Acquittal due to lack of publicity in instigation at private union meetingAbsolutoria por faltar publicidad en instigación en reunión sindical privada

Resolution: 2023-406 Case File: 19-000647-0619-PE (7) SENTENCE APPEALS COURT. Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Goicoechea, at nine hours and minutes on the twenty-second of March, two thousand and twenty-three.

APPEALS filed in the present case against [Name 001], who is of legal age, Costa Rican, with identity card number [Value 001], born in San José, on April 3, 1956, son of [Name 002] and [Name 003], single, union organizer, resident of Alajuelita, San José; for the crime of PUBLIC INSTIGATION to the detriment of PUBLIC TRANQUILITY. The judges Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Patricia Vargas González, and Kathya Jiménez Fernández participate in the decision on the appeals. Appearing before this court are Master Oscar Quirós Soto and Licentiate Carlos Meléndez Lugo, representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, Adjutant Prosecutor's Office of San José and of Appeals, respectively; Licentiate Gloria Navas Montero, legal representative of the private prosecutor "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica," under whose name dozens of individual grantor persons are grouped; Licentiate Margot Avellán Ruiz, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, who has acted as private prosecutor and civil plaintiff; and Licentiates Rodrigo Rosales Arce and Luis Carlos García Rivera, both private defense attorneys for the accused, and,

WHEREAS:

I.- That by means of judgment number 980-2021, at 15:30 hours on December 9, 2021, the Criminal Trial Court of San José, resolved: "THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing and articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 1 to 6, 1, 13, 16, 72 to 74, 111 to 116, 142, 182, 184, 265 to 267, 270, 360 to 366, of the Criminal Procedure Code and 1, 2, 11, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 45 and 280 of the Criminal Code, 16, 27 and 38 of the Fee Schedule for Professional Legal and Notarial Services No. 41457-JP, this Court resolves to ACQUIT OF ALL PENALTY AND LIABILITY [Name 001], for the crime of PUBLIC INSTIGATION to the detriment of PUBLIC TRANQUILITY for which he was being accused. The costs of the criminal proceedings are to be borne by the State, having proceeded at the instance of the Public Prosecutor's Office. REGARDING THE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES: The civil action for damages filed by THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC against the civil defendant [Name 001] is declared without merit. REGARDING COSTS: The costs derived from the private prosecutions and civil action are to be borne by the losing parties, which are set at the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to the civil action and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to the private prosecutions. The agreed sums must be paid once this judgment becomes final, by simple bank deposit into the Court's account. Once the judgment is final, the evidence seized in this matter is ordered destroyed. NOTIFY. Lorena Blanco Jiménez. Trial Judge." (sic, folio 482).

II.- That, against the previous ruling, appeals were filed by Master Oscar Quirós Soto, representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, Adjutant Prosecutor's Office of San José; Licentiate Gloria Navas Montero, attorney-in-fact and representative of persons grouped under the name "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica," who have been private prosecutors; and Licentiate Margot Avellán Ruiz, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic as private prosecutor and civil plaintiff.

III.- That, having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the court considered the issues raised in the appeals.

IV.- That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Judge Chinchilla Calderón writes; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- Procedural and jurisdictional matters. (A) By ruling of this jurisdictional body, number 2022-293 at 11:10 hours on February 25, 2022 (see folio 539), the appeals of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and the attorney representing the so-called "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica," a name under which dozens of individuals have grouped, who have appeared, personally, as private prosecutors alleging a diffuse interest and granting special judicial power to act on their behalf to Licentiate Navas, were admitted; procedures were rectified regarding the delivery, to this last entity and in accordance with its organic law, of a copy of the appeals so that, if it saw fit, it could make a statement; the testimonial evidence offered by the defense was rejected (the statement of Víctor Rodríguez Rescia, president of the Center for Civil and Political Rights based in Geneva and former president of the United Nations Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture, who would refer to the international implications of an action of unconstitutionality filed) and the requested oral hearing was scheduled, which was held in person on March 9, 2022, with the present composition. (B) In this proceeding, the defendant's attorney raised a defective procedural activity, alleging that Licentiate Navas Montero, being a deputy-elect at that date, lacked standing to intervene as legal representative of the private prosecutor and civil plaintiff because she was now a representative of all Costa Rican people and not of a specific group, for which he invoked resolutions of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (1847-E-2003) and of the Constitutional Chamber (551-91) that establish the national character of all deputations. Said defective procedural activity was rejected orally in the aforementioned proceeding (see record on folio 546 front) under the arguments that, first, Licentiate Navas Montero did not yet hold the condition of deputy until she formally assumed office on May 1, 2022, and, second, that, even if hypothetically she already had such condition (which she does at the time of this decision), that does not prevent her from carrying out her private activities unless she obtains some income by prohibition, which must be demonstrated and, to date, has not been. In this specific case, there is a power of attorney given to her by the individuals under the name of the prosecuting entity, and the issue of admissibility of both documents was already discussed and accepted when filing their initial briefs and in the preliminary hearing, and she has intervened in the process in such capacity, so she continues to hold it. In response to the above, the cited defense attorney made a reservation for cassation, which was recorded in the respective record. In the referenced hearing, no evidence was received, and the parties presented their arguments as will be summarized in each point. (C) Likewise, in this court's resolution that scheduled the hearing, the Constitutional Chamber was requested to provide the status of the case file related to the action of unconstitutionality number 21-024578-0007-CO promoted by [Name 001], in his capacity as general secretary of the National Association of Public and Private Employees (hereinafter ANEP). Upon receipt of the respective official communication, it was verified that the challenged norm refers to article 280 of the Criminal Code (that is, the one serving as the basis for the act accused here) and that it was challenged insofar as «It considers that the phrases "that affects public tranquility" and "without it being necessary for the act to occur" convert this crime into an open and general criminal offense, so that any action that minimally disturbs the collective can be prosecuted with just a complaint. The norm configures a risk crime which, being centered on the verb to instigate, materializes through speech, thus violating several fundamental rights, among which is freedom of expression, through the right to public or private assembly and demonstrations in public spaces. It points out that formal legal punitiveness alone is not sufficient to restrict rights; therefore, a norm must not only be typical (típico) but also unlawful and culpable, adjusting the governing verbs to concrete, specific, and irreducibly determinable conducts. The generality and breadth of this criminal offense allows for "fitting" any conduct to a verb and an action as broad as "instigate," allowing for the sanctioning of diverse conducts» and that, at the date of the oral hearing, the matter was in the substantive study phase by the constitutional body, since the action was admitted, and the respective edicts were published in Judicial Bulletins numbers 18 to 20, dated January 28 to February 1, respectively, all of 2022. From both said publications and the norm on which they are based, numeral 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the order to suspend the issuance of the "final resolution" in the matter where the application of the challenged norm is discussed, and, of course, in the underlying case of the action of unconstitutionality, as this case was, is inferred. This forced this court, by ruling number 2022-356 at 11:30 hours on March 9, 2022 (cf. folios 547 to 549), to suspend the decision in this venue pending the resolution in that instance. As reported and published in various Judicial Bulletins of this year (e.g., No. 19 of February 2, 2023, p. 9, and also accredited with the document on folio 556), said action has already been resolved through ruling number 2023-00430 of January 11 of the current year, in which it was ordered: «By majority, the action of unconstitutionality is declared without merit. Magistrates Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado, and Garita Navarro give different reasons. Magistrate Cruz Castro dissents and considers that this action should be declared with merit and consequently, due to its content and effects, article 280 of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional.» Therefore, as the referenced constitutional obstacle no longer exists and the case file having been reactivated by a procedural order at 10:08 hours on January 12, 2023 (folio 557) (which means the statute of limitations for the criminal action continues to run), it is appropriate to issue the decision on these appeals, especially given that older adults who are parties are involved, despite the fact that, as is evident from the preceding certification (folio 565), the content of the full ruling is still unknown as it is being drafted. However, this could not differ from the already published operative part, in which there was no declaration of unconstitutionality or any conforming interpretation. (D) In this matter, the three accusing parties (Public Prosecutor's Office, Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and the individuals acting under the name "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica," an unregistered entity) filed an accusation for facts (drafted differently, especially in the case of the last entity) that were limited to September 9, 2019, when [Name 001], as secretary of ANEP, in a meeting of the Movimiento Encuentro Social Multisectorial held in the auditorium of the Episcopal Conference, allegedly called for a national strike lasting one or two days that would include the closure of borders and the closure or blockade of Routes No. 2 (Alto de Ochomogo), No. 27 (San José-Caldera), and No. 32 (San José-Limón). However, the complaint of the "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" described in the operative part of the judgment (it will be seen in the following considering that these facts were also omitted, in part, regarding the facts on which the trial was to be based according to the arraignment order) includes these other factual references not found in those other accusations: «Sixth (…) He specifically used such tactics in acts already perpetrated in 2018, actions that have not prescribed. We refer to the paralysis of essential services starting in June 2018. The entire population suffered, and the leader, supported by directed groups and in the company of others, sowed chaos in education, in hospitals, in transportation, and in many other public services. Vehicular traffic was interrupted, and the population was affected by fear and confusion. This occurred in the capital city and in other areas of the country. We reiterate, it is a public and notorious fact (…) Eighth: We also file a complaint for the act perpetrated on September 3, 2019, outside the Legislative Assembly in the afternoon hours, when the journalist from La Nación [Name 004] was attacked by the mob at the clear instigation of the defendant. He not only caused aggression with his intervention but also interrupted the exercise of journalism and denied the right of information to the citizenry, a fundamental right. The fact was recorded in the media and in the interview of the defendant on Repretel in the midday edition of September 13, 2019» (see the respective complaint file; folios 511-512, the highlights are supplied). On these topics, the court's judgment was silent both in its reasoning part (except for a paragraph alluding to costs) and in its operative part. However, if one observes the appeal of the representative of "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" (which will be described later), she only alludes to what happened on September 9, 2019, and does not mention, in any part of her argument, the previous or subsequent facts referenced above. This silence by the private prosecutor (the only party legitimated to allege it since it only referred to facts contained in a complaint filed by her), both in the written brief and in the hearing held at her request, validates the defect (by omission) of the judgment, in accordance with what is stipulated in article 177, subsection b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which states, in what is relevant: "…the defects shall be validated in the following cases (…) b) When those entitled to challenge it have accepted, expressly or tacitly, the effects of the act." Furthermore, as stipulated by numerals 439 and 446 of said regulation, this chamber's competence is limited to the arguments presented, so it is not permissible to conduct an ex officio analysis, especially in predominantly accusatory systems like ours and before appeals from those accusing, as this would imply substituting and invading those functions. Accordingly, the judgment on those issues (from 2018 and September 3, 2019) must be considered final and unchallengeable. (E) In order to address the different topics raised in an orderly and logical manner, the analysis will begin with the allegations regarding evidentiary legality, the assessment of the material, the reasoning, and the determination of facts; then the matter concerning legal characterization (tipicidad) and legal argumentation in general; next, the matter concerning the civil action; and, finally, the costs. Therefore, the order of grievances raised by the appellants will not necessarily be followed, and, in some cases, some of their complaints will be addressed jointly. (F) To ensure a fluid reading of the text without distractions from secondary ideas, but, at the same time, to provide self-sufficiency to this judgment and facilitate access for those challenging (and reading) to the cited materials, references to public legal documents made in the operative position of this chamber (not in the merely descriptive one) are inserted via hyperlink (highlighted by underlining and a different text color), which is accessed, in the digitized text, by clicking on the highlighted part.

II.- Master Oscar Quirós Soto, coordinating prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office, appeals the acquittal judgment, presenting a series of phrases that are mostly generic and applicable to any matter. In what he titles the "first ground" of his challenge (which, in reality, is the only one), he expresses his disagreement with the assessment of the evidence because he believes there was a violation of the rules of sound criticism which, in his view, generates improper and contradictory reasoning. He argues that the testimonial evidence of Rubén Hernández Valle and Gloria Navas Montero was not correctly analyzed and that, if this had been done and subjective assessments had been omitted, a different decision would have been reached. He considers that the appealed judgment lacks motivation as only one of the aspects referred to by the parties is mentioned, leaving aside essential circumstances (without stating which ones). He says it was demonstrated that the accused made a series of statements to cause a revolt in the country, and although he did so in a private center, the Episcopal Conference, that does not prevent the criminal offense from being consummated. He criticizes the judge's position that the act must occur in a public place. He adds, in a somewhat disordered exposition, that it is not a requirement that the video provided be the original, that no one has reported the improper capture of statements, and that the fact that it was edited does not mean it cannot be assessed, since no one, not even the accused, has indicated that it was adulterated or that the images contained therein are false. He recalls that in our system there is no weighted evidence and this material was heard by third parties, which would be sufficient. Furthermore, it was seized from a mass media outlet, which would prove, according to the challenger, that the interviewee was making the statements to several people. He adds that, although the crime is found in the title of crimes against public tranquility, that does not mean that the instigation must only be for unlawful acts found in that title, since there are others that affect that legal interest (such as disruption of public service and obstruction of public roads) which are multi-offensive and affect an entire population. He adds that "It is not true that the offense requires determining the mass's will because it is a crime of danger. The judge's conclusion that what the accused said is not instigation but a proposal, pretending that a person instigating must say when and how the act will occur goes beyond what is required by the offense." (Cf. folio 490 back). He maintains that, although the instigation did not materialize, the criminal offense does not require that to happen. Next, the appellant, in a somewhat confused manner and as a question, adds: "How does the court intend that, in this type of case, the mere element that the accused, at the time and in the manner, did not authorize himself to be recorded, exempts him from the crime of Public Instigation, since from the analysis made, it is determined that there is no Criminal Characterization (Tipicidad), nothing further from reality. In the Public Prosecutor's Office's consideration, the Court arrives at an erroneous conclusion by determining that the evidence does not manage to credibly prove the prosecution's thesis and leaves aside circumstances that were exposed by the witnesses, and due to the above and according to the principle of Correlation between Accusation and Sentence, the accused must be acquitted. In this sense, this representation wishes to make it known that we are before credible testimonies that should have been assessed from the perspective of coherence and logic; since the Court takes for granted that there is no coherence in their accounts and the prosecutorial request was not correct, a very subjective assessment" (see folio 491 front and back; the wording and spelling errors, including the inappropriate use of capital letters, are from the prosecution's text itself). Generically (as it does not describe any concretely), it indicates that there are serious contradictions between what was narrated by the witnesses and what was interpreted by the court, and that the court limited itself to pointing out some alleged circumstances expressed by the witnesses. After other abstract statements, valid for any case, on the importance of the reasoning, it concludes by requesting the annulment of the ruling. Likewise, Licentiate Gloria Navas Montero, president of "Movimiento Ciudadano C.R." and legal representative of the individuals who compose it and appear as private prosecutors alleging a diffuse interest, anticipates that the essential request is the annulment of the substantive judgment. As a first argument for this, she alludes to the lack of reasoning and the erroneous factual assessment that led to the main proven fact. She says it is true that the accused is the General Secretary of ANEP, a union leader, and that on September 9, 2019, he participated in a meeting "that is said to be of a private nature but which transcended to public opinion" (a condition underlined that she claims was not included as a proven fact, even though the witnesses for Mr. [Name 001] were at the meeting and can attest that he addressed the attending public where he uttered the expressions that were complained of, and these came to public knowledge). It is also true, she adds, that the accused expressed statements before the meeting participants and the original video could not be located, but one was provided from the interview that, due to this, she gave to Repretel where, in her opinion, it would be proven that the expressions were given before a public exacerbated by the leader's attitude and that they were reported to the affected and intimidated public. She says that the imputed crime does not distinguish whether the punishable act is committed in public or in private, as the offense is of public action, and that, for this reason, the proven fact is incomplete, affecting the reasoning and generating the grievance, so the court's reasoning does not fully comply with the limits of due process. She adds that upon examining the statements of Rubén Hernández Valle as well as the one she herself gave, it is established that they felt affected by the declarations of Mr. [Name 001] (which have not been denied by him or his unions) but that other people were also affected. They learned of this through the press, so the act occurred and became information for public opinion, which is the one affected. She maintains that the accused publicly indicated that he had made them. She alludes to what Cesar López, a witness for the defense, narrated; denies that what the defendant said was an exchange of ideas and affirms that this witness acknowledged that the video circulated on CRHoy and in various television media. She summarizes the statement of Walter Quesada, who pointed out his participation in union movements that historically have produced great economic losses for the country and generated the disruption of education. The appellant says that in 2018 there was almost three months of strike and that "this history has not produced amnesia in the population" (folio 501 back) and that this is the modus operandi of the accused, a topic not assessed by the intervening judge. Therefore, the threat uttered in the groups that have supported these harmful movements for the national community was made credible. She complains that the judge rejected the overall interpretation and the principle of experience, which affected the assessment of the evidentiary material. She denies that this is a political trial, as the accused says, and requests the annulment of the ruling. When responding to the appeals, the defendant's private defense attorneys indicate that the offended refer to 2018 events in which Mr. [Name 001] did not even participate; they use illegitimate evidence (a copy of an unauthorized video in its reproduction, whose capture would constitute a crime under articles 181 to 183 of the Criminal Code) and attempt to artificially extend public instigation, to the detriment of legislative will, to articles other than those contemplated as crimes in Title X of the "Criminal Procedures Code" (sic) which were not attributed. They say that the accusers' interpretation of the elements of this offense is general and extensive and forget that the generic figure of instigation under article 46 of the Criminal Code exists; they violate —the defense attorneys continue arguing— articles 25, 26, and 29 of the Political Constitution referring to the freedoms of manifestation or expression, association, and assembly, as well as the principles of legality and criminal characterization, all of which violates international standards (for which a copy of an action of unconstitutionality is provided). They add that, through this channel, prior censorship is exercised and freedom of expression is curtailed, opening a window to criminal risk, especially when the person being criminalized is a human rights defender, as the United Nations Rapporteurship classifies union members. They affirm that public instigation cannot occur in a private sphere, and the private prosecutor's assertion that the criminal offense does not distinguish such a thing is an illogical legal thought. They are surprised by the flippancy of the prosecutorial appeal brief and the "machotero" (arrogant) use of affirmations and add that a case file should never have been opened for this matter, as "it is embarrassing" (folio 532 back) when the judgment states that the video provided did not meet the minimum requirements to be analyzed because it was not original, and that, despite this, the Public Prosecutor's Office continues with this "judicial runway show" (ibidem), which is not a minor issue as it costs taxpayers' money that should be used for other things. They insist that the video is illicit evidence, and everything derived from it is also illicit, so the private prosecutor Navas cannot revive it by incorporating other videos from media outlets that reproduce it, and, therefore, it is irrelevant whether the location is public or private. They add that the statements are based on the video and are not from eyewitnesses. They maintain that the judgment is well-reasoned. At the hearing held, Licentiate Carlos Meléndez, prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office, requested that his appeal be granted and a retrial be ordered, reiterating the arguments presented in writing. Licentiate Navas Montero, as the private prosecutor, expanded her appeal, indicating that she was filing it both personally —as a Costa Rican citizen through popular action— and in her capacity as judicial legal representative of the persons grouped under the name "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica," and that she did so for three factors: for a rupture in the rules of sound criticism in the assessment of the evidence; for an erroneous interpretation of article 280 of the Criminal Code by declaring that the act was not typical (típico) and insofar as her represented party was ordered to pay costs (an aspect on which she focuses another independent grievance). Regarding the first two aspects, she highlighted that this is a crime of danger and not of result (a relevant topic to associate with the condemnation for costs) and that the interpretation that the phrase was uttered in private is a first error, because it was in the context of a strike, with scandal, obstruction of roads, disruption of hospital services and public transportation, all of which generated chaos and the public interest was at stake. As for the video in which the accused speaks at the intersectoral meeting, the fact that it was not provided in its original form is criticized, but she intervened as a witness for the Public Prosecutor's Office, and there is evidentiary freedom. She considers it erroneous to indicate that this crime cannot be applied to criminal offenses that protect the same legal interest, even if they are found in other sections of the Criminal Code. Licentiate Rodrigo Rosales, criminal defense attorney for the accused, stated that none of the appellants provided arguments to dismantle what was stated in the judgment, but rather they start from a "criminal law of the author that would make Günther Jakobs die again" (sic). He points out that they intend to use illicit evidence for a double reason: his client was in an activity and on private premises, and a video of him was leaked without his consent or approval, which, as if that were not enough, was edited. Licentiate Carlos García indicated that the accusing parties moved from "public instigation" to "common instigation"; that article 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code was violated because the source evidence was obtained through a crime related to the violation of correspondence. The accused, at the end of the hearing, stated that he is a son and heir of the values of 1949 with the anteroom of the guarantees of the 1940s, has 30 years in social struggle at the forefront of ANEP and has never done so out of aspiration for public office, but rather has had the consent of committees of people who have considered him important for the social cause, so he did not endanger public tranquility, but rather this exposes the growing social inequality generated by the deployed economic policies. He indicates that his organization is a reference point for social groups of different natures that do not receive responses from political parties. In a multisectoral social gathering, private, to draft proposals and outline a struggle strategy against the government, which has totally excluded them, many people infiltrate. He says he has no ideology, nor does ANEP possess one, but rather there is an attempt to delegitimize, and his only banner is human rights, to the point that he sits in the dock of the accused for defending them.

Refers to OC-27/21 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights concerning freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, which are also human rights. Says that Ms. Gloria is an elected deputy of the Republic and that she offered him a hearing as soon as she took office, but he is already asking her to return the right to strike to the people, since it is not merely a referendum but a judgment of an international court that is being violated. Adds that he was at a private event and there was a leak without his consent that was distorted due to the animosity some media outlets have against him. Points out that the country went back 50 years in social development, that at that moment there was agitation and social movements and that will continue with or without [Name 001], with or without ANEP, in the face of hunger and high wage indebtedness. Says that ANEP is a benchmark for social aid, for the free defense of labor rights, for which corporate unionism was broken; that far from affecting public tranquility, they seek to consolidate it, and that it is they who endangered that value. The arguments are connected and will be addressed jointly, rejecting them. As can be seen, the parties intermingle procedural issues with questions of substantive law and the configuration of the criminal definition. These latter issues, which are also mentioned in other arguments that will be summarized later, will therefore be addressed in other sections (to which the applicants are referred in order to avoid unnecessary reiteration), in order to maintain a logical order of presentation, limiting this first section to topics related to the validity and assessment of evidence and the reasoning of the resolution. However, no reference will be made to the principle of correlation between accusation and sentence, mentioned by the appealing prosecutor, since no violation of it is verified, insofar as not only were the facts of the accusations not deemed proven (and that principle, which protects the right of defense, seeks to preserve that the conviction be based on what was accused), but the aforementioned prosecutor merely throws out a phrase on that topic without giving it any content, which more clearly shows the use of a pre-established and uncorrected form than a real defect in the decision. It is also advisable to warn, from the outset, that in a democratic country that is truly respectful of the rights of all persons, anyone can be taken to court for acts that a person considers harmful to their rights or interests, as this is part of the human right of access to justice, without the fact of being subjected to a proceeding (of any nature and whatever its outcome) being considered a political trial, since, to date, (still) there exists judicial independence that, although with weaknesses and opportunities for improvement, continues to function and will permit determining whether what is attributed is acceptable or not and, in either case, establish the corresponding responsibilities. A political trial is, in the strict sense and in some political systems, one conducted by Parliaments to establish political (not legal) responsibilities of a high-ranking public official (a condition the accused does not have and a proceeding that does not exist in the country) or, in a broad sense or *latu sensu* (which is what the accused seems to use), it is one brought to dismantle an opposition using co-opted judicial channels, but for this qualification to be valid, it requires not only the motivation of the petitioner but absolute control over the judicial or jurisdictional apparatus, which, in this case, is not shown to exist, since the trial court's sentence rejected the parties' claims and this chamber assumes, with all rigor, its independent role. For this reason, from the start, such qualifiers are rejected, which, rather than providing analysis, stem from subjectivities or emotions that this court does not validate. Likewise, it is necessary to point out to attorney Rosales not only that the German author Günther Jakobs (1937-…) has not died (so he could not die again), but rather that this academic has been the one who devised the ideological bases of "criminal law of the enemy," which is the closest thing to criminal law of the author, hence this school of thought, far from being adverse to him, is akin to him, so no criticism could be made from the theoretical position he follows regarding the expressions cited by the defendant's lawyers. Having made these clarifications, in order to have an express contextual framework to allude to the evidentiary and reasoning issues, it is also convenient to provide a quick recount of what happened in the proceeding, as well as to provide a summary of the sentence—issued in writing by a single-judge court—which consists of 42 pages (located at folios 460 to 482 of the main case file): (A) Summary of what happened in the proceeding. i. This matter began with a complaint dated September 13, 2019, filed by the subsequent plaintiff Gloria Navas Montero, representing the "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" under whose name 82 natural persons are grouped, 81 of whom granted special judicial power of attorney to attorney Navas, who also acted in her personal capacity. All of them, together with the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, filed an accusation against [Name 001]. ii. The three accusations have in common charging the sentenced person with the crime of public instigation for events that occurred on September 9, 2019, when [Name 001], as secretary of ANEP, at a meeting of the "Movimiento Encuentro Social Multisectorial" held in the auditorium of the Costa Rican Episcopal Conference, allegedly called for a national strike, lasting one or two days, which would include closing borders and blocking Routes No. 2 (Alto de Ochomogo), No. 27 (San José-Caldera), and No. 32 (San José-Limón), none of which occurred or, at least, was discussed and proven at trial. However, the complaint of the self-styled "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" includes, as already mentioned, these other factual references that are not covered in the other accusations, namely: «Sixth (…) He used these tactics specifically in already consummated acts in the year 2018, actions that have not prescribed. We refer to the paralyzation of essential services starting in June 2018. The entire population suffered and the leader, supported by the directed groups and in the company of others, sowed chaos in education, in hospitals, in transportation, and in many other public services. Vehicular traffic was interrupted and the population affected by fear and confusion. This occurred in the capital city and in other areas of the country. We reiterate, it is a public and well-known fact (…) Eighth: We also complain about the act consummated on September 3, 2019, outside the Legislative Assembly in the afternoon, when the La Nación journalist [Name 004] was attacked by the mob at the clear instigation of the defendant. He not only provoked aggression with his intervention but also interrupted the exercise of journalism and denied the right to information to the citizenry, a fundamental right. The fact was recorded (sic) in the information media and in the very interview given by the defendant on Repretel in the midday edition of September 13, 2019.» (The wording is from the original, bold text is provided). The foregoing was part of what was outlined in the operative part of the appealed sentence. However, if the complaint document itself is examined (which was admitted in its entirety in the order opening the trial), it contained other facts, namely: «3. In recent times, as proven by public and well-known facts, said gentleman has exceeded himself in his speeches, actions, and decisions to the point that he has not only illegitimately abused his right to opinion, but his conduct transgresses the law and other fundamental guarantees of the citizenry, who choose to express themselves not with violence or coercion but with the appropriate instruments of the Rule of Law. 4. Said gentleman, with his speeches and actions, has attempted to destabilize the constitutional order, inciting violence and the exercise of groups that intentionally disturb the free passage of citizens, young students, children heading to their educational centers, and many workers who must punctually report to their jobs. Even a few days ago, with his statements, he managed to get people directed by his negative expressions and improper actions to physically attack a member of the press who was trying to do his job. 5. A few days ago, before an alleged strike called by medical unions and related professions, he incited the masses to react and deny the provision of essential services such as health, endangering the lives of many people due to the massive cancellation of appointments and scheduled surgeries. The delivery of medications was denied, all of which constitutes an evident affront and violation of fundamental human rights. This has been recorded by the press and other information media. These are public and well-known facts. (…) 7. We formally complain against said gentleman because he has attempted to move his followers and other union movements, as he affirmed, towards citizen and governmental extortionate offenses with the consummation of a nationwide strike lasting 24 to 48 hours from border to border.» (Points described as 1 and 2 also appear there, which are omitted in the above transcription since they contain the identification of the accused and the time related to his union activity, topics that are not part of the accusation per se but are merely descriptive; bold text is added). In this last private accusation document, other legal qualifications are added, such as obstruction of the public roadway and rioting in the capacity of instigator (see the respective complaint file). iii. The complaint by attorney Navas and the 81 remaining persons was filed on October 23, 2019, and was admitted on that same date. After the prosecutorial accusation was filed, in August 2020, it was communicated to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which brought its complaint (see complaint file and transfer of the accusation at folio 161 of the main file). iv. A civil action for damages was also filed solely by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which claimed social damage in the sum of one million colones, a claim it maintained throughout the proceeding (see the complaint file for this procedural party at folio 2, civil action file at folio 1, and trial conclusions at folio 458). v. At trial, four witnesses were received, the first two members of the "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" (Rubén Hernández Valle, Gloria Navas Montero) who were not present at the meeting but learned of it through the media, and the others provided by the defense (César López Dávila and Walter Quesada Hernández) who, although they attended the meeting, did not remember the exact terms in which the accused expressed himself; the statement of the indictee was taken (who alluded to the context of his speech without accepting that he had said those phrases); and the following was admitted as documentary evidence: the complaints and their attached documentation from folios 1 to 17, 124 to 129, and 130 to 134; a petition with signatures from different people from folios 18 to 119; the seizure record and its description number 0064696 from folio 141; the O.I.J. reports, one from the Visual Inspections Section number 1816-DC-SIOERI-2019 at folios 148 and back, and another from the Miscellaneous Crimes Section number 059-DVDC-2020 from folios 154 and 155; the certification of convictions from folio 251; and, as material evidence, a gold-colored DVD-R disc labeled 19-647-619-PE; a silver-colored Maxell brand DVD+R disc labeled "video [Name 001]"; a silver-colored Maxell brand DVD-R disc labeled "signatures of the citizens"; and a white "Transcend" 4GB USB device; vi. In the proven facts of the sentence, the following were considered proven: the accused's status as a union leader, his participation in a nationwide private meeting held on the accused date and place (September 9, 2019, in the auditorium of the San José Episcopal Conference within the framework of the group "Movimiento de Encuentro Social Multisectorial"), and the fact that, without him authorizing the capture of his voice or image, he was filmed while making his statements to the attendees, without the original video being able to be located. It was also considered proven that the accused has no criminal record. vii. The intellective and legal evidentiary analysis was set out, together, in Considerando III (pages 30 to 40 of the sentence) where the following are presented as reasons for the criminal acquittal of the accused: a) the accused facts are not typical of the attributed crime (public instigation) or any other; b) while this is not a political trial, as the accused says, it is regrettable that the parties did not analyze the evidence, not even the documentary evidence, and digressed on facts unrelated to the *thema probandum*, such as the 2018 national strike movement, about which they had not questioned to link the accused to it; c) the parties did not analyze the way the video was obtained, but rather the prosecutorial entity contented itself with mentioning that this was a crime of abstract danger (which the judge accepts as valid) but without referring to the evidentiary basis for its proof, since there is a police report (059-DVDC-2020) that states that the original video was never seized, making it impossible to determine if the one published by media outlets and seen in the trial room had been edited or not; d) the video provided by a plaintiff (gold-colored DVD-R labeled 19-647-619-PE), at second 18, presents a cut and is not, as stated in the accusations, the original video but rather "…a Repretel video where Mrs. Gloria Navas is interviewed, which shows that the parties arrived at trial without proper handling of the evidence" (page 32 of the sentence). On the other hand, the silver-colored Maxell brand DVD-R disc labeled "video [Name 001]" was a copy, its modification date is September 12, 2019, and «…for purposes of analyzing its authenticity as stated at folio 147, it was necessary to have the original video, and for this reason, the seizure of the original video where the accused's statements were recorded was ordered by prosecutorial request to the Judicial Investigation Agency as stated at folio 148, procedures carried out through the report of the Miscellaneous Crimes Section No. 059-DVDC-2020, which is found at folios 154 and 155, which is duly admitted evidence, and which regarding the relevant procedure indicates: \"CRhoy responded that they were unable to find original videos of their journalists' recordings,\" therefore the original video could never be analyzed to determine not only the veracity of the copy provided as evidence but also the conditions under which it was obtained, since determining who the journalist or correspondent who recorded it had been, they could well be interviewed and offered as a witness to determine if there was free press access to that meeting and/or consent for those statements to be captured, and in that sense then the publicity of the statements and the accused's knowledge of that circumstance would indeed be considered proven, but at this point it is unknown, to the extent that it cannot be ruled out that the crime of improper capture of verbal statements may have been committed» (Cfr. sentence, pages 37-38); e) the state representative (the sentence does not specify which of the two it refers to, and both the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic intervene in that capacity) does not substantiate their assertion that the convened event was public; f) the fact that a video was shown in the media, without knowing who recorded it and without authorization to do so, does not confer public character upon the meeting; g) the accusers have the burden of proof and did not demonstrate essential elements of the criminal definition; h) the only people, among the meeting attendees, who testified at trial, and the accused himself, said the event was private (this was accepted by the prosecutor in their conclusions according to page 36 of the sentence), the statements would have been made in a private place (the latter qualified as an uncontroverted fact on page 36 of the sentence), and this was not refuted, since although Navas indicated that farmers from San Carlos told her they attended, and witness López Dávila affirmed that there were civil society representatives, this does not confer the status of public upon the meeting, especially since it took place in a private venue and the accused said it had that character and it was each union that determined the method of calling its representatives; i) it is unacceptable to reverse the burden of proof and affirm that, since the defense witnesses said they did not know the details of the meeting's convocation, it was therefore not private; j) the representative of the "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" stated that the accused had confessed because he had publicly accepted saying the accused expressions and that he would not back down, but she did not refer to the evidentiary elements from which she derived this, because if he accepted it that way in some other television interview, it was not offered, and on that point, arguments were only presented in the trial conclusions and not through the questioning of witnesses or other formally admitted evidence, and at trial, the defendant rejected the charges; k) "…while the plaintiff, in the complaint she filed on October 23, 2019, indicated that as evidence, the midday video from September 12 and 13, 2019, should be requested from Repretel, where the interviews with Gloria Navas and [Name 001] are respectively recorded, from a proper review of the evidentiary collection she would have realized that ultimately the only video that was seized from Noticias Repretel according to record No. 64696 at folio 138 was the interview with Mrs. Navas, this because in her complaint - see folio 125 back - she indicated that both interviews had taken place on September 12, 2019, and therefore that was what was requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office according to folio 135, and if the party considered that this was not the evidence required in accordance with her accusatory theory, she could well have pointed it out at the opportune procedural moment, which did not happen, to the point that at the time of playing the provided videos, she indicated that she missed the video in question without providing further details…" (cfr. sentence, folio 477); l) the witnesses for the prosecution (Hernández and Navas) were not present at the event but learned of the facts from the dissemination of the video through media outlets; from the information they provide, it cannot be concluded that the event was public; m) the crime of public instigation is not configured, says the trial court, since this crime, provided for in article 280 of the Penal Code and punishable by imprisonment of six months to four years, does not refer to just any crime but to one that affects public tranquility, a placement that this criminal definition also has (in Title X "Crimes against public tranquility") along with others such as illicit association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation, and advocacy of crime. However, the accusers did not attribute any of these to the accused, but rather the crimes of disruption of public services and obstruction of the public roadway, which are placed in Title IX "Crimes against common security"; n) the fact that an event generates collective alarm, chaos, or concern (as the accusers alleged) —the trial judge continues saying— does not mean that public tranquility is affected for purposes of configuring the criminal definition, since there is a specific title in the Penal Code that establishes which crimes have public tranquility as the protected legal interest. Not interpreting it this way would mean making an extensive interpretation and falling into the excesses incurred by the state attorney when saying that even a robbery affects public tranquility, which violates Article 2 of the Penal Code; ñ) in Costa Rica, the criminal definition of public instigation is more restricted than in other legislations, such as those of Colombia and Argentina (which are transcribed in the impugned sentence), where the criminal definition does not limit the commission of the illicit act to the affectation of a specific legal interest, as does happen in our system; o) the crimes of obstruction of the public roadway and disruption of public services do admit instigation, but through the generic figure of Article 46 of the Penal Code. However, if [Name 001] had been considered to have intervened as an instigator of those crimes, the wording of the accusations should have been different, first because the acts would have had to have been perpetrated; second because it was necessary to individualize their authors in order to establish that it was the accused who determined them to commit the punishable acts. The judge establishes the difference between the two figures in that generic instigation requires determining the will of a specific person, whereas public instigation, due to its characteristic of publicity, refers to determining the will of a mass or indeterminate subjects. Therefore, she continues saying (supported by references to Manzini and Quisbert), publicity, in Costa Rica, is part of the intent. None of this was proven in the specific case, the judge concludes, since there were no acts subsequent to those words materializing such closures; p) nor was the seriousness of the instigation proven, since this implies inducing or moving the will toward the crime, not simply expressing an idea, proposing, or advising. Starting from the fact that he is accused of saying "I believe the thesis of a national strike is correct, we must propose a great national strike, but for real, not a runway one, close the borders, close Route 27, close Route 32, close Ochomogo..." that would not be instigation but a proposal within the framework of a social protest speech, since it does not indicate how and when the proposals would occur. Hernández Valle alluded to the fact that no one paid attention to those words, which denotes a lack of seriousness; q) With doctrinal citations that, in turn, refer to Argentine jurisprudence, mention is made that similar cases are protected by freedom of thought and expression, constitutional guarantees. viii. The civil action for damages filed by the State, represented by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, was rejected in Considerando IV (one paragraph on page 40 of the sentence) because subjective responsibility was attributed and, as it was not proven that the accused committed the acts, there was no causal link. ix. The resolution was reached with an award of costs against the losing parties, both in criminal and civil matters (Considerando V, pages 41-42), as it was considered that there was no plausible reason to litigate given the evidence provided and the aforementioned atypical nature; the complaints are based on evidence different from what was offered and admitted, and it was not verified whether it was pertinent or erroneous until the trial was reached. (B) Addressing the complaints. In the first place, the witnesses for the prosecution (Navas and Hernández), indeed, were not eyewitnesses, they were not at the meeting where the questioned opinions were allegedly expressed, according to the accusation, and, therefore, nothing they provide allows uncovering the manner in which the audiovisual material was obtained or the characteristic of the meeting, i.e., whether it was public or private, much less the content of what was discussed there, which they learned about from the media. Now, in a criminal proceeding, the obligation to prove all the constituent elements of a crime (action, typicality, unlawfulness, and culpability) falls upon those who accuse, not upon the person accused of the infraction, since considering it otherwise would reverse the burden of proof and violate the state of innocence guaranteed constitutionally (Article 39 of the Political Constitution) and conventionally (Articles 8.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights —hereinafter ACHR— and 14.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among others). From the state of innocence (formerly incorrectly called presumption) derives the principle that, in case of doubt about factual circumstances, the matter must be resolved in the way most favorable to the accused person (Article 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code). For this reason, if the accusing parties did not provide evidentiary elements regarding the nature of the meeting, i.e., whether it was public or private, but rather the evidence presented at trial indicated, rather, that it took place in a private venue and was restricted to representatives of various social movements, a point also mentioned by the accused, the appellants are wrong to consider that the absence of proof on this point should affect the accused, since, instead, the most favorable interpretation for him must be adopted, i.e., that the meeting was private (since, as will be developed later, this involves constitutional and conventional guarantees with additional requirements), an aspect also mentioned by witness Juan López Dávila ("I remember an event I participated in, in September 2019, yes I remember it because of everything that happened later, it was a closed-door discussion held in the auditorium of the Episcopal Conference on 20th Street, that is a private activity, it was not a demonstration, a discussion for exchanging ideas, which is usually held every so often, especially at times when there are public policies affecting workers, it was a meeting of several union groups and several civil society groups, it was a multisectoral meeting. That is the auditorium of the Episcopal Conference, which rents it out for activities, being a private activity, options are sought in the market that meet capacity and sound requirements to hold them. Around 18-25 people could have spoken in the first round (…) the press was not invited, it is a debate in the world of ideas, we are talking about social positions, no media outlet was invited, it was not a public activity, no one wants anyone to feel compelled to respond due to what is called social desirability in social science, the filming and dissemination of the event were not authorized to respect the privacy of the people who were there, I listened to most of the speeches (…) among the people who speak, Mr. [Name 001] (…) Yes, I remember a video that circulated in various media, I remember CRhoy and various television media, about the video I remember that it was recorded as if secretly, from behind in a corner, it is quite short, [Name 001]'s intervention used to last about five minutes, the video does not correspond to that, I remember seeing a cut, I cannot help but think that it does not correspond to the entirety of what was said, due to the cut and its duration, and often when participating, one must refer to what people said three or four turns ago, an excerpt from an intervention does not reveal the spirit of what was stated.") (Cfr. sentence, folios 467 back and 468, highlighted text is provided). This is accepted by attorney Navas herself in the appeal itself, so no contradiction or erroneous assessment is observed in the decision to consider the meeting as private. Attorney Navas, however, criticizes that the proven facts did not state that, although the event was "privately held (…) it transcended to public opinion" (cfr. folio 500, bold text is added). Now, on this particular topic, i.e., regarding the dissemination to public opinion, the trial court's sentence could not consider it proven because it was based on the thesis that the audiovisual material was unlawful evidence and, therefore, so too was everything derived from that spurious source. The appealed resolution reaches this conclusion for two reasons: a) because the accused did not authorize the capture of his image and voice, and the recording, as witness López Dávila stated above, is seen to have been made surreptitiously, from the back of the room, and the meeting was private, and b) because although some videos were provided, these were manipulated (one cut and another edited), thus casting doubt on the chain of custody of the material and whether what was captured there corresponded to what the accused intended to say and actually stated, since it could have been taken out of context. Both positions are inferences reached while respecting the rules of correct human understanding, without this court identifying errors in the reasoning. Indeed, if there is no evidence whatsoever to determine that the event was freely and openly accessible to the public, then it must be considered private, and, within this framework, protected by the right to assembly and the capturing of voice and image of persons covered by the right to privacy, both regulated in the Political Constitution (Articles 24 and 26) and in international treaties (Articles 11.2 and 15 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 17 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).

The same witness Rubén Hernández Valle, in his early legal texts, alluded to the importance of that determination: “…the meeting shall be private, even if it takes place on a public-domain asset for general use (street, square, public monument, etc.) when, due to the manner in which it is conducted, only previously determined persons may participate in it and who, generally, know each other (Example: meetings of members of an association […] group of tourists […] meetings of political party associations […]) Then, in contrast to meetings in a place open to the public, meetings whose participants are mutually known to each other, or are in an effective position to know each other before or during the course of the meeting, are defined as private (…) Regarding public meetings, the main reason for their eventual dissolution is constituted by (…) Regarding private meetings, such powers must be denied, since this type of meeting is governed rather by the rules relating to the protection of domicile and the freedom and secrecy of communications.” (Cfr. Hernández Valle, Rubén, 1980. Las libertades públicas en Costa Rica. Editorial Juricentro, pp. 141-142; emphasis added. To the same effect and by the same author and publisher: El derecho de la Constitución. Volume II, 1993, page 521). For its part, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR), when interpreting the CADH, has indicated that “171. The right to protest or demonstrate disagreement with any state action or decision is protected by the right of assembly, enshrined in Article 15 of the American Convention (…) The possibility of demonstrating publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways of exercising the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be claimed. Therefore, the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and must not be interpreted restrictively (…) 174. (…) the Court recalls that the right of assembly is not an absolute right and may be subject to restrictions, provided that the interferences are not abusive or arbitrary; therefore, they must be provided for by law, pursue a legitimate aim…” (IACHR. Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. Judgment of November 28, 2018; emphasis supplied). Part of the legal restrictions are given by the possibility of searching domiciles and private premises (Articles 193 to 197 of the Código Procesal Penal) but, in this matter, there was no jurisdictional search order nor were the exceptions for conducting one without an order present (there was no threat to the life or property of the attendees by fire, flood, or similar commotion; no strangers were seen entering with clear signs of committing illicit acts; no one pursued for a serious crime entered the site, nor were there voices inside the place asking for help). Consequently, the persons attending were exercising a constitutional and conventional right of assembly, a framework in which other rights were also enhanced, such as the right to privacy, which is also developed by law in the Código Civil (Article 47: “The photograph or image of a person cannot be published, reproduced, exhibited, or sold in any way without their consent, unless the reproduction is justified by the person’s notoriety, the public function they perform, the needs of justice or police, or when such reproduction relates to events, happenings, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public. Images and photographs with stereotyped roles that reinforce discriminatory attitudes toward social sectors cannot be published, reproduced, exhibited, or sold in any way”; emphasis added) and in the Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones, numerals 1 and 9, which require judicial intervention for their infringement, none of which occurred in the present case. Indeed, the right to privacy and the expression of manifestations in private spaces is of such superior protection that, as the trial judge rightly argued, the transgression of these provisions is sanctioned as a crime in numeral 198 of the Código Penal, which states: “Improper capture of verbal manifestations. Article 198.- Whoever, without their consent, records the words of another or others, not intended for the public, or who, through technical procedures, listens to private manifestations that are not directed at them, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years, except as provided in the Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones. The same penalty shall be imposed on whoever installs devices, instruments, or their parts, for the purpose of intercepting or preventing oral or written communications, whether or not they achieve their purpose” (the bold type is substituted). This crime, although it is prosecutable ex officio (de acción pública) and could be reported by anyone and not necessarily the affected person (Articles 16 to 18 of the Código Procesal Penal), had it been judicially pursued before, by this date it would already be time-barred unless there were some cause for suspension (the meeting would have taken place on September 9, 2019, and the maximum penalty is three years, so under ordinary circumstances, the action would have expired on September 9, 2022). However, this does not preclude considering that, by criminalizing the conduct, the capture of the material under those circumstances for other purposes is unlawful. All this reasoning has found support in the jurisprudence itself (binding erga omnes according to Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) of the Sala Constitucional. For example, in judgment number 1026-94, it was indicated that: “Numeral 24 of the Constitución Política enshrines the fundamental right to privacy. This is a sphere of protection for the private life of citizens. Privacy is formed by those phenomena, behaviors, data, and situations of a person that are normally kept from the knowledge of strangers and whose knowledge by them can morally disturb them by affecting their modesty and reserve, unless that same person consents to that knowledge. Although what happens inside a citizen's home cannot but be considered private life, what happens in offices, friends' homes, and other private premises may also fall within that sphere. In this way, the constitutional rights of inviolability of domicile, private documents, and communications exist to protect said privacy, which is an essential right of every individual…” (bold added) and also in number 6776-94, where the constitutional court indicated the following: “The right to privacy has a positive content that manifests itself in multiple forms, such as, for example: the right to image, to domicile, and to correspondence. For this Chamber, the right to private life can be defined as the sphere into which no one may intrude. The freedom of private life is the recognition of a zone of activity that is each person's own, and the right to privacy limits the intervention of other persons or public authorities in a person's private life; this limitation can manifest itself both in the observation and capture of the image and documents in general, as well as in the listening to or recording of private conversations and in the subsequent dissemination or disclosure of what was captured or obtained without the consent of the affected person…” (emphasis supplied). If, despite all of the above, someone captured the voice and image of the accused in a private meeting, without his consent and without the legal exceptions being met, and after doing so disseminated them, the only conclusion that could be reached (if we are speaking of legal reasoning) is that the material provided was unlawful, pursuant to Article 181 of the Código Procesal Penal, second paragraph, which provides: “Information obtained through (…) deceit, undue intrusion into the privacy of the domicile, correspondence, communications (…) nor information obtained by other means that diminishes the will or violates fundamental rights of persons may be used” (emphasis added). If the video was unlawful, as indeed it has been (since it was captured in a private meeting and the accused did not authorize the dissemination of his image and voice), what Navas and Hernández or any other witness said regarding its content could not be analyzed, as we are faced with the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, which also affects those references. It must be remembered that, according to this theoretical position, not only the evidentiary references directly derived from the violation of fundamental rights are null and void (as would be, in this case, the recording of the video), but also all those indirect ones (such as the witnesses' reference to the content of the video), unless there is an independent source or an inevitable discovery (among other exceptions, only these are accepted in our legal system), none of which has even been discussed and, much less, had evidentiary support. Otherwise, it would be very easy to violate the fundamental rights of persons, discard the principal document or evidence, and give validity to the testimonies that have examined its illicit content, a practice undoubtedly harmful in a State of Law (Estado de Derecho). On the other hand, even if the audiovisual material were lawful —which it has already been said it is not, and this is alluded to only in an analytical-hypothetical manner—, the original document was also not provided because the police could not seize it, and the ones delivered have obvious cuts and dates different from the one on which the events occurred, which are indications of their manipulation. It must be recalled that the chain of custody refers to the process by which it is guaranteed that a specific material element seized at the scene where the event occurred is the same one that is assessed by experts or that arrives at trial, the purpose of which is to guarantee its purity and the eventual evidentiary value, direct or circumstantial, that it may have. This institute also applies to digital and video evidence characterized by its volatility and ease of manipulation, hence the need to preserve the identity between what was seized and what is exhibited in the debate and that it has not been modified. The steps comprising the chain of custody that require safeguarding have been addressed both by constitutional jurisprudence (binding pursuant to Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (also binding as provided in numeral 62 of the CADH and by references from the IACHR itself, among others, in the Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile judgment, judgment of September 26, 2006). In the first instance, in judgment number 5831-96, it was indicated that: “II. Respect for the chain of custody in the collection of evidence can be analyzed from two different dimensions. From a strictly evidentiary point of view, the evidence will be more effective if it is truly proven that it has been handled correctly from its discovery at the crime scene or at the site where it was found until its effective introduction into the process. The discovery, lifting, fixing, collection, transfer, and custody of evidence or material elements that serve as proof of the criminal act require special technical capacity, so they are often entrusted to qualified personnel of the judicial police, in order not to alter or contaminate the evidence with external factors, and, if applicable, to maintain its purity for further analysis, be it chemical, physical, or of any nature. This operation is generally supported in multiple ways: through close-up photographs, identification and general location of the objects, videos, reports, and their respective packaging or securing. Any defect or omission in this procedure eventually weakens the purity of the collected evidentiary element, including with respect to its correct location at the scene or the way in which it links to the criminal responsibility of the accused. In turn, the chain of custody may refer to aspects pertaining exclusively to the legality of the evidence, that is, whether it was collected by subjects with competence to do so, whether the procedural formalities provided for this were complied with – existence of a reasoned judicial resolution, for example, in cases of searches; preparation of the respective report with the assistance of instrumental witnesses, etc. –, whether the respective receipts exist in the different departments where the evidence or material evidence was transferred, indicating the time, nature, weight, and quantity of the objects, so that – procedurally speaking – the legal trail of the evidence can be followed for valid incorporation into the process. III. The first dimension mentioned of the chain of custody refers to the assessment of evidence. The appreciation of respect for the minimum security standards in the collection of evidence is an integral part of the rules of sound judgment, and therefore its non-observance or erroneous appreciation violates due process. As for the legality of the production and introduction of that evidence into the process, due process is affected, since every accused has the right to be tried based on legally valid evidence. It will be up to the consulting Chamber to determine if in the specific case, the defects in the chain of custody in the two spheres indicated occurred, and their impact on the judgment challenged by the appellant.” (Bold added). Likewise, in vote number 6469-99 of said chamber, it was added: “(…) the relevance of defects in the chain of custody depends absolutely on the relevance of the evidentiary element of which it forms part, so that it will only constitute a violation of the right to due process when it has occurred within the procedure for the production of evidentiary elements essential for the demonstration of the attributed act, in the sense that the absence of that evidence makes the attribution of the act to the accused impossible. It then falls to the consulting Chamber to establish whether the conditions just set forth exist in the specific case, because if so, and the chain of custody of the evidence had truly been violated, due process would have been violated in the base case of the consultation being discharged.” (Emphasis added). Finally, the IACHR has indicated: “193. In addition, due diligence in an investigation (…) requires the maintenance of the chain of custody of every piece of forensic evidence. This consists of keeping a precise written record, supplemented, as appropriate, by photographs and other graphic elements to document the history of the evidentiary element as it passes through the hands of various investigators in charge of the case.” Case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. Judgment of May 19, 2014 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is clear that respect for the chain of custody forms part of a due process of law and its violation has consequences for the validity of the evidentiary element and its admissibility for assessment. If in this case it is not possible to determine whether the video provided was cut, edited, or otherwise manipulated (since the original could not be seized) and there are indications that it was (a crude cut and a date that does not correspond to the events at the base of the file), said material could hardly be assessed, especially since, as stated, the capture was also unlawful. It was not up to the accused (or the union he represents) to assert the unlawfulness of that material, nor did anyone need to do so for the legality of the evidence to be analyzed, because the burden of proof lies with the plaintiffs, and both the prosecuting agency and the court must ensure that the evidence received and that forms the basis of a decision is lawful (Articles 63, 175, 180, and 181, second paragraph of the Código Procesal Penal), which makes it strange that the Ministerio Público abandoned its duty of objectivity. Note that the last article is imperative: “Information obtained through (…) deceit, undue intrusion into the privacy of the domicile, correspondence, communications (…) nor information obtained by other means that diminishes the will or violates fundamental rights of persons may be used” (emphasis added). The provision is clear that no complaint is necessary (as the prosecutor argues) nor is it required that it be alleged in order to declare. Therefore, since the original document or an expert report allowing verification of the non-alteration of the delivered recording was not presented, its weighing was inappropriate, especially due to the method of obtaining it as already indicated. Note that, without prejudice to what will be discussed in detail in the following section regarding publicity (publicidad) as an element of the criminal definition (tipo penal), here the public or private site is relevant to determine not only the element of the criminal definition but also the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the capture and of the evidentiary material (an aspect that all appellants overlook), and since the meeting was one held in private places, where such authorization (for public entry or recording by media) was not enabled, the evidence becomes unlawful because the constitutional guarantee is the protection of private spaces and the meetings and expressions that take place there. Nor is it true that any element was incorporated into the debate from which it could be inferred that there was an endorsement, consent, or acceptance by the accused regarding the making or use of said recording, or from which it is inferred that he acknowledged having made the statements, because he rejected the charges and, in the length of his statements (both at trial and at the oral hearing at this venue), alluded to the prevailing socio-political context in the country and to union struggles (see folios 472 vuelto to 475). None of the three accusers specifies what that evidence from which that statement would derive is, and this omission is explained by the fact that none was incorporated because, if there was one, it was not offered or admitted, and according to the legal aphorism, what is not in the process is not in the world. Therefore, a judgment could hardly allude to unaccepted evidence, even if it existed (which is also in doubt). But even if it were accepted, again hypothetically for analytical purposes, that the videos provided were lawful and admissible and that the chain of custody was not violated in them, even so, it would also not be possible to deduce from them, evidentiarily, that the accused expressed statements with which he adapted his conduct to the criminal definitions of the crime of public instigation. From the audiovisual document provided (it has already been said it was provided illegally, but mentioned here hypothetically and subsidiarily) according to the lower court judgment (which is not disputed by the appellants), only the accused is heard saying “I think the thesis of a national strike is correct, we must propose a great national strike, but a real one, not a runway one, close the borders, close 27, close 32, close Ochomogo..." and the video is cut off. Therefore, it is unknown if [Name 001] is proposing that position or, for example, and without this being the only possibility, if he is referring to what someone said, be it to later refute it or to analyze it. None of this can be inferred due to the abrupt cut in the recording, an edit that allows one to infer the objective of the person recording it (illicitly, it must be remembered) that the people receiving the message be unaware of the communicative context. It is not in vain that in linguistics and communication (and, therefore, in journalism) emphasis is placed on the need to know the communicative contexts (historical, cultural, and social; linguistic, situational) to give meaning to the text, as the text is usually a pretext for variations in meaning from literalness (Cfr. Johnson Barella, Doris, 2005. La literalidad en el uso de las citas directas en las noticias de la prensa regional navarra. Dos casos: Diario de Noticias y Diario de Navarra. In: Revista Comunicación y sociedad, Volume XVIII, No. 2, pp. 109-140 and López Pan, Fernando. ¿Realmente ha dicho eso? Algunas implicaciones éticas en el uso de citas directas en los textos periodísticos. At https://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/35259/1/%C2%BFRealmente%20ha%20dicho%20eso%20Algunas%20implicaciones%20%C3%A9ticas%20en%20el%20uso%20de%20las%20citas%20directas%20en%20los%20textos%20period%C3%ADsticos.pdf). The last author warns: “Linguistic research, especially that related to discourse analysis, shows how every quotation — including literal quotation — involves a fiction of contexts, an intervention in which the quoter controls the quoted material and uses it within their own discursive strategy. And this does not refer to blatant manipulations in which someone is made to say something they did not say or their phrases are intentionally betrayed” (p. 108). Specifically regarding the situational context, it is necessary to know the set of data accessible to the participants of a conversation that are drawn from the immediate physical environment. None of this is achieved by capturing a recording of only a few seconds, cut at its beginning and end. Therefore, not even hypothetically assuming that everything was legal (the capture, the recordings, the custody, etc.) can it be concluded that, from that extract taken in such a way, the accused is determining others to commit a crime, and as the prosecution witnesses, Navas and Hernández, merely reproduced what they heard in the media (which, in principle, as can be inferred from their depositions, already had the cut made), their statements also do not contribute anything to support the alleged criminal commission. It is not that the decision aims to rely on fixed statutory evidence (prueba tasada), as the prosecutor claims, but rather that it relies on lawful evidence, as is the obligation of every court, a character that not all of the evidence provided possesses. The plaintiff Navas has insisted that the analysis consider the affectation that she and the witness Hernández Valle stated they felt due to the events, as well as that expressed by other persons who reported and sued and gave her power of attorney to take action (although they did not testify in the debate). However, this is irrelevant because, even if it were hypothetically assumed (only for analytical purposes) that such affectation occurred and that it was of great magnitude, this does not remedy the fact that it was not demonstrated that it was the accused who committed the act, since the evidence pointing to him is either unlawful (due to the manner of its capture and the unreliability of what was reproduced) or does not allow that imputation to be made in a reliable or credible manner, as has been previously referred to. Finally, although the parties alluded to other prior strike movements and the effects that, in their opinion, these generated as a modus operandi, they did not provide any evidentiary material in this regard, therefore theirs are mere statements without evidentiary value. For all the foregoing, these complaints must be rejected.

III.- For her part, Licentiate Margot Avellán Ruiz, attorney representing the State, in her appeal, began by presenting, as background, the facts on which the civil action for restitution was based and a summary of what was decided in the appealed judgment. After that, she stipulates, as the first ground for complaint, the lack of reasoning of the decision due to non-observance of the rules of sound judgment with respect to evidentiary means or elements of decisive value and the failure to apply substantive law, in particular Articles 280, 263, and 263 bis of the Código Penal. She states that the accused was acquitted because the facts are considered atypical and there is no proof that he committed a public instigation. She copies the content of the article and doctrinal references by the author Carlos Creus (Derecho Penal, parte especial, 1997, p. 105) and states that, based on that author, there is no limitation regarding the crimes that can be considered instigated, provided that, for their configuration, they hold that condition, i.e., that they are crimes, even if they are not contained in the main repressive body itself. She adds that to establish a restriction on the criminal definitions (tipos penales) to be considered, it must be contained in the norm, and if it does not exist, the alternative application of all existing criminal definitions in criminal legislation in general is appropriate. She considers that another component of the cited criminal definition relates to its consequences, since the crime is configured 'without it being necessary that the act be produced,' therefore one is in the presence of a crime of endangerment (delito de peligro), that is, those in which the legislator has taken into account, to define the criminal definition, the probability that the protected legal interest (bien jurídico tutelado) may suffer harm derived from the conduct carried out by the perpetrator, without the need for proof or confirmation of its existence. She cites the vote of the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de San José (R. Badilla, E. Montero, and G. Mena), number 2016-0235 and adds that, according to the aforementioned Argentine author (pp. 106-107), it is a crime of mere activity, which requires at least that there be an instigated person, although, if the means are suitable, there may be attempt, without a requirement that it transcend or potentially transcend to an indeterminate plurality of persons. Therefore, the appellant adds, it is not necessary that the crime was provoked, but simply that the exposure to risk of the legal interest occurs: the criminal definition is configured with the mere incitement. She alludes to the subjective aspect of the crime and to the fact that Creus maintains (in the cited work, page 106) that something more than the simple will to instigate is required, since there must be the will that the instigated act be actually carried out. From there, she concludes, derives the knowledge that what is instigated is a crime, and accidental or indeterminate statements are excluded. She states that the trial court, in an unsustainable attempt to acquit the accused, dissects the norm as if the content included the same elements that subsist in similar provisions of other Latin American legislations, transcribing criminal definitions from Colombia and Argentina and the doctrine supporting them, according to which publicity (publicidad) is a requirement, so an instigation in a private premises is not possible. The appellant states that if one observes the transcription made in the judgment of the foreign norms, it is evident that they textually introduce, as part of the criminal definition, that the instigation be "pública" or carried out "públicamente"; an indication that, although it is described in the heading (epígrafe) of the national numeral, is not specifically contained within the criminal definition and cannot be supplied by interpretation, as this would be an evident and improper substitution of legislative work, for which a court is not legitimized. On the other hand, she states that the prohibitive content also does not indicate that the instigated crime must be located in Title X of the Código Penal, as the judgment held, but simply that the incited conduct be a crime and that it disturbs public tranquility. Therefore, she concludes, the interpretation of the deciding court exceeds what is permitted by the criminal definition, transgressing its work and affecting the work that corresponds to the Asamblea Legislativa. She maintains that what is sought with the crime is to protect the right of the citizenry to order and collective tranquility, regardless of the means, since the article does not provide for it either, so it suffices that the means are suitable to transmit the message to at least one person whom one wishes to instigate, without the effective execution of the instigated crimes being indispensable, but only the exposure to danger of the protected legal interest. In light of all the above, she considers that the proven facts constitute the crime of public instigation contained in numeral 280 of the Código Penal, since it was confirmed that [Name 001], in his capacity as Secretary of the ANEP and on September 9, 2019, during a meeting of the "Movimiento de Encuentro Social Multisectorial," publicly instigated, through verbal statements, the persons present (mostly members of unions) to carry out illegal actions that included closing roads (highway N° 27 between San José and Caldera, N° 32 between San José and Limón, and route 2 over the Alto de Ochomogo in Cartago, a place where there is a Recope plant that supplies fuel to the entire country) and that he did so with full knowledge that said criminal actions could generate the disruption of public services and obstruction of public roads, conducts criminalized as crimes according to Articles 263 and 263 bis of the current Código Penal, thus disturbing public tranquility, all with the purpose of forcing the Government to agree to the union demands. She says that, in the debate, as proof of the above, a video captured while the accused was making those statements was reproduced, which was known by the community through news media, and thus, without the need for further proof as the court intends, it can be considered that the accused committed the crime.

It asserts that, regardless of the manner in which the incitement was captured, it involved a suitable means, carried out in person, before a group of people willing to listen to him. It points out that the accused did not deny his participation in the events nor did he retract the words spoken at the recorded meeting, given that, in interviews conducted with him by television media, he not only had a confessing and boastful attitude in this regard, but also never rejected having uttered them nor stated that said recording was made in violation of any of his rights. It states that not even the slightest discomfort was evidenced, on the part of the accused, regarding the publication of the video on the news broadcasts, which persists to this day, an attitude with which he ratifies and corroborates —the appellant prosecutor continues— the acts complained of. It adds that none of the issues relating to the publicity of the video or the violation of the accused's privacy were raised, contested, or questioned by the accused's defense attorneys, meaning the material is legitimate and any argument regarding its inadmissibility would thus be remedied. Nor has its veracity been questioned, so it is not appropriate to allude to the "authenticity of the video" (as the judgment does) if it has not been refuted that the person observed in it or the words heard were not uttered by [Name 001]. It states that there is no way to accuse it of falsehood, since with only a visual review —without any expertise on the subject— it is notorious that the filmed subject is the accused and not an iota of distortion is perceived in the recording that would allow one to point out that manipulation of the observed images existed, circumstances which confirm the veracity of what was captured. Nor has that image of the accused been disproven, attacked, or rejected by the defense or by the defense witnesses, who, on the contrary, accept that it concerns the union leader accused here. It maintains that determining the manner in which the video was obtained is irrelevant (as the judgment maintains) because its publicity is not part of the criminal offense. It adds that, otherwise, "...all those who make serious incitements to commit crimes could do so with impunity if it occurs within a private venue." It alludes to section 47 of the Civil Code to establish that, although the prohibition on reproducing images without consent is established there, exceptions to this include the notoriety of the person, the public function they perform, the needs of justice or police for the purpose of an investigation, and that the recording relates to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public. It mentions and partially transcribes rulings such as those of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) numbers 2014-11715 and 2004-11154 on the limits to the right to one's image and states that the rights of third parties, freedom of expression, and the public interest of news or information must be added to these, as established in articles 28 and 29 of our Political Constitution. It concludes that, under these parameters, the validity of capturing the image and voice of the accused made via video finds solid normative foundation that discards any notion of illegality because [Name 001] has been considered a leader of the Costa Rican trade union movement for decades, has proactively intervened in strikes and work stoppages continuously and publicly, meaning his notoriety and national significance are undisputed. Furthermore, he was participating in an act of public interest, given its implications at the social, political, and labor level (it was not an event of a family or personal nature but markedly union-related, as admitted by the defense witnesses themselves); and finally, the person who made the recording was protected under the constitutional precept of freedom of expression that every citizen has regarding matters of national relevance, as that meeting was. It qualifies the video as "absolutely authentic, legitimate, and valid for evidentiary purposes" and from it, it continues, the incitement by the accused towards a group of union members to carry out road closures, including the one adjacent to the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery (Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo) plant, from which fuel is distributed to almost the entire territory and the obstruction of which would imply the paralysis of the country, including public services, is extracted. It states that since acts are accused and not legal classifications "...the Court should have analyzed (…) whether the configuration of the conduct demonstrated fit the criminal offense or any other it deemed appropriate; an exercise which, had it been carried out, would not have led to the acquittal being challenged today" (folio 511 verso). In addition to the video, it recounts that the testimony of Rubén Hernández Valle and Gloria Navas Montero (representative of a group of people who filed a complaint and private prosecution in this case) was available, who evidenced not only the publicity of the video but also the feelings of fear and impotence that overwhelmed the citizenry since what was stated by the accused [Name 001] was published, as they projected a new disruption of public tranquility and the generation of consequences like those that affected Costa Rica with the strike movement that occurred in 2018, plunging the Costa Rican population into uncertainty and generating social harm to the detriment of the community. It insists that the criminal offense, as it stands, and the evidence received, allowed for a conviction. It reiterates some previous statements and considers it is not viable to point out, as the court did, that what was stated responds to the use of the constitutional right to free expression and that the crime exists even if the actions that were said would be carried out were not executed. It requests that the judgment be overturned and "revoked," ordering remand for a new one. In a second section of the appeal by the complaining party represented by attorney Navas, reference is made to the typicality of the act as the basis for the acquittal, and its annulment is requested because the criminal offense was erroneously interpreted despite the recognition that it is a crime of endangerment. It insists that, even though the "original" video was not seized, what was broadcast by the collective media constituted a public fact based precisely on that video, from which it was possible to conclude that the act occurred. The interview with the appellant, conducted by Repretel, occurred precisely because of that video which had been made public, and the accused appeared the next day and admitted his statement, so the issue of who recorded it did not eliminate the commission of the act. What was reported and known by the public —it continues pointing out— gave credibility to the existence of the act and the legitimacy of what was transmitted and disclosed. The event was known with the threats included, hence the concluding reasoning incurred a flaw of illogicality. Regarding the merits, it qualifies as erroneous the interpretation of section 280 of the Penal Code when it holds that crimes of disruption of public services and the eventual obstruction of roads are excluded from constituting that criminal offense, these being mentioned as the possibility of results that could be added to the acts, without affecting the typicality of the principal crime. It considers that the events that affect public tranquility are not exclusively the other criminal figures contained in Title X of the Penal Code. Public instigation is one of them and independent of the others. It is not necessarily linked to the others. It requests the nullity of the ruling. In responding to the appeals, in writing, the accused's defense attorneys requested the rejection of the challenge. They reiterate the criticisms outlined against the Public Ministry regarding the use of public resources and affirm that it has not been possible to reverse "the rejection of the video or the copies" that was made in the judgment. In the oral hearing held, attorney Carlos Meléndez, prosecutor for the Public Ministry, states it is an error to consider that the offense in question must be in the title of crimes against tranquility instead of simply affecting public tranquility. It mentions ruling number 495-2003 of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) where the types of crimes that must be instigated for this criminal offense to be constituted are not specified, nor is its application to the disruption of services or obstruction of roads impeded. Attorney Margot Avellán, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), affirmed that this is a complete crime, even though it is completed through others and argues that, in Argentina and Colombia, public instigation must be carried out in that manner, in public places, but not in Costa Rica; rather, that reference ("public instigation") alludes to the concept of social peace or equilibrium of the citizenry, affected by the offense and not to the manner of commission. She adds that these were not simple statements, but promises, and that the accused has not ruled out that the video was false; he even admitted on one channel that it did exist. The arguments are related and will therefore be addressed jointly and must be rejected. Once again, the appellants mix procedural and substantive aspects. Regarding the evidentiary issues (of lawfulness and assessment) and the reasoning of the judgment, we must adhere to what was indicated in the preceding recital to avoid unnecessary reiterations. That is, it was already explained why obtaining the video was unlawful (private meeting, recording not authorized by the accused; lack of guarantee of the chain of custody and disregard for context); why the testimonial references to it were also unlawful (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine which extends not only to the primary source but also to the sources derived from it, such as the cited statements of persons who only refer to what they saw on that tape) and why the judgment was well-reasoned (by requiring evidentiary lawfulness, preventing the reversal of the burden of proof, and requiring evidence and not simple statements to derive assertions to be introduced into a debate). These aspects will not be elaborated on now, but rather it suffices to add, to what has already been stated, that the exceptions contemplated in section 47 of the Civil Code do not apply ("The photograph or image of a person may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, or sold in any manner without their consent, unless the reproduction is justified by the notoriety of that person, the public function they perform, the needs of justice or police, or when such reproduction relates to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public. Images and photographs with stereotyped roles that reinforce discriminatory attitudes towards social sectors may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, or sold in any manner"; emphasis added). It is clear (as it derives from the lack of evidence in this matter) that [Name 001] is not a public official, nor were there needs of justice or police prior to the event of capturing his voice and image at that meeting, so the only allusion, from the exceptions in the norm, that would fit him is being notorious, since, as a trade union leader in the country for several decades, he is a very well-known or easily perceived or noticed person, which are the meanings of that word. However, the prosecutor performs an erroneous reading of the article. First, it should be remembered that these are exceptions to a constitutional and human right, that is, of higher rank, and as such, must be interpreted restrictively: "...in no way could 'public order' or the 'common good' be invoked as means to suppress a right guaranteed in the Convention or to denature it or deprive it of real content (see Art. 29 of the Convention). Those concepts, insofar as they are invoked as grounds for limitations on human rights, must be subject to an interpretation strictly consistent with the 'just requirements' of 'a democratic society' that takes into account the balance between the different interests at stake and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the Convention" [Cf. IACHR Court. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985, para. 67]. Although the accused is a notorious figure, the cited section requires that the reproduction not be solely based on the type of person (as already stated) but also on the event, and that is why it adds: "...when such reproduction relates to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public." It was already stated previously that the acts did not occur in a public place (or at least it was not proven that way) and were covered by other constitutional and conventional rights (of assembly, of expression), thereby ruling out the final phrase, and, being a private meeting, its content could not be accessed to verify if it related to facts or events of public interest, as that would have been an invasion of the hard core of constitutional rights. That link could only be made when public acts occurred (if they occurred), which did not happen. Of course, all of this, as the prosecutor states, had to be linked to other constitutional and conventional rights such as freedom of expression (but also with freedom of association and the right to strike stipulated in Article 8 of the Additional Protocol to the ACHR on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known as the Protocol of San Salvador ratified by Costa Rica through Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999), but not only those of third parties but also of the very persons intervening in the meeting, including the accused, which the appellant curiously overlooks. To understand, as the representative of the State's legal organ worryingly does, that the public apparatus can invade people's private sphere based on what they state there would be to raze all human rights and the historical achievements to contain power and to foster a fascist state that, depending on what is done or said in private spaces, may disrespect any limit, which is inadmissible. Again, it must be remembered that freedom of assembly forms part of a range of interrelated rights for the full enjoyment and exercise of civil and political rights that, in the specific case, also touch upon social rights such as freedom of association. In this sense, it is pointed out: "...given that both the Inter-American Court and Commission have appealed on various occasions to the decisions issued by other supervisory bodies for compliance with international human rights treaties to interpret the content of the rights protected by the Convention, we believe it is important on this occasion to make a succinct reference to some of the standards that, regarding the right of assembly, have been shaped by the doctrine developed by the ILO. Highlighting in this regard that, although ILO regulations referring to freedom of association do not make express reference to the right to freedom of assembly in any of its conventions relating to freedom of association, its supervisory bodies have undertaken to generate a broad development of doctrine relating to the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly in the labor sphere, assuming it as an intrinsic element of freedom of association. In the indicated sense, for example, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has highlighted that 'freedom of assembly constitutes one of the essential elements of trade union rights.' Just as its Committee on Freedom of Association has added that the right of professional organizations to hold meetings on their premises to examine professional matters, without prior authorization and without interference from the authorities, constitutes a fundamental element of freedom of association and public authorities should refrain from any intervention that may limit this right or hinder its legal exercise, unless such exercise disrupts public order or poses a serious and imminent danger to its maintenance. The Committee on Freedom of Association has pointed out that freedom of assembly constitutes 'a fundamental condition for the exercise of trade union rights,' and therefore governments 'should refrain from any intervention equivalent to a requirement of prior authorization, which limits the right to hold trade union meetings, or prevents the legitimate exercise of this right.'" [Cf.: Mujica. Javier. Article 15. Right of Assembly. Article 16. Freedom of Association. In: Steiner, Christian and Uribe, Patricia (editors). American Convention on Human Rights. Commentary. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, p. 363 et seq. Bold added]. Consequently, it is worth reiterating that the privacy of the meeting and the right to privacy prevented the assessment of the evidence unlawfully obtained through surreptitious recordings and in contravention of such rights.

Now, it could be considered that those evidentiary issues were sufficient to support the acquittal and that, therefore, it is not necessary to address other substantive issues, but this is not so. In these grounds, the parties, by questioning the manner of interpreting the criminal offense, seek to introduce the element that publicity is not an element of this crime and, therefore, that even if what the accused issued were private statements, public instigation would still be constituted, and this could be proven solely by the reference, direct or indirect, of those who were present at the activity. They also aspire to apply other criminal offenses (including the reference to a common instigation to certain crimes, as described in the private complaint of attorney Navas), so that what has already been said is not sufficient to rule on the complaints, and the substantive issue must be addressed, as it is linked to the evidentiary elements that prove or disprove each of their contents. Therefore, the analysis will be carried out by alluding, first, to the base crime accused (public instigation), its constitutionality, mode of configuration, its constituent elements, and, therefore, the evidence required, and then reference will be made to other possible legal classifications. First, it is necessary to set out a constitutional parameter and a context, both historical and legal-systematic, without which, in the opinion of this Chamber, a complete scrutiny is not possible.

(A) Constitutionality of the criminal offense. The constitutionality of the offense of public instigation has been questioned on several occasions, although not all of them have had a ruling on the merits. Thus, through ruling number 2003-5410 of June 25, 2003, an argument relating to the impact this provision would have on the rights of freedom of expression and movement was flatly rejected because the matter had not been previously raised as unconstitutional in said proceedings. In this matter, the accused started from the same panorama and evidenced the conflict of constitutional and conventional rights at play, which is why —as indicated in the initial recital— he filed constitutional action number 21-024578-0007-CO against section 280 of the Penal Code. Although the action was admitted and the respective edicts were published in judicial bulletins numbers 18 to 20 dated January 28 to February 1, respectively, all of 2022, it was resolved through ruling number 2023-00430 of January 11 of the current year, in which it was ordered: "By majority vote, the unconstitutionality action is dismissed. Justices Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado, and Garita Navarro give different reasons. Justice Cruz Castro dissents and considers that this action should be granted and consequently, due to its content and effects, Article 280 of the Penal Code is unconstitutional." Although the full opinion is not available at this date (nor is it required to issue a ruling because the operative part has already been published, lifts the suspension of the norm, and does not evidence any unconstitutionality or conforming interpretation), said constitutional pronouncement (which was divided, denoting the plausibility of various theses at play) does not prevent this court, as an ordinary interpreter, from carrying out the referred legality exercise or applying the hierarchy of sources and the hermeneutical rules proper to this matter.

(B) National historical evolution of public instigation. The Latin American jurist and former judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, has been a pioneer, in criminal dogmatics, in proposing the application of the principle of genealogical cleansing as a method to unravel (and, consequently, understand and apply) the meaning of criminal norms. According to this author, only by going to the origin of a punitive provision is it possible to observe the contextual elements that were or were not present when the criminal offense was created and that, therefore, implicitly condition it. In this way, the Argentine dogmatist concludes, the principle of legality and restrictive interpretation, proper to this matter, are better applied. The cited author states: "...in historical criminal law, multiple rationalizations contrary to the republican principle, to ethics, to the rule of law, and to Human Rights are found, when they do not present aberrant arguments. Particular primary criminalizations arise at a certain historical moment and are enshrined by legislators who participate in a determined cultural and power context: the legislator who constructs a criminal offense imagines a conflict and defines it, conditioned by collective representations, prejudices, ethical evaluations, scientific knowledge, power factors, and the rationalizations of their particular historical and cultural moment. These conditioning factors mutate rapidly due to the effect of cultural dynamism, but the criminal offenses remain and, moreover, are copied by other codes in countries that have nothing in common with the original context (…) The criminal offenses contained in them are frequently dragged from one code to another, because the authors of the law draw on comparative criminal law. The drags of the offenses do not always respond to a contextual analysis of these, but, on the contrary, this is almost never considered, which is why they frequently bring with them an original ideological load that is scarcely compatible with the Rule of Law. This original ideological load is the genealogy of the criminal offense, which is investigated through comparison (comparative criminal law) and history (original power context) (…) The objective of the genealogical investigation of criminal offenses is to discover drag components dangerous to the Rule of Law and to facilitate the interpretative work purified of them. In a criminal dogmatics that pursues a precise political objective, an exegetical analysis of the text is not sufficient as a first step if it is not accompanied by the necessary tracing of its genealogy, which exposes the police state components it drags and which must be carefully neutralized in the construction" (Cf. Zaffaroni, Eugenio Raúl; Slokar, Alejandro and Alagia, Alejandro. Criminal Law: General Part. 2nd edition, pp. 138-139, bold supplied). Criminal dogmatics and Costa Rican regulations always have a precise political objective, which is given by Article 1 of the Political Constitution which establishes: "Costa Rica is a democratic, free, independent, multiethnic, and pluricultural Republic." There, then, the interpretative lines of the entire legal system are defined. If it is understood that, when speaking of a republic, reference is made to the division of powers and the system of checks and balances designed by the constituent power internal to a State power, it will be deduced that respect for these derivatives is essential when scrutinizing any norm. Furthermore, that republic must be democratic, that is, a system where decisions are made by the majority of the community with the right to do so, but where such decisions do not affect the rights and dignity of minorities. It is often forgotten that democracy is not only a political and lifestyle system of majorities, but that, equally or more important than that, it is a system that must start from respect for the human dignity of each and every human being, from which the connection with respect for human rights (all human rights of all people at all times) are axiological criteria for normative exegesis. In this country, as defined by the National Constituent Assembly of 1949, the rule must be freedom, and only by exception and through the existence of a formal law must penalization or repression occur. This fully links with the dogmatic definition of criminal law as a discontinuous order of wrongs, with respect for the ultima ratio principle, with the principle of harmfulness in primary criminalization, and with strict observance of the principle of legality and restrictive interpretation in punitive matters. That freedom is guaranteed by the Political Constitution and the international instruments on human rights signed and ratified by the country and has many facets: freedom of movement, expression, opinion, press and information, teaching, professorship, assembly, demonstration, association, unionization, commerce, enterprise, religion and worship, among others. Each primary criminalization that is carried out is an impairment of those rights and, therefore, must be done by formal law and interpreted restrictively. Independence alludes to the exercise of sovereignty and the public powers that derive from it (such as the signing and approval of treaties) in accordance with the rules of the Rule of Law. The fact that the nation is multiethnic and pluricultural (the latest additions to the cited section) starts from recognizing the contribution that all ethnic groups [of more remote origin (such as the different indigenous ethnic groups existing in the territory at the time of the conquest; the Afro-descendant and Chinese community, and the European culture, particularly Spanish and Italian) or closer to our reality (such as the migrant populations from all countries, particularly from Central America, Colombia, and, more recently, Venezuela] give to the formation of our nation, where diverse cultural manifestations must coexist, all of which must be respected and must coexist. Thus, a criminal law committed to section 1 of the Political Constitution cannot tolerate expansive interpretations to undermine public liberties or promote their use by groups to attack minorities or override the exercise of human rights of others or encourage authoritarianism, abuse of power, etc. It must be remembered that the normative definition of the country's theoretical political model was made in 1949 within the framework of the National Constituent Assembly, but the dogmatic development of criminal law spans centuries, so it is understandable that criminal norms prior to that date (or that arise in other socio-political contexts) do not necessarily conform to the political objective to which all persons inhabiting the territory have subscribed through the constitutional oath (Article 194 of the Political Constitution). Hence, genealogical (and restricted systematic) interpretation is essential to fulfill that mandate. Thus, by way of example, a criminal law issued in the 1940s or 1950s of the previous century that alludes to the concept of "key" cannot be interpreted under the current concept of a key (which involves alphanumeric or biometric codes to open and enter certain virtual spaces that were developed recently thanks to the Technological Revolution) because, at the date the law was issued, the sociological concept of a key (its genealogical origin) was limited to a physical, metallic device, so a broader interpretation would be expansive and violative of the principle of legality. In the genealogy of that hypothetical criminal offense, the normative-cultural element "key" was much more circumscribed or limited than at present. The relevance of unraveling the origin of the offense under analysis, in this case, the crime of public instigation contained in section 280 of the Penal Code, which provides: "Anyone who instigates another to commit a determined crime that affects public tranquility shall be punished with a prison sentence of six months to four years, without it being necessary for the act to occur," is therefore understood. It is worth beginning by emphasizing that this section has not changed its wording since it was enacted in the repressive legislation in force —the Penal Code known as the "Código Padilla" in honor of the president of its drafting commission, Dr. Padilla Castro— on November 15, 1970 (according to Supplement No. 120 to La Gaceta No. 257, although it was in force until 1973). This detail is not minor, as our country has been characterized by the opposite, that is, by legislative activism in punitive matters (the Penal Code has been amended by 70 laws to this date, according to the Legal Information System of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which have modified multiple sections, and some of these have been modified several times by different laws).

Thus, the historical origin of the figure (which dates back at least to 1970) allows the criminal provision to be placed in a different historical and normative context, as will be indicated further on. The original article has indeed changed its numbering as a result of subsequent additions and deletions to other offenses, since it previously occupied number 271. However, although the offense has not undergone variations (neither in conduct nor in the punitive amount) since its issuance in 1970, this does not mean that the criminal type "arose spontaneously" on that date, since it is known that, first, the current code has its source of "inspiration" in the Model Penal Code for Latin America and in the drafts prepared, respectively, by Luis Jiménez de Asúa and by Sebastián Soler for Guatemala (as acknowledged on pages 2 and 72 of the statement of motives of the draft Penal Code; folios 129 and 199 of legislative file 3986 held by the Department of Archives, Research, and Procedure of the Legislative Assembly and consulted by this chamber. In the same sense: Antillón Montealegre, Walter. La legislación penal en Costa Rica. Revista de Ciencias Penales de Costa Rica, p. 26 ff. and Romero Pérez, Jorge Enrique. Algunas notas acerca del Código Penal de Costa Rica.). These sources of inspiration, in turn, collected provisions that emerged in various parts of the world. Secondly, the punitive compendium in question has not been the only one that Costa Rica has had, since it was preceded, in retrospective order, by the Penal and Police Codes of 1941 (known as the Guier Codes), the Penal Code of Costa Rica of 1924 (Second Astúa Code), the Penal Code of Costa Rica of 1918-1919 (First Astúa Code), the Penal Code of 1880 (or Orozco Code), and the General Code of the State of Costa Rica of 1841 (or Carrillo Code). In the statement of motives of the draft of the current Penal Code made in 1970, regarding the special part, it reads: "It can be affirmed that for almost half a century the special part of the Penal Code of Costa Rica has been the same. Very slight variations were made in 1941, but the structure, taken from the Argentine Penal Code of 1922, criticized ad nauseam by some and defended by very few, remains intact. In the draft we follow the same ordering as the previous one, beginning with crimes against persons and ending with those relating to public faith. In general lines we follow the Soler Draft for Guatemala" (Cf. legislative file 3986, folio 198) and for the section in which the criminal type in question is inserted, the explanation of the reform reads: "Crimes against public tranquility. Articles 271 to 274. A large part of the crimes that in the 1924 Code were included in a chapter called against public order, passed to the Police Code of 1941. The pruning was somewhat drastic, and for this reason we restore to its logical place the crime of public intimidation, which together with the apology of crime constitute acts of extreme gravity and transcendence. These two criminal acts together with those of public instigation and association to commit crimes, which appear in our Penal Code, we have rather called crimes against public tranquility and they form the four of which this Title is composed" (Cf. legislative file 3986, folios 213-214). Thus, it is clear that the criminal type of public instigation introduced in 1970 was taken without substantial modifications from preceding legislation, both domestic and foreign. For its part, the Penal Police Code of 1941 in its Title VII: Crimes against public order (which only comprised this crime and that of criminal association) stipulated: "Article 331.- Anyone who through the press or otherwise publicly instigates the commission of a specific crime against a person or institution, shall incur, for that act alone, imprisonment from six months to four years." (Emphasis added). It should be added that this normative body assumed an extensive concept of perpetrator (i.e., that all contributions of the subjects had equal value) since number 43 established: "Shall be punished as perpetrators of the punishable act those who carried it out themselves; those who took part in the execution; those who contributed with aid or cooperation without which it could not have been executed or would have been notably hindered, or those who instigated, forced, or determined another sufficiently to commit it." (Bold added). A similar situation was found in the Penal Code of Costa Rica of 1924 (Second Astúa Code) since public instigation to commit crimes was provided for in article 428 (Sole Chapter of Title Eight: Crimes against public order) as follows: «Public instigation to commit crimes. Anyone who through the press or otherwise publicly instigates the commission of a specific crime, shall incur, for that act alone, imprisonment in its first to second degrees, according to the importance of the threatened goods, the determining motive and means of the instigation, the circumstances in which it is exercised, and the danger it may be capable of creating.// The penalty may be applied with a reduction of one degree, when the instigation, in none of those respects, should be considered serious, in the judgment of the court.//If the instigation takes effect, the instigator shall be punished as a co-perpetrator of the crime committed, and if it was done through the press, the provisions of article 31 shall apply.» (Bold added). This code also relied on a single or extensive concept of perpetrator in which this was equated "...To those who sufficiently, according to the circumstances, determined others to commit it, whether by exercising physical violence upon them, whether by virtue of an order, threat, gift, promise, advice of essential importance, or other mode of suggestion or moral force" (article 26). Why is it important to mention the theory of the single concept of perpetrator? First, because it is not the one currently followed where forms of participation in the strict sense, such as complicity and instigation, are distinguished from perpetration (articles 45 to 47 and 74 of the Penal Code) and, second, because when those prior norms did not distinguish the contributions of the active subjects, neither was the level of development of the criminal act carried out by the perpetrator of interest in order to fix the reproach of the participant in the strict sense (accomplice and instigator). As current legislation does make these distinctions, it is essential to differentiate the figures of common instigation (valid for all crimes: article 46 of the Penal Code) from public instigation as a special crime (cited number 280) because for common instigation, as will be seen, it is required that the active subject determine the will of someone to commit a specific crime (that is, that there is acceptance of the incitement) and that this specific crime at least begins with acts of execution, whereas for public instigation it is not necessary that this instigated act occurs or that there is acceptance because, due to the publicity of the provocation, the danger arises. In this framework, to draw this distinction, it is essential that the last figure be surrounded by publicity and, in its absence, the rule of common instigation governs, which can occur in private, but does require the beginning of acts of execution of the instigated act, as will be seen. Now, from the pen of the president of the drafting commission of the current Penal Code (1970), it follows, then, that the basis of this crime was taken from the draft Penal Code for Guatemala prepared by Sebastián Soler, which makes it necessary to look at what this author said about this crime. In his classic work Derecho Penal argentino. TEA, volume 4, 9th reprint, 1983, pages 589-602, the Argentine jurist says: "Crimes against public tranquility. §130- The different figures. The reform of the Criminal Code has begun (…) by correcting the designation of the title, since there have been many misunderstandings caused by the previous reference to 'public order' [remember that Padilla, in the statement of motives, points out that this crime moves from the chapter on 'public order' to those committed against public tranquility]. Let us see the reasons that made this change advisable. In few areas of criminal law can one verify a greater confusion and vagueness of opinion than that which manifests itself when doctrine tries to fix the concept of public order. The fundamental misunderstanding comes from the fact that this expression has at least two meanings (…) A brief examination of the distinct chapters and figures contained under the title of crimes against public order is enough to realize that this is not the sense in which the expression must be taken at this point in legal theory. These crimes are: public instigation, illicit association, public intimidation, and apology of crime. For our criminal law, public order simply means tranquility and social confidence in the secure, peaceful development of civil life. It is not about defending social security itself, but rather the opinion of that security which, in turn, in reality, constitutes a further reinforcing factor of it. These characteristics of a secondary, mediate good explain the reason why the penal scales of these chapters are, in general, low. It is not about the direct protection of primary legal goods, such as security, but about forms of mediate protection of those, since one of the favorable conditions for the commission of serious harms is social disorder and disturbance. These figures, then, have an aspect of prevention of greater harms, which brings them close to what a contravention is. If one observes, in effect, their content, it will be seen that they are all oriented towards other harms whose avoidance they mediately aim at: behind instigation and illicit association is the possibility of all kinds of crimes, which one wishes to avoid; behind the apology of crime, an indirect form of advising crime is perceived; behind intimidation, there are the harms derived from disorder. Many of the figures are true preparatory acts for other crimes, which would be unpunishable due to their equivocality (…) II. Instigation to commit crimes. Art. 209 establishes: 'Anyone who publicly instigates the commission of a specific crime shall be punished, for the sole instigation…' (…) generic instigation was an accessory form of participation. Its punishability depended, then, not only on the instigation being accepted, but also on the act having, at least, a beginning of execution by the instigated person. This aspect is precisely what poses a problem, diversely resolved by legislation and doctrine, according to whether the instigation is not accepted or, if it is, is not carried out by the instigated. In such a situation, some positivists, with little success, have postulated the punishability of instigation as an attempt with an unsuitable means (…) but the most reasonable and common solution has consisted of making that act a special criminal figure, in the same way that certain forms of preparatory acts, generally unpunishable, are erected into autonomous figures. This is, in reality, the origin of the figure we are examining, which, for some, is nothing more than a common act of instigation that is not successful (…) the specific difference of this crime consists in the act of instigation being carried out publicly. This is the element that makes an act of unsuccessful instigation punishable, which, done without the requirement of publicity, remains unpunished, for lack of a beginning of execution. It is not a condition of punishability, as Manzini says, but a true constitutive element of the figure. As such, it must be encompassed within the intent of the perpetrator, that is, that the perpetrator, in addition to instigating the commission of a specific act, must know that they are doing it publicly. If a private instigation becomes public, let us suppose, through a microphone unknown to the perpetrator, no crime exists (…) If ten individually determined persons meet in a private place and one of them, behind closed doors, instigates them to commit a crime, there is no public instigation. (…) Publicity thus arises when there is the possibility that the instigation may be received or heard by someone not personally summoned." (Emphasis added). It is true that the criminal type discussed by Soler expressly contemplates the issue of publicity in the description of the conduct, unlike the one that exists in Costa Rica, which only mentions it in the name of the figure; however, this does not mean that such an element should be considered excluded from the conduct, since not only does the nomen iuris of the figure refer to the legislative meaning (so it would be a contradiction for the crime of "public instigation" to be able to be done in private) but that this necessary publicity is extracted by virtue of genealogical-restrictive and historical interpretation, which are valid if and only if they seek to limit the punitive scope, never to expand it (article 2 of the Penal Code). As was seen, in the national historical context from which the respective type was extracted and inserted, instigation was always public, as the type expressly contained this element, and there was never any discussion to modify that, from which understanding it this way is the most restrictive. Therefore, in number 280 of the Penal Code which stipulates: "Shall be punished with a penalty of six months to four years' imprisonment, anyone who instigates another to commit a specific crime that affects public tranquility, without it being necessary that the act occur" it not only requires the publicity of the instigation (which in this case did not occur because the meeting was private) to generate the danger, but it also requires that those crimes instigated be ones that affect public tranquility, a concept that must be interpreted restrictively and which cannot be considered extensive to any crime because, to understand it otherwise, would also modify the rules of participation (common instigation) for those other crimes. Again, the political affiliation (in a broad sense) of Costa Rican criminal law (democratic, liberal, and republican according to the initial number of the Magna Carta referred to) would suffer detriment if the interpretation were broad, and the reason why is explained a little more fully immediately below. Remember that with the emergence of Modern States (15th and 16th centuries), medieval regulations were broken with, and a differentiation began between the state legal order and others (such as morality and religions) which, initially, were amalgamated. This essential difference translates into the fact that, while morality and religions regulate the internal sphere of persons (their thoughts and feelings under the notion of "sins" in one of them), state law would deal with external acts that imply a material modification of the world, leaving the internal sphere to the interference of those other normative orders. The entire theory of iter criminis (or the path of crime) is based on this foundation. To avoid unnecessarily extending the historical references, it is worth remembering that the separation between unpunishable and punishable acts (or, what is the same, between freedom as a democratic principle and repression, which must be exceptional) is given in the external phase of the iter criminis, properly starting from the acts of execution that cause the sanction of attempt to emerge (without it being necessary, for these purposes, to refer to the evolution of the theories which, by so referring, emphasize various nuances, and it being sufficient to allude to the fact that the one mostly accepted by modern dogmatics is the individual objective theory). The fact that the intermediate phase (ideation, deliberation, and resolution), intermediate (manifested resolution), and even the preparatory acts of the external phase are unpunishable does not arise from a simple dogmatic whim, but is the product of the systematic attempt for States not to penetrate into zones (thoughts, feelings, private expression of opinions) that are essential not only for the development of personality and human dignity but also for the consolidation of a democratic political system. Therefore, only by way of exception should expression crimes (insults, slander, defamation, hate crimes, apology of a crime, obstruction of public roads) and possession crimes (of weapons, of drugs) be punished, since they imply advancements of the protective barrier that is given by the beginning of acts of execution. Expression crimes advance the barrier to the intermediate phase of the iter criminis (manifested resolution) and possession crimes to preparatory acts. In both situations, not only is the advancement of the barrier required by mere criminal policy, but also the affectation of a legal good (harmfulness). If the above is understood, it will be easily understood why saying that one is going to kill someone is not (and should not be) a crime, just as it should not be a crime for a subject to tell another to kill a person and that person not accept (act of unaccepted instigation). In neither case is there a modification of the external world, and if any reaction should occur, it must come from ethical, moral, or religious normative systems, not from state-legal ones, because, furthermore, human freedom means that this "expressed bad thought" can be reversed by "repentance" (in a common, not legal sense), without modifying the external world. It is different when the subject accepts the proposal (intent is born) and that subject, thus determined, in turn, begins acts of execution. At that point, at least a danger to the legal good arises, and that justifies state intervention. But it should be noted that, although all the foregoing is required to sanction a simple instigation, that is not sufficient because, depending on the theory of accessoriness that is followed, more or fewer additional elements will be required. For a restricted theory of perpetrator (such as the one followed in modern times), not only is perpetration differentiated from participation in the strict sense (instigation and complicity), but the punishment of these forms of participation is made dependent on the intervention the perpetrator may have. Thus, the theory of minimal accessoriness sanctions participants only if the perpetrator has carried out a criminal type; the theory of limited accessoriness makes the sanction of accomplices and instigators dependent on the perpetrator carrying out a criminal wrong; the theory of maximum accessoriness requires the perpetrator to have a typical, unlawful, and culpable conduct to be able to fix the responsibility of the participants; and the theory of hyper-accessoriness requires typical, unlawful, culpable, and punishable conduct for that repression. Current criminal dogmatics considers that the most adequate theory is that of limited accessoriness, and our substantive legislation lacks a position on this matter [articles 46 and 47 allude to "punishable act" and from this some authors and in other latitudes hyper-accessoriness has been derived: see: Chinchilla Calderón, Rosaura. El principio de legalidad; ¿muro de contención o límite difuso para la interpretación de la teoría del delito en Costa Rica? Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2008, p. 89 ff.; Reform of the German Penal Code of 29.5.1943 and the doctrine and jurisprudence that interpreted it, cited by Castillo González, Francisco. Autoría y participación en el Derecho Penal. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 1st edition, San José, 2006, pp. 55 and 347-348 (the author does not ascribe to that thesis, only describes what happened in Germany, although he omits mentioning it in later editions of his texts)]. Then it would be that, through this route (of interpreting 'public tranquility' in a broad sense to apply it to any crime that affects it), one would practically arrive at repealing the institute of common instigation and the theory of accessoriness (whatever it may be), since this criminal type, unlike general instigation, does not require such accessoriness. But, furthermore, from a systematic point of view, if it were interpreted as the appellant parties intend, the figures of instigation (which in dogmatics and comparative law may carry a slightly greater reproach than the perpetrator because they give rise to the intent in the latter) would have a lesser sanction than perpetration, to the detriment of what number 46 of the Penal Code indicates, or an excessive repression, foreign to doctrinal regulations and to the principles of equality and culpability. Let us see two situations: i) if it were accepted that public instigation can occur against any crime, in a broad sense, that violates public tranquility, as the appellants intend, one would arrive at the absurdity of maintaining, as the prosecutor did, that since aggravated robbery in dwellings, for example, affects tranquility, the crime of public instigation of such a crime could be committed and, in that way, the conduct would no longer carry the penalty of the perpetrator of that crime (from 5 to 15 years according to numbers 46 and 213 of the Penal Code) but only one of six months to four years of imprisonment, which is the one contemplated in this criminal type. ii) Another absurd consequence of this position would be the opposite, that is, that instigation could carry a higher penalty than the principal crime, although in Costa Rica it was expressly assumed that this could not be so by virtue of the general rules. For example, a person who instigates others to commit larcenies on public roads can affect, and greatly so, social tranquility if those crimes unfold. And thus, while the perpetrators of the larcenies would be punished with imprisonment from one month to three years, the one who instigated them would be punished under the figure of "public instigation" (following the criterion of the appellants) and would receive a sanction of six months to four years of imprisonment, which demonstrates an enormous disproportion of the penalty that is not accepted even by dogmatics, which only justifies the greater increase for the one who causes the intent to arise, provided it is proportional to the crime, and this has been understood as long as it does not exceed one third. Reductio ad absurdum ('reduction to absurdity') is a logical method of demonstrating the validity (or invalidity) of categorical propositions, and in this case, the results of the appellants' proposal could not be more evident. But let us continue delving into the argumentative lines presented. The prosecutor maintains that while including the word "publicly" in the type would be an invasion of legislative competence (thereby ignoring that jurisdictional work, by constitutional mandate, always requires a hermeneutical task that follows rules given in the legal system itself and that, in criminal cases, genealogical, historical, and systematic interpretation must be resorted to in order to restrict and never to expand the type), she does consider it possible, without any consequence, to include crimes not contemplated by the legislator in the examined criminal type or to expand its concepts according to the criterion of the author she cites (who comments on legislation different from ours), despite the fact that articles 1 and 2 of the substantive criminal legislation prohibit it. However, such a position is not admissible because doctrine can indeed contribute to clarifying the meaning of a normative provision, provided that the principle of legality is respected, not if it extends the prohibition as is sought here, and in this case the limit of the figure is given by a parallel legal figure which is generic instigation. The text cited by the prosecutor and discussed by Creus contains, unlike our legislation, a broad reference to crimes. The Costa Rican code, in a manner differentiated from that commented on by the Argentine jurist, added the type of crimes that could be instigated in this way. Another incoherence of the prosecutor is that, while she accepts part of what Argentine doctrine says (although this does not correspond to our legislation), she rejects what it stipulates as the differentiating element of instigation as an institute of the general part, as opposed to public instigation as a crime of the special part (the latter is introduced because the former cannot be configured in the absence of acts of execution that generate a criminal wrong, according to the theory of limited accessoriness, such that those elements are suppressed, but the type is constructed as one of danger, and this is achieved precisely through the issue of publicity). In summary, the publicity of the instigation is indeed required for the commission of the crime of public instigation, because this element is what generates the abstract danger that, in turn, permits the suppression of the accessoriness of participation in the strict sense, and the expression "...a specific crime that affects public tranquility..." contained in article 280 must be interpreted restrictively as circumscribed to the crimes stipulated in Title X: Crimes against public tranquility, that is, those of illicit association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation, and apology of crime, since to do otherwise is to create crimes through interpretation. This consequently leads to the fact that both elements (the publicity of the act and that a determination is being made to affect a crime against public tranquility) must be known by the perpetrator. If the publicity is not known to the perpetrator (for being secretly recorded and, therefore, ignoring that they are inciting a collective), one is facing an error of type. If the active subject is unaware that they are instigating a crime "against public tranquility," an error occurs regarding normative legal elements which, as it is most beneficial for the accused person, must also be resolved as an error of type despite having elements in common with the error of prohibition (on this topic see the judgment of the former Criminal Cassation Court of San José, number 2010-641: R. Chinchilla, U. Zúñiga e I. Estrada). The interpretation of the appellant parties (by excluding publicity from the type and by suppressing the reference to certain crimes contained therein) is not only broad against the mandate of number 2 but throws overboard the entire issue of errors and the principle of culpability, since they seek a sanction of the person regardless of their internal consonance (knowledge and will) with the allegedly externalized conduct. This is the same effect generated by crimes of abstract danger, and not in vain do they seek to convert all forms of instigation into this category, which is a dangerous tendency in times when respect for the Constitutional, Social, and Democratic Rule of Law is not, precisely, the dominant value. This was understood by the trial court's judgment, which, with solvency, rejected such proposals, and in that, no error is observed. But, in addition to what has already been said, which is neither small nor light in weight, there is a far, far stronger reason why the theories attempted by the appellant parties cannot be accepted. Again, it relates to the political system to which the country subscribed and to the genealogical sanitation that must be followed, and this will be set forth in the following section. (C) International Human Rights Law and the Penal Code: integration and systematic application. One must return to the idea, already developed based on historical evidence, that there has been no variation between the introduction of the figure of "public instigation" in 1970 and today, and that this figure presents, in the immediate normative antecedents, a reference to the instigation being public (indeed, in many of the earlier texts, emphasis is placed on the use of the press, the only medium that, at that time, guaranteed that publicity). This origin allows for clarity regarding the normative context into which the figure is inserted. Remember that, when the current repressive body was approved (1970), although the Political Constitution of 1949 formally governed in the country, there was no effective control over the coupling of lower norms with those of higher rank, since the concentrated constitutionality control, in the hands of the Plenary Court and governed by the Code of Civil Procedures of 1887, was considered merely on paper, given that a minority could veto a declaration of unconstitutionality (a qualified majority of the Plenary Court was required, then composed of 17 magistrates as the seven of the Constitutional Chamber had not been incorporated, so 12 votes were needed to declare something unconstitutional, which historically prevented that from occurring). The constitutional reform of 1989 and the creation of the constitutional jurisdiction were necessary for such control to be effective, and no longer only against the constitutional hierarchy but also to incorporate human rights treaties as a constitutional parameter. Nor had the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter VCLT) become effective when the current article on public instigation was approved, which, although signed by Costa Rica in 1969, was not ratified by the country until 1996 through Law No. 7615. Finally, by 1990, International Human Rights Law (hereinafter IHL) had not emerged with the strength it has today, which, although it already had some declarations that emerged after the Second World War to its credit, was under development in almost all its areas to give rise to the treaties in force. It was not until 2006 when, derived from there (and embodied by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the judgment of the case Almonacid Arellano et al. vs. Chile of September 26, 2006), the concept of conventionality control emerges, with binding character.

These three elements (constitutionality control over the hierarchy of norms, the value of treaties superior to law according to Article 27 of the VCLT, and the development of IHRL that implies the internal value of signed and ratified treaties and the conventionality control over them) occurred after the emergence, in 1970, of the criminal offense under discussion. None of this can be lost sight of because they are elements that contribute to shaping the original criminal offense, as all of them have higher rank and integrate the political system described in the aforementioned constitutional Article 1. As part of International Human Rights Law, individual freedoms such as the right of assembly, of protest or expression, of association, and of thought are situated (Articles 26, 28, and 29 of the Political Constitution; 13, 15, and 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights; and 18 to 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), but also social rights such as the right to unionize, to strike, and to collective bargaining (Article 8 of the Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of El Salvador, and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Both integrate, under equal conditions (unlike what is commonly thought in our country), the human rights framework characterized by being inalienable, indivisible, unrenounceable, universal, imprescriptible, and interdependent. As can be seen, these rights have been incorporated, in many cases, into multilateral treaties or conventions that our country has signed and ratified. And this latter point connects with the principle *pacta sunt servanda* contained in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), according to which a State cannot invoke its domestic law to disregard a treaty it has signed and ratified. Therefore, since 1996 (when the VCLT was ratified), International Human Rights Law must be inserted into the integration and interpretation of all criminal offenses, including those issued previously, because the law (in this case, the substantive repressive body) not only cannot disregard a higher-ranking norm (the treaties: Article 7 of the Political Constitution) but also domestic law cannot disregard conventional law. In the same vein, Constitutional Law establishes the predominance of human rights treaties (or the pronouncements of the bodies that interpret them) over the Political Constitution if those treaties grant more rights or protect them better (see Article 73(d) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and the votes of the Constitutional Chamber numbers No. 3435-92, No. 2313-95, No. 1319-97, No. 4356-98, and No. 6830-98). Then, having reached this point, it is clear that, although the crime of public instigation is in force and is constitutional according to the vote of the Constitutional Chamber number 2023-00430 of January 11, 2023 (whose full content is unknown to this date despite having been constantly requested, even before voting on this matter as is apparent from the preceding records), the ordinary interpreter MUST (it is not optional but an obligation) adapt it, in its interpretation, to that normative context. And it is here where it is necessary to examine the content of those other human rights that substantially limit punitive power in a democracy like the one described by Article 1 of the Political Constitution because, even though criminal offenses formally exist that prohibit certain conduct (many of them, like this one, of pre-constitutional or pre-conventional origin), their scopes of validity are limited by the aforementioned normative evolution. In the present matter, even starting (hypothetically, only for analytical purposes) from the statement of the accusing party—that public instigation under Article 280 ibidem can also be committed when one determines others to commit crimes such as the obstruction of public roads that are not part of those against public tranquility—other considerations are necessary, beginning with the fact that, after the accused meeting, there was no materialization of road closures (neither was this stipulated in the complaints nor is there evidence received at trial to that effect). The crime of obstruction of a public road is regulated in Article 263 bis and states: “A penalty of ten to thirty days in prison shall be imposed on whoever, without authorization from the competent authorities, impedes, obstructs, or hinders, in any way, vehicular traffic or the movement of pedestrians.” (Emphasis supplied). Said provision was elevated to the category of a crime (which enables repressive actions such as raids, preventive detention, etc.) and ceased to be a simple contravention by law No. 8250 of May 02, 2002, that is, approved shortly after the popular demonstrations that erupted in March 2000 occurred in protest of what was called the “Combo del ICE” (bills that sought the 'modernization of ICE, the opening in energy and telecommunications'). The purpose of discouraging and repressing that mechanism of demonstration is evident and it joins Article 263 of the Criminal Code which refers: «Obstruction of public services. Article 263.-Whoever, without creating a situation of common danger, impedes, obstructs, or hinders the normal functioning of land, water, and air transportation, communication public services, or energy substances shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to two years.» (Emphasis added). However, social protest is a human right derived from freedom of expression and demonstration which, to that extent, has a higher rank than the law, and the law cannot deprive it of content, without prejudice to the exercise of balancing in case of collision with other rights of similar or greater magnitude that must be carried out in each specific case. Regarding its scope, the supreme interpreter of the ACHR has stated: «171. The right to protest or express disagreement against any state action or decision is protected by the right of assembly, enshrined in Article 15 of the American Convention (…) The right protected by Article 15 of the American Convention (…) encompasses both private meetings and meetings on public roads, whether static or mobile. The possibility of demonstrating publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways to exercise the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be claimed. Therefore, the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and should not be interpreted restrictively (…) 172 (…) the Court takes note of the statements by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to assembly and association, according to which “when the violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is an enabling and even decisive factor or a pre-condition for the violation of other rights (…) the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is also inevitably affected and this deserves to be recognized.” Furthermore, as happens with other rights with a social dimension, it is emphasized that the violation of the rights of participants in an assembly or meeting by the authorities “has serious inhibitory effects [chilling effect] on future meetings or assemblies,” as people may choose to abstain to protect themselves from these abuses, in addition to being contrary to the State's obligation to facilitate and create enabling environments so that people can effectively enjoy their right of assembly.» (IACHR Court. Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. Judgment of November 28, 2018; emphasis supplied). Commenting on such provision, it has been stated: «Thus, it not being sufficient that doubts exist as to whether the right of assembly could produce negative effects to the detriment of others, restrictions on the right of assembly will only find support in those cases where objective data exist that allow deducing in an indubitable manner that the demonstration does not conform to conventional parameters, and especially in relation to the need to protect public health and public morals, as well as the rights and freedoms of others. For this reason, the reasons alleged for prohibiting or restricting the right of assembly must not only be convincing and imperative so as to justify the restrictions on that freedom, but must also be proven. That is to say, they must not be mere suspicions, uncertain dangers, much less insufficient, capricious, or arbitrary arguments; but rather objective, sufficient, and duly substantiated reasons. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has indicated, “the assembly or demonstration will depend on its peaceful nature. Although, certainly, any assembly in a public transit place or demonstration provokes a restriction on the right of free movement of non-demonstrating citizens, such restriction cannot by itself give rise to a prohibition if the requirement of a peaceful nature is met, understanding as such the absence of disturbances of public order with danger to persons or property. There is no room, moreover, to subject the ideas or claims of the demonstrators to any type of political opportunity controls based on the principles and values, both legal and meta-legal, dominant in society or that identify with any kind of ideology or thought.”» [Cf.: Mujica. Javier. Article 15. Right of assembly. Article 16. Freedom of association. In: Steiner, Christian and Uribe, Patricia (editors). Commentary. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, p. 371 et seq. Boldface is added]. And, as has been said, if this process was characterized by something, in the words of the trial judge herself, it was by evidentiary inertia because, although many assertions were made (both in writing and at trial and at the hearing before this chamber), these lacked any evidentiary support, to the point that extremes contained in the complaint filed by Attorney Navas, such as the alleged instigation to assault a journalist or the accused's involvement in strikes that affected the right to health or education, were only emotional expressions (emotional appeal fallacy), without any evidentiary basis. Therefore, if there is no objective evidence of limitations on the rights of others (because there were no material acts of road closures after what was said at that meeting) and intervening in demonstrations, even on public roads, is a right, this would imply that instigating demonstrations on public roads (whether considered via the special crime of public instigation or through generic instigation to a specific crime of road obstruction) could not be a crime even if this limits vehicular traffic because, although it may constitute typical conduct, this would be justified by the exercise of a right and, to that extent, it becomes a cause of justification [Article 25 of the Criminal Code: “A person does not commit a crime who acts in (…) the legitimate exercise of a right”]. But if what has been said so far were not sufficient, it must be taken into account that these rights, of expression and assembly, with the contents already outlined from International Human Rights Law, are also related to the hard core of the right to unionize. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself, at the request of the IACHR, in advisory opinion OC-27/21 of May 05, 2021, developed these aspects profusely and, given its binding nature for the country, it is appropriate to transcribe part of what was decided, even though the quote may be lengthy: «74. (…) this Court deems it pertinent to make the following additional considerations regarding the content of the right to freedom of association for trade union purposes. (…) 81. (…) the Court considers that the right of workers to belong to a trade union logically includes the right to carry out trade union activities. The spectrum of actions included in this right has broad content and must be regulated in the statute of trade union organizations, which must be determined by their members. These activities may include, for example, participation in trade union meetings, the right to express opinions, the right to receive or distribute information, the right to participate in decisions adopted at meetings or assemblies (…) The State has the obligation to protect the adequate exercise of workers' activities in trade union life, avoiding any action by the authorities that allows the limitation of the exercise of these rights, as well as adopting the necessary measures so that workers, and their representatives, can carry out their trade union activities effectively in the companies or organizations where they work (…) 106. This Court reiterates that freedom of association for trade union purposes, collective bargaining, and the right to strike are rights incorporated in Article 26 of the Convention, as these are derived from Article 45(c) and (g) of the OAS Charter (…) Although they are autonomous rights, this Court highlights their interdependence and indivisibility. (…) 111. In relation to the right to strike (…) States must respect and guarantee that it can be exercised effectively by all workers, without discrimination (…) the State must guarantee that workers can exercise their right to strike without being subject to criminalization by the private employer, or by the State itself. In this sense, States must abolish those criminal laws that may be used to persecute the exercise of the right to strike. On the other hand, with respect to workers who provide essential services, or who exercise authority functions on behalf of the State, it must be guaranteed that the list of essential services not subject to the exercise of the right to strike is clearly defined domestically, and in accordance with the provisions established by the ILO. Likewise, workers who perform said essential functions must have conciliation and arbitration mechanisms that allow them to obtain a response to their claims (…) 121. Article 16.1 of the American Convention recognizes the right of persons to freely associate for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, cultural, sports, or any other purposes. This Court has indicated that the right of association is characterized by enabling persons to create or participate in entities or organizations for the purpose of acting collectively in the pursuit of the most diverse ends, as long as these are legitimate (…) from freedom of association, positive obligations also arise to prevent attacks against it, to protect those who exercise it, and to investigate violations of said freedom (…) 123. (…) this Court understands that the relationship between freedom of association and freedom of association for trade union purposes is a genus-species relationship, as the former recognizes the right of persons to create organizations and act collectively in the pursuit of legitimate ends, based on Article 16 of the American Convention, while the latter must be understood in relation to the specificity of the activity and the importance of the aim pursued by trade union activity (…) 132. (…) this Court highlights the relationship between freedom of expression, the right of assembly, and the rights to freedom of association for trade union purposes, collective bargaining, and the right to strike. (…) 134 (…) freedom of expression is indispensable for the formation of public opinion in a democratic society. In the labor sphere, the Court has indicated that it is a *conditio sine qua non* for trade unions and, in general, for those who wish to influence the community to develop fully. In this logic, freedom of expression is a necessary condition for the exercise of workers' organizations, including trade unions, in order to protect their labor rights and improve their conditions and legitimate interests, since without this right, said organizations would lack effectiveness and their very reason for being (…) 135. (…) the scope of protection of the right to freedom of thought and expression is particularly applicable in labor contexts (…) a reinforced level of protection of freedom of expression is required, and especially regarding those who hold a representative position for workers (…) 137. For this Court, the existence of a free flow of information, ideas, and opinions is fundamental for the exercise of trade union rights and collective bargaining, so the threat of initiating criminal actions by the authorities in response to legitimate opinions of the representatives of a trade union organization can have intimidating and harmful effects to the detriment of workers or employers. For this reason, detention or imprisonment as punishment for the legitimate exercise of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association is arbitrary. (…) 139. Regarding the right of assembly, this Court recalls that Article 15 of the American Convention “recognizes the right of peaceful assembly, without arms.” The Court has noted that this right encompasses both private meetings and meetings on public roads, whether static or mobile. The possibility of demonstrating publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways to exercise the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be claimed. Therefore, the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and should not be interpreted restrictively (…) Likewise, this Court has expressed that the right to protest or express disagreement against any state action or decision is protected by the right of assembly (…) 141. This Court warns that the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association, in their relationship with freedom of association for trade union purposes, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, constitute fundamental rights for workers, and their representatives, to organize and express specific claims about their working conditions, in order thus to effectively represent their interests before the employer, and even to participate in matters of public interest with a collective voice. States have the duty to respect and guarantee these rights, which allow leveling the unequal relationship that exists between workers and employers, and access to fair wages and safe working conditions. In this sense, the Court recalls that human rights are interdependent and indivisible, so that the effectiveness of the exercise of one right depends on the effectiveness of the exercise of other rights. Thus, civil and political rights, and economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights must be understood integrally as human rights, without hierarchy among them and enforceable in all cases before the authorities that are competent» (The emphasis is added by this chamber). The chronological contextualization of the criminal law reform that introduced Article 263 bis is important because it demonstrates the discouragement that, from various state agencies, has been fostered against the broad exercise of social human rights such as protest, as a form in which freedom of expression is manifested, although it has limits, as will be discussed below. Human rights are not only individual rights, disconnected from social rights (and, to that extent, violative of the principle of interconnection in this matter), and the criminalization of social protest (through the obstruction of public roads), by itself, says nothing about the unlawfulness of the conduct, but only about its typicality. It must be remembered that, although ordinary courts cannot declare the unconstitutionality of norms and, for the one that now concerns us, the Constitutional Chamber has not done so (see vote number 2023-00430 of January 11 of the current year in which it dismissed the unconstitutionality action regarding Article 280; vote number 2003-5414 that flatly rejected an action against the current Article 263, both of the Criminal Code; and vote number 2012-17027 of 14:30 hours on December 5, 2012, which ruled on the obstruction of public roads in the terms that will be referred to later), this does not prevent the exercise of ordinary jurisdiction, which must verify, in each specific case, not only the conventionality of the provision but also whether there was, in addition to typicality, unlawfulness, and this is both material and formal, and it is here where the analysis of causes of justification such as the legitimate exercise of a right (Article 25 of the Criminal Code) is involved. In a similar case, this was understood jurisprudentially, for example, in this vote: «…the crime of public instigation contained in Article 280 of the Criminal Code –former 273–, states: “Whoever instigates another to commit a specific crime that affects public tranquility shall be punished with a penalty of six months to four years in prison, without it being necessary that the act be carried out.” With the complaint filed by Attorney V, it cannot be considered proven that Mr. J's speech had such force over a person or persons that it caused a determination to carry out an unlawful act. It must be added that, even on the assumption that such instigation over the demonstrators existed, what is indicated by Article 25 of the Criminal Code cannot be overlooked, insofar as it states: “A person does not commit a crime who acts in compliance with a legal duty or in the legitimate exercise of a right.” In the present matter, the complaint alleges that Deputy J calls on students to demonstrate on the issue of photocopying and to demand the protection of the right to education. This is nothing other than the exercise of a right, which must be examined based on the provisions of Title VII of the Political Constitution and Article 28 of the Magna Carta, on the understanding that the call made is part of the right of expression that every citizen has in this country, especially since what is requested has to do with a fundamental right: education. This is why this Chamber upholds the prosecutorial request, considering that Mr. J was in the full exercise of his freedom of expression, which was aimed at safeguarding the right to education. Based on this interpretation, the accused crime could not be constituted, because even if the alleged conduct were included in a criminal offense, the existence of a cause of justification would eliminate the unlawfulness of said acts, and, consequently, such actions would also not be considered criminal. In this type of case, Article 282 of the Criminal Procedure Code indicates that “when the reported act does not constitute a crime or it is impossible to proceed, the Public Prosecutor’s Office shall request the preliminary procedure court, by means of a substantiated request, the dismissal of the complaint…”. Having verified that the acts reported by Attorney V do not constitute any crime, the request made by the Attorney General of the Republic is upheld, decreeing the dismissal.» Third Chamber (Chinchilla, Ramírez, Arroyo, Pereira, and López). Vote number 2013-495 (boldface supplied). As recognized by Attorney Navas in her own complaint brief, both the right to unionize (and its derivatives including collective bargaining mechanisms) and the rights of assembly and demonstration, including the right to social protest as part of freedom of expression, are human rights, essential for maintaining democratic balance and reducing social tensions and polarization. It is clear that it is not permissible to abuse any of these rights, nor to exercise them in bad faith, nor to carry out an antisocial exercise of them (Articles 20 to 22 of the Civil Code), because every right has as its limit the exercise of other rights that concern other persons in the population. Therefore, it is possible to repress the damages or injuries that occur within those protest frameworks, as it is also possible to sanction (from a labor point of view) the execution of movements that affect essential services defined, restrictively and not broadly, in a prior law, according to the IACHR Court in OC-27/21 of May 05, 2021. However, in this matter, not only was there no evidence that these effects (on life, health, integrity, property, or essential services) occurred (because after the accused meeting no protest materialized), but also many of the regulations on the right were introduced by a law subsequent to the accused acts (Law to Provide Legal Certainty on Strikes and Their Procedures No. 9808 of 2020) and did not exist as of the date of these acts (2018 onwards). For their part, other rights (such as the freedom of movement of citizens) can be reconciled with these (of freedom of expression, assembly, and trade union rights) through other measures, thanks to balancing exercises in each specific case. In summary, while this chamber agrees that the exercise of violence is not a valid or justified form of protest, nor is the affecting of essential services, it cannot but warn that, in scenarios where unease cannot be exercised through the channels allowed in International Human Rights Law—because these have been closing—violence, sooner or later, ends up erupting. Therefore, *prima facie*, that a person determines the will of another or others to obstruct public roads does not necessarily constitute a crime, as this will depend on whether the author's action is justified or not (if ordinary instigation is applied) or whether the protest can be assumed, without more, as a crime and not as a right to determine if it affects "public tranquility" or rather tends to strengthen it through the exercise of rights. Consequently, accepting hypothetically (for analytical purposes only) that the indictee made such a call (without any subsequent materialization) would not inexorably allow reaching a conclusion on the unlawfulness of his behavior because, for this, it was necessary to specify other elements that not only did not occur in reality (the aforementioned closure did not happen) but were also not proven at trial. In comparative law, there are pronouncements that reveal the tension of rights and the way to resolve it. For example, the Spanish Constitutional Court, in judgment number 42/2000 of February 14, 2000, established that «…the right of assembly when exercised in public transit places is a collective manifestation of freedom of expression exercised through a transient association of persons that operates as an instrumental technique placed at the service of the exchange or exposition of ideas, the defense of interests, or the publicity of problems or claims, thus constituting, therefore, a relevant channel of the participatory democratic principle, whose configurative elements are the subjective—grouping of persons—, the temporal—transient duration—, the finalistic—lawfulness of the purpose—, and the real or objective—place of celebration”. (…) This Court has already had occasion to rule on the disturbances of public order caused by concentrations that affect the circulation of vehicles on public transit roads, noting that the "exercise of this right, by its very nature, requires the use of public transit places and, given certain circumstances, allows the, so to speak instrumental, occupation of the roadways", recognizing that "the holding of this type of assembly usually produces disruptions and restrictions on the movement of persons and, as relevant here, of vehicles" (SSTC 59/1990, FJ 6; 66/1995, FJ 3). However, such findings do not lead this Court to consider that when the exercise of this fundamental right entails the indicated restrictions, it is not constitutionally legitimate, but, on the contrary, to understand that "in a democratic society, urban space is not only an area of circulation, but also a space of participation" (STC 66/1995, FJ 3).» On the other hand, in the inter-American system, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR) has stated that “governments cannot simply invoke one of the legitimate restrictions on freedom of expression, such as the maintenance of ‘public order’, as a means to suppress a ‘right guaranteed by the Convention or to denaturalize it or deprive it of real content’.” If this occurs, the restriction applied in that manner is not legitimate (…) if the consequences of criminal sanctions and the inevitably inhibiting effect they have on freedom of expression are considered, the criminalization of any type of expression can only be applied in exceptional circumstances where there is a clear and direct threat of anarchic violence (…) the Commission understands that the use of such powers to limit the expression of ideas lends itself to abuse, as a measure to silence unpopular ideas and opinions, thereby restricting a debate that is fundamental to the effective functioning of democratic institutions. Laws that criminalize the expression of ideas that do not incite anarchic violence are incompatible with the freedom of expression and thought enshrined in Article 13 and with the fundamental purpose of the American Convention to protect and guarantee the pluralistic and democratic form of life” (IACHR, Annual Report 1994, “Report on the Compatibility of Desacato Laws and the American Convention on Human Rights”, Chapter V; emphasis added). As the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression indicates: “…within certain limits, States may establish regulations on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly to protect the rights of others. However, when balancing the right to transit, for example, and the right to assembly, it must be taken into account that the right to freedom of expression is not just another right but, in any case, one of the first and most important foundations of the entire democratic structure: undermining freedom of expression directly affects the main nerve of the democratic system.” Thus, any measure tending to limit public demonstrations must ensure that its application safeguards the essential content of the human rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. Limitations should not depend on the content of what is to be expressed through a public demonstration, must serve a public interest, and leave other alternative channels of communication available. Limitations must have legal support and can only aim to prevent serious and imminent threats, a potential danger not being sufficient” (emphasis supplied). The Costa Rican Constitutional Chamber itself has understood this, stating: «Regarding the criminal power of the State, it must be used as a last resort (ultima ratio) for ensuring social peace, not as a mere mechanism of social control. Hence, Article 256 bis of the Penal Code, which criminalizes the obstruction of public roads, must be interpreted so that its application does not entail an impairment of the essential content of the constitutional rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. In this sense, the conduct referred to in that criminal provision, regarding public demonstrations, refers only to those in which considerable harm to the rights of other persons or to State property is verified. For example, a protest in which demonstrators assault security forces or other persons, or commit acts of vandalism against public or private property, exceeds the protective content of the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, and is therefore criminally punishable and justifies the action of police authorities, even with the use of force, provided that it is proportionate to the magnitude of the damage and the specific characteristics of the demonstration. Under this understanding, police intervention becomes reasonable when it is evident that the characteristics of the demonstration produce significant damage by blocking access to establishments or facilities of great impact for national or third-party interests (such as a port or airport due to the damages that could arise from the loss of flights or the deterioration of perishable goods destined for import or export, among others). The situation is different when the demonstration and consequent blocking of public roads does not prevent free transit through alternative routes. In other words, the detention of persons in a public demonstration and the application of criminal sanctions are only justified when there is a pressing social need to avoid disturbances to peace and public order, or serious damage to the rights of other persons, conditioned upon the police action being proportionate to the legitimate interest pursued and the specific characteristics of each particular demonstration. In no way can the criminalization of social protest become an intimidating instrument to the detriment of a form of participatory social expression characteristic of a democratic system. As long as a public demonstration unfolds within normal margins, prudence and tolerance must prevail. In this way, it is avoided that the means of expressing social disagreement (which historically have been accepted in democratic regimes but not in dictatorships) become true sources of violence and public disorder, which is precisely what would occur when the use of police force becomes disproportionate. However, this form of expression finds its limits in that it must be exercised reasonably and within the framework of the right of peaceful assembly, that is, without aggression against security forces or other persons, nor acts of vandalism against public or private property, nor serious damages inflicted on the rights of other persons, all of which must be assessed in the specific case.» Constitutional Chamber. Judgment No. 2012-17027 of 2:30 p.m. on December 5, 2012. Therefore, it was not feasible, as the appellant parties propose, that the mere reference to demonstrating on national highways (if hypothetically accepted that this occurred) formally constituted a crime of obstruction of public roads and, consequently, nor of public incitement to a crime. But, in addition to the foregoing, the interpretation MUST also be made, as the trial court judgment correctly states, based on other parameters specific to criminal matters, that is, respecting the principle of legality and the restrictive interpretation it imposes (articles 1 and 2 of the Penal Code) but also in protection of the pro personae and pro libertatis principles inherent to International Human Rights Law. Thus, unlike what the three appellants propose (in the sense that, when facing three hermeneutical possibilities, the broadest must be chosen), the trial court and this jurisdictional panel are obligated to use the most narrowly tailored interpretation of the criminal offense (tipo penal), as only this is the restrictive one and only this is the one that protects liberty. Ergo, when current numeral 280 of the Penal Code states: “Public incitement. Whoever incites another to commit a specific crime that affects public tranquility shall be punished with a prison term of six months to four years, without it being necessary that the act be produced.” (Emphasis supplied) it must not only be understood that publicity is inherent to the offense, even if it is only in the title of the article, but that the reference to crimes affecting “public tranquility” must be circumscribed to those criminal offenses so classified by the legislator (that is, unlawful association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation, and apology of crime) and not to others that, although they may protect the same legal interest, fall outside the section so named. Both elements emerge, with complete clarity, from the historical development of the norm detailed above and from the demands not only of the restrictive interpretation stipulated by the initial provisions of the national substantive codification but also by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself when referring to criminal norms affecting freedom of expression (and the relationship between this crime and said right was already established earlier) by stating: «76. The Court has indicated that Criminal Law is the most restrictive and severe means for establishing responsibility for unlawful conduct. The broad criminalization of slander and libel may be contrary to the principle of minimal intervention and last resort (ultima ratio) of criminal law. In a democratic society, punitive power is only exercised to the extent strictly necessary to protect fundamental legal interests from the most serious attacks that damage or endanger them. The contrary would lead to the abusive exercise of the State's punitive power. 77. Taking into account the considerations formulated so far on the due protection of freedom of expression, the reasonable reconciliation of the demands for protecting that right, on one hand, and honor on the other, and the principle of minimal criminal intervention characteristic of a democratic society, the use of criminal proceedings must correspond to the need to protect fundamental legal interests against conduct that implies serious injuries to said interests, and be related to the magnitude of the harm inflicted. The criminal definition of conduct must be clear and precise, as determined by the jurisprudence of this Court in examining Article 9 of the American Convention. 78. The Court does not consider any criminal measure regarding the expression of information or opinions to be contrary to the Convention, but this possibility must be analyzed with special caution, weighing in this regard the extreme gravity of the conduct displayed by the issuer thereof, the intent with which he acted, the characteristics of the unjustly caused harm, and other data that reveal the absolute necessity of using, in a truly exceptional manner, criminal measures. At all times, the burden of proof must fall on the one formulating the accusation.» Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Judgment in the case of Kimel Vs. Argentina of May 2, 2008 (emphasis supplied). With a norm similar to the Costa Rican one, this has been understood in other latitudes: «Public incitement to commit crime is an offense affecting public tranquility. To incite is to urge, provoke, or induce someone to do something; it is not merely proposing that it be committed, but promoting it in a somewhat coercive manner, using the excitement of the persons or the instincts of the person being incited; it is an accessory form of participation and the general principles enunciated regarding participation proper apply to it. The inciter wants the act, but wants it produced by another; he wants to achieve that act through the psychology of the other, determining in the latter the resolution to execute it. The governing verbs are to incite or induce, being a formal criminal offense, by virtue of which the will of the active subject to induce or determine someone to commit or perpetrate a crime is necessary. It is an autonomous crime. To prove public incitement, it must be public, that is, a challenge to the law, an open, direct challenge, and in the presence of other persons, or through some means of communication, which allows the dissemination and propagation of the message, not clandestinely; the incitement must be directed at the commission of a specific crime; for example, to breaking the law, or to disregarding the constitutional order, with the aim of destabilizing social peace and tranquility. (…) The incriminated conduct comprises incitement made publicly, that is, in public, in the presence of several persons. It can be directed at only one of them, as long as it is done publicly. And this requirement is met, not only when the inciter acts in the presence of several persons, but also when he uses some means of communication that inherently implies publicity, capable of establishing simultaneous or successive information with a more or less appreciable number of persons…» Institute of Constitutional Studies. The Infraction of Freedom of Assembly and Expression as a Mechanism for Political Persecution in Venezuela. Special reference to the case of Leopoldo López and others. In: Electronic Journal of Investigation and Legal Advisory of the National Assembly. No. 1 January-July 2016 pp. 60-61 citing resolution of the 28th Court of First Instance. Caracas Trial 09/10/2015, p. 271. The appellants, particularly the attorney, indicate that “…the Court should have analyzed (…) whether the demonstrated conduct fit the criminal offense or any other it deemed appropriate; an exercise that, had it been carried out, would not have resulted in the acquittal being challenged today.” (See folio 511 verso). However, the trial judgment did not only perform that exercise of scrutinizing other possible classifications as can be verified in folios 477 recto and following (page 33 onwards of the judgment), which is overlooked and made invisible in the appeals, but the appellants do not even mention the other possible criminal offenses into which the proven conduct would fit, and although the principle iura novit curia (the court knows the law) prevails, the one filing the complaint and appealing must also reveal the errors of the adopted decision regarding each of their claims (accusatorial principle). This court, in exercise of the iura novit curia precept, also does not observe that possibility of typical classification. It is true that almost all criminal offenses (except negligent ones, for example) admit common incitement (article 46 ibidem) but this is not configured in the present case because the conduct of obstruction of roads or hindering of services was neither externalized nor materialized, that is, there are no acts of execution in the iter criminis and, therefore, neither was anyone determined to have committed it at the level of, at least, a criminal wrong (theory of limited accessoriness). And if it is considered that this crime is multi-offensive and affects public tranquility and that, via that route (the broad interpretation already discarded), it integrates the criminal offense of numeral 280 of the repressive code, even so, there would also not be any crime in this case because for a crime to exist it is required that, in addition to criminality (tipicidad), unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) operates, and as has already been stated, the latter could hardly occur when a constitutional and conventional right (or several) is being exercised, which acts as a cause of justification. Ultimately, from no perspective does this chamber find errors or omissions in the reasoning of the trial judge nor the configuration of a crime that would allow reversing what was decided, reason for which the complaints will be rejected.

IV.- In the second argument of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, a lack of reasoning and violation of the rules of sound criticism is reproached, as well as non-application or disregard of articles 1045, 222 and following of the current rules of liability of the Penal Code of 1941 and numeral 38 of the Criminal Procedure Code in relation to the rejection of the civil action. It states that the claim for damages was not admitted because the acquittal implied there is no causal link and because intent was not proven, but that this does not substitute the due reasoning on such aspects and there is no factual or legal support for either the acquittal of the defendant or for the rejection of the civil action for damages filed by its represented party. With jurisprudential references (vote No. 2020-00332 of the Sentence Appeals Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón) it insists on the autonomy of the civil claim regarding the configuration of the crime and that the one exercised here was supported by the aforementioned numerals as the compensation for social damage, which the appellant defines, was sought. It adds that, with this, social interests are affected and can encompass all types of acts that cause damage to the well-being of the community, such as the disturbance of public tranquility derived from the defendant's actions, and as it is not possible to bring the entire population, some witnesses were provided who could reflect widespread national sentiments, such as the movement represented by the complainant Navas Montero. It adds that the defendant affected public tranquility, generated feelings of fear and bewilderment in the citizenry derived from the fact that, with the hindering of public services and the obstruction of roads, free access to workplaces, schools, social services, and timely medical care is impeded, situations of public violence could be created that would result in insecurity, compromising social peace, the exercise of civil liberties, and harming the fundamental rights of the community. It alludes to judgments No. 341-2004, 370-2009, 167-2011 and 548-2013 of the Tax Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in which the entirety of its claim for social damage has been accepted and to No. 71-2013 in which it establishes the “trial judge as expert of experts” to estimate its causation and amount). It requests that the judgment be declared ineffective in the civil aspect, “revoking it in all its aspects and ordering its remand.” There were no written responses. In the oral hearing held, Attorney Margot Avellán, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, emphasized that the civil action was rejected for lack of causal link, but there the decision lacks reasoning because it was not analyzed whether the damage was caused. She requests that the judgment be annulled in all its aspects. The complaint is rejected. The judgment on the merits resolved this issue in the following terms: «IV-: REGARDING THE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES: To address the civil claim, the material prerequisites of the claim, or what is also known as substantive exceptions, must first be verified, which must be examined ex officio. Regarding the existence of the right, this relates to the demonstration of damages of a material nature or, as in this case, social nature, which was alleged in the factual basis of the civil action for damages, the causal link, and the criterion for imputing it, whether based on intent, negligence, created risk, etc. In the present matter, given that the damages sought - of a social nature - have a close causal relationship with the accused acts (of an intentional nature) and the liability of the civil defendant for the same has not been demonstrated, given that the criterion for imputation in this case is evidently subjective based on intent, it is verified that the civil plaintiff party has no right whatsoever. In no way can the invoked social damage be attributed to an intentional action of the civil defendant, as has already been extensively set forth in the recital regarding criminal liability, thus the civil action for damages presented by THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC against the civil defendant [Name 001] is declared without merit.» (See judgment, folio 480 verso). As the appellant correctly states, the essence of the rejection, as verified, is that, as the criminal liability of the defendant had not been established and the claimed civil liability being subjective for one's own act, it was not possible to grant the civil complaint, a conclusion that, indeed, is correct, without a more extensive elucidation being necessary, as the complainant seems to miss, since all the reasons put forth in the other parts of the judgment to support the acquittal (and whose correctness has already been examined and endorsed) are integrated into this part of the decision. It must be remembered that judgments are a unit of logical-legal meaning where their different parts cannot be read in isolation. In matters of civil liability —as previously indicated to the same attorney in another matter, see vote number 2023-349 of 8:15 a.m. on March 13 last— doctrine distinguishes two types: contractual and extracontractual. The first arises from express agreements or legal relationships. The second, from acts or omissions in social life. These can be intentional (that is, desired), negligent (that is, lacking the duty of care), or stipulated in law, regardless of whether there is intent or negligence or whether they are lawful or unlawful acts, as this is based on the generation of risks (for example, article 1048 of the Civil Code) or on obtaining profits that those who propitiate them must bear (strict liability). Extracontractual civil liability (which is what is claimed upon the commission of a criminal act like the one discussed here) can be subjective (based on intent or negligence) and either for one's own act or direct, or for the act of another or indirect (culpa in eligiendo or culpa in vigilando). The latter is provided for in numeral 1048 of the Civil Code, third paragraph, which states: “One who entrusts a person with the fulfillment of one or many acts is obligated to choose a person suitable to execute them and to supervise the execution within the limits of the diligence of a good father of a family; and if he neglects these duties, he shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages that his agent causes to a third party with an action violating another's right, committed with bad intention or by negligence in the performance of his duties, unless that action could not have been avoided even with due diligence in supervision.” This is different from the other type of liability, that is, strict liability, which, besides the need for a specific legal provision (for example, in article 1048 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code; in article 32 of the Law on effective protection and defense of the consumer, contained in article 32; numeral 197 of the Law on Transit on public roads or land routes or in articles 190 and following of the General Law on Public Administration), the criterion for imputation implies analyzing three requirements: a) the use of objects that entail danger or risk; b) the causation of damage of a patrimonial nature; c) the relationship or cause-effect link between the act and the damage. This, in turn, can be principal or sole, or joint and several. Schematically it is posed as follows:

| --- | --- | --- | | --- | --- | --- | | --- | --- | --- | As the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic established that the defendant, with the action he was accused of, had generated damage, its claim was framed within subjective extracontractual civil liability for one's own act through intent. In the judgment, when analyzing the criminal issue, it was not established that he carried out the conduct described in both the public and private accusations, that is, the factual and legal basis had already been set forth and analyzed, whereupon it was not necessary to repeat it to sustain the civil decision and it was also not necessary for the judgment to analyze the other sources of civil liability since they were not those invoked by the civil plaintiff and in this matter the principle of congruence and its derived prohibitions of ultra or extra petita rulings apply. It is true that the civil action for damages is accessory to the criminal one and there is a relative autonomy between both claims, but when what is requested in the civil sphere depends on the defendant having committed the act and this is not proven, it is clear that the criminal aspect affects the civil one insofar as it prevents proving the causal link, which is one of the elements, besides the generating act and the damage, that must be demonstrated in the civil sphere. Regardless of the type of compensation sought (in this case for social damage), that does not change the fact that the source of liability is subjective and not strict, and, this being so, the plaintiff party had to prove that the defendant carried out the conduct (own act), that there was damage, and that it was that action which generated the damage (causal link). As the first is not proven, the last also does not exist and, therefore, what was decided is correct. On the other hand, although it may have been that some persons were affected by the events and two of them testified in the trial, neither does this allow an extrapolation to the “affectation of public tranquility” nor, even if hypothetically it could be done, does that allow proving the causal link that is missing, as that would only speak of another element (the damage) but not of the mentioned link in which the civil defendant must be subjectively involved, without this having been done in this case. The fact that several courts have accepted a civil claim, in other cases in which the three elements for conviction were demonstrated (generating act, social damage, and causal link), did not compel the lower court to make the specific analysis nor did it compel it to grant the items if, in the specific case, which is what matters, that proof was not provided. Nor does this chamber understand the reason for arguing that the court is an expert of experts when such an aphorism allows elucidating issues related to controversies between expert criteria, none of which is recorded here, and although, in some cases when the law authorizes it, courts can make a prudential estimation of the amount of compensation, that does not mean the civil plaintiff party does not have to demonstrate the damage (what is estimated is the amount to pay, not the existence of the damage), which was also not taken as proven in this instance. Therefore, the complaints must be rejected.

V.- As a third complaint from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the same arguments of lack of reasoning, violation of sound criticism, and improper application of the law are raised, but this time articles 16, 38 and 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 3 subsection i), 20 and 21 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, 50 of the Political Constitution, and 73.2 subsection 4 of the current Civil Procedure Code. It states that the State was ordered to pay costs for considering it did not have a plausible reason to litigate because, as there was no evidence and the acts were not crimes, the complaint was improper and the State's claim is reckless. However, it argues that at the time the complaint and civil action briefs were filed, the accused acts revealed the possible commission of an unlawful act to the detriment of the community and the production of damage of considerable proportions (despite which it was prudently estimated at an extremely low amount). It adds that there was a prosecutorial accusation and that is the plausible reason to litigate. It copies the content of the article referring to the order to pay costs and says that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic bases its action on extensive regulations that legally oblige it to exercise criminal and civil actions against whoever is allegedly responsible for the reported and accused acts according to the investigation carried out by the Public Ministry. It alludes to the content of the Organic Law of its institution which, in numerals 20 and 21, establish that attorneys “...are absolutely prohibited from acquiescing, settling, conciliating, or desisting from lawsuits or claims” and “...failing to file the lawsuits or claims in which they must intervene as plaintiffs...” Therefore, what has been done here, it continues, responds to the duties imposed by law, and failing to do so implies a serious breach of the cited express prohibition. It argues that both the complaint and the civil action for damages were subjected to analysis by the intermediate stage court, which, as guarantor of the parties' rights, examined the accusatory pieces and deemed it appropriate to proceed to trial, thereby passing the filter of the preliminary hearing and affirming the sufficient degree of probability for the continuation of the process. It considers that it was not appropriate to punish the State for an action it was compelled to bring. It gives references to multiple votes from different courts that allude, in similar situations, to its represented party's plausible reason to litigate. It mentions that there is no bad faith, no abuse of law, nor was it proceeded with arbitrarily or recklessly, but rather they acted in accordance with the legal and constitutional demands that oblige them to take action and, therefore, the State should have been exempted from costs due to the existence of the cited plausible reason to litigate, and instead they were ordered to pay costs through an unfounded decision. It requests the revocation of this aspect. In a third section, although without numbering, of the appeal by the complainant party represented by Navas, it alludes to the order to pay costs. It affirms that its represented party has acted in defense of citizen rights given the objectivity of the facts that were of general knowledge as public events. Initially a report was filed and the complaint was formalized because there was an accusation from the Public Ministry and they were granted a hearing. The matter was elevated to trial in a preliminary hearing, so there has been a plausible reason to litigate. It requests to annul the ruling in this aspect. There were no written responses. In the oral hearing held, attorney Navas Montero, as complainant, expanded her appeal indicating that she was bringing it both personally —as a Costa Rican citizen through a popular action— and in her capacity as attorney-in-fact for the “Asociación Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica.” She argues that they acted in good faith, to the point that there was a prosecutorial accusation, and therefore the order to pay costs was inappropriate.

Ms. Margot Avellán, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), complains about the order requiring her client to pay costs (costas), which, in her opinion, also lacks justification, since they acted in accordance with the law, to the point that it is a serious breach not to file an action if diffuse or collective interests are involved, and the entity she represents waited for the prosecutorial accusation to be filed before deciding what to do. She indicates that they did not initiate the proceeding nor accuse first; that the action passed the filter of a judge in the preliminary stage, and that the origin of the amount for costs set by the judge is unknown, as there is no reasoning provided. Mr. Carlos García stated that the order for the State to pay costs is appropriate because a citizen is being stigmatized, since he had no participation in the 2018 strike, no prior crime was investigated, illegal evidence was used, and there was no crime that had just occurred. The complaints are heard jointly because they refer to the same issue and will be rejected.

To examine this topic, it is convenient to set out both the court's reasoning and this Chamber's interpretation of the prevailing rules on costs when litigating in criminal matters (an aspect in which, as will be seen, some controversy has existed) to, finally, address the specific case.

(A) Description of what occurred. In this matter, the criminal action was brought both by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) and by two private prosecutors (querellantes): the "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. The latter entity also brought a civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria). In the judgment, the issue of costs was resolved as follows: «V.- COSTS: In accordance with the provisions of articles 266, 267, 270 and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), it is appropriate to determine the costs arising from this action, which as a rule must be borne by the losing party and only exceptionally may this party be exempted from payment when it is considered that there was a plausible reason to litigate. This is based on the principle that if one brings an action claiming rights to which one believes to be entitled, one must also assume responsibility for unfounded actions. In the case now before us, both the costs in the criminal aspect and in the civil aspect must be borne by the losing party. This is because it is in no way considered that there was a plausible reason to litigate, taking into account that the reported facts, according to the evidence provided, do not even constitute a crime. It is considered that in the case before us, the threshold of criminality (tipicidad) was not even surpassed, and furthermore, the private criminal complaints (querellas) were based on evidence containing elements completely different from those offered, or once offered, it was not even verified that they were effectively incorporated into the process. The complaint by the Office of the Attorney General makes an offer of evidence almost identical to that of the Public Prosecutor's Office, without the state representation even taking the trouble to verify that the evidence offered was relevant and, most importantly, that it effectively contained what was indicated in the offer. This is contrary to what was proven in the record, in the considering clause (considerando) relating to the evidentiary analysis, where it was established that the DVD evidence that had been seized by the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) contained the statements of the accused when in reality it contained the interview given by the private prosecutor days later to a television channel. And on the other hand, the complaint of the Movimiento Ciudadano offered an evidentiary element that was never effectively seized and therefore incorporated into the process, without this being verified beforehand but rather at the moment the material evidence was being incorporated into the debate, in the first hearing on December 8, where the private prosecutor, after minute 23 of the recording and prior information from the Court about the videos that had been admitted as evidence, acknowledges that it was not admitted and that they set it, and despite this, a brief allusion was made at the time of issuing conclusions. Added to this is that they filed a private criminal complaint regarding one event—the eighth—from which it is not even clear what crime the accused could have been instigated to commit, because the allegedly injured person did not even want to report it, and despite this, the private prosecutors continued with the complaint regarding this event—this as is evident from folio 216 verso of the case file (expediente), where the order for trial (auto de apertura a juicio) indicates that the complaint admitted to Movimiento Ciudadano CR is that of folios 1 to 20 of the respective file, which consists of eight events. Furthermore, the Court cannot fail to consider that the private criminal complaints, which as already stated do not constitute the crime charged or any crime, were filed with legal representation (patrocinio letrado). Finally, regarding the civil action, besides the fact that article 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is very clear on who must bear the costs, it is also not considered that the litigation was conducted in good faith, because regarding the evidence offered, the objections would be the same ones made to the complaint filed by that party. Adding that it did not even take care to provide the evidence it offered to gather on its own behalf, namely the assessment of damages and costs for expenses for eventual preventive measures to safeguard public peace, which was part of the list with which it sought to prove the social damage suffered, as stated in point VII of the filing brief for the civil action for damages. Thus, upon determining the non-existence of a plausible reason to litigate in accordance with the foregoing, the costs derived from the private criminal complaints and civil action are to be borne by the losing parties. These are set at the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND COLONES (CIENTO VEINTIÚN MIL COLONES) corresponding to the civil action and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND COLONES (CUATROCIENTOS OCHENTA Y CUATRO MIL COLONES) corresponding to each of the private criminal complaints. The agreed sums must be paid once this ruling becomes final and by simple bank deposit into the Court's account.» (Cf. judgment, folio 481 front and back).

(B) Rules on costs in criminal proceedings. Before proceeding to the analysis of the issue, it is necessary to have clarity on the current rules regarding costs within criminal proceedings. In vote number 2012-1052 (R. Chinchilla, L. García and E. Salinas), assumed, revisited, and expanded upon in vote number 2015-909 (R. Chinchilla, L. García and R. Obando) and in vote number 2017-291 (R. Chinchilla, A.I. Solís and J. Campos), whose criterion is shared by the current panel, reference was made to the regulatory framework on costs, whose general rule is an order against the losing party with exceptions based on evident good faith, although other provisions seemed to contain rules that were supposedly special and different from that general rule. Although the emphasis of those pronouncements was on the matter of civil action, the arguments, by parity of reasoning in many cases, are extendable to the private criminal complaint.

Thus it was said then—and is reiterated now—that even when a civil action for damages is brought within a criminal proceeding, because it is accessory, it is done in accordance with the rules established by this Code (article 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). It is thus that numeral 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while mandating, as a rule of principle, that costs be borne by the losing party, also indicates that they may be exempted, totally or partially, "when there is a plausible reason to litigate," which is nothing other than the same regulation that exists in civil matters under the concept of "evident good faith" (article 222 of the repealed Civil Procedure Code No. 7130 and numeral 73.2 of the current Civil Procedure Code). It is true that this Chamber, with panels partially similar to the current one and under the name of Criminal Cassation Court (Tribunal de Casación Penal), on different occasions stated: «The first thing that must be indicated is that, as a counterweight to the right of action or access to justice, there is an obligation to finance the expenses that the process generates. That obligation falls, as a general rule, on the losing party since, by not having extrajudicially recognized the claim of the winning party, it forced the latter to make use of the judicial system. This rule, that the losing party bears the expenses originating in the process, is practically universal. This is how traditional procedural doctrine explains it (...) {CHIOVENDA, José. La condena en costas. Translation by Juan de la Puente y Quijano. Madrid, 1928, p. 220 (...) CHIOVENDA, José. Derecho procesal civil: principios. Tomo II. Cárdenas editor y distribuidor, México, 1990 edition (...) CARNELUTTI, Francesco. Derecho procesal civil y penal. Translation by Enrique Figueroa Alfonzo. Colección de clásicos del derecho, México, 1994, p. 80.} Now, the costs of the process or court costs, as inferred from the above, cannot be confused with procedural costs. The first is the generic category which has two components: personal costs, which include attorney's fees, and procedural costs, which are all the remaining expenses originating with the process (...) In Costa Rican law, the various procedural codes in force in different matters include the obligation that the ruling on the issue of costs must be made, mandatorily and even ex officio, in the resolution that puts an end to the process, and that this must be borne by the losing party. That general rule, which excludes the cost issue from causing the ruling to suffer from a lack of congruence due to ultra or extrapetitio (...) is, however, excepted in some rules that foresee the possibility that, optionally, other guidelines may be applied: (...) Now, the issue focused on in this way—questioned in modern general process theory based on principles such as free access to justice, but without such criticism having had major practical repercussions in world legislation—was put in check, long ago, in criminal procedural law, given the nature (public or collective) of the conflict decided therein and the existence of international human rights instruments that oblige the states that have signed them to provide, mandatorily, a free defense for the accused who, against their will, is brought into the process but is protected by a constitutional state of innocence, as well as the state duty to provide its population with suitable mechanisms to resolve their most important conflicts (cfr.: article 8.2.a and 8.2.e of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14.2.d and 14.2.f of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which establish the right of the accused to be assisted free of charge by a translator or interpreter and for the State to provide a lawyer). This differentiated treatment of the issue, while maintaining the same principles, incorporates additional ones and is manifested in the evolution with which these topics have been addressed in the different criminal procedural laws that have succeeded one another in Costa Rica (...) ¬Code of Criminal Procedure (1996): "Article 265. Costs of the accused. In every process, the State shall cover the expenses in relation to the accused and the other parties that enjoy the benefit of litigating without being charged for them. When the accused is solvent, they must pay the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) for the services of the public defender or any other they have received. For this, the procedure established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) regarding the public defender shall be followed. Excepting from that duty is the payment of the official translator or interpreter." "Article 266. Necessary resolution. The criminal court must rule in a reasoned manner on the payment of procedural and personal costs when issuing the resolution that ends the case." "Article 267. Fixing of costs. Costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt them, totally or partially, when there is a plausible reason to litigate. When there are several parties ordered to pay costs, the court shall fix the proportional part corresponding to each one, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law" (...) "Article 270. Civil action. If the civil claim is admitted in the judgment, the accused and the civilly liable third party shall jointly bear the costs; if the claim is rejected, the civil plaintiff shall bear them. If the action cannot proceed, each of the interveners shall bear their own costs, unless the parties have agreed to another measure or the court, due to the circumstances of the case, distributes them in another manner" (...) It is thus how, in Costa Rican criminal procedural matters, some exceptions arise to the treatment of this topic in other branches of law, whether public or private. Then, although the rule is that costs are borne by the losing party, if the latter is the criminal defendant, a differentiation must be made between procedural costs or expenses. The latter, that is, the expenses incorporating the payment of the translator or interpreter, will always be borne by the State, as provided in the cited numeral 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and regarding attorney's fees, the accused may be exempted from payment, if and only if two situations converge: a) that their defense counsel is public; and b) that they lack the resources to refund the payment of their fees to the State (...) Although this last position has been academically questioned regarding its constitutionality when the accused is acquitted (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416..."), the truth is that it has not yet been challenged through the procedural channels of rigor, which means it remains in force (...) But if the legal professional for the accused person is private, or if, being paid by the State, the accused possesses the resources to pay them (an aspect that, as has been indicated, can be elucidated in the enforcement stage according to what the judgment may have decided in that regard), the order for personal costs will imply that it is the accused or sentenced person who pays their lawyer's fees, and not that the latter can demand such payment from the State, as would happen if the cited rule were interpreted or applied erroneously and, out of ignorance, the accused were always exempted from the payment of both costs or if the State were always ordered to pay them (...) The same occurs if the losing party is the Public Prosecutor's Office, regarding which there is also a legal exemption from the collection of both costs, as provided in numeral 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (...) The issue has been treated in various ways by this same Court, with various panels, it appearing that the tendency is to always require reasoning and even to accept exemption as an exception for all cases (...) . However, those rules are for the ordinary process and in criminal matters, because it must be taken into account that in other types of special criminal processes (private prosecution, for example) and in matters of civil claims, there are special rules that displace those general provisions. There, the general rule is that the losing party always faces both costs, and that the possibility of making an exemption is not applicable since the special rule does not enable it. This is how articles 78 (express withdrawal of the public prosecution complaint where the order against the party withdrawing is mandatorily provided unless the parties agree otherwise), 118 second paragraph (withdrawal of the civil action), 384 (withdrawal of the private prosecution complaint where the order against the party withdrawing is mandatorily provided unless the parties agree otherwise), and 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (order against the losing civil party) pronounce themselves (see in this regard the vote of this Court, with a partially different panel than the current one, number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 - U. Zúñiga, Llobet and Salazar- and the note in vote number 2010-0085 of January 17, 2010 -Camacho, García and U. Zúñiga-. To the contrary, that is, accepting the plausible reason to litigate as an exception in all cases, the votes of this Chamber, with a different panel, numbers 2006-1035 of September 29, 2006 -García, Porras and Morales- and 2000-119 of February 11, 2000 -López, Sanabria and Arroyo-, where the issue is addressed although with criteria different from that set out here). On the other hand, supplementary application of the Civil Procedure Code is also not appropriate, since there is an express rule to the contrary. (...)» The highlights are omitted. See votes of the Criminal Cassation Court number 2010-0305 of 2:40 p.m. on March 19, 2010 (L. García, R. Chinchilla and U. Zúñiga) and number 2010-0366 of 3:20 p.m. on April 8, 2010 (R. Chinchilla, U. Zúñiga and R. Gullock). Under similar conditions and adopting the previous criterion, cf.: vote number 2011-1296 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). That position, in general terms, was endorsed or maintained in the background cases mentioned above, except regarding the mandatory order of costs for the civil claim against the losing party, an issue on which there was a re-evaluation of the question based on constitutional principles of higher hierarchy than the law (such as equality before the law: constitutional article 34), and that criterion was expressly modified. For this, it was said—in the cited votes number 2015-909 and number 2017-291—that although the criminal procedural legislation contains a special rule (relating to the civil claim) that mandatorily establishes the order of costs against the losing civil party, this treatment is different from that given to the same party if they had resorted to the ordinary civil route. On the other hand, in not a few cases, the civil claim cannot succeed because the factual basis on which it rests, although established as probable, was not proven with the certainty required for a criminal conviction, and this, added to conceptual errors by the parties who have not incorporated different criteria of liability for damage into their pleadings, usually generates the rejection of civil claims. Finally, although the rule (final phrase of the first paragraph of article 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) is mandatory, so is numeral 267, and in the same Book and Title and immediately thereafter, the provision for exemption is inserted (article 267 first paragraph, ab initio, of the Code of Criminal Procedure). That is, the exemption is provided precisely to relax the rigor of the mandatory rules referred to therein, both provisions being at the same level of general rules. Combining all this, it can be concluded that the mandatory order of costs against the losing civil party, with the possibility of a justified discretionary exemption for said party made by the court, are the current rules on the matter that are thus harmonized with those of the ordinary civil process. And this, being the origin of both provisions, allows for resolving the specific case with greater justice, in order to restore social harmony (article 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), a position that this Chamber ultimately considers correct.

(C) The specific case. From the transcription made at the beginning of this considering clause, it is possible to conclude that the judgment on the merits did provide express and extensive reasoning for said order of costs, so the defect of lack of reasoning contained in numeral 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not present. On the other hand, the factual assertions from which it departed (accusing without verifying or providing the evidence; making conclusions without support in the material presented at trial; not rectifying facts from the private criminal complaint despite not providing any material regarding them; not realizing the lack of evidence until the trial, etc.) have not been challenged by the parties, and this Chamber has verified that they are true, that is, they derive from what really happened in the process, so there are also no errors in this regard.

Now, what remains to be determined is whether the discretion (to order costs or not) was applied correctly by the trial court, or if there was abuse or arbitrariness in this regard. In this exercise, this Chamber concludes that there is also no defect to be declared. Note that while the parties appealing this issue maintain that they filed private criminal complaints once the Public Prosecutor's Office presented its accusation and that they proceeded in the process under the protection of an order for trial issued by a judicial authority, which consequently reviewed the complaints and determined compliance with requirements to reach this procedural phase, what they do not say is that such a decision by the intermediate stage court is based on a probability, not a certainty, and this probability in turn derives from the picture that the same claimants present to the judicial body in their briefs. Said court does not evaluate the evidence to determine if it establishes what they affirm they will provide; rather, it assumes it in good faith. As such, the fact that said court ordered the case to go to trial does not endorse the conduct of the subjects who provided the information, for example, the private prosecutor introducing events (such as number 8) regarding which no evidence is provided, or the state entities not reviewing the material offered to determine whether it contains what they stipulate in their brief. State representations, with even greater responsibility than a private individual, have a duty of objectivity (article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and article 10 subsection l) of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic) and it is therefore even more reprehensible that they promote accusations without adequate evidentiary support or make legal interpretations that exceed the framework of the Democratic Rule of Law, which they are obliged to respect.

On the other hand, while the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has legal prohibitions against acquiescing, settling, withdrawing, or conciliating, it has no obligation to accuse those whom others determine it should accuse; rather, it has its own judgment and functional independence in this regard. Moreover, what numeral 15 of its Organic Law indicates is that: “Artículo 15°.-Los funcionarios de la Procuraduría General de la República (…) También les está prohibido, sin la previa autorización referida: dejar de establecer demandas o reclamaciones en que deban intervenir como actores, omitir la contestación de los traslados o audiencias que se les haya dado, dejar de presentar las pruebas legales que les corresponda rendir, abandonar las que hayan propuesto, no interponer oportunamente los recursos legales contra actos ejecutados o resoluciones dictadas en contra de las demandas o pedimentos que hayan presentado o en perjuicio de los intereses cuya defensa les está confiada” (bold added). That is, the prohibition lies in doing so without authorization, and the determination of when to intervene corresponds to a value judgment by the head of the agency; thus, there is no obligation without the possibility of departing from the mandate as claimed by the prosecutor. Furthermore, none of the foregoing excuses her from her obligation to review the evidentiary material, especially when it is of a documentary nature, to verify that the content of what is offered is reliable. It is evident that she did not do so in this case, as the parties did not realize that the supposed video containing the accused’s interventions was not an original, was edited, and was never provided.

Regarding the private prosecutors, their good faith is also not evident, not only because of the aforementioned errors and omissions but also because they included events for which no evidence was presented and because they did not take care to filter some of their statements in light of other constitutional rights, including those derived from freedom of expression (of which social protest is a part) and union rights, which are also human rights of persons. And when these clash with other fundamental rights of other persons, there is an obligation to make balancing judgments (juicios de ponderación), which in this case were completely omitted.

Furthermore, no one can arrogate to themselves the rights of others or the exercise of national sovereignty (article 2 of the Political Constitution), and the fact that some people feel affected by certain actions does not imply that "public tranquility" is thereby affected in the terms of the criminal offense invoked as the basis for the compensation sought, as accepting this would lead to unacceptable abuses, which, in times of profound crises of various sorts and great social polarization, can generate regrettable abuses.

Thus, this Chamber does not consider that there is any defect or omission in the reasoning expressed by the trial court on this issue, and this leads to the rejection of the complaints. Regarding the amount, it is true that the appealed resolution did not explain the procedure for arriving at it; rather, reference was only made to the order and the sums thereof: «Son las costas derivadas de las querellas y acción civil a cargo de las partes perdidosas, las cuales se fijan en la suma de CIENTO VEINTIÚN MIL COLONES correspondientes a la acción civil y CUATROCIENTOS OCHENTA Y CUATRO MIL COLONES correspondientes a las querellas.» (Bold added, uppercase in the original). However, if a simple arithmetic exercise is performed regarding the content of the decree applicable to this matter, it will be noted that there is no harm whatsoever. This matter began, as initially stated (considering clause II.A), in September 2019, the date on which Decreto Ejecutivo N° 41457-JP of October 17, 2018, "Fee Schedule for Professional Legal and Notarial Services" (Arancel de honorarios por servicios profesionales de abogacía y notariado) was in force. This decree took effect on February 1, 2019, and establishes the minimum amounts for professional fees in those areas. In Title III regarding judicial matters, Chapter I (general rate for declaratory processes), article 19, as of the date of the judgment (which was issued in December 2021, a date that is important because the decree had amendments in September 2022 that do not apply to this case, being subsequent to the decision under review), established: “Article 19.- Fees in processes of unquantifiable amount. The minimum fees for this type of process may not be less than two hundred forty-two thousand colones.” Meanwhile, in Chapter VIII (Criminal Process), the following special rules were established: «Article 38.- Single-judge court: In criminal cases whose jurisdiction corresponds to a Single-Judge Court (Tribunal Unipersonal), the minimum fees for the criminal defense shall be four hundred eighty-four thousand colones. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the fees shall be paid as follows: a) One third for the investigation stage. b) One third for the holding of the preliminary hearing. c) One third for the holding of the oral trial. In those cases where the process concludes through the application of the abbreviated procedure or some alternative measure, the fees shall be seventy-five percent (75%) of the total fees for the process. The fees corresponding to the civil action for damages shall be governed by the rules established for said matter in this Fee Schedule. The same rules shall apply for the lawyer who files a private criminal complaint in crimes of public prosecution.» (Bold added). As can be noted, that minimum fee was the one set as personal costs for each private criminal complaint, so there is no harm in the lack of reasoning. Regarding the civil action, numeral 42 of the cited decree stipulated: «Article 42.- Civil Action: The fees for the civil action for damages are independent of those corresponding to the processing of the criminal case. The lawyer for the civil plaintiff shall charge fees for this action in accordance with the General Rate, unless otherwise agreed in writing. The fees shall be paid in three equal parts as follows: a) For its presentation. b) For the holding of the preliminary hearing. c) For the holding of the oral trial. The lawyer representing the civil defendant shall earn equal fees.» (Bold added). Said rate is regulated by numeral 16.a of the fee schedule, establishing, among other parameters, 20% of the amount if it does not exceed 16 million colones. As one million colones was claimed in this case, 20% amounts to two hundred thousand colones, an amount that was higher than the amount set (of 121 thousand colones, which, consequently, is also lower than the minimum rate contemplated in numeral 19). Therefore, the appealing party was actually favored, and such cannot be reversed as there is no appeal on this point by the party who was harmed (principle of prohibition of reformation in peius). In short, there is no harm whatsoever to declare, and for this reason, this point must also be rejected.

VI.- Note from Judge Vargas González: I concur with what was resolved in all aspects except the following: i) in that it is indicated that the crime of public instigation has, as one of its constitutive elements, that of publicity, an aspect with which I do not agree.

In my opinion, the objective elements of the offense are those that are literally set forth in it, and not those that derive implicitly or are extracted from its title or from historical or systematic interpretation, such that, since advertising is not included in the criminal definition, it does not form part of the crime in question nor did it need to be encompassed by the subject's intent (dolo). However, that does not affect the decision taken to reject the appeals on the criminal matter, since this is based on the rest of the unanimous arguments (unlawful evidence, lack of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, as well as the restrictive interpretation of "crimes against public tranquility" to understand only those included in the section of the Penal Code so named and not all those that affect said legal interest). ii) Regarding the proposition that in our country the right to protest could justify the obstruction of the main public roads. Although the analysis carried out in point (C) of this decision, called "International Human Rights Law and the Penal Code: integration and systematic application" is by way of greater abundance [since in this matter common instigation (instigación común) was ruled out given that acts of execution of the crimes of disruption of public services (art. 263 of the Penal Code) or obstruction of the public road (art. 263 bis of the same code) did not materialize, and the so-called "public instigation" (instigación pública) (article 280 C.P.) was also excluded to the extent that the aforementioned crimes are not contemplated within Title X of the Penal Code, called "Crimes against public tranquility"], after weighing that in Costa Rica the road infrastructure is chaotic and alternative routes practically do not exist (unlike what happens in other latitudes), I conclude that the closure of the main national roads indisputably affects the fundamental rights of other citizens, at the very least their right to free transit. Consequently, in our current context, the exercise of the aforementioned rights (for example, social protest, union freedom, the right to strike, and freedom of expression) cannot be invoked as a valid justification for the aforementioned conduct (had it occurred, which is not the case). Also, for what I have just set forth, I do not share one of the arguments given by my colleagues to conclude that the order to pay legal costs (costas) issued against the private complainants (querellantes particulares) is appropriate, namely: "[…] for not bothering to screen some of their expressions in light of other constitutional rights, including those derived from freedom of expression (of which social protest is a part) and union rights, which are also human rights of persons, and in the face of the clash of these with other fundamental rights of other persons, there is an obligation to make balancing judgments which in this case were completely omitted." Now, with this caveat, I agree with the resolution of the claims made on the civil matter and costs, since there are other reasonings in the judgment on the merits that support the decision adopted by the lower court (a quo) (for example, the atypicality of the charged conduct) and on which it is unnecessary to make further considerations.

POR TANTO:

The appeals filed by the prosecutor, Máster Oscar Quirós Soto; by Licenciada Margot Avellán Ruíz, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, complainant and civil plaintiff; and by Licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, attorney-in-fact for the persons acting as complainants under the name "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica," are declared without merit. Judge Vargas González records a note. NOTIFÍQUESE.

Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón Patricia Vargas González Kathya Jiménez Fernández Judges of Appeal of Criminal Judgment Defendant: [Nombre 001] Victim: Public tranquility Crime: Public instigation (Instigación pública) DDURANC In what it titles “first ground” of its challenge (which, in reality, is the only one), it expresses disagreement with the assessment of the evidence because it believes there was a violation of the rules of sound criticism (reglas de la sana crítica) which, in its view, generates an improper and contradictory reasoning. It states that the testimonial evidence of Rubén Hernández Valle and Gloria Navas Montero was not correctly analyzed and that, had this been done and subjective assessments omitted, a different decision would have been reached. It considers that the appealed decision lacks reasoning (ayuna de motivación) because only one of the aspects to which the parties alluded is mentioned, leaving aside essential circumstances (without expressing which ones). It says it was demonstrated that the accused made a series of statements to cause an upheaval in the country, and even though he did so in a private center, the Episcopal Conference (Conferencia Episcopal), this does not prevent the criminal offense from being consummated. It criticizes the judge's position that the act must be carried out in a public place. It adds, in a somewhat disorganized exposition, that it is not a requirement that the video to be provided be the original, that no one has reported the unlawful capture of statements, and that the fact that it was edited does not mean it cannot be evaluated, since no one, not even the defendant, has indicated that it was adulterated or that the images contained therein are false. It recalls that in our system there is no fixed evidentiary weight (prueba tasada) and this material was heard by third parties, which would be sufficient. Furthermore, it was seized from a mass media outlet, which would prove, according to the challenger, that the interviewee was making the statements to several people. It adds that, although the crime is found in the title of offenses against public order (tranquilidad pública), this does not mean that incitement (instigación) must only be of unlawful acts within that title, since there are others that affect that legal interest (such as disruption of public service [entorpecimiento de servicio público] and obstruction of public road [obstrucción de vía pública]) which are multi-offensive and affect an entire population. It adds that “It is not true that the offense requires determining the will of the masses because the crime is one of endangerment. The judge's conclusion that what the defendant said is not incitement (instigación) but a proposal is not correct; to claim that a person inciting must say when and how the act will occur goes beyond what is required by the offense.” (Cfr. folio 490 verso). It maintains that, although the incitement did not materialize, the criminal offense does not require that to happen. Immediately, the appellant, in a somewhat confused manner and as a question, adds: “How does the court intend that, in these types of cases, the mere element that the defendant, at the time and in the manner, did not authorize being recorded, exempts him from the crime of Public Incitement (Instigación Pública), since from the analysis conducted, it is determined that there is no Criminality (Tipicidad), nothing could be further from reality. In the Public Prosecutor's Office's (Ministerio Público) opinion, the Court reaches an erroneous conclusion by determining that the evidence does not reliably prove the prosecutorial theory and leaves aside circumstances that were presented by the witnesses, and therefore, and in accordance with the principle of Correlation between Accusation and Sentence (principio de Correlación entre Acusación y Sentencia), the defendant must be acquitted. In that regard, this representation wishes to point out that we are dealing with credible testimonies that should have been evaluated from the perspective of coherence and logic; since the Court assumes there is no coherence in their accounts and the prosecutorial request was not the correct one, a very subjective assessment” (see folio 491 recto and verso; the wording and spelling errors, including the improper use of capital letters, belong to the prosecutorial text itself). Generically (as it does not describe, concretely, any), it indicates that there are serious contradictions between what was narrated by the witnesses and what was interpreted by the court, and that the court limited itself to pointing out some supposed circumstances expressed by the witnesses. After other abstract statements, valid for any case, about the importance of reasoning, it ends by requesting the nullity of the decision. Likewise, Attorney Gloria Navas Montero, president of the “Movimiento Ciudadano C.R.” and legal representative (apoderada) of the natural persons who constitute it and appear as private prosecutors (querellantes), alleging a diffuse interest, anticipates that the essential petition is the annulment of the decision on the merits. As a first argument for this, she alludes to the lack of reasoning (ayuna fundamentación) and the erroneous factual assessment that led to the main proven fact. She says it is true that the defendant is the General Secretary of ANEP, a union leader, and on September 9, 2019, participated in a meeting “that is said to be private but which became known to the public opinion” (an underlined condition that she claims was not included as a proven fact, despite the fact that [Name 001]'s witnesses were at the meeting and it is evident to them that he addressed the public present where he uttered the expressions that were subject to the private prosecution and these became known to the public). It is also true, she adds, that the accused made statements before the meeting participants and the original video could not be located, but one was provided from the interview that, on account of that matter, she gave to Repretel where, in her opinion, it would be proven that the expressions occurred before a public exacerbated by the attitude of the leader and that they were reported to the affected and intimidated public. She says the charged crime does not distinguish whether the punishable act is committed in public or in private because the criminal offense is of public action and that, for this reason, the proven fact is incomplete, and this affects the reasoning and generates harm (gravamen), so the court's reasoning does not fully comply with the limits of due process (debido proceso). She adds that examining the declaration of Rubén Hernández Valle, as well as the one she herself gave, it is established that they felt affected by the statements of [Name 001] (which have not been denied by him or his unions) but that other people were also affected. They learned of this through the press, so the fact occurred and was transmitted to public opinion, which is the entity affected. She maintains that the defendant publicly indicated that he had indeed made them. She refers to what was narrated by Cesar López, a defense witness; she denies that what the accused said was an exchange of ideas and affirms that this witness acknowledged that the video circulated on CRHoy and various television media. She summarizes the testimony of Walter Quesada, who pointed out his participation in union movements that historically have produced great economic losses to the country and generated the disruption of education (entorpecimiento de la educación). The appellant says that in 2018 there was a strike of almost three months and that “this history has not produced amnesia in the population” (folio 501 verso) and that this is the modus operandi of the accused, an issue not assessed by the intervening judge. For this reason, the threat uttered became credible to groups that have supported these harmful movements for the national community. She complains that the judge discarded the overall interpretation and the principle of experience, which affected the assessment of the evidentiary material. She denies being in a political trial, as the accused says, and requests the nullity of the decision. When responding to the resources (recursos), the private defenders of the accused indicate that the offended parties refer to events from 2018 in which [Name 001] did not even participate; they use illegitimate evidence (a copy of a video not authorized for reproduction and whose capture would constitute a crime under articles 181 to 183 of the Criminal Code [Código Penal]) and attempt to artificially extend public incitement (instigación pública), to the detriment of legislative intent, to articles other than those contemplated as crimes in Title X of the “Criminal Procedural” Code (Código “Procesal Penal”) (sic) which were not attributed. They say the accusers' interpretation of the elements of this offense is general and extensive and they forget that there is the generic figure of incitement in article 46 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal); they violate —the defenders continue arguing— articles 25, 26 and 29 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) referring to freedoms of manifestation or expression, association, and assembly, as well as the principles of legality and criminality, all of which transgresses international standards (for which a copy of a constitutional challenge action is provided). They add that, through this avenue, prior censorship is exercised and freedom of expression is curtailed, which opens a window to criminal risk, especially when the person being criminalized is a defender of human rights, as the United Nations Rapporteurship classifies trade unionists. They affirm that public incitement (instigación pública) cannot be carried out in the private sphere and the private prosecutor's (querellante) assertion that the criminal offense does not distinguish such a thing is an illogical legal thought. They are surprised by the frivolity of the prosecutorial appeal brief and the “boilerplate” use of affirmations and add that a case file should never have been opened for this fact because “it is embarrassing” (folio 532 verso) when the judgment states that the video provided did not meet the minimum requirements to be analyzed because it was not the original and that, despite this, the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) continues with this “judicial parade” (ibídem), which is not a minor matter because it costs taxpayer money that should be used for other things. They insist that the video is illicit evidence and everything derived from it is also illicit, so the private prosecutor (querellante) Navas cannot revive it by incorporating other media outlets that reproduce it, and therefore, whether the site is public or private is irrelevant. They add that the statements merely rely on the video, and are not from eyewitnesses. They maintain that the judgment is well reasoned. In the hearing held, Attorney Carlos Meléndez, prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), requested that his appeal be accepted and a retrial ordered, reiterating the arguments presented in writing. Attorney Navas Montero, as private prosecutor (querellante), expanded her appeal indicating she was filing it both personally —as a Costa Rican citizen by popular action— and in her capacity as judicial representative (apoderada judicial) of the persons grouped under the name “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” and that she did so for three reasons: a rupture in the rules of sound criticism in the assessment of the evidence; an erroneous interpretation of article 280 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal) by declaring that the act was not criminal and in ordering her represented party to pay costs (aspect on which she centers another independent grievance). Regarding the first two aspects, she highlighted that this is a crime of endangerment (delito de peligro) and not of result (a relevant issue to associate with the order of costs) and that the interpretation that the phrase was uttered in private is a first error, because it was in the context of a strike, with scandal, obstruction of roads, disruption of hospital and public transport services, all of which generated chaos and the public interest was at stake. The video in which the defendant speaks at the intersectoral meeting is reproached for not being provided in its original, but she intervened as a witness for the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) and there is freedom of proof. She considers it erroneous to indicate that this crime cannot be applied to criminal offenses that protect the same legal interest, even if found in other sections of the Criminal Code (Código Penal). Attorney Rodrigo Rosales, criminal defense counsel for the defendant, stated that none of the appellants provided arguments to dismantle what was set out in the judgment, but rather it is based on an “author-based criminal law (derecho penal de autor) that would make Günther Jakobs die again” (sic). He points out that the intent is to use illicit evidence for a double reason: his client was at an activity and in a private venue and a video of him was leaked without his consent or approval which, as if that were not enough, was edited. Attorney Carlos García indicated that the accusing parties moved from “public incitement” to “common incitement”; that article 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) was violated because the primary evidence was obtained through a crime referring to the violation of correspondence. The defendant, at the end of the hearing, indicated that he is a son and heir of the values of 1949 with the preamble of the guarantees of the 1940s, he has 30 years in the social struggle at the head of ANEP and he has never done it by aspiring to public office, but rather he has had the approval of committees of people who have considered that he is important for the social cause, so he did not endanger public order (tranquilidad pública) but rather this highlights the growing social inequality generated by the deployed economic policies. He indicates that his organization is a reference for social groups of different natures that do not receive a response from political parties. In a private, multi-sector social meeting, to draft proposals and outline a strategy of struggle against the government, which has totally excluded them, many people infiltrate. He says he has no ideology, nor does ANEP possess one, but rather the aim is to delegitimize, and his only flag is human rights, to the point that he finds himself in the dock of the accused for defending them. He refers to Advisory Opinion OC27/21 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) regarding trade union freedom, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, which are also human rights. He says that Mrs. Gloria is an elected deputy of the Republic and that he offered her a hearing as soon as she took office, but he is already asking her to return the right to strike to the people, as it is not a simple reference but a judgment from an international court that is being breached. He adds that he was at a private event and a leak occurred without his consent, which was distorted due to the annoyance some media outlets have against him. He notes that the country went back 50 years in social development, that at that time there was agitation and social movements and that will continue with or without [Name 001], with or without ANEP, in the face of hunger and high wage indebtedness. He says ANEP is a reference for social aid, for free labor rights defense, for which corporate unionism was broken, so rather than affecting public order (tranquilidad pública), it seeks to consolidate it and that they are the ones who endangered that value. The arguments are related and will be addressed jointly, rejecting them. As can be seen, the parties intermingle procedural issues with matters of substantive law and the configuration of the criminal offense. The latter, which are also mentioned in other pleadings to be summarized later, will be addressed, therefore, in other sections (to which the parties are referred to avoid unnecessary repetitions), to maintain a logical order of exposition, limiting this first section to issues related to the validity and assessment of the evidence and the reasoning of the decision. However, no reference will be made to the principle of correlation between accusation and sentence, mentioned by the appealing prosecutor, since its affectation is not verified, as not only were the facts of the accusations not proven (and that principle, which protects the right of defense, seeks to ensure that a conviction is based on what was accused), but the aforementioned prosecutor merely throws a phrase on that subject into the air, without giving it any content, which demonstrates more the use of a pre-established and uncorrected form than a real defect in the decision. It is also appropriate to warn, from now, that in a democratic country truly respectful of the rights of all persons, anyone can be brought to court for acts that a person considers harmful to their rights or interests, because this is part of the human right of access to justice, without the fact of subjecting someone to a process (of whatever nature and whatever its result) being considered a political trial because, to date, there (still) exists a judicial independence which, although with weaknesses and areas of opportunity for improvement, continues to function and will determine whether what was attributed is acceptable or not and, in either case, establish the corresponding responsibilities. A political trial is, in the strict sense and in some political systems, one deployed by Parliaments to establish political (not legal) responsibilities of a high public official (a condition the accused does not have and a process not available in the country) or, in a broad sense or latu sensu (which seems to be the one used by the defendant), it is one raised to dismantle an opposition using co-opted judicial channels, but for this classification to be valid, not only the motivation of the plaintiff party is required, but also the absolute control of the judicial or jurisdictional apparatus, which, in this case, is not proven to exist since the lower court judgment rejected the parties' claims and this chamber assumes, with all rigor, its independent role. Therefore, from the outset, such labels are rejected, as they derive more from subjectivisms or emotions than from analysis, which this court does not validate. Likewise, it is necessary to point out to Attorney Rosales not only that the German author Günther Jakobs (1937-…) has not died (so he could not die again) but that this academic has, rather, been the one who devised the ideological foundations of “criminal law of the enemy” (derecho penal del enemigo), which is the closest thing to author-based criminal law (derecho penal de autor), hence this current, far from being adverse to him, is akin to him, so no criticism could be made from the theoretical position he follows to the expressions cited by the defendant's lawyers. Having made these clarifications, in order to have an express contextual framework to refer to the evidentiary and reasoning issue, it is convenient, furthermore, to make a quick recount of what happened in the process, as well as to elaborate a summary of the judgment —issued in writing by a single-judge court— which consists of 42 pages (located at folios 460 to 482 of the main file): (A) Summary of what happened in the process. i. This matter began with a complaint dated September 13, 2019, filed by the subsequent private prosecutor (querellante) Gloria Navas Montero, representing the “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica,” under whose name 82 natural persons are grouped, 81 of whom granted special judicial power to Attorney Navas, who also acted in her personal capacity. All of them, together with the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) and the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), charged [Name 001]. ii. The three accusations have in common the attribution to the defendant of the crime of public incitement (instigación pública) for events that occurred on September 9, 2019, when [Name 001], as secretary of ANEP, in a meeting of the “Movimiento Encuentro Social Multisectorial” held in the auditorium of the Costa Rican Episcopal Conference (Conferencia Episcopal Costarricense), allegedly called for a national strike, lasting one or two days, in which borders would be closed and there would be a blockade of Routes No. 2 (Alto de Ochomogo), No. 27 (San José-Caldera), and No. 32 (San José-Limón), without any of this occurring or, at least, being discussed and proven at trial. However, the private prosecution complaint (querella) of the self-styled “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” includes, as already mentioned, these other factual references not included in the other accusations, namely: «Sixth (…) These tactics were specifically used in events already consummated in 2018, actions that have not prescribed. We refer to the paralysis of essential services starting from June 2018. The entire population suffered and the leader, supported by directed groups and in the company of others, sowed chaos in education, in hospitals, in transport, and in many other public services. Vehicular traffic was interrupted and the population affected by fear and confusion. This occurred in the capital city and in other areas of the country. We reiterate, it is a public and well-known fact (…) Eighth: We equally prosecute the fact consummated on September 3, 2019, outside the Legislative Assembly in the afternoon, when the journalist from La Nación [Name 004] was attacked by the mob at the clear instigation of the defendant. He not only provoked aggression with his intervention, but he interrupted the exercise of journalism and denied the right to information to the citizenry, a fundamental right. The fact was recorded (sic) in the information media and in the same interview conducted with the defendant on Repretel in the midday edition of September 13, 2019.» (The wording is from the original, bold text is supplied). The foregoing was part of what was summarized in the findings of fact (resultandos) of the appealed judgment. However, if the private prosecution complaint (querella) itself is observed (which was admitted in its entirety in the order to open trial), it contained other facts, namely: «3. In recent times, as demonstrated by public and well-known facts, said gentleman has exceeded himself in his speeches, actions, and decisions to the point that he has not only illegitimately abused his right to free speech, but his conduct transgresses the law and other fundamental guarantees of the citizenry, which chooses to manifest itself not with violence or coercion, but with the appropriate instruments of the Rule of Law. 4. Said gentleman, with his speeches and actions, has attempted to destabilize the constitutional order by inciting violence and the exercise of groups that wilfully disturb the free transit of citizens, young students, children heading to their educational centers, and many workers who must report punctually to their jobs. Even a few days ago, with his speech, he caused persons directed by his negative targeted expressions and improper actions to physically attack a member of the press who was trying to carry out his work. 5. A few days ago, before an alleged strike called by medical and related profession unions, he incited the masses to react and deny the provision of essential services such as health, endangering the life of many due to the massive cancellation of appointments and scheduled surgeries. The delivery of medications was denied, all in evident affront and breach of fundamental human rights. This has been recorded by the press and other information media. These are public and well-known facts. (…) 7. We formally prosecute said gentleman because he has attempted to move his followers and other union movements, as he stated, towards citizen and governmental extortive offense with the consummation of a national strike lasting 24 to 48 hours from border to border.» (Also appearing there are points described as 1 and 2, which are omitted in the previous transcription as they contain the defendant's identification and the time relative to his union activity, issues that are not of accusation per se but merely descriptive; bold text is added). In this latter private prosecution brief (escrito de acusación particular), other legal classifications are added, such as obstruction of public road (obstrucción en la vía pública) and rioting as an instigator (see respective private prosecution file [legajo de querella]). iii. The private prosecution complaint (querella) of Attorney Navas and the remaining 81 persons was filed on October 23, 2019, and admitted on that same date. After the prosecutorial accusation was filed, in August 2020, it was communicated to the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), which filed its own private prosecution complaint (querella) (see private prosecution file [legajo de querella] and transfer of the accusation at folio 161 of the main file). iv. A compensatory civil action (acción civil resarcitoria) was also filed only by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), which claimed social damages in the sum of one million colones, a claim it maintained throughout the entire process (see private prosecution file [legajo de querella] of this procedural party at folio 2, civil action file [legajo de acción civil] folio 1, and closing arguments at folio 458).

v. At trial, four witnesses were received: the first two were members of the “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” (Rubén Hernández Valle, Gloria Navas Montero), who were not present at the meeting but learned of it through the media, and the other two were provided by the defense (César López Dávila and Walter Quesada Hernández), who, although they attended the meeting, could not recall the exact terms in which the accused expressed himself; the statement of the indictee was taken (who alluded to the context of his speech without accepting that he had said those phrases), and the following was admitted as documentary evidence: the complaints and their attached documentation from folios 1 to 17, 124 to 129, and 130 to 134; a petition with signatures from various individuals from folios 18 to 119; the seizure record and what is described therein, number 0064696 from folio 141; the O.I.J. reports, one from the On-Site Inspections Section number 1816-DC-SIOERI-2019 on folio 148 and its verso, and another from the Miscellaneous Crimes Section number 059-DVDC-2020 on folios 154 and 155; the judgment history certification from folio 251; and, as material evidence, a gold-colored DVD-R disc with the legend 19-647-619-PE; a silver-colored Maxell DVD+R disc with the legend “video [Name 001]”; a silver-colored Maxell DVD-R disc with the legend “firmas de los ciudadanos”; and a white “Transcend” 4GB USB device; vi. In the proven facts of the judgment, the following were established: the accused’s status as a union leader, his participation in a private national-level meeting held on the day and at the place charged (September 9, 2019, in the auditorium of the Conferencia Episcopal de San José within the framework of the “Movimiento de Encuentro Social Multisectorial” group), and the fact that, without him authorizing the capture of his voice or image, he was filmed while making his points to the attendees, without the original video being located. It was also demonstrated that the indictee has no criminal record. vii. The probative and legal intellectual analysis was jointly set forth in Considerando III (pages 30 to 40 of the judgment), where the following are cited as reasons for the criminal acquittal of the accused: a) the charged acts do not fit the elements of the attributed crime (public instigation, instigación pública) or any other; b) although this is not a political trial, as the accused says, it is regrettable that the parties did not analyze the evidence, not even the documentary evidence, and digressed onto facts unrelated to the thema probandum, such as the 2018 national strike movement, about which they had not questioned him to link the accused to it; c) the parties did not analyze how the video was obtained; rather, the prosecuting entity merely mentioned that it was dealing with an abstract-danger crime (which the judge accepts as valid) but without referring to the evidentiary basis for its proof, given that there is a police report (059-DVDC-2020) stating that the original video was never seized, making it impossible to determine whether the one published by the media and viewed in the courtroom had been edited or not; d) the video provided by a complainant (gold-colored DVD-R with the legend 19-647-619-PE) shows a cut at the 18th second and is not, as stated in the accusations, the original video, but rather “…a Repretel video where Mrs. Gloria Navas is interviewed, which denotes that the parties arrived at trial without an adequate handling of the evidence” (page 32 of the judgment). Furthermore, the silver-colored Maxell DVD-R disc with the legend “video [Name 001]” was a copy, shows a modification date of September 12, 2019, and «…for the purpose of analyzing its authenticity, as stated on folio 147, it was necessary to have the original video, and therefore, through a prosecutorial request to the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, as stated on folio 148, the seizure of the original video containing the accused’s statements was ordered. These proceedings were carried out through the report of the Miscellaneous Crimes Section No. 059-DVDC-2020, which appears on folios 154 and 155, which is duly admitted evidence, and which, regarding the relevant proceeding, indicates: "CRhoy responded that they were unable to find original videos of their journalists' recordings." As a result, the original video could never be analyzed to determine not only the veracity of the copy provided as evidence but also the conditions under which it was obtained, since by determining who the journalist or correspondent who recorded it was, they could have been interviewed and offered as a witness to determine if there was free press access to that meeting and/or consent for those statements to be captured. In that sense, then, not only would the public nature of the statements be proven, but also the defendant's knowledge of such circumstance. However, at this moment, this is unknown, to the point that it cannot be ruled out that the crime of unlawful capture of verbal statements was committed.» (Cfr. judgment, pages 37-38); e) the state representative (the judgment does not specify which of the two it refers to, and both the Ministerio Público and the Procuraduría General de la República participate in that capacity) does not prove their assertion that the convened event was public; f) the fact that a video was shown in the media, without knowing who recorded it and without authorization to do so, does not confer public character upon the meeting; g) the accusers bear the burden of proof and did not demonstrate essential elements of the criminal offense; h) the only people among the meeting attendees who testified at trial, and the accused himself, said the event was private (this was accepted by the prosecutor in their closing arguments according to page 36 of the judgment). The statements would have been made in a private place (the latter qualified as an incontrovertible fact on page 36 of the judgment), and this was not disproven, because even though Navas indicated that farmers from San Carlos told her they attended, and the witness López Dávila affirmed that there were representatives of civil society, this does not confer public status on the meeting, especially since it took place in a private venue, and the accused said it had that character, and it was each union that determined the method for convening its representatives; i) it is unacceptable to reverse the burden of proof and assert that, since the defense witnesses said they did not know the details of the meeting’s convocation, it was therefore not private; j) the representative of the “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” stated that the accused was self-confessed because he had publicly accepted having said the charged expressions and that he would not back down, but she did not refer to the evidentiary elements from which this derived. For if he indeed accepted it in some other television interview, this was not offered into evidence, and on this point, only arguments were presented in the trial’s closing statements and not through witness interrogations or other formally admitted evidence. Moreover, at trial, the defendant rejected the charges; k) “…although the complainant, in the complaint she filed on October 23, 2019, indicated that as evidence, Repretel should be requested to provide the midday video from September 12 and 13, 2019, which respectively contain the interviews with Gloria Navas and [Name 001], a proper review of the evidentiary collection would have revealed that the only video ultimately seized from Noticias Repretel, pursuant to record No. 64696 on folio 138, was that of the interview with Mrs. Navas. This was because in her complaint - see folio 125 verso - she indicated that both interviews had occurred on September 12, 2019, and therefore, that was what was requested by the Ministerio Público according to folio 135. If the party believed that this was not the evidence required according to its accusatory theory, it could have raised this at the appropriate procedural moment, which did not happen, to the point that when the submitted videos were reproduced, she indicated that she missed the video in question without providing further details…” (cfr. judgment, folio 477); l) the prosecution witnesses (Hernández and Navas) were not present at the event but learned of the facts through the dissemination of the video by the media; from the information they provide, it cannot be inferred that the event was public; m) the crime of public instigation (instigación pública) is not established, says the trial court, because this crime, provided for in section 280 of the Código Penal and punishable by six months to four years in prison, does not refer to just any crime, but to one that affects public tranquility (tranquilidad pública), a classification that this criminal offense also holds (in Title X “Delitos contra la tranquilidad pública”) along with others such as unlawful association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation, and apology for crime. However, the accusers did not attribute any of these to the accused, but rather those of disruption of public services (entorpecimiento de servicios públicos) and obstruction of the public thoroughfare (obstrucción de la vía pública), which are located in Title IX “Delitos contra la seguridad común”; n) the fact that an event generates collective alarm, chaos, or concern (as the accusers alleged) —the trial judge continues— does not mean that public tranquility (tranquilidad pública) is affected for the purposes of establishing the criminal offense, because there is a specific title in the Código Penal that establishes which crimes have public tranquility (tranquilidad pública) as the legally protected interest. Not interpreting it this way would be to make an expansive interpretation and fall into the excesses incurred by the state attorney when she said that even a robbery affects public tranquility, which violates article 2 of the Código Penal; ñ) in Costa Rica, the criminal offense of public instigation (instigación pública) is more restricted than in other legislations, such as those of Colombia and Argentina (which are transcribed in the appealed judgment), where the criminal offense does not limit the commission of the illicit act to the affectation of a specific legal interest, as indeed happens in our system; o) the crimes of obstruction of the public thoroughfare (obstrucción de la vía pública) and disruption of public services (entorpecimiento de servicios públicos) do admit instigation, but through the generic figure of article 46 of the Código Penal. However, had it been considered that [Name 001] participated as an instigator of those crimes, the drafting of the accusations would have had to be different. First, because the acts would have had to have been perpetrated; second, because it was necessary to individualize their authors in order to establish that it was the accused who determined them to commit the punishable acts. The judge establishes the difference between both figures in that generic instigation requires determining the will of a specific person, while public instigation (instigación pública), due to its characteristic of publicity, refers to determining the will of a mass or indeterminate subjects. Therefore, she continues (relying on references to Manzini and Quisbert), publicity, in Costa Rica, is part of the criminal intent (dolo). None of this was proven in the specific case, the judge concludes, since there were no subsequent acts to those words involving the materialization of those blockades; p) neither was the seriousness of the instigation proven, as this implies inducing or moving the spirit towards crime, not simply expressing an idea, proposing, or advising. Starting from the accusation that he said, "creo que la tesis de paro nacional es correcta, hay que proponer un gran paro nacional, pero de verdad, no de pasarela, cerrar las fronteras, cerrar la 27, cerrar la 32, cerrar Ochomogo...," this would not be instigation but a proposal within the framework of a social protest speech, since it does not indicate how and when the proposals would be carried out. Hernández Valle alluded to the fact that no one heeded those words, which denotes the lack of seriousness; q) With doctrinal citations that, in turn, refer to Argentine jurisprudence, mention is made that similar cases are protected by freedom of thought and expression, constitutional guarantees. viii. The civil action for damages filed by the State, represented by the Procuraduría General de la República, was rejected in Considerando IV (a paragraph on page 40 of the judgment) because subjective responsibility was attributed, and since it was not proven that the accused committed the acts, there was no causal link. ix. The ruling included an award of costs against the losing parties, both in criminal and civil matters (Considerando V, pages 41-42), as it was deemed there was no plausible reason to litigate given the evidence provided and the stated lack of criminal nature (atipicidad); the complaints were based on evidence different from that offered and admitted, and its pertinence or erroneous nature was not verified until the trial was reached. (B) Approach to the complaints. First, the prosecution declarants (Navas and Hernández), in effect, were not eyewitnesses; they were not at the meeting where the questioned opinions were allegedly expressed, according to the accusation, and, therefore, nothing they provide allows one to unravel the manner in which the audiovisual material was obtained, nor the characteristic of the meeting, that is, whether it was public or private, and much less the content of what was discussed there, which they learned about through the media. Now, in a criminal proceeding, the obligation to demonstrate all the constitutive elements of a crime (action, typicity, unlawfulness, and culpability) falls upon those who accuse, and not upon the person accused of the infraction. To consider it otherwise would be to reverse the burden of proof and violate the state of innocence guaranteed constitutionally (article 39 of the Constitución Política) and conventionally (articles 8.2 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos —hereinafter CADH— and 14.2 of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, among others). From the state of innocence (formerly poorly termed presumption) derives the principle that, in case of doubt regarding factual circumstances, one must abide by what is most favorable to the accused person (article 9 of the Código Procesal Penal). For this reason, if the accusing parties did not provide evidentiary elements related to the nature of the meeting, that is, whether it was public or private, but rather the evidence presented at trial showed, instead, that it took place in a private venue and was restricted in nature to representatives of various social movements, a topic also mentioned by the accused, the appellants err in considering that the absence of evidence on this point should affect the indictee. On the contrary, one must abide by what is most favorable to him, that is, that the meeting was private (since, as will be developed further below, this involves constitutional and conventional guarantees with additional requirements), an aspect also mentioned by the witness Juan López Dávila (“I remember an event in which I participated in September 2019. Yes, I remember it precisely because of everything that happened later. It was a closed-door discussion (conversatorio a puerta cerrada) held in the auditorium of the Conferencia Episcopal on Calle 20. That is a private activity, it was not a demonstration, a discussion for the exchange of ideas, which is usually held from time to time, especially when there are public policies affecting workers. It was a meeting of several union groups and various civil society groups, a multi-sectoral meeting. That is the auditorium of the Conferencia Episcopal, which rents it out for activities. Since it is a private activity, one looks for options in the market that meet capacity and sound requirements to hold them. Approximately 18-25 people may have spoken in the first round (…) the press media were not invited. It is a debate in the world of ideas; we are talking about social positions. No media outlet was invited; it was not a public activity. No one is wanted to feel challenged to respond due to what is called social desirability in social science. The filming or dissemination of the event was not authorized, to respect the privacy of the people who were there. I listened to most of the speeches (…). Among the people who spoke, Mr. [Name 001] (…) I do remember a video that circulated in various media outlets. I remember CRhoy and several television media. From the video, I remember it was recorded as if surreptitiously, as if from behind, in a corner; it is quite short. [Name 001]'s intervention used to be approximately five minutes. The video does not correspond to that. I remember seeing a cut; I cannot help but think it does not correspond to the totality of what was said, due to the cut and its duration. And many times, when participating, one has to refer to what people said three or four turns earlier; an extract of an intervention does not reveal the spirit of what was presented.” (Cfr. judgment, folios 467 verso and 468, emphasis supplied). This same point is accepted by attorney Navas in her own appeal, so no contradiction or erroneous assessment is observed in the decision to consider the meeting as private. Attorney Navas, however, criticizes that the proven facts did not state that, even though the act was “of a private nature (…) it transcended into public opinion” (cfr. folio 500, bold added). Now, on this particular topic, that is, regarding the dissemination to public opinion, the lower court’s judgment could not have considered it proven because it was based on the thesis that the audiovisual material was illicit evidence and, therefore, so was everything deriving from that spurious source. The appealed resolution assumes this conclusion for two reasons: a) because the accused did not authorize the capture of his image and voice, and the recording, as the aforementioned witness López Dávila said, is seen to have been made surreptitiously, from the back of the room, and the meeting was private; and b) because although some videos were provided, these were manipulated (one cut and another edited), casting doubt on the chain of custody of the material and on whether what was captured there corresponded to what the accused intended to say and actually stated, as it could have been decontextualized. Both positions are derived, and they were reached respecting the rules of sound human understanding, without this court observing errors in the argumentation. Indeed, if there is no evidence whatsoever determining that the event was free and open to the public, then it must be considered private and, within this framework, protected by the right of assembly and the capture of individuals' voice and image encompassed by the right to privacy, both regulated in the Constitución Política (articles 24 and 26) as well as in international treaties (articles 11.2 and 15 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos and 17 and 21 of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos).

The same witness Rubén Hernández Valle, in his early legal texts, alluded to the importance of this determination: «…the meeting shall be private, even if held on a public-domain asset for general use (street, plaza, public monument, etc.), when, due to the manner in which it is conducted, only previously determined persons who generally know each other may participate in it (Example: meetings of members of an association […] group of tourists […] meetings of political party associations […]) Then, in contrast to meetings in a place open to the public, meetings whose participants are mutually known to each other, or are effectively able to know each other before or during the course of the meeting, are defined as private (…) Regarding public meetings, the main reason for their eventual dissolution is (…) Regarding private meetings, such powers must be denied, since this type of meeting is rather governed by the rules relating to the protection of the home and the freedom and secrecy of communications.» (Cfr. Hernández Valle, Rubén, 1980. Las libertades públicas en Costa Rica. Editorial Juricentro, pp. 141-142; emphasis added. In the same vein and from the same author and publisher: El derecho de la Constitución. Volumen II, 1993, page 521). For its part, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter I/A Court H.R.), when interpreting the CADH has indicated that «171. The right to protest or express disagreement with any state action or decision is protected by the right of assembly, enshrined in Article 15 of the American Convention (…) The possibility of demonstrating publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways of exercising the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be claimed. Therefore, the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and must not be interpreted restrictively (…) 174. (…) the Court recalls that the right of assembly is not an absolute right and may be subject to restrictions, provided that interferences are not abusive or arbitrary, therefore, they must be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim…» (I/A Court H.R. Caso Mujeres Víctimas de Tortura Sexual en Atenco Vs. México. Judgment of November 28, 2018; emphasis supplied). Part of the legal restrictions are given by the possibility of conducting searches (allanamientos) of domiciles and private premises (Articles 193 to 197 of the Código Procesal Penal) but, in this matter, there was no jurisdictional search order nor was one in the presence of the exceptions for conducting one without an order (there was no threat to the life or property of the attendees by fire, flood, or similar commotion; no unknown persons were seen entering with clear indications of committing illicit acts, no one pursued for a serious crime entered the site, nor were there voices within the place calling for help). Consequently, the persons in attendance were exercising a constitutional and conventional right of assembly, a framework in which other rights were also enhanced, such as the right to privacy which is also developed by law in the Código Civil (Article 47: “The photograph or image of a person may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, nor sold in any way except with their consent, unless the reproduction is justified by the notoriety of that person, the public office they hold, the needs of justice or law enforcement, or when such reproduction is related to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public. Images and photographs with stereotyped roles that reinforce discriminatory attitudes towards social sectors may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, nor sold in any way”; emphasis added) and in the Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones, numerals 1 and 9, which require judicial intervention for their infringement, none of which occurred in the present case. In fact, the right to privacy and the expression of demonstrations in private spaces is of such superior protection that, as the judge of merit rightly argued, the transgression of these provisions is sanctioned as a crime in numeral 198 of the Código Penal which states: «Indebida capture of verbal manifestations. Article 198.- Anyone who records, without their consent, the words of another or others, not intended for the public, or who, through technical procedures, listens to private manifestations not directed at them, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years, except as provided in the Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones. The same penalty shall be imposed on anyone who installs devices, instruments, or their parts, for the purpose of intercepting or impeding oral or written communications, whether they succeed or not in their purpose» (the bold text is substituted). This crime, although a matter of public prosecution and anyone, not necessarily the affected person, could report it (Articles 16 to 18 of the Código Procesal Penal), had it been judicially pursued earlier, would now be time-barred unless there were some cause for suspension (the meeting would have occurred on September 9, 2019, and the maximum sentence is three years, therefore, under normal circumstances, the action would have expired on September 9, 2022). However, this does not preclude considering that, since the conduct is criminalized, the capturing of the material under those circumstances for other purposes is unlawful. All this reasoning has found support in the same jurisprudence (binding erga omnes according to Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) of the Constitutional Chamber. For example, in judgment number 1026-94 it was stated that: "Numeral 24 of the Political Constitution enshrines the fundamental right to privacy. It is a protective forum for the private life of citizens. Privacy is formed by those phenomena, behaviors, data, and situations of a person that are normally withheld from the knowledge of strangers and whose knowledge by them can morally disturb the person by affecting their modesty and reserve, unless that same person consents to that knowledge. While it cannot but be considered that what happens inside a citizen's home is private life, what happens in offices, friends' homes, and other private premises may also be within that sphere. In this way, the constitutional rights of inviolability of the domicile, private documents, and communications exist to protect said privacy, which is an essential right of every individual…" (bold type added) and also in number 6776-94, where the constitutional court indicated the following: “The right to privacy has a positive content that manifests itself in multiple ways, such as, for example: the right to one's image, to domicile, and to correspondence. For this Chamber, the right to private life can be defined as the sphere into which no one may intrude. The freedom of private life is the recognition of a zone of activity that is proper to each person, and the right to privacy limits the intervention of other persons or public authorities in the private life of the person; this limitation can manifest itself in the observation and capture of images and documents in general, as well as in the listening to or recording of private conversations and in the subsequent dissemination or disclosure of what was captured or obtained without the consent of the affected person…” (emphasis supplied). If, despite all of the above, someone captured the voice and image of the accused in a private meeting, without their consent and without the legal exceptions applying, and after doing so disseminated them, the only conclusion that could be reached (if we are speaking of legal reasoning) is that the material provided was unlawful, pursuant to the provisions of Article 181 of the Código Procesal Penal, second paragraph, which provides: “Information obtained through (…) deceit, undue intrusion into the privacy of the home, correspondence, communications (…) nor information obtained by any other means that diminishes the will or violates the fundamental rights of persons may not be used” (emphasis added). If the video was unlawful, as indeed it has been (since it was captured in a private meeting and the accused did not authorize the dissemination of his image and voice), what Navas and Hernández or any other witness said regarding its content could not be analyzed, as this falls under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, which also affects these references. Recall that, according to this theoretical position, not only the evidentiary references derived directly from the violation of fundamental rights are null (as would be, in this case, the recording of the video), but also all those indirect ones (such as witnesses' reference to the content of the video), unless there is an independent source or an inevitable discovery (among other exceptions, only these are accepted in our legal system), none of which has even been discussed and, much less, had evidentiary support. Otherwise, it would be very easy to violate the fundamental rights of persons, discard the main document or evidence, and give validity to the testimonies that have examined its illicit content, a practice undoubtedly harmful in a State governed by the Rule of Law. Moreover, even if the audiovisual material were lawful—which it has already been stated it is not, and this is only alluded to in an analytical-hypothetical manner—, the original document was also not provided as the police could not seize it, and those delivered have evident cuts and dates different from the one on which the events occurred, which are indications of its manipulation. It must be remembered that the chain of custody (cadena de custodia) refers to the process by which it is guaranteed that a specific material element seized at the scene where the event occurred is the same one that is examined by experts or reaches the trial, the purpose of which is to guarantee the purity and the eventual evidentiary value, direct or circumstantial, that it may have. This institute also applies to digital and videographic evidence, characterized by its volatility and ease of manipulation, hence the need to preserve that there is identity between what was seized and what is exhibited in debate and that this has not been modified. The steps comprising the chain of custody that require safeguarding have been addressed both by constitutional jurisprudence (binding under Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (also binding as provided in numeral 62 of the CADH and by references of the I/A Court H.R. itself, among others, in the vote Almonacid Arellano y otros Vs. Chile, judgment of September 26, 2006). In the first instance, in judgment number 5831-96, it was indicated that: "II. Respect for the chain of custody in the collection of evidence can be analyzed from two different dimensions. From a strictly evidentiary point of view, the evidence will have greater efficacy if it is indeed demonstrated that it has been handled correctly from its discovery at the crime scene or at the site where it was found until its effective introduction into the proceedings. The discovery, lifting, fixation, collection, transfer, and custody of evidence (evidencias) or material elements that serve as proof of the criminal act require special technical capacity, so they are often entrusted to qualified judicial police personnel, in order not to alter or contaminate the evidence with external factors, and if applicable, to maintain its purity for the purposes of deeper analysis, be it chemical, physical, or of any nature. This operation is generally supported in multiple ways: by close-up photographs, identification and general location of objects, videos, reports, and the respective packaging or securing of the same. Any defect or omission in this procedure eventually weakens the purity of the collected evidentiary element, including with respect to its correct location at the scene or the way in which it is linked to the criminal responsibility of the accused. In turn, the chain of custody can refer to aspects pertaining exclusively to the legality of the evidence, that is, whether it was collected by subjects with the competence to do so, whether the procedural formalities provided for this were fulfilled—the existence of a reasoned judicial resolution, for example, in cases of searches (allanamientos); preparation of the respective report with the presence of instrumental witnesses, etc.—, whether the respective receipts exist in the different units through which the evidence (prueba) or material evidence (evidencia material) has been transferred, with an indication of the time, nature, weight, and quantity of the objects, so that the legal trail of the evidence may be followed—procedurally speaking—in order to be validly incorporated into the process. III. The first of the indicated dimensions of the chain of custody refers to the assessment of evidence. The appreciation of respect for the minimum security standards in the collection of evidence is an integral part of the rules of sound criticism, and therefore, their non-observance or erroneous appreciation violates due process. Regarding the legality of the production and introduction of that evidence into the process, due process is affected, since every accused has the right to be judged based on legally valid evidence. It shall correspond to the requesting Chamber to determine if, in the specific case, defects in the chain of custody in the two indicated spheres occurred, and their impact on the judgment challenged by the appellant." (Bold type added). Likewise, in vote number 6469-99 of said chamber it was added: "(…) the relevance of defects in the chain of custody depends absolutely on the relevance of the evidentiary element of which it forms part, so that only (sic) it will constitute an infringement of the right to due process when it has occurred within the procedure for the production of evidentiary elements essential for proving the attributed act, in the sense that the absence of that evidence makes it impossible to attribute the act to the accused. It then corresponds to the requesting Chamber to establish whether the conditions just set forth exist in the specific case, for if so, and the chain of custody of the evidence had really been violated, due process would have been violated in the base case of the query being answered." (Emphasis added). Finally, the I/A Court H.R. has stated: “193. Furthermore, due diligence in an investigation (…) requires the maintenance of the chain of custody of all forensic evidence (elemento de prueba forense). This consists of keeping an accurate written record, supplemented, as appropriate, by photographs and other graphic elements to document the history of the evidentiary element as it passes through the hands of various investigators assigned to the case.” Caso Veliz Franco y otros vs. Guatemala. Judgment of May 19, 2014 (emphasis added). So, it is clear that respect for the chain of custody forms part of a legal due process and its violation has consequences for the validity of the evidentiary element and its possibility of assessment. If in this case it is not possible to determine whether the provided video was cut, edited, or otherwise manipulated (since the original could not be seized) and there are indications that it was (a crude cut and a date in the file's properties that does not correspond to the events), this material could hardly be assessed, especially since, as stated, the capture was also unlawful. It was not up to the accused (or the union he represents) to allege the unlawfulness of this material, nor should anyone have had to do so for the legality of the evidence to be analyzed, for the burden of proof lies with the private accusers (querellantes) and both the prosecutorial entity (ente fiscal) and the court must ensure that the evidence received and supporting a decision is lawful (Articles 63, 175, 180, and 181, second paragraph, of the Código Procesal Penal), hence it is strange that the Public Prosecutor's Office disregarded its duty of objectivity. Note that the last article is imperative: “Information obtained through (…) deceit, undue intrusion into the privacy of the home, correspondence, communications (…) nor information obtained by any other means that diminishes the will or violates the fundamental rights of persons may not be used” (emphasis added). The provision is clear that no complaint is necessary (as the prosecutor argues), nor is it required for this to be alleged in order to so declare. Therefore, as the original document was not presented, nor an expert one that would allow verification of the non-alteration of the delivered tape, its weighing was not appropriate, especially due to the method of obtaining it already indicated. Note that, without prejudice to what will be elaborated in the following section regarding publicity as an element of the criminal offense, here the public or private nature of the site is relevant to determine not only an element of the offense but also the lawfulness of the capture and the evidentiary material (an aspect that all appellants overlook), and as the meeting was held in private places, where such authorization (for public entry or recording by media) was not enabled, the evidence becomes unlawful because the constitutional guarantee is the protection of private spaces and of the meetings and expressions that take place there. Neither is it true that some element was incorporated into the debate from which it can be inferred that there was an endorsement, consent, or acceptance by the accused regarding the creation or use of such recording, or from which it can be inferred that he acknowledged having made the statements, for he denied the charges and, throughout his extensive statements (both at trial and at the oral hearing before this court), he alluded to the prevailing socio-political context in the country and to union struggles (see folios 472 reverse to 475). None of the three accusers specifies what that evidence from which that statement would derive is, and this omission is explained by the fact that none was incorporated because, if there was any, it was not offered nor admitted, and, according to the legal aphorism, what is not in the proceedings is not in the world. Therefore, a judgment could hardly allude to unaccepted evidence, even if it existed (about which there are also doubts). But even if it were further accepted, again hypothetically for analytical purposes, that the videos provided were lawful and admissible and that the chain of custody was not violated in them, even so, it would not be possible to derive from them, evidentiarily, that the accused expressed statements with which he adapted his conduct to the typical provisions of the crime of public instigation. From the audiovisual document provided (it has already been said it was done illegally, but mentioned here hypothetically and subsidiarily) according to the instance judgment (which is not disputed by the appellants) the accused is only heard saying "I think the national strike thesis is correct, we must propose a great national strike, but a real one, not a showy one, close the borders, close the 27 [highway], close the 32 [highway], close Ochomogo..." and the video is cut short.

Therefore, it is unknown whether [Nombre 001] is proposing that position or, for example and without this being the only possibility, whether he is referring to something someone said, either to refute it later or to analyze it. None of this can be inferred from the abrupt cut in the recording, an edit that allows one to glean the objective of the person recording it (illicitly, it must be remembered) of ensuring that the recipients of the message were unaware of the communicative context. It is not for nothing that in linguistics and communication (and, therefore, in journalism) emphasis is placed on the need to know the communicative *contexts* (historical, cultural, and social; linguistic, situational) to give meaning to the *text*, as the latter is usually a *pretext* for variations in meaning from literalness (Cfr. Johnson Barella, Doris, 2005. [La literalidad en el uso de las citas directas en las noticias de la prensa regional navarra. Dos casos: Diario de Noticias y Diario de Navarra](https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/83560292.pdf). En: Revista Comunicación y sociedad, volumen XVIII, No. 2, págs 109-140 y López Pan, Fernando. *¿Realmente ha dicho eso? Algunas implicaciones éticas en el uso de citas directas en los textos periodísticos*. En [https://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/35259/1/%C2%BFRealmente%20ha%20dicho%20eso%20Algunas%20implicaciones%20%C3%A9ticas%20en%20el%20uso%20de%20las%20citas%20directas%20en%20los%20textos%20period%C3%ADsticos.pdf](https://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/35259/1/%C2%BFRealmente%20ha%20dicho%20eso%20Algunas%20implicaciones%20%C3%A9ticas%20en%20el%20uso%20de%20las%20citas%20directas%20en%20los%20textos%20period%C3%ADsticos.pdf)). The latter author warns: “*Linguistic research, especially that related to discourse analysis, shows how every quote—including the literal one—is a fiction of contexts, an intervention in which the quoter controls what is quoted and uses it within their own discursive strategy. And this does not allude to blatant manipulations where someone is made to say something they did not say or their phrases are intentionally betrayed*” (pág. 108). Specifically regarding the situational context, it is necessary to know the set of data accessible to the participants of a conversation that are extracted from the immediate physical environment. None of this is achieved by recording a video lasting a few seconds, cut off at its beginning and its end. Therefore, even starting from the hypothetical assumption that everything was legal (the recording, the videos, the custody, etc.), it cannot be concluded from that extract taken in such a manner that the accused was determining others to commit a crime, and since the witnesses for the prosecution, Navas and Hernández, limited themselves to reproducing what they heard in the media (which, in principle, as inferred from their statements, already had the cut made), their statements also contribute nothing to support the criminal commission being accused. It is not that the decision seeks to be based on court-assessed evidence, as the prosecutor says, but rather that it relies on lawful evidence, as is the obligation of every court, a character which not all of the evidence submitted possesses. The complainant Navas has insisted that the impact she and the witness Hernández Valle stated they felt from the events be analyzed, as well as the impact expressed by other persons who reported and filed complaints and granted her power to act (although they did not testify at trial). However, this is irrelevant because, even if it were hypothetically assumed (solely for analytical purposes) that such an impact occurred and was of great magnitude, it does not remedy the failure to demonstrate that it was the defendant who committed the act, since the evidence pointing to him is either unlawful (due to the manner of recording and the unreliability of what was reproduced) or does not allow for that imputation to be made in a reliable or credible manner, as previously discussed. Finally, although the parties alluded to other prior strike movements and the effects that, in their view, these generated as a *modus operandi*, they did not provide any probative material in this regard, making their statements mere allegations without evidentiary value. For all the foregoing reasons, these complaints must be rejected.

**III.-** For her part, **Attorney Margot Avellán Ruiz, legal representative of the State**, in her appeal, began by setting forth, as background, the facts on which the civil action for damages was based and a summary of what was decided in the appealed judgment. After that, she stipulates, as the **first ground for complaint**, the lack of reasoning of the decision due to disregard of the rules of sound judgment regarding decisive probative means or elements and the failure to apply substantive law, particularly Articles 280, 263, and 263 bis of the [Código Penal](http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=5027). She says the defendant was acquitted on the grounds that the facts are atypical and that there is no proof he committed a public instigation. She copies the content of the article and doctrinal references by author Carlos Creus ([Derecho Penal, part especial](https://www.academia.edu/33191444/Creus_Carlos_Derecho_Penal_Parte_Especial_Tomo_I), 1997, pág. 105) and affirms that, based on that author, there is no limitation regarding the crimes that can be considered instigated, provided that, for their configuration, they hold that condition, that is, of crimes, even when they are not strictly contained in the main repressive body. She adds that, to establish a restriction on the criminal types to be considered, it must be contained in the norm, and if it does not exist, the alternative application of all existing criminal types in criminal legislation in general is appropriate. She considers that another component of the cited criminal type relates to its consequences, since the illicit act is configured ‘*without it being necessary for the act to occur*,’ meaning that it is a crime of danger, that is, those in which the legislator has taken into account, to define the criminal type, the probability that the protected legal right may suffer harm derived from the conduct carried out by the author, without requiring proof or confirmation of its existence. She cites the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Criminal Sentencing of San José (R. Badilla, E. Montero y G. Mena), [number 2016-0235](https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-671572) and adds that, according to the Argentine author *supra* cited (págs. 106-107), it is a crime of simple activity, which requires, at least, that there be an instigated person, although, if the means is suitable, there can be an attempt, without the transcendence or possibility of this reaching an indeterminate plurality of persons being a requirement. For this reason, the appellant adds, it is not necessary for the crime to have been provoked, but simply for the exposure to risk of the legal right to occur: the criminal type is configured by the mere incitement. She alludes to the subjective aspect of the crime and to Creus's assertion (in the cited work, page 106) that something more than the simple will to instigate is required, since there must be the will for the instigated act to be effectively carried out. From there, she concludes, the knowledge that what is instigated is a crime is derived, and accidental or indeterminate statements are excluded. She says the trial court, in an unsustainable attempt to acquit the defendant, broke down the norm as if the content included the same elements that subsist in similar provisions of other Latin American legislations, transcribing criminal types from Colombia and Argentina and the doctrine supporting them, according to which publicity is a requirement, making instigation in a private setting impossible. The appellant affirms that if the transcription of foreign norms made in the judgment is observed, it is evident that they textually introduce, as part of the criminal type, that the instigation be "public" or carried out "publicly"; an indication that, although described in the epigraph of the national provision, is not specifically contained within the criminal type and cannot be supplied by interpretation, as this would be an evident and improper substitution of legislative work, for which a court is not empowered. On the other hand, she affirms that the prohibitive content also does not indicate that the instigated crime must be located in Title X of the [Código Penal](http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=5027), as the judgment held, but simply that the incited conduct be a crime and that it disturb public tranquility. Therefore, she concludes, the deciding court's interpretation exceeds what is permitted by the criminal type, transgressing its work and affecting that which corresponds to the Legislative Assembly. She maintains that what is sought with the crime is to protect citizens' right to order and collective tranquility, regardless of the means, since the article does not provide for it either, so it is sufficient that it is suitable for transmitting the message to at least one person whom one wishes to instigate, without the effective execution of the instigated illicit acts being essential, but only the exposure to danger of the protected legal right. In light of all the foregoing, she considers that the proven facts configure the crime of public instigation contained in provision 280 of the [Código Penal](http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=5027), since it was confirmed that [Nombre 001], in his capacity as Secretary of ANEP and being on September 9, 2019, at a meeting of the “Movimiento de Encuentro Social Multisectorial,” publicly instigated, through verbal statements, the persons present (mostly union members) to carry out illegal actions that included road closures (Route No. 27 between San José and Caldera, No. 32 between San José and Limón, and Route 2 over the Alto de Ochomogo in Cartago, a location where there is a Recope facility that supplies fuel to the entire country) and that he did so with full knowledge that such criminal actions could generate the disruption of public services and obstruction of public roads, conduct defined as crimes under Articles 263 and 263 bis of the current [Código Penal](http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=5027), thereby disturbing public tranquility, all of which had the purpose of forcing the Government to accede to union demands. She says that, at trial, as proof of the above, a video recorded while the defendant made those statements was reproduced, which was made known to the public through news media and thus, without needing further proof as the court intends, it can be considered that the defendant committed the crime. She affirms that, regardless of how the incitement was recorded, it was a suitable means, in person, before a group of people willing to listen to him. She notes that the defendant did not deny his participation in the events nor did he retract the words uttered at the recorded meeting, because, in interviews conducted with him by television media, he not only had a confessed and boastful attitude in this regard, but he never rejected having uttered them nor stated that the recording was made in violation of any of his rights. She says that not the slightest discomfort was evidenced on the part of the defendant regarding the publication of the video on the newscasts, which persists to this day, an attitude with which he ratifies and corroborates—the appealing government attorney continues—the criminal acts in the complaint. She adds that none of the issues concerning the publicity of the video or the violation of the defendant's privacy were raised, contested, or questioned by the defendant's counsel, so the material is legitimate and any argument regarding its inadmissibility would thus be remedied. Its veracity has not been questioned either, so it is not appropriate to allude to the "authenticity of the video" (as the judgment does) if it has not been refuted that the person observed in it or the words heard were not uttered by [Nombre 001]. She says there is no way to allege falsehood, since just by visual review—without any expertise on the subject—it is notorious that the subject filmed is the defendant and not a hint of distortion is perceived in the recording that would allow one to point out that manipulation of the observed images existed, circumstances that confirm the veracity of what was recorded. Nor has that image of the defendant been disproven, attacked, or rejected by the defense or by the defense witnesses, who, on the contrary, accept that he is the union leader accused here. She maintains that it is irrelevant to determine how the video was obtained (as the judgment holds) since its publicity is not part of the criminal type. She adds that, otherwise, “…*all those who make serious incitements to commit crimes could do so with impunity if it occurs within a private setting*.” She alludes to provision 47 of the [Código Civil](http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=15437) to establish that, although the prohibition on reproducing images without consent is established there, exceptions to this are the notoriety of the person, the public function they perform, the needs of justice or police in connection with an investigation, and that the recording relates to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public. She mentions and partially transcribes rulings such as those of the Constitutional Chamber numbers [2014-11715](https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-625236) and [2004-11154](https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-291619) regarding the limits on the right to one's image and says that to these must be added the rights of third parties, freedom of expression, and the public interest of news or information, as provided in Articles 28 and 29 of our [Constitución Política](https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=871). She concludes that, under these parameters, the validity of recording the image and voice of the accused via video finds solid normative grounding that dismisses any notion of illegality because [Nombre 001] has been considered a leader of the Costa Rican union movement for decades, has proactively intervened in strikes and work stoppages continuously and publicly, making his notoriety and national significance indisputable. Furthermore, he was participating in an act of public interest, given its social, political, and labor implications (it was not an event of a family or personal nature but markedly union-related, as the defense witnesses themselves admit); and finally, the person who made the recording was protected under the constitutional precept of freedom of expression that every citizen has regarding matters of national relevance, as that meeting was. She qualifies the video as “*absolutely authentic, legitimate, and valid for probative purposes*” and from it, she continues, the defendant’s incitement of a group of union members to carry out road closures, including the one adjacent to the facility of the Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo, from which fuel is distributed to almost the entire territory and whose obstruction would paralyze the country, including public services, is extracted. She says that since acts are accused and not legal classifications, “…*the Court should have analyzed* (…) *whether the demonstrated conduct fit the criminal type or any other it deemed appropriate; an exercise which, had it been carried out, would not have led to the acquittal being challenged today*” (folio 511 verso). In addition to the video, she narrates that the statements of Rubén Hernández Valle and Gloria Navas Montero (representative of a group of persons who filed a report and complaint in this case) were available, which evidenced not only the publicity of the video but also the feelings of fear and helplessness that overwhelmed the citizenry since what was stated by the defendant [Nombre 001] was published, as they projected a new disruption of public tranquility and the generation of consequences like those that affected Costa Rica with the strike movement that occurred in 2018, plunging the Costa Rican population into uncertainty and generating social harm to the detriment of the community. She insists that the criminal type, as it is written, and the evidence received, allowed for a conviction. She reiterates some previous statements and considers that it is not viable to point out, as the court did, that what was stated responds to the use of the constitutional right to free expression and that the crime exists even if the actions that were said were going to be taken were not executed. She asks that the judgment be declared void and "revoked," ordering a remand for a new one. In a **second section of the appeal by the complainant party represented by Attorney Navas**, reference is made to the typical nature of the act as the basis for the acquittal, and its annulment is requested because the criminal type was erroneously interpreted despite it being recognized that it is a crime of danger. She insists that, although the "original" video was not seized, what was broadcast by the mass media constituted a public fact based precisely on that video, from which it was possible to conclude that the act occurred. The interview with the appellant, conducted by Repretel, occurred precisely because of that video that had been made public, and the accused appeared the next day and admitted his statement, so the issue of who recorded it did not eliminate the commission of the act. What was reported and known by public opinion—she continues to point out—gave credibility to the existence of the act and the legitimacy of what was transmitted and disclosed. The event was known with the threats included, hence the conclusive reasoning incurred a flaw of illogicality. On the merits, she qualifies the interpretation of provision 280 of the [Código Penal](http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=5027) as erroneous when it holds that the crimes of disruption of public services and eventual obstruction of roads are excluded from integrating that criminal type, crimes which were mentioned as possible outcomes that could be added to the facts, without affecting the typical nature of the principal crime. She considers that events affecting public tranquility are not exclusively the other criminal figures contained in Title X of the [Código Penal](http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=5027). Public instigation is one of them and is independent of the others. It is not necessarily linked to the others. She requests the nullity of the decision. <span style="text-decoration:underline">When responding to the appeals</span>, in writing, the defendant's counsel requested the rejection of the challenge. They reiterate the criticisms outlined against the Public Ministry regarding the use of public resources and affirm that they did not succeed in reversing “*the dismissal of the video or the copies*” that was done in the judgment. <span style="text-decoration:underline">At the oral hearing held</span>, *Attorney Carlos Meléndez, prosecutor of the Public Ministry*, says it is an error to consider that the illicit act under discussion must be within the title of crimes against tranquility instead of simply affecting public tranquility. He mentions ruling number [495-2003 of the Third Chamber](https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-236231), where no types of crimes that must be instigated for this criminal type to be configured are specified, nor is its application to the disruption of services or obstruction of roads prevented. *Attorney Margot Avellán*, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, affirmed that it is a complete crime, although it is completed by others, and argues that in Argentina and Colombia, public instigation must be carried out in that manner, in public places, but not in Costa Rica; instead, that <span style="text-decoration:underline">reference</span> (“**public** instigation”) alludes to the concept of social peace or equilibrium of the citizenry, affected by the illicit act, and not the mode of commission. She adds that here it was not a matter of simple statements, but of promises, and that the defendant has not ruled out that the video was false; he even admitted on one channel that it did exist. **The arguments are connected, so they will be heard together and must be rejected.** Once again, the appellants mix procedural and substantive aspects. Regarding the evidentiary matters (lawfulness and assessment) and reasoning of the judgment, we must abide by what is indicated in the preceding recital to avoid unnecessary reiterations. That is, it was already explained why the procurement of the video was unlawful (private meeting, recording not authorized by the defendant; no guarantee of chain of custody and disregard of context); why references to it in testimonies were also unlawful (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, which extends not only to the primary source but also to those derived from it, such as the cited statements of persons who only refer to what they saw on that tape); and why the judgment was well-reasoned (by requiring lawful evidence, preventing the reversal of the burden of proof, and requiring proof, not mere statements, to derive affirmations to introduce into a trial). These aspects will not be elaborated on further now, but rather, it suffices to add to what has already been stated that the exceptions contemplated in provision 47 of the [Código Civil](http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=15437) do not apply (“*The photograph or image of a person may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, or sold in any way without their consent, **unless the reproduction is justified by the notoriety of that person, the public function they perform, the needs of justice or police, or when such reproduction relates to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public**. Images and photographs with stereotyped roles that reinforce discriminatory attitudes towards social sectors may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, or sold in any way*”; emphasis added). It is clear (for so it derives from the lack of proof in this matter) that [Nombre 001] is not a public official, nor were there prior needs of justice or police at the event where his voice and image were recorded in that meeting, so the only reference, among the norm's exceptions, that would fit with him is being notorious since, as a union leader in the country for several decades, he is a very well-known or easily perceived or noted person, which are the meanings of that word. However, the government attorney makes an erroneous reading of the article. First, it must be remembered that these are exceptions to a constitutional and human right, that is, of a higher rank, and as such, must be interpreted restrictively: «…*“public order” or the “common good” can in no way be invoked as a means to suppress a right guaranteed in the Convention or to denature it or deprive it of real content (see art. 29 of the Convention). Those concepts, insofar as they are invoked as grounds for limiting human rights, must be subject to an interpretation confined to the “just demands” of “a democratic society” that takes into account the balance between the different interests at stake and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the Convention*» [Cfr. I/A Court H.R. [La colegiación obligatoria de periodistas (arts.

13 and 19 American Convention on Human Rights)</span></a><span>. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985, para. 67]. Although the accused is a public figure, the cited provision requires that the reproduction not only be based on the type of person (as already stated) but also in consideration of the event, and therefore adds: “…</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">when such reproduction </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">is related to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> or that take place in public.” </span><span>It has already been stated above that the facts did not occur in a public place (or at least it was not proven that way) and were covered by other constitutional and conventional rights (of assembly, of expression), thus the final phrase is ruled out, and, being a private meeting, its content could not be accessed to verify</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\"> </span><span>whether it related to facts or events of public interest, as that would have been an invasion of the hard core of the constitutional right. That linkage could only be made when public acts occurred (if they did), which did not happen. Of course, all of this, as the prosecutor says, had to be linked to other constitutional and conventional rights such as freedom of expression (but also with the freedom of association and the right to strike stipulated in Article 8 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=44205&amp;nValor3=46578&amp;param2=1&amp;strTipM=TC&amp;lResultado=2&amp;strSim=simp\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known as the Protocol of San Salvador</span></a><span> ratified by Costa Rica through Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999), but not only those of third parties but also those of the very persons participating in the meeting, including the defendant, which the appellant curiously overlooks. To understand, as the representative of the State's legal body concerningly does, that the public apparatus can invade the sphere of privacy of persons based on what they express there would be to demolish all human rights and the historical achievements to contain power and foster a fascist state that, depending on what is done or said in private spaces, can disrespect any limit, which is not admissible. Again, let it be remembered that freedom of assembly forms part of a range of interrelated rights for the full enjoyment and exercise of civil and political rights which, in the particular case, also touch upon social rights such as freedom of association. In this sense, it is noted:</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\"> «…</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">given that both the Inter-American Court and Commission have appealed on various occasions to the decisions issued by other supervisory bodies for compliance with international human rights treaties to interpret the content of the rights protected by the Convention, we believe it is important on this occasion to make a succinct reference to some of </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the standards that, regarding the right of assembly, have been shaped by the doctrine elaborated on the matter by the ILO</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. Highlighting in this regard that, although the ILO regulations referring to freedom of association do not make express reference to the right to freedom of assembly in any of its conventions relating to freedom of association, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">its supervisory bodies have been tasked with generating a broad development of the doctrine relating to the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> in the labor sphere, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">assuming it as an intrinsic element of freedom of association</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. In the sense indicated, for example, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has emphasized that “freedom of assembly constitutes one of the essential elements of trade union rights.” Just as its Committee on Freedom of Association has added that the right of professional organizations to hold meetings on their premises to examine professional matters, without prior authorization </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">and without interference from the authorities constitutes a fundamental element of freedom of association and public authorities should refrain from any intervention that may limit this right or hinder its legal exercise, unless such exercise disrupts public order or poses a serious and imminent danger to its maintenance</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. The Committee on Freedom of Association has pointed out that freedom of assembly constitutes “a fundamental condition for the exercise of trade union rights,” and therefore governments “should refrain from any intervention equivalent to a prior authorization requirement, which limits the right to hold union meetings, or which prevents the legitimate exercise of this right.”</span><span>» [Cf.: Mujica. Javier. </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Article 15. Right of Assembly. Article 16. Freedom of Association</span><span>. In: Steiner, Christian and Uribe, Patricia (editors). </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/30237.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">American Convention on Human Rights</span></a><span>. Commentary. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, p. 363 et seq. Boldface added]. Consequently, it is worth reiterating that the privacy of the meeting and the right to privacy prevented the assessment of the evidence illicitly obtained through surreptitious recordings and in contravention of such rights. Now, it might be considered that those evidentiary issues were sufficient to support the acquittal and that, therefore, it is not necessary to delve into other substantive issues, but that is not the case. In these motives, the parties, when questioning the manner of interpreting the criminal offense, seek to introduce the element that publicity is not an element of this crime and, therefore, that, even if what the accused uttered were private statements, it would still constitute public incitement (instigación pública) and that could be accredited with the mere reference, direct or indirect, of those who were at the activity. They also seek to apply other criminal offenses (including the reference to common incitement (instigación común) to certain crimes, as described in the private complaint of Lic. Navas), so, then, what has already been said is not sufficient to rule on the complaints and one must delve into the substantive issue, as it is linked to the evidentiary elements that prove or not each of its contents. Therefore, the analysis will be carried out alluding, first, to the base crime charged (instigación pública), its constitutionality, form of configuration, its constituent elements and, therefore, the required evidence and then other possible classifications will be mentioned. Previously, it is necessary to set out a constitutional parameter and both a historical and legal-systematic context, without which, in the opinion of this chamber, a complete scrutiny is not possible. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">(A) Constitutionality of the criminal offense. </span><span>The constitutionality of the figure of instigación pública has been questioned on several occasions, although not all of them have resulted in a substantive ruling. Thus, through </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-242202\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">vote number 2003-5410</span></a><span> of June 25, 2003, an argument relating to the impact that this provision would have on the rights of freedom of expression and movement was rejected outright because the unconstitutionality had not been previously alleged in those processes. In this matter, the accused started from the same panorama and evidenced the conflict of constitutional and conventional rights at play, which is why —as indicated in the initial whereas clause (considerando)— he filed the unconstitutionality action number 21-024578-0007-CO against Article 280 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code (Código Penal)</span></a><span>. Although </span><span>the action was admitted and the respective edicts were published in judicial bulletins number 18 to 20 of dates January 28 to February 1, respectively, all of 2022, it was resolved through vote number 2023-00430 of January 11 of the current year, in which it was ordered: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">By majority, the unconstitutionality action is declared without merit. Judges Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado, and Garita Navarro give different reasons. Judge Cruz Castro dissents and considers that this action should be declared with merit and consequently, due to its content and its effects, Article 280 of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional</span><span>.» Despite the fact that on this date the full vote is not available (nor is it required to issue a ruling since the operative part has already been published, lifts the suspension of the norm, and does not evidence any unconstitutionality or conforming interpretation) such constitutional pronouncement (which was divided, denoting the plausibility of various theses at play) does not prevent this tribunal, as an ordinary interpreter, from carrying out the legality exercise referred to or from applying the hierarchy of sources and the hermeneutic rules specific to this matter. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">(B) National historical evolution of instigación pública. </span><span>The Latin American jurist and former judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, has been a pioneer, in criminal dogmatics, in proposing the application </span><a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y0YFtJgs3P8\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">of the principle of genealogical cleansing (principio de saneamiento genealógico)</span></a><span> as a method to unravel (and, consequently, understand and apply) the meaning of criminal norms. According to said author, only by going to the origin of a punitive provision is it possible to observe the contextual elements that were or were not present when the criminal offense was created and that, therefore, implicitly condition it. In this way, concludes the Argentine dogmatist, the principle of legality and the restrictive interpretation specific to this matter are better applied. The cited author states: «…</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">in historical criminal law, multiple rationalizations contrary to the republican principle, to ethics, to the rule of law, and to Human Rights are found, when they do not present aberrant arguments. Particular primary criminalizations arise at a certain historical moment and are enshrined by legislators who participate in a specific cultural and power context: the legislator who constructs a criminal offense, imagines a conflict and defines it, conditioned by collective representations, prejudices, ethical valuations, scientific knowledge, power factors, and the rationalizations of their particular historical and cultural moment. These conditioning factors mutate rapidly due to the effect of cultural dynamism, but the criminal offenses remain and, furthermore, are copied by other codes in countries that have nothing in common with the original context </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The criminal offenses contained therein are frequently dragged from one code to another, as the authors of the law draw from comparative criminal law. The dragging of offenses does not always respond to a contextual analysis of these, but, on the contrary, it is almost never considered, and therefore they frequently bring with them an original ideological burden that is scarcely compatible with the Rule of Law. This original ideological burden is the genealogy of the criminal offense, which is investigated through comparison (comparative criminal law) and history (original power context) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> The objective of the genealogical investigation of criminal offenses is to discover the drag components dangerous to the Rule of Law and to facilitate the purified interpretive work thereof. In </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">a criminal dogmatics that pursues a </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">precise political objective</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, an exegetical analysis of the text is not sufficient as a first step if it is not accompanied by the necessary tracing of its genealogy, which brings to light the components of the police state that it drags with it and that must be carefully neutralized in the construction</span><span>» (Cf. Zaffaroni, Eugenio Raúl; Slokar, Alejandro and Alagia, Alejandro. </span><a href=\"https://www.academia.edu/32234639/Zaffaroni_Eugenio_Raul_Derecho_Penal_Parte_General\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Law: General Part (Derecho Penal: Parte General)</span></a><span>. 2nd edition, pp. 138-139, boldface supplied). Costa Rican criminal dogmatics and regulations always have a </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">precise political objective</span><span> which is given by Article 1 of the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Political Constitution (Constitución Política)</span></a><span> which establishes: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Costa Rica is a democratic, free, independent, multiethnic, and pluricultural Republic.</span><span>” There, then, the interpretive lines of the entire legal system are defined. If it is understood that, when one speaks of a </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">republic</span><span> reference is made to the division of powers and the system of checks and balances designed by the constituent power within a branch of the State, it will be deduced that respect for these derivatives is essential when scrutinizing any norm. Furthermore, that republic must be </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">democratic,</span><span> that is, a system in which decisions are made by the majority of the community with the right to do so, but such decisions do not affect the rights and dignity of minorities. It is frequently forgotten that democracy is not only a political and life system of majorities, but that, as or more important than that, it is a system that must start from respect for the human dignity of each and every human being, hence the connection with respect for human rights (</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">all</span><span> the human rights of </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">all</span><span> persons at all times) are axiological criteria for normative exegesis. In this country, as defined by the National Constituent Assembly of 1949, the rule must be </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">freedom</span><span> and only by exception and through the existence of a formal law should penalization or repression occur. This fully links with the dogmatic definition of criminal law as a discontinuous order of illicit acts, with respect for the principle of </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">ultima ratio,</span><span> with the principle of harmfulness (principio de lesividad) in primary criminalization, and with the strict observance of the principle of legality and restrictive interpretation in punitive matters. That freedom is guaranteed by the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Political Constitution</span></a><span> and the international instruments on human rights signed and ratified by the country and has many facets: freedom of movement, expression, opinion, press and information, teaching, academic freedom, assembly, demonstration, association, unionization, commerce, enterprise, religion and worship, among others. Each primary criminalization that is made is an impairment of those rights and, therefore, must be done by formal law and interpreted restrictively. </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">Independence</span><span> alludes to the exercise of sovereignty and the public powers derived from it (such as the signing and approval of treaties) in accordance with the rules of the Rule of Law. That the nation is </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">multiethnic</span><span> and </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">pluricultural</span><span> (the latest additions to the cited provision) starts from recognizing the contribution that all ethnic groups [of more remote origin (such as the different indigenous ethnic groups existing in the territory at the time of the conquest; the Afro-descendant and Chinese community and the European culture, particularly Spanish and Italian) or more recent to our reality (such as the migrant populations from all countries, particularly from Central America, Colombia, and, more recently, Venezuela] give to the formation of our nation, where diverse cultural manifestations must coexist, all of which must be respected and must coexist. Therefore, </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">a criminal law committed to Article 1 of the Political Constitution cannot tolerate extensive interpretations to undermine public freedoms or promote their use by groups to attack minorities or disavow the exercise of the human rights of others or foster authoritarianism, abuse of power, etc.</span><span> It must be remembered that the normative definition of the country's theoretical political model was made in 1949 within the framework of the National Constituent Assembly, but the dogmatic development of criminal law has centuries of history, so it is understandable that criminal norms prior to that date (or that arise in other socio-political contexts) do not necessarily conform to the political objective to which all persons inhabiting the territory have adhered through the constitutional oath (Article 194 of the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Political Constitution</span></a><span>). Hence, genealogical (and restricted systematic) interpretation is essential to fulfill that mandate. Thus, by way of example, a criminal law issued in the 1940s or 50s of the last century that alludes to the concept of “key” cannot be interpreted under the current concept of key (which involves alphanumeric or biometric keys to open and enter certain virtual spaces that were recently developed thanks to the Technological Revolution) because, at the date the law was issued, the sociological concept of key (its genealogical origin) was limited to a physical, metallic device, so a broader interpretation would be extensive and violate the principle of legality. In the genealogy of that hypothetical criminal offense, the normative-cultural element “key” was much more circumscribed or limited than at present. The relevance of unraveling the origin of the figure under analysis is thus understood, in this case, of the crime of instigación pública contained in Article 280 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span> which stipulates: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Whoever incites another to commit a specific crime that affects public tranquility shall be punished with a penalty of six months to four years of imprisonment, without it being necessary for the act to be</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">produced.</span><span>” It is worth beginning by emphasizing that this provision has not varied its wording since it was enacted in the repressive legislation in force —the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span> known as “Código Padilla” in honor of the president of its drafting commission, Dr. Padilla Castro— on November 15, 1970 (according to Supplement No. 120 to La Gaceta No. 257, although it was in force until 1973). This fact is not minor because our country has been characterized by the opposite, that is, by legislative activism in punitive matters (the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span> has been amended by 70 laws to date, according to the Legal Information System of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), which have modified multiple provisions and some of these have been modified several times by different laws). Thus, the historical origin of the figure (which dates back at least to the year 1970) allows the punitive provision to be located in a different historical and normative context, as will be indicated later. The original article has changed its numbering as a result of subsequent additions and deletions to other crimes, since it formerly occupied article 271. However, although the crime has not undergone variations (neither in the conduct nor in the punitive amount) since its enactment in 1970, it does not mean that the criminal offense “emerged spontaneously” on that date, as it is known, firstly, that the current code has its source of “inspiration” in the </span><a href=\"https://perso.unifr.ch/derechopenal/assets/files/obrasportales/op_20110407_01.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Model Criminal Code for Latin America (Código Penal Tipo para América Latina)</span></a><span> and in the drafts prepared, respectively, by </span><a href=\"https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/288500753.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Luis Jiménez de Asúa</span></a><span> and by </span><a href=\"https://catalogosiidca.csuca.org/Record/UNANL.42208/Description\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Sebastián Soler for Guatemala</span></a><span> (as is acknowledged on pages 2 and 72 of the explanatory memorandum of the preliminary draft of the Criminal Code; folios 129 and 199 of legislative file 3986 held by the Department of Archive, Research and Procedure of the Legislative Assembly and consulted by this chamber. In the same sense: Antillón Montealegre, Walter. </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r17098.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal legislation in Costa Rica (La legislación penal en Costa Rica)</span></a><span>. Journal of Criminal Sciences of Costa Rica, p. 26 et seq and Romero Pérez, Jorge Enrique. </span><a href=\"https://www.boe.es/biblioteca_juridica/anuarios_derecho/abrir_pdf.php?id=ANU-P-1972-20042500458\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Some notes about the Criminal Code of Costa Rica (Algunas notas acerca del Código Penal de Costa Rica)</span></a><span>.). These sources of inspiration, in turn, collected provisions that emerged in various parts of the world. Secondly, the punitive compendium in commentary has not been the only one that Costa Rica has had, as it was preceded, in retrospective order, by the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/SCIJ/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=37382&amp;nValor3=83854&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal</span></a><span> and </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=33613&amp;nValor3=35446&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Police</span></a><span> Codes of 1941 (known as Códigos Guier), the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=35220&amp;nValor3=83785&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code of Costa Rica of 1924</span></a><span> (Second Código Astúa), the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=77202&amp;nValor3=0&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code of Costa Rica of 1918-1919</span></a><span> (First Código Astúa), the </span><a href=\"https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/185728\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code of 1880</span></a><span> (or Código Orozco), and the </span><a href=\"https://www.sinabi.go.cr/ver/biblioteca%20digital/libros%20completos/Codigo%20general%20de%20la%20Republica%20de%20Costa%20Rica/Codigo%20gen%20Rep%20Costa%20Rica%20I%20%201-120.pdf#.Y_vKf3bMIaY\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">General Code of the State of Costa Rica (Código General del Estado de Costa Rica)</span></a><span> of 1841 (or Código de Carrillo). In the explanatory memorandum of the preliminary draft of the current Criminal Code, made in 1970, regarding the special part it reads: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">It can be affirmed that </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">for almost half a century the special part of the Criminal Code of Costa Rica has been the same</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. Very slight variations were made in 1941, but the structure</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">, taken from the Argentine Criminal Code of 1922</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, criticized ad nauseam by some and defended by very few, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">remains intact</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. In the draft we follow the same order as the previous one, beginning with crimes against persons and ending with those relating to public faith. In general terms we follow the Soler Draft for Guatemala</span><span>” (Cf. legislative file 3986, folio 198) and for the section in which the criminal offense under commentary is inserted, it reads in the explanation of the reform: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Crimes against public tranquility. Articles 271 to 274. A large part of the crimes that in the </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">1924</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Code were included in a chapter called against public order, passed to the Police Code of 1941. The pruning was somewhat drastic, and therefore </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">we restore the crime of public intimidation (intimidación pública) to its logical place</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, which together with the apology of crime constitute acts of utmost gravity and transcendence. These two criminal acts together with those of instigación pública and association to commit crimes, which appear in our Criminal Code, we have rather called crimes against public tranquility and they form the four that make up this Title</span><span>” (Cf. legislative file 3986, folios 213-214). Therefore, it is clear that the criminal offense of instigación pública introduced in 1970 was collected without substantial modifications from preceding legislation, both internal and foreign.</span> For its part, the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=37382&amp;nValor3=39414&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">1941 Police Penal Code</span></a><span> in its </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Title VII: Crimes against public order</span><span> (which only comprised this crime and that of criminal association) stated: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Article 331.- Whoever </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">publicly instigates, through the press or otherwise, the commission of a specific crime against a person or institution</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, shall incur, by that fact alone, imprisonment of six months to four years</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">.” </span><span>(Emphasis supplied). It should be added that this normative body adopted an extensive concept of perpetration (perpetración) (meaning that all contributions of the subjects had equal value) since numeral 43 established: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Shall be sanctioned </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">as perpetrators</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> of the punishable act those who carried it out themselves; those who took part in the execution; those who contributed with aid or cooperation without which it could not have been executed or would have been notably hindered, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">or those who instigated, forced, or determined another</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> sufficiently to commit it.” </span><span>(Emphasis added). A similar situation was found in the</span><span> </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=35220&amp;nValor3=83785&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">1924 Criminal Code of Costa Rica</span></a><span> (Second Astúa Code) since the public instigation to commit crimes was provided for in article 428 (Sole Chapter of </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Title Eight: Crimes against public order</span><span>) in the following manner: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Public instigation to commit crimes. Whoever, through the </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">press or otherwise, publicly instigates</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> the commission of a specific crime, shall incur, by that fact alone, imprisonment in its first to second degrees, according to the importance of the threatened interests, the determining motive and means of instigation, the circumstances in which it is exercised, and the danger it is capable of creating.// The penalty may be applied with a reduction of one degree, when the instigation in none of those respects should be considered serious, in the court's judgment.// If the instigation takes effect, the instigator shall be punished as a co-perpetrator (coautor) of the crime committed, and if it was done through the press, the provisions of article 31 shall apply.</span><span>» </span><span>(Emphasis added). </span><span>This code also started from a unitary or extensive concept of perpetration in which the perpetrator was equated with “…</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Those who, sufficiently, according to the circumstances, determined others to commit it, whether by exercising physical violence upon them, whether by virtue of an order, threat, gift, promise, advice of essential importance, or any other mode of suggestion or moral force</span><span>” (article 26). Why is it important to mention the theory of the unitary concept of perpetration? First, because it is not the one currently followed, in which forms of participation in the strict sense, such as aiding and abetting (complicidad) and instigation (articles 45 to 47 and 74 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span>), are distinguished from perpetration, and, second, because as those prior rules did not distinguish the contributions of the active subjects, the level of development of the criminal act carried out by the perpetrator was also not relevant in order to establish the reproach of the participant in the strict sense (aider and abettor and instigator). Since the current legislation does make those distinctions, it is essential to differentiate the elements of common instigation (valid for all crimes: article 46 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span>) from public instigation as a special crime (cited numeral 280) because for common instigation, as will be seen, it is required that the active subject determine the will of someone to commit a specific crime (that is, that there be acceptance of the incitement) and that this determined crime at least begin with acts of execution (actos de ejecución), whereas for public instigation it is not necessary that this instigated act occurs nor that there be acceptance, since the publicity of the provocation creates the danger. In that framework, it is essential for drawing that distinction that the publicity with which the latter element is surrounded, and in its absence, the rule of common instigation applies, which may occur in private, but does require the start of acts of execution of the instigated act, as will be seen. Now then, from the pen of the president of the drafting committee of the current </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span> (1970) it follows, therefore, that the basis of this crime was taken from the </span><a href=\"https://catalogosiidca.csuca.org/Record/UNANL.40193\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">draft Criminal Code for Guatemala prepared by Sebastián Soler</span></a><span>, for which reason it is appropriate to turn our attention to what this author stated about this crime. In his classic work </span><a href=\"http://todosxderecho.com/recopilacion/Tratados%20y%20Manuales%20Basicos/Penal%20Parte%20General%20y%20Especial/Derecho_Penal_Argentino_-_Sebasti_n_Soler_-_Tomo_IV%28full%20permission%29.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Argentine Criminal Law. TEA, volume 4</span></a><span>, 9th reprint, 1983, pages 589-602, the Argentine jurist says: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Crimes against public tranquility. §130- The different offenses. The reform of the Criminal Code has begun </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> by correcting the designation of the title, as there have been many misunderstandings brought about by the previous reference to ‘public order’ </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">[It should be recalled that Padilla, in the statement of motives, points out that this crime moves from the chapter of ‘public order’ crimes to those committed against public tranquility]. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Let us see the reasons that made that change advisable. In few areas of criminal law can one verify greater confusion and vagueness of opinions than that which manifests when doctrine tries to establish the concept of public order. The fundamental misunderstanding comes from the fact that this expression has, at least, two meanings </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> A brief examination of the different chapters and offenses contained under the title of crimes against public order is enough to notice that this is not the sense in which the expression should be taken at this point in legal theory. These crimes are: public instigation, illicit association, public intimidation, and apology of crime. For our criminal law, public order simply means tranquility and social confidence in the secure, peaceful development of civil life. It is not about defending social security itself, but rather the opinion of that security which, in turn, in reality, constitutes a further reinforcing factor for it. Those characteristics of a secondary, mediate interest explain the reason why </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the penal scales in these chapters are, in general, low</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. It is not about direct protection of primary legal interests, such as security, but rather forms of mediate protection of those interests, since one of the favorable conditions for the commission of serious harm is social disorder and disturbance. These offenses, then, have an aspect of preventing greater harms, which </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">approximates them to what a contravention is</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. If one observes, in effect, their content, it will be seen that they are all oriented towards other harms whose avoidance they mediately aim for: behind instigation and illicit association lies the possibility of all kinds of crimes, which one wishes to prevent; behind the apology of crime, an indirect form of advising crime is perceived; behind intimidation are the harms derived from disorder. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Many of these offenses are true preparatory acts for other crimes, which would be unpunished due to their equivocality </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">II. Instigation to commit crimes. Article 209 establishes: ‘Whoever </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">publicly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> instigates the commission of a specific crime shall be punished, for the instigation alone…’ </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">generic instigation was an accessory form of participation. Its punishability depended, therefore, not only on the instigation being accepted, but also on the act having, at least, a beginning of execution by the instigated person. This aspect is precisely what poses a problem</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, resolved differently by legislation and doctrine, depending on whether the instigation is not accepted or, being accepted, is not carried out by the instigated person. In such a situation, some positivists, with little success, have postulated the punishability of instigation as an attempt with unsuitable means</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\"> (…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">but the most reasonable and common solution has consisted of making that act a special criminal offense, in the same way that certain forms of preparatory acts, generally unpunished, are elevated into autonomous offenses. This is, in reality, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the origin of the offense we are examining, which, for some, is nothing more than a common act of instigation that does not succeed</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">the specific difference of this crime consists in the act of instigation being carried out publicly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. This is the element that makes an unaccepted act of instigation punishable, which, done without the requirement of publicity, remains unpunished, for lack of a beginning of execution. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">It is not a condition of punishability, as Manzini says, but a true constituent element of the offense. As such, it must be encompassed within the intent (dolo) of the perpetrator, that is, that the latter, besides instigating the commission of a specific act, must know that he is doing so publicly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">If a private instigation becomes public, let us suppose, through a microphone unknown to the perpetrator, no crime exists</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">If ten individually determined persons gather in a private place and one of them, behind closed doors, instigates them to commit a crime, there is no public instigation</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">. (…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Publicity thus arises when there is the possibility that the instigation be received or heard by someone not personally summoned</span><span>.» (Emphasis added). It is true that the criminal offense which Soler comments on expressly contemplates the issue of </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">publicity</span><span> in the description of the conduct, unlike the one that exists in Costa Rica which only mentions it in the name of the offense, however, this does not mean that such element should be considered excluded from the conduct, since not only does the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">nomen iuris</span><span> of the offense refer to the legislative meaning (such that it would be a contradiction for the crime of “public instigation” to be able to be done in private), but also that necessary publicity is extracted by virtue of genealogical-restrictive and historical interpretation, which are valid if and only if they intend to limit the punitive scope, never to expand it (article 2 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span>). As was seen, in the national historical development from which the respective offense was extracted and inserted, instigation was always public, as the offense expressly contained that element, and there was never any discussion to modify that, from which understanding it this way is the most restrictive approach. Therefore, in numeral 280 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span> which states: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Whoever instigates another to commit </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">a specific crime that affects public tranquility</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to four years, without it being necessary that the act be carried out</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">,</span><span>” it not only requires the publicity of the instigation (which in this case did not occur because the meeting was private) to generate the danger, but it also requires that the crimes being instigated be ones that affect public tranquility, a concept that must be interpreted restrictively and cannot be considered extensible to any crime, because understanding it that way would, moreover, modify the rules of participation (common instigation) for those other crimes. Again, the political ascription (in a broad sense) of Costa Rican criminal law (democratic, liberal, and republican according to the initial numeral of the Magna Carta referred to) would suffer detriment if the interpretation were broad, and the reason why is explained a bit more fully below. It should be recalled that with the emergence of Modern States (15th and 16th centuries), a break with the regulations of the Middle Ages occurred, and the state legal order began to differentiate itself from others (such as morality and religions) that were initially amalgamated. This essential difference translates into the fact that, while morality and religions regulate the internal sphere of persons (their thoughts and feelings under the notion of “sins” in one of them), state law was to concern itself with external acts that implied a material modification of the world, leaving the internal sphere to the interference of those other normative orders. The entire theory of the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">iter criminis </span><span>(or path of the crime) is based on this foundation. In order not to lengthen the historical references unnecessarily, it is worth remembering that the separation between unpunishable and punishable acts (or, what is the same, between freedom as a democratic principle and repression, which must be exceptional) is given in the external phase of the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">iter criminis</span><span>, properly from the acts of execution which give rise to the sanction for attempt (tentativa) (without it being necessary, for these purposes, to refer to the evolution of the theories that, stating it thus, emphasize various nuances, and it suffices to allude to the fact that the one mostly accepted by modern doctrine is the individual objective theory). That the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">intermediate phase</span><span> (ideation, deliberation, and resolution), </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">intermediate</span><span> (manifested resolution), and even the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">preparatory acts of the external phase</span><span> are unpunishable does not arise from a simple doctrinal whim, but is the product of the systematic attempt to ensure that States do not penetrate areas (thoughts, feelings, private manifestation of opinions) that are essential not only for the development of personality and human dignity but also for the consolidation of a democratic political system. Therefore, only by exception should expression-based crimes (expression-based crimes) (insults, slanders, defamation, hate crimes, apology of a crime, obstruction of public roads) and possession-based crimes (tenencia) (of weapons, of drugs) be punished, as they imply advances of the protective barrier that is set by </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">the beginning of the acts of execution</span><span>. Expression-based crimes advance the barrier to the intermediate phase of the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">iter criminis</span><span> (manifested resolution), and possession-based crimes advance it to the preparatory acts. In both situations, not only the advancement of the barrier by mere criminal policy is required, but also the affectation of a legal interest (harmfulness, lesividad). If the foregoing is understood, it will be easy to understand why saying that one is going to kill someone is not (and should not be) a crime, just as it should not be a crime when one subject tells another to kill a person and that person does not accept (an unaccepted act of instigation). In neither case is there a modification of the external world, and if any reaction to that is to occur, it must come from ethical, moral, or religious normative systems, not from state legal ones, since, moreover, human freedom means that that “expressed bad thought” can be reversed by “repentance” (in a common, not legal, sense), without reaching a modification of the external world. It is different when the subject accepts the proposal (the intent is born) and this determined subject, in turn, begins acts of execution. At that point, at least a danger to the legal interest arises, and that justifies state intervention. But note that, although all of the above is required to sanction a simple instigation, that is not sufficient, since, depending on the theory of accessoriness (accesoriedad) followed, more or fewer additional elements will be required. For a </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">restricted theory of perpetration</span><span> (like the one followed in modern times), not only is perpetration differentiated from participation in the strict sense (instigation and aiding and abetting), but the punishment of these forms of participation is made dependent on the intervention that the perpetrator comes to have. Thus, the theory of </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">minimum accessoriness</span><span> sanctions participants only if the perpetrator has carried out a criminal offense; that of </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">limited accessoriness</span><span> makes the sanction of aiders and abettors and instigators dependent on the perpetrator carrying out a criminal wrong; that of </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">maximum accessoriness</span><span> requires a typical, unlawful, and culpable conduct in the perpetrator to be able to establish the responsibility of the participants; and that of </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">hyper-accessoriness</span><span> requires a typical, unlawful, culpable, and punishable conduct for that repression. Current criminal doctrine considers that the most adequate theory is that of limited accessoriness, and our substantive regulations lack a position on the matter </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">[articles 46 and 47 refer to “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">punishable act</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">” and from this, some authors and in other latitudes have derived hyper-accessoriness: see: Chinchilla Calderón, Rosaura. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The Principle of Legality; containment wall or diffuse limit for the interpretation of the theory of crime in Costa Rica?</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\"> Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2008, p. 89 et seq.; Reform to the German Criminal Code of 29.5.1943 and the doctrine and jurisprudence that interpreted it cited by Castillo González, Francisco. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Perpetration and Participation in Criminal Law</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 1st edition, San José, 2006, pp. 55 and 347-348 (the author does not subscribe to that thesis, only describes what happened in Germany, although he ceases to mention it in later editions of his texts)].</span><span> Thus, one would have that, by this route (of interpreting ‘</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">public tranquility</span><span>’ in a broad sense to apply it to any crime that affects it), one would practically arrive at repealing the institution of common instigation and the theory of accessoriness (whatever it may be) because this criminal offense, unlike general instigation, does not require such accessoriness. But, in addition, from a systematic point of view, if it were interpreted as the appellant parties intend, the offenses of instigation (which in doctrine and comparative law may have a slightly greater reproach than the perpetrator since they give rise to the intent in the latter) would have a lesser sanction than perpetration, to the detriment of what is indicated in numeral 46 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span> or an excessive repression, alien to doctrinal regulations and the principles of equality and culpability. Let us consider two situations: </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">i)</span><span> if it were accepted that public instigation could be directed against any crime, in a broad sense, that violates public tranquility, as the appellants intend, one would arrive at the absurdity of sustaining, as the prosecutor did, that, for example, since aggravated robbery in dwellings affects tranquility, the crime of public instigation of such a crime could be committed and, in that way, the conduct would no longer carry the penalty of the perpetrator of that crime (5 to 15 years according to numerals 46 and 213 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Code</span></a><span>) but only one of six months to four years of imprisonment, which is the one contemplated in this criminal offense. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">ii) </span><span>Another absurd consequence of this position would be the opposite, that is, that instigation could have a greater penalty than the principal crime, although in Costa Rica it was expressly assumed that this could not be the case by virtue of the general rules. For example, a person who instigates others to commit thefts on public roads can affect, and greatly affect, social tranquility if those crimes unfold. And so, while the perpetrators of the thefts would be punished with imprisonment of one month to three years, the one who instigated them would be punished under the offense of “public instigation” (following the criterion of the appellant persons) and would receive a sanction of six months to four years of imprisonment, which evidences an enormous disproportion of the penalty that is not accepted even by doctrine, which only justifies the greater increase in the one who gives rise to the intent provided it is proportional to the crime, and this has been understood as long as it does not exceed one third. The </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">reductio ad absurdum</span><span> (‘reduction to absurdity') is a logical method of demonstrating the validity (or invalidity) of categorical propositions, and in this case, the results of the appellants' proposal could not be more evident. But let us continue to delve deeper into the argumentative lines proposed. The prosecutor maintains that including the word “publicly” in the offense description would be an invasion of legislative competence (thereby ignoring that jurisdictional work, by constitutional mandate, always requires a hermeneutic task that follows rules given in the legal system itself and that, in criminal cases, one must resort to genealogical, historical, and systematic interpretation to restrict and never to expand the offense), yet she considers it possible, without any consequence, to include crimes not contemplated by the legislator in the criminal offense under examination or to expand its concepts according to the criterion of the author she cites (who comments on legislation different from ours), despite the fact that articles 1 and 2 of the substantive criminal legislation prohibit this. However, such a position is not admissible because doctrine can indeed contribute to clarifying the meaning of a normative provision provided the principle of legality is respected, not if it extends the prohibition as is sought here, and in this case the limit of the offense is given by a parallel legal offense which is generic instigation. The text that the prosecutor cites and Creus comments on contains, unlike our legislation, a broad reference to crimes. The Costa Rican code, in a manner distinct from that commented on by the Argentine jurist, added the type of crimes that could be instigated in this way. Another incoherence of the prosecutor is that, while she accepts part of what Argentine doctrine says (even though it does not correspond to our legislation), she rejects what it stipulates as the differentiating element of instigation as an institution of the general part with respect to public instigation as a crime of the special part (the latter is introduced because the former cannot be configured in the absence of acts of execution that generate a criminal wrong, according to the theory of limited accessoriness, so such elements are suppressed but the offense is constructed as a danger-based crime, and this is achieved, precisely, through the issue of publicity). In synthesis, the publicity of the instigation is required to commit the crime of public instigation because this element is what generates the abstract danger which, in turn, makes it possible to suppress the accessoriness of participation in the strict sense, and the expression “…</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">a specific crime that affects public tranquility</span><span>…” contained in article 280 must be interpreted restrictively as circumscribed to the crimes stipulated in </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Title X: Crimes against public tranquility</span><span>, that is, those of illicit association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation, and apology of crime, because doing it otherwise is to create crimes by interpretive means. This leads, consequently, to the conclusion that both elements (the publicity of the act and that a determination is being made to affect a crime against public tranquility) must be known by the perpetrator. If the publicity is not known by the perpetrator (by being recorded secretly and, therefore, ignoring that he is inciting a collective), one is facing a mistake of fact (error de tipo).</span> If the active subject does not know that they are instigating a crime “</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">against public tranquility</span><span>” an error occurs regarding normative legal elements which, because it is most beneficial for the accused person, must also be resolved as an error of fact (error de tipo) despite having common elements with an error of law (error de prohibición) (on this topic see the judgment of the former </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-474235\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Cassation Court of San José</span></a><span>, number 2010-641: R. Chinchilla, U. Zúñiga e I. Estrada). The interpretation of the appellant parties (by excluding publicity from the definition of the crime and by suppressing the reference to certain crimes contained therein) is not only broad against the mandate of article 2 but also throws overboard the entire topic of errors and the principle of culpability, as they seek a sanction against the person regardless of their internal consonance (knowledge and will) with the allegedly externalized conduct. This is the same effect generated by abstract danger crimes and it is not in vain that they attempt to convert all forms of instigation into this category, which is a dangerous trend in times when respect for the Constitutional, Social, and Democratic Rule of Law is not, precisely, the dominant value. This is how the first-instance judgment understood it, which, with competence, rejected such proposals, and in that, no error is observed. But, in addition to what has already been said, which is neither little nor light in weight, there is a much stronger reason why the theses attempted by the appellant parties cannot be accepted. It is again related to the political system to which the country subscribed and the genealogical cleansing that must be followed, and this will be set out in the following section. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">(C) International Human Rights Law and the Penal Code: integration and systematic application. </span><span>The idea must be taken up again, already developed from historical evidence, that there has been no variation between the introduction of the figure of “public instigation” in 1970 to date and that this presents, in the immediate normative antecedents, reference to the instigation being public (indeed, in many of the previous texts emphasis is placed on the use of the press, the only medium that, at that time, guaranteed that publicity). This origin allows for clarity regarding the normative context into which the figure is inserted. It should be remembered that, when the current repressive body was approved (1970), although the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Constitución Política</span></a><span> of 1949 formally governed the country, there was no effective control over the coupling of lower-ranking norms to those of higher rank, because concentrated constitutional control, in the hands of the Full Court and governed by the </span><a href=\"https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/185514\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Civil Procedure Code</span></a><span> of 1887, was considered merely on paper, since a minority could veto a declaration of unconstitutionality (a qualified majority of the Full Court was required, then composed of 17 magistrates as the seven of the Constitutional Chamber had not been incorporated, so 12 votes were needed to declare something unconstitutional, which historically prevented this from happening). The constitutional reform of 1989 and the creation of the constitutional jurisdiction were necessary for such control to be effective, and not only vis-à-vis the constitutional hierarchy but also to incorporate human rights treaties as a constitutional parameter. When the current article on public instigation was approved, the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties</span></a><span> (hereinafter VCLT) had also not become effective, which, although signed by Costa Rica in 1969, was not ratified by the country until 1996 through </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/SCIJ/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Law No. 7615</span></a><span>. Finally, by 1990, International Human Rights Law (hereinafter IHR Law) had not emerged with its current force, which, although it already had some declarations that emerged after World War II, was under development in almost all its areas to give rise to the treaties in force. It was not until 2006 when, derived from there (and expressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the judgment of the </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_154_esp.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Almonacid Arellano et al. vs. Chile case of September 26, 2006</span></a><span>), the concept of conventionality control emerged, with binding character. These three elements (constitutional control over the hierarchy of norms, the value of treaties being superior to law according to article </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">27 of the VCLT</span></a><span> and the development of IHR Law which implies the internal value of signed and ratified treaties and the conventionality control over them) occurred after the emergence, in 1970, of the criminal offense under discussion. None of that can be lost sight of because they are elements that contribute to molding the original criminal offense, as they all have higher rank and integrate the political system described in constitutional article 1 already referred to. As part of International Human Rights Law are found </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">individual freedoms</span><span> such as the right of assembly, of demonstration or expression, of association and of thought (articles 26, 28 and 29 </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Constitución Política</span></a><span>; 13, 15 and 16 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=36150&amp;nValor3=38111&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">American Convention on Human Rights</span></a><span> and 18 to 22 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;param2=1&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=20579&amp;n\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</span></a><span>) but also social rights such as the right to unionize, to strike, to collective bargaining (article 8</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\"> </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=44205&amp;nValor3=46578&amp;param2=1&amp;strTipM=TC&amp;lResultado=2&amp;strSim=simp\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or Protocol of El Salvador</span></a><span> and article 8 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=11190&amp;nValor3=12008&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</span></a><span>). Both integrate, on equal terms (unlike what is often thought in our country), the human rights framework characterized by being inalienable, indivisible, unrenounceable, universal, imprescriptible, and interdependent. As can be seen, these rights have been incorporated, in many cases, into multilateral treaties or conventions that our country has signed and ratified. And this last point connects with the principle </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">pacta sunt servanda</span><span> contained in article 27 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)</span></a><span> according to which a State cannot invoke its domestic law to disregard a treaty it has signed and ratified. Therefore, since 1996 (when the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">VCLT</span></a><span> was ratified), IHR Law must be inserted into the integration and interpretation of all criminal offenses, including those issued previously, because the law (in this case the substantive repressive body) not only cannot disregard a higher-ranking norm (the treaties: article 7 of the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Constitución Política</span></a><span>) but also domestic law cannot disregard conventional law. In the same sense, Constitutional Law establishes the predominance of human rights treaties (or the pronouncements of the bodies that interpret them) over the Constitución Política if those grant more rights or protect them better (see article 73 subsection d of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=38533\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction</span></a><span> and the votes of the </span><span>Constitutional Chamber</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\"> </span><span>numbers No. </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-89799\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">3435-92</span></a><span>, No. </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-81561\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">2313-95</span></a><span>, No.</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\"> </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-82278\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">1319-97</span></a><span>, No. 4356-98 and No. </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-83870\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">6830-98</span></a><span>). So, having reached this point, it is clear that, although the crime of public instigation is in force and is constitutional according to vote of the Constitutional Chamber number 2023-00430 of January 11, 2023 (whose full content is unknown to this date despite having been constantly requested, even before voting on this matter as is evident from the preceding records), the ordinary interpreter </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">MUST</span><span> (it is not optional but an obligation) adapt it, in its interpretation, to that normative context. And it is here where it is necessary to examine the content of those other human rights that substantially limit punitive power in a democracy like the one described by article 1 of the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Constitución Política</span></a><span> because, although there are formally criminal offenses that prohibit certain conduct (many of them, like this one, of pre-constitutional or pre-conventional origin), their spheres of validity are limited by the normative evolution already referred to. In the present matter, even starting (hypothetically, only for analytical purposes) from the claim of the accusing party —that public instigation of article 280 </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">ibidem</span><span> can also be committed when one determines to commit crimes such as the obstruction of public roads that are not part of those against public tranquility— other considerations are necessary, beginning with the fact that, after the accused meeting, there was no materialization of road closures (nor was this stipulated in the complaints, nor is there evidence in that sense received at trial). The crime of obstruction of a public road is regulated in article 263 bis and states: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">A penalty of ten to thirty days of imprisonment shall be imposed on whoever, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">without authorization from the competent authorities</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, impedes, obstructs, or hinders, in any way, vehicular traffic or the movement of pedestrians</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">.</span><span>” (Emphasis supplied). Said provision was elevated to the category of a crime (which enables repressive actions such as raids, pretrial detention, etc.) and ceased to be a simple infraction by Law No. 8250 of May 02, 2002, that is, approved shortly after the popular demonstrations that broke out in March 2000 in protest of what was called the “</span><a href=\"https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/el-combo-que-estremecio-al-pais/XPNTNN5GIFFVFCZ7AVOTCP74W4/story/\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Combo del ICE</span></a><span>” (bills that sought the ‘modernization of ICE, the opening in energy and telecommunications’). The purpose of discouraging and repressing that mechanism of demonstration is evident, and it joins article 263 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Penal Code</span></a><span> which states: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Disruption of public services. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Article 263.- Whoever, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">without</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> creating a situation of common danger, impedes, disturbs, or disrupts the normal functioning of transportation by land, water, and air, or of public communication services or energy substances, shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to two years.</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">» (Emphasis added).</span><span> However, social protest is a human right derived from freedom of expression and assembly which, to that extent, has a higher rank than the law, and the law cannot render it devoid of content, without prejudice to the balancing exercise in the event of a clash with other rights of similar or greater magnitude that must be performed in each specific case. Regarding its scope, the supreme interpreter of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=36150&amp;nValor3=38111&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">ACHR</span></a><span> has said: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">171. The right to protest or demonstrate disagreement against any state action or decision is protected by the right of assembly, enshrined in article 15 of the American Convention </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The right protected by article 15 of the American Convention </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">includes both private meetings and </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">meetings in public thoroughfares, whether static or moving</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. The possibility to demonstrate publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways to exercise the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be claimed. Therefore, the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and should not be interpreted restrictively </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">172 </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">the Court takes note of what was indicated by the former UN Rapporteur on the right to assembly and association, according to which “when the violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is an enabling and even determining factor or a pre-condition for the violation of other rights </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is also inevitably affected and this deserves to be recognized.” Furthermore, as with other rights with a social dimension, it is highlighted that </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the violation of the rights of participants in a meeting or assembly by the authorities “has serious inhibitory effects [chilling effect] on future meetings or assemblies</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">,” as people may choose to abstain to protect themselves from these abuses, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">in addition to being contrary to the State's obligation to facilitate and create enabling environments so that people can effectively enjoy their right of assembly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">.</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">»</span><span> (IACHR. </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_371_esp.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco vs. Mexico. Judgment of November 28, 2018</span></a><span>; emphasis supplied). Commenting on that provision, it has been said: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Thus, it not being sufficient that there are doubts about whether the right of assembly could produce negative effects to the detriment of others, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">restrictions on the right of assembly shall only </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">(sic) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">find support in those cases where objective data exist that allow deducing indubitably that the demonstration does not conform to conventional parameters</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, and especially in relation to the need to protect public health and morals, as well as the rights and freedoms of others. For this reason, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the grounds alleged to prohibit or restrict the right of assembly must not only be compelling and imperative so as to justify the restrictions on that freedom, but must be proven</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. That is, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">they must not be mere suspicions, uncertain dangers, much less insufficient, capricious, or arbitrary arguments; but rather objective, sufficient, and duly founded reasons</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has indicated, “the meeting or demonstration will depend on its peaceful nature. Although, certainly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">, any meeting in a public transit place or demonstration causes a restriction on the right of free movement of non-demonstrating citizens, such restriction cannot by itself give rise to a prohibition if the requirement of peaceful nature is met</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, understanding by such the absence of disturbances of public order with danger to persons or property. It is not possible, moreover, to subject the ideas or claims of the demonstrators to any kind of political expediency controls based on the principles and values, both legal and meta-legal, dominant in society or identified with any kind of ideology or thought.”</span><span>» [Cf.: Mujica. Javier. </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Article 15. Right of Assembly. Article 16. Freedom of Association</span><span>. In: Steiner, Christian and Uribe, Patricia (editors).</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\"> </span><span>Commentary. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, p. 371 et seq. Bold type is added]. And, as has been said, if this process was characterized by something, in the words of the first-instance judge herself, it was by the evidentiary inertia because although many affirmations were made (both in writing and at trial and at the hearing before this chamber), these lacked any evidentiary support, to the point that extremes contained in the complaint of attorney Navas, such as the alleged instigation to assault a journalist or the accused's intervention in strikes that affected the right to health or education, were only emotional expressions (appeal to emotion fallacy), without any evidentiary basis. Therefore, if there is no objective proof of the limitations on the rights of others (because there were no material acts of road closures following what was said in said meeting) and intervening in demonstrations, even on public roads, is a right, this would imply that instigating demonstrations on public roads (whether it is considered through the special crime of public instigation or through a generic instigation to a specific crime of obstruction of a road), could not be a crime even though this limits vehicular traffic because, although it may constitute a typical conduct, it would be justified by the exercise of a right and, to that extent, becomes a defense (causa de justificación) [article 25 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Penal Code</span></a><span>: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">No one commits a crime who acts in </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">the legitimate exercise of a right”</span><span>]. But if what has been said so far were not enough, it must be considered that these rights, of expression and assembly with the contents already outlined from IHR Law, are also related to the hard core of the right to unionize. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself, at the request of the IACHR, in Advisory Opinion </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_27_esp1.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">OC27/21 of May 05, 2021</span></a><span> developed these aspects extensively and, given its binding nature for the country, it is appropriate to transcribe part of what was decided, even if the citation may be lengthy: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">74. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">this Court considers it pertinent to make the following additional considerations regarding the content of the right to freedom of association (union). </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">81. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">the Court considers that the right of workers to belong to a union logically includes the right to carry out union activities. The spectrum of actions included in this right </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">has broad content</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, and must be regulated in the statutes of union organizations, which must be determined by their members. These activities can include, for example, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">participation in union meetings, the right to express opinions,</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> the right to receive or distribute information, the right to participate in decisions adopted at meetings or assemblies </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The State has the obligation to protect</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> the adequate exercise of the activities of workers in union life, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">preventing any action by the authorities that allows the limitation on the exercise of these rights</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, as well as adopting the necessary measures so that workers, and their representatives, can carry out their union activities effectively in the companies or bodies where they work </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">106. This Court reiterates that freedom of association (union), collective bargaining, and the right to strike are rights incorporated in article 26 of the Convention, as these are derived from article 45 subsections c) and g) of the OAS Charter </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Although they are autonomous rights, this Court </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">highlights their interdependence and indivisibility</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">111. In relation to the right to strike </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">States must respect and guarantee that this right can be exercised effectively by all workers, without discrimination </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">the State must guarantee that workers can exercise their right to strike </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">without being subject to penalization</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> by the private employer, or by the State itself. In that sense, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">States must repeal those criminal norms that can be used to persecute the exercise of the right to strike</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">.</span> On the other hand, with regard to workers who provide essential services, or who exercise authority functions on behalf of the State, it must be ensured that the list of essential services not subject to the exercise of the right to strike is clearly defined in domestic law, and in accordance with the provisions established by the ILO. Likewise, workers who perform such essential functions must have conciliation and arbitration mechanisms that allow them to obtain a response to their claims </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">121. Article 16.1 of the American Convention recognizes the right of persons to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, cultural, sporting, or any other purposes. This Court has indicated that the right of association is characterized by enabling persons to create or participate in entities or organizations for the purpose of acting collectively in pursuit of the most diverse ends, provided that these are legitimate </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> positive obligations also derive from the freedom of association to prevent attacks against it, protect those who exercise it, and investigate violations of said freedom </span><span>(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">123. </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">this Court understands that the relationship between freedom of association and freedom of association (trade union) is a relationship of genus and species</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, since the former recognizes the right of persons to create organizations and act collectively in pursuit of legitimate ends, based on Article 16 of the American Convention, while the latter must be understood in relation to the specificity of the activity and the importance of the purpose pursued by union activity </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">132. </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> this Court </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">highlights the relationship that exists between freedom of expression, the right of assembly, and the rights to freedom of association (trade union), collective bargaining, and strike.</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">134</span><span> (…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">freedom of expression is indispensable for the formation of public opinion in a democratic society. In the labor sphere, the Court has indicated that it is a conditio sine qua non for trade unions and, in general, those who wish to influence the community to develop fully. In this logic, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">freedom of expression is a necessary condition for the exercise of workers' organizations, including trade unions, in order to protect their labor rights and improve their legitimate conditions and interests, since without this right such organizations would lack effectiveness and reason for being</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">135. </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> the scope of protection of the right to freedom of thought and expression is particularly applicable in labor contexts </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">a reinforced level of protection of freedom of expression is required, and especially with regard to those who hold a position representing workers</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">137. For this Court, the existence of a free flow of information, ideas, and opinions is fundamental for the exercise of trade union rights and collective bargaining, and therefore </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">the threat of initiating criminal proceedings by authorities in response to legitimate opinions of the representatives of a trade union organization can have intimidating and harmful effects to the detriment of workers or employers</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. For this reason, detention or imprisonment as punishment for the legitimate exercise of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association is arbitrary. </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">139. Regarding the right of assembly, this Court recalls that Article 15 of the American Convention “recognizes the right of peaceful assembly, without arms.” The Court has indicated that this right </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">encompasses</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">both private meetings </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">and meetings on public roads</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, whether static </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">or with movement</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">The possibility of demonstrating publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways to exercise the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be claimed</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. Therefore, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and must not be interpreted restrictively </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> Likewise, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">this Court has expressed that the right to protest or demonstrate disagreement against any state action or decision is protected by the right of assembly </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">141. This Court notes that the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association, in their relationship with freedom of association (trade union), collective bargaining, and strike, constitute fundamental rights so that workers, and their representatives, can organize and express specific claims about their working conditions, in order to effectively represent their interests before the employer, and even participate in matters of public interest with a collective voice. States have the duty to respect and guarantee these rights, which make it possible to level the unequal relationship that exists between workers and employers, and access to fair wages and safe working conditions. In this sense, the Court recalls that human rights are interdependent and indivisible, such that the effectiveness of the exercise of rights depends on the effectiveness of the exercise of other rights. Thus, civil and political rights, and economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights must be understood integrally as human rights, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">without hierarchy among themselves</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> and enforceable in all cases before those authorities that are competent</span><span>» (The emphasis is added by this Chamber). The chronological contextualization of the criminal reform that introduced numeral 263 bis is important because it evidences the discouragement that, from various state agencies, has been fostered against the broad exercise of social human rights such as protest as a form in which freedom of expression is manifested, although it has limits, as will be stated below. Human rights are not only individual ones, disconnected from social rights (and, to that extent, violative of the principle of interconnection of this matter) and the criminalization of social protest (by way of the obstruction of public roads), by itself, says nothing of the unlawfulness of the conduct, but only of its definition as a crime (tipicidad). Let it be recalled that, although ordinary courts cannot decree the unconstitutionality of norms and, for the one that now concerns us, the Constitutional Chamber has not done so (see vote </span><a href="file:///C:\\Rosaura\\Downloads\\voto%20número%202023-00430\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">número 2023-00430</span></a><span> of January 11 of the current year, in which it dismissed the action of unconstitutionality regarding Article 280;</span><span> the </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-242205\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">vote número 2003-5414</span></a><span> that flatly rejected an action against the current numeral 263, both</span><span> of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Penal Code</span></a><span> and vote número </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-563817\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">2012-17027</span></a><span> of 2:30 p.m. on December 5, 2012, which ruled on the obstruction of public roads in the terms that will be referred to below), this does not prevent the exercise of ordinary jurisdiction, which must verify, in each specific case, not only the conventionality of the provision but also whether, in addition to definition as a crime (tipicidad), there was unlawfulness, and this is both material and formal, and it is here that the analysis of grounds for justification such as the legitimate exercise of a right is involved (Article 25 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Penal Code</span></a><span>). In a similar case, it was thus understood jurisprudentially, for example, in this vote: </span><span style="font-size:11pt">«…</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">the crime of</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">public instigation</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">contained in Article 280 of the Penal Code –formerly 273-, states:</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“Whoever instigates another to commit a specific crime that affects public tranquility shall be punished with a penalty of six months to four years of imprisonment, without it being necessary that the act be carried out.”</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">With the complaint</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">of</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Licentiate V, it cannot be held as proven that the speech</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">of</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Mr. J had such force over a person or persons that it provoked a determination to carry out an illicit act. It should be added that, even in the event that such instigation</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">over the demonstrators existed, what is indicated by Article 25 of the Penal Code cannot be ignored, insofar as it states: “No one commits a crime who acts in compliance with a legal duty or in the legitimate exercise of a right.” In the present matter, the complaint claims that Deputy J calls on students to demonstrate on the topic</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">of</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">photocopying and to demand the protection</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">of</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">the right to education. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">This is nothing other than the exercise of a right, which must be examined based on the provisions of Title VII of</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the Political Constitution</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">and numeral 28 of</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the Magna Carta</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, on the understanding that the call made is part of the right of expression that every citizen in this country has, especially since what is requested has to do with a fundamental right: education. It is for this reason that this Chamber endorses the prosecutorial request, considering that Mr. J</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> was in the full exercise of his freedom of expression, which was aimed at safeguarding the right to education</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. Based on this interpretation, the crime charged could not be configured, because even if the imputed conduct were included in a criminal definition, the existence of a ground for justification would eliminate the unlawfulness of said acts, and, consequently, such conduct would not be considered criminal either. In these types of cases, Article 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that “when the reported fact does not constitute a crime or it is impossible to proceed, the Public Ministry will request the court of preparatory procedure, by reasoned request, the dismissal of the complaint… .” Having verified that the facts reported by Licentiate V do not configure any crime, the request made by the Attorney General of</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">the Republic is granted, decreeing the dismissal.</span><span style="font-size:11pt">» </span><span>Third Chamber (Chinchilla, Ramírez, Arroyo, Pereira, and López). </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-581099\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Vote número 2013-495</span></a><span> (bold print supplied). </span><span>As Attorney Navas recognizes in her own criminal complaint libel, both the right to unionize (and its derivatives including collective bargaining mechanisms), as well as the rights of assembly and demonstration, including the right to social protest as part of freedom of expression, are human rights, essential for maintaining democratic balance and reducing social tensions and polarizations. It is clear that it is also not permissible to abuse any of these rights, nor to exercise them in bad faith, nor to carry out an antisocial exercise of them (Articles 20 to 22 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Civil Code</span></a><span>) since every right is limited by the exercise of other rights that concern other persons in the population. Therefore, it is possible to punish damages or injuries that occur in those protest contexts, just as it is possible to sanction (from a labor standpoint) the execution of movements that affect essential services defined, in a restrictive and not broad manner, in a prior law, according to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in </span><a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_27_esp1.pdf\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">OC27/21 of May 05, 2021</span></a><span>. However, in this matter, not only was there no proof that these affectations (to life, health, integrity, property, or essential services) occurred (since after the accused meeting no protest materialized), but many of the regulations on the right were introduced by law subsequent to the accused events (</span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=90459&amp;nValor3=0&amp;strTipM=TC\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">law to provide legal certainty on strikes and their procedures No. 9808 of 2020</span></a><span>) and there were none at the date of these (2018 onwards). For their part, other rights (such as the freedom of transit of the citizenry) can be reconciled with these (freedom of expression, assembly, and trade union rights) through other measures, thanks to balancing exercises in each specific case. In sum, although this Chamber agrees that the exercise of violence is not a valid or justified option for protest, nor is the affectation of essential services, it cannot but note that, in scenarios where discontent cannot be exercised through the channels allowed under International Human Rights Law—since these have been closing—violence, sooner or later, ends up erupting. Therefore, </span><span style="font-style:italic">prima facie</span><span>, the fact that a person determines the will of another or others to obstruct public roads does not </span><span style="text-decoration:underline">necessarily</span><span> constitute a crime, as this will depend on whether the author's action is justified or not (if ordinary instigation applies) or whether the protest can be assumed, without further ado, as a crime and not as a right to determine if it affects “public tranquility” or rather tends to strengthen it through the exercise of rights. Consequently, the hypothetical acceptance (for analytical purposes only) that the accused made such a call (without any subsequent materialization) would not inexorably allow reaching a conclusion on the unlawfulness of his conduct because, for this, it was necessary to specify other elements that not only did not occur in reality (the cited closure did not happen) but were also not proven at trial. In comparative law, there are pronouncements that reveal the tension of rights and how to resolve it. For example, the Constitutional Court of Spain, </span><a href="https://editorialbomarzo.es/comprar/articulo/stc-422000-de-14-de-febrero-boe-17-03-00-manifestacion-de-trabajadores-en-la-via-publica-el-corte-de-trafico-entra-dentro-del-ejercicio-normal-y-legitimo-del-derecho-de-reunion-y-solo-pueden-co/\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">in judgment número 42/2000 of February 14, 2000</span></a><span>, established that </span><span style="font-size:11pt">«</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">…</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the right of assembly when exercised in places of public transit is a collective manifestation of freedom of expression exercised through a transitory association of persons</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> that operates as an instrumental technique placed at the service of the exchange or exposition of ideas, the defense of interests, or the publicity of problems or claims, thus constituting </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">a relevant channel of the democratic participatory principle</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, whose configuring elements are the subjective -grouping of persons-, the temporal -transitory duration--, the finalistic -lawfulness of the purpose-, and the real or objective -place of celebration”. </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">This Court has already had the opportunity to rule on the disturbances of public order caused by gatherings that affect the circulation of vehicles on public transit roads, indicating that the "exercise of this right, by its very nature, requires the use of places of public transit and, given certain circumstances, permits the occupation, so to speak instrumental, of roadways", recognizing that "the holding of this type of gatherings usually causes disturbances and restrictions in the circulation of persons and, what is of interest here, of vehicles" (SSTC 59/1990, FJ 6; 66/1995, FJ 3). However, such observations do not lead this Court to consider that when the exercise of this fundamental right entails the indicated restrictions, the same is not constitutionally legitimate, but, on the contrary, to understand that "</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">in a democratic society, urban space is not only a sphere of circulation, but also a space of participation</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">" (STC 66/1995, FJ 3).</span><span>» Furthermore, in the inter-American system, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR) has stated that “</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">governments cannot simply invoke one of the legitimate restrictions on freedom of expression, such as the maintenance of “public order”, as a means to suppress a “right guaranteed by the Convention or to denature it or deprive it of real content”. If this occurs, the restriction applied in that way is not legitimate </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">if one considers the consequences of criminal sanctions and the inevitably inhibiting effect they have on freedom of expression, the criminalization of any type of expression can only be applied in exceptional circumstances in which there is a clear and direct threat of anarchic violence </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> the Commission understands that the use of such powers to limit the expression of ideas lends itself to abuse, as a measure to silence unpopular ideas and opinions, thereby restricting a debate that is fundamental for the effective functioning of democratic institutions. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Laws that criminalize the expression of ideas that do not incite anarchic violence are incompatible with the freedom of expression and thought enshrined in Article 13</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> and with the fundamental purpose of the American Convention to protect and guarantee the pluralistic and democratic way of life</span><span>” (IACHR, </span><a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/a12042.pdf\" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Annual Report 1994, "Report on the Compatibility of Desacato Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights</span></a><span>”, Chapter V; bold print is added). As indicated by the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS: “…</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">within certain limits, States may establish regulations on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly to protect the rights of others. However, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">when striking a balance between the right of transit, for example, and the right of assembly, it is appropriate to bear in mind that the right to freedom of expression is not just one more right but, in any case, one of the first and most important foundations of the entire democratic structure: the undermining of freedom of expression directly affects the main nerve of the democratic system</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">”. Thus, any measure aimed at limiting public demonstrations must seek to ensure that in its application the essential content of the human rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression is safeguarded. Limitations must not depend on the content of what is to be expressed through a public demonstration, must serve a public interest, and leave other alternative avenues of communication. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Limitations must have a legal basis and can only have the purpose of avoiding serious and imminent threats, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">a potential danger</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> not being sufficient</span><span>.” (the emphasis is supplied). This has been understood by the Costa Rican Constitutional Chamber itself when stating: «</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Regarding the criminal power of the State, it must be used as a resource of ultima ratio for ensuring social peace, not as a mere mechanism of social control. Hence, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Article 256 bis of the Penal Code, through which the obstruction of public roads is criminalized, must be interpreted in such a way that its application does not imply an affectation of the essential content of the constitutional rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. In this sense, the conducts referred to by that criminal norm, regarding public demonstrations, refer only to those in which considerable injuries to the rights of other persons or to State property are verified. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">For instance, a protest in which demonstrators attack security forces or other persons, or carry out acts of vandalism against public or private property, exceeds the protective content of the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, and is therefore criminally punishable and justifies the action of police authorities, including the use of force, provided that it is proportionate to the magnitude of the damage and the specific characteristics of the demonstration.</span><span>»</span> Under that reasoning, police intervention becomes reasonable when it is evident that the characteristics of the protest produce significant damages by blocking access to establishments or facilities of great impact for national or third-party interests (such as a port or airport by virtue of the damages that could occur from the loss of flights or the deterioration of perishable goods destined for import or export, among others). </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The situation is different when the protest and consequent blocking of public roads does not impede free transit </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">via alternate routes</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. In other words, the detention of persons in a public protest and the application of criminal sanctions are only justified when there is a compelling social need to avoid disturbances to the peace and public order, or serious damage to the rights of other persons, conditioned upon the police action being proportionate to the legitimate interest pursued and to the specific characteristics of each concrete protest. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">In no way can the criminalization of social protest become an intimidating instrument to the detriment of a form of participatory social expression inherent to a democratic system</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. As long as a public protest develops within normal margins, good sense and tolerance must prevail. In this way, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">it prevents the means of expressing social discontent (which historically have been accepted in democratic regimes but not in dictatorships) from becoming true focal points of violence and public disorder</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, which is precisely what would occur when the use of police force becomes disproportionate. However, this form of expression finds its limits in that it must be exercised in a reasonable manner and within the framework of the right to peaceful assembly, that is, without aggression against security forces or other persons, nor acts of vandalism against public or private property, nor the infliction of serious damage to the rights of other persons, all of which must be assessed in the specific case.</span><span>»</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span>Constitutional Chamber. Judgment N° </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-563817\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">2012-17027</span></a><span> of 2:30 p.m. on December 5, 2012</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. </span><span>It was therefore not feasible, as the appellants argue, that the mere reference to protesting on national highways (accepting hypothetically that this occurred) would formally constitute a crime of obstruction of public roads and, consequently, neither would it constitute public solicitation to commit a crime. But, in addition to the foregoing, the interpretation also </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">MUST</span><span> be made, as the lower court judgment correctly states, based on other parameters specific to criminal law, that is, respecting the principle of legality and the restrictive interpretation it imposes (Articles 1 and 2 of the Penal Code) but also in safeguarding the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">pro persona</span><span> and </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">pro libertatis</span><span> principles inherent to International Human Rights Law. Thus, contrary to what the three appellants argue (in the sense that, faced with three hermeneutical possibilities, the broadest must be chosen), the lower court and this jurisdictional panel are obliged to use the most narrow interpretation of the criminal offense, since only this one is restrictive and only this one protects liberty. Ergo, when the current Article 280 of the Penal Code states: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Public solicitation </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Instigación pública)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Anyone who solicits another to commit a specific crime that affects </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">public tranquility (tranquilidad pública)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> shall be punished with a penalty of six months to four years of imprisonment, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">without it being necessary that the act be carried out</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline\"></span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">.</span><span>” (Emphasis supplied) it must not only be understood that publicity is inherent to the offense, even if it is only in the title of the article, but the reference to the crimes affected “against public tranquility” must be limited to those criminal offenses so classified by the legislator (that is, unlawful association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation, and apology of crime) and not to others that, although they may protect the same legal interest, fall outside the section so named. Both elements emerge, with complete clarity, from the historical development of the rule set forth above and from the requirements not only of the restrictive interpretation stipulated by the initial provisions of the national substantive codification but also by the IACHR Court itself when referring to criminal rules that affect freedom of expression (and the relationship between this crime and said right was already established earlier) by stating: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">76. The Court has noted that Criminal Law is the most restrictive and severe means for establishing responsibility for an illicit conduct. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The broad criminalization of defamation and slander may be contrary to the principle of minimum intervention and of ultima ratio of criminal law</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. In a democratic society, punitive power is only exercised to the extent strictly necessary to protect fundamental legal interests </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">from the most serious attacks</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> that damage or endanger them. The opposite would lead to the abusive exercise of the State's punitive power. 77. Taking into account the considerations formulated thus far regarding the due protection of freedom of expression, the reasonable reconciliation of the requirements for protecting that right, on one hand, and honor on the other, and the principle of minimum criminal intervention characteristic of a democratic society, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the use of criminal proceedings must correspond to the need to protect fundamental legal interests against conduct that implies </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">serious</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> injuries to said interests</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, and be related to the magnitude of the harm inflicted. The criminalization of conduct must be clear and precise, as determined by the jurisprudence of this Tribunal in the examination of Article 9 of the American Convention. 78. The Court does not consider any criminal measure regarding the expression of information or opinions contrary to the Convention, but this possibility must be analyzed </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">with special caution</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, weighing in this regard the extreme gravity of the conduct carried out by the issuer, the intent with which they acted, the characteristics of the unjustly caused harm, and other data that demonstrate the absolute necessity of using criminal measures in a truly exceptional manner. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">At all times, the burden of proof must fall on the accuser</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">.</span><span>» IACHR Court. Judgment of the case </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_177_esp.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Kimel Vs. Argentina</span></a><span> of May 2, 2008 (emphasis supplied). With a rule similar to the Costa Rican one, it has been understood in other jurisdictions as follows: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Public solicitation to commit a crime is an offense that affects public tranquility. To solicit is to incite, provoke, or induce someone to do something; it is not merely to propose that it be committed, but to promote it in a somewhat coercive manner, employing the excitement of persons or the instincts of the person solicited; it is an accessory form of participation and the general principles enunciated in relation to participation per se apply to it. The solicitor wants the act, but wants it produced by another, wants to achieve that act through the psyche of the other, determining in them the resolution to execute it. The governing verbs are to solicit or induce, it being a formal criminal offense by virtue of the fact that the intent of the active subject to induce or determine someone to commit or perpetrate a crime is necessary. It is an autonomous crime. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">To establish public solicitation, it must be public, that is, a challenge to the law, an open, direct challenge, in the presence of other persons, or through some means of communication that allows the dissemination and propagation of the message, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">not in a clandestine manner</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; the solicitation must be directed </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">at the commission of a specific crime</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; for example, to break the law, or to disregard the constitutional order, with the aim of destabilizing social peace and tranquility. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The incriminated conduct comprises a solicitation made publicly, that is, in public, in the presence of several persons. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">It may be directed at a single one of these, as long as it is done publicly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. And this requirement is met, not only when the solicitor acts in the presence of several persons, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">but also when they use some means of communication that inherently involves publicity</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, capable of establishing simultaneous or successive information with a more or less appreciable number of persons…</span><span>» Institute of Constitutional Studies (Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales). </span><a href=\"http://www.estudiosconstitucionales.com/REDIAJ/REDIAJ.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">The Infringement of Freedom of Assembly and Expression as a Mechanism of Political Persecution in Venezuela. Special Reference to the Case of Leopoldo López and Others</span></a><span>. In:</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Electronic Journal of Research and Legal Advisory of the National Assembly. Nº 1 January-July 2016 pp. 60-61 citing ruling of the 28th Court of First Instance, Trial Court of Caracas 09/10/2015, p. 271. </span><span>The appellants, particularly the prosecutor, indicate that “…</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">the Court should have analyzed </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> whether the configuration of the demonstrated conduct corresponded to this criminal offense or any other it deemed appropriate; an exercise that, had it been carried out, would not have led to the acquittal being challenged today</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">.</span><span>” (Cf. folio 511 verso). However, the lower court judgment not only carried out that exercise of scrutinizing other possible legal classifications, as can be verified in folios 477 recto and following (page 33 onwards of the judgment), which is overlooked and made invisible in the appeals, but the appellants do not even mention the other possible criminal offenses into which the proven conduct would fit, and although the principle </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">iura novit curia</span><span> (the court knows the law) prevails, the private accuser and appellant must also point out the errors in the decision adopted regarding their claims (accusatory principle). This court, in exercising the precept </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">iura novit curia</span><span>, also does not observe that possibility of matching the conduct to a criminal offense. It is true that almost all criminal offenses (except negligent ones, for example) admit common solicitation (Article 46 </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">ibid.</span><span>) but this is not configured in the present case because the conduct of obstructing roads or disrupting services was neither externalized nor materialized, that is, there are no acts of execution in the </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">iter criminis</span><span> and, therefore, no one was determined to have committed it, at least at the level of criminal wrong (theory of limited accessoriness). And if it is considered that this crime is multi-offensive and affects public tranquility and that, by that route (of the broad interpretation already discarded), it integrates the criminal offense of Article 280 of the repressive code, even so there would also be no crime in this case, because for a crime to exist it is required that, in addition to the offense description, the unlawfulness operates, and as already stated, the latter could hardly occur when exercising a constitutional and conventional right (or several) that act as a cause of justification. In short, from no perspective does this chamber find either errors or omissions in the reasoning of the trial judge or the configuration of a crime that would allow reversing the decision, which is why the complaints will be rejected.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">IV.-</span><span> In the</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> second argument of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) </span><span>a lack of substantiation and violation of the rules of sound judgment are reproached, as well as non-application or disregard of Articles 1045, 222 and following of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=35108&amp;nValor3=37024&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">current rules of liability of the 1941 Penal Code</span></a><span> and Article 38 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal)</span></a><span> in relation to the dismissal of the civil action. It states that the claim for damages was not admitted because the acquittal implied there was no causal link and because intent was not proven, but that this does not substitute for proper substantiation on those points and there is no factual or legal support for either the acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed by its represented party. With jurisprudential references (vote N° </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-974572\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">2020-00332</span></a><span> of the Sentence Appeals Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón) it insists on the autonomy of the civil claim regarding the configuration of the crime and that the one exercised here was protected by the articles referred to </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">supra</span><span> since it sought compensation for the social harm which the appellant defines. It adds that this affects social interests and can encompass all types of acts that cause damage to the well-being of the community, such as the disturbance to public tranquility derived from the defendant's action, and since it is not possible to bring the entire population, some witnesses were provided who managed to reflect the generalized national sentiments, such as the movement represented by the private accuser Navas Montero. It adds that the defendant affected public tranquility, generating feelings of fear and unease among the citizenry derived from the fact that, with the disruption of public services and obstruction of roads, free access to workplaces, schools, social services, and timely medical care is impeded, situations of public violence could be created that would result in insecurity, compromising social peace, the exercise of civil liberties, and harming the fundamental rights of the community. It alludes to judgments N° 341-2004, 370-2009, 167-2011, and 548-2013 of the Criminal Tax Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in which the entirety of its claim for social harm was granted, and to N° 71-2013 in which it establishes the “</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">trial judge as expert of experts</span><span>\" to estimate its causation and amount). It requests that the judgment be declared ineffective in the civil aspect, “revoking it in all its terms and ordering its remand.” </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">There were no written responses</span><span>. In the</span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\"> oral hearing held</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">licenciada Margot Avellán</span><span>, representative of the Attorney General's Office, emphasized that the civil action was dismissed for lack of a causal link, but the decision lacks substantiation there because it was not analyzed whether the damage was caused. She requests that the judgment be annulled in all its terms. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">The complaint is rejected. </span><span>The judgment on the merits resolved this issue in the following terms: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">IV-: ON THE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES: To address the civil claim, the material prerequisites of the claim, or what are also known as substantive exceptions, must first be verified, which must be examined ex officio. Regarding the existence of the right, this has to do with the demonstration of damages of a material nature or, as in this case, of a social nature that was alleged in the factual basis of the civil action for damages, the causal link, and the criterion for its imputation, whether due to intent, negligence, created risk, etc. In the present matter, given that the claimed damages -of a social nature- are closely causally related to the accused facts (of an intentional nature) and since the liability of the civil defendant for these facts was not demonstrated, given that the criterion for imputation in this case is evidently subjective based on intent, it is verified that the civil claimant has no right whatsoever. In no way can the alleged social harm be attributed to an intentional action of the civil defendant, as was already extensively set forth in the consideration regarding criminal liability, and the civil action for damages filed by the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE against the civil defendant [Name 001]<span data-mce-type=\"bookmark\" id=\"mce_7_start\" data-mce-style=\"overflow:hidden;line-height:0px\" style=\"overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;\"></span> is hereby dismissed.</span><span>» (Cf. judgment, folio 480 verso). As the appellant rightly states, the essence of the dismissal, as verified, is that, since the criminal liability of the defendant was not established and the claimed civil liability is subjective for one's own act, the civil lawsuit could not be granted, a conclusion that is, in effect, correct, without the need for further elaboration, as the complainant seems to miss, since all the reasons put forward in the other parts of the judgment to support the acquittal (and whose correctness was already examined and endorsed) are integrated into this part of the decision. It should be remembered that judgments are a unit of logical-legal meaning where their different parts cannot be read in isolation. In matters of civil liability —as was already indicated to the same prosecutor in another matter, see vote number 2023-349 of 08:15 a.m. on March 13 last— doctrine distinguishes two types: contractual and extracontractual. The first arises from express agreements or legal relationships. The second, from acts or omissions of social life. These may be intentional (that is, desired), negligent (that is, lacking the duty of care), or stipulated in the law, regardless of whether there is intent or negligence or whether they are lawful or unlawful acts, since this is based on the creation of risks (for example, Article 1048 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Civil Code (Código Civil)</span></a><span>) or on the obtaining of profits that must be borne by those who generate them (strict liability). Extracontractual civil liability (which is what is claimed upon the commission of a criminal act such as the one discussed here) can be subjective (due to intent or negligence) and either for one's own act or direct, or for another's act or indirect (negligence in selection, </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">culpa in eligendo</span><span>, or negligence in supervision, </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">culpa in vigilando</span><span>). The latter is provided for in Article 1048 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Civil Code</span></a><span>, third paragraph, which reads: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Anyone who entrusts a person with the performance of one or many acts is obliged to choose a person suitable to execute them and to supervise the execution within the limits of the diligence of a good father of a family; and if they neglect these duties, they shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages that their agent causes to a third party through an action violating the rights of another, committed with malicious intent or through negligence in the performance of their functions, unless such action could not have been avoided despite the due diligence in supervision</span><span>.” This is different from the other type of liability, that is, strict liability, which, in addition to the need for specific legal provision (for example, in Article 1048, paragraph 5 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Civil Code</span></a><span>; in Article 32 of the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=26481\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Consumer Protection and Effective Defense Law (Ley de protección y defensa efectiva del consumidor)</span></a><span>, contained in Article 32; Article 197 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=73504\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Law of Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por vías públicas o terrestres)</span></a><span> or Articles 190 and following of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=13231\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)</span></a><span>), the criterion for imputation implies analyzing three requirements: a) the use of objects that carry danger or risk; b) the causation of pecuniary damage; c) the relationship or causal link between the act and the damage. This, in turn, may be principal or sole, or joint and several.

Schematically, it is presented as follows:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"-aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"-aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.45pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-35.45pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><img src=\"\" style=\"display:inline-block\" width=\"318\" height=\"187\"/></p> 2ª. El índice de construcción a aplicar será de conformidad con el “Reglamento de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones” del INVU, sin embargo, en los casos en que este Reglamento no especifique la actividad a ejecutar, el índice será especificado por la administración municipal.

3ª. Para construcciones en aquellos terrenos con más de 1000 m² y que se ubiquen en predios planos, la cobertura en el área de protección del naciente (Área de Protección del Naciente, APN) no debe sobrepasar el 30% de la cobertura boscosa original. En los terrenos con pendientes superiores al 30%, el área de protección del naciente no puede sobrepasar el 50% de la cobertura boscosa original. Dicha cobertura boscosa original se establecerá con base a estudios técnicos de campo que definan, para ambas categorías de pendiente, lo siguiente: la cobertura boscosa original, el índice de área foliar (Leaf Area Index, LAI), y la cobertura actual. El límite del 30% de la cobertura boscosa original solo puede ser alcanzado cuando la cobertura actual sea menor a este límite, y el 50% del límite solo puede alcanzarse cuando la cobertura actual sea menor a este límite. En ningún caso se podrán cortar árboles para alcanzar la cobertura boscosa indicada en este punto. Ver Anexo 1 y Anexo 2.

4ª. Para las actividades de movimientos de tierra (earthworks), construcción de obras de infraestructura y edificaciones, se debe implementar un Programa de Gestión Ambiental (PGA) que contemple, al menos, las siguientes medidas: control de sedimentos, manejo de aguas pluviales, manejo de aguas residuales (tanto las de tipo ordinario como las especiales), control de emisiones atmosféricas y manejo integral de residuos sólidos. Asimismo, se debe mantener un registro de implementación del PGA.

Considerando: I. That Costa Rica has subscribed to international commitments such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (ratified by Ley 7575), which establishes in its Article 6 the obligation of the signatory states to develop national strategies, plans, or programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. II. That, in accordance with the provisions of Voto 4654-2003 of the Constitutional Chamber, the State must adopt the necessary measures to guarantee the protection of the country's forest resources. III. That Decreto Ejecutivo 25721 established the general guidelines for the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) of activities, works, or projects. IV. That Decreto N° 31849-MINAE, which reformed the Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (General Regulation on the Procedures of Environmental Impact Assessment), defines the criteria for the treatment of land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo) and the required compensations. V. That the Pago de Servicios Ambientales (PSA) program, regulated by the Ley Forestal and its respective regulations, constitutes a fundamental economic tool for the conservation of forest cover (cobertura boscosa). VI. That it is necessary to establish the technical criteria for the determination of the areas of protection of springs (nacientes) and watercourses in the context of the procedures for the environmental viability of subdivision (fraccionamiento) and urbanization projects, in harmony with the Reglamento de Fraccionamiento. VII. That it is appropriate to define the parameters related to the lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad) of forested areas and the constitution of ecological easements (servidumbres ecológicas), for the strict compliance with the environmental commitments acquired in the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) processes before SETENA. Therefore, THE FOLLOWING IS RESOLVED:

To approve the following Technical Guide for the application of the criteria of environmental viability in the procedures for land-use change before the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA).

Article 1. Purpose. This technical guide aims to standardize the technical criteria for the analysis of land-use change in the phase of environmental viability, ensuring the physical and legal protection of primary and secondary forest cover, as well as the water resource, within the framework of the administrative procedures managed by SETENA.

Article 2. Scope of application. The provisions of this guide are mandatory for all the regional offices of the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), the Área de Conservación Osa (ACOSA), and other public institutions that intervene in the processes of environmental viability associated with land-use change, such as INVU, ICAA, ICE, MOPT, and CONARE.

Article 3. Protection of springs. For the environmental viability analysis, the following protection radii must be observed around any permanent or intermittent spring, established according to the topographical surveying carried out by professionals incorporated into the CFIA, based on the criteria of the Reglamento de Fraccionamiento and the technical guidelines issued by the MINAE.

| --- | --- | | Type of Spring | Protection Radius (meters) | | Permanent | 100 | | Intermittent | 60 | The protection radius will be demarcated with a buffer area of 15 meters of strict protection, measured horizontally from the perimeter of the defined circle. The registry of these springs must be included in the digital cartographic file in the format established in Anexo 1.

Article 4. Protection of watercourses. In compliance with the provisions of the Ley Forestal and the Reglamento de Fraccionamiento, the forested strips adjacent to permanent watercourses must be maintained, establishing a minimum forested protection area according to the following topographical criteria, based on the map of flat topography:

| --- | --- | | Slope (%) | Protection Width (meters) | | 0-15 | 15 | | 15-30 | 30 | | 30-50 | 50 | | >50 | 100 | The cartographic delimitation must strictly follow the guidelines established by the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN) and the technical specifications of Anexo 2.

Article 5. Lifetime tenure of forested area. The land-use change allowed in forest properties previously authorized by SETENA will be conditional upon the constitution of effective and perpetual mechanisms of lifetime tenure over the area of remaining forest cover, whether it belongs to a private or state natural heritage. Any authorized land-use change must guarantee these areas' lifetime tenure, whose characteristics will be recorded in the corresponding cadastral plan.

Article 6. Environmental easements. The environmental viability resolution that authorizes land-use change will require the mandatory formalization of a perpetual ecological easement over the areas of protection of springs, riverbanks, and steep slopes, as defined in Considerando III of this resolution. This easement must be duly registered in the Public Registry and recorded in the maps of the corresponding cadastral plan.

Article 7. Criteria for the release of the environmental guarantee. For the release of the environmental guarantee deposit set in favor of the MINAE, the interested party must demonstrate before SETENA, through a certification from the institutional technical offices (SINAC, ACOSA, JASEC, among others), the effective recovery and maintenance of the forest cover in the easement and lifetime tenure areas, as well as the full functionality of the environmental offset measures imposed in the EIA resolution. The performance guarantees, which could be used to compensate for non-compliance with the PSA or PSAH programs, will remain in force during the entire period of monitoring and post-EIA control, in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 of this regulation.

Article 8. Exceptions for public interest projects. The developments declared as national or public interest by the Poder Ejecutivo, and executed by entities such as ICE, MOPT, CNE, among others, may exceptionally manage the compensation of the land-use change through the mechanisms established by the PSA program, with the prior binding technical approval of the MINAE, subject to the current payment rates defined by FONAFIFO. In such cases, the project must present a compensation plan that guarantees at least a 1:1 ratio for affected primary forests.

Article 9. Institutional coordination. SETENA will coordinate with the IMN, the IGN, and the competent institutional technical offices (SINAC, INDER) the verification of the technical information presented, within the framework of the respective conventions and inter-institutional cooperation agreements, including CONARE and JASEC, to guarantee the physical consistency of the declared coordinates in the field.

Article 10. Effective date. This Technical Guide will become effective upon its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta.

As the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) established that the defendant, through the actions he was accused of, had caused damage, its claim was framed within a subjective extra-contractual civil liability for one's own actions based on willful misconduct (dolo).

In the judgment, when analyzing the criminal matter, it was not established that he carried out the conduct described in both the public and private accusations; that is, the factual and legal basis had already been set forth and analyzed, so it was not necessary to repeat it to support the civil decision, nor was it necessary for the judgment to analyze the other sources of civil liability because they were not the ones invoked by the civil plaintiff, and in this matter the principle of congruence and its derived prohibitions of *ultra* or *extrapetita* apply. It is true that the civil action for damages is accessory to the criminal one and there is relative autonomy between both claims, but when what is sought in the civil sphere depends on the accused having committed the act and this is not proven, it is clear that the criminal aspect affects the civil one insofar as it prevents proving the causal link, which is one of the elements, along with the generating event and the damage, that must be demonstrated in the civil sphere. Regardless of the type of compensation sought (in this case for social damage), this does not change the fact that the source of liability is subjective and not objective, and, this being so, the plaintiff party had to prove that the accused carried out the conduct (own act), that there was damage, and that it was that action which generated the damage (causal link). As the first element was not proven, the last one does not exist either, and, therefore, the decision is correct. On the other hand, while it may be that some people were affected by the events and two of them testified at trial, this neither allows for an extrapolation to the “affectation of public tranquility,” nor, even if it hypothetically could be done, does it allow for proving the causal link which is found lacking, as that would only speak to another element (the damage) but not to the referenced link in which the civil defendant must be subjectively involved, which was not done in this case. The fact that several courts have accepted a civil claim in other cases where the three elements for conviction were indeed demonstrated (generating event, social damage, and causal link) did not obligate the *a quo* to conduct the specific analysis, nor did it obligate the granting of the awards if, in the specific case, which is the one that matters, that proof was not provided. Nor does this chamber understand the reason for alleging that the court is an expert of experts when such an aphorism allows for resolving matters related to controversies between expert criteria, none of which is evidenced here, and although, in some cases where the law authorizes it, courts may make a prudential estimate of the amount of compensation, that does not mean the civil plaintiff party does not have to demonstrate the damage (what is estimated is the amount to pay, not the existence of the damage), which was also not held as proven in this instance. Therefore, the complaints must be dismissed.

**V.-** As a **third complaint from the Procuraduría General de la República**, the same arguments of lack of reasoning, violation of sound criticism, and improper application of the law are raised, but this time concerning articles 16, 38, and 267 of the Código Procesal Penal, 3 subsection i), 20 and 21 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, 50 of the Constitución Política, and 73.2 subsection 4 of the Código Procesal Civil vigente. It says that the State is ordered to pay costs for considering that it had no plausible reason to litigate because, with no evidence and the facts not being crimes, the complaint was improper and the State's claim is reckless. However, it maintains that at the time the briefs of complaint and civil action were filed, the accused facts revealed the eventual commission of an unlawful act to the detriment of the community and the production of damage of considerable proportions (despite which it was prudentially estimated at an extremely low amount). It adds that there was a prosecutorial accusation, and that is the plausible reason to litigate. It copies the content of the article referring to the order to pay costs and says that the Procuraduría General de la República bases its action on broad regulations that legally obligate it to bring criminal and civil actions against whoever is presumably responsible for the reported and accused facts, according to the investigation carried out by the Ministerio Público. It refers to the content of the Ley Orgánica of its institution, which, in its articles 20 and 21, establishes that prosecutors "...are absolutely prohibited from acquiescing, compromising, conciliating, or desisting from the lawsuits or claims" and "...from failing to bring the lawsuits or claims in which they must intervene as plaintiffs..." Therefore, the actions taken here, it continues, respond to duties imposed by law, and not doing so implies a serious breach of the cited express prohibition. It maintains that both the complaint and the civil action for damages were subject to analysis by the court of the intermediate stage, which, as guarantor of the parties' rights, examined the accusatory pieces and considered it appropriate to elevate them to trial, thus overcoming the filter of the preliminary hearing and affirming the sufficient degree of probability for the continuation of the proceedings. It considers it was not appropriate to punish the State for an action it was compelled to file. It provides references of multiple rulings from different courts that allude, in similar situations, to its represented party’s plausible reason to litigate. It mentions that there is no bad faith, no abuse of right, and they did not proceed in an arbitrary or reckless manner, but rather acted in accordance with the legal and constitutional requirements that obligate them to act, and therefore, that representation should have been exempted from costs due to the existence of the cited plausible reason to litigate, and instead, they were ordered to pay them through an unfounded decision. It requests the revocation of this point. In a **third section**, although without numbering, **of the appeal from the complainant represented by Navas**, it refers to the order to pay costs. It states that her represented party has acted in defense of citizens' rights given the objectivity of the facts that were of general knowledge as public facts. Initially, a report was filed, and the complaint was made because there was an accusation from the Ministerio Público, and they were given a hearing. The matter was elevated to trial in the preliminary hearing, such that there has been plausible reason to litigate. It requests annulling the judgment on this point. There were no written responses. In the oral hearing held, *Attorney Navas Montero, as complainant*, expanded on her appeal, indicating that she was filing it both personally —as a Costa Rican citizen by popular action— and in her capacity as legal representative of the “Asociación Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica”. She argues they acted in good faith, to the point that there was a prosecutorial accusation, so the order to pay costs was not appropriate. *Attorney Margot Avellán*, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, complains about her represented party being ordered to pay costs which, in her opinion, also lacks reasoning, since they acted in accordance with the law, to the point that failing to bring an action when diffuse or collective interests are involved is a serious breach, and the entity she represents waited for the prosecutorial accusation to be ready to decide what to do. She indicates they did not initiate the proceedings or accuse first; that the action passed the filter of a judge at the preliminary stage, and that it is unknown where the amount for costs set by the judge came from, as there is no reasoning. *Attorney Carlos García* indicated that the order for the State to pay costs is appropriate because a citizen is being stigmatized, since he had no participation in the 2018 strike, no prior crime was investigated, illegal evidence was used, and it was not a crime of mere passage. **The complaints are heard together as they refer to the same issue and will be dismissed.** To examine this topic, it is convenient to set forth both the court's reasoning and this chamber's interpretation of the prevailing rules on costs when litigating in criminal matters (an aspect in which, as will be seen, some controversy has existed) to, finally, descend to the specific case. **(A) Description of what happened.** In this matter, criminal action was brought by both the Ministerio Público and two complainants: the “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” and the Procuraduría General de la República. The latter entity also brought a civil action for damages. In the judgment, the issue of costs was resolved as follows: «*V.- COSTS: In accordance with the provisions of articles 266, 267, 270, and 367 of the Código Procesal Penal, it is appropriate to determine matters relating to the costs derived from the present action, which as a rule must be borne by the losing party, and only exceptionally is it appropriate to exempt it from payment when it is considered that there was a plausible reason to litigate, and this is based on the fact that if one sues in pursuit of claims to which one believes to have a right, one must also assume responsibility for unfounded actions. In the case now before us, both the costs in the criminal aspect and in the civil aspect must be borne by the losing party, because in no way is it considered that there was a plausible reason to litigate, if it is taken into account that the reported facts, according to the evidence that was provided, do not even constitute a crime, as it is considered that in the case before us, the stratum of typicality was not even overcome, and even the complaints were based on evidence containing elements completely different from those offered, or that once offered, it was not even verified that they were effectively incorporated into the proceedings. The complaint from the Procuraduría makes an evidentiary offer almost identical to that of the Ministerio Público without the state representation even taking the trouble to verify that the evidence offered was pertinent and, most importantly, that it effectively contained what was indicated in the offer, and not as was proven in the record, in the recital concerning the evidentiary analysis, where it was assumed that the DVD evidence that had been seized by the Judicial Investigation Agency contained the defendant's statements, when in reality it contained the interview given by the complainant days later to a television channel. And on the other hand, the complaint from the Movimiento Ciudadano offered a piece of evidence that was never effectively seized and therefore incorporated into the proceedings, without this being verified beforehand, but only at the moment the material evidence was being incorporated into the debate, in the first hearing on December 8th, where the complainant, after minute 23 of the recording and prior information from the Court about the videos that had been admitted as evidence, acknowledged that it was not admitted and that they had set it, and despite this, a brief allusion was made when delivering conclusions. Added to this, they complained about a fact —the eighth one— regarding which it cannot even be deduced what crime the defendant could have instigated another to commit, since the presumably aggrieved person did not even want to report, and despite this, the complainants continued with the complaint regarding this fact —this as deduced from folio 216 verso of the case file, where the order for trial indicates that the complaint admitted from Movimiento Ciudadano CR is that of folios 1 to 20 of the respective bundle, which consists of eight facts—. Furthermore, the Court cannot fail to consider that the complaints, which as already stated do not constitute the crime charged nor any crime, had legal representation for their filing, and finally, regarding the civil action, besides the fact that article 270 of the Código Procesal Penal is very clear on who must bear the costs, it is also not considered that litigation was conducted in good faith, since regarding the evidence offered, the questions would be the same as for the complaint filed by that party, adding that it did not even bother to provide the evidence it offered to gather at its own expense, namely the assessment of damages and costs for expenses for eventual preventive measures to safeguard public peace, which was part of the list with which it was intended to prove the social damage suffered, as recorded in point VII of the brief filing the civil action for damages. Thus, upon determining the inexistence of plausible reason to litigate according to the foregoing, the costs derived from the complaints and civil action are borne by the losing parties, which are set at the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to the civil action and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to each of the complaints. The agreed sums must be paid once this judgment becomes final, by simple bank deposit into the Court's account.*» (Cfr. judgment, folio 481 front and back). **(B) Rules on costs in the criminal process.** Before descending to the analysis of the issue, it is necessary to have clarity on the rules in force regarding costs within the criminal process. In ruling number 2012-1052 (R. Chinchilla, L. García and E. Salinas), adopted, resumed, and expanded upon in ruling number 2015-909 (R. Chinchilla, L. García and R. Obando) and in ruling number 2017-291 (R. Chinchilla, A.I. Solís and J. Campos), whose criterion is shared by the current panel, reference was made to the regulatory framework on costs, whose general rule is the order against the losing party, with exceptions based on evident good faith, although other provisions seemed to contain presumably special provisions different from that general rule. Although the emphasis of those pronouncements was on civil action matters, the arguments, by parity of reasoning in many cases, are extensible to the complaint. Thus, it was said then —and is reiterated now— that even though the civil action for damages is brought within the criminal process, being accessory, it is done in accordance with the rules established by this Code (article 41 of the Código Procesal Penal). Thus, article 267 of the Código Procesal Penal, although it mandates, as a rule of principle, that costs be borne by the losing party, also indicates that it may be exempted, totally or partially, from these, “*when there is a plausible reason to litigate*,” which is nothing other than the same regulation that exists in civil matters under the concept of “*evident good faith*” (article 222 of the repealed Código Procesal Civil No. 7130 and article 73.2 of the Código Procesal Civil vigente). It is true that this chamber, with panels partially similar to the current one and under the name of Tribunal de Casación Penal, on different occasions stated: «*The first thing to indicate is that, as a counterpart to the right of action or access to justice, there is an obligation to finance the expenses that the process generates. This obligation falls, as a general rule, on the party that has been defeated, since, by not having extrajudicially recognized the claim of the winning party, it forced the latter to make use of the jurisdictional apparatus. This rule, that the losing party bears the expenses arising from the process, is practically universal. Traditional procedural doctrine sets it forth thusly* (...) *{CHIOVENDA, José. La condena en costas. Translation by Juan de la Puente y Quijano. Madrid, 1928, p. 220* (...) *CHIOVENDA, José. Derecho procesal civil: principios. Tomo II. Cárdenas editor y distribuidor, México, 1990 edition* (...) *CARNELUTTI, Francesco. Derecho procesal civil y penal. Translation by Enrique Figueroa Alfonzo. Colección de clásicos del derecho, México, 1994, p. 80.* } *Now, the costs of the process or judicial costs, as inferred from the above, cannot be confused with procedural costs. The first is the generic category that has two components: personal costs, which include attorney's fees, and procedural costs, which are all the remaining expenses arising from the process* (...) *In Costa Rican law, the various current procedural codes in different matters include the obligation that the ruling on the issue of costs be made, imperatively and even ex officio, in the resolution that ends the process, and that this burden falls on the losing party. This general rule, which excludes the issue of costs from causing the ruling to incur lack of congruence due to ultra or extrapetitia* (...) *is excepted, however, in some provisions that foresee the possibility that, facultatively, other guidelines may be applied:* (...) *Now, the matter thus approached —questioned in modern general theory of process based on principles such as free access to justice, but without such criticism having had major practical repercussions in world legislation— was put in check, a long time before, in criminal procedural law, given the nature (public or collective) of the conflict decided therein and the existence of international human rights instruments that obligate the states that have signed them to provide, mandatorily, a free defense for the accused who, against their will, is brought into the process but is protected by a constitutional state of innocence, as well as by the state’s duty to provide its population with suitable mechanisms to resolve their most important conflicts (cfr.: articles 8.2.a and 8.2.e of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14.2.d and 14.2.f of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establish the right of the accused to be assisted free of charge by a translator or interpreter and for the State to provide them with a lawyer). This differentiated treatment of the issue, although it maintains the same principles, incorporates additional ones and is manifested in the evolution with which such topics have been addressed in the different criminal procedural legislations that have succeeded one another in Costa Rica* (...) *¬Código Procesal Penal (1996): "Article 265. Costs of the accused. In every process, the State shall cover the expenses related to the accused and the other parties who enjoy the benefit of litigating without their collection. When the accused has economic solvency, they must pay the Poder Judicial for the services of the public defender or any other they have received. For this, the procedure established in the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial shall be followed, regarding the public defender. Payment of the official translator or interpreter is exempt from this duty." "Article 266. Necessary Resolution. The criminal court must rule in a reasoned manner on the payment of procedural and personal costs when issuing the resolution that terminates the case." "Article 267. Fixing of costs. The costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is a plausible reason to litigate. When there are several parties ordered to pay costs, the court shall fix the proportional part corresponding to each one, without prejudice to the solidarity established by law."* (...) *"Article 270. Civil action.* If the civil claim is admitted in the judgment, the accused and the civilly liable third party shall jointly bear the costs (costas); if the claim is rejected, the civil claimant shall bear them. If the action cannot proceed, each intervening party shall bear their own costs (costas), unless the parties have agreed to another measure or the court, due to the circumstances of the case, distributes them in another manner. [...]

Thus, in Costa Rican criminal procedural law, certain exceptions arise to the treatment of this topic in other branches of law, whether public or private. Therefore, although the rule is that costs (costas) are borne by the losing party, if that party is the criminal defendant, a distinction must be made between procedural costs (costas procesales) and expenses. The latter, that is, the expenses that incorporate the payment of the translator or interpreter, will always be borne by the State, as provided in Article 265 of the cited Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), and, regarding attorney's fees, the defendant may be exempted from payment if and only if two situations converge: a) that their defense counsel is a public defender; and b) that they lack the resources to reimburse the State for the payment of their fees. [...]

Although this latter position has been academically questioned regarding its constitutionality when the defendant is acquitted (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416..."), the truth is that it has not yet been questioned through the proper procedural channels, which means it remains in force. [...]

However, if the legal professional representing the accused person is private, or if, being paid by the State, the accused has the resources to pay for it (an aspect that, as indicated, can be elucidated in the enforcement stage according to what the judgment has decided on the matter), a ruling imposing personal costs (costas personales) will imply that it is the accused or sentenced person who pays their attorney's fees, and not that the attorney can demand such remuneration from the State, as would happen if the cited rule were erroneously interpreted or applied and, out of ignorance, the defendant were always exempted from paying both types of costs (costas) or the State were always ordered to pay them. [...]

The same occurs if the losing party is the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), for whom there is also a legal exemption from the collection of both types of costs (costas), as provided in Article 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). [...]

The issue has been treated in various ways by this same Court, with different panels, seemingly tending always to require justification and even to accept exemption as an exception for all cases. [...] However, these rules are for the ordinary criminal procedure, since it must be considered that in other types of special criminal proceedings (private prosecution, for example) and in matters of civil claims (demandas civiles), there are special rules that displace these general provisions. There, the general rule is that the losing party always faces both types of costs (costas), and the possibility of exemption is not available since the special rule does not allow for it. This is how Articles 78 (express withdrawal of the public-action complaint–querella–where the conviction for costs–costas–of the withdrawing party is imperatively ordered, unless the parties agree otherwise), 118, second paragraph (withdrawal of the civil claim–acción civil), 384 (withdrawal of the private-action complaint–querella–where the conviction for costs–costas–of the withdrawing party is imperatively ordered, unless the parties agree otherwise), and 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) (conviction of the unsuccessful civil party–parte civil vencida) provide (see, in this sense, the vote of this Court, with a panel partially different from the current one, number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 -U. Zúñiga, Llobet, and Salazar- and the note in vote number 2010-0085 of January 17, 2010 -Camacho, García, and U. Zúñiga-. To the contrary, that is, accepting plausible reason to litigate as an exception in all cases, the votes of this Chamber, with different panels, numbers 2006-1035 of September 29, 2006 -García, Porras, and Morales- and 2000-119 of February 11, 2000 -López, Sanabria, and Arroyo-, which address the issue albeit with criteria differing from that set forth here). On the other hand, the supplementary application of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) is also not possible, since there is an express rule to the contrary. [...]

The emphasis is supplied. See votes of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal (Tribunal de Casación Penal) number 2010-0305 of 2:40 p.m. on March 19, 2010 (L. García, R. Chinchilla, and U. Zúñiga) and number 2010-0366 of 3:20 p.m. on April 8, 2010 (R. Chinchilla, U. Zúñiga, and R. Gullock). Under similar conditions and adopting the previous criterion, cfr.: vote number 2011-1296 of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia). That position, in general terms, was endorsed or maintained in the antecedents reviewed above, except regarding the imperative conviction in costs (costas) of the civil claim (demanda civil) for the losing party, an issue on which there was a reconsideration of the matter based on constitutional principles of higher hierarchy than the law (such as equality before the law: Article 34 of the Constitution) and that criterion was expressly modified. For this, it was stated —in the cited votes number 2015-909 and number 2017-291— that although the criminal procedural legislation contains a special rule (relating to the civil claim–demanda civil) that imperatively establishes the conviction for costs (costas) against the unsuccessful civil party (parte civil perdidosa), this treatment is different from that provided to the same party had they resorted to the ordinary civil route. On the other hand, in many instances, the civil claim (demanda civil) cannot succeed because the factual basis on which it rests, while established as probable, was not proven with the certainty required for a criminal conviction, and this, added to conceptual errors of the parties who have not incorporated different criteria for the imputation of damage into their submissions, often leads to the rejection of civil claims (pretensiones civiles). Finally, although the rule (the final phrase of the first paragraph of Article 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code–Código Procesal Penal) is imperative, so too is Article 267, and, within the same Book and Title and immediately after, the provision for exemption is inserted (Article 267, first paragraph, ab initio, of the Criminal Procedure Code–Código Procesal Penal). That is to say, exemption is provided precisely to make the rigor of the imperative rules referred to therein more flexible, both provisions being at the same level of general rules. Combining all of this, it can be concluded that the imperative conviction for costs (costas) against the unsuccessful civil party (parte perdidosa civil), with the possibility of a discretionary (and justified) exemption for said party made by the court, are the rules in force on the matter which, thus, are made uniform with those of the ordinary civil process and which, as is the origin of both provisions, allows for the resolution of the specific case with greater justice, in order to restore social harmony (Article 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code–Código Procesal Penal), a position that, ultimately, this chamber considers correct.

(C) The Specific Case. From the transcription made at the beginning of this considerando, it is possible to conclude that the judgment on the merits did indeed expressly and extensively justify said conviction for costs (costas), meaning that the defect of lack of proper justification contained in Article 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) is not present. On the other hand, the factual assertions from which it started (that accusations were made without verifying or providing evidence; that conclusions were drawn without support from the material presented at trial; that facts of the private complaint–querella privada were not corrected despite no supporting material being contributed for them; that it was not until the trial stage that the lack of evidence was noticed, etc.) have not been disputed by the parties, and this chamber has verified that they are true, that is, they derive from what really happened in the process, so there are also no errors in this matter. Now then, what remains to be determined is whether the discretion (to order payment of costs–costas or not) was applied correctly by the court of merit, or whether there was abuse or arbitrariness in this regard, and, in this exercise, this chamber concludes that there is also no defect to be declared. It is noted that although the parties appealing this issue maintain that they filed a complaint (querellaron) once the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) filed an accusation and that they proceeded through the process under the protection of a trial commencement order (auto de apertura a juicio) issued by a jurisdictional authority that, consequently, reviewed the documents and determined compliance with the requirements to reach this procedural phase, what they do not say is that such a decision of the intermediate-stage tribunal is based on probability, not certainty, and such probability in turn derives from the picture that the parties themselves present to the jurisdictional entity in their writings. Said tribunal does not examine the evidence to determine if it establishes what they affirm they will provide; rather, it assumes it in good faith, meaning that the fact that this tribunal ordered the commencement of trial does not endorse the conduct of the subjects who provided the information—for example, the private complainant (querellante privada) introducing facts (such as fact 8) for which no evidence was provided, or the state entities failing to review the offered material to determine if it has the content they stipulate in their writing. The state representatives, with even greater responsibility than a private individual, have a duty of objectivity (Article 63 of the Criminal Procedure Code–Código Procesal Penal and Article 10, subsection l) of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office–Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República), making it even more reprehensible for them to initiate accusations without adequate evidentiary support or to make legal interpretations that exceed the framework of the Democratic Rule of Law which they are obligated to respect. Furthermore, although the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) has legal prohibitions against yielding, settling, withdrawing, or conciliating, it has no obligation to accuse those whom others determine it must accuse; rather, it has its own criteria and functional independence for that purpose. What Article 15 of the Organic Law (Ley Orgánica) indicates is that: “Article 15°.- The officials of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) (...) They are also prohibited, without the aforementioned prior authorization, from: failing to file claims or demands in which they must intervene as plaintiffs, omitting to respond to transfers or hearings granted to them, failing to present the legal evidence that it is their duty to produce, abandoning the evidence they have proposed, failing to timely file legal remedies against acts executed or resolutions issued against the demands or petitions they have presented, or to the detriment of the interests whose defense is entrusted to them” (emphasis omitted). That is, the prohibition lies in doing so without authorization, and the determination of when one must intervene responds to a value judgment by the head of office, meaning there is no obligatory duty without the possibility of departing from the mandate that the prosecutor asserts. Furthermore, none of the foregoing excuses her from her obligation to review the evidentiary material, especially when it is of a documentary nature, to verify that the content of what is offered is accurate, which evidently was not done in this case, as the parties did not realize that the supposed video containing the interventions of the accused (querellado) was not an original, was edited, and was never provided. Regarding the private complainants (querellantes particulares), their good faith is also not evidenced, not only due to the errors and omissions already mentioned but also for including events for which no evidence was adduced and for not taking care to filter some of their statements in light of other constitutional rights, including those derived from freedom of expression (of which social protest is a part) and union rights, which are also human rights of individuals, and given the clash of these with other fundamental rights of other individuals, there is an obligation to make balancing judgments which, in this case, were completely omitted. Moreover, no one can arrogate to themselves the rights of others or the exercise of national sovereignty (Article 2 of the Political Constitution–Constitución Política), and the fact that some people feel affected by certain actions does not imply that "public tranquility" is thereby affected in terms of the criminal offense invoked as the basis for the compensation that was the exercise attempted, because accepting this would lead to unacceptable abuses which, in times of deep crises of various kinds and great social polarization, could create regrettable abuses. This being the case, this chamber does not consider that any defect or omission exists in the reasoning expressed by the court of merit on this issue, and this leads to the rejection of the complaints. Regarding the amount, it is true that the appealed resolution did not explain the procedure for arriving at it, but merely referred to the conviction and the sums thereof: "The costs (costas) derived from the complaints (querellas) and civil claim (acción civil) are charged to the losing parties, which are set at the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to the civil claim (acción civil) and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to the complaints (querellas)." (Emphasis omitted, capitalization is from the original). However, if a simple arithmetic exercise is performed regarding the content of the decree applicable to this matter, it will be noted that there is no grievance. This matter began, as initially set forth (considerando II.A), in September 2019, a date on which Executive Decree No. 41457-JP of October 17, 2018, was in force, "Tariff of Fees for Professional Legal and Notarial Services," which began to govern on February 1, 2019, and establishes the minimum amounts for professional fees in those areas. In Title III, relating to judicial matters, Chapter I (general tariff for knowledge-based processes), Article 19, as of the date of the judgment (which was handed down in December 2021—a date that is important because the decree underwent reforms in September 2022 that do not apply to this case, being subsequent to the decision sought to be reviewed), established: “Article 19.- Fees in processes of inestimable amount. The minimum fees for this type of process may not be less than two hundred forty-two thousand colones.” For its part, Chapter VIII (Criminal Process) established the following special rules: «Article 38.- Single-judge Court: In criminal cases under the jurisdiction of a Single-judge Court, the minimum fees for the criminal defense shall be four hundred eighty-four thousand colones. Unless a written agreement states otherwise, fees shall be paid as follows: a) One third for the investigation stage. b) One third for the holding of the preliminary hearing. c) One third for the holding of the oral trial. In those cases where the process concludes through the application of an abbreviated procedure or an alternative measure, the fees shall be seventy-five percent (75%) of the total fees for the process. The fees corresponding to the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) shall be governed by the rules established for that matter in this Tariff. The same rules shall apply to the attorney exercising the complaint (querella) in cases of crimes subject to public prosecution.» (Emphasis added). As can be noted, this minimum fee was what was set as personal costs (costas personales) for each complaint (querella), meaning there is no prejudice whatsoever in the lack of reasoning. With regard to the civil claim (acción civil), Article 42 of the cited decree stated: «Article 42.- Civil Claim (Acción Civil): The fees for the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) are independent of those corresponding to the processing of the criminal case. The Attorney for the civil plaintiff (actor civil) shall charge fees for this claim (acción) in accordance with the General Tariff, unless a written agreement states otherwise. The fees shall be paid in three equal parts as follows: a) For its filing. b) For the holding of the preliminary hearing. c) For the holding of the oral trial. The attorney representing the civil defendant (demandado civil) shall earn equal fees.» (Emphasis added). This tariff is regulated by Article 16.a of the tariff schedule, establishing, among other parameters, 20% of the amount if the value thereof does not exceed 16 million colones.

As in this case one million colones was sought, 20% reaches two hundred thousand colones, an amount that was superior to the amount set (of 121 thousand colones which, consequently, is also lower than the minimum fee contemplated in Article 19), so the appellant party was instead favored, and such a thing cannot be reversed since the prejudiced party did not file an appeal on this point (principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius). In short, there is no grievance whatsoever to declare and therefore this point must also be rejected.

**VI.- Note from Judge Vargas González:** I concur with what was resolved in all aspects except for the following: **i)** regarding the indication that the crime of public instigation (instigación pública) has, as one of its constituent elements, publicity, an aspect I do not share. In my opinion, the objective elements of the criminal type are those literally set forth within it and not those that derive implicitly or are drawn from its title or from historical or systematic interpretation, so that, given that publicity is not included in the criminal type in question, it is not part of the crime concerned nor did it require being encompassed by the perpetrator's intent (dolo). However, this does not affect the adopted decision to reject the appeals in criminal matters, as this is based on the rest of the unanimous arguments (unlawful evidence (prueba ilícita), lack of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, as well as interpreting "crimes against public order (delitos contra la tranquilidad pública)" restrictively to only understand those included in the section so named in the Criminal Code and not all those that affect said legal right). **ii)** Regarding the proposition that in our country the right to protest could justify the obstruction of main public roads. Although the analysis carried out in point **(C)** of this decision, called "*International Human Rights Law and the Criminal Code: integration and systematic application*" is made for the sake of fullness of argument [since in this matter common instigation was dismissed given that acts of execution of the crimes of disruption of public services (art. 263 of the Criminal Code) or obstruction of public roads (art. 263 bis of the same code) did not materialize, and the so-called "*public instigation (instigación pública)*" (article 280 C.P.) was also excluded insofar as the recently mentioned crimes are not contemplated within Title X of the Criminal Code, called "*Crimes against public order (Delitos contra la tranquilidad pública)*"] after pondering that in Costa Rica the road infrastructure is chaotic and alternate routes practically do not exist (unlike what happens in other latitudes), I conclude that the closure of the main national highways indisputably affects the fundamental rights of other citizens, at least their right to free movement (libre tránsito). Consequently, in our current context, the exercise of the indicated rights (for example, social protest, union freedom, right to strike, and freedom of expression) cannot be invoked as a valid justification (causa de justificación) for the aforementioned behaviors (had these occurred, which is not the case). Also, for what I have just stated, I do not share one of the arguments given by my colleagues to conclude that the order of legal costs (costas) decreed against the private complainants is appropriate, namely: "*[…] for not taking care to sift some of their manifestations in light of other constitutional rights, including those derived from freedom of expression (of which social protest is a part) and union rights, which are also human rights of individuals, and given the clash of these with other fundamental rights of other persons there exists an obligation to carry out balancing judgments which in this case were entirely omitted*". Now, having made this caveat, I agree with the resolution of the claims made in civil matters and legal costs (costas), because there are other reasonings in the judgment on the merits (sentencia de mérito) that support the decision adopted by the a quo (for example, the atypicality (atipicidad) of the attributed conduct) and on which it is unnecessary to make further considerations.

**POR TANTO:** The appeals filed by the prosecutor, Máster Oscar Quirós Soto; by Licenciada Margot Avellán Ruíz, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, complainant and civil plaintiff; and by Licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, attorney-in-fact of the persons acting as complainants under the name "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" are declared without merit. Judge Vargas González adds a note. **NOTIFÍQUESE.** ***Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón*** ***Patricia Vargas González Kathya Jiménez Fernández*** Appellate Judges of Criminal Sentencing *Expediente: 19-000647-0619-PE (7)* *Accused: [Name 001]* *Victim: Public order (La tranquilidad pública)* *Crime: Public instigation (Instigación pública)* **DDURANC** From the state of innocence (formerly misnamed presumption) it follows that, in case of doubt regarding factual circumstances, the course most favorable to the accused person must be followed (article 9 of the <a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" style=\"text-decoration: none;\" data-mce-href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">Código Procesal Penal</span></a>).\"</span></p>\n\r\n" ...no contradiction or erroneous assessment is observed in the decision to hold the meeting as private. Ms. Navas, however, criticizes that the proven facts did not state that, although the event was "of a private nature (...), it transcended into public opinion (trascendió a la opinión pública)" (cfr. folio 500, boldface added). Now, on this particular topic, that is, regarding the dissemination to public opinion, the trial court's judgment could not have considered it accredited because it proceeded from the thesis that the audiovisual material was illicit evidence (prueba ilícita) and, therefore, everything derived from that spurious source was also illicit. The appealed decision reaches this conclusion for two reasons: a) because the defendant did not authorize the capture of his image and voice, and the recording, as the witness López Dávila stated above (supra), is seen to have been made surreptitiously, from the back of the hall, and the meeting was private, and b) because although some videos were provided, these were manipulated (one cut and another edited), which cast doubt on the chain of custody (cadena de custodia) of the material and on whether what was captured therein corresponded to what the defendant wanted to say and actually stated, since it could have been taken out of context. Both positions are derived and were reached respecting the rules of correct human understanding, without this court visualizing errors in the argumentation. Indeed, if there is no evidence whatsoever determining that the event was freely and openly accessible to the public, then it must be considered private and, within this framework, protected by the right of assembly (derecho de reunión) and the capture of the voice and image of persons encompassed by the right to privacy (derecho a la intimidad) [...]

...On the other hand, even if the audiovisual material were lawful—which it has already been stated it is not, and this is alluded to only in an analytical-hypothetical manner—, the original document was not provided because the police could not seize it, and those submitted have evident cuts and dates different from the one on which the events occurred, which are indications of their manipulation. It must be remembered that the chain of custody (cadena de custodia) refers to the process by which it is guaranteed that a certain material element seized at the scene where the event took place is the same one that is examined by experts or that reaches the trial, the purpose of which is to guarantee its purity and any eventual evidentiary value (valor probatorio), direct or circumstantial, that it may have. This institute also applies to digital and videographic evidence, characterized by its volatility and ease of manipulation, hence the need to preserve the identity between what was seized and what is exhibited in the hearing and to ensure that this has not been modified.

III. [...] The constitutionality of the offense of public instigation (instigación pública) has been questioned on several occasions, although not all of them have resulted in a ruling on the merits. Thus, through <a style="text-decoration: none;" href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-242202" data-mce-href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-242202" data-mce-style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;" data-mce-style="text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;">Voto 2003-5410</span></a> of June 25, 2003, an argument regarding the impact this provision would have on the rights to freedom of expression and movement was summarily dismissed because the issue of unconstitutionality had not been previously raised in those proceedings.

In this matter, the defendant started from the same panorama and evidenced the conflict of constitutional and conventional rights at play, which is why—as indicated in the initial recital (considerando inicial)—the defendant filed the unconstitutionality action number 21-024578-0007-CO against numeral 280 of the <a style=\"text-decoration: none;\" href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" data-mce-href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">Código Penal</span></a>. Although the action was admitted and the respective edicts were published in judicial bulletins numbers 18 through 20 dated January 28 to February 1, respectively, all of 2022, it was resolved through vote number 2023-00430 of January 11 of the current year, which ordered: [...]\"</span></p> "IV. [...] As the appellant rightly states, the essence of the rejection, as confirmed, is that, since the criminal liability of the accused was not established and the claimed liability is a subjective civil liability for one's own act, it was not possible to grant the civil lawsuit, a conclusion that is, indeed, correct, without needing further elaboration, as the complainant seems to miss, since all the reasons put forward in other parts of the judgment to support the acquittal (the correctness of which has already been examined and endorsed) are integrated into this part of the decision. Recall that judgments are a unit of logical-legal meaning where its different parts cannot be read in isolation. In matters of civil liability—as already pointed out to the same attorney in another matter, see vote number 2023-349 at 08:15 hours on March 13 last—the doctrine distinguishes two types: contractual and extracontractual. The first arises from [...]" "**V. [...] (B) Rules on procedural costs in criminal proceedings.** Before proceeding to the analysis of the issue, it is necessary to be clear on the current rules regarding procedural costs (costas) within the criminal process. In vote number <a style=\"text-decoration: none;\" href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-546477\" data-mce-href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-546477\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">2012-1052 (R. Chinchilla, L. García and E. Salinas)</span></a> adopted, retaken, and expanded upon in vote <a style=\"text-decoration: none;\" href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-643535\" data-mce-href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-643535\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">number 2015-909 (R. Chinchilla, L. García and R. Obando)</span></a> and in <a style=\"text-decoration: none;\" href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-705902\" data-mce-href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-705902\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">vote number 2017-291 (R. Chinchilla, A.I. Solís and J. Campos)</span></a>, a criterion shared by the current panel, reference was made to the normative regulation on procedural costs whose <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">general</span> rule is the imposition of costs on the losing party with exceptions based on evident good faith (buena fe), although other provisions seemed to have purportedly special and different rules from that general rule. Although the emphasis of those pronouncements was on the civil action (acción civil) matter, the arguments, by parity of reasoning in many cases, are extensible to the private criminal complaint (querella). It was stated then—and is reiterated now—that even though the civil compensatory action (acción civil resarcitoria) is exercised within the criminal process, being accessory, it is done in accordance with the rules established by this Code (Article 41 of the <a style=\"text-decoration: none;\" href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" data-mce-href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">Código Procesal Penal</span></a>). Thus, numeral 267 of the <a style=\"text-decoration: none;\" href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" data-mce-href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">Código Procesal Penal</span></a>, although&nbsp;obligating, as a rule of principle, that procedural costs&nbsp;be borne by the losing party, also indicates that they may be exempted, totally or partially, from these, "<span style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\">when there is a plausible reason to litigate</span>", which is nothing other than the same regulation that exists in civil matters under the concept of&nbsp;<span style=\"font-style: italic;\" data-mce-style=\"font-style: italic;\">"</span><span style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\">evident</span><span style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\">&nbsp;</span><span style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\">good</span><span style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\">&nbsp;</span><span style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\" data-mce-style=\"font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;\">faith</span>" (Article 222 of the <a style=\"text-decoration: none;\" href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=12443&amp;nValor3=128044&amp;strTipM=TC\" data-mce-href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=12443&amp;nValor3=128044&amp;strTipM=TC\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">repealed Código Procesal Civil No. 7130</span></a> and numeral 73.2 of the <a style=\"text-decoration: none;\" href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=81360\" data-mce-href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=81360\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: none;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\" data-mce-style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #0563c1;\">current Código Procesal Civil</span></a>).

It is true that this chamber, with compositions partially similar to the current one and under the name of Criminal Cassation Court, on different occasions stated: [...]" --- "VI.- Note by Judge Vargas González: I concur with the decision in all aspects except for the following: i) regarding the indication that the crime of public instigation has, as one of its constituent elements, that of publicity, an aspect I do not share. In my opinion, the objective elements of the criminal type are those that are literally set forth therein and not those that derive implicitly or are extracted from its title or from historical or systematic interpretation, so that, since publicity is not included in said criminal type, it does not form part of the crime in question nor did it need to be encompassed by the intent of the subject. However, that does not affect the decision reached to reject the appeals on the criminal matter, since it is based on the rest of the unanimous arguments (unlawful evidence, lack of proof, reversal of the burden of proof, as well as restrictively interpreting 'crimes against public tranquility' to only understand those included in the section so named of the Penal Code and not all those that affect said legal interest). ii) Regarding [...]" We refer to the paralysis of essential services starting in June 2018. The entire population suffered, and the leader, supported by the directed groups and in the company of others, sowed chaos in education, in hospitals, in transportation, and in many other public services. Vehicular traffic was interrupted and the population affected by fear and bewilderment. This occurred in the capital city and in other areas of the country. We reiterate, it is a public and notorious fact (...) *Eighth: We likewise file a complaint regarding the act consummated on* ***September 3, 2019*** *in the afternoon outside the Legislative Assembly, when the La Nación journalist [Name 004] was attacked by the mob at the clear instigation of the defendant. He not only provoked aggression with his intervention, but also interrupted the exercise of journalism and denied the right to information to the citizenry, a fundamental right. The event was recorded in the information media and in the same interview given by the defendant on Repretel in the midday edition of September 13, 2019*" (see respective complaint file; folios 511-512, highlights are supplied). On these topics, the trial court judgment was silent both in its recitals section (except for a paragraph alluding to costs) and in the operative part. However, if one observes the appeal of the representative of the "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" (which will be described later), it only alludes to what occurred on September 9, 2019, and does not mention, in any segment of its argument, the prior or subsequent facts *supra* referenced. That silence of the private complainant (the only party legitimized to allege it since it only alluded to facts contained in a complaint filed by her), both in the written brief and in the hearing held at her request, validates the defect (omission) of the judgment, pursuant to the provisions of Article 177(b) of the Código Procesal Penal which states, as relevant: "... *defects shall be deemed validated in the following cases* (...)* b) When those entitled to challenge it have accepted, expressly or tacitly, the effects of the act.*" Furthermore, as stipulated by numerals 439 and 446 of said regulation, the competence of this chamber is circumscribed to the arguments raised, so it is also not possible to carry out an analysis *ex officio*, especially in predominantly accusatorial systems like ours and in the face of appeals from those who accuse, as this would imply substituting and invading those functions. This being the case, the judgment on those matters (from 2018 and September 3, 2019) must be considered final and unassailable. **(E)** In order to address the different topics raised in an orderly and logical manner, we will begin with the analysis of the arguments referring to the lawfulness of the evidence, the assessment of the material, the reasoning, and the determination of the facts; then matters relating to typicity and legal argumentation in general; next, matters concerning the civil action and, finally, costs. Therefore, the order of grievances raised by those appealing will not necessarily be followed, and in some cases, some of their complaints will be addressed jointly. **(F)** To guarantee a fluent reading of the text, without distractions to secondary ideas, but, at the same time, to give this judgment self-sufficiency and facilitate access for those challenging (and reading) to the cited materials, references to public legal documents made in the decision of this chamber (not in the merely descriptive part) are inserted via hyperlink (highlighted by underlining and another text color) which is accessed, in the digitized text, by clicking on the highlighted part.

**II.-** The **Máster Oscar Quirós Soto, coordinating prosecutor of the Public Ministry**, appeals the acquittal judgment, presenting a series of phrases that are mostly generic and applicable to any matter. In what he titles the "**first ground**" of his challenge (which is, in reality, the **only** one), he shows his disagreement with the assessment of the evidence because he considers there was a breach of the rules of sound criticism which, in his opinion, generates improper and contradictory reasoning. He states that the testimonial evidence of Rubén Hernández Valle and Gloria Navas Montero was not correctly analyzed and that, if this had been done and subjective assessments had been omitted, a different decision would have been reached. He considers the appealed judgment to be devoid of reasoning as mention is made of only one of the aspects alluded to by the parties, leaving aside essential circumstances (without stating which ones). He says it was demonstrated that the accused made a series of statements to cause an uproar in the country and although he did so in a private center, the Conferencia Episcopal, this does not prevent the criminal type from being consummated. He criticizes the judge's position that the act must be carried out in a public place. He adds, in a somewhat disordered exposition, that it is not a requirement that the video to be provided be the original, that no one has denounced the improper capture of statements, and that the fact that it was edited does not mean it cannot be assessed, because no one, not even the defendant, has indicated that it was adulterated or that the images contained therein are false. He recalls that in our system there is no weighted evidence and this material was heard by third parties, which would be sufficient. Furthermore, it was seized from a mass media outlet, which would prove, according to the appellant, that the interviewee was making the statements to several people. He adds that, although the crime is found in the title of crimes against public order (tranquilidad pública), that does not mean the solicitation (instigación) must only be for unlawful acts that are in that title, since there are others that affect that legal interest (such as disruption of public service and obstruction of public roads) which are multi-offensive and affect an entire population. He adds that "*It is not true that the criminal type requires determining the will of the masses because the crime is one of danger. The judge's conclusion that what was said by the defendant is not a solicitation but a proposal is not correct; to claim that a person, when soliciting, must say when and how the event is going to happen goes beyond what is required by the criminal type.*" (Cf. folio 490 verso). He maintains that, although the solicitation did not materialize, the criminal type does not require that to happen. Next, the appellant, in a somewhat confusing manner and as a question, adds: "*How does the court intend that, in this type of case, the mere element that the defendant, at the time and in the manner, did not authorize being recorded, exempts him from the crime of Public Solicitation (Instigación Pública), because from the analysis conducted, it is determined that there is no Typicity, nothing could be further from reality. In the opinion of the Public Ministry, the Court reaches an erroneous conclusion in determining that the evidence does not reliably prove the prosecutorial thesis and leaves aside circumstances that were presented by the witnesses and, due to the foregoing and according to the principle of Correlation between Accusation and Judgment, the defendant must be acquitted. In that sense, this representation wishes to point out that we are before credible testimonies that should have been assessed from the perspective of coherence and logic; as the Court takes for granted that there is no coherence in their accounts and that the prosecutorial request was not correct, a very subjective assessment*" (see folio 491 recto and verso; the wording and spelling errors, including the inappropriate use of capital letters, are from the prosecutorial text itself). In a generic way (since he also does not describe, specifically, any), he indicates that there are serious contradictions between what was narrated by the witnesses and what was interpreted by the court and that the court limited itself to pointing out some supposed circumstances expressed by the witnesses. After other abstract statements, valid for any case, about the importance of reasoning, he ends by requesting the nullity of the decision. Likewise, **the licensed Gloria Navas Montero, president of the "Movimiento Ciudadano C.R." and legal representative of the natural persons who compose it and appear as complainants**, alleging a diffuse interest, anticipates that the essential request is the annulment of the judgment on the merits. As a **first argument** for this, she alludes to the lack of reasoning and the erroneous factual assessment that led to the main proven fact. She says it is true that the defendant is the General Secretary of ANEP, a union leader, and on September 9, 2019, he participated in a meeting "*which is said to be of a private nature* *but that transcended into public opinion*" (an underlined condition that she claims was not included as a proven fact, despite the fact that the witnesses of Mr. [Name 001] were at the meeting and know that he addressed the audience present where he uttered the expressions that were complained of and these came to public knowledge). It is also true, she adds, that the accused expressed statements before the meeting participants, and the original video could not be located, but one was provided of the interview that, because of this, she gave to Repretel where, in her judgment, it would be proven that the expressions were made before an audience exacerbated by the leader's attitude and that they were reported to the affected and intimidated public. She says the imputed crime does not distinguish whether the punishable act is committed in public or in private because the crime is of public action and that, therefore, the proven fact is incomplete and this affects the reasoning and generates the grievance, so the court's reasoning does not fully comply with the limits of due process. She adds that upon examining the declaration of Rubén Hernández Valle as well as the one she herself gave, it is established that they felt affected by the statements of Mr. [Name 001] (which have not been denied either by him or by his unions) but that other people were also affected. They learned of this through the press, so the event occurred and became information in public opinion, which is what is affected. She maintains that the defendant publicly indicated that he had indeed made them. She alludes to what Cesar López, witness for the defense, narrated; she denies that what the accused said was an exchange of ideas and states that this witness acknowledged that the video circulated on CRHoy and in several television media. She summarizes the statement of Walter Quesada who pointed out his participation in union movements that have historically produced great economic losses to the country and generated the disruption of education. The appellant says that in 2018 there were almost three months of strike and that "*this history has not produced amnesia in the population*" (folio 501 verso) and that this is the *modus operandi* of the accused, a topic not assessed by the intervening judge. Therefore, the threat proffered within the groups that have supported those movements harmful to the national community was credible. She complains that the judge discarded the interpretation as a whole and the principle of experience, which affected the assessment of the evidentiary material. She denies that this is a political trial, as the accused says, and requests the nullity of the decision. Upon contesting the appeals, the private defense attorneys of the accused indicate that the offended parties refer to facts from 2018 in which Mr. [Name 001] did not even participate; they use illegitimate evidence (a copy of an unauthorized video in its reproduction and whose capture would constitute a crime provided for in Articles 181 to 183 of the Código Penal) and they try to artificially extend public solicitation (instigación pública), to the detriment of legislative will, to articles other than those contemplated as crimes in Title X of the Código "Procesal Penal" (sic) which were not attributed. They say that the accusers' interpretation regarding the elements of this criminal type is general and extensive and they forget that the generic figure of solicitation exists in Article 46 of the Código Penal; they violate —the defense attorneys continue arguing— Articles 25, 26, and 29 of the Constitución Política referring to the freedoms of demonstration or expression, association, and assembly, as well as the principles of legality and criminal typicity, all of which transgresses international standards (for which a copy of an action of unconstitutionality is provided). They add that, through this means, prior censorship is exercised and freedom of expression is curtailed, which opens a window to criminal risk, especially when the person being criminalized is a defender of human rights as the United Nations Rapporteurship classifies union members. They state that public solicitation cannot be carried out in a private setting and the complainant's statement, that such a thing is not distinguished in the criminal type, is an illogical legal thought. They are surprised by the superficiality of the prosecutorial appeal brief and the "template" use of statements, and they add that a case file should never have been opened for this event because "*it is embarrassing*" (folio 532 verso) when the judgment says that the video provided did not meet the minimum requirements to be analyzed because it was not original and that, despite this, the Public Ministry continues with this "*judicial catwalk*" (*ibidem*), which is not a minor thing as it costs taxpayers' money that should be used for other things. They insist that the video is unlawful evidence and so is everything derived from it, so the complainant Navas cannot revive it by incorporating other ones from media outlets that reproduce it and, therefore, it is irrelevant whether the site is public or private. They add that the statements are based on the video and are not from eyewitnesses. They maintain that the judgment is well-reasoned. At the hearing, *licensed Carlos Meléndez, prosecutor of the Public Ministry*, requested to accept his appeal and order a retrial, reiterating the arguments presented in writing. *Licensed Navas Montero, as complainant*, expanded her appeal indicating that she was filing it both personally —as a Costa Rican citizen through popular action— and in her capacity as judicial representative of the persons grouped under the name "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" and that she was doing so for three reasons: for a rupture in the rules of sound criticism in the assessment of the evidence; for an erroneous interpretation of Article 280 of the Código Penal in declaring that the act was not typical and inasmuch as her client was ordered to pay costs (an aspect on which she centers another independent grievance). Regarding the first two aspects, she highlighted that this is a crime of danger and not of result (a relevant topic to associate with the order of costs) and that the interpretation that the phrase was uttered in private is a first error, because it was in the context of a strike, with scandal, obstruction of roads, disruption of hospital services and public transportation, all of which generated chaos and public interest was at stake. The video in which the defendant speaks at the intersectoral meeting is criticized for not being provided in its original, but she intervened as a witness for the Public Ministry and there is freedom of proof. She considers it erroneous to indicate that this crime cannot be applied to criminal types that protect the same legal interest, even if they are found in other sections of the Código Penal. *Licensed Rodrigo Rosales*, criminal defender of the defendant, stated that none of the appellants provided arguments to dismantle what was stated in the judgment, but rather they start from a "*criminal law of the author that would make Günther Jakobs die again*" (sic). He points out that they seek to use unlawful evidence for a double reason: his client was at an activity and in a private venue and a video of him was leaked without his consent or approval which, as if that were not enough, was edited. *Licensed Carlos García* indicated that the accusing parties went from a "public solicitation (instigación pública)" to a "common solicitation"; that Article 180 of the Código Procesal Penal was violated because the primary evidence was obtained through a crime related to the violation of correspondence. *The defendant*, at the end of the hearing, indicated that he is a child and heir of the values of 1949 with the prelude of the guarantees of the 1940s, he has 30 years in the social struggle at the head of ANEP and has never done it to aspire to public office but has had the consent of committees of people who have considered that he is important for the social cause, so he did not endanger public order (tranquilidad pública) but this highlights the growing social inequality generated by the economic policies deployed. He indicates that his organization is a reference for social groups of different natures that do not receive a response from the political parties. At a multisectoral social meeting, private, to draft proposals and delimit a strategy of struggle against the government, which has excluded them entirely, many people infiltrate. He says he has no ideology, nor does ANEP possess one, but rather there is an attempt to delegitimize and that his only flag is human rights to the point that he is in the dock of the accused for defending them. He alludes to Advisory Opinion OC-27/21 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) regarding freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, which are also human rights. He says that Ms. Gloria is an elected deputy of the Republic and that she offered him a hearing as soon as she took office, but from now on he asks her to return the right to strike to the people, as it is not a simple reference but a judgment of an international tribunal that is being breached. He adds that he was at a private event and a leak occurred without his consent that was distorted by the annoyance some media outlets have against him. He points out that the country went back 50 years in social development, that at that time there was agitation and social movements, and that will continue with or without [Name 001], with or without ANEP, in the face of hunger and high salary indebtedness. He says that ANEP is a reference for social assistance, for the defense of labor rights free of charge, for which corporate unionization was broken, so rather than affecting public order (tranquilidad pública), it seeks to consolidate it, and that it is they who endangered that value. **The arguments are related and will be addressed jointly, rejecting them**. As can be seen, the parties intermingle procedural issues with questions of substantive law and the configuration of the criminal type. The latter, which are also mentioned in other arguments that will be summarized later, will be addressed, then, in other sections (to which the petitioners are referred to avoid unnecessary reiterations), to maintain a logical order of exposition, limiting this first section to topics related to the validity and assessment of the evidence and the reasoning of the decision. However, no reference will be made to the principle of correlation between accusation and judgment, mentioned by the appealing prosecutor, since its violation is not verified, as not only were the facts of the accusations not considered proven (and that principle, which protects the right of defense, seeks to preserve that the conviction is based on what was accused), but the cited prosecutor only tosses out a phrase on that topic, without giving it any content, which shows more the use of a pre-established and uncorrected form than a real defect in the decision. It is also worth noting, from the outset, that in a democratic country truly respectful of the rights of all persons, anyone can be brought before the courts for acts that a person considers harmful to their rights or interests, as this is part of the human right of access to justice, without the fact of submitting them to a process (of any nature and whatever its result) being considered a political trial because, to date, there (still) exists judicial independence that, although with weaknesses and opportunities for improvement, continues functioning and that will allow determining whether what is attributed is acceptable or not and, in one case or the other, establishing the corresponding responsibilities. A political trial is, in the strict sense and in some political systems, one carried out by Parliaments to establish political (not legal) responsibilities of a high public official (a condition the accused does not have, and a process not available in the country) or, in a broad sense or *latu sensu* (which is what the defendant seems to use), it is one brought to dismantle an opposition using co-opted judicial channels, but for this qualification to be valid, not only the motivation of the acting party is required but also the absolute control of the judicial or jurisdictional apparatus, which, in this case, is not shown to exist since the trial court judgment rejected the parties' claims and this chamber assumes, with all rigor, its independent role. Therefore, from the outset, such qualifiers are rejected, which, rather than conducting analysis, start from subjectivities or emotions that this court does not validate. Likewise, it is necessary to warn Mr. Rosales not only that the German author Günther Jakobs (1937-…) has not died (so he could not die again) but that this academic has, rather, been the one who devised the ideological bases of "criminal law of the enemy," which is what is closest to the criminal law of the author, so this current, far from being adverse to him, is akin to him, so no criticism could be made from the theoretical position he follows against the expressions cited by the defendant's lawyers. Having made these clarifications, in order to have an express contextual framework to allude to the evidentiary and reasoning topic, it is also convenient to make a quick recount of what happened in the process, as well as to elaborate a summary of the judgment —issued in writing by a single-judge court— which consists of 42 pages (which are located in folios 460 to 482 of the main file): **(A) Summary of what happened in the process.** ***i.*** This matter began with a complaint dated September 13, 2019, filed by the subsequent complainant Gloria Navas Montero, representing the "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" under whose name 82 natural persons are grouped, 81 of whom granted a special judicial power to Ms. Navas, who also acted in a personal capacity. All of them, along with the Public Ministry and the Procuraduría General de la República, filed an accusation against [Name 001]. ***ii.*** The three accusations are common in charging the convicted person with the crime of public solicitation (instigación) for events that occurred on September 9, 2019, when [Name 001], as secretary of ANEP, at a meeting of the "Movimiento Encuentro Social Multisectorial" held in the auditorium of the Conferencia Episcopal Costarricense, supposedly called for a national strike, lasting one or two days, in which borders would be closed and Routes No. 2 (Alto de Ochomogo), No. 27 (San José-Caldera), and No. 32 (San José-Limón) would be blocked **without any of that happening or, at least, being discussed and proven at trial**. However, the complaint of the self-styled "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" includes, as already mentioned, these other factual references that are not included in the other accusations, namely: "*Sixth* (...) *He specifically used these tactics in acts already consummated in 2018, actions that have not prescribed. We refer to the* ***paralysis of essential services starting in June 2018***. *The entire population suffered, and the leader, supported by the directed groups and in the company of others, sowed chaos in education, in hospitals, in transportation, and in many other public services. Vehicular traffic was interrupted and the population affected by fear and bewilderment. This occurred in the capital city and in other areas of the country.* We reiterate, it is a public and notorious fact (…) Eighth: We also complain about the consummated act on the day of September 3, 2019 outside the Legislative Assembly in the afternoon hours, when the journalist from La Nación [Name 004] was attacked by a mob at the clear instigation of the defendant. He not only provoked aggression with his intervention, but also interrupted the exercise of journalism and denied the right to information to the citizenry, a fundamental right. The event was left on record (sic) in the news media and in the same interview conducted with the defendant on Repretel in the midday edition of September 13, 2019." (The wording is from the original, the bold type is added). The foregoing was part of what was summarized in the findings of fact of the appealed judgment. However, if one observes the criminal complaint itself (which was admitted in its entirety in the order opening trial) it contained other facts, namely: "3. In recent times, as evidenced by public and notorious facts, this gentleman has gone too far in his speeches, actions and decisions to the point that he has not only illegitimately abused his right to an opinion, but his conduct violates the law and other fundamental guarantees of the citizenry, which chooses to express itself not with violence or coercion but with the appropriate instruments of the Rule of Law. 4. This gentleman with his speeches and actions has sought to destabilize the constitutional order by inciting violence and the action of groups that willfully disturb the free movement of citizens, of young students, children heading to their educational centers and many workers who must report punctually to their jobs. Even, a few days ago with his sayings he succeeded in getting people directed by his targeted negative expressions and improper actions to physically attack a member of the press who was trying to carry out his work. 5. A few days ago, in light of a supposed strike called by medical unions and related professions, he was inciting the masses to react and refuse to provide essential services such as health care, endangering the lives of many in light of the massive cancellation of appointments and scheduled surgeries. The delivery of medications was refused, all of this in an evident affront to and violation of fundamental human rights. This has been recorded by the press and other news media. These are public and notorious facts. (…) 7. We formally file a criminal complaint against this gentleman because he has sought to move his followers and other union movements, as he stated, toward extortive citizen and governmental offense with the consummation of a national strike lasting from 24 to 48 hours from border to border." (Also appearing there are the points described as 1 and 2 which are omitted in the above transcription as they contain the identification of the accused and the time relative to his union activity, topics that are not properly charges but merely descriptive; the bold type is added). In this last private accusation writing, other legal classifications are added, such as obstruction of public thoroughfare and riot in the condition of instigator (see respective criminal complaint file). iii. The criminal complaint filed by attorney Navas and the 81 remaining persons was filed on October 23, 2019 and was admitted on that same date. After the prosecutorial accusation was filed, in August 2020, it was communicated to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) which filed its criminal complaint (see criminal complaint file and transfer of accusation on folio 161 of the main file). iv. A civil action for damages was also filed solely by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, which claimed social damage in the sum of one million colones, a claim it maintained throughout the entire process (see criminal complaint file of this procedural party on folio 2, civil action file folio 1 and closing arguments of the trial on folio 458). v. In the trial, four witnesses were heard, the first two members of the "Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica" (Rubén Hernández Valle, Gloria Navas Montero) who were not present at the meeting but rather learned of it through the media, and the others provided by the defense (César López Dávila and Walter Quesada Hernández) who, although they attended the meeting, did not recall the exact terms in which the accused expressed himself; the statement of the indicted person was taken (who alluded to the context of his speech without acknowledging having said those phrases) and the following was admitted as documentary evidence: the complaints and their attached documentation from folios 1 to 17, 124 to 129 and 130 to 134; a petition with signatures from different people from folios 18 to 119; the seizure record and what is described therein number 0064696 from folio 141; the reports from the OIJ, one from the Crime Scene Inspection Section number 1816-DC-SIOERI-2019 on folio 148 and back, and another from the Miscellaneous Crimes Section number 059-DVDC-2020 from folios 154 and 155; the criminal record certification from folio 251 and, as material evidence, a gold-colored DVD-R disc with the label 19-647-619-PE; a silver-colored Maxell brand DVD+R disc with the label "video [Name 001]"; a silver-colored Maxell brand DVD-R disc with the label "firmas de los ciudadanos" and a white "Transcend" brand 4GB USB device; vi. In the proven facts of the judgment, the accused's status as a union leader was deemed proven, as well as his participation in a private national meeting held on the day and at the place charged (September 9, 2019 in the auditorium of the Episcopal Conference of San José within the framework of the group “Movimiento de Encuentro Social Multisectorial”) and that, without him authorizing the capture of his voice or image, he was filmed while presenting his proposals to the attendees, without the original video being located. It was also proven that the accused has no prior criminal record. vii. The intellectual and legal evidentiary analysis was set forth, collectively, in Considerando III (pages 30 to 40 of the judgment) where the following are put forward as reasons for the criminal acquittal of the defendant: a) the facts charged are not typified by the alleged crime (public instigation) or by any other; b) although this is not a political trial, as the accused says, it is missed that the parties did not analyze the evidence, not even the documentary evidence, and rambled about facts that had no relation to the thema probandum such as the 2018 national strike movement about which they had not questioned to link the defendant with it; c) the parties did not analyze the manner in which the video was obtained; instead, the prosecuting authority merely mentioned it was dealing with an abstract danger crime (which the judge accepts as valid) but without alluding to the evidentiary basis for its proof, because there is a police report (059-DVDC-2020) which states the original video was never seized, so it is not possible to determine whether the one published by the media and viewed in the courtroom had been edited or not; d) the video provided by a complainant (gold-colored DVD-R with the label 19-647-619-PE), at second 18, shows a cut and is not, as was said in the accusations, the original video but rather “…a video from Repretel where Mrs. Gloria Navas is interviewed, which denotes that the parties arrived at trial without having proper management of the evidence” (page 32 of the judgment). On the other hand, the silver-colored Maxell brand DVD-R disc with the label "video [Name 001]" was a copy, has a modification date of September 12, 2019 and «…for purposes of analyzing its authenticity as stated on folio 147, it was necessary to have the original video and therefore it was ordered by prosecutorial request to the Judicial Investigation Organization as stated on folio 148, the seizure of the original video containing the defendant's statements, procedures carried out through the report of the Miscellaneous Crimes Section No. 059-DVDC-2020, which appears on folios 154 and 155, which is duly admitted evidence, which regarding the proceeding in question indicates: "CRhoy responded that they could not find original videos of their journalists' recordings," before which the original video could never be analyzed to determine not only the veracity of the copy provided as evidence, but also the conditions under which it was obtained, since determining who the journalist or correspondent who recorded it was, they could well have been interviewed and offered as a witness to determine if there was free access by the press to that meeting and/or consent for those statements to be captured and in that sense, then the publicity of the statements would be considered proven, as well as the accused's knowledge of that circumstance, but at this moment it is unknown to the point that rather it cannot be ruled out that the crime of unlawful capture of verbal statements may have been committed» (Cf. judgment, pages 37-38); e) the state representative (the judgment does not specify which of the two it refers to, and both the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic intervene in that condition) does not prove his assertion that the convened event was public; f) the fact that a video was shown in the media, without knowing who recorded it and without authorization to do so, does not give the meeting a public nature; g) the prosecutors have the burden of proof and did not prove essential elements of the criminal type; h) the only persons, among the attendees at the meeting, who testified at trial and the defendant himself said the event was private (as accepted by the prosecutor in his closing arguments according to page 36 of the judgment), the statements would have been made in a private place (the latter classified as an incontrovertible fact on page 36 of the judgment) and this was not disproven, because even though Navas indicated that farmers from San Carlos told her they attended and the witness López Dávila stated there were representatives of civil society, this does not give the meeting a public condition, especially since it took place in a private venue and the defendant said it had that nature and it was up to each union to determine how its representatives were convened; i) it is not acceptable to reverse the burden of proof and state that, since the defense witnesses said they did not know the details of the meeting's call, it was therefore not private; j) the representative of “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” said the defendant was a confessed person because he had publicly acknowledged saying the charged expressions and that he did not back down, but she did not cite the evidentiary elements from which she derived that, since if he accepted it in some other television interview, this was not offered and on this point only arguments were presented in the trial's closing arguments and not through the cross-examination of witnesses or other formally admitted evidence, and at trial, the defendant rejected the charges; k) “…although the complainant, in the criminal complaint she filed on October 23, 2019, indicated that as evidence, Repretel be asked for the midday video from September 12 and 13, 2019, containing the interviews with Gloria Navas and [Name 001] respectively, from a proper review of the body of evidence she would have realized that ultimately the only video seized from Noticias Repretel according to record No. 64696 on folio 138, was that of the interview with Mrs. Navas, this because in her complaint -see folio 125 back- she indicated that both interviews had taken place on September 12, 2019 and therefore that was what was requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office according to folio 135, whereas if the party considered that this was not the evidence required according to her accusatory theory, she could well have pointed it out at the appropriate procedural moment, which did not happen, to the point that when the provided videos were played, she indicated that she missed the video in question without providing further details…” (see judgment, folio 477); l) the prosecution witnesses (Hernández and Navas) were not present at the event but rather learned of the facts through the dissemination of the video by the media; from the information they provide, it cannot be derived that the event was public; m) the crime of public instigation is not configured, says the trial court, for this, provided for in article 280 of the Código Penal and punishable by imprisonment of six months to four years, does not allude to any crime but to one that affects public tranquility, a heading which this criminal type also has (in Title X “Delitos contra la tranquilidad pública”) along with others such as unlawful association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation and apology of crime. However, the prosecutors did not attribute any of these to the defendant, but only those of disruption of public services and obstruction of public thoroughfare, which are located in Title IX “Delitos contra la seguridad común”; n) the fact that an event generates collective alarm, chaos or concern (as the prosecutors alleged) —the trial judge continues— does not mean public tranquility is affected for the purposes of configuring the criminal type, because there is a specific title in the Código Penal establishing which crimes have public tranquility as the legally protected interest. Not interpreting it this way would be to make an expansive interpretation and fall into the excesses incurred by the attorney when stating that even a robbery affects public tranquility, which violates article 2 of the Código Penal; ñ) in Costa Rica, the criminal type of public instigation is more restricted than in other legislations, such as those of Colombia and Argentina (which are transcribed in the challenged judgment), where the criminal type does not limit the commission of the offense to the affectation of a specific legally protected interest, as is the case in our jurisdiction; o) the crimes of obstruction of public thoroughfare and disruption of public services do admit instigation, but through the generic figure of article 46 of the Código Penal. However, if it had been considered that [Name 001] intervened as an instigator of those crimes, the drafting of the accusations should have been different, first because the acts would have had to have been perpetrated; second because it was necessary to individualize their perpetrators in order to establish that it was the defendant who determined them to commit the punishable acts. The judge establishes the difference between the two figures in that generic instigation requires the determination of the will of a specific person, while public instigation, due to its characteristic of publicity, alludes to determining the will of a mass or undetermined subjects. For this reason, she continues (supported by references to Manzini and Quisbert), publicity, in Costa Rica, is part of the criminal intent (dolo). None of this was proven in the specific case, the judge concludes, because there were no subsequent acts to these words materializing those closures; p) the seriousness of the instigation was not proven either, because this implies inducing or moving the spirit toward crime, not simply expressing an idea, proposing or advising. Starting from the fact that he is accused of saying "I believe the national strike thesis is correct, we must propose a grand national strike, but a real one, not a show, close the borders, close Route 27, close Route 32, close Ochomogo..." that would not be instigation but a proposal within the framework of a social protest speech since the how and when of the proposals are not indicated. Hernández Valle alluded to the fact that those words were not heeded, which denotes the lack of seriousness; q) With doctrinal citations that, in turn, allude to Argentine jurisprudence, mention is made that similar cases are protected by freedom of thought and expression, constitutional guarantees. viii. The civil action for damages filed by the State, represented by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, was rejected in Considerando IV (one paragraph on page 40 of the judgment) because subjective responsibility was attributed and, since it was not proven that the defendant committed the acts, there was no causal link. ix. Judgment was entered with an award of costs against the losing parties, both in criminal and civil matters (Considerando V, pages 41-42), as it was considered there was no plausible reason to litigate given the evidence provided and the stated lack of criminality; the criminal complaints were based on evidence different from that offered and admitted, and whether it was pertinent or erroneous was not verified until reaching trial. (B) Addressing the complaints. In the first place, the prosecution witnesses (Navas and Hernández), indeed, were not eyewitnesses; they were not at the meeting where the questioned opinions would have been expressed, according to the accusation, and, therefore, nothing they contribute allows unraveling how the audiovisual material was obtained nor the characteristic of the meeting, that is, whether it was public or private, much less the content of what was discussed there, which they learned of through the media. Now, in criminal proceedings, the obligation to prove all the constituent elements of a crime (act, criminality, unlawfulness, and culpability) falls on those who accuse and not on the person charged with the offense, because considering it otherwise would be to reverse the burden of proof and violate the state of innocence constitutionally guaranteed (article 39 of the Constitución Política) and through international conventions (articles 8.2 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos —hereinafter ACHR— and 14.2 of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, among others). From the state of innocence (formerly misnamed presumption) derives that, in case of doubt about factual circumstances, one must abide by what is most favorable to the accused person (article 9 of the Código Procesal Penal). For this reason, if the prosecuting parties did not provide evidentiary elements regarding the nature of the meeting, that is, whether it was public or private, but rather the evidence presented at trial showed, instead, that it took place in a private venue and was restricted to representatives of various social movements, a topic the defendant also referred to, the appellants are wrong to consider that the absence of evidence on this point should affect the defendant, because rather, one must abide by what is most favorable to him, that is, that the meeting was private (since, as will be developed later, this involves constitutional and conventional guarantees with additional requirements), an aspect also mentioned by witness Juan López Dávila (“I remember an event I participated in September 2019, yes I remember it regarding everything that happened afterwards, it was a closed-door discussion (conversatorio a puerta cerrada) held in the auditorium of the Episcopal Conference on 20th Street, that is a private activity, it was not a demonstration, a discussion to exchange ideas, as is usually done from time to time especially when there are public policies affecting workers, it was a meeting of several union groups and various civil society groups, it was a multisectoral gathering. That is the Episcopal Conference auditorium which is rented for activities, since it is a private activity, options are sought in the market that meet capacity and sound requirements for holding them.

About 18-25 people could have spoken in the first round </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">no media outlets were invited</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, it is a debate in the world of ideas, we are talking about social positions, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">no media outlet was invited, it was not a public activity</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, it was intended that no one feel compelled to respond due to what is called social desirability bias in social science</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">, filming and dissemination of the event were not authorized</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">to respect the privacy of the persons who were there</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, I listened to most of the speeches </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> among the persons who spoke, Mr. <span data-mce-type=\"bookmark\" id=\"mce_19_start\" data-mce-style=\"overflow:hidden;line-height:0px\" style=\"overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;\"></span>[Name 001]<span data-mce-type=\"bookmark\" id=\"mce_26_start\" data-mce-style=\"overflow:hidden;line-height:0px\" style=\"overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;\"></span><span data-mce-type=\"bookmark\" id=\"mce_19_end\" data-mce-style=\"overflow:hidden;line-height:0px\" style=\"overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;\"></span> </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Yes, I do remember a video that circulated in various media outlets, I remember CRhoy<span data-mce-type=\"bookmark\" id=\"mce_47_start\" data-mce-style=\"overflow:hidden;line-height:0px\" style=\"overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;\"></span> and various television media, about the video I remember that </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">it was recorded as if in secret, as if from behind in a corner, it is quite short</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, the intervention of [Name 001]<span data-mce-type=\"bookmark\" id=\"mce_20_start\" data-mce-style=\"overflow:hidden;line-height:0px\" style=\"overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;\"></span> used to be about five minutes, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the video does not correspond to that, I remember seeing a clip, I cannot help but think that it does not correspond to the totality of what was said</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, due to the clip and its duration and many times when participating one must allude to what people said three or four turns prior, an excerpt of an intervention does not reveal the spirit of what was stated.</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">» (</span><span>Cf. judgment, folios 467 verso and 468, emphasis supplied). This same point is accepted by Attorney Navas in the appeal itself, such that no contradiction or erroneous assessment is observed in the decision to consider the meeting as private. Attorney Navas, however, reproaches that the proven facts did not state that, although the event was “</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">private in nature </span><span>(…)</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> it came to public attention</span><span>” (cf. folio 500, bold added). Now, regarding this particular topic, that is, regarding the dissemination to the public, the lower-court judgment could not consider it accredited because it started from the thesis that the audiovisual material was illicit evidence and, therefore, so was everything derived from that spurious source. The appealed decision reaches this conclusion for two reasons: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">a)</span><span> because the defendant did not authorize the capture of his image and voice and the recording, as the witness López Dávila stated </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">supra</span><span>, appears to have been made surreptitiously, from the back of the hall, and the meeting was private, and </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">b)</span><span> because although some videos were provided, they were manipulated (one cut and another edited), raising doubts about the chain of custody of the material and whether what was captured therein corresponded to what the defendant intended to say and actually expressed, since it could have been taken out of context. Both positions are derived from the evidence, and they were reached while respecting the rules of sound human understanding, without this tribunal visualizing errors in the argumentation. In effect, if there is no evidence whatsoever to determine that the event was free and open to the public, then it must be considered private and, within this framework, protected by the right of assembly and the capturing of voice and image of persons, encompassed by the right to privacy, both regulated in the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Constitución Política</span></a><span> (Articles 24 and 26) as well as in international treaties (Articles 11.2 and 15 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=36150&amp;nValor3=38111&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos</span></a><span> and 17 and 21 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;param2=1&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=20579&amp;n\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos</span></a><span>). The witness Rubén Hernández Valle himself, in his early legal writings, alluded to the importance of this determination: «…</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the assembly shall be private, even if it takes place on public domain property for general use (street, plaza, public monument, etc.) when, by the manner in which it is conducted, only previously determined persons can participate in it and who, generally, know each other</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> (Example: meetings of members of an association </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">[…] </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">a group of tourists </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">[…]</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> meetings of political party associations </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">[…]</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">) Therefore, in contrast to assemblies in a place open to the public, assemblies whose participants are reciprocally known to each other, or are in an effective position to get to know each other before or during the course of the assembly, are defined as private </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Regarding public assemblies, the principal reason for their eventual dissolution is </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> Regarding</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp; </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">private assemblies, such powers must be denied, since this type of assembly is governed rather by rules relating to </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the protection of the home and the freedom and secrecy of communications</span><span>.» (Cf. Hernández Valle, Rubén, 1980. </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Las libertades públicas en Costa Rica</span><span>. Editorial Juricentro, pp. 141-142; emphasis added. In the same vein and by the same author and publisher: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">El derecho de la Constitución. Volumen II</span><span>, 1993, page 521). For its part, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter "I/A Court H.R."), in interpreting the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=36150&amp;nValor3=38111&amp;strTipM=TC\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">CADH</span></a><span>, has indicated that «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">171. The right to protest or to express disagreement with a state action or decision </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">is protected by the right of assembly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, enshrined in Article 15 of the American Convention </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The possibility of demonstrating publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways of exercising the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be demanded. Therefore, the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and must not be interpreted restrictively </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> 174. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">the Court recalls that the right of assembly is not an absolute right and may be subject to restrictions, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">provided that the interferences are not abusive or arbitrary</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">therefore, they must be provided for by law, pursue a legitimate aim</span><span>…» (I/A Court H.R. </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_371_esp.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. Judgment of November 28, 2018</span></a><span>; emphasis supplied). Part of the legal restrictions are given by the possibility of searching homes and private premises (Articles 193 to 197 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Procesal Penal</span></a><span>), but, in this matter, there was no judicial warrant for a search nor were the exceptions present to carry one out without a warrant (there was no threat to the life or property of the attendees by fire, flood, or similar commotion; no unknown persons were seen entering with clear indications of committing illicit acts; no one pursued for a serious crime entered the site; nor were there voices from within the place asking for help). Consequently, the persons attending were exercising a constitutional and conventional right of assembly, a framework in which other rights were also enhanced, such as the right to privacy, which is also developed by law in the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Civil</span></a><span> (Article 47: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The photograph </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">or the image of a person may not be published, reproduced, exhibited</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> nor sold in any way whatsoever </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">except with their consent</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, unless the reproduction is justified by the notoriety of that person, the public function they perform, the necessities of justice or police, or when such reproduction is related to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">or that take place in public</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. Images and photographs with stereotyped roles that reinforce discriminatory attitudes toward social sectors may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, nor sold in any way whatsoever</span><span>”; emphasis added) and in the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRM&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=16466&amp;strTipM=FN\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones</span></a><span>, articles 1 and 9, which require judicial intervention for their infringement, none of which occurred in the present case. Even so superior is the protection of the right to privacy and the expression of manifestations in private spaces that, as the trial judge correctly argued, the transgression of these provisions is penalized as a crime in Article 198 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Penal</span></a><span>, which states: «</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Unlawful Recording of Verbal Statements. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Article 198.-Whoever records, without consent, the words of another or others, not intended for the public, shall be punished with imprisonment from one to </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">three years</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, or who, through technical procedures, listens to private manifestations that are not directed at them, except as provided in the </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. The same penalty shall be imposed on whoever installs apparatuses, instruments, or their parts, with the purpose of intercepting or impeding oral or written communications, whether or not they achieve their purpose</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">» </span><span>(bold substituted). This crime, although it is subject to public prosecution and could be reported by anyone and not necessarily the affected person (Articles 16 to 18 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Procesal Penal</span></a><span>), had it been brought to court earlier, would by now be time-barred unless there existed some cause for suspension (the meeting would have occurred on September 9, 2019, and the maximum penalty is three years, whereby under usual circumstances the action would have expired on September 9, 2022). However, this does not preclude considering that, by penalizing the conduct, the capturing of the material under those circumstances for other purposes is illicit. All of this reasoning has found support in the case law (binding </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">erga omnes</span><span> according to Article 13 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=38533\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional</span></a><span>) of the Sala Constitucional. For example, in </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-94597\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">judgment number 1026-94</span></a><span>, it was stated that: \"</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Article 24 of the Constitución Política enshrines the fundamental right to privacy. It is a protective forum for the private life of citizens. Privacy consists of those phenomena, behaviors, data, and situations of a person that are normally withheld from the knowledge of strangers and whose knowledge by these can morally disturb them by affecting their modesty and discretion, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">unless that same person consents to that knowledge</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. While it cannot but be reputed that what happens inside a citizen's home is private life, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">it may also be that what happens in offices, friends' homes, and other private premises</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> falls within that scope. In this way, the constitutional rights of inviolability of the home, of private documents, and of communications exist to protect said privacy, which is an essential right of every individual…</span><span>\" (bold added) and also in </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-83723\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">number 6776-94</span></a><span>, where the constitutional court stated the following: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The right to privacy has a positive content that manifests itself in multiple ways, such as for example</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">: the right to one's own image</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, to the home, and to correspondence. For the Chamber, the right to private life can be defined as the sphere into which no one may intrude. The freedom of private life is the recognition of a zone of activity that is proper to each individual </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">and the right to privacy limits the intervention of other persons or public authorities in the private life of the person; this limitation can manifest itself both in the observation and capturing of the image and documents in general, as in the listening to or recording of private conversations and in the subsequent dissemination or disclosure of what was captured or obtained without the consent of the affected person</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">…</span><span>” (emphasis supplied). If, despite all of the foregoing, someone captured the voice and image of the defendant in a private meeting, without his consent and without the legal exceptions being met, and after doing so disseminated them, the only conclusion that could be reached (if we are speaking of legal reasoning) is that the material provided was illicit, pursuant to Article 181 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Procesal Penal</span></a><span>, second paragraph, which provides: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Information obtained through </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">deceit, undue intrusion into the privacy</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> of the home, correspondence, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">communications</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(…)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> nor information obtained by any other means that impairs the will or violates the fundamental rights of persons may not be used</span><span>” (emphasis added). If the video was illicit, as indeed it was (since it was captured in a private meeting and the defendant did not authorize the dissemination of his image and voice), what Navas and Hernández or any other witness said regarding its content could not be analyzed, as we are faced with the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, which also affects those references. It should be recalled that, in accordance with this theoretical position, not only are the evidentiary references derived </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">directly</span><span> from the violation of fundamental rights null (as would be, in this case, the recording of the video), but also all those that are </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">indirect</span><span> (such as the witnesses' reference to the content of the video), unless there is an independent source or an inevitable discovery (among other exceptions, only these are accepted in our legal system), none of which has even been discussed, much less had evidentiary support. Otherwise, it would be very easy to violate the fundamental rights of persons, discard the principal document or evidence, and validate the testimonies that have examined its illicit content, a practice undoubtedly harmful in a State governed by the Rule of Law. Furthermore, even if the audiovisual material were licit—which it has already been stated it is not, and this is alluded to only for analytical-hypothetical purposes—, the original document was also not provided because the police could not seize it, and those submitted have evident cuts and dates different from the date on which the events occurred, which are indications of their manipulation. It must be remembered that the chain of custody refers to the process by which it is guaranteed that a specific material element seized at the scene where the event occurred is the same one that is evaluated by experts or that arrives at trial, the purpose of which is to guarantee the purity and the eventual probative value, direct or circumstantial, that it may have. This institution also applies to digital and videographic evidence, characterized by its volatility and ease of manipulation, hence the need to preserve that there is identity between what was seized and what was exhibited in the hearing, and that it has not been modified. The steps that the chain of custody comprises and that require safeguarding have been addressed both by constitutional case law (binding under Article 13 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=38533\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional</span></a><span>) and by the case law of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (also binding as provided in Article 62 of the </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/17229a.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">CADH</span></a><span> and by references of the I/A Court H.R. itself, among others, in the </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_154_esp.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">vote of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, judgment of September 26, 2006</span></a><span>). In the first case, in </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-83141\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">judgment number 5831-96</span></a><span>, it was stated that: \"</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">II. Respect for the chain of custody in the collection of evidence can be analyzed from two different dimensions. From a strictly probative point of view, the evidence will have greater efficacy if it is truly proven that it has been correctly handled from its discovery at the crime scene or at the site where it was found until its effective introduction into the process. The discovery, collection, securing, gathering, transfer, and custody of the evidence or material elements that serve as proof of the criminal act require special technical capacity, for which reason they are often entrusted to qualified judicial police personnel, in order not to alter or contaminate the evidence with external factors, and if applicable, to maintain its purity for the purposes of a more in-depth analysis, be it chemical, physical, or of any nature. This operation is generally supported in multiple ways: through close-up photographs, identification and general location of the objects, videos, records, and the respective packaging or securing of the same. Any defect or omission in this procedure potentially weakens the purity of the collected evidentiary element, including with respect to its correct location at the scene or the manner in which it is linked to the criminal responsibility of the accused. In turn, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the chain of custody can refer to aspects exclusively related to the legality of the evidence, that is, whether it was collected by subjects with competence to do so, whether the procedural formalities provided for this were fulfilled—existence of a reasoned judicial resolution, for example, in cases of searches</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; preparation of the respective record with the attendance of instrumental witnesses, etc.—, whether the respective receipts exist in the different departments to which the evidence or material evidence has been transferred, indicating the time, nature, weight, and quantity of the objects, in such a way that the legal trail of the evidence can be followed—procedurally speaking—to be validly incorporated into the process. III. The first of the aforementioned dimensions of the chain of custody refers to the assessment of evidence. The appreciation of respect for the minimum standards of security in the collection of evidence is an integral part of the rules of sound criticism, and thus its non-observance or erroneous appreciation violates due process. </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Regarding the legality of the production and introduction of that evidence into the process, due process is affected, since every defendant has the right to be tried on the basis of legally valid evidence</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. It will be for the referring Chamber to determine whether in the specific case the defects in the chain of custody in the two spheres indicated occurred, and their impact on the judgment challenged by the appellant</span><span>.\" (Bold added). Likewise, in </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-83480\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">vote number 6469-99</span></a><span> of that Chamber, it was added: \"(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">the relevance of the defects in the chain of custody depends entirely on that of the evidentiary element of which it forms part, so that it will only </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(sic) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">constitute an infringement of the right to due process when it has occurred within the procedure for the production of evidentiary elements essential for demonstrating the attributed act, in the sense that the absence of that evidence makes the attribution of the act to the defendant impossible. It is then for the referring Chamber to establish whether the conditions just set forth exist in the specific case, because </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">if that were so and the chain of custody of the evidence were truly violated, due process would have been violated</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> in the base case of the consultation being addressed</span><span>.\" (Emphasis added). Finally, the I/A Court H.R. has stated: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">193.

Furthermore, due diligence in an investigation <span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">requires</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> the maintenance of the chain of custody of </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">all</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> forensic evidence</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. This consists of keeping a precise written record, supplemented, as appropriate, by photographs and other graphic elements to document the history of the evidence as it passes through the hands of various investigators assigned to the case</span><span>.” </span><a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/resumen_277_esp.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala Case. Judgment of May 19, 2014</span></a><span> (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that respect for the chain of custody forms part of a due process of law and its violation has consequences on the validity of the evidentiary element and its possibility of assessment. If in this case it is not possible to determine whether the submitted video was cut, edited, or otherwise manipulated (since the original could not be seized) and there are indications that it was (a crude cut and a date that does not correspond to the events at the base of the file), said material could hardly be assessed, especially since, as stated, its capture was also not lawful. It was not incumbent upon the defendant (or the union he represents) to allege the unlawfulness of that material, nor did anyone need to do so for the legality of the evidence to be analyzed, since the burden of proof lies with the plaintiffs and both the prosecuting body and the court must ensure that the evidence received and serving as support for a decision is lawful (articles 63, 175, 180 and 181, second paragraph, of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=41297" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Procedure Code</span></a><span>), which makes it strange that the Public Prosecutor's Office disregarded its duty of objectivity. Note that the last article is imperative: “</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Information obtained through </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">deception, undue intrusion into the privacy</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> of the home, correspondence, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">communications</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> nor information obtained by other means that undermine the will or violate fundamental rights of persons, may not be used</span><span>” (emphasis added). The provision is clear that no complaint is necessary (as the prosecutor argues) nor is it required that this be alleged for it to be declared. Therefore, since the original document or an expert report allowing verification of the non-alteration of the delivered tape was not presented, its consideration was improper, especially due to the method of obtaining it already indicated. Note that, without prejudice to what will be elaborated in the following section regarding publicity as an element of the criminal type, here the public or private location is relevant to determine not only the element of the type but also </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">the lawfulness of the capture and of the evidentiary material</span><span> (an aspect that all appellants overlook) and as the meeting was held in private places, where such authorization (for public entry or recording by media) was not permitted, the evidence becomes unlawful because the constitutional guarantee is the protection of private spaces and of the meetings and expressions that occur there. It is also not true that any element was incorporated into the trial from which it can be inferred that there was an endorsement, consent, or acceptance by the accused regarding the making or use of said recording or from which it can be inferred that he acknowledged having made the statements, since he rejected the charges and, in the extent of his statements (both at trial and in the oral hearing at this venue) he referred to the prevailing socio-political context in the country and to union struggles (see folios 472 verso to 475). None of the three prosecutors specifies what that evidence is from which that statement would derive and that omission is explained by the fact that none was incorporated because, if it existed, it was neither offered nor admitted and, according to the legal aphorism, what is not in the proceedings is not in the world. Therefore, a judgment could hardly refer to unaccepted evidence, even if it existed (which there are also doubts about). But even if it were accepted, again hypothetically for analytical purposes, that the submitted videos were lawful and admissible and that the chain of custody was not violated in them, it would still be impossible to derive from them, evidentiarily, that the defendant made statements by which he adapted his conduct to the typical provisions of the offense of public instigation. From the submitted audiovisual document (it has already been stated that it was submitted illegally, but mentioned here hypothetically and subsidiarily) according to the trial court judgment (which is not disputed by the appellants) the defendant is only heard saying “</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">I believe the national strike thesis is correct, we must propose a great national strike, but a real one, not a catwalk one, close the borders, close Route 27, close Route 32, close Ochomogo...</span><span>" and the video is cut. Thus, it is unknown if <span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_32_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span>[Nombre 001]<span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_40_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span><span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_32_end" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span> is proposing that position or well, for example and without this being the only possibility, if he is referring to what someone said, either to refute it later or to analyze it. None of that can be inferred due to the abrupt cut of the recording, an editing that allows one to deduce the objective of the person recording it (illicitly, remember) so that the recipients of the message were unaware of the communicative context. Not in vain, in linguistics and communication (and, therefore, in journalism) emphasis is placed on the need to know communicative </span><span style="font-style:italic">contexts</span><span> (historical, cultural and social; linguistic, situational) to give meaning to the </span><span style="font-style:italic">text</span><span> as this is usually a </span><span style="font-style:italic">pretext</span><span> for variations in meaning from the literalness (Cf. Johnson Barella, Doris, 2005. </span><a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/83560292.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Literalness in the use of direct quotes in the news of the Navarre regional press. Two cases: Diario de Noticias and Diario de Navarra</span></a><span>. In: Revista Comunicación y sociedad, volume XVIII, No. 2, pp 109-140 and López Pan, Fernando. </span><span style="font-style:italic">Did he really say that? Some ethical implications in the use of direct quotes in journalistic texts</span><span>. At </span><a href="https://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/35259/1/%C2%BFRealmente%20ha%20dicho%20eso%20Algunas%20implicaciones%20%C3%A9ticas%20en%20el%20uso%20de%20las%20citas%20directas%20en%20los%20textos%20period%C3%ADsticos.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">https://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/35259/1/%C2%BFRealmente%20ha%20dicho%20eso%20Algunas%20implicaciones%20%C3%A9ticas%20en%20el%20uso%20de%20las%20citas%20directas%20en%20los%20textos%20period%C3%ADsticos.pdf</span></a><span>). The last author warns: “</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Linguistic research, especially that related to discourse analysis, shows how every quotation —including the literal one— involves a fiction of contexts, an intervention in which the quoter controls what is quoted and uses it within their own discursive strategy. And it does not allude to blatant manipulations in which someone is made to say something they did not say or their sentences are intentionally betrayed</span><span>” (p. 108). Specifically regarding the situational context, it is necessary to know the set of data accessible to participants in a conversation that are extracted from the immediate physical environment. None of this is achieved with the capture of a recording of just a few seconds, cut at the beginning and at the end. Therefore, not even starting hypothetically from the premise that everything was legal (the capture, the recordings, the custody, etc.) can one conclude that, from an excerpt taken like that, the accused is determining others to commit a crime, and since the witnesses for the prosecution, Navas and Hernández, limited themselves to reproducing what they heard in the media (which, in principle, as inferred from their depositions, already had the cut made), their statements also do not contribute anything to support the criminal commission being charged. It is not that the decision seeks to be based on rigidly assessed evidence, as the prosecutor says, but rather that it is based on lawful evidence, as is the duty of every court, a character that all the evidence submitted lacks. The plaintiff Navas has insisted on analyzing the affectation that she and the witness Hernández Valle stated they felt due to the events, as well as that expressed by other persons who filed complaints and lawsuits and granted her power to act (even though they did not testify at trial). However, this is irrelevant because, even if it were hypothetically assumed (only for analytical purposes) that said affectation occurred and that it was of great magnitude, that does not remedy the fact that it was not proven that it was the defendant who committed the act, since the evidence pointing to him is either unlawful (due to the method of capture and the unreliability of what was reproduced) or does not allow that imputation to be made in a reliable or credible manner, as referred to previously. Finally, although the parties alluded to other prior strike movements and to the effects that, in their opinion, these generated as a </span><span style="font-style:italic">modus operandi</span><span>, they did not provide any evidentiary material in this regard, therefore their statements are simple assertions without probative value. For all the foregoing reasons, these complaints must be dismissed.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-weight:bold">III.-</span><span> For her part, </span><span style="font-weight:bold">Attorney Margot Avellán Ruiz, legal representative of the State</span><span>,</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span>in her appeal, began by presenting, as background, the facts on which the civil action for damages was based and a summary of what was decided in the appealed judgment. After that, she stipulates, as the </span><span style="font-weight:bold">first ground of complaint</span><span>, the lack of substantiation of the decision due to non-observance of the rules of sound criticism regarding means or evidentiary elements of decisive value and the failure to apply substantive law, particularly articles 280, 263 and 263 bis of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a><span>. She states that the defendant was acquitted because the facts were considered atypical and that there is no evidence that he committed a public instigation. She copies the content of the article and doctrinal references from author Carlos Creus (</span><a href="https://www.academia.edu/33191444/Creus_Carlos_Derecho_Penal_Parte_Especial_Tomo_I" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Derecho Penal, parte especial</span></a><span>, 1997, p. 105) and affirms that, based on that author, there is no limitation regarding the crimes that can be considered as instigated, provided that, for their configuration, they possess that condition, that is, of being crimes, even when they are not contained in the main repressive body itself. She adds that, to establish a restriction regarding the criminal types to be considered, this must be contained in the norm, and if it does not exist, the alternative application of all existing criminal types in the general criminal legislation applies. She considers that another component of the cited criminal type is related to its consequences, since the offense is configured ‘</span><span style="font-style:italic">without it being necessary that the act occurs’ </span><span>and therefore one is in the presence of a crime of danger, that is, those in which the legislator has taken into account, to define the criminal type, the probability that the protected legal interest may suffer damage derived from the conduct carried out by the author, without the need for proof or confirmation of its existence. She cites the vote of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of San José (R. Badilla, E. Montero and G. Mena), </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-671572" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">number 2016-0235</span></a><span> and adds that, according to the Argentine author referred to </span><span style="font-style:italic">supra</span><span> (pp. 106-107), it is a crime of simple activity, which requires, at least, that there be an instigated person, although, if the medium is suitable, there can be an attempt, without the transcendence or possibility of this to an indeterminate plurality of persons being a requirement. Therefore, adds the appellant, it is not necessary that the crime has been provoked, but simply that the exposure to the risk of the legal interest occurs: the type is configured with the mere incitement. She alludes to the subjective aspect of the crime and to Creus maintaining (in the cited work, page 106) that something more than the simple will to instigate is required, since there must be the will that the instigated act is actually carried out. From there, she concludes, derives the knowledge that what is instigated is a crime, and accidental or indeterminate manifestations are excluded. She says that the trial court, in an unsustainable attempt to acquit the defendant, breaks down the norm as if the content included the same elements that subsist in similar provisions of other Latin American legislations, transcribing types from Colombia and Argentina and the doctrine that supports them, according to which publicity is a requirement, so an instigation in a private venue is not possible. The appellant affirms that if one observes the transcription made in the judgment of the foreign norms, it is evident that they textually introduce, as part of the type, that the instigation be "public" or carried out "publicly"; an indication that, although described in the epigraph of the national numeral, is not specifically contained within the type and cannot be supplied by interpretation, as it would be an evident and improper supplanting of the legislative function, for which a court is not legitimate. On the other hand, she affirms that it is also not indicated, in the prohibitive content, that the instigated crime must be located in Title X of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a><span>, as the judgment held, but simply that the incited conduct be a crime and that it disturb public tranquility. Therefore, she concludes, the deciding court's interpretation exceeds what is permitted by the type, transgressing its function and affecting that which corresponds to the Legislative Assembly. She maintains that what is sought with the crime is to protect the right of citizens to order and collective tranquility, regardless of the medium, since the article does not provide for it either, so it suffices that it is suitable for transmitting the message to at least one person that one wishes to instigate, without the effective execution of the instigated offenses being indispensable but only the exposure to danger of the protected legal interest. In light of all the foregoing, she considers that the proven facts configure the crime of public instigation contained in numeral 280 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a><span>, since it was confirmed that [Nombre 001]<span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_6_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span>, in his capacity as Secretary of ANEP and being on September 9, 2019, at a meeting of the “Movimiento de Encuentro Social Multisectorial,” publicly instigated, through verbal statements, the persons present (mostly union members) to carry out illegal actions that included the closure of roads (Highway No. 27 between San José and Caldera, No. 32 between San José and Limón and Route 2 over Alto de Ochomogo in Cartago, a place where there is a RECOPE facility that supplies fuel to the entire country) and that he did so with full knowledge that said criminal actions could generate the disruption of public services and obstruction of public roads, conducts typified as crimes according to articles 263 and 263 bis of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a><span> in force, thus disturbing public tranquility, all of which had the purpose of forcing the Government to accede to union demands. She says that, at trial, as proof of the above, a video captured while the accused made those statements was reproduced, which was known by the community through news media and thus, without the need for more evidence as the court intends, it can be considered that the accused committed the crime. She affirms that, regardless of the way in which the incitement was captured, it was a suitable medium, in person, before a group of people willing to listen to him. She points out that the defendant did not deny his participation in the events nor retract the words delivered at the recorded meeting since, in interviews conducted with him by television media, he not only had a confessing and boastful attitude in this regard but never rejected having issued them nor stated that said recording was made in any transgression of his rights. She says that not the slightest discomfort was evidenced by the defendant regarding the publication of the video on the news, which persists today, an attitude with which he ratifies and corroborates —the appellant legal representative continues saying— the facts complained of. She adds that none of the issues regarding the publicity of the video or the violation of the defendant's privacy was raised, the subject of controversy, or questioned by the defendant's defenders, therefore the material is legitimate and thus any argument regarding its inadmissibility would be remedied. Nor has its veracity been questioned, so it is not appropriate to allude to the "authenticity of the video" (as the judgment does) if it has not been refuted that the person observed in it or the words heard were not issued by <span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_33_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span>[Nombre 001]<span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_41_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span><span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_33_end" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span>. She says there is no way to accuse falsity since, just by visual review —without any expertise on the subject— it is notorious that the filmed subject is the defendant and no hint of distortion is perceived in the recording that would allow pointing out that there was manipulation of the observed images, circumstances which confirm the veracity of what was captured. Nor has that image of the defendant been denied, attacked, or rejected by the defense or by the witnesses for the defense, who, on the contrary, accept that it is the union leader accused here. She maintains that it is irrelevant to determine the way in which the video was obtained (as the judgment holds) since its publicity does not form part of the type. She adds that, otherwise “…</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">all those who make serious incitements to commit crimes, could do so with impunity if it occurs within a private venue</span><span>.”</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces"> </span><span>She alludes to numeral 47 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Civil Code</span></a><span> to establish that, although it establishes the prohibition of reproducing images without consent, exceptions to this are the notoriety of the person, the public function they perform, the needs of justice or police regarding an investigation, and that the recording relates to facts, events, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public. She mentions and partially transcribes votes such as those of the Constitutional Chamber numbers </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-625236" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">2014-11715</span></a><span> and </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-291619" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">2004-11154</span></a><span> on the limits to the right to one's image and says that to these must be added the rights of third parties, freedom of expression, and the public interest of a news item or information, as provided in articles 28 and 29 of our </span><a href="https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Political Constitution</span></a><span>. She concludes that, under those parameters, the validity of capturing the image and voice of the accused via video finds solid normative foundation that rules out any notion of illegality since <span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_21_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span>[Nombre 001]<span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_1_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span> has been considered a leader of the Costa Rican union movement for decades, has proactively intervened in strikes and stoppages continuously and publicly, therefore his notoriety and transcendence at a national level is indisputable. Furthermore, he was participating in an act of public interest, given its implications at a social, political, and labor level (it was not an event of a family or personal nature but markedly unionist, as admitted by the defense witnesses themselves); and finally, the person who made the recording was protected under the constitutional precept of freedom of expression that every citizen has with respect to issues of national relevance, as was that meeting. She qualifies the video as “</span><span style="font-style:italic">absolutely authentic, legitimate and valid for evidentiary purposes</span><span>” and from it, she continues saying, the accused's incitement to a group of unionists to carry out road closures, including the one adjacent to the Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo facility, from which fuel is distributed to almost the entire territory and whose obstruction would imply the paralysis of the country, including public services, is extracted. She says that since acts are charged and not legal classifications “…</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">the Court should have analyzed </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> whether the configuration of the demonstrated conduct corresponded to the criminal type or any other it deemed appropriate; an exercise that, if carried out, would not have triggered the acquittal that is today challenged</span><span>” (folio 511 verso). In addition to the video, she narrates that there was the testimony of Rubén Hernández Valle and Gloria Navas Montero (representative of a group of people who filed the complaint and lawsuit in this case) who highlighted not only the publicity of the video but the feelings of fear and impotence that overwhelmed the citizenry since what was stated by the defendant <span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_34_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span>[Nombre 001]<span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_34_end" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span> was published, as they projected a new disruption of public tranquility and the generation of consequences like those that affected Costa Rica with the strike movement that occurred in 2018, plunging the Costa Rican population into uncertainty and generating social harm to the detriment of the community. She insists that the criminal type, as it is, and the evidence received, allowed a conviction. She reiterates some previous statements and considers that it is not viable to point out, as the court did, that what was stated responds to the use of the constitutional right to free expression and that the crime exists even if the actions that were said were going to be taken were not executed. She requests that the judgment be declared and "reversed," ordering a remand for a new one. In a </span><span style="font-weight:bold">second section of the appeal by the plaintiff represented by Attorney Navas</span><span>, reference is made to the typicality of the fact as the basis for the acquittal and its annulment is requested since the criminal type was erroneously interpreted despite it being recognized that it is a crime of danger. She insists that, although the "original" video was not seized, what was transmitted by the media constituted a public fact based precisely on that video, from which it was possible to conclude that the act occurred. The interview with the appellant, conducted by Repretel, was precisely because of that video that had been made public, and the accused appeared the next day and admitted his statement, so the issue of who recorded it did not eliminate the commission of the act. What was reported and known by public opinion —she continues pointing out— gave credibility to the existence of the act and the legitimacy of what was transmitted and disclosed. The event was known with the threats included, hence the concluding reasoning incurred a vice of illogic. Regarding the merits, she qualifies the interpretation of numeral 280 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a><span> as erroneous when it holds that the crimes of disruption of public services and eventual obstruction of roads are excluded from integrating that type, those that were mentioned as the possibility of results that could be added to the facts, without affecting the typicality of the main crime.</span></p> Considers that the events affecting public tranquility are not exclusively the other criminal figures contained in Title X of the <a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Penal</span></a><span>. Public instigation is one of them and independent of the others. It is not necessarily linked to the others. Requests the nullity of the ruling. </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">Upon answering the appeals</span><span>, in writing, the defendant's defense attorneys requested the rejection of the challenge. They reiterate the criticisms outlined against the Public Prosecutor's Office regarding the use of public resources and affirm that they did not manage to reverse “</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">the dismissal of the video or the copies</span><span>” that was done in the judgment. </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">In the oral hearing held</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Attorney Carlos Meléndez, prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office, </span><span>says it is an error to consider that the illicit act in question must be in the title of crimes against tranquility instead of simply affecting public tranquility. Mentions vote number </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-236231\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">495-2003 of the Third Chamber</span></a><span> where types of crimes that must be instigated for this offense to be configured are not specified, nor is its application to the obstruction of services or blockage of roads prevented. </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Attorney Margot Avellán</span><span>, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, affirmed that this is a complete crime, although it is completed through others, and argues that in Argentina and Colombia, public instigation must be carried out in that manner, in public places, but not in Costa Rica, where that </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">reference</span><span> (“</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">public</span><span> instigation”) alludes to the concept of social peace or citizen equilibrium, affected by the illicit act, and not to the mode of commission. She adds that this was not a matter of simple demonstrations, but of promises, and that the defendant has not ruled out that the video was false; he even admitted on one channel that it did exist. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">The arguments are connected, therefore they will be addressed jointly and must be rejected. </span><span>Once again, the appellants mix procedural and substantive aspects. Regarding the evidentiary issues (of lawfulness and assessment) and the reasoning of the judgment, we must abide by what was indicated in the preceding whereas clause in order to avoid unnecessary reiteration. That is, it was already explained why obtaining the video was unlawful (private meeting, recording not authorized by the defendant; no guarantee of chain of custody and disregard of context); why the testimonial references to it were also unlawful (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, which extends not only to the primary source but also to those derived from it, such as the cited statements of people who only refer to what they saw on that tape); and why the judgment was well-reasoned (by demanding evidentiary lawfulness, preventing the reversal of the burden of proof, and requiring evidence and not simple statements to derive affirmations to be introduced in a debate). These aspects will not be delved into now, but suffice it to add, to what has already been stated, that the exceptions contemplated in numeral 47 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Civil</span></a><span> (“</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The photograph or image of a person may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, or sold in any form without their consent, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">unless the reproduction is justified by the notoriety of that person, the public function they perform, the needs of justice or police, or when such reproduction relates to events, happenings, or ceremonies of public interest or that take place in public</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. Images and photographs with stereotyped roles that reinforce discriminatory attitudes towards social sectors may not be published, reproduced, exhibited, or sold in any form</span><span>”; highlights added) do not apply. It is clear (for so it derives from the lack of evidence in this matter) that <span class=\"\">[Name 001]</span> is not a public official, nor were there needs of justice or police prior to the event of capturing his voice and image at that meeting, so the only reference, from the exceptions in the rule, that would fit him is being notorious since, as a union leader in the country for several decades, he is a very well-known or easily perceived or noted person, which are the meanings of that word. However, the prosecutor makes an erroneous reading of the article. First, it must be remembered that these are exceptions to a constitutional and human right, that is, of higher rank, and, as such, they must be interpreted restrictively: “... </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">in no way could 'public order' or 'common good' be invoked as means to suppress a right guaranteed in the Convention or to denature it or deprive it of real content (see Art. 29 of the Convention). These concepts, insofar as they are invoked as grounds for limitations on human rights, must be subject to an interpretation that adheres to the 'just requirements' of 'a democratic society' that takes into account the balance between the different interests at stake and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the Convention</span><span>” [Cf. I/A Court H.R. </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_05_esp.pdf.\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">The Mandatory Membership of Journalists (Arts. 13 and 19 American Convention on Human Rights)</span></a><span>. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985, para. 67]. Although the accused is a notorious figure, the cited numeral requires that the reproduction be justified not only based on the type of person (as already stated) but also in consideration of the event, and therefore adds: “... </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">when such reproduction </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">relates to events, happenings, or ceremonies of public interest</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> or that take place in public.” </span><span>It was already stated above that the events did not occur in a public place (or at least it was not proven that way) and were covered by other constitutional and conventional rights (assembly, expression), with which the final phrase is ruled out, and, being a private meeting, its content could not be accessed to verify </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\"> </span><span>if it related to events or happenings of public interest, for that would have been an invasion of the core of the constitutional right. That link could only be made when public acts occurred (if they occurred), which did not happen. Of course, all of this, as the prosecutor says, had to be linked to other constitutional and conventional rights such as freedom of expression (but also with freedom of association and the right to strike stipulated in Article 8 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=44205&amp;nValor3=46578&amp;param2=1&amp;strTipM=TC&amp;lResultado=2&amp;strSim=simp\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known as the Protocol of San Salvador</span></a><span> ratified by Costa Rica through Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999), but not only those of third parties but also those of the very people taking part in the meeting, including the defendant, which the appellant curiously overlooks. To understand, as the representative of the State's legal body worryingly does, that the public apparatus can invade the sphere of privacy of individuals based on what they express there would be to raze all human rights and the historical achievements to contain power and foster a fascist state that, depending on what is done or said in private spaces, can disrespect any limit, which is not admissible. Once again, it must be remembered that the freedom of assembly is part of a range of interrelated rights for the full enjoyment and exercise of civil and political rights which, in this particular case, also engage with social rights such as freedom of association. In this sense, it is noted:</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\"> “... </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">given that both the Inter-American Court and Commission have appealed on various occasions to decisions rendered by other supervisory bodies for compliance with international human rights treaties in order to interpret the content of the rights protected by the Convention, we believe it is important on this occasion to make a succinct reference to some of </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the standards that, regarding the right of assembly, have been shaped by the doctrine elaborated in this regard by the ILO</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. Highlighting in this regard that, although the ILO regulations referring to freedom of association do not make express reference to the right to freedom of assembly in any of its conventions relating to freedom of association, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">its supervisory bodies have been responsible for generating a broad development of the doctrine relating to the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> in the labor field, </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">assuming it as an intrinsic element of freedom of association</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. In the indicated sense, for example, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has highlighted that 'freedom of assembly constitutes one of the essential elements of trade union rights.' Just as its Committee on Freedom of Association has added that the right of professional organizations to hold meetings on their premises to examine professional matters, without prior authorization </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">and without interference from the authorities, constitutes a fundamental element of freedom of association, and public authorities should refrain from any intervention that could limit this right or hinder its legal exercise, unless such exercise disrupts public order or poses a serious and imminent danger to its maintenance</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">. The Committee on Freedom of Association has pointed out that freedom of assembly constitutes 'a fundamental condition for the exercise of trade union rights,' therefore, governments 'should refrain from any intervention equivalent to a prior authorization requirement, which would limit the right to hold union meetings, or which would impede the legitimate exercise of this right.'</span><span>” [Cf.: Mujica. Javier. </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Article 15. Right of Assembly. Article 16. Freedom of Association</span><span>. In: Steiner, Christian and Uribe, Patricia (editors). </span><a href=\"https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/30237.pdf\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos</span></a><span>. Comentario. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, p. 363 and ff. The bold text is added]. Consequently, it is worth reiterating that the privacy of the meeting and the right to intimacy prevented assessing the illicitly obtained evidence through surreptitious recordings and in violation of such rights. Now, it could be considered that those evidentiary issues were sufficient to support the acquittal and that, therefore, it is not necessary to delve into other substantive issues, but this is not the case. In these grounds, the parties, by questioning the manner of interpreting the criminal offense, attempt to introduce the element that publicity is not an element of this crime and, therefore, that even if what the accused uttered were private statements, public instigation would still be configured, and this could be credited by the mere reference, direct or indirect, of those who were at the activity. They also aspire to apply other criminal offenses (including the reference to common instigation to certain crimes, as described in the private criminal complaint of Attorney Navas), so, therefore, what has already been said is not enough to rule on the complaints, and we must descend to the substantive issue, as it is linked to the evidentiary elements that prove or do not prove each of its contents. For this reason, the analysis will be carried out by alluding, first, to the base crime charged (public instigation), its constitutionality, manner of configuration, its constituent elements and, therefore, the required evidence, and then other possible classifications will be alluded to. Previously, it is necessary to set out a constitutional parameter and a context, both historical and legal-systematic, without which, in the opinion of this chamber, a complete scrutiny cannot be made. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">(A) Constitutionality of the criminal offense. </span><span>The constitutionality of the figure of public instigation has been questioned on several occasions, although not all of them have resulted in a substantive ruling. Thus, through </span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-242202\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">vote number 2003-5410</span></a><span> of June 25, 2003, an argument regarding the impact this provision would have on the rights to freedom of expression and transit was summarily dismissed because the unconstitutionality had not been previously alleged in those proceedings. In this case, the accused started from the same panorama and evidenced the conflict of constitutional and conventional rights at play, which is why —as indicated in the initial whereas clause— he filed the unconstitutionality action number 21-024578-0007-CO against numeral 280 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Penal</span></a><span>. Although </span><span>the action was admitted and the respective edicts were published in judicial bulletins numbers 18 to 20, dated January 28 to February 1, respectively, all of 2022, it was resolved through vote number 2023-00430 of January 11 of the current year, in which it was ordered: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">By majority, the unconstitutionality action is dismissed. Justices Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado, and Garita Navarro provide different reasons. Justice Cruz Castro dissents and considers that this action should be granted, and consequently, due to its content and effects, Article 280 of the Código Penal is unconstitutional.</span><span>” Despite not having the full reasoning of the vote at this date (nor is it required to issue a ruling, as the operative part has already been published, lifts the suspension of the norm, and does not evidence any unconstitutionality or conforming interpretation), this constitutional pronouncement (which was divided, denoting the plausibility of various theses at play) does not prevent this tribunal, as an ordinary interpreter, from performing the aforementioned legality exercise or applying the hierarchy of sources and the hermeneutical rules specific to this matter. </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">(B) National historical evolution of public instigation. </span><span>The Latin American jurist and former judge of the I/A Court H.R., Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, has been a pioneer, in criminal dogmatics, in proposing the application </span><a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y0YFtJgs3P8\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">of the principle of genealogical cleansing</span></a><span> as a method to unravel (and, consequently, understand and apply) the meaning of criminal norms. According to said author, only by going to the origin of a punitive provision is it possible to observe the contextual elements that were or were not present when the criminal offense was created and that, therefore, implicitly condition it. In this way, the Argentine dogmatist concludes, the principle of legality and the restrictive interpretation specific to this matter are better applied. The cited author states: “... </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">in historical criminal law, multiple rationalizations contrary to the republican principle, to ethics, to the rule of law, and to Human Rights are found, when not presenting aberrant arguments. The particular primary criminalizations arise at a certain historical moment and are enshrined by legislators who participate in a certain cultural and power context: the legislator who constructs a criminal offense imagines a conflict and defines it, conditioned by collective representations, prejudices, ethical valuations, scientific knowledge, power factors, and rationalizations of their particular historical and cultural moment. These conditioning factors mutate rapidly due to the effect of cultural dynamism, but the criminal offenses remain, and furthermore, they are copied by other codes in countries that have nothing in common with the original context </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(...) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The criminal offenses contained in them are frequently dragged from one code to another, as the authors of the law draw from comparative criminal law. The dragging of criminal offenses does not always respond to a contextual analysis of them, but, on the contrary, this is almost never addressed, so they often bring with them an original ideological burden that is hardly compatible with the Rule of Law. This original ideological burden is the genealogy of the criminal offense, which is investigated through comparison (comparative criminal law) and history (original power context) </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">(...)</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> The objective of the genealogical investigation of criminal offenses is to discover the drag components dangerous to the Rule of Law and facilitate the interpretative work purified of them. In </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">a criminal dogmatics that pursues a </span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">precise political objective</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, an exegetical analysis of the text is not sufficient as a first step if it is not accompanied by the necessary tracking of its genealogy, which exposes the police state components it drags and that must be carefully neutralized in the construction</span><span>” (Cf. Zaffaroni, Eugenio Raúl; Slokar, Alejandro and Alagia, Alejandro. </span><a href=\"https://www.academia.edu/32234639/Zaffaroni_Eugenio_Raul_Derecho_Penal_Parte_General\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Derecho Penal: Parte General</span></a><span>. 2nd edition, pp. 138-139, bold text supplied). Criminal dogmatics and Costa Rican regulations always have a </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">precise political objective</span><span>, which is given by Article 1 of the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Constitución Política</span></a><span> which establishes: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Costa Rica is a democratic, free, independent, multiethnic, and pluricultural Republic.</span><span>” There, then, the interpretative lines of the entire legal system are defined. If it is understood that when one speaks of a </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">republic</span><span>, it alludes to the division of powers and the system of checks and balances designed by the constituent power within a branch of the State, it will be deduced that respect for these derivatives is essential when scrutinizing any norm. Furthermore, that republic must be </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">democratic,</span><span> that is, a system where decisions are made by the majority of the community with the right to do so, but such decisions do not affect the rights and dignity of minorities. It is frequently forgotten that democracy is not only a political and life system of majorities but that, as much or more important than that, it is a system that must start from respect for the human dignity of each and every human being, hence the connection with respect for human rights (</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">all</span><span> the human rights of </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">all</span><span> people at all times) are axiological criteria for normative exegesis. In this country, as defined by the National Constituent Assembly of 1949, the rule must be </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">freedom</span><span>, and only by exception and through the existence of a formal law shall penalization or repression occur. This fully links with the dogmatic definition of criminal law as a discontinuous order of illicitness, with respect for the principle of </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">ultima ratio,</span><span> with the principle of harmfulness in primary criminalization, and with the strict observance of the principle of legality and restrictive interpretation in punitive matters. That freedom is guaranteed by the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Constitución Política</span></a><span> and the international instruments on human rights signed and ratified by the country, and it has many facets: freedom of transit, expression, opinion, press and information, teaching, professorship, assembly, demonstration, association, unionization, commerce, enterprise, religion and worship, among others. Each primary criminalization that is made constitutes a diminishment of those rights and, therefore, must be done by formal law and interpreted restrictively. </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">Independence</span><span> alludes to the exercise of sovereignty and the public powers deriving from it (such as the signing and approval of treaties) according to the rules of the Rule of Law. That the nation is </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">multiethnic</span><span> and </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">pluricultural</span><span> (the latest additions to the cited numeral) stems from recognizing the contribution that all ethnic groups [of more remote origin (such as the different indigenous ethnic groups existing in the territory at the time of the conquest; the Afro-descendant and Chinese community, and European culture, particularly Spanish and Italian) or closer to our reality (such as migrant populations from all countries, particularly from Central America, Colombia, and, more recently, Venezuela] make to the formation of our nation, where diverse cultural manifestations must coexist, all of which must be respected and must coexist. Therefore, </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">a criminal law committed to numeral 1 of the Constitución Política cannot tolerate extensive interpretations to undermine public freedoms, nor promote its use by groups to attack minorities or disauthorize the exercise of the human rights of others, or foster authoritarianism, abuse of power, etc.</span><span> It must be remembered that the normative definition of the country's theoretical political model was made in 1949 within the framework of the National Constituent Assembly, but the dogmatic development of criminal law goes back centuries, so it is understandable that criminal norms prior to that date (or that arise in other socio-political contexts) do not necessarily adjust to the political objective to which all the inhabitants of the territory have subscribed through the constitutional oath (Article 194 of the </span><a href=\"https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Constitución Política</span></a><span>). Hence, genealogical (and restricted systematic) interpretation is essential to fulfill that mandate. Thus, by way of example, a criminal law issued in the 40s or 50s of the previous century that alludes to the concept of “key” cannot be interpreted under the current concept of key (which involves alphanumeric or biometric codes to open and access certain virtual spaces that were recently developed thanks to the Technological Revolution) because, at the date the law was issued, the sociological concept of key (its genealogical origin) was limited to a physical, metallic device, so a broader interpretation would be extensive and violate the principle of legality. In the genealogy of that hypothetical criminal offense, the normative-cultural element “key” was much more circumscribed or bounded than it is today. The relevance of unraveling the origin of the figure under analysis is understood, then, in this case, the crime of public instigation contained in numeral 280 of the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Penal</span></a><span> which states: “</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Whoever instigates another to commit a specific crime that affects public tranquility shall be punished with a penalty of six months to four years in prison, without it being necessary for the act to oc</span><span style=\"font-size:11pt\">cur.</span><span>” It is worth beginning by emphasizing that this numeral has not changed its wording since it was sanctioned in the current repressive legislation —the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Penal</span></a><span> known as the “Código Padilla” in honor of the president of its drafting committee, Dr. Padilla Castro— on November 15, 1970 (according to Supplement No. 120 to La Gaceta No. 257, although it was in force until 1973). This fact is not minor, as our country has been characterized by the opposite, that is, by legislative activism in punitive matters (the </span><a href=\"http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">Código Penal</span></a><span> has been reformed by 70 laws to date, according to the Legal Information System of the Procuraduría General de la República, which have modified multiple numerals, and some of these have been modified several times by different laws). Thus, the historical origin of the figure (which dates back at least to the year 1970) allows the criminal provision to be located in a different historical and normative context, as will be indicated later. The original article has changed its numbering as a result of subsequent additions and deletions to other crimes, as it previously occupied numeral 271.</span> However, although the offense has not undergone variations (neither in the conduct nor in the punitive amount) since its issuance in 1970, it does not mean that the criminal type “emerged spontaneously” on that date, since it is known that, in the first place, the current code has its source of “inspiration” in the <a href="https://perso.unifr.ch/derechopenal/assets/files/obrasportales/op_20110407_01.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Código Penal Tipo para América Latina</span></a> and in the drafts written, respectively, by <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/288500753.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Luis Jiménez de Asúa</span></a> and by <a href="https://catalogosiidca.csuca.org/Record/UNANL.42208/Description" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Sebastián Soler for Guatemala</span></a> (as is acknowledged on pages 2 and 72 of the statement of legislative intent (exposición de motivos) of the draft Criminal Code; folios 129 and 199 of legislative file (expediente) 3986 held by the Department of Archive, Research and Processing of the Legislative Assembly and consulted by this chamber. In the same sense: Antillón Montealegre, Walter. <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r17098.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">La legislación penal en Costa Rica</span></a>. Revista de Ciencias Penales de Costa Rica, pág. 26 y ss and Romero Pérez, Jorge Enrique. <a href="https://www.boe.es/biblioteca_juridica/anuarios_derecho/abrir_pdf.php?id=ANU-P-1972-20042500458" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Algunas notas acerca del Código Penal de Costa Rica</span></a>.). These sources of inspiration, in turn, collected provisions that emerged in various parts of the world. Secondly, the punitive compendium under discussion has not been the only one that Costa Rica has had, since it was preceded, in retrospective order, by the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/SCIJ/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=37382&amp;nValor3=83854&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Penal</span></a> and <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=33613&amp;nValor3=35446&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Police</span></a> Codes of 1941 (known as the Códigos Guier), the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=35220&amp;nValor3=83785&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code of Costa Rica of 1924</span></a> (Second Código Astúa), the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=77202&amp;nValor3=0&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code of Costa Rica of 1918-1919</span></a> (First Código Astúa), the <a href="https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/185728" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code of 1880</span></a> (or Código Orozco) and the <a href="https://www.sinabi.go.cr/ver/biblioteca%20digital/libros%20completos/Codigo%20general%20de%20la%20Republica%20de%20Costa%20Rica/Codigo%20gen%20Rep%20Costa%20Rica%20I%20%201-120.pdf#.Y_vKf3bMIaY" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">General Code of the State of Costa Rica</span></a> of 1841 (or Código de Carrillo). In the statement of legislative intent of the draft of the current Criminal Code carried out in 1970, regarding the special part it reads: “<span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">It can be affirmed that </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">for almost half a century the special part of the Criminal Code of Costa Rica has been the same</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. Very slight variations were made in 1941, but the structure</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">, taken from the Argentine Criminal Code of 1922</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, criticized ad nauseam by some and defended by very few, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">remains intact</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. In the draft bill, we follow the same ordering as the previous one, beginning with crimes against persons and ending with those relating to public faith. In general terms, we follow the Soler Draft Bill for Guatemala</span>” (Cfr. legislative file 3986, folio 198) and for the section in which the criminal type under discussion is inserted, one reads in the explanation of the reform: “<span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Crimes against public tranquility. Articles 271 to 274. A large part of the crimes that in the Code of </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">1924</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> were included in a chapter called against public order, passed to the Police Code of 1941. The pruning was somewhat drastic, and for that reason, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">we restore to its logical place the crime of public intimidation</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, which along with the glorification of crime constitute acts of extreme gravity and transcendence. These two criminal acts together with those of public instigation and association to commit crimes, which figure in our Criminal Code, we have rather called crimes against public tranquility and they form the four that make up this Title</span>” (Cfr. legislative file 3986, folios 213-214). Therefore, it is clear that the criminal type of public instigation introduced in 1970 was taken up without substantial modifications from preceding legislation, both domestic and foreign. For its part, the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=37382&amp;nValor3=39414&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Police Criminal Code of 1941</span></a> in its <span style="font-style:italic">Title VII: Crimes against public order</span> (which only comprised this crime and that of criminal association) stated: “<span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Article 331.- He who </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">by press or otherwise publicly instigates another to commit a determinate crime against a person or institution</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, shall incur for that sole act a prison sentence of six months to four years</span><span style="font-size:11pt">.” </span>(Emphasis supplied). It should be added that in this regulatory body, an extensive concept of perpetrator (author) was assumed (that is, that all the contributions of the subjects had equal value) since article 43 established: “<span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">They shall be punished </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">as perpetrators (autores)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> of the punishable act: those who carry it out by themselves; those who take part in the execution; those who contribute with aid or cooperation without which it could not have been executed or would have been made notably difficult, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">or those who instigate, force, or determine another</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> sufficiently to commit it.” </span>(Emphasis added). A similar situation was found in the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=35220&amp;nValor3=83785&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code of Costa Rica of 1924</span></a> (Second Código Astúa) since the public instigation to commit crimes was provided for in article 428 (Sole Chapter of <span style="font-style:italic">Title Eight: Crimes against public order</span>) as follows: «<span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Public instigation to commit crimes. He who by </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">press or otherwise publicly instigates</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> to commit a determinate crime, shall incur for that sole act in prison in its first to second degrees, according to the importance of the threatened legal interests, the determining motive and means of the instigation, the circumstances under which it is exercised and the danger it is capable of causing to arise.// The penalty may be applied with a reduction of one degree, when the instigation in none of those concepts should be considered serious, in the judgment of the court.// If the instigation takes effect, the instigator shall be punished as a co-perpetrator of the committed crime, and if it was done through the press, the provisions of article 31 shall apply.</span>» <span>(Emphasis added). </span><span>This code also proceeded from a unitary or extensive concept of perpetrator in which the following were equated to the perpetrator “…</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Those who by sufficient means, according to the circumstances, determine others to commit it, either by exercising physical violence upon them, or by virtue of an order, threat, gift, promise, advice of essential importance or another mode of suggestion or moral force</span><span>” (article 26). Why is it important to mention the theory of the unitary concept of perpetrator? First, because it is not the one followed today, where forms of participation in the strict sense, such as aiding and abetting and instigation, are distinguished from perpetration (articles 45 to 47 and 74 of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a>) and, second, because since those norms did not distinguish the contributions of the active subjects, neither was the level of development of the criminal act carried out by the perpetrator of interest to set the reproach of the participant in the strict sense (aider and abettor and instigator). As current legislation does make those distinctions, it is essential to differentiate the figures of common instigation (valid for all crimes: article 46 of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a>) from public instigation as a special crime (cited article 280) because for common instigation, as will be seen, it is required that the active subject determine the will of someone to commit a specific crime (that is, that there be acceptance of the incitement) and this determinate crime at least begins with acts of execution, whereas for public instigation it is not necessary for this instigated act to occur nor for there to be acceptance because, due to the publicity of the provocation, the danger arises. Within this framework, it is essential for drawing that distinction the publicity that surrounds the latter figure and, in the absence thereof, the rule of common instigation that can occur in private applies, but which requires the beginning of acts of execution of the instigated act, as will be seen. Now then, from the pen of the president of the drafting committee of the current <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a> (1970), it emerges, then, that the basis for this crime was taken from the <a href="https://catalogosiidca.csuca.org/Record/UNANL.40193" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">draft Criminal Code for Guatemala prepared by Sebastián Soler</span></a> for which reason it is appropriate to look back at what this author stated regarding this crime. In his classic work <a href="http://todosxderecho.com/recopilacion/Tratados%20y%20Manuales%20Basicos/Penal%20Parte%20General%20y%20Especial/Derecho_Penal_Argentino_-_Sebasti_n_Soler_-_Tomo_IV%28full%20permission%29.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Derecho Penal argentino. TEA, tomo 4</span></a>, 9ª reimpresión, 1983, páginas 589-602, the Argentine jurist says: “<span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Crimes against public tranquility. §130- The different figures. The reform of the Criminal Code has begun </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> by correcting the designation of the title, as there has been much misunderstanding brought about by the previous reference to ‘public order’ </span><span style="font-size:11pt">[remember that Padilla, in the statement of legislative intent, points out that this crime passes from the chapter of crimes against ‘public order’ to those committed against public tranquility]. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Let us see the reasons that made this change advisable. In few topics of criminal law can one verify greater confusion and vagueness of opinions than that which manifests itself when doctrine tries to set the concept of public order. The fundamental misunderstanding comes from the fact that this expression has at least two meanings </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> A brief examination of the different chapters and figures contained under the title of crimes against public order is enough to warn that it is not that meaning in which the expression must be taken at this point of legal theory. These crimes are: public instigation, illegal association, public intimidation, and glorification of crime. For our criminal law, public order simply means social tranquility and trust in the peaceful, secure development of civil life. It is not a matter of defending social security itself, but rather the opinion of that security which, in turn, in reality, constitutes a further reinforcing factor thereof. These characteristics of a secondary, mediate legal interest explain the reason why </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the penal scales of these chapters are, in general, low</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. It is not a matter of direct protection of primary legal interests, such as security, but of forms of mediate protection of those, because one of the favorable conditions for the commission of serious harm is social disorder and disturbance. These figures, then, have an aspect of prevention of greater harms, which </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">approximates them to what a contravention is</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. Indeed, if one observes their content, it will be seen that they are all oriented in the direction of other harms whose avoidance they seek in a mediate manner: behind instigation and illegal association lies the possibility of all kinds of crimes, which one seeks to avoid; behind the glorification of crime, an indirect way of counseling crime is perceived; behind intimidation, lie the harms derived from disorder. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Many of the figures are true preparatory acts for other crimes, which would be unpunishable due to their ambiguity </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">II. Instigation to commit crimes. Art. 209 establishes: ‘He who </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">publicly</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> instigates to commit a determinate crime shall be punished, for the mere instigation…’ </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">generic instigation was an accessory form of participation. Its punishability depended, therefore, not only on the instigation being accepted, but also on the act having, at the very least, a beginning of execution by the instigated person. This aspect is precisely what poses a problem</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, differently resolved by legislation and doctrine, depending on whether the instigation is not accepted or, being accepted, is not carried out by the instigated person. In such a situation, some positivists, with little success, have postulated the punishability of instigation under the heading of attempt with unsuitable means</span><span style="font-size:11pt"> (…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">but the most reasonable and common solution has consisted of making that act a special crime figure, in the same way in which certain forms of preparatory acts, generally unpunishable, are established as autonomous figures. This is, in reality, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the origin of the figure we are examining, which, for some, is nothing more than a common act of instigation that is unsuccessful</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">the specific difference of this crime consists of the fact that the act of instigation is carried out publicly</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. This is the element that makes an act of unaccepted instigation punishable, which, done without the requirement of publicity, remains unpunished, for lack of a beginning of execution. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">It is not a condition of punishability, as Manzini says, but a true constitutive element of the figure. As such, it must be included within the criminal intent of the perpetrator, that is, that the latter, in addition to instigating the commission of a determinate act, must know that he is doing so publicly</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">If a private instigation is made public, let us suppose, by means of a microphone unknown to the perpetrator, no crime exists</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">If ten individually determined persons gather in a private place and one of them, behind closed doors, instigates them to commit a crime, there is no public instigation</span><span style="font-size:11pt">. (…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Publicity thus arises when there exists the possibility that the instigation may be received or heard by someone not personally summoned</span>.” (Emphasis added). It is true that the criminal type commented on by Soler expressly contemplates, in the description of the conduct, the matter of <span style="text-decoration:underline">publicity</span>, unlike the one existing in Costa Rica which only mentions it in the name of the figure; however, that element should not therefore be considered excluded from the conduct because not only does the <span style="font-style:italic">nomen iuris</span> of the figure refer to the legislative meaning (such that it would be a contradiction for the crime of “public instigation” to be carried out in private) but that necessary publicity is extracted by virtue of the genealogical-restrictive and historical interpretation, which are valid if and only if they aim to limit the punitive reaches, never to broaden them (article 2 of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a>). As was seen, in the national historical development from which the respective criminal type was extracted and inserted, instigation was always public, as the type expressly contained that element, and there was never any discussion to modify such a thing, hence understanding it this way is the most restrictive. Therefore, in article 280 of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Criminal Code</span></a> which states: “<span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">He who instigates another to commit </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">a determinate crime that affects public tranquility</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> shall be punished with a prison sentence of six months to four years, without it being necessary for the act to occur</span>,” not only is the publicity of the instigation required (which in this case did not occur because the meeting was private) to generate the danger, but it also needs those crimes that are instigated to be ones that affect public tranquility, a concept that must be interpreted restrictively and that cannot be considered extensible to any crime because, understanding it that way, would also modify the rules of participation (common instigation) for those other crimes. Again, the political affiliation (in the broad sense) of Costa Rican criminal law (democratic, liberal and republican according to the initial article of the Magna Carta referred to) would suffer detriment if the interpretation were broad, and why that is so is explained a little more extensively below. Remember that with the emergence of Modern States (15th and 16th centuries), the regulations of the Middle Ages were broken away from and state legal order began to differentiate itself from others (such as morality and religions) that were initially amalgamated. This essential difference translates into the fact that, while morality and religions regulate the internal sphere of persons (their thoughts and feelings under the notion of “sins” in one of them), state law was to deal with external acts that implied a material modification of the world, leaving the internal sphere to the interference of those other normative orders. The entire theory of the <span style="font-style:italic">iter criminis </span>(or the path of crime) is based on this foundation. To avoid unnecessarily extending the historical references, it is worth recalling that the separation between unpunishable and punishable acts (or, what is the same, between freedom as a democratic principle and repression, which must be exceptional) occurs in the external phase of the <span style="font-style:italic">iter criminis</span>, specifically from the acts of execution that give rise to the sanction for attempt (without it being necessary, for these purposes, to refer to the evolution of the theories that, by stating it this way, emphasize various nuances, and suffice it to allude to the fact that the one mostly accepted by modern dogmatics is the individual objective theory). The fact that the <span style="font-style:italic">intermediate phase</span> (ideation, deliberation, and resolution), <span style="font-style:italic">intermediate</span> (manifested resolution) and even the <span style="font-style:italic">preparatory acts of the external phase</span> are unpunishable does not arise from a mere dogmatic whim, but is the product of the systematic attempt to prevent States from penetrating zones (thoughts, feelings, private expression of opinions) that are essential not only for the development of personality and human dignity but also for the consolidation of a democratic political system. For this reason, only by exception should expression-based crimes (insults, slander, defamation, hate crimes, glorification of a crime, obstruction of public roads) and possession-based crimes (of weapons, of drugs) be punished, since they imply advancements of the protective barrier that is established by <span style="font-weight:bold">the beginning of the acts of execution</span>. Expression-based crimes advance the barrier to the intermediate phase of the <span style="font-style:italic">iter criminis</span> (manifested resolution) and possession-based crimes to the preparatory acts. In both situations, not only the advancement of the barrier due to mere criminal policy is required but also the affectation of a legal interest (harmfulness (lesividad)). If the above is understood, it will be easily understood why saying that one is going to kill someone is not (and should not be) a crime, just as it should not be a crime, either, for a subject to tell another to kill a person and that person not to accept (an act of unaccepted instigation). In neither case is there a modification of the external world, and if there is to be any reaction to it, it must come from ethical, moral, or religious normative systems, not from state-legal ones because, moreover, human freedom means that this “expressed bad thought” can be reversed by “repentance” (in the common, non-legal sense), without ever modifying the external world. It is different when the subject accepts the proposal (criminal intent is generated) and this determined subject, in turn, begins acts of execution. At that point, at least a danger for the legal interest arises, and that justifies state intervention. But note that, although all of the above is required to punish a simple instigation, that is not sufficient because, depending on the theory of accessoriness followed, more or fewer additional elements will be required. For a <span style="font-style:italic">restricted theory of perpetration</span> (like the one followed today), not only is perpetration differentiated from participation in the strict sense (instigation and aiding and abetting), but the punishment of these forms of participation is made to depend on the intervention that the perpetrator may have. Thus, the theory of <span style="text-decoration:underline">minimum accessoriness</span> punishes participants only if the perpetrator has deployed a criminal type; that of <span style="text-decoration:underline">limited accessoriness</span> makes the punishment of aiders, abettors, and instigators depend on the perpetrator deploying a criminal wrong; that of <span style="text-decoration:underline">maximum accessoriness</span> requires in the perpetrator a typical, unlawful, and culpable conduct to determine the responsibility of the participants; and that of <span style="text-decoration:underline">hyper-accessoriness</span> requires typical, unlawful, culpable, and punishable conduct for such repression. Current criminal dogmatics considers the most adequate theory to be that of limited accessoriness, and our substantive regulations lack a position on this matter <span style="font-size:11pt">[articles 46 and 47 allude to “</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">punishable act</span><span style="font-size:11pt">” and from this, some authors and in other latitudes have derived hyper-accessoriness: see: Chinchilla Calderón, Rosaura. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">El principio de legalidad; ¿muro de contención o límite difuso para la interpretación de la teoría del delito en Costa Rica?</span><span style="font-size:11pt"> Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2008, pág. 89 y ss.; Reform to the German Criminal Code of 29.5.1943 and the doctrine and jurisprudence that interpreted it cited by Castillo González, Francisco. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Autoría y participación en el Derecho Penal</span><span style="font-size:11pt">. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 1ª edición, San José, 2006, pp. 55 y 347-348 (the author does not adhere to that thesis, he only describes what happened in Germany, although he stops mentioning it in later editions of his texts)].</span><span> Thus, one would have that, by this route (of interpreting ‘</span><span style="font-style:italic">public tranquility</span><span>’ in a broad sense to apply it to any crime that affects it) the institution of common instigation and the theory of accessoriness (whatever that may be) would practically be repealed because this criminal type, unlike general instigation, does not require such accessoriness.

But, moreover, from a systematic point of view, if it were interpreted as the appellant parties intend, the figures of solicitation (instigación) (which in dogmatics and comparative law may carry a slightly greater reproach than the principal since they create the intent in the latter) would have a lesser penalty than perpetration (autoría), to the detriment of what is indicated by article 46 of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Código Penal</span></a><span> or an excessive repression, alien to doctrinal regulations and the principles of equality and culpability. Let us look at two situations: </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">i)</span><span> if it were accepted that public solicitation can occur against any crime, in a broad manner, that violates public tranquility, as the appellants claim, we would reach the absurdity of maintaining, as the prosecutor did, that since aggravated robbery in homes, for example, affects tranquility, the crime of public solicitation of such a crime could be committed and, in this way, the conduct would no longer carry the penalty of the perpetrator of that crime (from 5 to 15 years according to articles 46 and 213 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Código Penal</span></a><span>) but only one of six months to four years of imprisonment, which is the one contemplated in this criminal type. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">ii) </span><span>Another absurd consequence of this position would be the opposite, that is, that solicitation could have a greater penalty than the principal crime, although in Costa Rica it was expressly assumed that this could not be so by virtue of the general rules. For example, a person who solicits others to commit thefts on public roads can greatly affect social tranquility if those crimes are deployed. And thus, while the perpetrators of the thefts would be punished with imprisonment of one month to three years, the one who solicited them would be punished under the figure of "public solicitation" (following the appellant persons' criterion) and would receive a penalty of six months to four years of imprisonment, which demonstrates an enormous disproportion of the penalty that is not accepted even by dogmatics, which only justifies the greater increase in the person who creates the intent provided it is proportional to the crime, and this has been understood as long as it does not exceed one third. The </span><span style="font-style:italic">reductio ad absurdum</span><span> ('reduction to absurdity') is a logical method of demonstrating the validity (or invalidity) of categorical propositions, and in this case the results of the appellants' proposal cannot be more evident. But let us continue to delve deeper into the argumentative lines that are raised. The prosecutor maintains that while including the word "publicly" in the criminal type would be an invasion of legislative competence (thereby ignoring that the jurisdictional function, by constitutional mandate, always requires a hermeneutical task that follows rules given in the legal system itself and that, in criminal cases, one must resort to genealogical, historical, and systematic interpretation to restrict and never to expand the type), she does consider it possible, without any consequence, to include crimes not contemplated by the legislator in the examined criminal type or to expand its concepts according to the criterion of the author she cites (who comments on legislation different from ours) even though this is prohibited by articles 1 and 2 of the substantive criminal legislation. However, such a position is not admissible because doctrine can indeed contribute to clarifying the meaning of a normative provision provided the principle of legality is respected, not if it extends the prohibition as is sought here, and in this case the limit of the figure is given by a parallel legal figure which is generic solicitation. The text cited by the prosecutor and commented on by Creus contains, unlike our legislation, a broad reference to crimes. The Costa Rican code, in a manner differentiated from that commented on by the Argentine jurist, added the type of crimes that could be solicited in this way. Another incoherence of the prosecutor is that, while she accepts part of what Argentine doctrine says (although this does not correspond to our legislation), she rejects what this stipulates as the differentiating element of solicitation as an institute of the general part with respect to public solicitation as a crime of the special part (this is introduced because the former cannot be configured in the absence of execution acts that generate a criminal wrong, according to the theory of limited accessoriness, so such elements are suppressed but the type is constructed as one of danger and this is achieved, precisely, with the issue of publicity). In synthesis, the publicity of the solicitation is required to commit the crime of public solicitation because this element is what generates the abstract danger that, in turn, allows the suppression of the accessoriness of participation in the strict sense, and the expression "...</span><span style="font-style:italic">a determined crime that affects public tranquility</span><span>..." contained in article 280 must be interpreted restrictively as circumscribed to the crimes stipulated in </span><span style="font-style:italic">Title X: Crimes against public tranquility</span><span>, that is, those of illicit association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation, and apology of crime because, to do otherwise, is to create crimes by interpretive means. This consequently leads to the fact that both elements (the publicity of the act and that a determination is being made to affect a crime against public tranquility) must be known by the perpetrator. If the publicity is not known by the perpetrator (because they are being secretly recorded and, therefore, are unaware that they are inciting a collective), there is a mistake of type (error de tipo). If the active subject is unaware that they are soliciting a crime "</span><span style="font-style:italic">against public tranquility</span><span>", a mistake regarding normative legal elements occurs which, because it is most beneficial for the accused person, must also be resolved as a mistake of type despite having common elements with a mistake of prohibition (error de prohibición) (on this topic, see the judgment of the former </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-474235" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José</span></a><span>, number 2010-641: R. Chinchilla, U. Zúñiga and I. Estrada). The interpretation of the appellant parties (by excluding publicity from the type and by suppressing the reference to certain crimes contained therein) is not only broad against the mandate of article 2 but also throws overboard the whole issue of mistakes and the principle of culpability, as they seek a penalty for the person outside of their internal consonance (knowledge and will) with the allegedly externalized conduct. This is the same effect generated by crimes of abstract danger, and it is not in vain that they aim to convert all forms of solicitation into this category, which is a dangerous tendency in times when respect for the Constitutional, Social, and Democratic State of Law is not, precisely, the dominant value. This was understood by the first-instance judgment which, with proficiency, rejected such proposals and, in that, no error is observed. But, in addition to what has already been said, which is neither little nor of light weight, there is a much stronger reason why the theses tried by the appellant parties cannot be accepted. Again, it is related to the political system to which the country subscribed and the genealogical cleansing that must be followed, and this will be set out in the following section. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(C) International Human Rights Law and the Penal Code: integration and systematic application. </span><span>The idea, already developed from historical evidence, must be retaken that there has been no variation between the introduction of the figure of "public solicitation" in 1970 to date and that it presents, in the immediate normative antecedents, a reference that the solicitation be public (in fact, in many of the earlier texts, emphasis is placed on the use of the press, the only medium that, at that time, guaranteed such publicity). This origin allows clarity regarding the normative context in which the figure is inserted. It should be remembered that, when the current repressive body was approved (1970), although the </span><a href="https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Constitución Política</span></a><span> of 1949 formally governed in the country, there was no effective control over the coupling of lower-ranking norms to those of superior rank, because concentrated constitutional control, in the hands of the Corte Plena and governed by the </span><a href="https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/185514" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Código de Procedimientos Civiles</span></a><span> of 1887, was considered merely on paper, since a minority could veto a declaration of unconstitutionality (a qualified majority of the Corte Plena was required, then composed of 17 magistrates as the seven of the Sala Constitucional had not been incorporated, so 12 votes were needed to declare something unconstitutional, which historically prevented this from occurring). The constitutional reform of 1989 and the creation of the constitutional jurisdiction were necessary for such control to be effective and no longer only regarding constitutional hierarchy but also to incorporate human rights treaties as a constitutional parameter. Nor had the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados</span></a><span> (hereinafter CVDT) been made effective when the current article on public solicitation was approved, which, although signed by Costa Rica in 1969, was not ratified by the country until 1996 through </span><a href="https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/SCIJ/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">ley No. 7615</span></a><span>. Finally, by 1990, International Human Rights Law (hereinafter DIDDHH) had not emerged with its current force, which, although it already had some declarations that emerged after World War II to its credit, was under development in almost all its areas to give rise to the treaties in force. It was not until 2006 that, derived from there (and embodied by the Corte IDH in the judgment of the </span><a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_154_esp.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">caso Almonacid Arellano y otros vs. Chile of September 26, 2006</span></a><span>), the concept of conventionality control (control de convencionalidad) emerged, with binding character. These three elements (constitutional control over the hierarchy of norms, the value of treaties superior to law according to article </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">27 of the CVDT</span></a><span>, and the development of the DIDDHH that implies the internal value of signed and ratified treaties and the conventionality control over them) occurred after the emergence, in 1970, of the criminal type under comment. None of this can be lost sight of because they are elements that contribute to shaping the original criminal type, as they all have higher rank and integrate the political system described in the aforementioned constitutional article 1. As part of International Human Rights Law are </span><span style="text-decoration:underline">individual freedoms</span><span> such as the right of assembly, of demonstration or expression, of association, and of thought (articles 26, 28, and 29 </span><a href="https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Constitución Política</span></a><span>; 13, 15, and 16 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=36150&amp;nValor3=38111&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos</span></a><span> and 18 to 22 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;param2=1&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=20579&amp;n" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos</span></a><span>) but also social rights such as the right to unionize, to strike, to collective bargaining (article 8</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&nbsp; </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=44205&amp;nValor3=46578&amp;param2=1&amp;strTipM=TC&amp;lResultado=2&amp;strSim=simp" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Protocolo a la Convención adicional a la CADH en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales or Protocolo de El Salvador</span></a><span> and article 8 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=11190&amp;nValor3=12008&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales</span></a><span>). Both integrate, under equal conditions (unlike what is often thought in our country), the framework of human rights that are characterized by being inalienable, indivisible, inalienable, universal, imprescriptible, and interdependent. As can be seen, these rights have been collected, in many cases, in multilateral treaties or conventions that our country has signed and ratified. And this latter connects with the principle </span><span style="font-style:italic">pacta sunt servanda</span><span> contained in article 27 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados (CVDT)</span></a><span> according to which a State cannot invoke its domestic law to disregard a treaty it has signed and ratified. Therefore, since 1996 (when the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=42751&amp;nValor3=45069&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">CVDT</span></a><span> was ratified), International Human Rights Law must be inserted into the integration and interpretation of all criminal types, including those that were issued previously, because the law (in this case the substantive repressive body) not only cannot disregard a norm of superior rank (the treaties: article 7 of the </span><a href="https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Constitución Política</span></a><span>) but also domestic law cannot disregard conventional law. In the same sense, Constitutional Law establishes the predominance of human rights treaties (or of the pronouncements of the bodies that interpret them) over the Political Constitution if those grant more rights or protect them in a better manner (see article 73(d) of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=38533" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional</span></a><span> and the votes of the </span><span>Sala</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&nbsp; </span><span>Constitucional numbers No. </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-89799" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">3435-92</span></a><span>, No. </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-81561" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">2313-95</span></a><span>, No.</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&nbsp; </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-82278" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">1319-97</span></a><span>, No. 4356-98, and No. </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-83870" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">6830-98</span></a><span>). Therefore, having reached this point, it is clear that, although the crime of public solicitation is in force and is constitutional according to the vote of the Sala Constitucional number 2023-00430 of January 11, 2023 (whose full content is unknown as of this date despite having been constantly requested, even before voting on this matter as is evident from the preceding records), the ordinary interpreter </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">MUST</span><span> (it is not optional but an obligation) adapt it, in its interpretation, to that normative context. And it is here where it is necessary to examine the content of those other human rights that substantially limit the punitive power in a democracy like the one described by article 1 of the </span><a href="https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=871" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Constitución Política</span></a><span> because, although criminal types formally exist that prohibit certain conducts (many of them, like this one, of pre-constitutional or pre-conventional origin), their spheres of validity are limited by the normative evolution already referred to. In the present matter, even starting (hypothetically, only for analytical purposes) from the claim of the accusing party —that public solicitation of article 280 </span><span style="font-style:italic">ibidem</span><span> can also be committed when a determination is made to commit crimes like the obstruction of public roads, which are not part of those against public tranquility— other considerations are necessary, beginning with the fact that, after the accused meeting, there was no materialization of road closures (nor was this stipulated in the complaints nor is there evidence in this sense received in debate). The crime of obstruction of a public road is regulated in article 263 bis and states: “</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">A penalty of ten to thirty days of imprisonment shall be imposed on whoever, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">without authorization from the competent authorities</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, impedes, obstructs, or hinders, in any way, vehicular traffic or the movement of pedestrians</span><span style="font-style:italic">.</span><span>” (Emphasis supplied). Said provision was elevated to the category of a crime (which enables repressive actions such as raids, pretrial detention, etc.) and ceased to be a simple contravention by law No. 8250 of May 2, 2002, that is, approved shortly after the popular demonstrations that erupted in March 2000 in protest against what was called the “</span><a href="https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/el-combo-que-estremecio-al-pais/XPNTNN5GIFFVFCZ7AVOTCP74W4/story/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Combo del ICE</span></a><span>” (bills that sought the ‘modernization of the ICE, the opening in energy and telecommunications’). The purpose of discouraging and repressing that mechanism of demonstration is evident and it joins article 263 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=5027" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Código Penal</span></a><span> which states: «</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Disruption of public services. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Article 263.- Whoever, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">without</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> creating a situation of common danger, impedes, obstructs, or disrupts the normal functioning of transportation by land, water, and air, or of public communication services or energy substances, shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to two years.</span><span style="font-size:11pt">» (Emphasis added).</span><span> However, social protest is a human right derived from freedom of expression and demonstration which, in that measure, has a rank superior to law and the latter cannot leave it without content, without prejudice to the exercise of balancing in case of collision with other rights of similar or greater magnitude that must be carried out in each specific case. Regarding its scope, the supreme interpreter of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&amp;nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=36150&amp;nValor3=38111&amp;strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">CADH</span></a><span> has said: «</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">171. The right to protest or express disagreement against any state action or decision is protected by the right of assembly, enshrined in Article 15 of the American Convention </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> The right protected by Article 15 of the American Convention </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> covers both private gatherings and </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">gatherings on public roads, whether static or with movement</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. The possibility to demonstrate publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways to exercise the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be claimed. Therefore, the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and must not be interpreted restrictively </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">172 </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> the Court takes note of what was indicated by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to assembly and association, according to which “when the violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is an enabling and even determining factor or a precondition for the violation of other rights </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is also inevitably affected and this deserves to be recognized.” Furthermore, as occurs with other rights with a social dimension, it is highlighted that </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the violation of the rights of participants in a gathering or assembly by the authorities, “has serious chilling effects on future gatherings or assemblies</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">”, as people may choose to abstain to protect themselves from these abuses, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">in addition to being contrary to the State's obligation to facilitate and create conducive environments so that people can effectively enjoy their right of assembly</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">.</span><span style="font-size:11pt">»</span><span> (Corte IDH. </span><a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_371_esp.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Caso Mujeres Víctimas de Tortura Sexual en Atenco Vs. México. Judgment of November 28, 2018</span></a><span>; emphasis supplied). Commenting on said provision, it has been said: «</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Thus, it being insufficient that there are doubts about whether the right of assembly could produce negative effects to the detriment of others, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">restrictions on the right of assembly will only </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">(sic)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> find support in those cases where there are objective data that allow deducing in an indubitable manner that the demonstration does not conform to conventional parameters</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, and especially in relation to the need to protect public health and morals, as well as the rights and freedoms of others. For this reason, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the reasons alleged to prohibit or restrict the right of assembly must not only be convincing and imperative so as to justify the restrictions on that freedom, but they must be proven</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. That is, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">they must not be simple suspicions, uncertain dangers, much less insufficient, capricious, or arbitrary arguments; but objective, sufficient, and duly grounded reasons</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has indicated, “the gathering or demonstration will depend on its peaceful character. Although, certainly</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">, every gathering in a place of public transit or demonstration causes a restriction on the right to free movement of non-demonstrating citizens, this restriction cannot in itself lead to a prohibition if the requirement of peaceful character is met</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, understanding by such the absence of disturbances of public order with danger to persons or property. Moreover, the ideas or claims of the demonstrators cannot be subjected to any type of political opportunity controls based on the principles and values, both legal and meta-legal, dominant in society or that are identified with any genre of ideology or thought.”</span><span>» [Cf.: Mujica. Javier. </span><span style="font-style:italic">Artículo 15. Derecho de reunión. Artículo 16. Libertad de asociación</span><span>. In: Steiner, Christian and Uribe, Patricia (editors).</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&nbsp; </span><span>Comentario. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, p. 371 et seq. Bold text is added]. And, as has been said, if this process was characterized by something, in the words of the first-instance judge herself, it was by evidentiary inertia because although many assertions were made (both in writing and at trial and in the hearing before this chamber), these lacked any evidentiary support, to the point that extremes contained in the complaint of attorney Navas, such as the alleged solicitation to attack a journalist or the accused's intervention in strikes that affected the right to health or education, were only emotional expressions (emotional appeal fallacy), without any evidentiary basis.

Therefore, if there is no objective evidence of limitations on the rights of others (because there were no material acts of road closures after what was said in that meeting) and intervening in demonstrations, even on public roads, is a right, this would imply that instigating demonstrations on public roads (whether considered through the specific crime of public instigation or through generic instigation to the specific crime of obstruction of a public road) could not be a crime even though it limits vehicular traffic, because, although it may constitute a typical conduct, it would be justified by the exercise of a right and, to that extent, becomes a justification [article 25 of the Código Penal: "No delinque quien obrare en (…) ejercicio legítimo de un derecho"]. But if what has been said so far were not enough, it must be taken into account that these rights, of expression and assembly with the contents already outlined from International Human Rights Law, are also related to the hard core of the right to unionization. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself, at the request of the IACHR, in the advisory opinion OC27/21 of May 5, 2021 developed these aspects profusely and, given its binding nature for the country, it is appropriate to transcribe part of what was decided, even if the citation may be lengthy: «74. (...) this Court considers it pertinent to make the following additional considerations regarding the content of the right to freedom of association. (…) 81. (…) the Court considers that the right of workers to belong to a union logically comprises the right to carry out union activities. The spectrum of actions included in this right has a broad content, and must be regulated in the statutes of union organizations, which must be determined by their members. These activities may include, for example, participation in union meetings, the right to express opinions, the right to receive or distribute information, the right to participate in decisions adopted at meetings or assemblies (…) The State has the obligation to protect the adequate exercise of workers' activities in union life, avoiding any action by the authorities that allows the limitation in the exercise of these rights, as well as adopting the necessary measures so that workers, and their representatives, can carry out their union activities effectively in the companies or bodies where they work (…) 106. This Court reiterates that freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike are rights incorporated in Article 26 of the Convention, as these derive from Article 45(c) and (g) of the OAS Charter (…) Although these are autonomous rights, this Court highlights their interdependence and indivisibility. (…) 111. In relation to the right to strike (…) States must respect and guarantee that it can be exercised effectively by all workers, without discrimination (…) the State must guarantee that workers can exercise their right to strike without being subject to penalization by the private employer, or by the State itself. In that sense, States must suppress those criminal norms that could be used to persecute the exercise of the right to strike. On the other hand, with respect to workers who provide essential services, or who exercise authority functions on behalf of the State, it must be guaranteed that the list of essential services that are not subject to the exercise of the right to strike is clearly defined in domestic law, and in accordance with the provisions established by the ILO. Likewise, workers who perform said essential functions must have conciliation and arbitration mechanisms that allow them to obtain a response to their claims (…) 121. Article 16.1 of the American Convention recognizes the right of persons to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, cultural, sports, or any other purposes. This Court has indicated that the right of association is characterized by enabling persons to create or participate in entities or organizations with the purpose of acting collectively in the pursuit of the most diverse ends, as long as these are legitimate (…) positive obligations also derive from freedom of association to prevent attacks against it, protect those who exercise it, and investigate violations of said freedom (…) 123. (…) this Court understands that the relationship between freedom of association and freedom of association is a relationship of genus and species, since the former recognizes the right of persons to create organizations and act collectively in the pursuit of legitimate ends, based on Article 16 of the American Convention, while the latter must be understood in relation to the specificity of the activity and the importance of the purpose pursued by union activity (…) 132. (…) this Court highlights the relationship that exists between freedom of expression, the right of assembly, and the rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining, and strike. (…) 134 (…) freedom of expression is indispensable for the formation of public opinion in a democratic society. In the labor sphere, the Court has indicated that it is a conditio sine qua non for unions and, in general, those who wish to influence the community to develop fully. In this logic, freedom of expression is a necessary condition for the exercise of workers' organizations, including unions, in order to protect their labor rights and improve their conditions and legitimate interests, since without this right said organizations would lack effectiveness and reason for being (…) 135. (…) the protective scope of the right to freedom of thought and expression is particularly applicable in labor contexts (…) a reinforced level of protection of freedom of expression is required, and especially with respect to those who hold a representative position for workers (…) 137. For this Court, the existence of a free flow of information, ideas, and opinions is fundamental for the exercise of union rights and collective bargaining, therefore the threat of initiating criminal actions by the authorities in response to legitimate opinions of the representatives of a union organization can have intimidating and harmful effects to the detriment of workers or employers. For this reason, detention or imprisonment as punishment for the legitimate exercise of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association is arbitrary. (…) 139. Regarding the right of assembly, this Court recalls that Article 15 of the American Convention “recognizes the right of peaceful assembly, without arms”. The Court has indicated that this right covers both private meetings and meetings on public roads, whether static or with movements. The possibility of demonstrating publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways of exercising the right to freedom of expression, through which the protection of other rights can be claimed. Therefore, the right of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and must not be interpreted restrictively (…) Likewise, this Court has expressed that the right to protest or express disagreement against any state action or decision is protected by the right of assembly (…) 141. This Court warns that the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association, in their relationship with freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, constitute fundamental rights for workers and their representatives to organize and express specific demands about their working conditions, in order to effectively represent their interests before the employer, and even participate in matters of public interest with a collective voice. States have the duty to respect and guarantee these rights, which allow leveling the unequal relationship that exists between workers and employers, and access to fair wages and safe working conditions. In this sense, the Court recalls that human rights are interdependent and indivisible, so that the effectiveness of the exercise of rights depends on the effectiveness of the exercise of other rights. In this way, civil and political rights, and economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights must be understood integrally as human rights, without hierarchy among themselves and enforceable in all cases before those authorities that are competent» (The highlights are added by this Chamber). The chronological contextualization of the criminal reform that introduced numeral 263 bis is important because it evidences the discouragement that, from various state agencies, has been promoted against the broad exercise of social human rights such as protest as a form in which freedom of expression is manifested, even though it has limits, as will be said later. Human rights are not only individual rights, detached from social rights (and, to that extent, violative of the principle of interconnection of this matter) and the criminalization of social protest (through the obstruction of public roads), by itself, says nothing about the unlawfulness of the conduct, but only about its typicality. It should be remembered that, although ordinary courts cannot decree the unconstitutionality of norms and, for the one that now concerns us, the Constitutional Chamber has not done so (see voto número 2023-00430 of January 11 of the current year in which it dismissed the unconstitutionality action regarding article 280; voto número 2003-5414 that outright rejected an action against the current numeral 263, both of the Código Penal, and voto número 2012-17027 of 2:30 p.m. on December 5, 2012, which ruled on the obstruction of public roads in the terms that will be referred to later), this does not prevent the exercise of ordinary jurisdiction, which must verify, in each specific case, not only the conventionality of the provision but also whether there was, in addition to typicality, unlawfulness, and this is both material and formal, and it is here where the analysis of causes of justification is involved, such as the legitimate exercise of a right (article 25 of the Código Penal). In a similar case, this was understood jurisprudentially, for example, in this vote: «…the crime of public instigation contained in article 280 of the Código Penal –formerly 273-, states: “Será reprimido con la pena de seis meses a cuatro años de prisión, el que instigare a otro a cometer un delito determinado que afecte la tranquilidad pública, sin que sea necesario que el hecho se produzca.” With the complaint of licenciado V, it cannot be considered proven that the speech of Mr. J had such force over a person or persons that it provoked a determination in the realization of an unlawful act. It must be added that, even in the event that such instigation over the demonstrators existed, what is indicated by article 25 of the Código Penal cannot be ignored, insofar as it states: “No delinque quien obrare en cumplimiento de un deber legal o en el ejercicio legítimo de un derecho”. In the present matter, the complaint claims that deputy J calls on students to demonstrate on the issue of photocopying and to demand the protection of the right to education. This is nothing other than the exercise of a right, which must be examined based on the provisions of Title VII of the Constitución Política and numeral 28 of the Carta Magna, on the understanding that the call being made is part of the right of expression that every citizen in this country has, especially since what is requested has to do with a fundamental right: education. It is for this reason that this Chamber endorses the prosecutorial request, considering that Mr. J was in the full exercise of his freedom of expression, which was aimed at safeguarding the right to education. Based on this interpretation, the accused crime could not be configured, because even though the imputed conduct was included in a criminal type, the existence of a cause of justification would eliminate the unlawfulness of said acts, and, consequently, such deployment would not be considered criminal either. In this type of cases, article 282 of the Código Procesal Penal indicates that “cuando el hecho denunciado no constituya delito o sea imposible proceder, el Ministerio Público solicitará al tribunal de procedimiento preparatorio, mediante requerimiento fundado, la desestimación de la denuncia…”. Having verified that the facts denounced by licenciado V do not constitute any crime, the request formulated by the Fiscal General de la República is accepted, decreeing the dismissal.» Sala Tercera (Chinchilla, Ramírez, Arroyo, Pereira and López). Voto número 2013-495 (bold supplied). As licenciada Navas recognizes in her own complaint brief, both the right to unionization (and its derivatives including collective bargaining mechanisms), as well as the rights to assembly and demonstration, including the right to social protest as part of freedom of expression, are human rights, essential to maintain democratic balance and reduce social tensions and polarizations. It is clear that it is also not permissible to abuse any of these rights, nor to exercise them in bad faith, nor to perform an antisocial exercise of them (articles 20 to 22 of the Código Civil) since every right has as its limit the exercise of other rights that concern other people in the population. Therefore, it is possible to repress the damages or injuries that occur within those protest frameworks, just as it is also possible to sanction (from a labor point of view) the execution of movements that affect essential services defined, in a restrictive and not broad manner, in a prior law, according to the Inter-American Court in OC27/21 of May 5, 2021. However, in this matter, not only was there no evidence that these affectations (to life, health, integrity, property, or essential services) occurred (since after the accused meeting no protest materialized), but many of the regulations on the right were introduced by law after the accused facts (ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos No. 9808 of 2020) and did not exist at the date of these (2018 onwards). On the other hand, other rights (such as the freedom of transit of citizens) can be reconciled with these (freedom of expression, assembly, and union rights) through other measures, thanks to balancing exercises in each specific case. In short, although this Chamber agrees that the exercise of violence is not a valid or justified protest option, nor is the affectation of essential services, it cannot help but warn that, in scenarios where discontent cannot be exercised through the channels admitted in International Human Rights Law —since these have been closing— violence, sooner or later, ends up erupting. Therefore, prima facie, the fact that a person determines the will of another or others to obstruct public roads does not necessarily constitute a crime, since this will depend on whether the author's action is justified or not (if common instigation is applied) or whether the protest can be assumed, without more, as a crime and not as a right to determine if it affects "public tranquility" or rather tends to strengthen it through the exercise of rights. Consequently, hypothetically accepting (for analytical purposes only) that the accused made a call of that type (without any subsequent materialization) would not inexorably allow reaching a conclusion about the unlawfulness of his conduct because, for this, it was necessary to specify other elements that not only did not occur in reality (the mentioned closure did not occur) but were also not proven at trial. In comparative law, there are pronouncements that reveal the tension of rights and the way to resolve it. For example, the Spanish Constitutional Court, in judgment number 42/2000 of February 14, 2000, established that «…the right of assembly when exercised in places of public transit is a collective manifestation of freedom of expression exercised through a transitory association of persons that operates as an instrumental technique placed at the service of the exchange or exposition of ideas, the defense of interests, or the publicity of problems or demands, thus constituting a relevant channel of the participatory democratic principle, whose configuring elements are the subjective - group of persons -, the temporal - transitory duration -, the finalistic - lawfulness of the purpose -, and the real or objective - place of celebration”. (…) This Court has already had occasion to rule on the alterations to public order caused by concentrations that affect the circulation of vehicles on public transit roads, pointing out that the “exercise of this right, by its very nature, requires the use of places of public transit and, given certain circumstances, allows the occupation, so to speak instrumentally, of roadways,” recognizing that “the holding of this type of meetings usually produces disruptions and restrictions in the circulation of persons and, as relevant here, of vehicles” (SSTC 59/1990, FJ 6; 66/1995, FJ 3).

Notwithstanding, such findings do not lead this Court to consider that when the exercise of this fundamental right entails the indicated restrictions, it is not constitutionally legitimate, but, on the contrary, to understand that "<span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">in a democratic society, urban space is not only an area of circulation, but also a space of participation</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">" (STC 66/1995, FJ 3).</span><span>» Furthermore, in the Inter-American system, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR) has stated that “</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">governments cannot simply invoke one of the legitimate restrictions on freedom of expression, such as the maintenance of ‘public order,’ as a means to suppress a ‘right guaranteed by the Convention or to distort it or deprive it of real content.’ If this occurs, the restriction applied in that manner is not legitimate </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">if the consequences of criminal sanctions and the inevitably inhibiting effect they have on freedom of expression are considered, the criminalization of any type of expression can only be applied in exceptional circumstances where there is a clear and direct threat of anarchic violence </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> the Commission understands that the use of such powers to limit the expression of ideas lends itself to abuse, as a measure to silence unpopular ideas and opinions, thereby restricting debate that is fundamental for the effective functioning of democratic institutions. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Laws that criminalize the expression of ideas that do not incite anarchic violence are incompatible with the freedom of expression and thought enshrined in Article 13</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> and with the fundamental purpose of the American Convention to protect and guarantee the pluralistic and democratic way of life</span><span>” (IACHR, </span><a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/a12042.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Annual Report 1994, “Report on the Compatibility of Desacato Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights</span></a><span>”, Chapter V; bold added). As the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS indicates: “…</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">within certain limits, States may establish regulations on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly to protect the rights of others. However, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">when balancing the right to transit, for example, and the right to assembly, it is necessary to consider that the right to freedom of expression is not just another right but, in any case, one of the first and most important foundations of the entire democratic structure: undermining freedom of expression directly affects the main nerve of the democratic system</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">”. Thus, any measure aimed at limiting public demonstrations must seek to ensure that its application safeguards the essential content of the human rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. Limitations must not depend on the content of what is to be expressed through a public demonstration, must serve a public interest, and must leave other alternative channels of communication. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Limitations must have a legal basis and can only be aimed at preventing serious and imminent threats, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">a potential danger not being sufficient</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">.</span><span>” (emphasis supplied). The Costa Rican Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has understood this when stating: «</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Regarding the State's criminal power, it must be used as a last resort (ultima ratio) for ensuring social peace, not as a mere mechanism of social control. Hence, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Article 256 bis of the Penal Code, which criminalizes the obstruction of public roads, must be interpreted in such a way that its application does not entail an affectation of the essential content of the constitutional rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. In this sense, the conducts referred to in that criminal provision, regarding public demonstrations, are only those where considerable injuries to the rights of other persons or to State property are proven. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">For example, a protest in which demonstrators attack security forces or other persons, or commit acts of vandalism against public or private property, exceeds the protective content of the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, therefore it is criminally punishable and justifies the action of police authorities, including the use of force, provided it is proportional to the magnitude of the damage and the specific characteristics of the demonstration. Under this understanding, police intervention becomes reasonable when it is evident that the characteristics of the demonstration cause significant damage by blocking access to establishments or facilities of great impact for national or third-party interests (such as a port or airport due to the damages that could occur from the loss of flights or the deterioration of perishable goods destined for import or export, among others). </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The situation is different when the demonstration and consequent blocking of a public road does not impede free transit </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">through alternative routes</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. In other words, the detention of persons in a public demonstration and the application of criminal sanctions are only justified when there is a compelling social need to prevent disturbances to the peace and public order, or serious damage to the rights of other persons, conditioned on the police action being proportional to the legitimate interest pursued and the specific characteristics of each particular demonstration. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">In no way can the criminalization of social protest become an intimidating instrument to the detriment of a form of participatory social expression inherent to a democratic system</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. As long as a public demonstration unfolds within normal margins, sanity and tolerance must prevail. In this way, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the means of expressing social disagreement (which have historically been accepted in democratic regimes but not in dictatorships) are prevented from becoming true epicenters of violence and public disorder</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, which is precisely what would happen when the use of police force becomes disproportionate. However, this form of expression finds its limits in that it be exercised reasonably and within the framework of the right to peaceful assembly, that is, without aggression against security forces or other persons, nor acts of vandalism against public or private property, nor serious damage to the rights of other persons, all of which must be assessed in the specific case.</span><span>»</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> </span><span>Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). Judgment N° </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-563817" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">2012-17027</span></a><span> of 2:30 p.m. on December 5, 2012</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. </span><span>It was therefore not feasible, as the appellants suggest, that the mere reference to demonstrating on national highways (if hypothetically accepted that this occurred) would formally constitute a crime of obstructing public roads and, consequently, nor a crime of public incitement to commit an offense. But, in addition to the above, the interpretation </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">MUST</span><span> also be made, as the trial judgment correctly states, based on other parameters specific to criminal matters, that is, respecting the principle of legality and the restrictive interpretation it imposes (Articles 1 and 2 of the Penal Code) but also safeguarding the </span><span style="font-style:italic">pro persona</span><span> and </span><span style="font-style:italic">pro libertatis</span><span> principles inherent to International Human Rights Law. Thus, contrary to what the three appellants argue (in the sense that, when faced with three hermeneutical possibilities, the broadest one should be chosen), the trial court and this collegiate court are obligated to use the most narrowly defined interpretation of the criminal offense (tipo penal), for only this is the restrictive one and only this is the one that protects liberty. Ergo, when the current Article 280 of the Penal Code states: “</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Public Incitement</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">.</span><span> </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Whoever incites another to commit a specific crime that affects </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">public tranquility</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> shall be punished with a penalty of six months to four years in prison, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">without it being necessary for the act to occur</span><span style="font-size:11pt">.</span><span>” (Emphasis supplied) not only must publicity be understood as an element of the offense, even if it is only in the title of the article, but the reference to crimes affecting “public tranquility” must be circumscribed to those criminal offenses (tipos penales) thus categorized by the legislator (that is, illicit association, support and services for terrorism, public intimidation, and apology of crime) and not to others which, although they may protect the same legal interest, fall outside the section so named. Both elements clearly emerge from the historical development of the norm detailed above and from the requirements not only of the restrictive interpretation stipulated by the initial provisions of the national substantive codification but also by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) itself, when referring to criminal norms affecting freedom of expression (and the relationship between this crime and said right was already established above), indicating: «</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">76. The Court has indicated that Criminal Law is the most restrictive and severe means for establishing responsibility for an illicit conduct. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Broad criminalization of defamation and slander offenses may be contrary to the principle of minimum intervention and of last resort (ultima ratio) of criminal law</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. In a democratic society, punitive power is only exercised to the extent strictly necessary to protect fundamental legal interests </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">from the most serious attacks</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> that damage or endanger them. The contrary would lead to the abusive exercise of the State's punitive power. 77. Taking into account the considerations made so far regarding the due protection of freedom of expression, the reasonable reconciliation of the requirements for protecting that right, on the one hand, and honor, on the other, and the principle of minimum criminal intervention characteristic of a democratic society, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the use of criminal proceedings must correspond to the need to protect fundamental legal interests against conducts that imply </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">serious</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> injuries to said interests</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, and be related to the magnitude of the harm inflicted. The criminalization of a conduct must be clear and precise, as determined by the jurisprudence of this Court in examining Article 9 of the American Convention. 78. The Court does not consider any criminal measure regarding the expression of information or opinions to be contrary to the Convention, but this possibility must be analyzed </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">with special caution</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, weighing in this respect the extreme seriousness of the conduct deployed by the issuer thereof, the intent with which they acted, the characteristics of the unjustly caused damage, and other data that demonstrate the absolute necessity of utilizing, in a truly exceptional manner, criminal measures. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">At all times, the burden of proof must fall on whoever formulates the accusation</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">.</span><span>» Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH). Judgment of the case </span><a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_177_esp.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Kimel Vs. Argentina</span></a><span> of May 2, 2008 (emphasis supplied). With a norm similar to the Costa Rican one, it has been understood in other jurisdictions as follows: «</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Public incitement to commit an offense is a crime that affects public tranquility. To incite is to urge, provoke, or induce someone to do something; it is not merely proposing that it be committed, but promoting it in a somewhat coercive manner, using the excitement of the persons or the instincts of the person being incited; it is an accessory form of participation and the general principles enunciated in relation to participation itself apply to it. The inciter wants the act, but wants it produced by another; they want to achieve that act through the psyche of the other, determining in the latter the resolution to execute it. The governing verbs are to incite or to induce, being a formal criminal offense (tipo penal), by virtue of which the will of the active subject to induce or determine someone to commit or perpetrate a crime is necessary. It is an autonomous crime. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">To prove public incitement, it must be public, that is, a challenge to the law, an open, direct challenge, and in the presence of other persons, or through some means of communication that allows the dissemination and propagation of the message, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">not clandestinely</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">; the incitement must be directed </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">at the commission of a specific crime</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">; for example, to break the law, or to disregard the constitutional order, with the aim of destabilizing social peace and tranquility. </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…) </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">The incriminated conduct comprises incitement made publicly, that is, in public, in the presence of several persons. </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">It may be directed at only one of them, provided it is done publicly</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. And this requirement is met not only when the inciter acts in the presence of several persons, </span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">but also when they use any means of communication that implies publicity</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, capable of establishing simultaneous or successive information with a more or less appreciable number of persons…</span><span>» Institute of Constitutional Studies (Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales). </span><a href="http://www.estudiosconstitucionales.com/REDIAJ/REDIAJ.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">The Infringement of Freedom of Assembly and Expression as a Mechanism of Political Persecution in Venezuela. Special Reference to the Case of Leopoldo López and Others</span></a><span>. In:</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> Electronic Journal of Research and Legal Advisory of the National Assembly. Nº 1 January-July 2016 pp. 60-61 citing a ruling of the 28th Court of First Instance in Trial Matters of Caracas, 09/10/2015, p. 271. </span><span>The appellants, particularly the Prosecutor, indicate that “…</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">the Court should have analyzed </span><span style="font-size:11pt">(…)</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> whether the configuration of the demonstrated conduct fell within that criminal offense (tipo penal) or any other it deemed appropriate; an exercise which, had it been carried out, would not have led to the acquittal being challenged today</span><span style="font-style:italic">.</span><span>” (See folio 511 verso). However, the trial judgment not only carried out this exercise of scrutinizing other possible classifications as can be verified in folios 477 recto and following (page 33 onwards of the judgment), which is overlooked and made invisible in the appeals, but the appellants do not even mention the other possible criminal offenses in which the accredited conduct would fit, and although the principle </span><span style="font-style:italic">iura novit curia</span><span> (the court knows the law) prevails, the party who files the complaint and appeals must also point out the errors of the adopted decision regarding each of their claims (accusatory principle). This court, in exercise of the precept </span><span style="font-style:italic">iura novit curia</span><span>, also does not observe this possibility of typical classification. It is true that almost all criminal offenses (except negligent ones, for example) allow for common incitement (Article 46 </span><span style="font-style:italic">ibidem</span><span>), but this is not configured in the present case because the conduct of obstructing roads or hindering services was not externalized or materialized, that is, there are no acts of execution in the </span><span style="font-style:italic">iter criminis</span><span> and, therefore, no one was determined to have committed it at least at the level of a criminal wrong (limited accessory theory). And if it is considered that this crime is multi-offensive and affects public tranquility and that, by that route (of broad interpretation already discarded), it integrates the criminal offense of Article 280 of the repressive code, even so, there would be no crime whatsoever in this case, because for a crime to exist, in addition to typicality, unlawfulness must operate, and as has already been said, the latter could hardly occur when a constitutional and conventional right (or several) is being exercised, which acts as a ground for justification. In short, from no perspective does this Chamber find errors or omissions in the reasoning of the trial judge, nor the configuration of a crime that would allow reversing the decision, which is why the complaints will be rejected.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-weight:bold">IV.-</span><span> In the</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> second argument of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) </span><span>a lack of reasoning and violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) is reproached, as well as the non-application or disregard of Articles 1045, 222 and following of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&nValor1=1&nValor2=35108&nValor3=37024&strTipM=TC" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">current liability rules of the 1941 Penal Code</span></a><span> and Article 38 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=41297" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Code of Criminal Procedure</span></a><span> in relation to the rejection of the civil action. It states that the claim for compensation was not admitted because the acquittal implied there is no causal link and because intent was not proven, but that this does not substitute the due reasoning on such points and there is no factual or legal support for either the acquittal of the defendant or the rejection of the civil action for compensation filed by its represented entity. With jurisprudential references (Voto N° </span><a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-974572" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">2020-00332</span></a><span> of the Sentencing Appeals Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón) it insists on the autonomy of the civil claim with respect to the configuration of the crime and that the claim exercised here was protected by the articles mentioned </span><span style="font-style:italic">supra</span><span> because compensation for social damage, which the appellant defines, was sought. It adds that this affects social interests and can encompass all types of acts that cause damage to the well-being of the community, such as the disturbance to public tranquility derived from the defendant's action, and, since it is not possible to bring the entire population, some witnesses were provided who could reflect the generalized national sentiments, such as the movement represented by the plaintiff Navas Montero. It adds that the defendant affected public tranquility, generated feelings of fear and bewilderment in the citizenry derived from the fact that, by hindering public services and obstructing roads, free access to workplaces, schools, social services, and timely medical care is prevented, situations of public violence could be created that would result in insecurity, compromising social peace, the exercise of civil liberties, and injuring the fundamental rights of the community. It alludes to judgments N° 341-2004, 370-2009, 167-2011 and 548-2013 of the Criminal Tax Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in which the entirety of its claim for social damage was upheld, and to N° 71-2013 in which it establishes the “</span><span style="font-style:italic">trial judge as an expert of experts</span><span>\" to estimate its causation and amount). It requests that the judgment in civil matters be declared ineffective, "revoking it in all its aspects and ordering its remittance". </span><span style="text-decoration:underline">There were no written responses</span><span>. At the</span><span style="text-decoration:underline"> oral hearing held</span><span> </span><span style="font-style:italic">Lic. Margot Avellán</span><span>, representative of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), emphasized that the civil action was rejected for lack of causal link, but there the decision lacks reasoning because it was not analyzed whether the damage was caused. She requests that the judgment be annulled in all its aspects. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">The complaint is rejected. </span><span>The judgment on the merits resolved this issue in the following terms: «</span><span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">IV-: REGARDING THE CIVIL ACTION FOR COMPENSATION: To address the civil claim, the material prerequisites of the claim, or what is also known as substantive exceptions, must first be verified, which must be examined ex officio. Regarding the existence of the right, this has to do with the demonstration of damages of a material nature or, as in this case, of a social nature that was alleged in the factual basis of the civil action for compensation, the causal link, and the criterion for attributing it, whether by intent, fault, created risk, etc. In the present matter, given that the damages sought —of a social nature— bear a close causal relationship with the accused acts (of an intentional nature) and the liability of the civil defendant for them has not been demonstrated, given that the criterion of attribution in this case is evidently subjective by way of intent, it is verified that the civil plaintiff has no right whatsoever. In no way can the invoked social damage be attributed to an intentional action by the civil defendant, as was extensively set forth in the recital regarding criminal liability, thus the civil action for compensation filed by THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA) against the civil defendant [Name 001]<span data-mce-type="bookmark" id="mce_7_start" data-mce-style="overflow:hidden;line-height:0px" style="overflow: hidden; line-height: 0px;"></span> is dismissed.</span><span>» (See judgment, folio 480 verso). As the appellant correctly states, the essence of the rejection, as verified, is that, since the criminal liability of the defendant was not established and the claimed civil liability is subjective for one's own act, the acceptance of the civil lawsuit was not possible, a conclusion that, indeed, is correct, without further elaboration being necessary, as the complainant seems to miss, since all the reasons set forth in the other parts of the judgment to support the acquittal (the correctness of which has already been examined and endorsed) are integrated into this part of the decision. It must be remembered that judgments are a unit of legal-logical meaning where their different parts cannot be read in isolation. In matters of civil liability —as the same Attorney General's Office was already told in another matter, see Voto number 2023-349 of 08:15 a.m. on March 13 of last year— doctrine distinguishes two types: contractual and tort. The first arises from express agreements or legal relationships. The second, from acts or omissions in social life. These can be intentional (that is, desired), negligent (that is, lacking the duty of care), or stipulated by law, regardless of whether there is intent or fault or whether they involve lawful or unlawful acts, as this is based on the creation of risks (for example, Article 1048 of the </span><a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=15437" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Civil Code</span></a><span>) or on obtaining profits that must be borne by those who cause them (strict liability). Tort liability (which is what is claimed upon the commission of a criminal act such as the one discussed here) can be subjective (by intent or fault) and both for one's own act or direct, as well as for another's act or indirect (fault </span><span style="font-style:italic">in eligiendo</span><span> or fault </span><span style="font-style:italic">in vigilando</span><span>).</span></p> The latter is provided for in number 1048 of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Civil Code</span></a>, third paragraph, which states: “<span style="font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">He who entrusts a person with the performance of one or many acts is obligated to choose a person fit to execute them and to supervise the execution within the limits of the diligence of a good father of a family; and if he neglects those duties, he shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages that his agent causes to a third party through an action violating the rights of another, committed with bad faith or through negligence in the performance of his functions, unless that action could not have been avoided even with all due diligence in supervision</span>.” This is different from the other type of liability, that is, strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), which, in addition to the need for specific legal provision (for example, in Article 1048 paragraph 5 of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=15437" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Civil Code</span></a>; in Article 32 of the <a href="https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=26481" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Law for the effective protection and defense of the consumer</span></a>, contained in Article 32; number 197 of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=73504" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">Law of Transit on Public Roads and Land</span></a> or in Articles 190 and following of the <a href="http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&amp;nValor2=13231" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1">General Law of Public Administration</span></a>) the criterion of imputation involves analyzing three requirements: a) the use of objects that entail danger or risk; b) the causation of damage of an economic nature; c) the relationship or causal link between the act and the damage. This, in turn, may be principal or sole or joint and several.

Schematically, it is set out as follows:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.45pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-35.45pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><img 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 2ª. El índice de construcción a aplicar será de conformidad con el “Reglamento de Fraccionamiento y Urbanizaciones” del INVU, sin embargo, en los casos en que este Reglamento no especifique la actividad a ejecutar, el índice será especificado por la administración municipal.

3ª. Para construcciones en aquellos terrenos con más de 1000 m² y que se ubiquen en predios planos, la cobertura en el área de protección del naciente (Área de Protección del Naciente, APN) no debe sobrepasar el 30% de la cobertura boscosa original. En los terrenos con pendientes superiores al 30%, el área de protección del naciente no puede sobrepasar el 50% de la cobertura boscosa original. Dicha cobertura boscosa original se establecerá con base a estudios técnicos de campo que definan, para ambas categorías de pendiente, lo siguiente: la cobertura boscosa original, el índice de área foliar (Leaf Area Index, LAI), y la cobertura actual. El límite del 30% de la cobertura boscosa original solo puede ser alcanzado cuando la cobertura actual sea menor a este límite, y el 50% del límite solo puede alcanzarse cuando la cobertura actual sea menor a este límite. En ningún caso se podrán cortar árboles para alcanzar la cobertura boscosa indicada en este punto. Ver Anexo 1 y Anexo 2.

4ª. Para las actividades de movimientos de tierra (earthworks), construcción de obras de infraestructura y edificaciones, se debe implementar un Programa de Gestión Ambiental (PGA) que contemple, al menos, las siguientes medidas: control de sedimentos, manejo de aguas pluviales, manejo de aguas residuales (tanto las de tipo ordinario como las especiales), control de emisiones atmosféricas y manejo integral de residuos sólidos. Asimismo, se debe mantener un registro de implementación del PGA.

Considerando: I. That Costa Rica has subscribed to international commitments such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (ratified by Ley 7575), which establishes in its Article 6 the obligation of the signatory states to develop national strategies, plans, or programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. II. That, in accordance with the provisions of Voto 4654-2003 of the Constitutional Chamber, the State must adopt the necessary measures to guarantee the protection of the country's forest resources. III. That Decreto Ejecutivo 25721 established the general guidelines for the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) of activities, works, or projects. IV. That Decreto N° 31849-MINAE, which reformed the Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (General Regulation on the Procedures of Environmental Impact Assessment), defines the criteria for the treatment of land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo) and the required compensations. V. That the Pago de Servicios Ambientales (PSA) program, regulated by the Ley Forestal and its respective regulations, constitutes a fundamental economic tool for the conservation of forest cover (cobertura boscosa). VI. That it is necessary to establish the technical criteria for the determination of the areas of protection of springs (nacientes) and watercourses in the context of the procedures for the environmental viability of subdivision (fraccionamiento) and urbanization projects, in harmony with the Reglamento de Fraccionamiento. VII. That it is appropriate to define the parameters related to the lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad) of forested areas and the constitution of ecological easements (servidumbres ecológicas), for the strict compliance with the environmental commitments acquired in the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) processes before SETENA. Therefore, THE FOLLOWING IS RESOLVED:

To approve the following Technical Guide for the application of the criteria of environmental viability in the procedures for land-use change before the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA).

Article 1. Purpose. This technical guide aims to standardize the technical criteria for the analysis of land-use change in the phase of environmental viability, ensuring the physical and legal protection of primary and secondary forest cover, as well as the water resource, within the framework of the administrative procedures managed by SETENA.

Article 2. Scope of application. The provisions of this guide are mandatory for all the regional offices of the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), the Área de Conservación Osa (ACOSA), and other public institutions that intervene in the processes of environmental viability associated with land-use change, such as INVU, ICAA, ICE, MOPT, and CONARE.

Article 3. Protection of springs. For the environmental viability analysis, the following protection radii must be observed around any permanent or intermittent spring, established according to the topographical surveying carried out by professionals incorporated into the CFIA, based on the criteria of the Reglamento de Fraccionamiento and the technical guidelines issued by the MINAE.

| --- | --- | | Type of Spring | Protection Radius (meters) | | Permanent | 100 | | Intermittent | 60 | The protection radius will be demarcated with a buffer area of 15 meters of strict protection, measured horizontally from the perimeter of the defined circle. The registry of these springs must be included in the digital cartographic file in the format established in Anexo 1.

Article 4. Protection of watercourses. In compliance with the provisions of the Ley Forestal and the Reglamento de Fraccionamiento, the forested strips adjacent to permanent watercourses must be maintained, establishing a minimum forested protection area according to the following topographical criteria, based on the map of flat topography:

| --- | --- | | Slope (%) | Protection Width (meters) | | 0-15 | 15 | | 15-30 | 30 | | 30-50 | 50 | | >50 | 100 | The cartographic delimitation must strictly follow the guidelines established by the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN) and the technical specifications of Anexo 2.

Article 5. Lifetime tenure of forested area. The land-use change allowed in forest properties previously authorized by SETENA will be conditional upon the constitution of effective and perpetual mechanisms of lifetime tenure over the area of remaining forest cover, whether it belongs to a private or state natural heritage. Any authorized land-use change must guarantee these areas' lifetime tenure, whose characteristics will be recorded in the corresponding cadastral plan.

Article 6. Environmental easements. The environmental viability resolution that authorizes land-use change will require the mandatory formalization of a perpetual ecological easement over the areas of protection of springs, riverbanks, and steep slopes, as defined in Considerando III of this resolution. This easement must be duly registered in the Public Registry and recorded in the maps of the corresponding cadastral plan.

Article 7. Criteria for the release of the environmental guarantee. For the release of the environmental guarantee deposit set in favor of the MINAE, the interested party must demonstrate before SETENA, through a certification from the institutional technical offices (SINAC, ACOSA, JASEC, among others), the effective recovery and maintenance of the forest cover in the easement and lifetime tenure areas, as well as the full functionality of the environmental offset measures imposed in the EIA resolution. The performance guarantees, which could be used to compensate for non-compliance with the PSA or PSAH programs, will remain in force during the entire period of monitoring and post-EIA control, in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 of this regulation.

Article 8. Exceptions for public interest projects. The developments declared as national or public interest by the Poder Ejecutivo, and executed by entities such as ICE, MOPT, CNE, among others, may exceptionally manage the compensation of the land-use change through the mechanisms established by the PSA program, with the prior binding technical approval of the MINAE, subject to the current payment rates defined by FONAFIFO. In such cases, the project must present a compensation plan that guarantees at least a 1:1 ratio for affected primary forests.

Article 9. Institutional coordination. SETENA will coordinate with the IMN, the IGN, and the competent institutional technical offices (SINAC, INDER) the verification of the technical information presented, within the framework of the respective conventions and inter-institutional cooperation agreements, including CONARE and JASEC, to guarantee the physical consistency of the declared coordinates in the field.

Article 10. Effective date. This Technical Guide will become effective upon its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta.

As the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) established that the defendant, through the actions he was accused of, had caused damage, its claim was framed within a subjective extra-contractual civil liability for one's own actions based on willful misconduct (dolo).

In the judgment, when analyzing the criminal matter, it was not established that he carried out the conduct described in both the public and private accusations; that is, the factual and legal basis had already been set forth and analyzed, such that it was not necessary to repeat it to support the civil decision, nor was it necessary for the judgment to analyze the other sources of civil liability since they were not invoked by the civil plaintiff and in this matter the principle of congruence and its derived prohibitions against *ultra* or *extrapetita* rulings govern. It is true that the civil action for damages is accessory to the criminal action and there is relative autonomy between both claims, but when what is requested in the civil sphere depends on the accused having committed the act and this is not proven, it is clear that the criminal aspect affects the civil aspect by preventing the proof of the causal link (nexo de causalidad), which is one of the elements, along with the generating act (hecho generador) and the damage (daño), that must be demonstrated in the civil sphere. Regardless of the type of compensation sought (in this case for social harm), this does not change the fact that the source of liability is subjective and not objective, and, this being so, the plaintiff had to prove that the accused executed the conduct (personal act), that there was damage, and that said action was the generator of the damage (causal link). By not proving the first, the last also does not exist and, therefore, the decision is correct. Furthermore, while it could have been that some people were affected by the events and two of them testified at trial, neither does this permit an extrapolation to the “affectation of public tranquility,” nor, even if hypothetically it could be done, would it allow proof of the causal link that is found lacking, since that would only speak to another element (the damage) but not to the referred link in which the civil defendant has to be subjectively involved, which was not done in this case. The fact that several tribunals have accepted a civil claim in other cases where the three elements for conviction were indeed demonstrated (generating act, social harm, and causal link) did not obligate the lower court (a quo) to conduct the specific analysis nor did it obligate it to grant the remedies if, in the specific case, which is the one that matters, that proof was not provided. Nor does this Chamber understand the reason for arguing that the tribunal acts as an expert over experts when such an aphorism allows for resolving issues related to controversies between expert opinions, none of which is evident here, and while, in some cases where the law authorizes it, tribunals can make a prudential estimate of the amount of compensation, this does not mean that the civil plaintiff does not have to demonstrate the damage (what is estimated is the amount to pay, not the existence of the damage), which was also not taken as proven in this instance. Therefore, the complaints must be rejected.

**V.-** As a **third complaint by the Procuraduría General de la República**, the same arguments of lack of legal reasoning, violation of sound judicial discretion (sana crítica), and improper application of the law are raised, but this time regarding Articles 16, 38, and 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), 3(i), 20, and 21 of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República (Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República), 50 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), and 73.2(4) of the current Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). It states that the State was ordered to pay costs because it was considered that it had no plausible reason to litigate, since, with no evidence and the facts not being crimes, the complaint (querella) was improper and the State's claim is reckless. However, it maintains that at the time the briefs for the complaint and civil action were filed, the accused facts revealed the eventual commission of an unlawful act to the detriment of the community and the production of damage of considerable proportions (despite which it was prudentially estimated at a very low amount). It adds that there was a prosecutorial accusation and that is the plausible reason to litigate. It quotes the content of the article regarding the award of costs and states that the Procuraduría General de la República bases its action on broad regulations that legally obligate it to exercise criminal and civil actions against whoever is presumably responsible for the reported and accused facts, in accordance with the investigation carried out by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público). It alludes to the content of the Organic Law (Ley Orgánica) of its institution which, in its Articles 20 and 21, establish that prosecutors "...are absolutely prohibited from acceding to, settling, conciliating, or withdrawing from lawsuits or claims" and "...from failing to bring the lawsuits or claims in which they must intervene as plaintiffs..." Consequently, what was done here, it continues, responds to the duties imposed by law, and failing to do so implies a serious breach of the cited express prohibition. It maintains that both the complaint and the civil action for damages were subject to analysis by the tribunal of the intermediate stage, which, in its capacity as guarantor of the parties' rights, examined the accusatory pieces and deemed it appropriate to bring the case to trial, thus surpassing the filter of the preliminary hearing and affirming a sufficient degree of probability for the continuation of the process. It considers that it was not appropriate to punish the State for an action it was compelled to bring. It gives references for multiple rulings from different tribunals that allude, in similar situations, to its represented entity's plausible reason to litigate. It mentions that there is no bad faith, no abuse of rights, nor was the action arbitrary or reckless, but rather they acted in accordance with the legal and constitutional requirements that obligate them to bring action, and therefore, this representation should have been exempted from costs for having the cited plausible reason to litigate, and instead, they were ordered to pay costs through an unfounded decision. It requests the reversal of this issue. In a **third section**, although without numbering, **of the appeal by the complainant represented by Navas**, it alludes to the order to pay costs. It affirms that its represented party has acted in defense of citizens' rights given the objectivity of the facts that were of general knowledge as public facts. Initially, a report was filed, and the complaint was formulated because there was an accusation by the Public Prosecutor's Office and they were granted a hearing. The matter was brought to trial in a preliminary hearing, such that there has been a plausible reason for litigating. It requests that the verdict be annulled on this issue. There were no written responses. In the oral hearing held, the attorney Navas Montero, as complainant, expanded her appeal, indicating that she was filing it both personally—as a Costa Rican citizen through a popular action (acción popular)—and in her capacity as legal representative of the “Asociación Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica.” She argues that they acted in good faith, to the point that there was a prosecutorial accusation, and therefore the award of costs was not appropriate. The attorney Margot Avellán, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, complains about her represented entity being ordered to pay costs, which, in her opinion, also lacks legal reasoning, since they acted in accordance with the law, to the point that it is a serious breach not to bring an action if diffuse or collective interests (intereses difusos o colectivos) are involved, and the entity she represents waited for the prosecutorial accusation before deciding what to do. She indicates that they did not initiate the process nor accuse first; that the action passed the filter of a judge of the preliminary stage; and that it is not known where the amount for costs set by the judge came from, since there is no reasoning provided. Attorney Carlos García indicated that ordering the State to pay costs is appropriate because a citizen is being stigmatized, since he had no participation in the 2018 strike, no prior crime was investigated, illegal evidence was used, and it was not a crime of simple passage. **The complaints are addressed together as they refer to the same topic and will be rejected.** To examine this topic, it is appropriate to set forth both the tribunal's reasoning and this Chamber's interpretation of the prevailing rules on costs when litigating in criminal matters (an aspect in which, as will be seen, some controversy has existed) to then, finally, address the specific case. **(A) Description of what occurred.** In this matter, the criminal action was exercised by both the Public Prosecutor’s Office and two complainants: the “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” and the Procuraduría General de la República. This latter entity also brought a civil action for damages. In the judgment, the issue of costs was resolved as follows: «*V.- COSTS: In accordance with the provisions of Articles 266, 267, 270, and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is necessary to determine the matter of the costs derived from this action, which, as a rule, must be borne by the losing party, and only exceptionally is it appropriate to exempt them from payment when it is considered that there was a plausible reason to litigate, and this is based on the fact that if one brings an action in pursuit of claims one believes to have a right to, one must also assume responsibility for unfounded actions. In the case now before us, both the costs in the criminal aspect and in the civil aspect must be borne by the losing party, because it is in no way considered that there existed a plausible reason to litigate, taking into account that the events reported, according to the evidence that was provided, do not even constitute a crime, considering that in the case before us not even the threshold of typicality was surpassed, and even the complaints were based on evidence that contained elements completely different from those offered, or that once offered, it was not even verified that they had actually been incorporated into the process. The complaint of the Procuraduría makes an offer of proof almost identical to that of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, without the state representation even bothering to verify that the proof offered was pertinent and, most importantly, that it actually contained what was indicated in the offer, and not as was shown in the case file, in the recital concerning the evidentiary analysis, where it was assumed that the DVD evidence that had been seized by the Judicial Investigation Organism (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) contained the statements of the accused when in reality it contained the interview the complainant gave days later to a television channel. And on the other hand, the complaint by Movimiento Ciudadano offered an evidentiary element that was never actually seized and therefore not incorporated into the process, without this having been verified beforehand but only at the moment when material evidence was being incorporated into the trial, in the first hearing on December 8th, where the complainant, after minute 23 of the recording and prior information from the Tribunal about which videos had been admitted as evidence, acknowledges that it was not admitted and that it was pasted in, and despite this, a brief allusion was made to it when delivering conclusions. Added to this, they complained of a fact—the eighth—regarding which it is not even evident what crime the queried party could have instigated to commit, since the allegedly aggrieved person did not even want to file a report, and despite this, the complainants continued with the complaint regarding this fact—this as shown on folio 216 verso of the file, where the order to open trial indicates that the complaint admitted from Movimiento Ciudadano CR is that of folios 1 to 20 of the respective sub-file, which consists of eight facts. Furthermore, the Tribunal cannot fail to consider that the complaints, which as already stated do not constitute the accused crime or any crime, had legal representation for their filing, and finally regarding the civil action, besides Article 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being very clear on who must bear the costs, it is also not considered that they litigated in good faith, since regarding the proof offered, the questions would be the same as those made to the complaint filed by that party, adding that it did not even bother to provide the evidence it offered to gather on its own, namely the valuation of damages and costs for expenses for potential preventive measures to safeguard public peace, which was part of the list with which it was intended to prove the social harm suffered, as recorded in point VII of the brief filing the civil action for damages. Thus, upon determining the inexistence of a plausible reason to litigate in accordance with the foregoing, the costs derived from the complaints and civil action are to be borne by the losing parties, which are set in the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to the civil action and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to each of the complaints. The agreed sums must be paid when this verdict becomes final and by simple bank deposit into the Tribunal’s account.*» (Cf. judgment, folio 481 front and back). **(B) Rules regarding costs in criminal proceedings.** Before proceeding to the analysis of the topic, it is necessary to have clarity on the rules in force regarding costs within the criminal process. In ruling number 2012-1052 (R. Chinchilla, L. García, and E. Salinas), adopted, retaken, and expanded in ruling number 2015-909 (R. Chinchilla, L. García, and R. Obando), and in ruling number 2017-291 (R. Chinchilla, A.I. Solís, and J. Campos), whose criterion is shared by the current panel, reference was made to the normative regulation regarding costs, whose general rule is the award against the losing party with exceptions based on clear good faith, although other provisions seemed to have presumably special and distinct rules from that general rule. Although the emphasis of those pronouncements was on the matter of civil action, the arguments, by parity of reasoning in many cases, are extendable to the complaint. It was stated then—and reiterated now—that even though the civil action for damages is exercised within the criminal process, because it is accessory, it is done in accordance with the rules established by this Code (Article 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)). Thus, Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), although it mandates, as a general rule, that costs be borne by the losing party, also states that they may be exempted, totally or partially, “when there is a plausible reason to litigate,” which is none other than the same regulation that exists in civil matters under the concept of “clear good faith” (Article 222 of the repealed Code of Civil Procedure No. 7130 and Article 73.2 of the current Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)). It is true that this Chamber, with panels partially similar to the current one and under the name of Tribunal of Criminal Cassation, on various occasions stated: «*The first thing to be noted is that, as a counterpart to the right of action or access to justice, there exists the obligation to finance the expenses that the process generates. This obligation falls, as a general rule, on the party that has been defeated, since by not having extrajudicially recognized the claim of the winning party, it forced the latter to make use of the judicial apparatus. This rule, that the losing party bears the expenses originating from the process, is practically universal. As traditional procedural doctrine explains it* (...) {*CHIOVENDA, José. The award of costs. Translation by Juan de la Puente y Quijano. Madrid, 1928, p. 220* (...) *CHIOVENDA, José. Civil Procedural Law: principles. Volume II. Cárdenas editor and distributor, Mexico, 1990 edition* (...) *CARNELUTTI, Francesco. Civil and Criminal Procedural Law. Translation by Enrique Figueroa Alfonzo. Collection of law classics, Mexico, 1994, p. 80.*} *Now then, the costs of the process or judicial costs, as inferred from the above, cannot be confused with procedural costs. The first is the generic category that has two components: personal costs, which include attorney’s fees, and procedural costs, which are all the remaining expenses originating from the process* (...). *In Costa Rican law, the various procedural codes in force in different matters codify the obligation that the ruling on the issue of costs be made, imperatively and even ex officio, in the resolution that ends the process and that it fall upon the losing party. This general rule, which excludes the issue of costs from causing the ruling to incur in a lack of congruence due to an ultra or extrapetita ruling* (...), *is excepted, however, in some norms that foresee the possibility that, optionally, other guidelines may be applied* (...). *Now then, the topic approached in this manner—questioned in modern general theory of process based on principles such as gratuity in access to justice, but without such criticism having had major practical repercussions in world legislation—was challenged, long ago, in criminal procedural law, given the nature (public or collective) of the conflict decided there and the existence of international instruments on human rights that obligate the states that have signed them to provide, mandatorily, free defense for the accused who, against their will, is brought into the process but is protected by a constitutional state of innocence, as well as by the state's duty to provide its population with suitable mechanisms to resolve their most important conflicts (cf.: Article 8.2.a and 8.2.e of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14.2.d and 14.2.f of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establish the right of the accused to be assisted free of charge by a translator or interpreter and for the State to provide them with a lawyer). This differentiated treatment of the topic,* while maintaining the same principles, incorporates additional ones *and is evident in the evolution with which such topics have been addressed in the different criminal procedural laws that have been enacted in Costa Rica* (...). *¬Code of Criminal Procedure (1996): "Article 265. Costs of the accused. In any process, the State shall cover the expenses related to the accused and the other parties who enjoy the benefit of litigating without being charged for them. When the accused has financial solvency, they must pay the Judicial Branch for the services of the public defender or any other they have received. For this, the procedure established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch shall be followed, regarding the public defender. Payment for the official translator or interpreter is excepted from this duty" "Article 266. Necessary Resolution. The criminal tribunal must issue a reasoned ruling on the payment of procedural and personal costs when issuing the resolution that brings the case to an end." "Article 267. Setting of costs. The costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the tribunal may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is a plausible reason to litigate. When there are several parties ordered to pay costs, the tribunal shall set the proportional part corresponding to each one, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law"* (...). *"Article 270. Civil action.* If the civil claim is admitted in the judgment, the accused and the civilly liable third party shall jointly bear the costs (costas); if the claim is rejected, the civil plaintiff shall bear them. If the action cannot proceed, each intervening party shall bear their own costs (costas), unless the parties have agreed to another measure or the court, due to the circumstances of the case, distributes them otherwise." (...) Thus, in Costa Rican criminal procedural law, some exceptions arise to the treatment of this topic in other branches of law, whether public or private. Therefore, although the rule is that costs (costas) are borne by the losing party, if that party is the criminal accused, a distinction must be made between procedural costs (costas procesales) and expenses. The latter, that is, the expenses that include the payment of the translator or interpreter, shall always be borne by the State, as mandated by Article 265 of the cited Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), and, regarding attorney's fees, the accused may be exempted from payment if and only if two situations converge: a) their defense counsel is a public defender; and b) they lack the resources to reimburse the State for the payment of those fees. (...) Although this latter position has been academically questioned regarding its constitutionality when the accused is acquitted (cf.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4th edition, 2009, p. 416..."), the fact is that it has not yet been so questioned through the appropriate procedural channels, which means it remains in force. (...) But if the legal professional of the accused person is private, or if, being paid by the State, the accused possesses the resources to pay for it (an aspect that, as indicated, can be elucidated in the execution stage according to what the judgment may have decided in that regard), the imposition of personal costs (costas personales) will mean that the accused or sentenced party pays their own attorney's fees, and not that the attorney may demand such remuneration from the State, as would occur if the cited rule were interpreted or applied erroneously and, out of ignorance, the accused were always exempted from paying both costs (costas) or the State were always condemned to pay them. (...) The same occurs if the losing party is the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público), concerning which there is also a legal exemption from the collection of both costs (costas), as set forth in Article 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). (...) The matter has been dealt with in various ways by this same Tribunal, with different panels, and the tendency seems to be to always require justification and even to accept the exemption as an exception for all cases. (...) However, those rules are for the ordinary process in criminal law, since it must be taken into account that in other types of special criminal processes (private prosecution, for example) and in civil claims, there are special rules that displace those general provisions. There, the general rule is that the losing party always faces both costs (costas) and that the possibility of granting an exemption is not applicable since the special rule does not permit it. This is pronounced in Articles 78 (express withdrawal of a public prosecution complaint in which the imposition of costs upon the withdrawing party is imperatively ordered, unless the parties agree otherwise), 118 second paragraph (withdrawal of the civil action), 384 (withdrawal of a private prosecution complaint in which the imposition of costs upon the withdrawing party is imperatively ordered, unless the parties agree otherwise), and 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) (imposition of costs upon the losing civil party) (see in this regard the ruling of this Tribunal, with a panel partially different from the current one, number 851-2005 of September 1, 2005 -U. Zúñiga, Llobet and Salazar- and the note in ruling number 2010-0085 of January 17, 2010 -Camacho, García and U. Zúñiga-. To the contrary, that is, accepting a plausible reason to litigate as an exception in all cases, the rulings of this Chamber, with a different panel, numbers 2006-1035 of September 29, 2006 -García, Porras and Morales- and 2000-119 of February 11, 2000 -López, Sanabria and Arroyo-, where the topic is addressed although with different criteria than that set forth here). Furthermore, supplementary application of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) is also not permissible, since there is an express rule to the contrary. (...)" The bold text is supplied. See rulings of the Court of Criminal Cassation (Tribunal de Casación Penal) number 2010-0305 of 14:40 hours on March 19, 2010 (L. García, R. Chinchilla and U. Zúñiga) and number 2010-0366 of 15:20 hours on April 8, 2010 (R. Chinchilla, U. Zúñiga and R. Gullock). Under similar conditions and adopting the preceding criterion, cf.: ruling number 2011-1296 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). That position, in general terms, was endorsed or maintained in the antecedents summarized above except with regard to the mandatory imposition of costs (costas) in the civil claim upon the losing party, a matter on which there was a reconsideration of the issue based on constitutional principles of higher hierarchy than the law (such as equality before the law: Article 33 of the Constitution) and that criterion was expressly modified. To this end, it was stated —in the cited rulings number 2015-909 and number 2017-291— that while criminal procedural legislation contains a special rule (regarding the civil claim) that imperatively establishes the imposition of costs (costas) upon the losing civil party, that treatment is different from that afforded to the same party had they resorted to the ordinary civil route. On the other hand, in many instances the civil claim cannot succeed because the factual basis on which it rests, although established as probable, was not proven with the certainty required for a criminal conviction and that, added to conceptual errors by the parties who have not incorporated different criteria for the attribution of damage into their pleadings, usually results in the rejection of civil claims. Finally, although the rule (final sentence of the first paragraph of Article 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal)) is imperative, so too is Article 267 and, in the same Book and Title and immediately thereafter, the provision for exemption is inserted (Article 267 first paragraph, ab initio, of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal)). That is, exemption is provided precisely to make more flexible the rigor of the imperative rules referred to therein, both provisions being on the same level of general rules. Combining all this, it can be concluded that the mandatory imposition of costs (costas) upon the losing civil party, with the possibility of a discretionary (reasoned) exemption to said party made by the court, are the rules in force on the matter which are thus made uniform with those of the ordinary civil process and which, as the origin of both provisions, allows the specific case to be resolved with greater justice, in order to restore social harmony (Article 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal)), a position that this chamber ultimately considers correct. (C) The specific case. From the transcription made at the beginning of this recital, it is possible to conclude that the judgment on the merits did expressly and amply justify said imposition of costs, meaning the defect of lack of justification contained in Article 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) is not present. Furthermore, the factual affirmations taken as a starting point (an accusation was made without verifying or providing evidence; conclusions were drawn without support from the material presented at trial; facts in the private complaint were not rectified despite no material being provided regarding them; it was not until the trial hearing that the lack of evidence was noticed, etc.) have not been challenged by the parties, and this chamber has verified that they are true, that is, they derive from what actually happened in the process, so there are also no errors in this matter. Now, what remains to be determined is whether the discretion (to impose costs (costas) or not) was correctly applied by the trial court or whether there was abuse or arbitrariness in that regard, and, in such exercise, this chamber concludes there is also no defect to declare. Note that although the parties appealing this matter claim they filed the complaint once the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) presented the accusation and they proceeded in the process under the protection of an order to open the trial (auto de apertura a juicio) issued by a jurisdictional authority that, consequently, reviewed the pleadings and determined compliance with the requirements to reach this procedural stage, what they do not say is that such decision by the court in the intermediate stage is based on a probability, not a certainty, and that probability in turn derives from the picture that the petitioners themselves presented to the jurisdictional entity in their briefs. Said court does not evaluate the evidence to determine if it establishes what they affirm they will provide, but rather assumes it in good faith, hence the fact that said court ordered the opening of the trial does not endorse the conduct of the subjects who provided the information, for example, the private plaintiff introducing facts (such as fact 8) regarding which no evidence is provided, or the state entities failing to review the material offered to determine whether it holds the content they stipulate in their brief. State representations, with even greater responsibility than a private individual, have a duty of objectivity (Article 63 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) and 10 subsection l) of the Organic Law of the General Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República)), therefore it is even more reprehensible that they promote accusations without adequate evidentiary support or make legal interpretations exceeding the framework of the Democratic Rule of Law they are obligated to respect. Moreover, although the General Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) has legal prohibitions against acquiescing, compromising, withdrawing, or settling, it has no obligation to accuse those whom others determine it must accuse; for that, it has its own criteria and functional independence. In fact, what Article 15 of the Organic Law (Ley Orgánica) states is: “Article 15.-The officials of the General Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) (...) They are also prohibited, without the prior authorization referred to, from: failing to file lawsuits or claims in which they must intervene as plaintiffs, failing to respond to motions or hearings that have been granted to them, failing to present the legal evidence they are responsible for presenting, abandoning the evidence they have proposed, not timely filing legal remedies against acts carried out or resolutions issued against the lawsuits or petitions they have presented or to the detriment of the interests whose defense is entrusted to them” (the bold type is supplied). That is, the prohibition lies in doing so without authorization, and the determination of when intervention is necessary responds to a value judgment by the head of the office, hence there is no mandatory obligation without the possibility of departing from the mandate that the attorney asserts. Furthermore, none of the above excuses her from the obligation to review the evidentiary material, especially when it is of a documentary nature, to verify that the content of what is offered is faithful, which was evidently not done in this case as the parties did not realize that the alleged video containing the interventions of the accused was not an original, was edited, and was never provided. Regarding the private plaintiffs, their good faith is also not evident, not only due to the errors and omissions already mentioned but also because they included events for which no evidence was presented and for failing to filter some of their statements in light of other constitutional rights, including those derived from freedom of expression (of which social protest is a part) and union rights, which are also human rights of individuals and, when these clash with other fundamental rights of other individuals, there is an obligation to make balancing judgments, which were completely omitted in this case. Furthermore, no one can arrogate to themselves the rights of others or the exercise of national sovereignty (Article 2 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política)), and the fact that some people feel affected by certain actions does not imply that this thereby affects "public tranquility" in the terms of the criminal offense invoked as the basis for the compensation that was the exercise intended, because accepting this would lead to unacceptable abuses which, in times of deep crises of various kinds and great social polarization, could generate regrettable abuses. Thus, this chamber does not consider that any defect or omission exists in the reasoning expressed by the trial court on this topic, and this leads to the rejection of the complaints. Regarding the amount, it is true that the contested resolution did not explain the procedure for arriving at it, but only made reference to the imposition and the sums thereof: «They are the costs (costas) derived from the complaints and civil action borne by the losing parties, which are fixed in the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to the civil action and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND COLONES corresponding to the complaints.» (The bold type is supplied; the capital letters are from the original). However, if a simple arithmetic exercise is performed regarding the content of the decree applicable to this matter, it will be noticed that there is no actual grievance. This matter began, as stated initially (Recital II.A), in September 2019, a date on which Executive Decree No. 41457-JP of October 17, 2018, "Schedule of Fees for Professional Legal and Notarial Services (Arancel de honorarios por servicios profesionales de abogacía y notariado)," which took effect from February 1, 2019, and establishes the minimum amounts of professional fees in those areas, was in force. In Title III regarding Judicial Matters, Chapter I (General Tariff for Proceedings Seeking a Declaration of Rights), Article 19, on the date of the judgment (which was handed down in December 2021, a date that is important because the decree underwent reforms in September 2022 that do not apply to this case as they are subsequent to the decision sought to be reviewed), established: “Article 19.- Fees in Proceedings of Unquantifiable Amount (Honorarios en procesos de cuantía inestimable). The minimum fees for this type of proceedings may not be less than two hundred forty-two thousand colones.” For its part, in Chapter VIII (Criminal Procedure), the following special rules were established: «Article 38.- Single-Judge Court (Tribunal unipersonal): In criminal cases within the competence of a Single-Judge Court, the minimum fees for the criminal defense shall be four hundred eighty-four thousand colones. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the fees shall be paid as follows: a) One-third for the investigation stage. b) One-third for the holding of the preliminary hearing. c) One-third for holding the oral trial. In those cases where the proceeding concludes by the application of the abbreviated procedure or some alternative measure, the fees shall be seventy-five percent (75%) of the total fees for the process. The fees corresponding to the civil action for damages shall be governed by the rules established for such matter in this Schedule (Arancel). The same rules shall apply to the attorney filing the complaint for crimes of public action.» (The bold type is added). As can be noted, that minimum fee was what was set as personal costs (costas personales) for each complaint, hence there is no harm whatsoever in the lack of reasoning. Regarding the civil action, Article 42 of the cited decree provided: «Article 42.- Civil Action: The fees for the civil action for damages are independent of those corresponding to the processing of the criminal case. The Attorney for the civil plaintiff shall charge fees for this action in accordance with the General Tariff, unless otherwise agreed in writing. The fees shall be paid in three equal parts as follows: a) For its filing. b) For the holding of the preliminary hearing. c) For the holding of the oral trial. The same fees shall be earned by the attorney representing the civil defendant.» (The bold type is added). Said tariff is regulated by Article 16.a of the Schedule, establishing, among other parameters, 20% of the amount in dispute if the amount thereof does not exceed 16 million colones.

As in this case one million colones was sought, 20% amounts to two hundred thousand colones, an amount that was higher than the one set (of 121 thousand colones, which, consequently, is also less than the minimum fee contemplated in Article 19), so the appellant was actually favored, and this cannot be reversed because the party harmed did not appeal that point (principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius). In short, there is no grievance to declare, and therefore this ground must also be rejected.

**VI.- Note by Judge Vargas González:** I concur with the ruling in all respects except as follows: **i)** as to the statement that the crime of public instigation has publicity as one of its constituent elements, a point I do not share. In my view, the objective elements of the offense are those literally set forth therein, not those derived implicitly or extracted from its title or from historical or systematic interpretation, so that, since publicity is not included in the criminal provision, it is not part of the crime in question nor did it need to be covered by the defendant’s criminal intent (dolo). However, that does not affect the decision to dismiss the appeals on the criminal matter, since that decision rests on the other unanimous grounds (illegal evidence, lack of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, as well as narrowly interpreting “*crimes against public order*” to mean only those included in the section of the Criminal Code so named, and not all those that affect that legal interest). **ii)** As to the suggestion that in our country the right to protest could justify the obstruction of main public roads. While the analysis conducted in point **(C)** of this decision, titled “*International Human Rights Law and the Criminal Code: Integration and Systematic Application*,” is by way of additional reasoning [since in this matter common instigation was discarded because no acts of execution materialized for the crimes of disruption of public services (Article 263 of the Criminal Code) or obstruction of public roads (Article 263 bis of the same code), and so-called *“public instigation”* (Article 280 C.P.) was also excluded insofar as the aforementioned crimes are not contemplated within Title X of the Criminal Code, named *“Crimes against public order”*], after weighing that in Costa Rica the road infrastructure is chaotic and alternate routes practically do not exist (unlike what occurs in other latitudes), I conclude that the closure of main national highways indisputably affects the fundamental rights of other citizens, at least their right to free movement. Consequently, in our current context, the exercise of the rights mentioned (for example, social protest, union freedom, right to strike, and freedom of expression) cannot be invoked as a valid justification for the aforementioned conduct (had it occurred, which is not the case). Also, for the reasons I have just set forth, I do not share one of the arguments given by my colleagues to conclude that the award of costs (condena en costas) decreed against the private plaintiffs is appropriate, namely: *“[...] for failing to take care to filter some of their statements in light of other constitutional rights, including those derived from freedom of expression (of which social protest is a part) and union rights, which are also human rights of individuals, and when these clash with other fundamental rights of other persons, there is an obligation to perform balancing exercises that in this case were entirely omitted”*. Now, with this caveat, I agree with the resolution of the claims raised in civil matters and costs, since there are other reasonings in the judgment on the merits that support the decision adopted by the *a quo* (for example, the atypical nature of the charged conduct) and on which further comment is unnecessary.

**POR TANTO:** The appeals filed by the prosecutor, Máster Oscar Quirós Soto; by Licenciada Margot Avellán Ruíz, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, plaintiff and civil party; and by Licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, attorney for the individuals acting as plaintiffs under the name “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica,” are dismissed. Judge Vargas González adds a note. **NOTIFÍQUESE.** ***Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón*** ***Patricia Vargas González Kathya Jiménez Fernández*** Appellate criminal judgment judges *Expediente: 19-000647-0619-PE (7)* *Accused: [Nombre 001]* *Victim: Public order* *Crime: Public instigation* **DDURANC**

Resolución: 2023-406 TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Goicoechea, a las nueve horas minutos del veintidós de marzo de dos mil veintitrés.

RECURSOS DE APELACIÓN interpuestos en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre 001], quien es mayor de edad, costarricense, con cédula de identidad número [Valor 001], nacido en San José, el 3 de abril de 1956, hijo de [Nombre 002] y de [Nombre 003], soltero, promotor sindical, vecino de Alajuelita, San José; por el delito de INSTIGACIÓN PÚBLICA en perjuicio de LA TRANQUILIDAD PÚBLICA. Intervienen en la decisión de los recursos, las juezas Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Patricia Vargas González y Kathya Jiménez Fernández. Se apersonaron en esta sede el máster Oscar Quirós Soto y el licenciado Carlos Meléndez Lugo, representantes del Ministerio Público, fiscalías Adjunta de San José y de Impugnaciones, respectivamente; la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, apoderada de la parte querellante “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” bajo cuyo nombre se agrupan decenas de personas físicas poderdantes; la licenciada Margot Avellán Ruiz, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República quien ha fungido como querellante y actora civil; y los licenciados Rodrigo Rosales Arce y Luis Carlos García Rivera, ambos defensores particulares del encartado y,

RESULTANDO:

I.- Que mediante sentencia número 980-2021, de las 15:30 horas del 9 de diciembre de 2021, el Tribunal Penal de San José, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto y artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 1 a 6, 1, 13, 16, 72 a 74, 111 a 116, 142, 182, 184, 265 a 267, 270, 360 a 366, del Código Procesal Penal y 1, 2, 11, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 45 y 280 del Código Penal, 16, 27 y 38 del Arancel de honorarios por Servicios Profesionales de Abogacía y Notariado N° 41457-JP este Tribunal dispone ABSOLVER DE TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a [Nombre 001], por el delito de INSTIGACIÓN PÚBLICA que en perjuicio de LA TRANQUILIDAD PÚBLICA se le venía acusando. Son los gastos del proceso penal a cargo del Estado a haberse procedido a instancia del Ministerio Público. SOBRE LA ACCIÓN CIVIL RESARCITORIA: Se declara sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria presentada por LA PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA contra el demandado civil [Nombre 001]. SOBRE COSTAS: Son las costas derivadas de las querellas y acción civil a cargo de las partes perdidosas, las cuales se fijan en la suma de CIENTO VEINTIÚN MIL COLONES correspondientes a la acción civil y CUATROCIENTOS OCHENTA Y CUATRO MIL COLONES correspondientes a las querellas. Las sumas acordadas deberán ser canceladas al adquirir firmeza este fallo y por simple depósito bancario en la cuenta del Tribunal. Una vez firme el fallo se ordena destruir la evidencia decomisada en este asunto. NOTIFÍQUESE. Lorena Blanco Jiménez. Jueza de juicio." (sic, folio 482).

II.- Que, contra el anterior pronunciamiento, interpusieron recursos de apelación el máster Oscar Quirós Soto, representante del Ministerio Público, Fiscalía Adjunta de San José; la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, apoderada y representante de personas agrupadas bajo el nombre “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica”, quienes han sido querellantes y la licenciada Margot Avellán Ruíz, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República como querellante y actora civil.

III.- Que, verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 465 del Código Procesal Penal, el tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en los recursos de apelación.

IV.- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta la jueza Chinchilla Calderón; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Cuestiones de trámite y competencia. (A) Mediante voto de este colegio jurisdiccional, número 2022-293 de las 11:10 horas del 25 de febrero de 2022 (ver folio 539), se admitieron los recursos del Ministerio Público, de la Procuraduría General de la República y de la abogada representante del denominado “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica”, nombre bajo el cual se han agrupado decenas de personas físicas que han figurado, a título personal, como querellantes alegando un interés difuso y otorgando poder especial judicial para actuar en su nombre a la licenciada Navas; se enderezaron procedimientos respecto a la entrega, a esta última entidad y conforme a su ley orgánica, de una copia de los recursos para que, si lo tenía a bien, se pronunciara; se rechazó la prueba testimonial ofrecida por la defensa (la declaración de Víctor Rodríguez Rescia, presidente del Centro de Derechos Civiles y Políticos con sede en Ginebra y expresidente del Subcomité para la prevención de la tortura de Naciones Unidas, quien se referiría a las implicaciones internacionales de una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta) y se señaló la audiencia oral solicitada, la cual se celebró en forma presencial el 09 de marzo de 2022 con la presente integración. (B) En esta diligencia el defensor del encartado planteó una actividad procesal defectuosa alegando que la licenciada Navas Montero, al ser diputada electa a esa fecha, carecía de legitimación para intervenir como apoderada de la parte querellante y actora civil pues ahora era representante de todas las personas costarricenses y no de un grupo específico, para lo cual invocó resoluciones del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (1847-E-2003) y de la Sala Constitucional (551-91) que establecen el carácter nacional de todas las diputaciones. Dicha actividad procesal defectuosa le fue rechazada oralmente en la citada diligencia (ver acta de folio 546 frente) bajo los argumentos de que, en primer lugar, aún la licenciada Navas Montero no ostentaba la condición de diputada sino hasta que asumiera formalmente el cargo el 01 de mayo de 2022 y, en segundo lugar, que, aunque hipotéticamente ya tuviera tal condición (que sí la tiene al momento de esta decisión) eso no le impide ejercer sus actividades privadas salvo que obtenga algún rubro por prohibición, lo que debe ser demostrado y, hasta la fecha, no lo ha sido. En el caso específico consta un poder de ella dado por las personas integrantes bajo el nombre de la entidad querellante y el tema de admisibilidad de ambas piezas ya fue discutido y aceptado al plantear sus escritos iniciales y en la audiencia preliminar y ella ha intervenido en el proceso en tal condición, de manera que la sigue ostentando. Frente a lo anterior, el citado defensor hizo reserva de casación que le quedó consignada en el acta respectiva. En la referida audiencia no se recibió prueba y las partes expusieron sus argumentos de la forma que se resumirá en cada motivo. (C) Asimismo, en la resolución de este tribunal que señaló a ‘vista’ se solicitó a la Sala Constitucional aportar el estado del expediente relativo a la acción de inconstitucionalidad número 21-024578-0007-CO que promueve [Nombre 001], en su condición de secretario general de la Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Privados (en adelante ANEP). Recibido el oficio respectivo se constató que la norma impugnada alude al artículo 280 del Código Penal (es decir, la que sirve de base al hecho aquí acusado) y que esta se cuestionó en cuanto «Considera que las frases “que afecte a la tranquilidad pública” y “sin que sea necesarios que el hecho se produzca” convierten este delito en un tipo penal abierto y general, de manera que cualquier acción en que se altere mínimamente el colectivo pueda ser perseguida con solo la denuncia. La norma configura un delito de riesgos que, al estar centrado en el verbo instigar, se materializa a través de la palabra, por lo que lesiona varios derechos fundamentales, entre los cuales está la libertad de expresión, por medio del derecho de reunión pública o privada y las manifestaciones en espacios públicos. Señala que la sola punitividad legal formal no es suficiente para restringir derechos; por ello, una norma no solo debe ser típica, sino también, antijurídica y culpable, ajustando los verbos rectores a conductas concretas, específicas e irreductiblemente determinables. La generalidad y amplitud de este tipo penal permite “adecuar” cualquier conducta a un verbo y una acción tan amplia como “instigar”, permite sancionar diversas conductas» y que, para la fecha de celebración de la audiencia oral, el asunto estaba en fase de estudio de fondo por el órgano constitucional, pues la acción fue admitida y se publicaron los edictos respectivos en los Boletines Judiciales número 18 a 20 de fechas 28 de enero al 1 de febrero, respectivamente, todos de 2022. Tanto de dichas publicaciones como en la norma que les sirve de base, el numeral 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se desprende la orden de suspender el dictado de la “resolución final” del asunto en que se discuta la aplicación de lo cuestionado y, por supuesto, en la causa base de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, como era este caso. Eso obligó a que este tribunal, mediante voto número 2022-356 de las 11:30 horas del 09 de marzo de 2022 (cfr. folios 547 a 549), suspendiera la decisión en esta sede a la espera de lo resuelto en aquella instancia. Según se informó y se encuentra publicado en diversos Boletines Judiciales del presente año (vgr. el No. 19 del 02 de febrero de 2023, pág. 9 y también se acredita con el documento de folio 556), dicha acción ya fue resuelta a través del voto número 2023-00430 del 11 de enero del año en curso, en que se dispuso: «Por mayoría se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad. Los magistrados Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado y Garita Navarro dan razones diferentes. El magistrado Cruz Castro salva el voto y considera que esta acción debe ser declarada con lugar y en consecuencia, por su contenido y sus efectos, el artículo 280 del Código Penal, resulta inconstitucional.» Por ello, al no existir el obstáculo constitucional referido y haberse reactivado el expediente por auto de trámite de las 10:08 horas del 12 de enero de 2023 (folio 557) (lo que hace que la prescripción de la acción penal siga su curso), procede emitir la decisión en estos recursos máxime por estar involucradas en él personas adultas mayores que figuran como partes, pese a que, como se desprende de la constancia que antecede (folio 565), aún se desconoce el contenido del voto integral por estar en redacción. Sin embargo, este no podría ser diferente a la parte dispositiva ya publicada y en la que no hubo ninguna declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad ni ninguna interpretación conforme. (D) En el presente asunto las tres partes acusadoras (Ministerio Público, Procuraduría General de la República y las personas físicas que actúan bajo el nombre de “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica”, entidad no inscrita) plantearon imputación por hechos (redactados de forma diversa sobre todo en el caso de la última entidad) que circunscribieron al 09 de setiembre de 2019, cuando [Nombre 001], como secretario de la ANEP, en una reunión del Movimiento Encuentro Social Multisectorial realizado en el auditorio de la Conferencia Episcopal, habría hecho un llamado a un paro nacional con una duración de uno o dos días que incluiría el cierre de fronteras, el cierre o bloqueo de las rutas No. 2 (Alto de Ochomogo), No. 27 (San José-Caldera) y No. 32 (San José-Limón). Sin embargo, la querella del “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” descrita en los resultandos de la sentencia (ya se verá en el considerando siguiente que también esos resultandos fueron omisos, en parte, respecto a los hechos sobre los que versaría el juicio según el auto de apertura) incluye estas otras referencias fácticas que no se encuentran en aquellas otras acusaciones: «Sexto (…) Dichas tácticas las utilizó específicamente en hechos ya consumados en el año 2018, acciones que no han prescrito. Nos referimos a la paralización de servicios esenciales a partir del mes de junio de 2018. Toda la población sufrió y el dirigente apoyado en los grupos dirigidos y en compañía de otros, sembró el caos en educación, en los hospitales, en el transporte y en muchos otros servicios públicos. El tránsito vehicular fue interrumpido y la población afectada por el temor y el desconcierto. Ello ocurrió en la ciudad capital y en otras zonas del país. Reiteramos, es hecho público y notorio (…) Octavo: Querellamos igualmente el hecho consumado el día 3 de setiembre de 2019 en las afueras de la Asamblea Legislativa en horas de la tarde, cuando el periodista de La Nación [Nombre 004] fue atacado por la turba a instancias claras del querellado. No solo provocó agresión con su intervención, sino que interrumpió el ejercicio del periodismo y negó derecho de información a la ciudadanía, derecho fundamental. El hecho quedó constancia en los medios de información y en la misma entrevista hecha al querellado en Repretel en la edición del mediodía del día 13 de setiembre de 2019» (ver legajo de querella respectivo; folios 511-512, se suplen los destacados). Sobre estos tópicos, la sentencia de instancia fue omisa tanto en su parte considerativa (salvo un párrafo alusivo a las costas) como en la dispositiva. Sin embargo, si se observa el recurso de la representante del “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” (que se describirá más adelante) solo alude a lo acaecido el 09 de setiembre de 2019 y no menciona, en ningún segmento de su planteamiento, los hechos previos o posteriores supra referenciados. Ese silencio de la querellante particular (única parte legitimada para alegarlo desde que solo aludía a hechos contenidos en una querella por ella planteada), tanto en el memorial escrito como en la audiencia celebrada a su petición, convalida el vicio (omisivo) de la sentencia, al tenor de lo estipulado en el artículo 177 inciso b) del Código Procesal Penal que refiere, en lo que interesa: «…los vicios quedarán convalidados en los siguientes casos (…) b) Cuando quienes tengan derecho a impugnarlo hayan aceptado, expresa o tácitamente, los efectos del acto.» Además, conforme lo estatuyen los numerales 439 y 446 de dicha normativa, la competencia de esta cámara está circunscrita a los alegatos planteados, por lo que tampoco es dable efectuar el análisis de oficio, máxime en sistemas predominantemente acusatorios como el nuestro y ante recursos de quienes acusan, pues ello implicaría sustituir e invadir dichas funciones. Así las cosas, la sentencia en esos temas (de 2018 y del 03 de setiembre de 2019) ha de entenderse firme e inexpugnable. (E) A fin de abordar los diferentes tópicos planteados de un modo ordenado y lógico se iniciará con el análisis de los alegatos referentes a la licitud probatoria, la valoración del material, la fundamentación y la determinación de los hechos; luego lo relativo a la tipicidad y la argumentación jurídica en general; enseguida lo referente a la acción civil y, por último, las costas. Por ello no necesariamente se seguirá el orden de agravios planteado por quienes apelan y, en algunos casos, se abordarán en conjunto algunas de sus quejas. (F) Para garantizar una lectura fluida del texto, sin distracciones a ideas secundarias, pero, a la vez, darle autosuficiencia de esta sentencia y facilitar el acceso de quienes impugnan (y leen) a los materiales citados, las referencias a documentos jurídicos públicos que se hagan en la posición resolutiva de esta cámara (no en la meramente descriptiva) se insertan mediante hipervínculo (destacado mediante subrayado y otro color de texto) al cual se accede, en el texto digitalizado, haciendo clic sobre la parte destacada.

II.- El máster Oscar Quirós Soto, fiscal coordinador del Ministerio Público, apela la sentencia absolutoria exponiendo una serie de frases en su mayoría genéricas y aplicables a cualquier asunto. En lo que titula “primer motivo” de su impugnación (que, en realidad, es el único) muestra su inconformidad con la valoración de la prueba porque estima que hubo quebranto a las reglas de la sana crítica lo que, en su criterio, genera una indebida y contradictoria fundamentación. Refiere que no se analizó correctamente la prueba testimonial de Rubén Hernández Valle y de Gloria Navas Montero y que, si se hubiera hecho eso y se hubiesen omitido apreciaciones subjetivas, se habría llegado a otra decisión. Considera que la recurrida es ayuna de motivación pues se hace mención solo a uno de los aspectos a los que aludieron las partes, dejando de lado circunstancias esenciales (sin expresar cuáles). Dice que quedó demostrado que el acusado efectuó una serie de manifestaciones para causar una revuelta en el país y si bien lo hizo en un centro privado, la Conferencia Episcopal, eso no obsta para que el tipo penal se consume. Critica la posición de la juzgadora de que el hecho debe realizarse en un sitio público. Agrega, en una exposición un tanto desordenada, que no es requisito que el video a aportar sea el original, que nadie ha denunciado la captación indebida de manifestaciones y que el que este se haya editado no significa que no pueda ser valorado, pues nadie, ni siquiera el encartado, ha indicado que hubiese sido adulterado o las imágenes allí contenidas sean falsas. Recuerda que en nuestro sistema no hay prueba tasada y este material fue escuchado por terceros lo que sería suficiente. Además, fue secuestrado en un medio de comunicación colectiva lo que acreditaría, según el impugnante, que el entrevistado estaba haciendo las manifestaciones a varias personas. Añade que, si bien el delito se encuentra en el título de los delitos contra la tranquilidad pública, eso no significa que la instigación solo debe ser de ilícitos que estén en ese título, ya que hay otros que afectan aquel bien jurídico (como el entorpecimiento de servicio público y la obstrucción de vía pública) los cuales son pluriofensivos e inciden en toda una población. Añade que “No es cierto que el tipo requiere determinar la voluntad de masa porque el delito es de peligro. No es correcta la conclusión de la jueza de que lo dicho por el encartado, no es una instigación sino una propuesta, pretender que una persona al instigar tenga que decir cuándo y cómo va a suceder el hecho va más allá de lo requerido por el tipo”. (Cfr. folio 490 vuelto). Sostiene que, si bien la instigación no se materializó, el tipo penal no requiere que eso suceda. Enseguida el apelante, de modo un tanto confuso y como interrogante añade: “Como pretende el tribunal que, en este tipo de casos, el solo elemento de que el encartado en momento y forma, no autorizó que se le grabara, y lo exime del delito de Instigación Pública, por cuanto del análisis que se hace, se determina que no existe Tipicidad, nada más alejado de la realidad. A consideración del Ministerio Público, arriba el Tribunal a una conclusión errónea al determinar que la prueba no logra acreditar certeramente la tesis fiscal y deja de lado circunstancias que fueron expuestas por los testigos y por lo anterior y de acuerdo del principio de Correlación entre Acusación y Sentencia, debe se absolverse al encartado. En ese sentido, desea hacer ver esta representación que estamos ante testimonios creíbles que debieron ser valorados desde la perspectiva de la coherencia y la logicidad; ya que el Tribunal da por sentado que no hay coherencia en sus relatos y el requerimiento fiscal no fue el correcto, apreciación muy subjetiva” (ver folio 491 frente y vuelto; la redacción y las faltas de ortografía, incluido el uso inadecuado de mayúsculas, son del propio texto fiscal). En forma genérica (pues tampoco describe, en concreto, alguna) indica que hay serias contradicciones entre lo narrado por los testigos y lo interpretado por el tribunal y que este se limitó a señalar algunas supuestas circunstancias expresadas por los testigos. Luego de otras manifestaciones abstractas, válidas para cualquier causa, sobre la importancia de la motivación termina pidiendo la nulidad de lo resuelto. Asimismo, la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, presidenta del “Movimiento Ciudadano C.R.” y apoderada de las personas físicas que lo componen y figuran como querellantes alegando un interés difuso, adelanta que la petitoria esencial es la anulación del fallo de mérito. Como primer argumento para ello alude a la ayuna fundamentación y a la valoración fáctica errada que condujo al hecho probado principal. Dice que es cierto que el encartado es el Secretario General de la ANEP, dirigente sindical y el nueve de setiembre de 2019 participó de una reunión “que dícese de carácter privado pero que trascendió a la opinión pública” (condición subrayada que reclama no fuera incluida como hecho probado, pese a que los testigos de don [Nombre 001] estuvieron en la reunión y les consta que él se dirigió al público presente donde profirió las expresiones que se querellaron y estas llegaron a conocimiento público). También es verdad, agrega, que el procesado externó planteamientos ante los participantes de la reunión y el video original no pudo ser localizado, pero se aportó uno de la entrevista que, con motivo de eso, ella dio a Repretel donde, a su juicio, se acreditaría que se dieron las expresiones ante un público exacerbado por la actitud del líder y que se informaron al público afectado y amedrentado. Dice que el delito imputado no distingue si el hecho punible se comete en público o en privado pues la delincuencia es de acción pública y que, por eso, el hecho probado resulta incompleto y eso afecta la fundamentación y genera el gravamen, por lo que el razonamiento del tribunal no cumple a cabalidad con los límites del debido proceso. Añade que al examinar la declaración de Rubén Hernández Valle tanto como la que ella misma dio se establece que se sintieron afectados por las declaraciones de don [Nombre 001] (las cuales no han sido negadas ni por él ni por sus sindicatos) pero que también lo fueron otras personas. De eso se enteraron por los medios de prensa, por lo que el hecho se dio y se pasó a información de la opinión pública, que es la que resulta afectada. Sostiene que el encartado públicamente indicó que sí las había hecho. Alude a lo que narró Cesar López, testigo de la defensa; niega que lo que el procesado dijera fuese un intercambio de ideas y afirma que este testigo reconoció que el video circuló en CRHoy y en varios medios televisivos. Resume el dicho de Walter Quesada quien señaló su participación en movimientos sindicales que históricamente han producido grandes pérdidas económicas al país y generado el entorpecimiento de la educación. Dice la apelante que en el 2018 hubo casi tres meses de huelga y que “esta historia no ha producido amnesia en la población” (folio 501 vuelto) y que ese es el modus operandi del acusado, tema no valorado por la jueza interviniente. Por ello, se hacía creíble la amenaza proferida en los grupos que han apoyado esos movimientos lesivos para la comunidad nacional. Se queja de que la jueza desechara la interpretación de conjunto y el principio de experiencia, lo que afectó la valoración del material probatorio. Niega que se esté ante un juicio político, como dice el acusado, y pide la nulidad de lo resuelto. Al contestar los recursos, los defensores privados del imputado indican que los ofendidos hacen referencia a hechos de 2018 en los que don [Nombre 001] ni siquiera participó; usan prueba ilegítima (copia de un video no autorizado en su reproducción y cuya captación configuraría un delito previsto en los artículos 181 a 183 del Código Penal) y pretenden extender artificiosamente la instigación pública, en detrimento de la voluntad legislativa, a artículos distintos de los contemplados como delitos en el Título X del Código “Procesal Penal” (sic) los cuales no fueron atribuidos. Dicen que la interpretación de los acusadores respecto de los elementos de este tipo es general y extensiva y se olvidan que existe la figura genérica de la instigación del artículo 46 del Código Penal; violentan —siguen argumentando los defensores— los artículos 25, 26 y 29 de la Constitución Política referente a las libertades de manifestación o expresión, asociación y reunión, así como los principios de legalidad y tipicidad penal, todo lo cual transgrede estándares internacionales (para lo cual se aporta copia de una acción de inconstitucionalidad). Añaden que, por esta vía, se ejerce censura previa y se cercena la libertad de expresión lo cual abre una ventana al riesgo penal, máxime cuando a quien se criminaliza es a un defensor de derechos humanos como califica la Relatoría de las Naciones Unidas a las personas sindicalistas. Afirman que la instigación pública no puede realizarse en el ámbito privado y la afirmación de la querellante, de que no se distingue en el tipo penal tal cosa, es un pensamiento jurídico ilógico. Les sorprende la ligereza del escrito de apelación fiscal y el uso “machotero” de afirmaciones y agregan que nunca se debió abrir una carpeta para este hecho pues “da pena ajena” (folio 532 vuelto) cuando en la sentencia se dice que el video aportado no cumplía los requisitos mínimos para ser analizado porque no era original y que, pese a eso, el Ministerio Público continúe con esta “pasarela judicial” (ibídem), lo que no es algo menor pues cuesta dinero de las personas contribuyentes el cual debería usarse en otras cosas. Insisten en que el video es prueba ilícita y también lo es todo lo que derive de este, por lo que la querellante Navas no puede revivirlo incorporando otros de medios de comunicación que lo reproducen y, por tanto, es irrelevante si el sitio es público o privado. Añaden que las declaraciones lo que hacen es basarse en el video, y no son de testigos presenciales. Sostienen que la sentencia está bien fundamentada. En la audiencia celebrada, el licenciado Carlos Meléndez, fiscal del Ministerio Público pidió acoger su recurso y ordenar el reenvío, reiterando los argumentos expuestos por escrito. La licenciada Navas Montero, como querellante amplió su recurso indicando que lo interponía tanto personalmente —como ciudadana costarricense por acción popular— como en su condición de apoderada judicial de las personas agrupadas bajo el nombre “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” y que lo hacía por tres factores: por una ruptura en las reglas de la sana crítica en la valoración de la prueba; por una errónea interpretación del artículo 280 del Código Penal al declararse que el hecho no era típico y en cuanto se condenó a su representada al pago de las costas (aspecto en el que centra otro agravio independiente). En cuanto a los dos primeros aspectos resaltó que se está ante un delito de peligro y no de resultado (tema relevante para asociar a la condena en costas) y que la interpretación de que la frase se emitió en privado es un primer yerro, porque se estaba en el contexto de una huelga, con escándalo, obstrucción de vías, entorpecimiento de servicios hospitalarios y de transporte público, todo lo cual generaba caos y estaba en juego el interés público. El video en que el encartado se pronuncia en la intersectorial se reprocha que no se aportó en su original, pero ella intervino como testigo del Ministerio Público y hay libertad probatoria. Considera erróneo que se indique que no se pueda aplicar este delito a tipos penales que tutelan el mismo bien jurídico, aunque se encuentren en otras secciones del Código Penal. El licenciado Rodrigo Rosales, defensor penal del encartado, manifestó que ninguno de los apelantes aportó argumentos para desbaratar lo expuesto en la sentencia, sino que se parte de un “derecho penal de autor que haría que Günther Jakobs se volviera a morir” (sic). Señala que se pretende usar prueba ilícita por una doble razón: su representado estaba en una actividad y en un recinto privado y se filtró un video suyo sin su consentimiento ni aprobación el cual, como si fuera poco, se editó. El licenciado Carlos García indicó que las partes acusadoras pasaron de una “instigación pública” a una “instigación común”; que se violó el artículo 180 del Código Procesal Penal pues la prueba madre se obtiene mediante un delito referido a la violación de correspondencia. El encartado, al finalizar la audiencia, indicó que es hijo y heredero de los valores de 1949 con la antesala de las garantías de los años 40, tiene 30 años en la lucha social al frente de ANEP y nunca lo ha hecho por aspirar a cargos públicos sino que ha contado con la venia de comités de personas que han considerado que él es importante para la causa social, de modo que no hizo peligrar la tranquilidad pública sino que esto pone en evidencia la desigualdad social creciente generada por las políticas económicas desplegadas. Indica que su organización es referente de grupos sociales de distinta naturaleza que no reciben respuesta de los partidos políticos. En un encuentro social multisectorial, privado, para redactar planteamientos y deslindar una estrategia de lucha frente al gobierno, que los ha excluido en forma total, mucha gente se infiltra. Dice que no tiene ideología, ni tampoco la posee ANEP, sino que se busca deslegitimar y que su única bandera son los derechos humanos al punto que se encuentra en el banquillo de los acusados por defenderlos. Alude a la OC27/21 de la Corte IDH relativa a la libertad sindical, la negociación colectiva y el derecho de huelga, que son también derechos humanos. Dice que doña Gloria es diputada electa de la República y que le ofreció una audiencia apenas asumiera, pero desde ya le pide que le devuelva al pueblo el derecho de huelga, pues no se trata de un simple referente sino de una sentencia de un tribunal internacional lo que se incumple. Añade que estaba en un evento privado y se dio una filtración sin su consentimiento que fue tergiversada por la molestia que tienen algunos medios de comunicación en su contra. Señala que el país se devolvió 50 años en desarrollo social, que en ese momento había agitación y movimientos sociales y eso seguirá con o sin [Nombre 001], con o sin ANEP, ante el hambre y el alto endeudamiento salarial. Dice que ANEP es un referente de ayuda social, de defensa laboral de derechos en forma gratuita para lo que se rompió la agremiación corporativista, de donde más que afectar la tranquilidad pública buscar consolidarla y que son ellos los que pusieron en peligro dicho valor. Los planteamientos son conexos y se abordarán conjuntamente, rechazándolos. Como puede verse, las partes entremezclan temas procesales con cuestiones propias del derecho sustantivo y de la configuración del tipo penal. Estas últimas, que también se mencionan en otros alegatos que se resumirán más adelante, se abordarán, entonces, en otros apartados (a los que se remite a las personas gestionantes con el fin de evitar reiteraciones innecesarias), para mantener un orden lógico de exposición, circunscribiéndose este primer acápite a temas relacionados con la validez y valoración de la prueba y la fundamentación de la resolución. No obstante, no se hará referencia alguna al principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia, mencionado por el fiscal impugnante, desde que no se verifica su afectación, en tanto no solo los hechos de las acusaciones no se tuvieron por demostrados (y aquel principio, que tutela el derecho de defensa, busca preservar que la condena se base en lo acusado), sino que el citado fiscal solo lanza una frase sobre ese tema al aire, sin darle contenido alguno, lo que evidencia más el uso de un formulario preestablecido y no corregido que un vicio real de la decisión. También conviene advertir, desde ya, que en un país democrático y realmente respetuoso de los derechos de todas las personas, cualquiera puede ser llevado a los tribunales por actos que una persona considere lesivos a sus derechos o intereses pues esto es parte del derecho humano de acceso a la justicia, sin que el hecho de someterlo a un proceso (de cualquier naturaleza y sea cual sea su resultado) pueda considerarse como un juicio político pues, a la fecha, (aún) existe una independencia judicial que, aunque con debilidades y puntos de oportunidad para su mejora, sigue funcionando y que permitirá determinar si lo atribuido es aceptable o no y, en uno u otro caso, fijar las responsabilidades que correspondan. Un juicio político es, en sentido estricto y en algunos sistemas políticos, uno desplegado por los Parlamentos para fijar responsabilidades políticas (no jurídicas) de un alto funcionario público (condición que no tiene el acusado y proceso que no se tiene en el país) o bien, en sentido amplio o latu sensu (que es el que parece usar el encartado), es el planteado para desarticular una oposición usando canales judiciales cooptados pero para que esta calificación sea válida se requiere no solo la motivación de la parte actora sino el dominio absoluto del aparato judicial o jurisdiccional, lo que, en la especie, no consta que exista desde que la sentencia de instancia rechazó las pretensiones de las partes y esta cámara asume, con todo rigor, su rol independiente. Por ello, de entrada, se rechazan tales calificativos que, más que efectuar análisis parten de subjetivismos o emociones que este tribunal no valida. Asimismo, es preciso advertirle al licenciado Rosales no solo que el autor alemán Günther Jakobs (1937-…) no ha fallecido (por lo que no podría volverse a morir) sino que este académico ha sido, más bien, quien ha ideado las bases ideológicas del “derecho penal del enemigo” que es lo más cercano al derecho penal de autor, de donde esta corriente, lejos de serle adversa, le es afín, por lo que ninguna crítica podría hacerse desde la posición teórica que él sigue a las expresiones citadas por los abogados del imputado. Hechas esas precisiones, a fin de tener un marco contextual expreso para aludir al tema probatorio y de fundamentación, conviene, además, efectuar un rápido recuento de lo sucedido en el proceso, así como elaborar un resumen de la sentencia —emitida por escrito por una jueza unipersonal— la cual consta de 42 páginas (las que se localizan en los folios 460 a 482 del expediente principal): (A) Resumen de lo sucedido en el proceso. i. Este asunto inició por denuncia de fecha 13 de setiembre de 2019 planteada por la posterior querellante Gloria Navas Montero, en representación del “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” bajo cuyo nombre se agrupan 82 personas físicas, 81 de las cuales otorgaron poder especial judicial a la licenciada Navas quien también actuó a título personal. Todas ellas, junto con el Ministerio Público y la Procuraduría General de la República, plantearon acusación contra [Nombre 001]. ii. Las tres acusaciones tienen en común el imputarle al sentenciado el delito de instigación pública por hechos sucedidos el 09 de setiembre de 2019 cuando [Nombre 001], como secretario de la ANEP, en una reunión del “Movimiento Encuentro Social Multisectorial” realizada en el auditorio de la Conferencia Episcopal Costarricense, habría hecho un llamado a un paro nacional, con una duración de uno o dos días, en el cual se haría cierre de fronteras y el bloqueo de las rutas No. 2 (Alto de Ochomogo), No. 27 (San José-Caldera) y No. 32 (San José-Limón) sin que nada de eso se diera o, al menos, así se discutiera y probara en el juicio. Sin embargo, la querella del autodenominado “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica incluye, como ya se adelantó, estas otras referencias fácticas que no están comprendidas en las otras acusaciones, a saber: «Sexto (…) Dichas tácticas las utilizó específicamente en hechos ya consumados en el año 2018, acciones que no han prescrito. Nos referimos a la paralización de servicios esenciales a partir del mes de junio de 2018. Toda la población sufrió y el dirigente apoyado en los grupos dirigidos y en compañía de otros, sembró el caos en educación, en los hospitales, en el transporte y en muchos otros servicios públicos. El tránsito vehicular fue interrumpido y la población afectada por el temor y el desconcierto. Ello ocurrió en la ciudad capital y en otras zonas del país. Reiteramos, es hecho público y notorio (…) Octavo: Querellamos igualmente el hecho consumado el día 3 de setiembre de 2019 en las afueras de la Asamblea Legislativa en horas de la tarde, cuando el periodista de La Nación [Nombre 004] fue atacado por la turba a instancias claras del querellado. No solo provocó agresión con su intervención, sino que interrumpió el ejercicio del periodismo y negó derecho de información a la ciudadanía, derecho fundamental. El hecho quedó constancia (sic) en los medios de información y en la misma entrevista hecha al querellado en Repretel en la edición del mediodía del día 13 de setiembre de 2019.» (La redacción es del original, se suplen las negritas). Lo anterior fue parte de lo que se reseñó en los resultandos de la sentencia apelada. Sin embargo, si se observa el escrito de querella propiamente (el cual se admitió íntegramente en el auto de apertura a juicio) este contenía otros hechos, a saber: «3. En los últimos tiempos, conforme lo acreditan hechos públicos y notorios, dicho señor se ha excedido en sus discursos acciones y decisiones al punto que no solo ha abusado ilegítimamente de su derecho de opinión, sino que su conducta transgrede la ley y otras garantías fundamentales de la ciudadanía, la que escoge manifestarse no con violencia ni con coacción sino con los instrumentos adecuados del Estado de Derecho. 4. Dicho señor con sus discursos y acciones ha pretendido desestabilizar el orden constitucional incitando a la violencia y el ejercicio de grupos que perturban dolosamente el libre tránsito de los ciudadanos, de jóvenes estudiantes, niños que se dirigen a sus centros de educación y muchos trabajadores que deben presentarse puntualmente a sus labores. Incluso, hace pocos días con su dicho logró que personas dirigidas con sus expresiones negativas dirigidas y acciones indebidas atacaran físicamente a un miembro de la prensa que trataba de ejercer su labor. 5. Hace pocos días ante una presunta huelga convocada por sindicatos médicos y de profesiones afines incitaba a las masas a reaccionar y negar la prestación de servicios esenciales como la salud, poniendo en peligro la vida de muchos ante la masiva cancelación de citas y de cirugías programadas. Se negó la entrega de medicamentos, todo ello en evidente afrenta y quebranto de derechos humanos fundamentales. Ello ha quedado registrado por la prensa y otros medios de información. Se trata de hechos públicos y notorios. (…) 7. A dicho señor lo querellamos formalmente por cuanto ha pretendido mover a sus seguidores y a otros movimientos sindicales como lo afirmó, hacia la ofensa ciudadana y gubernamental extorsiva con la consumación de un paro en la nación entre 24 a 48 horas de frontera a frontera.» (También figuran allí los puntos descritos como 1 y 2 que se omiten en la anterior transcripción pues contienen la identificación del encartado y el tiempo relativo a su actividad sindical, temas que no son de imputación propiamente tal sino meramente descriptivos; se agregan las negritas). En este último escrito de acusación particular se agregan otras calificaciones jurídicas como obstrucción en la vía pública y motín en condición de instigador (ver legajo de querella respectivo). iii. La querella de la licenciada Navas y de las 81 personas restantes se presentó el 23 de octubre de 2019 y se admitió en esa misma fecha. Luego de planteada la acusación fiscal, en agosto de 2020, esta se comunicó a la Procuraduría General de la República quien incoó su querella (ver legajo de querella y traslado de la acusación en folio 161 del principal). iv. También se planteó acción civil resarcitoria únicamente por parte de la Procuraduría General de la República quien reclamó el daño social en la suma de un millón de colones, pretensión que mantuvo en todo el proceso (ver legajo de querella de esta parte procesal en folio 2, legajo de acción civil folio 1 y conclusiones del debate en folio 458). v. En el debate se recibieron cuatro testigos, los primeros dos integrantes del “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” (Rubén Hernández Valle, Gloria Navas Montero) que no estuvieron presentes en la reunión sino que se enteraron de ella por medios de comunicación y los otros aportados por la defensa (César López Dávila y Walter Quesada Hernández) que, aunque asistieron a la reunión, no recordaron los términos exactos en que se expresó el encartado; se evacuó la declaración del indiciado (quien aludió al contexto de su discurso sin aceptar que hubiese dicho aquellas frases) y se incorporó, como prueba documental, las denuncias y su documentación adjunta de folios 1 al 17, 124 al 129 y 130 al 134; libelo con firmas de diferentes personas de folios 18 al 119; el acta de decomiso y lo descrito en ella número 0064696 de folio 141; los informes del O.I.J., uno de la Sección de Inspecciones Oculares número 1816-DC-SIOERI-2019 en folios 148 y vuelto y otro de la Sección de Delitos Varios número 059-DVDC-2020 de folios 154 y 155; la certificación de juzgamientos de folio 251 y, como prueba material, un disco DVD-R de color dorado con la leyenda 19-647-619-PE; un disco marca Maxell DVD+R de color plateado con la leyenda “video [Nombre 001]”; un disco marca Maxell DVD-R de color plateado con la leyenda "firmas de los ciudadanos” y un dispositivo USB color blanco "Transcend" 4GB; vi. En los hechos probados de la sentencia se tuvo por acreditada la condición de dirigente sindical del encartado, la participación de este en una reunión privada a nivel nacional celebrada el día y en el lugar acusados (09 de setiembre de 2019 en el auditorio de la Conferencia Episcopal de San José en el marco del grupo “Movimiento de Encuentro Social Multisectorial”) y el que, sin él autorizar la captación de su voz o imagen, fue filmado mientras hacía sus planteamientos a las personas asistentes, sin que se pudiera localizar el video original. Se tuvo por demostrado, además, que el sindicado no cuenta con antecedentes. vii. El análisis probatorio intelectivo y jurídico se plasmó, en conjunto, en el considerando III (páginas 30 a 40 de la sentencia) en donde se esgrimen, como motivos de la absolutoria penal del encartado, los siguientes: a) los hechos acusados no son típicos del delito atribuido (instigación pública) ni de ningún otro; b) si bien no se está ante un juicio político, como dice el acusado, se echa de menos que las partes no hicieron un análisis de las pruebas, ni siquiera de las documentales, y divagaron por hechos que no tenían relación con el thema probandum como el movimiento de huelga nacional de 2018 sobre el que no habían interrogado para ligar al encartado con eso; c) las partes no analizaron la forma en que se obtuvo el video sino que el ente fiscal se contentó con mencionar que se estaba ante un delito de peligro abstracto (lo que la jueza acepta como válido) pero sin aludir al asidero probatorio para su acreditación, pues hay un informe policial (059-DVDC-2020) que refiere que el video original nunca fue decomisado, por lo que no es posible determinar si el publicado por medios de comunicación y visto en la sala de debates había sido editado o no; d) el video aportado por una querellante (DVR-R color dorado con la leyenda 19-647-619-PE), en el segundo 18, presenta un corte y no es, como se dijera en las acusaciones, el video original sino “…un video de Repretel donde se entrevista a la señora Gloria Navas, lo cual denota que las partes llegaron a debate sin tener un adecuado manejo de la prueba” (página 32 de la sentencia). Por otro lado, el disco marca Maxell DVD-R color plateado con la leyenda "video [Nombre 001]” era una copia, presenta fecha de modificación el 12 de setiembre de 2019 y «…a efectos de analizar la autenticidad del mismo conforme consta a folio 147 se hacía necesario contar con el video original y por ello se dispuso mediante requerimiento fiscal al Organismo de Investigación Judicial según consta a folio 148, el secuestro del video original donde constaban las manifestaciones del encartado, diligencias llevadas a cabo mediante el informe de la Sección de Delitos Varios N° 059-DVDC-2020, el cual consta a folios 154 y 155, que es prueba debidamente admitida, el cual sobre la diligencia que interesa indica: "CRhoy respondió que no lograron encontrar videos originales de las grabaciones de sus periodistas", ante lo cual el video original nunca pudo ser analizado para determinar no solo la veracidad de la copia aportada como prueba, sino también las condiciones en que el mismo fue obtenido, pues determinando quien había sido el periodista o corresponsal que lo grabó, bien podía entrevistársele y ofrecerse como testigo para determinar si existió libre acceso a la prensa a esa reunión y/o consentimiento para que esas manifestaciones fuesen captadas y en ese sentido entonces sí se tendría por acreditada no solo la publicidad de las manifestaciones sino también el conocimiento del imputado de tal circunstancia, pero que a este momento se desconoce al punto que más bien no puede descartarse que se haya cometido el delito de captación indebida de manifestaciones verbales» (Cfr. sentencia, páginas 37-38); e) el representante estatal (la sentencia no especifica a cuál de los dos se refiere e intervienen en esa condición el Ministerio Público y la Procuraduría General de la República) no acredita su aseveración de que el evento convocado fuera público; f) el que se exhibiera un video en los medios de comunicación, sin que se sepa quién lo grabó y sin contar con autorización para ello, no le imprime publicidad a la reunión; g) los acusadores tienen la carga de la prueba y no demostraron elementos esenciales del tipo penal; h) las únicas personas, de los asistentes a la reunión, que declararon en juicio y el propio encartado dijeron que el evento era privado (así lo aceptó el fiscal en sus conclusiones según página 36 de la sentencia), las manifestaciones habrían sido emitidas en un lugar privado (esto último calificado como hecho incontrovertido en página 36 de la sentencia) y eso no fue desvirtuado, pues aunque Navas indicó que agricultores de San Carlos le dijeron que asistieron y el testigo López Dávila afirmó que había representantes de la sociedad civil, eso no le imprime la condición de pública a la reunión, máxime que esta se efectuaba en un recinto privado y el encartado dijo que tenía ese carácter y era cada sindicato quien determinaba la forma de convocatoria de sus representantes; i) no es aceptable que se invierta la carga de la prueba y se afirme que, como los testigos de descargo dijeron que no conocían los detalles de la convocatoria de la reunión, entonces esta no era privada; j) la representante del “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” refirió que el encartado era confeso porque había aceptado públicamente haber dicho las expresiones acusadas y que no se echaba para atrás, pero no refirió los elementos probatorios de donde derivaba eso pues si él lo aceptó así en alguna otra entrevista televisiva, esta no fue ofrecida y sobre tal extremo solo se expusieron planteamientos en las conclusiones del juicio y no mediante los interrogatorios a los testigos u otra prueba formalmente admitida y, en el juicio, el procesado rechazó los cargos; k) “…si bien la querellante, en la querella que interpuso el 23 de octubre del 2019, indicó que como prueba se solicite a Repretel el video del medio día de los días 12 y 13 de setiembre del 2019, donde constan respectivamente las entrevistas a Gloria Navas y [Nombre 001], de una adecuada revisión del acervo probatorio se habría percatado que finalmente el único video que fue decomisado en Noticias Repretel conforme el acta N° 64696 de folio 138, fue el de la entrevista a la señora Navas, ello porque en su denuncia -ver folio 125 vuelto- indicó que ambas entrevistas se habían dado el día 12 de setiembre del 2019 y por ello eso fue lo requerido por el Ministerio Público según folio 135, siendo que si la parte estimaba que esa no era la prueba requerida acorde a su tesis acusatoria bien pudo advertirlo en el momento procesal oportuno, lo cual no sucedió al punto que al momento de reproducirse los videos aportados indicó que echaba de menos el video en cuestión sin aportar mayores detalles…” (cfr. sentencia, folio 477); l) los testigos de cargo (Hernández y Navas) no fueron presenciales del evento sino que se enteraron de los hechos por la divulgación del video por medios de comunicación; de la información que ellos aportan no puede derivarse que el evento fuera público; m) no se configura el delito de instigación pública, dice el tribunal de mérito, pues este, previsto en el numeral 280 del Código Penal y sancionado con prisión de seis meses a cuatro años, no alude a cualquier delito sino a uno que afecte la tranquilidad pública, ubicación que también tiene ese tipo penal (en el título X “Delitos contra la tranquilidad pública”) junto con otros como la asociación ilícita, el apoyo y servicios para el terrorismo, la intimidación pública y la apología del delito. Sin embargo, los acusadores no le atribuyeron ninguno de estos al encartado, sino los de entorpecimiento de servicios públicos y obstrucción de la vía pública, los cuales se ubican en el Título IX “Delitos contra la seguridad común”; n) el que un suceso genere alarma colectiva, caos o preocupación (como lo alegaron los acusadores) —sigue diciendo la juzgadora de instancia— no significa que se afecte la tranquilidad pública a los fines de configuración del tipo penal, pues hay un título específico en el Código Penal que establece cuáles delitos tienen como bien jurídico tutelado la tranquilidad pública. No interpretarlo así sería hacer una interpretación extensiva y caer en los excesos en que incurrió la procuradora al decir que hasta un robo afecta la tranquilidad pública, lo que violenta el artículo 2 del Código Penal; ñ) en Costa Rica el tipo penal de instigación pública es más restringido que en otras legislaciones, como las de Colombia y Argentina (que se transcriben en la sentencia impugnada), en donde el tipo penal no limita la comisión del ilícito a la afectación de un bien jurídico específico, como sí sucede en nuestro medio; o) los delitos de obstrucción de la vía pública y entorpecimiento de servicios públicos sí admiten instigación, pero mediante la figura genérica del artículo 46 del Código Penal. Sin embargo, de haberse considerado que [Nombre 001] intervino como instigador de esos delitos, la redacción de las acusaciones debió ser distinta, primero porque los hechos tenían que haberse perpetrado; segundo porque era preciso individualizar a sus autores a fin de establecer que fue el encartado quien los determinó a cometer los hechos punibles. La jueza establece la diferencia entre ambas figuras en que la instigación genérica requiere la determinación de la voluntad de alguien concreto, en tanto que la instigación pública, por su característica de publicidad, alude a determinar la voluntad de una masa o sujetos indeterminados. Por eso, sigue diciendo (con apoyo en referencias a Manzini y Quisbert), la publicidad, en Costa Rica, es parte del dolo. Nada de esto se probó en el caso concreto, concluye la juzgadora, pues no hubo actos posteriores a esas palabras de materialización de esos cierres; p) tampoco se acreditó la seriedad de la instigación, pues esta implica inducir o mover el ánimo al delito, no simplemente manifestar una idea, proponer o aconsejar. Partiendo de que se le acusa que dijo "creo que la tesis de paro nacional es correcta, hay que proponer un gran paro nacional, pero de verdad, no de pasarela, cerrar las fronteras, cerrar la 27, cerrar la 32, cerrar Ochomogo..." eso no sería instigación sino una propuesta en el marco de un discurso de protesta social pues no se indica el cómo y el cuándo de las propuestas. Hernández Valle aludió a que no se les hizo caso a esas palabras, lo que denota la falta de seriedad; q) Con citas doctrinales que, a su vez, aluden a jurisprudencia argentina, se hace mención de que, casos similares, están amparados a la libertad de pensamiento y expresión, garantías constitucionales. viii. La acción civil resarcitoria planteada por el Estado, representado por la Procuraduría General de la República, se rechazó en el considerando IV (un párrafo en página 40 de la sentencia) porque se atribuyó una responsabilidad subjetiva y, como no se acreditó que el encartado cometiera los hechos, no había nexo causal. ix. Se resolvió con condena en costas a las partes vencidas, tanto en lo penal como en lo civil (considerando V, páginas 41-42), pues se estimó que no había razón plausible para litigar dada la prueba aportada y la atipicidad dicha; las querellas se basan en prueba distinta a la ofrecida y admitida y esta no se constató si era pertinente o errónea sino hasta llegar al juicio. (B) Abordaje de las quejas. En primer término, los declarantes de cargo (Navas y Hernández), en efecto, no fueron testigos presenciales, no estuvieron en la reunión en donde se habrían expresado las opiniones cuestionadas, según se acusa, y, por ello, nada de lo que aportan permite desentrañar la forma en que se obtuvo el material audiovisual ni la característica de la reunión, es decir, si era pública o privada y mucho menos el contenido de lo allí tratado, del que ellos supieron por los medios de comunicación. Ahora bien, tratándose de un proceso penal, la obligación de demostrar todos los elementos constitutivos de un delito (acción, tipicidad, antijuridicidad y culpabilidad) le compete a quienes acusan y no a la persona señalada de la infracción pues, considerarlo de otro modo, sería revertir la carga de la prueba y violentar el estado de inocencia garantizado constitucional (artículo 39 de la Constitución Política) y convencionalmente (artículos 8.2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos —en lo sucesivo CADH— y 14.2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, entre otros). Del estado de inocencia (antes mal llamada presunción) deriva que, en caso de duda sobre circunstancias de hecho, debe estarse a lo que sea más favorable para la persona acusada (artículo 9 del Código Procesal Penal). Por esta razón, si las partes acusadoras no aportaron elementos probatorios relativos a la naturaleza de la reunión, es decir si era pública o privada, sino que la prueba evacuada en el debate daba cuenta, más bien, que se efectuó en un recinto privado y que era de carácter restringido para representantes de diversos movimientos sociales, tema que también refirió el encartado, mal hacen los apelantes en considerar que la ausencia de prueba sobre tal extremo debe afectar al sindicado pues, más bien, ha de estarse a lo que le es más favorable, es decir, que la reunión era privada (pues, como se desarrollará más adelante, esto involucra garantías constitucionales y convencionales con requerimientos adicionales), aspecto que también mencionó el testigo Juan López Dávila (“Recuerdo un evento en el que había participado en setiembre del 2019, sí lo recuerdo a propósito de todo lo que pasó luego, fue un conversatorio a puerta cerrada que se hizo en el auditorio de la Conferencia Episcopal en calle 20, eso es una actividad privada, no era una manifestación, un conversatorio de intercambio de ideas, que se suele hacer cada cierto tiempo sobre todo en momento en que hay políticas públicas que afectan las y los trabajadores, fue un encuentro de varios grupos sindicales y varios grupos de la sociedad civil, fue un encuentro multisectorial. Ese es el auditorio de la Conferencia Episcopal que lo renta para actividades, al ser una actividad privada se busca en el mercado opciones que cumplan con aforo y sonido para hacerlas. Podrían haber hecho uso de la palabra alrededor de 18-25 personas en primera ronda (…) no se invitó a medios de la prensa, es un debate en el mundo de las ideas, estamos hablando de posiciones sociales, no fue invitado ningún medio de comunicación, no era una actividad pública, no se quiere que nadie se sienta interpelado a responder por lo que se llama en ciencia social deseabilidad social, no se autorizó la filmación ni la difusión del evento para respetar la privacidad de las personas que ahí se encontraban, escuché la mayor parte de los discursos (…) dentro de las personas que intervienen al señor [Nombre 001] (…) Sí recuerdo un video que circuló en varios medios de comunicación, recuerdo CRhoy y varios medios televisivos, del video recuerdo que estaba grabado como a escondidas, como desde atrás en un rincón, es bastante corto, la intervención de [Nombre 001] solía ser de aproximadamente cinco minutos, el video no corresponde a eso, recuerdo haber visto un corte, no puedo evitar pensar que no corresponde a la totalidad de lo que se dijo, por el corte y su duración y muchas veces a la hora de participar hay que hacer alusión a lo que dijeron personas tres o cuatro turnos atrás, un extracto de una intervención no revela el espíritu de lo expuesto.» (Cfr. sentencia, folios 467 vuelto y 468, se suplen los destacados). Eso mismo lo acepta la licenciada Navas en el propio recurso, por lo que ninguna contradicción o errónea valoración se observa en la decisión de tener la reunión como privada. La licenciada Navas, sin embargo, reprocha que no se dijera en los hechos probados que, aunque el acto fuera “de carácter privado (…) trascendió a la opinión pública” (cfr. folio 500, se agregan las negrillas). Ahora bien, sobre este tema en particular, es decir, sobre la difusión a la opinión pública, la sentencia de instancia no podía tenerla por acreditada pues partió de la tesis de que el material audiovisual era prueba ilícita y, por ende, también lo era, todo lo que de esa fuente espuria derivara. La resolución recurrida asume esa conclusión por dos razones: a) porque el encartado no autorizó la captura de su imagen y voz y la grabación, como dijo el testigo López Dávila supra referido, se ve que fue realizada en forma subrepticia, desde atrás del salón y la reunión era privada y b) porque si bien se aportaron unos videos, estos fueron manipulados (uno cortado y otro editado) de donde se dudaba de la cadena de custodia del material y de que lo allí captado respondiera a lo que el encartado quería decir y efectivamente manifestase, pues pudo ser descontextualizado. Ambos posicionamientos son derivados y a ellos se llegó respetando las reglas del correcto entendimiento humano, sin que este tribunal visualice errores en la argumentación. En efecto, si no hay prueba alguna que determine que el evento era de acceso libre y abierto al público, entonces ha de tenerse como privado y, en este marco, protegido por el derecho de reunión y la captación de voz e imagen de las personas que recoge el derecho a la intimidad, ambos regulados tanto en la Constitución Política (artículos 24 y 26) de como en los tratados internacionales (artículos 11.2 y 15 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y 17 y 21 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos). El mismo testigo Rubén Hernández Valle, en sus primeros textos jurídicos, aludió a la importancia de esa determinación: «…la reunión será privada, aunque se realice en un bien demanial de uso general (calle, plaza, monumento público, etc.) cuando, por la modalidad con que se desarrolla, puedan participar en ella solo las personas previamente determinadas y que, por lo general, se conocen entre sí (Ejemplo: reuniones de miembros de una asociación […] grupo de turistas […] reuniones de asociaciones de partidos políticos […]) Luego, en contraposición a las reuniones en lugar abierto al público, se definen como privadas las reuniones cuyos participantes sean recíprocamente conocidos entre ellos, o estén en posibilidad efectiva de conocerse antes o durante el curso de la reunión (…) Respecto de las reuniones públicas el motivo principal para su eventual disolución lo constituye (…) Respecto de las reuniones privadas tales potestades deben ser negadas, ya que este tipo de reuniones se encuentra disciplinado más bien por las normas relativas a la tutela del domicilio y la libertad y secreto de las comunicaciones.» (Cfr. Hernández Valle, Rubén, 1980. Las libertades públicas en Costa Rica. Editorial Juricentro, págs. 141-142; se agrega el destacado. En igual sentido y del mismo autor y editorial: El derecho de la Constitución. Volumen II, 1993, página 521). Por su parte, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en lo sucesivo Corte IDH), al interpretar la CADH ha indicado que «171. El derecho a protestar o manifestar inconformidad contra alguna acción o decisión estatal está protegido por el derecho de reunión, consagrado en el artículo 15 de la Convención Americana (…) La posibilidad de manifestarse pública y pacíficamente es una de las maneras más accesibles de ejercer el derecho a la libertad de expresión, por medio de la cual se puede reclamar la protección de otros derechos. Por tanto, el derecho de reunión es un derecho fundamental en una sociedad democrática y no debe ser interpretado restrictivamente (…) 174. (…) la Corte recuerda que el derecho de reunión no es un derecho absoluto y puede estar sujetos a restricciones, siempre que las injerencias no sean abusivas o arbitrarias, por ello, deben estar previstas en ley, perseguir un fin legítimo…» (Corte IDH. Caso Mujeres Víctimas de Tortura Sexual en Atenco Vs. México. Sentencia de 28 de noviembre de 2018; se suplen los destacados). Parte de las restricciones legales están dadas por la posibilidad de allanar los domicilios y recintos privados (artículos 193 a 197 del Código Procesal Penal) pero, en este asunto, no hubo ninguna orden jurisdiccional de allanamiento ni tampoco se estaba en presencia de las excepciones para practicarlo sin orden (no había amenaza a la vida o la propiedad de los asistentes mediante incendio, inundación o conmoción semejante; no se vio a personas extrañas ingresar con indicios manifiestos de cometer ilícitos, no había nadie perseguido por delito grave que entrara al sitio ni hubo voces dentro del lugar pidiendo auxilio). En consecuencia, las personas asistentes ejercían un derecho constitucional y convencional de reunión, marco en el cual también se potenciaban otros derechos como el de intimidad que también está desarrollado por la ley en el Código Civil (artículo 47: “La fotografía o la imagen de una persona no puede ser publicada, reproducida, expuesta ni vendida en forma alguna si no es con su consentimiento, a menos que la reproducción esté justificada por la notoriedad de aquella, la función pública que desempeñe, las necesidades de justicia o de policía, o cuando tal reproducción se relacione con hechos, acontecimientos o ceremonias de interés público o que tengan lugar en público. Las imágenes y fotografías con roles estereotipados que refuercen actitudes discriminantes hacia sectores sociales no pueden ser publicadas, reproducidas, expuestas ni vendidas en forma alguna”; destacados agregados) y en la Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones, numerales 1 y 9, los cuales requieren intervención judicial para su afectación, nada de lo cual se dio en el presente caso. Inclusive, tan es de resguardo superior el derecho a la intimidad y a la expresión de manifestaciones en espacios privados que, como bien argumentó la jueza de mérito, la transgresión de esas disposiciones está sancionada como delito en el numeral 198 del Código Penal que señala: «Captación indebida de manifestaciones verbales. Artículo 198.-Será reprimido, con prisión de uno a tres años, quien grabe sin su consentimiento, las palabras de otro u otros, no destinadas al público o que, mediante procedimientos técnicos, escuche manifestaciones privadas que no le estén dirigidas, excepto lo previsto en la Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones. La misma pena se impondrá a quien instale aparatos, instrumentos, o sus partes, con el fin de interceptar o impedir las comunicaciones orales o escritas, logren o no su propósito» (las negritas son sustituidas). Ese delito, aunque es de acción pública y podía denunciarlo cualquiera y no necesariamente la persona afectada (artículos 16 a 18 del Código Procesal Penal), de haberse judicializado antes, ya a esta fecha estaría prescrito salvo que existiera alguna causa de suspensión (la reunión habría sucedido el 09 de setiembre de 2019 y el máximo de la pena son tres años, de donde en situaciones comunes habría fenecido la acción el 09 de setiembre de 2022). Empero, eso no obsta para considerar que, al penalizarse la conducta, la captación en esas circunstancias del material para otros fines es ilícito. Todo ese razonamiento ha encontrado respaldo en la misma jurisprudencia (vinculante erga omnes según el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) de la Sala Constitucional. Por ejemplo, en la sentencia número 1026-94 se indicó que: "El numeral 24 de la Constitución Política consagra el derecho fundamental a la intimidad. Se trata de un fuero de protección a la vida privada de los ciudadanos. La intimidad está formada por aquellos fenómenos, comportamientos, datos y situaciones de una persona que normalmente están sustraídos al conocimiento de extraños y cuyo conocimiento por éstos puede turbarla moralmente por afectar su pudor y su recato, a menos que esa misma persona asienta a ese conocimiento. Si bien, no puede menos que reputarse que lo que suceda dentro del hogar del ciudadano es vida privada, también puede ser que lo que suceda en oficinas, hogares de amigos y otros recintos privados, esté en ese ámbito. De esta manera los derechos constitucionales de inviolabilidad del domicilio, de los documentos privados y de las comunicaciones existen para proteger dicha intimidad, que es un derecho esencial de todo individuo…" (se agregan las negrillas) y también en la número 6776-94, donde el tribunal constitucional indicó lo siguiente: “El derecho a la intimidad tiene un contenido positivo que se manifiesta de múltiples formas, como por ejemplo: el derecho a la imagen, al domicilio y a la correspondencia. Para la Sala el derecho a la vida privada se puede definir como la esfera en la cual nadie puede inmiscuirse. La libertad de la vida privada es el reconocimiento de una zona de actividad que es propia de cada uno y el derecho a la intimidad limita la intervención de otras personas o de los poderes públicos en la vida privada de la persona; esta limitación puede manifestarse tanto en la observación y captación de la imagen y documentos en general, como en las escuchas o grabaciones de las conversaciones privadas y en la difusión o divulgación posterior de lo captado u obtenido sin el consentimiento de la persona afectada…” (el destacado se suple). Si, a pesar de todo lo anterior, alguien captó la voz y la imagen del encartado en una reunión privada, sin su consentimiento y sin que se den las excepciones legales, y luego de hacerlo las difundió, la única conclusión a la que podía llegarse (si es que de razonamiento jurídico hablamos) es que el material aportado resultaba ilícito, al tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 181 del Código Procesal Penal, párrafo segundo, que dispone: “No podrá utilizarse información obtenida mediante (…) engaño, indebida intromisión en la intimidad del domicilio, de la correspondencia, las comunicaciones (…) ni información obtenida por otro medio que menoscabe la voluntad o viole derechos fundamentales de las personas” (se agregan los destacados). Si el video era ilícito, como en efecto lo ha sido (desde que se captó en una reunión privada y el encartado no autorizó la difusión de su imagen y voz), no podía analizarse lo que, respecto de su contenido dijeron Navas y Hernández o cualquier otro testigo, pues se está ante la teoría de los frutos del árbol envenenado que afecta también esas referencias. Recuérdese que, conforme a dicha posición teórica, son nulas no solo las referencias probatorias derivadas directamente de la violación de derechos fundamentales (como sería, en este supuesto, la grabación del video) sino todas aquellas indirectas (como la referencia de testigos a lo contenido en el video), salvo que haya una fuente independiente o un hallazgo inevitable (entre otras excepciones, solo estas son las aceptadas en nuestro ordenamiento) nada de lo cual ni siquiera se ha discutido y, mucho menos, tuvo respaldo probatorio. Caso contrario sería muy fácil violentar los derechos fundamentales de las personas, desechar el documento o evidencia principal y darle validez a los testimonios que hayan examinado su contenido ilícito, práctica sin duda alguna nociva en un Estado de Derecho. Por otra parte, aunque el material audiovisual fuese lícito —que ya se dijo que no lo es y a esto se alude solo a modo analítico-hipotético—, tampoco se aportó el documento original pues la policía no lo pudo decomisar y los entregados tienen cortes evidentes y fechas distintas a aquella en que se dieron los hechos, los que son indicios de su manipulación. Ha de recordarse que la cadena de custodia alude al proceso mediante el cual se garantiza que un determinado elemento material decomisado en el escenario donde aconteció el hecho sea el mismo que es valorado pericialmente o que llega al juicio, lo cual tiene como fin el garantizar la pureza y el eventual valor probatorio, directo o indiciario, que pueda tener. Este instituto también aplica a la evidencia digital y videográfica caracterizada por su volatilidad y facilidad de maniobra, de allí la necesidad de preservar que haya identidad entre lo decomisado y exhibido en debate y que esto no se haya modificado. Los pasos que comprende la cadena de custodia y que requieren resguardarse han sido abordados tanto por la jurisprudencia constitucional (vinculante al tenor del artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) como por la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos (también vinculante por así disponerse en el numeral 62 de la CADH y por referencias de la misma Corte IDH, entre otras, en el voto Almonacid Arellano y otros Vs. Chile, sentencia del 26 de septiembre de 2006). En el primer supuesto, en la sentencia número 5831-96, se indicó que: "II. El respeto a la cadena de custodia en la recolección de la prueba puede analizarse desde dos dimensiones diferentes. Desde el punto de vista estrictamente probatorio, la prueba tendrá mayor eficacia si se comprueba realmente que ha sido manipulada en forma correcta desde su descubrimiento en la escena del delito o en el sitio en el que haya sido encontrada hasta su introducción efectiva al proceso. El descubrimiento, el levantamiento, la fijación, la recolección, el traslado y la custodia de las evidencias o elementos materiales que sirvan como prueba del hecho delictivo, requieren de una especial capacidad técnica, por lo que a menudo se encomiendan a personal calificado de la policía judicial, con el objeto de no alterar ni contaminar con factores externos la evidencia, y si es del caso, mantener su pureza a los fines de un análisis más profundo, sea químico, físico o de cualquier naturaleza. Esta operación generalmente se respalda de múltiples maneras: mediante fotografías de acercamiento, identificación y ubicación general de los objetos, videos, actas y el respectivo embalaje o aseguramiento de los mismos. Cualquier defecto u omisión en este procedimiento, debilita eventualmente la pureza del elemento probatorio recopilado, incluso en lo que respecta a su correcta ubicación en la escena o a la forma en que el mismo se vincule con la responsabilidad penal del imputado. A su vez, la cadena de custodia puede referirse a aspectos atinentes en exclusiva a la legalidad de la prueba, es decir, si fue recopilada por sujetos con competencia para ello, si se cumplieron las formalidades procesales previstas para ello -existencia de resolución fundada de juez, por ejemplo, en los casos de allanamientos; confección del acta respectiva con la asistencia de testigos instrumentales, etc.-, si existen las respectivas razones de recibido en las distintas dependencias en que la prueba o evidencia material ha sido trasladada, con indicación de la hora, naturaleza, peso y cantidad de los objetos, de modo tal que pueda seguirse -procesalmente hablando- el rastro legal de la prueba para ser válidamente incorporada al proceso. III. La primera de las dimensiones señalada de la cadena de custodia, se refiere a la valoración de la prueba. La apreciación del respeto a las normas mínimas de seguridad en la recolección de la prueba, es parte integrante de las reglas de la sana crítica, y por ello su inobservancia o errónea apreciación, lesiona el debido proceso. En cuanto a la legalidad de la producción e introducción de esa prueba al proceso, se afecta el debido proceso, desde que todo imputado tiene derecho a ser juzgado con fundamento en prueba legalmente válida. Corresponderá a la Sala consultante determinar si en el caso concreto, los defectos de la cadena de custodia en las dos esferas señaladas se dieron, y su incidencia en la sentencia impugnada por el recurrente." (Se agregan las negrillas). Asimismo, en el voto número 6469-99 de dicha sala se agregó: "(…) la relevancia de los vicios en la cadena de custodia depende absolutamente de la que tenga el elemento probatorio de la que ella forma parte, de manera que sólo (sic) se constituirá en infracción al derecho al debido proceso, cuando haya ocurrido dentro del procedimiento para la producción de elementos probatorios esenciales para la demostración del hecho atribuido, en el sentido de que la ausencia de esa prueba torne imposible la atribución del hecho al imputado. Corresponde entonces a la Sala consultante establecer si existen las condiciones recién expuestas en el caso concreto, pues si así fuera y realmente se hubiera violado la cadena de custodia de la evidencia, se habría violado el debido proceso en el caso base de la consulta que se evacua." (Los destacados son agregados). Por último, la Corte IDH ha indicado: “193. Además, la debida diligencia en una investigación (…) exige el mantenimiento de la cadena de custodia de todo elemento de prueba forense. Ello consiste en llevar un registro escrito preciso, complementado, según corresponda, por fotografías y demás elementos gráficos para documentar la historia del elemento de prueba a medida que pasa por las manos de diversos investigadores encargados del caso.” Caso Veliz Franco y otros vs. Guatemala. Sentencia del 19 de mayo de 2014 (el destacado se agrega). Entonces, es claro que el respeto a la cadena de custodia forma parte de un debido proceso legal y su violación tiene consecuencias sobre la validez del elemento probatorio y su posibilidad de valoración. Si en este caso no es posible determinar si el video aportado se cortó, editó o de diversa forma se manipuló (pues no se pudo decomisar el original) y hay indicios de que sí lo fue (un corte burdo y una fecha que no corresponde a los hechos en la base del archivo) mal podría valorarse dicho material, máxime que, como se dijo, tampoco en la captación hubo licitud. No competía al encartado (o al sindicato que este representa) aducir la ilicitud de ese material ni nadie debía hacerlo para que la legalidad de las probanzas esta fuera analizada, pues la carga probatoria la tienen los querellantes y tanto el ente fiscal como el tribunal deben velar porque la prueba recibida y que sea soporte de una decisión sea lícita (artículos 63, 175, 180 y 181 párrafo segundo del Código Procesal Penal) de donde extraña que el Ministerio Público haya dejado de lado su deber de objetividad. Nótese que el último artículo es imperativo: “No podrá utilizarse información obtenida mediante (…) engaño, indebida intromisión en la intimidad del domicilio, de la correspondencia, las comunicaciones (…) ni información obtenida por otro medio que menoscabe la voluntad o viole derechos fundamentales de las personas” (se agregan los destacados). La disposición es clara en que no es necesaria denuncia alguna (como argumenta el fiscal) ni se requiere que eso se alegue para declararse. Por ello, al no presentarse el documento original o bien uno pericial que permitiera verificar la no alteración de la cinta entregada, no procedía su ponderación, máxime por la forma de obtención ya indicada. Véase que, sin perjuicio de lo que se ahondará en el siguiente acápite sobre la publicidad como elemento del tipo penal, aquí el sitio público o privado es relevante para determinar no solo el elemento del tipo sino la licitud o de la captación y del material probatorio (aspecto que todos los apelantes pasan por alto) y al tratarse la reunión de una celebrada en lugares privados, en donde no estaba habilitada tal autorización (de ingreso de público o grabación por medios), la prueba deviene en ilícita pues la garantía constitucional es la protección de los espacios privados y de las reuniones y expresiones que allí se den. Tampoco es cierto que en el debate se incorporara algún elemento del que pueda desprenderse que hubo un aval, consentimiento o aceptación del imputado respecto a la elaboración o uso de dicha grabación o del que se desprenda que él reconociera haber efectuado las manifestaciones, pues él rechazó los cargos y, en lo extenso de sus manifestaciones (tanto en juicio como en la audiencia oral en esta sede) aludió al contexto sociopolítico imperante en el país y a las luchas sindicales (ver folios 472 vuelto a 475). Ninguno de los tres acusadores específica cuál es esa prueba de la que esa manifestación derivaría y esa omisión se explica en que no se incorporó ninguno pues, si lo hubo, no se ofreció ni admitido y, conforme al aforismo jurídico, lo que no está en el proceso no está en el mundo. Por ello, mal podría aludir una sentencia a prueba no aceptada, aunque existiera (de lo que también hay dudas). Pero es que, si aún se aceptara, nuevamente en forma hipotética para efectos analíticos, que los videos aportados fuesen lícitos y admisibles y que en ellos no se violentó la cadena de custodia, aún así tampoco sería posible derivar de ellos, probatoriamente, que el encartado expresara manifestaciones con las cuales adaptara su conducta a las previsiones típicas del ilícito de instigación pública. Del documento audiovisual aportado (ya se dijo que lo fue en forma ilegal, pero mencionado aquí de forma hipotética y subsidiaria) según la sentencia de instancia (lo que no es controvertido por los recurrentes) solo se escucha al encartado decir “creo que la tesis de paro nacional es correcta, hay que proponer un gran paro nacional, pero de verdad, no de pasarela, cerrar las fronteras, cerrar la 27, cerrar la 32, cerrar Ochomogo..." y el video queda cortado. Entonces, se desconoce si [Nombre 001] está proponiendo esa posición o bien, por ejemplo y sin que esta sea la única posibilidad, si él se está refiriendo a lo que alguien dijo, sea para luego refutarlo o para analizarlo. Nada de eso se puede colegir por el corte abrupto de la grabación, edición que permite desprender el objetivo de quien lo graba (ilícitamente recuérdese) de que las personas receptoras del mensaje desconocieran el contexto comunicativo. No en vano en lingüística y comunicación (y, por ende, en periodismo) se hace énfasis en la necesidad de conocer los contextos comunicativos (históricos, cultural y sociales; lingüísticos, situacionales) para darle sentido al texto pues este suele ser un pretexto para las variaciones de sentido de la literalidad (Cfr. Johnson Barella, Doris, 2005. La literalidad en el uso de las citas directas en las noticias de la prensa regional navarra. Dos casos: Diario de Noticias y Diario de Navarra. En: Revista Comunicación y sociedad, volumen XVIII, No. 2, págs 109-140 y López Pan, Fernando. ¿Realmente ha dicho eso? Algunas implicaciones éticas en el uso de citas directas en los textos periodísticos. En https://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/35259/1/%C2%BFRealmente%20ha%20dicho%20eso%20Algunas%20implicaciones%20%C3%A9ticas%20en%20el%20uso%20de%20las%20citas%20directas%20en%20los%20textos%20period%C3%ADsticos.pdf). El último autor advierte: “Las investigaciones lingüísticas, especialmente las relacionadas con el análisis del discurso, muestran cómo toda cita —también la literal— supone una ficción de los contextos, una intervención en la que el que cita controla lo citado y lo utiliza dentro de su propia estrategia discursiva. Y no se alude a manipulaciones descaradas en las que se hace decir a alguien algo que no dijo o se traicionan intencionalmente sus frases” (pág. 108). Específicamente respecto al contexto situacional es necesario conocer el conjunto de datos accesibles a los participantes de una conversación que se extraen del entorno físico inmediato. Nada de esto se logra con la captación de una grabación de escasos segundos, cortada en su inicio y en su fin. Entonces, ni siquiera partiendo hipotéticamente de que todo fue legal (la captación, las grabaciones, la custodia, etc.) se puede concluir que, de ese extracto así tomado, el acusado esté determinando a otros a cometer un delito y como los testigos de cargo, Navas y Hernández, se limitaron a reproducir lo que escucharon en medios de comunicación (que, en principio según se infiere de sus deposiciones, ya tenía el corte efectuado), tampoco sus declaraciones aportan nada para sustentar la comisión delictiva que se acusa. No es que la decisión pretenda basarse en prueba tasada, como dice el fiscal, sino que lo hace en prueba lícita, como es la obligación de todo tribunal, carácter que no tiene toda la aportada. La querellante Navas ha insistido en que se analice la afectación que ella y el testigo Hernández Valle manifestaron haber sentido por los hechos, tanto como la expresada por otras personas que denunciaron y querellaron y le dieron poder a ella para accionar (aunque no declararon en debate). Sin embargo, tal cosa resulta irrelevante porque, aunque se asumiera hipotéticamente (solo para efectos analíticos) que se dio dicha afectación y que la misma fuera de gran envergadura, ello no subsana el que no se hubiese demostrado que fuera el encartado quien cometiera el hecho desde que la prueba que lo señala o es ilícita (por su forma de captación y por la no fidedignidad de lo reproducido) o no permite hacer esa imputación en forma confiable o verosímil, como se ha referido con antelación. Por último, aunque las partes aludieron a otros movimientos huelguísticos previos y a los efectos que, en su criterio, estos generaron como modus operandi, no aportaron ningún material probatorio al respecto, de donde las suyas son simples manifestaciones sin valor probatorio. Por todo lo expuesto, estas quejas deben rechazarse.

III.- Por su parte, la licenciada Margot Avellán Ruiz, procuradora en representación del Estado, en su recurso, inició exponiendo, como antecedentes, los hechos en que sustentó la acción civil resarcitoria y un resumen de lo decidido en la sentencia recurrida. Luego de ello estipula, como primer motivo de queja, la falta de fundamentación de lo resuelto por inobservancia de las reglas de la sana crítica con respecto a medios o elementos probatorios de valor decisivo y la falta de aplicación de la ley sustantiva, en particular de los artículos 280, 263 y 263 bis del Código Penal. Dice que se absolvió al encartado por considerar que los hechos son atípicos y que no hay prueba de que él cometiera una instigación pública. Copia el contenido del artículo y referencias doctrinales del autor Carlos Creus (Derecho Penal, parte especial, 1997, pág. 105) y afirma que, partiendo de tal autor, no existe limitación en cuanto a los delitos que se pueden tener por instigados, siempre que, para su configuración, ostenten esa condición, sea de delitos, aun cuando no estén contenidos en el cuerpo represivo principal propiamente. Añade que, para establecer una restricción en cuanto a los tipos penales a considerar, esta debe estar contenida en la norma, y de no existir, procede la aplicación alternativa de todos los tipos penales existentes en la normativa penal en general. Considera que otro componente del citado tipo penal tiene relación con sus consecuencias, pues el ilícito se configura ‘sin que sea necesario que el hecho se produzca’ por lo que se está en presencia de un delito de peligro, es decir, aquellos en los que quien legisla ha tomado en cuenta, para definir el tipo penal, la probabilidad de que el bien jurídico tutelado pueda sufrir daño derivado de la conducta llevada a cabo por el autor, sin que sea necesario prueba o confirmación de su existencia. Cita el voto del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de San José (R. Badilla, E. Montero y G. Mena), número 2016-0235 y añade que, conforme al autor argentino supra referido (págs. 106-107), se trata de un delito de actividad simple, que requiere, al menos, que haya un instigado, aunque, si el medio es idóneo, puede haber tentativa, sin que sea requisito la trascendencia o posibilidad de esta a una pluralidad indeterminada de personas. Por ello, añade la apelante, no es necesario que el delito se haya suscitado, sino simplemente que se dé la exposición al riesgo del bien jurídico: se configura el tipo con la sola incitación. Alude al aspecto subjetivo del delito y a que Creus sostiene (en la obra citada, página 106) que se requiere algo más que la simple voluntad de instigar, pues debe darse la voluntad de que el hecho instigado se realice efectivamente. De allí, concluye, se deriva el conocimiento de que lo instigado es un delito y quedan excluidas manifestaciones accidentales o indeterminadas. Dice que el tribunal de juicio, en un intento insostenible por absolver al encartado, desgrana la norma como si el contenido acogiera los mismos elementos que subsisten en disposiciones similares de otras legislaciones latinoamericanas, transcribiendo tipos de Colombia y Argentina y la doctrina que los soporta, según la cual es requisito la publicidad, por lo que no es posible una instigación en recinto privado. Afirma la recurrente que si se observa la transcripción realizada en la sentencia de las normas extranjeras se evidencia que textualmente introducen, como parte del tipo, que la instigación sea "pública" o realizada "públicamente"; indicación que si bien está descrita en el epígrafe del numeral nacional, no está contenida específicamente dentro del tipo y no puede ser suplida por interpretación, ya que sería una evidente e improcedente suplantación de la labor legislativa, para lo cual no está legitimado un tribunal. Por otra parte, afirma que tampoco se indica, en el contenido prohibitivo, que el delito instigado deba estar ubicado en el Título X del Código Penal, como lo sostuvo la sentencia, sino simplemente que la conducta incitada sea delito y que perturbe la tranquilidad pública. Por ello, concluye, la interpretación del tribunal decisor excede lo permitido por el tipo, transgrediendo su labor y afectando la que le compete a la Asamblea Legislativa. Sostiene que lo que se busca con el delito es proteger el derecho de la ciudadanía al orden y a la tranquilidad colectiva, sin importar el medio, ya que tampoco el artículo lo dispone, por lo que basta con que este sea idóneo para transmitir el mensaje a, por lo menos, una persona que se desee instigar, sin ser indispensable la ejecución efectiva de los ilícitos instigados sino solo la exposición a peligro del bien jurídico protegido. A la luz de todo lo expuesto considera que los hechos demostrados configuran el delito de instigación pública contenido en el numeral 280 del Código Penal, ya que se confirmó que [Nombre 001], en su carácter de Secretario de la ANEP y encontrándose el día 9 de setiembre de 2019 en una reunión del “Movimiento de Encuentro Social Multisectorial” instigó públicamente, mediante manifestaciones verbales, a las personas presentes (en su mayoría integrantes de sindicatos) a realizar acciones ilegales que incluían el cierre de vías (carretera N° 27 entre San José y Caldera, N° 32 entre San José y Limón y ruta 2 sobre el Alto de Ochomogo en Cartago, lugar donde se encuentra un plantel de Recope que suministra combustible a todo el país) y que eso lo hizo con pleno conocimiento de que dichas acciones delictivas podrían generar el entorpecimiento de servicios públicos y obstrucción de la vías públicas, conductas tipificadas como delitos según los artículos 263 y 263 bis del Código Penal vigente, perturbándose así la tranquilidad pública, todo lo cual tenía el propósito de obligar al Gobierno a acceder a las demandas sindicales. Dice que, en el debate, como prueba de lo anterior, se reprodujo un video captado mientras el imputado realizaba esas manifestaciones, el cual fue conocido por la colectividad a través de medios noticiosos y así, sin necesidad de mayor prueba como lo pretende el tribunal, puede considerarse que el imputado cometió el delito. Afirma que, con independencia de la forma en que se captó la incitación, se trató de un medio idóneo, en forma presencial, ante un grupo de personas dispuestas a escucharlo. Señala que el encartado no negó su participación en los hechos ni se retractó de las palabras conferidas en la reunión grabada pues, en entrevistas realizadas a él por medios televisivos, no solo tuvo una actitud confesa y jactanciosa al respecto, sino que jamás rechazó que las hubiera emitido ni manifestó que dicha grabación se haya hecho en transgresión alguna de sus derechos. Dice que ni la más mínima molestia se evidenció, por parte del encartado, por la publicación del video en los noticieros, lo que persiste hoy en día, actitud con la que ratifica y corrobora —sigue diciendo la procuradora apelante— los hechos querellados. Agrega que ninguno de los temas referentes a la publicidad del video o a la violación a la privacidad del encartado fue expuesto, objeto de controversia o cuestionamiento por parte los defensores del encartado, por lo que el material es legítimo y así se subsanaría cualquier argumento en cuanto a su improcedencia. Tampoco se ha cuestionado su veracidad por lo que no es procedente aludir a la "autenticidad del video” (como lo hace la sentencia) si no se ha refutado que la persona que se observa en él o las palabras que se escuchan no hayan sido emitidas por [Nombre 001]. Dice que no hay forma de acusar falsedad, ya que con solo su revisión visual —sin experticia alguna en el tema— es notorio que el sujeto filmado es el encartado y no se percibe un ápice de distorsión en la grabación que permita señalar que existió manipulación de las imágenes observadas, circunstancias estas que confirman la veracidad de lo captado. Tampoco esa imagen del encartado ha sido desmentida, atacada o rechazada por la defensa ni por los testigos de descargo, quienes, por el contrario, aceptan que se trata del dirigente sindical aquí acusado. Sostiene que es irrelevante determinar la forma en que se obtuvo el video (como lo sostiene la sentencia) pues la publicidad de este no forma parte del tipo. Añade que, de lo contrario “…todos aquellos que hagan graves incitaciones a cometer delitos, lo puedan realizar impunemente si ocurre dentro de un recinto privado.” Alude al numeral 47 del Código Civil para establecer que, si bien allí se establece la prohibición de reproducir imágenes sin consentimiento, son excepciones a ello la notoriedad de la persona, la función pública que desempeñe, las necesidades de justicia o de policía a propósito de una investigación, y que la grabación se relacione con hechos, acontecimientos o ceremonias de interés público o que tengan lugar en público. Menciona y transcribe parcialmente votos como los de la Sala Constitucional número 2014-11715 y 2004-11154 sobre los límites al derecho a la imagen y dice que a esos hay que agregar los derechos de terceros, la libertad de expresión y el interés público de una noticia o información, así dispuestos en los artículos 28 y 29 de nuestra Constitución Política. Concluye que, bajo esos parámetros, la validez de la captación de la imagen y la voz del imputado hecha mediante video, encuentra sólido fundamento normativo que descarta cualquier noción de ilegalidad pues [Nombre 001] ha sido considerado líder del movimiento sindical de Costa Rica durante décadas, ha intervenido proactivamente en huelgas y paros en forma continua y pública, por lo que su notoriedad y trascendencia a nivel nacional es indiscutible. Además, se encontraba participando en un acto de interés público, dadas sus implicaciones a nivel social, político y laboral (no era un evento de carácter familiar o personal sino marcadamente sindical, según lo admiten los propios testigos de descargo); y finalmente, quien realizó la grabación se encontraba amparado bajo el precepto constitucional de la libertad de expresión que tiene todo ciudadano con respecto a temas de relevancia nacional, como era esa reunión. Califica de “absolutamente auténtico, legítimo y válido para los efectos probatorios” el video y de este se extrae, sigue diciendo, la incitación del encartado hacia un grupo de personas sindicalistas para realizar cierre de vías incluyendo la aledaña al plantel de la Refinería Costarricense de Petróleo, del que se distribuye el combustible a casi todo el territorio y cuyo obstáculo implicarla la paralización del país, incluyendo los servicios públicos. Dice que como se acusan hechos y no calificaciones “…debió el Tribunal analizar (…) si correspondía la configuración de la conducta demostrada en el tipo penal o cualquier otro que si estimase procedente; ejercicio que de haberse realizado no hubiese desencadenado en la absolutoria que hoy se impugna” (folio 511 vuelto) Adicional al video, narra que se contó con el dicho de Rubén Hernández Valle y Gloria Navas Montero (representante de un grupo de personas que interpusieron denuncia y querella en esta causa) quienes pusieron en evidencia no solo la publicidad del video sino los sentimientos de temor e impotencia que embargaban a la ciudadanía desde que se publicó lo manifestado por el encartado [Nombre 001], pues proyectaron un nuevo quebranto de la tranquilidad pública y la generación de consecuencias como las que afectaron a Costa Rica con el movimiento de huelga ocurrido en el 2018, sumiendo en incerteza a la población costarricense y generando un daño social en perjuicio de la colectividad. Insiste en que el tipo penal, tal y como está, y la prueba recibida, permitían la condena. Reitera algunas manifestaciones previas y considera que no es viable señalar, como lo hizo el tribunal, que lo manifestado responde al uso del derecho constitucional a la libre expresión y que el delito existe aun cuando no se ejecutaran las acciones que se dijeron que iban a hacerse. Pide que se declare y “se revoque” la sentencia, ordenando el reenvío para una nueva. En un segundo apartado del recurso de la parte querellante representada por la licenciada Navas se hace referencia a la tipicidad del hecho como fundamento de la absolutoria y se pide su anulación por cuanto el tipo penal fue erradamente interpretado a pesar de que se reconoce que es un delito de peligro. Insiste en que, aunque el video "original'' no fue decomisado, lo transmitido por los medios de información colectiva constituyó un hecho público basado precisamente en ese video, de donde era posible concluir que el hecho se dio. La entrevista a la apelante, efectuada por Repretel, se dio precisamente a causa de ese video que se había hecho público y el acusado compareció al día siguiente y admitió su dicho, de modo que el tema de quién lo grabó no eliminaba la comisión del hecho. Lo informado y conocido por la opinión pública —sigue apuntando— daba credibilidad a la existencia del hecho y la legitimidad de lo transmitido y divulgado. El evento fue conocido con las amenazas incluidas, de aquí que el razonamiento conclusivo haya incurrido en vicio de ilogicidad. En cuanto al fondo, califica de errada la interpretación del numeral 280 del Código Penal cuando sostiene como excluidos de integrar ese tipo a los delitos de entorpecimiento de servicios públicos y la obstrucción eventual de vías, los que se mencionaron como la posibilidad de resultados que podrían adicionarse a los hechos, sin afectar la tipicidad del delito principal. Considera que los eventos que afectan la tranquilidad pública no son exclusivamente las otras figuras delictivas que contiene el Título X del Código Penal. La instigación pública es uno de ellos e independiente de los demás. No está vinculado necesariamente con los otros. Pide la nulidad de lo resuelto. Al contestar los recursos, por escrito, los defensores del encartado pidieron el rechazo de la impugnación. Reiteran las críticas esbozadas contra el Ministerio Público sobre el uso de recursos públicos y afirman que no se logra revertir “el desechamiento del video o de las copias” que se hizo en sentencia. En la audiencia oral celebrada el licenciado Carlos Meléndez, fiscal del Ministerio Público dice que es un error considerar que el ilícito en comentario debe estar en el título de delitos contra la tranquilidad en vez de simplemente afectar la tranquilidad pública. Menciona el voto número 495-2003 de la Sala Tercera en donde no se especifican tipos de delitos que deban ser instigados para que este tipo se configure ni se impide su aplicación al entorpecimiento de servicios u obstrucción de vías. La licenciada Margot Avellán, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, afirmó que se está ante un delito completo, aunque se completa por otros y argumenta que, en Argentina y Colombia la instigación pública debe ser realizada de ese modo, en lugares públicos, pero en Costa Rica no, sino que esa referencia (“instigación pública”) alude al concepto de paz social o equilibrio de la ciudadanía, afectados con el ilícito y no al modo de comisión. Añade que aquí no se trató de simples manifestaciones, sino de promesas y que el encartado no ha descartado que el video fuera falso, inclusive en un canal admitió que sí existía. Los alegatos son conexos, por lo que se conocerán en conjunto y deben rechazarse. Nuevamente los recurrentes mezclan aspectos procesales y de fondo. En lo correspondiente a los temas probatorios (de licitud y valoración) y motivación de la sentencia, deben estarse a lo indicado en el considerando precedente a fin de evitar reiteraciones innecesarias. Es decir, ya se explicó por qué la obtención del video era ilícita (reunión privada, grabación no autorizada por el encartado; no garantía de cadena de custodia e inobservancia del contexto); por qué lo eran, también, las referencias testimoniales a este (teoría de los frutos del árbol envenenado que se extiende no solo a la fuente primaria sino a las derivadas de esta como las citadas declaraciones de personas quienes solo refieren lo que vieron en tal cinta) y por qué la sentencia estaba bien motivada (al exigir licitud probatoria, impedir la inversión de la carga probatoria y requerir prueba y no simples manifestaciones para derivar afirmaciones a introducir en un debate). Sobre tales aspectos no se profundizará ahora, sino que baste agregar, a lo ya referido, que no se dan las excepciones contempladas en el numeral 47 del Código Civil (“La fotografía o la imagen de una persona no puede ser publicada, reproducida, expuesta ni vendida en forma alguna si no es con su consentimiento, a menos que la reproducción esté justificada por la notoriedad de aquella, la función pública que desempeñe, las necesidades de justicia o de policía, o cuando tal reproducción se relacione con hechos, acontecimientos o ceremonias de interés público o que tengan lugar en público. Las imágenes y fotografías con roles estereotipados que refuercen actitudes discriminantes hacia sectores sociales no pueden ser publicadas, reproducidas, expuestas ni vendidas en forma alguna”; destacados agregados). Es claro (pues así deriva de la falta de prueba en este asunto) que [Nombre 001] no es funcionario público ni había necesidades de justicia o policía previas al evento de la captación de su voz e imagen en esa reunión, por lo que la única alusión, de las excepciones de la norma, que calzaría con él es el ser notorio pues, en tanto dirigente sindical del país por varias décadas, es una persona muy conocida o fácilmente percibida o notada, que son las acepciones de esa palabra. Sin embargo, la señora procuradora realiza una lectura errónea del artículo. Primero recuérdese que son excepciones a un derecho constitucional y humano, es decir, de mayor rango y, como tales, deben interpretarse restrictivamente: «…de ninguna manera podrían invocarse el “orden público” o el “bien común” como medios para suprimir un derecho garantizado en la Convención o para desnaturalizarlo o privarlo de contenido real (ver el art. 29 de la Convención). Esos conceptos, en cuanto se invoquen como fundamento de limitaciones a los derechos humanos, deben ser objeto de una interpretación ceñida a las “justas exigencias” de “una sociedad democrática” que tenga en cuenta el equilibrio entre los distintos intereses en juego y la necesidad de preservar el objeto y fin de la Convención» [Cfr. Corte IDH. La colegiación obligatoria de periodistas (arts. 13 y 19 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión consultiva OC-5/85 del 13 de noviembre de 1985, párr. 67]. Aunque el acusado es una figura notoria, el numeral citado exige que la reproducción no sea solo en función del tipo de persona (lo ya dicho) sino también en atención al evento y por eso agrega: “…cuando tal reproducción se relacione con hechos, acontecimientos o ceremonias de interés público o que tengan lugar en público.” Ya se dijo atrás que los hechos no se dieron en un lugar público (o al menos no se probó de esa manera) y estaban cubiertos por otros derechos constitucionales y convencionales (de reunión, de expresión), con lo que queda descartada la frase final y, al ser una cita privada, su contenido no podía ser accedido para verificar si se relacionaba con hechos o acontecimientos de interés público, pues ello hubiera sido una invasión al núcleo duro del derecho constitucional. Ese ligamen solo podía hacerse cuando se dieran (si es que se daban) actos públicos, lo que no sucedió. Por supuesto que todo ello, como dice la procuradora, había que ligarlo a otros derechos constitucionales y convencionales como la libertad de expresión (pero también con la libertad de sindicalización y el derecho de huelga estipulados en el artículo 8 del Protocolo adicional a la CADH en materia de derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, conocido como Protocolo de San Salvador ratificado por Costa Rica mediante ley No. 7907 del 03 de setiembre de 1999), pero no solo la de terceros sino de las mismas personas intervinientes en la reunión, incluyendo el encartado, lo que la apelante curiosamente pasa por alto. Entender, como preocupantemente lo hace la señora representante del órgano jurídico del Estado, que el aparato público puede invadir la esfera de privacidad de las personas en función de lo que estas manifiesten allí sería arrasar todos los derechos humanos y las conquistas históricas para contener el poder y propiciar un estado fascista que, según sea lo que se haga o diga en los espacios privados, puede irrespetar cualquier límite, lo que no es admisible. Nuevamente recuérdese que la libertad de reunión forma parte de un abanico de derechos interrelacionados para el pleno goce y disfrute de derechos civiles y políticos que, en el caso particular, tocan también con derechos sociales como la libertad de sindicalización. En este sentido se apunta: «…dado que tanto la Corte como la Comisión Interamericanas han apelado en diversas ocasiones a las decisiones proferidas por otros órganos de supervisión del cumplimiento de los tratados internacionales de derechos humanos para interpretar el contenido de los derechos protegidos por la Convención, creemos importante hacer en esta ocasión una sucinta referencia a algunos de los estándares que, respecto al derecho de reunión, ha ido conformando la doctrina elaborada al respecto por la OIT. Destacando al respecto que, aunque la normativa de la OIT referida a la libertad sindical no hace referencia expresa al derecho a la libertad de reunión en ninguno de sus convenios relativos a la libertad sindical, sus órganos de control se han encargado de generar un amplio desarrollo de la doctrina relativa al ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de reunión en el ámbito laboral, asumiéndola como un elemento intrínseco de la libertad sindical. En el sentido señalado, por ejemplo, la Comisión de Expertos en Aplicación de Convenios y Recomendaciones (CEACR) de la OIT ha puesto de relieve que “la libertad de reunión constituye uno de los elementos esenciales de los derechos sindicales”. Así como su Comité de Libertad Sindical ha agregado que el derecho de las organizaciones profesionales a celebrar reuniones en sus locales para examinar cuestiones profesionales, sin autorización previa y sin injerencia de las autoridades constituye un elemento fundamental de la libertad de asociación y las autoridades públicas deberían abstenerse de toda intervención que pueda limitar este derecho u obstaculizar su ejercicio legal, salvo que tal ejercicio altere el orden público o ponga en peligro grave e inminente el mantenimiento del mismo. El Comité de Libertad Sindical ha señalado que la libertad de reunión constituye “una condición fundamental para el ejercicio de los derechos sindicales”, por lo que los gobiernos “deberían abstenerse de toda intervención equivalente a un requisito de autorización previa, que limite el derecho a celebrar reuniones sindicales, o que impida el legítimo ejercicio de este derecho”.» [Cfr.: Mujica. Javier. Artículo 15. Derecho de reunión. Artículo 16. Libertad de asociación. En: Steiner, Christian y Uribe, Patricia (editores). Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Comentario. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, pág. 363 y ss. Las negritas son agregadas]. En consecuencia, valga reiterar que la privacidad de la reunión y el derecho a la intimidad impedían el valorar la prueba ilícitamente obtenida mediante grabaciones subrepticias y en contravención a tales derechos. Ahora bien, podría considerarse que aquellos temas probatorios eran suficientes para sustentar la absolutoria y que, por ello, no es necesario descender a otros temas de fondo, pero no es así. En estos motivos, las partes, al cuestionar la forma de interpretación del tipo penal, pretenden introducir el elemento de que la publicidad no es un elemento de este delito y, por ende, que, aunque se aludiera a lo que el endilgado emitió fueran manifestaciones privadas, aún así se configuraría la instigación pública y eso podía acreditarse con la sola referencia, directa o indirecta, de quienes estuvieron en la actividad. También aspiran a aplicar otros tipos penales (incluyendo la referencia a una instigación común a ciertos delitos, según se describió en la querella particular de la licenciada Navas), de modo, entonces, que no basta con lo ya dicho para pronunciarse sobre las quejas y debe descenderse al tema de fondo, en tanto ligado con los elementos probatorios que acreditan o no cada uno de sus contenidos. Por ello, se efectuará el análisis aludiendo, primero, al delito base acusado (instigación pública), su constitucionalidad, forma de configuración, sus elementos constitutivos y, por ende, la prueba requerida y luego se aludirá a otras posibles calificaciones. De previo, es necesario exponer un parámetro constitucional y un contexto tanto histórico como jurídico-sistemático, sin el cual, a criterio de esta cámara, no es posible hacer un escrutinio completo. (A) Constitucionalidad del tipo penal. La constitucionalidad de la figura de instigación pública ha sido cuestionada en varias oportunidades, aunque no en todas ellas ha habido pronunciamiento de fondo. Así, mediante voto número 2003-5410 de 25 de junio de 2003 se rechazó de plano un argumento relativo a la afectación que esta disposición tendría respecto a los derechos de libertad de expresión y tránsito pues no se había alegado el asunto previamente la inconstitucionalidad en dichos procesos. En este asunto, el acusado partió del mismo panorama y evidenció el conflicto de derechos constitucionales y convencionales en juego, razón por la que —como se indicó en el considerando inicial— planteó la acción de inconstitucionalidad número 21-024578-0007-CO contra el numeral 280 del Código Penal. Aunque la acción fue admitida y se publicaron los edictos respectivos en los boletines judiciales número 18 a 20 de fechas 28 de enero al 1 de febrero, respectivamente, todos de 2022, fue resuelta a través del voto número 2023-00430 del 11 de enero del año en curso, en que se dispuso: «Por mayoría se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad. Los magistrados Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado y Garita Navarro dan razones diferentes. El magistrado Cruz Castro salva el voto y considera que esta acción debe ser declarada con lugar y en consecuencia, por su contenido y sus efectos, el artículo 280 del Código Penal, resulta inconstitucional.» Pese a que en esta fecha no se tiene el voto integral (ni se requiere para emitir pronunciamiento pues la parte dispositiva ya fue publicada, levanta la suspensión de la norma y no evidencia ninguna inconstitucionalidad o interpretación conforme) tal pronunciamiento constitucional (que fue dividido lo que denota las verosimilitud de diversas tesis en juego) no impide que este tribunal, como intérprete ordinario, haga el ejercicio de legalidad referido ni aplique la jerarquía de fuentes y las reglas hermenéuticas propias de esta materia. (B) Evolución histórica nacional de la instigación pública. El jurista latinoamericano y ex juez de la Corte IDH, Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, ha sido pionero, en la dogmática penal, en proponer la aplicación del principio de saneamiento genealógico como método para desentrañar (y, en consecuencia, entender y aplicar) el sentido de las normas penales. Según dicho autor solo yendo al origen de una disposición punitiva es posible observar los elementos contextuales que estaban o no presentes al crearse el tipo penal y que, por tanto, lo condicionan implícitamente. De esta manera, concluye el dogmático argentino, se aplica mejor el principio de legalidad y la interpretación restrictiva propios de esta materia. Señala el citado autor: «…en el derecho penal histórico se hallan múltiples racionalizaciones contrarias al principio republicano, a la ética, al estado de derecho y a los Derechos Humanos, cuando no presentan argumentos aberrantes. Las particulares criminalizaciones primarias surgen en cierto momento histórico y son consagradas por legisladores que participan en determinado contexto cultural y de poder: el legislador que construye un tipo, imagina un conflicto y lo define, condicionando por las representaciones colectivas, los prejuicios, las valoraciones éticas, los conocimientos científicos, los factores de poder y las racionalizaciones de su particular momento histórico y cultural. Estos condicionantes mutan rápidamente por efecto del dinamismo cultural, pero los tipos penales quedan y además, son copiados por otros códigos en países que nada tienen en común con el contexto originario (…) Los tipos penales en ellos contenidos, con frecuencia se arrastran de un código a otro, pues los autores de la ley se nutren del derecho penal comparado. Los arrastres de los tipos no siempre responden a un análisis contextual de éstos, sino que, por el contrario, casi nunca se repara en ello, por lo cual con frecuencia traen consigo una carga ideológica originaria poco compatible con el Estado de Derecho. Esta carga ideológica originaria es la genealogía del tipo penal, que se investiga a través de la comparación (derecho penal comparado) y de la historia (contexto de poder originario) (…) El objetivo de la investigación genealógica de los tipos penales es descubrir los componentes de arrastre peligrosos para el Estado de Derecho y facilitar la labor interpretativa depurada de los mismos. En una dogmática penal que persigue un objetivo político preciso, no basta como primer paso un análisis exegético del texto si no va a acompañado del necesario rastreo de su genealogía, que ponga al descubierto los componentes del estado de policía que arrastra y que deben ser cuidadosamente neutralizados en la construcción» (Cfr. Zaffaroni, Eugenio Raúl; Slokar, Alejandro y Alagia, Alejandro. Derecho Penal: Parte General. 2ª edición, págs. 138-139, se suplen negrillas). La dogmática penal y la normativa costarricense tienen, siempre, un objetivo político preciso el cual está dado por el artículo 1 de la Constitución Política que establece: “Costa Rica es una República democrática, libre, independiente, multiétnica y pluricultural.” Allí, entonces, se definen las líneas interpretativas de todo el ordenamiento jurídico. Si se entiende que, cuando se habla de una república se alude a la división de poderes y al sistema de pesos y contrapesos diseñado por el constituyente a lo interno de un poder del Estado, se deducirá que el respeto a esos derivados es esencial al escrutar cualquier norma. Además, esa república ha de ser democrática, es decir, un sistema en donde se tomen decisiones por la mayoría de la colectividad con derecho a hacerlo pero que tales decisiones no afecten los derechos y la dignidad de las minorías. Con frecuencia se olvida que la democracia no solo es un sistema político y de vida de mayorías, sino que, tanto o más importante que eso, es un sistema que debe partir del respeto a la dignidad humana de todos y cada uno de los seres humanos, de donde el entronque con el respeto a los derechos humanos (todos los derechos humanos de todas las personas en todo momento) son criterios axiológicos para la exégesis normativa. En este país, tal y como fue definido por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 1949, la regla ha de ser la libertad y solo por excepción y mediante la existencia de una ley formal ha de darse la penalización o represión. Esto enlaza plenamente con la definición dogmática del derecho penal como orden discontinuo de ilicitudes, con el respeto del principio de última ratio, con el principio de lesividad en la criminalización primaria y con la estricta observancia del principio de legalidad e interpretación restrictiva en materia punitiva. Esa libertad la garantizan la Constitución Política y los instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos suscritos y ratificados por el país y tiene muchas facetas: la libertad de tránsito, de expresión, opinión, imprenta e información, de enseñanza, de cátedra, de reunión, de manifestación, de asociación, sindicalización, de comercio, la empresarial, religiosa y de cultos, entre otras. Cada criminalización primaria que se haga es un menoscabo a esos derechos y, por tanto, ha de hacerse por ley formal e interpretarse restrictivamente. La independencia alude al ejercicio de la soberanía y de las potestades públicas que de ella deriven (como la suscripción y aprobación de tratados) conforme a las reglas del Estado de Derecho. El que la nación sea multiétnica y pluricultural (las últimas adiciones al citado numeral) parte de reconocer el aporte que todos los grupos étnicos [de origen más remoto (como las diferentes etnias indígenas existentes en el territorio al momento de la conquista; la comunidad afrodescendiente y china y la cultura europea, en particular la española e italiana) o más cercanos a nuestra realidad (como las poblaciones migrantes de todos los países, en particular de Centroamérica, Colombia y, más recientemente, Venezuela] dan a la conformación de nuestra nación, en donde han de convivir diversas manifestaciones culturales, todas las cuales deben ser respetadas y deben coexistir. Entonces, un derecho penal comprometido con el numeral 1 de la Constitución Política no puede tolerar interpretaciones extensivas para menoscabar libertades públicas ni propiciar su uso por grupos para atacar a minorías o desautorizar el ejercicio de derechos humanos de otros o fomentar el autoritarismo, el abuso del poder, etc. Ha de recordarse que la definición normativa del modelo teórico político del país se hizo en 1949 en el marco de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, pero el desarrollo dogmático del derecho penal tiene siglos, por lo que es comprensible que normas penales anteriores a esa fecha (o que surgen en otros contextos socio-políticos) no necesariamente se ajusten al objetivo político al que todas las personas habitantes del territorio nos hemos adscrito mediante el juramento constitucional (artículo 194 de la Constitución Política). De allí que la interpretación genealógica (y sistemática restringida) sean esenciales para cumplir con ese mandato. Así, a modo de ejemplo, una ley penal emitida en los años 40 o 50 del siglo anterior que aluda al concepto de “llave” no puede ser interpretada bajo el concepto actual de llave (que involucra claves alfanuméricas o biométricas para abrir e ingresar a ciertos espacios virtuales que se desarrollaron recientemente gracias a la Revolución Tecnológica) pues, para la fecha de emisión de la ley, el concepto sociológico de llave (su origen genealógico) se circunscribía a un dispositivo físico, metálico, de modo que una interpretación más amplia sería extensiva y violatoria del principio de legalidad. En la genealogía de ese hipotético tipo penal el elemento normativo-cultural “llave” estaba mucho más circunscrito o acotado que en la actualidad. Se comprende, entonces, la relevancia de desentrañar el origen de la figura objeto de análisis, en este caso, del delito de instigación pública contenido en el numeral 280 del Código Penal que estatuye: “Será reprimido con la pena de seis meses a cuatro años de prisión, el que instigare a otro a cometer un delito determinado que afecte la tranquilidad pública, sin que sea necesario que el hecho se produzca.” Valga empezar recalcando que este numeral no ha variado su redacción desde que fuera sancionado en la legislación represiva vigente —el Código Penal conocido como “Código Padilla” en honor al presidente de su comisión redactora el Dr. Padilla Castro— el 15 de noviembre de 1970 (según Alcance No. 120 a La Gaceta No. 257, aunque estuviera vigente hasta 1973). Ese dato no es menor pues nuestro país se ha caracterizado por lo contrario, es decir por el activismo legislativo en materia punitiva (el Código Penal ha sido reformado por 70 leyes a esta fecha, según el Sistema de Información Jurídica de la Procuraduría General de la República, las cuales han modificado múltiples numerales y algunos de estos han sido modificados varias veces por diferentes leyes). Entonces el origen histórico de la figura (que se remonta, al menos, al año 1970) permite ubicar el dispositivo penal en un contexto histórico y normativo distinto, según se indicará más adelante. El artículo original sí ha cambiado su numeración producto de los agregados y supresiones posteriores a otros delitos, pues antes ocupaba el numeral 271. Sin embargo, aunque el delito no ha sufrido variaciones (ni en la conducta ni en el monto punitivo) desde su emisión en 1970, no significa que el tipo penal “surgiera espontáneamente” en esa fecha, pues es sabido que, en primer lugar, el código vigente tiene su fuente de “inspiración” en el Código Penal Tipo para América Latina y en los proyectos redactados, respectivamente por Luis Jiménez de Asúa y por Sebastián Soler para Guatemala (así se reconoce en las páginas 2 y 72 de la exposición de motivos del anteproyecto de Código Penal; folios 129 y 199 expediente legislativo 3986 custodiado por el Departamento de Archivo, Investigación y trámite de la Asamblea Legislativa y consultado por esta cámara. En igual sentido: Antillón Montealegre, Walter. La legislación penal en Costa Rica. Revista de Ciencias Penales de Costa Rica, pág. 26 y ss y Romero Pérez, Jorge Enrique. Algunas notas acerca del Código Penal de Costa Rica.). Estas fuentes de inspiración, a su vez, recogieron disposiciones emergidas en diversas partes del mundo. En segundo término, el compendio punitivo en comentario no ha sido el único que ha tenido Costa Rica, pues estuvo precedido, en orden retrospectivo, por los Códigos Penal y de Policía de 1941 (conocidos como Códigos Guier), el Código Penal de Costa Rica de 1924 (Segundo Código Astúa), el Código Penal de Costa Rica de 1918-1919 (Primer Código Astúa), el Código Penal de 1880 (o Código Orozco) y el Código General del Estado de Costa Rica de 1841 (o Código de Carrillo). En la exposición de motivos del anteproyecto del Código Penal vigente efectuada en 1970, respecto de la parte especial se lee: “Puede afirmarse que desde hace casi medio siglo la parte especial del Código Penal de Cota Rica ha sido la misma. Muy ligeras variantes se operaron en 1941, pero la estructura, tomada del Código Penal Argentino de 1922, criticado hasta la saciedad por unos y defendido por muy pocos, se mantiene intacta. En el proyecto seguimos el mismo ordenamiento del anterior, comenzando con los delitos contras las personas y terminando con los relativos a la fe pública. En líneas generales seguimos el Proyecto Soler para Guatemala” (Cfr. expediente legislativo 3986, folio 198) y para la sección en que se inserta el tipo penal en comentario se lee en la explicación de la reforma: “Delitos contra la tranquilidad pública. Artículos 271 a 274. Gran parte de los delitos que en el Código de 1924 se incluyeron en un capítulo llamado contra el orden público, pasaron al Código de Policía de 1941. La poda fue un poco drástica, y por lo mismo restablecemos a su sitio lógico el delito de intimidación pública, que junto con la apología del delito constituyen hechos de suma gravedad y trascendencia. Estos dos hechos delictuosos conjuntamente con los de instigación pública y la asociación para cometer delitos, que figuran en nuestro Código Penal, los hemos denominado más bien delitos contra la tranquilidad pública y forman los cuatro de que se compone este Título” (Cfr. expediente legislativo 3986, folios 213-214). Entonces, es claro que el tipo penal de instigación pública introducido en 1970 se recogió sin modificaciones sustanciales de legislaciones precedentes tanto internas como extranjeras. Por su parte, el Código Penal de Policía de 1941 en su Título VII: Delitos contra el orden público (que solo comprendía este delito y el de asociación delictiva) estatuía: “Artículo 331.- El que por la prensa o de otro modo instigare públicamente a cometer un determinado delito contra una persona o institución, incurrirá por ese solo hecho en prisión de seis meses a cuatro años.” (Se suplen los destacados). Cabe agregar que en este cuerpo normativo se asumía un concepto extensivo de autor (es decir, que todos los aportes de los sujetos tenían igual valor) pues el numeral 43 establecía: “Serán sancionados como autores del hecho punible los que lo realizaren por sí mismos; los que tomaren parte en la ejecución; los que coadyuvaren con auxilio o cooperación sin los cuales no habría podido ejecutarse o se habría dificultado notablemente, o los que instigaren, forzaren o determinaren a otro de modo bastante a cometerlo.” (Las negritas son agregadas). Similar situación se encontraba en el Código Penal de Costa Rica de 1924 (Segundo Código Astúa) ya que la instigación pública a cometer delitos estaba prevista en el artículo 428 (Capítulo único del Título Octavo: Delitos contra el orden público) del siguiente modo: «Instigación pública a cometer delitos. El que por la prensa o de otro modo instigare públicamente a cometer un determinado delito, incurrirá por ese solo hecho en prisión en sus grados primero a segundo, según la importancia de los bienes amenazados, el móvil determinante y medios de la instigación, las circunstancias en que se ejerza y el peligro que sea capaz de hacer surgir.// La pena se podrá aplicar con descenso de un grado, cuando la instigación en ninguno de esos conceptos deba estimarse grave, a juicio del tribunal.//Si la instigación surtiere efecto, será penado el instigador como coautor del delito cometido, y si se hubiere hecho por medio de la prensa, se aplicará lo dispuesto en el artículo 31.» (Las negritas son agregadas). Este código también partía de un concepto único o extensivo de autor en que se equiparaba a este “…A los que por modo bastante, según las circunstancias, determinaren a otros a cometerlo, ya ejerciendo en ellos violencia física, ya en virtud de orden, amenaza, dádiva, promesa, consejo de esencial importancia u otro modo de sugestión o fuerza moral” (artículo 26). ¿Por qué es importante mencionar la teoría del concepto único de autor? Primero, porque no es la que se sigue en la actualidad en donde sí se distinguen de la autoría las formas de participación en sentido estricto como complicidad e instigación (artículos 45 a 47 y 74 del Código Penal) y, segundo, porque al no distinguirse en aquellas normas los aportes de los sujetos activos, tampoco interesaba el nivel de desarrollo del hecho delictivo efectuado por el autor para poder fijar el reproche del partícipe en sentido estricto (cómplice e instigador). Como la legislación vigente sí hace esas diferencias, resulta esencial diferenciar las figuras de la instigación común (válida para todos los delitos: artículo 46 del Código Penal) de la instigación pública como delito especial (numeral 280 citado) pues para la instigación común, según se verá, se requiere que el sujeto activo determine la voluntad de alguien a cometer un delito específico (es decir que haya aceptación de la incitación) y este delito determinado al menos inicie con actos de ejecución, en tanto que para la instigación pública no es necesario que este hecho instigado se dé ni que haya aceptación pues, por la publicidad de la provocación, se da el peligro. En ese marco, es esencial para trazar esa diferencia la publicidad con que se rodea la última figura y, a falta de esta, rige la regla de la instigación común que puede darse en privado, pero sí necesita el inicio de actos de ejecución del hecho instigado, conforme se verá. Ahora bien, de la pluma del propio presidente de la comisión redactora del Código Penal vigente (1970) se desprende, entonces, que la base de este delito se tomó del proyecto de Código Penal para Guatemala elaborado por Sebastián Soler por lo cual conviene volver la mirada a lo que este autor refería sobre este delito. En su clásica obra Derecho Penal argentino. TEA, tomo 4, 9ª reimpresión, 1983, páginas 589-602, dice el jurista argentino: “Delitos contra la tranquilidad pública. §130- Las distintas figuras. La reforma del C. penal ha comenzado (…) por corregir la designación del título, pues han sido muchos los equívocos traídos por la anterior referencia al ‘orden público’ [recuérdese que Padilla, en la exposición de motivos, señala que este delito pasa del capítulo de los del ‘orden público’ a los cometidos contra la tranquilidad pública]. Veamos las razones que hacían aconsejable ese cambio. En pocos temas del derecho penal se puede verificar una mayor confusión y vaguedad de opiniones que la que se manifiesta cuando la doctrina trata de fijar el concepto de orden público. El equívoco fundamental proviene de que esa expresión tiene, por lo menos, dos sentidos (…) Basta un somero examen de los distintos capítulos y figuras contenidas bajo el título de delitos contra el orden público para advertir que no es ese el sentido en que la expresión debe ser tomada en este punto de la teoría jurídica. Estos delitos son: la instigación pública, la asociación ilícita, la intimidación pública y la apología del crimen. Para nuestra ley penal, orden público quiere simplemente decir tranquilidad y confianza social en el seguro desenvolvimiento pacífico de la vida civil. No se trata de defender la seguridad social misma, sino más bien la opinión de esa seguridad que, a su vez, en realidad, constituye un factor más de refuerzo de aquella. Esas características de bien secundario, mediato, explica la razón por la cual las escalas penales de estos capítulos son, en general, bajas. No se trata de protección directa de bienes jurídicos primarios, como la seguridad, sino de formas de protección mediatas de aquéllos, pues una de las condiciones favorables para la comisión de graves daños es el desorden y la perturbación social. Tienen, pues, estas figuras un aspecto de prevención de daños mayores, que las aproxima a lo que es una contravención. Si se observa, en efecto, el contenido de ellas, se verá que están todas orientadas en el sentido de otros daños a cuya evitación tienden de manera mediata: detrás de la instigación y de la asociación ilícita está la posibilidad de toda clase de delitos, que se quiere evitar; detrás de la apología del crimen, se percibe una forma indirecta de aconsejar el crimen; detrás de la intimidación, están los daños derivados del desorden. Muchas de las figuras son verdaderos actos preparatorios de otros delitos, que serían impunes por su equivocidad (…) II. Instigación a cometer delitos. El art. 209 establece: ‘El que públicamente instigare a cometer un delito determinado será reprimido, por la sola instigación…’ (…) la instigación genérica era una forma accesoria de participación. Su punibilidad dependía, pues, no solamente de que la instigación fuese aceptada, sino, además, de que el hecho tuviese, cuando menos, un principio de ejecución por parte del instigado. Este aspecto es precisamente el que plantea un problema, diversamente resuelto por la legislación y la doctrina, según que la instigación no sea aceptada o, siéndolo, no sea cumplida por el instigado. En tal situación, algunos positivistas, con poca fortuna, han postulado la punibilidad de la instigación a título de tentativa con medio inidóneo (…) pero la solución más razonable y corriente ha consistido en hacer de ese hecho una figura especial de delito, de la misma manera en que se erigen en figuras autónomas ciertas formas de actos preparatorios, generalmente impunes. Este es, en realidad, el origen de la figura que examinamos, la cual, para algunos, no es más que un acto común de instigación que no tiene éxito (…) la diferencia específica de este delito consiste en que el acto de instigación se realice públicamente. Este es el elemento que torna punible un acto de instigación no acogida, que hecha sin el requisito de la publicidad queda impune, por fata de principio de ejecución. No es una condición de punibilidad, como dice Manzini, sino un verdadero elemento constitutivo de la figura. Como tal debe estar comprendido dentro del dolo del autor, es decir, que éste, además de instigar a la comisión de un hecho determinado, ha de saber que lo hace públicamente. Si una instigación privada se hace pública, supongamos, por medio de un micrófono ignorado por el autor, no existe delito (…) Si en un lugar privado se reúnen diez personas individualmente determinadas y una de ellas, a puertas cerradas, las instiga a cometer un delito, no hay instigación pública. (…) La publicidad surge así cuando existe la posibilidad de que la instigación sea recibida u oída por alguien no personalmente convocado.» (Los destacados son agregados). Es cierto que el tipo penal que comenta Soler expresamente contempla en la descripción de la conducta el tema de la publicidad, a diferencia del que existe en Costa Rica que solo lo menciona en el nombre de la figura, sin embargo no por ello tal elemento ha de considerarse excluido de la conducta pues no solo lo menciona el nomen iuris de la figura remite al sentido legislativo (por lo que sería un contrasentido que el delito de “instigación pública” pueda hacerse en privado) sino que esa necesaria publicidad se extrae en virtud de la interpretación genealógica-restrictiva e histórica, que son válidas si y solo si pretenden limitar los alcances punitivos, nunca para ampliarlos (artículo 2 del Código Penal). Como se vio, en el acontecer histórico nacional desde el que se extrajo e insertó el tipo respectivo, la instigación siempre fue pública al contener expresamente ese elemento el tipo y nunca hubo ninguna discusión para modificar tal cosa, de donde entenderlo así es lo más restrictivo. Entonces en el numeral 280 del Código Penal que estatuye: “Será reprimido con la pena de seis meses a cuatro años de prisión, el que instigare a otro a cometer un delito determinado que afecte la tranquilidad pública, sin que sea necesario que el hecho se produzca” no solo requiere la publicidad de la instigación (que en este supuesto no se dio porque la reunión era privada) para generar el peligro sino que necesita que esos delitos que se instigan sean unos que afecten la tranquilidad pública, concepto que hay que interpretar restrictivamente y que no puede considerarse extensivo a cualquier delito porque, entenderlo así, además, modificaría las reglas de participación (instigación común) de esos otros delitos. Nuevamente la adscripción política (en sentido amplio) del derecho penal costarricense (democrática, liberal y republicana según el numeral inicial de la Carta Magna referido) sufriría desmedro si la interpretación fuese amplia y enseguida se explica un poco más ampliamente el por qué. Recuérdese que con el surgimiento de los Estados Modernos (siglos XV y XVI) se rompe con las regulaciones de la Edad Media y se empieza a diferenciar el orden jurídico estatal de otros (como la moral y las religiones) que, inicialmente, estaban amalgamados. Esta diferencia esencial se traduce en que, mientras la moral y las religiones regulan el ámbito interno de las personas (sus pensamientos y sentimientos bajo la noción de “pecados” en una de ella), el derecho estatal se iba a ocupar de actos exteriores que implicaran una modificación material del mundo, dejando lo interno a la injerencia de aquellos otros órdenes normativos. Toda la teoría del iter criminis (o camino del delito) parte de esta base. Para no alargar innecesariamente las referencias históricas, valga recordar que la separación entre actos impunes y punibles (o, lo que es lo mismo, entre la libertad como principio democrático y la represión que debe ser excepcional) está dada en la fase externa del iter criminis, propiamente a partir de los actos de ejecución que hacen emerger la sanción de la tentativa (sin que sea necesario, a estos efectos, referirse a la evolución de las teorías que, refiriéndolo así, ponen énfasis en diversos matices y bastando aludir a que la mayoritariamente aceptada por la dogmática moderna es la individual objetiva). El que la fase intermedia (ideación, deliberación y resolución), intermedia (resolución manifestada) y hasta los actos preparatorios de la fase externa sean impunes no surge por un simple capricho dogmático, sino que es producto del intento sistemático de que los Estados no penetren en zonas (pensamientos, sentimientos, manifestación privada de opiniones) que son esenciales no solo para el desarrollo de la personalidad y la dignidad humana sino, también, para la consolidación de un sistema político democrático. Por ello, solo por excepción los delitos de expresión (injurias, calumnias, difamación, delitos de odio, apología de un delito, obstaculización de las vías públicas) y los delitos de tenencia (de armas, de drogas) deben ser castigados, pues implican adelantos de la barrera de protección que está dada por el inicio de los actos de ejecución. Los delitos de expresión adelantan la barrera a la fase intermedia del iter criminis (resolución manifestada) y los de tenencia a los actos preparatorios. En ambas situaciones se precisa no solo el adelanto de la barrera por mera política criminal sino la afectación de un bien jurídico (lesividad). Si se comprende lo anterior se entenderá, fácilmente, por qué el decir que se va a matar a alguien no es (y no debe ser) delito, como no debe serlo, tampoco, el que un sujeto le diga a otro que mate a una persona y esta persona no acepte (acto de instigación no aceptada). En ninguno de los casos hay una modificación del mundo exterior y si alguna reacción ha de haber a eso debe provenir de sistemas normativos éticos, morales o religiosos, no de los jurídico-estatales pues, además, la libertad humana hace que ese “mal pensamiento expresado” pueda ser revertido por el “arrepentimiento” (en sentido común, no jurídico), sin llegar a modificar el mundo externo. Distinto es cuando el sujeto acepta la propuesta (se hace nacer el dolo) y este sujeto así determinado, a su vez, inicia actos de ejecución. Ahí ya surge, al menos, un peligro para el bien jurídico y eso justifica la intervención estatal. Pero nótese que, aunque se requiere todo lo anterior para sancionar una instigación simple, eso no es suficiente pues, según sea la teoría de la accesoriedad que se siga, se requerirán más o menos elementos adicionales. Para una teoría restringida de autor (como la que se sigue modernamente) no solo se diferencia la autoría de la participación en sentido estricto (instigación y complicidad) sino que se hace depender el castigo de estas formas de participación de la intervención que llegue a tener el autor. Así la teoría de la accesoriedad mínima sanciona a partícipes solo si el autor ha desplegado un tipo penal; la de accesoriedad limitada hace depender la sanción de cómplices e instigadores de que el autor despliegue un injusto penal; la de la accesoriedad máxima requiere en el autor una conducta típica, antijurídica y culpable para poder fijar la responsabilidad de los partícipes y la de la hiperaccesoriedad requiere una conducta típica, antijurídica, culpable y punible para esa represión. La dogmática penal actual considera que la teoría más adecuada es la de la accesoriedad limitada y nuestra normativa sustancial carece de posicionamiento al respecto [los artículos 46 y 47 aluden a “hecho punible” y de esto algunos autores y en otras latitudes se ha derivado la hiperaccesoriedad: ver: Chinchilla Calderón, Rosaura. El principio de legalidad; ¿muro de contención o límite difuso para la interpretación de la teoría del delito en Costa Rica? Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2008, pág. 89 y ss.; Reforma al Código Penal alemán de 29.5.1943 y la doctrina y jurisprudencia que la interpretó citados por Castillo González, Francisco. Autoría y participación en el Derecho Penal. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 1ª edición, San José, 2006, pp. 55 y 347-348 (el autor no se adscribe a esa tesis, solo describe lo sucedido en Alemania, aunque deja de mencionarlo en ediciones posteriores de sus textos)]. Entonces se tendría que, por esta vía (de interpretar en sentido amplio ‘tranquilidad pública’ para aplicarlo a cualquier delito que la afecte) se llegaría prácticamente a derogar el instituto de la instigación común y la teoría de la accesoriedad (cualquiera que sea esta) pues este tipo penal, a diferencia de la instigación general, no requiere tal accesoriedad. Pero, además, desde un punto de vista sistemático, si se interpretara como lo pretenden las partes apelantes, las figuras de instigación (que en dogmática y en derecho comparado pueden tener un ligero mayor reproche que el autor pues hacen nacer en este el dolo) tendrían menos sanción que la autoría, en detrimento de lo que indica el numeral 46 del Código Penal o una represión excesiva, ajeno a las regulaciones doctrinales y a los principios de igualdad y culpabilidad. Veamos dos situaciones: i) si se aceptara que la instigación pública puede darse contra cualquier delito, en forma amplia, que violente la tranquilidad pública, como pretenden los apelantes, se llegaría al absurdo de sostener, como lo hizo la procuradora, que como el robo agravado en las viviendas, por ejemplo, afecta la tranquilidad, podría cometerse delito de instigación pública de tal delito y, de esa manera, la conducta ya no tendría la pena del autor de ese delito (de 5 a 15 años según los numerales 46 y 213 del Código Penal) sino solo una de seis meses a cuatro años de prisión que es la contemplada en este tipo penal. ii) Otra consecuencia absurda de esta posición sería la contraria, es decir, que la instigación pueda tener una mayor pena que el delito principal, aunque en Costa Rica expresamente se asumió que no pudiera ser así en virtud de las reglas generales. Por ejemplo, una persona que instigue a otras a cometer hurtos en la vía pública puede afectar, y mucho, la tranquilidad social si esos delitos se despliegan. Y así, mientras los autores de los hurtos serían reprimidos con prisión de un mes a tres años, quien los instigó, sería castigado bajo la figura de la “instigación pública” (siguiendo el criterio de las personas apelantes) y recibiría una sanción de seis meses a cuatro años de prisión, lo que evidencia una desproporción enorme de la pena que no es aceptada ni siquiera por la dogmática que solo justifica el mayor incremento en quien hace nacer el dolor siempre que sea proporcional al delito y eso se ha entendido mientras no supere un tercio. La reductio ad absurdum (‘reducción al absurdo') es un método lógico de demostración de la validez (o invalidez) de proposiciones categóricas y en este caso los resultados de la propuesta de las apelantes no pueden ser más evidentes. Pero sigamos profundizando en las líneas argumentativas que se plantean. La procuradora sostiene que mientras incluir la voz “públicamente” en el tipo sería una invasión a la competencia legislativa (con lo cual desconoce que la labor jurisdiccional, por mandato constitucional, exige siempre una labor hermenéutica que sigue reglas dadas en el propio ordenamiento y que, en el caso penal, debe recurrirse a la interpretación genealógica, histórica y sistemática para restringir y nunca para ampliar el tipo) sí estima posible, sin consecuencia alguna, incluir delitos no contemplados por quien legisla en el tipo penal examinado o ampliar los conceptos de este conforme al criterio del autor que cita (quien comenta una legislación distinta a la nuestra) pese a que lo prohíben los artículos 1 y 2 de la legislación penal sustantiva. No obstante, tal posición no es admisible pues la doctrina sí puede contribuir a precisar el sentido de una disposición normativa siempre que se respete el principio de legalidad, no si extiende la prohibición como aquí se busca y en este caso el límite de la figura está dado por una figura jurídica paralela que es la instigación genérica. El texto que cita la procuradora y comenta Creus contiene, a diferencia de nuestra legislación, una referencia amplia a delitos. El código costarricense, de manera diferenciada al comentado por el jurista argentino, agregó el tipo de delitos que podían instigarse de esta manera. Otra incoherencia de la procuradora es que, mientras acepta parte de lo que dice la doctrina argentina (aunque esto no responda a nuestra legislación) rechaza lo que esta estipula el elemento diferenciador de la instigación como instituto de la parte general respecto de la instigación pública como delito de la parte especial (este se introduce porque aquella no se puede configurar a falta de actos de ejecución que generen un injusto penal, según la teoría de accesoriedad limitada, de modo que se suprimen tales elementos pero se construye el tipo como de peligro y esto se logra, justamente con el tema de la publicidad). En síntesis, sí se requiere la publicidad de la instigación para cometer el delito de instigación pública pues este elemento es el que genera el peligro abstracto que, a su vez, permite suprimir la accesoriedad de la participación en sentido estricto y sí se debe interpretar restrictivamente la expresión “…un delito determinado que afecte la tranquilidad pública…” contenida en el artículo 280 como circunscrita a los delitos estipulados en el Título X: Delitos contra la tranquilidad pública, es decir, los de asociación ilícita, apoyo y servicios para el terrorismo, intimidación pública y apología del delito pues, hacerlo de otro modo, es crear delitos por vía interpretativa. Ello conduce, en consecuencia, a que ambos elementos (la publicidad del acto y que se está haciendo una determinación a afectar un delito contra la tranquilidad pública) deban ser conocidos por el autor. Si la publicidad no es sabida por el autor (por estar siendo grabado a escondidas y, por ende, ignorar que está incitando a una colectividad) se está ante un error de tipo. Si el sujeto activo desconoce que está instigando a un delito “contra la tranquilidad pública” se produce un error sobre elementos normativos jurídicos que, por ser lo más beneficioso para la persona acusada, también debe resolverse como error de tipo a pesar de tener elementos comunes con el error de prohibición (sobre este tópico véase la sentencia del antiguo Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José, número 2010-641: R. Chinchilla, U. Zúñiga e I. Estrada). La interpretación de las partes apelantes (al excluir la publicidad del tipo y al suprimir la referencia a ciertos delitos allí contenida) no solo es amplia en contra del mandato del numeral 2 sino que tira por la borda todo el tema de los errores y el principio de culpabilidad pues pretenden una sanción de la persona al margen de su consonancia interna (conocimiento y voluntad) con la conducta presuntamente exteriorizada. Es el mismo efecto que generan los delitos de peligro abstracto y no en vano pretenden convertir a esta categoría todas las formas de instigación lo cual es una tendencia peligrosa en tiempos en que el respeto al Estado Constitucional, Social y Democrático de Derecho no es, precisamente, el valor dominante. Así lo entendió la sentencia de instancia que, con solvencia, rechazó tales propuestas y, en eso, no se observa yerro alguno. Pero, adicional a lo que ya se ha dicho, que no es poco ni de peso ligero, hay un motivo muchísimo más fuerte por el cual las tesis ensayadas por las partes apelantes no puedan ser acogidas. Nuevamente tiene relación con el sistema político al que se adscribió el país y al saneamiento genealógico que debe seguirse y eso se expondrá en el siguiente apartado. (C) El Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y el Código Penal: integración y aplicación sistemática. Debe retomarse la idea, ya desarrollada a partir de evidencia histórica, que no ha habido ninguna variación entre la introducción de la figura de la “instigación pública” en 1970 a la fecha y que esta presenta, en los antecedentes normativos inmediatos, referencia a que la instigación sea pública (inclusive, en muchos de los textos anteriores se hace énfasis al uso de la prensa, único medio que, para esas fechas, garantizaba esa publicidad). Este origen permite tener claridad en cuanto al contexto normativo en que la figura se inserta. Recuérdese que, para cuando el actual cuerpo represivo se aprueba (1970), aunque en el país regía formalmente la Constitución Política de 1949, no existía un control efectivo sobre el acople de las nomas inferiores a las de superior rango, pues el control de constitucionalidad concentrado, en manos de Corte Plena y regido por el Código de Procedimientos Civiles de 1887, se consideraba meramente de papel, desde que una minoría podía vetar una declaración de inconstitucionalidad (se requería mayoría calificada de Corte Plena, integrada entonces por 17 magistraturas al no haberse incorporado las siete de la Sala Constitucional, por lo que se necesitaban 12 votos para declarar algo inconstitucional, lo que históricamente impidió que ello se diera). Fue necesaria la reforma constitucional de 1989 y la creación de la jurisdicción constitucional para que tal control fuese efectivo y ya no solo frente a la jerarquía constitucional sino también para incorporar a los tratados de derechos humanos como parámetro constitucional. Tampoco cuando se aprobó el actual artículo de instigación pública se había hecho efectiva la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados (en lo sucesivo CVDT) la cual, si bien fue firmada por Costa Rica en 1969, no fue ratificada por el país sino hasta 1996 mediante ley No. 7615. Finalmente, para 1990 no había emergido, con la fuerza actual, el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (en adelante DIDDHH) que, si bien ya contaba a su haber con algunas declaraciones emergidas luego de la II Guerra Mundial, estaba en desarrollo en casi todas sus áreas para hacer nacer los tratados vigentes. No fue sino hasta 2006 en que, derivado de allí (y plasmado por la Corte IDH en la sentencia del caso Almonacid Arellano y otros vs. Chile de 26 de septiembre de 2006), surge el concepto de control de convencionalidad, con carácter vinculante. Estos tres elementos (control de constitucionalidad sobre la jerarquía de las normas, valor de los tratados superior a la ley según el artículo 27 de la CVDT y desarrollo del DIDDHH que implica el valor interno de los tratados suscritos y ratificados y el control de convencionalidad sobre ellos) se dieron con posterioridad al surgimiento, en 1970, del tipo penal en comentario. Nada de eso puede perderse de vista porque son elementos que contribuyen a moldear el tipo penal original, por tener todos mayor rango e integrar el sistema político descrito en el numeral 1 constitucional ya referido. Como parte del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos se ubican libertades individuales como el derecho de reunión, de manifestación o expresión, de asociación y de pensamiento (artículos 26, 28 y 29 Constitución Política; 13, 15 y 16 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y 18 a 22 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos) pero también derechos sociales como el derecho de sindicalización, huelga, de negociación colectiva (artículo 8 Protocolo a la Convención adicional a la CADH en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales o Protocolo de El Salvador y numeral 8 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales). Unos y otros integran, en igualdad de condiciones (a diferencia de lo que suele pensarse en nuestro país) el marco de derechos humanos que se caracterizan por ser irrenunciables, indivisibles, inalienables, universales, imprescriptibles e interdependientes. Como puede verse, estos derechos se han recogido, en muchos casos, en tratados o convenios multilaterales que nuestro país ha suscrito y ratificado. Y esto último conecta con el principio pacta sunt servanda contenido en el artículo 27 de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados (CVDT) según el cual un Estado no puede alegar su derecho interno para desconocer un tratado que ha firmado y ratificado. Entonces, desde 1996 (en que se ratificó la CVDT, el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos debe insertarse en la integración e interpretación de todos los tipos penales, incluyendo en aquellos que se emitieron con anterioridad, pues la ley (en este caso el cuerpo represivo sustantivo) no solo no puede desconocer una norma de rango superior (los tratados: artículo 7 de la Constitución Política) sino que el derecho interno no puede desconocer el derecho convencional. En el mismo sentido, el Derecho de la Constitución establece el predominio de los tratados de derechos humanos (o de los pronunciamientos de los órganos que los interpretan) por sobre la Constitución Política si aquellos otorgan más derechos o los protegen de mejor manera (ver artículo 73 inciso d de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y los votos de la Sala Constitucional números No. 3435-92, No. 2313-95, No. 1319-97, No. 4356-98 y No. 6830-98). Entonces, llegados a este punto, es claro que, aunque el delito de instigación pública está vigente y es constitucional según el voto de la Sala Constitucional número 2023-00430 del 11 de enero de 2023 (cuyo contenido integral a esta fecha se desconoce pese a haberse solicitado constantemente, incluso antes de votar este asunto como se desprende de las constancias precedentes) el intérprete ordinario DEBE (no es potestativo sino una obligación) adaptarlo, en su interpretación, a aquel contexto normativo. Y es aquí en donde es necesario examinar el contenido de aquellos otros derechos humanos que limitan sustancialmente el poder punitivo en una democracia como la descrita por el numeral 1 de la Constitución Política pues, aunque formalmente existan tipos penales que prohíban ciertas conductas (muchos de ellos, como este, de origen preconstitucional o preconvencional) sus ámbitos de validez quedan limitados por la evolución normativa ya referida. En el presente asunto, aún partiendo (hipotéticamente, solo para efectos analíticos) del dicho de la parte acusadora —de que también puede cometerse instigación pública del numeral 280 ibídem cuando se determina a cometer delitos como la obstrucción de vías públicas que no son parte de aquellos contra la tranquilidad pública— es necesario otras consideraciones iniciando por el hecho de que, luego de la reunión acusada, no hubo ninguna materialización de cierres de vías (ni esto se estipuló en las querellas ni hay prueba en tal sentido recibida en debate). El delito de obstrucción de la vía pública se encuentra regulado en el numeral 263 bis y señala: “Se impondrá pena de diez a treinta días de prisión a quien, sin autorización de las autoridades competentes, impidiere, obstruyere o dificultare, en alguna forma, el tránsito vehicular o el movimiento de transeúntes.” (Se suplen los destacados). Dicha disposición fue elevada a la categoría delictual (lo que habilita acciones represivas como allanamientos, prisión preventiva, etc.) y dejó de ser simple contravención por ley No. 8250 del 02 de mayo de 2002, es decir, aprobada poco tiempo después de que se dieran las manifestaciones populares que estallaron en marzo de 2000 como protesta a lo que se denominó “Combo del ICE” (proyectos de ley que pretendían la ‘modernización del ICE, la apertura en energía y en telecomunicaciones’). Es evidente el propósito de desestimular y reprimir ese mecanismo de manifestación y se une al artículo 263 del Código Penal que refiere: «Entorpecimiento de servicios públicos. Artículo 263.-Será reprimido con prisión de seis meses a dos años, el que sin crear situación de peligro común, impidiere, estorbare o entorpeciere el normal funcionamiento de los transportes por tierra, agua y aire a los servicios públicos de comunicación o de sustancias energéticas.» (Se agrega el destacado). Empero la protesta social es un derecho humano derivado de la libertad de expresión y manifestación que, en esa medida, tiene un rango superior a la ley y esta no puede dejarlo sin contenido, sin perjuicio del ejercicio de ponderación en caso de choque con otros derechos de similar o mayor magnitud que debe efectuarse en cada caso concreto. Sobre sus alcances ha dicho el intérprete supremo de la CADH «171. El derecho a protestar o manifestar inconformidad contra alguna acción o decisión estatal está protegido por el derecho de reunión, consagrado en el artículo 15 de la Convención Americana (…) El derecho protegido por el artículo 15 de la Convención Americana (…) abarca tanto reuniones privadas como reuniones en la vía pública, ya sean estáticas o con desplazamientos. La posibilidad de manifestarse pública y pacíficamente es una de las maneras más accesibles de ejercer el derecho a la libertad de expresión, por medio de la cual se puede reclamar la protección de otros derechos. Por tanto, el derecho de reunión es un derecho fundamental en una sociedad democrática y no debe ser interpretado restrictivamente (…) 172 (…) la Corte toma nota de lo indicado por el ex Relator de Naciones Unidas sobre el derecho de reunión y asociación, según el cual “cuando la violación del derecho a la libertad de reunión pacífica es un factor habilitante e incluso determinante o una pre condición para la violación de otros derechos (…) también inevitablemente se ve afectado el derecho a la libertad de reunión pacífica y ello merece ser reconocido”. Además, como sucede con otros derechos con una dimensión social, se resalta que la violación de los derechos de los participantes en una reunión o asamblea por parte de las autoridades, “tienen graves efectos inhibitorios [chilling effect] sobre futuras reuniones o asambleas”, en tanto las personas pueden optar por abstenerse para protegerse de estos abusos, además de ser contrario a la obligación del Estado de facilitar y crear entornos propicios para que las personas pueden disfrutar efectivamente de su derecho de reunión.» (Corte IDH. Caso Mujeres Víctimas de Tortura Sexual en Atenco Vs. México. Sentencia de 28 de noviembre de 2018; se suplen los destacados). Comentando tal disposición se ha dicho: «Así pues, no siendo suficiente con que existan dudas sobre si el derecho de reunión pudiera producir efectos negativos en perjuicio de otros, las restricciones al derecho de reunión sólo (sic) encontrarán apoyo en aquellos casos en los que existan datos objetivos que permitan deducir de forma indubitable que la manifestación no se ajusta a los parámetros convencionales, y especialmente en relación con la necesidad de proteger la salud y moral públicas, así como los derechos y libertades de los demás. Por esta razón, los motivos que se aleguen para prohibir o restringir el derecho de reunión no solo deben ser convincentes e imperativos de modo que puedan justificar las restricciones a esa libertad, sino que deben ser probados. Esto es, que no deben tratarse de simples sospechas, peligros inciertos, ni menos aún de argumentos insuficientes, antojadizos o arbitrarios; sino de razones objetivas, suficientes y debidamente fundadas. Como ha señalado el Tribunal Constitucional español, “la reunión o manifestación va a depender de su carácter pacífico. Aunque, ciertamente, toda reunión en lugar de tránsito público o manifestación provoca una restricción al derecho de libre circulación de los ciudadanos no manifestantes, dicha restricción no puede dar lugar por sí sola a una prohibición si se cumple el requisito del carácter pacífico, entendiendo por tal la ausencia de alteraciones del orden público con peligro para personas o bienes. No cabe, por lo demás, someter las ideas o reivindicaciones de los manifestantes a ningún tipo de controles de oportunidad política basados en los principios y valores, tanto jurídicos como metajurídicos, dominantes en la sociedad o que se identifiquen con cualquier género de ideología o pensamiento”.» [Cfr.: Mujica. Javier. Artículo 15. Derecho de reunión. Artículo 16. Libertad de asociación. En: Steiner, Christian y Uribe, Patricia (editores). Comentario. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, pág. 371 y ss. Las negritas son agregadas]. Y, como se ha venido diciendo, si por algo se caracterizó este proceso, en palabras de la propia jueza de instancia, fue en la inercia probatoria pues aunque se hicieron muchas afirmaciones (tanto por escrito como en el juicio y en la audiencia ante esta cámara) estas carecieron de sustento probatorio alguno, al punto que extremos contenidos en la querella de la licenciada Navas, como la supuesta instigación a agredir a un periodista o la intervención del imputado en huelgas que afectaron el derecho a la salud o la educación, solo fueron expresiones emocionales (falacia de apelación emocional), sin ningún asidero probatorio. Entonces, si no hay prueba objetiva de las limitaciones a los derechos de los demás (porque no hubo actos materiales de cierres de vías luego de lo dicho en tal reunión) y el intervenir en manifestaciones, aún en vía pública, es un derecho, esto implicaría que instigar a manifestarse en las vías públicas (ya sea que se considere por la vía del delito especial de instigación pública o bien por medio de una instigación genérica a un delito específico de obstrucción de vía), no podría ser delito aunque esto limite el tránsito vehicular pues, aunque puede configurar una conducta típica esta se encontraría justificada por el ejercicio de un derecho y, en ese tanto, se convierte en una causa de justificación [artículo 25 del Código Penal: “No delinque quien obrare en (…) ejercicio legítimo de un derecho”]. Pero si lo dicho hasta aquí no fuera suficiente, hay que tener en cuenta que estos derechos, de expresión y reunión con los contenidos ya perfilados desde el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, también se relacionan con el núcleo-duro del derecho a la sindicalización. La propia Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, a solicitud de la CIDH, en la opinión consultiva OC27/21 del 05 de mayo de 2021 desarrolló estos aspectos de forma profusa y, dado su carácter vinculante para el país, conviene trascribir parte de lo decidido, aun cuando la cita pueda resultar extensa: «74. (...) este Tribunal considera pertinente realizar las siguientes consideraciones adicionales respecto del contenido del derecho a la libertad sindical. (…) 81. (…) el Tribunal considera que el derecho de los trabajadores y las trabajadoras de pertenecer a un sindicato comprende, lógicamente, el derecho de desarrollar actividades sindicales. El espectro de acciones comprendidas en este derecho tiene un contenido amplio, y debe estar regulado en el estatuto de las organizaciones sindicales, las cuales deben ser determinadas por sus miembros. Estas actividades pueden comprender, por ejemplo, la participación en las reuniones sindicales, el derecho a emitir opiniones, el derecho de recibir o distribuir información, el derecho a participar en las decisiones que se adopten en las reuniones o asambleas (…) El Estado tiene la obligación de tutelar el adecuado ejercicio de las actividades de los trabajadores y las trabajadoras en la vida sindical, evitando cualquier acción por parte de las autoridades que permita la limitación en el ejercicio de estos derechos, así como adoptando las medidas necesarias para que los trabajadores y las trabajadoras, y sus representantes, pueda realizar sus actividades sindicales de manera eficaz en las empresas u organismos en que laboren (…) 106. Este Tribunal reitera que la libertad sindical, la negociación colectiva y la huelga son derechos incorporados en el artículo 26 de la Convención, pues éstos se derivan del artículo 45 incisos c) y g) de la Carta de la OEA (…) Si bien se trata de derechos autónomos, este Tribunal destaca su interdependencia e indivisibilidad. (…) 111. En relación con el derecho de huelga (…) los Estados deben respetar y garantizar que éste pueda ser ejercido de manera efectiva por todos los trabajadores y las trabajadoras, sin discriminación (…) el Estado debe garantizar que los trabajadores y las trabajadoras puedan ejercer su derecho a huelga sin ser objeto de penalización por parte del empleador particular, o del propio Estado. En ese sentido, los Estados deben suprimir aquellas normas penales que puedan ser utilizadas para perseguir el ejercicio del derecho de huelga. Por otro lado, en lo que respecta a los trabajadores y las trabajadoras que brinden servicios esenciales, o que ejerzan funciones de autoridad a nombre del Estado, se debe garantizar que la lista de servicios esenciales que no son sujetos del ejercicio del derecho de huelga se encuentre claramente definida en el ámbito interno, y de conformidad con las disposiciones establecidas por la OIT. Asimismo, los trabajadores y las trabajadoras que realicen dichas funciones esenciales deben contar con mecanismos de conciliación y arbitraje que les permitan obtener respuesta a sus reclamos (…) 121. El artículo 16.1 de la Convención Americana reconoce el derecho de las personas de asociarse libremente con fines ideológicos, religiosos, políticos, económicos, laborales, culturales, deportivos o de cualquier otra índole. Este Tribunal ha señalado que el derecho de asociación se caracteriza por habilitar a las personas para crear o participar en entidades u organizaciones con el objeto de actuar colectivamente en la consecución de los más diversos fines, siempre y cuando estos sean legítimos (…) de la libertad de asociación también se derivan obligaciones positivas de prevenir los atentados contra la misma, proteger a quienes la ejercen e investigar las violaciones a dicha libertad (…) 123. (…) este Tribunal entiende que la relación entre la libertad de asociación y la libertad sindical es una relación de género y especie, pues el primero reconoce el derecho de las personas de crear organizaciones y actuar colectivamente en la persecución de fines legítimos, sobre la base del artículo 16 de la Convención Americana, mientras que el segundo debe ser entendido en relación con la especificidad de la actividad y la importancia de la finalidad perseguida por la actividad sindical (…) 132. (…) este Tribunal destaca la relación que existe entre la libertad de expresión, el derecho de reunión y los derechos a la libertad sindical, la negociación colectiva y la huelga. (…) 134 (…) la libertad de expresión es indispensable para la formación de la opinión pública en una sociedad democrática. En el ámbito laboral, la Corte ha señalado que es conditio sine qua non para que los sindicatos y en general, quienes deseen influir sobre la colectividad puedan desarrollarse plenamente. En esta lógica, la libertad de expresión resulta una condición necesaria para el ejercicio de organizaciones de trabajadores y trabajadoras, incluidos los sindicatos, a fin de proteger sus derechos laborales y mejorar sus condiciones e intereses legítimos, puesto que sin este derecho dichas organizaciones carecerían de eficacia y razón de ser (…) 135. (…) el ámbito de protección del derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y expresión resulta particularmente aplicable en contextos laborales (…) se requiere de un nivel reforzado de protección de la libertad de expresión, y especialmente respecto de quienes ejercen un cargo de representación de los trabajadores y las trabajadoras (…) 137. Para este Tribunal la existencia de una corriente libre de información, ideas y opiniones es fundamental para el ejercicio de los derechos sindicales y de la negociación colectiva, por lo que la amenaza de iniciar acciones penales por parte de las autoridades en respuesta a opiniones legítimas de los representantes de una organización sindical puede tener efectos intimidatorios y perjudiciales en perjuicio de los trabajadores y las trabajadoras o los empleadores y las empleadoras. Por esta razón, es arbitraria la detención o la reclusión como castigo por el ejercicio legítimo de los derechos a la libertad de opinión y de expresión, la libertad de reunión y la libertad de asociación. (…) 139. Respecto del derecho de reunión, este Tribunal recuerda que el artículo 15 de la Convención Americana “reconoce el derecho de reunión pacífica y sin armas”. La Corte ha señalado que este derecho abarca tanto reuniones privadas como reuniones en la vía pública, ya sean estáticas o con desplazamientos. La posibilidad de manifestarse pública y pacíficamente es una de las maneras más accesibles de ejercer el derecho a la libertad de expresión, por medio de la cual se puede reclamar la protección de otros derechos. Por tanto, el derecho de reunión es un derecho fundamental en una sociedad democrática y no debe ser interpretado restrictivamente (…) Asimismo, este Tribunal ha expresado que el derecho a protestar o manifestar inconformidad contra alguna acción o decisión estatal está protegido por el derecho de reunión (…) 141. Este Tribunal advierte que los derechos a la libertad de expresión, de reunión y de asociación, en su relación con la libertad sindical, la negociación colectiva y la huelga, constituyen derechos fundamentales para que los trabajadores y las trabajadoras, y sus representantes, se organicen y expresen las reivindicaciones específicas acerca de sus condiciones laborales, para poder así representar efectivamente sus intereses ante el empleador, e incluso participar en cuestiones de interés público con una voz colectiva. Los Estados tienen el deber de respetar y garantizar estos derechos, los cuales permiten nivelar la relación desigual que existe entre trabajadores y trabajadoras, y empleadores y empleadoras, y el acceso a salarios justos, y condiciones de trabajo seguras. En este sentido, la Corte recuerda que los derechos humanos son interdependientes e indivisibles, de forma que la efectividad del ejercicio de los derechos depende de la efectividad del ejercicio de otros derechos. De esta forma, los derechos civiles y políticos, y los derechos económicos sociales, culturales y ambientales deben ser entendidos integralmente como derechos humanos, sin jerarquía entre sí y exigibles en todos los casos ante aquellas autoridades que resulten competentes» (Los destacados son agregaos por esta cámara). La contextualización cronológica de la reforma penal que introdujo el numeral 263 bis es importante porque evidencia el desestímulo que, desde diversas agencias estatales, se ha propiciado contra el amplio ejercicio de derechos humanos sociales como la protesta en tanto forma en que se manifiesta la libertad de expresión, aunque tenga límites, como en adelante se dirá. Los derechos humanos no son solo los individuales, desvinculados de derechos sociales (y, en esa medida violatorios del principio de interconexión de esta materia) y la penalización de la protesta social (por la vía de la obstrucción de las vías públicas), por sí sola, no dice nada de la ilicitud de la conducta, sino solo de su tipicidad. Recuérdese que, si bien los tribunales comunes no pueden decretar la inconstitucionalidad de normas y, para la que ahora nos ocupa la Sala Constitucional no lo ha hecho (ver voto número 2023-00430 del 11 de enero del año en curso en que declaró sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad respecto al artículo 280; el voto número 2003-5414 que rechazó de plano una acción contra el actual numeral 263 ambos del Código Penal y el voto número 2012-17027 de las 14:30 horas del 5 de diciembre de 2012 que se pronunció sobre la obstrucción de la vía pública en los términos que más adelante se referirán), eso no impide el ejercicio de la jurisdicción ordinaria que debe verificar, en cada caso concreto, no solo la convencionalidad de la disposición sino, también, si hubo, además de tipicidad, antijuridicidad y esta es tanto material como formal y es aquí donde se involucra el análisis de causas de justificación como el ejercicio legítimo de un derecho (artículo 25 del Código Penal). En un caso similar, así se entendió jurisprudencialmente, por ejemplo, en este voto: «…el delito de instigación pública contenido en el artículo 280 del Código Penal –antiguo 273-, señala: “Será reprimido con la pena de seis meses a cuatro años de prisión, el que instigare a otro a cometer un delito determinado que afecte la tranquilidad pública, sin que sea necesario que el hecho se produzca.” Con la denuncia del licenciado V, no se puede tener por demostrado que el discurso del señor J haya tenido tal fuerza sobre una persona o personas, que provocara una determinación en la realización de un hecho ilícito. Debe agregarse que, aún en el supuesto que existiera tal instigación sobre los manifestantes, no puede obviarse lo indicado por el artículo 25 del Código Penal, en el tanto señala: “No delinque quien obrare en cumplimiento de un deber legal o en el ejercicio legítimo de un derecho”. En el presente asunto, la denuncia reclama que el diputado J llama a los estudiantes a manifestarse sobre el tema del fotocopiado y a exigir la protección del derecho a la educación. Esto no es otra cosa más que el ejercicio de un derecho, lo que debe examinarse con base en lo dispuesto por el Título VII de la Constitución Política y el numeral 28 de la Carta Magna, en el entendido que el llamado que se hace es parte del derecho de expresión que tiene todo ciudadano en este país, máxime que lo pedido tiene que ver con un derecho fundamental: la educación. Es por ello que, esta Cámara avala la petición fiscal, considerando que el señor J se encontraba en el pleno ejercicio de su libertad de expresión, el cual iba dirigido a salvaguardar el derecho a la educación. A partir de esta interpretación, no podría configurarse el delito acusado, pues aunque la conducta imputada estuviera comprendida en un tipo penal, la existencia de una causa de justificación eliminaría la antijuridicidad de dichos actos, y, por consiguiente, tampoco se tendría por delictivo tal despliegue. En este tipo de casos, el artículo 282 del Código Procesal Penal señala que “cuando el hecho denunciado no constituya delito o sea imposible proceder, el Ministerio Público solicitará al tribunal de procedimiento preparatorio, mediante requerimiento fundado, la desestimación de la denuncia…”. Habiéndose constatado que los hechos denunciados por el licenciado V no configuran delito alguno, se acoge la solicitud formulada por el Fiscal General de la República, decretándose la desestimación.» Sala Tercera (Chinchilla, Ramírez, Arroyo, Pereira y López). Voto número 2013-495 (se suplen las negrillas). Como lo reconoce la licenciada Navas en su propio libelo de querella, tanto el derecho a la sindicalización (y sus derivados incluyendo los mecanismos de negociación colectiva), como los derechos de reunión y manifestación, incluido el derecho a la protesta social como parte de la libertad de expresión, son derechos humanos, esenciales para mantener el equilibrio democrático y reducir las tensiones y polarizaciones sociales. Es claro que tampoco es dable abusar de ninguno de esos derechos, ni ejercitarlos de mala fe, ni efectuar un ejercicio antisocial de ellos (artículos 20 a 22 del Código Civil) pues todo derecho tiene por límite el ejercicio de otros derechos que conciernen a otras personas de la población. Por ello, es posible reprimir los daños o las lesiones que se den en aquellos marcos de protesta, como también es posible sancionar (desde el punto de vista laboral) la ejecución de movimientos que afecten servicios esenciales definidos, en forma restrictiva y no amplia, en una ley previa, según la Corte IDH en la OC27/21 del 05 de mayo de 2021. Sin embargo, en este asunto no solo no hubo prueba de que esas afectaciones (a la vida, la salud, la integridad, la propiedad o los servicios esenciales) se dieran (pues luego de la reunión acusada no se materializó protesta alguna), sino que muchas de las regulaciones al derecho se introdujeron por ley posterior a los hechos acusados (ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos No. 9808 de 2020) y no las había para la data de estos (2018 en adelante). Por su parte, otros derechos (como la libertad de tránsito de la ciudadanía) pueden conciliarse con estos (de libertad de expresión, reunión y sindicales) a través de otras medidas, gracias a ejercicios de ponderación en cada caso específico. En suma, si bien esta cámara concuerda con que el ejercicio de la violencia no es una opción de protesta válida ni justificada, como tampoco lo es la afectación de los servicios esenciales, no puede menos que advertir que, en escenarios en donde el malestar no puede ser ejercido por los canales admitidos en el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos —pues estos se han ido cerrando— la violencia, tarde o temprano, termina estallando. Entonces, prima facie, el que una persona determine la voluntad de otra u otras a obstruir vías públicas no necesariamente constituye un delito, pues ello dependerá de si la acción del autor está justificada o no (si se aplica la instigación común) o si la protesta puede asumirse, sin más, como un delito y no como un derecho para determinar si afecta la “tranquilidad pública” o más bien tiende a fortalecerla mediante el ejercicio de derechos. En consecuencia, el que se aceptara hipotéticamente (para efectos analíticos únicamente) que el encartado hizo un llamado de ese tipo (sin materialización alguna posterior) no permitiría inexorablemente arribar a una conclusión sobre la ilicitud de su proceder pues, para esto, era necesario precisar otros elementos que no solo no se dieron en la realidad (no hubo el citado cierre) sino que tampoco se probaron en juicio. En el derecho comparado se encuentran pronunciamientos que revelan la tensión de derechos y la forma de resolverla. Por ejemplo, el Tribunal Constitucional Español, en sentencia número 42/2000 de 14 de febrero de 2000, estableció que «…el derecho de reunión cuando se ejercita en lugares de tránsito público es una manifestación colectiva de la libertad de expresión ejercitada a través de una asociación transitoria de personas que opera a modo de técnica instrumental puesta al servicio del intercambio o exposición de ideas, de la defensa de intereses o de la publicidad de problemas o reivindicaciones, constituyendo, por tanto, un cauce relevante del principio democrático participativo, cuyos elementos configuradores son el subjetivo -agrupación de personas-, el temporal -duración transitoria--, el finalista -licitud de la finalidad- y el real u objetivo -lugar de celebración”. (…) Este Tribunal ya ha tenido ocasión de pronunciarse sobre las alteraciones del orden público que ocasionan las concentraciones que afectan a la circulación de vehículos por vías de tránsito público señalando que el "ejercicio de este derecho, por su propia naturaleza, requiere la utilización de los lugares de tránsito público y, dadas determinadas circunstancias, permite la ocupación, por así decir instrumental de las calzadas", reconociendo que "la celebración de este tipo de reuniones suele producir trastornos y restricciones en la circulación de personas y, por lo que aquí interesa, de vehículos" (SSTC 59/1990, FJ 6; 66/1995, FJ 3). No obstante, tales constataciones no conducen a este Tribunal a considerar que cuando el ejercicio de este derecho fundamental conlleve las señaladas restricciones, el mismo no sea constitucionalmente legítimo, sino, al contrario, a entender que "en una sociedad democrática el espacio urbano no es sólo un ámbito de circulación, sino también un espacio de participación" (STC 66/1995, FJ 3).» Por otra parte, en el sistema interamericano la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante CIDH) ha manifestado que “los gobiernos no pueden sencillamente invocar una de las restricciones legítimas de la libertad de expresión, como el mantenimiento del “orden público”, como medio para suprimir un “derecho garantizado por la Convención o para desnaturalizarlo o privarlo de contenido real”. Si esto ocurre, la restricción aplicada de esa manera no es legítima (…) si se consideran las consecuencias de las sanciones penales y el efecto inevitablemente inhibidor que tienen para la libertad de expresión, la penalización de cualquier tipo de expresión sólo puede aplicarse en circunstancias excepcionales en las que exista una amenaza evidente y directa de violencia anárquica (…) la Comisión entiende que el uso de tales poderes para limitar la expresión de ideas se presta al abuso, como medida para acallar ideas y opiniones impopulares, con lo cual se restringe un debate que es fundamental para el funcionamiento eficaz de las instituciones democráticas. Las leyes que penalizan la expresión de ideas que no incitan a la violencia anárquica son incompatibles con la libertad de expresión y pensamiento consagrada en el artículo 13 y con el propósito fundamental de la Convención Americana de proteger y garantizar la forma pluralista y democrática de vida” (CIDH, Informe Anual 1994, “Informe sobre la compatibilidad entre leyes de desacato y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos”, Capítulo V; las negritas son agregadas). Como indica la Relatoría Especial de la Libertad de Expresión de la OEA: “…dentro de ciertos límites, los Estados pueden establecer regulaciones a la libertad de expresión y a la libertad de reunión para proteger los derechos de otros. No obstante, al momento de hacer un balance entre el derecho de tránsito, por ejemplo, y el derecho de reunión, corresponde tener en cuenta que el derecho a la libertad de expresión no es un derecho más sino, en todo caso, uno de los primeros y más importantes fundamentos de toda la estructura democrática: el socavamiento de la libertad de expresión afecta directamente el nervio principal del sistema democrático”. Así las cosas, toda medida tendente a limitar las manifestaciones públicas debe procurar que en su aplicación se resguarde el contenido esencial de los derechos humanos de reunión pacífica y libertad de expresión. Las limitaciones no deben depender del contenido de lo que se vaya a expresar a través de una manifestación pública, deben servir a un interés público y dejar otras vías alternativas de comunicación. Las limitaciones deben tener sustento legal y solo pueden tener por objeto evitar amenazas serias e inminentes, no bastando un peligro eventual.” (el destacado es suplido). Así lo ha entendido la propia Sala Constitucional costarricense al referir: «En cuanto al poder penal del Estado, debe ser usado como recurso de ultima ratio para el aseguramiento de la paz social, no como un mero mecanismo de control social. De ahí que el artículo 256 bis del Código Penal, mediante el cual se penaliza la obstrucción de la vía pública, deba interpretarse de modo que su aplicación no suponga una afectación al contenido esencial de los derechos constitucionales de reunión pacífica y libertad de expresión. En tal sentido, las conductas a que se refiere esa norma penal, en lo atinente a manifestaciones públicas, están referidas únicamente a aquellas en que comprueben lesiones considerables a los derechos de otras personas o a los bienes del Estado. Verbigracia, una protesta en que los manifestantes agredan a las fuerzas de seguridad u otras personas, o bien, realicen actos vandálicos contra bienes públicos o privados, excede el contenido protector del derecho a la reunión pacífica y la libertad de expresión, por lo que resulta penalmente punible y justifica la actuación de las autoridades policiales, incluso con el uso de la fuerza, siempre que esta sea proporcionada a la magnitud del daño y las características concretas de la manifestación. Bajo esa inteligencia, deviene razonable la intervención policial cuando resulta evidente que las características de la manifestación producen daños importantes al bloquear el acceso a establecimientos o instalaciones de gran impacto para los intereses nacionales o de terceros (como un puerto o aeropuerto en virtud de los daños que podrían darse por la pérdida de vuelos o el deterioro de bienes perecederos destinados a la importación o exportación, entre otros). Distinta es la situación cuando la manifestación y consecuente bloqueo de vía pública, no impide el libre tránsito a través de vías alternas. En otras palabras, la detención de personas en una manifestación pública y la aplicación de sanciones penales solo se justifican cuando existe la necesidad social imperiosa de evitar disturbios a la paz y el orden público, o serios daños a los derechos de otras personas, condicionado ello a que la actuación policial sea proporcionada al interés legítimo perseguido y a las características propias de cada manifestación en concreto. De ninguna forma, la penalización de la protesta social puede convertirse en un instrumento amedrentador en detrimento de una forma de expresión participativa social propia de un sistema democrático. Mientras una manifestación pública se desarrolle dentro de márgenes normales, debe imperar la cordura y la tolerancia. De este modo, se evita que los medios de expresión de la disconformidad social (los cuales históricamente han sido aceptados en los regímenes democráticos mas no en las dictaduras) lleguen a convertirse en verdaderos focos de violencia y desorden público, a lo que precisamente se llegaría cuando el uso de la fuerza policial deviene desproporcionado. Sin embargo, esta forma de expresión encuentra sus límites en que se ejercite de manera razonable y dentro del marco del derecho de reunión pacífica, esto es sin que haya agresión a las fuerzas de seguridad u otras personas, ni se den actos vandálicos contra bienes públicos o privados, ni tampoco se infrinjan daños serios a los derechos de otras personas, todo lo cual debe valorarse en el caso concreto.» Sala Constitucional. Sentencia N° 2012-17027 de las 14:30 horas del 5 de diciembre de 2012. Entonces no era factible, como lo plantean las partes apelantes, que con la sola referencia a manifestarse en carreteras nacionales (de aceptarse hipotéticamente que así sucediera) formalmente se configurara un delito de obstrucción de vías públicas y, por ende, tampoco de instigación pública a un delito. Pero es que, además de lo anterior, la interpretación también DEBE hacerse, como bien expresa la sentencia de instancia, partiendo de otros parámetros propios de la materia penal, es decir, respetando el principio de legalidad y la interpretación restrictiva que este impone (artículos 1 y 2 del Código Penal) pero también en resguardo de los principios pro persona y pro libertatis propios del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos. Así, a diferencia de lo que plantean los tres apelantes (en el sentido de que, frente a tres posibilidades hermenéuticas debe escogerse la más amplia) el tribunal de instancia y este colegio jurisdiccional estamos obligados a usar la interpretación más acotada del tipo penal, pues solo esta es la restrictiva y solo esta es la que tutela la libertad. Ergo, cuando el actual numeral 280 del Código Penal dice: “Instigación pública. Será reprimido con la pena de seis meses a cuatro años de prisión, el que instigare a otro a cometer un delito determinado que afecte la tranquilidad pública, sin que sea necesario que el hecho se produzca.” (Se suplen los destacados) no solo debe entenderse la publicidad como propia del tipo, aunque solo esté en el título del artículo, sino que la referencia a los delitos afectados “contra la tranquilidad pública” debe hacerse circunscrita a aquellos tipos penales así ubicados por quien legisla (es decir la asociación ilícita, el apoyo y servicios para el terrorismo, la intimidación pública y la apología del delito) y no a otros que, aunque pueden tutelar el mismo bien jurídico, quedan fuera de la sección así denominada. Ambos elementos surgen, con toda claridad, del desarrollo histórico de la norma que se hiciera atrás y de las exigencias no solo de la interpretación restrictiva estipula por las disposiciones iniciales de la codificación sustantiva nacional sino, también, por la misma Corte IDH al aludir a normas penales que afectan la libertad de expresión (y ya antes se estableció la relación entre este delito y ducho derecho) al indicar: «76. La Corte ha señalado que el Derecho Penal es el medio más restrictivo y severo para establecer responsabilidades respecto de una conducta ilícita. La tipificación amplia de delitos de calumnia e injurias puede resultar contraria al principio de intervención mínima y de ultima ratio del derecho penal. En una sociedad democrática el poder punitivo sólo se ejerce en la medida estrictamente necesaria para proteger los bienes jurídicos fundamentales de los ataques más graves que los dañen o pongan en peligro. Lo contrario conduciría al ejercicio abusivo del poder punitivo del Estado. 77. Tomando en cuenta las consideraciones formuladas hasta ahora sobre la protección debida de la libertad de expresión, la razonable conciliación de las exigencias de tutela de aquel derecho, por una parte, y de la honra por la otra, y el principio de mínima intervención penal característico de una sociedad democrática, el empleo de la vía penal debe corresponder a la necesidad de tutelar bienes jurídicos fundamentales frente a conductas que impliquen graves lesiones a dichos bienes, y guarden relación con la magnitud del daño inferido. La tipificación penal de una conducta debe ser clara y precisa, como lo ha determinado la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal en el examen del artículo 9 de la Convención Americana. 78. La Corte no estima contraria a la Convención cualquier medida penal a propósito de la expresión de informaciones u opiniones, pero esta posibilidad se debe analizar con especial cautela, ponderando al respecto la extrema gravedad de la conducta desplegada por el emisor de aquéllas, el dolo con que actuó, las características del daño injustamente causado y otros datos que pongan de manifiesto la absoluta necesidad de utilizar, en forma verdaderamente excepcional, medidas penales. En todo momento la carga de la prueba debe recaer en quien formula la acusación.» Corte IDH. Sentencia del caso Kimel Vs. Argentina del 02 de mayo de 2008 (el destacado es suplido). Con una norma similar a la costarricense así se ha entendido en otras latitudes: «La instigación pública a delinquir es un delito que afecta la tranquilidad pública. Instigar, es incitar, provocar o inducir a uno a que haga una cosa; no es meramente proponer que se cometa, sino promover en cierta forma coactiva a ello, valiéndose de la excitación de las personas o de los instintos de la persona a quien se instiga; es una forma accesoria de participación y a ella son aplicables los principios generales enunciados con relación a la participación propiamente dicha. El instigador quiere el hecho, pero lo quiere producido por otro, quiere alcanzar ese hecho a través de la psiquiatría del otro, determinando en éste la resolución de ejecutarlo. Los verbos rectores son instigar o inducir, siendo un tipo penal de carácter formal, en virtud que es necesaria la voluntad del sujeto activo para inducir o determinar a alguien a la comisión o perpetración de un delito. Es un delito de carácter autónomo. Para acreditarse la instigación pública, debe ser pública, es decir, de desafío a la ley, de reto abierto, directo, y en presencia de otras personas, o a través de algún medio de comunicación, que permita la divulgación y propagación del mensaje, no de manera clandestina; la instigación debe ser dirigida a la comisión de un delito determinado; verbigracia, a quebrantar la ley, o a desconocer el orden constitucional, con el objeto de desestabilizar la paz y tranquilidad social. (…) La conducta incriminada, comprende una instigación hecha públicamente, es decir, en público, en presencia de varias personas. Puede ser dirigida a una sola de éstas, siempre que se haga públicamente. Y este requisito se cumple, no sólo cuando el instigador actúa en presencia de varias personas, sino también cuando se vale de algún medio de comunicación que lleve implícita la publicidad, capaz de establecer información simultánea o sucesiva con un número más o menos apreciable de personas…» Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales. La infracción de la libertad de reunión y de expresión como mecanismo de persecución política en Venezuela. Especial referencia al caso de Leopoldo López y otros. En: Revista Electrónica de Investigación y Asesoría Jurídica de la Asamblea Nacional. Nº 1 enero-julio 2016 págs. 60-61 citando resolución del Juzgado 28vo 1ra Inst. Juicio Caracas 10/09/2015, pág. 271. Las apelantes, en particular la procuradora, indican que “…debió el Tribunal analizar (…) si correspondía la configuración de la conducta demostrada en el tipo penal o cualquier otro que si estimase procedente; ejercicio que de haberse realizado no hubiese desencadenado en la absolutoria que hoy se impugna.” (Cfr. folio 511 vuelto). Sin embargo, la sentencia de instancia no solo hizo ese ejercicio de escrutar otras posibles calificaciones según se puede constatar en los folios 477 frente y siguientes (página 33 en adelante de la sentencia), lo cual se pasa por alto e invisibiliza en los recursos sino que las recurrentes ni siquiera mencionan los otros posibles tipos penales en que encajaría la conducta acreditada y si bien prima el principio iura novit curia (el tribunal conoce el derecho) también quien querella y apela debe hacer ver los yerros de la decisión adoptada sobre cada a sus pretensiones (principio acusatorio). Este tribunal, en ejercicio del precepto iura novit curia, tampoco observa esa posibilidad de adecuación típica. Es cierto que casi todos los tipos penales (salvo los culposos, por ejemplo) admiten la instigación común (artículo 46 ibídem) pero esta no se configura en el presente caso porque la conducta de obstaculización de vías o entorpecimiento de servicios no se exteriorizó ni materializó, es decir, no hay actos de ejecución en el iter criminis y, por ende, tampoco se determinó a alguien para que la hubiese cometido a nivel, al menos, de injusto penal (teoría de la accesoriedad limitada). Y si se considera que este delito es pluriofensivo y afecta la tranquilidad pública y que, por esa vía (de interpretación amplia ya descartada) integra el tipo penal del numeral 280 del código represivo, aún así tampoco habría, en este caso, delito alguno pues para que haya delito se requiere que, además de la tipicidad, opere la antijuridicidad y como ya se ha dicho, esto último difícilmente podría darse cuando se ejerce un derecho constitucional y convencional (o varios) que actúan como causa de justificación. En definitiva, desde ninguna óptica encuentra esta cámara ni yerros u omisiones en el razonamiento de la juzgadora de instancia ni la configuración de un delito que permita revertir lo resuelto, razón por la que se rechazarán las quejas.

IV.- En el segundo alegato de la Procuraduría General de la República se reprocha falta de fundamentación y violación a las reglas de la sana crítica, así como inaplicación o inobservancia de los artículos 1045, 222 y siguientes de las reglas vigentes de responsabilidad del Código Penal de 1941 y en el numeral 38 del Código Procesal Penal en relación con el rechazo de la acción civil. Dice que la pretensión resarcitoria no se admitió porque la absolutoria implicó que no haya nexo de causalidad y porque no se tuvo por demostrado el dolo, pero que eso no sustituye la debida fundamentación sobre tales extremos y no hay sustento fáctico ni jurídico ni para la absolutoria del encartado ni para el rechazo de la acción civil resarcitoria incoada por su representada. Con referencias jurisprudenciales (voto N° 2020-00332 del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, San Ramón) insiste en la autonomía de la pretensión civil respecto a la configuración del delito y que la aquí ejercida se amparaba en los numerales supra referidos pues se buscaba el resarcimiento del daño social el cual la apelante define. Añade que, con este, se afectan intereses sociales y puede comprender todo tipo de hechos que causen un daño al bienestar de la colectividad, como la perturbación a la tranquilidad pública derivada de la actuación del imputado y, como no es posible traer a toda la población, se aportaron algunos testigos que lograsen reflejar los sentimientos generalizados nacionales, como el movimiento representado por la querellante Navas Montero. Agrega que el imputado afectó la tranquilidad pública, generó en la ciudadanía sentimientos de temor y desconcierto derivado del hecho de que, con el entorpecimiento de servicios públicos y la obstrucción de vías, se impide el libre acceso a lugares de trabajo, a las escuelas, a los servicios sociales y a la atención médica oportuna, se podían crear situaciones de violencia pública que redundarían en inseguridad, comprometiendo la paz social, el ejercicio de las libertades civiles y lesionando los derechos fundamentales de la colectividad. Alude a las sentencias N° 341-2004, 370-2009, 167-2011 y 548-2013 del Tribunal Penal de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José en que se ha acogido la totalidad de su pretensión por el daño social y a la N° 71-2013 en que establece al “juez de juicio como perito de peritos" para estimar su causación y cuantía). Pide que se declarare ineficaz la sentencia en lo civil, “revocándola en todos sus extremos y ordenando su reenvío”. No hubo respuestas escritas. En la audiencia oral celebrada la licenciada Margot Avellán, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, enfatizó que se rechazó la acción civil por falta de nexo causal, pero allí la decisión carece de fundamentación pues no se analizó si el daño se causó. Pide que se anule la sentencia en todos sus extremos. Se rechaza la queja. La sentencia de mérito resolvió este tema en los siguientes términos: «IV-: SOBRE LA ACCIÓN CIVIL RESARCITORIA: Para entrar al conocimiento del reclamo civil, deben verificarse en primer lugar los presupuestos materiales del reclame o lo que también se conoce corno excepciones sustantivas, la cuales precede examinar de oficio. En cuanto a la existencia del derecho, este tiene que ver con la demostración de los daños de índole material o como en este caso social que fue alegado en el fundamento factico de la acción civil resarcitoria, el nexo causal y el criterio de imputación de este, sea a título de dolo, culpa, riesgo creado, etc. En el presente asunto, dado que los daños pretendidos -de índole social-, guardan estrecha relación causal con los hechos acusados (de índole dolosa) y no habiéndose demostrado la responsabilidad del demandado civil en los mismos, dado que el criterio de imputación en este caso es evidentemente subjetivo a título de dolo, se verifica que no le asiste derecho alguno a la parte actora civil. En modo alguno el daño social invocado puede atribuirse a una acción dolosa del demandado civil, como ya quedo ampliamente expuesto en el considerando atinente a la responsabilidad penal, así las declara sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria presentada por LA PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA contra el demandado civil [Nombre 001].» (Cfr. sentencia, folio 480 vuelto). Como bien dice la apelante, la esencia del rechazo, según se constata, es que, al no haberse establecido la responsabilidad penal del encartado y ser la reclamada una responsabilidad civil subjetiva por hecho propio, no era posible la acogida de la demanda civil, conclusión que, en efecto, es correcta, sin que sea necesario una mayor elucubración, como parece echarla de menos la quejosa, desde que todas las razones esgrimidas en las otras partes de la sentencia para sustentar la absolutoria (y cuya corrección ya fue examinada y avalada) se integran a esta parte de la decisión. Recuérdese que las sentencias son una unidad de sentido lógico jurídico en donde sus distintas partes que no pueden leerse en forma aislada. En materia de responsabilidad civil —como ya se le indicara a la misma procuradora en otro asunto, ver voto número 2023-349 de las 08:15 horas del 13 de marzo pasado— la doctrina distingue dos tipos: la contractual y la extracontractual. La primera surge de convenios o relaciones jurídicas expresas. La segunda, de actos u omisiones de la vida social. Estos pueden ser dolosos (es decir queridos), culposos (o sea, carentes del deber de cuidado) o estipulados en la ley, con independencia de si hay dolo o culpa o de si se trata de hechos lícitos o ilícitos pues esta se basa en la generación de riesgos (por ejemplo, artículo 1048 del Código Civil) o en la obtención de lucros que deben soportar quienes los propicien (responsabilidad objetiva). La responsabilidad civil extracontractual (que es la que se reclama ante la comisión de un hecho delictivo como el que aquí se discute) puede ser subjetiva (por dolo o culpa) y tanto por hecho propio o directa como por hecho ajeno o indirecta (culpa in eligiendo o culpa in vigilando). La última se encuentra prevista en el numeral 1048 del Código Civil, tercer párrafo, que dice: “El que encarga a una persona del cumplimiento de uno o muchos actos, está obligado a escoger una persona apta para ejecutarlos y a vigilar la ejecución en los límites de la diligencia de un buen padre de familia; y si descuidare esos deberes, será responsable solidariamente de los perjuicios que su encargado causare a un tercero con una acción violatoria del derecho ajeno, cometida con mala intención o por negligencia en el desempeño de sus funciones, a no ser que esa acción no se hubiere podido evitar con todo y la debida diligencia en vigilar.” Esa es diferente del otro tipo de responsabilidad, es decir, la objetiva, que, además de la necesidad de previsión legal específica (por ejemplo, en el artículo 1048 párrafo 5 del Código Civil; en el artículo 32 de la Ley de protección y defensa efectiva del consumidor, contenida en el artículo 32; el numeral 197 de la Ley de Tránsito por vías públicas o terrestres o en los artículos 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) el criterio de imputación implica analizar tres requisitos: a) el empleo de objetos que conllevan peligro o riesgo; b) la causación de un daño de carácter patrimonial; c) la relación o nexo de causa efectos entre el hecho y el daño. Esta, a su vez, puede ser principal o única o solidaria. Esquemáticamente se plantea así:

Como la Procuraduría General de la República estableció que el encartado, con el actuar que se le acusó había generado un daño, su pretensión se enmarcó en una responsabilidad civil extracontractual subjetiva por hecho propio mediante dolo. En la sentencia, al analizar el tema penal, no se estableció que él efectuara la conducta descrita en las acusaciones tanto pública como privadas, es decir, el fundamento fáctico y jurídico ya se había expuesto y analizado, de donde no era necesario repetirlo para sustentar la decisión civil y tampoco era necesario que la sentencia analizara las otras fuentes de responsabilidad civil pues no fueron las invocadas por la parte actora civil y en esta materia rige el principio de congruencia y sus prohibiciones derivadas de ultra o extrapetita. Es cierto que la acción civil resarcitoria es accesoria a lo penal y hay una relativa autonomía entre ambas pretensiones, pero, cuando lo pedido en lo civil depende de que el encartado haya cometido el hecho y esto no se acredita, es claro que lo penal incide en lo civil en tanto impide acreditar el nexo de causalidad que es uno de los elementos, además del hecho generador y del daño, que han de demostrarse en lo civil. Con independencia del tipo de resarcimiento buscado (en este caso por daño social) eso no cambia que la fuente de responsabilidad es subjetiva y no objetiva y, al ser así, la parte actora debía acreditar que el encartado ejecutó la conducta (hecho propio), que hubo un daño y que fue aquella acción la generadora del daño (nexo de causalidad). Al no probarse lo primero tampoco existe lo último y, por ende, lo decidido es correcto. Por otro lado, si bien pudo ser que algunas personas se vieran afectadas por los hechos y dos de ellas declararon en debate, ni esto permite hacer una extrapolación a la “afectación de la tranquilidad pública” ni, aunque hipotéticamente, de poderse, se hiciera, eso tampoco permite acreditar el nexo causal que se echa de menos, pues aquello solo diría de otro elemento (el daño) pero no del nexo referido en que ha de involucrarse subjetivamente al demandado civil, sin que en este caso se hiciera. El que varios tribunales hayan aceptado una pretensión civil, en otros casos en que sí se demostraron los tres elementos para la condena (hecho generador, daño social y nexo causal) no obligaba al a quo para hacer el análisis específico ni obligaba a conceder las partidas si, en el caso concreto, que es el que interesa, aquella acreditación no se hizo. Tampoco comprende esta cámara la razón para alegar que el tribunal es perito de perito cuando tal aforismo permite dilucidar temas relacionados con controversias entre criterios periciales, nada de lo cual consta aquí y si bien, en algunos casos en que la ley lo autorice, los tribunales pueden hacer una estimación prudencial del monto del resarcimiento, eso no significa que la parte actora civil no deba demostrar el daño (lo que se estima es el monto a pagar, no la existencia del daño), lo que tampoco se tuvo por acreditado en este supuesto. Por ende, deben rechazarse las quejas.

V.- Como tercera queja de la Procuraduría General de la República se plantean los mismos alegatos de falta de fundamentación, violación de la sana crítica e indebida aplicación de la ley, pero esta vez artículos 16, 38 y 267 del Código Procesal Penal, 3 inciso i), 20 y 21 de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, 50 de la Constitución Política y 73.2 inciso 4 del Código Procesal Civil vigente. Dice que se condena en costas al Estado por considerar que no tenía razón plausible para litigar pues, al no haber prueba y no ser los hechos delitos, la querella fue indebida y la pretensión estatal es temeraria. Sin embargo, sostiene que para el momento en que los libelos de querella y acción civil se presentaron, los hechos acusados revelaban la eventual comisión de un ilícito en perjuicio de la colectividad y la producción de un daño de considerables proporciones (pese a lo cual se estimó prudencialmente en un monto sumamente bajo). Agrega que hubo una acusación fiscal y esa es la razón plausible para litigar. Copia el contenido del artículo referente a la condena en costas y dice que la Procuraduría General de la República funda su acción en amplia normativa que la obliga jurídicamente a ejercer las acciones penales y civiles contra quien presuntamente sea el responsable de los hechos denunciados y acusados conforme a la investigación llevada a cabo por el Ministerio Publico. Alude al contenido de la Ley Orgánica de su institución que, en sus numerales 20 y 21, establecen que a los procuradores "...les está absolutamente prohibido allanarse, transar, conciliar o desistir de las demandas o reclamaciones” y "...dejar de establecer las demandas o reclamaciones en las que deban intervenir como actores..." Por ello, lo aquí actuado, sigue diciendo, responde a los deberes impuestos por la ley y no hacerlo implica un grave incumplimiento de la prohibición expresa citada. Sostiene que tanto la querella como la acción civil resarcitoria fueron sujetas a análisis por parte del tribunal de la etapa intermedia quien, en calidad de garante de los derechos de las partes, examinó las piezas acusatorias y consideró oportuno elevar a juicio, con lo que se superó el tamiz de la audiencia preliminar y se afirmó el grado de probabilidad suficiente para la continuación del proceso. Considera que no era procedente castigar al Estado por una acción que se vio compelido a entablar. Da las referencias de múltiples votos de diferentes tribunales que aluden, en situaciones semejantes, a la razón plausible para litigar de su representada. Menciona que no existe mala fe alguna, ni abuso del derecho ni se procedió en forma arbitraria o temeraria, sino que actuaron en concordancia con las exigencias de carácter legal y constitucional que los obligan a accionar y, por ello, se debió eximir a esa representación de las costas por existir la citada razón plausible para litigar y, en su lugar, se les condena mediante una decisión infundada. Pide la revocatoria de este extremo. En un tercer apartado, aunque sin enumerar, del recurso de la parte querellante representada por Navas, alude a la condenatoria en costas. Afirma que su representada ha actuado en la defensa de derechos ciudadanos ante la objetividad de los hechos que fueron del conocimiento general como hechos públicos. Inicialmente se presentó una denuncia y la querella se formuló por cuanto existió acusación del Ministerio Publico y se les dio audiencia. El hecho se elevó a juicio en audiencia preliminar de tal forma que ha existido razón plausible para litigar. Pide anular el fallo en este extremo. No hubo respuestas escritas. En la audiencia oral celebrada la licenciada Navas Montero, como querellante amplió su recurso indicando que lo interponía tanto personalmente —como ciudadana costarricense por acción popular— como en su condición de apoderada de la “Asociación Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica”. Aduce que actuaron de buena fe, al punto que hubo una acusación fiscal, por lo que no procedía la condena en costas. La licenciada Margot Avellán, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, se queja de la condena a su representada al pago de costas lo que, a su juicio, también carece de fundamentación, pues actuaron conforme a la ley, al punto que es un grave incumplimiento el no interponer una acción si hay intereses difusos o colectivos involucrados y la entidad que representa esperó a que estuviera la acusación fiscal para decidir qué hacer. Indica que no iniciaron el proceso ni acusaron primero; que la acción pasó el filtro de una persona juzgadora de la etapa preliminar y que no se sabe de dónde salió el monto por costas que fija la jueza, pues no hay motivación. El licenciado Carlos García indicó que la condena en costas al Estado es procedente porque se está estigmatizando a un ciudadano, desde que no tuvo ninguna participación en la huelga de 2018, no se investigó ningún delito anterior, se usó prueba ilegal y no se estaba ante un delito de pasaje. Las quejas se conocen en conjunto por aludir al mismo tema y se rechazarán. Para examinar este tópico es conveniente exponer tanto el razonamiento del tribunal como la interpretación que esta cámara hace de las reglas imperantes sobre costas cuando se litiga en materia penal (aspecto en el que, como se verá, alguna controversia ha existido) para, por último, descender al caso concreto. (A) Descripción de lo sucedido. En este asunto se ejerció la acción penal tanto por el Ministerio Público como por dos querellantes: el “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica” y la Procuraduría General de la República. Esta última entidad planteó, además, una acción civil resarcitoria. En la sentencia se resolvió el tema de costas de la siguiente forma: «V.- COSTAS: De conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 266, 267, 270 y 367 del Código Procesal Penal corresponde determinar lo relativo a las costas derivadas de la presente acción, las cuales por regla deben correr a cargo de la parte vencida y solo de manera excepcional precede eximir a esta de su pago cuando se considere que existió razón plausible para litigar y esto tiene su fundamento en que si se acciona en reclamo de pretensiones a las que se cree tener derecho, también se debe asumir la responsabilidad por acciones infundadas. En el caso que ahora nos ocupa, tanto las costas en el aspecto penal como en el civil deben correr a cargo de la parte vencida, esto porque en modo alguno se considera que existió razón plausible para litigar si se toma en cuenta que los hechos denunciados, conforme a la prueba que fue aportada ni siquiera constituyen delito, al considerarse que en el caso que nos ocupa ni siquiera se superó el estrato de la tipicidad e incluso las querellas estuvieron basadas en pruebas que contenían elementos completamente distintos a los ofrecidos o que una vez que se ofrecieron ni siquiera se constató que efectivamente fueron incorporados al proceso. La querella de la Procuraduría hace un ofrecimiento de prueba casi idéntico al del Ministerio Público sin que la representación estatal se tomara siquiera la molestia de constatar que la prueba que se ofrecía era pertinente y lo más importante, que efectivamente contenía lo indicado en al ofrecimiento, y no como quedó acreditado en autos, en el considerando atinente al análisis probatorio, donde se partió que la prueba del DVD que había sido decomisado por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial contenía las manifestaciones del imputado cuando en realidad contenía la entrevista que rindiera la querellante días después ante un canal de televisión. Y por otro lado, la querella del Movimiento Ciudadano ofreció un elemento probatorio que nunca fue efectivamente decomisado y por ende incorporado al proceso, sin que ello fuese constatado de previo sino hasta el momento en que se estaba incorporado la prueba material al debate, en la primera audiencia del día 08 de diciembre, donde la querellante luego del minuto 23 de la grabación y previa información del Tribunal sobre los videos que habían sido admitidos como prueba reconoce que no fue admitido y que fijaron y pese a ello se hizo alusión breve al momento de emitir conclusiones. Aunado a que, querellaron un hecho -el octavo- respecto del cual no se desprende siquiera que delito pudo haber el querellado instigado a cometer, por cuanto la persona presuntamente agredida ni siquiera quiso denunciar y pese a ello los querellantes continuaron con la querella en cuanto a este hecho -esto conforme se desprende del folio 216 vuelto del expediente, donde indica el auto de apertura a juicio que la querella admitida al Movimiento Ciudadano CR es la de folios 1 a 20 del respectivo legajo, la cual consta de ocho hechos-. Además no puede dejar de considerar el Tribunal que las querellas, que como ya se dijo no son constitutivas del delito acusado ni de delito alguno, contaron con patrocinio letrado para su interposición y finalmente en cuanto a la acción civil, amén de que el artículo 270 del Código Procesal Penal es muy claro en quien debe soportar las costas, tampoco se considera que se litigó con buena fe pues en cuanto a la prueba ofrecida los cuestionamientos serían los mismos hechos a la querella por esa parte interpuesta, agregando que ni siquiera se preocupó por aportar la prueba que ofreció por recabar a su cargo, a saber la valoración de daños y costos por gastos por eventuales medidas preventivas para resguardar la paz pública, que era parte del elenco con que se pretendía acreditar el daño social sufrido conforme se consigna en el punto VII del escrito de interposición de la acción civil resarcitoria. Así, al determinarse la inexistencia de razón plausible para litigar conforme a lo expuesto, son las costas derivadas de las querellas y acción civil a cargo de las partes perdidosas, las cuales se fijan en la suma de CIENTO VEINTIÚN MIL COLONES correspondientes a la acción civil y CUATROCIENTOS OCHENTA Y CUATRO MIL COLONES correspondientes a cada una de las querellas. Las sumas acordadas deberán ser canceladas al adquirir firmeza este fallo y por simple depósito bancario en la cuenta del Tribunal.» (Cfr. sentencia, folio 481 frente y vuelto). (B) Reglas en materia de costas en el proceso penal. De previo a descender al análisis del tema es menester tener claridad sobre las reglas vigentes en materia de costas dentro del proceso penal. En el voto número 2012-1052 (R. Chinchilla, L. García y E. Salinas) asumido, retomado y ampliado en el voto número 2015-909 (R. Chinchilla, L. García y R. Obando) y en el voto número 2017-291 (R. Chinchilla, A.I. Solís y J. Campos) y cuyo criterio se comparte con la actual integración, se aludió a la regulación normativa en materia de costas cuya regla general es la condena a la parte perdidosa con excepciones basadas en la evidente buena fe, aunque otras disposiciones parecían tener disposiciones presuntamente especiales y distintas a aquella regla general. Aunque el énfasis de esos pronunciamientos estaba dado en materia de acción civil, los argumentos, por paridad de razón en muchos casos, son extensibles a la querella. Así se dijo entonces —y se reitera ahora— que aun y cuando la acción civil resarcitoria se ejerza dentro del proceso penal, por ser accesoria, se hace conforme a las reglas establecidas por este Código (artículo 41 del Código Procesal Penal). Es así que el numeral 267 del Código Procesal Penal, aunque obliga, como regla de principio, a que las costas estén a cargo de la parte vencida, también señala que se le podrá eximir, total o parcialmente de estas, "cuando haya razón plausible para litigar", lo que no es otra cosa, que la misma regulación que existe en materia civil bajo el concepto de "evidente buena fe" (artículo 222 del Código Procesal Civil No. 7130 derogado y numeral 73.2 del Código Procesal Civil vigente). Es cierto que esta cámara, con integraciones parcialmente similares a la actual y bajo el nombre de Tribunal de Casación Penal, en diferentes oportunidades refirió: «Lo primero que ha de indicarse es que, como una contrapartida del derecho de acción o de acceso a la justicia, existe la obligación de financiar los gastos que el proceso genere. Esa obligación recae, por regla general, en la parte que ha sido vencida desde que, al no haber reconocido extrajudicialmente la pretensión de la parte vencedora obligó a ésta a hacer uso del aparato jurisdiccional. Esta regla, de que la parte vencida soporta los gastos que se originen en el proceso, es prácticamente universal. Así la expone la doctrina procesal tradicional (...) {CHIOVENDA, José. La condena en costas. Traducción de Juan de la Puente y Quijano. Madrid, 1928, p. 220 (...) CHIOVENDA, José. Derecho procesal civil: principios. Tomo II. Cárdenas editor y distribuidor, México, edición 1990 (...) CARNELUTTI, Francesco. Derecho procesal civil y penal. Traducción de Enrique Figueroa Alfonzo. Colección de clásicos del derecho, México, 1994, p. 80.} Ahora bien, las costas del proceso o judiciales, como se infiere de lo anterior, no pueden confundirse con las costas procesales. La primera es la categoría genérica que tiene dos componentes: las costas personales que comprenden los honorarios de abogado y las costas procesales que son todos los restantes gastos que se originen con el proceso (...) En el derecho costarricense, los diversos cuerpos procesales vigentes en las distintas materias recogen la obligación de que el pronunciamiento sobre el extremo de costas se haga, imperativamente y aún de oficio, en la resolución que pone fin al proceso y que éste pese sobre la parte vencida. Esa norma general, que excluye que el tema de costas haga incurrir al pronunciamiento en falta de congruencia por ultra o extrapetitio (...) es excepcionado, sin embargo, en algunas normas que prevén la posibilidad de que, facultativamente, sean otras las pautas a aplicar: (...) Ahora bien, el tema así enfocado -cuestionado en la moderna teoría general del proceso a partir de principios como la gratuidad en el acceso a la justicia, pero sin que tal crítica haya tenido mayores repercusiones prácticas en las legislaciones mundiales- fue puesto en jaque, desde mucho tiempo atrás, en el derecho procesal penal, habida cuenta de la naturaleza (pública o colectiva) del conflicto que allí se decide y de la existencia de instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos que obligan a los estados que los han suscrito a proporcionar, obligatoriamente, una defensa gratuita para el encartado que, contra su voluntad, es traído al proceso pero se encuentra amparado por un estado constitucional de inocencia, así como por el deber estatal de suministrar a su población mecanismos idóneos para resolver sus conflictos más importantes (cfr.: artículo 8.2.a y 8.2.e de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y 14.2.d y 14.2.f del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y políticos que establecen el derecho del imputado de ser asistido gratuitamente por un traductor o intérprete y de que el Estado le suministre abogado). Ese trato diferenciado del tema, si bien mantiene los mismos principios, incorpora otros adicionales y se pone de manifiesto en la evolución con que tales tópicos se han abordado en las diferentes legislaciones procesales penales que se han sucedido en Costa Rica (...) ¬Código Procesal Penal (1996): "Artículo 265. Costas del imputado. En todo proceso, el Estado cubrirá los gastos en relación con el imputado y las demás partes que gocen del beneficio de litigar sin el cobro de ellos. Cuando el imputado tenga solvencia económica, deberá pagar al Poder Judicial los servicios del defensor público o cualquier otro que haya recibido. Para ello, se seguirá el procedimiento establecido en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, respecto del defensor público. Se exceptúa de ese deber el pago del traductor o del intérprete oficiales" "Artículo 266. Resolución necesaria. El tribunal penal deberá pronunciarse en forma motivada sobre el pago de las costas procesales y personales al dictar la resolución que ponga término a la causa." "Artículo 267. Fijación de las costas. Las costas estarán a cargo de la parte vencida , pero el tribunal podrá eximirla, total o parcialmente, cuando haya razón plausible para litigar. Cuando sean varios los condenados al pago de las costas, el tribunal fijará la parte proporcional que corresponda a cada uno, sin perjuicio de la solidaridad que establezca la ley" (...) "Artículo 270. Acción civil. Si es admitida la pretensión civil en la sentencia, el imputado y el tercero civilmente demandado soportarán solidariamente las costas; si se rechaza la pretensión, las soportará el actor civil. Si la acción no puede proseguir, cada uno de los intervinientes soportará sus propias costas, salvo que las partes hayan convenido otra medida o el tribunal, por las circunstancias del caso, las distribuya de otra manera" (...) Es así como, en materia procesal penal costarricense, surgen algunas excepciones al tratamiento que de este tópico se hace en otras ramas del derecho, sea público o privado. Entonces, aunque la regla es que las costas corren por cuenta de la parte vencida, si ésta es el acusado penal, cabe hacer la diferenciación entre las costas procesales o gastos. Estos últimos, es decir los gastos que incorporan el pago del traductor o intérprete- siempre quedarán a cargo del Estado, por así disponerlo el numeral 265 del Código Procesal Penal citado y, en lo referente a los honorarios de abogado, el encartado puede estar eximido del pago, si y solo si converjan dos situaciones: a)- que su defensor sea público; y b)- que carezca de recursos para devolver el pago de sus honorarios al Estado (...) Aunque esta última posición ha sido académicamente cuestionada en su constitucionalidad cuando el encartado es absuelto (cfr.: LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ, Javier. Proceso penal comentado. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 4a. edición, 2009, p. 416..."), lo cierto es que no lo ha sido aún por los canales procesales de rigor, lo que hace que permanezca vigente (...) Pero si el o la profesional en derecho de la persona acusada es particular o si, siendo pagado/a por el Estado, el encartado/a posee recursos para pagarlo (aspecto que, como ha quedado indicado, puede dilucidarse en la etapa de ejecución según lo que al respecto haya decidido la sentencia) la condena en costas personales implicará que sea el encartado o sentenciado quien pague los honorarios de su abogado y no que éste pueda exigirle al Estado dicha retribución, como sucedería si se interpretara o aplicara erróneamente la regla citada y, por desconocimiento, se eximiera siempre al encartado del pago de ambas costas o se condenara en ellas, siempre, al Estado (...) Igual ocurre, si la parte vencida es el Ministerio Público, respecto de quien, también, hay exención legal para el cobro de ambas costas, esto por lo dispuesto en el numeral 268 del Código Procesal Penal (...) El tema ha sido tratado de diversa manera por este mismo Tribunal, con diversas integraciones, pareciendo que la tendencia es a exigir siempre la fundamentación y hasta a aceptar la exención como excepción para todos los casos (...) . No obstante, esas reglas son para el proceso ordinario y en materia penal, pues hay que tener en cuenta que en otros tipos de procesos penales especiales (de acción privada por ejemplo) y en materia de demandas civiles existen normas especiales que desplazan a esas disposiciones generales. Allí la regla general es que el perdidoso siempre afronta ambas costas y que la posibilidad de hacer exención no cabe desde que la norma especial no lo posibilita. Así se pronuncian los artículos 78 (desistimiento expreso de la querella de acción pública en que imperativamente se dispone la condena al que desiste salvo acuerdo de partes en contrario), 118 párrafo segundo (desistimiento de la acción civil), 384 (desistimiento de la querella de acción privada en que imperativamente se dispone la condena al que desiste salvo acuerdo de partes en contrario) y 270 del Código Procesal Penal (condena a la parte civil vencida) (ver en tal sentido el voto de este Tribunal, con una integración parcialmente diferente a la actual, número 851-2005 del 01 de setiembre de 2005 -U. Zúñiga, Llobet y Salazar- y la nota en el voto número 2010-0085 del 17 de enero de 2010 -Camacho, García y U. Zúñiga-. En sentido contrario, esto es, aceptando la razón plausible para litigar como excepción en todos los casos, los votos de esta Cámara, con diferente integración, números 2006-1035 del 29 de setiembre de 2006 -García, Porras y Morales- y 2000-119 del 11 de febrero de 2000 -López, Sanabria y Arroyo-, en donde se aborda el tema aunque con diversos criterios al aquí expuesto). Por otra parte, tampoco cabe hacer aplicación supletoria del Código Procesal Civil, desde que hay norma expresa en contrario. (...)» Los destacados se suplen. Ver votos del Tribunal de Casación Penal número 2010-0305 de las 14:40 horas del 19 de marzo de 2010 (L. García, R. Chinchilla y U. Zúñiga) y número 2010-0366 de las 15:20 horas del 08 de abril de 2010 (R. Chinchilla, U. Zúñiga y R. Gullock). En similares condiciones y asumiendo el anterior criterio cfr.: voto número 2011-1296 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Esa posición, en términos generales, se avaló o mantuvo en los antecedentes supra reseñados excepto en lo referente a la condena imperativa en costas de la demanda civil para la parte perdidosa, tema sobre el que hubo un replanteamiento de la cuestión a partir de principios constitucionales de mayor jerarquía que la ley (como el de igualdad ante la ley: artículo 34 constitucional) y se modificó expresamente ese criterio. Para ello se dijo —en los citados votos número 2015-909 y número 2017-291— que si bien la legislación procesal penal contiene una norma especial (relativa a la demanda civil) que, imperativamente, establece la condena en costas a la parte civil perdidosa, ese trato es diferente al que se le brinda a la misma parte si hubiera recurrido a la vía civil ordinaria. Por otro lado, en no pocas ocasiones la demanda civil no puede prosperar porque la base fáctica sobre la que descansa, si bien se estableció como probable, no llegó a acreditarse con la certeza requerida para condenar penalmente y eso, sumado a errores conceptuales de las partes que no han incorporado a sus planteamientos criterios distintos de imputación del daño, suele generar el rechazo de las pretensiones civiles. Finalmente, aunque la norma (frase final del primer párrafo del artículo 270 del Código Procesal Penal) es imperativa, también lo es el numeral 267 y, en el mismo Libro y Título e inmediatamente después, se inserta la previsión de exención (artículo 267 párrafo primero, ab initio, del Código Procesal Penal). Es decir, la exención se prevé justamente, para flexibilizar el rigor de las normas imperativas allí referidas, estando ambas disposiciones en el mismo nivel de normas generales. Conjugando todo ello, se puede concluir que la condena en costas imperativa a la parte perdidosa civil, con la posibilidad de exención facultativa (fundamentada) a dicha parte que haga el tribunal son las reglas vigentes en la materia que, así se uniforman con las del proceso civil ordinario y que, como es el origen de ambas disposiciones, permite resolver, con mayor justicia, el caso concreto, a fin de restaurar la armonía social (artículo 7 del Código Procesal Penal), posición esta que, en definitiva, estima correcta esta cámara. (C) El caso concreto. De la transcripción que se hiciera al iniciar este considerando es posible concluir que la sentencia de mérito sí fundamentó, en forma expresa y amplia, la condena dicha, de donde no se configura el vicio de falta de fundamentación contenido en el numeral 142 del Código Procesal Penal. Por otra parte, las afirmaciones fácticas de las que se partió (se acusó sin verificar o aportar la prueba; se hicieron conclusiones sin tener apoyo en el material evacuado en juicio; no se rectificaron hechos de la querella privada pese a que, respecto de ellos, ningún aporte de material se hizo; no fue sino hasta en debate cuando se percatan de la falta de prueba, etc.) no han sido controvertidas por las partes y esta cámara ha constatado que son ciertas, es decir, derivan de lo que realmente sucedió en el proceso, por lo que tampoco hay yerros en esta materia. Ahora bien, lo que resta por determinar es si la discrecionalidad (para condenar o no en costas) fue aplicada en forma correcta por el tribunal de mérito o si hubo abuso o arbitrariedad al respecto y, en tal ejercicio, esta cámara concluye que tampoco hay vicio alguno que declarar. Véase que si bien las partes apelantes de este tema sostienen que querellaron una vez que el Ministerio Público presentó acusación y se desenvolvieron en el proceso al amparo de un auto de apertura a juicio dictado por una autoridad jurisdiccional que, en consecuencia, revisó los libelos y determinó el cumplimiento de requisitos para llegar a esta fase procesal, lo que no dicen es que tal decisión del tribunal de la etapa intermedia se basa en una probabilidad, no en una certeza, y tal probabilidad a su vez deriva del panorama que las mismas gestionantes le exhiben al ente jurisdiccional en sus escritos. Dicho tribunal no evacúa la prueba para determinar si esta establece lo que ellas le afirman que aportará sino que lo asume de buena fe, de donde el que tal tribunal haya ordenado la apertura a juicio no avala el proceder de los sujetos que dieron la información, por ejemplo de la querellante privada de introducir hechos (como el 8) respecto de los que no aporta ninguna prueba o de las entidades estatales de no revisar el material ofrecido para determinar que este tenga el contenido de lo que ellas estipulan en su escrito. Las representaciones estatales, con más responsabilidad aún que un particular, tienen el deber de objetividad (artículo 63 del Código Procesal Penal y 10 inciso l) de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República) por lo que es más censurable aún que promuevan acusaciones sin el sustento probatorio adecuado o que efectúen interpretaciones jurídicas que excedan el marco del estado Democrático de Derecho que están obligadas a respetar. Por otra parte, si bien la Procuraduría General de la República tiene prohibiciones legales de allanarse, transar, desistir o conciliar, no tiene obligación de acusar a quienes otros determinen que debe acusar, sino que para ello cuenta con criterio propio e independencia funcional. Inclusive lo que el numeral 15 de la Ley Orgánica señala es que: “Artículo 15°.-Los funcionarios de la Procuraduría General de la República (…) También les está prohibido, sin la previa autorización referida: dejar de establecer demandas o reclamaciones en que deban intervenir como actores, omitir la contestación de los traslados o audiencias que se les haya dado, dejar de presentar las pruebas legales que les corresponda rendir, abandonar las que hayan propuesto, no interponer oportunamente los recursos legales contra actos ejecutados o resoluciones dictadas en contra de las demandas o pedimentos que hayan presentado o en perjuicio de los intereses cuya defensa les está confiada” (se suplen las negritas). Es decir, la prohibición radica en que se haga sin autorización y la determinación de cuándo se debe intervenir responde a un criterio valorativo del jerarca, de donde no existe la obligatoriedad sin posibilidades de apartarse del mandato que esgrime la procuradora. Además, nada de lo anterior le excusa de su obligación de revisar el material probatorio, máxime cuando este es de tipo documental, para constatar que el contenido de lo que se ofrece sea fidedigno, sin que evidentemente lo hiciera en este caso al no darse cuenta las partes que el supuesto video en que estarían las intervenciones del querellado no era un original, estaba editado y nunca se aportó. En lo tocante a las querellantes particulares tampoco se evidencia su buena fe no solo por los yerros y omisiones ya dichas sino por incluir eventos sobre los que ninguna prueba esgrimió y por no preocuparse por tamizar algunas de sus manifestaciones a la luz de otros derechos constitucionales, incluyendo los derivados de la libertad de expresión (de los que la protesta social es parte) y los derechos sindicales, que también son derechos humanos de las personas y ante el choque de estos con otros derechos fundamentales de otras personas existe la obligación de hacer juicios de ponderación que en la especie se omitieron por completo. Por otra parte, nadie puede arrogarse como suyos los derechos de los demás ni el ejercicio de la soberanía nacional (artículo 2 de la Constitución Política), y el que unas personas se sientan afectadas por algunas acciones no implica que, con ello, se afecte la “tranquilidad pública” en los términos del tipo penal invocado como base de la indemnización que fue el ejercicio que pretendió hacerse, pues aceptarlo así conduciría a abusos inaceptables que, en tiempos de profundas crisis de diverso orden y gran polarización social, pueden generar abusos lamentables. Así las cosas, no estima esta cámara que exista ningún vicio u omisión en el razonamiento externado por el tribunal de mérito sobre este tema y ello conduce al rechazo de las quejas. En lo referente al monto, es cierto que en la resolución recurrida no se explicó el procedimiento para llegar a este, sino que únicamente se hizo referencia a la condena y las sumas de ella: «Son las costas derivadas de las querellas y acción civil a cargo de las partes perdidosas, las cuales se fijan en la suma de CIENTO VEINTIÚN MIL COLONES correspondientes a la acción civil y CUATROCIENTOS OCHENTA Y CUATRO MIL COLONES correspondientes a las querellas.» (Se suplen las negritas, las mayúsculas son del original). Empero, si se hace un simple ejercicio aritmético respecto a lo contenido en el decreto aplicable a este asunto se notará que no hay agravio alguno. Este asunto inició, como se expuso inicialmente (considerando II.A), en setiembre de 2019 fecha en que estaba vigente el decreto ejecutivo N° 41457-JP del 17 de octubre de 2018, "Arancel de honorarios por servicios profesionales de abogacía y notariado" que empezó a regir desde el 01 de febrero de 2019 y establece los montos mínimos de honorarios profesionales en esas áreas. En el Título III relativo a los asuntos judiciales, Capítulo I (tarifa general para procesos de conocimiento) el artículo 19 a la fecha de la sentencia (que se dictó en diciembre de 2021 data que es importante porque el decreto tuvo reformas en setiembre de 2022 que no aplican a este supuesto por ser posteriores a la decisión que se pide revisar) establecía: “Artículo 19.- Honorarios en procesos de cuantía inestimable. Los honorarios mínimos por este tipo de procesos no podrán ser inferiores a doscientos cuarenta y dos mil colones.” Por su parte, ya en el capítulo VIII (Proceso penal) se establecieron las siguientes reglas especiales: «Artículo 38.- Tribunal unipersonal: En las causas penales cuya competencia sea de un Tribunal Unipersonal, los honorarios mínimos por la defensa penal serán de cuatrocientos ochenta y cuatro mil colones. Salvo pacto escrito en contrario, los honorarios se pagarán de la siguiente forma: a) Una tercera parte por la etapa de investigación. b) Una tercera parte por la celebración de la audiencia preliminar. c) Una tercera parte por la celebración del juicio oral. En aquellos casos en que el proceso concluya por la aplicación del procedimiento abreviado o alguna medida alternativa, los honorarios serán un setenta y cinco por ciento (75%) de la totalidad de los honorarios del proceso. Los honorarios correspondientes a la acción civil resarcitoria se regirán por las reglas establecidas para dicha materia en el presente Arancel. Las mismas reglas se aplicarán para el abogado que ejerza la querella en delitos de acción pública.» (Las negritas son agregadas). Como puede notarse, ese honorario mínimo fue el que se fijó como costas personales para cada querella, de donde no hay perjuicio alguno en la falta de motivación. En lo que atañe a la acción civil el numeral 42 del citado decreto estatuía: «Artículo 42.- Acción Civil: Los honorarios por la acción civil resarcitoria son independientes de los que correspondan al trámite de la causa penal. El Abogado(a) del actor civil cobrará honorarios por esta acción de acuerdo con la Tarifa General, salvo pacto escrito en contrario. Los honorarios se pagarán en tres partes iguales de la siguiente forma: a) Por su presentación. b) Por la celebración de la audiencia preliminar. c) Por la celebración del juicio oral. Iguales honorarios devengará el abogado que represente al demandado civil.» (Las negritas son agregadas). Dicha tarifa la regula el numeral 16.a del arancel estableciendo, entre otros parámetros, un 20% de la cuantía si el monto de esta no supera los 16 millones de colones. Como en este caso se pretendió un millón de colones, el 20% llega a doscientos mil colones, monto este que correspondía superior al fijado (de 121 mil colones que, en consecuencia, también es inferior a la tarifa mínima contemplada en el numeral 19), por lo que más bien la parte apelante resultó favorecida y sin que tal cosa se pueda revertir al no haber recurso sobre tal extremo de quien resultó perjudicado (principio de prohibición de reforma en perjuicio). En definitiva, no hay agravio alguno que declarar y por ello también este extremo debe rechazarse.

VI.- Nota de la jueza Vargas González: Concurro con lo resuelto en todos los aspectos salvo en lo siguiente: i) en cuanto se indica que el delito de instigación pública tiene, como uno de sus elementos constitutivos el de la publicidad, aspecto que no comparto. En mi criterio los elementos objetivos del tipo son aquellos que se exponen literalmente en este y no los que derivan implícitamente o se extraen de su título o de interpretación histórica o sistemática, de modo que, al no estar la publicidad comprendida en el tipo penal dicho, no forma parte del delito en cuestión ni requería ser abarcada por el dolo del sujeto. Sin embargo, eso no afecta la decisión adoptada de rechazar los recursos en el tema penal, pues esta se sustenta en el resto de las argumentaciones unánimes (prueba ilícita, carencia de prueba, inversión de la carga probatoria, así como el interpretar restrictivamente “delitos contra la tranquilidad pública” para solo entender los comprendidos en la sección así denominada del Código Penal y no todos los que incidan en dicho bien jurídico). ii) En cuanto se plantea que en nuestro país el derecho a protestar podría justificar la obstrucción de las principales vías públicas. Si bien el análisis efectuado en el punto (C) de esta decisión, denominado “El Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y el Código Penal: integración y aplicación sistemática” es a mayor abundamiento [pues en este asunto se descartó la instigación común dado que no se materializaron actos de ejecución de los delitos de entorpecimiento de servicios públicos (art. 263 del Código Penal) o de obstrucción de la vía pública (art. 263 bis del mismo código) y también se excluyó la denominada “instigación pública” (artículo 280 C.P.) en la medida en que los delitos recién mencionados no están contemplados dentro del Título X del Código Penal, denominado “Delitos contra la tranquilidad pública”] tras ponderar que en Costa Rica la infraestructura vial es caótica y las rutas alternas prácticamente no existen (a diferencia de lo que sucede en otras latitudes) concluyo que el cierre de las principales carreteras nacionales afecta indiscutiblemente los derechos fundamentales de los demás ciudadanos, cuando menos el de su libre tránsito. En consecuencia, en nuestro contexto actual el ejercicio de los derechos apuntados (por ejemplo, protesta social, libertad sindical, derecho de huelga y libertad de expresión) no puede invocarse como una causa de justificación válida para las conductas ya mencionadas (de haberse dado estas, que no es el caso). También, por lo que acabo de exponer, no comparto uno de los argumentos dados por mis compañeras para concluir que la condena en costas decretada contra las querellantes particulares sea adecuada, a saber: “[…] por no preocuparse por tamizar algunas de sus manifestaciones a la luz de otros derechos constitucionales, incluyendo los derivados de la libertad de expresión (de los que la protesta social es parte) y los derechos sindicales, que también son derechos humanos de las personas y ante el choque de estos con otros derechos fundamentales de otras personas existe la obligación de hacer juicios de ponderación que en la especie se omitieron por completo”. Ahora, hecha esta salvedad, estoy acuerdo con la resolución de los reclamos formulados en materia civil y costas, pues hay otros razonamientos en la sentencia de mérito que sustentan la decisión adoptada por el a quo (por ejemplo, la atipicidad de la conducta imputada) y sobre los cuales es innecesario hacer mayores consideraciones.

POR TANTO:

Se declaran sin lugar los recursos de apelación interpuestos por el fiscal, máster Oscar Quirós Soto; por la licenciada Margot Avellán Ruíz, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República querellante y actora civil y por la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, apoderada de las personas que actúan como querellantes bajo el nombre de “Movimiento Ciudadano Costa Rica”. La jueza Vargas González pone nota. NOTIFÍQUESE.

Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón Patricia Vargas González Kathya Jiménez Fernández Juezas de apelación de sentencia penal Imputado: [Nombre 001] Ofendido: La tranquilidad pública Delito: Instigación pública DDURANC