Res. 00425-2002 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección I — Municipal sign license fee based on unconstitutional regulation

OutcomeResultado

GrantedCon lugar

The sign license fee based on Article 69 of the Public Spaces, Roads and Transport Regulation is annulled for being unconstitutional.Se anula el cobro por licencia de rótulos basado en el artículo 69 del Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte, por ser inconstitucional.

SummaryResumen

The Administrative Litigation Court annuls a fee for sign licenses imposed by the Municipality of San José, based on Article 69 of the Public Spaces, Roads and Transport Regulation, which was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber in Ruling 5503-2002. The Court reiterates that tax matters are subject to the principle of legal reserve (Article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitution), so taxes cannot be created by regulation. Although the constitutional ruling limited its effects to the future, Article 95 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law allows the annulment of administrative acts based on unconstitutional norms. The Court rejects the municipality's defenses and orders costs against the Municipality.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo anula el cobro de un impuesto por licencia de rótulos impuesto por la Municipalidad de San José, por basarse en el artículo 69 del Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte, el cual fue declarado inconstitucional por la Sala Constitucional en el Voto 5503-2002. El Tribunal reitera que en materia tributaria rige el principio de reserva de ley (artículo 121 inciso 13 de la Constitución Política), por lo que no pueden crearse tributos mediante reglamento. Aunque la sentencia de constitucionalidad limitó sus efectos a futuro, el artículo 95 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional permite la anulación de actos administrativos basados en normas inconstitucionales. El Tribunal rechaza las excepciones municipales y condena en costas a la Municipalidad.

Key excerptExtracto clave

"V.- Although the regulation of outdoor advertising or signs in the Canton of San José conforms to the Constitution and the Law, it is appropriate to analyze Article 69 of the Regulation, the application of which constitutes the central point of discussion in this case, since it is the basis of the challenged act. In tax matters, the principle of legal reserve applies, meaning that taxes can only be created by legislative mandate and, correspondingly, exemptions can only be granted by law. This principle is contained in our Constitution in Article 121, subsection 13, and developed in Article 5 of the Tax Code, so a tax —the license fee— cannot be created by regulation. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court, in Ruling 5503-2002 referred to, declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 69 of the Public Spaces, Roads and Transport Regulation of the Master Plan of the Central Canton of San José, stating: 'IX.- Tax nature of the license fee. Violation of the principle of legal reserve. Regarding the license fee provided for in the challenged Article 69, the Chamber observes that, as the Attorney General well states in her report, it is a tax not provided for or authorized by Law.' The conclusion is that Official Letter 4428 of April 2, 2001, inasmuch as it imposes on the plaintiff the payment of a license fee for the use of four signs, is based on an unconstitutional norm and is absolutely null and void under Articles 121(13) of the Constitution, 2 and 5 of the Tax Code, and 6, 132, 133, 166, and 172 of the General Public Administration Law. Although the Constitutional Chamber modulated the effects of its declaration of unconstitutionality, in the sense that by its nature it only applies prospectively and not retroactively, so as not to cause serious disruption to legal certainty, this does not prevent this Court from declaring the nullity sought in the complaint, since Article 95 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law provides that the foregoing articles —which include the rules on temporal, spatial, or material limitation of the retroactive effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality— 'shall not prevent the elimination, by absolute nullity, of administrative acts, in accordance with the General Public Administration Law'.“V.- Si bien la regulación de la publicación exterior o rótulos en el Cantón de San José, es acorde con la Constitución y la Ley, procede analizar el artículo 69 del Reglamento, cuya aplicación constituye el punto central de la discusión en este proceso, por cuanto es el fundamento del acto impugnado. En materia tributaria rige el principio de reserva de ley, lo que significa que solamente por mandato legislativo se pueden crear tributos y, correlativamente solo mediante la ley se pueden conceder exenciones. Ese principio es recogido por nuestra Constitución Política en su artículo 121 inciso 13) y desarrollado en el artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, por lo que no puede crearse un impuesto –el pago por la licencia- vía reglamentaria. Por esas razones, el Tribunal Constitucional en el Voto 5503-2002 al que se ha hecho referencia, declaró inconstitucional y anuló el artículo 69 del Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte, del Plan Director del Cantón Central de San José, indicando: “IX.- Naturaleza impositiva del pago por licencia. Violación al principio de reserva de ley. En lo que se refiere al pago por licencia previsto en el artículo 69 impugnado, observa la Sala que tal y como bien lo señala la Procuraduría en su informe, se trata de un impuesto que no está previsto ni autorizado por Ley.” La conclusión, es que el oficio 4428 del 2 de abril del 2001, en cuanto establece a cargo de la actora el pago por la licencia para la utilización de 4 rótulos, se encuentra basado en una norma inconstitucional y resulta absolutamente nulo a tenor de los artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, 2 y 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, 6, 132, 133, 166, 172 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Si bien la Sala Constitucional, dimensionó los efectos de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad pronunciada, en el sentido de que en virtud de la materia, rige sólo para el futuro y no en forma retroactiva, para no causar un grave dislocamiento a la seguridad jurídica, lo anterior no impide que aquí se declare la nulidad solicitada en la demanda, por cuanto, el artículo 95 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que lo dispuesto en los artículos que anteceden –lo que incluye la normativa sobre graduación en el espacio, el tiempo o la materia del efecto retroactivo de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad- “no impedirá la eliminación, por nulidad absoluta, de los actos administrativos, conforme con la Ley General de la Administración Pública”.

Pull quotesCitas destacadas

"En materia tributaria rige el principio de reserva de ley, lo que significa que solamente por mandato legislativo se pueden crear tributos y, correlativamente solo mediante la ley se pueden conceder exenciones."

"In tax matters, the principle of legal reserve applies, meaning that taxes can only be created by legislative mandate and, correspondingly, exemptions can only be granted by law."

Considerando V

"En materia tributaria rige el principio de reserva de ley, lo que significa que solamente por mandato legislativo se pueden crear tributos y, correlativamente solo mediante la ley se pueden conceder exenciones."

Considerando V

"La conclusión, es que el oficio 4428 del 2 de abril del 2001, en cuanto establece a cargo de la actora el pago por la licencia para la utilización de 4 rótulos, se encuentra basado en una norma inconstitucional y resulta absolutamente nulo."

"The conclusion is that Official Letter 4428 of April 2, 2001, inasmuch as it imposes on the plaintiff the payment of a license fee for the use of four signs, is based on an unconstitutional norm and is absolutely null and void."

Considerando V

"La conclusión, es que el oficio 4428 del 2 de abril del 2001, en cuanto establece a cargo de la actora el pago por la licencia para la utilización de 4 rótulos, se encuentra basado en una norma inconstitucional y resulta absolutamente nulo."

Considerando V

"Si bien la Sala Constitucional, dimensionó los efectos de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad pronunciada, en el sentido de que en virtud de la materia, rige sólo para el futuro y no en forma retroactiva, […] lo anterior no impide que aquí se declare la nulidad solicitada en la demanda."

"Although the Constitutional Chamber modulated the effects of its declaration of unconstitutionality, in the sense that by its nature it only applies prospectively and not retroactively, […] this does not prevent this Court from declaring the nullity sought in the complaint."

Considerando V

"Si bien la Sala Constitucional, dimensionó los efectos de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad pronunciada, en el sentido de que en virtud de la materia, rige sólo para el futuro y no en forma retroactiva, […] lo anterior no impide que aquí se declare la nulidad solicitada en la demanda."

Considerando V

Full documentDocumento completo

1 No. 425-2002 FIRST SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at ten hours twenty minutes on the twenty-ninth of November of two thousand two.

Contentious administrative proceeding –special tax proceeding– filed by IMPORTADORA DE AZULEJOS Y PISO CERÁMICO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, represented by Nombre34904, chemical engineer, resident of Heredia, against the MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ, in the person of its general judicial representative Ana Cecilia González Soto, resident of San Francisco de Dos Ríos. Erick Gatgens Gómez and Adrián Fernández Rodríguez, both residents of San José, also intervene as special judicial representatives of the plaintiff. With the exception noted, the persons mentioned are of legal age, married, and attorneys.

WHEREAS:

1)That, set at an unquantifiable amount, the complaint seeks a judgment: "1)- That the charge issued by the Municipalidad de San José, Urban Inspection Section, contained in Resolution 4428-R dated April 2, 2001, related to the charge for the use of signs (uso de rótulos), as established by the Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes, published in Supplement No. 70 to La Gaceta No. 186 of September 24, 1999, be revoked as improper. The foregoing because said charge is contrary to the constitutional provisions established in Articles 1, 34, 121 Subsection 13 of the Political Constitution and Article 4 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. 2)- That the defendant be ordered to pay both costs of this action." 2) That the representative of the Municipalidad de San José answered the complaint negatively and opposed the defenses of lack of right and the generic defense of sine actione agit.
3)That the applicable requirements have been observed in the proceedings, and no errors or omissions that must be corrected are noted; therefore, judgment is rendered within the term of law.

Judge Víquez Cerdas writes; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- PROVEN FACTS: Of importance for resolving this matter, the following is deemed well proven: 1.- That through official letter No. 4428 R of April 2, 2001, the Urban Inspection Section of the Municipalidad de San José, notified the plaintiff that, pursuant to Article 65 of the "Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes" published in Supplement No. 70 to La Gaceta No. 186 of September 24, 1999, "YOU MUST OBTAIN A LICENSE FOR SIGN(S) 4 signs (sic) that joined together measure 35 m long by 1.10 m wide, attached to the facade, single-faced, opaque, operational. Note: you must demonstrate that you pay for signs (sic)" In observations it was indicated: "Including in accordance with Article 14 subsection A of Ley 4898 the payment of the municipal business license (patente) and the consequent closure of the business". (folio 6 of the administrative file); 2.- That on April 16, 2001, the plaintiff's representative filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against official letter No. 4428 R (folios 1 to 4 and 7 of the administrative file); 3.- That through official letter No. 28-R-SIU-01 of June 27, 2001, the Urban Inspection Section of the Municipalidad de San José, based on official letter from the Legal Department No. 2938-DAL-2001 of June 19, rejected the motion for reconsideration, forwarding the appeal to the Mayor (folio 17 of the administrative file); 4.- That in official letter 4669 of July 4, 2001, supplemented by No. 5665 of August of that same year, the Mayor of San José rejected the appeal and declared the administrative remedies exhausted (folios 19 and 22 of the administrative file) II.- The plaintiff's legal representative states that there is no legal norm supporting the tax charge for the use of signs (rótulos), given that it is based on a regulation, which violates the principle of legality. He adds that it is not true that the Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes is based on Article 29 of the Ley de Construcciones, on the planning powers the Municipality possesses regarding urban planning, in relation to Articles 15 and 19 of the Código Municipal or the Ley de Planificación Urbana. He considers that, while it is true that municipalities have a series of powers to regulate city planning, this does not authorize them to create a tax via regulation, because legislative approval is required; therefore, the Municipalidad de San José is unable to establish a quantum for fixing a tax for the use of signs. He points out that although Article 29 of the Ley de Construcciones establishes the need to have a municipal license to place a sign, the law does not create a tax for that concept. On the other hand, he states that Article 81 of the Regulation suffers from a defect of unconstitutionality by having a retroactive effect in violation of acquired rights and Article 34 of the Political Constitution. Finally, he indicates that the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated, because the imposition of payment for a license for signs constitutes a double charge for the same taxable event, since the municipal business license (patente) involves the use of the premises, including the signs.

III.- The representative of the Municipalidad de San José defends the legality of the acts challenged here, indicating they have their legal basis in Article 29 of the Ley de Construcciones and in the planning powers the Municipality possesses in matters of urban planning. Citing an opinion from the Procuraduría General de la República, she points out that a regulation can develop limitations authorized by law, because the principle of legal reserve is not absolute, and the delegation technique can operate, provided it does not contain limitations neither authorized nor contemplated in the law; in the specific case, the requirements, restrictions, deadlines, and sanctions established by Articles 66, 67, 68, 70 to 79 of the Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes of the Municipalidad de San José are based on Article 29 of the Ley de Construcciones, as well as Articles 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the same legal body. It is added that Article 69 of the Regulation establishes the payment of a license, which is supported by Articles 78 and 79 of the Ley de Construcciones, which state that all licenses shall incur fees, which must be paid for them to take effect; furthermore, Article 70 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana authorizes municipalities to establish taxes for the purposes of that law. She points out that the business license tax (impuesto de patente) taxes the lucrative activity carried out, whereas the license for the sign is for outdoor advertising, so there is no double charge. Regarding the retroactive application of the Regulation, any unconstitutionality, if it exists, has not been declared, so the norm must be applied as it is. Finally, it is indicated that what is being settled here is a matter of constitutionality, which only the Constitutional Chamber is competent to hear and resolve.

IV.- Regarding the installation of outdoor advertising and operational signs (rótulos de funcionamiento) in the Cantón de San José, the Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte issued by the Municipal Council of the Cantón Central de San José, in firm agreement No. 6, article VI, session No. 92, held on September 7, 1999, and published in Supplement No. 70 to La Gaceta No. 186 of September 24, 1999, provides in pertinent part:

"Article 65.- Licenses. To place, replace, remodel, and exhibit advertisements, signs, placards, notices, and other typologies (hereinafter Signs (Rótulos)) a license must be requested from the Municipality.

Article 66.- Sign categories. Outdoor advertising shall be classified by category according to its characteristics, to which a Visual Impact Coefficient (Coeficiente de Incidencia Visual, CIV) corresponds, which shall be used to calculate the amount corresponding to the payment for its License see (article 97). The categories are the following (…)

Article 67.- License term. The license for placing any type of sign, except for temporary signs, shall be valid for a period of two years, after which its renewal must be requested, complying with the application requirements. The license may be renewed, subject to a municipal inspection to ascertain the state, characteristics, and quantity of existing signs at the particular site where the sign is located. Should there be any alteration in its conditions: unauthorized alterations made after its placement, poor condition due to lack of maintenance, or, if in any aspect it violates this Regulation, its renewal shall not be authorized. The owner shall be notified and must proceed within the indicated period to comply with the law.(…)

Article 68.- Sanctions, license cancellation. The Municipality may cancel the license for an outdoor advertising advertisement or sign, and order its removal or demolition at the owner's expense when unauthorized modifications have been made by the Municipality, when they are failing to comply with the provisions of this Regulation, or when at the time of on-site inspection the owner or lessee of the premises or site where the signs are located does not present to the inspector the renewed sign license receipt issued by the Municipalidad de San José (Department of Patentes or responsible party).

Based on Law number 6890 (art. 14), in case of non-compliance with this Outdoor Advertising Regulation, the Municipality shall sanction offenders with the cancellation of the municipal license or business license (patente) and with the closure of the commercial establishment until they comply with the law. Previously, the transgressor must be notified, who shall have a term of thirty business days to comply with the law.

The Penal Code (art. 386, subsection 2) sanctions with a penalty of three to thirty days' fine, anyone who, for advertisement or propaganda purposes and without permission from the owner or possessor or the respective authority, as applicable, writes or draws drawings or emblems or affixes papers or posters on the exterior part of a construction, public or private building, dwelling house, or wall.

Article 69.- License Payment. The payment is calculated for each square meter of advertising message. The corresponding payment shall be made every two years at the Municipality's cashier offices or may be automatically charged to the municipal services or business license (patentes) payment receipt. A Special Fee shall be applied for the occupation of public space through the projection of the advertising message, according to the following formula:

Where: TE= TB (CZ.CC) CIV. (CL) TB Base Rate which corresponds to a fixed amount of one thousand colones per square meter of advertising message, which shall be weighted by the following coefficients. This rate shall be updated annually, according to the increase in the general consumer price index.

CZ= Zone Coefficient CC= Classification Coefficient CIV= Visual Impact Coefficient CL= Luminosity Coefficient CZ= Within the zone coefficient there are two classifications (CZ1) Zone coefficient 1, which corresponds to special control zones; and (CZ2) Zone coefficient 2, which corresponds to the rest of the canton. Their value corresponds to 1.5 and 1.0 respectively.

CC= Within the classification coefficient there are three classifications (CC1)= Classification coefficient 1, which corresponds to the operational (funcionamiento) message, equivalent to a value of 1.0; (CC2): Classification coefficient 2, which corresponds to the mixed sign, whose value is 1.25; (CC3): Classification coefficient 3, which corresponds to the advertising sign and its equivalent value of 1.5.

CIV= Visual Impact Coefficient: This coefficient corresponds to the sign categories indicated in article 94 of this Regulation and the coefficient values shall be those indicated in article 94. Each side of the sign counts independently for the calculation of the Fee.

The corresponding payment shall be made every two years or quarterly at the cashier offices of the Municipalidad de San José.

Article 70.- Requirements for license application. Every license application and renewal shall be resolved by the Department of Patentes of the Municipality, prior approval from the Urban Control Department thereof. The following documents shall be submitted: (…)

This regulation and, in general, Articles 67 to 79 of the Regulation in question were the subject of a study by the Constitutional Chamber, which in ruling No. 5503-2002 of 14:34 hours on June 5, 2002, stated that pursuant to Article 45 of the Political Constitution, it is possible to establish limitations of social interest on property through regulatory plans and Urban Planning Law, provided they are of a general nature and do not empty the content of the private property right; that such limitations are a product of the very fact of being part of a community, with the aim of achieving an optimal and harmonious enjoyment of the rights of all individuals. The Chamber added that "outdoor advertising is indeed an activity capable of causing harm to third parties, to morals, and to public order; because it directly affects the right of every individual to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and the State's power to regulate matters relating to urban planning. From that perspective, the legitimacy of the restriction of the right to property and freedom of commerce produced by the questioned regulation must be taken as a first premise," municipalities being competent for urban planning. Specifically regarding the regulation at issue here, it stated:

"VII.- Legal basis of the challenged regulation. Inexistence of a violation of the principle of legal reserve.

In none of the challenged rules are limitations established that prevent the exercise of freedom of commerce and the right to property. The essential content of those rights is not affected; rather, what is done is to regulate their exercise. Furthermore, the regulation is based on the competence conferred upon it by norms of legal rank. First, it must be borne in mind that the Código Municipal, in Articles 15 and 19, recognizes the competence of municipalities to plan and control urban development, as indicated in the previous recital. For its part, Law of Constructions number 833 of November second, nineteen hundred forty-nine, regarding the requirements for the outdoor advertising license, restrictions, terms, and sanctions, in its Articles 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 indicates:

Article 29.- License. To place or affix advertisements, signs, placards, or notices, a license must be requested from the Municipality. The license shall be requested by the owner of the structure on which the advertisement is to be affixed and with the consent of the owner of the land on which the structure is placed when applicable. In cases where frameworks or structures are used, the Municipality shall require a responsible expert to be in charge of the construction. A dimensioned sketch showing the inscriptions or figures to be placed shall be required.

Article 30.- Prohibition. Advertisements that cross the public thoroughfare are prohibited, as well as those placed using public service posts or trees in parks or gardens.

Article 31.- The Municipality has the power to limit the surface area that an advertisement or a set of advertisements may occupy on a facade and to disallow its placement.

Article 32.- Prohibitions. It is strictly prohibited to affix or paint advertisements, announcements, programs, etc., of any class and material, in the following places:

a)Public buildings, schools, and temples.
b)Buildings cataloged by the Municipality as national monuments.
c)Posts, lighting lampposts, kiosks, fountains, trees, sidewalks, curbs, in general ornamental elements of squares and promenades, parks, and streets.
d)Private houses and fences.
e)On third-party boards.
f)At a distance of less than thirty (30) centimeters in any direction from street nomenclature plates.
g)In places where they obstruct visibility for traffic.
h)On hills, rocks, trees, where it may affect the panoramic perspective or the harmony of a landscape.

Article 33.- Sanctions. The Municipality shall impose fines of ten (10) to one hundred (100) colones for violations of the rules of this Chapter, and shall order the dismantling and removal, at the owner's expense, of advertisements and related structures it deems inconvenient or dangerous.

Likewise, Article 14 of Law number 6890 of September fourteenth, nineteen hundred eighty-three, states:

Article 14.- The Executive Branch and the following state entities are authorized, for what is indicated in each case: […] To all Municipalities of the Country: a) So that in all cases of non-compliance with the Sign Regulation, offenders are sanctioned with the cancellation of the municipal license or business license (patente) and with the closure of the commercial establishment.

Previously, the transgressor must be notified, who shall have a term of five business days to comply with the law." In addition to said regulation, the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente states regarding environmental pollution and specifically regarding visual pollution:

"Article 59.- Environmental Pollution.- Pollution is understood as any alteration or modification of the environment that may harm human health, threaten natural resources, or affect the environment in general of the Nation. The discharge and emission of pollutants shall be obligatorily adjusted to the technical regulations issued. The State shall adopt the measures necessary to prevent or correct environmental pollution." "Article 71.- Visual Pollution.- Actions, works, or installations that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum admissible limits established by technical norms issued or to be issued in the future shall be considered visual pollution.

The Executive Branch shall dictate the appropriate measures and promote their execution through the organisms, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of pollution." Together with what is provided in those norms, the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, in Article 205 of the Law, establishes:

"Article 205.- Advertisements and signs placed for advertising purposes on lands adjacent to public roads and in places that may affect visibility, safety, or the panoramic perspective may only be placed outside the road right-of-way and in strict accordance with what is provided by the regulation on this matter…" These are the norms that the Municipality regulates with respect to outdoor advertising and within the scope of its competence in the administration of local interests and services; wherewith, the Chamber confirms that no violation of the principle of legality and legal reserve is observed. Article 69 of the Regulation is excepted, as it establishes a license payment not provided for in the Law nor approved as such. In this regard, in recital IX of this ruling, the respective analysis will be made.

VIII.- Reasonableness analysis of the norms The plaintiff points out that the challenged regulation harms the principle of reasonableness and proportionality of norms. To arrive at that conclusion, he starts from the following premises: a) The imposition of licenses for advertising signs finds no legal support. In relation to this issue, it has already been established not only that the Municipality has the constitutional and legal competence to regulate all matters relating to outdoor advertising that affects the administration and governance of local interests and services; but also that there are norms of legal rank that regulate and restrict that activity. The Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte merely develops what is provided in the norms, without contradicting, exceeding, or in any way supplanting their essential content.

b)It concerns private activity that should not be subject to restrictions unless it endangers public health or safety. Outdoor advertising transcends that sphere of freedom in private actions, because the rights of third parties, public order, and potentially morals are directly affected. This is because it has to do with every person's right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and with urban planning, which must occur as a process tending to procure health, safety, comfort, and well-being for the community in general. Consequently, under the terms of Article 28 of the Constitution, the limitation and regulation of the exercise of that activity is legitimate.
c)It harms the right to property, as it restricts the free use of a construction. As analyzed, the right to private property is neither absolute nor unrestricted. Its social function makes it necessary and reasonable to impose limitations on its exercise for the sake of the common good. The challenged norms do not absolutely prohibit the placement of signs on private property; what they do is regulate and limit the activity, according to technical criteria that guarantee respect for legal rights, such as safety, the right to a healthy environment, physical integrity, among others.
d)It harms freedom of commerce. The challenged articles also do not infringe on freedom of commerce because they do not denature it; what they do is restrict and limit a particular aspect of that freedom, namely the right of outdoor advertising, insofar as the rights of third parties, public order, and potentially morals are affected.
e)The technical reasonableness test imposed by Constitutional Law is not satisfied. In relation to the principle of reasonableness of norms, this Chamber has stated:

"Constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering the principle of reasonableness as a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth recalling, firstly, that the 'reasonableness of law' was born as part of 'substantive due process of law,' a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in line with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the initial conception, 'due process' was directed at the procedural review of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, it overcame that procedural conception that gave it origin and rose to an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of freedom, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The overcoming of 'due process' as a procedural guarantee is basically due to the fact that a law that has complied with the established procedure and is valid and effective can also harm Constitutional Law. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, US doctrine invites an examination, firstly, of the so-called 'technical reasonableness,' within which the specific norm (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once established that the chosen norm is adequate to regulate a particular matter, it must be examined whether there is proportionality between the means chosen and the aim sought. Having passed the 'technical reasonableness' criterion, one must analyze 'legal reasonableness.' For which this doctrine proposes examining: a) weight-based reasonableness, which is a type of legal assessment resorted to when, faced with the existence of a certain antecedent (e.g., income), a certain obligation is demanded (e.g., tax), in which case it must be established whether it is equivalent or proportionate; b) reasonableness of equality, is the type of legal assessment that starts from the principle that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness in the aim: at this point, it is evaluated whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the purposes provided in the constitution. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and size of the limitation that a personal right must bear by that means. Thus, if the same end can be reached by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. It was in ruling number 01739-92, of eleven hours forty-five minutes on July first, nineteen hundred ninety-two, where an attempt was first made to define this principle, in the following manner:

'Reasonableness as a parameter of constitutional interpretation. But a further step was taken in Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition when the concept of due process was extended to what in that tradition is known as substantive due process of law, which, in reality, although it does not refer to any procedural matter, constituted an ingenious mechanism devised by the Supreme Court of the United States to affirm its jurisdiction over the federated states, in line with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, but which among us, especially in the absence of that need, would simply be equivalent to the principle of reasonableness of laws and other norms or public, or even private, acts, as a requirement of their own constitutional validity, meaning they must conform, not only to the specific norms or precepts of the Constitution, but also to the sense of justice contained therein, which implies, in turn, the fulfillment of fundamental demands of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, the latter understood as suitability to achieve the proposed ends, the supposed principles, and the presupposed values in Constitutional Law.

Hence, laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity, not only having been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures, but also passing the substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, freedom, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with its object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially to the rights and freedoms recognized or supposed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society.' German doctrine made an important contribution to the topic of 'reasonableness' by successfully identifying, in a very clear manner, its components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, ideas it develops, affirming that they have already been recognized by our constitutional jurisprudence:

'… Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective intended with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such an objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person; and proportionality in the strict sense dictates that apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'demandable' from the individual... (Ruling of this Chamber number 03933-98, of nine hours fifty-nine minutes on June twelfth, nineteen hundred ninety-eight).

In judgment number 08858-98, at sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes on the fifteenth of December, nineteen ninety-eight, it was recently developed, a resolution in which the guidelines for its analysis were indicated, both for administrative acts and for general rules:

Thus, an act that limits rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it essential to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiation measure. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or does not fulfill the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate to us that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of a markedly greater magnitude than the benefit intended to be obtained thereby for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second stems from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed." Finally, recently, in judgment number 05236-99, at fourteen hours on the seventh of July, nineteen ninety-nine, upon mentioning the principle of constitutional reasonableness (principio de razonabilidad constitucional) as a constitutional parameter, it is done in a practical manner, that is, with a view to being able to carry out the constitutional review of the rules and/or acts challenged before this Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional); "In the sense of the criterion set forth above, this Chamber has been applying the institution in its jurisprudence. Let us now look at the analysis of the specific case. Regarding the proof of 'reasonableness': To undertake a reasonableness review of a rule, the Constitutional Court requires that the party provide proof or at least elements of judgment on which to base its argument, and the same procedural burden corresponds to whoever rebuts the arguments of the action, and the failure to comply with these requirements makes the claims of unconstitutionality unacceptable. The foregoing is due to the fact that it is not possible to perform an analysis of 'reasonableness' without the existence of a coherent line of argument that is supported by evidence. This, of course, when it does not involve cases whose 'unreasonableness' is evident and manifest." (Judgment 2000-02858 at fifteen hours fifty-four minutes on the twenty-ninth of March, two thousand) The claimant states that the challenged rules are unreasonable because less harmful measures could have been used for the exercise of freedoms. However, he does not specify which of the limitations or requirements he refers to, nor does he indicate in what that dissatisfaction with technical reasonableness consists. He also does not provide proof or elements of judgment that would allow a review of the reasonableness of the questioned rules. In general terms, without entering into a particularized analysis of each of the challenged rules (given the claimant's omission), this Chamber considers that the challenged regulations are adequate and suitable for regulating the matter and, furthermore, necessary, since they aim at the regulation and control of outdoor advertising (publicidad exterior), not only for reasons of urban planning (planificación urbana), but also for the due respect for the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment." V.- Although the regulation of outdoor advertising or signs (rótulos) in the Canton of San José (Cantón de San José) is in accordance with the Constitution and the Law, it is appropriate to analyze Article 69 of the Regulation (Reglamento), whose application constitutes the central point of discussion in this proceeding, as it is the basis of the challenged act. In tax matters, the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva de ley) applies, which means that taxes (tributos) can only be created by legislative mandate and, correlatively, exemptions can only be granted by law. This principle is embodied in our Political Constitution (Constitución Política) in its Article 121 subsection 13) and developed in Article 5 of the Tax Rules and Procedures Code (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), therefore, a tax –the payment for the license (licencia)– cannot be created via regulation. The hierarchy of sources of the tax legal system (Article 2 of the Tax Rules and Procedures Code) and of the administrative legal system (Article 6 of the General Law on Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública), means that administrative acts –and the regulations issued by the Administrations are such– are subject to the principle of legal reserve, therefore they cannot regulate or modify matters reserved to the law, as is the case with taxes. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court in Voto 5503-2002 to which reference has been made, declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 69 of the Regulation on Public Spaces, Roads, and Transport (Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte), of the Master Plan for the Central Canton of San José (Plan Director del Cantón Central de San José), stating:

"IX.- Tax nature of the license payment. Violation of the principle of legal reserve. Regarding the license payment provided for in the challenged Article 69, the Chamber observes that, as the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría) rightly points out in its report, it is a tax that is neither provided for nor authorized by Law. Regarding the nature of the patent tax (tributo por patente), it has been stated:

'As the action questions the application of the so-called patent tax (impuesto de patente)—which taxes any for-profit activity carried out in the Canton of Buenos Aires (articles 96 and 98 Municipal Code, Código Municipal)—specifically, the one charged on pineapple production, it is essential to point out some important notes on this matter. Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act that enables the individual to carry out the respective activity, and the payment of the tax, properly speaking, which is called by the name of patent. The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is the traditional one in the field of Municipal Law, which defines it as the imperative need to cover the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality; that is, that commercial businesses or for-profit activities, according to the nomenclature used by our Municipal Code, are highly benefited with safety, order, cleanliness, and municipal activity in general, so they must contribute to the Local Government. In doctrine, patent or tax on for-profit activity is called those that tax businesses on the basis of more or less easily determined external characteristics, without there being a single system in this regard. On the contrary, the systems for imposing this tax are the most varied, but they do have certain common characteristics. This is why the patent tax laws differ from one municipality to another, and the tax bases can be equally varied, such as for example on gross profits, gross sales, based on categories or classes, or, a minimum and a maximum patent.

III- From the viewpoint of Tax Law doctrine, its most important legal principles are: a) the legality of taxation, also known as legal reserve; or what is the same, the exclusive regulation of tax activity by formal law; b) the principle of equality before tax and public charges, which alludes to the need to ensure the same treatment for those in analogous situations (a concept more related to materiality than to formality); this principle allows the formation of different categories, to the extent that they are reasonable, which in turn requires total exclusion of arbitrary discriminations; c) that of generality, which implies that persons or singularly determined assets should not be affected by the tax, since in such a case the taxes acquire a persecutory character or one of odious or illegitimate discrimination. Put another way, the tax must be conceived in such a way that any person whose situation coincides with the one indicated as the taxable event (hecho generador) will be subject to the tax. For the specific case, there is no doubt that the tax was authorized by a law, and what is appropriate is to analyze whether the differentiation alleged by the claimant and which comes from the aforementioned patent law is reasonable or if, on the contrary, it creates arbitrary discrimination against her.' (Judgment 1992-02197 at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the eleventh of August, nineteen ninety-two) The principle of legal reserve in tax matters is of a constitutional nature and is entirely applicable to the payment of municipal licenses or patents. While it is true that an original municipal taxing power is recognized, by virtue of the autonomy that the Constitution itself confers on those Entities; it is necessary to have the authorization of the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), as indicated by Article 121 subsection 13) of the Constitution:

'Repeatedly, this Court has indicated that the autonomy of the municipalities derives from the provisions of Article 170 of the Political Constitution, a principle from which emanates the municipal taxing or fiscal power to obtain the necessary income and to cover the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality, provided that they comply with the necessary legal procedures, and are manifested in taxes that are subject to the constitutional principles specific to that matter; in such a way that the Legislative Assembly only issues a "typically tutelary act of authorization" in this matter, when exercising the power conferred upon it by subsection 13) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, so that the initiative for the creation, modification, or extinction of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, as well as the power to exempt from municipal taxes (in this sense, see, among others, judgments number 1631-91, at fifteen hours fifteen minutes on the twenty-first of August, nineteen ninety-one; 0140-94, at fifteen hours fifty-one minutes on the eleventh of January, nineteen ninety-four; 2494-94, at fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the twelfth of July, nineteen ninety-four; 4496-94; 4497-94, at fifteen hours thirty-nine minutes on the twenty-third of August, nineteen ninety-four; 4510-94, at fourteen hours fifty-one minutes on the twenty-fourth of August, nineteen ninety-four; 4512-94, at fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on the twenty-fourth of August, nineteen ninety-four; 6362-94, at fifteen hours thirty-nine minutes on the first of November, nineteen ninety-four; 1269-95, fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on the seventh of March, nineteen ninety-five; 2311-95, at sixteen hours twelve minutes on the ninth of May, nineteen ninety-five; 2631-95, at sixteen hours three minutes on the twenty-third of May, nineteen ninety-five; 1974-96, at nine hours on the thirtieth of April, nineteen ninety-six; and 4982-96, at ten hours twelve minutes on the twentieth of September, nineteen ninety-six).

'Municipalities do not make a mere proposal to the Legislative Assembly, but must be able to submit to it true tax fixations. This means that the municipal tax act is terminal and definitive, creator of the tax in a tax procedure opened for that purpose by each municipality, not initial in a presumed legislative procedure with the same function, as if it were a simple proposal subject to the constitutive and free will of the legislator. Consequently, the municipal tax fixation frames the matter of the legislative pronouncement, whose function is tutelary and not constitutive of the municipal tax, and whose consequent result can only be the authorization or rejection of what is proposed, not the substitution of the municipal will' (judgment number 1631-91, supra cited).

This competence is established in Article 68 of the current Municipal Code which provides:

'The municipality shall agree on its respective budgets, propose its taxes (tributos) to the Legislative Assembly, and set the rates and prices for municipal services. Only the municipality, following a law authorizing it, may decree exemptions from the indicated taxes.' Likewise, from the autonomy of these corporations derives the possibility of administering their resources, as each local government is free to define the limits of its own taxing power, hence the systems of municipal tax imposition for their specific collection and application are the most varied.' (Judgment 1999-05445 at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the fourteenth of July, nineteen ninety-nine) In application of the foregoing, Article 69 must be declared unconstitutional insofar as it provides for a license payment, for not having the due authorization of the Legislative Assembly, in violation of the principle of legal reserve in tax matters" The conclusion is that official communication (oficio) 4428 of April 2, 2001, insofar as it establishes, at the plaintiff's charge, the payment for the license to use 4 signs, is based on an unconstitutional rule and is absolutely null and void pursuant to Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, 2 and 5 of the Tax Rules and Procedures Code, 6, 132, 133, 166, 172 of the General Law on Public Administration. Although the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) dimensioned the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality pronounced, meaning that by virtue of the matter, it applies only for the future and not retroactively, so as not to cause serious disruption to legal certainty, the foregoing does not prevent the nullity requested in the complaint from being declared here, since Article 95 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that the provisions of the preceding articles –which include the regulations on the graduation in space, time, or matter of the retroactive effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality– "shall not prevent the elimination, by absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta), of administrative acts, in accordance with the General Law on Public Administration" VI.- Consequently, the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho) and the generic defense of sine actione agit must be rejected, to grant the complaint.

VII.- The general principle of awarding costs (costas) against the losing party must be followed (Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Código Procesal Civil)

POR TANTO:

The defenses of lack of right and sine actione agit are rejected. The complaint is granted, and consequently, the charge for the use of signs (rótulos), made by the Municipality of San José, Urban Inspection Section (Sección de Inspección Urbana) as recorded in official communication (oficio) 4428-R of April 2, two thousand one, is annulled. Both costs (costas) of the proceeding are to be borne by the Municipality of San José.

Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez Cristina Víquez Cerdas Hubert Fernández Argüello Special Tax Proceeding Importadora de Azulejos y Piso Cerámico vs. the Municipality of San José.

Citing an opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), it notes that a regulation may develop limitations authorized by law, because the principle of legal reservation (reserva de ley) is not absolute, and the technique of delegation may operate, provided it does not contain limitations not authorized or contemplated in the law; in the specific case, the requirements, restrictions, deadlines, and sanctions established by Articles 66, 67, 68, 70 to 79 of the Public Spaces, Roadways, and Transportation Regulation (Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes) of the Municipality of San José are grounded in Article 29 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), as well as Articles 30, 31, 32, and 33 of that same legal body. It adds that Article 69 of the Regulation establishes the payment of a license, which is supported by Articles 78 and 79 of the Construction Law, which state that all licenses shall incur fees, which must be paid for them to take effect; furthermore, Article 70 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) authorizes municipalities to establish taxes for the purposes of that law. It notes that the business license tax (impuesto de patente) taxes the lucrative activity carried out, while the license for the sign (rótulo) is for outdoor advertising, and therefore there is no double charging.

Regarding the retroactive application of the Regulation, any unconstitutionality, if it exists, has not been declared, so the rule must be applied as it stands.

Finally, it is indicated that what is being settled here is a matter of constitutionality, which only the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) is competent to hear and resolve.

IV.- Regarding the installation of outdoor advertising and business signs in the Canton of San José, the Public Spaces, Roadways, and Transportation Regulation issued by the Municipal Council of the Central Canton of San José, in final agreement No. 6, article VI, session No. 92, held on September 7, 1999, and published in Supplement No. 70 to La Gaceta No. 186 of September 24, 1999, provides in pertinent part:

"Article 65.- Licenses. To place, replace, remodel, and display advertisements, signs, placards, notices, and other typologies (hereinafter Signs (Rótulos)), a license must be requested from the Municipality.

Article 66.- Categories of signs. Outdoor advertising shall be classified by categories according to its characteristics, to which a Visual Incidence Coefficient (Coeficiente de Incidencia Visual, CIV) corresponds, which shall be used to calculate the amount corresponding to the payment for its License, see (Article 97). The categories are as follows (…)

Article 67.- License term. The license for the placement of any type of sign, except for temporary signs, shall be valid for a period of two years, after which its renewal must be requested, complying with the application requirements. The license may be renewed, after a municipal inspection to ascertain the condition, characteristics, and quantity of signs existing at the particular site where the sign is located. Should there be any alteration in its conditions: unauthorized alterations made after its placement, poor conditions due to lack of maintenance, or if it violates this Regulation in any aspect, its renewal shall not be authorized. The owner shall be notified and must proceed within the indicated period to comply with the law.(…)

Article 68.- Sanctions, cancellation of licenses. The Municipality may cancel the license for an outdoor advertising advertisement or sign (rótulo), and order its removal or demolition at the owner's expense when modifications have been made to it without the Municipality's authorization, when it is failing to comply with the provisions of this Regulation, or when at the time of the on-site inspection the owner or lessee of the premises or site where the signs are located does not present to the inspector the renewed sign license receipt issued by the Municipality of San José (Department of Licenses (Patentes) or responsible party).

Based on Law number 6890 (art. 14), in case of non-compliance with this Outdoor Advertising Regulation, the Municipality shall sanction violators with the cancellation of the municipal license or patent (patente municipal) and with the closure of the commercial establishment until they comply with the law. The transgressor must be previously notified, who shall have a term of thirty business days to comply with the law.

The Penal Code (Código Penal) (art. 386, subsection 2) sanctions with a penalty of three to thirty days’ fine, anyone who, for advertising or propaganda purposes and without the permission of the owner or possessor or the respective authority, as applicable, writes or draws drawings or emblems or affixes papers or posters on the exterior part of a construction, public or private building, dwelling house, or wall.

Article 69.- Payment for license. The payment is calculated for each square meter of advertising message. The corresponding payment shall be made every two years at the Municipality's cashiers or may be automatically charged to the payment receipt for municipal services or business license taxes (patentes). A Special Fee (Tasa Especial) shall be applied for the occupation of public space with the projection of the advertising message, according to the following formula:

Where: TE= TB (CZ.CC) CIV. (CL) TB Base fee (Tasa base) corresponding to a fixed amount of one thousand colones per square meter of advertising message, which shall be weighted by the following coefficients. This fee shall be updated annually, according to the increase in the general consumer price index.

CZ= Zone coefficient (Coeficiente de zona) CC= Classification coefficient (Coeficiente de clasificación) CIV= Visual incidence coefficient CL= Luminosity coefficient (Coeficiente de luminosidad) CZ= Within the zone coefficient there are two classifications (CZ1) Zone coefficient 1, corresponding to special control zones; and (CZ2) Zone coefficient 2, corresponding to the rest of the canton. Their value corresponds to 1.5 and 1.0 respectively.

CC= Within the classification coefficient there are three classifications (CC1)= Classification coefficient 1, corresponding to the business operating message, equivalent to a value of 1.0; (CC2): Classification coefficient 2, corresponding to the mixed sign (rótulo mixto), whose value is 1.25; (CC3): Classification coefficient 3, corresponding to the advertising sign (rótulo publicitario) and its equivalent value is 1.5.

CIV= Visual incidence coefficient: This coefficient corresponds to the sign categories, indicated in Article 94 of this Regulation and the coefficient values shall be those indicated in Article 94. Each face of the sign counts independently for the calculation of the Special Fee (T.E.)

The corresponding payment shall be made every two years or quarterly at the cashiers of the Municipality of San José.

Article 70.- Requirements for license application. Every license and renewal application shall be resolved by the Department of Licenses of the Municipality, with the prior approval of the Department of Urban Control of the same. The following documents shall be submitted: (…)

That regulation and, in general, Articles 67 to 79 of the Regulation of interest, were the subject of study by the Constitutional Chamber, which in judgment No. 5503-2002 of 2:34 p.m. on June 5, 2002, stated that in accordance with Article 45 of the Political Constitution, it is possible to establish social interest limitations on property, through regulatory plans and Urban Planning Law, provided they are of a general nature and do not empty the content of the private property right; that such limitations are a product of the very fact of being part of a community, with the aim of achieving optimal and harmonious enjoyment of the rights of all individuals. The Chamber added that “outdoor advertising is indeed an activity capable of causing harm to third parties, to morals, and to public order; because it directly affects every individual's right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and the State's power to regulate matters concerning urban planning. From that perspective, the legitimacy of the restriction of the right to property and freedom of commerce produced by the questioned regulations must be taken as a first premise,” with urban planning being the competence of the municipalities. Specifically regarding the regulations of interest here, it indicated:

“VII.- Legal foundation of the challenged regulation. Nonexistence of a violation of the principle of legal reservation (principio de reserva de ley) None of the challenged rules establish limitations that prevent the exercise of freedom of commerce and the right to property. The essential content of those rights is not affected; rather, what is done is to regulate their exercise. Furthermore, the regulation is based on the competence conferred by rules of legal rank. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), in Articles 15 and 19, recognizes the competence of municipalities to plan and control urban development, as indicated in the preceding recital (considerando). For its part, the Construction Law number 833 of November second, nineteen forty-nine, regarding the requirements for the outdoor advertising license, restrictions, terms, and sanctions, in its Articles 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 indicates:

Article 29.- License. To place or affix advertisements, signs, placards, or notices, a license must be requested from the Municipality. The license shall be requested by the owner of the structure on which the advertisement is to be affixed and with the consent of the owner of the property where the structure is placed, when applicable. In cases where frames or structures are used, the Municipality shall require a responsible expert (perito responsable) to be in charge of the construction. A dimensioned sketch showing the inscriptions or figures to be placed shall be required.

Article 30.- Prohibition. Advertisements that cross the public thoroughfare are prohibited, as are those placed using public service posts or trees in parks or gardens.

Article 31.- The Municipality has the authority to limit the surface area that a notice or a set of notices may occupy on a facade and to not permit its placement.

Article 32.- Prohibitions. It is strictly forbidden to affix or paint notices, advertisements, programs, etc., of any class or material, in the following places:

a)Public buildings, schools, and temples.
b)Buildings cataloged by the Municipality as national monuments.
c)Posts, lighting candelabras, kiosks, fountains, trees, sidewalks, curbs, and in general ornamental elements of squares and promenades, parks, and streets.
d)Private houses and fences.
e)On others' signboards.
f)At a distance of less than thirty (30) centimeters in any direction from the street name plates.
g)In places where they obstruct visibility for traffic.
h)On hills, rocks, trees, where they may affect the panoramic perspective or the harmony of a landscape.

Likewise, Article 14 of Law number 6890 of September fourteenth, nineteen eighty-three, states:

Article 14.- The Executive Branch and the following state entities are authorized for what is indicated in each case: […] To all Municipalities of the Country: a) So that in all cases of non-compliance with the Sign Regulation (Reglamento de Rótulos), violators are sanctioned with the cancellation of the municipal license or patent and with the closure of the commercial establishment. The transgressor must be previously notified, who shall have a term of five business days to comply with the law.” In addition to said regulations, the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) refers, regarding environmental contamination and specifically regarding visual contamination:

"Article 59.- Contamination of the environment.- Contamination is understood as any alteration or modification of the environment that may harm human health, threaten natural resources, or affect the environment in general of the Nation. The discharge and emission of pollutants shall obligatorily conform to the technical regulations issued. The State shall adopt the measures necessary to prevent or correct environmental contamination." "Article 71.- Visual contamination.- Actions, works, or installations that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum limits admissible by the established technical standards or those issued in the future shall be considered visual contamination. The Executive Branch shall dictate the appropriate measures and promote their execution through agencies, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of contamination." Coupled with the provisions of those regulations, the Law on Transit on Public and Land Roadways (Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres), in Article 205 of the Law, establishes:

"Article 205.- Advertisements and signs placed for advertising purposes on lands adjacent to public roadways and in places that may affect visibility, safety, or the panoramic perspective may only be placed outside the roadway's right-of-way and in strict adherence to what the regulation on this matter provides…" It is these rules that the Municipality regulates concerning outdoor advertising and within its sphere of competence in the administration of local interests and services; thereby, the Chamber confirms that no violation of the principle of legality and legal reservation is observed. Excepting Article 69 of the Regulation, which establishes a license payment that is neither provided for in the Law nor approved as such. In this regard, in recital IX of this judgment, the respective analysis shall be made.

VIII.- Reasonableness analysis of the rules The claimant (accionante) points out that the challenged regulation harms the principle of reasonableness and proportionality of rules. To arrive at that conclusion, he starts from the following premises: a) The imposition of licenses for advertising signs finds no legal support whatsoever. In relation to that topic, it has already been established not only that the Municipality has the constitutional and legal competence to regulate everything related to outdoor advertising that affects the administration and governance of local interests and services, but also that there are rules of legal rank that regulate and restrict that activity. What the Public Spaces, Roadways, and Transportation Regulation does is develop what is provided for in the rules, without opposing, exceeding, or supplementing their essential content in any way.

b)It is a private activity that should not be subject to restrictions unless it endangers public health or safety. Outdoor advertising transcends that scope of freedom in private actions, because the rights of third parties, public order, and eventually, morals, are directly affected. This is because it has to do with every person's right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and with urban planning, which must occur as a process aimed at ensuring the health, safety, comfort, and well-being of the community in general. Consequently, in accordance with the provisions of constitutional Article 28, the limitation and regulation of the exercise of that activity is legitimate.
c)It harms the right to property, as it restricts the free use of a construction. As was analyzed, the right to private property is not absolute or unrestricted. Its social function makes it necessary and reasonable to impose limitations on its exercise for the sake of the common good. The challenged rules do not absolutely prohibit the placement of signs on private property; what they do is regulate and limit the activity, according to technical criteria that guarantee respect for legal interests (bienes jurídicos), such as safety, the right to a healthy environment, physical integrity, among others.
d)It harms freedom of commerce. The challenged articles also do not violate freedom of commerce because they do not denature it; what they do is restrict and limit a particular aspect of that freedom, namely the right to outdoor advertising, to the extent that rights of third parties, public order, and eventually, morals, are affected.
e)It does not satisfy the test of technical reasonableness imposed by Constitutional Law. In relation to the principle of reasonableness of rules, this Chamber has pointed out:

"Constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth remembering, first of all, that the 'reasonableness of the law' was born as part of the 'substantive due process of law', a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in the wake of the XIV Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the initial conception, 'due process' was directed at the procedural judgment of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, it surpassed that procedural conception that had given rise to it and rose to become an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of freedom, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The overcoming of 'due process' as a procedural guarantee basically stems from the fact that even a law that has conformed to the established procedure and is valid and effective can harm Constitutional Law. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, U.S. doctrine invites us to examine, first, the so-called 'technical reasonableness' within which the specific rule (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen rule is adequate to regulate a specific matter, it must be examined whether there is proportionality between the chosen means and the intended end. Having passed the criterion of 'technical reasonableness', the 'legal reasonableness' must be analyzed. For this, this doctrine proposes to examine: a) weighting reasonableness, which is a type of legal assessment used when, given the existence of a certain antecedent (e.g., income), a certain provision (e.g., tax) is demanded, and in this case, it must be established whether it is equivalent or proportionate; b) equality reasonableness, is the type of legal assessment that starts from the premise that given equal antecedents there must be equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness in the end: at this point, it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved offends the purposes provided for in the constitution. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and size of the limitation that a personal right must bear because of that means.

Thus, if the same end can be reached by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. It was in judgment number 01739-92, at eleven hours forty-five minutes on the first of July, nineteen ninety-two, where an attempt was first made to define this principle, in the following manner: \"Reasonableness as a parameter of constitutional interpretation. But a further step was taken in the Anglo–North American jurisprudential tradition, by extending the concept of due process to what in that tradition is known as substantive due process –substantive due process of law–, which, in reality, although it does not refer to any procedural matter, constituted an ingenious mechanism devised by the Supreme Court of the United States to assert its jurisdiction over the federated states, in line with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, but which among us, especially lacking that need, would simply be equivalent to the principle of reasonableness of laws and other norms or public acts, or even private ones, as a requirement of their own constitutional validity, in the sense that they must conform not only to the concrete norms or precepts of the Constitution, but also to the sense of justice contained therein, which implies, in turn, compliance with fundamental requirements of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, understood as suitability to achieve the proposed ends, the assumed principles, and the presupposed values in the Law of the Constitution. Hence, laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity not only having been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures, but also passing substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, liberty, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the means selected have a real and substantial relationship with their object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or adaptation to the Constitution in general, and especially to the rights and liberties recognized or presupposed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society.\" German doctrine made an important contribution to the subject of \"reasonableness\" by successfully identifying, in a very clear manner, its components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, ideas it develops by affirming that they have already been recognized by our constitutional jurisprudence: \"... Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought with the challenged act or disposition must not, at least, be legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the state measure in question must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it is not \"demandable\" of the individual ... (Judgment of this Chamber number 03933-98, at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on the twelfth of June, nineteen ninety-eight). In judgment number 08858-98, at sixteen hours thirty-three minutes on the fifteenth of December, nineteen ninety-eight, it was the subject of recent development, a resolution in which the guidelines for its analysis were indicated, both for administrative acts and for norms of a general character: Thus, an act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiation measure. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, moreover, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate that other mechanisms may exist that better resolve the existing need, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. From the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second stems from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed.\"Finally, recently, in judgment number 05236-99, at fourteen hours on the seventh of July, nineteen ninety-nine, when mention is made of the principle of constitutional reasonableness as a constitutional parameter, it is done in a practical manner, that is, with a view to being able to conduct the constitutional examination of the norms and/or acts challenged before this Constitutional Tribunal; \"In the sense of the criterion set forth above, this Chamber has been applying the institution in its jurisprudence. Let us now look at the analysis of the specific case. On the proof of \"reasonableness\": To undertake an examination of the reasonableness of a norm, the Constitutional Tribunal requires that the party provide proof or at least elements of judgment on which to base their argument, and the same procedural burden falls on whoever rebuts the arguments of the action, and failure to comply with these requirements makes the arguments of unconstitutionality unacceptable. The foregoing, because it is not possible to conduct an analysis of \"reasonableness\" without the existence of a coherent line of argument that is probatively supported. That is, of course, when it is not a case whose «unreasonableness» is evident and manifest.\" (Judgment 2000-02858 at fifteen hours fifty-four minutes on the twenty-ninth of March, two thousand)The petitioner affirms that the challenged norms are unreasonable because less harmful measures for the exercise of liberties could have been used. However, he does not specify which of the limitations or requirements he refers to, nor does he indicate what this lack of satisfaction of technical reasonableness consists of. Nor does he provide proof or elements of judgment that would allow an examination of the reasonableness of the norms in question. In general terms, without entering into a particularized analysis of each of the challenged norms (given the petitioner's omission), this Chamber considers that the challenged regulations are adequate and suitable for regulating the matter and, further, necessary, as they seek the regulation and control of outdoor advertising, not only for reasons of urban planning, but also for due respect to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.” V.- Although the regulation of outdoor advertising or signs in the Canton of San José is in accordance with the Constitution and the Law, it is appropriate to analyze Article 69 of the Regulation, the application of which constitutes the central point of the discussion in this proceeding, as it is the basis of the challenged act.  In tax matters, the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) applies, which means that taxes can only be created by legislative mandate and, correlatively, exemptions can only be granted through law.   This principle is enshrined in our Political Constitution in its Article 121, subsection 13) and developed in Article 5 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), therefore a tax—the license payment—cannot be created via regulation.  The hierarchy of sources in the tax legal system (Article 2 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures) and the administrative legal system (Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration), means that administrative acts—and the regulations issued by the Administrations are such—are subject to the  principle of legal reserve, and therefore cannot regulate or modify matters reserved to law, as is the case with taxes.  For these reasons, the Constitutional Tribunal in Vote 5503-2002, to which reference has been made,  declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 69 of the Regulation of Public Spaces, Roads, and Transportation, of the Master Plan of the Central Canton of San José, stating:“IX.- Tax nature of the license payment. Violation of the principle of legal reserve. Regarding the license payment provided for in the challenged Article 69, the Chamber observes that, as the Attorney General's Office points out in its report, it is a tax not provided for or authorized by Law. Regarding the nature of the business license tax (patente), it has been noted:\"As the action questions the application of the so-called business license tax—which taxes all lucrative activity carried out in the Canton of Buenos Aires (Articles 96 and 98 Municipal Code)—specifically, that charged on pineapple production, it is essential to point out some important notes on this matter. Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act that authorizes the individual to carry out the respective activity, and the payment of the tax, properly speaking, which is called the business license tax. The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is the one already traditional in the field of Municipal Law, which defines it as the imperative need to defray the cost of public services that the individual receives from the municipality; that is, that commercial businesses or lucrative activities, according to the nomenclature used by our Municipal Code, are highly benefited by security, order, cleanliness, and municipal activity in general, and therefore must contribute to the Local Government. In doctrine, a business license tax or tax on lucrative activity is one that taxes businesses on the basis of more or less easily determinable external characteristics, without there being a single system in this regard. On the contrary, the systems for imposing this tax are highly varied, but they do have certain characteristics that are common to them. This is why business license tax laws differ from one municipality to another, and the tax bases can be equally varied, such as on gross profits, gross sales, based on categories or classes, or a minimum and maximum license fee.III- From the point of view of Tax Law doctrine, its most important legal principles are: a) legality of taxation, also known as legal reserve; or what is the same, the exclusive regulation of tax activity by formal law; b) the principle of equality before the tax and public charges, which alludes to the need to ensure the same treatment to those who are in analogous situations (a concept related more to materiality than to formality); this principle allows the formation of different categories, to the extent that they are reasonable, which in turn requires the total exclusion of arbitrary discriminations; c) generality, which implies that specifically identified persons or goods must not be affected by the tax, because in such a case the taxes acquire a persecutory character or one of odious or illegitimate discrimination. Put another way, the tax must be conceived in such a way that any person, whose situation coincides with that indicated as the taxable event, will be subject to the tax. For the specific case, there is no doubt that the tax was authorized by a law, and it is appropriate to analyze whether the differentiation alleged by the petitioner and coming from the business license law referred to is reasonable, or if, on the contrary, it creates arbitrary discrimination against her.\" (Judgment 1992-02197 at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the eleventh of August, nineteen ninety-two)The principle of legal reserve in tax matters is of a constitutional nature and is entirely applicable to the payment of municipal licenses or business license taxes. While it is true that an original municipal taxing power is recognized, by virtue of the autonomy that the Constitution itself confers on these Entities, it is necessary to have the authorization of the Legislative Assembly, as indicated by Article 121, subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter: \"Repeatedly, this Tribunal has indicated that the autonomy of the municipalities derives from the provisions of Article 170 of the Political Constitution, a principle from which emanates the municipal taxing or imposing power to procure the necessary income and to defray the cost of public services that the individual receives from the municipality, provided they comply with the necessary legal procedures, and are manifested in taxes that comply with the constitutional principles inherent to that matter; in such a way that the Legislative Assembly only issues in this matter a 'typically tutelary act of authorization' when it exercises the power conferred on it by subsection 13) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, so that the initiative for the creation, modification, or extinction of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, as well as the power to exempt from municipal taxes (in this regard, see, among others, judgments number 1631-91, at fifteen hours fifteen minutes on the twenty-first of August, nineteen ninety-one; 0140-94, at fifteen hours fifty-one minutes on the eleventh of January, nineteen ninety-four; 2494-94, at fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the twelfth of July, nineteen ninety-four; 4496-94; 4497-94, at fifteen hours thirty-nine minutes on the twenty-third of August, nineteen ninety-four; 4510-94, at fourteen hours fifty-one minutes on the twenty-fourth of August, nineteen ninety-four; 4512-94, at fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on the twenty-fourth of August, nineteen ninety-four; 6362-94, at fifteen hours thirty-nine minutes on the first of November, nineteen ninety-four; 1269-95, at fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on the seventh of March, nineteen ninety-five; 2311-95, at sixteen hours twelve minutes on the ninth of May, nineteen ninety-five; 2631-95, at sixteen hours three minutes on the twenty-third of May, nineteen ninety-five; 1974-96, at nine hours on the thirtieth of April, nineteen ninety-six; and 4982-96, at ten hours twelve minutes on the twentieth of September, nineteen ninety-six). \"The Municipalities do not make a mere proposition to the Legislative Assembly, but must be able to submit to it true tax fixings. This means that the municipal tax act is terminal and definitive, creator of the tax in a tax procedure opened for this purpose by each municipality, not an initial act in a presumed legislative procedure with the same function, as if it were a simple proposition subject to the constitutive and free will of the legislator. Consequently, the municipal tax fixing frames the subject matter of the legislative pronouncement, whose function is tutelary and not constitutive of the municipal tax, and whose consistent result can only be the authorization or disavowal of what is proposed, not the substitution of the municipal will.\" (judgment number 1631-91, cited above).This competence is established in Article 68 of the current Municipal Code, which provides:\"The municipality shall agree on its respective budgets, propose its taxes to the Legislative Assembly, and set the rates and prices for municipal services.

Only the municipality, by prior law authorizing it, may grant exonerations of the stated taxes." Likewise, from the autonomy inherent to these corporations derives the possibility of administering their resources, insofar as each local government is free to define the limits of its own taxing power, from which the systems of municipal tax imposition for their specific collection and application are of the most varied kinds." (Judgment 1999-05445 of fourteen hours thirty minutes on the fourteenth of July of nineteen ninety-nine) In application of the foregoing, Article 69 must be declared unconstitutional insofar as it provides for a payment for a license (licencia), as it lacks the due authorization of the Legislative Assembly, in violation of the principle of legal reserve in tax matters" The conclusion is that official letter 4428 of April 2, 2001, insofar as it establishes a charge against the plaintiff for the license (licencia) for the use of 4 signs, is based on an unconstitutional norm and is absolutely null and void pursuant to Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, 2 and 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, 6, 132, 133, 166, 172 of the General Law of Public Administration. While the Constitutional Chamber dimensioned the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality issued, in the sense that by virtue of the subject matter, it applies only for the future and not retroactively, so as not to cause a serious dislocation to legal certainty, the foregoing does not prevent the nullity sought in the complaint from being declared here, because Article 95 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that the provisions in the preceding articles – which includes the regulations on graduation in space, time, or subject matter of the retroactive effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality – "shall not prevent the elimination, by absolute nullity, of administrative acts, in accordance with the General Law of Public Administration" VI.- Consequently, the defenses of lack of right and the generic defense of sine actione agit must be rejected, so as to grant the complaint.

VII.- The general principle of awarding costs against the losing party must be followed (Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code)

POR TANTO:

The defenses of lack of right and sine actione agit are rejected. The complaint is granted and, consequently, the charge for the use of signs, issued by the Municipality of San José, Urban Inspection Section, contained in official letter 4428-R of April second, two thousand one, is annulled. Both costs of the proceeding are borne by the Municipality of San José.

Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez Cristina Víquez Cerdas Hubert Fernández Argüello 01-000672-161-CA Special tax proceeding Importadora de Azulejos y Piso Cerámico v. Municipalidad de San José.

For its part, Construction Law No. 833 of November 2, 1949, regarding the requirements for the exterior advertising license, restrictions, deadlines, and sanctions, in its articles 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 states:  Article 29.- License. To place or affix advertisements, signs, billboards, or notices, a license must be requested from the Municipality. The license shall be requested by the owner of the structure on which the advertisement is to be affixed and with the consent of the owner of the property where the structure is placed, when applicable. In cases where frameworks or structures are used, the Municipality shall require a responsible expert to take charge of the construction. A dimensioned sketch showing the inscriptions or figures to be placed shall be required. Article 30.- Prohibition. Advertisements that cross the public thoroughfare are prohibited, as well as those placed using public service posts or trees in parks or gardens. Article 31.- The Municipality has the authority to limit the surface area that a notice or a set of notices will occupy on a facade and to not permit their placement. Article 32.- Prohibitions. It is strictly forbidden to affix or paint notices, advertisements, programs, etc., of any kind and material, in the following places: a) Public buildings, schools, and temples. b) Buildings cataloged by the Municipality as national monuments. c) Posts, lighting candelabras, kiosks, fountains, trees, sidewalks, curbs, in general, ornamental elements of squares and promenades, parks, and streets. d) Private houses and fences. e) On billboards belonging to others. f) At a distance of less than thirty (30) centimeters in any direction from street name plaques. g) In places where they obstruct visibility for traffic. h) On hills, rocks, trees, where the panoramic perspective or the harmony of a landscape may be affected. Article 33.- Sanctions. The Municipality shall impose fines of ten (10) to one hundred (100) colones for infractions of the rules of this Chapter, and shall order the dismantling and removal, at the owner's expense, of advertisements and related structures it deems inconvenient or dangerous. Likewise, article 14 of Law No. 6890 of September 14, 1983, states: Article 14.- The Executive Branch and the following state entities are authorized, for what is indicated in each case: […] To all the Municipalities of the Country: a) So that in all cases of non-compliance with the Sign Regulations (Reglamento de Rótulos), offenders are sanctioned with the cancellation of the municipal license or patent and with the closure of the commercial establishment. The transgressor must be previously notified, who will have a term of five business days to comply with the law." In addition to said regulations, the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) refers regarding environmental contamination and specifically regarding visual contamination: "Article 59.- Environmental Contamination.- Contamination is understood as any alteration or modification of the environment that may harm human health, threaten natural resources, or affect the environment in general of the Nation. The discharge and emission of pollutants shall obligatorily conform to the technical regulations that are issued. The State shall adopt the measures that are necessary to prevent or correct environmental contamination." "Article 71.- Visual Contamination.- Actions, works, or installations that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum limits admissible by the established technical standards or those issued in the future, shall be considered visual contamination. The Executive Branch shall dictate the appropriate measures and promote their execution through the organisms, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of contamination." Added to the provisions in those norms, the Law on Transit on Public and Land Routes (Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres), in article 205 of the Law establishes: "Article 205.- Advertisements and signs placed for advertising purposes on land adjacent to public roads and in places that may affect visibility, safety, or the panoramic perspective, may only be placed outside the road right-of-way (derecho de vía) and in strict adherence to what the regulations on this matter provide…" It is these norms that the Municipality regulates regarding exterior advertising and within the scope of its competence in the administration of local interests and services; with which, the Chamber confirms that no violation of the principle of legality and reservation of law is observed. Excepted is article 69 of the Regulations (Reglamento) which establishes a payment for a license, which is not provided for in the Law nor approved as such. In this regard, in recital (considerando) IX of this judgment, the respective analysis will be made. VIII.- Analysis of the reasonableness of the norms.  The plaintiff (accionante) points out that the challenged regulations violate the principle of reasonableness and proportionality of norms. To reach that conclusion, he starts from the following premises: a) The imposition of licenses for advertising signs finds no legal basis whatsoever. In relation to this topic, it has already been established, not only that the Municipality has the constitutional and legal competence to regulate everything concerning exterior advertising that affects the administration and governance of local interests and services; but also, that there are legal-rank norms that regulate and restrict that activity. The Regulation on Public Spaces, Roadways, and Transportation (Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte) develops what is provided for in the norms, without in any way contravening, exceeding, or supplanting their essential content. b) This is private activity that should not be subject to restrictions unless public health or common safety is endangered. Exterior advertising transcends that sphere of freedom in private actions, because the rights of third parties, public order, and eventually, morality are directly affected. This is because it has to do with the right of every person to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and with urban planning, which must occur as a process aimed at ensuring the health, safety, comfort, and well-being of the community in general. Consequently, pursuant to the provisions of constitutional article 28, the limitation and regulation of the exercise of that activity is legitimate. c) It violates the right to property, as it restricts the free use of a construction. As analyzed, the right to private property is neither absolute nor unrestricted. Its social function makes it necessary and reasonable to impose limitations on its exercise for the sake of the common good. The challenged norms do not absolutely prohibit the placement of signs on private property; what they do is regulate and limit the activity, adhering to technical criteria that guarantee respect for legal interests, such as safety, the right to a healthy environment, physical integrity, among others. d) It violates freedom of commerce. The challenged articles also do not infringe upon freedom of commerce because they do not denature it; what they do is restrict and limit a particular aspect of that freedom, which is the right to exterior advertising, to the extent that the rights of third parties, public order, and eventually, morality are affected. e) The test of technical reasonableness imposed by the Law of the Constitution is not satisfied. In relation to the principle of reasonableness of norms, this Chamber has pointed out: "Constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth remembering, first of all, that the 'reasonableness of the law' was born as part of 'substantive due process of law' (substantive due process of law), a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in the wake of the XIV Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In its initial conception, 'due process' was directed at the procedural examination of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, it overcame that procedural conception that had given it origin and rose to an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of freedom, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The overcoming of 'due process' as a procedural guarantee is basically due to the fact that a law that has adjusted to the established procedure and is valid and effective can also violate the Law of the Constitution. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, American doctrine invites us to examine, first of all, the so-called "technical reasonableness within which the specific norm (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it is established that the chosen norm is adequate to regulate a certain matter, it must be examined whether there is proportionality between the chosen means and the sought end. Once the criterion of 'technical reasonableness' is overcome, the "legal reasonableness must be analyzed. For which this doctrine proposes to examine: a) balancing reasonableness, which is a type of legal valuation resorted to when, in the presence of a certain antecedent (e.g., income), a certain provision (e.g., tax) is demanded, requiring in this case to establish whether said provision is equivalent or proportionate; b) reasonableness of equality, is the type of legal valuation that assumes that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness in the end: at this point, it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the ends provided for in the constitution. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and size of the limitation that a personal right must bear through that means. Thus, if the same end can be reached by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. It was in judgment number 01739-92, at eleven hours forty-five minutes on July 1, 1992, where an attempt was first made to define this principle, as follows: "Reasonableness as a parameter of constitutional interpretation. But a further step was still taken in the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition, by extending the concept of due process to what in that tradition is known as substantive due process –substantive due process of law–, which, in reality, although it does not refer to any procedural matter, constituted an ingenious mechanism devised by the Supreme Court of the United States to affirm its jurisdiction over the federated states, in the wake of the XIV Amendment to the Federal Constitution, but which among us, especially in the absence of that need, would simply be equivalent to the principle of reasonableness of laws and other norms or public acts, or even private ones, as a requirement of their own constitutional validity, in the sense that they must conform, not only to the specific norms or precepts of the Constitution, but also to the sense of justice contained within it, which in turn implies the fulfillment of fundamental requirements of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, understood as suitability to achieve the proposed ends, the supposed principles, and the values presupposed in the Law of the Constitution. Hence, laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity, not only to have been promulgated by competent bodies and due procedures, but also to pass the substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, freedom, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified in accordance with constitutional ideology. In this way, it is ensured not only that the law is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with their object. A distinction is thus made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or the adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and freedoms recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society." German doctrine made an important contribution to the topic of "reasonableness" by successfully identifying, in a very clear manner, its components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, ideas that it develops by affirming that they have already been recognized by our constitutional jurisprudence:  "... Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such an objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'exigible' of the individual ... (Judgment of this Chamber number 03933-98, at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on June 12, 1998). In judgment number 08858-98, at sixteen hours thirty-three minutes on December 15, 1998, it was the subject of recent development, a resolution in which the guidelines for its analysis were indicated, both for administrative acts and for norms of a general nature: Thus, an act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary, suitable, and proportionate. The necessity of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community -or of a certain group- through the adoption of a differentiation measure. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable either, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or not the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate to us that there may be other mechanisms that better solve the existing need, some of them possibly fulfilling the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality sends us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of markedly greater entity than the benefit that is intended to be obtained with it for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second starts from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed." Finally, recently, in judgment number 05236-99, at fourteen hours on July 7, 1999, when mention is made of the principle of constitutional reasonableness as a constitutional parameter, it is done in a practical manner, that is, with a view to being able to carry out the constitutional examination of the norms and/or acts challenged before this Constitutional Court; "In the sense of the previously expressed criterion, this Chamber has been applying the institution in its jurisprudence. Let us now see the analysis of the specific case. On the proof of "reasonableness": To undertake an examination of the reasonableness of a norm, the Constitutional Court requires that the party provide proof or at least elements of judgment on which to base their argument, and an equal procedural burden corresponds to whoever refutes the arguments of the action, and failure to comply with these requirements makes the allegations of unconstitutionality unacceptable. The foregoing, because it is not possible to make an analysis of "reasonableness" without the existence of a coherent argumentative line that is evidentially supported. This, of course, when it does not involve cases whose 'unreasonableness' is evident and manifest." (Judgment 2000-02858 at fifteen hours fifty-four minutes on March 29, two thousand). The plaintiff (accionante) affirms that the challenged norms are unreasonable because less harmful measures to the exercise of freedoms could have been used. However, he does not specify which of the limitations or requirements he refers to nor does he indicate what that dissatisfaction of technical reasonableness consists of. Nor does he provide proof or elements of judgment that allow an examination of the reasonableness of the questioned norms. In general terms, without entering into a particularized analysis of each of the challenged norms (given the omission of the plaintiff, accionante), this Chamber considers that the challenged regulations are adequate and suitable to regulate the matter and, moreover, necessary, as they seek the regulation and control of exterior advertising, not only for reasons of urban planning but also for due respect for the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment." V.- Although the regulation of exterior publications or signs in the Canton of San José is in accordance with the Constitution and the Law, it is appropriate to analyze article 69 of the Regulations (Reglamento), the application of which constitutes the central point of the discussion in this process, as it is the basis of the challenged act.  In tax matters, the principle of reservation of law (reserva de ley) governs, which means that only by legislative mandate can taxes be created and, correlatively, only through law can exemptions be granted.   This principle is enshrined in our Political Constitution in its article 121, subsection 13) and developed in article 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), so a tax – the payment for the license – cannot be created via regulation.  The hierarchy of the sources of the tax legal order (article 2 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) and of the administrative legal order (article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública), means that administrative acts – and the regulations issued by the Administrations are such – are subject to the  principle of reservation of law (reserva de ley), so they cannot regulate or modify matters reserved to the law, as is the case with taxes.  For these reasons, the Constitutional Court in Voto 5503-2002 to which reference has been made,  declared unconstitutional and annulled article 69 of the Regulation on Public Spaces, Roadways, and Transportation, of the Master Plan of the Central Canton of San José (Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte, del Plan Director del Cantón Central de San José), stating: "IX.- Tax nature of the license payment. Violation of the principle of reservation of law. Regarding the license payment provided for in the challenged article 69, the Chamber observes that, as the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) rightly points out in its report, it is a tax that is neither provided for nor authorized by Law. Regarding the nature of the patent tax, it has been stated: "As the action questions the application of the so-called patent tax - with which all lucrative activity carried out in the Canton of Buenos Aires is taxed (articles 96 and 98 Municipal Code) -, specifically, that charged for pineapple production, it is essential to point out some important notes on this matter. Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act that enables the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax, properly speaking, which is called the patent. The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is the one already traditional in the field of Municipal Law, which defines it as the imperative need to defray the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality; that is, that commercial businesses or lucrative activities, according to the nomenclature used by our Municipal Code, are highly benefited by security, order, cleanliness, and municipal activity in general, so they should contribute to the Local Government. In doctrine, it is called a patent or tax on lucrative activity, those that tax businesses on the basis of more or less easy-to-determine external characteristics, without a single system existing in this regard. On the contrary, the systems of imposition of this tax are of the most varied, but they do have certain common characteristics. This is why the patent tax laws differ from one municipality to another and the tax bases can be equally varied, such as on gross profits, gross sales, based on categories or classes, or a minimum and maximum patent. III- From the point of view of Tax Law doctrine, its most important legal principles are: a) the legality of taxation, also known as reservation of law (reserva de ley); or what is the same, the exclusive regulation of tax activity by formal law; b) the principle of equality before the tax and public burdens, which alludes to the need to ensure the same treatment for those who are in analogous situations (a concept related more to materiality than to formality); this principle allows the formation of different categories, to the extent that they are reasonable, which in turn requires that it be with total exclusion of arbitrary discriminations; c) that of generality, which implies that individuals or goods determined singularly should not be affected by the tax, since in such a case the taxes acquire a persecutory nature or constitute odious or illegitimate discrimination. In other words, the tax must be conceived in such a way that any person whose situation coincides with that indicated as the taxable event will be subject to the tax. For the specific case, there is no doubt that the tax was authorized by a law and what is appropriate is to analyze whether the differentiation alleged by the plaintiff and which comes from the referenced patent law is reasonable or if, on the contrary, it creates arbitrary discrimination against her." (Judgment 1992-02197 at fourteen hours thirty minutes on August 11, 1992). The principle of legal reservation (reserva legal) in tax matters is of a constitutional nature and is entirely applicable to the payment of municipal licenses or patents.

While it is true that an original municipal taxing power is recognized, by virtue of the autonomy that the Constitution itself grants to those Entities, it is essential to have the authorization of the Legislative Assembly, as indicated in Article 121, subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter:  "Repeatedly, this Court has indicated that the autonomy of the municipalities derives from the provisions of Article 170 of the Political Constitution, a principle from which emanates the municipal taxing or levying power to procure the necessary income and to defray the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality, provided that the necessary legal procedures are met, and they are manifested in taxes (tributos) that comply with the constitutional principles proper to that matter; in such a way that the Legislative Assembly only issues in this matter a "typically tutelary act of authorization," when it exercises the power conferred upon it by subsection 13) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, so that the initiative for the creation, modification, or extinction of municipal taxes (impuestos municipales) corresponds to these entities, as well as the power to exempt from municipal taxes (tributos municipales) (in this regard, see among others judgments number 1631-91, at fifteen hours and fifteen minutes on August twenty-first, nineteen ninety-one; 0140-94, at fifteen hours and fifty-one minutes on January eleventh, nineteen ninety-four; 2494-94, at fourteen hours and fifty-four minutes on July twelfth, nineteen ninety-four; 4496-94; 4497-94, at fifteen hours and thirty-nine minutes on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-four; 4510-94, at fourteen hours and fifty-one minutes on August twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-four; 4512-94, at fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes on August twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-four; 6362-94, at fifteen hours and thirty-nine minutes on November first, nineteen ninety-four; 1269-95, fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on March seventh, nineteen ninety-five; 2311-95, at sixteen hours twelve minutes on May ninth, nineteen ninety-five; 2631-95, at sixteen hours three minutes on May twenty-third, nineteen ninety-five; 1974-96, at nine hours on April thirtieth, nineteen ninety-six; and 4982-96, at ten hours twelve minutes on September twentieth, nineteen ninety-six). "The Municipalities do not make a mere proposal to the Legislative Assembly, but rather must be able to submit to it true tax determinations. This means that the municipal tax act is final and definitive, creator of the tax in a tax procedure opened for that purpose by each municipality, not an initial act in a supposed legislative procedure with the same function, as if it were a simple proposal subject to the constitutive and free will of the legislator. Consequently, the municipal tax determination frames the matter of the legislative pronouncement, whose function is tutelary and not constitutive of the municipal tax, and whose consequent result can only be the authorization or non-authorization of what was proposed, not the substitution of the municipal will" (judgment number 1631-91, cited above). This competence is established in Article 68 of the current Municipal Code which provides: "The municipality shall agree upon its respective budgets, shall propose its taxes (tributos) to the Legislative Assembly, and shall set the fees (tasas) and prices for municipal services. Only the municipality, by prior law authorizing it, may decree exemptions from the indicated taxes (tributos)." Likewise, from the autonomy proper to these corporations derives the possibility of administering their resources, as each local government is free to define the limits of its own taxing power, from which the systems of municipal tax imposition for their specific collection and application are of the most varied kinds." (Judgment 1999-05445 at fourteen hours thirty minutes on July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine). In application of the foregoing, Article 69 must be declared unconstitutional insofar as it provides for payment for a license (licencia), for lack of the due authorization of the Legislative Assembly, in violation of the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) in tax matters.”  The conclusion is that official communication 4428 of April 2, 2001, insofar as it establishes against the plaintiff the payment for the license for the use of 4 signs (rótulos), is based on an unconstitutional norm and is absolutely null and void pursuant to Articles 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, 2 and 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), 6, 132, 133, 166, 172 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública).  Although the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) dimensioned the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality pronounced, in the sense that by virtue of the matter, it governs only for the future and not retroactively, so as not to cause a serious dislocation to legal certainty, the foregoing does not prevent the nullity (nulidad) requested in the complaint from being declared here, since Article 95 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that the provisions in the preceding articles - which includes the regulations on the graduation in space, time, or matter of the retroactive effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality -  “shall not prevent the elimination, by absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta), of administrative acts, in accordance with the General Law of Public Administration.”\" </div></body></html>" Their values correspond to 1.5 and 1.0 respectively.

*CC= Within the classification coefficient there are three classifications* *(CC1)= Classification coefficient 1, which corresponds to the operational message, equivalent to a value of 1.0; (CC2): Classification coefficient 2, which corresponds to the mixed sign, whose value is 1.25; (CC3): Classification coefficient 3, which corresponds to the advertising sign and its equivalent value is 1.5.* *CIV= Visual incidence coefficient: This coefficient corresponds to the categories of signs, indicated in Article 94 of this Regulation and the coefficient values shall be those indicated in Article 94. Each face of the sign counts independently for the calculation of the T.Estado* *The corresponding payment shall be made every two years or quarterly at the cashiers of the Municipality of San José.* *Article 70.- Requirements for license application. Every license and renewal application shall be resolved by the Department of Patentes of the Municipality, prior approval from its Department of Urban Control (Departamento de Control Urbano). The following documents shall be submitted: (…)* That regulation and, in general, Articles 67 to 79 of the Regulation of interest, were subject to study by the Constitutional Chamber, which in ruling No. 5503-2002 at 14:34 hours on June 5, 2002, stated that pursuant to Article 45 of the Political Constitution, it is possible to establish limitations of social interest on property, through regulatory plans and Urban Planning Law, provided they are of a general nature and do not empty the content of the private property right; that such limitations are a product of the very fact of forming part of a community, with the purpose of achieving an optimal and harmonious enjoyment of the rights of all individuals. The Chamber added that “outdoor advertising is indeed an activity capable of causing harm to third parties, to public morality and to public order; because it directly affects every individual's right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and the State's power to regulate matters concerning urban planning. From that perspective, the legitimacy of the restriction of the property right and freedom of commerce produced by the questioned regulation must be taken as a first premise,” with urban planning being the competence of the municipalities. Specifically regarding the regulation of interest here, it stated:

**“VII.- Legal basis of the challenged regulation. Non-existence of violation of the principle of legal reserve** In none of the challenged norms are limitations established that prevent the exercise of freedom of commerce and the right of property. The essential content of those rights is not affected, but rather what is done is to regulate their exercise. In addition to that, the regulation is based on the competence conferred by legal-rank norms. Firstly, it must be borne in mind that the Código Municipal, in Articles 15 and 19, recognizes the competence of municipalities to plan and control urban development, as indicated in the preceding recital (considerando). For its part, the Ley de Construcciones number 833 of November 2, 1949, regarding the requirements for the outdoor advertising license, restrictions, terms, and sanctions, in its Articles 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 indicates:

*Article 29.- License. To place or affix advertisements, signs, billboards, or notices, a license must be requested from the Municipality. The license shall be requested by the owner of the structure on which the advertisement is to be affixed and with the consent of the owner of the property where the structure is placed when applicable. In cases where frames or structures are used, the Municipality shall require a responsible expert in charge of the construction. A dimensioned sketch showing the inscriptions or figures to be placed shall be required.* *Article 30.- Prohibition. Advertisements that cross the public thoroughfare are prohibited, as well as those placed using public utility posts or trees in parks or gardens.* *Article 31.- The Municipality has the power to limit the surface area that an advertisement or a set of advertisements may occupy on a façade and to not permit their placement.* *Article 32.- Prohibitions. It is strictly forbidden to affix or paint advertisements, announcements, programs, etc., of any class and material, in the following places:* *a) Public buildings, schools, and temples.* *b) Buildings cataloged by the Municipality as national monuments.* *c) Posts, lighting candelabras, kiosks, fountains, trees, sidewalks, curbs, in general ornamental elements of plazas and promenades, parks, and streets.* *d) Private houses and fences.* *e) On others' panels.* *f) At a distance of less than thirty (30) centimeters in any direction from street name signs.* *g) In places where they obstruct visibility for traffic.* *h) On hills, rocks, trees, where they may affect the panoramic perspective or the harmony of a landscape.* *Article 33.- Sanctions. The Municipality shall impose fines of ten (10) to one hundred (100) colones for infractions of the rules of this Chapter, and shall order the dismantling and removal, at the owner's expense, of advertisements and related structures it deems inconvenient or dangerous.* Likewise, Article 14 of Law number 6890 of September 14, 1983, states:

*Article 14.- The Executive Branch and the following state entities are authorized for the purpose indicated in each case: […] To all the Municipalities of the Country: a) So that in all cases of non-compliance with the Reglamento de Rótulos, offenders are sanctioned with the cancellation of the municipal license or patent (patente) and with the closure of the commercial establishment. Previously, the transgressor must be notified, who shall have a term of five business days to come into compliance.\"* In addition to said regulation, the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente refers, regarding environmental pollution and specifically concerning visual pollution:

*\"Article 59.- Environmental pollution.- Pollution is understood as any alteration or modification of the environment that may harm human health, threaten natural resources, or affect the environment in general of the Nation. The discharge and emission of pollutants shall be obligatorily adjusted to the technical regulations issued. The State shall adopt the measures that are necessary to prevent or correct environmental pollution.\"* *\"Article 71.- Visual pollution.- Actions, works, or installations that exceed, to the temporary or permanent detriment of the landscape, the maximum limits admissible by the established technical norms or those issued in the future shall be considered visual pollution. The Executive Branch shall dictate the appropriate measures and shall promote their execution through the agencies, public entities, and municipalities, to prevent this type of pollution.\"* In addition to the provisions of those norms, the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, in Article 205 of the Law establishes:

***\"Article 205.-** Advertisements and signs placed for advertising purposes on lands adjacent to public roads and in places that may affect visibility, safety, or the panoramic perspective may only be placed outside the road's right-of-way (derecho de vía) and in strict adherence to what the regulation in this matter provides…\"* It is these norms that the Municipality regulates regarding outdoor advertising and within the scope of its competence in the administration of local interests and services; with which, the Chamber confirms that no violation of the principle of legality and legal reserve is observed. Exception is made for Article 69 of the Regulation, which establishes a payment for a license that is not provided for in the Law nor approved as such. In this regard, in recital (considerando) IX of this ruling, the respective analysis will be made.

**VIII.- Analysis of reasonableness of the norms** The claimant states that the challenged regulation harms the principle of reasonableness and proportionality of the norms. To arrive at that conclusion, he starts from the following premises: a) The imposition of licenses for advertising signs finds no legal basis whatsoever. In relation to this subject, it has already been established not only that the Municipality has the constitutional and legal competence to regulate everything concerning outdoor advertising that affects the administration and governance of local interests and services, but also that there exist legal-rank norms that regulate and restrict that activity. What the Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte does is to develop what is provided for in the norms, without opposing, exceeding, or replacing in any way their essential content.

b)It is a private activity that should not be subject to restrictions unless it endangers public health or common safety. Outdoor advertising transcends that sphere of freedom in private actions, because the rights of third parties, public order, and eventually, public morality are directly affected. This is because it has to do with every person's right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and with urban planning, which must occur as a process aimed at procuring the health, safety, comfort, and well-being of the community in general. Consequently, in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the Constitution, the limitation and regulation of the exercise of that activity is legitimate.
c)It harms the property right, as it restricts the free use of a construction. As was analyzed, the right to private property is not absolute or unrestricted. Its social function makes it necessary and reasonable to impose limitations on its exercise for the sake of the common good. The challenged norms do not absolutely prohibit the placement of signs on private property; what they do is regulate and limit the activity, attending to technical criteria that guarantee the respect of legal interests, such as safety, the right to a healthy environment, physical integrity, among others.
d)It harms freedom of commerce. The challenged articles also do not infringe freedom of commerce because they do not denature it; what they do is restrict and limit a particular aspect of that freedom, which is the right of outdoor advertising, to the extent that the rights of third parties, public order, and eventually, public morality are affected.
e)The test of technical reasonableness imposed by the Constitution's Law is not satisfied. In relation to the principle of reasonableness of norms, this Chamber has stated:

*\"Constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth remembering, in the first place, that the 'reasonableness of the law' was born as part of the 'substantive due process of law,' a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in line with Amendment XIV to the Federal Constitution. In the initial conception, 'due process' was directed at the procedural examination of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, it surpassed that procedural conception that gave it origin and rose to an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of liberty, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The overcoming of 'due process' as a procedural guarantee basically obeys the fact that a law that has adjusted to the established procedure and is valid and effective can also harm the Constitution's Law. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, American doctrine invites us to examine, first of all, the so-called '**technical reasonableness**' within which the norm is examined in the concrete (law, regulation, etc.). Having established that the chosen norm is adequate to regulate a specific matter, it will be necessary to examine whether there is proportionality between the means chosen and the pursued end. Having surpassed the criterion of 'technical reasonableness,' we must analyze '**legal reasonableness.**' For which this doctrine proposes to examine: **a)** weighting reasonableness, which is a type of legal assessment resorted to when, given the existence of a specific antecedent (e.g., income), a specific provision is demanded (e.g., tax), and in this case, it must be established whether the provision is equivalent or proportionate; **b)** reasonableness of equality, is the type of legal assessment that starts from the premise that equal antecedents should have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; **c)** reasonableness in the end: at this point, it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the ends foreseen in the constitution. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and size of the limitation that a personal right must bear because of that means. In this way, if the same end can be reached by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. It was in ruling number 01739-92, at eleven hours forty-five minutes on July 1, 1992, where an attempt to define this principle was first made, in the following manner:* *\"**Reasonableness as a parameter of constitutional interpretation.** But one more step was taken in the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition by extending the concept of due process to what in that tradition is known as substantive due process – substantive due process of law – which, in reality, although it does not refer to any procedural matter, constituted an ingenious mechanism devised by the Supreme Court of the United States to affirm its jurisdiction over the federated States, in line with Amendment XIV to the Federal Constitution, but which among us, especially lacking that necessity, would simply be equivalent to the principle of reasonableness of laws and other norms or public acts, or even private ones, as a requirement of their own constitutional validity, in the sense that they must conform not only to the specific norms or precepts of the Constitution but also to the sense of justice contained therein, which implies, in turn, compliance with fundamental requirements of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, understood as suitability to achieve the proposed ends, the assumed principles, and the presupposed values in the Constitution's Law. Hence, laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity not only having been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures but also passing a substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, liberty, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is to say, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with their object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or the adaptation to the Constitution in general, and especially to the rights and freedoms recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society.\"* *German doctrine made an important contribution to the subject of 'reasonableness' by successfully identifying, in a very clear manner, its components: **legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense,** ideas that it develops by affirming that they have already been recognized by our constitutional jurisprudence:* *\"... **Legitimacy** refers to the fact that the objective intended with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; **suitability** indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; **necessity** means that among several equally apt measures to achieve that objective, the competent authority must choose the one that affects the legal sphere of the person the least; and **proportionality in the strict sense** provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'demandable' of the individual ... (Ruling of this Chamber number 03933-98, at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on June 12, 1998). In ruling number 08858-98, at sixteen hours thirty-three minutes on December 15, 1998, it was the subject of recent development, a resolution in which the guidelines for its analysis were indicated, both for administrative acts and for norms of a general nature:* *Thus, an act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is **necessary,** suitable, **and proportional.** The **necessity** of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it essential to protect some good or set of goods of the community – or of a specific group – through the adoption of a differentiation measure. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable either, and therefore constitutionally valid. **Suitability,** for its part, involves a judgment concerning whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected necessity or not. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing necessity, some of which could fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, **proportionality** refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of a markedly greater magnitude than the benefit intended to be obtained with it for the benefit of the community.* Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second proceeds from a quantitative comparison of the two objects under analysis." Finally, recently, in judgment number 05236-99, of fourteen hundred hours on July seventh, nineteen ninety-nine, upon mentioning the principle of constitutional reasonableness (principio de razonabilidad constitucional) as a constitutional parameter, it was done in a practical manner, that is, with a view to carrying out the constitutional review of the norms and/or acts challenged before this Constitutional Court; "In line with the criterion previously set forth, this Chamber has been applying the institution in its case law. Let us now examine the analysis of the specific case. Regarding the proof of 'reasonableness' (razonabilidad): To undertake an examination of the reasonableness of a norm, the Constitutional Court requires that the party provide proof or at least elements of judgment on which to base its argument, and the same procedural burden corresponds to whoever rebuts the arguments of the action, and failure to fulfill these requirements makes the claims of unconstitutionality unacceptable. This is due to the fact that it is not possible to carry out an analysis of 'reasonableness' without the existence of a coherent line of argument that is supported by evidence. This, of course, when it does not involve cases whose 'unreasonableness' (irrazonabilidad) is evident and manifest." (Judgment 2000-02858 of fifteen hours fifty-four minutes on March twenty-ninth, two thousand) The plaintiff asserts that the challenged norms are unreasonable because less harmful measures could have been used to restrict the exercise of freedoms. However, he does not specify which of the limitations or requirements he refers to, nor does he indicate what that dissatisfaction with technical reasonableness consists of. He also fails to provide proof or elements of judgment that would allow an examination of the reasonableness of the questioned norms. In general terms, without entering into a particularized analysis of each of the challenged norms (given the plaintiff's omission), this Chamber considers that the challenged regulation is the adequate and suitable one to regulate the matter and, furthermore, necessary, as it aims at the regulation and control of outdoor advertising, not only for reasons of urban planning, but also for due respect of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment." V.- Although the regulation of outdoor advertising or signs in the Canton of San José is in accordance with the Constitution and the Law, it is appropriate to analyze Article 69 of the Regulation, whose application constitutes the central point of the discussion in this process, as it is the basis of the challenged act. In tax matters, the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva de ley) applies, which means that taxes can only be created by legislative mandate and, correlatively, exemptions can only be granted through law. This principle is enshrined in our Political Constitution in its Article 121, subsection 13) and developed in Article 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios); therefore, a tax –the payment for the license– cannot be created via regulation. The hierarchy of sources of the tax legal system (Article 2 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures) and of the administrative system (Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública), means that administrative acts –and the regulations issued by Administrations are such– are subject to the principle of legal reserve, and therefore cannot regulate or modify matters reserved to law, as is the case with taxes. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court, in Voto 5503-2002 to which reference has been made, declared unconstitutional and annulled Article 69 of the Regulation of Public Spaces, Roadways and Transportation, of the Master Plan for the Central Canton of San José, stating:

"IX.- Tax nature of the license payment. Violation of the principle of legal reserve. With regard to the license payment provided for in the challenged Article 69, this Chamber observes that, as the Attorney General's Office rightly points out in its report, it is a tax that is neither provided for nor authorized by Law. Regarding the nature of the tax for a business license (patente), the following has been stated:

'As the action questions the application of the so-called business license tax –with which any for-profit activity carried out in the Canton of Buenos Aires is taxed (Articles 96 and 98 of the Municipal Code)– specifically, the one charged for pineapple production, it is essential to point out some important notes about this matter. Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act enabling the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax itself, which is called a business license (patente). The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is the traditional one in the field of Municipal Law, which defines it as the imperative need to cover the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality; that is to say, commercial businesses or for-profit activities, according to the nomenclature used by our Municipal Code, greatly benefit from security, order, cleanliness, and municipal activity in general, and therefore must contribute to the Local Government. In legal doctrine, a business license or tax on for-profit activity is one that taxes businesses based on external characteristics that are more or less easy to determine, without there being a single system in this regard. On the contrary, the systems for imposing this tax are highly varied, but they do have certain characteristics that are common to them. This is why the business license tax laws differ from one municipality to another, and the tax bases can be equally varied, such as, for example, on gross profits, gross sales, based on categories or classes, or on a minimum and maximum license fee.

III- From the point of view of Tax Law doctrine, its most important legal principles are: a) that of legality of taxation, also known as legal reserve; or what is the same, the exclusive regulation of tax activity by formal law; b) the principle of equality before taxes and public charges, which alludes to the need to ensure the same treatment for those in analogous situations (a concept related more to materiality than to formality); this principle allows the formation of different categories, to the extent that they are reasonable, which in turn requires the total exclusion of arbitrary discriminations; c) that of generality, which implies that taxes should not affect singularly determined persons or goods, for in such a case the taxes take on a persecutory character or one of hateful or illegitimate discrimination. Stated otherwise, the tax must be conceived in such a way that any person whose situation coincides with that designated as the taxable event will be subject to the tax. For the specific case, there is no doubt that the tax was authorized by law, and it is appropriate to analyze whether the differentiation alleged by the plaintiff and which originates from the referenced license law is reasonable, or if, on the contrary, it creates arbitrary discrimination against her.' (Judgment 1992-02197 of fourteen hours thirty minutes on August eleventh, nineteen ninety-two) The principle of legal reserve in tax matters is of constitutional nature and is entirely applicable to the payment of municipal licenses or business licenses. While it is true that an original municipal tax authority is recognized, by virtue of the autonomy that the Constitution itself confers on these Entities, it is necessary to have the authorization of the Legislative Assembly, as stated in Article 121, subsection 13) of the Fundamental Charter:

'Repeatedly, this Court has indicated that the provision in Article 170 of the Political Constitution gives rise to the autonomy of municipalities, a principle from which emanates the municipal taxing or tax authority to procure the necessary income and to cover the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality, provided they comply with the necessary legal procedures, and manifest themselves in taxes that adhere to the constitutional principles specific to that matter; in such a way that the Legislative Assembly only issues in this matter a "typically tutelary act of authorization," when exercising the power conferred by subsection 13) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, so that the initiative for the creation, modification, or extinction of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, as well as the power to exempt from municipal taxes (in this sense, see, among others, judgments number 1631-91, of fifteen hours fifteen minutes on August twenty-first, nineteen ninety-one; 0140-94, of fifteen hours fifty-one minutes on January eleventh, nineteen ninety-four; 2494-94, of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on July twelfth, nineteen ninety-four; 4496-94; 4497-94, of fifteen hours thirty-nine minutes on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-four; 4510-94, of fourteen hours fifty-one minutes on August twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-four; 4512-94, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on August twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-four; 6362-94, of fifteen hours thirty-nine minutes on November first, nineteen ninety-four; 1269-95, fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on March seventh, nineteen ninety-five; 2311-95, of sixteen hours twelve minutes on May ninth, nineteen ninety-five; 2631-95, of sixteen hours three minutes on May twenty-third, nineteen ninety-five; 1974-96, of nine hours on April thirtieth, nineteen ninety-six; and 4982-96, of ten hours twelve minutes on September twentieth, nineteen ninety-six).

'Municipalities do not make a mere proposal to the Legislative Assembly, but they must be able to submit true tax determinations. This means that the municipal tax act is terminal and definitive, creator of the tax in a tax procedure opened for that purpose by each municipality, not initial in a supposed legislative procedure with the same function, as if it were a simple proposal subject to the constituent and free will of the legislator. Consequently, the municipal tax determination frames the matter of the legislative pronouncement, whose function is tutelary and not constitutive of the municipal tax, and whose consistent result can only be the authorization or non-authorization of what was proposed, not the substitution of the municipal will' (judgment number 1631-91, cited above).

This competence is established in Article 68 of the current Municipal Code, which provides:

'The municipality shall agree on its respective budgets, shall propose its taxes to the Legislative Assembly, and shall fix the rates and prices for municipal services. Only the municipality, by prior law authorizing it, may dictate exemptions from the indicated taxes.' Likewise, from the autonomy inherent to these corporations derives the possibility of administering their resources, insofar as each local government is free to define the limits of its own tax authority, from which the municipal tax imposition systems for their specific collection and application are among the most varied.' (Judgment 1999-05445 of fourteen hours thirty minutes on July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine) In application of the foregoing, Article 69 must be declared unconstitutional insofar as it provides for a license payment, for lacking due authorization from the Legislative Assembly, in violation of the principle of legal reserve in tax matters." The conclusion is that official letter 4428 of April 2, 2001, insofar as it establishes the payment by the plaintiff for the license for the use of 4 signs, is based on an unconstitutional norm and is absolutely null according to Articles 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, 2 and 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, 6, 132, 133, 166, 172 of the General Law of Public Administration. Although the Constitutional Chamber dimensioned the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality pronounced, in the sense that by virtue of the matter, it applies only for the future and not retroactively, so as not to cause a serious disruption to legal certainty, the foregoing does not prevent the nullity requested in the lawsuit from being declared here, since Article 95 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that the provisions in the preceding articles –which include the regulations on graduation in space, time, or matter of the retroactive effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality– "shall not prevent the elimination, by absolute nullity, of administrative acts, in accordance with the General Law of Public Administration." VI.- Consequently, the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho) and the generic sine actione agit must be rejected, to declare the lawsuit with merit.

VII.- The general principle of awarding costs against the losing party must be followed (Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, Código Procesal Civil).

POR TANTO:

The defenses of lack of right and sine actione agit are rejected. The lawsuit is declared with merit, and consequently, the charge for the use of signs, made by the Municipality of San José, Urban Inspection Section, contained in official letter 4428-R of April second, two thousand one, is annulled. Both costs of the process are borne by the Municipality of San José.

Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez Cristina Víquez Cerdas Hubert Fernández Argüello Special tax proceeding (Proceso especial tributario) Importadora de Azulejos y Piso Cerámico v/ Municipalidad de San José.

1 No. 425-2002 SECCIÓN PRIMERA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, a las diez horas veinte minutos del veintinueve de noviembre del dos mil dos.

Proceso contencioso administrativo –especial tributario- interpuesto por IMPORTADORA DE AZULEJOS Y PISO CERÁMICO SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, representada por Nombre34904 , ingeniero químico, vecino de Heredia, contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ, en la persona de su apoderada general judicial Ana Cecilia González Soto, vecina de San Francisco de Dos Ríos. Intervienen además Erick Gatgens Gómez y Adrián Fernández Rodríguez, ambos vecinos de San José, como apoderados especiales judiciales de la parte actora. Con la salvedad indicada, las personas mencionadas son mayores, casados y abogados.

RESULTANDO:

1)Que fijada como de cuantía inestimable, la demanda es para que en sentencia: “1)- Se revoque por resultar improcedente el cobro formulado por la Municipalidad de San José, Sección de Inspección Urbana que consta en la Resolución 4428-R de fecha 02 de abril del 2001 relacionado con el cobro por concepto de uso de rótulos, según lo establecido por el Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes, publicado en el Alcance No. 70 a la Gaceta No. 186 del 24 de setiembre de 1999. Lo anterior por resultar dicho cobro contrario a las disposiciones constitucionales establecidas en los artículos 1, 34, 121 Inciso 13 de la Constitución Política y artículo 4 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. 2)- Que se condene a la demandada al pago de ambas costas de la presente acción.” 2) Que la apoderada de la Municipalidad de San José contestó negativamente la demanda y a ella opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y la genérica de sine actione agit.
3)Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de rigor, no se notan errores u omisiones que deban ser subsanados, por lo que se procede a dictar sentencia dentro del término de ley.

Redacta la Juez Víquez Cerdas; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para resolver el presente asunto, se tiene por bien probado lo siguiente: 1.- Que mediante oficio No. 4428 R del 2 de abril del 2001, la Sección de Inspección Urbana de la Municipalidad de San José, comunicó a la actora, que conforme al artículo 65 del “Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes” publicado en el Alcance No. 70 a La Gaceta No. 186 del 24 de septiembre de 1999, “DEBE OBTENER LICENCIA PARA ROTULO (S) 4 rotulos (sic) que unidos suman 35 mt. de largo con 1.10 mt. de ancho, adosados a la fachada, de una cara, opacos, de funcionamiento. Nota: deben demostrar que pagan rotulos (sic)” En observaciones se indicó: “Incluyendo conforme al artículo 14 inciso A de la Ley 4898 la cancelación de la patente y el consecuente cierre del negocio”. (folio 6 del expediente administrativo); 2.- Que el 16 de abril del 2001 el representante de la actora, presentó recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra el oficio No. 4428 R (folios 1 a 4 y 7 del expediente administrativo); 3.- Que mediante oficio No. 28-R-SIU-01 de 27 de junio del 2001, la Sección de Inspección Urbana de la Municipalidad de San José, con fundamento en el oficio del Departamento Legal No. 2938-DAL-2001 de 19 de junio, rechazó el recurso de revocatoria, elevando la apelación para ante el señor Alcalde (folio 17 del expediente administrativo); 4.- Que en oficio 4669 del 4 de julio del 2001, adicionado por el No. 5665 de agosto de ese mismo año, el señor Alcalde de San José, rechazó el recurso de apelación y dio por agotada la vía administrativa (folios 19 y 22 del expediente administrativo) II.- Manifiesta el apoderado de la parte actora, que no existe una norma legal que respalde el cobro del impuesto por concepto de uso de rótulos, siendo que se fundamenta en un reglamento, lo que quebranta el principio de legalidad. Agrega, que no es cierto que el Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes, tenga fundamento en el artículo 29 de la Ley de Construcciones, en las potestades de planificación que posee la Municipalidad en cuanto al ordenamiento urbano, con relación a los artículos 15 y 19 del código Municipal o la Ley de Planificación Urbana. Estima, que si bien es cierto, las municipalidades tienen una serie de potestades para regular lo relativo a la planificación de las ciudades, esto no las autoriza a crear un impuesto vía reglamento, porque se requiere aprobación legislativa, por lo que la Municipalidad de San José se encuentra imposibilitada de establecer un quantum para la fijación de un tributo por el uso de rótulos. Señala, que si bien el artículo 29 de la Ley de Construcciones, establece la necesidad de contar con una licencia municipal para colocar un rótulo, la ley no crea un impuesto por ese concepto. Por otra parte, manifiesta que el artículo 81 del Reglamento, adolece de un vicio de inconstitucionalidad al darse un efecto retroactivo en violación de los derechos adquiridos y del artículo 34 de la Constitución Política. Finalmente, indica que se violan los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, por que la imposición del pago de una licencia para rótulos, constituye un doble cobro por un mismo hecho generador, por cuanto al patente municipal involucra el uso del local, incluidos los rótulos.

III.- La apoderada de la Municipalidad de San José, defiende la legalidad de los actos aquí impugnados, indicando que tienen su base jurídica en el artículo 29 de la Ley de Construcciones y en las potestades de planificación que posee la Municipalidad en materia de ordenamiento urbano. Citando un dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República, señala que un reglamento puede desarrollar limitaciones autorizadas por la Ley, porque el principio de reserva de ley no es absoluto, pudiendo operar la técnica de la delegación, siempre y cuando no contenga limitaciones no autorizadas ni contempladas en la ley; en el caso concreto, los requisitos, restricciones, plazos y sanciones que establecen los artículos 66, 67, 68, 70 a 79 del Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transportes de la Municipalidad de San José, tienen fundamento en el artículo 29 de la Ley de Construcciones, así como los artículos 30, 31, 32 y 33 del mismo cuerpo legal. Se agrega, que el artículo 69 del Reglamento establece el pago de una licencia, lo que se respalda en los artículos 78 y 79 de la Ley de Construcciones, que señalan que todas las licencias causarán derechos, los cuales deben ser pagados para que surtan sus efectos; además, el artículo 70 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana autoriza a las municipalidades para establecer impuestos, para los fines de esa ley. Señala, que el impuesto de patente grava la actividad lucrativa que se realiza, mientras que la licencia por el rótulo lo es por la publicidad exterior, por lo que no existe un doble cobro. En cuanto a la aplicación retroactiva del Reglamento, la inconstitucionalidad, de existir, no ha sido declarada, por lo que la norma debe aplicarse tal y como está. Finalmente, se indica que lo que aquí se dirime es un asunto de constitucionalidad, que sólo compete conocer y resolver a la Sala Constitucional.

IV.- En cuanto a la instalación de publicidad exterior y rótulos de funcionamiento en el Cantón de San José, el Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte emitido por el Consejo Municipal del Cantón Central de San José, en acuerdo firme No. 6, artículo VI, sesión No. 92, celebrada el 7 de setiembre de 1999, y publicado en el Alcance No. 70 a La Gaceta No. 186 del 24 de septiembre de 1999, dispone en lo pertinente:

"Artículo 65.- Licencias. Para colocar, sustituir, remodelar, y exhibir anuncios, rótulos, letreros, avisos y demás tipologías (en adelante Rótulos) deberá solicitarse licencia a la Municipalidad.

Artículo 66.- Categorías de rótulos. La publicidad exterior se clasificará por categorías según sus características, a las cuales les corresponde un Coeficiente de Incidencia Visual (CIV), el cual se utilizará para calcular el monto corresponde al pago por su Licencia ver (artículo 97). Las categorías son las siguientes (…)

Artículo 67.- Plazo de licencias. La licencia para la colocación de cualquier tipo de rótulo exceptuando los rótulos temporales tendrá una vigencia por un período de dos años a partir del cual deberá solicitarse su renovación cumpliendo con los requisitos de solicitud. La licencia se podrá renovar, previa inspección municipal para conocer el estado, las características y la cantidad de rótulos existentes en el sitio particular donde se ubica el rótulo. En caso de existir alguna alteración en las condiciones del mismo: alteraciones no autorizadas hechas posteriores a su colocación, malas condiciones del mismo por falta de mantenimiento, o, si en algún aspecto violare este Reglamento, no se autorizará su renovación. El propietario será notificado y deberá proceder en el plazo indicado a ponerse a derecho.(…)

Artículo 68.- Sanciones, cancelación de licencias. La Municipalidad podrá cancelar la licencia para un anuncio o rótulo de publicidad exterior, y ordenar su retiro o demolición a costa del propietario cuando se le hayan hecho modificaciones, no autorizadas por la Municipalidad, cuando estén incumpliendo lo establecido en este Reglamento, o cuando al momento de inspección en el sitio el propietario o arrendatario del local o sitio en que se ubicaren los rótulos no presenten al inspector el comprobante de licencia de rótulos renovada extendida por la Municipalidad de San José (Departamento de Patentes o encargado).

En base a la Ley número 6890 (art. 14) en caso de no cumplimiento de este Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior, la Municipalidad sancionará a los infractores con la cancelación de la licencia o patente municipal y con el cierre del establecimiento comercial hasta que se ponga a derecho. Previamente deberá notificarse al transgresor, quien tendrá un término de treinta días hábiles para ponerse a derecho.

El Código Penal (art. 386, inciso 2) sanciona con una pena de tres a treinta días multa, a quien con fines de anuncio o propaganda y sin permiso del dueño o poseedor o de la autoridad respectiva, en su caso, escribiere o trazare dibujos o emblemas o fijare papeles o carteles en la parte exterior de una construcción, edificio público o privado, casa de habitación o pared.

Artículo 69.- Pago por licencia. El pago se calcula para cada metro cuadrado de mensaje publicitario. El pago correspondiente se realizará cada dos años en las cajas de la Municipalidad o podrá cargarse automáticamente al recibo de pago de los servicios municipales o patentes. Se aplicará una Tasa Especial por la ocupación del espacio público con la proyección del mensaje publicitario, de acuerdo a la siguiente fórmula:

Donde: TE= TB (CZ.CC) CIV. (CL) TB Tasa base que corresponde a un monto fijo de mil colones por metro cuadrado de mensaje publicitario, la cual se ponderará por los siguientes coeficientes. Esta tasa se actualizará anualmente, de acuerdo al incremento del índice general de precios al consumidor.

CZ= Coeficiente de zona CC= Coeficiente de clasificación CIV= Coeficiente de incidencia visual CL= Coeficiente de luminosidad CZ= Dentro del coeficiente de zona hay dos clasificaciones (CZ1) Coeficiente zona 1, que corresponde a las zonas de control especial; y el (CZ2) Coeficiente de zona 2 que corresponde al resto del cantón. Su valor corresponde 1.5 y 1.0 respectivamente.

CC= Dentro del coeficiente de clasificación hay tres clasificaciones (CC1)= Coeficiente de clasificación 1, que corresponde al mensaje de funcionamiento, equivalente a un valor de 1.0; (CC2): Coeficiente clasificación 2, que corresponde al rótulo mixto, cuyo valor es 1.25; (CC3): Coeficiente de clasificación 3, que corresponde al rótulo publicitario y su valor equivalente a 1.5.

CIV= Coeficiente de incidencia visual: Este coeficiente corresponde a las categorías de rótulos, indicados en el artículo 94 de este Reglamento y los valores de coeficientes serán los indicados en el artículo 94. Cada cara de rótulo cuenta independientemente para el cálculo de la T.Estado El pago correspondiente se realizará cada dos años o trimestralmente en las cajas de la Municipalidad de San José.

Artículo 70.- Requisitos para solicitud de licencia. Toda solicitud de licencia y renovación se resolverá por el Departamento de Patentes de la Municipalidad, previo visto bueno del Departamento de Control Urbano de la misma. Se presentarán los siguientes documentos: (…)

Esa normativa y en general, los artículos 67 a 79 del Reglamento de interés, fueron objeto de estudio por la Sala Constitucional, quien en sentencia No. 5503-2002 de las 14:34 horas del 5 de junio del 2002, expresó que conforme al artículo 45 de la Constitución Política, es posible establecer limitaciones de interés social a la propiedad, mediante planes reguladores y el Derecho Urbanístico, siempre y cuando sean de carácter general y no vacíen el contenido del derecho de propiedad privada; que tales limitaciones son producto del hecho mismo de formar parte de una colectividad, con la finalidad de alcanzar un disfrute óptimo y armónico de los derechos de todos los individuos. Agregó la Sala, que “la publicidad exterior sí es una actividad susceptible de causar daño a terceros, a la moral y al orden público; porque incide directamente en el derecho de todo individuo a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado y en la potestad del Estado para regular lo referente a la planificación urbana. Desde esa óptica, debe tenerse como un primer supuesto, la legitimidad de la restricción del derecho de propiedad y libertad de comercio producida por la normativa cuestionada”, siendo competencia de las municipalidades la planificación urbana. Específicamente en cuanto a la normativa que aquí interesa, indico:

“VII.- Fundamento legal de la reglamentación impugnada. Inexistencia de violación al principio de reserva de ley En ninguna de las normas impugnadas se establecen limitaciones que impidan el ejercicio de la libertad de comercio y el derecho de propiedad. No se afecta el contenido esencial de esos derechos, sino que lo que se hace es regular su ejercicio. Además de ello, la reglamentación está basada en la competencia que le confieren normas de rango legal. En primer término, debe tenerse presente que el Código Municipal, en los artículos 15 y 19 reconoce la competencia de las municipalidades para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano, según se indicó en el considerando anterior. Por su parte, la Ley de Construcciones número 833 del dos de noviembre de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, en cuanto a los requisitos de la licencia de publicidad exterior, restricciones, plazos y sanciones, en sus artículos 29, 30, 31, 32 y 33 indica:

Artículo 29.- Licencia. Para colocar o fijar anuncios, rótulos, letreros, o avisos, deberá pedirse licencia a la Municipalidad. La licencia será solicitada por el propietario de la estructura en que se va a fijar el anuncio y con la conformidad del propietario del predio en que se coloque la estructura cuando sea del caso. En los casos en que se empleen armazonas o estructuras, la Municipalidad exigirá un perito responsable que se encargue de la construcción. Se exigirá un croquis acotado que muestre las inscripciones o figuras que van a poner.

Artículo 30.- Prohibición. Se prohíben los anuncios que atraviesen la vía pública, así como los que se coloquen utilizando los postes de los servicios públicos o de los árboles de parques o jardines.

Artículo 31.- La Municipalidad tiene facultades para limitar la superficie que en una fachada ocupará un aviso o un conjunto de avisos y para no permitir su colocación.

Artículo 32.- Prohibiciones. Queda prohibido terminantemente fijar o pintar avisos, anuncios, programas, etc., de cualquier clase y material, en los siguientes lugares:

a)Edificios públicos, escuelas y templos.
b)Edificios catalogados por la Municipalidad como monumentos nacionales.
c)Postes, candelabros de alumbrado, kioscos, fuentes, árboles, aceras, guarniciones, en general elementos de ornato de plazas y paseos,parques y calles.
d)Casas particulares y cercas.
e)En tableros ajenos.
f)A una distancia menor de treinta (30) centímetros de cualquiera dirección, de las placas de nomenclatura de las calles.
g)En lugares en donde estorben la visibilidad para el tránsito.
h)En cerros, rocas, árboles, en que pueda afectar la perspectiva panorámica o la armonía de un paisaje.

Artículo 33.- Sanciones. La Municipalidad impondrá multas de diez (10) a cien (100) colones por las infracciones a las reglas de este Capítulo, y ordenará el desmantelamiento y retiro, a costa del propietario, de anuncios y estructuras relativas que considere inconvenientes o peligrosas.

Asimismo, el artículo 14 de la Ley número 6890 del catorce de setiembre de mil novecientos ochenta y tres, señala:

Artículo 14.-Autorízase al Poder Ejecutivo y a los entes estatales siguientes, para lo indicado en cada caso: […] A todas las Municipalidades del País: a) Para que en todos los casos de incumplimiento del Reglamento de Rótulos, se sancione a los infractores con la cancelación de la licencia o patente municipal y con el cierre del establecimiento comercial.

Previamente deberá notificarse al transgresor, quien tendrá un término de cinco días hábiles para ponerse a derecho." Además de dicha normativa, la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente refiere en cuanto a la contaminación del ambiente y específicamente en lo que a la contaminación visual se refiere:

"Artículo 59.- Contaminación del ambiente.- Se entiende por contaminación toda alteración o modificación del ambiente que pueda perjudicar la salud humana, atentar contra los recursos naturales o afectar el ambiente en general de la Nación. La descarga y la emisión de contaminantes, se ajustará, obligatoriamente, a las regulaciones técnicas que se emitan. El Estado adoptará las medidas que sean necesarias para prevenir o corregir la contaminación ambiental." "Artículo 71.- Contaminación visual.- Se considerarán contaminación visual, las acciones, obras o instalaciones que sobrepasen, en perjuicio temporal o permanente del paisaje, los límites máximos admisibles por las normas técnicas establecidas o que se emitan en el futuro.

El Poder Ejecutivo dictará las medidas adecuadas y promoverá su ejecución mediante los organismos, los entes públicos y las municipalidades, para prevenir este tipo de contaminación." Aunado a lo dispuesto en esas normas, la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, en el artículo 205 de la Ley establece:

"Artículo 205.- Los anuncios y los rótulos colocados con fines publicitarios en los terrenos adyacentes a las vías públicas y en lugares que puedan afectar la visibilidad, la seguridad o la perspectiva panorámica, sólo pueden colocarse fuera del derecho de vía de la carretera y en estricto apego a lo que dispone el reglamento en esta materia…" Son estas normas las que reglamenta la Municipalidad en lo que a publicidad exterior se refiere y en el ámbito de su competencia en la administración de los intereses y servicios locales; con lo cual, confirma la Sala que no se observa violación alguna al principio de legalidad y reserva de ley. Se exceptúa, el artículo 69 del Reglamento que establece un pago por licencia, que no está previsto en la Ley ni se encuentra aprobado como tal. Al respecto, en el considerando IX de esta sentencia, se hará el análisis respectivo.

VIII.- Análisis de razonabilidad de las normas El accionante señala que la reglamentación impugnada lesiona el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas. Para arribar a esa conclusión parte de las siguientes premisas: a) La imposición de licencias para rótulos publicitarios no encuentra sustento jurídico alguno. En relación con ese tema, ya se estableció, no sólo que la Municipalidad tiene la competencia constitucional y legal para regular todo lo referente a la publicidad exterior que incida en la administración y gobierno de los intereses y servicios locales; sino que, además, existen normas de rango legal que regulan y restringen esa actividad. El Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte, lo que hace es desarrollar lo previsto en las normas, sin contraponerse, superar ni suplir en modo alguno su contenido esencial.

b)Se trata de actividad privada que no debe ser objeto de restricciones salvo que se ponga en peligro la salud o seguridad común. La publicidad exterior trasciende ese ámbito de libertad en las acciones privadas, porque se afectan directamente los derechos de terceros, el orden público y eventualmente, la moral. Ello por cuanto, tiene que ver con el derecho de toda persona a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado y con la planificación urbana, que debe producirse como un proceso tendiente a procurar la salud, seguridad, comodidad y bienestar de la comunidad en general. En consecuencia, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 28 constitucional, resulta legítima la limitación y regulación del ejercicio de esa actividad.

c)Lesiona el derecho de propiedad, pues restringe el libre uso de una construcción. Conforme se analizó, el derecho a la propiedad privada no es absoluto ni irrestricto. Su función social hace que resulte necesario y razonable imponer limitaciones a su ejercicio en aras del bien común. Las normas impugnadas no prohíben en forma absoluta la colocación de rótulos en propiedad privada, lo que hacen es regular y limitar la actividad, atendiendo a criterios técnicos, que garanticen el respeto de bienes jurídicos, tales como la seguridad, el derecho a un ambiente sano, la integridad física, entre otros.

d)Lesiona la libertad de comercio. Los artículos impugnados tampoco infringen la libertad de comercio porque no la desnaturalizan, lo que hacen es restringir y limitar un aspecto particular de esa libertad, cual es el derecho de la publicidad exterior, en la medida en que se afectan derechos de terceros, el orden público y eventualmente, la moral.

e)No se satisface el test de razonabilidad técnica que impone el Derecho de la Constitución. En relación con el principio de la razonabilidad de las normas, esta Sala ha señalado:

"La jurisprudencia constitucional ha sido clara y conteste en considerar que el principio de razonabilidad constituye un parámetro de constitucionalidad. Conviene recordar, en primer término, que la "razonabilidad de la ley" nació como parte del "debido proceso sustantivo" (substantive due process of law), garantía creada por la jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América, al hilo de la Enmienda XIV a la Constitución Federal. En la concepción inicial "debido proceso" se dirigió al enjuiciamiento procesal del acto legislativo y su efecto sobre los derechos sustantivos. Al finalizar el siglo XIX, sin embargo, superó aquella concepción procesal que le había dado origen y se elevó a un recurso axiológico que limita el accionar del órgano legislativo. A partir de entonces podemos hablar del debido proceso como una garantía genérica de la libertad, es decir, como una garantía sustantiva. La superación del "debido proceso" como garantía procesal obedece, básicamente, a que también la ley que se ha ajustado al procedimiento establecido y es válida y eficaz, puede lesionar el Derecho de la Constitución. Para realizar el juicio de razonabilidad la doctrina estadounidense invita a examinar, en primer término, la llamada "razonabilidad técnica" dentro de la que se examina la norma en concreto (ley, reglamento, etc.). Establecido que la norma elegida es la adecuada para regular determinada materia, habrá que examinar si hay proporcionalidad entre el medio escogido y el fin buscado. Superado el criterio de "razonabilidad técnica" hay que analizar la "razonabilidad jurídica". Para lo cual esta doctrina propone examinar: a) razonabilidad ponderativa, que es un tipo de valoración jurídica a la que se concurre cuando ante la existencia de un determinado antecedente (ej. ingreso) se exige una determinada prestación (ej. tributo), debiendo en este supuesto establecerse si la misma es equivalente o proporcionada; b) la razonabilidad de igualdad, es el tipo de valoración jurídica que parte de que ante iguales antecedentes deben haber iguales consecuencias, sin excepciones arbitrarias; c) razonabilidad en el fin : en este punto se valora si el objetivo a alcanzar, no ofende los fines previstos en la constitución. Dentro de este mismo análisis, no basta con afirmar que un medio sea razonablemente adecuado a un fin; es necesario, además, verificar la índole y el tamaño de la limitación que por ese medio debe soportar un derecho personal. De esta manera, si al mismo fin se puede llegar buscando otro medio que produzca una limitación menos gravosa a los derechos personales, el medio escogido no es razonable. Fue en la sentencia número 01739-92, de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos, donde por primera vez se intentó definir este principio, de la siguiente manera:

"La razonabilidad como parámetro de interpretación constitucional. Pero aún se dio un paso más en la tradición jurisprudencial anglo–norteamericana, al extenderse el concepto del debido proceso a lo que en esa tradición se conoce como debido sustantivo o sustancial –substantive due process of law–, que, en realidad, aunque no se refiere a ninguna materia procesal, constituyó un ingenioso mecanismo ideado por la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos para afirmar su jurisdicción sobre los Estados federados, al hilo de la Enmienda XIV a la Constitución Federal, pero que entre nosotros, sobre todo a falta de esa necesidad, equivaldría sencillamente al principio de razonabilidad de las leyes y otras normas o actos públicos, o incluso privados, como requisito de su propia validez constitucional, en el sentido de que deben ajustarse, no sólo a las normas o preceptos concretos de la Constitución, sino también al sentido de justicia contenido en ella, el cual implica, a su vez, el cumplimiento de exigencias fundamentales de equidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, entendidas éstas como idoneidad para realizar los fines propuestos, los principios supuestos y los valores presupuestos en el Derecho de la Constitución.

De allí que las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sólo haber sido promulgados por órganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino también pasar la revisión de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constitución (formal y material), como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc., que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad. Es decir, que una norma o acto público o privado sólo es válido cuando, además de su conformidad formal con la Constitución, esté razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideología constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sólo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino además que los medios seleccionados tengan una relación real y sustancial con su objeto. Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurídica, o la adecuación a la Constitución en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad." La doctrina alemana hizo un aporte importante al tema de la "razonabilidad" al lograr identificar, de una manera muy clara, sus componentes: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, ideas que desarrolla afirmando que ya han sido reconocidas por nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional:

"... La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido; la idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada debe ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido; la necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona; y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, o sea, no le sea "exigible" al individuo ... (Sentencia de esta Sala número 03933-98, de las nueve horas cincuenta y nueve minutos del doce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho). En la sentencia número 08858-98, de las dieciséis horas con treinta y tres minutos del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, fue objeto de reciente desarrollo, resolución en la que se indicaron las pautas para su análisis, tanto de los actos administrativos como de las normas de carácter general:

Así, un acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: es necesario, idóneo y proporcional. La necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad -o de un determinado grupo- mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. Es decir, que si dicha actuación no es realizada, importantes intereses públicos van a ser lesionados. Si la limitación no es necesaria, tampoco podrá ser considerada como razonable, y por ende constitucionalmente válida. La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción a ser adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. La inidoneidad de la medida nos indicaría que pueden existir otros mecanismos que en mejor manera solucionen la necesidad existente, pudiendo algunos de ellos cumplir con la finalidad propuesta sin restringir el disfrute del derecho en cuestión. Por su parte, la proporcionalidad nos remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer, de manera que la limitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que con ella se pretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad. De los dos últimos elementos, podría decirse que el primero se basa en un juicio cualitativo, en cuanto que el segundo parte de una comparación cuantitativa de los dos objetos analizados." Por último, recientemente, en sentencia número 05236-99, de las catorce horas del siete de julio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, al hacerse mención del principio de razonabilidad constitucional como parámetro constitucional, se hace de una manera práctica, es decir, con miras de poder realizar el examen constitucional de las norma y/o actos impugnados ante este Tribunal Constitucional; "En el sentido del criterio anteriormente expuesto, esta Sala ha venido aplicando la institución en su jurisprudencia. Veamos, ahora, el análisis del caso concreto. Sobre la prueba de "razonabilidad": Para emprender un examen de razonabilidad de una norma, el Tribunal Constitucional requiere que la parte aporte prueba o al menos elementos de juicio en los que sustente su argumentación e igual carga procesal le corresponde a quien rebata los argumentos de la acción y la falta en el cumplimiento de estos requisitos, hace inaceptables los alegatos de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior, debido a que no es posible hacer un análisis de "razonabilidad" sin la existencia de una línea argumentativa coherente que se encuentre probatoriamente respaldada. Ello desde luego, cuando no se trate de casos cuya «irrazonabilidad» sea evidente y manifiesta." (Sentencia 2000-02858 de las quince horas cincuenta y cuatro minutos del veintinueve de marzo del dos mil) Afirma el accionante que las normas impugnadas son irrazonables porque se pudieron utilizar medidas menos lesivas al ejercicio de las libertades. Sin embargo, no especifica a cuál de las limitaciones o exigencias se refiere ni señala en qué consiste esa insatisfacción de la razonabilidad técnica. Tampoco aporta prueba ni elementos de juicio que permitan realizar un examen de la razonabilidad de las normas cuestionadas. En términos generales, sin entrar en un análisis particularizado de cada una de las normas impugnadas (dada la omisión del accionante) esta Sala estima que la normativa impugnada es la adecuada e idónea para regular la materia y además, necesaria, pues pretende la regulación y el control de la publicidad exterior, no sólo por razones de planificación urbana, sino también, por el debido respeto al derecho de contar con un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado”.

V.- Si bien la regulación de la publicación exterior o rótulos en el Cantón de San José, es acorde con la Constitución y la Ley, procede analizar el artículo 69 del Reglamento, cuya aplicación constituye el punto central de la discusión en este proceso, por cuanto es el fundamento del acto impugnado. En materia tributaria rige el principio de reserva de ley, lo que significa que solamente por mandato legislativo se pueden crear tributos y, correlativamente solo mediante la ley se pueden conceder exenciones. Ese principio es recogido por nuestra Constitución Política en su artículo 121 inciso 13) y desarrollado en el artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, por lo que no puede crearse un impuesto –el pago por la licencia- vía reglamentaria. La jerarquía de las fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico tributario (artículo 2 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) y del ordenamiento administrativo (artículo 6 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), hace que los actos administrativos –y los reglamentos emitidos por las Administraciones lo son- estén sujetos al principio de reserva de ley, por lo que no pueden regular o modificar materias reservadas a la ley, como es el caso de los tributos. Por esas razones, el Tribunal Constitucional en el Voto 5503-2002 al que se ha hecho referencia, declaró inconstitucional y anuló el artículo 69 del Reglamento de Espacios Públicos, Vialidad y Transporte, del Plan Director del Cantón Central de San José, indicando:

“IX.- Naturaleza impositiva del pago por licencia. Violación al principio de reserva de ley. En lo que se refiere al pago por licencia previsto en el artículo 69 impugnado, observa la Sala que tal y como bien lo señala la Procuraduría en su informe, se trata de un impuesto que no está previsto ni autorizado por Ley. En cuanto a la naturaleza del tributo por patente se ha señalado:

"Como en la acción se cuestiona la aplicación del llamado impuesto de patente -con el que se grava a toda actividad lucrativa que se ejerza en el Cantón de Buenos Aires (artículos 96 y 98 Código Municipal)-, concretamente, al que se cobra a la producción de piña, resulta imprescindible señalar algunas notas de importancia acerca de esa materia. Distingue nuestra legislación entre la licencia propiamente dicha, que es el acto administrativo que habilita al particular para ejercer la respectiva actividad y el pago del impuesto, propiamente dicho, que se denomina con el nombre de patente. La principal justificación teórica para imponer este tipo de tributo, es la ya tradicional en el ámbito del Derecho Municipal, que lo define como la imperiosa necesidad de sufragar el costo de los servicios públicos que el particular recibe de la municipalidad; es decir, que los negocios comerciales o las actividades lucrativas, según la nomenclatura que utiliza nuestro Código Municipal, se ven altamente beneficiados con la seguridad, el orden, el aseo y la actividad municipal en general, por lo que deben contribuir con el Gobierno Local. En doctrina se llama patente o impuesto a la actividad lucrativa, a los que gravan a los negocios sobre la base de caracteres externos más o menos fáciles de determinar, sin que exista un sistema único al respecto. Por el contrario, los sistemas de imposición de este tributo, son de lo más variados, pero sí tienen ciertas características que les son comunes. Por esto es que difieren las leyes del impuesto de patente de un municipio a otro y las bases impositivas pueden ser igualmente variadas, como por ejemplo sobre las utilidades brutas, las ventas brutas, a base de categorías o clases, o bien, de una patente mínima y otra máxima.

III- Desde el punto de vista de la doctrina del Derecho Tributario, sus principios jurídicos más importantes son : a) el de legalidad de la tributación, conocido también, como reserva de ley; o lo que es lo mismo, la exclusiva regulación de la actividad tributaria por la ley formal; b) el principio de igualdad ante el impuesto y las cargas públicas, que alude a la necesidad de asegurar el mismo tratamiento a quienes se encuentren en análogas situaciones (concepto relacionado más con la materialidad, que con la formalidad); este principio permite la formación de distintas categorías, en la medida que éstas sean razonables, lo que a su vez exige que sea con total exclusión de discriminaciones arbitrarias; c) el de generalidad, que implica que no deben resultar afectadas con el tributo, personas o bienes determinados singularmente, pues en tal supuesto los tributos adquieren carácter persecutorio o de discriminación odiosa o ilegítima. Dicho en otra forma, el tributo debe estar concebido de tal forma, que cualquier persona, cuya situación coincida con la señalada como hecho generador, será sujeto del impuesto. Para el caso concreto no hay duda que el tributo fue autorizado por una ley y lo que procede es analizar si la diferenciación alegada por la accionante y que proviene de la ley de patentes referida, es razonable o si por el contrario, crea una discriminación arbitraria contra ella." (Sentencia 1992-02197 de las catorce horas treinta minutos del once de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y dos) El principio de reserva legal en materia tributaria es de índole constitucional y resulta enteramente aplicable al pago de licencias o patentes municipales. Si bien es cierto, se reconoce un poder tributario municipal originario, en virtud de la autonomía que la propia Constitución les confiere a esos Entes; es preciso que se cuente con la autorización de la Asamblea Legislativa, tal y como lo señala el artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Carta Fundamental:

"En forma reiterada, este Tribunal ha indicado que de lo dispuesto en el artículo 170 de la Constitución Política deriva la autonomía de las municipalidades, principio del cual emana el poder impositivo o tributario municipal para procurarse los ingresos necesarios y para sufragar el costo de los servicios públicos que el particular recibe de la municipalidad, siempre que cumplan con los procedimientos legales necesarios, y se manifiesten en tributos que se sujeten a los principios constitucionales propios de esa materia; de modo tal que la Asamblea Legislativa únicamente emite en esta materia un "acto de autorización típicamente tutelar", cuando ejercita la facultad que le confiere el inciso 13) del artículo 121 de la Constitución Política, de manera que la inciativa para la creación, modificación o extinción de los impuestos municipales le corresponde a estos entes, así como la potestad de eximir de los tributos municipales (en este sentido, entre otras ver sentencias número 1631-91, de las quince horas quince minutos del veintiuno de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y uno; 0140-94, de las quince horas cincuenta y un minutos del once de enero de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro; 2494-94, de las catorce horas cincuenta y cuatro minutos del doce de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro; 4496-94; 4497-94, de las quince horas treinta y nueve minutos del veintitrés de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro; 4510-94, de las catorce horas cincuenta y un minutos del veinticuatro de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro; 4512-94, de las catorce horas cincuenta y siete minutos del veinticuatro de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro; 6362-94, de las quince horas treinta y nueve minutos del primero de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro; 1269-95, quince horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del siete de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco; 2311-95, de las dieciséis horas doce minutos del nueve de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco; 2631-95, de las dieciséis horas tres minutos del veintitrés mayo mil novecientos noventa y cinco; 1974-96, de las nueve horas del treinta de abril de mil novecientos noventa y seis; y 4982-96, de las diez horas doce minutos del veinte de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis).

"Las Municipalidades no hacen a la Asamblea Legislativa una mera proposición, sino que deben poder someterle verdaderas fijaciones impositivas. Esto significa que el acto impositivo municipal es terminal y definitivo, creador del impuesto en un procedimiento tributario abierto al efecto por cada municipalidad, no inicial en un presunto procedimiento legislativo con igual función, como si fuera una simple proposición sujeta a la voluntad constitutiva y libre del legislador. Por consiguiente, la fijación tributaria municipal enmarca la materia del pronunciamiento legislativo, cuya función es tutelar y no constitutiva del impuesto municipal, y cuyo resultado consecuente sólo puede ser la autorización o desautorización de lo propuesto, no la sustitución de la voluntad municipal" (sentencia número 1631-91, supera citada).

Esta competencia esta establecida en el artículo 68 del vigente Código Municipal que dispone:

"La municipalidad acordará sus respectivos presupuestos, propondrá sus tributos a la Asamblea Legislativa y fijará las tasas y precios de los servicios municipales. Sólo la municipalidad previa ley que la autorice, podrá dictar exoneraciones de los tributos señalados." Asimismo, de la autonomía propia de estas corporaciones, deriva la posibilidad de administración de sus recursos, en tanto cada gobierno local es libre para definir los límites de su propio poder impositivo, de donde los sistemas de imposición tributaria municipal para su cobro y aplicación concretos son de los más variados." (Sentencia 1999-05445 de las catorce horas treinta minutos del catorce de julio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve) En aplicación de lo anterior, debe declararse inconstitucional el artículo 69 en cuanto prevé un pago por licencia, por no contar con la debida autorización de la Asamblea Legislativa, en quebranto del principio de reserva de ley en materia tributaria” La conclusión, es que el oficio 4428 del 2 de abril del 2001, en cuanto establece a cargo de la actora el pago por la licencia para la utilización de 4 rótulos, se encuentra basado en una norma inconstitucional y resulta absolutamente nulo a tenor de los artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, 2 y 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, 6, 132, 133, 166, 172 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Si bien la Sala Constitucional, dimensionó los efectos de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad pronunciada, en el sentido de que en virtud de la materia, rige sólo para el futuro y no en forma retroactiva, para no causar un grave dislocamiento a la seguridad jurídica, lo anterior no impide que aquí se declare la nulidad solicitada en la demanda, por cuanto, el artículo 95 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que lo dispuesto en los artículos que anteceden –lo que incluye la normativa sobre graduación en el espacio, el tiempo o la materia del efecto retroactivo de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad- “no impedirá la eliminación, por nulidad absoluta, de los actos administrativos, conforme con la Ley General de la Administración Pública” VI.- En consecuencia, deben rechazarse las excepciones de falta de derecho y la genérica de sine actione agit, para declarar con lugar la demanda.

VII.- Debe seguirse el principio general de condena en costas a la parte vencida (artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil)

POR TANTO:

Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho y sine actione agit. Se declara con lugar la demanda y en consecuencia, se anula el cobro por concepto de uso de rótulos, formulado por la Municipalidad de San José, Sección de Inspección Urbana que consta en el oficio 4428-R de dos de abril del dos mil uno. Son ambas costas del proceso a cargo de la Municipalidad de San José.

Elvia Elena Vargas Rodríguez Cristina Víquez Cerdas Hubert Fernández Argüello Proceso especial tributario Importadora de Azulejos y Piso Cerámico c/ Municipalidad de San José.

Municipal sign license fee based on unconstitutional regulationCobro municipal por licencia de rótulos basado en reglamento inconstitucional

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