente se ha hecho, al proceder el Tribunal a reconstruir la relación de hechos probados, conforme a lo que consta en el expediente. Por otra parte, es evidente que el caso exige un estudio profundo de la normativa agraria “publicista”, y su aplicación tanto frente a la Administración, en este caso frente al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, como respecto de sujetos privados como lo es la Sociedad actora, sin que ello signifique que el análisis sea propio de un “administrativista”, y no de un “agrarista”, pues el caso concreto exige una comprensión global de las normas tanto del derecho público como del derecho privado agrario.

IX.En el caso de marras, es evidente que ha operado la prescripción a favor de la Administración Pública y, particularmente, a favor del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. La Sociedad actora, desde 1986 sometió el conflicto de tierras a conocimiento del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. El 15 de octubre de 1987, la actora interpuso una denuncia penal por usurpación y daños, amparándose al silencio administrativo de la Institución. El 18 de octubre de 1988, cuando habían transcurrido sobradamente los tres meses de silencio administrativo (oportunidad en la cual ya quedaba abierta la vía judicial a favor de los propietarios), el Instituto declaró la existencia del conflicto de ocupación precaria de tierras. Posteriormente, la actora pidió una reconsideración y reposición, y tal solicitud fue conocida hasta el 14 de octubre de 1992, cuando el mismo Instituto revocó la declaratoria, por considerar que la resolución había sido extemporánea, y en ésta segunda resolución indicó “se AGOTA LA VIA ADMINISTRATIVA de las diligencias numeradas mil cuatrocientos uno, en que intervienen como partes Agropecuaria del Caribe Sociedad Anónima y [Nombre1] (ver folios 327-329). Dicha resolución fue notificada al Representante de Agropecuaria del Caribe el 6 de enero de 1993 (notificación de folio 329). Ese fue el acto administrativo que agotó la vía correspondiente al conflicto de ocupación precaria de tierras. Conforme a la doctrina “El acto que gota la vía administrativa o que “causa estado” es el que cierra el procedimiento administrativo, al haber sido dictado por la más alta autoridad competente –jerarca-, una vez agotados los recursos establecidos en las normas que rigen la instancia administrativa.”(JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I, Diké, 2002, pág. 303). Por lo tanto, a partir de que se configura ese presupuesto procesal, la sociedad actora tenía abierta la vía jurisdiccional para plantear cualquier reclamo frente al Estado. Se trató de un acto firme que no fue anulado, revocado o modificado, quedando expedita la vía judicial para su impugnación. La Sociedad actora, tuvo conocimiento de los hechos que motivaron la responsabilidad del Estado desde 1986 y, habiendo agotado el procedimiento administrativo en 1993 no acudió a la vía judicial. Por el contrario, la Sociedad reclamante, como lo admite en su propio recurso de apelación, siguió gestionando ante el Instituto el pago de la propiedad, pero ésta vez ya no mediante la vía del conflicto de ocupación precaria, sino ofreciendo en venta sus propiedades a la Administración (ver documentos de folios 61 a 64). Ello de ningún modo comprometía al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario a comprar el inmueble y por ende no era un acto que pudiera interrumpir la prescripción en sede judicial, pues se trata de una oferta unilateral del propietario, tal y como se indicó en ese mismo documento de oferta de venta. El plazo de la prescripción continuó su curso, hasta cumplirse definitiva e inexorablemente el día 6 de enero de 1997, fecha en que se cumplieron los 4 años establecidos en el artículo 196 de la Ley General de Administración Pública. Luego de ésta fecha, no podrían producirse actos interrruptores de una prescripción ya cumplida, salvo la renuncia a la prescripción, que en forma expresa o tácita hiciera el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario que, como veremos, no realizó tal renuncia, por el contrario alegó la prescripción. Con posterioridad a esa fecha, 6 de enero de 1997, es que la Representante de la Sociedad, en ese entonces, la señora Brenes Castro, dirige un escrito con fecha 23 de setiembre de 1997 (es decir, 7 meses después de operada la prescripción), a la Presidencia de la República, alegando la supuesta responsabilidad del Instituto, alegando daños y perjuicios y solicitando una indemnización por parte del Estado. Esa gestión abrió un nuevo expediente administrativo ante el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, pero basado en los mismos hechos que supuestamente motivaron la responsabilidad del Estado, originados desde 1987. En consecuencia, el referido reclamo administrativo, de ninguna manera, podía “reabrir” un nuevo plazo de prescripción. Así lo ha interpretado la Sala I de Casación cuando en un una situación fáctica similar dispuso: “VII.- En la especie, se tiene que la falsedad del documento en cuestión fue declarada mediante sentencia penal de fecha 13 de octubre de 1986, momento a partir del cual empezó a correr el plazo fatal de tres años, que era en ese momento del plazo de prescripción que contemplaba el artículo 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, para reclamar la eventual responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado por el hecho concreto. Cumplido el término previsto por la ley, resulta obvio, y más que eso ilógico, que pueda interrumpirse el plazo de prescripción. Interrumpir es, dice la Real Academia Española, “cortar la continuidad de una cosa en el lugar o en el tiempo”…Se interrumpe un plazo mientras está en curso, jamás cuando ya ha fenecido. Así, en el sub-lite, operada la prescripción desde el 13 de octubre de 1989, resulta imposible pensar en una “interrupción”. En consecuencia, el reclamo administrativo no pudo constituir, de ninguna manera, un acto interruptor del plazo de prescripción…” (Sala I de Casación, No. 861-F-2000 de las 15:15 horas del 16 de noviembre del 2000).

X.En el caso de marras, es evidente que si el plazo de prescripción comenzó a correr a partir de la fecha en que se tuvo por agotada la vía administrativa, circunstancia notificada a la parte el 6 de enero de 1993, y los cuatro años se cumplieron el 6 de enero de 1997, el reclamo administrativo posterior, ante la Presidencia de la República, no podría tener la virtud de “interrumpir”, ese plazo fatal que ya se había cumplido. La Sociedad accionante, en lugar de acudir a la vía judicial en reclamo de sus derechos, se mantuvo en la espera de una solución administrativa, con lo cual se fue generando una situación de inseguridad e incerteza jurídica, tanto para el Instituto, como para la misma propietaria. De esa forma, transcurrieron más de 4 AÑOS, desde enero de 1993 hasta setiembre de 1997. En fecha 13 de agosto de 1998 el Instituto decide remitir a la Sociedad actora a la vía judicial. Pero ya para esa fecha, como se indicó, había transcurrido sobradamente el término fatal de prescripción señalado por el artículo 196 de la Ley General de Administración Pública. Inclusive, aún siguiendo la tesitura de la actora, en el sentido que la norma de la prescripción aplicable fuese la del Código Civil, es decir, los 10 años, podría llegarse a concluir que si el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario conoció del conflicto desde 1986, hecho que motivó la posible responsabilidad también conocido por la actora, y no se pronunció dentro de los tres meses, desde esa fecha quedó abierta la posibilidad de la Sociedad actora para plantear cualquier reclamación, contra el Estado, en la vía judicial, pero al no hacerlo el plazo de la prescripción decenal se completó en 1997. Resulta inconcebible, en consecuencia que, por tantos años, la Sociedad demandante en este proceso, haya dejado transcurrir tanto tiempo para plantear su reclamo en la vía judicial. Su propia incuria la hace merecedora de esa sanción.

XI.Por las razones expuestas, deberán rechazarse los agravios del apelante. El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, en ningún momento renunció a la prescripción, por el contrario, la invocó expresamente como excepción al contestar la presente demanda ordinaria. Tampoco puede considerarse que los informes del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario derivados de su último reclamo administrativo favorezcan sus pretensiones o enerve el plazo de la prescripción, pues como se ha dicho, el mismo ya había operado, con creces, al plantearse el reclamo indemnizatorio tanto en sede administrativa como judicial. Finalmente, en cuanto a la aplicación del artículo 356 inciso 1 de La Ley General de Administración Pública, debe indicarse que esa norma no es aplicable en éstos casos, por cuanto la misma Ley excluyó de su aplicación, a la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, en cuanto a procedimientos administrativos se refiere (ver artículo 367.2 Ley General de Administración Pública, Decreto número 8979-P del 18 de diciembre de 1978); en consecuencia si la Ley de Tierras y Colonización establece los modos en que se da por agotada la Vía Administrativa, no podía exigirse el dictamen jurídico, como lo pretende el recurrente. Aún así en ambos casos en que el Instituto dió por agotada la vía administrativa ( 1993 y 1998), siempre se escuchó al Departamento Legal, pero con la particularidad de que para el segundo caso (1998) ya había operado el plazo prescriptivo favorable a la administración.-

XII. Por las razones expuestas en ésta instancia, se confirma el auto-sentencia apelado

POR TANTO:

Se confirma el auto-sentencia apelado.

[Nombre4] [Nombre5] [Nombre6] CBM ORDINARIO ACT:// COMPAÑÍA AGROPECUARIA DEL CARIBE S.A DEM:// I.D.A