Exclusion from child support for lack of proof of studies by adult daughterExclusión alimentaria por falta de prueba de estudios de hija mayor de edad

**EXPEDIENTE:** **PROCESO:** SEGUNDA INSTANCIA **ACTOR/A:** [Nombre 001] **DEMANDADO/A:** [Nombre 002] **SENTENCIA DE SEGUNDA INSTANCIA** **N° 2023001129** **JUZGADO PRIMERO DE FAMILIA DE SAN JOSÉ.** At twenty hours fifty-eight minutes on the first of November of two thousand twenty-three. Alimony proceeding —exclusion and reduction— filed by [Nombre 001], identity card number [...] against [Nombre 002], identity card number [...]. On appeal filed by the alimony obligor, this Court reviews the judgment rendered at 5:07 p.m. on September 21, 2023, and **RESULTANDO:** The First Instance Judge, Ana Gabriela Herrera Alfaro, declared the exclusion proceeding filed by the alimony obligor without merit and partially granted the reduction proceeding. The matter was resolved without an award of costs. The alimony obligor appeals and indicates that there is no proof that the beneficiary is studying. He states that the last academic information for the young woman refers to the second quarter of 2022, and nothing further is known. In addition, he alleges that the young woman is working. He did not appeal the ruling on costs.

**CONSIDERANDO:** **I. PROVEN FACTS:** Those stated in the appealed judgment are endorsed, as they reflect the record.

**II. UNPROVEN FACT:** The following is added as an unproven fact: It is unknown whether the young beneficiary passed the courses she enrolled in during the second quarter of 2022, and since then, it is not known whether she continued studying or not, her academic load, the degree's curriculum, or her performance.

**III. ON THE MERITS: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALIMONY OBLIGATION.** Regarding the practical application of Article 169 of the Family Code in accordance with current legislation and binding jurisprudence —Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law and 8.1) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch—, the requirements for alimony are reviewed in every proceeding and in the following strict order, whether to set alimony —provisional or not—; to modify it —increase or reduce it—; and to analyze the grounds for exoneration and exclusion:

**FIRST:** Kinship or legal tie, as the case may be, since both concepts are not the same. This requirement is based on the following regulations: Article 169 of the Family Code, amended regarding subsection 2) by Law No. 10166, La Gaceta No. 82 of May 5, 2022; Article 248 of said Code, which corresponded to former Article 245 and is now 248 because the numbering was shifted by the law called "Creación del Sistema Nacional de Cuidados y Apoyos para Personas Adultas y Personas Adultas Mayores en Situación de Dependencia (SINCA)", No. 10192 published in La Gaceta No. 110 of June 14, 2022, Supplement (Alcance) No. 118. Added to this regulation is Law No. 10228 on the authentic interpretation of Article 245 —248— of the Family Code, La Gaceta No. 100 of May 31, 2022; Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Preamble and Article 24(d) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 69 and 92, second paragraph, of the Family Code, Articles 12, 31, and 1400 of the Civil Code, regulations that allow resolving the matter of alimony for unborn children not only regarding women joined in marriage but also women in a common-law marriage, and it could even be considered applicable in the case of an irregular common-law marriage where it is not the woman who is joined in marriage but her partner. Furthermore, what is contemplated in Articles 23, 27, and 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child must be considered. Likewise, what is provided in Articles 29, 37 to 39 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code must be added. As a complement, what is provided in Article 13(a) and 16(c) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Law No. 6968, and Articles 1, 2(a), 3, 4(b), (e), and (g) of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women "Convención Belem Do Pará" must also be considered. Equally, the provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Alimony Obligations, Law No. 8053, and the provisions of the Code of Private International Law, Law No. 50, published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 7, La Gaceta No. 30 of February 6, 1930, must also be considered. Now then, the review of all these regulations also involves analyzing the following issues in each specific case:

1.a. The examination of the status of preferred obligor as provided in Articles 168, 169, and 173(1) of the Family Code, 23 of the Alimony Law, and 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code. It should be noted that there are at least five provisions referring to the preferred status regarding alimony debtors. Furthermore, said regulations also require reviewing the status of preferred beneficiary, as derived from constitutional jurisprudence, such as, for example, ruling No. 5720-00, 2:58 p.m. of July 11, 2000, in which it stated: "By resolution of sixteen hours and twenty minutes on July fourth, two thousand, the Contraventional and Small Claims Court of San Joaquín de Flores annulled the resolution that admitted the alimony claim and the one that ordered the corporal sanction (apremio corporal) against the petitioner. This was based on the consideration that the Family Code, section 156, establishes a priority (prelación) of alimony obligors, making it indispensable, in the first place, to prove the material impossibility of the minors' father to cover alimony, for which the corresponding warnings were issued to the plaintiff (folio 30). II.- Section 15 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law states that the habeas corpus action proceeds against 'acts or omissions originating from any authority, including judicial, against threats to that freedom and the disturbances or restrictions that regarding it are unduly established by the authorities...' (bold not in original). In the case before us, it is evident that the respondent authority, without performing the corresponding analysis of section 156 of the Family Code, admitted an alimony claim against the petitioner, obligating him to pay a provisional alimony payment set at two hundred forty thousand colones, under warning of ordering corporal sanction (apremio corporal) against the obligor if the corresponding payment was not made, which he did not make, leading to the order for his corporal sanction and consequent capture. The respondent authority indicates that before being notified of the habeas corpus filing, it had already revoked those resolutions, making the corresponding communications to the police authorities to prevent the petitioner's detention; therefore, in its opinion, the present habeas corpus action lacks purpose; however, that subsequent action does not make non-existent the threat to liberty that both jurisdictional resolutions caused to the petitioner. For this Chamber, the petitioner's personal liberty was illegitimately threatened by ordering his corporal sanction without analyzing whether, in the specific case, the circumstances existed that made necessary the admission of the claim and the warning to pay alimony. It does not go unnoticed by this Chamber that, despite the petitioner, in his response to the claim, pointing out to the court the irregularity of the proceeding and the ordered payment, an arrest warrant was ordered against him —without further analysis of his arguments—, which demonstrates a clear lack of assessment by the respondent authority of the circumstances of the specific case, obligating this Chamber to declare its responsibility for the threat to liberty suffered by the petitioner. Based on the foregoing, the appeal must be granted, warning the respondent authority to refrain from engaging in acts such as those that have given rise to the granting of this appeal. It is unnecessary to order the lifting of the arrest warrant, as requested by the appellant, because the respondent authority has already provided for this." Along the same lines, in ruling No. 6610-01, 3:59 p.m. of July 10, 2001, the Constitutional Chamber stated: "The purpose of the Alimony Law, which is of a family nature, was to seek alimony assistance and the personal and patrimonial protection of persons who, having need, in one way or another cannot provide for themselves. The Law grants this right, based on the idea of a just principle of family solidarity; therefore, it limits this right to the closest degrees of kinship and affinity: the obligation to provide alimony affects only the relatives and in-laws called upon by law, and according to a pre-established order. The obligation to provide alimony is an economic benefit that, maintaining the proper relationship between the economic possibilities of the obligor and the needs of the alimony creditor, aims to satisfy the provision of nutritious substances or food, medical care and medications, cover the needs for clothing, housing, and recreation, and, in the case of minors, provide the necessary resources to ensure formal or informal education to provide comprehensive development as a citizen and human being. The alimony benefit, therefore, does not have only a pecuniary value. Precisely for this reason, its set-off is not allowed, nor the assignment of the alimony right; and consequently, neither transaction nor compromise on it. What is discussed in alimony proceedings is not, as indicated, a merely pecuniary benefit, for profit, as in any other civil proceeding, but rather, although the debt is monetary, it is aimed at satisfying the needs of every human being to achieve harmonious development. Note that the legal right protected through the imposition of alimony is the need and condition of dependency in which the alimony creditor finds itself concerning the obligor. By virtue of the foregoing, the alimony obligation cannot be equated to any other legal obligation, given that in the alimony one, the family powers to demand such a benefit are not attributed for the purpose of satisfying a merely personal interest, but to meet a superior need of a family nature." This criterion has been reiterated, for example, in rulings No. 1124-05, 11:14 a.m. of February 4, 2005; No. 10484-01, 3:50 p.m. of October 16, 2001; No. 7923-02, 3:19 p.m. of August 20, 2002, among others. Furthermore, other constitutional rulings dealing with subsidiary obligors and preferred obligors are: No. 5498-13, 2:30 p.m. of April 23, 2013; No. 1817-14, 4:05 p.m. of February 11, 2014; No. 9580-15, 9:05 a.m. of June 26, 2015; No. 18945-15, 11:01 a.m. of December 2, 2015, and No. 518-18, 9:15 a.m. of January 17, 2018.

1.b. The analysis of the provisions of Article 40 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code, as well as section 10 of the Alimony Law. Therefore, it must be taken into account that the person who files an alimony claim would not necessarily be obligated to pay alimony —solidarity— as is the case of uncles and aunts, who are not obligated to pay alimony with respect to nephews and nieces, as derived from Article 169 and 173(5) of the Family Code. Similarly, grandparents are not obligated to pay alimony regarding grandchildren of legal age who do not have a disability that prevents them from attending to their own interests. This is pursuant to Article 169(c) of the Family Code. Another example is a person who is the administrative or judicial custodian (depositario/a) of a minor, since the custodian is not necessarily someone who owes alimony according to Article 169 of the Family Code. As can be seen, there are many scenarios in which the person filing the claim for the benefit of another person is not obligated to pay alimony. In summary, the practical application of the cited Articles 40 and 10 is not a minor issue considering that it is not possible to take evidence on the economic capacity of persons who are not obligated to pay alimony. Thus, investigating their finances without being obligated to pay alimony constitutes an arbitrary interference in their life, and this practice is expressly prohibited at least in Articles 12.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; V of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 11.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 3.1, 4, and 16); General Comment of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, No. 14; Articles 5 and 16 of the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons; and Article 22 of the UN Convention on Disability and the recommendations of the Committee of said Convention, among other provisions. Also, in the practical application of Article 10 of the Alimony Law, it is vital to determine whether the person acting for the benefit of another is, in reality, the preferred obligor, or even if, whether they are or not, they maintain a conflicting interest. Finally, this Article 10 requires special analysis when the migratory issue is at stake, as it is usual for migrants to leave their minor children, or even adult children with disabilities, in their country of origin or in the State where they previously resided, in the care of relatives or third parties, while they work in Costa Rica to generate resources and thus send them to their children abroad. Now then, as the alimony obligation is by definition extraterritorial, it is clear that the person claiming alimony, while possibly not exercising immediate care of the beneficiaries, may be exercising mediate care, and consequently, it will be up to the respondent to demonstrate that, in reality, the claimant remains disconnected from the beneficiaries and, therefore, lacks standing to claim alimony. Thus, in situations where the migratory issue and the application of Article 10 converge, it is necessary to make interpretations that favor access to justice for migrants and, at the same time, the extraterritorial nature of the alimony obligation. This, without neglecting, of course, the certainty regarding the connection between the person claiming on behalf of beneficiaries located abroad.

1.c. Review of the joinder of parties (integración de la litis). That is, the necessary passive joinder (litisconsorcio pasiva necesaria). This is pursuant to Articles 35 and 169 of the Family Code, and 106 of the Civil Procedure Code, Law No. 7130, as well as Article 2, second paragraph, of the Alimony Law regarding the directive on the fulfillment of family duties. Similarly, it is indispensable to consider the joint and several nature (carácter solidario) of the alimony obligation, understood as family cohesion and not as in commercial obligations, where one can choose which debtor to demand compliance with the obligation from. Now then, it must be clear that, just because by virtue of the joint and several nature of the alimony obligation the passive joinder is necessary and not optional, this does not mean that all respondents must be obligated to pay provisional alimony or alimony in the judgment, since it is always necessary to analyze the economic possibilities of each person separately and the needs of the beneficiary. Similarly, it must be clear that it is not possible to require a single son or daughter to conform to the fact that their father or mother does not want to claim against other sons or daughters, either because they do not want to, because they conform to what they already receive extrajudicially —which may or may not be proportional to those persons' income—, or because they do consider the circumstances of some children and not others, which could even be the same or different, but in itself, some are relevant to them and others are not. These are all subjectivities that the respondent does not have to bear, and even less so considering that an order for corporal sanction (apremio corporal), an exit ban, a search warrant, etc., could be issued solely against them. Why should a person conform to being the sole respondent if there are other persons who are also family-held jointly and severally liable? Why should they conform to the fact that those persons possibly do not contribute or, well, contribute what they want, without their economic capacity being analyzed to determine if they are contributing as is being required of the person who has been sued? Note that if family solidarity and the directive on fulfilling family duties do not imply that the passive joinder is necessary, then, extrajudicially, one person would be allowed not to contribute or, well, allowed to contribute what they want, while another would be judicially required to contribute a specific sum, and in the first case, no judge would verify that they cannot contribute or that the contribution actually exists and, furthermore, is proportional to the possibilities of the person providing the contribution and the needs of the person receiving it, while, in the second case, the respondent would indeed be subjected to deep scrutiny as determined by Article 164 of the Family Code and Articles 2 and 27 of the Alimony Law, that is, it is a scrutiny aimed at determining the real truth.

**SECOND:** Determine whether the party claiming alimony, or the person who benefits from it due to the claim made by another person, is or is not subject to any ground for exclusion. This finds support in Article 173(2) to (7) of the Family Code. With the observation that the grounds contained in subsections (2) to (7) of that provision, as already stated, are grounds for exclusion due to actions or omissions contrary to good faith in family relations, which is why they have been termed "family infamy (infamia familiar)" starting from judgment 900-23, at 8:40 a.m. on September 18, 2023, drafted by Judge Patricia Méndez Gómez, presiding judge of the First Family Court with Second Instance Jurisdiction. The purpose of this is to generate a specific denomination and not to use the concept of "unworthiness (indignidad)" because it is specific to inheritance matters, nor "ingratitude (ingratitud)," which refers to the donation contract. Now then, when analyzing these regulations, i.e., Article 173(2) to (7) of the Family Code, what is provided in constitutional rulings No. 3685-09, 10:30 a.m., March 6, 2009, and No. 14026-11, 2:50 p.m., October 19, 2011, is of interest; Article 523 of the Civil Code, amended by Law No. 9777, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Supplement (Alcance) No. 280; Law No. 10217, La Gaceta No. 100 of May 31, 2022; Article 572(c) of the Civil Code, and Articles 48, 57, 58, 66, 140, 143, 158, 159, 160, 233, and 248 of the Family Code. All this, with the following observations:

2.a. Article 233 of the Family Code was incorporated by Law No. 10192, and said Law, as already indicated, shifted the numbering by incorporating Articles 231, 232, and 233 to the Family Code. Therefore, it must be determined whether, in a specific case, there exists a final judgment (sentencia firme) issued in a proceeding for "lifting of the care obligation (levantamiento de obligación de cuido)." For greater clarity, this is a new proceeding created by the addition of Article 233 to the Family Code according to Article 32 of the law Creación del Sistema Nacional de Cuidados y Apoyos para Personas Adultas y Personas Adultas Mayores en Situación de Dependencia (SINCA), No. 10192 of April 28, 2022. Thus, if such a judgment exists, its scope in the specific case must be determined. Furthermore, based on Article 8 of the Family Code and 106 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, these types of matters fall under the jurisdiction of the family courts, and what is resolved therein may or may not affect an alimony proceeding by analogous application of the last paragraph of Article 173 of the Family Code.

2.b. Similarly, the amendment introduced to Articles 56, 60, and 141, the heading of Chapter II of Title III, and Articles 151 and 152 of the Family Code, by Law No. 9781, La Gaceta No. 238 of December 13, 2019, Supplement (Alcance) No. 279, must be considered.

2.c. Moreover, it is also necessary to take into account that Article 158 of the Family Code has been amended by Law No. 9406, November 30, 2016, La Gaceta No. 10, Supplement (Alcance) No. 9; Law No. 9095, La Gaceta No. 28 of February 8, 2013, Supplement 27 a; Law No. 10263, La Gaceta No. 99 of May 30, 2022, Supplement (Alcance) No. 109. In addition to this, it must be considered that there is also the amendment introduced to Article 57 of the Penal Code by Law No. 8875, La Gaceta No. 202 of October 19, 2010, regarding the disqualification from exercising "patria potestad, tutela, curatela o administración judicial de bienes" (parental authority, guardianship, conservatorship, or judicial administration of property) as indicated in the provision, and that Article 159 of the Family Code has been amended by Law No. 9379, La Gaceta No. 166 of August 30, 2016, Supplement (Alcance) No. 153.

2.d. As a complement, it cannot be overlooked that against Article 173(4) regarding adultery —committed in the past or present— as a ground for exclusion from the alimony right, there is an unconstitutionality action pending, docket number 22-009920-0007-CO, and first published in the Boletín Judicial No. 103, June 3, 2022. That edict, in what is relevant, states: "(...) This notice only affects pending judicial proceedings in which the application of the challenged provision is discussed, and it is warned that the only thing that cannot be done in said proceedings is to dictate judgment or the act in which what is being challenged must be applied in the sense in which it has been. Likewise, the only thing the action suspends in administrative proceedings is the issuance of the final resolution in procedures aimed at exhausting that avenue, which are those that begin with and from the appeal for reversal or reconsideration filed against the final act, unless, of course, it concerns provisions that must be applied during the process, in which case the suspension operates immediately (...)." 2.e. In addition to all this, what is provided in Article 42 of the Political Constitution, Article 164 of the Civil Procedure Code, Law No. 7130, and Articles 148, 408, 412, 416, and 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and what is provided in the Code of Private International Law, Law No. 50, published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 7, La Gaceta No. 30 of February 6, 1930, must be added.

2.f. Furthermore, it is opportune to indicate that distinguishing between exoneration and exclusion is not an inconsequential matter, since exoneration operates with respect to the alimony debtor, and exclusion, with respect to the alimony creditor. Additionally, the burdens of proof are different in an exoneration proceeding and an exclusion proceeding. Thus, a ground is for exoneration if it involves analyzing the obligor's circumstances to determine whether or not they can pay alimony, whereas when what is being analyzed is whether the beneficiary should or should not receive alimony, it is a ground for exclusion. Obviously, there may be situations where the dispute involves grounds for both exoneration and exclusion. In any case, the order admitting evidence must reflect the subject matter of the debate and the respective burdens of proof.

For greater clarity, the first two grounds for exoneration are contemplated in Article 173(1), as they refer to the impossibility of paying because the obligor cannot meet their own needs or due to the existence of other preferred alimony obligations. Thus, those first two grounds are for exoneration. The remaining subsections of the provision, that is, those provided in subsections (2) to (7), are for exclusion, as they refer to actions or omissions committed by the person receiving alimony that warrant the loss thereof. Therefore, these subsections refer to situations where a person is receiving alimony under the following circumstances: without needing it; for having engaged in acts of mistreatment —serious insult (injuria), fault, or damages—; for having engaged in voluntary and malicious abandonment; if, being a former spouse, they remarried or began a common-law cohabitation; if, being an adult child, but under twenty-five years old, they are not studying under the terms required by the legislation; if they breached alimony duties when legally obligated to fulfill them; and, finally, if they commit or committed adultery, with this last ground —adultery— being the subject of the aforementioned unconstitutionality action.

2.g. Finally, when analyzing exclusion situations, it is necessary to determine whether there has been pardon or forgiveness regarding a possible situation determined as a ground excluding alimony due to "family infamy (infamia familiar)." On this subject, barring a better opinion, the provisions of Articles 52 and 63 of the Family Code apply, as well as section 524 of the Civil Code, Article 5, paragraphs 2 to 3, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and Article 12 of the Civil Code.

**THIRD:** The needs of the person who will benefit from the alimony payment, Article 51 of the Political Constitution, amended by Law No. 9697, published in La Gaceta No. 147 of August 7, 2019, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Protocol, Law No. 8661, published in La Gaceta No. 187 of February 29, 2008, and the General Comments of the Committee of said Convention: No. 1 Equal recognition before the law; No. 2 Accessibility; No. 3 On women and girls with disabilities; No. 4 On the right to inclusive education; No. 5 On the right to live independently and be included in the community; No. 6 On equality and non-discrimination; No. 7 On the participation of persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through the organizations that represent them, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention; No. 8 On the right of persons with disabilities to work and employment; Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, Law No. 7948 published in La Gaceta No. 238 of December 8, 1999; Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, Forty-eighth session, of December 20, 1993; Articles 160 bis, 164, and 166 of the Family Code, as well as Article 2(h), (i), and (j) of the Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities, i.e., Law No. 9379, published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 254, La Gaceta No. 166 of August 30, 2016; Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Comments of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, such as, for example: General Comment No. 4. Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; General Comment No. 5. General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; General Comment No. 7. Implementing child rights in early childhood; General Comment No. 9. The rights of children with disabilities; General Comment No. 11. Indigenous children and their rights under the Convention; General Comment No. 14. The right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration; General Comment No. 15. The right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health; General Comment No. 17. The right of the child to rest, leisure, play, recreational activities, cultural life and the arts; General Comment No. 20.

Regarding the effectiveness of children's rights during adolescence, among others; Articles 29, 37 to 39 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code; 13(a) and 16(c) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Law No. 6968 (CEDAW), which includes the General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee, such as, for example: General Recommendations No. 19 and No. 35 on Violence against women; General Recommendation No. 21 on equality in marriage and family relations; General Recommendation No. 27 on older women and protection of their human rights; General Recommendation No. 29 on the economic consequences of marriage, family relations and their dissolution; General Recommendation No. 33 on women's access to justice; General Recommendation No. 34 on the rights of rural women and, General Recommendation No. 39 on Indigenous Women and Girls, among others; Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations Law No. 8053, published in La Gaceta No. 12 of January 17, 2001; United Nations Principles for Older Persons, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1991, Resolution 46/91; the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, which corresponds to Law No. 9379; Articles 231 to 233 of the Family Code - Law No. 10192 - and the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons, Law No. 9394, published in Alcance No. 203 to La Gaceta No. 188 of September 30, 2016, among other provisions-, as well as any other regulation that protects the rights of specific populations, such as, for example, the regulation concerning indigenous populations, in which case it is notorious that the Child Support and Alimony Law is not only insufficient but even contrary to norms of supra-constitutional rank, particularly because the appointment of an interpreter, everything concerning the manner of fulfilling the support obligation—and that includes the committal order itself and even its execution—requires special attention. In this regard, I refer to Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which corresponds to Law No. 71316, published in La Gaceta No. 234 of December 4, 1992; Law No. 9593 on Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples of Costa Rica, published in La Gaceta No. 100, May 31, 2022, Minimum Rules for the Application of the First Paragraph of section 7 of the Law on Access to Justice for Indigenous Persons of Costa Rica, an agreement made by the Superior Council of the Judiciary in session No. 27-19 held on March 26, 2019, Article LXXI and which corresponds to Circular No. 67-19; Law No. 9305 declaring Costa Rica a democratic, free, independent, and multi-ethnic Republic, published in La Gaceta No. 191 of October 1, 2015.

As a complement, in each specific case, when examining the needs, it is of interest to distinguish between urgent needs, which are those protected by a provisional child support and alimony (pensión alimentaria provisional), and the needs that form part of a certain standard of living. In this latter case, consideration must also be given to whether they are needs created unilaterally by the person receiving support, needs created unilaterally by the person obligated and for the benefit of support creditors, as well as needs agreed upon by the persons jointly and severally obliged to pay support, and needs agreed upon by the persons subsidiarily obliged to pay support.

FOURTH: The possibilities of the person sued for support, which entails determining whether or not they are subject to any ground for exoneration - Article 27 of the Child Support and Alimony Law, Article 173(1), 160 bis, 164 and 35 of the Family Code of the Family Code, this last article amended by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239, December 16, 2019, Alcance No. 280. Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations Law No. 8053; all the regulations cited in the third point regarding the older adult population, the population with disabilities, and the indigenous population. Added to this is the provision in Article 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code. As a complement to this premise, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 9775-2010, 4:31 a.m. of June 1, 2010, held: “(…) it must be clear that the provisional amount of the child support and alimony should not be quantified solely in relation to the economic income of the support debtor, but rather a balancing test must be established in which both the conditions of the person responsible for the support obligation and those of the beneficiaries must be taken into account.” Logically, the proportionality of the support payment to which the Constitutional Court referred does not govern only with respect to a provisional child support and alimony but also for that which is fixed in a judgment. In addition to this, regarding the economic possibilities in support proceedings, the aforementioned Court referred to the former Article 151 - now Article 165 of the Family Code as follows: “In accordance with Article 151 of the Family Code, the support provision must maintain a relationship between the economic possibilities of the giver and the needs of the receiver, according to the particular circumstances of each case. This provision finds its rationale in the fact that no generalization can be made of all the needs that the support recipients may have, since everyone's circumstances are different; some will need special food, others will require particular medications, and some education under the charge of qualified tutors or teachers, etc., and on the other hand, neither can a common parameter be established to measure the economic possibilities of all those obliged to pay support, since some will have a better economic situation than others. In such a way that in this respect, without distorting the principle that all persons are equal before the law, the judge can be allowed to weigh all the circumstances of the specific case and make the determination in accordance with them, because a multiplicity of personal circumstances, all different, may arise. The principle of equality operates, as stated supra, insofar as the persons find themselves in equal or reasonably similar situations, which does not occur in relation to the needs and economic possibilities of human beings and their needs for support and personal development, therefore, it is not possible to accept the argument of the petitioner, that section 151 of the Family Code violates the principle of equality by establishing the need to consider the particular conditions of each party when fixing the amount of the support payment.” Resolution No. 1725-94, 3:21 p.m. of April 12, 1994. At this point, it is worth saying that said Court has on many occasions referred to the fact that the economic capacity of the party obliged to pay support is an issue that must be analyzed in each particular case: No. 1354-09, 1:16 p.m. of January 30, 2009; No. 15335-10, 8:32 a.m. of September 17, 2010; No. 7455-14, 3:15 p.m. of May 28, 2014; No. 4349-16, 9:00 a.m. of April 1, 2016; No. 466-18, 11:30 a.m. of January 16, 2018, No. 26760-21, 9:15 a.m. of November 26, 2021 and, No. 3986-23, 9:15 a.m. of February 21, 2023, among many.

As can be seen then, when carrying out the ordered examination of these premises, it is perfectly possible that, although a need exists, a ground for exoneration or a ground for exclusion has been simultaneously determined. This is because it is not only the needs of the beneficiary that count. In these cases, the exoneration or the exclusion prevails over the need. Similarly, it is also possible that the person claiming support is not a preferential beneficiary or that the person sued is not a preferential obligor, in which case, although the need exists, what is appropriate is to respect the preferential order.

Up to this point, the premises that must be reviewed in every support proceeding have been broken down. Now it is appropriate to analyze the premises that must be added when dealing with Article 173(5) of the Family Code.

IV.SUPPORT RIGHTS OF ADULT CHILDREN UNDER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE. When analyzing this issue, it is essential first of all to take into consideration the normative framework that regulates this specific support obligation. To begin, the ordinary regulation is contemplated in the aforementioned Article 173(5) of the Family Code, which states: “There shall be no obligation to provide support: (…) 5. When the support recipients have reached the age of majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load. These requirements must be proven when filing the lawsuit, providing information on the academic load and performance.” As amended by Law No. 7654, published in La Gaceta No. 16 of January 23, 1997.

Regarding this norm, the constitutional jurisprudence has been very extensive. Initially, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 2869-94, 2:36 p.m. of June 15, 1994, addressed the issue, but it was developed based on the cited Article 173(5) before it was reformed by the Child Support and Alimony Law. It is understood, then, that it is a ruling no longer applicable due to the said legal reform. Subsequently, ruling No. 6181-97, 5:51 p.m. of September 30, 1997, does develop the norm once reformed. Therefore, this ruling is applicable, with the observation that other later rulings dimension the application of the norm. Now, in the cited ruling No. 6181-97, the Constitutional Chamber stated: “(…) the circumstances that gave rise to the issuance of the partially transcribed judgment changed with the enactment of Law No. 7654 of December 19, 1996, published in number 16 of January 23, 1997 of the Official Gazette 'La Gaceta'. The Family Code, which contemplated the situation under study in Article 160(6), was reformed and in its section 173 it states: 'There shall be no obligation to provide support: 5. When the support recipients have reached the age of majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load. These requirements must be proven when filing the lawsuit, providing information on the academic load and performance.' The transcribed norm indicates that the child of legal age may be a beneficiary of support, if they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, and are not older than twenty-five years of age, as was established by Article 160(6) of the Family Code before its reform. However, it introduces a new element, when it indicates that good performance and a reasonable academic load must be demonstrated at the time of filing the lawsuit, thereby allowing the Judge to initially assess the appropriateness of the support and set a provisional amount in favor of the petitioner. Therefore, this Chamber finds that it is not improper that a provisional support amount was set for the protected party, whose amount, by the way, he challenged in the corresponding venue, nor does the committal order issued against him by the Child Support and Alimony Court of Liberia violate his fundamental right to personal liberty. The support provision is indispensable for the subsistence of the beneficiaries, so its non-compliance entails the committal order that may be issued under the terms of the Child Support and Alimony Law and in protection of Article 13(h) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Hence, if the appellant is obliged to the support provision and the committal order was requested by the petitioner, the order must take effect without the deprivation of liberty resulting from that fact being able to be understood as arbitrary or illegal.” Furthermore, in a later judgment, judgment No. 7372-97, 3:15 p.m. of November 4, 1997, said Court held: "This Chamber considers that, although it is true there is no express regulation indicating the exact moment to exclude the debtor from their support obligation, it is also true that there can be no interpretation other than that aimed at benefiting the best interest of the child, in accordance with Articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2 of the Family Code and 7 of the Child Support and Alimony Law No. 7654, regulations from which the general principle emerges that in this matter what prevails and must be considered primarily, is the best interest of the child. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be sought - as the appellant wants - that a beneficiary of a support obligation, upon reaching the age of majority, automatically loses their right to it, but rather, on the contrary, it must always be presumed that they continue studying and having good performance in their studies, so that they continue to enjoy the child support and alimony, as established by Article 173, in its paragraph 5) of the Child Support and Alimony Law (...)." This last point with the observation that the norm in question does not correspond to the Child Support and Alimony Law but rather to the Family Code.

Additionally, in other later rulings, the Constitutional Chamber made it clear that the criteria expressed when the norm had not been reformed had changed and that it is a matter proper to the ordinary jurisdiction to determine the appropriateness or not of a provisional child support and alimony. In this regard, judgments No. 3491-02, 2:39 p.m. of April 17, 2002; No. 5081-05, 2:34 p.m. of April 29, 2005; No. 13923-05, 8:31 a.m. of October 14, 2005 and, No. 6600-09, 2:22 p.m. of April 28, 2009, among others, may be consulted.

Now, in judgment No. 15209-2009, 11:08 a.m. of September 25, 2009, corrected by resolution No. 3278-10, 3:56 p.m. of February 12, 2010, that Constitutional Court stated: "V.- On the support duty towards children of legal age and its procedural handling. Section 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code indicates that the parents' support obligation towards their children is maintained even when they reach the age of majority, only to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load, all aspects that must be proven when filing the lawsuit and that necessarily must be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction. For this, the procedural system is arranged in such a way that, upon reaching the age of majority, the support creditor who considers they maintain their right to receive support must file the corresponding action before the specialized court in the matter, so that it is in that venue that it is accredited whether the interested party maintains that right and the obligor continues with the duty to provide the support, which must necessarily be assessed and defined according to the particular needs of the person who has reached the age of majority. This is so because upon reaching the age of majority, a series of needs different from those previously established for the support beneficiary while they were a minor are acquired, a situation that in practice implies the preclusion of the first recognized benefit, in order to, in its place and through a new judicial action, determine the new benefit that legally corresponds. In such a way, if within the first judicial case support beneficiaries persist, and the one who has reached the age of majority files a new action, the support obligor must act as appropriate within the first judicial process to achieve its adaptation to the new conditions, but as has been indicated, this is a matter within the competence of the interested party himself and, being an aspect of ordinary legality, it is outside the scope of competences of this jurisdiction." This was reiterated in judgment No. 2099-2014, 2:30 p.m. of February 18, 2014 as follows: “Section 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code indicates that the parents' support obligation towards their children is maintained even when they reach the age of majority, only to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load, all aspects that must be proven when filing the lawsuit and that necessarily must be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction. For this, the procedural system is arranged in such a way that, upon reaching the age of majority, the support creditor who considers they maintain their right to receive support must file the corresponding action before the specialized court in the matter, so that it is in that venue that it is accredited whether the interested party maintains that right and the obligor continues with the duty to provide the support, which must necessarily be assessed and defined according to the particular needs of the person who has reached the age of majority. This is so because upon reaching the age of majority, a series of needs different from those previously established for the support beneficiary while they were a minor are acquired, a situation that in practice implies the preclusion of the first recognized benefit, in order to, in its place and through a new judicial action, determine the new benefit that legally corresponds.” Now, in judgment No. 11490-2010, 4:47 p.m. of June 30, 2010, that Court stated: "(…) ordinary jurisprudence and constitutional jurisprudence have recognized that the acquisition of the age of majority is understood as a preclusion of the original support obligation - from which one benefits while a minor -, so a new support action must be processed if the person reaching eighteen years of age considers they maintain their status as a support beneficiary." And, finally, that Court, in resolution No. 5112-11, 12:21 p.m. of April 15, 2011, stated, regarding the right to support of the adult child under twenty-five years of age, who was already a beneficiary of a child support and alimony during minority: “In application of the principle of the most favorable interest to the creditor, then, said right is maintained within their sphere of rights enforceable against the support debtor, upon reaching the age of majority, as long as the conditions established in the legislation applicable to the case and in force in the Republic are met, which must be claimed and discussed in the ordinary jurisdictional venue. (…) Hence, it cannot be said, as was erroneously indicated in the cited judgment, that the age of majority operates to the detriment of the minor support beneficiary who reaches it, as a preclusion of the benefit, which is the same as affirming that the preclusion of the right to support occurs. There can be, as is procedurally logical, a problem of active capacity to sue related to representation, as explained supra, since it is presumed that the capacity to act in representation of the minor's interests expires at the moment their mandate is extinguished, by the advent of the legal or juridical circumstance previously established in the law. What cannot be affirmed is that a preclusion, statute of limitations or expiration of the benefit or right to support occurs, precisely for the reasons that have been set forth throughout this judgment. The right or benefit declared while being a minor is maintained upon reaching the age of majority, upon fulfillment of the procedural requirement established by the legislation governing the matter, being: a) appearing in such condition in the pre-existing process to demonstrate their capacity, right, and need, so that their situation and the appropriateness of what is sought is reassessed by the jurisdictional authority according to the new circumstances proper to the age of majority, and b) under the terms established in Whereas IV of judgment 2010-003278, in those cases where a duality or duplication of judicial actions occurs, resulting from the filing of a new lawsuit for child support and alimony by the person of legal age despite a pre-existing process where the right to support had been declared in their favor while being a minor, a situation that would produce the obligatory determination of the ordinary jurisdictional authority to order the joinder of both processes, evidently if such circumstance has been brought to its knowledge by the support defendant, all with a view to adequately guaranteeing the rights of both the beneficiary and the support obligor.” It is also important to highlight regarding constitutional judgment No. 5112-2011, 12:21 p.m. of April 2011, the following: “V.- On the support duty towards children of legal age and its procedural handling. Section 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code indicates that the parents' support obligation towards their children is maintained even when they reach the age of majority, only to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load, all aspects that must be proven when filing the lawsuit and that necessarily must be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction.” This criterion was also set forth in judgments No. 15209-2009, 11:08 a.m. of September 25, 2009, corrected by resolution No. 3278-10, 3:56 p.m. of February 12, 2010. It can be seen that the jurisprudence is very clear in establishing the exceptional and conditional nature of the support obligation in question, since it clearly indicates that the support right subsists “only to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load.” Furthermore, in that judgment No. 5112-2011, the Constitutional Chamber made it very clear that, the support obligation for adult children who were already judicial beneficiaries of support, “in application of the principle of the most favorable interest to the creditor, then, said right is maintained within their sphere of rights enforceable against the support debtor, upon reaching the age of majority, as long as the conditions established in the legislation applicable to the case and in force in the Republic are met, which must be claimed and discussed in the ordinary jurisdictional venue.” In other words, to enjoy that right, it is necessary to verify that the beneficiary person falls within the circumstances established in this case by Article 173(5) of the Family Code. From these binding jurisprudential criteria, it is important to highlight the following:

a. The support obligation provided for in Article 173(5) of the Family Code only proceeds to the extent that the support beneficiary persons have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade and do not exceed twenty-five years of age.

b. Therefore, the circumstances of the norm are not fulfilled with just any studies, but rather, they must be directed at acquiring a profession or trade; the circumstance of the norm cannot be fulfilled with just any performance nor with just any academic load, and this support obligation is fully conditional and is, consequently, exceptional. Thus, it is clear then that Article 173(5) of the Family Code, regarding the person receiving support, is not fulfilled with just any form of study, any enrollment at any time, and with any study results.

c. In other words, the support obligation of adult children is an obligation that necessarily implies a consideration of verifiable results: if one intends to receive the child support and alimony, one must study with the verifiable purpose stated in the norm, that is, to obtain a profession or trade and, in addition, with a reasonable academic load and good performance; to receive support, one must remain in compliance with the circumstances contemplated by the legislation; otherwise, an unjust enrichment would occur and even the circumstances of a procedural fraud could be constituted. See also that Article 23 of the Child Support and Alimony Law states: “When a provisional payment is set for someone who is not the preferential obligor or it is decided in a judgment that the support creditor has no right to support, whoever has paid the provisional payment, their representatives or heirs may demand restitution of the amount paid. The sum for the concept of restitution shall constitute an enforceable title and shall be determined through the incidental procedural route.” d. In addition to this, requesting the committal order upon the non-compliance of the person obliged to pay support, without the beneficiary person being in full and permanent compliance with the requirements demanded by Article 173(5) of the Family Code and, that situation - not complying with such requirements - is not attributable to the debtor party precisely for failing to pay, paying late, or another cause, could constitute a fault according to Article 173(3), being a ground for exclusion of the right to support, which of course must be analyzed in each specific case. In other words, demanding compliance with the obligation without, at the same time, complying with the requirements demanded by section 5) of the cited norm, is not a minor issue but on the contrary, it is something very delicate and can generate various legal consequences, among them the commission of a ground for loss of the right to support, unjust enrichment, attempted procedural fraud, and procedural fraud.

As a complement to the provisions of Article 173(5) of the Family Code and the constitutional jurisprudence on said norm, must be added that also ordinary regulation which deals with the preferential order not only of persons obliged to pay support but also of persons receiving support. That is, Articles 168, 169, and 173(1) of the Family Code, 23 of the Child Support and Alimony Law, 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code.

For greater clarity, it is appropriate to transcribe the norms in the order in which they have been cited, and everything referring to the preferential order will be highlighted: “Article 168.- While the support lawsuit is being processed, once the kinship is proven, the judge may set a provisional payment for any of the persons indicated in the following article, observing the preferential order established therein. This payment shall be set prudentially at a sum capable of filling, for the moment, the basic needs of the support recipients and shall subsist as long as it is not varied in a judgment.” Its numbering was thus shifted by Article 2 of Law No. 7538 of August 22, 1995, which transferred it from the former Article 155 to 168. Thus reformed by Article 65 of Law No. 7654 of December 19, 1996, “Child Support and Alimony Law”.

“Article 169.- The following owe support: 1.- Spouses to each other. 2- Fathers and mothers to their minor or incapable children, and children to their fathers and mothers, including those of crianza. (Thus amended the previous paragraph by Article 1 of Law No. 10166 of March 30, 2022, 'Reform of various laws for the recognition of rights to mothers and fathers by crianza'). 3.- Siblings to minor siblings or to those who have a disability that prevents them from fending for themselves; grandparents to minor grandchildren and to those who, due to a disability, cannot fend for themselves, when the more immediate relatives of the support recipient indicated above cannot give them support or to the extent that they cannot do so; and grandchildren and great-grandchildren, to grandparents and great-grandparents under the same conditions indicated in this paragraph.” Thus amended by Article 3 of Law No. 7640 of October 14, 1996. Its numbering was thus shifted by Article 2 of Law No. 7538 of August 22, 1995, which transferred it from the former Article 156 to 169.

“Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide support: 1.- When the debtor cannot provide it without neglecting their own support needs or without failing in the same support obligation towards other persons who, with respect to them, have a preferential title.” “Article 23.- Provisional payment and cases in which restitution is appropriate. When a provisional payment is set for someone who is not the preferential obligor or it is decided in a judgment that the support creditor has no right to support, whoever has paid the provisional payment, their representatives or heirs may demand restitution of the amount paid.” The sum for restitution shall constitute an executory title and shall be determined through an incidental proceeding." "Article 38°- Supplementary subsidy. If the preferred obligor is absent, presents temporary incapacity, or a de facto impossibility to fulfill the duty to provide child support to a minor or a pregnant woman, the State shall provide them with supplementary support (alimentos) through the incorporation of these families into social promotion and human development processes, by means of inter-institutional programs in which, according to their particular situation, the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, the Ministerio de Salud, or any other entity necessary to guarantee comprehensive treatment for the family with the support of organized civil society networks established for this purpose, shall intervene. Pregnant women shall have the right to the subsidy only during the prenatal and lactation period. /When child support (alimentos) is claimed in judicial proceedings and it is verified that any of these circumstances occur, the judge shall manage the subsidy before the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social." As already stated, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has already ruled on the preferential order in resolutions No. 5720-00, 14:58 of July 11, 2000; No. 6610-01, 15:59 of July 10, 2021; No. 1124-05, 11:14 of February 4, 2005; No. 10484-01, 15:50 of October 16, 2001, and No. 7923-02, 15:19 of August 20, 2002, among others.

Now then, from all that has been said, the undersigned concludes the following regarding the non-preferential nature of child support (alimentos) for adult sons and daughters:

a. The child support obligation regarding sons and daughters who are of legal age but under twenty-five years of age is not the same as the child support obligation regarding minor daughters and sons, inasmuch as minors are preferred beneficiaries, as are adult sons and daughters with a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests. In this last scenario, although subsection 3 of Article 169 of the Family Code uses the expression "that prevents them from fending for themselves," by application of the supra-constitutional regulations on disability—cited in this ruling—and the institutional policy of inclusive language, I incline toward not using that expression contemplated in the law as I consider it pejorative, given that every person has value in themselves and there is absolutely no one who lacks dignity. For greater clarity, the Superior Council, in session No. 15-2012 of February 21, 2012, Article LIII, at the request of the Technical Secretariat for Gender, established as an institutional directive, "…the promotion and use of inclusive language in all written, oral, and digital communications of the Judicial Branch, as well as in the resolutions and writings of judicial offices (…)". This decision was disseminated through circular No. 39-2012 of March 8, 2012, and, according to Article 122 of the General Law of Public Administration, is of mandatory compliance.

Continuing with what is provided in Article 169 subsection 3 of the Family Code, it is important to note that not just any disability generates the scenario that the norm contemplates, and therefore, disability(ies) concerning adult sons (daughters) and grandchildren (granddaughters) is not necessarily synonymous with having a right to child support (alimentos). Thus, each disability must be considered according to the specific case.

b. Adult sons and daughters, but under twenty-five years of age, who do not have a disability that prevents them from attending to their own interests, are not preferred child support beneficiaries because they are not included in Article 169 of the Family Code, and Article 168 of that Code grants the list in Article 169 a preferential order. Furthermore, the child support pension for adult sons (daughters) under twenty-five years of age who are studying is not regulated in Article 169 of the Family Code but in Article 173 subsection 5) of that Code. In this way, the sons and daughters who are indeed included in the cited Article 169 are minor sons and daughters, as well as adults with a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests, and even minor grandsons and granddaughters and those who, being of legal age, have a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests. That is, grandparents (abuelos y abuelas) are not obligated to pay child support (alimentos) regarding adult grandsons and granddaughters, but under twenty-five years of age, who are pursuing studies.

Consequently, sons and daughters over eighteen years of age and under twenty-five years of age are not preferred beneficiaries not only because it is so contemplated in the transcribed regulations but because, pursuant to the principle of equality, those who are not in equal conditions cannot be treated as equals. Thus, minors are not in a position to generate resources, and adults with a disability(ies) who cannot attend to their own interests are also not in a position to generate resources, in both cases to satisfy all their needs, while a person over eighteen years of age and under twenty-five years of age is indeed in a position to work full-time or part-time to thus generate resources and attend to their needs, as well as to contribute to obtaining a profession or trade and even to build an independent life project.

Regarding the difference between the child support obligation provided in Article 169 subsection 3) and Article 173 subsection 5), both of the Family Code, the Constitutional Chamber, in resolution No. 4627-13, 14:30 of April 20, 2013, stated: "(…) from the study of the challenged norm, it is clearly inferred that contrary to what the plaintiff affirms, the norm does not establish equality between both groups, that is, between the legally incapacitated and students under twenty-five years of age. In the first place, it should be clarified that family legislation, specifically, Article 169 of the Family Code establishes a general rule, which consists of the obligation on the part of parents to give child support (alimentos) to their minor or incapacitated children. That obligation remains for the time that those conditions persist, without any special condition existing for it. That is, in the case of minors, the parent's obligation persists—in principle—until they reach the age of majority, and in the case of the incapacitated, the obligation persists regardless of age, as long as the condition of incapacity remains. However, subsection 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code establishes an exception to that general rule, which cannot be considered as equal treatment, because exceptionality does not intend to equate situations, but to provide exceptional or particular and normally transitory treatment to situations that the legislator, as part of their legislative technique and discretionary power, considered relevant, in order to protect people who find themselves in certain circumstances or conditions of vulnerability or need. In the second place, one cannot speak of equal treatment either, when the requirements and conditions that the law demands in one case and in another are different, because in the case of minors and the incapacitated, the legislation only requires proof of the filial bond and the payment capacity of the child support debtor, while the adult students referred to in the challenged norm can only, exceptionally, claim child support (alimentos) from their parents, provided they meet certain conditions, namely, that they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, as long as they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load. Such demands make the exception to the rule established by the norm a conditioned and temporary situation, so that adult child support creditors who are under those special conditions can meet their needs. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that the norm does not provide equal treatment for the two groups of people cited by the plaintiff, that is, the legal measure offered by the law is not the same for the incapacitated as for students of legal age and under twenty-five, for which reason this Chamber considers that the norm in no way violates the principle of equality. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as to this point." It is worth noting that this ruling was generated as a result of an action of unconstitutionality filed against Article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code. Furthermore, although the ruling refers to persons with disabilities as "incapacitated," it is important to make the effort not to use that pejorative expression, which is superseded by supra-constitutional regulations.

Lastly, the child support obligation provided in Article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code is so exceptional that, as already stated, it is not demandable from grandparents (abuelos y abuelas), nor from great-grandparents (bisabuelos y bisabuelas). However, grandparents (abuelos y abuelas) could indeed be obligated to pay child support (alimentos) regarding minor grandsons and granddaughters, or adults—without age limit—if they are persons with disabilities who cannot attend to their own interests. This is based on Article 169 subsection 3 of the Family Code.

c. No child support beneficiary is prohibited from working. On the contrary, work as a right is provided for in Article 56 of the Political Constitution. For better understanding, cited Article 56 states: "Work is a right of the individual and an obligation to society. The State must endeavor to ensure that everyone has honest and useful occupation, duly remunerated, and prevent conditions from being established because of it that in any way undermine the freedom or dignity of man or degrade their work to the condition of a simple commodity. The State guarantees the right of free choice of work." Therefore, in addition to the fact that the Child Support Pensions Law and the Family Code do not prohibit a child support beneficiary from working, no interpretation could be made in that sense, because it would be contrary to Article 56 of the Political Constitution, and as will be explained, there is rather a norm that makes it clear that any child support beneficiary can work, and it is also regulated what impact this has on the child support matter.

In that sense, see that, pursuant to Article 166 of the Family Code, "child support (alimentos) is only owed in the part that the property and work of the support recipient (alimentario) do not satisfy them." This means that, if a person who works decides to claim child support (alimentos), they could aspire to a child support pension if the property belonging to or possessed by them, or the work they perform, does not generate sufficient income, and it is then up to them to demonstrate that. That is, they have the burden of proving not only what their needs are but what their resources are and why they are not sufficient to meet such needs. This also includes the obligation to prove what prevents them from working full or part-time: disability, illness, the social function of care, etc.

Regarding this last topic, that is, the social function of care, for the purpose of Article 35 of the Family Code—reformed by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Alcance No. 280—as well as by application of numerals 5.a, 13.a, and 14.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and also by application of Law No. 9325—Law for the Accounting of the Contribution of Unpaid Domestic Work in Costa Rica—it must be understood that usually the mother, as part of her contribution to the support of each minor, contributes care with everything that entails. In certain cases, it is possible that in addition to such contribution, the mother can collaborate with the household economy with money, but, in any case, domestic work and the care of minors in each specific case, as well as dependent persons in general, cannot be disregarded as a contribution. Disregarding it, for example, in the case of minor sons and daughters, would imply generating and consolidating overburdened maternities, as well as rendering the social function of care invisible. In this regard, I refer to the UN Human Rights Council resolution on "Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development," of October 10, 2023, resolution A/HRC/54/L.6/Rev.1, available at https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/54/L.6/Rev.1. That resolution, among other things, states: "1. Recognizes the importance of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of paid and unpaid caregivers and of persons receiving care and support; 2. Expresses deep concern about the unequal organization and distribution of care and support work, and the repercussions this has on the rights of all women and girls in society and the economy. 3. Recognizes that, to achieve gender equality, it is essential to equitably distribute care and support work and the time dedicated to such work; 4. Urges States to: a) Implement all necessary measures to recognize care work and redistribute it among individuals, as well as among families, communities, the private sector, and States, in such a way that promotes gender equality and the enjoyment of human rights by all persons; b) Increase investment in care and support policies and infrastructure to guarantee universal access to affordable and quality services for all persons, including childcare services and health and support services for persons with disabilities and older persons, and to guarantee universal access to parental, maternity, and paternity leave and social protection for all workers, both workers in the informal sector and those working in atypical forms of employment; c) Foster and support research and studies aimed at producing data disaggregated by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, marital status, disability, geographic location, and other pertinent characteristics in the national context, as well as statistics on the scope and distribution of care work and the time dedicated to it, as well as on the persons providing this care and those receiving it, through periodic time-use surveys and the establishment of satellite accounts to assess the contribution of that work to national income and quantify unpaid care work, in order to include them in the gross national product for the purposes of designing, financing, and evaluating policies in this area; d) Adopt all necessary measures to enable the full, equal, genuine, and inclusive participation of women, persons with disabilities, and older persons, as well as children, in decision-making related to care and support, both in private and public life, including social dialogue and collective bargaining of paid care workers; e) Raise awareness about the negative impacts that stereotypes related to gender, disability, and age have when providing and receiving care and support, and establish programs and policies to eliminate these stereotypes." It is for all that has been said that it is not possible to disregard the contribution that the mother makes to her solidarity-based child support duty through care, since even according to Law No. 9325—Law for the Accounting of the Contribution of Unpaid Domestic Work in Costa Rica—there exists the "care economy" and it refers to "unpaid work performed in the home, related to the maintenance of the dwelling, care for other persons in the household or the community, and the maintenance of the paid workforce." That law warns that this category of work is of fundamental economic importance in a society. For greater understanding, that normative instrument indicates in Article 3 that "the following, among others, are considered unpaid domestic work and care activities: a) The organization, distribution, and supervision of domestic tasks. b) The preparation of food. c) The cleaning and maintenance of the dwelling and household goods. d) The cleaning and maintenance of clothing. e) The care, formation, and instruction of children (transport to school and help with the development of school tasks). f) The care of older adults and sick persons. g) Carrying out purchases, payments, or procedures related to the home. h) The cleaning and maintenance of goods for family use. i) Services to the community and unpaid help to other households of relatives, friends, and neighbors. This classification does not exclude other activities that may be incorporated in due course." As a complement, it is important to note that it cannot be ignored that needs exist that are presumed according to Articles 414 to 417 of the Civil Procedure Code, Law No. 7130. That is, it is presumed that a person requires consumption of potable water, electrical energy, food, transportation, clothing, etc. Logically, that which falls outside the usual will require proof, and more so if a certain standard of living is sought to be protected. For greater clarity, said norms of the Civil Procedure Code, Law No. 7130, state: "Article 414. Legal presumption. Every legal presumption exempts the party alleging it from the obligation to prove the fact held to be true by virtue of such presumption. However, whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts that serve as its basis. Article 415. Absolute presumption. Those by virtue of which the law annuls certain acts or grants a peremptory exception shall be considered absolute presumptions, if in those hypotheses the law has not expressly reserved proof to the contrary. However, no matter how absolute a legal presumption may be, it does not oppose the effectiveness of the confession of the contrary fact, provided that the presumptions are exclusively established for a private interest, and that the confession is admissible in the matter of contention. Article 416. Relative presumption. Outside of absolute presumptions, the rest may be contested by proof to the contrary, for which all legal means are admissible, except what is established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of complying with them. Article 417. Human presumption. Human presumptions only constitute proof if they are a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. The proof of presumptions must be serious and concord with the others rendered in the process." Furthermore, pursuant to Article 166 and Article 173 subsection 2), both of the Family Code, if the person claiming child support (alimentos) ceases to need it or does not need it, the termination of the child support obligation or the declaration of the lawsuit as having merit, respectively, is appropriate. Therefore, it is a myth to assert that a person receiving child support (alimentos) cannot work, and it is also a myth to believe that if the person receiving child support works, this never affects the child support amount, and even the right to receive child support. For greater clarity, Alda Facio Montejo proposes a conception of the legal phenomenon not based solely on the formal component. Specifically, she posits a tripartite conception of the legal phenomenon that presupposes constant and profound interaction between the formal-normative or substantive component, the structural component, and the political-cultural one. The first component comprises the formally created norm in a broad sense, that is, not only as a synonym for law. The second refers to the content, scope, and interpretation that authorities—in a broad sense—give to the formal component. Thus, the identification of the structural component implies making visible the set of "unwritten norms" that are followed rigorously by authorities and citizens. Lastly, the political-cultural component refers to the dimension and understanding granted to the formal component through vulgar—empirical—knowledge of the normative provisions, customs, traditions, legal doctrine, the use that people make of the law, etc. All of this also forms a set of "unwritten norms" that are observed and reinforced by the community. (Facio Montejo, Alda. (1999). Cuando el género suena cambios trae. Metodología para el análisis de género del fenómeno legal. Third Edition. San José, Costa Rica. ILANUD. The digital version can be consulted at http://fundacionjyg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Cuando-elg%C3%A9nero-suena-cambios-trae.pdf) The author explains that these three components remain in constant interaction since those who create the laws, apply them, or rather, interpret them, form part of a specific society at a specific historical moment, hence, the content, scope, projection, and interpretation of the formal component reflects the set of prevailing considerations in a specific society and juncture. They thus reveal the overvaluation of the masculine, the undervaluation of the feminine, of disability, of aging, of childhood, of foreignness, etc.

Thus, to assert that a child support beneficiary is prohibited from working is a myth, and so is believing that if they work, this never affects the child support amount, and even the right to receive child support, that is, that they can capitalize on the product of their work or even their income, and, at the same time, receive a child support pension.

d. Adult sons and daughters over eighteen years of age and under twenty-five years of age who seek child support (alimentos) and to remain as child support beneficiaries must remain within the scenarios indicated in Article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code. That is, it is not sufficient to place oneself momentarily or superficially within the scenario contemplated by the norm to have the right to child support (alimentos), but rather, it is indispensable to remain within those scenarios, as the child support obligation with respect to said population is conditional. In other words, it subsists if the person complies with what the norm states. In judicial practice, it is common to observe that resolutions that impose child support pensions—provisional or not—in favor of adult sons and daughters, but under twenty-five years of age and who study, do not contemplate what the charges are that the beneficiaries must fulfill. That is, they are resolutions that always warn the obligor what will happen if they fail to comply with what is provided in a specific resolution, but do not warn the beneficiaries what they are obligated to. This is not a minor issue, because as parental responsibility ceases upon the age of majority according to Article 158 subsection a) of the Family Code, it is clear that no person obligated to pay child support (alimentos) can obtain, regarding the adult child support beneficiary, information about the academic load and the results obtained at the end of the respective school period as defined in a specific study plan. For greater clarity, that information has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber as private information. In this regard, resolution No. 592-13, 9:05 of January 18, 2013, may be consulted, reiterated in judgment No. 2135-17, 9:30 of February 10, 2017, and No. 3159-2017, 9:30 of February 28, 2017.

Therefore, as a consequence of the cessation of parental responsibility, the burden of proving compliance with the requirements when filing the lawsuit and during the execution of the child support obligation, whether set during minority or subsequently, corresponds to the beneficiary, precisely because they are an adult. Now then, in those cases where obtaining the certification of grades and enrollment represents an economic burden of impossible or difficult compliance for the beneficiary, what is appropriate is that, before the end of the school period according to the study plan, or immediately after it ends, the beneficiary requests the respective court to issue an official communication (oficio) where the judicial authority requests the relevant information from the educational center, with the indication that such a requirement is covered by the principle of gratuity inherent to the child support matter and also responds to a judicial order. Furthermore, it will be the responsibility of the child support beneficiary to process the official communication and demonstrate the respective processing, as the burden of proof corresponds to that party and not to the defendant. Logically, it is the responsibility of the judicial authority to issue the official communication immediately and to send any reminder, as well as to make the information provided by the educational center known to the parties. It goes without saying that the request to the educational center must be clear about the necessity and urgency of the information, as well as that it is necessary to know which subjects have been taken and the result of each—passed or not, withdrawn justifiably or not, frozen or not—as well as the grades obtained, the study plan of the degree being pursued, the schedule taken, and the current enrollment. Furthermore, if it is an educational center that requires an investment to enroll, it must indicate what the cost of the current enrollment is, or if the beneficiary has some type of scholarship, as well as any other information the judicial authority deems pertinent according to the specific case.

As the child support obligation regarding persons over eighteen years of age and under twenty-five years of age is a conditional obligation, inasmuch as the child support beneficiary must remain within the scenarios contemplated in Article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code, if the beneficiary does not provide information about the academic load they have taken and are taking, as well as the results obtained, or does not request that the court issue said official communication, or, if already issued, does not demonstrate that it has been processed, it will be the responsibility of the judicial authority to order the provision of the information within a peremptory period to be defined in each specific case, regarding what Article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code indicates, under warning that, at the request of the party obligated to pay child support (alimentos), the suspension of the execution of the child support obligation may be ordered with justification, and, furthermore, no bodily restraint order will be issued while the prevented matter is not complied with. All of this because the burden of proving that they remain within the scenarios contemplated by the norm corresponds to the child support beneficiary, and not remaining within the scenarios contemplated by the cited norm is a breach of the condition imposed by the regulation. If this verification of requirements is not carried out, the already mentioned consequences could arise: procedural fraud, attempted procedural fraud, unjust enrichment, etc., and even worse could occur: that the beneficiary is no longer pursuing studies.

Thus, it must be very clear that whoever incurs in abusive exercise of the right pursuant to Articles 19 and following of the Civil Code, whether to claim child support (alimentos) or to execute the child support obligation, and thereby generates a judicial resolution or avoids a judicial resolution, and this, as a result, causes patrimonial transfers in their favor without meeting the requirements that the norm demands, could face a criminal case for procedural fraud or attempted procedural fraud. For greater clarity, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: "On procedural fraud, it is useful to mention what has been written in doctrine about this criminal type: 'there are common cases of triangular fraud, in these cases, the deceived and the injured party are different. The most complicated case of this triangular Fraud is the so-called procedural fraud. Characteristic of procedural fraud is that the deceived judge issues a resolution by which they perform a dispositive act prejudicial to one of the procedural parties or to a third party. Procedural fraud consists of a deceitful action carried out by the agent with the aim of obtaining an unlawful patrimonial benefit for themselves or for a third party in the course of a proceeding. By means of this deceitful action, they induce the judge hearing the case to error or maintain them in it, and as a consequence of that error, the judge issues a resolution that does not correspond to the real factual situation, a resolution that causes harm to the patrimony of a procedural party or a third party.' (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, FRANCISCO. El delito de Estafa. Editorial Juritexto. San José. Costa Rica. 2001. p. 178).

For the crime of Procedural Fraud (Estafa Procesal) to be configured, the existence of patrimonial harm to a party involved in the proceeding or a third party must be verified." Ruling No. 1164-14, 10:08 of July 4, 2014.

Said Chamber, in ruling No. 313-14, 8:52 of March 7, 2014 stated: "Precisely, regarding the existence of the criminal offense of interest, in addition to what was said previously, it must be understood that it came into legal existence and led to harming the victims, with the particularity of what is doctrinally called: 'procedural' or 'triangular' fraud (estafa “procesal” o “triangular”). This type of crime has been known mostly by this example: '...presupposes deceit toward the judge, who, due to the error produced by the deceit, through an erroneous decision, carries out a harmful act of disposition over the patrimony of the other party...' (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, FRANCISCO. El delito de estafa. Editorial Juritexto. San José, Costa Rica. Year 2001. p. 126). This type of fraud fulfills all the elements of common fraud but is characterized by the participation of three subjects: i) the active one, in charge of deceiving; ii) the passive one deceived who, by error, carries out the act of disposition, and, iii) the harmed party." Furthermore, in judgment No. 1206-04, 9:35 of October 22, 2004, said Chamber indicated: "(...) Section 24 of the Criminal Code, as pertinent, states: 'An attempt exists when the execution of a crime is initiated, through acts directly aimed at its consummation, and the latter does not occur due to causes independent of the agent. The penalty corresponding to the attempt shall not be applied when the consummation of the crime was absolutely impossible.' As seen, the criminal offense punishes as an attempt the initiation of the crime's execution, carried out through acts directly aimed at its consummation. Thus, unpunishable preparatory acts are separated from the acts of execution of the crime, which are punishable as an attempt. In Costa Rica, said separation is made based on the individual-objective theory. According to this, two extremes must be taken into account: The first, the plan of the active subject, and the second, whether, according to that plan, the action represents a close danger to the legal right. For this theory, the commencement of execution is not necessarily a part of the typical action: '(...) the commencement of the execution of the crime is not strictly the commencement of execution of the action objectively described by the typical verb, but also encompasses those acts that, according to the author's plan (the concrete manner of carrying out the typical action chosen by the author), are immediately prior to the commencement of the execution of the typical action and objectively represent a danger to the legal right, understanding that a partial act will be immediately preceding the realization of the typical action when, between it and said action, there is no other partial act in the author's concrete plan.' (ZAFFARONI, Eugenio Raúl. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Buenos Aires: EDIAR, segunda edición, 2002, p. 829). As extracted from this text, unpunishable preparatory acts are those that, although directed at the realization of the criminal offense, do not do so in a direct and immediate manner and, consequently, are not a serious threat to the protected legal right (unless the legislation expressly considers them punishable, converting them into an independent crime). Likewise, acts directly aimed at the consummation of the crime -among which is included the action immediately preceding the commencement of the typical action, temporally and spatially- and which allow the active subject, according to his plan, the uninterrupted step to the commencement of that action, are punishable as an attempt. Based on the foregoing, this Court considers that, contrary to what the defense states without any basis, the accused initiated the execution of the crime by filing the executory complaint and the promissory notes with the court, knowing that the obligations guaranteed by them did not exist, indicating to the Judge that the defendant company owed him the sum mentioned in said negotiable instruments. Through this artifice, (...) he intended that the Judge issue a resolution that would bring him an undue benefit and that, in turn, would entail a diminution in the patrimony of the defendant company. In summary, by the mere filing of the executory complaint and the negotiable instruments, the accused initiated the execution of the procedural fraud (estafa procesal), a conclusion derived from the plan he pursued, as well as from the threat to the legal right that his actions implied at that moment. (...) As observed, in the case of procedural fraud (estafa procesal), the crime begins its execution with the filing of the complaint and the evidence, elements which, together, form the deceptive maneuver directed at the Judge. (...) To understand what was previously said, first, one must refer to the topic of formal and material consummation in fraud (estafa). Formal consummation occurs when the patrimonial harm is caused, while material consummation occurs when the active subject obtains the unlawful patrimonial benefit pursued, a purpose that transcends the criminal offense. This Chamber has previously stated that, for criminal purposes, it is sufficient for formal consummation to occur: 'The requirement of subsequent purposes allows, in some crimes that expressly contemplate it, for example fraud (estafa), simulated fraud, or extortion, all crimes affecting the patrimony in its entirety, to distinguish between two moments of consummation: the formal one, which occurs upon the occasion of the patrimonial harm caused, and the material consummation, which occurs when the agent obtains the desired purpose, specifically the unlawful patrimonial benefit, whether for himself or for a third party. However, formal consummation is sufficient for the crime to be considered consummated, for the corresponding criminal purposes, whether or not material consummation occurs.' Ruling No. 420-F-95 of 10:00 hours on July 21, 1995. In this same sense, Carlos Fontán Balestra states: 'Fraud (Estafa) is consummated at the moment the patrimonial harm takes place. Advancing that moment to the time of carrying out the artifice would mean considering as acts of consummation those that only constitute an attempt. Delaying consummation to the moment when the benefit is obtained would be demanding the concurrence of an element not required in the criminal offense, given that in Argentine Law, the pecuniary advantage is only a purpose that must accompany the action.' FONTÁN BALESTRA (Carlos). Derecho Penal. Parte Especial. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 15th edition, 1998, p. 483. All these considerations, made in relation to pure and simple fraud (estafa), are also applicable to procedural fraud (estafa procesal). In the latter, then, it would be sufficient for the Judge to issue resolutions that harm the victim's patrimony for the act to be considered consummated, even if they are interlocutory measures that do not conclude the proceeding. The resolution ordering execution and decreeing attachment is undoubtedly one of them. Although the proceeding has not been definitively concluded and, consequently, the active subject of the crime has not obtained the unlawful patrimonial benefit, a formal consummation of the crime already exists, since as a consequence of the deceptive maneuver, the jurisdictional body issued resolutions that harm another's patrimony." Likewise, said Court, in judgment No. 1219-05, 9:15 of October 26, 2005, ruled: "(...) For a better understanding, it is necessary to make some brief considerations about the crime of fraud (estafa), contained in Article 216 of the Criminal Code. The current structure of this criminal offense contains forms of fraud different from the traditional definition established before the 1988 reform, such as the so-called 'triangular fraud' (estafa triangular). In this type of fraud, the triangular structure arises between the active subject, the passive subject, and the harmed party. Thus, the perpetrator induces the passive subject into error, who has dispositive power over the victim's patrimony, and thereby manages to cause patrimonial harm, obtaining an unlawful benefit. The most illustrative example is the so-called procedural fraud (estafa procesal), which –in a strict sense– 'presupposes deceit toward the judge, who, due to the error produced by the deceit, through an erroneous decision, carries out a harmful act of disposition over the patrimony of the other party.' (Castillo González, Francisco. El delito de estafa. Editorial Juritexto, San José Costa Rica, Year 2001, p. 126). The core point of fraud (estafa) is the simulation of false facts or the deformation or concealment of true facts, which in turn implies that the artifice or error can be produced by action or by omission, all with the aim of obtaining an unlawful patrimonial benefit. This last element does not prove to be necessary for material consummation, because the crime is formally consummated when there has been injury to another's patrimony; this is so because fraud (estafa) is a crime of truncated result, in which a formal consummation (when the patrimonial harm occurs) and the material consummation or phase of exhaustion of the illicit act (when the unlawful patrimonial benefit is achieved) are distinguished. In general, both in the classic modality of fraud (estafa) and in triangular fraud (estafa triangular), it is necessarily required that the subject induced into error is the one who carries out the act of disposition (to his own detriment or to the detriment of a third party). Thus, 'the patrimonial harm must be the result of an act of disposition by the deceived subject –not necessarily by the harmed party–. It is not a matter here of subtracting or appropriating, but of provoking the 'collaboration of the passive subject', in such a way that the latter carries out a patrimonial disposition to the detriment of himself or a third party.' (Valle Muñiz, José Manuel. El delito de Estafa. Bosch, Casa Editorial, Barcelona, 1988, p. 187). In this same sense, the author Francisco Castillo González opines, indicating that 'The crime of fraud (estafa) requires identity between the deceived person and the one who makes the act of disposition, but does not presuppose identity between the one who makes the act of disposition and the harmed party.' (Castillo González, Francisco. op. cit. p.168). In summary, the error must motivate the harmful patrimonial disposition, and in cases of 'frauds in a triangle,' the one who carries out the act of disposition must have a special power of disposition over the patrimony upon which the injury will fall; this means that 'the criminally relevant act of disposition must be understood, then, generically, as that behavior, active or omissive, of the subject induced into error that will directly entail the production of patrimonial damage to himself or a third party. It is the causal link between the deceit and the harm, which without said disposition cannot be attributed to the deceptive conduct, at least as fraud (estafa).' (Valle Muñiz, José Manuel. Op.cit. p. 214)." In other words, if the person receiving alimony (alimentos) has not undertaken to remain within the conditions required by Article 173 section 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), that is, does not conduct themselves with the responsibility that comes with studying a university degree or studying to obtain a trade, receiving an alimony (pensión alimentaria) for this purpose, and, additionally, does not diligently fulfill their procedural obligations using funds paid by the party owing alimony, and has merely placed themselves momentarily or even superficially within the situation contemplated in the norm, it is a very delicate matter that, depending on the specific case, could constitute an abusive exercise of rights and a procedural fraud (estafa procesal) or attempted procedural fraud (tentativa de estafa procesal) even, or unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa). See, for example, that in a case before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) where the imposition of the payment of expenses for the start of the academic term for the benefit of a person under the situation of Article 173 section 5) of the Family Code was discussed, that Court said: "(...) the Chamber considers that, regarding the granting of the alimony (pensión alimentaria) being claimed, the appealed alimony court committed a serious error in the substantiation of the summary proceeding that cannot be overlooked, because upon the alimony creditor reaching the age of majority, the appropriate action -in accordance with the applicable legal regulations- was for them to appear in the proceeding and provide information on the course load and academic performance, just as they did when they requested the school salary in 2019; however, when the alimony obligor requests this updated information each time corporal coercion (apremio corporal) is required for that item, the beneficiary is obligated to present said evidence. Despite the foregoing, the appealed jurisdictional authority did not proceed to require that evidence as it should have, through a warning (prevención), but instead imposed on the protected party the payment of the benefit, indicating that if he wished, he could initiate a proceeding for the exclusion of the alimony beneficiary. However, the party seeking protection here did not intend that exclusion, if the academic load and performance of the beneficiary were previously accredited." Judgment No. 9319-23, 9:15 of April 25, 2023. That is, as ordered by the Constitutional Chamber, the beneficiary must demonstrate their continued presence in the factual circumstances contemplated by the cited norm and not disregard that obligation. It is not enough to have demonstrated it once, either at the beginning of a new proceeding or when appearing as an adult in the alimony proceeding that existed when they were a minor; rather, they must demonstrate that they remain in the factual conditions that the norm contemplates if they intend to receive alimony and even request corporal coercion measures in case of non-compliance. Logically, it is not a matter of presenting a certification of grades and enrollment with each coercion request, but rather providing the certification of grades and enrollment each time an academic term ends, which also entails demonstrating the enrollment completed, where not only the number of subjects being taken can be observed, but also the schedules.

Now then, as the Constitutional Chamber points out in the preceding ruling - No. 9319-23-, in judicial practice, it is common that, even though the alimony obligation provided for in the cited Article 173 section 5) of the Family Code is an evidently conditional alimony obligation, it is usual that some first instance courts do not generate a supervisory mechanism for compliance with remaining in the conditions the norm contemplates and, on the contrary, it has become a custom that resolutions setting provisional alimony or judgments do not establish procedural obligations for the person receiving alimony, as if the alimony obligation in question were the same as the alimony obligation regarding a minor, for example. Subject to a better opinion, this neglect in setting the obligations that a beneficiary must fulfill by application of Article 173 section 5) of the Family Code has generated abuse of rights by some beneficiaries and has placed debtors in a situation of uncertainty. Furthermore, it has forced the latter to initiate exclusion proceedings precisely because they do not know whether the beneficiary complies with what the cited norm requires. In this way, the creation of an impartial, practical, expeditious mechanism, based on existing procedural and substantive norms, as well as on binding constitutional case law, for the purpose of supervising compliance with the condition inherent to this type of alimony obligation and, additionally, to guarantee the pro homine principle for both parties to the obligation, as well as to guarantee the pro libertatis principle for the party owing alimony, will foster de-escalation between the parties, the decongestion of the first instance, and with it, the prudent consumption of public funds dedicated to the administration of justice, as well as prevent the abuse of rights in a double direction.

For greater clarity, in the first case, it will foster de-escalation because adult sons and daughters will not be subjected to potential extrajudicial harassment, mortifications, and pressures from those obligated to pay alimony, demanding information about their academic progress, as everything will be carried out within the judicial process. In the second case, decongestion occurs because judicial offices will not have to process alimony proceedings in which the obligated person files exclusion proceedings based on information they do not have or are assuming.

In practice, it is frequently observed that obligated persons file exclusion proceedings stating that the beneficiary does not study, does not fulfill the academic load, or does not have good performance, because in reality, they know nothing about the compliance or non-compliance with the conditions that the beneficiary must demonstrate, and that lack of knowledge comes from the age of majority of the beneficiary or from deficient or absent communication between the parties. Consequently, it is possible that this mechanism, which makes procedural obligations visible, will avoid the processing of unnecessary alimony proceedings that only create expectations in the parties, cause tension, and foster unnecessary judicial confrontations, besides saturating the schedules of judicial offices.

This mechanism that makes procedural obligations visible will also benefit the public service provided by the Public Defense, as it would not have reason to intervene in proceedings which today are basically caused by uncertainty regarding the continued compliance with the requirements established by said norm. Additionally, it is possible that this supervisory mechanism may also decrease the filing of Habeas Corpus appeals by persons obligated to pay alimony. In this line, this mechanism will also prevent the abusive exercise of rights by the person receiving alimony and by the obligated person, as the rules for fulfilling the obligation for each party will be clear.

Additionally, within that framework of preventing the abusive exercise of a right, there is also the issue of corporal coercion (apremio corporal), as it is contrary to the pro libertatis principle for a person obligated to pay alimony to be coerced without knowing whether, at the end of each academic term, the beneficiary is complying with what Article 173 section 5) of the Family Code stipulates, as if the norm allowed the beneficiary to disregard demonstrating that they remain in the circumstances the norm contemplates.

Finally and no less importantly, making clear compliance rules visible for both parties could somehow prevent beneficiaries from abandoning their studies, making little progress in the study plan, or constantly changing degree programs, since evidently, such behavior could cause them to lose the right to alimony. Thus, when a person receiving alimony is not obligated to demonstrate that they remain in the circumstances the norm contemplates, they could easily disregard studying.

f. In those cases where information on the fulfillment of requirements is not incorporated into the case file for a reason attributable to the party receiving alimony, or where the information obtained reveals that they do not remain in the circumstances established by Article 173 section 5) of the Family Code, the party obligated to pay alimony may request that the enforcement of the obligation be suspended and must indicate the basis for such request. In this sense, if there was already a prior warning to the beneficiary regarding everything already explained, that is, regarding the obligations they must fulfill, the request must be resolved without further procedure through a reasoned pronouncement on the requested measure, indicating whether it is granted or not and why. This implies analyzing the circumstances of each specific case that are in the case file, as generalizing is not possible. Furthermore, if the debtor is not obligated to pay alimony due to a firm precautionary measure ordering the suspension of the obligation, the impediment to leaving the country must be lifted. Thus, the beneficiary must also be very clear about what will happen if they do not fulfill the procedural obligation incumbent upon them.

Now then, if no warning has been given to the beneficiary about the obligations they must fulfill, a hearing must be granted for the request for a precautionary measure formulated by the beneficiary for a reasonable period, and it must be notified to the means indicated for that purpose, which entails that every person receiving alimony must be warned to maintain an active means to receive notifications, under the warning (apercibimiento) that automatic notification will operate in case of non-compliance, and this same warning must apply to every person obligated to pay alimony. That is, it is a procedural obligation that each party must fulfill. All of this, especially since constitutional case law has pronounced on the possibility of using a means indicated in the case file according to the circumstances analyzed, for example, in constitutional rulings No. 12407-21, 8:30 of May 28, 2021; No. 25582-21, 9:15 of November 12, 2021; No. 3077-22, 9:15 of February 9, 2023; No. 13002-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 19495-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 19498-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 2210-23, 9:40 of January 31, 2023; No. 9966-23, 9:15 of April 28, 2023 and, No. 11037-23, 9:20 of May 12, 2023. That is, constitutional case law has considered it possible that, in certain circumstances, personal notification or notification via notice (cédula) at the place of residence may be dispensed with. Of course, this must be analyzed with great care because such rulings refer to proceedings for the modification of judgment and those are: exclusions, exonerations, reductions, and increases. That is, it does not refer to so-called "inclusion" proceedings, because in those, it is clear that a person is not being included in an already existing amount; consequently, it is a new proceeding that implies new procedural obligations for the obligated party and, especially, a new warning of corporal coercion in case of non-compliance. Added to this, it is essential to know if the adult beneficiary -adult son or daughter, for example- has already received advice from the public defense, because in that case, it is usual for that office to provide legal assistance until the second instance judgment is rendered.

Now then, returning to the topic of the precautionary measure, in both cases - denying or granting the precautionary measure to suspend the alimony obligation - as indicated, the resolution must be reasoned and, as it produces its own effects, is appealable. As a complement, if the judicial authority decides to grant the precautionary measure, it logically cannot have an indefinite duration without a formal exclusion proceeding having been filed, because a precautionary measure cannot have an indefinite effect. In this line, the Constitutional Chamber has been very clear, having stated: "IV.- The Chamber considers that despite the Family Code, in its Article 173, section 5, stipulating that there is no obligation to provide alimony when the beneficiaries have reached their majority, the same norm establishes that the rule is not absolute, because if the children are pursuing studies, the duty is not interrupted. Nor is it applied automatically, since it states that the concurrence of the grounds for exemption from the alimony obligation, in general, must be demonstrated before the competent judicial authority. In this case, the plaintiff has not yet been released from his alimony obligation, since there was opposition to the exclusion of the beneficiary and the petition filed for that purpose has not yet been decided, having a court date for May 12, 2011, for conciliation and, if it fails, for receiving evidence. Thus, the incomplete payment of the monthly quota for March was sufficient grounds for the issuance of the order." Judgment No. 4442-11, 14:40 of April 5, 2011; No. 1223-15, 9:05 of January 28, 2015, No. 19969-15, 9:30 of December 30, 2015 and, No. 3442-19, 10:40 of February 26, 2019. Furthermore, in a similar sense, rulings No. 2439-1995, 15:03 of May 16, 1995, No. 6123-2009, 16:11 of April 22, 2009, No. 47-2006, 9:46 of January 6, 2006; No. 2230-05, 14:32 of March 2, 2005; 10643-2014, 14:30 of July 1, 2014; No. 2426-2020, 09:30 hours of February 7, 2020; No. 16457-2020, 9:20 of August 28, 2020; No. 9478-12, 14:30 of July 18, 2012; No. 18821-15, 14; 30 of December 1, 2015.

Thus, upon granting the precautionary measure, the judicial authority must warn the debtor that they must obligatorily file the exclusion complaint within the non-extendable term of one month and under the warning (apercibimiento) that the ordered measure will cease to have effect, which implies that they must comply with the alimony obligation under warning of corporal coercion if applicable, or by reactivating the garnishment, if that is the form of compliance being enforced. This mandatory warning is based on the provisions of Articles 241 through 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, Law No. 7130, which state: "Article 241.- Opportunity. The precautionary procedure may be initiated before or during the course of the main proceeding, of which it will always form part. Article 242.- Judge's powers. In addition to specific precautionary procedures, the judge may determine the protective measures deemed appropriate, when there is a well-founded fear that one party, before the judgment, may cause serious and difficult-to-repair injury to the other party's right. To avoid the damage, the judge may authorize or prohibit the practice of certain acts, order the deposit of goods, or impose the granting of a bond. Article 243.- Duty to file the complaint. The party must file their complaint within a term of one month counted from the date on which the precautionary measure was carried out, when it was granted in a preparatory proceeding. Article 244.- Cessation of effects. The efficacy of the precautionary measure shall cease: 1) If the party does not file the complaint within the term established in the preceding article. 2) If it is unjustifiably not executed within that same term. Once the efficacy of the measure has ceased, the party is prohibited from repeating the action, except on new grounds." On this point, it should be noted that regarding precautionary measures, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: "Assurance or precautionary measures, according to the most qualified doctrine, arise in the process as a necessity to guarantee effective jurisdictional protection and can therefore be conceptualized as 'a set of procedural powers of the judge -whether jurisdictional or administrative justice- to resolve before the final ruling, with the specific purpose of preserving the real conditions indispensable for the issuance and execution of the final act.' The doctrine understands that instrumentality and provisionality are two fundamental characteristics of precautionary measures and that their main configurative elements require that they be: a) licit and legally possible; b) provisional, since they are extinguished with the issuance of the final act; c) well-founded, that is, have a real factual basis in relation to the particular case; d) modifiable, in the sense that they are susceptible to being increased or decreased to adapt them to new needs; e) accessory, since they are justified within a main proceeding; f) of a preventive nature, as their purpose is to avoid inconveniences to the interests and rights represented in the main proceeding; g) of assurance effects, by intending to maintain a state of fact or law during the development of the proceeding, preventing situations that may harm the effectiveness of the judgment or final act; h) be homogeneous and not respond to characteristics of identity with respect to the substantive right protected, so that they are effective preventive measures and not anticipated acts of enforcement." Judgment No. 7190-1994, 13:24 of December 6, 1994. Additionally, the judgments issued by that Constitutional Court No. 5407-94, 15:54 of July 18, 1995, No. 6786-94, 15:27 hours of November 22, 1994, No. 3929-95, 15:24 hours of July 18, 1995 and No. 6337-02, 14:40 of June 26, 2002, among others, may be consulted.

In addition to this, as precautionary measures subsist as long as the factual circumstances that gave rise to them remain, it is clear that upon an express and reasoned request by the creditor, if the factual basis that originated the precautionary measure has changed, the reactivation of the alimony obligation may be ordered through a reasoned resolution, and in that case, the forms of enforcement will resume: corporal coercion, garnishment, impediment to leaving the country, etc. However, it is also the responsibility of the judicial authority to define what will occur with the alimony payments made by the party obligated to pay alimony while the beneficiary was not fulfilling the requirements established in Article 173 section 5) of the Family Code, since omitting a pronouncement on this point could generate unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa). Note that it is not a matter of restitution of alimony payments but of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa).

In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 574, 9:30 a.m. of July 14, 2004, stated: “(...) Thus, the Chamber deems the application of articles 1,043 and 1,044 of the Civil Code to be appropriate, which make up Chapter V, “Of Quasi-Contracts”, of Title I (Contracts and Quasi-Contracts), of Book IV of said normative body. The first cited norm establishes: ‘Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties.’ The cited numeral 1,044 indicates: ‘To this class of obligations belong, among others, the management of another’s affairs, the administration of a thing in common, voluntary guardianship, and undue payment.’ (The bold and underline are the editor’s). As can be seen, this latter norm does not exclude the application of other legal figures, considered as quasi-contracts. Doctrine, for its part, includes unjust enrichment within this scope. Regarding this theory, Messineo explains the following: ‘Another case of legal obligation is constituted by unjust enrichment ... Included in the figure of unjust enrichment ... are cases in which someone converts another's property for their own benefit, or benefits from another's activity (the so-called useful version or in rem versio) to the detriment of another, without there being a reason that justifies the advantage or the benefit: in other words, without there being a legal relationship, already constituted, that serves as a cause legitimizing the advantage, or the benefit, of the enriched person... / In said formula, ... also enter the cases of enrichment without the will of another person (the impoverished); the lack of will of the impoverished person resolves into a figure of lack of cause./ The action for unjust enrichment tends to re-establish the balance between the two estates, that is, to eliminate the undue enrichment, through a claim for compensation./ There are several prerequisites for the action we are dealing with. It is necessary: a) ... the effective enrichment of a subject, that is, that his estate receives an increase ..., and saving an expense is also considered enrichment, or having avoided a loss for another through one's own patrimonial sacrifice... b) that, to such an increase for the enriched person, there corresponds a decrease in the estate of another subject (the impoverished)... c) ... a relationship of correspondence between the enrichment and the impoverishment; and, additionally, a nexus of causality between the patrimonial decrease suffered by one subject and the patrimonial advantage of the other; ... d) it is necessary that the enrichment-impoverishment occurs without cause... Absence of cause means that there is no patrimonial relationship ... that justifies the enrichment-impoverishment.../ The effect of unjust enrichment is the birth of the obligation to indemnify; on the part of the enriched person, in favor of the impoverished person... Finally, it must be observed that the indemnity must be adjusted to the entity of the enrichment and cannot exceed it...’ (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tomo VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1955, pp. 465-466). (On the subject, one may also consult BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 808-818 and PLANIOL, Marcel and RIPERT, Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 812-813) (...).” This criterion was also set forth in judgment No. 837-04, 10:10 a.m. of October 1, 2004, and No. 301-10, 10:45 a.m. of February 26, 2010.

g. It should be noted that, in those cases where a judgment has not been issued and a provisional child support (pensión alimentaria) exists fixed without defining the obligations that the person benefiting from support must fulfill in accordance with article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, or where the person benefiting from support has already reached the age of majority and there is no resolution advising them of what their obligations are, and even in those cases where a judgment has already been issued without advising the obligated party of their obligations, the prudent course would be to issue a resolution that clarifies said obligations, as understood from constitutional judgment No. 5112-11, 12:21 p.m. of April 25, 2011. Furthermore, in reality, in any ruling that grants a claim based on article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, said obligations must be defined. This is based on the principle of procedural loyalty and the principle of preference for de-escalation.

h. Now then, by virtue of the principle of party autonomy and because the child support comes from private funds, it is clear that the obligated party can expressly release the benefiting party from providing said documentation on the permanent compliance with requirements, and that release cannot be used for games or pressures, i.e., whoever releases from that obligation must have clarity that they cannot change their criterion constantly. Thus, to go back on that release must be something well-founded and not capricious. Therefore, reactivating the compliance with obligations and, consequently, the supervision mechanism, requires a well-founded resolution.

i. Since said support obligation is an exceptional and conditional obligation, it is important to analyze what should be understood by good performance (buenos rendimientos) and reasonable academic load (carga académica razonable). Thus, in accordance with article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, obtaining “good performance with a reasonable academic load” is the consideration that the person receiving support must fulfill. As observed, the norm does not separate the concept of “good performance” from the concept of “reasonable academic load,” but rather links the former to the latter, as it introduces the preposition “with.” Therefore, in each specific case, one must first determine what the academic load is, then define whether or not it is reasonable and why, and then conclude whether the obtained performance is good or not and why, which implies analyzing what is understood by “good” in the particular case. Moreover, it is notorious that determining what the academic load is, is also normatively linked to obtaining a profession or trade, i.e., the academic load must be analyzed in terms of obtaining a profession or trade, which excludes the obtaining of “another” profession or trade, or enrolling and enrolling in subjects without concrete progress toward obtaining a profession or trade. In other words, any enrollment is not sufficient, since the norm does not protect “remaining in study” but rather obtaining “good performance with a reasonable academic load,” and with a purpose already defined by law: to obtain a profession or trade. For greater clarity, each enrollment must entail progress toward obtaining a profession or trade. Thus, “filler” courses to “maintain active student status” are not courses that allow progress toward obtaining a profession or trade, insofar as they are not part of the study plan. Consequently, it is opportune to insist that “remaining in study” is not what the core requirement of the norm demands.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is clear that there may be exceptional situations in which enrollment in some course could be accepted to cover the transition between secondary and university education, or to obtain a trade, especially due to issues of impossibility of enrollment given the time when the benefiting person finished secondary school. Such is the case of persons who have had to take extraordinary exams to finish the fifth year and, consequently, did not qualify for enrollment in a university or other study center. Similarly, if what could not be concluded was the high school diploma (bachillerato), the situation must be analyzed in each specific case, because it is a known fact that there are some subjects where the deficiency is not solely or necessarily attributable to the person taking the exam but to the educational system itself, and there are even areas of the country where academic performance is low in a generalized manner. All of this must be analyzed in each specific case.

As has been set forth, it is evident that the norm in question expressly establishes, as a general rule, the termination of the support right for children of legal age, and subsequently determines, as an exception, the continuity of the right if the person has not finished their studies, and furthermore, it must be clear that it does not deal with any type of studies but rather studies to obtain a single—in singular—profession or trade. Moreover, they are mutually exclusive: profession or trade, and not both. Following this, the norm establishes the termination of the support obligation upon reaching twenty-five years of age, regardless of whether a profession or trade has or has not been obtained by that age. For better understanding, it is worth revisiting what the norm states: “Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide support: (…) 5.- When the support recipients have reached their majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, as long as they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load. These requirements must be proven upon filing the claim, providing information on the academic load and performance.” As observed, it is also clear that the norm does not define what should be understood by “reasonable academic load” or “good performance.” For the undersigned, both expressions are indeterminate legal concepts.

On this subject, Administrative Law has advanced significantly in the analysis of such concepts, and it is evident that they are not exclusive to that area of Law. Thus, it is necessary to turn to the doctrine developed in that branch of Law to analyze article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code. In this vein, for example, González Alonso proposes that “a large part of the doctrine relates determined and indeterminate legal concepts to normative language. It seems evident that, with these concepts or definitions (of which our Law offers us abundant samples: «good father of a family», «good faith», «recklessness», «loyal administrator», «just price»…), the aim is to delimit a reality that manifests itself imperfectly and that is difficult to translate into normative language. Thus, determined legal concepts are those that delimit, without leaving room for doubt, a scope of reality, while indeterminate legal concepts delimit that scope of reality through a process of integration or determination, of judgment or estimation.” (González Alonso, Augusto. Discrecionalidad y su control. Diferenciación con la arbitrariedad y con los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados. Revista CEFLEGAL No. 98. 2009. Document consulted at the site https://revistas.cef.udima.es/index.php/ceflegal/article/view/13091) Furthermore, Trayter Jiménez defines indeterminate legal concepts as follows: “They are maxims of experience. They are abstract concepts whose application requires an assessment based on technical criteria or logical reasoning. They are not automatic like the previous ones [referring to determined legal concepts] (…); in Administrative Law: ruin, public order, the expropriatory just price, extraordinary and urgent need, the manifest goal-scoring opportunity, parks and gardens with ‘artistic, historical, anthropological value’ (for purposes of integrating them into the Spanish historical heritage), public utility, public necessity, imperative need of general interest.” (Trayter Jiménez, Joan Manuel (2015). Manual de Derecho Administrativo. Parte General, Barcelona, Atelier Libros Jurídicos).

Consequently, the undersigned considers that indeterminate legal concepts are those that have a framework or reference normative definition and, therefore, are imprecise, so they must be given specific scope and meaning, but not subjectively but rather legally, i.e., in attention to specific, pertinent, and proven facts. Thus, Clavijo Suntura warns that, “the process of judicial determination, while taking into account principles of moral, social, and axiological ethics, must be defined based on legal criteria.” (Clavijo Suntura, Joel Harry. 2018. Los Conceptos Jurídicos determinados e indeterminados y la decisión judicial. Derecho y Cambio Social). As a consequence of all the foregoing, it is clear that “reasonable academic load” and “good performance” are integrated concepts to form the expression “good performance with a reasonable academic load”; both expressions form part of a framework or hard core that is given by the real benefit of the support, since studying with one's own resources is one thing, and studying using the resources of others is another. In this latter case, it is imperative that the benefiting person truly takes advantage of the resources received and prospers in their studies. It is, then, a matter of utilization that must be susceptible to verification, and consequently, there must be parity between the chronological age of the benefiting person and their progress in studies. If that parity does not exist, the person receiving support must prove the reason for that lack of parity, since it entails a fracture of the hard core of the norm, which refers to the effective utilization of the resources received.

Thus, abandoning a degree program or the study of a trade to start other studies is not a minor issue but something very delicate, because far from generating progress in studies, it rather causes an unjustified delay in obtaining a profession or trade. Therefore, just as a person obligated to pay support cannot seek a variation in the support quota based on subjective, or even provoked, circumstances, neither can a benefiting person change their degree program or trade capriciously, and even less so if that entails losing all or a large part of the progress made in the studies being abandoned. Note that there may even be situations where, instead of finishing a degree program or trade long before turning twenty-five, the benefiting person abandons the degree program or studies they are pursuing to obtain a trade, in order to start other studies with the purpose of extending the validity of the support obligation until the age of twenty-five. With practices like those cited, the benefiting person would be “guaranteeing” support without truly complying with what the norm requires, which is, pursuing studies to obtain a profession or trade. That is, the norm does not authorize a change of degree program, because if it did, all the contribution given by the party obligated to pay support would be lost. The issue of changing degree programs is so delicate that a benefiting person could change their program every four-month term or every certain time and thus not commit to obtaining any university degree, but evidently, such conduct is not covered by the norm, since the support obligation provided for in subsection 5) of article 173 of the Family Code is exceptional and conditional, besides being normatively oriented toward obtaining a profession or trade. Thus, “remaining in study” is not what the norm contemplates as a prerequisite for receiving support.

j. Another topic of interest consists of the support claim of someone who decides to begin studies after some time—even years—after having reached the age of majority. In those cases, it is determining to question how they were meeting their needs before initiating the support process, so, as article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code requires, when claiming support they must prove not only that they have enrolled. That is, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that they will pursue studies or are pursuing them. The norm in this sense is very clear: the academic load and good performance must be demonstrated upon filing the claim. In other words, the norm makes a difference between those who, after reaching the age of majority, have continued studying to obtain a profession or trade, and those who, after reaching the age of majority, have not been studying but rather decide to do so some time later. Those who find themselves in this latter situation are required, upon filing the claim—if they were not support recipients as minors—not only to demonstrate that they are pursuing studies or have already enrolled but also the academic load they now carry and the results previously obtained. For better understanding, it is opportune to refresh the content of the norm: “Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide support: (…) 5.- When the support recipients have reached their majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, as long as they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load. These requirements must be proven upon filing the claim, providing information on the academic load and performance.” As observed, when the norm states “these requirements must be proven upon filing the claim, providing information on the academic load and performance,” it refers to those new support processes given that the person seeking support was not a recipient as a minor, and if it involves a person who was a support recipient as a minor but decided not to pursue studies once they reached the age of majority and later decides to resume or start them, it is clear that they must demonstrate not only the academic load but also their performance.

In this latter case, the undersigned considers that it is not simply a matter of “activating” the process, but rather that what the norm requires must be complied with, i.e., demonstrating the academic load and performance. As the norm requires demonstrating performance, it is understood that there must be a prior academic term whose performance is verifiable. Thus, support obligations in accordance with article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code require much attention and prudence, because it is not surprising that some person may attempt to receive provisional or non-provisional support, a year-end bonus (aguinaldo), and even expenses for the start of the academic term, when they are barely beginning their studies and, due to their age, it would be practically impossible for them to finish a degree program or trade.

k. Additionally, just as actions or omissions by the benefiting person that have the purpose or result of undermining the hard core of the norm—article 173, subsection 5 of the Family Code—are inadmissible, neither is it possible for that hard core to be fractured by actions or omissions of the obligated person, for if they do not pay the support quota on time, do not pay it at all, or incur in another type of violence, and even if they are obligated to pay a modest sum compared to financing studies to obtain a profession or trade, they cannot expect this not to be considered when analyzing the consideration to which the benefiting party is obligated: “good performance with a reasonable academic load.” In other words, failing to comply with the support obligation and violating the right to non-violence of the benefiting party does have favorable consequences for them when analyzing the consideration to which they are obligated, for just as violence by the person who is an adult support recipient affects the termination of the right to support, violence by the person obligated to pay support also affects the verification of obtaining “good performance with a reasonable academic load to obtain a profession or trade.” l. As a complement, there are subjective situations that may prove relevant when analyzing compliance with said consideration. For example, an illness of the benefiting person, particular skills for the learning process, etc., or objective situations that the benefiting person cannot control, such as, for example, the availability of educational offerings in a specific area, internet connectivity in a specific zone, etc. Therefore, in measuring “good performance with a reasonable academic load to obtain a profession or trade,” there must be an analysis according to each specific case, since generalizing grossly violates the principle of equality. All this with the observation that this analysis does not authorize emptying the hard core of the norm, such that it is always mandatory to have as a reference the framework established by the norm and its purpose: obtaining a profession or trade.

m. As has been stated in this resolution, the support obligation established in article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code is exceptional and conditional, but, additionally, it is not preferential. Now then, this does not mean that a person obligated to pay support can fill themselves with preferential support obligations to attempt to neglect the previously acquired support obligation. On the contrary, what this non-preferential character does imply is that, when analyzing compliance with the requirements that the norm contemplates, the judicial authority must be more rigorous in the assessment of the specific case when there are other preferential benefiting persons.

n. As has also been set forth, the norm in question protects the support right for obtaining a profession or trade, that is, not to obtain several professions, several trades, or a profession and a trade. This, besides being regulated in this way, that is, in the singular, is understood because it involves an exceptional support obligation, and of course, without prejudice to the obligated party agreeing to pay a quota that covers several professions, several trades, or a profession or trade, and this does not entail the detriment of other support obligations that are preferential. Likewise, it will be up to the judicial authority to define whether the payment of support proceeds in favor of someone who already has a trade, as, for example, the case of persons graduated from technical colleges. This is because it is clear that the payment of a support quota during technical education entailed, for the obligated person, the investment of money to provide a profession or trade to the benefiting person, and if the support obligation were to continue to obtain a degree similar to the one already obtained, it warrants an analysis in each specific case, especially if what is now being sought is to pursue studies in a technical career that has no relationship with the one already completed. A similar situation occurs when someone who seeks support to pursue a university degree has already completed a technical career. Note that in both cases, the first technical career obtained basically becomes a wasted investment that was backed by the threat of the freedom of the support obligor in case of non-compliance. Now then, the undersigned does not rule out that the practice of making an already completed technical career invisible could be due to the myth that exists in the sense that whoever claims support is prohibited from working, but in this ruling it has already been set forth why that assertion is a myth, understanding a myth as an imaginary story that alters reality.

ñ. An issue that is also of interest when analyzing the support obligation in question lies in the unilateral decision regarding the study center. Thus, in practice, it is common for an adult child to choose a private study center, and, moreover, the most expensive one, without demonstrating that this was consented to by the obligated party or that it corresponds to a certain standard of living provided by the responding party. This practice is a delicate issue because, as has been indicated, the cited support obligation is not preferential, is conditional, and is exceptional. So much so that its purpose is also not to financially sustain an independent life project of the benefiting person, such as leaving the nuclear family to have a different place to live, which could even have the purpose of avoiding the basic rules of coexistence that are set for them in their family group. No norm indicates that the father and mother are obligated to finance an independent life project for children over eighteen years of age and under twenty-five years of age. Thus, a unilateral decision by the young adult person that entails financing an independent life project is not contemplated in the legislation, and therefore, is not legally enforceable, unless their departure from the home is caused by proven situations of violence. All of this with the observation that living in a family implies compliance with basic rules of coexistence, such as, for example, having a clear arrival time, not consuming addictive substances, not entering the home having consumed addictive substances, actively participating in the household cleaning and food preparation tasks, as well as managing the acquisition of supplies and paying bills, etc. That is, living in a family is not living in a “hotel.” Therefore, active participation in these indispensable tasks for household sustainability are duties imposed by family life, and demanding collaboration from adult children is not violence, unless, in specific situations, the requirement is made through violence, which, as stated, must be demonstrated. In the same sense, the young adult person who responds with violence to such requirements could also place themselves in the scenario of loss of the right to support contemplated in article 173, subsection 3) of the Family Code.

Having carried out the corresponding analysis regarding the prerequisites of the support obligation and the prerequisites, characteristics, and operability of the support obligation regarding children of legal age but under eighteen years of age, it is important to analyze the specific case.

V.SPECIFIC CASE. In this matter, the substantive issue is quite simple, insofar as absolutely nothing is known about the academic activity of the beneficiary since the second four-month term of the year 2022. As has been explained, the burden of proving that she complies with the requirements established in article 172, subsection 3) of the Family Code corresponds to said young woman, and she did not do so in the first instance. In the second instance, she has been given the opportunity to provide that evidence, since evidence for a better resolution has been ordered, and she has been given the opportunity to manage the required information, without needing to incur expenses, since a court order (oficio) has been issued so that the academic information would be processed at no cost, but the young woman was notified of the resolution ordering the evidence for a better resolution and showed no interest in it. This being the case, it is clear that, if nothing is known about the academic circumstances of the young woman since the end of the second four-month term of the previous year, she must be excluded from the right to support. In this case, the appealed ruling is clear that nothing is known about the academic circumstances of the young woman since the end of the second four-month term of the previous year, and yet it has denied the exclusion process filed. That is, a decision has been made outside of what the regulations establish and without considering the binding constitutional jurisprudence. The contested ruling focuses on the right of the young woman to study, and that is not the issue under discussion, but rather that she is not doing so. No one doubts that the young woman has the right to study. The cited article clearly states so, but if the young woman does not meet her evidentiary obligations, it cannot be affirmed that she is studying, and moreover, under the terms that the norm indicates. Consequently, the appropriate course is to grant the appeal filed and revoke the contested resolution in what has been the subject of appeal. This being the case, the filed exclusion is granted. The support right of the beneficiary ceases. Ruling on costs is omitted, as that was not appealed.

THEREFORE:

The appeal filed is granted, and the contested resolution is revoked in what has been the subject of appeal. This being the case, the filed exclusion is granted. The support right of the beneficiary ceases. Ruling on costs is omitted. Maureen Roxana Solís Madrigal. Judge.- MSOLISM exp 16-001786-0172PA ???????????????

MAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUDGE/DECISOR SEGUNDA INSTANCIA ACTOR/A:

[Nombre 001] DEMANDADO/A:

[Nombre 002] SECOND INSTANCE JUDGMENT No. 2023001129 JUZGADO PRIMERO DE FAMILIA DE SAN JOSÉ.- At twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on November first, two thousand twenty-three.- Child support (alimentario) process -exclusion and reduction- established by [Nombre 001], identity card number [...] against [Nombre 002], identity card number [...]. On appeal filed by the support obligor, this Court reviews the judgment of 17:07 on September 21, 2023, and,

RESULTANDO:

The First Instance Judge, Ana Gabriela Herrera Alfaro, declared without merit the exclusion process filed by the support obligor and, partially granted the reduction process. The matter was resolved without an award of costs (condenatoria en costas). The support obligor appeals and indicates that there is no evidence that the beneficiary is studying. He indicates that the last academic information for the young woman refers to the second quadmester of the year 2022 and, nothing further is known. Furthermore, he alleges that the young woman is working. He did not appeal the ruling on costs.

CONSIDERANDO:

I. PROVEN FACTS (HECHOS PROBADOS)

Those indicated in the appealed decision are endorsed, as they reflect the case file.

II. UNPROVEN FACT (HECHO NO PROBADO)

The following is incorporated as an unproven fact: It is unknown whether the young beneficiary passed the courses she enrolled in during the second quadmester of the year 2022 and, since then, it is not known whether she continued studying or not, the academic load, the career's study plan, or her performance.

III. ON THE MERITS

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION (OBLIGACIÓN ALIMENTARIA). Regarding the practical application of Article 169 of the Family Code in accordance with current legislation and binding jurisprudence -Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional and 8.1) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial-, the requirements for a support pension are reviewed in every process and in the following strict order, whether to set a support pension - provisional or not-; to modify it -increase it or reduce it- and, to analyze the grounds for exoneration (exoneración) and exclusion (exclusión):

FIRST: Kinship or legal bond (vínculo) as the case may be, as both concepts are not the same. This requirement is based on the following regulations: Article 169 of the Family Code, reformed regarding subsection 2) by means of Law No. 10166, La Gaceta No. 82 of May 5, 2022; Article 248 of the cited Code, which corresponded to the former Article 245 and is now 248 because the numbering was shifted by the law called “Creación del Sistema Nacional de Cuidados y Apoyos para Personas Adultas y Personas Adultas Mayores en Situación de Dependencia (SINCA)”, No. 10192 published in La Gaceta No. 110 of June 14, 2022, Alcance No. 118.

Added to that regulation is Law No. 10228 on the authentic interpretation of Article 245 -248- of the Family Code (Código de Familia), La Gaceta No. 100 of May 31, 2022; Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Preamble and Article 24(d) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 69 and 92 second paragraph of the Family Code, Article 12, 31 and 1400 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), regulations that allow the issue of child support (alimentos) in favor of unborn children to be resolved not only with respect to women united in marriage but also to women in a common-law marriage (unión de hecho), and could even be considered applicable if it involves an irregular common-law marriage where it is not the woman who is married but rather her partner. In addition, what is contemplated in Articles 23, 27 and 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child must be considered. Likewise, the provisions of Articles 29, 37 to 39 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) must be added. As a complement, what is provided for in Article 13(a) and 16(c) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Law No. 6968 and Articles 1, 2(a), 3, 4(b), (e) and (g) of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women "Convention of Belém do Pará" (Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la mujer “Convención Belem Do Pará”) must also be considered. Equally, the provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations (Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias), Law No. 8053 and the provisions of the Code of Private International Law (Código de Derecho Internacional Privado) Law No. 50, published in Alcance No. 7, La Gaceta No. 30 of February 6, 1930, must also be considered. Now, the review of all these regulations also involves analyzing in each specific case the following topics:

1.a The examination of the character of a preferred obligor (persona obligada preferente) as provided for in Articles 168, 169 and 173(1) of the Family Code, 23 of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code. It must be observed that there are at least five rules referring to the preferred character regarding child support debtors (personas deudoras alimentarias). Furthermore, said regulations also require reviewing the character of a preferred beneficiary (persona beneficiaria preferente), as is evident from constitutional case law such as, for example, resolution No. 5720-00, 14:58 of July 11, 2000, which stated: “By resolution at sixteen hours and twenty minutes of July fourth, two thousand, the Contraventional and Small Claims Court of San Joaquín de Flores annulled the resolution that admitted the child support claim (demanda de alimentos) and the one that ordered the physical coercion (apremio corporal) against the petitioner. The foregoing, in consideration that the Family Code, numeral 156, establishes a priority order (prelación) of those obligated to pay support, it being indispensable, in the first place, to prove the material impossibility of the minors' father to cover support, for which the corresponding warnings were made to the plaintiff (folio 30). II.- Numeral 15 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) indicates that a habeas corpus action proceeds against 'acts or omissions that come from an authority of any order, including judicial, against threats to that freedom and disturbances or restrictions that authorities unduly establish regarding it…' (bold not from original). In the case before us, it is evident that the appealed authority, without conducting the corresponding analysis of numeral 156 of the Family Code, processed a child support claim against the petitioner, obligating him to pay a provisional child support payment (cuota provisional de alimentos) that it established in the sum of two hundred and forty thousand colones, under warning of ordering physical coercion against the obligor if he failed to make the corresponding payment, which he did not make, for which reason his physical coercion and consequent capture were ordered. The appealed authority indicates that before it was notified of the filing of the habeas corpus, it had already revoked those resolutions, making the corresponding communications to the police authorities to avoid the petitioner's detention, for which reason in its opinion this habeas corpus action lacks interest; however, that subsequent action does not render non-existent the threat to the freedom that both jurisdictional resolutions caused to the petitioner. For this Chamber, the personal freedom of the defendant was illegitimately threatened by ordering his physical coercion without analyzing whether, in the specific case, the circumstances that made the processing of the claim and the prevention of payment of support necessary were present. It does not go unnoticed by this Chamber that, despite the fact that the petitioner in his reply to the claim made the court aware of the irregularity of the proceeding and the ordered payment, against him was ordered – without further analysis of his arguments – an arrest warrant, which shows a clear lack of appreciation by the appealed authority of the circumstances of the specific case, which obliges the Chamber to declare its responsibility in the threat to the freedom suffered by the petitioner. By reason of the foregoing, the appeal must be declared with merit, warning the appealed authority to refrain from incurring in acts such as those that have given rise to the granting of the appeal.

It is pointless to order the lifting of the arrest warrant, as requested by the appellant, because the respondent authority has already provided what was necessary." Along the same lines, in ruling no. 6610-01, 15:59 of July 10, 2021, the Constitutional Chamber stated: "The purpose of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), which is of a family nature, was to secure the food assistance and personal and patrimonial protection of persons who, having need, in one way or another cannot obtain it for themselves. The Law grants this right based on the idea of a just principle of family solidarity, therefore, it limits this right to the closest degrees of kinship and affinity: the obligation to provide support affects solely the relatives and affines called upon by law, and according to a pre-established order. The obligation to provide support (alimentos) is an economic provision that, maintaining the proper relationship between the economic possibilities of the obliged person and the needs of the maintenance creditor (alimentario), has the purpose of satisfying the provision of nutritional substances or edibles, of medical care and medications, covering the needs of clothing, housing and recreation, and, in the case of minors, providing the necessary resources to secure formal or informal education in order to provide comprehensive development as a citizen and human being. The support provision, consequently, does not only have a patrimonial value. Precisely because of this, its set-off (compensación) is not permitted, nor the assignment (cesión) of the support right; and consequently, neither the settlement (transacción) nor the arbitration agreement regarding it. What is discussed in support proceedings is not, as indicated, a merely pecuniary provision, with a profit motive, as if it were any other civil proceeding, but rather, although the debt is monetary, it is directed at satisfying the needs of every human being to achieve harmonious development. Note that the legal right protected through the imposition of a support payment is the need and condition of dependency in which the maintenance creditor finds themselves regarding the obligor. By virtue of the foregoing, the support obligation cannot be compared to any other legal obligation, given that in matters of support, the family powers to demand such provision are not attributed for the purpose of satisfying a merely personal interest, but to provide for a superior need of a family nature." This criterion has been reiterated, for example, in rulings no. 1124-05, 11:14 of February 4, 2005; no. 10484-01, 15:50 of October 16, 2001; no. 7923-02, 15:19 of August 20, 2002, among others. In addition, other constitutional rulings dealing with subsidiary obligor (personas obligadas subsidiarias) and preferential obligor (personas obligadas preferentes) are: no. 5498-13, 14:30 of April 23, 2013; no. 1817-14, 16:05 of February 11, 2014; no. 9580-15, 9:05 of June 26, 2015; no. 18945-15, 11:01 of December 2, 2015 and, no. 518-18, 9:15 of January 17, 2018.

1.b. The analysis of the provisions of article 40 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia), as well as numeral 10 of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias). Therefore, it must be taken into account that the person filing a support claim would not necessarily be obligated to the payment of support -solidarity- as is the case of uncles and aunts, who are not obligated to pay support with respect to nephews and nieces, as follows from article 169 and article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). Likewise, grandfathers and grandmothers are not obligated to pay support with respect to grandchildren of legal age who do not have a disability that prevents them from attending to their own interests. This is in accordance with article 169 subsection c) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). Another example is constituted by a person who is the administrative or judicial custodian (depositaria administrativa o judicial) of a minor, since the person who will be the custodian (depositario) must not necessarily owe support in accordance with article 169 of the Family Code (Código de Familia). As can be observed, there are many scenarios in which the person filing the claim for the benefit of another person is not obligated to pay support. In summary, the practical application of the cited articles 40 and 10 is not a minor issue if it is considered that it is not possible to take evidence on the economic capacity of persons who are not obligated to pay support. Thus, investigating their finances without being obligated to pay support constitutes an arbitrary interference in life, and that practice is expressly prohibited at least in articles 12.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; V of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 11.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in articles 3.1, 4, 16); General Comment of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, no. 14; article 5 and 16 of the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons and, article 22 of the UN Convention on Disability and the recommendations of the Committee of said Convention, among other norms. Also, in the practical application of article 10 of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), it is vital to determine if the person acting for the benefit of another person is in reality the preferential obligor (persona obligada preferente) or even, whether being so or not, they maintain a conflict of interest (interés contrapuesto).

Finally, that Article 10 requires special analysis when the issue of immigration is involved, since it is common for migrants to leave their minor children or even adult children with disabilities in their country of origin or in the State where they previously resided, in the care of relatives or third parties, while they work in Costa Rica to generate resources and send them to their children abroad. However, as the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is, by definition, extraterritorial, it is clear that the person claiming support, while possibly not exercising the immediate care of the beneficiaries, may be exercising care at a distance and, consequently, the defendant must demonstrate that the claimant remains disconnected from the beneficiaries and, therefore, lacks standing (legitimación) to claim support. Thus, in situations where the issue of immigration and the application of Article 10 converge, it is necessary to make interpretations that favor access to justice for migrants and, at the same time, the extraterritorial nature of the support obligation. This, without neglecting of course the certainty about the connection between the person claiming on behalf of beneficiaries who are abroad.

**1.c.** Review of the joinder of the litis. That is, the necessary passive joinder of parties (litisconsorcio pasiva necesaria). This in accordance with Articles 35, 169 of the Family Code and 106 of the Civil Procedure Code Law No. 7130, as well as paragraph two of Article 2 of the Law on Support Pensions (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) regarding the directive for compliance with family duties. Likewise, it is essential to consider the joint and several nature (carácter solidario) of the support obligation, understood as family cohesion and not as in mercantile obligations, where one may choose which debtor to demand performance of the obligation from. However, it must be clear that, even though by virtue of the joint and several nature of the support obligation the passive joinder of parties is necessary and not optional, this does not mean that all defendants must be ordered to pay provisional support or support in the judgment, since it is always necessary to analyze the economic possibilities of each person separately and the needs of the beneficiary. Likewise, it must be clear that it is not possible to require an only child to agree that their father or mother does not wish to sue other children, whether because the parent does not want to, because they settle for what they already receive extrajudicially—which may or may not be proportional to those persons' income—or because they do consider the circumstances of some children and not others which may even be the same or different, but indeed, some are relevant to them and others are not. All these are subjectivities that the defendant does not have to bear, and less so considering that a corporal arrest warrant (apremio corporal), an exit prohibition order (impedimento de salida del país), a raid (allanamiento), etc., could only be issued against them. Why should a person agree to be the only defendant if there are other persons who are also jointly family obligated? Why should they agree that said persons may eventually not contribute, or that they contribute whatever they want without their economic capacity being analyzed to determine if they are contributing as is being required of the person who was actually sued? Note that if family joint and several liability and the directive on compliance with family duties did not imply that the passive joinder of parties is necessary, then, extrajudicially, one person would be allowed not to contribute, or indeed, they would be allowed to contribute what they want, while another would be judicially required to contribute a specific sum and, in the first case, no judging person would verify that they cannot contribute, or indeed, that the contribution actually exists and furthermore is proportional to the possibilities of the person providing the contribution and the needs of the person receiving the contribution, while, in the second case, the defendant would indeed be subjected to deep scrutiny as determined by Article 164 of the Family Code and Articles 2 and 27 of the Law on Support Pensions, that is, a scrutiny aimed at determining the real truth.

**SECOND:** Determine whether the party claiming support or the person benefiting from the claim made by another person is or is not subject to any ground for exclusion (causal de exclusión). This finds support in subsection 2) to 7) of Article 173 of the Family Code. With the observation that the grounds ranging from subsection 2) to 7) of that norm, as already stated, are grounds for exclusion due to actions or omissions contrary to good faith in family relationships, which is why they have been termed “family infamy” (infamia familiar) as of judgment 900-23, of 8:40 on September 18, 2023, drafted by Judge Patricia Méndez Gómez, titular of the First Family Court with Second Instance Competence. The foregoing, in order to create a specific denomination and not use the concept of “unworthiness” (indignidad) as it is specific to probate matters, nor “ingratitude” (ingratitud), which refers to the donation contract. However, when analyzing this regulation, that is, subsection 2) to 7) of Article 173 of the Family Code, the provisions in constitutional resolutions No. 3685-09 10:30, March 6, 2009 and No. 14026-11, 14:50 of October 19, 2011; Article 523 of the Civil Code, amended by Law No. 9777, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Supplement No. 280; Law No. 10217, La Gaceta No. 100 of May 31, 2022; subsection c) of Article 572 of the Civil Code; and Articles 48, 57, 58, 66, 140, 143, 158, 159, 160, 233, and 248 of the Family Code are of interest. All this, with the following observations:

**2.a.** Article 233 of the Family Code was incorporated by Law No. 10192 and said Law, as already indicated, shifted the numbering by incorporating Articles 231, 232, and 233 into the Family Code. Therefore, it must be determined whether, in a specific case, a final judgment has been issued in a process of “lifting of the care obligation” (levantamiento de obligación de cuido).

For greater clarity, this concerns a new process created by the addition of Article 233 to the Family Code (Código de Familia) pursuant to Article 32 of the law Creating the National System of Care and Support for Adults and Older Adults in Situations of Dependency (Creación del Sistema Nacional de Cuidados y Apoyos para Personas Adultas y Personas Adultas Mayores en Situación de Dependencia, SINCA), No. 10192 of April 28, 2022. Therefore, if such a ruling exists, the scope it holds in the specific case must be determined. Furthermore, based on Article 8 of the Family Code and Article 106 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), these types of matters fall under the jurisdiction of the family courts, and what is resolved there may or may not affect a support (alimentario) proceeding through the analogous application of the last paragraph of Article 173 of the Family Code.

**2.b.** Similarly, one must consider the reform introduced to Articles 56, 60, 141, the heading of Chapter II of Title III, and Articles 151 and 152 of the Family Code, by Law No. 9781, La Gaceta No. 238 of December 13, 2019, Alcance No. 279.

**2.c.** Moreover, it is also necessary to bear in mind that Article 158 of the Family Code has been reformed by Law No. 9406, November 30, 2016, La Gaceta No. 10, Alcance No. 9; Law No. 9095, La Gaceta No. 28 of February 8, 2013, Alcance 27 a; Law No. 10263, La Gaceta No. 99 of May 30, 2022, Alcance No. 109. Added to this, it must be considered that there also exists the reform introduced to Article 57 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) by Law No. 8875, La Gaceta No. 202 of October 19, 2010, regarding the disqualification (inhabilitación) from exercising “parental authority (patria potestad), guardianship (tutela), conservatorship (curatela), or judicial administration of assets (administración judicial de bienes)” as indicated by the regulation, and that Article 159 of the Family Code has been reformed by Law No. 9379, La Gaceta No. 166 of August 30, 2016, Alcance No. 153.

**2.d.** As a complement, it cannot be overlooked that, against Article 173 subsection 4) regarding adultery—committed in the past or present—as a ground for exclusion (exclusión) of the support right, there is an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) being processed under case file number 22-009920-0007-CO, and first published in Boletín Judicial No. 103, June 3, 2022. That edict, in what is relevant, states: “(...) This notice only affects pending judicial proceedings in which the application of the challenged provision is discussed, and it is noted that the only thing that cannot be done in said proceedings is to issue a final judgment (sentencia) or the act in which the challenged provision would be applied in the sense that it has been. Equally, the only thing the action suspends in the administrative channel is the issuance of the final resolution (resolución final) in the procedures aimed at exhausting that channel, which are those initiated with and arising from the appeal (recurso de alzada) or motion for reversal (recurso de reposición) filed against the final act, except, of course, when dealing with rules that must be applied during the proceeding, in which case the suspension operates immediately (...).” **2.e.** To all this, one must also add the provisions of Article 42 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), Article 164 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) Law No. 7130, and Articles 148, 408, 412, 416, and 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), as well as the provisions of the Private International Law Code (Código de Derecho Internacional Privado) Law No. 50, published in Alcance No. 7, La Gaceta No. 30 of February 6, 1930.

**2.f.** Furthermore, it is appropriate to point out that distinguishing between exoneration (exoneración) and exclusion (exclusión) is not a trivial matter, since exoneration operates with respect to the person obligated to pay support (persona deudora de alimentos) and exclusion operates with respect to the creditor person (persona acreedora). Additionally, the burdens of proof are different in an exoneration proceeding and in an exclusion proceeding. Thus, the ground is one of exoneration if it is a matter of analyzing the circumstances of the obligated person to determine whether or not they can pay support, whereas, when analyzing whether or not the beneficiary person should receive support, it is a ground for exclusion. Obviously, there may be situations where the dispute (litis) is joined with grounds for both exoneration and exclusion. In any case, the order admitting evidence (auto de admisión de pruebas) must reflect what the subject of the debate is and the respective burdens of proof.

For greater clarity, the first two grounds for exoneration are contemplated in Article 173 subsection 1), since they refer to the impossibility of paying because the obligated person cannot meet their own needs or because other preferential support obligations exist. Therefore, those first two grounds are for exoneration. The remaining subsections of the rule are for exclusion, that is, those provided for in subsections 2) through 7), insofar as they refer to actions or omissions committed by the person receiving support that warrant the loss thereof.

As</span><span style=\"font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub;\"> such, these subsections refer to situations in which a person is receiving alimony (alimentos) under the following assumptions: without needing it; for having engaged in acts of mistreatment—injury, serious insult, or harm (injuria, falta o daños graves); for having engaged in voluntary and malicious abandonment; if, as a former spouse, they remarried or entered into a common-law relationship (convivencia de hecho); if, being an adult child, but under the age of twenty-five, they are not studying under the terms required by legislation; if they breached alimony duties when legally obliged to fulfill them; and, lastly, if they commit or have committed adultery, this last scenario—adultery—being the subject of the already mentioned unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad).

2.g. Lastly, when analyzing situations of exclusion, it is necessary to determine whether there has been an excuse or pardon (disculpa o perdón) regarding a potential situation determined as grounds for exclusion from alimony for “family infamy” (infamia familiar). On this topic, unless a better criterion applies, the provisions of articles 52 and 63 of the Código de Familia, as well as numeral 524 of the Código Civil, article 5 paragraphs 2 to 3 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, and article 12 of the Código Civil, govern.

THIRD: The needs of the person who will benefit from the alimony payment, article 51 of the Constitución Política, amended by Ley n° 9697, published in La Gaceta n.° 147 of August 7, 2019, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Protocol, Ley n.° 8661, published in La Gaceta n.° 187 of February 29, 2008, and the General Comments of the Committee of that Convention: n.° 1 Equal recognition as a person before the law; n.° 2 Accessibility; n.° 3 On women and girls with disabilities; n.° 4 On the right to inclusive education; n.° 5 On the right to live independently and be included in the community; n.° 6 On equality and non-discrimination (no discriminación); n.° 7 On the participation of persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through the organizations that represent them, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention; n.° 8 On the right of persons with disabilities to work and employment; Inter-American Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, Ley n° 7948 published in La Gaceta n.° 238 of December 8, 1999; Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, Forty-eighth session, of December 20, 1993; article 160 bis, 164 and 166 of the Código de Familia, as well as article 2 subsections h), i), j) of the Ley de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad, being Ley n.° 9379, published in Alcance n.° 254, La Gaceta n.° 166 of August 30, 2016; Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, such as, for example: General Comment n.° 4. Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; General Comment n.° 5. General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; General Comment n.° 7. Implementing child rights in early childhood; General Comment n.° 9. The rights of children with disabilities; General Comment n.° 11. Indigenous children and their rights under the Convention; General Comment n.° 14. The right of the child to have their best interests (interés superior) taken as a primary consideration; General Comment n.° 15. The right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health; General Comment n.° 17. The right of the child to rest, leisure, play, recreational activities, cultural life and the arts; General Comment n.° 20.

on the effectiveness of children's rights during adolescence, among others; articles 29, 37 to 39 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia); 13(a) and 16(c) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra La Mujer), Law No. 6968 (CEDAW), which includes the General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee, such as, for example: General Recommendations No. 19 and No. 35 on Violence against women; General Recommendation No. 21 on equality in marriage and family relations; General Recommendation No. 27 on older women and protection of their human rights; General Recommendation No. 29 on the economic consequences of marriage, family relations and their dissolution; General Recommendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice; General Recommendation No. 34 on the rights of rural women and, General Recommendation No. 39 on Indigenous Women and Girls, among others; Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations (Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias), Law No. 8053, published in La Gaceta No. 12 of January 17, 2001; United Nations Principles for Older Persons, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1991, Resolution 46/91; the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), which corresponds to Law No. 9379; articles 231 to 233 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) -Law No. 10192- and the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons (Convención Interamericana sobre Protección de los Derechos Humanos de la Persona Adulta Mayor), Law No. 9394, published in Alcance No. 203 to Gaceta No. 188 of September 30, 2016, among other provisions-, as well as any other regulation that protects the rights of specific populations (población específica), such as, for example, the regulation on indigenous populations (poblaciones indígenas), in which case it is notorious that the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) is not only insufficient but even contrary to norms of supra-constitutional rank, particularly because the designation of an interpreter requires special attention, everything related to the form of compliance with the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) and that includes the corporal sanction (apremio corporal) itself and even its execution. In this regard, I refer to Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Convenio No. 169 sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes), which corresponds to Law No. 71316, published in Gaceta No. 234 of December 4, 1992; Law No. 9593 on Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples of Costa Rica (Ley No. 9593 sobre Acceso a la Justicia de los Pueblos Indígenas de Costa Rica), published in Gaceta No. 100, May 31, 2022, Minimum Rules for the Application of the First Paragraph of numeral 7 of the Law on Access to Justice for Indigenous Persons of Costa Rica (Reglas Mínimas para la Aplicación del Primer Párrafo del numeral 7 de la Ley de Acceso a la Justicia de Personas Indígenas de Costa Rica), agreement reached by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial) in session No. 27-19 held on March 26, 2019, article LXXI and which corresponds to Circular No. 67-19; Law No. 9305 declaring Costa Rica a democratic, free, independent, and multicultural Republic (Ley No. 9305 que declara a Costa Rica República democrática, libre, independiente y multicultural), published in La Gaceta No. 191 of October 1, 2015.

As a complement, in each specific case, when examining needs, it is of interest to distinguish between urgent needs (necesidades perentorias), which are protected through a provisional alimony (pensión alimentaria provisional), and needs that form part of a certain standard of living. In this latter case, one must also consider when it involves needs created unilaterally by the person benefiting from alimony, needs created unilaterally by the obligor and for the benefit of alimony creditors, as well as needs agreed upon by the persons jointly and severally liable (solidariamente obligadas) for the payment of alimony and needs agreed upon by the persons subsidiarily liable (subsidiariamente obligadas) for the payment of alimony.

**FOURTH:** The financial capacity (posibilidades) of the person sued for alimony, which entails determining whether or not they fall under any ground for exoneration (causal de exoneración) - Article 27 of the Alimony Law, Article 173(1), 160 bis, 164 and 35 of the Family Code, this latter article modified by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239, December 16, 2019, Alcance No. 280. Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, Law No. 8053; all the regulations cited in the third point regarding the older adult population (población adulta mayor), population with disabilities (población con discapacidad) and indigenous population (población indígena). Added to this is what is provided in Article 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code. As a complement to this premise, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in ruling No. 9775-2010, 4:31 hours of June 1st, 2010, ordered: "(...) it must be clear that the provisional amount of alimony should not be quantified solely in relation to the economic income of the alimony debtor, but rather a judgment of weighting must be established in which both the conditions of the person who bears the support obligation and those of the beneficiaries must be taken into account." Logically, the proportionality of the alimony amount referred to by the Constitutional Court does not govern only with respect to a provisional alimony but also for that which is set in a judgment.

In addition to this, regarding the economic possibilities in support (alimentarios) proceedings, the aforementioned Court referred to the former article 151—now article 165 of the Family Code (Código de Familia)—as follows: “Pursuant to article 151 of the Family Code, the support (prestación alimentaria) must maintain a relationship between the economic possibilities of the person who provides it and the needs of the person who receives it, according to the particular circumstances of each case. Such provision finds its raison d'être in that a generalization cannot be made of all the needs that the support recipients (alimentarios) may have, since everyone's circumstances are different; some will need special food, others will require particular medications, and some education under the charge of tutors or qualified teachers, etc., and on the other hand, a common parameter cannot be established to measure the economic possibilities of all those obliged to pay support (pensión), since some will have a better economic situation than others. So in this respect, without distorting the principle that all persons are equal before the law, the judge can be allowed to weigh all the circumstances of the specific case and make the determination accordingly, because a multiplicity of personal circumstances, all different, can occur. The principle of equality operates, as stated above, insofar as persons find themselves in equal or reasonably similar situations, something that does not occur in relation to the needs and economic possibilities of human beings and their support (alimentarias) and personal development needs, for which reason it is not possible to accept the claimant's argument that numeral 151 of the Family Code violates the principle of equality by establishing the need to consider the particular conditions of each individual when setting the amount of the support quota (cuota alimentaria).” Resolution No. 1725-94, 15:21 of April 12, 1994. At this point, it is worth noting that said Court has on many occasions referred to the fact that the economic capacity of the party obliged to pay support (alimentos) is an issue that must be analyzed in each particular case: No. 1354-09, 13:16 of January 30, 2009; No. 15335-10, 8:32 of September 17, 2010; No. 7455-14, 15:15 of May 28, 2014; No. 4349-16, 9:00 of April 1, 2016; No. 466-18, 11:30 of January 16, 2018; No. 26760-21, 9:15 of November 26, 2021; and No. 3986-23, 9:15 of February 21, 2023, among many.

As can be seen then, when carrying out the ordered examination of said requirements, it is perfectly possible that, although need exists, a ground for exoneration (exoneración) or a ground for exclusion (exclusión) has simultaneously been determined. This is because the needs of the beneficiary person are not the only thing that counts. In these cases, exoneration or exclusion prevails over need. Likewise, it is also possible that the person claiming support (alimentos) is not a preferential beneficiary, or that the respondent is not a preferential obligor, in which case, even though need exists, the appropriate course is to respect the preferential order.

Up to this point, the requirements that must be reviewed in every support (alimentario) proceeding have been broken down. Now it is appropriate to analyze the requirements that must be added when dealing with article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code.

**IV. SUPPORT RIGHTS (DERECHO ALIMENTARIO) OF ADULT SONS AND DAUGHTERS UNDER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE.** When analyzing this issue, it is essential first of all to consider what the regulatory framework is that governs this specific support obligation (obligación alimentaria). To begin with, the ordinary regulation is contemplated in the already cited article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, which states: *“There shall be no obligation to provide support (alimentos): (…) 5. When the support recipients (alimentarios) have reached their majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic course load. These requirements must be proven when filing the claim, providing information on the academic course load and performance.”* As amended by Law No. 7654, published in Gazette No. 16 of January 23, 1997.

Regarding this norm, the constitutional jurisprudence has been very extensive. Initially, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 2869-94, 14:36 of June 15, 1994, referred to the issue, but it was developed based on the cited article 173, subsection 5) before being reformed by the Support Pensions Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias). It is understood then that it is a ruling no longer applicable due to said legal reform. Later, ruling No. 6181-97, 17:51 of September 30, 1997, does develop the norm once reformed. Therefore, this ruling is applicable, with the observation that other subsequent rulings dimension the application of the norm. Now, in the cited ruling No. 6181-97, the Constitutional Chamber stated: *“(…) the circumstances that gave rise to the issuance of the partially transcribed judgment varied with the enactment of Law No. 7654 of December 19, 1996, published in number 16 of January 23, 1997 of the Official Newspaper "La Gaceta". The Family Code, which contemplated the situation under study in article 160, subsection 6), was reformed and in its numeral 173 indicates: "There shall be no obligation to provide support: 5. When the support recipients (alimentarios) have reached their majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic course load."* These requirements must be proven upon filing the claim, by providing information on the academic course load and performance." The transcribed rule indicates that a child who has reached the age of majority may be a beneficiary of child support (alimentos), if they have not finished the studies to acquire a profession or trade, and are not older than twenty-five years of age, as was established by Article 160, subsection 6) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) before its reform. However, it introduces a new element, when it states that good performance and a reasonable academic course load must be demonstrated at the time of filing the claim, thereby allowing the Judge to initially assess the appropriateness of the support (pensión) and set a provisional amount in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, the Chamber considers that it is not inappropriate that a provisional support (pensión) was set for the petitioner, whose amount, by the way, he challenged in the corresponding venue, nor that the order of corporal punishment (apremio corporal) issued against him by the Child Support Office (Alcaldía de Pensiones Alimenticias) of Liberia violates his fundamental right to personal liberty. The support payment (prestación alimentaria) is indispensable for the subsistence of the beneficiaries, so its non-compliance entails the corporal punishment (apremio corporal) that may be ordered under the terms of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimenticias) and in protection of Article 13, subsection h) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Hence, if the appellant is obligated to the support payment (prestación alimentaria) and the order of corporal punishment (apremio) was requested by the plaintiff, the order must take effect without the deprivation of liberty resulting from that fact being considered arbitrary or illegal." Furthermore, in a later judgment, judgment No. 7372-97, at 15:15 on November 4, 1997, said Court held: "This Chamber considers that, while it is true there is no express regulation indicating the exact moment to exclude the debtor from their support obligation (obligación alimentaria), it is also true that there can be no interpretation other than that aimed at benefiting the best interests of the minor, in accordance with Articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), and 7 of the Child Support Law No. 7654 (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias N° 7654), regulations from which the general principle emerges that in this matter what prevails and must be primarily considered is the best interests of the child. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be claimed—as the appellant wishes—that a beneficiary of a support obligation (obligación alimentaria), upon reaching the age of majority, automatically loses their right to it, but on the contrary, it should always be presumed that they continue studying and making good progress in their studies, in order to continue enjoying the child support (pensión alimentaria), as established by Article 173, in its paragraph 5) of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) (...)." This last point with the observation that the rule in question does not correspond to the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) but to the Family Code (Código de Familia).

Additionally, in other subsequent votes, the Constitutional Chamber made it clear that it had changed the criterion expressed when the rule had not been reformed and that it is a matter for the ordinary jurisdiction to determine the appropriateness or not of a provisional child support (pensión alimentaria). In this regard, judgments No. 3491-02, at 14:39 on April 17, 2002; No. 5081-05, at 14:34 on April 29, 2005; No. 13923-05, at 8:31 on October 14, 2005; and No. 6600-09, at 14:22 on April 28, 2009, among others, may be consulted.

Now, in judgment No. 15209-2009, at 11:08 on September 25, 2009, corrected by resolution No. 3278-10, at 15:56 on February 12, 2010, that Constitutional Court stated: "V.- Regarding the duty of support towards children who have reached the age of majority and its procedural handling. Subsection 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) indicates that the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) of parents towards their children is maintained even when they reach the age of majority, only to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic course load, all aspects that must be proven upon filing the claim and that must necessarily be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction. For this, the procedural system is arranged in such a way that, upon reaching the age of majority, the support creditor who considers they maintain their right to receive support (alimentos), must file the corresponding action before the specialized court of the matter, so that it is in that venue that it is proven whether the interested party maintains that right and the obligor continues with the duty to provide support (alimentos), which must necessarily be assessed and defined according to the particular needs of the person who has reached the age of majority. This is so because upon reaching the age of majority, a series of needs are acquired that are different from those previously established for the support beneficiary while they were a minor, a situation that in practice implies the preclusion of the first recognized benefit, to instead, through a new judicial action, determine the new benefit legally due." Thus, if within the first judicial case there are still maintenance beneficiaries, and the person who has reached the age of majority files a new action, the maintenance obligor must take the appropriate steps within the first judicial proceeding to seek its adjustment to the new conditions, but as has been indicated, this is a matter within the competence of the interested party and, being an aspect of ordinary legality, is outside the scope of this jurisdiction's powers." This was reiterated in judgment No. 2099-2014, 14:30 of February 18, 2014, as follows: "Subsection 5) of article 173 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) indicates that the maintenance obligation of parents toward their children is maintained even when the latter reach the age of majority, only to the extent that the maintenance beneficiaries have not completed the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load, all aspects that must be proven when filing the claim and which must necessarily be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction. To this end, the procedural system is designed in such a way that, upon reaching the age of majority, the maintenance creditor who considers they maintain their right to receive support must file the corresponding action before the specialized court in the matter, so that it is in that venue that it is accredited whether the interested party maintains that right and the obligor continues to have the duty to provide support, which must necessarily be appreciated and defined according to the particular needs of the person who has reached the age of majority. This is so because, upon reaching the age of majority, a series of needs different from those previously established for the maintenance beneficiary while a minor are acquired, a situation that in practice implies the preclusion (preclusión) of the first recognized benefit, in order to, in its place and through a new judicial action, determine the new benefit that is legally appropriate." Now, in judgment No. 11490-2010, 16; 47 of June 30, 2010, that Court stated: "(...) ordinary jurisprudence and constitutional jurisprudence have recognized that reaching the age of majority is understood as a preclusion (preclusión) of the original maintenance obligation—which is enjoyed while being a minor—, so a new maintenance action must be processed if the person turning eighteen years of age considers they maintain their status as a maintenance beneficiary." And, finally, that Court, in resolution No. 5112-11, 12:21 of April 15, 2011, stated, regarding the right to support for a son or daughter of legal age and under twenty-five, who was already a maintenance pension beneficiary during minority: "In application of the principle of the most favorable interest to the creditor, then, said right is maintained within their sphere of rights enforceable against the maintenance debtor, upon reaching the age of majority, as long as the conditions established in the applicable legislation current in the Republic are met, which must be claimed and discussed in the ordinary jurisdictional venue. (...) Hence, it cannot be said, as was erroneously indicated in the cited judgment, that the age of majority operates to the detriment of the minor maintenance beneficiary who reaches it, as a preclusion (preclusión) of the benefit, which is the same as affirming that the preclusion (preclusión) of the right to maintenance is produced. A problem of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) related to representation may arise, as is procedurally logical, as explained supra, since it is presumed that the standing to act in representation of the minor's interests expires at the moment their mandate is extinguished, by the advent of the legal or juridical circumstance previously established in the law. What cannot be affirmed is that a preclusion (preclusión), extinguishment by limitation (prescripción), or expiration (caducidad) of the benefit or right to maintenance occurs, precisely for the reasons that have been set forth throughout this judgment. The right or benefit declared while being a minor is maintained upon reaching majority, upon fulfillment of the procedural requirement established by the legislation governing the matter, that is: a) appearing in such condition in the pre-existing proceeding to demonstrate their standing (legitimación), right, and need, so that their situation and the appropriateness of what is sought are re-evaluated by the jurisdictional authority according to the new circumstances inherent to majority; and b) in the terms established in Considerando IV of judgment 2010-003278, in those cases where a duality or duplication of judicial actions occurs, resulting from the filing of a new claim for a maintenance pension by the person of legal age despite the pre-existence of a proceeding where their right to maintenance had been declared in their favor while being a minor, a situation that would produce the obligatory determination by the ordinary jurisdictional authority to order the joinder (acumulación) of both proceedings, evidently if such circumstance has been brought to its attention by the maintenance defendant, all with a view to adequately guaranteeing the rights of both the beneficiary and the maintenance obligor." It is also important to highlight, regarding constitutional judgment No. 5112-2011, 12:21 of April 2011, the following: "V.- On the maintenance duty toward children of legal age and its procedural processing." Section 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) states that the parents' support obligation (obligación alimentaria) toward their children continues even when they reach the age of majority, “only to the extent that the support beneficiaries (beneficiarios alimentarios) have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load (carga académica), all aspects that must be proven when filing the claim and that must necessarily be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction.” This criterion was also set forth in judgments No. 15209-2009, 11:08 of September 25, 2009, corrected by resolution No. 3278-10, 15:56 of February 12, 2010. It should be noted that the jurisprudence is very clear in establishing the exceptional and conditional nature of the support obligation in question, as it clearly indicates that the support right subsists “only to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load (carga académica).” Furthermore, in judgment No. 5112-2011, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) made it very clear that the support obligation for adult children who were already judicial support beneficiaries, “in application of the principle of the most favorable interest to the creditor, then, said right remains within their sphere of rights enforceable against the support debtor (deudor alimentario), upon reaching the age of majority, as long as the conditions established in the legislation applicable to the case and in force in the Republic are met, which must be claimed and discussed in ordinary jurisdictional venue.” In other words, to enjoy this right, it is necessary to verify that the beneficiary meets the assumptions established in this case by Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code. From these binding jurisprudential criteria, it is important to highlight the following:

a. The support obligation provided for in Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code only proceeds to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade and do not exceed twenty-five years of age.

b. Therefore, the legal assumptions are not met by just any study; rather, they must be aimed at acquiring a profession or trade; the legal assumption cannot be fulfilled with just any performance, nor with just any academic load (carga académica), and this support obligation is fully conditioned and is, consequently, exceptional. Thus, it is clear then that Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code, regarding the support beneficiary, is not complied with by just any form of study, any enrollment at any time, and with any study results.

c. In other words, the support obligation of adult sons and daughters is an obligation that necessarily implies a quid pro quo of verifiable results: if one intends to receive the support payment (pensión alimentaria), one must study for the verifiable purpose stated in the law, that is, to obtain a profession or trade and, in addition, with a reasonable academic load (carga académica) and good performance; to receive support, one must remain in compliance with the assumptions contemplated by the legislation, otherwise, it would produce unjust enrichment and could even constitute the elements of procedural fraud (estafa procesal). See also that Article 23 of the Support Payments Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) states: “When a provisional quota is set for someone who is not the preferential obligor (obligado preferente) or it is decided in a judgment that the support creditor does not have the right to support, whoever has paid the provisional quota, their representatives or heirs may demand the restitution of the amount paid. The sum for restitution shall constitute an executory title (título ejecutivo) and shall be determined through the incidental proceeding (vía incidental).” d. In addition to this, requesting a writ of bodily attachment (apremio corporal) for the non-compliance of the person obliged to pay support, while the beneficiary is not in full and permanent compliance with the requirements demanded by Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code and, this situation –not complying with such requirements– is not attributable to the debtor precisely for failing to pay, paying late, or another cause, could constitute a fault according to Article 173, section 3), that is, a cause for exclusion from the right to support, which, of course, must be analyzed in each specific case. In other words, demanding compliance with the obligation without, at the same time, complying with the requirements demanded by section 5) of the cited provision, is not a minor issue but, on the contrary, is something very delicate and can generate various legal consequences, including the commission of a cause for loss of the right to support, unjust enrichment, attempted procedural fraud (estafa procesal), and procedural fraud (estafa procesal).

As a complement to the provisions of Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code and the constitutional jurisprudence on said provision, one must also add the ordinary regulation that deals with the preferential order (orden preferente) not only of persons obliged to pay support but also of the beneficiaries of support. That is, Articles 168, 169, and 173, section 1) of the Family Code, 23 of the Support Payments Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), and 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia).

For greater clarity, it is appropriate to transcribe the provisions in the order in which they have been cited and everything referring to the preferential order (orden preferente) will be highlighted: “Article 168.- While the support claim (demanda alimentaria) is being processed, once the family relationship is proven, the judge may set a provisional quota for any of the persons indicated in the following article, observing the preferential order (orden preferente) established therein." This quota shall be prudently set at an amount capable of meeting, for the time being, the basic needs of the maintenance creditors and shall subsist as long as it is not modified by judgment." Thus renumbered by Article 2 of Law No. 7538 of August 22, 1995, which transferred it from former Article 155 to 168. Thus amended by Article 65 of Law No. 7654 of December 19, 1996, "Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias".

"Article 169.- The following owe maintenance: 1.- Spouses to each other. 2.- Fathers and mothers to their minor or incapacitated sons and daughters and the sons and/or daughters to their fathers and mothers, including those by fosterage (crianza). (Thus amended the foregoing subsection by Article 1 of Law No. 10166 of March 30, 2022, "Reforma varias leyes para el reconocimiento de derechos a madres y padres de crianza". 3.- Siblings to minor siblings or to those who have a disability that prevents them from fending for themselves; grandparents to minor grandchildren and to those who, due to a disability, cannot fend for themselves, when the more immediate relatives of the aforementioned maintenance creditor cannot provide them with maintenance or to the extent that they cannot do so; and grandchildren and great-grandchildren, to grandparents and great-grandparents under the same conditions indicated in this subsection." Thus amended by Article 3 of Law No. 7640 of October 14, 1996. Thus renumbered by Article 2 of Law No. 7538 of August 22, 1995, which transferred it from former Article 156 to 169.

"Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide maintenance: 1.- When the debtor cannot provide it without neglecting their own maintenance needs or without failing in the same maintenance obligation toward other persons who, with respect to them, have a preferential claim." "Article 23.- Provisional quota and cases in which restitution is appropriate. When a provisional quota is set for someone who is not the preferentially obligated party or it is decided in a judgment that the maintenance creditor is not entitled to maintenance, whoever paid the provisional quota, their representatives, or heirs may demand restitution of the amount paid. The sum for restitution shall constitute an enforceable instrument (título ejecutivo) and shall be determined through the incidental proceeding (vía incidental)." "Article 38.- Supplementary subsidy. If the preferentially obligated party is absent, presents a temporary incapacity, or a factual impossibility to fulfill the duty of providing maintenance to a minor or a pregnant woman, the State shall supplementarily provide them with maintenance by incorporating these families into processes of social promotion and human development, through inter-institutional programs in which, according to their particular situation, the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, the Ministerio de Salud, or any other entity necessary to guarantee comprehensive treatment for the family shall intervene, with the support of organized civil society networks established for this purpose. Pregnant women shall be entitled to the subsidy only during the prenatal and lactation period. /When maintenance is claimed in court and it is verified that any of these circumstances exist, the judge shall process the subsidy before the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social." As has already been set forth, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has already ruled on the preferential order in resolutions No. 5720-00, 14:58 of July 11, 2000; No. 6610-01, 15:59 of July 10, 2021; No. 1124-05, 11:14 of February 4, 2005; No. 10484-01, 15:50 of October 16, 2001; and No. 7923-02, 15:19 of August 20, 2002, among others.

Now then, from all that has been said, the undersigned concludes regarding the non-preferential nature of maintenance for adult sons and daughters the following:

a. The maintenance obligation with respect to adult sons and daughters, but under twenty-five years old, is not the same as the maintenance obligation with respect to minor daughters and sons, insofar as minors are preferential beneficiaries, as are adult sons and daughters with a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests. In this latter case, although subsection 3 of Article 169 of the Family Code employs the expression "that prevents them from fending for themselves," by application of the supra-constitutional regulations on disability—cited in this ruling—and the institutional policy on inclusive language, I am inclined not to use that expression contemplated in the law, considering it pejorative, given that every person has value in themselves and absolutely no one lacks dignity. For greater clarity, the Superior Council, in session No. 15-2012 of February 21, 2012, Article LIII, at the request of the Secretaría Técnica de Género, established as an institutional directive, "...the promotion and use of inclusive language in all written, oral, and digital communications of the Judicial Branch, as well as in the resolutions and writings of judicial offices (...)". This decision was disseminated through circular No. 39-2012 of March 8, 2012, and, pursuant to Article 122 of the General Law of Public Administration, is mandatory.

Continuing with what is provided in Article 169 subsection 3 of the Family Code, it is important to point out that not just any disability generates the situation that the norm contemplates and, therefore, disability(ies) with respect to adult sons/daughters and grandchildren is not necessarily a synonym for having a right to maintenance. Thus, each disability must be considered according to the specific case.

b. Children over the age of majority, but under twenty-five years old who do not have a disability that prevents them from attending to their own interests, are not preferential maintenance beneficiaries (personas beneficiarias alimentarias preferentes) because they are not included in article 169 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and, article 168 of that Code grants the list in article 169 a preferential order. Furthermore, the maintenance (pensión alimentaria) for children over the age of majority and under twenty-five years old who are studying is not regulated in article 169 of the Family Code but in article 173, subsection 5) of that Code. Thus, the children who are included in the cited article 169 are minor children, as well as children over the age of majority with a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests, and even minor grandchildren and those who, being over the age of majority, have a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests. That is, grandparents are not obligated to pay maintenance for grandchildren over the age of majority, but under twenty-five years old, who are pursuing studies.

Consequently, children over eighteen years old and under twenty-five years old are not preferential beneficiaries not only because it is so contemplated in the transcribed regulations but because, in accordance with the principle of equality, those who are not in equal conditions cannot be treated as equals. Thus, minors are not in a position to generate resources, and adults with a disability(ies) who cannot attend to their own interests are also not in a position to generate resources, in both cases to satisfy all their needs, whereas a person over eighteen years old and under twenty-five years old is in a position to work full-time or part-time to thereby generate resources and attend to their needs, as well as to contribute to obtaining a profession or trade and even to build an independent life project.

Regarding the difference between the maintenance obligation (obligación alimentaria) provided for in article 169, subsection 3) and article 173, subsection 5), both of the Family Code, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in resolution No. 4627-13, 14:30 of April 20, 2013, stated: “(...) from the study of the challenged norm, it is clearly inferred that contrary to what the claimant affirms, the norm does not establish equality between both groups, that is, between the legally incapacitated and students under twenty-five years old. In the first place, it should be clarified that family legislation, specifically, article 169 of the Family Code establishes a general rule, which consists of the obligation on parents to provide maintenance (alimentos) to their minor children or to the incapacitated. That obligation remains for as long as those conditions persist, without any special conditioning for this. That is, in the case of minors, the parent's obligation persists - in principle - until they reach the age of majority, and in the case of the incapacitated, the obligation persists regardless of age, as long as the condition of incapacitation remains. However, subsection 5) of article 173 of the Family Code establishes an exception to that general rule, which cannot be considered as equal treatment, since exceptionality does not intend to equate situations, but to provide exceptional or particular and normally transitory treatment, to situations that the legislator, as part of their legislative technique and discretionary power, considered relevant, in order to protect people who find themselves in certain circumstances or conditions of vulnerability or need. Secondly, there can be no talk of equal treatment when the requirements and conditions that the law demands in one case and another are different, because in the case of minors and the incapacitated, the legislation only requires proof of the filial bond and the payment capacity of the maintenance debtor (deudor alimentario), while students over the age of majority referred to in the challenged norm can only, exceptionally, demand maintenance (alimentos) from their parents, provided they meet certain conditions, namely, that they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, as long as they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load. These demands make the exception to the rule established by the norm a conditioned and temporary situation, so that maintenance creditors (acreedores alimentarios) over the age of majority who find themselves under these special conditions can meet their needs. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that the norm does not provide equal treatment for the two groups of people cited by the claimant, that is, the legal measure offered by the law is not the same for the incapacitated as for students over the age of majority and under twenty-five, reason for which this Chamber considers that the norm does not in any way violate the principle of equality. Consequently, the action is inadmissible with respect to this point.” It is worth noting that this vote was generated as a result of an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed against article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code. Furthermore, although the vote refers to persons with disabilities as “incapacitated”, it is important to make the effort not to use that pejorative expression, which is superseded by regulations of supra-constitutional rank.

Finally, the maintenance obligation provided for in article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code is so exceptional that, as already stated, it is not demandable from grandparents, nor from great-grandparents. However, grandparents could be obligated to pay maintenance for minor grandchildren or, for those over the age of majority - without age limit - if they are persons with a disability who cannot attend to their own interests. This is based on article 169, subsection 3 of the Family Code.

c. No maintenance beneficiary (persona beneficiaria de alimentos) is prohibited from working. On the contrary, work as a right is provided for in article 56 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). For better understanding, the cited article 56 states: “Work is a right of the individual and an obligation to society.

The State must ensure that everyone has honest and useful occupation, duly remunerated, and prevent conditions from being established that in any way undermine the freedom or dignity of the person or degrade their work to the condition of a simple commodity. The State guarantees the right to free choice of work." Therefore, in addition to the fact that the Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias and the Código de Familia do not prohibit a person receiving alimony (alimentos) from working, no interpretation to that effect could be made, because it would be contrary to Article 56 of the Constitución Política and, as will be explained, there is rather a rule that makes it clear that any person receiving alimony can work and, also, what impact that has on the issue of alimony is regulated.

In that sense, note that, according to Article 166 of the Código de Familia, "alimony is only owed to the extent that the property and work of the recipient (alimentario) do not satisfy it." This means that, if a person who works decides to claim alimony, they could aspire to an alimony pension (pensión alimentaria) if the property they own or possess, or the work they perform, does not generate sufficient income, and it is then their responsibility to demonstrate that. That is, they have the burden of proving not only what their needs are, but what their resources are and why they are not sufficient to meet such needs. This also includes the obligation to prove what prevents them from working full or part-time: disability, illness, the social function of caregiving (función social de cuido), etc.

Regarding this last topic, that is, the social function of caregiving, for the purposes of Article 35 of the Código de Familia — amended by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Supplement (Alcance) No. 280 —, as well as by application of clauses 5.a, 13.a, and 14.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and, also by application of Law No. 9325 — Ley de Contabilización del Aporte del Trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica —, it must be understood that the mother, as part of her contribution to the support of each minor child, usually provides caregiving with everything that entails. In certain cases, it is possible that in addition to such contribution, the mother can contribute money to the household economy, but, in any case, domestic work and the care of minors in each specific case, as well as of dependent persons in general, cannot be disregarded as a contribution. Disregarding it, for example, in the case of minor sons and daughters, would imply generating and consolidating overburdened motherhoods, as well as rendering the social function of caregiving invisible. In this regard, I refer to the resolution of the UN Human Rights Council on "Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development," of October 10, 2023, resolution A/HRC/54/L.6/Rev.1, available at https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/54/L.6/Rev.1 That resolution, among other things, states: "1. Recognizes the importance of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of paid and unpaid caregivers and of persons receiving care and support; 2. Expresses deep concern about the unequal organization and distribution of care and support work, and about the impact this has on the rights of all women and girls in society and in the economy. 3. Recognizes that, to achieve gender equality, it is essential to equitably distribute care and support work and the time dedicated to said work; 4.

Urges States to: a) Implement all necessary measures to recognize care work and redistribute it among individuals, as well as among families, communities, the private sector, and States, in such a way as to promote gender equality and the enjoyment of human rights by all persons; b) Increase investment in care and support policies and infrastructure in order to guarantee universal access to affordable and quality services for all persons, including childcare services and health and support services for persons with disabilities and older persons, and to guarantee universal access to parental, maternity, and paternity leave and to social protection for all workers, both informal sector workers and those working in atypical forms of employment; c) Foster and support research and studies aimed at producing data disaggregated by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, marital status, disability, geographic location and other relevant characteristics in the national context, as well as statistics on the scope and distribution of care work and the time devoted to it, as well as on the persons who provide such care and those who receive it, through periodic time-use surveys and the establishment of satellite accounts to evaluate the contribution of this work to national income and to quantify unpaid care work, in order to include them in the gross national product for the purposes of designing, financing, and evaluating policies in this area; d) Adopt all necessary measures to enable the full, equal, genuine, and inclusive participation of women, persons with disabilities, and older persons, as well as children, in decision-making regarding care and support, both in private and public life, including social dialogue and collective bargaining by paid care workers; e) Raise awareness about the negative impacts that stereotypes related to gender, disability, and age have when providing and receiving care and support, and establish programs and policies to eliminate those stereotypes." It is for all of the foregoing that it is not possible to disregard the contribution made by the mother to her solidary maintenance duty through care, since even according to Law No. 9325 -Ley de contabilización del aporte del trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica- there exists the "care economy (economía de cuidado)" and, it refers to the "unpaid work performed in the home, related to the maintenance of the dwelling, the care of other persons in the household or the community, and the maintenance of the paid workforce." That law warns that this category of work is of fundamental economic importance in a society. For better understanding, this normative instrument indicates in article 3 that "the following, among others, are considered unpaid domestic and care work (trabajo doméstico y de cuidado no remunerado) activities: a) The organization, distribution, and supervision of domestic tasks. b) The preparation of food. c) The cleaning and maintenance of the dwelling and household goods. d) The cleaning and maintenance of clothing. e) The care, upbringing, and instruction of children (transportation to school and help with school tasks). f) The care of older adults and sick persons. g) Making purchases, payments, or carrying out errands related to the household. h) The cleaning and maintenance of goods for family use. i) Services to the community and unpaid help to other households of relatives, friends, and neighbors. This classification does not exclude other activities that may be incorporated in due course." As a complement, it is important to point out that it cannot be ignored that there are needs that are presumed according to articles 414 through 417 of the Código Procesal Civil Ley No. 7130. That is, it is presumed that a person requires consumption of potable water, electrical energy, food, transportation, clothing, etc. Logically, anything outside the ordinary would require proof, even more so if a particular standard of living is sought to be protected. For greater clarity, said norms of the Código Procesal Civil Ley No. 7130 state: "Article 414. Legal presumption (Presunción legal). Every legal presumption exempts the party that alleges it from the obligation to prove the fact deemed true by virtue of such presumption. However, whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts on which it is based. Article 415. Absolute presumption (Presunción absoluta). Those shall be considered absolute presumptions by virtue of which the law annuls certain acts, or grants a peremptory exception, if in those hypotheses the law has not expressly reserved proof to the contrary. However, no matter how absolute a legal presumption is, it does not oppose the effectiveness of the confession of the contrary fact, provided that the presumptions are exclusively established for a private interest, and that the confession is admissible in the matter of the litigation. Article 416. Relative presumption (Presunción relativa). Outside of absolute presumptions, the others may be contested by proof to the contrary, for which all legal means are admissible, except as established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of complying with them. Article 417. Human presumption (Presunción humana). Human presumptions only constitute proof if they are the direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. The proof of presumptions must be serious and consistent with the other evidence provided in the process." Furthermore, according to article 166 Family and 173 subsection 2), both of the Código de Familia, if the person claiming maintenance ceased to need them or, indeed, does not need them, the termination of the maintenance obligation or, respectively, the granting of the claim is appropriate. So, it is a myth to affirm that a person receiving maintenance cannot work, and it is also a myth to believe that if the person receiving maintenance works, this never impacts the maintenance amount and even the right to receive maintenance. For greater clarity, Alda Facio Montejo proposes a conception of the legal phenomenon not based solely on the formal component.

It specifically proposes a tripartite conception of the legal phenomenon, which entails the constant and deep interaction between the formal-normative or substantive component, the structural component, and the political-cultural component. The first component comprises the formally created norm in a broad sense, that is, not only as a synonym for law. The second refers to the content, scope, and interpretation that authorities *-in a broad sense-* give to the formal component. Thus, identifying the structural component implies making visible the set of *“unwritten norms”* that are rigorously followed by authorities and citizens. Finally, the political-cultural component refers to the dimension and understanding granted to the formal component through common knowledge -empirical- of normative provisions, customs, traditions, legal doctrine, the use people make of the law, etc. All of this also forms a set of *“unwritten norms”* that are obeyed and reinforced by the community. (Facio Montejo, Alda. (1999). Cuando el género suena cambios trae. Metodología para el análisis de género del fenómeno legal. Tercera Edición. San José, Costa Rica. ILANUD. The digital version can be consulted at http://fundacionjyg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Cuando-elg%C3%A9nero-suena-cambios-trae.pdf) The author states that these three components remain in constant interaction since those who create the laws, apply them, or rather, interpret them, are part of a specific society at a specific historical moment; hence, the content, scope, projection, and interpretation of the formal component reflects the set of prevailing considerations in a specific society and situation. Thus, they highlight the overvaluation of the masculine, the undervaluation of the feminine, of disability, of aging, of childhood, of foreignness, etc.

Thus, to affirm that a person beneficiary of child support is prohibited from working is a myth, and so is believing that if they work, this never affects the support amount or even the right to receive support, that is, that they can capitalize the product of their work or even their income and, at the same time, receive a support pension.

d. Sons and daughters over eighteen years of age and under twenty-five years of age who seek support and to remain as support beneficiaries must remain within the assumptions indicated by article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). That is, it is not enough to momentarily or superficially place oneself in the assumption contemplated by the norm to have the right to support; rather, it is indispensable to remain in those assumptions, as the support obligation regarding said population is conditional. In other words, it subsists if the person fulfills what the norm states. In judicial practice, it is common to observe that resolutions imposing support pensions *-provisional or not-* in favor of sons and daughters of legal age but under twenty-five years of age who are studying, do not contemplate what the obligations are that the beneficiary persons must fulfill. That is, they are resolutions that always warn the obligated person what will happen if they fail to comply with what is provided in a specific resolution, but they do not warn the beneficiary persons what they are obligated to. This is not a minor issue, since as parental responsibility ceases upon reaching the age of majority according to article 158, subsection a) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), it is clear that no person obligated to pay support can obtain, regarding the adult support beneficiary person, information about the academic load and the results obtained at the end of the respective school term as defined in a specific study plan. For greater clarity, such information has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) as private information. In this regard, resolution No. 592-13, 9:05 of January 18, 2013, reiterated in judgment No. 2135-17, 9:30 of February 10, 2017, and No. 3159-2017, 9:30 of February 28, 2017, may be consulted.

Therefore, as a consequence of the cessation of parental responsibility, the burden of proving compliance with the requirements when filing the claim and during the execution of the support obligation, whether established since minority or subsequently, corresponds to the beneficiary person, precisely because they are an adult person. Now then, in those cases where obtaining the certification of grades and enrollment represents an economic burden of impossible or difficult fulfillment for the beneficiary person, what is appropriate is that, before the end of the school term according to the study plan or else, immediately after it ends, the beneficiary person request the respective court to issue an official letter where the judicial authority requests the pertinent information from the educational center, with the indication that such a request is protected by the principle of gratuity inherent to support matters and also responds to a judicial order. Furthermore, it will be the responsibility of the party beneficiary of support to process the official letter and prove the respective processing, since the evidentiary burden corresponds to that party and not to the defendant party. Logically, it is up to the judicial authority to issue the official letter immediately and to send any reminder, as well as to inform the parties of the information provided by the educational center. It goes without saying that the request to the educational center must be clear about the need and urgency of the information, as well as that it is necessary to know what subjects were taken and the result of each one -passed or not, withdrawn with or without justification, frozen or not-, as well as the grades obtained, the study plan of the degree program being pursued, the schedule taken, and the enrollment currently in progress. Furthermore, if it is an educational center that requires an investment to enroll, it must indicate the cost of the current enrollment or if the beneficiary person has any type of scholarship, as well as any other information that the judicial authority deems pertinent according to the specific case.

</p> <p style="margin-top: 7.9pt; margin-bottom: 7.9pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 14pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">Since the maintenance obligation (obligación alimentaria) regarding persons over eighteen and under twenty-five years of age is a conditional obligation insofar as the support beneficiary (persona beneficiaria de alimentos) must remain within the circumstances contemplated in Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), if the beneficiary does not provide information about the academic load they have taken and are taking, as well as the results obtained, or does not request that the court issue the corresponding official letter, or, if issued, does not demonstrate that it has been processed, it will be up to the judicial authority to order the provision of the information within a peremptory deadline to be defined in each specific case, regarding what is indicated in Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), under warning (apercibimiento) that, at the request of the party obligated to pay support, the suspension of the execution of the maintenance obligation (obligación alimentaria) may be ordered with grounds, and furthermore, no corporal coercion (apremio corporal) will be imposed while the ordered requirement is not fulfilled. All this because the burden of proving that they remain within the circumstances contemplated by the norm corresponds to the support beneficiary (persona beneficiaria de alimentos) and, not remaining within the circumstances contemplated by the cited norm constitutes a breach of the condition imposed by the regulations. If this verification of requirements is not carried out, the previously mentioned consequences could arise: procedural fraud (estafa procesal), attempted procedural fraud (tentativa de estafa procesal), unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa), etc., and even worse could occur: that the beneficiary is no longer pursuing studies. </span></p> <p style="margin-top: 7.9pt; margin-bottom: 7.9pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 14pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">Thus, it must be very clear that whoever engages in abusive exercise of rights (ejercicio abusivo del derecho) in accordance with Articles 19 and following of the Civil Code (Código Civil), whether to sue for support or to execute the maintenance obligation (obligación alimentaria), and thereby generates a judicial resolution or prevents a judicial resolution, and this, as a result, causes asset displacements in their favor without meeting the requirements that the norm demands, could face a criminal case for procedural fraud (estafa procesal) or attempted procedural fraud (tentativa de estafa procesal). For greater clarity, the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has stated: <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“Regarding procedural fraud (estafa procesal), it is useful to mention what doctrine has written about this criminal type: <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“there are common cases of triangular frauds; in these cases, the deceived party and the injured party are different. The most complicated case of this triangular fraud is the so-called procedural fraud (estafa procesal). Characteristic of procedural fraud (estafa procesal) is that the deceived judge issues a resolution by which they carry out a dispositive act harmful to one of the procedural parties or to a third party. Procedural fraud (estafa procesal) consists of a deceptive action carried out by the agent with the purpose of obtaining an unlawful patrimonial benefit for themselves or for a third party in the course of a proceeding. By means of this deceptive action, they induce an error in the judge hearing the case or maintain them in it, and as a consequence of that error, the judge issues a resolution that does not correspond to the real factual situation, a resolution that causes damage to the sponsorship of a procedural party or a third party</span>”. (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, FRANCISCO. El delito de Estafa. Editorial Juritexto. San José. Costa Rica. 2001. p. 178). For the crime of Procedural Fraud (Estafa Procesal) to be configured, the existence of a patrimonial injury to a party that is part of the proceeding or to a third party must be verified.”</span> Resolution No. 1164-14, 10:08 of July 4, 2014.</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 7.9pt; margin-bottom: 7.9pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 14pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">Said Chamber, in Resolution No. 313-14, 8:52 of March 7, 2014, stated: <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“Precisely, regarding the existence of the criminal type of interest, in addition to adhering to what was stated above, it must be understood that it was born into legal life and led to harming the victims, with the particularity of what is doctrinally called: <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“procedural”</span> fraud (estafa <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“procesal”</span>) or <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“triangular”</span> fraud (estafa <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“triangular”</span>). This type of crime has been known mostly through this example: <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“…presupposes deception of the judge, who, due to the error produced by the deception, through an erroneous decision, carries out a harmful dispositive act on the other party's patrimony…”</span> (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, FRANCISCO. El delito de estafa. Editorial Juritexto. San José, Costa Rica. Year 2001. p. 126). This type of fraud fulfills all the elements of common fraud but is characterized by the participation of three subjects: i) the active one, in charge of deceiving; ii) the deceived passive one who carries out the dispositive act by mistake; and, iii) the injured party.”</span></span></p> <p style="margin-top: 7.9pt; margin-bottom: 7.9pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 14pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">Furthermore, in Judgment No. 1206-04, 9:35 of October 22, 2004, said Chamber indicated: <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“(…) Article 24 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) insofar as it is relevant, states: <span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">“There is an attempt (tentativa) when the execution of a crime is initiated, through acts directly aimed at its consummation, and the consummation does not occur due to causes independent of the agent. The penalty corresponding to the attempt (tentativa) shall not be applied when the consummation of the crime was absolutely impossible.”</span> As can be seen, the criminal type punishes as an attempt (tentativa) the initiation of the execution of the crime, carried out through acts directly aimed at its consummation. In this way, unpunished preparatory acts are separated from the acts of execution of the crime, which are punishable as an attempt (tentativa). In Costa Rica, said separation is made based on the individual-objective theory.”</span></span></p> According to this theory, two extremes must be taken into account: First, the plan of the active subject and second, whether, pursuant to that plan, the action represents a close danger to the legal right. For this theory, the beginning of the execution is not necessarily a part of the typical action: "(...) the beginning of the execution of the crime is not strictly the beginning of the execution of the action objectively indicated by the typical verb, but also encompasses acts that, according to the perpetrator's plan (the concrete mode of carrying out the typical action chosen by the perpetrator), are immediately prior to the beginning of the execution of the typical action and objectively represent a danger to the legal right, it being understood that a partial act will be immediately preceding the execution of the typical action when there is no other partial act in the perpetrator's concrete plan between it and that action." (ZAFFARONI, Eugenio Raúl. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Buenos Aires: EDIAR, second edition, 2002, p. 829). As can be extracted from this text, unpunishable preparatory acts are those that, although directed toward the execution of the criminal type, do not do so in a direct and immediate manner and, consequently, are not a serious threat to the protected legal right (unless legislation expressly considers them punishable, turning them into an independent crime). Likewise, acts directly aimed at the consummation of the crime—among which is included the action that immediately precedes the beginning of the typical action, temporally and spatially—and that allow the active subject, according to their plan, the step without essential interruptions to the beginning of that action, are punishable as an attempt. Based on the foregoing, this Court considers that, contrary to what the defense asserts without any basis, the accused began the execution of the crime with the filing before the court of the executory complaint and the promissory notes, knowing that the obligations that were guaranteed with them did not exist, indicating to the Judge that the defendant company owed him the sum mentioned in said negotiable instruments. Through this scheme, (...) he intended for the Judge to issue a resolution that would provide him an undue benefit and that, in turn, entailed a diminution in the assets of the defendant company. In summary, with the mere filing of the executory complaint and the negotiable instruments, the accused began the execution of the procedural fraud, a conclusion derived from the plan he pursued, as well as from the threat to the legal right that his actions implied at that moment. (...) As observed, in the case of procedural fraud, the crime begins its execution with the filing of the complaint and the evidence, elements that together make up the deceptive scheme directed at the Judge. (...) For us to understand the aforementioned, first we must refer to the issue of formal and material consummation in fraud. Formal consummation occurs when the pecuniary damage is caused, while material consummation occurs when the active subject obtains the unlawful pecuniary benefit they pursued, a purpose that transcends the criminal type. This Chamber has previously stated that, for criminal purposes, formal consummation is sufficient: "The requirement of subsequent purposes allows, in some crimes that expressly contemplate it, for example fraud, simulation fraud, or extortion, all crimes that affect property as a whole, to distinguish between two moments of consummation: the formal, which occurs with the causing of the pecuniary damage, and the material consummation, which occurs when the agent obtains the desired purpose, specifically the unlawful pecuniary benefit, whether for himself or for a third party. However, formal consummation is sufficient for the crime to be considered consummated, for the corresponding criminal purposes, with material consummation possibly occurring or not (...)." Resolution No. 420-F-95 of 10:00 a.m. on July 21, 1995. In this same sense, Carlos Fontán Balestra indicates: "Fraud is consummated at the moment the pecuniary damage takes place. Advancing that moment to the time of carrying out the scheme supposes taking as acts of consummation those that only constitute an attempt. Taking consummation to the moment when the benefit is obtained is to demand the concurrence of an element not required in the type, given that in Argentine law the pecuniary advantage is only a purpose that must accompany the action." FONTÁN BALESTRA (Carlos). Derecho Penal. Parte Especial. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 15th edition, 1998, p. 483. All these considerations, made in relation to pure and simple fraud, are also applicable to procedural fraud.

From that point on, it was enough for the Judge to issue resolutions that harm the victim's property for the act to be considered consummated, even if they are interlocutory measures that do not end the proceeding. The resolution ordering execution (despacha ejecución) and decreeing seizure (embargo) is undoubtedly one of them. Although the proceeding has not been definitively concluded and, consequently, the active subject of the crime has not obtained the unlawful patrimonial benefit, there is already a formal consummation of the crime, since as a consequence of the deceitful maneuver, the jurisdictional body issued resolutions that harm another's property." Similarly, this Court, in judgment No. 1219-05, 9:15 of October 26, 2005, held: "(...) For a better understanding, it is necessary to make some brief considerations about the crime of fraud (estafa), contained in Article 216 of the Penal Code. The current structure of this criminal type contains forms of fraud different from the traditional definition established before the 1988 reform, such as the so-called 'triangular fraud (estafa triangular)'. In this type of fraud, the triangular structure arises between the active subject, the passive subject, and the injured party. Thus, the perpetrator induces the passive subject, who has dispositive power over the victim's property, into an error, and thereby manages to cause a patrimonial injury, thereby obtaining an unlawful benefit. The most illustrative example is the so-called procedural fraud (estafa procesal), which – in a strict sense – 'presupposes a deception of the judge, who, due to the error produced by the deception, through an erroneous decision, carries out a harmful dispositive act on the other party's property.' (Castillo González, Francisco. El delito de estafa. Editorial Juritexto, San José Costa Rica, Year 2001, p. 126). The core point of fraud is the simulation of false facts or the deformation or concealment of true facts, which implies in turn that the trick or error can be produced by action or by omission, all with the purpose of obtaining an unlawful patrimonial benefit. This last element is not necessary for material consummation, because the crime is formally consummated when there has been injury to another's property; this is so because fraud is a crime of shortened result, in which a distinction is made between formal consummation (when the patrimonial injury occurs) and material consummation or the exhaustion phase of the illicit act (when the unlawful patrimonial benefit is achieved). In general, both in the classic modality of fraud and in triangular fraud, it is necessarily required that the subject induced into error is the one who performs the dispositive act (to his own detriment or to the detriment of a third party). Thus, 'the patrimonial injury must be the result of an act of disposition by the deceived subject – who is not, necessarily, the injured party. It is not a matter here of stealing, nor of appropriating, but of provoking the 'collaboration of the passive subject,' in such a way that the latter makes a patrimonial disposition to the detriment of himself or a third party.' (Valle Muñiz, José Manuel. El delito de Estafa. Bosch, Casa Editorial, Barcelona, 1988, p. 187). Author Francisco Castillo González opines in this same sense, indicating that 'The crime of fraud requires identity between the one deceived and the one who performs the dispositive act, but does not presuppose identity between the one who performs the dispositive act and the injured party.' (Castillo González, Francisco. op. cit. p.168). In summary, the error must motivate the harmful patrimonial disposition, and in cases of 'triangular frauds,' the one who performs the dispositive act must have a special power of disposition over the property on which the injury will fall, which is to say that 'the criminally relevant act of disposition should be understood, then, generically, as that behavior, active or omissive, of the subject induced into error that will directly lead to the production of patrimonial damage to himself or a third party. It is the causal nexus between the deception and the injury, which without said disposition could not be attributed to the deceitful conduct, at least under the title of fraud.' (Valle Muñiz, José Manuel. Op. cit. p. 214)." In other words, if the person benefiting from child support has not undertaken to remain within the conditions required by Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, that is, does not conduct themselves with the responsibility that pursuing a university degree or studying for a trade entails, receiving a child support pension (pensión alimentaria) for it and, furthermore, does not diligently fulfill their procedural burdens from funds paid by the party who owes child support, and has merely placed themselves momentarily or even superficially within the assumption contemplated in the norm, it is a very delicate matter that, depending on the specific case, could constitute an abusive exercise of rights and a procedural fraud or an attempted procedural fraud even, or unjust enrichment.

See for example that, in a case before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) where the imposition of payment of expenses for the start of the school year for the benefit of a person under the provision of article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) was discussed, that Court stated: “(…) the Chamber considers that with respect to the granting of the alimony (pensión alimentaria) claimed, the appealed alimony court committed a serious error in the processing of the summary proceeding that cannot be overlooked, since when the alimony creditor reached the age of majority, the proper course of action -according to the applicable legal regulations- was to appear in the process and provide information on the course load and academic performance, just as she did when she requested the school stipend in 2019; however, when the alimony obligor requests that updated information each time a writ of body attachment (apremio corporal) is required for that item, the beneficiary is obliged to present said evidence. Despite the above, the appealed jurisdictional authority did not proceed to require that evidence as it should have, through a preventive order (prevención), but instead imposed the payment of the benefit on the person under its protection, indicating that if he wished, he could file a process of exclusion (exclusión) of the alimony beneficiary. However, the petitioner here did not seek that exclusion, provided the beneficiary's course load and performance were previously accredited.” Judgment No. 9319-23, 9:15 a.m. of April 25, 2023. That is, as ordered by the Constitutional Chamber, the beneficiary person must demonstrate their continued presence in the factual circumstances contemplated by the cited rule and not disregard that obligation. It is not enough to have demonstrated it once, either at the beginning of a new process or when appearing as an adult in the alimony process that existed while a minor, but rather, they must demonstrate that they remain in the factual circumstances contemplated by the rule if they intend to receive alimony and even request body attachments in case of non-compliance. Logically, it is not a matter of presenting a certification of grades and enrollment with each attachment requested, but rather, providing the certification of grades and enrollment, each time an academic period ends, which also entails demonstrating the completed enrollment, where not only the number of courses taken can be observed but also the schedules.

Now, as the Constitutional Chamber pointed out in the previous vote - No. 9319-23-, in judicial practice it is common that, even though the alimony obligation provided for in the cited article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code is an evidently conditional alimony obligation, it is usual that some courts of first instance do not generate a supervision mechanism for compliance with the permanence in the circumstances contemplated by the rule and, on the contrary, it has become a custom that in the rulings that set provisional alimony or in a judgment, procedural burdens are not established for the person receiving alimony, as if the alimony obligation in question were the same as the alimony obligation towards a minor, for example. In a better view, this neglect in establishing the burdens that a beneficiary person must comply with by application of article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code has generated abuse of right by some beneficiary persons and has placed debtor persons in a situation of uncertainty. Furthermore, it has forced the latter to promote processes of exclusion precisely because they do not know if the beneficiary person complies or not with what the cited rule requires. In this way, the generation of an impartial, practical, expeditious mechanism based on existing procedural and substantive norms, as well as on binding constitutional jurisprudence, for the purpose of supervising compliance with the condition that this type of alimony obligation entails and also, to guarantee the pro homine principle for both parties to the obligation, as well as to guarantee the pro libertatis principle to the alimony debtor, will favor the de-confrontation (descontención) between the parties, the decongestion of the first instance, and with it, the prudent consumption of public funds dedicated to the administration of justice, as well as, will avoid the abuse of right in a double way.

For greater clarity, in the first case, it will favor de-confrontation because adult sons and daughters will not be subjected to possible harassment, mortification, and extrajudicial pressure by the persons obliged to pay alimony, demanding information about their academic progress, while everything will be done within the judicial process. In the second case, decongestion is produced, because judicial offices will not have to process alimony proceedings in which the obligor files exclusion processes based on information they do not have or suppose.

In practice, it is frequently observed that obligors file exclusion processes stating that the beneficiary person does not study, does not fulfill an academic load, or does not have good performance, because in reality they know nothing about the compliance or non-compliance with the conditions that the beneficiary party must prove, and that lack of knowledge stems from the age of majority of the beneficiary person or from the deficient or absent communication between the parties. Consequently, it is possible that this mechanism that makes procedural burdens visible will avoid the processing of unnecessary alimony proceedings that only generate expectations in the parties, cause tension, and foster unnecessary judicial confrontations, in addition to saturating the schedules of judicial offices.

This mechanism that makes procedural burdens visible will also benefit the public service provided by the Public Defense (Defensa Pública), insofar as it would have no reason to intervene in processes that nowadays are basically caused by uncertainty regarding the permanence in the fulfillment of the requirements established by said rule. Additionally, it is possible that this supervision mechanism will also decrease the filing of Habeas Corpus remedies by the persons obliged to pay alimony.

In this line, this mechanism will also prevent the abusive exercise of the right by the maintenance beneficiary and the obligor, as the rules of compliance with the obligation for each party will be clear.

Additionally, within this framework of preventing the abusive exercise of a right, the issue of contempt of court (apremio corporal) is also found, as it is contrary to the pro-liberty principle that a person obligated to pay maintenance may be subjected to contempt of court without knowing if, at the end of each academic period, the beneficiary party is complying with the provisions of Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), as if the norm allowed the beneficiary to disregard demonstrating that they remain in the situations contemplated by the norm.

Lastly and no less importantly, making the clear compliance rules visible for both parties could somehow prevent beneficiaries from abandoning their studies, making little progress in the study plan, or constantly changing programs, since such behavior could evidently cause them to lose the right to maintenance. Thus, when a maintenance beneficiary is not obliged to demonstrate that they remain in the situations contemplated by the norm, they could easily disregard studying.

f. In those cases where the information on compliance with requirements is not incorporated into the case file (expediente) for a reason attributable to the maintenance beneficiary, or the information obtained reveals that they do not remain in the situations established by Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), the party obligated to pay maintenance may request that the execution of the obligation be suspended and must indicate the basis for such a request. In this sense, if there was a prior warning (advertencia previa) to the beneficiary party regarding all the above, that is, regarding the procedural burdens they must fulfill, the request must be resolved without further procedure by means of a reasoned pronouncement on the requested measure, indicating whether it is granted or not and why. This implies analyzing the circumstances of each specific case that appear in the case file (expediente), as it is not possible to generalize. Furthermore, if the debtor party is not obligated to pay maintenance due to the issuance of a firm interim measure (medida cautelar) ordering the suspension of the obligation, the travel ban (impedimento de salida del país) must be lifted. Therefore, it must also be very clear to the beneficiary party what would happen if they do not fulfill their corresponding procedural burden.

Now, if no warning (prevención) has been made to the beneficiary party regarding the burdens they must fulfill, a hearing must be granted on the request for an interim measure (medida cautelar) formulated by the beneficiary party for a reasonable period, and it must be notified at the means indicated for this purpose, which entails that every maintenance beneficiary must be warned to maintain an active means for receiving notifications, under the warning (apercibimiento) that automatic notification will operate in case of non-compliance, and this same warning (prevención) must apply to every person obligated to pay maintenance. That is, it is a procedural burden that each party must fulfill. All of this, especially since constitutional jurisprudence has ruled on the possibility of using a means indicated in the case file (expediente) according to the circumstances that have been analyzed, for example, in constitutional resolutions (resoluciones constitucionales) No. 12407-21, 8:30 of May 28, 2021; No. 25582-21, 9:15 of November 12, 2021; No. 3077-22, 9:15 of February 9, 2023; No. 13002-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 19495-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 19498-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 2210-23, 9:40 of January 31, 2023; No. 9966-23, 9:15 of April 28, 2023, and No. 11037-23, 9:20 of May 12, 2023. That is, constitutional jurisprudence has considered it possible, in certain circumstances, to dispense with personal notification or notification by ID card at the home address. Of course, this must be analyzed with great care because such votes refer to processes for modification of judgment (modificación de fallo) and those are: exclusions, exonerations, reductions, and increases. That is, it does not refer to the so-called "inclusion" processes, because in those it is clear that a person is not being included in an already current amount; consequently, it is a new process that implies for the obligated party new procedural burdens and, especially, a new warning (apercibimiento) of contempt of court (apremio corporal) in case of non-compliance. In addition to this, it is essential to know if the of-age beneficiary party — an adult son or daughter, for example — has already received legal advice from the public defender's office (defensa pública), since in that case it is usual for that office to provide legal assistance until the issuance of the second-instance judgment.

Now, returning to the issue of the interim measure (medida cautelar), in both cases — denying or granting the interim measure (medida cautelar) to suspend the maintenance obligation — as indicated, the resolution must be reasoned, and, as it produces its own effects, it is appealable. As a complement, if the judicial authority decides to grant the interim measure (medida cautelar), logically it cannot have an indefinite duration without a formal exclusion process having been filed, because an interim measure (medida cautelar) cannot have an indefinite effect. In this line, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has been very clear, having stated: "IV.- The Chamber considers that despite the fact that the Family Code (Código de Familia), in its Article 173, subsection 5, provides that there is no obligation to provide maintenance when the beneficiaries have reached the age of majority, the same norm establishes that the rule is not absolute, since if the children are studying, the duty is not interrupted. Nor is it applied automatically, as it indicates that the concurrence of the exonerating grounds for the maintenance obligation, in general, must be demonstrated before the competent judicial authority. In this case, the plaintiff has not yet been released from his maintenance obligation, since there was opposition to the exclusion of the beneficiary and the petition filed for this purpose has not yet been decided, with a hearing set for May 12, 2011, for conciliation and, should this fail, the receiving of evidence. In this way, the incomplete payment of the monthly quota for March gave sufficient grounds for the issuance of the order." Judgment No. 4442-11, 14:40 of April 5, 2011; No. 1223-15, 9:05 of January 28, 2015; No. 19969-15, 9:30 of December 30, 2015, and No. 3442-19, 10:40 of February 26, 2019.

Furthermore, in a similar vein, resolutions no. 2439-1995, 15:03 of May 16, 1995, no. 6123-2009, 16:11 of April 22, 2009, no. 47-2006, 9:46 of January 6, 2006; no. 2230-05, 14:32 of March 2, 2005; 10643-2014, 14:30 of July 1, 2014; no. 2426-2020, 09:30 hours of February 7, 2020; no. 16457-2020, 9:20 of August 28, 2020; no. 9478-12, 14:30 of July 18, 2012; no. 18821-15, 14;30 of December 1, 2015.

Thus, upon granting the precautionary measure (medida cautelar), the judicial authority must warn the debtor that they must mandatorily file the exclusion claim within a non-extendable period of one month, under warning that the ordered measure will cease to have effect, which implies that they must comply with the support obligation under warning of civil arrest (apremio corporal) if applicable, or by reactivating the withholding, if that is the form of compliance being executed. This mandatory warning is based on the provisions of Articles 241 to 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), Law no. 7130, which state: "Article 241.- Timing. The precautionary procedure may be initiated before or during the course of the main proceeding, of which it will always form a part. Article 242.- Powers of the judge. In addition to the specific precautionary procedures, the judge may determine the precautionary measures deemed appropriate, when there is a well-founded fear that one party, before the judgment, may cause a serious and difficult-to-repair injury to the other party's right. To avoid the damage, the judge may authorize or prohibit the performance of certain acts, order the deposit of assets, or impose the granting of a bond. Article 243.- Duty to file the claim. The party must file its claim within a period of one month counted from the date on which the precautionary measure was executed, when it was granted in a preliminary proceeding. Article 244.- Cessation of effects. The effectiveness of the precautionary measure shall cease: 1) If the party does not file the claim within the period established in the previous article. 2) If it is unjustifiably not executed within that same period. The effectiveness of the measure having ceased, it shall be prohibited for the party to repeat the action, except on new grounds." At this point, it is worth noting that regarding precautionary measures, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: "According to the most qualified doctrine, interim or precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) arise in the process as a necessity to guarantee effective jurisdictional protection and can therefore be conceptualized as 'a set of procedural powers of the judge—whether judicial or administrative—to resolve before the final ruling, with the specific purpose of preserving the real conditions indispensable for the issuance and execution of the final act.' The doctrine understands that instrumentality and provisionality are two fundamental characteristics of precautionary measures and that their main configurative elements require that they must be: a) lawful and legally possible; b) provisional, since they are extinguished upon the issuance of the final act; c) well-founded, that is, having a real factual basis in relation to the particular case; d) modifiable, in the sense that they can be increased or decreased to adapt them to new needs; e) accessory, since they are justified within a main proceeding; f) preventive in nature, as their purpose is to avoid inconveniences to the interests and rights represented in the main proceeding; g) of securing effects, by seeking to maintain a state of fact or law during the development of the proceeding, preventing situations that could harm the effectiveness of the judgment or final act; h) homogeneous and not responding to characteristics of identity with respect to the substantive right protected, so that they are effective preventive measures and not anticipated acts of execution." Judgment no. 7190-1994, 13:24 of December 6, 1994. Furthermore, the judgments issued by that Constitutional Court can be consulted: no. 5407-94, 15:54 of July 18, 1995, no. 6786-94, 15:27 hours of November 22, 1994, no. 3929-95, 15:24 hours of July 18, 1995, and no. 6337-02, 14:40 of June 26, 2002, among others.

In addition to this, as precautionary measures remain in effect as long as the factual circumstances that gave rise to them persist, it is clear that upon the express and well-founded request of the creditor, if the factual basis that gave rise to the precautionary measure has changed, the reactivation of the support obligation may be ordered by a well-founded resolution, and in that case, the forms of execution will resume: civil arrest, withholding, impediment to leave the country, etc. However, it also falls to the judicial authority to define what will happen with the support payments made by the party obligated to pay support while the beneficiary did not meet the requirements established in Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), since omitting a ruling on such an extreme could generate unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa). Note that it is not a matter of restitution of support payments but of unjust enrichment. In this regard, it is timely to point out that the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment no. 574, 9:30 of July 14, 2004, stated: "(...) Thus, the Chamber deems the application of Articles 1,043 and 1,044 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which make up Chapter V, 'Of Quasi-Contracts (cuasicontratos)', of Title I (Contracts and Quasi-Contracts), of Book IV of that normative body, to be appropriate." The first cited norm establishes: "Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties." The cited numeral 1,044 indicates: "To this class of obligations belong, among others, the management of another's affairs (gestión de negocios), the administration of a thing in common, voluntary guardianship, and undue payment." (The bold and underline are by the drafter). As can be seen, this last norm does not exclude the application of other legal figures, considered as quasi-contracts. Doctrine, for its part, includes unjust enrichment within this scope. Regarding this theory, Messineo explains the following: "Another case of legal obligation is constituted by unjust enrichment ... Included in the figure of unjust enrichment are ... cases in which someone converts another's property for their own benefit, or benefits from another's activity (the so-called versión útil or in rem versio) to the detriment of another, without there being a reason that justifies the gain or benefit: in other words, without there being an already constituted legal relationship that serves as the cause legitimizing the gain, or benefit, of the enriched party... / In said formula, ... also enter cases of enrichment without the will of the other person (the impoverished party); the lack of will of the impoverished party resolves itself into a figure of lack of cause. / The action for unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) tends to re-establish the balance between the two estates, that is, to eliminate the undue enrichment, through the claim for an indemnification. / Various are the prerequisites of the action we are dealing with. There must be: a) ... the effective enrichment of a subject, that is, that his estate receive an increase ..., and enrichment is also considered the saving of an expense, or having, by one's own patrimonial sacrifice, avoided a loss for another... b) that, to such increase for the enriched party, there correspond a decrease in the estate of another subject (impoverished party)... c) ... a relationship of correspondence between the enrichment and the impoverishment; and, in addition, a causal link between the patrimonial decrease suffered by one subject and the patrimonial advantage of the other; ... d) it is necessary that the enrichment-impoverishment occur without cause... Absence of cause means that there is no patrimonial relationship ... that justifies the enrichment-impoverishment.../ The effect of unjust enrichment is the birth of the obligation of indemnification; on the part of the enriched party, in favor of the impoverished party... Finally, it must be observed that the indemnification must adjust to the extent of the enrichment and cannot exceed it..." (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tomo VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1955, pp. 465-466). (On the subject, one may also consult BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 808-818 and PLANIOL, Marcel and RIPERT, Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1997, pp. 812-813) (...)." This criterion was also set forth in judgment No. 837-04, 10:10 of October 1, 2004 and, No. 301-10, 10:45 of February 26, 2010.

g. It should be noted that, in those cases where no judgment has been issued and there exists a provisional child support (pensión alimentaria) set without defining the burdens that the support beneficiary must fulfill pursuant to Article 173, subsection 5) of the Código de Familia, or, the support beneficiary has already reached the age of majority and there is no resolution advising them of what their burdens are, and even, in those cases where a judgment has already been issued without advising the obligated party of their burdens, the prudent course would be to issue a resolution that clarifies said burdens, as is understood from constitutional judgment No. 5112-11, 12:21 of April 25, 2011. Furthermore, in reality, in every ruling that upholds a claim based on Article 173, subsection 5) of the Código de Familia, the said burdens must be defined. This is based on the principle of procedural loyalty (lealtad procesal) and the principle of preference for dispute reduction (descontención).

h. Now then, by virtue of the principle of party autonomy (autonomía de la voluntad) and because the child support payment comes from private funds, it is clear that the obligated party may expressly release the beneficiary party from providing said documentation regarding the permanent fulfillment of requirements, and this release cannot be used for games or pressures, that is, whoever releases from that burden must be clear that they cannot constantly change their mind. Thus, going back on that release must be a reasoned act and not a capricious one. Therefore, reactivating the fulfillment of burdens and, consequently, the supervision mechanism, requires a reasoned resolution.

i. Since the said support obligation is an exceptional and conditional obligation, it is important to analyze what should be understood by good performance and reasonable academic load. Thus, pursuant to Article 173, subsection 5) of the Código de Familia, obtaining "good performance with a reasonable academic load" is the consideration that the person receiving support must fulfill. As can be observed, the norm does not separate the concept "good performance" from the concept "reasonable academic load," but rather, links the former to the latter, since it introduces the preposition "with." Therefore, in each specific case, one must first determine what the academic load is, then define whether or not it is reasonable and why, in order to then conclude whether the performance obtained is good or not and why, which entails analyzing what is understood by "good" in the particular case.

Furthermore, it is well known that determining what constitutes the academic course load (carga académica) is also normatively linked to obtaining a profession or trade (profesión u oficio); that is, the academic course load must be analyzed in terms of obtaining a profession or trade, which excludes obtaining "another" profession or trade, or simply enrolling in and passing courses without concrete progress toward obtaining a profession or trade. In other words, just any enrollment is not sufficient, since the rule does not protect "remaining a student," but rather obtaining "good academic performance with a reasonable academic course load" and with a purpose already defined by law: to obtain a profession or trade. For greater clarity, each course enrollment must entail progress toward obtaining a profession or trade. Thus, "filler" courses taken to "maintain active student status" are not courses that allow progress toward obtaining a profession or trade, as they are not part of the curriculum. Consequently, it is pertinent to insist that "remaining a student" is not what the core of the rule requires.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is clear that there may be exceptional situations in which enrollment in some course could be accepted to cover the transition between secondary and university education, or to obtain a trade, especially due to the impossibility of enrollment given the time when the beneficiary completed secondary school. Such is the case of individuals who had to take extraordinary exams to finish the fifth year and, therefore, did not manage to enroll in a university or other type of educational center. Similarly, if what could not be completed was the high school diploma, the situation must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, because it is a known fact that there are some subjects in which the deficiency is not solely or necessarily attributable to the person taking the exam, but to the educational system itself, and there are even areas of the country where academic performance is generally low. All of this must be analyzed in each specific case.

As has been stated, it is evident that the rule in question expressly establishes, as a general rule, the termination of the right to support (derecho alimentario) for sons and daughters who have reached the age of majority and, subsequently, determines as an exception the continuation of the right if the person has not finished their studies (estudios), and furthermore, it must be clear that it does not refer to just any type of studies, but rather studies for obtaining a—in the singular—profession or trade. Moreover, they are mutually exclusive obtainments: profession or trade, and not both. Subsequently, the rule establishes the termination of the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) upon reaching twenty-five years of age, regardless of whether a profession or trade has been obtained by that age. For greater understanding, it is worth revisiting what the rule states: "Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide support: (...) 5.- When the support recipients have reached the age of majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good academic performance with a reasonable academic course load. These requirements must be proven when filing the claim, by providing information on the academic course load and performance." As can be observed, it is also clear that the rule does not define what should be understood by "reasonable academic course load" or "good academic performance." In the undersigned's view, both expressions are undefined legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados).

On this subject, Administrative Law has advanced greatly in the analysis of such concepts, and it is evident that they are not exclusive to that area of Law. Thus, it is necessary to turn to the doctrine developed in that branch of Law to analyze Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). Along these lines, for example, González Alonso proposes that "a large part of the doctrine relates defined and undefined legal concepts to normative language. It seems evident that, with these concepts or definitions (of which our Law offers abundant examples: 'good family father,' 'good faith,' 'recklessness,' 'loyal administrator,' 'just price'...), the intent is to delineate a reality that manifests itself imperfectly and is difficult to translate into normative language. Thus, defined legal concepts are those that delimit, without leaving room for doubt, a sphere of reality, while undefined legal concepts delimit that sphere of reality through a process of integration or determination, of judgment or estimation." (González Alonso, Augusto. Discrecionalidad y su control.

Distinction from arbitrariness and from indeterminate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados). Revista CEFLEGAL No. 98. 2009. Document consulted at the site https://revistas.cef.udima.es/index.php/ceflegal/article/view/13091 Furthermore, Trayter Jiménez defines indeterminate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados) as follows: “They are maxims of experience. They are abstract concepts whose application requires an assessment based on technical criteria or logical reasoning. They are not automatic like the aforementioned, referring to determinate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos determinados) (…); in Administrative Law: ruin, public order, just compensation (justiprecio) in expropriation, extraordinary and urgent need, clear goal-scoring opportunity, parks and gardens with ‘artistic, historical, anthropological value’ (for purposes of integrating them into the Spanish historical heritage), public utility, public necessity, imperative need of general interest.” (Trayter Jiménez, Joan Manuel (2015). Manual of Administrative Law. General Part, Barcelona, Atelier Legal Books).

Consequently, the undersigned considers that indeterminate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados) are those that have a framework or reference normative definition and, therefore, an imprecise one, so that they must be given concrete scope and meaning, not subjectively but legally, that is, in consideration of specific, pertinent, and proven facts. Thus, Clavijo Suntura warns that, “the judicial determination process, although it takes into account ethical, social, and axiological principles, must be defined based on legal criteria.” (Clavijo Suntura, Joel Harry. 2018. Determinate and Indeterminate Legal Concepts and the Judicial Decision. Law and Social Change). As a consequence of all the foregoing, it is clear that “reasonable academic load (carga académica razonable)” and “good performance (buenos rendimientos)” are concepts integrated to form the expression “good performance with a reasonable academic load (buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable)”; both expressions form part of a framework or core (núcleo duro) that is given by the real benefit of the support, since studying with one's own resources is one thing, and studying with the resources of others is another. In this latter case, it is imperative that the beneficiary actually takes advantage of the resources received and prospers in their studies. It is therefore a matter of a benefit that must be susceptible to verification and, consequently, there must be parity between the chronological age of the beneficiary and their progress in their studies. If that parity does not exist, the person receiving support must prove the reason for this lack of parity, since it entails a fracture of the core (núcleo duro) of the norm, which refers to the effective use of the resources received.

Thus, abandoning a degree program or the study of a trade to start other studies is not a minor issue but something very delicate, because far from generating progress in one's studies, it rather causes an unjustified delay in obtaining a profession or trade. Then, just as a person obligated to pay support cannot seek a variation in the support amount based on subjective or even self-induced circumstances, neither can a beneficiary change their degree program or trade whimsically, even less so if this entails losing all or a large part of what they had advanced in the studies they are abandoning. See that there may even be situations where, instead of finishing a degree program or trade long before turning twenty-five, the beneficiary abandons the degree program or the studies they are pursuing to obtain a trade, in order to start other studies with the purpose of extending the duration of the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) until age twenty-five. With practices like those cited, the beneficiary would be “guaranteeing” support without actually complying with what the norm requires, which is to pursue studies to obtain a profession or trade. That is, the norm does not authorize a change of degree program, because doing so would lose all the contribution that the party obligated to pay support has provided. The issue of changing degree programs is so delicate that a beneficiary could change their degree program every semester or every certain amount of time and thus, not commit to obtaining any university degree, but evidently, such conduct is not covered by the norm, since the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) provided for in subsection 5) of article 173 of the Family Code is exceptional and conditional, in addition to being normatively oriented toward obtaining a profession or trade. Thus, “remaining a student” is not what the norm contemplates as a prerequisite for receiving support.

j. Another topic of interest consists of the support claim by someone who decides to start studies after some time—even years—having reached the age of majority. In these cases, it is decisive to question how that person met their needs before initiating the support proceeding, so that, just as required by article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, when claiming support they must prove not only that they have enrolled. That is, it is not enough to demonstrate that they will pursue studies or are pursuing them. The norm in this sense is very clear: the academic load (carga académica) and good performance (buenos rendimientos) must be demonstrated when filing the claim. In other words, the norm makes a difference between those who, after reaching the age of majority, have continued studying to obtain a profession or trade, and those who, after reaching the age of majority, have not been studying, but rather decide to do so some time later.

Those who find themselves in this last situation are required, when filing the claim —if they were not alimony beneficiaries while minors— not only to demonstrate that they are pursuing studies or have already enrolled, but also the current academic course load and the previously obtained results. For greater understanding, it is appropriate to review the content of the rule: "Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide alimony: (…) 5.- When the alimony beneficiaries have reached their majority, unless they have not completed studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic course load. These requirements must be proven upon filing the claim, by providing information on the academic course load and performance." As can be observed, when the rule states "these requirements must be proven upon filing the claim, by providing information on the academic course load and performance," it refers to those new alimony proceedings because the person seeking alimony was not a beneficiary while a minor, and, if it involves a person who was an alimony beneficiary while a minor but chose not to pursue studies once they reached majority and later decides to resume or begin them, it is clear that they must demonstrate not only the academic course load but also their performance.

In this last case, the undersigned considers that it is not simply a matter of "activating" the process; rather, what the rule demands must be fulfilled, that is, demonstrating the academic course load and performance. Since the rule requires demonstrating performance, it is understood that there must be a prior academic term whose performance is verifiable. Thus, alimony obligations under Article 173(5) of the Family Code require great attention and prudence, because it is not surprising that someone might attempt to receive provisional alimony or not, a year-end bonus, and even expenses for the start of the academic term, when they are barely beginning studies and, given their age, it would be practically impossible for them to finish a degree or a trade.

k. Additionally, just as actions or omissions by the beneficiary person that have the purpose or result of undermining the hard core of the rule —Article 173(5) of the Family Code— are inadmissible, it is also not possible for that hard core to be fractured by actions or omissions of the obligated person, for if they do not pay the alimony installment on time, do not pay it at all, or engage in other types of violence, and even if they are obligated to pay a modest sum compared to the financing of studies to obtain a profession or trade, they cannot claim that this should not be considered when analyzing the consideration to which the beneficiary party is obligated: "good performance with a reasonable academic course load." In other words, failing to fulfill the alimony obligation and violating the beneficiary party's right to non-violence does have favorable consequences for them when analyzing the consideration to which they are obligated, for just as violence by the adult alimony beneficiary impacts the termination of the right to alimony, so too does violence by the person obligated to pay alimony impact the verification of obtaining "good performance with a reasonable academic course load to obtain a profession or trade." l. As a complement, there are subjective situations that may be relevant when analyzing the fulfillment of said consideration. For example, an illness of the beneficiary person, particular abilities for the learning process, etc., or objective situations that the beneficiary person cannot control, such as availability of educational offerings in a certain area, Internet connectivity in a specific area, etc. Therefore, in measuring "good performance with a reasonable academic course load to obtain a profession or trade," there must be an analysis according to each specific case, since generalizing grossly violates the principle of equality. All of this with the observation that such analysis does not authorize emptying the hard core of the rule, so that it is always mandatory to have as a reference the framework established by the rule and its purpose: obtaining a profession or trade.

m. As stated in this ruling, the alimony obligation established in Article 173(5) of the Family Code is exceptional and conditional, and moreover, it is not preferential. However, this does not mean that a person obligated to pay alimony may burden themselves with preferential alimony obligations in order to seek to neglect the previously acquired alimony obligation. On the contrary, what this non-preferential character does imply is that, when analyzing compliance with the requirements contemplated by the rule, the judicial authority must be more rigorous in the assessment of the specific case when there are other preferential beneficiaries.

n. As has also been set forth, the rule in question protects the alimony right for obtaining a profession or trade, that is, not for obtaining several professions, several trades, or a profession and a trade. The fact that this is regulated in the singular is understood because it is an exceptional alimony obligation and, of course, without prejudice to the obligated person accepting to pay an installment covering several professions, several trades, or a profession and a trade, provided this does not entail the detriment of other alimony obligations that are indeed preferential. Likewise, it shall be up to the judicial authority to define whether or not alimony payments are appropriate in favor of someone who already has a trade, such as, for example, the case of persons graduated from technical high schools.

This is because it is clear that the payment of a support allowance (cuota alimentaria) during technical education (enseñanza técnica) entailed for the obligated person the investment of money to provide a profession or trade to the beneficiary and, if the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) were to continue in order to obtain a title similar to the one already obtained, it merits an analysis in each specific case, especially if the intention is now to pursue studies in a technical career that has no relation whatsoever to the one already completed. A similar situation occurs when the person seeking support to pursue a university degree has already completed a technical career. It is evident that in both cases, the first technical career obtained essentially becomes a wasted investment that was backed by the threat of the obligated party's freedom in case of non-compliance. That said, the undersigned does not rule out that the practice of rendering a completed technical career invisible could stem from the myth that exists to the effect that a person claiming support is forbidden to work, but in this judgment it has already been explained why that assertion is a myth, understanding a myth as an imaginary story that alters reality.

A topic that is also of interest when analyzing the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) in question lies in the unilateral decision of the educational center. Thus, in practice it is common for an adult child to choose a private educational center and, furthermore, the most expensive one, without demonstrating that this was consented to by the obligated party or that it corresponds to a certain standard of living provided by the respondent party. This practice is a delicate issue because, as has been indicated, the cited support obligation is not preferential, it is conditional, and it is exceptional. So much so that it is also not intended to financially sustain an independent life project of the beneficiary, such as leaving the nuclear family to have a different place to live, which could even have the purpose of evading the basic rules of coexistence set within their family group. No rule indicates that the father and mother are under the obligation to finance an independent life project for children over eighteen years of age and under twenty-five years of age. In this way, a unilateral decision by the young adult that entails financing an independent life project is not contemplated in the legislation and, therefore, is not legally enforceable, unless their departure from home is caused by proven situations of violence. All of this with the observation that living as a family implies compliance with basic rules of coexistence such as, for example, having clear arrival times, not consuming addictive substances, not entering the home having consumed addictive substances, actively participating in household cleaning and meal preparation tasks, as well as the management of supply acquisition and payment of bills, etc. That is, living as a family is not living in a "hotel." Therefore, active participation in these indispensable tasks for the sustainability of the home are duties imposed by family life, and demanding collaboration from adult children is not violence, unless, in specific situations, the requirement is made through violence, which, as stated, must be demonstrated. In the same sense, a young adult who responds with violence to such requirements could also fall under the assumption of loss of the right to support contemplated in Article 173, subsection 3 of the Family Code (Código de Familia).

Having carried out the corresponding analysis regarding the prerequisites of the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) and the prerequisites, characteristics, and operation of the support obligation regarding adult children, but under twenty-five years of age, it is important to analyze the specific case.

V.SPECIFIC CASE. In this matter, the substantive issue is quite simple, in that absolutely nothing is known about the beneficiary's academic activity since the second quarter of the year 2022. As explained, the burden of proving that she meets the requirements established in Article 172, subsection 3 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) corresponds to said young woman, and in the first instance she did not do so. In the second instance, she has been given the opportunity to provide that evidence, as evidence for a better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver) was ordered, and she has been given the opportunity to manage the required information, without needing to incur expenses, since a court order (oficio) has been issued so that the academic information would be processed without cost, but the young woman was notified of the resolution ordering the evidence for a better resolution and showed no interest in it. Thus, it is clear that, if nothing is known about the young woman's academic circumstances since the end of the second quarter of the previous year, she must be excluded from the right to support. In this case, the appealed judgment is clear that nothing is known about the young woman's academic circumstances since the end of the second quarter of the previous year and, nevertheless, it has denied the exclusion process filed. That is, a decision was made outside of what the regulations establish and without considering binding constitutional jurisprudence. The contested judgment focuses on the young woman's right to study, and that is not the issue under discussion but rather that she is not doing so. No one doubts that the young woman has the right to study. This is clearly indicated in the cited article, but if the young woman does not meet her evidentiary burdens, it cannot be affirmed that she is studying and, moreover, under the terms that the rule indicates. Consequently, the appropriate course is to grant the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed and revoke the contested resolution insofar as it has been the subject of appeal. Thus, the requested exclusion is granted. The beneficiary's right to support ceases. No ruling on costs is made, as that was not appealed.

POR TANTO: The appeal (recurso de apelación) filed is granted, and the contested resolution is revoked insofar as it has been the subject of appeal. Thus, the requested exclusion is granted. The beneficiary's right to support ceases. No ruling on costs is made. Maureen Roxana Solís Madrigal.

Judge.</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">MSOLISM</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">exp 16-001786-0172PA</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;">&nbsp; </span></p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><img style="-aw-left-pos: 0pt; -aw-rel-hpos: column; -aw-rel-vpos: paragraph; -aw-top-pos: 0pt; 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font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">???????????????</span><br /><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">BMZ3RHHKVGM61</span><br /><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">MAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: ignore;">&nbsp;</span></p> <div style="-aw-headerfooter-type: footer-primary; clear: both;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">EXP: </span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">16-001786-0172-PA</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 1pt; text-align: center; border-bottom: 0.75pt solid #000000; -aw-border-bottom: 0pt single;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">I Circuito Judicial de San Jos</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">&eacute;</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">, Edificio Tribunales, Primer Piso. Tel</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">&eacute;</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">fonos: 2295-3473. Fax: 2295-3627.</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 1pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 10pt; color: #00b0f0;">Email</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">:</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;"> [email protected]</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 1pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: ignore;">&nbsp;</span></p> </div> </div> ]3 "III.

ON THE MERITS: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION. [...] As can be seen then, upon conducting the ordered examination of said requirements, it is perfectly possible that, although a need exists, a ground for exoneration or a ground for exclusion has simultaneously been determined. This is because they do not account solely for the needs of the beneficiary. In these cases, the exoneration or the exclusion prevails over the need. Likewise, it is also possible that the person claiming support is not a preferred beneficiary, or that the respondent is not a preferred obligor, in which case, even if the need exists, the proper course is to respect the preferred order.[...]"

IV.SUPPORT RIGHTS OF ADULT SONS AND DAUGHTERS UNDER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE. [...] m. As has been stated in this decision, the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) established in Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code is exceptional and conditional, but, furthermore, it is not preferred. Now, this does not mean that a person obligated to pay support may burden themselves with preferred support obligations in order to attempt to disregard a previously acquired support obligation.

On the contrary, what this non-preferential status does entail is that, when analyzing compliance with the requirements established by the norm, the judicial authority must be more rigorous in the assessment of the specific case when other preferential beneficiary persons exist.[...]" Added to that regulation is Law No. 10228 on the authentic interpretation of Article 245 -248- of the Family Code (Código de Familia), La Gaceta No. 100 of May 31, 2022; Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Preamble and Article 24(d) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 69 and 92 second paragraph of the Family Code, Article 12, 31 and 1400 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), regulations that allow the issue of child support (alimentos) in favor of unborn children to be resolved not only with respect to women united in marriage but also to women in a common-law marriage (unión de hecho), and could even be considered applicable if it involves an irregular common-law marriage where it is not the woman who is married but rather her partner. In addition, what is contemplated in Articles 23, 27 and 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child must be considered. Likewise, the provisions of Articles 29, 37 to 39 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) must be added. As a complement, what is provided for in Article 13(a) and 16(c) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Law No. 6968 and Articles 1, 2(a), 3, 4(b), (e) and (g) of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women "Convention of Belém do Pará" (Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la mujer “Convención Belem Do Pará”) must also be considered. Equally, the provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations (Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias), Law No. 8053 and the provisions of the Code of Private International Law (Código de Derecho Internacional Privado) Law No. 50, published in Alcance No. 7, La Gaceta No. 30 of February 6, 1930, must also be considered. Now, the review of all these regulations also involves analyzing in each specific case the following topics:

1.a The examination of the character of a preferred obligor (persona obligada preferente) as provided for in Articles 168, 169 and 173(1) of the Family Code, 23 of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code. It must be observed that there are at least five rules referring to the preferred character regarding child support debtors (personas deudoras alimentarias). Furthermore, said regulations also require reviewing the character of a preferred beneficiary (persona beneficiaria preferente), as is evident from constitutional case law such as, for example, resolution No. 5720-00, 14:58 of July 11, 2000, which stated: “By resolution at sixteen hours and twenty minutes of July fourth, two thousand, the Contraventional and Small Claims Court of San Joaquín de Flores annulled the resolution that admitted the child support claim (demanda de alimentos) and the one that ordered the physical coercion (apremio corporal) against the petitioner. The foregoing, in consideration that the Family Code, numeral 156, establishes a priority order (prelación) of those obligated to pay support, it being indispensable, in the first place, to prove the material impossibility of the minors' father to cover support, for which the corresponding warnings were made to the plaintiff (folio 30). II.- Numeral 15 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) indicates that a habeas corpus action proceeds against 'acts or omissions that come from an authority of any order, including judicial, against threats to that freedom and disturbances or restrictions that authorities unduly establish regarding it…' (bold not from original). In the case before us, it is evident that the appealed authority, without conducting the corresponding analysis of numeral 156 of the Family Code, processed a child support claim against the petitioner, obligating him to pay a provisional child support payment (cuota provisional de alimentos) that it established in the sum of two hundred and forty thousand colones, under warning of ordering physical coercion against the obligor if he failed to make the corresponding payment, which he did not make, for which reason his physical coercion and consequent capture were ordered. The appealed authority indicates that before it was notified of the filing of the habeas corpus, it had already revoked those resolutions, making the corresponding communications to the police authorities to avoid the petitioner's detention, for which reason in its opinion this habeas corpus action lacks interest; however, that subsequent action does not render non-existent the threat to the freedom that both jurisdictional resolutions caused to the petitioner. For this Chamber, the personal freedom of the defendant was illegitimately threatened by ordering his physical coercion without analyzing whether, in the specific case, the circumstances that made the processing of the claim and the prevention of payment of support necessary were present. It does not go unnoticed by this Chamber that, despite the fact that the petitioner in his reply to the claim made the court aware of the irregularity of the proceeding and the ordered payment, against him was ordered – without further analysis of his arguments – an arrest warrant, which shows a clear lack of appreciation by the appealed authority of the circumstances of the specific case, which obliges the Chamber to declare its responsibility in the threat to the freedom suffered by the petitioner. By reason of the foregoing, the appeal must be declared with merit, warning the appealed authority to refrain from incurring in acts such as those that have given rise to the granting of the appeal.

It is pointless to order the lifting of the arrest warrant, as requested by the appellant, because the respondent authority has already provided what was necessary." Along the same lines, in ruling no. 6610-01, 15:59 of July 10, 2021, the Constitutional Chamber stated: "The purpose of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), which is of a family nature, was to secure the food assistance and personal and patrimonial protection of persons who, having need, in one way or another cannot obtain it for themselves. The Law grants this right based on the idea of a just principle of family solidarity, therefore, it limits this right to the closest degrees of kinship and affinity: the obligation to provide support affects solely the relatives and affines called upon by law, and according to a pre-established order. The obligation to provide support (alimentos) is an economic provision that, maintaining the proper relationship between the economic possibilities of the obliged person and the needs of the maintenance creditor (alimentario), has the purpose of satisfying the provision of nutritional substances or edibles, of medical care and medications, covering the needs of clothing, housing and recreation, and, in the case of minors, providing the necessary resources to secure formal or informal education in order to provide comprehensive development as a citizen and human being. The support provision, consequently, does not only have a patrimonial value. Precisely because of this, its set-off (compensación) is not permitted, nor the assignment (cesión) of the support right; and consequently, neither the settlement (transacción) nor the arbitration agreement regarding it. What is discussed in support proceedings is not, as indicated, a merely pecuniary provision, with a profit motive, as if it were any other civil proceeding, but rather, although the debt is monetary, it is directed at satisfying the needs of every human being to achieve harmonious development. Note that the legal right protected through the imposition of a support payment is the need and condition of dependency in which the maintenance creditor finds themselves regarding the obligor. By virtue of the foregoing, the support obligation cannot be compared to any other legal obligation, given that in matters of support, the family powers to demand such provision are not attributed for the purpose of satisfying a merely personal interest, but to provide for a superior need of a family nature." This criterion has been reiterated, for example, in rulings no. 1124-05, 11:14 of February 4, 2005; no. 10484-01, 15:50 of October 16, 2001; no. 7923-02, 15:19 of August 20, 2002, among others. In addition, other constitutional rulings dealing with subsidiary obligor (personas obligadas subsidiarias) and preferential obligor (personas obligadas preferentes) are: no. 5498-13, 14:30 of April 23, 2013; no. 1817-14, 16:05 of February 11, 2014; no. 9580-15, 9:05 of June 26, 2015; no. 18945-15, 11:01 of December 2, 2015 and, no. 518-18, 9:15 of January 17, 2018.

1.b. The analysis of the provisions of article 40 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia), as well as numeral 10 of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias). Therefore, it must be taken into account that the person filing a support claim would not necessarily be obligated to the payment of support -solidarity- as is the case of uncles and aunts, who are not obligated to pay support with respect to nephews and nieces, as follows from article 169 and article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). Likewise, grandfathers and grandmothers are not obligated to pay support with respect to grandchildren of legal age who do not have a disability that prevents them from attending to their own interests. This is in accordance with article 169 subsection c) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). Another example is constituted by a person who is the administrative or judicial custodian (depositaria administrativa o judicial) of a minor, since the person who will be the custodian (depositario) must not necessarily owe support in accordance with article 169 of the Family Code (Código de Familia). As can be observed, there are many scenarios in which the person filing the claim for the benefit of another person is not obligated to pay support. In summary, the practical application of the cited articles 40 and 10 is not a minor issue if it is considered that it is not possible to take evidence on the economic capacity of persons who are not obligated to pay support. Thus, investigating their finances without being obligated to pay support constitutes an arbitrary interference in life, and that practice is expressly prohibited at least in articles 12.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; V of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 11.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in articles 3.1, 4, 16); General Comment of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, no. 14; article 5 and 16 of the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons and, article 22 of the UN Convention on Disability and the recommendations of the Committee of said Convention, among other norms. Also, in the practical application of article 10 of the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), it is vital to determine if the person acting for the benefit of another person is in reality the preferential obligor (persona obligada preferente) or even, whether being so or not, they maintain a conflict of interest (interés contrapuesto).

Finally, that Article 10 requires special analysis when the issue of immigration is involved, since it is common for migrants to leave their minor children or even adult children with disabilities in their country of origin or in the State where they previously resided, in the care of relatives or third parties, while they work in Costa Rica to generate resources and send them to their children abroad. However, as the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is, by definition, extraterritorial, it is clear that the person claiming support, while possibly not exercising the immediate care of the beneficiaries, may be exercising care at a distance and, consequently, the defendant must demonstrate that the claimant remains disconnected from the beneficiaries and, therefore, lacks standing (legitimación) to claim support. Thus, in situations where the issue of immigration and the application of Article 10 converge, it is necessary to make interpretations that favor access to justice for migrants and, at the same time, the extraterritorial nature of the support obligation. This, without neglecting of course the certainty about the connection between the person claiming on behalf of beneficiaries who are abroad.

**1.c.** Review of the joinder of the litis. That is, the necessary passive joinder of parties (litisconsorcio pasiva necesaria). This in accordance with Articles 35, 169 of the Family Code and 106 of the Civil Procedure Code Law No. 7130, as well as paragraph two of Article 2 of the Law on Support Pensions (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) regarding the directive for compliance with family duties. Likewise, it is essential to consider the joint and several nature (carácter solidario) of the support obligation, understood as family cohesion and not as in mercantile obligations, where one may choose which debtor to demand performance of the obligation from. However, it must be clear that, even though by virtue of the joint and several nature of the support obligation the passive joinder of parties is necessary and not optional, this does not mean that all defendants must be ordered to pay provisional support or support in the judgment, since it is always necessary to analyze the economic possibilities of each person separately and the needs of the beneficiary. Likewise, it must be clear that it is not possible to require an only child to agree that their father or mother does not wish to sue other children, whether because the parent does not want to, because they settle for what they already receive extrajudicially—which may or may not be proportional to those persons' income—or because they do consider the circumstances of some children and not others which may even be the same or different, but indeed, some are relevant to them and others are not. All these are subjectivities that the defendant does not have to bear, and less so considering that a corporal arrest warrant (apremio corporal), an exit prohibition order (impedimento de salida del país), a raid (allanamiento), etc., could only be issued against them. Why should a person agree to be the only defendant if there are other persons who are also jointly family obligated? Why should they agree that said persons may eventually not contribute, or that they contribute whatever they want without their economic capacity being analyzed to determine if they are contributing as is being required of the person who was actually sued? Note that if family joint and several liability and the directive on compliance with family duties did not imply that the passive joinder of parties is necessary, then, extrajudicially, one person would be allowed not to contribute, or indeed, they would be allowed to contribute what they want, while another would be judicially required to contribute a specific sum and, in the first case, no judging person would verify that they cannot contribute, or indeed, that the contribution actually exists and furthermore is proportional to the possibilities of the person providing the contribution and the needs of the person receiving the contribution, while, in the second case, the defendant would indeed be subjected to deep scrutiny as determined by Article 164 of the Family Code and Articles 2 and 27 of the Law on Support Pensions, that is, a scrutiny aimed at determining the real truth.

**SECOND:** Determine whether the party claiming support or the person benefiting from the claim made by another person is or is not subject to any ground for exclusion (causal de exclusión). This finds support in subsection 2) to 7) of Article 173 of the Family Code. With the observation that the grounds ranging from subsection 2) to 7) of that norm, as already stated, are grounds for exclusion due to actions or omissions contrary to good faith in family relationships, which is why they have been termed “family infamy” (infamia familiar) as of judgment 900-23, of 8:40 on September 18, 2023, drafted by Judge Patricia Méndez Gómez, titular of the First Family Court with Second Instance Competence. The foregoing, in order to create a specific denomination and not use the concept of “unworthiness” (indignidad) as it is specific to probate matters, nor “ingratitude” (ingratitud), which refers to the donation contract. However, when analyzing this regulation, that is, subsection 2) to 7) of Article 173 of the Family Code, the provisions in constitutional resolutions No. 3685-09 10:30, March 6, 2009 and No. 14026-11, 14:50 of October 19, 2011; Article 523 of the Civil Code, amended by Law No. 9777, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Supplement No. 280; Law No. 10217, La Gaceta No. 100 of May 31, 2022; subsection c) of Article 572 of the Civil Code; and Articles 48, 57, 58, 66, 140, 143, 158, 159, 160, 233, and 248 of the Family Code are of interest. All this, with the following observations:

**2.a.** Article 233 of the Family Code was incorporated by Law No. 10192 and said Law, as already indicated, shifted the numbering by incorporating Articles 231, 232, and 233 into the Family Code. Therefore, it must be determined whether, in a specific case, a final judgment has been issued in a process of “lifting of the care obligation” (levantamiento de obligación de cuido).

For greater clarity, this concerns a new process created by the addition of Article 233 to the Family Code (Código de Familia) pursuant to Article 32 of the law Creating the National System of Care and Support for Adults and Older Adults in Situations of Dependency (Creación del Sistema Nacional de Cuidados y Apoyos para Personas Adultas y Personas Adultas Mayores en Situación de Dependencia, SINCA), No. 10192 of April 28, 2022. Therefore, if such a ruling exists, the scope it holds in the specific case must be determined. Furthermore, based on Article 8 of the Family Code and Article 106 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), these types of matters fall under the jurisdiction of the family courts, and what is resolved there may or may not affect a support (alimentario) proceeding through the analogous application of the last paragraph of Article 173 of the Family Code.

**2.b.** Similarly, one must consider the reform introduced to Articles 56, 60, 141, the heading of Chapter II of Title III, and Articles 151 and 152 of the Family Code, by Law No. 9781, La Gaceta No. 238 of December 13, 2019, Alcance No. 279.

**2.c.** Moreover, it is also necessary to bear in mind that Article 158 of the Family Code has been reformed by Law No. 9406, November 30, 2016, La Gaceta No. 10, Alcance No. 9; Law No. 9095, La Gaceta No. 28 of February 8, 2013, Alcance 27 a; Law No. 10263, La Gaceta No. 99 of May 30, 2022, Alcance No. 109. Added to this, it must be considered that there also exists the reform introduced to Article 57 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) by Law No. 8875, La Gaceta No. 202 of October 19, 2010, regarding the disqualification (inhabilitación) from exercising “parental authority (patria potestad), guardianship (tutela), conservatorship (curatela), or judicial administration of assets (administración judicial de bienes)” as indicated by the regulation, and that Article 159 of the Family Code has been reformed by Law No. 9379, La Gaceta No. 166 of August 30, 2016, Alcance No. 153.

**2.d.** As a complement, it cannot be overlooked that, against Article 173 subsection 4) regarding adultery—committed in the past or present—as a ground for exclusion (exclusión) of the support right, there is an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) being processed under case file number 22-009920-0007-CO, and first published in Boletín Judicial No. 103, June 3, 2022. That edict, in what is relevant, states: “(...) This notice only affects pending judicial proceedings in which the application of the challenged provision is discussed, and it is noted that the only thing that cannot be done in said proceedings is to issue a final judgment (sentencia) or the act in which the challenged provision would be applied in the sense that it has been. Equally, the only thing the action suspends in the administrative channel is the issuance of the final resolution (resolución final) in the procedures aimed at exhausting that channel, which are those initiated with and arising from the appeal (recurso de alzada) or motion for reversal (recurso de reposición) filed against the final act, except, of course, when dealing with rules that must be applied during the proceeding, in which case the suspension operates immediately (...).” **2.e.** To all this, one must also add the provisions of Article 42 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), Article 164 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) Law No. 7130, and Articles 148, 408, 412, 416, and 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), as well as the provisions of the Private International Law Code (Código de Derecho Internacional Privado) Law No. 50, published in Alcance No. 7, La Gaceta No. 30 of February 6, 1930.

**2.f.** Furthermore, it is appropriate to point out that distinguishing between exoneration (exoneración) and exclusion (exclusión) is not a trivial matter, since exoneration operates with respect to the person obligated to pay support (persona deudora de alimentos) and exclusion operates with respect to the creditor person (persona acreedora). Additionally, the burdens of proof are different in an exoneration proceeding and in an exclusion proceeding. Thus, the ground is one of exoneration if it is a matter of analyzing the circumstances of the obligated person to determine whether or not they can pay support, whereas, when analyzing whether or not the beneficiary person should receive support, it is a ground for exclusion. Obviously, there may be situations where the dispute (litis) is joined with grounds for both exoneration and exclusion. In any case, the order admitting evidence (auto de admisión de pruebas) must reflect what the subject of the debate is and the respective burdens of proof.

For greater clarity, the first two grounds for exoneration are contemplated in Article 173 subsection 1), since they refer to the impossibility of paying because the obligated person cannot meet their own needs or because other preferential support obligations exist. Therefore, those first two grounds are for exoneration. The remaining subsections of the rule are for exclusion, that is, those provided for in subsections 2) through 7), insofar as they refer to actions or omissions committed by the person receiving support that warrant the loss thereof.

As</span><span style=\"font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; vertical-align: sub;\"> such, these subsections refer to situations in which a person is receiving alimony (alimentos) under the following assumptions: without needing it; for having engaged in acts of mistreatment—injury, serious insult, or harm (injuria, falta o daños graves); for having engaged in voluntary and malicious abandonment; if, as a former spouse, they remarried or entered into a common-law relationship (convivencia de hecho); if, being an adult child, but under the age of twenty-five, they are not studying under the terms required by legislation; if they breached alimony duties when legally obliged to fulfill them; and, lastly, if they commit or have committed adultery, this last scenario—adultery—being the subject of the already mentioned unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad).

2.g. Lastly, when analyzing situations of exclusion, it is necessary to determine whether there has been an excuse or pardon (disculpa o perdón) regarding a potential situation determined as grounds for exclusion from alimony for “family infamy” (infamia familiar). On this topic, unless a better criterion applies, the provisions of articles 52 and 63 of the Código de Familia, as well as numeral 524 of the Código Civil, article 5 paragraphs 2 to 3 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, and article 12 of the Código Civil, govern.

THIRD: The needs of the person who will benefit from the alimony payment, article 51 of the Constitución Política, amended by Ley n° 9697, published in La Gaceta n.° 147 of August 7, 2019, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Protocol, Ley n.° 8661, published in La Gaceta n.° 187 of February 29, 2008, and the General Comments of the Committee of that Convention: n.° 1 Equal recognition as a person before the law; n.° 2 Accessibility; n.° 3 On women and girls with disabilities; n.° 4 On the right to inclusive education; n.° 5 On the right to live independently and be included in the community; n.° 6 On equality and non-discrimination (no discriminación); n.° 7 On the participation of persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through the organizations that represent them, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention; n.° 8 On the right of persons with disabilities to work and employment; Inter-American Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, Ley n° 7948 published in La Gaceta n.° 238 of December 8, 1999; Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, Forty-eighth session, of December 20, 1993; article 160 bis, 164 and 166 of the Código de Familia, as well as article 2 subsections h), i), j) of the Ley de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad, being Ley n.° 9379, published in Alcance n.° 254, La Gaceta n.° 166 of August 30, 2016; Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, such as, for example: General Comment n.° 4. Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; General Comment n.° 5. General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; General Comment n.° 7. Implementing child rights in early childhood; General Comment n.° 9. The rights of children with disabilities; General Comment n.° 11. Indigenous children and their rights under the Convention; General Comment n.° 14. The right of the child to have their best interests (interés superior) taken as a primary consideration; General Comment n.° 15. The right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health; General Comment n.° 17. The right of the child to rest, leisure, play, recreational activities, cultural life and the arts; General Comment n.° 20.

on the effectiveness of children's rights during adolescence, among others; articles 29, 37 to 39 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia); 13(a) and 16(c) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra La Mujer), Law No. 6968 (CEDAW), which includes the General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee, such as, for example: General Recommendations No. 19 and No. 35 on Violence against women; General Recommendation No. 21 on equality in marriage and family relations; General Recommendation No. 27 on older women and protection of their human rights; General Recommendation No. 29 on the economic consequences of marriage, family relations and their dissolution; General Recommendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice; General Recommendation No. 34 on the rights of rural women and, General Recommendation No. 39 on Indigenous Women and Girls, among others; Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations (Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias), Law No. 8053, published in La Gaceta No. 12 of January 17, 2001; United Nations Principles for Older Persons, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1991, Resolution 46/91; the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), which corresponds to Law No. 9379; articles 231 to 233 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) -Law No. 10192- and the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons (Convención Interamericana sobre Protección de los Derechos Humanos de la Persona Adulta Mayor), Law No. 9394, published in Alcance No. 203 to Gaceta No. 188 of September 30, 2016, among other provisions-, as well as any other regulation that protects the rights of specific populations (población específica), such as, for example, the regulation on indigenous populations (poblaciones indígenas), in which case it is notorious that the Alimony Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) is not only insufficient but even contrary to norms of supra-constitutional rank, particularly because the designation of an interpreter requires special attention, everything related to the form of compliance with the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) and that includes the corporal sanction (apremio corporal) itself and even its execution. In this regard, I refer to Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Convenio No. 169 sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes), which corresponds to Law No. 71316, published in Gaceta No. 234 of December 4, 1992; Law No. 9593 on Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples of Costa Rica (Ley No. 9593 sobre Acceso a la Justicia de los Pueblos Indígenas de Costa Rica), published in Gaceta No. 100, May 31, 2022, Minimum Rules for the Application of the First Paragraph of numeral 7 of the Law on Access to Justice for Indigenous Persons of Costa Rica (Reglas Mínimas para la Aplicación del Primer Párrafo del numeral 7 de la Ley de Acceso a la Justicia de Personas Indígenas de Costa Rica), agreement reached by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial) in session No. 27-19 held on March 26, 2019, article LXXI and which corresponds to Circular No. 67-19; Law No. 9305 declaring Costa Rica a democratic, free, independent, and multicultural Republic (Ley No. 9305 que declara a Costa Rica República democrática, libre, independiente y multicultural), published in La Gaceta No. 191 of October 1, 2015.

As a complement, in each specific case, when examining needs, it is of interest to distinguish between urgent needs (necesidades perentorias), which are protected through a provisional alimony (pensión alimentaria provisional), and needs that form part of a certain standard of living. In this latter case, one must also consider when it involves needs created unilaterally by the person benefiting from alimony, needs created unilaterally by the obligor and for the benefit of alimony creditors, as well as needs agreed upon by the persons jointly and severally liable (solidariamente obligadas) for the payment of alimony and needs agreed upon by the persons subsidiarily liable (subsidiariamente obligadas) for the payment of alimony.

**FOURTH:** The financial capacity (posibilidades) of the person sued for alimony, which entails determining whether or not they fall under any ground for exoneration (causal de exoneración) - Article 27 of the Alimony Law, Article 173(1), 160 bis, 164 and 35 of the Family Code, this latter article modified by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239, December 16, 2019, Alcance No. 280. Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, Law No. 8053; all the regulations cited in the third point regarding the older adult population (población adulta mayor), population with disabilities (población con discapacidad) and indigenous population (población indígena). Added to this is what is provided in Article 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code. As a complement to this premise, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in ruling No. 9775-2010, 4:31 hours of June 1st, 2010, ordered: "(...) it must be clear that the provisional amount of alimony should not be quantified solely in relation to the economic income of the alimony debtor, but rather a judgment of weighting must be established in which both the conditions of the person who bears the support obligation and those of the beneficiaries must be taken into account." Logically, the proportionality of the alimony amount referred to by the Constitutional Court does not govern only with respect to a provisional alimony but also for that which is set in a judgment.

In addition to this, regarding the economic possibilities in support (alimentarios) proceedings, the aforementioned Court referred to the former article 151—now article 165 of the Family Code (Código de Familia)—as follows: “Pursuant to article 151 of the Family Code, the support (prestación alimentaria) must maintain a relationship between the economic possibilities of the person who provides it and the needs of the person who receives it, according to the particular circumstances of each case. Such provision finds its raison d'être in that a generalization cannot be made of all the needs that the support recipients (alimentarios) may have, since everyone's circumstances are different; some will need special food, others will require particular medications, and some education under the charge of tutors or qualified teachers, etc., and on the other hand, a common parameter cannot be established to measure the economic possibilities of all those obliged to pay support (pensión), since some will have a better economic situation than others. So in this respect, without distorting the principle that all persons are equal before the law, the judge can be allowed to weigh all the circumstances of the specific case and make the determination accordingly, because a multiplicity of personal circumstances, all different, can occur. The principle of equality operates, as stated above, insofar as persons find themselves in equal or reasonably similar situations, something that does not occur in relation to the needs and economic possibilities of human beings and their support (alimentarias) and personal development needs, for which reason it is not possible to accept the claimant's argument that numeral 151 of the Family Code violates the principle of equality by establishing the need to consider the particular conditions of each individual when setting the amount of the support quota (cuota alimentaria).” Resolution No. 1725-94, 15:21 of April 12, 1994. At this point, it is worth noting that said Court has on many occasions referred to the fact that the economic capacity of the party obliged to pay support (alimentos) is an issue that must be analyzed in each particular case: No. 1354-09, 13:16 of January 30, 2009; No. 15335-10, 8:32 of September 17, 2010; No. 7455-14, 15:15 of May 28, 2014; No. 4349-16, 9:00 of April 1, 2016; No. 466-18, 11:30 of January 16, 2018; No. 26760-21, 9:15 of November 26, 2021; and No. 3986-23, 9:15 of February 21, 2023, among many.

As can be seen then, when carrying out the ordered examination of said requirements, it is perfectly possible that, although need exists, a ground for exoneration (exoneración) or a ground for exclusion (exclusión) has simultaneously been determined. This is because the needs of the beneficiary person are not the only thing that counts. In these cases, exoneration or exclusion prevails over need. Likewise, it is also possible that the person claiming support (alimentos) is not a preferential beneficiary, or that the respondent is not a preferential obligor, in which case, even though need exists, the appropriate course is to respect the preferential order.

Up to this point, the requirements that must be reviewed in every support (alimentario) proceeding have been broken down. Now it is appropriate to analyze the requirements that must be added when dealing with article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code.

**IV. SUPPORT RIGHTS (DERECHO ALIMENTARIO) OF ADULT SONS AND DAUGHTERS UNDER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE.** When analyzing this issue, it is essential first of all to consider what the regulatory framework is that governs this specific support obligation (obligación alimentaria). To begin with, the ordinary regulation is contemplated in the already cited article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, which states: *“There shall be no obligation to provide support (alimentos): (…) 5. When the support recipients (alimentarios) have reached their majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic course load. These requirements must be proven when filing the claim, providing information on the academic course load and performance.”* As amended by Law No. 7654, published in Gazette No. 16 of January 23, 1997.

Regarding this norm, the constitutional jurisprudence has been very extensive. Initially, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 2869-94, 14:36 of June 15, 1994, referred to the issue, but it was developed based on the cited article 173, subsection 5) before being reformed by the Support Pensions Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias). It is understood then that it is a ruling no longer applicable due to said legal reform. Later, ruling No. 6181-97, 17:51 of September 30, 1997, does develop the norm once reformed. Therefore, this ruling is applicable, with the observation that other subsequent rulings dimension the application of the norm. Now, in the cited ruling No. 6181-97, the Constitutional Chamber stated: *“(…) the circumstances that gave rise to the issuance of the partially transcribed judgment varied with the enactment of Law No. 7654 of December 19, 1996, published in number 16 of January 23, 1997 of the Official Newspaper "La Gaceta". The Family Code, which contemplated the situation under study in article 160, subsection 6), was reformed and in its numeral 173 indicates: "There shall be no obligation to provide support: 5. When the support recipients (alimentarios) have reached their majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic course load."* These requirements must be proven upon filing the claim, by providing information on the academic course load and performance." The transcribed rule indicates that a child who has reached the age of majority may be a beneficiary of child support (alimentos), if they have not finished the studies to acquire a profession or trade, and are not older than twenty-five years of age, as was established by Article 160, subsection 6) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) before its reform. However, it introduces a new element, when it states that good performance and a reasonable academic course load must be demonstrated at the time of filing the claim, thereby allowing the Judge to initially assess the appropriateness of the support (pensión) and set a provisional amount in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, the Chamber considers that it is not inappropriate that a provisional support (pensión) was set for the petitioner, whose amount, by the way, he challenged in the corresponding venue, nor that the order of corporal punishment (apremio corporal) issued against him by the Child Support Office (Alcaldía de Pensiones Alimenticias) of Liberia violates his fundamental right to personal liberty. The support payment (prestación alimentaria) is indispensable for the subsistence of the beneficiaries, so its non-compliance entails the corporal punishment (apremio corporal) that may be ordered under the terms of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimenticias) and in protection of Article 13, subsection h) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Hence, if the appellant is obligated to the support payment (prestación alimentaria) and the order of corporal punishment (apremio) was requested by the plaintiff, the order must take effect without the deprivation of liberty resulting from that fact being considered arbitrary or illegal." Furthermore, in a later judgment, judgment No. 7372-97, at 15:15 on November 4, 1997, said Court held: "This Chamber considers that, while it is true there is no express regulation indicating the exact moment to exclude the debtor from their support obligation (obligación alimentaria), it is also true that there can be no interpretation other than that aimed at benefiting the best interests of the minor, in accordance with Articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), and 7 of the Child Support Law No. 7654 (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias N° 7654), regulations from which the general principle emerges that in this matter what prevails and must be primarily considered is the best interests of the child. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be claimed—as the appellant wishes—that a beneficiary of a support obligation (obligación alimentaria), upon reaching the age of majority, automatically loses their right to it, but on the contrary, it should always be presumed that they continue studying and making good progress in their studies, in order to continue enjoying the child support (pensión alimentaria), as established by Article 173, in its paragraph 5) of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) (...)." This last point with the observation that the rule in question does not correspond to the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) but to the Family Code (Código de Familia).

Additionally, in other subsequent votes, the Constitutional Chamber made it clear that it had changed the criterion expressed when the rule had not been reformed and that it is a matter for the ordinary jurisdiction to determine the appropriateness or not of a provisional child support (pensión alimentaria). In this regard, judgments No. 3491-02, at 14:39 on April 17, 2002; No. 5081-05, at 14:34 on April 29, 2005; No. 13923-05, at 8:31 on October 14, 2005; and No. 6600-09, at 14:22 on April 28, 2009, among others, may be consulted.

Now, in judgment No. 15209-2009, at 11:08 on September 25, 2009, corrected by resolution No. 3278-10, at 15:56 on February 12, 2010, that Constitutional Court stated: "V.- Regarding the duty of support towards children who have reached the age of majority and its procedural handling. Subsection 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) indicates that the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) of parents towards their children is maintained even when they reach the age of majority, only to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic course load, all aspects that must be proven upon filing the claim and that must necessarily be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction. For this, the procedural system is arranged in such a way that, upon reaching the age of majority, the support creditor who considers they maintain their right to receive support (alimentos), must file the corresponding action before the specialized court of the matter, so that it is in that venue that it is proven whether the interested party maintains that right and the obligor continues with the duty to provide support (alimentos), which must necessarily be assessed and defined according to the particular needs of the person who has reached the age of majority. This is so because upon reaching the age of majority, a series of needs are acquired that are different from those previously established for the support beneficiary while they were a minor, a situation that in practice implies the preclusion of the first recognized benefit, to instead, through a new judicial action, determine the new benefit legally due." Thus, if within the first judicial case there are still maintenance beneficiaries, and the person who has reached the age of majority files a new action, the maintenance obligor must take the appropriate steps within the first judicial proceeding to seek its adjustment to the new conditions, but as has been indicated, this is a matter within the competence of the interested party and, being an aspect of ordinary legality, is outside the scope of this jurisdiction's powers." This was reiterated in judgment No. 2099-2014, 14:30 of February 18, 2014, as follows: "Subsection 5) of article 173 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) indicates that the maintenance obligation of parents toward their children is maintained even when the latter reach the age of majority, only to the extent that the maintenance beneficiaries have not completed the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load, all aspects that must be proven when filing the claim and which must necessarily be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction. To this end, the procedural system is designed in such a way that, upon reaching the age of majority, the maintenance creditor who considers they maintain their right to receive support must file the corresponding action before the specialized court in the matter, so that it is in that venue that it is accredited whether the interested party maintains that right and the obligor continues to have the duty to provide support, which must necessarily be appreciated and defined according to the particular needs of the person who has reached the age of majority. This is so because, upon reaching the age of majority, a series of needs different from those previously established for the maintenance beneficiary while a minor are acquired, a situation that in practice implies the preclusion (preclusión) of the first recognized benefit, in order to, in its place and through a new judicial action, determine the new benefit that is legally appropriate." Now, in judgment No. 11490-2010, 16; 47 of June 30, 2010, that Court stated: "(...) ordinary jurisprudence and constitutional jurisprudence have recognized that reaching the age of majority is understood as a preclusion (preclusión) of the original maintenance obligation—which is enjoyed while being a minor—, so a new maintenance action must be processed if the person turning eighteen years of age considers they maintain their status as a maintenance beneficiary." And, finally, that Court, in resolution No. 5112-11, 12:21 of April 15, 2011, stated, regarding the right to support for a son or daughter of legal age and under twenty-five, who was already a maintenance pension beneficiary during minority: "In application of the principle of the most favorable interest to the creditor, then, said right is maintained within their sphere of rights enforceable against the maintenance debtor, upon reaching the age of majority, as long as the conditions established in the applicable legislation current in the Republic are met, which must be claimed and discussed in the ordinary jurisdictional venue. (...) Hence, it cannot be said, as was erroneously indicated in the cited judgment, that the age of majority operates to the detriment of the minor maintenance beneficiary who reaches it, as a preclusion (preclusión) of the benefit, which is the same as affirming that the preclusion (preclusión) of the right to maintenance is produced. A problem of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) related to representation may arise, as is procedurally logical, as explained supra, since it is presumed that the standing to act in representation of the minor's interests expires at the moment their mandate is extinguished, by the advent of the legal or juridical circumstance previously established in the law. What cannot be affirmed is that a preclusion (preclusión), extinguishment by limitation (prescripción), or expiration (caducidad) of the benefit or right to maintenance occurs, precisely for the reasons that have been set forth throughout this judgment. The right or benefit declared while being a minor is maintained upon reaching majority, upon fulfillment of the procedural requirement established by the legislation governing the matter, that is: a) appearing in such condition in the pre-existing proceeding to demonstrate their standing (legitimación), right, and need, so that their situation and the appropriateness of what is sought are re-evaluated by the jurisdictional authority according to the new circumstances inherent to majority; and b) in the terms established in Considerando IV of judgment 2010-003278, in those cases where a duality or duplication of judicial actions occurs, resulting from the filing of a new claim for a maintenance pension by the person of legal age despite the pre-existence of a proceeding where their right to maintenance had been declared in their favor while being a minor, a situation that would produce the obligatory determination by the ordinary jurisdictional authority to order the joinder (acumulación) of both proceedings, evidently if such circumstance has been brought to its attention by the maintenance defendant, all with a view to adequately guaranteeing the rights of both the beneficiary and the maintenance obligor." It is also important to highlight, regarding constitutional judgment No. 5112-2011, 12:21 of April 2011, the following: "V.- On the maintenance duty toward children of legal age and its procedural processing." Section 5) of Article 173 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) states that the parents' support obligation (obligación alimentaria) toward their children continues even when they reach the age of majority, “only to the extent that the support beneficiaries (beneficiarios alimentarios) have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load (carga académica), all aspects that must be proven when filing the claim and that must necessarily be assessed within the specialized jurisdiction.” This criterion was also set forth in judgments No. 15209-2009, 11:08 of September 25, 2009, corrected by resolution No. 3278-10, 15:56 of February 12, 2010. It should be noted that the jurisprudence is very clear in establishing the exceptional and conditional nature of the support obligation in question, as it clearly indicates that the support right subsists “only to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade, do not exceed twenty-five years of age, and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load (carga académica).” Furthermore, in judgment No. 5112-2011, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) made it very clear that the support obligation for adult children who were already judicial support beneficiaries, “in application of the principle of the most favorable interest to the creditor, then, said right remains within their sphere of rights enforceable against the support debtor (deudor alimentario), upon reaching the age of majority, as long as the conditions established in the legislation applicable to the case and in force in the Republic are met, which must be claimed and discussed in ordinary jurisdictional venue.” In other words, to enjoy this right, it is necessary to verify that the beneficiary meets the assumptions established in this case by Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code. From these binding jurisprudential criteria, it is important to highlight the following:

a. The support obligation provided for in Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code only proceeds to the extent that the support beneficiaries have not finished the studies necessary to acquire a profession or trade and do not exceed twenty-five years of age.

b. Therefore, the legal assumptions are not met by just any study; rather, they must be aimed at acquiring a profession or trade; the legal assumption cannot be fulfilled with just any performance, nor with just any academic load (carga académica), and this support obligation is fully conditioned and is, consequently, exceptional. Thus, it is clear then that Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code, regarding the support beneficiary, is not complied with by just any form of study, any enrollment at any time, and with any study results.

c. In other words, the support obligation of adult sons and daughters is an obligation that necessarily implies a quid pro quo of verifiable results: if one intends to receive the support payment (pensión alimentaria), one must study for the verifiable purpose stated in the law, that is, to obtain a profession or trade and, in addition, with a reasonable academic load (carga académica) and good performance; to receive support, one must remain in compliance with the assumptions contemplated by the legislation, otherwise, it would produce unjust enrichment and could even constitute the elements of procedural fraud (estafa procesal). See also that Article 23 of the Support Payments Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias) states: “When a provisional quota is set for someone who is not the preferential obligor (obligado preferente) or it is decided in a judgment that the support creditor does not have the right to support, whoever has paid the provisional quota, their representatives or heirs may demand the restitution of the amount paid. The sum for restitution shall constitute an executory title (título ejecutivo) and shall be determined through the incidental proceeding (vía incidental).” d. In addition to this, requesting a writ of bodily attachment (apremio corporal) for the non-compliance of the person obliged to pay support, while the beneficiary is not in full and permanent compliance with the requirements demanded by Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code and, this situation –not complying with such requirements– is not attributable to the debtor precisely for failing to pay, paying late, or another cause, could constitute a fault according to Article 173, section 3), that is, a cause for exclusion from the right to support, which, of course, must be analyzed in each specific case. In other words, demanding compliance with the obligation without, at the same time, complying with the requirements demanded by section 5) of the cited provision, is not a minor issue but, on the contrary, is something very delicate and can generate various legal consequences, including the commission of a cause for loss of the right to support, unjust enrichment, attempted procedural fraud (estafa procesal), and procedural fraud (estafa procesal).

As a complement to the provisions of Article 173, section 5) of the Family Code and the constitutional jurisprudence on said provision, one must also add the ordinary regulation that deals with the preferential order (orden preferente) not only of persons obliged to pay support but also of the beneficiaries of support. That is, Articles 168, 169, and 173, section 1) of the Family Code, 23 of the Support Payments Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), and 38 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia).

For greater clarity, it is appropriate to transcribe the provisions in the order in which they have been cited and everything referring to the preferential order (orden preferente) will be highlighted: “Article 168.- While the support claim (demanda alimentaria) is being processed, once the family relationship is proven, the judge may set a provisional quota for any of the persons indicated in the following article, observing the preferential order (orden preferente) established therein." This quota shall be prudently set at an amount capable of meeting, for the time being, the basic needs of the maintenance creditors and shall subsist as long as it is not modified by judgment." Thus renumbered by Article 2 of Law No. 7538 of August 22, 1995, which transferred it from former Article 155 to 168. Thus amended by Article 65 of Law No. 7654 of December 19, 1996, "Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias".

"Article 169.- The following owe maintenance: 1.- Spouses to each other. 2.- Fathers and mothers to their minor or incapacitated sons and daughters and the sons and/or daughters to their fathers and mothers, including those by fosterage (crianza). (Thus amended the foregoing subsection by Article 1 of Law No. 10166 of March 30, 2022, "Reforma varias leyes para el reconocimiento de derechos a madres y padres de crianza". 3.- Siblings to minor siblings or to those who have a disability that prevents them from fending for themselves; grandparents to minor grandchildren and to those who, due to a disability, cannot fend for themselves, when the more immediate relatives of the aforementioned maintenance creditor cannot provide them with maintenance or to the extent that they cannot do so; and grandchildren and great-grandchildren, to grandparents and great-grandparents under the same conditions indicated in this subsection." Thus amended by Article 3 of Law No. 7640 of October 14, 1996. Thus renumbered by Article 2 of Law No. 7538 of August 22, 1995, which transferred it from former Article 156 to 169.

"Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide maintenance: 1.- When the debtor cannot provide it without neglecting their own maintenance needs or without failing in the same maintenance obligation toward other persons who, with respect to them, have a preferential claim." "Article 23.- Provisional quota and cases in which restitution is appropriate. When a provisional quota is set for someone who is not the preferentially obligated party or it is decided in a judgment that the maintenance creditor is not entitled to maintenance, whoever paid the provisional quota, their representatives, or heirs may demand restitution of the amount paid. The sum for restitution shall constitute an enforceable instrument (título ejecutivo) and shall be determined through the incidental proceeding (vía incidental)." "Article 38.- Supplementary subsidy. If the preferentially obligated party is absent, presents a temporary incapacity, or a factual impossibility to fulfill the duty of providing maintenance to a minor or a pregnant woman, the State shall supplementarily provide them with maintenance by incorporating these families into processes of social promotion and human development, through inter-institutional programs in which, according to their particular situation, the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, the Ministerio de Salud, or any other entity necessary to guarantee comprehensive treatment for the family shall intervene, with the support of organized civil society networks established for this purpose. Pregnant women shall be entitled to the subsidy only during the prenatal and lactation period. /When maintenance is claimed in court and it is verified that any of these circumstances exist, the judge shall process the subsidy before the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social." As has already been set forth, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has already ruled on the preferential order in resolutions No. 5720-00, 14:58 of July 11, 2000; No. 6610-01, 15:59 of July 10, 2021; No. 1124-05, 11:14 of February 4, 2005; No. 10484-01, 15:50 of October 16, 2001; and No. 7923-02, 15:19 of August 20, 2002, among others.

Now then, from all that has been said, the undersigned concludes regarding the non-preferential nature of maintenance for adult sons and daughters the following:

a. The maintenance obligation with respect to adult sons and daughters, but under twenty-five years old, is not the same as the maintenance obligation with respect to minor daughters and sons, insofar as minors are preferential beneficiaries, as are adult sons and daughters with a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests. In this latter case, although subsection 3 of Article 169 of the Family Code employs the expression "that prevents them from fending for themselves," by application of the supra-constitutional regulations on disability—cited in this ruling—and the institutional policy on inclusive language, I am inclined not to use that expression contemplated in the law, considering it pejorative, given that every person has value in themselves and absolutely no one lacks dignity. For greater clarity, the Superior Council, in session No. 15-2012 of February 21, 2012, Article LIII, at the request of the Secretaría Técnica de Género, established as an institutional directive, "...the promotion and use of inclusive language in all written, oral, and digital communications of the Judicial Branch, as well as in the resolutions and writings of judicial offices (...)". This decision was disseminated through circular No. 39-2012 of March 8, 2012, and, pursuant to Article 122 of the General Law of Public Administration, is mandatory.

Continuing with what is provided in Article 169 subsection 3 of the Family Code, it is important to point out that not just any disability generates the situation that the norm contemplates and, therefore, disability(ies) with respect to adult sons/daughters and grandchildren is not necessarily a synonym for having a right to maintenance. Thus, each disability must be considered according to the specific case.

b. Children over the age of majority, but under twenty-five years old who do not have a disability that prevents them from attending to their own interests, are not preferential maintenance beneficiaries (personas beneficiarias alimentarias preferentes) because they are not included in article 169 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) and, article 168 of that Code grants the list in article 169 a preferential order. Furthermore, the maintenance (pensión alimentaria) for children over the age of majority and under twenty-five years old who are studying is not regulated in article 169 of the Family Code but in article 173, subsection 5) of that Code. Thus, the children who are included in the cited article 169 are minor children, as well as children over the age of majority with a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests, and even minor grandchildren and those who, being over the age of majority, have a disability(ies) that prevents them from attending to their own interests. That is, grandparents are not obligated to pay maintenance for grandchildren over the age of majority, but under twenty-five years old, who are pursuing studies.

Consequently, children over eighteen years old and under twenty-five years old are not preferential beneficiaries not only because it is so contemplated in the transcribed regulations but because, in accordance with the principle of equality, those who are not in equal conditions cannot be treated as equals. Thus, minors are not in a position to generate resources, and adults with a disability(ies) who cannot attend to their own interests are also not in a position to generate resources, in both cases to satisfy all their needs, whereas a person over eighteen years old and under twenty-five years old is in a position to work full-time or part-time to thereby generate resources and attend to their needs, as well as to contribute to obtaining a profession or trade and even to build an independent life project.

Regarding the difference between the maintenance obligation (obligación alimentaria) provided for in article 169, subsection 3) and article 173, subsection 5), both of the Family Code, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in resolution No. 4627-13, 14:30 of April 20, 2013, stated: “(...) from the study of the challenged norm, it is clearly inferred that contrary to what the claimant affirms, the norm does not establish equality between both groups, that is, between the legally incapacitated and students under twenty-five years old. In the first place, it should be clarified that family legislation, specifically, article 169 of the Family Code establishes a general rule, which consists of the obligation on parents to provide maintenance (alimentos) to their minor children or to the incapacitated. That obligation remains for as long as those conditions persist, without any special conditioning for this. That is, in the case of minors, the parent's obligation persists - in principle - until they reach the age of majority, and in the case of the incapacitated, the obligation persists regardless of age, as long as the condition of incapacitation remains. However, subsection 5) of article 173 of the Family Code establishes an exception to that general rule, which cannot be considered as equal treatment, since exceptionality does not intend to equate situations, but to provide exceptional or particular and normally transitory treatment, to situations that the legislator, as part of their legislative technique and discretionary power, considered relevant, in order to protect people who find themselves in certain circumstances or conditions of vulnerability or need. Secondly, there can be no talk of equal treatment when the requirements and conditions that the law demands in one case and another are different, because in the case of minors and the incapacitated, the legislation only requires proof of the filial bond and the payment capacity of the maintenance debtor (deudor alimentario), while students over the age of majority referred to in the challenged norm can only, exceptionally, demand maintenance (alimentos) from their parents, provided they meet certain conditions, namely, that they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, as long as they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic load. These demands make the exception to the rule established by the norm a conditioned and temporary situation, so that maintenance creditors (acreedores alimentarios) over the age of majority who find themselves under these special conditions can meet their needs. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that the norm does not provide equal treatment for the two groups of people cited by the claimant, that is, the legal measure offered by the law is not the same for the incapacitated as for students over the age of majority and under twenty-five, reason for which this Chamber considers that the norm does not in any way violate the principle of equality. Consequently, the action is inadmissible with respect to this point.” It is worth noting that this vote was generated as a result of an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed against article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code. Furthermore, although the vote refers to persons with disabilities as “incapacitated”, it is important to make the effort not to use that pejorative expression, which is superseded by regulations of supra-constitutional rank.

Finally, the maintenance obligation provided for in article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code is so exceptional that, as already stated, it is not demandable from grandparents, nor from great-grandparents. However, grandparents could be obligated to pay maintenance for minor grandchildren or, for those over the age of majority - without age limit - if they are persons with a disability who cannot attend to their own interests. This is based on article 169, subsection 3 of the Family Code.

c. No maintenance beneficiary (persona beneficiaria de alimentos) is prohibited from working. On the contrary, work as a right is provided for in article 56 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). For better understanding, the cited article 56 states: “Work is a right of the individual and an obligation to society.

The State must ensure that everyone has honest and useful occupation, duly remunerated, and prevent conditions from being established that in any way undermine the freedom or dignity of the person or degrade their work to the condition of a simple commodity. The State guarantees the right to free choice of work." Therefore, in addition to the fact that the Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias and the Código de Familia do not prohibit a person receiving alimony (alimentos) from working, no interpretation to that effect could be made, because it would be contrary to Article 56 of the Constitución Política and, as will be explained, there is rather a rule that makes it clear that any person receiving alimony can work and, also, what impact that has on the issue of alimony is regulated.

In that sense, note that, according to Article 166 of the Código de Familia, "alimony is only owed to the extent that the property and work of the recipient (alimentario) do not satisfy it." This means that, if a person who works decides to claim alimony, they could aspire to an alimony pension (pensión alimentaria) if the property they own or possess, or the work they perform, does not generate sufficient income, and it is then their responsibility to demonstrate that. That is, they have the burden of proving not only what their needs are, but what their resources are and why they are not sufficient to meet such needs. This also includes the obligation to prove what prevents them from working full or part-time: disability, illness, the social function of caregiving (función social de cuido), etc.

Regarding this last topic, that is, the social function of caregiving, for the purposes of Article 35 of the Código de Familia — amended by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Supplement (Alcance) No. 280 —, as well as by application of clauses 5.a, 13.a, and 14.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and, also by application of Law No. 9325 — Ley de Contabilización del Aporte del Trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica —, it must be understood that the mother, as part of her contribution to the support of each minor child, usually provides caregiving with everything that entails. In certain cases, it is possible that in addition to such contribution, the mother can contribute money to the household economy, but, in any case, domestic work and the care of minors in each specific case, as well as of dependent persons in general, cannot be disregarded as a contribution. Disregarding it, for example, in the case of minor sons and daughters, would imply generating and consolidating overburdened motherhoods, as well as rendering the social function of caregiving invisible. In this regard, I refer to the resolution of the UN Human Rights Council on "Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development," of October 10, 2023, resolution A/HRC/54/L.6/Rev.1, available at https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/54/L.6/Rev.1 That resolution, among other things, states: "1. Recognizes the importance of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of paid and unpaid caregivers and of persons receiving care and support; 2. Expresses deep concern about the unequal organization and distribution of care and support work, and about the impact this has on the rights of all women and girls in society and in the economy. 3. Recognizes that, to achieve gender equality, it is essential to equitably distribute care and support work and the time dedicated to said work; 4.

Urges States to: a) Implement all necessary measures to recognize care work and redistribute it among individuals, as well as among families, communities, the private sector, and States, in such a way as to promote gender equality and the enjoyment of human rights by all persons; b) Increase investment in care and support policies and infrastructure in order to guarantee universal access to affordable and quality services for all persons, including childcare services and health and support services for persons with disabilities and older persons, and to guarantee universal access to parental, maternity, and paternity leave and to social protection for all workers, both informal sector workers and those working in atypical forms of employment; c) Foster and support research and studies aimed at producing data disaggregated by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, marital status, disability, geographic location and other relevant characteristics in the national context, as well as statistics on the scope and distribution of care work and the time devoted to it, as well as on the persons who provide such care and those who receive it, through periodic time-use surveys and the establishment of satellite accounts to evaluate the contribution of this work to national income and to quantify unpaid care work, in order to include them in the gross national product for the purposes of designing, financing, and evaluating policies in this area; d) Adopt all necessary measures to enable the full, equal, genuine, and inclusive participation of women, persons with disabilities, and older persons, as well as children, in decision-making regarding care and support, both in private and public life, including social dialogue and collective bargaining by paid care workers; e) Raise awareness about the negative impacts that stereotypes related to gender, disability, and age have when providing and receiving care and support, and establish programs and policies to eliminate those stereotypes." It is for all of the foregoing that it is not possible to disregard the contribution made by the mother to her solidary maintenance duty through care, since even according to Law No. 9325 -Ley de contabilización del aporte del trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica- there exists the "care economy (economía de cuidado)" and, it refers to the "unpaid work performed in the home, related to the maintenance of the dwelling, the care of other persons in the household or the community, and the maintenance of the paid workforce." That law warns that this category of work is of fundamental economic importance in a society. For better understanding, this normative instrument indicates in article 3 that "the following, among others, are considered unpaid domestic and care work (trabajo doméstico y de cuidado no remunerado) activities: a) The organization, distribution, and supervision of domestic tasks. b) The preparation of food. c) The cleaning and maintenance of the dwelling and household goods. d) The cleaning and maintenance of clothing. e) The care, upbringing, and instruction of children (transportation to school and help with school tasks). f) The care of older adults and sick persons. g) Making purchases, payments, or carrying out errands related to the household. h) The cleaning and maintenance of goods for family use. i) Services to the community and unpaid help to other households of relatives, friends, and neighbors. This classification does not exclude other activities that may be incorporated in due course." As a complement, it is important to point out that it cannot be ignored that there are needs that are presumed according to articles 414 through 417 of the Código Procesal Civil Ley No. 7130. That is, it is presumed that a person requires consumption of potable water, electrical energy, food, transportation, clothing, etc. Logically, anything outside the ordinary would require proof, even more so if a particular standard of living is sought to be protected. For greater clarity, said norms of the Código Procesal Civil Ley No. 7130 state: "Article 414. Legal presumption (Presunción legal). Every legal presumption exempts the party that alleges it from the obligation to prove the fact deemed true by virtue of such presumption. However, whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts on which it is based. Article 415. Absolute presumption (Presunción absoluta). Those shall be considered absolute presumptions by virtue of which the law annuls certain acts, or grants a peremptory exception, if in those hypotheses the law has not expressly reserved proof to the contrary. However, no matter how absolute a legal presumption is, it does not oppose the effectiveness of the confession of the contrary fact, provided that the presumptions are exclusively established for a private interest, and that the confession is admissible in the matter of the litigation. Article 416. Relative presumption (Presunción relativa). Outside of absolute presumptions, the others may be contested by proof to the contrary, for which all legal means are admissible, except as established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of complying with them. Article 417. Human presumption (Presunción humana). Human presumptions only constitute proof if they are the direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. The proof of presumptions must be serious and consistent with the other evidence provided in the process." Furthermore, according to article 166 Family and 173 subsection 2), both of the Código de Familia, if the person claiming maintenance ceased to need them or, indeed, does not need them, the termination of the maintenance obligation or, respectively, the granting of the claim is appropriate. So, it is a myth to affirm that a person receiving maintenance cannot work, and it is also a myth to believe that if the person receiving maintenance works, this never impacts the maintenance amount and even the right to receive maintenance. For greater clarity, Alda Facio Montejo proposes a conception of the legal phenomenon not based solely on the formal component.

It specifically proposes a tripartite conception of the legal phenomenon, which entails the constant and deep interaction between the formal-normative or substantive component, the structural component, and the political-cultural component. The first component comprises the formally created norm in a broad sense, that is, not only as a synonym for law. The second refers to the content, scope, and interpretation that authorities *-in a broad sense-* give to the formal component. Thus, identifying the structural component implies making visible the set of *“unwritten norms”* that are rigorously followed by authorities and citizens. Finally, the political-cultural component refers to the dimension and understanding granted to the formal component through common knowledge -empirical- of normative provisions, customs, traditions, legal doctrine, the use people make of the law, etc. All of this also forms a set of *“unwritten norms”* that are obeyed and reinforced by the community. (Facio Montejo, Alda. (1999). Cuando el género suena cambios trae. Metodología para el análisis de género del fenómeno legal. Tercera Edición. San José, Costa Rica. ILANUD. The digital version can be consulted at http://fundacionjyg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Cuando-elg%C3%A9nero-suena-cambios-trae.pdf) The author states that these three components remain in constant interaction since those who create the laws, apply them, or rather, interpret them, are part of a specific society at a specific historical moment; hence, the content, scope, projection, and interpretation of the formal component reflects the set of prevailing considerations in a specific society and situation. Thus, they highlight the overvaluation of the masculine, the undervaluation of the feminine, of disability, of aging, of childhood, of foreignness, etc.

Thus, to affirm that a person beneficiary of child support is prohibited from working is a myth, and so is believing that if they work, this never affects the support amount or even the right to receive support, that is, that they can capitalize the product of their work or even their income and, at the same time, receive a support pension.

d. Sons and daughters over eighteen years of age and under twenty-five years of age who seek support and to remain as support beneficiaries must remain within the assumptions indicated by article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). That is, it is not enough to momentarily or superficially place oneself in the assumption contemplated by the norm to have the right to support; rather, it is indispensable to remain in those assumptions, as the support obligation regarding said population is conditional. In other words, it subsists if the person fulfills what the norm states. In judicial practice, it is common to observe that resolutions imposing support pensions *-provisional or not-* in favor of sons and daughters of legal age but under twenty-five years of age who are studying, do not contemplate what the obligations are that the beneficiary persons must fulfill. That is, they are resolutions that always warn the obligated person what will happen if they fail to comply with what is provided in a specific resolution, but they do not warn the beneficiary persons what they are obligated to. This is not a minor issue, since as parental responsibility ceases upon reaching the age of majority according to article 158, subsection a) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), it is clear that no person obligated to pay support can obtain, regarding the adult support beneficiary person, information about the academic load and the results obtained at the end of the respective school term as defined in a specific study plan. For greater clarity, such information has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) as private information. In this regard, resolution No. 592-13, 9:05 of January 18, 2013, reiterated in judgment No. 2135-17, 9:30 of February 10, 2017, and No. 3159-2017, 9:30 of February 28, 2017, may be consulted.

Therefore, as a consequence of the cessation of parental responsibility, the burden of proving compliance with the requirements when filing the claim and during the execution of the support obligation, whether established since minority or subsequently, corresponds to the beneficiary person, precisely because they are an adult person. Now then, in those cases where obtaining the certification of grades and enrollment represents an economic burden of impossible or difficult fulfillment for the beneficiary person, what is appropriate is that, before the end of the school term according to the study plan or else, immediately after it ends, the beneficiary person request the respective court to issue an official letter where the judicial authority requests the pertinent information from the educational center, with the indication that such a request is protected by the principle of gratuity inherent to support matters and also responds to a judicial order. Furthermore, it will be the responsibility of the party beneficiary of support to process the official letter and prove the respective processing, since the evidentiary burden corresponds to that party and not to the defendant party. Logically, it is up to the judicial authority to issue the official letter immediately and to send any reminder, as well as to inform the parties of the information provided by the educational center. It goes without saying that the request to the educational center must be clear about the need and urgency of the information, as well as that it is necessary to know what subjects were taken and the result of each one -passed or not, withdrawn with or without justification, frozen or not-, as well as the grades obtained, the study plan of the degree program being pursued, the schedule taken, and the enrollment currently in progress. Furthermore, if it is an educational center that requires an investment to enroll, it must indicate the cost of the current enrollment or if the beneficiary person has any type of scholarship, as well as any other information that the judicial authority deems pertinent according to the specific case.

Since the duty to provide food (obligación alimentaria) for persons over eighteen years and under twenty-five years of age is a conditional obligation insofar as the person receiving food (persona beneficiaria de alimentos) must remain in the circumstances contemplated in article 173, subsection 5) of the Código de Familia, if the beneficiary does not provide information on the academic load they have taken and are taking, as well as the results obtained, or does not request that the court issue said official letter or, if already issued, does not demonstrate that it has been processed, the judicial authority must order the provision of the information within a peremptory period to be defined in each specific case, concerning what article 173, subsection 5) of the Código de Familia indicates, under warning that, upon request of the party obligated to pay food (parte obligada al pago de alimentos), the suspension of the execution of the food obligation may be ordered with grounds, and furthermore, no corporal compulsion (apremio corporal) will be issued until the ordered requirement is fulfilled. This is all because the burden of proving that they remain in the circumstances the norm contemplates corresponds to the person receiving food, and not remaining in the circumstances that the cited norm contemplates is a breach of the condition imposed by the regulations. If this verification of requirements is not carried out, the already mentioned consequences could arise: procedural fraud (estafa procesal), attempted procedural fraud (tentativa de estafa procesal), unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa), etc., and even worse could arise: that the beneficiary is no longer studying.

Thus, it must be very clear that whoever engages in an abuse of rights (ejercicio abusivo del derecho) in accordance with articles 19 and following of the Código Civil, either to demand food or to execute the food obligation, and thereby generates a judicial resolution or avoids a judicial resolution, and this, as a result, causes asset transfers (desplazamientos patrimoniales) in their favor without meeting the requirements the norm demands, could face a criminal case for procedural fraud or attempted procedural fraud. For greater clarity, the Sala Tercera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has said: "Regarding procedural fraud, it is useful to mention what doctrine has written about this criminal type: 'there are common cases of triangular frauds; in these cases, the deceived party and the harmed party are different. The most complicated case of this Triangular Fraud is the so-called procedural fraud. Characteristic of procedural fraud is that the deceived judge issues a resolution with which they perform a dispositive act harmful to one of the procedural parties or to a third party. Procedural fraud consists of a deceitful action carried out by the agent with the purpose of obtaining an unlawful asset benefit for themselves or for a third party in the course of a proceeding. By means of this deceitful action, they induce the judge hearing the case into error or maintain them therein, and as a consequence of that error, the judge issues a resolution that does not correspond to the real factual situation, a resolution that causes harm to the sponsorship of a procedural party or a third party.' (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, FRANCISCO. El delito de Estafa. Editorial Juritexto. San José. Costa Rica. 2001. p. 178). For the crime of Procedural Fraud to be configured, the existence of an asset harm (perjuicio patrimonial) to a party involved in the process or a third party must be verified." Resolution n.° 1164-14, 10:08 of July 4, 2014.

Said Chamber, in resolution n.° 313-14, 8:52 of March 7, 2014, stated: "Precisely, regarding the existence of the criminal type of interest, in addition to what was previously stated, it must be understood that it came into legal existence and led to harming the victims, with the particularity of what is doctrinally called: 'procedural' or 'triangular' fraud. By this example, this type of crime has been mostly known: '...presupposes a deception of the judge, who, due to the error produced by the deception, through an erroneous decision, performs a dispositive act harmful to the other party's assets...' (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, FRANCISCO. El delito de estafa. Editorial Juritexto. San José, Costa Rica. Year 2001. p. 126). This type of fraud meets all the elements of common fraud but characterized by the participation of three subjects: i) the active one, tasked with deceiving; ii) the deceived passive one who performs the dispositive act by error, and, iii) the harmed party." Furthermore, in judgment n.° 1206-04, 9:35 of October 22, 2004, said Chamber indicated: "(...) Article 24 of the Código Penal, as relevant, points out: 'There is an attempt when the execution of a crime begins, through acts directly aimed at its consummation, and it does not occur due to causes independent of the agent. The penalty corresponding to the attempt will not be applied when the consummation of the crime was absolutely impossible.' As can be seen, the criminal type punishes as an attempt the beginning of the execution of the crime, carried out through acts directly aimed at its consummation. In this way, unpunishable preparatory acts are separated from acts of execution of the crime, which are punishable as an attempt. In Costa Rica, this separation is made based on the individual-objective theory." According to this theory, two extremes must be taken into account: First, the plan of the active subject and second, whether, pursuant to that plan, the action represents a close danger to the legal right. For this theory, the beginning of the execution is not necessarily a part of the typical action: "(...) the beginning of the execution of the crime is not strictly the beginning of the execution of the action objectively indicated by the typical verb, but also encompasses acts that, according to the perpetrator's plan (the concrete mode of carrying out the typical action chosen by the perpetrator), are immediately prior to the beginning of the execution of the typical action and objectively represent a danger to the legal right, it being understood that a partial act will be immediately preceding the execution of the typical action when there is no other partial act in the perpetrator's concrete plan between it and that action." (ZAFFARONI, Eugenio Raúl. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Buenos Aires: EDIAR, second edition, 2002, p. 829). As can be extracted from this text, unpunishable preparatory acts are those that, although directed toward the execution of the criminal type, do not do so in a direct and immediate manner and, consequently, are not a serious threat to the protected legal right (unless legislation expressly considers them punishable, turning them into an independent crime). Likewise, acts directly aimed at the consummation of the crime—among which is included the action that immediately precedes the beginning of the typical action, temporally and spatially—and that allow the active subject, according to their plan, the step without essential interruptions to the beginning of that action, are punishable as an attempt. Based on the foregoing, this Court considers that, contrary to what the defense asserts without any basis, the accused began the execution of the crime with the filing before the court of the executory complaint and the promissory notes, knowing that the obligations that were guaranteed with them did not exist, indicating to the Judge that the defendant company owed him the sum mentioned in said negotiable instruments. Through this scheme, (...) he intended for the Judge to issue a resolution that would provide him an undue benefit and that, in turn, entailed a diminution in the assets of the defendant company. In summary, with the mere filing of the executory complaint and the negotiable instruments, the accused began the execution of the procedural fraud, a conclusion derived from the plan he pursued, as well as from the threat to the legal right that his actions implied at that moment. (...) As observed, in the case of procedural fraud, the crime begins its execution with the filing of the complaint and the evidence, elements that together make up the deceptive scheme directed at the Judge. (...) For us to understand the aforementioned, first we must refer to the issue of formal and material consummation in fraud. Formal consummation occurs when the pecuniary damage is caused, while material consummation occurs when the active subject obtains the unlawful pecuniary benefit they pursued, a purpose that transcends the criminal type. This Chamber has previously stated that, for criminal purposes, formal consummation is sufficient: "The requirement of subsequent purposes allows, in some crimes that expressly contemplate it, for example fraud, simulation fraud, or extortion, all crimes that affect property as a whole, to distinguish between two moments of consummation: the formal, which occurs with the causing of the pecuniary damage, and the material consummation, which occurs when the agent obtains the desired purpose, specifically the unlawful pecuniary benefit, whether for himself or for a third party. However, formal consummation is sufficient for the crime to be considered consummated, for the corresponding criminal purposes, with material consummation possibly occurring or not (...)." Resolution No. 420-F-95 of 10:00 a.m. on July 21, 1995. In this same sense, Carlos Fontán Balestra indicates: "Fraud is consummated at the moment the pecuniary damage takes place. Advancing that moment to the time of carrying out the scheme supposes taking as acts of consummation those that only constitute an attempt. Taking consummation to the moment when the benefit is obtained is to demand the concurrence of an element not required in the type, given that in Argentine law the pecuniary advantage is only a purpose that must accompany the action." FONTÁN BALESTRA (Carlos). Derecho Penal. Parte Especial. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 15th edition, 1998, p. 483. All these considerations, made in relation to pure and simple fraud, are also applicable to procedural fraud.

From that point on, it was enough for the Judge to issue resolutions that harm the victim's property for the act to be considered consummated, even if they are interlocutory measures that do not end the proceeding. The resolution ordering execution (despacha ejecución) and decreeing seizure (embargo) is undoubtedly one of them. Although the proceeding has not been definitively concluded and, consequently, the active subject of the crime has not obtained the unlawful patrimonial benefit, there is already a formal consummation of the crime, since as a consequence of the deceitful maneuver, the jurisdictional body issued resolutions that harm another's property." Similarly, this Court, in judgment No. 1219-05, 9:15 of October 26, 2005, held: "(...) For a better understanding, it is necessary to make some brief considerations about the crime of fraud (estafa), contained in Article 216 of the Penal Code. The current structure of this criminal type contains forms of fraud different from the traditional definition established before the 1988 reform, such as the so-called 'triangular fraud (estafa triangular)'. In this type of fraud, the triangular structure arises between the active subject, the passive subject, and the injured party. Thus, the perpetrator induces the passive subject, who has dispositive power over the victim's property, into an error, and thereby manages to cause a patrimonial injury, thereby obtaining an unlawful benefit. The most illustrative example is the so-called procedural fraud (estafa procesal), which – in a strict sense – 'presupposes a deception of the judge, who, due to the error produced by the deception, through an erroneous decision, carries out a harmful dispositive act on the other party's property.' (Castillo González, Francisco. El delito de estafa. Editorial Juritexto, San José Costa Rica, Year 2001, p. 126). The core point of fraud is the simulation of false facts or the deformation or concealment of true facts, which implies in turn that the trick or error can be produced by action or by omission, all with the purpose of obtaining an unlawful patrimonial benefit. This last element is not necessary for material consummation, because the crime is formally consummated when there has been injury to another's property; this is so because fraud is a crime of shortened result, in which a distinction is made between formal consummation (when the patrimonial injury occurs) and material consummation or the exhaustion phase of the illicit act (when the unlawful patrimonial benefit is achieved). In general, both in the classic modality of fraud and in triangular fraud, it is necessarily required that the subject induced into error is the one who performs the dispositive act (to his own detriment or to the detriment of a third party). Thus, 'the patrimonial injury must be the result of an act of disposition by the deceived subject – who is not, necessarily, the injured party. It is not a matter here of stealing, nor of appropriating, but of provoking the 'collaboration of the passive subject,' in such a way that the latter makes a patrimonial disposition to the detriment of himself or a third party.' (Valle Muñiz, José Manuel. El delito de Estafa. Bosch, Casa Editorial, Barcelona, 1988, p. 187). Author Francisco Castillo González opines in this same sense, indicating that 'The crime of fraud requires identity between the one deceived and the one who performs the dispositive act, but does not presuppose identity between the one who performs the dispositive act and the injured party.' (Castillo González, Francisco. op. cit. p.168). In summary, the error must motivate the harmful patrimonial disposition, and in cases of 'triangular frauds,' the one who performs the dispositive act must have a special power of disposition over the property on which the injury will fall, which is to say that 'the criminally relevant act of disposition should be understood, then, generically, as that behavior, active or omissive, of the subject induced into error that will directly lead to the production of patrimonial damage to himself or a third party. It is the causal nexus between the deception and the injury, which without said disposition could not be attributed to the deceitful conduct, at least under the title of fraud.' (Valle Muñiz, José Manuel. Op. cit. p. 214)." In other words, if the person benefiting from child support has not undertaken to remain within the conditions required by Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code, that is, does not conduct themselves with the responsibility that pursuing a university degree or studying for a trade entails, receiving a child support pension (pensión alimentaria) for it and, furthermore, does not diligently fulfill their procedural burdens from funds paid by the party who owes child support, and has merely placed themselves momentarily or even superficially within the assumption contemplated in the norm, it is a very delicate matter that, depending on the specific case, could constitute an abusive exercise of rights and a procedural fraud or an attempted procedural fraud even, or unjust enrichment.

See for example that, in a case before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) where the imposition of payment of expenses for the start of the school year for the benefit of a person under the provision of article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) was discussed, that Court stated: “(…) the Chamber considers that with respect to the granting of the alimony (pensión alimentaria) claimed, the appealed alimony court committed a serious error in the processing of the summary proceeding that cannot be overlooked, since when the alimony creditor reached the age of majority, the proper course of action -according to the applicable legal regulations- was to appear in the process and provide information on the course load and academic performance, just as she did when she requested the school stipend in 2019; however, when the alimony obligor requests that updated information each time a writ of body attachment (apremio corporal) is required for that item, the beneficiary is obliged to present said evidence. Despite the above, the appealed jurisdictional authority did not proceed to require that evidence as it should have, through a preventive order (prevención), but instead imposed the payment of the benefit on the person under its protection, indicating that if he wished, he could file a process of exclusion (exclusión) of the alimony beneficiary. However, the petitioner here did not seek that exclusion, provided the beneficiary's course load and performance were previously accredited.” Judgment No. 9319-23, 9:15 a.m. of April 25, 2023. That is, as ordered by the Constitutional Chamber, the beneficiary person must demonstrate their continued presence in the factual circumstances contemplated by the cited rule and not disregard that obligation. It is not enough to have demonstrated it once, either at the beginning of a new process or when appearing as an adult in the alimony process that existed while a minor, but rather, they must demonstrate that they remain in the factual circumstances contemplated by the rule if they intend to receive alimony and even request body attachments in case of non-compliance. Logically, it is not a matter of presenting a certification of grades and enrollment with each attachment requested, but rather, providing the certification of grades and enrollment, each time an academic period ends, which also entails demonstrating the completed enrollment, where not only the number of courses taken can be observed but also the schedules.

Now, as the Constitutional Chamber pointed out in the previous vote - No. 9319-23-, in judicial practice it is common that, even though the alimony obligation provided for in the cited article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code is an evidently conditional alimony obligation, it is usual that some courts of first instance do not generate a supervision mechanism for compliance with the permanence in the circumstances contemplated by the rule and, on the contrary, it has become a custom that in the rulings that set provisional alimony or in a judgment, procedural burdens are not established for the person receiving alimony, as if the alimony obligation in question were the same as the alimony obligation towards a minor, for example. In a better view, this neglect in establishing the burdens that a beneficiary person must comply with by application of article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code has generated abuse of right by some beneficiary persons and has placed debtor persons in a situation of uncertainty. Furthermore, it has forced the latter to promote processes of exclusion precisely because they do not know if the beneficiary person complies or not with what the cited rule requires. In this way, the generation of an impartial, practical, expeditious mechanism based on existing procedural and substantive norms, as well as on binding constitutional jurisprudence, for the purpose of supervising compliance with the condition that this type of alimony obligation entails and also, to guarantee the pro homine principle for both parties to the obligation, as well as to guarantee the pro libertatis principle to the alimony debtor, will favor the de-confrontation (descontención) between the parties, the decongestion of the first instance, and with it, the prudent consumption of public funds dedicated to the administration of justice, as well as, will avoid the abuse of right in a double way.

For greater clarity, in the first case, it will favor de-confrontation because adult sons and daughters will not be subjected to possible harassment, mortification, and extrajudicial pressure by the persons obliged to pay alimony, demanding information about their academic progress, while everything will be done within the judicial process. In the second case, decongestion is produced, because judicial offices will not have to process alimony proceedings in which the obligor files exclusion processes based on information they do not have or suppose.

In practice, it is frequently observed that obligors file exclusion processes stating that the beneficiary person does not study, does not fulfill an academic load, or does not have good performance, because in reality they know nothing about the compliance or non-compliance with the conditions that the beneficiary party must prove, and that lack of knowledge stems from the age of majority of the beneficiary person or from the deficient or absent communication between the parties. Consequently, it is possible that this mechanism that makes procedural burdens visible will avoid the processing of unnecessary alimony proceedings that only generate expectations in the parties, cause tension, and foster unnecessary judicial confrontations, in addition to saturating the schedules of judicial offices.

This mechanism that makes procedural burdens visible will also benefit the public service provided by the Public Defense (Defensa Pública), insofar as it would have no reason to intervene in processes that nowadays are basically caused by uncertainty regarding the permanence in the fulfillment of the requirements established by said rule. Additionally, it is possible that this supervision mechanism will also decrease the filing of Habeas Corpus remedies by the persons obliged to pay alimony.

In this regard, this mechanism will also prevent the abusive exercise of rights by the food support beneficiary and by the obligor, since the rules for compliance with the obligation will be clear for each party.

Additionally, within this framework of preventing the abusive exercise of a right, the issue of body attachment (apremio corporal) is also relevant, as it is contrary to the pro-liberty principle that a person obligated to pay food support can be subjected to coercion without knowing whether, at the end of each academic term, the beneficiary party is complying with the provisions of Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), as if the norm allowed the beneficiary to disregard demonstrating that they remain within the circumstances contemplated by the norm.

Finally, and no less importantly, making the clear compliance rules visible for both parties could somehow prevent beneficiaries from abandoning their studies, making little progress in their study plan, or constantly changing their degree program, since evidently, such behavior could cause them to lose their right to food support. Thus, when a food support beneficiary is not obligated to demonstrate that they remain within the circumstances contemplated by the norm, they could easily disregard studying.

f. In those cases where the information on compliance with requirements is not added to the case file (expediente) for reasons attributable to the food support beneficiary, or where the information obtained reveals that they do not remain within the circumstances established in Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), the party obligated to pay food support may request that the enforcement (ejecución) of the obligation be suspended, and must indicate the basis for such a request. In this sense, if there was a prior warning to the beneficiary party regarding all the above, that is, regarding the procedural burdens (cargas procesales) they must fulfill, the request must be resolved without further procedure by means of a reasoned pronouncement (pronunciamiento fundado) on the requested measure, indicating whether it is granted or not and why. This implies analyzing the circumstances of each specific case as they appear in the case file (expediente), as generalization is not possible. Furthermore, if the debtor party is not obligated to pay food support due to the issuance of a firm precautionary measure (medida cautelar) ordering the suspension of the obligation, the travel ban (impedimento de salida del país) must be lifted. Consequently, the beneficiary party must also be very clear about what will happen if they fail to comply with the corresponding procedural burden (carga procesal).

However, if no warning has been given to the beneficiary party regarding the procedural burdens (cargas procesales) they must fulfill, a hearing must be granted on the request for a precautionary measure (medida cautelar) formulated by the beneficiary party for a reasonable period, and it must be notified at the means indicated for that purpose. This entails that every food support beneficiary must be warned to maintain an active means for receiving notifications, under the admonishment (apercibimiento) that automatic notification will operate in case of non-compliance, and this same warning must apply to every person obligated to pay food support. That is, it is a procedural burden (carga procesal) that each party must fulfill. All of this, especially since constitutional jurisprudence has ruled on the possibility of using a means indicated in the case file (expediente) according to the circumstances that have been analyzed, for example, in constitutional resolutions No. 12407-21, 8:30 of May 28, 2021; No. 25582-21, 9:15 of November 12, 2021; No. 3077-22, 9:15 of February 9, 2023; No. 13002-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 19495-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 19498-22, 11:05 of August 23, 2022; No. 2210-23, 9:40 of January 31, 2023; No. 9966-23, 9:15 of April 28, 2023 and, No. 11037-23, 9:20 of May 12, 2023. That is, constitutional jurisprudence has considered it possible, in certain circumstances, to dispense with personal notification or notification by ID card (cédula) at the place of residence. Of course, this must be analyzed with great care because such decisions refer to processes for modifying the judgment (modificación de fallo), and these are: exclusions, exemptions, reductions, and increases. That is, it does not refer to the so-called "inclusion" processes, since in these it is clear that a person is not being included in an already existing amount; consequently, it is a new process that implies new procedural burdens (cargas procesales) for the obligated party, and especially, a new admonishment (apercibimiento) of body attachment (apremio corporal) in case of non-compliance. Added to this, it is essential to know if the beneficiary party of legal age—an adult son or daughter, for example—has already received advice from the public defender's office (defensa pública), since in that case, it is usual for said office to provide legal assistance until the issuance of a second-instance judgment.

Now, returning to the issue of the precautionary measure (medida cautelar), in both cases—denying or granting the precautionary measure (medida cautelar) to suspend the food support obligation—as indicated, the resolution must be reasoned (fundada) and, as it produces its own effects, it is appealable. As a complement, if the judicial authority decides to grant the precautionary measure (medida cautelar), logically, it cannot have an indeterminate duration without a formal exclusion process having been filed, since a precautionary measure (medida cautelar) cannot have an indefinite effect. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has been very clear, as it has stated: "IV.- The Chamber considers that even though the Family Code (Código de Familia), in its Article 173, subsection 5, provides that there is no obligation to provide food support when the beneficiaries have reached the age of majority, the same norm establishes that the rule is not absolute, since if the children are pursuing studies, the duty is not interrupted. It also does not apply automatically, as it indicates that the concurrence of the exempting causes of the food support obligation, in general, must be demonstrated before the competent judicial authority. In this case, the plaintiff has not yet been released from his food support obligation, as there was opposition to the exclusion of the beneficiary and the petition filed for that purpose has not yet been decided, having a hearing scheduled for May 12, 2011 for conciliation and, should this fail, the reception of evidence. Thus, the incomplete payment of the monthly quota for March provided sufficient grounds for the issuance of the order." Judgment No. 4442-11, 14:40 of April 5, 2011; No. 1223-15, 9:05 of January 28, 2015, No. 19969-15, 9:30 of December 30, 2015 and, No. 3442-19, 10:40 of February 26, 2019.

Furthermore, in a similar vein, resolutions no. 2439-1995, 15:03 of May 16, 1995, no. 6123-2009, 16:11 of April 22, 2009, no. 47-2006, 9:46 of January 6, 2006; no. 2230-05, 14:32 of March 2, 2005; 10643-2014, 14:30 of July 1, 2014; no. 2426-2020, 09:30 hours of February 7, 2020; no. 16457-2020, 9:20 of August 28, 2020; no. 9478-12, 14:30 of July 18, 2012; no. 18821-15, 14;30 of December 1, 2015.

Thus, upon granting the precautionary measure (medida cautelar), the judicial authority must warn the debtor that they must mandatorily file the exclusion claim within a non-extendable period of one month, under warning that the ordered measure will cease to have effect, which implies that they must comply with the support obligation under warning of civil arrest (apremio corporal) if applicable, or by reactivating the withholding, if that is the form of compliance being executed. This mandatory warning is based on the provisions of Articles 241 to 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), Law no. 7130, which state: "Article 241.- Timing. The precautionary procedure may be initiated before or during the course of the main proceeding, of which it will always form a part. Article 242.- Powers of the judge. In addition to the specific precautionary procedures, the judge may determine the precautionary measures deemed appropriate, when there is a well-founded fear that one party, before the judgment, may cause a serious and difficult-to-repair injury to the other party's right. To avoid the damage, the judge may authorize or prohibit the performance of certain acts, order the deposit of assets, or impose the granting of a bond. Article 243.- Duty to file the claim. The party must file its claim within a period of one month counted from the date on which the precautionary measure was executed, when it was granted in a preliminary proceeding. Article 244.- Cessation of effects. The effectiveness of the precautionary measure shall cease: 1) If the party does not file the claim within the period established in the previous article. 2) If it is unjustifiably not executed within that same period. The effectiveness of the measure having ceased, it shall be prohibited for the party to repeat the action, except on new grounds." At this point, it is worth noting that regarding precautionary measures, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: "According to the most qualified doctrine, interim or precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) arise in the process as a necessity to guarantee effective jurisdictional protection and can therefore be conceptualized as 'a set of procedural powers of the judge—whether judicial or administrative—to resolve before the final ruling, with the specific purpose of preserving the real conditions indispensable for the issuance and execution of the final act.' The doctrine understands that instrumentality and provisionality are two fundamental characteristics of precautionary measures and that their main configurative elements require that they must be: a) lawful and legally possible; b) provisional, since they are extinguished upon the issuance of the final act; c) well-founded, that is, having a real factual basis in relation to the particular case; d) modifiable, in the sense that they can be increased or decreased to adapt them to new needs; e) accessory, since they are justified within a main proceeding; f) preventive in nature, as their purpose is to avoid inconveniences to the interests and rights represented in the main proceeding; g) of securing effects, by seeking to maintain a state of fact or law during the development of the proceeding, preventing situations that could harm the effectiveness of the judgment or final act; h) homogeneous and not responding to characteristics of identity with respect to the substantive right protected, so that they are effective preventive measures and not anticipated acts of execution." Judgment no. 7190-1994, 13:24 of December 6, 1994. Furthermore, the judgments issued by that Constitutional Court can be consulted: no. 5407-94, 15:54 of July 18, 1995, no. 6786-94, 15:27 hours of November 22, 1994, no. 3929-95, 15:24 hours of July 18, 1995, and no. 6337-02, 14:40 of June 26, 2002, among others.

In addition to this, as precautionary measures remain in effect as long as the factual circumstances that gave rise to them persist, it is clear that upon the express and well-founded request of the creditor, if the factual basis that gave rise to the precautionary measure has changed, the reactivation of the support obligation may be ordered by a well-founded resolution, and in that case, the forms of execution will resume: civil arrest, withholding, impediment to leave the country, etc. However, it also falls to the judicial authority to define what will happen with the support payments made by the party obligated to pay support while the beneficiary did not meet the requirements established in Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), since omitting a ruling on such an extreme could generate unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa). Note that it is not a matter of restitution of support payments but of unjust enrichment. In this regard, it is timely to point out that the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment no. 574, 9:30 of July 14, 2004, stated: "(...) Thus, the Chamber deems the application of Articles 1,043 and 1,044 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which make up Chapter V, 'Of Quasi-Contracts (cuasicontratos)', of Title I (Contracts and Quasi-Contracts), of Book IV of that normative body, to be appropriate." The first cited provision states: "Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement (convención), civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties." The cited numeral 1.044 indicates: "This class of obligations includes, among others, the management of another's affairs (gestión de negocios), the administration of a thing in common (administración de una cosa en común), voluntary guardianship (tutela voluntaria), and undue payment (pago indebido)." (Bold and underlining are the editor's). As can be seen, this last provision does not exclude the application of other legal figures, considered as quasi-contracts (cuasicontratos). Legal doctrine, for its part, includes unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) within this scope. Regarding this theory, Messineo explains the following: "Another case of legal obligation (obligación legal) is constituted by unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) ... The figure of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) includes cases where someone converts another's property for their own benefit, or benefits from another's activity (the so-called versión útil or in rem versio) to the detriment of another, without there being a reason that justifies the profit or benefit: in other words, without there being a legal relationship (relación jurídica), already constituted, that serves as a cause legitimizing the profit, or the benefit, of the enriched party... / This formula ... also includes cases of enrichment without the will of another person (the impoverished party); the lack of will of the impoverished party results in a lack of cause. / The action for unjust enrichment (acción de enriquecimiento sin causa) seeks to restore the balance between the two estates, that is, to eliminate the undue enrichment, through a claim for compensation (indemnización). / Several prerequisites exist for the action we are discussing. They require: a) ... the effective enrichment of a subject, that is, that his estate receives an increase ..., and enrichment is also considered to be the savings of an expense, or having prevented a loss for another through one's own patrimonial sacrifice... b) that, for such an increase to the enriched party, there corresponds a decrease in the estate of another subject (the impoverished party)... c) ... a relationship of correspondence between the enrichment and the impoverishment; and, moreover, a causal link between the patrimonial decrease suffered by one subject and the patrimonial advantage of the other; ... d) it is necessary that the enrichment-impoverishment occur without cause... Absence of cause means that there is no patrimonial relationship (relación patrimonial) ... that justifies the enrichment-impoverishment... / The effect of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) is the birth of the obligation to compensate (obligación de indemnización); on the part of the enriched party, in favor of the impoverished party... Finally, it must be observed that the compensation (indemnización) must be adjusted to the extent of the enrichment and cannot exceed it..." (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tomo VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1.955, pp. 465-466). (On the subject, see also BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1.997, pp. 808-818 and PLANIOL, Marcel y RIPERT, Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1.997, pp. 812-813) (...)." This criterion was also expressed in judgment no. 837-04, 10:10 of October 1, 2004, and no. 301-10, 10:45 of February 26, 2010.

g. It should be noted that, in those cases where a judgment has not been issued and a provisional support payment (pensión alimentaria provisional) exists, set without defining the burdens that the support beneficiary (persona beneficiaria de alimentos) must fulfill according to article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), or the support beneficiary has already reached the age of majority and there is no ruling informing them of what their burdens are, and even in those cases where a judgment has already been issued without informing the obligor of their burdens, the prudent course would be to issue a ruling that makes clear said burdens, as is understood from constitutional judgment no. 5112-11, 12:21 of April 25, 2011. Furthermore, in reality, in every judgment that upholds a claim based on article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), said burdens must be defined. This is based on the principle of procedural good faith (lealtad procesal) and the principle of preference for non-contentious resolution (principio de preferencia por la descontentión).

h. Now, by virtue of the principle of autonomy of will (autonomía de la voluntad) and because the support payment (pensión alimentaria) comes from private funds, it is clear that the obligor can expressly release the beneficiary from providing said documentation regarding the permanent fulfillment of requirements, and that release cannot be used for games or pressure; that is, whoever releases from that burden must be clear that they cannot change their mind constantly. Thus, retracting that release must be based on something well-founded and not arbitrary. Therefore, reactivating the fulfillment of burdens and, consequently, the supervisory mechanism, requires a reasoned ruling.

i. Since said support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is an exceptional and conditional obligation, it is important to analyze what should be understood by good performance and a reasonable academic load (carga académica razonable). Thus, according to article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia), obtaining “good performance with a reasonable academic load” is the counter-prestation (contraprestación) that the person receiving support must fulfill. As observed, the provision does not separate the concept of “good performance” from the concept of “reasonable academic load,” but rather links the first to the second, as it introduces the preposition “with.” Therefore, in each specific case, one must first determine what the academic load is, then define whether it is reasonable and why, and then conclude whether the performance obtained is good or not and why, which entails analyzing what is understood by “good” in the particular case.

Furthermore, it is well known that determining what constitutes the academic course load (carga académica) is also normatively linked to obtaining a profession or trade (profesión u oficio); that is, the academic course load must be analyzed in terms of obtaining a profession or trade, which excludes obtaining "another" profession or trade, or simply enrolling in and passing courses without concrete progress toward obtaining a profession or trade. In other words, just any enrollment is not sufficient, since the rule does not protect "remaining a student," but rather obtaining "good academic performance with a reasonable academic course load" and with a purpose already defined by law: to obtain a profession or trade. For greater clarity, each course enrollment must entail progress toward obtaining a profession or trade. Thus, "filler" courses taken to "maintain active student status" are not courses that allow progress toward obtaining a profession or trade, as they are not part of the curriculum. Consequently, it is pertinent to insist that "remaining a student" is not what the core of the rule requires.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is clear that there may be exceptional situations in which enrollment in some course could be accepted to cover the transition between secondary and university education, or to obtain a trade, especially due to the impossibility of enrollment given the time when the beneficiary completed secondary school. Such is the case of individuals who had to take extraordinary exams to finish the fifth year and, therefore, did not manage to enroll in a university or other type of educational center. Similarly, if what could not be completed was the high school diploma, the situation must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, because it is a known fact that there are some subjects in which the deficiency is not solely or necessarily attributable to the person taking the exam, but to the educational system itself, and there are even areas of the country where academic performance is generally low. All of this must be analyzed in each specific case.

As has been stated, it is evident that the rule in question expressly establishes, as a general rule, the termination of the right to support (derecho alimentario) for sons and daughters who have reached the age of majority and, subsequently, determines as an exception the continuation of the right if the person has not finished their studies (estudios), and furthermore, it must be clear that it does not refer to just any type of studies, but rather studies for obtaining a—in the singular—profession or trade. Moreover, they are mutually exclusive obtainments: profession or trade, and not both. Subsequently, the rule establishes the termination of the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) upon reaching twenty-five years of age, regardless of whether a profession or trade has been obtained by that age. For greater understanding, it is worth revisiting what the rule states: "Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide support: (...) 5.- When the support recipients have reached the age of majority, unless they have not finished their studies to acquire a profession or trade, provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good academic performance with a reasonable academic course load. These requirements must be proven when filing the claim, by providing information on the academic course load and performance." As can be observed, it is also clear that the rule does not define what should be understood by "reasonable academic course load" or "good academic performance." In the undersigned's view, both expressions are undefined legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados).

On this subject, Administrative Law has advanced greatly in the analysis of such concepts, and it is evident that they are not exclusive to that area of Law. Thus, it is necessary to turn to the doctrine developed in that branch of Law to analyze Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia). Along these lines, for example, González Alonso proposes that "a large part of the doctrine relates defined and undefined legal concepts to normative language. It seems evident that, with these concepts or definitions (of which our Law offers abundant examples: 'good family father,' 'good faith,' 'recklessness,' 'loyal administrator,' 'just price'...), the intent is to delineate a reality that manifests itself imperfectly and is difficult to translate into normative language. Thus, defined legal concepts are those that delimit, without leaving room for doubt, a sphere of reality, while undefined legal concepts delimit that sphere of reality through a process of integration or determination, of judgment or estimation." (González Alonso, Augusto. Discrecionalidad y su control.

Distinction from arbitrariness and from indeterminate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados). Revista CEFLEGAL No. 98. 2009. Document consulted at the site https://revistas.cef.udima.es/index.php/ceflegal/article/view/13091 Furthermore, Trayter Jiménez defines indeterminate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados) as follows: “They are maxims of experience. They are abstract concepts whose application requires an assessment based on technical criteria or logical reasoning. They are not automatic, like the previous ones, referring to determined legal concepts (…); in Administrative Law: ruin, public order, the fair expropriation price, the extraordinary and urgent need, the clear goal-scoring opportunity, parks and gardens with ‘artistic, historical, anthropological value’ (for the purpose of integrating them into the Spanish historical heritage), public utility, public necessity, imperative need of general interest.” (Trayter Jiménez, Joan Manuel (2015). Manual of Administrative Law. General Part, Barcelona, Atelier Legal Books).

Consequently, the undersigned considers that indeterminate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados) are those that have a framework or reference normative definition and, therefore, an imprecise one, so they must be given specific scope and meaning, but not subjectively, rather legally, that is, in consideration of specific, pertinent, and proven facts. Thus, Clavijo Suntura warns that, “the judicial determination process, although it takes into account principles of moral, social, and axiological ethics, must be defined based on legal criteria.” (Clavijo Suntura, Joel Harry. 2018. Determined and Indeterminate Legal Concepts and the Judicial Decision. Law and Social Change). As a consequence of all the foregoing, it is clear that “reasonable academic load” and “good performance” are concepts integrated to form the expression “good performance with a reasonable academic load”; both expressions are part of a framework or hard core that is given by the real benefit of the support, since studying with one's own resources is one thing, and studying using the resources of another is another. In this latter case, it is imperative that the beneficiary person truly takes advantage of the resources received and prospers in their studies. This is, then, an achievement that must be susceptible to verification and, consequently, there must be parity between the chronological age of the beneficiary person and their progress in their studies. If that parity does not exist, the person receiving support must prove why that lack of parity exists, since it entails a fracture in the hard core of the norm, which refers to the effective utilization of the resources received.

Thus, abandoning a degree program or the study of a trade to begin other studies is not a minor issue but rather something very delicate, because far from generating progress in studies, it instead causes an unjustified delay in obtaining a profession or trade. Therefore, just as a person obligated to pay support cannot seek a change in the support payment based on subjective or even self-induced circumstances, neither can a beneficiary person change degree programs or trades capriciously, and even less so if doing so means losing all or a large part of what they had advanced in the studies they are abandoning. Note that there may even be situations where, instead of finishing a degree or trade well before turning twenty-five years old, the beneficiary person abandons the degree or the studies they are pursuing to obtain a trade, in order to begin other studies with the purpose of extending the validity of the support obligation up to the age of twenty-five. With practices such as those cited, the beneficiary person would be “guaranteeing” support without truly complying with what the norm requires, which is, to pursue studies to obtain a profession or trade. That is, the norm does not authorize a change of degree program, because by doing so, all the contribution that the party obligated to pay support has made would be lost. The matter of changing degree programs is so delicate that a beneficiary person could change degree programs every four-month term or every so often and thus, not commit to obtaining any university degree, but evidently, such conduct is not covered by the norm, since the support obligation provided for in subsection 5) of article 173 of the Family Code is exceptional and conditional, in addition to being normatively oriented toward obtaining a profession or trade. Thus, “keeping on studying” is not what the norm contemplates as a prerequisite for receiving support.

j. Another topic of interest consists of the support claim of someone who decides to begin studies after some time - even years - after having reached the age of majority. In those cases, it is decisive to question how they met their needs before initiating the support process, such that, as required by article 173 subsection 5) of the Family Code, when claiming support they must prove not only that they have enrolled. That is, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that they will pursue studies or are pursuing them. The norm in this sense is very clear: the academic load and good performance must be demonstrated when filing the claim. In other words, the norm makes a difference between those who, after reaching the age of majority, have continued studying to obtain a profession or trade, and those who, after reaching the age of majority, have not been studying, but rather, decide to do so some time later.

Those who are in this latter situation are required, when filing the claim — if they were not support recipients as minors — not only to prove that they are currently pursuing studies or have already enrolled, but also the academic course load (carga académica) they now carry and the results previously obtained. For a better understanding, it is appropriate to refresh the content of the provision: "*Article 173.- There shall be no obligation to provide support: (…) 5.- When the support recipients have reached the age of majority, unless they have not completed their studies to acquire a profession (profesión) or trade (oficio), provided they do not exceed twenty-five years of age and obtain good performance with a reasonable academic course load (carga académica). These requirements must be proven when filing the claim, providing the information on the academic course load and performance.*" As observed, when the provision states "these requirements must be proven when filing the claim, providing the information on the academic course load (carga académica) and academic performance," it refers to those new support proceedings where the person seeking support was not a recipient as a minor and, if it concerns a person who was a support recipient as a minor but decided not to pursue studies once they reached the age of majority and later decides to resume or begin them, they clearly must demonstrate not only the academic course load (carga académica) but also their performance.

In this latter case, the undersigned considers that it is not simply a matter of "activating" the proceeding; rather, what the provision demands must be fulfilled, that is, demonstrating the academic course load (carga académica) and performance. Since the provision demands demonstrating performance, it is understood that there must be a previous academic term whose performance is verifiable. Thus, the support obligations under Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) require much attention and prudence, because it would not be surprising if some person might attempt to receive provisional support or not, a year-end bonus (aguinaldo), and even expenses for the start of the academic term, when they are just beginning studies and, given their age, it would be practically impossible for them to finish a degree program or a trade.

k. Additionally, just as actions or omissions by the recipient that have the purpose or result of undermining the hard core of the provision — Article 173, subsection 5 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) — are inadmissible, it is also not possible for that hard core to be fractured by actions or omissions of the obligor, because if they do not pay the support quota on time, do not pay it at all, or engage in another type of violence and, even if they are obliged to pay a modest sum compared to the financing of studies to obtain a profession (profesión) or trade (oficio), they cannot claim that this should not be considered when analyzing the counterpart obligation (contraprestación) to which the recipient party is bound: "*good performance with a reasonable academic course load (carga académica).*" In other words, failing to fulfill the support obligation and violating the recipient party's right to non-violence does have favorable consequences for the latter when analyzing the counterpart obligation (contraprestación) to which they are bound, because just as violence on the part of an adult support recipient affects the termination of the right to support, so too does violence on the part of the person obliged to pay support affect the verification of obtaining "good performance with a reasonable academic course load (carga académica) to obtain a profession (profesión) or trade (oficio)." l. As a complement, there are subjective situations that may be relevant when analyzing the fulfillment of said counterpart obligation (contraprestación). For example, an illness of the recipient, particular abilities for the learning process, etc., or objective situations that the recipient cannot control, such as, for example, availability of educational offerings in a specific area, Internet connectivity in a specific area, etc. Therefore, in measuring "good performance with a reasonable academic course load (carga académica) to obtain a profession (profesión) or trade (oficio)," there must be an analysis according to each specific case, since generalizing grossly violates the principle of equality. All this with the observation that such analysis does not authorize emptying the hard core of the provision, so that it is always mandatory to take as a reference the framework established by the provision and its purpose: obtaining a profession (profesión) or trade (oficio).

m. As has been stated in this resolution, the support obligation established in Article 173, subsection 5) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) is exceptional and conditional, but also, it is not preferential. Now, this does not mean that a person obliged to pay support can fill themselves with preferential support obligations in order to attempt to neglect the previously acquired support obligation. On the contrary, what this non-preferential character does imply is that, when analyzing compliance with the requirements contemplated by the provision, the judicial authority must be more rigorous in the assessment of the specific case when other preferential recipients exist.

n. As has also been set forth, the provision in question protects the support right for obtaining a profession (profesión) or trade (oficio), that is, not for obtaining several professions, several trades, or a profession (profesión) and a trade (oficio). This, besides being regulated as such, that is, in the singular, is understood because it is an exceptional support obligation and, of course, without prejudice to the support obligor agreeing to pay a quota that covers several professions, several trades, or a profession (profesión) or trade (oficio) and that this does not entail the detriment of other support obligations that are indeed preferential. Likewise, it will be up to the judicial authority to define whether payment of support is appropriate in favor of someone who already has a trade (oficio), such as, for example, the case of persons graduated from technical high schools.

This is because it is clear that the payment of a support allowance during technical education entailed for the obligor the investment of money to provide a profession or trade to the beneficiary and, if the support obligation were to continue to obtain a degree similar to the one already obtained, it merits an analysis in each specific case, especially if what is now intended is to pursue studies in a technical career that has no relation whatsoever to the one already completed. A similar situation occurs when someone who seeks support to pursue a university degree has already completed a technical career. It can be seen that in both cases, the first technical career obtained basically becomes a wasted investment that was backed by the threat of the obligor's liberty in case of non-compliance. That said, the undersigned does not rule out that the practice of making invisible a technical career already completed could obey the myth that exists to the effect that whoever claims support is prohibited from working, but in this ruling it has already been set out why that assertion is a myth, understanding a myth as an imaginary story that alters reality.

Another topic that is also of interest when analyzing the support obligation in question lies in the unilateral decision of the educational center. Thus, in practice it is usual for an adult son or daughter to choose a private educational center and, moreover, the most expensive one, without demonstrating that this was consented to by the obligor or that it corresponds to a certain standard of living provided by the respondent. This practice is a delicate issue because, as has been indicated, the cited support obligation is not preferential, it is conditional, and it is exceptional. So much so that its purpose is also not to financially sustain an independent life project of the beneficiary, such as leaving the nuclear family to have a different place to live, which could even have the purpose of evading the basic rules of coexistence set in their family group. No rule indicates that the father and mother are obliged to finance an independent life project for sons or daughters over eighteen and under twenty-five years of age. In this way, a unilateral decision by the young adult that entails financing an independent life project is not contemplated in the legislation and, therefore, is not legally enforceable, unless their departure from the home is caused by proven situations of violence. All of this with the observation that living as a family implies compliance with basic rules of coexistence such as, for example, having a clear arrival time, not consuming addictive substances, not entering the home having consumed addictive substances, actively participating in household cleaning and food preparation tasks, as well as the management of acquiring supplies and paying bills, etc. That is, living in a family is not living in a "hotel." Therefore, active participation in these tasks indispensable for the sustainability of the home are duties imposed by family life, and demanding collaboration from adult sons or daughters is not violence, unless, in specific situations, the requirement is made through violence, which, as stated, must be demonstrated. In the same sense, a young adult who responds with violence to such requirements could also place themselves in the scenario of loss of the right to support contemplated in article 173, subsection 3) of the Código de Familia.

Having carried out the corresponding analysis regarding the prerequisites of the support obligation and the prerequisites, characteristics, and operability of the support obligation with respect to sons and daughters of legal age, but under twenty-five years of age, it is important to analyze the specific case.

V.SPECIFIC CASE. In this matter, the core issue is quite simple, in that absolutely nothing is known about the academic activity of the beneficiary since the second four-month period of the year 2022. As has been explained, the burden of proving that she meets the requirements established in article 172, subsection 3) of the Código de Familia corresponds to that young woman, and in the first instance she did not do so. In the second instance, she has been given the opportunity to provide that evidence, as evidence has been ordered for a better decision and she has been given the opportunity to process the required information, without the need to incur expenses, since an official letter was issued so that the academic information was processed without cost, but the young woman was notified of the resolution ordering the evidence for a better decision and showed no interest in it. This being the case, it is clear that if nothing is known about the young woman's academic circumstances since the end of the second four-month period of the previous year, she must be excluded from the right to support. In this case, the appealed judgment clearly acknowledges that nothing is known about the young woman's academic circumstances since the end of the second four-month period of the previous year and, nevertheless, it has denied the exclusion process filed. That is, a decision has been made outside of what the regulations establish and without considering binding constitutional jurisprudence. The challenged judgment focuses on the young woman's right to study, and that is not the topic under discussion but rather that she is not doing so. No one doubts that the young woman has the right to study. The cited article clearly indicates so, but if the young woman does not fulfill her evidentiary burdens, it cannot be affirmed that she is studying and, furthermore, under the terms that the rule indicates. Consequently, what is appropriate is to grant the appeal filed and revoke the challenged resolution regarding what has been the subject of the appeal. This being the case, the requested exclusion is granted. The beneficiary's right to support ceases. A ruling on costs is omitted, as that was not appealed.

POR TANTO:

The appeal filed is granted, and the challenged resolution is revoked regarding what has been the subject of the appeal. This being the case, the requested exclusion is granted. The beneficiary's right to support ceases. A ruling on costs is omitted. Maureen Roxana Solís Madrigal.

Judge. 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font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">???????????????</span><br /><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">BMZ3RHHKVGM61</span><br /><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">MAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: ignore;">&nbsp;</span></p> <div style="-aw-headerfooter-type: footer-primary; clear: both;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">EXP: </span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">16-001786-0172-PA</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 1pt; text-align: center; border-bottom: 0.75pt solid #000000; -aw-border-bottom: 0pt single;"><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">I Circuito Judicial de San Jos</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">&eacute;</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">, Edificio Tribunales, Primer Piso. Tel</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">&eacute;</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">fonos: 2295-3473. Fax: 2295-3627. Correo electr</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">&oacute;</span><span style="font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">nico: [email protected]</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 1pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: ignore;">&nbsp;</span></p> </div> </div>

EV Generación de Machote: E:\Gestion-Judicial\servidor de archivos\MODELOS\FAMILIA\JFMAG074.dpj ????????????????

SEGUNDA INSTANCIA ACTOR/A:

[Nombre 001] DEMANDADO/A:

[Nombre 002] SENTENCIA DE SEGUNDA INSTANCIA N° 2023001129 JUZGADO PRIMERO DE FAMILIA DE SAN JOSÉ.- A las veinte horas cincuenta y ocho minutos del uno de noviembre de dos mil veintitrés.- Proceso alimentario -exclusión y rebajo- establecido por [Nombre 001], cédula de identidad número [...] contra [Nombre 002], cédula de identidad número [...]. En apelación formulada por el obligado alimentario, conoce este Juzgado de la sentencia de las 17:07 del 21 de setiembre del año 2023 y,

RESULTANDO:

La señora Jueza de Primera Instancia, Ana Gabriela Herrera Alfaro, declaró sin lugar sin lugar el proceso de exclusión formulado por el obligado alimentario y, acogió parcialmente el proceso de rebajo. El asunto fue resuelto sin condenatoria en costas. El obligado alimentario recurre e indica que no consta que la beneficiaria se encuentre estudiando. Indica que la última información académica de la joven se refiere al segundo cuatrimestre del año 2022 y, no se sabe más. Además, alega que la joven se encuentra laborando. No recurrió lo resuelto sobre costas.

CONSIDERANDO:

I.HECHOS PROBADOS: Se avalan los que indica el fallo recurrido por ser reflejo de los autos.

II. HECHO NO PROBADO

Se incorpora como hecho no demostrado el siguiente: Se desconoce si la joven beneficiaria aprobó las materias que matriculó en el segundo cuatrimestre del año 2022 y, desde entonces, no se sabe si siguió estudiando o no, la carga académica, el plan de estudios de la carrera y su rendimiento.

III. SOBRE EL FONDO

PRESUPUESTOS GENERALES DE LA OBLIGACIÓN ALIMENTARIA. En cuanto a la aplicación práctica del artículo 169 del Código de Familia de conformidad con la legislación vigente y jurisprudencia vinculante -artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y 8.1) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial-, los presupuestos de la pensión alimentaria se revisan en todo proceso y en el siguiente orden estricto, ya sea para fijar una pensión alimentaria - provisional o no-; para modificarla -incrementarla o bien, rebajarla- y, para analizar las causales de exoneración y exclusión:

PRIMERO: Parentesco o vínculo según sea el caso, pues ambos temas no son lo mismo. Este requisito tiene fundamento en la siguiente normativa: Artículo 169 del Código de Familia, reformado en cuanto al inciso 2) mediante Ley n.°10166, La Gaceta n.°82 de 5 de mayo de 2022; artículo 248 del citado Código, que correspondía al anterior artículo 245 y ahora es el 248 debido a que la numeración fue corrida por la ley denominada “Creación del Sistema Nacional de Cuidados y Apoyos para Personas Adultas y Personas Adultas Mayores en Situación de Dependencia (SINCA)”, n°10192 publicada en La Gaceta n.°110 de 14 de junio de 2022, Alcance n°118. A esa regulación se suma la Ley n.°10228 sobre interpretación auténtica del artículo 245 -248- del Código de Familia, La Gaceta n.°100 de 31 de mayo de 2022; el artículo 1 de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra La Mujer (CEDAW), Preámbulo y artículo 24 inciso d) de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, artículo 69 y 92 párrafo segundo del Código de Familia, artículo 12, 31 y 1400 del Código Civil, normativa que permite resolver el tema de los alimentos a favor de concebidos no nacidos no solamente con respecto a mujeres unidas en matrimonio sino, a mujeres en unión de hecho, e incluso podría considerarse aplicable si se trata de una unión de hecho irregular donde no es la mujer quien se encuentra unida en matrimonio sino su pareja. Además, debe considerarse lo contemplado en los artículos 23, 27 y 32 de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño. De igual forma, debe sumarse lo previsto en los artículos 29, 37 al 39 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. Como complemento, también debe considerarse lo previsto en el artículo 13 inciso a) y 16 inciso c) de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra La Mujer, Ley n.°6968 y los artículos 1, 2.a), 3, 4.b), e) y g) de la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la mujer “Convención Belem Do Pará”. Igualmente, se debe considerar también lo dispuesto en la Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias, Ley n.°8053 y lo previsto en el Código de Derecho Internacional Privado Ley n.°50, publicado en Alcance n.°7, La Gaceta n.°30 de 6 de febrero de 1930. Ahora bien, la revisión de toda esta normativa también involucra analizar en cada caso concreto los siguientes temas:

1.a El examen del carácter de persona obligada preferente tal como disponen los artículos 168, 169 y 173 inciso 1) del Código de Familia, 23 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, 38 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. Debe observarse que se trata de al menos cinco normas que se refieren al carácter preferente en cuanto personas deudoras alimentarias. Además, dicha normativa impone revisar también el carácter de persona beneficiaria preferente, tal como se desprende de la jurisprudencia constitucional como, por ejemplo, resolución n.°5720-00, 14:58 de 11 de julio de 2000 en la que dijo: “Mediante resolución de las dieciséis horas con veinte minutos del cuatro de julio del dos mil, el Juzgado Contravencional y de Menor Cuantía de San Joaquín de Flores anuló la resolución que dio curso a la demanda de alimentos y la que decretó el apremio corporal en contra del amparado. Lo anterior, en la consideración de que el Código de Familia, numeral 156, establece una prelación de los obligados por alimentos, resultando indispensable, en primer término, acreditar la imposibilidad material del padre de los menores para cubrir alimentos, para lo que se hicieron las prevenciones correspondientes a la actora (folio 30). II.- El numeral 15 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional señala que procede la acción de hábeas corpus contra los "actos u omisiones que provengan de autoridad de cualquier orden incluso judicial, contra las amenazas a esa libertad y las perturbaciones o restricciones que respecto de ella establezcan indebidamente las autoridades…" (negrita no es del original). En el caso que nos ocupa, salta a la vista que la autoridad accionada, sin hacer el análisis correspondiente del numeral 156 del Código de Familia, cursó demanda de alimentos en contra del amparado, obligándole al pago de una cuota provisional de alimentos que estableció en la suma doscientos cuarenta mil colones, bajo apercimiento de decretar en su contra del obligado apremio corporal, en caso de no hacer el pago correspondiente, el que no hizo, por lo que se ordenó su apremio corporal y consecuente captura. La autoridad accionada señala que antes de que se le notificara de la interposición del hábeas corpus ya había revocado aquellas resoluciones, haciendo las comunicaciones correspondientes a las autoridades de policía para evitar la detención del amparado, por lo que en su criterio la presente acción de hábeas corpus carece de interés; sin embargo, esa actuación posterior no deja inexistente la amenaza a la libertad que ambas resoluciones jurisdiccionales causaron al amparado. Para esta Sala se amenazó ilegítimamente la libertad personal del demandado al ordenar su apremio corporal sin analizar si, en el caso concreto, concurrían las circunstancias que hacían preciso el curso de la demanda y la prevención de pago de alimentos. No pasa inadvertido para esta Sala que, a pesar de que el amparado en su escrito de contestación de la demanda, hizo ver al despacho lo irregular del traslado y del pago prevenido, en su contra se dispuso – sin mayor análisis de sus argumentos- orden de captura, lo que evidencia una clara falta de apreciación por parte de la autoridad recurrida de las circunstancias del caso concreto, lo que obliga a la Sala a declarar su responsabilidad en la amenaza a la libertad sufrida por el amparado. En razón de lo expuesto, el recurso debe declararse con lugar previendo a la autoridad accionada abstenerse de incurrir en hechos como los que han originado la estimación del recurso. Carece de interés ordenar el levantamiento de la orden de captura, tal y como lo solicita el recurrente, en razón de que la autoridad accionada ya proveyó lo correspondiente.” En esa misma línea, en la resolución n.°6610-01, 15:59 de 10 de julio de 2021, la Sala Constitucional dijo: “El objeto de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias que es de naturaleza familiar, fue procurar la asistencia alimenticia y la protección personal y patrimonial de las personas que teniendo necesidad, de una o de otra manera no pueden procurárselas por sí solas. La Ley concede este derecho, basándose en la idea de un justo principio de solidaridad familiar, por ello, limita este derecho a los grados próximos de parentesco y afinidad: la obligación de prestar alimentos afecta únicamente a los parientes y afines llamados por ley, y de acuerdo con un orden preestablecido. La obligación de suministrar alimentos, es una prestación económica que, guardando la debida relación entre las posibilidades económicas de la persona obligada y las necesidades del alimentario, tiene por finalidad satisfacer el suministro de sustancias nutritivas o comestibles, de atención médica y medicamentos, cubrir las necesidades de vestido, habitación y recreación, tratándose de menores, proporcionar los recursos necesarios a fin de procurar la educación formal o informal con el fin de proporcionar un desarrollo integral como ciudadano y ser humano. La prestación alimentaria no tiene en consecuencia, únicamente es valor patrimonial. Precisamente en razón de ello, no se admite su compensación, ni la cesión del derecho alimenticio; y por consiguiente, tampoco la transacción ni el compromiso sobre ella. Lo discutido en los procesos alimentarios, no es como se indicó una prestación meramente pecuniaria, con un fin de lucro, como si se tratase de cualquier otro proceso civil, sino que si bien es cierto la deuda es monetaria, ésta va dirigida a satisfacer las necesidades de todo ser humano para poder lograr un desarrollo armónico. Nótese que el bien jurídico protegido a través de la imposición de una pensión alimentaria, es la necesidad y condición de dependencia en que se encuentra el acreedor alimentario respecto al obligado. En virtud de lo anterior, es que no puede asemejarse la obligación alimentaria a cualquier otra obligación jurídica, toda vez que en la alimentaria, los poderes familiares de exigir tal prestación, no se atribuyen con el fin de satisfacer un interés meramente personal, sino para subvenir a una necesidad superior de carácter familiar.” Este criterio ha sido reiterado, por ejemplo, en las resoluciones n.°1124-05, 11:14 de 4 de febrero de 2005; n.°10484-01, 15:50 de 16 de octubre de 2001; n.°7923-02, 15:19 de 20 de agosto de 2002, entre otros. Además, otras resoluciones constitucionales que tratan sobre personas obligadas subsidiarias y personas obligadas preferentes son: n.°5498-13, 14:30 de 23 de abril de 2013; n.°1817-14, 16:05 de 11 de febrero de 2014; n.°9580-15, 9:05 de 26 de junio de 2015; n.°18945-15, 11:01 de 2 de diciembre de 2015 y, n.°518-18, 9:15 de 17 de enero de 2018.

1.b. El análisis de lo previsto en el artículo 40 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, así como el numeral 10 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias. Entonces, se debe tener en cuenta que quien planteada una demanda de alimentos no necesariamente estaría obligado al pago de alimentos -solidaridad- como es el caso de tíos y tías, quienes no están obligados al pago de alimentos con respecto a sobrinos y sobrinas, tal como se desprende del artículo 169 y 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia. De igual forma, no están obligados al pago de alimentos abuelos y abuelas respecto a nietos y nietas mayores de edad que no tengan una discapacidad que les impida atender sus propios intereses. Esto conforme al artículo 169 inciso c) del Código de Familia. Otro ejemplo lo constituye una persona depositaria administrativa o judicial de una persona menor de edad, puesto que, no necesariamente quien será depositario (a) debe alimentos conforme al artículo 169 del Código de Familia. Como puede observarse, son muchos los supuestos en los que, quien formula la demanda en beneficio de otra persona, no está obligada al pago de alimentos. En síntesis, la aplicación práctica de los artículos 40 y 10 citados, no es un tema menor si se considera que no es posible evacuar prueba sobre capacidad económica de personas que no están obligadas al pago de alimentos. Así, investigar sus finanzas sin ser obligadas al pago de alimentos, constituye una injerencia arbitraria en la vida y, esa práctica se encuentra expresamente prohibida al menos en los artículos 12.1 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos; V de la Declaración Americana de Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, 17 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; artículo 11,2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, en los artículos 3.1, 4, 16); Observación General del Comité de los Derechos del Niño, n.°14; artículo 5 y 16 Convención Interamericana sobre la Protección de los Derechos Humanos de las Personas Mayores y, artículo 22 de la Convención de la ONU sobre Discapacidad y las recomendaciones del Comité de dicha Convención, entre otras normas. También en la aplicación práctica del artículo 10 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, resulta vital determinar si quien acciona en beneficio de otra persona, es en realidad la persona obligada preferente o incluso, si siéndolo o no, mantiene interés contrapuesto. Por último, ese artículo 10 requiere especial análisis cuando está de por medio el tema migratorio, pues es usual que, personas migrantes dejen a sus hijos e hijas menores de edad o incluso, hijos (as) adultos (as) con discapacidad, en su país de origen o en el Estado donde tenían su anterior lugar de residencia y a cargo de familiares o terceras personas, mientras laboran en Costa Rica para generar recursos y así, enviarlos a sus hijos e hijas fuera del país. Ahora bien, como la obligación alimentaria es por definición, extraterritorial, es claro que, quien demanda alimentos si bien podría no estar ejerciendo el cuido inmediato de las personas beneficiarias, sí ejercer un cuido mediato y, por consiguiente, corresponderá a la persona accionada demostrar que, en realidad, quien acciona permanece desvinculado (a) de las personas beneficiarias y, por consiguiente, carece de legitimación para demandar alimentos. Así, en situaciones donde converge el tema migratorio y la aplicación del artículo 10, es menester realizar interpretaciones que favorezcan el acceso a la justicia de las personas migrantes y, a la vez, el carácter extraterritorial de la obligación alimentaria. Esto, sin desatender por supuesto la certeza sobre la vinculación entre quien demanda en representación de personas beneficiarias que se encuentran en el extranjero.

1.c. Revisión de la integración de la litis. Es decir, la litisconsorcio pasiva necesaria. Esto conforme a los artículos 35, 169 del Código de Familia y, 106 del Código Procesal Civil Ley n.°7130, así como artículo 2 párrafo segundo de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias en cuanto a la directriz de cumplimiento de los deberes de familia. De igual forma, resulta indispensable considerar el carácter solidario de la obligación alimentaria, entendido como cohesión familiar y no como en las obligaciones mercantiles, donde sí puede elegirse a cuál persona deudora exigir el cumplimiento de la obligación. Ahora bien, debe quedar claro que, no porque en virtud de solidaridad de la obligación alimentaria la litisconsorcio pasiva sea necesaria y no facultativa, esto quiere decir que, todas las personas accionadas deben ser obligadas al pago de alimentos provisionales o en la sentencia, puesto que siempre es necesario analizar las posibilidades económicas de cada persona por separado y, las necesidades de la persona beneficiaria. De igual forma, debe quedar claro que no es posible exigir a un único hijo o hija que se conforme con que su padre o su madre no quiera demandar a otros hijos o hijas, ya sea porque no quiere, porque se conforma con lo que ya recibe extrajudicialmente -que podría ser proporcional o no a los ingresos de esas personas- o bien, porque sí considera las circunstancias de unos hijos (as) y no las de otros (as) que incluso, podrían ser iguales o diferentes, pero en sí, unas sí le resultan relevantes y otras no. Todas estas son subjetividades que, no tiene por qué soportarlas la parte accionada y menos si se considera que, solamente contra ella se podría girar una orden de apremio corporal, un impedimento de salida del país, un allanamiento, etc. ¿Por qué debe conformarse una persona con ser la única demandada si hay otras personas que también son obligadas familiarmente solidarias? ¿Por qué debería conformarse con que dichas personas eventualmente no aporten o bien, aporten lo que querían y no sea analizada su capacidad económica para determinar si están aportando como se le está exigiendo a quien sí ha sido demandado? Véase que si la solidaridad familiar y la directriz en el cumplimiento de los deberes de familia no implica que la litisconsorcio pasivo sea necesaria, entonces, extrajudicialmente a una persona se le permitiría no aportar o bien, sí se le permitiría aportar lo que quiere, mientras que a otra, se le exigiría judicialmente aportar una suma determinada y, en el primer caso, ninguna persona juzgadora verificaría que no puede aportar o bien, que realmente exista el aporte y que además, sea proporcional a las posibilidades de quien brinda el aporte y a las necesidades de la persona que recibe el aporte, mientras que, en el segundo caso, la persona demandada sí sería sometida a un escrutinio profundo conforme determina el artículo 164 del Código de Familia y, artículos 2 y 27 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, es decir, es un escrutinio dirigido a determinar la verdad real.

SEGUNDO: Determinar si la parte que reclama alimentos o si a quien se beneficia de ellos por el reclamo hecho por otra persona, se encuentra o no en alguna causal de exclusión. Esto encuentra sustento en artículo 173 inciso 2) al 7) del Código de Familia. Con la observación de que, las causales que van del inciso 2) al 7) de esa norma, como ya se dijo, son causales de exclusión por acciones u omisiones contrarias a la buena fe en las relaciones familiares, por lo que han sido denominadas “infamia familiar” a partir de la sentencia 900-23, de las 8:40 de 18 de setiembre de 2023, redactada por la Jueza Patricia Méndez Gómez, titular del Juzgado Primero de Familia con Competencia en Segunda Instancia. Lo anterior, con el fin de generar una denominación propia y no utilizar el concepto “indignidad” por ser específico de materia sucesoria ni la “ingratitud”, que se refiere al contrato de donación. Ahora bien, al analizar esta normativa, sea el artículo 173 inciso 2) al 7) del Código de Familia, resulta de interés lo dispuesto en las resoluciones constitucionales n.°3685-09 10:30, 6 de marzo de 2009 y n.°14026- 11, 14:50 de 19 de octubre de 2011; artículo 523 del Código Civil, reformado mediante Ley n°9777, La Gaceta n°239 de 16 de diciembre 2019, Alcance n°280; Ley n.°10217, La Gaceta n.°100 de 31 de mayo de 2022; artículo 572 inciso c) del Código Civil y, artículos 48, 57, 58, 66, 140, 143, 158, 159, 160, 233 y 248 del Código de Familia. Todo esto, con las siguientes observaciones:

2.a. El artículo 233 del Código de Familia fue incorporado mediante Ley n°10192 y dicha Ley como ya se indicó, corrió la numeración al incorporar los artículos 231, 232 y 233 al Código de Familia. Entonces, debe determinarse si en un caso concreto, existe sentencia firme dictada en un proceso de “levantamiento de obligación de cuido”. Para mayor claridad, se trata de un nuevo proceso creado mediante adición del artículo 233 al Código de Familia según el artículo 32 de la ley Creación del Sistema Nacional de Cuidados y Apoyos para Personas Adultas y Personas Adultas Mayores en Situación de Dependencia (SINCA), n°10192 del 28 de abril de 2022. Entonces, si existe ese fallo, se debe determinar el alcance que tiene en el caso concreto. Además, con fundamento en el artículo 8 del Código de Familia y 106 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, ese tipo de asuntos son competencia de los juzgados de familia y, lo que ahí sea resuelto, podría incidir o no en un proceso alimentario por aplicación analógica del párrafo último del artículo 173 del Código de Familia.

2.b. De igual forma se debe considerar la reforma introducida a los artículos 56, 60, 141, el epígrafe del capítulo II del título III y los artículos 151 y 152 del Código de Familia, mediante Ley n.°9781, La Gaceta n.°238 de 13 de diciembre de 2019, Alcance n.°279.

2.c. Además, es menester tener en cuenta también que, el artículo 158 del Código de Familia ha sido reformado mediante Ley n.°9406, 30 de noviembre de 2016, La Gaceta n.°10, Alcance n.°9; Ley n.°9095, La Gaceta n.°28 de 8 de febrero de 2013, Alcance 27 a; Ley n.°10263, La Gaceta n.°99 de 30 de mayo de 2022, Alcance n.°109. Sumado a esto, debe considerarse que también existe la reforma introducida al artículo 57 del Código Penal mediante Ley n.°8875, La Gaceta n.°202 de 19 de octubre de 2010, sobre la inhabilitación para ejercer “patria potestad, tutela, curatela o administración judicial de bienes” según indica la norma y que, el artículo 159 del Código de Familia ha sido reformado según Ley n.°9379, La Gaceta n.°166 de 30 de agosto de 2016, Alcance n.°153.

2.d. Como complemento no puede dejarse de lado que, contra el artículo 173 inciso 4) en cuanto al adulterio -cometido en pasado o en presente- como causal de exclusión del derecho alimentario, existe acción de inconstitucionalidad cursada expediente número 22-009920-0007-CO y, publicada por primera vez en el Boletín Judicial n.°103, 3 de junio de 2022. Ese edicto, en lo que interesa dice: “(…) Este aviso sólo afecta los procesos judiciales pendientes en los cuales se discuta la aplicación de lo impugnado y se advierte que lo único que no puede hacerse en dichos procesos, es dictar sentencia o bien, el acto en que haya de aplicarse lo cuestionado en el sentido en que lo ha sido. Igualmente, lo único que la acción suspende en vía administrativa es el dictado de la resolución final en los procedimientos tendentes a agotar esa vía, que son los que se inician con y a partir del recurso de alzada o de reposición interpuestos contra el acto final, salvo, claro está, que se trate de normas que deben aplicarse durante la tramitación, en cuyo caso la suspensión opera inmediatamente (…).” 2.e. A todo esto, se suma también lo previsto en el artículo 42 de la Constitución Política, el artículo 164 del Código Procesal Civil Ley n°7130 y los artículos 148, 408, 412, 416 y 418 del Código Procesal Penal y, lo previsto en el Código de Derecho Internacional Privado Ley n.°50, publicado en Alcance n.°7, La Gaceta n.°30 de 6 de febrero de 1930.

2.f. Además, resulta oportuno indicar que, distinguir entre exoneración y exclusión no es un tema intrascendente, puesto que la exoneración opera con respecto a la persona deudora de alimentos y, la exclusión, con relación a la persona acreedora. Adicionalmente, las cargas probatorias son distintas en un proceso de exoneración y en uno de exclusión. Así, la causal es de exoneración si se trata de analizar las circunstancias de la persona obligada para determinar si puede o no pagar alimentos mientras que, cuando lo que se analiza es si la persona beneficiaria debe o no recibir alimentos, se trata de causal de exclusión. Obviamente, pueden existir situaciones en las que la litis sea trabada con causales de exoneración y exclusión. En todo caso, el auto de admisión de pruebas debe ser reflejo de lo que es objeto de debate y las respectivas cargas probatorias.

Para mayor claridad, los dos primeros supuestos de exoneración están contemplados en el artículo 173 inciso 1), puesto que se refieren a la imposibilidad de pagar porque la persona obligada no puede atender sus propias necesidades o bien, por existir otras obligaciones alimentarias preferentes. Entonces, esos dos primeros supuestos son de exoneración. Los restantes incisos de la norma, son de exclusión, es decir, los previstos en los incisos 2) al 7), en tanto se refieren a acciones u omisiones cometidas por quien recibe alimentos y que ameritan la pérdida de los mismos. Así, estos incisos se refieren a situaciones en las que una persona está recibiendo alimentos en los siguientes supuestos: sin necesitarlos; por haber incurrido en actos de maltrato -injuria, falta o daños graves-; haber incurrido en abandono voluntario y malicioso; si siendo ex cónyuge contrajo nuevas nupcias o inició una convivencia de hecho; si siendo hijo (a) adulto (a), pero menor de veinticinco años no se encuentra estudiando en los términos que exige la legislación; si incumplió deberes alimentarios cuando legalmente debía cumplirlos y, por último, si comete o cometió adulterio, siendo que este último supuesto -adulterio- es objeto de la acción de inconstitucionalidad ya expuesta.

2.g. Por último, cuando se analizan situaciones de exclusión, es necesario determinar si ha existido disculpa o perdón con respecto a una eventual situación determinada como causal excluyente de alimentos por “infamia familiar”. Sobre este tema, salvo mejor criterio, rige lo previsto en los artículos 52 y 63 del Código de Familia, así como el numeral 524 del Código Civil, el artículo 5 párrafos 2 al 3 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y, artículo 12 del Código Civil.

TERCERO: Las necesidades de la persona que se beneficiará con el pago de alimentos, artículo 51 de la Constitución Política, reformado según Ley n°9697, publicada en La Gaceta n.°147 de 7 de agosto de 2019, Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad y su Protocolo, Ley n.°8661, publicada en La Gaceta n.°187 de 29 de febrero de 2008 y las Observaciones Generales del Comité de esa Convención: n.°1 Igual reconocimiento como persona ante la ley; n.°2 Accesibilidad; n.°3 Sobre las mujeres y las niñas con discapacidad; n.°4 Sobre el derecho a la educación inclusiva; n.°5 sobre el derecho a vivir de forma independiente y a ser incluido en la comunidad; n.°6 Sobre la igualdad y la no discriminación; n.°7 Sobre la participación de las personas con discapacidad, incluidos los niños y las niñas con discapacidad, a través de las organizaciones que las representan, en la aplicación y el seguimiento de la Convención; n.°8 Sobre el derecho de las personas con discapacidad al trabajo y al empleo; Convención Interamericana para la Eliminación de todas las Formas de Discriminación contra las Personas con Discapacidad, Ley n°7948 publicada en La Gaceta n.°238 de 8 de diciembre de 1999; Normas Uniformes sobre la igualdad de oportunidades para las personas con discapacidad, Resolución Aprobada por la Asamblea General, Cuadragésimo octavo periodo de sesiones, de 20 de diciembre de 1993; artículo 160 bis, 164 y 166 del Código de Familia, así como artículo 2 incisos h), i), j) de la Ley de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal de las Personas con Discapacidad, sea la Ley n.°9379, publicada en Alcance n.°254, La Gaceta n.°166 de 30 de agosto de 2016; Convención de los Derechos del Niño y las Observaciones del Comité de los Derechos del Niño, como, por ejemplo: Observación General n.°4. La salud y el desarrollo de los adolescentes en el contexto de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño; Observación General n.°5. Medidas generales de aplicación de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño; Observación General n.°7. Realización de los derechos del niño en la primera infancia; Observación General n.°9. Los derechos de los niños con discapacidad; Observación General n.°11. Los niños indígenas y sus derechos en virtud de la Convención; Observación General n.°14. El derecho del niño a que su interés superior sea una consideración primordial; Observación General n.°15. El derecho del niño al disfrute del más alto nivel posible de salud; Observación General n.°17. El derecho del niño al descanso, el esparcimiento, el juego, las actividades recreativas, la vida cultural y las artes; Observación General n.°20. Sobre la efectividad de los derechos del niño durante la adolescencia, entre otras; artículos 29, 37 al 39 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia; 13 inciso a) y 16 inciso c) de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra La Mujer, Ley n.°6968 (CEDAW), lo que incluye las Recomendaciones Generales del Comité de la CEDAW, como, por ejemplo: Recomendaciones Generales n.°19 y n.°35 sobre Violencia contra la mujer; Recomendación General n.°21 sobre igualdad en el matrimonio y las relaciones familiares; Recomendación General n.º27 sobre las mujeres de edad y la protección de sus derechos humanos; Recomendación General n.°29 sobre las consecuencias económicas del matrimonio, las relaciones familiares y su disolución; Recomendación General n.º33, sobre el acceso de las mujeres a la justicia; Recomendación General n.°34, sobre los derechos de las mujeres rurales y, Recomendación General n.º39, sobre Mujeres y niñas indígenas, entre otras; artículo 10 de la Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias Ley n.°8053, publicada en La Gaceta n.°12 de 17 de enero de 2001; Principios de las Naciones Unidas en favor de las Personas de Edad, adoptado por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 16 de diciembre de 1991, Resolución 46/91; Ley de Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor, que corresponde a la Ley n.°9379; artículo 231 al 233 del Código de Familia -Ley n°10192- y Convención Interamericana sobre Protección de los Derechos Humanos de la Persona Adulta Mayor Ley n.°9394, publicada en Alcance n.°203 a Gaceta n.°188 de 30 de setiembre de 2016, entre otras disposiciones-, así como cualquier otra normativa que tutele derechos de población específica, como por ejemplo, la regulación sobre poblaciones indígenas, en cuyo caso es notorio que la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias resulta no solamente insuficiente sino incluso contraria a normas de rango supraconstitucional, particularmente porque requiere especial atención la designación de intérprete, todo lo referente a la forma de cumplimiento de la obligación alimentaria y eso incluye el apremio corporal en sí e incluso, su ejecución. Al respecto, remito al Convenio n°169 sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes y que corresponde a la Ley n.°71316, publicada en Gaceta n.°234 de 4 de diciembre de 1992; la Ley n.°9593 sobre Acceso a la Justicia de los Pueblos Indígenas de Costa Rica, publicada en Gaceta N°100, 31 de mayo de 2022, Reglas Mínimas para la Aplicación del Primer Párrafo del numeral 7 de la Ley de Acceso a la Justicia de Personas Indígenas de Costa Rica, acuerdo tomado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial en sesión n°27-19 celebrada el 26 de marzo de 2019, artículo LXXI y que corresponde a la Circular n°67-19; Ley n.°9305 que declara a Costa Rica República democrática, libre, independiente y multicultural, publicada en La Gaceta n°191 de 1 de octubre de 2015.

Como complemento, en cada caso concreto, al examinar las necesidades, resulta de interés distinguir entre necesidades perentorias, que son las tuteladas mediante una pensión alimentaria provisional y, las necesidades que forman parte de un determinado nivel de vida. En este último caso, también se debe considerar cuando se trata de necesidades creadas de forma unilateral por la persona beneficiaria de alimentos, necesidades creadas de forma unilateral por la persona obligada y en beneficio de acreedores alimentarios, así como, necesidades consensuadas por las personas solidariamente obligadas al pago de alimentos y, necesidades consensuadas por las personas subsidiariamente obligadas al pago de alimentos.

CUARTO: Las posibilidades de la persona demandada por alimentos, lo que supone determinar si se encuentra o no en alguna causal de exoneración - artículo 27 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, artículo 173 inciso 1), 160 bis, 164 y 35 del Código de Familia del Código de Familia, este último artículo modificado mediante Ley n.°9765, La Gaceta n.°239, 16 de diciembre de 2019, Alcance n.°280. Artículo 10 de la Convención Interamericana sobre Obligaciones Alimentarias Ley n.°8053; toda la normativa citada en el punto tercero sobre población adulta mayor, población con discapacidad y población indígena. A esto se une lo previsto en el artículo 38 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. Como complemento de este presupuesto, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el voto n.º 9775-2010, 4:31 horas de 1º de junio de 2010, dispuso: “(…) debe quedar claro que el monto provisional de la pensión alimentaria no debe cuantificarse únicamente en relación con los ingresos económicos del deudor alimentario, sino que debe establecerse un juicio de ponderación en que se han de tomar en cuenta tanto las condiciones de quien tiene a cargo la obligación alimentaria como de los beneficiarios.” Lógicamente, la proporcionalidad de la cuota alimentaria a la que se refirió el Tribunal Constitucional, no rige únicamente respecto a una pensión alimentaria provisional sino también para aquella que sea fijada en sentencia. Sumado a esto, en torno a las posibilidades económicas en los procesos alimentarios, el citado Tribunal se refirió al otrora artículo 151 -hoy artículo 165 del Código de Familia así: “De conformidad con el artículo 151 del Código de Familia, la prestación alimentaria debe guardar una relación entre las posibilidades económicas de quien la da y las necesidades de quien la recibe, según las circunstancias particulares de cada caso. Tal disposición encuentra su razón de ser en que no puede hacerse una generalización de todas las necesidades que puedan tener los alimentarios, ya que las circunstancias de todos son diferentes, algunos necesitarán alimentación especial, otros requerirán medicamentos particulares, y algunos educación a cargo de tutores o maestros calificados, etc, y por otra parte, tampoco puede establecerse un parámetro común para medir las posibilidades económicas de todos los obligados a pagar pensión, ya que unos tendrán mejor situación económica que otros. De modo tal que a este respecto, sin desvirtuar el principio de que todos los hombres son iguales ante la ley, se puede permitir al juzgador ponderar todas las circunstancias del caso concreto y hacer la fijación acorde con ellas, pues pueden darse multiplicidad de circunstancias personales, todas diferentes. El principio de igualdad opera, según quedó expuesto supra, en tanto las personas se encuentren en situaciones iguales o razonablemente semejantes, cosa que no ocurre en relación a las necesidades y posibilidades económicas de los seres humanos y sus necesidades alimentarias y de formación personal, por lo cuál, no resulta dable acoger el argumento del accionante, respecto a que el numeral 151 del Código de Familia, quebranta el principio de igualdad, al establecer la necesidad de considerar las condiciones particulares de cada cuál al fijar el monto de la cuota alimentaria.” Resolución n.°1725-94, 15:21 de 12 de abril de 1994. En este punto, vale decir que dicho Tribunal en muchas oportunidades se ha referido a que la capacidad económica de la parte obligada al pago de alimentos es un tema que debe ser analizado en cada caso particular: n.°1354-09, 13:16 de 30 de enero de 2009; n.°15335-10, 8:32 de 17 de setiembre de 2010; n.°7455-14, 15:15 de 28 de mayo de 2014; n.°4349-16, 9:00 de 1° de abril de 2016; n.°466-18, 11:30 de 16 de enero de 2018, n.°26760-21, 9:15 de 26 de noviembre de 2021 y, n.°3986-23, 9:15 de 21 de febrero de 2023, entre muchos.

Como se aprecia entonces, al realizar el examen ordenado de los presupuestos dichos, es perfectamente posible que, aunque exista necesidad, a la vez se haya determinado una causal de exoneración o bien, una causal de exclusión. Esto porque no cuentan únicamente las necesidades de la persona beneficiaria. En estos casos, prevalece la exoneración o bien la exclusión frente a la necesidad. De igual forma, es posible también que quien reclame alimentos, no sea beneficiario (a) preferente o bien, que la persona accionada no sea obligada preferente, en cuyo caso, aunque exista la necesidad, lo que corresponde es respetar el orden preferente.

Hasta aquí, han sido desglosados los presupuestos que deben ser revisados en todo proceso alimentario. Ahora procede analizar los presupuestos que deben sumarse cuando se trata del artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia.

IV.DERECHO ALIMENTARIO DE HIJOS A HIJAS MAYORES DE EDAD Y MENORES DE VEINTICINCO AÑOS. Al analizar este tema, es indispensable primero que todo, tener en consideración cuál es el marco normativo que regula esta obligación alimentaria específica. Para empezar, la regulación ordinaria está contemplada en el ya citado artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia que dice: “No existirá obligación de proporcionar alimentos: (…) 5. Cuando los alimentarios hayan alcanzado su mayoridad, salvo que no hayan terminado los estudios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, mientras no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable. Estos requisitos deberán probarse al interponer la demanda, aportando la información sobre la carga y el rendimiento académicos.” Así modificado mediante Ley n.°7654, publicada en Gaceta n.°16 de 23 de enero de 1997.

Sobre esta norma, la jurisprudencia constitucional ha sido muy basta. En un primer momento, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el voto n°2869-94, 14:36 de 15 de junio de 1994 se refirió al tema, pero fue desarrollado a partir del artículo citado 173 inciso 5) antes de ser reformado por la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias. Se entiende entonces que es un voto ya no aplicable por la reforma legal dicha. Luego, el voto n°6181-97, 17:51 de 30 de setiembre de 1997, sí desarrolla la norma una vez reformada. Entonces, este voto sí es aplicable, con la observación de que otros votos posteriores, dimensionan la aplicación de la norma. Ahora bien, en el citado voto n.°6181-97, la Sala Constitucional dijo: “(…) las circunstancias que dieron origen al dictado de la sentencia parcialmente transcrita variaron con la promulgación de la Ley No. 7654 de 19 de diciembre de 1996, publicada en el número 16 de 23 de enero de 1997 del Diario Oficial "La Gaceta". El Código de Familia, que contemplaba la situación en estudio en el artículo 160 inciso 6), fue reformado y en su numeral 173 señala: "No existirá obligación de proporcionar alimentos: 5. Cuando los alimentarios hayan alcanzado su mayoridad, salvo que no hayan terminado los estudios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, mientras no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable. Estos requisitos deberán probarse al interponer la demanda, aportando la información sobre la carga y el rendimiento académicos." La norma transcrita señala que el hijo mayor de edad puede ser beneficiario de alimentos, si no ha terminado los estudios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, y no es mayor de veinticinco años de edad, tal y como lo establecía el artículo 160 inciso 6) del Código de Familia antes de su reforma. Sin embargo introduce un nuevo elemento, cuando señala que el buen rendimiento y la carga académica razonable deben demostrarse al momento de interponer la demanda, con lo cual se permite que el Juez valore inicialmente la procedencia de la pensión y fije un monto provisional en favor del actor. Por lo anterior, estima la Sala que no resulta improcedente que se haya fijado una pensión provisional al amparado, cuyo monto, por cierto cuestionó en la vía correspondiente, ni tampoco la orden de apremio corporal emitida en su contra por la Alcaldía de Pensiones Alimenticias de Liberia lesiona su derecho fundamental a la libertad personal. La prestación alimentaria es indispensable para la subsistencia de los beneficiarios, por lo que su incumplimiento apareja el apremio corporal que puede dictarse en los términos de la Ley de Pensiones Alimenticias y en amparo al artículo 13 inciso h) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. De ahí que si el recurrente está obligado a la prestación alimentaria y la orden de apremio fue requerida por la actora la orden debe surtir sus efectos sin que la privación de libertad que de ese hecho resulta pueda entenderse arbitraria o ilegal.” Además, en una sentencia posterior, la sentencia n.°7372-97, 15:15 de 4 de noviembre de 1997, dicho Tribunal dispuso: "Estima esta Sala que, si bien es cierto no existe normativa expresa que indique cuál es el momento exacto para excluir al deudor de su obligación alimentaria, también lo es que no puede haber otra interpretación que la encaminada a beneficiar el interés superior del menor, de conformidad con los artículos 51 de la Constitución Política, 3 de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, 2 del Código de Familia y 7 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias N.°7654, normativa de la cual se desprende el principio general de que en esta materia lo que prevalece y se debe considerar primordialmente, es el interés superior del niño. Con base en lo anterior, no puede pretenderse -como así lo quiere el recurrente- que un beneficiario de una obligación alimentaria, al llegar a la mayoridad, pierda automáticamente su derecho a aquélla, sino que, por el contrario, deberá presumirse siempre que continúa estudiando y teniendo buen aprovechamiento de sus estudios, a fin de que continúe gozando de la pensión alimentaria, tal y como lo establece el artículo 173, en su párrafo 5) de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias (...)." Esto último con la observación de que, la norma en cuestión no corresponde a la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias sino, al Código de Familia.

Adicionalmente, en otros votos posteriores, la Sala Constitucional dejó claro que había cambiado el criterio expuesto cuando la norma no había sido reformada y que, es un tema propio de la jurisdicción ordinaria, determinar la procedencia o no de una pensión alimentaria provisional. Al respecto, pueden ser consultadas las sentencias n.°3491-02, 14:39 de 17 de abril de 2002; n.°5081-05, 14:34 de 29 de abril de 2005; n.°13923-05, 8:31 de 14 de octubre de 2005 y, n.°6600-09, 14:22 de 28 de abril de 2009, entre otras.

Ahora bien, en la sentencia n.°15209-2009, 11:08 de 25 de setiembre de 2009, corregida mediante resolución n.°3278-10, 15:56 de 12 de febrero de 2010, ese Tribunal Constitucional dijo: "V.- Sobre el deber alimentario para con los hijos mayores de edad y su tramitación procesal. El inciso 5) del artículo 173 del Código de Familia, señala que la obligación alimentaria de los padres hacia sus hijos se mantiene aún y cuando estos adquieran la mayoría de edad, únicamente en la medida que los beneficiarios alimentarios no hayan terminado los estudios necesarios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad, y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable, aspectos todos que deben probarse al interponer la demanda y que necesariamente deben ser valorados dentro de la jurisdicción especializada. Para ello, el sistema procesal está dispuesto en forma tal, que al cumplir la mayoría de edad el acreedor alimentario que se considere mantiene su derecho a recibir alimentos, debe interponer la acción correspondiente ante el juzgado especializado de la materia, de forma tal que sea en dicha sede que se acredite si el interesado mantiene ese derecho y el obligado continúa con el deber de otorgar los alimentos, los cuales necesariamente deberán ser apreciados y definidos de acuerdo a las particulares necesidades de la persona que ha adquirido la mayoría de edad. Esto es así por cuanto al adquirir la mayoría de edad, se adquiere una serie de necesidades distintas a las previamente establecidas para el beneficiario alimentario mientras fue menor de edad, situación que en la práctica implica la preclusión del primer beneficio reconocido, para en su lugar y a través de una nueva acción judicial, determinar el nuevo beneficio que en derecho corresponda. De tal manera, si dentro de la primera causa judicial persisten beneficiarios alimentarios, y quien ha adquirido la mayoría de edad interpone una nueva acción, el obligado alimentario deberá actuar lo que corresponda dentro del primer proceso judicial para lograr su adecuación a las nuevas condiciones, pero tal como se ha indicado, ello es un asunto de competencia propia del interesado y que por ser un aspecto de legalidad ordinaria es ajeno al ámbito de competencias de esta jurisdicción." Esto fue reiterado en la sentencia n.°2099-2014, 14:30 de 18 de febrero de 2014 así: “El inciso 5) del artículo 173 del Código de Familia, señala que la obligación alimentaria de los padres hacia sus hijos se mantiene aún y cuando estos adquieran la mayoría de edad, únicamente en la medida que los beneficiarios alimentarios no hayan terminado los estudios necesarios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad, y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable, aspectos todos que deben probarse al interponer la demanda y que necesariamente deben ser valorados dentro de la jurisdicción especializada. Para ello, el sistema procesal está dispuesto en forma tal, que al cumplir la mayoría de edad el acreedor alimentario que se considere mantiene su derecho a recibir alimentos, debe interponer la acción correspondiente ante el juzgado especializado de la materia, de forma tal que sea en dicha sede que se acredite si el interesado mantiene ese derecho y el obligado continúa con el deber de otorgar los alimentos, los cuales necesariamente deberán ser apreciados y definidos de acuerdo a las particulares necesidades de la persona que ha adquirido la mayoría de edad. Esto es así por cuanto al adquirir la mayoría de edad, se adquiere una serie de necesidades distintas a las previamente establecidas para el beneficiario alimentario mientras fue menor de edad, situación que en la práctica implica la preclusión del primer beneficio reconocido, para en su lugar y a través de una nueva acción judicial, determinar el nuevo beneficio que en derecho corresponda.” Ahora bien, en la sentencia n.°11490-2010, 16; 47 de 30 de junio de 2010, ese Tribunal dijo: "(…) la jurisprudencia ordinaria y la jurisprudencia constitucional han reconocido que la adquisición de la mayoría de edad se entiende como una preclusión de la obligación alimentaria original -de la que se disfruta siendo menor de edad-, por lo que debe tramitarse una nueva acción alimentaria si la persona que cumple los dieciocho años de edad considera mantener su condición de beneficiario alimentario." Y, finalmente, ese Tribunal, en la resolución n.°5112-11, 12:21 de 15 de abril de 2011 dijo, respecto al derecho a los alimentos del hijo o la hija mayor de edad y menor de veinticinco años, que ya era beneficiario de una pensión alimentaria durante la minoría de edad: “En aplicación del principio del interés más favorable al acreedor, entonces, dicho derecho se mantiene dentro de su esfera de derechos exigible al deudor alimentario, al momento de cumplir la mayoría de edad, en tanto y cuanto se cumpla con las condiciones establecidas en la legislación aplicable al caso y vigente en la República , lo que debe demandarse y discutirse en sede jurisdiccional ordinaria. (…) De ahí que no puede hablarse, como por error se indicó en la sentencia citada, que la mayoría de edad opera en perjuicio del beneficiario alimentario menor de edad que la alcanza, como una preclusión del beneficio, que es lo mismo que afirmar que se produce la preclusión del derecho a los alimentos. Puede darse como es procesalmente lógico un problema de legitimación ad causam activa relacionada con la representación, según se explicó supra, pues se presume que la legitimación para actuar en representación de los intereses del menor vence al momento en que se extingue su mandato, por el advenimiento de la circunstancia legal o jurídica previamente establecida en la ley. Lo que no puede afirmarse es que se produzca una preclusión, prescripción o caducidad del beneficio o derecho a los alimentos, precisamente por las razones que se han expuesto a lo largo de esta sentencia. El derecho o beneficio declarado al ser menor de edad se mantiene al momento de adquirir la mayoridad, previo cumplimiento del requisito procesal establecidos por la legislación que rige la materia, sea: a) apersonándose en tal condición al proceso preexistente para demostrar su legitimación, derecho y necesidad, a fin de que su situación y la procedencia de lo pretendido se revalore por la autoridad jurisdiccional conforme a las nuevas circunstancias propias de la mayoridad y b) en los términos establecidos en el considerando IV de la sentencia 2010-003278, en aquellos casos en que se produzca una dualidad o duplicidad de acciones judiciales, resultado de la interposición de una nueva demanda de pensión alimentaria por el mayor de edad a pesar de preexistir un proceso donde se había declarado a su favor el derecho a los alimentos siendo menor de edad, situación que produciría la obligatoria determinación de la autoridad jurisdiccional ordinaria de ordenar la acumulación de ambos procesos, evidentemente si ha sido puesto en su conocimiento tal circunstancia por parte el demandado de alimentos, todo con miras a garantizar adecuadamente los derechos del beneficiario como del obligado alimentario.” Es importante destacar también respecto de la sentencia constitucional n.°5112-2011, 12:21 de abril de 2011 lo siguiente: “V.- Sobre el deber alimentario para con los hijos mayores de edad y su tramitación procesal. El inciso 5) del artículo 173 del Código de Familia, señala que la obligación alimentaria de los padres hacia sus hijos se mantiene aún y cuando estos adquieran la mayoría de edad, únicamente en la medida que los beneficiarios alimentarios no hayan terminado los estudios necesarios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad, y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable, aspectos todos que deben probarse al interponer la demanda y que necesariamente deben ser valorados dentro de la jurisdicción especializada.” Este criterio también fue plasmado en las sentencias n.°15209-2009, 11:08 de 25 de setiembre de 2009, corregida mediante resolución n.°3278-10, 15:56 de 12 de febrero de 2010. Véase que la jurisprudencia es muy clara al dejar establecido el carácter excepcional y condicional de la obligación alimentaria en cuestión, pues claramente indica que el derecho alimentario subsiste “únicamente en la medida que los beneficiarios alimentarios no hayan terminado los estudios necesarios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad, y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable.” Además, en esa sentencia n.°5112-2011, la Sala Constitucional dejó muy claro que, la obligación alimentaria para hijos (as) adultos (as) que ya eran beneficiarios judiciales de alimentos, “en aplicación del principio del interés más favorable al acreedor, entonces, dicho derecho se mantiene dentro de su esfera de derechos exigible al deudor alimentario, al momento de cumplir la mayoría de edad, en tanto y cuanto se cumpla con las condiciones establecidas en la legislación aplicable al caso y vigente en la República , lo que debe demandarse y discutirse en sede jurisdiccional ordinaria.” En otras palabras, para gozar de ese derecho se requiere constatar que la persona beneficiaria se encuentre en los supuestos que establece en este caso, el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia. De estos criterios jurisprudenciales vinculantes, es importante destacar lo siguiente:

a. La obligación alimentaria prevista en el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, únicamente procede en la medida que las personas beneficiarias alimentarias no hayan terminado los estudios necesarios para adquirir una profesión u oficio y no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad.

b. Entonces, los supuestos de la norma no se cumplen con cualquier estudio, sino que, deben estar dirigidos a adquirir una profesión u oficio; no puede llenarse el supuesto de la norma con cualquier rendimiento y tampoco con cualquier carga académica y, esta obligación alimentaria está plenamente condicionada y es, por consiguiente, excepcional. Así, queda claro entonces que el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, por parte de la persona beneficiaria de alimentos, no se cumple con cualquier forma de estudio, cualquier matrícula en cualquier tiempo y con cualquier resultado de estudios.

c. En otras palabras, la obligación alimentaria de hijos (as) e hijas (as) mayores de edad, es una obligación que implica necesariamente una contraprestación de resultados verificables: si pretende recibir la pensión alimentaria, debe estudiar con el propósito verificable que dice la norma, es decir, para obtener una profesión u oficio y, además, con una carga académica razonable y buenos rendimientos; para recibir alimentos debe permanecer en cumplimiento de los supuestos que contempla la legislación, caso contrario, se produciría un enriquecimiento sin causa e incluso, podría configurarse los supuestos de una estafa procesal. Véase además que, el artículo 23 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias dice: “Cuando se le fije una cuota provisional a quien no es el obligado preferente o se decida en sentencia que el acreedor alimentario no tiene derecho a los alimentos, quien haya pagado la cuota provisional, sus representantes o herederos podrán exigir la restitución del monto pagado. La suma por concepto de restitución constituirá título ejecutivo y se determinará por la vía incidental.” d. Adicional a esto, solicitar el apremio corporal ante el incumplimiento de la persona obligada al pago de alimentos, sin estar la persona beneficiaria en pleno y permanente cumplimiento de los requisitos que exige el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia y, esa situación -no cumplir con tales requisitos- no es imputable a la parte deudora precisamente por incumplir el pago, pagar a destiempo u otra causa, podría constituir una falta conforme al artículo 173 inciso 3), sea causal de exclusión del derecho a los alimentos, lo que por supuesto, debe ser analizado en cada caso concreto. En otras palabras, exigir el cumplimiento de la obligación sin a la vez, cumplir con los requisitos que exige el inciso 5) de la norma citada, no es un tema menor sino por el contrario, es algo muy delicado y puede generar diversas consecuencias jurídicas, entre ellas la comisión de una causal de pérdida del derecho a los alimentos, el enriquecimiento sin causa, tentativa de estafa procesal y, estafa procesal.

Como complemento a lo dispuesto en el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia y la jurisprudencia constitucional sobre dicha norma, debe sumarse aquella regulación también ordinaria que trata sobre el orden preferente no solamente de personas obligadas al pago de alimentos sino también, las personas beneficiarias de alimentos. Es decir, los artículos 168, 169 y 173 inciso 1) del Código de Familia, 23 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, 38 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia.

Para mayor claridad, procede transcribir las normas en el orden en el que han sido citadas y se destacará todo aquello que se refiera al orden preferente: “Artículo 168.- Mientras se tramita la demanda alimentaria, comprobado el parentesco, el juez podrá fijar una cuota provisional a cualquiera de las personas indicadas en el artículo siguiente, guardando el orden preferente ahí establecido. Esta cuota se fijará prudencialmente en una suma capaz de llenar, de momento, las necesidades básicas de los alimentarios y subsistirá mientras no fuere variada en sentencia.” Así corrida su numeración por el artículo 2 de Ley n.7538 del 22 de agosto de 1995, que lo traspasó del antiguo artículo 155 al 168. Así reformado por el artículo 65 de la Ley n.°7654 de 19 de diciembre de 1996, “Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias”.

“Artículo 169.- Deben alimentos: 1.- Los cónyuges entre sí. 2- Los padres y madres a sus hijos e hijas menores o incapaces y los hijos y/o hijas a sus padres y madres, inclusive los y las de crianza. (Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1° de la ley n.°10166 del 30 de marzo de 2022, "Reforma varias leyes para el reconocimiento de derechos a madres y padres de crianza". 3.- Los hermanos a los hermanos menores o a los que presenten una discapacidad que les impida valerse por sí mismos; los abuelos a los nietos menores y a los que, por una discapacidad, no puedan valerse por sí mismos, cuando los parientes más inmediatos del alimentario antes señalado no puedan darles alimentos o en el tanto en que no puedan hacerlo; y los nietos y bisnietos, a los abuelos y bisabuelos en las mismas condiciones indicadas en este inciso.” Así reformado por el artículo 3º de la ley No.7640 de 14 de octubre de 1996. Así corrida su numeración por el artículo 2 de ley No.7538 del 22 de agosto de 1995, que lo traspasó del antiguo artículo 156 al 169.

“Artículo 173.- No existirá obligación de proporcionar alimentos: 1.- Cuando el deudor no pueda suministrarlos sin desatender sus necesidades alimentarias o sin faltar a la misma obligación de alimentos para con otras personas que, respecto de él, tengan título preferente.” “Artículo 23.- Cuota provisional y casos en que procede restitución. Cuando se le fije una cuota provisional a quien no es el obligado preferente o se decida en sentencia que el acreedor alimentario no tiene derecho a los alimentos, quien haya pagado la cuota provisional, sus representantes o herederos podrán exigir la restitución del monto pagado. La suma por concepto de restitución constituirá título ejecutivo y se determinará por la vía incidental.” “Artículo 38°- Subsidio supletorio. Si el obligado preferente se ausentare, presentare incapacidad temporal o imposibilidad de hecho para cumplir con el deber de brindar alimentos a una persona menor de edad o una embarazada, el Estado le brindará supletoriamente los alimentos por medio de la incorporación de estas familias a procesos de promoción social y desarrollo humano, mediante programas interinstitucionales en los que, de acuerdo con su situación particular, intervendrán el Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, el Ministerio de Salud o cualquier otro necesario para garantizar un tratamiento integral a la familia con el apoyo de las redes de la sociedad civil organizada, establecidas para tal fin. Las embarazadas tendrán derecho al subsidio únicamente durante el período prenatal y de lactancia. /Cuando los alimentos son reclamados en sede judicial y se constate que ocurre alguna de esas circunstancias, el juez gestionará el subsidio ante el Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social.” Como ya fue expuesto, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ya se ha pronunciado sobre el orden preferente en las resoluciones n.°5720-00, 14:58 de 11 de julio de 2000; n.°6610-01, 15:59 de 10 de julio de 2021; n.°1124-05, 11:14 de 4 de febrero de 2005; n.°10484-01, 15:50 de 16 de octubre de 2001 y n.°7923-02, 15:19 de 20 de agosto de 2002, entre otras.

Ahora bien, de todo lo dicho concluye la suscrita sobre el carácter no preferente de los alimentos para hijos e hijas mayores de edad lo siguiente:

a. La obligación alimentaria con respecto a hijos e hijas mayores de edad, pero menores de veinticinco años, no es igual a la obligación alimentaria con respecto a hijas e hijos menores de edad, en tanto las personas menores de edad son beneficiarias preferentes al igual que hijos e hijas mayores de edad con discapacidad (es) que les impida atender sus propios intereses. En este último supuesto, si bien el inciso 3 del artículo 169 del Código de Familia emplea la expresión “que les impida valerse por sí mismos”, por aplicación de la normativa de rango supraconstitucional en materia de discapacidad -citada en este fallo- y la política institucional de lenguaje inclusivo, me inclino por no utilizar esa expresión contemplada en la ley por considerarla peyorativa, dado que toda persona tiene valor por sí misma y no hay absolutamente nadie que no tenga dignidad. Para mayor claridad, el Consejo Superior en sesión nº15-2012 del 21 de febrero del 2012, artículo LIII, a solicitud de la Secretaría Técnica de Género, estableció como directriz institucional, “…la promoción y uso del lenguaje inclusivo en todas las comunicaciones escritas, orales y digitales del Poder Judicial, así como en las resoluciones y escritos de los despachos judiciales (…)”. Esta decisión fue divulgada mediante circular nº39-2012 del 8 de marzo del 2012 y, conforme el artículo 122 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, es de acatamiento obligatorio.

Siguiendo con lo previsto en el artículo 169 inciso 3 del Código de Familia, es importante señalar que, no cualquier discapacidad genera el supuesto que la norma contempla y por ello, discapacidad (es) en cuanto a hijos (as) y nietos (as) mayores de edad, no necesariamente es sinónimo de tener derecho a los alimentos. Así, cada discapacidad debe ser considerada según el caso concreto.

b. Los hijos e hijas mayores de edad, pero menores de veinticinco años que no tengan una discapacidad que les impida atender sus propios intereses, no son personas beneficiarias alimentarias preferentes porque no están comprendidos en el artículo 169 del Código de Familia y, el artículo 168 de ese Código, otorga al listado del artículo 169 un orden preferente. Además, la pensión alimentaria para hijos (as) mayores de edad y menores de veinticinco años que estudian, no está regulada en el artículo 169 del Código de Familia sino en el artículo 173 inciso 5) de ese Código. De esta forma, los hijos e hijas que sí están comprendidos en el artículo 169 citado son los hijos e hijas menores de edad, así como, los mayores de edad con discapacidad (es) que le impida atender sus propios intereses e incluso, los nietos y nietas menores de edad y quienes siendo mayores de edad, tengan discapacidad (es) que le impida atender sus propios intereses. Es decir, los abuelos y abuelas no están obligados al pago de alimentos respecto de nietos y nietas mayores de edad, pero menores de veinticinco años que estén cursando estudios.

En consecuencia, los hijos e hijas mayores de dieciocho años y menores de veinticinco años no son personas beneficiarias preferentes no solamente porque así está contemplado en la normativa transcrita sino porque, conforme al principio de igualdad, no puede tratarse como iguales a quienes no están en igualdad de condiciones. Así, las personas menores de edad no están en posibilidad de generar recursos y, las personas adultas con discapacidad (es) que no puedan atender sus propios intereses, tampoco están en posibilidad de generar recursos, en ambos casos para satisfacer todas sus necesidades, mientras que, una persona mayor de dieciocho años y menor de veinticinco años, sí está en posibilidad de laborar tiempo completo o de forma parcial para así generar recursos y atender sus necesidades, así como, para aportar para obtener una profesión u oficio e incluso, construir un proyecto de vida independiente.

Sobre la diferencia entre la obligación alimentaria prevista en el artículo 169 inciso 3) y el 173 inciso 5), ambos del Código de Familia, la Sala Constitucional, en la resolución n.°4627-13, 14:30 de 20 de abril de 2013 dijo: “(…) del estudio de la norma impugnada, se colige con claridad que contrario a lo que afirma el accionante, la norma no establece una igualdad entre ambos grupos, sea entre los legalmente incapaces y los estudiantes menores de veinticinco años. En primer término, cabe aclarar que la legislación de familia, específicamente, el artículo 169 del Código de Familia establece una regla general, que consiste en la obligación a cargo de los padres de dar alimentos a sus hijos menores o a los incapaces. Esa obligación permanece durante el tiempo que persistan esas condiciones, sin que para ello exista algún condicionamiento especial. Es decir, en el caso de los menores la obligación del padre persiste -en principio- hasta que éstos cumplan la mayoría de edad, y en el caso de los incapaces la obligación persiste independientemente de la edad, mientras se mantenga la condición de incapaz. Sin embargo, el inciso 5) del artículo 173 del Código de Familia lo que establece es una excepción a esa regla general, lo cual no puede ser considerado como un trato igualitario, pues la excepcionalidad, no pretende equiparar situaciones, sino brindar un trato excepcional o particular y normalmente transitorio, a situaciones que el legislador, como parte de su técnica legislativa y potestad discrecional, consideró relevantes, a efecto de proteger a las personas que se encuentren en determinadas circunstancias o condiciones de vulnerabilidad o de necesidad. En segundo lugar, tampoco puede hablarse de igualdad de trato, cuando los requisitos y condiciones que la ley exige en un caso y en otro son diferentes, pues en el caso de los menores e incapaces, la legislación solo exige la comprobación del vínculo filial y de la capacidad de pago del deudor alimentario, mientras que los estudiantes mayores de edad a los que se refiere la norma impugnada, sólo pueden, excepcionalmente, demandar alimentos de sus padres, siempre que cumplan determinadas condiciones, a saber, que no hayan terminado los estudios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, mientras no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable. Dichas exigencias hacen que la excepción a la regla que establece la norma, sea una situación condicionada y temporal, para que los acreedores alimentarios mayores de edad que se encuentren bajo esas condiciones especiales, puedan hacer frente a sus necesidades. En virtud de lo anterior, resulta claro, que la norma no brinda un trato igualitario para los dos grupos de personas citadas por el accionante, es decir, la medida jurídica que ofrece la ley no es igual para los incapaces, que para los estudiantes mayores de edad y menores de veinticinco, por lo que estima esta Sala que la norma no vulnera en forma alguna el principio de igualdad. En consecuencia, la acción es inadmisible en cuanto a este extremo.” Vale indicar que, ese voto se generó a raíz de una acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada contra el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia. Además, si bien el voto se refiere a las personas con discapacidad como “incapaces”, es importante hacer el esfuerzo de no utilizar esa expresión peyorativa y que está superada por la normativa de rango supraconstitucional.

Por último, tan excepcional es la obligación alimentaria prevista en el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia que, como ya se dijo, no es exigible a abuelos y abuelas, así como tampoco a bisabuelos y bisabuelas. Sin embargo, abuelos y abuelas sí podrían resultar obligados al pago de alimentos respecto de nietos y nietas menores de edad o bien, mayores de edad -sin límite de edad- si se trata de personas con discapacidad que no puedan atender sus propios intereses. Eso con fundamento en el artículo 169 inciso 3 del Código de Familia.

c. Ninguna persona beneficiaria de alimentos tiene prohibido trabajar. Por el contrario, el trabajo como derecho, está previsto en el artículo 56 de la Constitución Política. Para mayor comprensión, el artículo 56 citado dice: “El trabajo es un derecho del individuo y una obligación con la sociedad. El Estado debe procurar que todos tengan ocupación honesta y útil, debidamente remunerada, e impedir que por causa de ella se establezcan condiciones que en alguna forma menoscaben la libertad o la dignidad del hombre o degraden su trabajo a la condición de simple mercancía. El Estado garantiza el derecho de libre elección de trabajo.” Entonces, además de que la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias y el Código de Familia no prohíben trabajar a una persona beneficiaria de alimentos, no podría hacerse ninguna interpretación en ese sentido, porque sería contraria al artículo 56 de la Constitución Política y como se explicará, más bien existe norma que deja claro que cualquier persona beneficiaria de alimentos puede trabajar y, también está regulado qué impacto tiene eso en el tema alimentario.

En ese sentido, véase que, conforme al artículo 166 del Código de Familia, “los alimentos no se deben sino en la parte que los bienes y el trabajo del alimentario no los satisfagan”. Esto quiere decir que, si una persona que trabaja decide reclamar alimentos, podría aspirar a una pensión alimentaria si los bienes que le pertenezcan o posea o bien, el trabajo que realice no le generen ingresos insuficientes y, le corresponde entonces demostrar eso. Es decir, tiene la carga de probar cuáles son no solamente sus necesidades sino, cuáles son sus recursos y por qué no son suficientes para atender tales necesidades. Esto incluye también la obligación de acreditar qué le impide laborar a tiempo completo o parcial: discapacidad, enfermedad, función social de cuido, etc.

En cuanto a este último tema, es decir, la función social de cuido, para efecto del artículo 35 del Código de Familia -reformado por Ley n.°9765, La Gaceta n.°239 de 16 de diciembre de 2019, Alcance n.°280-, así como, por aplicación del numeral 5.a, 13.a y 14.1 de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra La Mujer y, también por aplicación de la Ley n.°9325 -Ley de Contabilización del Aporte del Trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica-, debe entenderse que usualmente la madre, como parte de su contribución al sustento de cada persona menor de edad, aporta el cuido con todo lo que eso conlleva. En ciertos casos, es posible que además de tal aporte, la madre pueda colaborar a la economía del hogar con dinero, pero, de todas formas, el trabajo doméstico y, la atención de las personas menores de edad en cada caso concreto, así como personas dependientes en general, no puede ser desconocido como un aporte. Desconocerlo, por ejemplo, en el caso de hijos e hijas menores de edad, implicaría generar y consolidar maternidades sobrecargadas, así como invisibilizar la función social de cuido. Al respecto, remito a la resolución del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU sobre “Promoción y protección de todos los derechos humanos, civiles, políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales, incluido el derecho al desarrollo,” de 10 de octubre de 2023, resolución A/HRC/54/L.6/Rev.1, disponible en https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/54/L.6/Rev.1 Esa resolución, entre otras cosas dice: “1. Reconoce la importancia de respetar, proteger y hacer efectivos los derechos humanos de los cuidadores remunerados y no remunerados y de las personas que reciben cuidados y apoyo; 2. Expresa profunda preocupación por la organización y el reparto desigual de los trabajos de cuidados y apoyo, y por las repercusiones que ello tiene en los derechos de todas las mujeres y las niñas en la sociedad y en la economía. 3. Reconoce que, para lograr la igualdad de género, es esencial distribuir equitativamente los trabajos de cuidados y apoyo y el tiempo dedicado a dichos trabajos; 4. Insta a los Estados a que: a) Apliquen todas las medidas necesarias para reconocer el trabajo de cuidados y redistribuirlo entre las personas, así como entre las familias, las comunidades, el sector privado y los Estados, de tal modo que se promueva la igualdad de género y el disfrute de los derechos humanos por todas las personas; b) Aumenten la inversión en políticas e infraestructuras de cuidados y apoyo a fin de garantizar el acceso universal a servicios asequibles y de calidad para todas las personas, incluidos servicios de cuidado de niños y servicios de salud y apoyo para las personas con discapacidad y las personas de edad, y de garantizar el acceso universal a licencias parentales, de maternidad y de paternidad y a la protección social para todos los trabajadores, tanto de los trabajadores del sector informal como de aquellos que trabajan en formas atípicas de empleo; c) Fomenten y apoyen las investigaciones y estudios encaminados a producir datos desglosados por ingresos, sexo, edad, raza, etnia, situación migratoria, estado civil, discapacidad, ubicación geográfica y otras características pertinentes en el contexto nacional, así como estadísticas sobre el alcance y la distribución del trabajo de cuidados y del tiempo que se le dedica, así como sobre las personas que prestan estos cuidados y las que los reciben, mediante encuestas periódicas sobre el empleo del tiempo y el establecimiento de cuentas satélite para evaluar la contribución de ese trabajo a los ingresos nacionales y cuantificar el trabajo de cuidados no remunerado, a fin de incluirlos en el producto nacional bruto a los efectos de diseñar, financiar y evaluar políticas en este ámbito; d) Adopten todas las medidas necesarias para permitir la participación plena, igualitaria, genuina e inclusiva de las mujeres, las personas con discapacidad y las personas mayores, así como los niños, en la toma de decisiones relativas a los cuidados y el apoyo, tanto en la vida privada como pública, incluido el diálogo social y la negociación colectiva de los trabajadores asistenciales remunerados; e) Sensibilicen acerca de los impactos negativos que tienen los estereotipos relacionados con el género, la discapacidad y la edad a la hora de prestar y recibir cuidados y apoyo, y establezcan programas y políticas para eliminar esos estereotipos.” Es por todo lo dicho que no es posible desconocer el aporte que realiza la madre a su deber alimentario solidario mediante el cuidado, pues incluso según la Ley n.°9325 -Ley de contabilización del aporte del trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica- existe la "economía de cuidado" y, se refiere al "trabajo no remunerado que se realiza en el hogar, relacionado con el mantenimiento de la vivienda, los cuidados a otras personas del hogar o la comunidad y el mantenimiento de la fuerza de trabajo remunerado". Esa ley advierte que esta categoría de trabajo es de fundamental importancia económica en una sociedad. Para mayor comprensión, ese instrumento normativo indica en el artículo 3 que "se consideran actividades de trabajo doméstico y de cuidado no remunerado, entre otras, las siguientes: a) La organización, distribución y supervisión de las tareas domésticas. b) La preparación de alimentos. c) La limpieza y el mantenimiento de vivienda y enseres. d) La limpieza y el mantenimiento del vestido. e) El cuidado, la formación e instrucción de la niñez (traslado al colegio y ayuda al desarrollo de tareas escolares). f) El cuido de las personas adultas mayores y enfermas. g) Realizar compras, pagos o trámites relacionados con el hogar. h) La limpieza y el mantenimiento de bienes de uso familiar. i) Servicios a la comunidad y ayudas no pagadas a otros hogares de parientes, amigos y vecinos. La presente clasificación no excluye otras actividades que se puedan incorporar en su oportunidad." Como complemento, es importante señalar que, no puede obviarse que existen necesidades que se presumen conforme a los artículos 414 al 417 del Código Procesal Civil Ley n.°7130. Es decir, se presume que una persona requiere consumo de agua potable, energía eléctrica, alimentos, transporte, vestido, etc. Lógicamente, aquello que se salga de lo habitual, requerirá prueba y más si se pretende tutelar un determinado nivel de vida. Para mayor claridad, dichas normas del Código Procesal Civil Ley n.°7130 dicen: “Artículo 414. Presunción legal. Toda presunción legal exime a la parte que la alegue, de la obligación de probar el hecho reputado cierto en virtud de tal presunción. Sin embargo, quien invoque una presunción legal deberá probar la existencia de los hechos que le sirven de base. Artículo 415. Presunción absoluta. Se deberán considerar como presunciones absolutas, aquellas en virtud de las cuales la ley anula ciertos actos, o acuerda una excepción perentoria, si en esas hipótesis la ley no ha reservado expresamente la prueba en contrario. Sin embargo, por absoluta que sea una presunción legal, no se opone a la eficacia de la confesión del hecho contrario, siempre que se trate de presunciones exclusivamente establecidas por un interés privado, y que la confesión sea admisible en la materia de la contención. Artículo 416. Presunción relativa. Fuera de las presunciones absolutas, las demás podrán ser combatidas por la prueba en contrario, para lo cual son admisibles todos los medios legales, salvo lo establecido por la ley en ciertos casos sobre el tiempo y el modo de acatarlas. Artículo 417. Presunción humana. Las presunciones humanas solo constituyen prueba si son consecuencia directa, precisa y lógicamente deducida de un hecho comprobado. La prueba de presunciones deberá ser grave y concordar con las demás rendidas en el proceso.” Además, conforme el artículo 166 Familia y el 173 inciso 2), ambos del Código de Familia, si quien reclama alimentos dejó de necesitarlos o bien, no los necesita, procede la terminación de la obligación alimentaria o bien, declarar con lugar la demanda respectivamente. Entonces, es un mito afirmar que quien recibe alimentos no puede trabajar y, también lo es, creer que si trabaja quien recibe alimentos, ello nunca incide en el monto alimentario e incluso, en el derecho a recibir alimentos. Para mayor claridad, Alda Facio Montejo propone una concepción del fenómeno jurídico no basada únicamente en el componente formal. De manera puntual plantea una concepción tripartita del fenómeno legal que supone la interacción constante y profunda entre el componente formal-normativo o sustantivo, el componente estructural y el político-cultural. El primer componente comprende la norma formalmente creada en un sentido amplio, es decir, no solamente como sinónimo de ley. El segundo se refiere al contenido, alcance e interpretación que las autoridades -en sentido amplio- damos al componente formal. Así, la identificación del componente estructural implica hacer visibles el conjunto de “normas no escritas” que son seguidas con rigurosidad por las autoridades y la ciudadanía. Por último, el componente político-cultural se refiere a la dimensión y comprensión que se otorga al componente formal por medio del conocimiento vulgar -empírico- de las disposiciones normativas, las costumbres, las tradiciones, la doctrina jurídica, el uso que las personas hacen de la ley, etc. Todo esto también conforma un conjunto de “normas no escritas” que son acatadas y reforzadas por la colectividad. (Facio Montejo, Alda. (1999). Cuando el género suena cambios trae. Metodología para el análisis de género del fenómeno legal. Tercera Edición. San José, Costa Rica. ILANUD. La versión digital puede ser consultada en http://fundacionjyg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Cuando-elg%C3%A9nero-suena-cambios-trae.pdf) La autora expone que estos tres componentes permanecen en constante interacción puesto que, quienes crean las leyes, las aplican o más bien, las interpretan, forman parte de una determinada sociedad en un momento histórico específico, de ahí que, el contenido, alcance, proyección e interpretación del componente formal refleja el conjunto de consideraciones imperantes en una sociedad y coyuntura específica. Entonces, ponen en evidencia la sobrevaloración de lo masculino, la infravaloración de lo femenino, de la discapacidad, del envejecimiento, de la niñez, de la extranjería, etc.

Así, afirmar que una persona beneficiaria de alimentos tiene prohibido trabajar, es un mito y también lo es, creer que si trabaja ello nunca incide en el monto alimentario e incluso, en el derecho a recibir alimentos, es decir, que puede capitalizar el producto de su trabajo o incluso, sus rentas y, a la vez, recibir una pensión alimentaria.

d.Los hijos e hijas mayores de dieciocho años y menores de veinticinco años que pretendan alimentos y mantenerse como beneficiarios alimentarios, deben permanecer en los supuestos que señala el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia. Es decir, no es suficiente colocarse momentánea o superficialmente en el supuesto que la norma contempla para tener derecho a los alimentos, sino que, es indispensable, permanecer en esos supuestos, en tanto la obligación alimentaria con respecto a dicha población es condicional. En otras palabras, subsiste si la persona cumple lo que dice la norma. En la práctica judicial, es usual observar que, resoluciones que imponen pensiones alimentarias -provisionales o no- a favor de hijos e hijas mayores de edad, pero menores de veinticinco años y que estudian, no contemplan cuáles son las cargas que deben cumplir las personas beneficiarias. Es decir, son resoluciones que advierten siempre a la persona obligada qué pasará si incumple lo dispuesto en una determinada resolución, pero no advierten a las personas beneficiarias a qué están obligadas. Este no es un tema menor, pues como la responsabilidad parental cesa con la mayoría de edad según el artículo 158 inciso a) del Código de Familia, es claro que ninguna persona obligada al pago de alimentos puede obtener, respecto de la persona beneficiaria de alimentos adulta, información sobre la carga académica y los resultados obtenidos al finalizar el período lectivo respectivo según esté definido en un determinado plan de estudios. Para mayor claridad, esa información ha sido definida por la Sala Constitucional como información privada. Al respecto puede ser consultada la resolución n.°592-13, 9:05 de 18 de enero de 2013, reiterada en la sentencia n.°2135-17, 9:30 de 10 de febrero de 2017 y, n.°3159-2017, 9:30 de 28 de febrero de 2017.

Entonces, como consecuencia del cese de la responsabilidad parental, la carga de probar el cumplimiento de los requisitos al plantear la demanda y durante la ejecución de la obligación alimentaria ya sea fijada desde la minoría de edad o con posterioridad, corresponde a la persona beneficiaria, porque precisamente se trata de una persona adulta. Ahora bien, en aquellos casos en que, obtener la certificación de notas y matrícula, representa para la persona beneficiaria una carga económica de imposible o difícil cumplimiento, lo que corresponde es que, antes de finalizar el período lectivo según el plan de estudios o bien, inmediatamente después de finalizado, la persona beneficiaria solicite al juzgado respectivo que sea expedido un oficio donde la autoridad judicial solicite al centro de estudios la información pertinente, con la indicación de que, tal requerimiento se encuentra amparado al principio de gratuidad propio de la materia alimentaria y responde también a una orden judicial. Además, corresponderá a la parte beneficiaria de alimentos, diligenciar el oficio y demostrar el respectivo diligenciamiento, pues la carga probatoria le corresponde a esa parte y no a la parte accionada. Lógicamente, corresponde a la autoridad judicial expedir el oficio de manera inmediata y, enviar cualquier recordatorio, así como poner en conocimiento de las partes la información suministrada por el centro de estudios. De sobra está decir que, el requerimiento al centro de estudios debe ser claro sobre la necesidad y urgencia de la información, así como, que resulta necesario saber cuáles han sido las materias cursadas y el resultado de cada una -aprobadas o no, retiradas de manera justificada o no, congeladas o no-, así como las notas obtenidas, el plan de estudios de la carrera que cursa, el horario que cursó y la matrícula que se encuentra en curso. Además, si se trata de un centro de estudios que requiera inversión para realizar matrícula, deberá indicase cuál es el costo de la matrícula en curso o si la persona beneficiaria tiene algún tipo de beca, así como, cualquier otra información que la autoridad judicial estime pertinente según el caso concreto.

Como la obligación alimentaria respecto a las personas mayores de dieciocho años y menores de veinticinco años es una obligación condicional en tanto la persona beneficiaria de alimentos debe permanecer en los supuestos que contempla el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, si la persona beneficiaria no aporta la información sobre la carga académica que ha cursado y cursa, así como los resultados obtenidos o bien, no solicita que el juzgado le expida el oficio dicho o, si ya expedido no demuestra que ha sido diligenciado, corresponderá a la autoridad judicial prevenir el suministro de la información dentro de un plazo perentorio a definir en cada caso concreto, sobre lo que indica el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, bajo apercibimiento de que, a gestión de la parte obligada al pago de alimentos, podrá ordenarse de manera fundada, la suspensión de la ejecución de la obligación alimentaria y, además, no se girará ningún apremio corporal mientras no cumpla lo prevenido. Todo esto debido a que la carga de probar que permanece en los supuestos que la norma contempla corresponde a la persona beneficiaria de alimentos y, no permanecer en los supuestos que contempla la citada norma, es un incumplimiento de la condición impuesta por la normativa. Si esta verificación de requisitos no se realiza, podrían generarse las consecuencias ya dichas: estafa procesal, tentativa de estafa procesal, enriquecimiento sin causa, etc., e incluso, podría generarse lo peor: que la persona beneficiaria ya no esté cursando estudios.

Así, debe quedar muy claro que quien incurre en ejercicio abusivo del derecho conforme los artículos 19 y siguientes del Código Civil, ya sea para demandar alimentos o bien, ejecutar la obligación alimentaria y, con ello genera alguna resolución judicial o evita una resolución judicial y esto, por resultado ocasiona desplazamientos patrimoniales a su favor sin cumplir los requisitos que la norma exige, podría enfrentar una causa penal por estafa procesal o tentativa de estafa procesal. Para mayor claridad, la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha dicho: “Sobre la estafa procesal, resulta provechoso mencionar lo que en doctrina se ha escrito acerca de este tipo penal: “hay casos comunes de estafas triangulares, en estos casos, engañado y perjudicado son diferentes. El caso más complicado de esta Estafa triangular es la llamada estafa procesal. Característico de la estafa procesal es que el juez engañado dicta una resolución con la cual realiza un acto dispositivo perjudicial para una de las partes procesales o para un tercero. La estafa procesal consiste en una acción engañosa realizada por el agente con la finalidad de obtener un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico para sí o para un tercero en el curso de un proceso. Por medio de esta acción engañosa induce a error al juez que conoce de la causa o lo mantiene en él y a consecuencia de ese error el juez dicta una resolución que no corresponde a la real situación fáctica resolución que causa un daño en el patrocinio de una parte procesal o de un tercero”. (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, FRANCISCO. El delito de Estafa. Editorial Juritexto. San José. Costa Rica. 2001. p. 178). Para que se configure la delincuencia de Estafa Procesal se debe verificar la existencia de un perjuicio patrimonial para una parte integrante del proceso o un tercero.” Resolución n.°1164-14, 10:08 de 4 de julio de 2014.

Dicha Sala, en la resolución n.°313-14, 8:52 de 7 de marzo de 2014 dijo: “Precisamente, en cuanto a la existencia del tipo penal de interés, además de estarse a lo dicho anteriormente, debe entenderse que nació a la vida jurídica y condujo a perjudicar a las víctimas, con la particularidad de lo que se denomina doctrinariamente: estafa “procesal” o “triangular”. Con este ejemplo se ha conocido mayoritariamente este tipo de delito: “…presupone un engaño al juez, el cual, a causa del error producido por el engaño, mediante una decisión errónea, realiza un acto dispositivo perjudicial sobre el patrimonio de la otra parte…” (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, FRANCISCO. El delito de estafa. Editorial Juritexto. San José, Costa Rica. Año 2001. p. 126). Este tipo de estafa cumple con todos los elementos de la estafa común pero caracterizada por la participación de tres sujetos: i) el activo, encargado de engañar; ii) el pasivo engañado que realiza por error el acto dispositivo, y, iii) el perjudicado.” Además, en la sentencia n.°1206-04, 9:35 de 22 de octubre de 2004, dicha Sala indicó: “(…) El numeral 24 del Código Penal en lo que interesa, señala: “Hay tentativa cuando se inicia la ejecución de un delito, por actos directamente encaminados a su consumación y ésta no se produce por causas independientes del agente. No se aplicará la pena correspondiente a la tentativa cuando fuere absolutamente imposible la consumación del delito.” Como se ve, el tipo penal castiga como tentativa el inicio de la ejecución del delito, realizada a través de actos directamente encaminados a su consumación. De esta manera, se separan los actos preparatorios impunes y los actos de ejecución del delito, que son punibles como tentativa. En Costa Rica, dicha separación se hace con base en la teoría individual-objetiva. Según ésta, debe tomarse en cuenta dos extremos: El primero, el plan del sujeto activo y el segundo, si, según ese plan, la acción representa un peligro cercano para el bien jurídico. Para esta teoría el comienzo de la ejecución no necesariamente es una parte de la acción típica: “(...) el comienzo de la ejecución del delito no es estrictamente el comienzo de ejecución de la acción señalada objetivamente por el verbo típico, sino que también abarca los actos que, conforme al plan de autor (el modo de realización concreto de la acción típica escogido por el autor), son inmediatamente anteriores al comienzo de la ejecución de la acción típica e importan objetivamente un peligro para el bien jurídico, bien entendido que un acto parcial será inmediatamente precedente de la realización de la acción típica cuando entre éste y aquella no haya otro acto parcial en el plan concreto del autor.” (ZAFFARONI, Eugenio Raúl. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Buenos Aires: EDIAR, segunda edición, 2002, p. 829). Como se extrae de este texto, los actos preparatorios impunes son aquellos que aunque se dirigen a la realización del tipo penal, no lo hacen de manera directa e inmediata y en consecuencia, no son una amenaza seria al bien jurídico tutelado (salvo que de manera expresa la legislación los considere punibles, convirtiéndolos en un delito independiente). Asimismo, los actos directamente encaminados a la consumación del delito, -entre los que se incluye la acción que precede inmediatamente el comienzo de la acción típica, temporal y espacialmente- y que le permiten al sujeto activo según su plan, el paso sin interrupciones esenciales al comienzo de esa acción, son punibles como tentativa. Con base en lo expuesto, estima esta Sede que contrario a lo que manifiesta la defensa sin asidero alguno, el acusado inició la ejecución del delito con la presentación ante el despacho de la demanda ejecutiva y las letras de cambio, a sabiendas de que no existían las obligaciones que fueron garantizadas con ellas, indicándole al Juez que la empresa demandada le debía la suma que mencionaban dichos títulos valores. A través de este ardid, (…) pretendía que el Juez dictara una resolución que le deparara un beneficio indebido y que a su vez, acarreaba una disminución en el patrimonio de la empresa demandada. En síntesis, con la sola presentación de la demanda ejecutiva y de los títulos valores, el acusado inició la ejecución de la estafa procesal, conclusión que se deriva del plan que perseguía, como también de la amenaza al bien jurídico que en ese momento implicaron sus acciones. (…) Como se observa, tratándose de la estafa procesal, el delito comienza su ejecución con la presentación de la demanda y la prueba, elementos que unidos conforman la maniobra engañosa dirigida al Juez. (…) Para que comprendamos lo antes dicho, primero hay que referirse al tema de la consumación formal y material en la estafa. La consumación formal se da cuando se causa el perjuicio patrimonial, mientras que la consumación material se presenta cuando el sujeto activo obtiene el beneficio patrimonial antijurídico que perseguía, finalidad que trasciende el tipo penal. Esta Sala ha dicho antes que para efectos penales, basta con que se dé la consumación formal: “La exigencia de finalidades posteriores permite, en algunos delitos que sí la contemplan expresamente, por ejemplo la estafa, el fraude de simulación o la extorsión, delitos todos que afectan al patrimonio en su globalidad, distinguir entre dos momentos de consumación: la formal, que se da con la ocasión del perjuicio patrimonial causado, y la consumación material, que se da cuando el agente obtiene la finalidad deseada, específicamente el beneficio patrimonial antijurídico, sea para sí o para un tercero. No obstante, basta la consumación formal para que el delito se tenga como consumado, para los efectos penales correspondientes, pudiendo darse o no la consumación material (...).” Resolución No. 420-F-95 de las 10:00 horas del 21 de julio de 1.995. En este mismo sentido, señala Carlos Fontán Balestra: “La estafa se consuma en el momento de tener lugar el perjuicio patrimonial. Adelantar ese momento al tiempo de la realización del ardid, supone tener por actos de consumación los que sólo constituyen tentativa. Llevar la consumación al momento en que se obtiene el beneficio, es pretender la concurrencia de un elemento no requerido en el tipo, habida cuenta de que en el Derecho argentino la ventaja patrimonial es sólo un propósito que debe acompañar a la acción.” FONTÁN BALESTRA (Carlos). Derecho Penal. Parte Especial. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 15° edición, 1998, p. 483. Todas estas consideraciones, hechas con relación a la estafa pura y simple, son aplicables también a la estafa procesal. En ésta entonces, bastaría con que el Juez dicte resoluciones que lesionen el patrimonio de la víctima para que se tenga como consumado el hecho, aunque se trate de medidas interlocutorias que no ponen fin al proceso. La resolución en la cual se despacha ejecución y se decreta embargo es sin duda una de ellas. Aunque no se ha concluido el proceso de manera definitiva y en consecuencia, el sujeto activo del delito no ha obtenido el beneficio patrimonial antijurídico, ya existe una consumación formal del delito toda vez que como consecuencia de la maniobra engañosa, el órgano jurisdiccional emitió resoluciones que lesionan el patrimonio ajeno.” Igualmente, dicho Tribunal en la sentencia n.°1219-05, 9:15 de 26 de octubre de 2005 dispuso: “(…) Para una mejor comprensión, es necesario realizar unas breves consideraciones acerca del delito de estafa, contenido en el artículo 216 del Código Penal. La estructura actual de este tipo penal, contiene formas de estafa diferentes a la definición tradicional establecida antes de la reforma del año 1988, tal y como resulta ser la denominada “estafa triangular”. En este tipo de estafa la estructura triangular surge entre el sujeto activo, sujeto pasivo y el perjudicado. Así, el autor induce a error al sujeto pasivo, que tiene poder dispositivo sobre el patrimonio de la víctima, y así logra causarle un perjuicio patrimonial, obteniendo con ello un beneficio antijurídico. El ejemplo más ilustrativo es de la llamada estafa procesal, que –en sentido estricto- “presupone un engaño al juez, el cual, a causa del error producido por el engaño, mediante una decisión errónea, realiza un acto dispositivo perjudicial sobre el patrimonio de la otra parte”. (Castillo González, Francisco. El delito de estafa. Editorial Juritexto, San José Costa Rica, Año 2001, p. 126) El punto medular de la estafa es la simulación de hechos falsos o la deformación u ocultamiento de hechos verdaderos, lo que implica a su vez que el ardid o error puede producirse por acción o por omisión, todo con el fin de obtener un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico. Este último elemento, no resulta ser necesario para la consumación material, pues el delito se consuma formalmente cuando ha existido lesión al patrimonio ajeno; esto es así, porque la estafa es un delito de resultado cortado, en el que se distingue una consumación formal (cuando se produce el perjuicio patrimonial) y la consumación material o fase de agotamiento del ilícito (cuando se logra el beneficio patrimonial antijurídico). En general, tanto en la modalidad clásica de estafa, como en la estafa triangular, se requiere necesariamente que el sujeto inducido a error sea quien realice el acto dispositivo (en su perjuicio o en perjuicio de un tercero). Así, “el perjuicio patrimonial debe ser el resultado de un acto de disposición del sujeto engañado –que no, necesariamente, del perjudicado- . No se trata aquí de sustraer, ni de apropiarse, sino de provocar la “colaboración del sujeto pasivo”, de tal forma que éste realice una disposición patrimonial en perjuicio de sí mismo o de un tercero.” (Valle Muñiz, José Manuel. El delito de Estafa. Bosch, Casa Editorial, Barcelona, 1988, p. 187). En este mismo sentido opina el autor Francisco Castillo González, al indicar que “El delito de estafa requiere identidad entre el engañado y quien hace el acto dispositivo, pero no presupone identidad entre quien hace el acto dispositivo y el perjudicado.” (Castillo González, Francisco. op. cit. p.168). En síntesis, el error debe motivar la disposición patrimonial perjudicial, y en casos de “estafas en triángulo”, quien realiza el acto dispositivo debe tener un especial poder de disposición sobre el patrimonio en el cual recaerá la lesión, esto quiere decir, que “el acto de disposición penalmente relevante debe ser entendido, entonces, genéricamente, como aquel comportamiento, activo u omisivo, del sujeto inducido a error que conllevará de manera directa la producción de un daño patrimonial en sí mismo o en un tercero. Es el nexo causal entre el engaño y el perjuicio, el cual sin dicha disposición no podrá ser imputado a la conducta engañosa, al menos a título de estafa.” (Valle Muñiz, José Manuel. Op.cit. p. 214).” En otras palabras, si la persona beneficiaria de alimentos no ha asumido permanecer en los presupuestos que exige el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, es decir, no se conduce con la responsabilidad que conlleva el estudiar una carrera universitaria o estudiar para obtener un oficio, recibiendo para ello una pensión alimentaria y, además, no cumple de forma diligente sus cargas procesales a partir de fondos pagados por la parte que adeuda alimentos y, nada más se ha colocado momentánea o incluso superficialmente en el supuesto contemplado en la norma, es un tema muy delicado que, dependiendo del caso concreto, podría constituir un ejercicio abusivo del derecho y una estafa procesal o tentativa de estafa procesal incluso o enriquecimiento sin causa. Véase por ejemplo que, en un caso ante la Sala Constitucional donde se discutió la imposición del pago de gastos por inicio del curso lectivo en beneficio de una persona en el supuesto del artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, ese Tribunal dijo: “(…) estima la Sala que en lo que respecta al otorgamiento de la pensión alimentaria que se reclama, el juzgado de pensiones alimentarias recurrido, cometió un grave error en la sustanciación de la sumaria que no se puede pasar por alto, pues al adquirir la acreedora alimentaria la mayoridad, lo procedente -conforme a la normativa legal aplicable- era que se apersonara al proceso y aportara la información sobre la carga y el rendimiento académico, tal y como lo hizo cuando solicitó el salario escolar en el 2019; sin embargo, cuando el obligado alimentario solicita esa información actualizada cada vez que se requiere apremio corporal por ese rubro, la beneficiaria está en la obligación de presentar dicha prueba. Pese a lo anterior, la autoridad jurisdiccional recurrida no procedió a requerir esa probanza como correspondía, a través de una prevención, sino le impuso al tutelado el pago del beneficio, indicándole que si a bien lo tenía podía interponer un proceso de exclusión de la beneficiaria alimentaria. No obstante, el aquí amparado no pretendía esa exclusión, si previamente se acreditaba la carga académica y rendimiento de la beneficiaria.” Sentencia n.°9319-23, 9:15 de 25 de abril de 2023. Es decir, conforme lo dispuso la Sala Constitucional, la persona beneficiaria debe demostrar su permanencia en los supuestos de hecho que contempla la citada norma y no desentenderse de esa obligación. No basta con haberlo demostrado una vez, ya sea al inicio de un proceso nuevo o cuando se apersona como adulto al proceso alimentario que existía siendo menor de edad, sino que, debe demostrar que permanece en los supuestos de hechos que la norma contempla si pretende recibir alimentos e incluso, solicitar apremios corporales en caso de incumplimiento. Lógicamente, no se trata de presentar una certificación de notas y matrícula con cada apremio pedido sino, aportar la certificación de notas y matrícula, cada vez que finaliza un período lectivo, lo que conlleva también demostrar la matrícula realizada, donde pueda observarse no solamente el número de materias que cursa sino, además, los horarios.

Ahora bien, como lo señala la Sala Constitucional en el anterior voto - n.°9319-23-, en la práctica judicial es habitual que, aun siendo la obligación alimentaria prevista en el citado artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, una obligación alimentaria evidentemente condicional, es usual que algunos juzgados de primera instancia no generen un mecanismo de supervisión de cumplimento de la permanencia en los supuestos que la norma contempla y, por el contrario, se ha convertido en una costumbre que en las resoluciones que fijan pensión alimentaria provisional o en sentencia, no se establezcan cargas procesales a quien recibe alimentos, como si la obligación alimentaria en cuestión fuera igual a la obligación alimentaria respecto a una persona menor de edad, por ejemplo. Salvo mejor criterio, esta desatención en cuanto a fijar las cargas que debe cumplir una persona beneficiaria por aplicación del artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, ha generado abuso del derecho por parte de algunas personas beneficiarias y, ha colocado a personas deudoras en una situación de incerteza. Además, ha obligado a estas últimas a promover procesos de exclusión precisamente porque no conocen si la persona beneficiaria cumple o no con lo que exige la citada norma. De esta manera, la generación de un mecanismo imparcial, práctico, expedito y basado en las normas procesales y de fondo existentes, así como en la jurisprudencia constitucional vinculante, a efecto de supervisar el cumplimiento de la condición que conlleva este tipo de obligación alimentaria y además, para garantizar el principio pro homine a ambas partes de la obligación, así como, garantizar el principio pro libertad a la parte deudora de alimentos, favorecerá la descontención entre las partes, la descongestión de la primera instancia y con ello, el prudente consumo de fondos públicos dedicados a la administración de justicia, así como, evitará el abuso del derecho en doble vía.

Para mayor claridad, en el primer caso, favorecerá la descontención porque hijos e hijas adultos no se serán sometidas a eventuales acosos, mortificaciones y presiones extrajudiciales por parte de las personas obligadas al pago de alimentos, exigiendo información sobre su progreso académico, en tanto todo será realizado en el proceso judicial. En el segundo caso se produce la descongestión, porque los despachos judiciales no tendrán que tramitar procesos alimentarios en los que, la persona obligada, formula procesos de exclusión a partir de información que no tiene o supone.

En la práctica, es frecuente observar que las personas obligadas formulan procesos de exclusión afirmando que la persona beneficiaria no estudia, no cumple carga académica o no tiene buenos rendimientos, porque en realidad no conoce nada sobre el cumplimiento o no de las condiciones que debe acreditar la parte beneficiaria y, ese desconocimiento proviene de la mayoría de edad de la persona beneficiaria o bien de la comunicación deficiente o ausente entre las partes. En consecuencia, es posible que este mecanismo que visibiliza las cargas procesales, evitará la tramitación de procesos alimentarios innecesarios que lo único que hacen es generar en las partes expectativas, ocasionan tensión y fomentan los enfrentamientos judiciales innecesarios, amén de que, satura las agendas de los despachos judiciales.

Este mecanismo que visibiliza las cargas procesales beneficiará también el servicio público que suministra la Defensa Pública, en tanto no tendría por qué intervenir en procesos que hoy en día, básicamente son provocados por la incertidumbre en cuanto a la permanencia en el cumplimiento de los requisitos que establece la norma dicha. Adicionalmente, es posible que este mecanismo de supervisión también disminuya la formulación de recursos de Hábeas Corpus por parte de las personas obligadas al pago de alimentos. En esta línea, este mecanismo evitará también el ejercicio abusivo del derecho por parte de la persona beneficiaria de alimentos y de quien es obligado (a), en tanto las reglas de cumplimiento de la obligación para cada parte estarán claras.

De forma adicional, en ese marco de evitar el ejercicio abusivo de un derecho, también se encuentra el tema del apremio corporal, en tanto es contrario al principio pro libertad que, una persona obligada al pago de alimentos pueda ser apremiada sin conocer si finalizado cada período lectivo, la parte beneficiaria está cumpliendo con lo que dispone el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, como si la norma permitiera a la persona beneficiaria desentenderse de demostrar que permanece en los supuestos que la norma contempla.

Por último y no menos importante, visibilizar las reglas claras de cumplimiento para ambas partes, de alguna forma podría evitar que las personas beneficiarias abandonen los estudios, avancen poco en el plan de estudios o bien, cambien de carrera de manera constante, pues evidentemente, tal comportamiento podría hacerles perder el derecho a los alimentos. Así, cuando una persona beneficiaria de alimentos no está obligada a demostrar que permanece en los supuestos que la norma contempla, fácilmente podría desentenderse de estudiar.

f.En aquellos casos donde la información sobre el cumplimiento de requisitos no sea incorporada al expediente por causa imputable a la parte beneficiaria de alimentos o bien, la información obtenida revele que no permanece en los supuestos que establece el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, la parte obligada al pago de alimentos podrá solicitar que la ejecución de la obligación se suspenda y, deberá indicar en qué se basa para tal solicitud. En este sentido, si ya existió una advertencia previa a la parte beneficiaria sobre todo lo ya expuesto, es decir, sobre las cargas que debe cumplir, la solicitud debe ser resuelta sin más trámite mediante pronunciamiento fundado sobre la medida solicitada, indicando si se acoge o no y por qué. Esto implica analizar las circunstancias de cada caso concreto que consten en el expediente, pues no es posible generalizar. Además, si la parte deudora no se encuentra obligada al pago de alimentos por el dictado de una medida cautelar firme que ordene la suspensión de la obligación, deberá levantarse el impedimento de salida del país. De forma que también a la parte beneficiaria le debe quedar muy claro qué ocurrirá si no cumple la carga procesal que le corresponde.

Ahora bien, si no se ha hecho prevención alguna a la parte beneficiaria sobre las cargas que debe cumplir, deberá darse audiencia de la solicitud de medida cautelar que formula la parte beneficiaria por un plazo prudencial y, deberá ser notificada en el medio señalado al efecto, lo que conlleva que, a toda persona beneficiaria de alimentos debe prevenírsele mantener un medio activo para recibir notificaciones, bajo apercibimiento de que opere la notificación automática en caso de incumplimiento y, esta misma prevención debe regir para toda persona obligada al pago de alimentos. Es decir, se trata de una carga procesal que debe cumplir cada parte. Todo esto, máxime que la jurisprudencia constitucional se ha pronunciado sobre la posibilidad de emplear un medio señalado en el expediente según las circunstancias que han sido analizadas por ejemplo, en las resoluciones constitucionales n.°12407-21, 8:30 de 28 de mayo de 2021; n.°25582-21, 9:15 de 12 de noviembre de 2021; n.°3077-22, 9:15 de 9 de febrero de 2023; n.°13002-22, 11:05 de 23 de agosto de 2022; n.°19495-22, 11:05 de 23 de agosto de 2022; n.°19498-22, 11:05 de 23 de agosto de 2022; n.°2210-23, 9:40 de 31 de enero de 2023; n.°9966-23, 9:15 de 28 de abril de 2023 y, n.°11037-23, 9:20 de 12 de mayo de 2023. Es decir, la jurisprudencia constitucional ha considerado posible que, en ciertas circunstancias, se prescinda de la notificación personal o por medio de cédula en casa de habitación. Por supuesto, esto debe ser analizado con sumo cuidado porque tales votos se refieren a procesos de modificación de fallo y esos son: exclusiones, exoneraciones, rebajos y aumentos. Es decir, no se refiere a los llamados procesos de “inclusión”, pues en ellos es claro que no se está incluyendo a una persona en un monto ya vigente, en consecuencia, se trata de un proceso nuevo que implica para la parte obligada, nuevas cargas procesales y especialmente, un nuevo apercibimiento de apremio corporal en caso de incumplimiento. Sumado a esto, es indispensable conocer si la parte beneficiaria mayor de edad -hijo o hija adulta, por ejemplo-, ya recibido asesoría de la defensa pública, pues en ese caso, es usual que dicha oficina brinde asistencia jurídica hasta el dictado de sentencia de segunda instancia.

Ahora bien, volviendo al tema de la medida cautelar, en ambos casos -denegar o acoger la medida cautelar para suspender la obligación alimentaria- como se indicó, la resolución debe ser fundada y, como produce efectos propios es apelable. Como complemento, si la autoridad judicial decide acoger la medida cautelar, lógicamente la misma no puede tener una duración indeterminada sin que exista formalmente un proceso de exclusión planteado, pues una medida cautelar no puede tener un efecto indefinido. En esta línea, la Sala Constitucional ha sido muy clara, pues ha dicho: “IV.- Considera la Sala que a pesar de que el Código de Familia, en su artículo 173, inciso 5, dispone que no hay obligación de proporcionar alimentos cuando los beneficiarios hayan alcanzado su mayoridad, la misma norma establece que la regla no es absoluta, pues si los hijos cursan estudios el deber no se interrumpe. Tampoco se aplica automáticamente, pues señala que la concurrencia de las causales eximentes de la obligación alimentaria, en general, deberá demostrarse ante la autoridad judicial competente. En este caso, no se ha relevado al actor aún de su obligación de alimentos, ya que hubo oposición a la exclusión de la beneficiaria y no se ha decidido aún la petición planteada con ese fin, teniendo señalamiento para el 12 de mayo de 2011 a conciliación y, en caso que esta fracase, recepción de pruebas. De este modo, el pago incompleto de la cuota mensual de marzo daba pie suficiente para la emisión de la orden.” Sentencia n.°4442-11, 14:40 de 5 de abril de 2011; n.°1223-15, 9:05 de 28 de enero de 2015, n.°19969-15, 9:30 de 30 de diciembre de 2015 y, n.°3442-19, 10:40 de 26 de febrero de 2019. Además, en un sentido similar, resoluciones n.°2439-1995, 15:03 de 16 de mayo de 1995, n.°6123-2009, 16:11 de 22 de abril de 2009, n.°47-2006, 9:46 de 6 de enero de 2006; n.°2230-05, 14:32 de 2 de marzo de 2005; 10643- 2014, 14:30 de 1° de julio de 2014; n.°2426-2020, 09:30 horas del 07 de febrero de 2020; n.°16457-2020, 9:20 de 28 de agosto de 2020; n.°9478-12, 14:30 de 18 de julio de 2012; n.°18821-15, 14; 30 de 1° de diciembre de 2015.

Así, al acoger la medida cautelar, la autoridad judicial deberá prevenir a la parte deudora que, obligatoriamente debe presentar la demanda de exclusión dentro del plazo improrrogable de un mes y bajo apercibimiento de que, la medida ordenada dejará de surtir efecto, lo que implica que deberá cumplir la obligación alimentaria bajo apercibimiento de apremio corporal si es que corresponde o bien, reactivando la retención, si es que esa es la forma de cumplimiento que se está ejecutando. Esta prevención de obligado cumplimiento tiene fundamento en lo previsto en los artículos 241 al 244 del Código Procesal Civil Ley n.°7130 que dicen: “Artículo 241.- Oportunidad. El procedimiento cautelar podrá ser instaurado antes o en el curso del proceso principal, del que siempre formará parte. Artículo 242.- Facultades del juez. Además de los procedimientos cautelares específicos, el juez podrá determinar las medidas precautorias que considere adecuadas, cuando hubiere fundado temor de que una parte, antes de la sentencia, le cause al derecho de la otra parte una lesión grave y de difícil reparación. Para evitar el daño, el juez podrá autorizar o prohibir la práctica de determinados actos, ordenar el depósito de bienes o imponer el otorgamiento de una caución. Artículo 243.- Deber de presentar la demanda. La parte deberá presentar su demanda en el plazo de un mes contado desde la fecha en que se realizó la medida cautelar, cuando ésta hubiere sido concedida en procedimiento preparatorio. Artículo 244.- Cesación de los efectos. Cesará la eficacia de la medida cautelar: 1) Si la parte no estableciera la demanda en el plazo establecido en el artículo anterior. 2) Si injustificadamente no fuese ejecutada dentro de ese mismo plazo. Habiendo cesado la eficacia de la medida, será prohibido a la parte repetir la gestión, salvo por nuevo fundamento.” En este punto cabe advertir que sobre las medidas cautelares la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha dicho que: “Las medidas asegurativas o cautelares, según la más calificada doctrina, surgen en el proceso como una necesidad que permita garantizar una tutela jurisdiccional efectiva y por ello se pueden conceptualizar como "un conjunto de potestades procesales del juez -sea justicia jurisdiccional o administrativa- para resolver antes del fallo, con el específico fin de conservar las condiciones reales indispensables para la emisión y ejecución del acto final". La doctrina entiende que la instrumentalidad y la provisionalidad son dos características fundamentales de las medidas cautelares y que sus principales elementos configurativos, exigen que deban ser : a) lícitas y jurídicamente posibles; b) provisionales, puesto que se extinguen con el dictado del acto final; c) fundamentadas, es decir, tener un sustento fáctico real con relación al caso particular; d) modificables, en el sentido que son susceptibles de aumentarse o disminuirse para adaptarlas a nuevas necesidades; e) accesorias, puesto que se justifican dentro de un proceso principal; f) de naturaleza preventiva, ya que tienen como objeto evitar inconveniencias a los intereses y derechos representados en el proceso principal; g) de efectos asegurativos, al pretender mantener un estado de hecho o de derecho durante el desarrollo del proceso, previniendo situaciones que puedan perjudicar la efectividad de la sentencia o acto final; h) ser homogéneas y no responder a características de identidad respecto del derecho sustantivo tutelado, con el fin de que sean medidas preventivas efectivas y no actos anticipados de ejecución.” Sentencia n.°7190-1994, 13:24 de 6 de diciembre de 1994. Además, pueden ser consultadas las sentencias dictadas por ese Tribunal Constitucional n.°5407-94, 15:54 de 18 de julio de 1995, n°6786-94, 15:27 horas de 22 de noviembre de 1994, n°3929-95, 15:24 horas de 18 de julio de 1995 y n.°6337-02, 14:40 de 26 de junio de 2002, entre otras.

Adicional a esto, como las medidas cautelares subsisten mientras permanezcan los supuestos fácticos que las originaron, es claro que ante solicitud expresa y fundada de la parte acreedora, si la plataforma fáctica que originó la medida cautelar ha cambiado, podrá ordenarse la reactivación de la obligación alimentaria mediante resolución fundada y en ese caso, se reanudarán las formas de ejecución: apremio corporal, retención, impedimento de salida del país, etc. No obstante, también corresponde a la autoridad judicial definir qué ocurrirá con las cuotas alimentarias pagadas por la parte obligada al pago de alimentos mientras la parte beneficiaria no cumplía los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, puesto que, omitir pronunciamiento sobre tal extremo, podría generar un enriquecimiento sin causa. Véase que no se trata de restitución de cuotas alimentarias sino, de enriquecimiento sin causa. Al respecto, resulta oportuno señalar que la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en la sentencia n.°574, 9:30 de 14 de julio de 2004 dijo: “(...) Así, la Sala estima procedente la aplicación de los artículos 1.043 y 1.044 del Código Civil, que conforman el Capítulo V, “De los cuasicontratos”, del Título I (Contratos y Cuasicontratos), del Libro IV de dicho cuerpo normativo. La primera norma citada establece: “Los hechos lícitos y voluntarios producen también, sin necesidad de convención, derechos y obligaciones civiles, en cuanto aprovechan o perjudican a terceras personas.” El numeral 1.044 citado indica: “A esta clase de obligaciones pertenecen, entre otras, la gestión de negocios, la administración de una cosa en común, la tutela voluntaria y el pago indebido.”(La negrita y el subrayado son del redactor). Como se ve, esta última norma no excluye la aplicación de otras figuras jurídicas, consideradas como cuasicontratos. La doctrina, por su parte, incluye dentro de este ámbito al enriquecimiento sin causa. Respecto de esta teoría, Messineo explica lo siguiente: “Otro caso de obligación legal está constituido por el enriquecimiento sin causa ... Se comprenden en la figura del enriquecimiento sin causa ..., los casos en que alguien convierta en beneficio propio un bien ajeno, o se beneficie de alguna actividad ajena (la denominada versión útil o in rem versio) con daño ajeno, sin que exista una razón que justifique el provecho o el beneficio: en otras palabras, sin que exista una relación jurídica, ya constituída, que haga de causa que legitime el provecho, o el beneficio, del enriquecido... / En dicha fórmula, ... entran, también, los casos de enriquecimiento sin la voluntad de otra persona (empobrecido), la falta de voluntad del empobrecido se resuelve en una figura de falta de causa./ La acción de enriquecimiento sin causa, tiende a restablecer el equilibrio entre los dos patrimonios, o sea, a eliminar el indebido enriquecimiento, mediante la demanda de una indemnización./Varios son los presupuestos de la acción de que tratamos. Hace falta: a) ... el enriquecimiento efectivo de un sujeto, o sea, que el patrimonio de él reciba incremento ..., y se considera enriquecimiento también el ahorro de un gasto, o el haber evitado, con propio sacrificio patrimonial, a otro, una pérdida... b) que, a tal incremento para el enriquecido, corresponda una disminución en el patrimonio de otro sujeto (empobrecido)... c) ... una relación de correspondencia entre el enriquecimiento y el empobrecimiento; y, además, un nexo de causalidad entre la disminución patrimonial, sufrida por un sujeto, y la ventaja patrimonial del otro; ... d) es necesario que el enriquecimiento-empobrecimiento ocurra sin causa... Ausencia de causa significa que no existe una relación patrimonial ... que justifique el enriquecimiento-empobrecimiento.../ El efecto del enriquecimiento sin causa es el nacimiento de la obligación de indemnización; por parte del enriquecido, a favor del empobrecido... Finalmente, debe observarse que la indemnización ha de ajustarse a la entidad del enriquecimiento y no puede sobrepasarla...” (MESSINEO, Francesco. Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, Tomo VI, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América, 1.955, pp. 465-466). (Sobre el tema, también pueden consultarse BONNECASE, Julien, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1.997, pp. 808-818 y PLANIOL, Marcel y RIPERT, Georges, Derecho Civil, México D.F., Editorial Mexicana, 1.997, pp. 812-813) (...).” Este criterio fue expuesto también en la sentencia n.°837-04, 10:10 de 1° de octubre de 2004 y, n.°301-10, 10:45 de 26 de febrero de 2010.

g. Cabe indicar que, en aquellos casos donde no se ha dictado sentencia y existe una pensión alimentaria provisional fijada sin definir las cargas que debe cumplir la persona beneficiaria de alimentos conforme al artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia o bien, la persona beneficiaria de alimentos ya alcanzó la mayoría de edad y no existe resolución que le prevenga cuáles son sus cargas e incluso, en aquellos casos donde ya se dictó sentencia sin prevenir a la parte obligada sobre sus cargas, lo prudente sería emitir una resolución que deje claras dichas cargas, tal como se entiende de la sentencia constitucional n.°5112-11, 12:21 de 25 de abril de 2011. Además, en realidad, en todo fallo que acoja una demanda con fundamento en el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, deben ser definidas las cargas dichas. Esto con fundamento en el principio de lealtad procesal y el principio de preferencia por la descontención.

h. Ahora bien, en virtud del principio de autonomía de la voluntad y porque la pensión alimentaria proviene de fondos privados, es claro que la parte obligada puede relevar expresamente a la parte beneficiaria de aportar la documentación dicha sobre el cumplimiento permanente de requisitos y ese relevo no puede emplearse para juegos o presiones, es decir, quien releva de esa carga, debe tener claridad que no puede cambiar de criterio constantemente. Así, desdecirse de ese relevo debe ser algo fundado y no antojadizo. Entonces, reactivar el cumplimiento de cargas y, en consecuencia, el mecanismo de supervisión, requiere de una resolución fundada.

i. Como la obligación alimentaria dicha es una obligación excepcional y condicional, es importante analizar qué debe entenderse por buenos rendimientos y, carga académica razonable. Así, conforme al artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, obtener “buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable” es la contraprestación que debe cumplir quien recibe alimentos. Como se observa, la norma no separa el concepto “buenos rendimientos” del concepto “carga académica razonable”, sino que, más bien, liga el primero al segundo, pues introduce la preposición “con”. Entonces, en cada caso concreto, primero hay que determinar cuál es la carga académica, luego definir si es o no razonable y por qué, para luego concluir si los rendimientos obtenidos son buenos o no y por qué, lo que supone analizar qué se entiende por “buenos” en el caso particular. Además, es notorio que determinar cuál es la carga académica también está normativamente ligado a la obtención de una profesión u oficio, es decir, la carga académica debe ser analizada en función de la obtención de una profesión u oficio, lo que excluye la obtención de “otra” profesión u oficio o bien, matricular y matricular materias sin un avance concreto para obtener una profesión u oficio. Dicho de otra forma, cualquier matrícula no es suficiente, puesto que la norma no tutela el “mantenerse estudiando” sino, obtener “buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable” y, con un propósito ya definido por ley: para obtener una profesión u oficio. Para mayor claridad, cada matrícula debe conllevar avance para obtener profesión u oficio. Así, los cursos de “relleno” para “mantener la condición de estudiante activo (a)” no son cursos que permitan avanzar para obtener una profesión u oficio, en tanto no forman parte del plan de estudios. En consecuencia, es oportuno insistir en que, “mantenerse estudiando” no es lo que exige el núcleo duro de la norma.

No obstante, lo ya expuesto, es claro que pueden existir situaciones excepcionales en las que, podría aceptarse la matrícula de algún curso para cubrir la transición entre la educación secundaria y la universitaria o bien para obtener un oficio, especialmente por temas de imposibilidad de matrícula dado el momento en que la persona beneficiaria finalizó la secundaria. Tal es el caso de personas que han tenido que rendir exámenes extraordinarios para finalizar el quinto años y, por consiguiente, no alcanzaron la matrícula en un centro de estudios universitario o de otra índole. De igual forma, si lo que no fue posible concluir fue el bachillerato, la situación debe analizarse en cada caso concreto, porque es un hecho conocido que existen algunas materias en las que la deficiencia no solamente o necesariamente es imputable a quien rinde el examen sino al sistema educativo en sí e incluso, hay zonas del país donde el rendimiento académico es bajo de manera generalizada. Todo esto debe ser analizado en cada caso concreto.

Como ha quedado expuesto, es evidente que la norma en cuestión establece expresamente como regla general, la terminación del derecho alimentario para hijos e hijas mayores de edad y, seguidamente, determina como excepción la continuidad del derecho si la persona no ha finalizado los estudios y, además, debe quedar claro que no se trata de cualquier tipo de estudios sino, estudios para la obtención de una -en singular- profesión u oficio. Además, se trata de obtenidos excluyentes: profesión u oficio y no ambos. Seguidamente, la norma establece la terminación de la obligación alimentaria por el cumplimiento de veinticinco años de edad independientemente de que a esa edad se haya obtenido o no una profesión u oficio. Para mayor comprensión, vale retomar lo que la norma dice: “Artículo 173.- No existirá obligación de proporcionar alimentos: (…) 5.- Cuando los alimentarios hayan alcanzado su mayoridad, salvo que no hayan terminado los estudios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, mientras no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable. Estos requisitos deberán probarse al interponer la demanda, aportando la información sobre la carga y el rendimiento académicos.” Como se observa, es también claro que la norma no define qué debe entenderse por “carga académica razonable” ni “buenos rendimientos”. Para la suscrita, ambas expresiones son conceptos jurídicos indeterminados.

Sobre este tema, el Derecho Administrativo ha avanzado mucho en el análisis de tales conceptos y, es evidente que los mismos no son exclusivos de esa área del Derecho. Así, es necesario acudir a la doctrina desarrollada en esa rama del Derecho para analizar el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia. En esta línea, por ejemplo, González Alonso propone que “gran parte de la doctrina relaciona los conceptos jurídicos determinados e indeterminados con el lenguaje normativo. Parece evidente que, con esos conceptos o definiciones (de las que nuestro Derecho nos ofrece abundantes muestras: «buen padre de familia», «buena fe», «temeridad», «leal administrador», «justo precio»…) se pretende acotar una realidad que se manifiesta de forma imperfecta y que es difícilmente traducible al lenguaje normativo. Así, los conceptos jurídicos determinados son los que delimitan, sin dejar lugar a dudas, un ámbito de la realidad, mientras que los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados delimitan ese ámbito de la realidad mediante un proceso de integración o de determinación, de juicio o de estimación.” (González Alonso, Augusto. Discrecionalidad y su control. Diferenciación con la arbitrariedad y con los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados. Revista CEFLEGAL n.°98. 2009. Documento consultado en el sitio https://revistas.cef.udima.es/index.php/ceflegal/article/view/13091 Además, Trayter Jiménez define los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados así: “Son máximas de la experiencia. Son conceptos abstractos cuya aplicación requiere una valoración fundada en criterios técnicos o razonamientos lógicos. No son automáticos como los anteriores se refiere a los conceptos jurídicos determinados (…); en el Derecho Administrativo: la ruina, el orden público, el justiprecio expropiatorio, la extraordinaria y urgente necesidad, la ocasión manifiesta de gol, los parques y jardines con “valor artístico, histórico, antropológico” (a efectos integrarlos en el patrimonio histórico español), utilidad pública, necesidad pública, necesidad imperiosa de interés general.” (Trayter Jiménez, Joan Manuel (2015). Manual de Derecho Administrativo. Parte General, Barcelona, Atelier Libros Jurídicos).

En consecuencia, estima la suscrita que los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados son aquellos que cuentan con una definición normativa marco o de referencia y, por consiguiente, imprecisa, por lo que, debe otorgárseles alcance y significado concreto, pero no de forma subjetiva sino, jurídica, es decir, en atención a hechos específicos, pertinentes y probados. Así, Clavijo Suntura advierte que, “el proceso de determinación judicial si bien toma en cuenta principios de ética moral, social y axiológica, tiene que definirse con sustento en criterios jurídicos.” (Clavijo Suntura, Joel Harry. 2018. Los Conceptos Jurídicos determinados e indeterminados y la decisión judicial. Derecho y Cambio Social). Como consecuencia de todo lo expuesto, es claro que “carga académica razonable” y “buenos rendimientos” son conceptos integrados para formar la expresión “buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable”; ambas expresiones forman parte de un marco o núcleo duro que está dado por el provecho real de los alimentos, pues estudiar con recursos propios es una cosa y, estudiar a partir de recursos ajenos, es otra. En este último caso, es imperioso que la persona beneficiaria aproveche realmente los recursos recibidos y prospere en los estudios. Se trata entonces de un aprovechamiento que debe ser susceptible de verificación y, por consiguiente, debe existir paridad entre la edad cronológica de la persona beneficiaria y el avance en los estudios. Si esa paridad no existe, quien recibe alimentos debe probar a qué obedece esa falta de paridad, puesto que la misma conlleva una fractura al núcleo duro de la norma y que se refiere al aprovechamiento efectivo de los recursos recibidos.

Así las cosas, abandonar una carrera o el estudio de un oficio para iniciar otros estudios, no es un tema menor sino algo muy delicado, porque lejos de generar un avance en los estudios, más bien ocasiona una demora injustificada para obtener una profesión u oficio. Entonces, así como una persona obligada al pago de alimentos no puede pretender una variación en la cuota alimentaria a partir de circunstancias subjetivas e incluso, provocadas, tampoco una persona beneficiaria puede cambiar de carrera o de oficio de manera antojadiza y menos si eso conlleva perder todo o gran parte de lo que había avanzado respecto de los estudios que abandona. Véase que incluso pueden existir situaciones donde en lugar de terminar una carrera u oficio mucho antes de cumplir veinticinco años, la persona beneficiaria abandona la carrera o los estudios que sigue para obtener un oficio, a efecto de iniciar otros estudios con el propósito de alargar la vigencia de la obligación alimentaria hasta los veinticinco años. Con prácticas como las citadas, la persona beneficiaria se estaría “garantizando” alimentos sin cumplir realmente con lo que la norma exige que es, cursar estudios para obtener una profesión u oficio. Es decir, la norma no autoriza el cambio de carrera, porque de hacerlo, se perdería todo el aporte que ha dado la parte obligada al pago de alimentos. El tema del cambio de carrera es tan delicado, que una persona beneficiaria podría cambiarse de carrera cada cuatrimestre o cada cierto tiempo y así, no comprometerse con obtener ningún título universitario, pero evidentemente, una conducta así no se encuentra cubierta por la norma, pues la obligación alimentaria prevista en el inciso 5) del artículo 173 del Código de Familia es excepcional y condicional, además de que está orientada normativamente a obtener una profesión u oficio. Así, “mantenerse estudiando” no es lo que la norma contempla como presupuesto para recibir alimentos.

j. Otro tema de interés consiste en el reclamo alimentario de quien decide iniciar estudios luego de algún tiempo -incluso años- de haber adquirido la mayoría de edad. En esos casos resulta determinante cuestionar cómo solventaba sus necesidades antes de iniciar el proceso alimentario, así que, tal como exige el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, al demandar alimentos debe probar no solamente que ha matriculado. Es decir, no es suficiente demostrar que cursará estudios o los cursa. La norma en este sentido es muy clara: la carga académica y los buenos rendimientos debe demostrarlos al formular la demanda. En otras palabras, la norma hace una diferencia entre quienes luego de cumplir la mayoría de edad han seguido estudiando para obtener una profesión u oficio y, quienes luego de cumplir la mayoría de edad no han estado estudiando, sino que, deciden hacerlo tiempo después. A quienes se encuentran en esta última situación se les exige que al formular la demanda -si es que no eran beneficiarios alimentarios siendo menores de edad- no solamente demuestren que están cursando estudios o que ya matricularon sino, la carga académica que ahora llevan y los resultados obtenidos con anterioridad. Para mayor comprensión, resulta oportuno refrescar el contenido de la norma: “Artículo 173.- No existirá obligación de proporcionar alimentos: (…) 5.- Cuando los alimentarios hayan alcanzado su mayoridad, salvo que no hayan terminado los estudios para adquirir una profesión u oficio, mientras no sobrepasen los veinticinco años de edad y obtengan buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable. Estos requisitos deberán probarse al interponer la demanda, aportando la información sobre la carga y el rendimiento académicos.” Como se observa, cuando la norma dice “estos requisitos deberán probarse al interponer la demanda, aportando la información sobre la carga y el rendimiento académicos”, se refiere a aquellos procesos alimentarios nuevos dado que la persona que pretende alimentos no era beneficiaria siendo menor de edad y, si se trata de una persona que fue beneficiaria de alimentos siendo menor, pero decidió no cursar estudios una vez que adquirió la mayoría de edad y luego decide retomarlos o iniciarlos, claro que debe demostrar no solamente la carga académica sino, su rendimiento.

En este último caso, estima la suscrita que, no se trata simplemente de “activar” el proceso, sino que, debe cumplirse lo que la norma exige, es decir, demostrar la carga académica y el rendimiento. Como la norma exige demostrar rendimiento, se entiende que debe existir un período lectivo previo cuyo rendimiento sea verificable. Así, las obligaciones alimentarias conforme al artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia, requieren mucha atención y prudencia, porque no es de extrañar que alguna persona pueda intentar recibir alimentos provisionales o no, aguinaldo e incluso gastos por inicio del curso lectivo, cuando apenas está iniciando estudios y por la edad que tiene, sería prácticamente imposible que termine una carrera o un oficio.

k. Adicionalmente, así como son inadmisibles acciones u omisiones de la persona beneficiaria que tengan como propósito o por resultado minar el núcleo duro de la norma -artículo 173 inciso 5 del Código de Familia-, tampoco es posible que, ese núcleo duro sea fracturado por acciones u omisiones de la persona obligada, pues si no paga a tiempo la cuota alimentaria, no paga del todo o bien, incurre en otro tipo de violencia e incluso, si se encuentra obligada al pago de una suma módica en comparación con el financiamiento de estudios para obtener una profesión u oficio, no puede pretender que ello no sea considerado para analizar la contraprestación a la que está obligada la parte beneficiaria: “buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable.” En otras palabras, no cumplir la obligación alimentaria y violentar el derecho a la no violencia de la parte beneficiaria sí tiene consecuencias favorables para ella al analizar la contraprestación a la que está obligada, pues así como la violencia de parte de quien sea beneficiario (a) adulto de alimentos incide en la terminación del derecho a los alimentos, también la violencia por parte de quien se encuentra obligado (a) al pago de alimentos, incide en la verificación de la obtención de “buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable para obtener una profesión u oficio.” l.Como complemento, existen situaciones subjetivas que pueden resultar relevantes al analizar el cumplimiento de la contraprestación dicha. Por ejemplo, una enfermedad de la persona beneficiaria, habilidades particulares para el proceso de aprendizaje, etc., o bien, situaciones objetivas que la persona beneficiaria no puede controlar como, por ejemplo, disponibilidad de oferta educativa en una zona determinada, la conectividad a Internet en una zona específica, etc. Entonces, en la medición de “buenos rendimientos con una carga académica razonable para obtener una profesión u oficio”, debe existir un análisis según cada caso concreto, puesto que generalizar atropella groseramente el principio de igualdad. Todo esto con la observación de que ese análisis no autoriza vaciar el núcleo duro de la norma, de forma que siempre es obligatorio tener como referencia el marco que establece la norma y su propósito: obtención de profesión u oficio.

m. Como se ha dicho en esta resolución, la obligación alimentaria establecida en el artículo 173 inciso 5) del Código de Familia es excepcional y condicional, pero, además, no es preferente. Ahora bien, esto no quiere decir que, una persona obligada al pago de alimentos pueda llenarse de obligaciones alimentarias preferentes para procurar desatender la obligación alimentaria adquirida previamente. Por el contrario, lo que sí implica este carácter no preferente es que, al analizar el cumplimiento de los requisitos que la norma contempla, la autoridad judicial debe ser más rigurosa en la valoración del caso concreto cuando existen otras personas beneficiarias preferentes.

n. Como ha sido expuesto también, la norma en cuestión tutela el derecho alimentario para la obtención de una profesión u oficio, es decir, no para obtener varias profesiones, varios oficios o una profesión y un oficio. Esto además de que está regulado así, es decir, en singular, se entiende porque se trata de una obligación alimentaria excepcional y por supuesto, sin perjuicio de que la persona obligada alimentaria acepte pagar una cuota que cubra varias profesionales, varios oficios o bien, una profesión u oficio y ello no conlleve el detrimento de otras obligaciones alimentarias que sí son preferentes. De igual forma, corresponderá a la autoridad judicial definir si procede o no el pago de alimentos a favor de quien ya tiene un oficio, como, por ejemplo, el caso de las personas graduadas de colegios técnicos. Esto porque es claro que el pago de una cuota alimentaria durante la enseñanza técnica, conllevó para la persona obligada la inversión de dinero para proveer de una profesión u oficio a la persona beneficiaria y, de darse continuidad a la obligación alimentaria para obtener un título semejante al que ya obtuvo, amerita un análisis en cada caso concreto, máxime si ahora se pretende cursar estudios en una carrera técnica que no tiene relación alguna con la ya finalizada. Situación semejante ocurre cuando si quien pretende alimentos para cursar una carrera universitaria, ya terminó una carrera técnica. Véase que en ambos casos, básicamente la primera carrera técnica obtenida se convierte en una inversión desaprovechada que estuvo respaldada con la amenaza de la libertad del obligado alimentario en caso de incumplimiento. Ahora bien, no descarta la suscrita que la práctica de invisibilizar una carrera técnica ya terminada podría obedecer al mito que existe en el sentido de que quien reclama alimentos tiene prohibido trabajar, pero en este fallo ya ha sido expuesto por qué esa afirmación es un mito, entendiendo por mito una historia imaginaria que altera la realidad.

ñ. Un tema que también reviste interés al analizar la obligación alimentaria en cuestión, radica en la decisión unilateral del centro de estudios. Así, en la práctica es usual que un hijo (a) adulto (a) elija un centro de estudios privado y, además, el más costoso, sin demostrar que ello fue algo consentido por la parte obligada o bien, que responde a un determinado nivel de vida dado por la parte accionada. Esta práctica es un tema delicado porque como se ha indicado, la citada obligación alimentaria no es preferente, es condicional y es excepcional. Tanto así que, tampoco tiene como finalidad sostener financieramente un proyecto de vida independiente de la persona beneficiaria como sería salir de la familia nuclear para tener un lugar diferente para vivir que podría incluso tener como propósito sustraerse de las reglas básicas de convivencia que le son fijadas en su grupo familiar. Ninguna norma indica que el padre y la madre están en la obligación de financiar un proyecto de vida independiente para hijos (as) mayores de dieciocho años y menores de veinticinco años. De esta forma, una decisión unilateral de la persona adulta joven que conlleve financiar un proyecto de vida independiente no está contemplado en la legislación y por ello, no es jurídicamente exigible, salvo que su salida del hogar sea provocada por situaciones comprobadas de violencia. Todo esto con la observación de que, vivir en familia implica el cumplimiento de reglas básicas de convivencia como, por ejemplo, tener horario claro de llegada, no consumir sustancias adictivas, no ingresar al hogar habiendo consumido sustancias adictivas, participar activamente en las labores de limpieza del hogar y preparación de alimentos, así como la gestión de adquisición de suministros y del pago de recibos, etc. Es decir, vivir en familia no es vivir en un “hotel”. Por ello, la participación activa en estas labores indispensables para la sostenibilidad del hogar son deberes que impone la vida familiar y, exigir colaboración de parte de hijos (as) adultos no es violencia, salvo que, en situaciones concretas, el requerimiento sí sea realizado mediando violencia, que como se dijo, debe ser demostrada. En igual sentido, también la persona adulta joven que responda con violencia ante tales requerimientos, podría colocarse en el supuesto de pérdida del derecho a los alimentos que contempla el artículo 173 inciso 3) del Código de Familia.

Hecho el análisis que corresponde en torno a los presupuestos de la obligación alimentaria y, los presupuestos, características y la operatividad de la obligación alimentaria respecto a hijos e hijas mayores de edad, pero menores de dieciocho años, es importante analizar el caso concreto.

V.CASO CONCRETO. En este asunto el tema de fondo es bastante simple, en tanto de la actividad académica de la beneficiaria no se conoce absolutamente nada desde el segundo cuatrimestre del año 2022. Como se ha explicado, la carga de probar que cumple con los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 172 inciso 3) del Código de Familia, le corresponde a dicha joven y, en primera instancia no lo hizo. En segunda instancia, se le ha dado la oportunidad de aportar esa prueba, pues se ha ordenado prueba para mejor resolver y, se le ha dado la oportunidad de que gestione la información requerida, sin necesidad de incurrir en gastos, puesto que se ha expedido un oficio para que la información académica fuera diligenciada sin costo, pero, la joven fue notificada de la resolución que ordena la prueba para mejor resolver y, no mostró ningún interés en ella. Así las cosas, es claro que, si no se sabe nada de las circunstancias académicas de la joven desde que finalizó el segundo cuatrimestre del año anterior, debe ser excluida del derecho a los alimentos. En este caso, el fallo recurrido tiene claro que de las circunstancias académicas de la joven no se sabe nada desde la finalización del segundo cuatrimestre del año anterior y, sin embargo, ha denegado el proceso de exclusión planteado. Es decir, se ha tomado una decisión al margen de lo que la normativa establece y, sin considerar la jurisprudencia constitucional vinculante. El fallo impugnado se centra en el derecho de la joven a estudiar y, ese no es el tema en discusión sino, que no lo está haciendo. Nadie duda de que la joven tiene derecho a estudiar. Así lo indica claramente el artículo citado, pero si la joven no cumple con sus cargas probatorias, no puede afirmarse que se encuentra estudiando y además, en los términos que la norma indica. En consecuencia, lo que corresponde es acoger el recurso de apelación planteado y, revocar la resolución impugnada en lo que ha sido objeto de recurso. Así las cosas, se acoge la exclusión planteada. Cesa el derecho alimentario de la beneficiaria. Es omite pronunciamiento sobre costas, pues eso no fue recurrido.

POR TANTO:

Se acoge el recurso de apelación planteado y, se revoca la resolución impugnada en lo que ha sido objeto de recurso. Así las cosas, se acoge la exclusión planteada. Cesa el derecho alimentario de la beneficiaria. Se omite pronunciamiento sobre costas. Maureen Roxana Solís Madrigal. Juez(a).- MSOLISM exp 16-001786-0172PA ???????????????

MAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A