Prescription of Disciplinary Action in Judicial InspectionPrescripción de la acción disciplinaria en la Inspección Judicial

*190006500031IJ* 19-000650-0031-IJ.

CONTRA:

[Nombre 001].

OFENDIDO:

[Nombre 005] N° 2186-2019.

Voto 1162-2020.

TRIBUNAL DE LA INSPECCIÓN JUDICIAL. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-six minutes on April fifteenth, two thousand twenty.- Disciplinary proceeding number 19-000650-0031-IJ, filed by CONSEJO SUPERIOR, against [Nombre 001], for OMISSION IN THE FULFILLMENT OF DUTIES (OMISIÓN EN EL CUMPLIMIENTO DE SUS DEBERES).

RESULTANDO

I- By means of a statement of charges (traslado de cargos) at nine hours and forty-seven minutes on April second, two thousand nineteen, the employee [Nombre 001], [...] Judicial 2 of the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, was accused: "...OMISSION IN THE FULFILLMENT OF DUTIES (ARTÍCULO 194 OF THE LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL). Specifically, the following is attributed to you: 1. That you [Nombre 001], have served in a permanent capacity, in the position of [...] Judicial 2 in the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, from October third, two thousand seventeen to date, so that during said period, among other tasks, you were responsible for attending to requests for information made by the Consejo Superior. 2. That you [Nombre 001], during the period from January seventh, two thousand nineteen, to February first of that same year, were the person in charge of the email account [...], assigned to the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of San José, and that on January tenth, two thousand nineteen, you received in said institutional email account, the email with the subject "Oficio 113-2019", sent by the Secretaría General de la Corte, by which you were notified of the agreement adopted by the Consejo Superior, in session number 106 of December sixth, two thousand eighteen, artículo LI, in which the following was ordered: "... 1.) Take note of report N° DGAN-DAN-1101-2018 of November 28, 2018, rendered by Licenciada [Nombre 012], [...] of the Departamento de Archivo Notarial of the Archivo Nacional, regarding the protocol volumes and notarial index files seized or loaned to different judicial offices. 2.) Order the offices indicated in the attached new list to return to the Archivo Nacional, within a period of 15 business days counted from the communication of this agreement, the documents indicated, and they must inform the Secretaría General de la Corte of compliance with the above, and in the event that this is not possible for a justified reason, they must communicate it, and they must take the appropriate measures for the return as soon as possible. Due to the foregoing, the Secretaría General de la Corte will make known to this Council only the list of offices that failed to comply with what was requested. 3.) The Secretaría General de la Corte must issue the corresponding circular informing the offices that when they transfer protocol volumes and notarial index files to another office, they must inform the Archivo Nacional. The exception is noted that said documents must not be sent by mail, the foregoing in order to safeguard their security..." (The underlining does not correspond to the original). 3. That within the list attached to the email indicated in the preceding fact (see Excel table called "Informe SECUESTROS Y PRESTAMOS DGAN-DAN-1101-2018"), the report that you [Nombre 001] were to render, in your capacity as [...] Judicial of the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, was related to the notarial index of the following Notaries Public, [Nombre 014], [Nombre 015], [Nombre 016], corresponding respectively to the following proceedings: 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, which were seized respectively on the following dates: July tenth, two thousand seventeen, April sixth, two thousand seventeen, and November sixteenth, two thousand seventeen. 4. That despite the foregoing, you [Nombre 001], as of February first, two thousand nineteen, had not fulfilled your duty to render the report requested by the Consejo Superior, with regard to the seized notarial indices indicated in the preceding fact, so that by means of the agreement adopted by the Consejo Superior in session number 11 of February twelfth, two thousand nineteen, artículo XCI, it ordered that said situation be transferred to the Inspección Judicial. 5. That based on the foregoing facts, you [Nombre 001] are accused of an omission in the fulfillment of your duties as [...] Judicial of the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, by not having prepared and sent to the Secretaría de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, within the fifteen-day period, the report requested via email dated January tenth, two thousand nineteen, with the subject "Oficio 113-2019", regarding the notarial indices seized in proceedings number 14-000333-187- FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, given that as of February first, two thousand nineteen, and having exceeded the granted period, you had not yet rendered the aforementioned report..." II.-) The accused answered the statement of charges, accepted them, and offered evidence. (See virtual file).

III.-) That the legal requirements have been followed, without there being defects or omissions capable of generating nullity or defenselessness. This resolution is issued within the legal time limits.

Drafted by Inspectora General Quesada Madrigal, with the affirmative vote of Inspectores Generales Mora Saprissa and Hernández Agüero and;

CONSIDERANDO

I.-) PROVEN FACTS (HECHOS PROBADOS): Of importance for the resolution of this complaint, the following are listed: 1- That the accused [Nombre 001], has served in a permanent capacity, in the position of [...] Judicial 2 in the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, from October third, two thousand seventeen to date, so that during said period, among other tasks, she was responsible for attending to requests for information made by the Consejo Superior. (Statements of [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] and documentary evidence that is added to the record). 2- That the employee [Nombre 001], during the period from January seventh, two thousand nineteen, to February first of that same year, was the person in charge of the email account [...], assigned to the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of San José, and that on January tenth, two thousand nineteen, she received in said institutional email account, the email with the subject "Oficio 113-2019", sent by the Secretaría General de la Corte, by which she was notified of the agreement adopted by the Consejo Superior, in session number 106 of December sixth, two thousand eighteen, artículo LI, in which the following was ordered: "... 1.) Take note of report N° DGAN-DAN-1101-2018 of November 28, 2018, rendered by Licenciada [Nombre 012], [...] of the Departamento de Archivo Notarial of the Archivo Nacional, regarding the protocol volumes and notarial index files seized or loaned to different judicial offices. 2.) Order the offices indicated in the attached new list to return to the Archivo Nacional, within a period of 15 business days counted from the communication of this agreement, the documents indicated, and they must inform the Secretaría General de la Corte of compliance with the above, and in the event that this is not possible for a justified reason, they must communicate it, and they must take the appropriate measures for the return as soon as possible. Due to the foregoing, the Secretaría General de la Corte will make known to this Council only the list of offices that failed to comply with what was requested. 3.) The Secretaría General de la Corte must issue the corresponding circular informing the offices that when they transfer protocol volumes and notarial index files to another office, they must inform the Archivo Nacional. The exception is noted that said documents must not be sent by mail, the foregoing in order to safeguard their security..." (The underlining does not correspond to the original). (Statements of [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] and documentary evidence that is added to the record). 3- That within the list attached to the email indicated in the preceding fact (see Excel table called "Informe SECUESTROS Y PRESTAMOS DGAN-DAN-1101-2018"), the report that the investigated [Nombre 001] was to render, in her capacity as [...] Judicial of the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, was related to the notarial index of the following Notaries Public, [Nombre 014], [Nombre 015], [Nombre 016], corresponding respectively to the following proceedings: 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, which were seized respectively on the following dates: July tenth, two thousand seventeen, April sixth, two thousand seventeen, and November sixteenth, two thousand seventeen. (Statements of [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] and documentary evidence that is added to the record). 4- That despite the foregoing, the accused [Nombre 001], as of February first, two thousand nineteen, had not fulfilled her duty to render the report requested by the Consejo Superior, with regard to the seized notarial indices indicated in the preceding fact, so that by means of the agreement adopted by the Consejo Superior in session number 11 of February twelfth, two thousand nineteen, artículo XCI, it ordered that said situation be transferred to the Inspección Judicial. (Statements of [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] and documentary evidence that is added to the record). 5- That based on the foregoing facts, the employee [Nombre 001] incurred an omission in the fulfillment of her duties as [...] Judicial of the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, by not having prepared and sent to the Secretaría de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, within the fifteen-day period, the report requested via email dated January tenth, two thousand nineteen, with the subject "Oficio 113-2019", regarding the notarial indices seized in proceedings number 14-000333-187- FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, given that as of February first, two thousand nineteen, and having exceeded the granted period, the accused had not rendered the aforementioned report. (Statements of [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] and documentary evidence that is added to the record).

II.-) UNPROVEN FACTS (HECHOS NO PROBADOS): None of importance for this resolution.

III-) POSITION OF THE TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL DEFENSE: Licda. Alejandra Quesada Chaves, Public Defender of the accused [Nombre 001], indicated that from the response, she accepts that due to a matter without serious or intentional fault (dolo) she omitted to send the email to the Consejo Superior. She requests that it be valued that she has 25 years in the Poder Judicial and has no sanctions. And that the defense's thesis is that her client was on a promotion (ascenso) between 2017 and 2018, and upon returning to the Juzgado de Familia she encountered some irregularities in the Juzgado de Familia; she undertook to put the matter of the protocols in order, and those indicated in the official letter were not ready, and that her substitute in the position did not maintain that control, and therefore she assumed the position with that situation, and for this reason she devised a work plan and even so she could not send the email to the Consejo Superior, and to date those protocols have already been sent to the Archive, and that the accused has been committed to the work, and for this reason all those aspects should be valued, and the matter of the principles of the disciplinary regime should be valued, and that no harm was caused by the omission, and she be absolved of all disciplinary responsibility. The accused, for her part, indicated that she accepts the charges and that everything was due to an involuntary error, she apologized, and requests that she be exempted from responsibility.

IV.) REGARDING THE INCIDENTS RAISED BY THE MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL DEFENSE:

1- EXCEPTION OF LACK OF COMPETENCE: The accused requested that in application of artículo 185 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, these proceedings be referred for lack of competence to the Office Head. The accused is not correct, given that in accordance with numerals 185 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, it is incumbent upon this Tribunal to exercise regular and constant control over all judicial employees of this Poder de la República, so that she is not correct in her arguments, and for this reason the exception (excepción) raised is declared without merit.

2- REGARDING THE LAPSE OF THE ACTION: The defense argues that in these proceedings, the lapse of the action (caducidad de la acción) has occurred, as the initial one-month period regulated by artículo 211 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial had expired, without her client having been notified of a statement of charges, since in her view, in the email dated March 4, 2019, these proceedings begin by reason of the agreement reached by the Consejo Superior in session N° 11-19 held on February 12, 2019, and that the Consejo Superior, the highest disciplinary body for this type of proceedings, it is from its knowledge that the initial monthly period regulated by the cited rule begins to be counted, and therefore, the statement of charges having been notified only until April 2, 2019, it is concluded that the lapse of the action has occurred, and that there is no reasoned order in the proceedings that interrupted the initial monthly period by way of a preliminary investigation.

In this regard, the following is resolved: As this section of the Tribunal has reiterated in various votes such as numbers 863-2014 and 614-2015, among others, it is held that "... regarding that the rule contained in artículo 211 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, over the years since its entry into force upon the enactment of the LOPJ in 1994, has given rise to multiple interpretations. It has been said that what it contemplates are statutes of limitations (prescripción), or else periods of lapse (caducidad), the latter, according to recent votes of the Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo (see vote number 99-F-TC-2014), referring to the month related to the action to investigate the offenses (that is, the statute of limitations or lapse period of the disciplinary action). Regarding the statute of limitations and lapse, it has been said that they are two institutes that, as doctrine has been pointing out, seek to react to the inactivity of the subjects who intervene in the respective legal relationships or, in other terms, the legal system establishes a period that delimits the period of time in which a certain action can be carried out. That period can have retroactive effects, causing the loss of what one had—extinctive statute of limitations—or prospective effects, causing the loss of what one could achieve—lapse.- However, regarding the statute of limitations of the DISCIPLINARY ACTION, we have that it is necessary to mention that the release supposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise, b) passage of time established by the legal system and; c) allegation or plea by the passive subject of the legal relationship to assert the statute of limitations. This supposes that there is no releasing effect if, despite the concurrence of elements a and b, the assertion is not made. Hence, the statute of limitations attends to a rogatory principle and, unlike lapse (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. The foregoing, regarding the disciplinary power, implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, upon the expiration of which, their faculty to seek recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. However, from that perspective, the corrective power of the superior regarding the officials who depend on him, for a matter of legal certainty, is subject to an extinctive term. Generically, that term is regulated by mandate 603 of the Código de Trabajo, which sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power. However, it is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. For example, in matters of public finance, the applicable term is that regulated and specified by Ley N°. 8292 in its artículo 43, Ley N° 8422 in its artículo 44, or Ley N° 8131 in its artículo 112, a matter that is therefore subject to this particular regime. It is a regulatory system that is constituted as a sectoral order containing concrete rules, which, as they are special, prevail over general regulations. In essence, these rules refer to the regime provided in precept 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428. The same occurs with the Ley General de Policía, N°. 7410 of May 26, 1994, published in Alcance No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 103 of May 30, 1994, in whose numeral 83 a particular statute of limitations regime is set, to wit: \"Minor offenses (faltas leves) shall prescribe in one month, and serious offenses (faltas graves), in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated.\" (vote 185-2012 of September 13. (Sección Sexta of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo).- In the same way and in similar terms, it occurs with the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, which in its artículo 211 alludes to three periods, that of the month that refers precisely to the statute of limitations of the disciplinary action (understood as the initial month to issue and notify the statement of charges), the period of one year, and that of the month to impose the sanction. However, in relation to these three periods, similar to those established in artículos 261 and 319.1 of the LGAP, "the principle of swift and complete justice supposes, in the case of administrative proceedings, that they must be resolved, in principle, by final act, within reasonable and proportional periods, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unduly long proceedings. It therefore constitutes an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, to the extent that it requires the definition of the case within a reasonable timeframe. The complexity or not of the proceeding could not justify arbitrarily long proceedings, as this would mean admitting an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and under its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear violation of due process. In that sense, numeral 261.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública states: \"The administrative proceeding must be concluded by final act within the two months following its initiation or, where appropriate, following the filing of the claim or petition of the administered party, unless otherwise provided in this law.\" That same period is set by numeral 32 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.- (...) Now, the violation of the periods set by the legal system for the exercise of a competence may well come to incorporate a pathology in the act, due to infringement of the subjective element of competence. It must be recalled that in light of precept 255 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the legal periods bind both the Administration and the administered parties. From that postulate, it follows then that powers subject to a period can result in null acts (doctrine of numeral 60.1 of that normative body). However, the correct understanding of that last statement must lead to the following: Imperium powers are imprescriptible as determined by artículo 66, subsection 1 of the LGAP, a situation that perfectly aligns with what is stated by numeral 329, subsection 3 of the cited Law as to that the act issued out of time shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly stated by law. Having said this, it is worth clarifying that, despite its wording in imperative language, the two-month period set by canon 261, subsection 2 of the LGAP is not peremptory, but only ordaining, which is inferred from what is stated regarding the duty of the Administration to exercise its powers and the initial validity of \"extemporaneous\" acts. Such a position can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia. This applies both to proceedings initiated ex officio and to those of party action...", and having analyzed this case, this Tribunal considers that the Defense is not correct, as from the study of the file, it emerges that on March 1, 2019, the Consejo Superior sent the agreement reached in session N° 11-19 held on February 12, 2019, the same that originates this complaint, which entered this Office on March 4 via email. Subsequently, the Preliminary Investigation was ordered by the instructing body on March 14 and 22 (See virtual file), and charges were filed against the accused, and she was notified thereof on April 2, 2019, within the month provided by numeral 211 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, so this Chamber does not observe that the alleged statute of limitations or lapse periods were violated, given that precisely the superior body, that is, the Consejo Superior, sends the complaint to this Tribunal, which is the one that has the disciplinary power to investigate this type of offenses in accordance with numeral 174 and following of the Ley Orgánica of this Poder de la República.

In view of the foregoing, the exception of lapse raised by the technical defense is declared without merit.

V.) ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS, QUALIFICATION OF THE OFFENSE, AND SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED: Based on the relation of facts set forth, which have full support in the body of evidence, primarily in the documentary and testimonial evidence, this Tribunal, after the detailed study of this summary proceeding, concludes that indeed the accused [Nombre 001] has incurred the disciplinary offenses charged, which warrants the application of the disciplinary regime. According to the constitutive elements of the disciplinary offense, and in accordance with Voto No. 5594-94 of the Sala Constitucional, 15:48 hours on September 27, 1994, it referred to the subject indicating: "... The disciplinary offense or infraction has been defined by saying that it is a violation of the functioning of any duty proper to their condition, even when it has not been specifically defined, although it is provided for. The determining facts of disciplinary offenses are innumerable, since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the 'subordinate' subjects, behaviors or conducts in truth unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary offense is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disruption to the functioning of the service or immediate or possible affectation of its efficiency ...", indeed in this proceeding, the commission of the offenses by the employee [Nombre 001] was accredited.

The accused answered the statements of charges imputed, indicating that as [...] she is responsible, among other tasks, for attending to requests for information made by the Consejo Superior, and that the indicated email was received by her person, and she proceeded to locate the protocols, and at that moment they were not ready to be sent, and that she also proceeded to review the received book, and it was determined that no volume of other protocols had been loaned or transferred to another Office, and that she did this by virtue of what the Archivo Notarial was indicating to the Consejo Superior, that is, she went beyond what was being requested of her. She further noted that according to the chain of custody of the protocols corresponding to files 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-0187-FA, and 14-001383-187-FA, they were seized on the dates indicated and were delivered to the Office without passing through her hands, and that only the protocol of the first file indicated, that is, 14-000333-0187-FA, was delivered to her on December 13, 2018, when it was returned from the handwriting analysis test, without being ready to send to the Archivo Notarial, since in the months of January and February 2019, the technician in charge at that time of processing the Nonexistent Marriage proceedings had to review whether the test had been performed satisfactorily or whether it had to be rescheduled for the corresponding test, and that the protocols indicated in the preceding paragraph were returned to the Archivo Notarial on March 21, 2019, as observed in the chain of custody corresponding to each file. She also stated that it is true that due to an involuntary omission, due to the heavy workload, the requested report was not sent within the indicated time, and that although she knows it is not an excuse, during the months of January and February, we had some internal changes in the Office, such as employees who went on vacation, and the general services assistant, Sra. [Nombre 017], went on to take a promotion (ascenso), the judicial technician [Nombre 020], who was in charge of processing the files corresponding to Nonexistent Marriages, was relieved of that position, and was assigned in her place the employee [Nombre 021], so that they had to take inventory of the files. Also, among the functions of the [...] is the processing of marriage applications, and for said months, several applications were submitted, and in addition to the foregoing, she had to make an urgent list of files to be delivered to the Oficina del Centro de Apoyo y Mejoramiento a la función Jurisdiccional, since they were going to collaborate with the resolution of files pending judgment, given the large number that the judges of the Office have, and apart from the above, I had to take a day of vacation to attend to a personal matter, and that we also had to begin with the task of destroying files, since the Office was in the process of converting to an electronic Court, and that although she accepts the fault of not having sent the report, she indicates that it was not due to intentional non-compliance, given that she did carry out the procedures regarding what was requested by the Consejo Superior, and since before the information was requested of them, it being an error of omission not having sent said report within the indicated period, a product strictly of the heavy workload, and she requests that it be taken into consideration that during her 25 years of service with this Institution, this is the only time that a report requested by the Consejo Superior has not been delivered, given that she has always tried to perform her tasks adequately and be responsible with her position, and that having not acted with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), no harm having been produced, and the purpose having been fulfilled by having returned the protocols accordingly, I request that I be exempted from disciplinary responsibility, and with the commitment that such a situation will not happen again.

Licda. Alejandra Quesada, Public Defender of the accused, likewise requested the archiving of the complaint, considering that her client has not incurred any disciplinary offense. (See response to the final hearing added to the file).

Regarding the testimonial evidence, the testimony of [Nombre 017] was received, who stated that she works as a judicial technician and as a general services assistant of the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the I Circuito Judicial de San José for two years, and the last year as a judicial technician, and that the accused, who is the [...] in the Juzgado de Familia, is her co-worker. She stated that her work in the position of judicial technician is to resolve files of the court in general, and that during this time [Nombre 022] has taken promotions (ascensos) but she does not remember well where she is currently appointed.

She noted that in 2018 she was in ascensos for most of the year, in December 2018 she was in the office and at that time she was an auxiliary of general services (auxiliar de servicios generales) and what she did was cleaning and take documents to the offices and internal mail for marriages to the civil registry (registro civil) and by January 2019 several restructurings and the work system of the office (despacho) occurred and they changed positions and had to organize case files (expedientes) and send case files (expedientes) for the archive to improve the office (despacho) in general and that in the case of the [...] she has to be aware of all the changes that are made and that office (despacho) became electronic and the change of the case files (expedientes) had to be made and learn to use the new system, she does not specify the date they began and that in the case of the workload of [Nombre 022] when she returned to the position she had to be aware of all the work of all those who worked there and they rely on her a lot. On the subject of the protocols (protocolos) she told them they had to keep a control of the protocols (protocolos), the only thing I know is that I must take them to San Joaquín for graphoscopic tests, I don't know how they come in and go out and what was said was that a control of the office's (despacho) protocols (protocolos) had to be kept, that was what she knew and she had never taken case files (expedientes) to the notarial archive (archivo notarial), that order to keep controls was at the end of 2018 and she was told that some protocols (protocolos) had to be taken to the Notarial Archive (Archivo Notarial) and that was by order of [Nombre 022] and she asked for a vehicle from administration to take them that was in December 2018 and after that she does not know what has happened because she changed position to technician and that this control is kept and she remembers that one of the colleagues who took over the position entered the document in the registry to take those protocols (protocolos) that she does know a control exists and she cannot say since when. This witness referred to the work dynamic in the office (despacho) and the functions within the office (despacho). She also referred to the workload in the office (despacho) and the multiple functions of the defendant due to her position of [...] . For her part, Mrs. [Nombre 024] works as a professional 2 in administration and is in charge of the administration of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (Juzgado Segundo de Familia del I Circuito Judicial de San José) in addition to other offices and regarding the facts she indicated that her functions are to provide collaboration with active reports and different needs and that she visits them once a month and that she does not remember that [Nombre 022] has been appointed in the Auditor's Office (Auditoría) since last year and that while she was in the position of [...] at the end of November 2018 she sent an email about the protocols (protocolos) that should be sent to the notarial archive (archivo notarial) and she asked her colleague [Nombre 027] and therefore she proceeded to request a date to send them and they gave her December 6 of last year and that in the case of [Nombre 022] she sent her the email where she indicates that she had asked [Nombre 027] who is an administration official, she takes up the matter again and that is why she coordinated the subject of the return of the protocols (protocolos) and that in the case of administrative transports they are not given service to carry case files (expedientes) so we give her help since one of our vehicles goes every day to those offices be it San Joaquín or archive. This deponent similarly declared about the workloads of the office (despacho) and the tasks they have from the Administration area, as well as about the sending made by [Nombre 022] of the email about the protocols (protocolos) that had to be sent to the Notarial Court (Juzgado Notarial).

In relation to the documentary evidence, we have copies of the agreements of the Superior Council (Consejo Superior) and the report of Lic. [Nombre 028] , Judge [...] of the Family Court of San José (Juzgado de Familia de San José) and the record of positions held by the accused, evidence that together with the testimonial evidence and the reply to the transfer of charges by the defendant, allow the facts to be taken as accredited.

In the present case, the facts for which the servant [Nombre 001] was accused are held to be duly proven, the foregoing based both on the defendant's reply and on the evidentiary elements gathered in the case file (autos).

Having analyzed the foregoing, it is clear to those now resolving that the defendant indeed, as stated in these proceedings, incurred in omission in the fulfillment of her duties.

Therefore, and in accordance with numerals 193, 194, 195 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and the accused fault having been taken as proven, the appropriate course is to classify the fault committed as MINOR (LEVE) and impose on the defendant [Nombre 001], the disciplinary sanction of WARNING (ADVERTENCIA), which is considered consistent with the merit of the case file (autos) and the seriousness that has been set forth of what happened, in such a way that such sanction serves as a corrective, so that situations like the one that occurred in the case at hand do not happen again.

The quantum of the sanction imposed by this Court is justified by the very nature of the fault attributed and proven, insofar as through her behavior, she turned, without any right, the official's workplace into a place of psychological violence and the constant acts of workplace harassment against the complainant lady. On the subject, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has also considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Vote No. 3933-98 of 09:50 hrs. on June 12, 1998, it indicated the following: “(…) Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective pursued by the challenged act or provision must not be at least legally prohibited. Suitability indicates that the state measure in question must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve that objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the person's legal sphere. Proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'unreasonable' for the individual (…).” For this reason, it is considered that the sanction imposed is consistent with the fault committed and fulfills the corrective purpose of the disciplinary process.

Regarding the principle of proportionality, it is understood that it seeks for the imposed sanction to be fair and proportionate to the fault committed, consisting of the adequate correlation that must exist between the sanction susceptible to being applied and the infraction committed, in accordance with the seriousness thereof and the degree of culpability of the accused. In relation to its reasonableness and proportionality, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in vote No. 1699-94 at eleven hours twelve minutes on April eighth, nineteen ninety-four, resolved the following: “...I. The principle of reasonableness implies equity and justice between the rule and its application in the specific case, in such a way that the decision is consistent with the cause that motivates it. In the sanctioning field, this constitutional principle implies that the sanction imposed must be adjusted to the illegitimate act that was carried out, such that the greater the seriousness of the fault, the greater the severity of the penalty, which implies a “proportionality” of cause and effect, with that sanction that does not maintain that “proportion” being illegitimate. The sanctioning measure must not only be proportionate to its cause but must also “explain” why a certain sanction is taken and not another, so that the subject of law who suffers the sanction has a “description” of the reasons why they suffer that sanctioning measure...” Regarding the Principle of proportionality and reasonableness, it establishes the need for the imposed sanction to be fair and proportionate to the fault committed and consists of the adequate correlation that must exist between the sanction susceptible to being applied and the infraction committed, in accordance with the seriousness thereof and the degree of culpability of the accused. On the subject, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Vote No. 3933-98 of 09:50 hrs. on June 12, 1998, it indicated the following: “(…) Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective pursued by the challenged act or provision must not be at least legally prohibited. Suitability indicates that the state measure in question must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve that objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the person's legal sphere. Proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'unreasonable' for the individual...” For this reason, it is considered that the sanction imposed is consistent with the fault committed and fulfills the corrective purpose of the disciplinary process.

For the purposes of imposing a sanction, this instance insists that the actions deployed by the servant [Nombre 001], assessed as a whole, the circumstantial aspects surrounding the case, and the purposes of the disciplinary regime, allow this Chamber to subsume what was verified here as a MINOR fault (FALTA LEVE), whose sanction must correspond to a WARNING (ADVERTENCIA), taking into consideration the years of service of the accused, as well as the fact that she has no disciplinary sanctions recorded. Notify the Human Resources Department (Departamento de Gestión Humana) and the defendant's Superior for their respective actions.

POR TANTO

For the reasons stated and in accordance with articles 192, 194, 195, following and concordant of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), the lady [Nombre 001] is considered responsible for negligence in the fulfillment of the duties inherent to her position. Subsumed within the provisions of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) under the assumptions of a MINOR FAULT (FALTA LEVE). The disciplinary sanction of WARNING (ADVERTENCIA) is imposed on the person investigated here. Notify the Human Resources Department (Departamento de Gestión Humana) and the defendant's Superior for their respective actions. That is all. Notify.

Ericka Quesada Madrigal.

María Mora Saprissa. Christian Hernández Agüero.

General Judicial Inspectors (Inspectores Generales Judiciales) *GG2DHAIRSVW61* ERICKA QUESADA MADRIGAL - INSPECTOR/A INSTRUCTOR/A *TTESQ43IJ7KA61* MARIA MORA SAPRISSA - INSPECTOR/A INSTRUCTOR/A *SNBVZ0WYUQ061* CRISTIAN HERNANDEZ AGUERO - INSPECTOR/A INSTRUCTOR/A Edificio O.I.J. Primer Piso Teléfonos: 2295-3729 ó 2295-3730 ó 2295-4338. Fax: 2257-5592. Correo electrónico: [email protected] 2.) Order the offices indicated in the new attached list to return to the National Archive within a period of 15 business days, counting from the notification of this agreement, the documents indicated, and they must inform the General Secretariat of the Court of compliance with this instruction. Should this not be possible for a justified reason, they must communicate this, and must therefore take the appropriate measures for the return as soon as possible. Due to the foregoing, the General Secretariat of the Court will make known to this Council only the list of offices that failed to comply with the request. 3.) The General Secretariat of the Court must issue the corresponding circular informing the offices that when they transfer protocol volumes and notarial index files (expedientes de índices notariales) to another office, they must inform the National Archive. The exception is made that these documents must not be sent via mail, in order to safeguard their security..." (The underlining is not in the original). (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence included in the case file).

3- That within the list attached to the email indicated in the previous fact (see Excel table called "Informe SECUESTROS Y PRESTAMOS DGAN-DAN-1101-2018"), the report that the investigated party [Name 001], in her capacity as [...] of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, was to render was related to the notarial index of the following Notaries Public, [Name 014], [Name 015], [Name 016], corresponding respectively to the following proceedings: 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, which were seized respectively on the following dates: July tenth, two thousand seventeen; April sixth, two thousand seventeen; and November sixteenth, two thousand seventeen. (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence included in the case file).

4- That despite the foregoing, the accused [Name 001], as of February first, two thousand nineteen, had not fulfilled her duty to render the report requested by the Superior Council (Consejo Superior) regarding the seized notarial indices indicated in the previous fact. Consequently, by agreement adopted by the Superior Council in session number 11 of February twelfth, two thousand nineteen, article XCI, it ordered that this situation be referred to the Judicial Inspection (Inspección Judicial). (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence included in the case file).

5- That based on the previous facts, the servant [Name 001] incurred an omission in the fulfillment of her duties as [...] of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by failing to prepare and send to the Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice, within the period of fifteen days, the report requested via email dated January tenth, two thousand nineteen, with the subject "Oficio 113-2019," regarding the notarial indices seized in proceedings number 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, given that as of February first, two thousand nineteen, and having exceeded the period granted, the defendant had not rendered the cited report. (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence included in the case file).

II.-) FACTS NOT PROVEN: None of importance for this resolution.

III-) POSITION OF THE TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL DEFENSE: Licda. Alejandra Quesada Chaves, Public Defender of the accused [Name 001], indicated that from the response, she accepts that due to an issue not constituting serious fault or willful misconduct (sin culpa grave o dolosamente), she omitted to send the email to the Superior Council. She requests that it be valued that she has 25 years in the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) and has no sanctions. And that the defense thesis is that her client was on a promotion track between 2017 and 2018 and upon returning to the Family Court she encountered some irregularities in the Family Court, she undertook to put the protocol matter in order, and those indicated in the official letter were not ready, and that her substitute in the position did not maintain that control, and therefore she assumed the position with that situation, and for this reason she devised a work plan, and even so, she could not send the email to the Superior Council, and to date those protocols have already been sent to the Archive, and that the accused has been committed to the work, and therefore all those aspects should be valued, as well as the principles of the disciplinary regime, and that no harm was caused by the omission, and she should be absolved of all disciplinary responsibility. The accused, for her part, indicated that she accepts the charges and that everything was due to an involuntary error, she apologized, and requests to be exempted from responsibility.

IV.) ON THE INCIDENTS RAISED BY THE MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL DEFENSE: 1- EXCEPTION OF LACK OF JURISDICTION (INCOMPETENCIA): The accused requested that, in application of article 185 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), these proceedings be referred for lack of jurisdiction (incompetencia) to the Office Head. The accused is incorrect, given that in accordance with numerals 185 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it is the responsibility of this Tribunal to exercise regular and constant control over all judicial servants of this Branch of the Republic; therefore, she is incorrect in her allegations, and for this reason, the exception filed is declared without merit.

2- ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE ACTION (CADUCIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN): The defense alleges that in these proceedings, the expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) has occurred, as the initial one-month period regulated by article 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch expired without having notified her represented party of a statement of charges (traslado de cargos), since, in her opinion, in the email dated March 4, 2019, these proceedings began by reason of the agreement adopted by the Superior Council in session No. 11-19 held on February 12, 2019, and that the Superior Council, the highest disciplinary body for this type of proceeding, it is from its knowledge that the initial monthly period regulated by the cited norm begins to be counted, and therefore, having been notified of the statement of charges only on April 2, 2019, it is concluded that the expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) has occurred and that there is no reasoned order (auto fundado) in the proceedings that would have interrupted the initial monthly period by way of a preliminary investigation.

In this regard, the following is resolved: As this section of the Tribunal has reiterated in various rulings such as numbers 863-2014 and 614-2015, among others, it is held that “… regarding the norm contained in article 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, over the years since its validity from the enactment of the LOPJ in 1994, it has given rise to multiple interpretations. It has been said that what it contemplates are statutes of limitations (plazos de prescripción), or expiration periods (plazos de caducidad), the latter, according to recent rulings of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo) (see ruling number 99-F-TC-2014), referring to the month related to the action to investigate the faults (that is, the expiration or statute of limitations period of the disciplinary action (acción disciplinaria)). Regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad), it has been said that they are two institutes that, as doctrine has been pointing out, seek to react to the inactivity of the subjects involved in the respective legal relationships or, in other terms, the legal system establishes a period that delimits the period of time in which a certain action can be carried out. That period can have retroactive effects, causing the loss of what one had – extinctive statute of limitations (prescripción extintiva) – or forward-looking, causing the loss of what could be achieved – expiration (caducidad).- Now, regarding the statute of limitations of the DISCIPLINARY ACTION (ACCIÓN DISCIPLINARIA), we must mention that the release supposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise, b) passage of time established by the legal system and; c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship to assert the statute of limitations. This supposes that there is no releasing effect if, despite the concurrence of presuppositions a and b, the articulation is not formulated. Hence, the statute of limitations follows a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. The foregoing, regarding the disciplinary power, implies that the holder of the right is the administrative hierarch and the passive subject is the public official, who to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which his power to require recognition of the loss of hierarchical power emerges. Now, from that perspective, the corrective power of the hierarch regarding the officials who depend on him, for a matter of legal certainty, is subject to an extinctive period. Generically, that period is regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, which sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power. However, it is a norm that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. For example, in matters of public finance, the applicable period is that regulated and specified by Law No. 8292 in its article 43, Law No. 8422 in its article 44, or Law No. 8131 in its articles 112, a matter that is therefore subject to this particular regime. It is a normative system constituted as a sectorial order that contains concrete rules, which being special, prevail over general regulations. In essence, these norms refer to the regime provided in precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428. The same occurs with the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, published in Supplement No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 103 of May 30, 1994, in whose numeral 83 a particular statute of limitations regime is set, namely: "Minor faults shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated." (ruling 185-2012 of September 13. (Sixth Section of the Contentious Administrative Tribunal).- In the same way and in similar terms, this occurs with the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, which in its article 211 refers to three periods: the one-month period that refers precisely to the statute of limitations of the disciplinary action (understand the initial month to issue and notify the statement of charges), the one-year period, and the one-month period to impose the sanction. Now, in relation to these three periods, similar to those established in articles 261 and 319.1 of the LGAP, “the principle of prompt and complete justice supposes, in the case of administrative procedures, that they must be resolved, in principle, by final act, within reasonable and proportional periods, avoiding subjecting the addressee to unduly long procedures. It constitutes therefore an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, to the extent that it requires the definition of the case within a reasonable temporal space. The complexity or not of the procedure could not justify arbitrarily long procedures, as this would suppose admitting an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and under its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear violation of due process. In that sense, numeral 261.1 of the General Law of Public Administration states: "The administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within the two months following its initiation or, where appropriate, following the submission of the claim or petition of the administered party, unless otherwise provided in this law." That same period is set by numeral 32 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code.- (…) Now, the violation of the periods set by the legal system for the exercise of a competence may well incorporate a pathology in the act, due to infringement of the subjective element of competence. It must be remembered that in light of precept 255 of the General Law of Public Administration, legal periods bind both the Administration and the administered parties. From such postulate it follows then that competences subject to a period can lead to null acts (doctrine of numeral 60.1 of that normative body). However, the correct understanding of that last affirmation must lead to the following: The powers of authority are imprescriptible as determined by article 66 section 1 of the LGAP, a situation that perfectly aligns with what is stated by numeral 329 section 3 of the cited Law in that the act issued outside the period will be valid for all legal purposes, except express mention of law. Having said this, it is worth clarifying, despite its drafting in imperative language, the bi-monthly period set by canon 261 section 2 of the LGAP is not peremptory, but only directory, which follows from what has been stated regarding the duty of the Administration to exercise its competences and the initial validity of "untimely" acts. Such posture can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. This applies both to proceedings initiated ex officio and those pursued by a party…”, and after analyzing this case this Tribunal considers that the Defense is incorrect in that from the study of the file it is evident that on March 1, 2019, the Superior Council sent the agreement adopted in session No. 11-19 held on February 12, 2019, the same that originates this complaint and entered this Office on March 4 via email. Subsequently, a Preliminary Investigation was ordered by the investigating body on March 14 and 22 (See virtual file) and charges were transferred to the accused, and she was notified of this on April 2, 2019, within the month provided by numeral 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Therefore, this Chamber does not observe that the alleged statute of limitations or expiration periods have been violated, given that precisely the superior body, that is, the Superior Council, refers the complaint to this Tribunal which is the one with the disciplinary power to investigate these types of faults in accordance with numeral 174 and following of the Organic Law of this Branch of the Republic.

Based on all the foregoing, the exception of expiration (caducidad) filed by the technical defense is declared without merit.

V.) ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS, CLASSIFICATION OF THE FAULT AND SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED: Based on the relationship of facts presented, which have full support in the body of evidence, primarily in the documentary evidence and testimonial evidence, this Tribunal, after a detailed study of this summary proceeding, determines that indeed the accused [Name 001] has incurred the accused disciplinary faults, for which the application of the disciplinary regime is warranted. According to the constitutive elements of the disciplinary fault and pursuant to Ruling No. 5594-94 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), 15:48 hours of September 27, 1994, it referred to the topic indicating: "... The disciplinary fault (falta disciplinaria) or infraction has been defined by saying that it is a violation of the functioning of any duty inherent to one's condition, even when it has not been specifically defined though it has been foreseen. The determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable, as they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the 'subordinate' subjects, behaviors or conducts in truth unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary fault is inferred: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or immediate or possible affectation of its efficiency ...", indeed in this process, the commission of the faults by the servant [Name 001] was accredited.

The accused responded to the statement of charges (traslados de cargos) imputed, indicating that as [...] she is responsible, among other tasks, for attending to requests for information formulated by the Superior Council and that the indicated email was received by her and steps were taken to locate the protocols and at that moment they were not ready to send, and that likewise steps were taken to review the received book and it was determined that no volume of other protocols had been lent or transferred to another Office, and that she did this by virtue of what the Notarial Archive was indicating to the Superior Council, that is, she went beyond what was being requested of her. Furthermore, she indicated that according to the chain of custody of the protocols corresponding to files 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-0187-FA and 14-001383-187-FA, they were seized on the indicated dates and were delivered to the Office without passing through her hands, and that only the protocol of the first indicated file, that is, 14-000333-0187-FA, was delivered to her on December 13, 2018, when she was returning from the graphoscopic examination, without being ready to send to the Notarial Archive, given that in the months of January and February 2019, the technician in charge at that time of processing the Nonexistent Marriage proceedings had to review whether the examination had been carried out satisfactorily or if a new hearing had to be scheduled for the corresponding examination, and that the protocols indicated in the previous paragraph were returned to the Notarial Archive on March 21, 2019, as observed in the chain of custody corresponding to each file. She also indicated that it is true that due to an involuntary omission, due to the heavy workload, the requested report was not sent within the indicated time, and that although she knows it is no excuse, during the months of January and February we had some internal changes in the Office, such as servants who went on vacation and the general services assistant, Ms. [Name 017], took a promotion, the judicial technician [Name 020] who was in charge of processing the files corresponding to Nonexistent Marriages was relieved of that position and the servant [Name 021] was assigned in her place, so they had to carry out an inventory of the files, also, within the functions of the [...] is the processing of marriage requests, and for those months several requests were submitted and coupled with the foregoing, she had to prepare a list of files urgently to be delivered to the Support and Improvement Center for Jurisdictional Function Office, as they were going to collaborate with the resolution of files pending judgment, given the large quantity that the judges of the Office have, and apart from what has been indicated, I had to take a day of vacation to attend to a personal matter, and that work also had to be started on the destruction of files, as the Office was in the process of converting to an Electronic Court, and that although she accepts the fault of not having sent the report, she indicates that it was not due to willful non-compliance, in view of the fact that she did carry out the procedures regarding what was requested by the Superior Council and even before the information was requested, the non-sending of said report within the indicated period being an error of omission, a product exactly of the heavy workload, and requests to take into consideration that during her 25 years of service to this Institution, this is the only time that a report requested by the Superior Council has not been delivered, given that she has always tried to perform her duties properly and be responsible with her position, and that having not acted with willful misconduct (dolo) or serious fault (culpa grave), no harm having been produced, and having fulfilled the purpose by having returned the protocols accordingly, she requests to be exempted from disciplinary responsibility and with the commitment that such a situation will not happen again.

Licda. Alejandra Quesada, Public Defender of the accused, likewise requested the dismissal of the complaint, considering that her client has not incurred any disciplinary fault.

( See response to the final hearing added to the case file).

Regarding the testimonial evidence, the testimony of [Name 017] was received, who stated she has worked as a judicial technician and as a general services assistant for the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José for two years, and the last year as a judicial technician, and that the accused, who is the [...] in the Family Court, is her coworker. She stated that her duties in the judicial technician position are to resolve case files for the court in general and that during this time [Name 022] has received promotions but she does not remember exactly where she is currently appointed. She noted that in 2018 she was on promotion assignments most of the time; in December 2018 she was in the office and at that time she was a general services assistant and what she did was cleaning and taking documents to the offices and internal mail regarding marriages to the Civil Registry, and by January 2019 several restructurings and changes to the office's work system occurred, and they changed positions and had to organize case files and remit case files to the archive to improve the office in general, and that in the case of the [...], she has to keep track of all the changes that are made and that office became electronic, and they had to make the change of the case files and learn to use the new system; she does not specify exactly the date they started, and that regarding the workload of [Name 022], when she returned to the position, she had to be aware of all the work of everyone who worked there and they turned to her a lot. Regarding the issue of the protocols, she told them they had to keep a control of the protocols; the only thing she knows is that she must take them to San Joaquín for graphoscopic tests; she does not know how they come in and go out, and what was said to her was that they had to keep a control of the office's protocols; that was what she learned, and she had never taken case files to the Notarial Archive; that order to keep controls was at the end of 2018 and she tells her that some protocols must be taken to the Notarial Archive, and that was by order of [Name 022], and she requested a vehicle from the administration to take them; this was in December 2018, and after that she does not know what has happened because she changed positions to technician, and that this control is indeed kept, and she remembers that one of the colleagues who assumed the position entered the document in the registry to keep track of those protocols; she does know that a control exists and cannot say since when. This witness referred to the work dynamic in the office and the functions within the office. She also referred to the workload in the office and the multiple functions of the defendant due to her position as [...]. For her part, Ms. [Name 024] works as a professional 2 in the administration and is in charge of the administration of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, in addition to other offices, and regarding the facts, she indicated that her functions are to provide collaboration with active reports and different needs, and that she visits them once a month, and that she does not remember that [Name 022] has been appointed in the Auditing Department since last year and this year, and that while she was in the position of [...] at the end of November 2018, she sent an email about the protocols that had to be sent to the Notarial Archive, and she asked her colleague [Name 027] and therefore proceeded to request a date to send them, and they gave her December 6th of last year, and that in the case of [Name 022], she sent him the email where she indicates that she had asked [Name 027], who is an administration official; she takes up the issue again and that is why she coordinated the issue of the return of the protocols, and that in the event that administrative transport does not provide them with a service to take case files, then we give him help given that one of our vehicles goes to those offices, whether San Joaquín or the archive, every day. This deponent similarly declared about the office's workload and the tasks they have from the Administration area, as well as about the sending made by [Name 022] of the email regarding the protocols that had to be sent to the Notarial Court.

Regarding the documentary evidence, there are copies of the agreements of the Superior Council and the report of Lic. [Name 028], [...] Judge of the Family Court of San José, and the certifications of positions held by the accused; this evidence, together with the testimonial evidence and the response to the transfer of charges by the accused, allows the facts to be considered as accredited.

In the present case, the facts for which the employee [Name 001] was accused are considered duly demonstrated, based both on the defendant's response and on the evidentiary elements gathered in the case file.

Having analyzed the foregoing, it is clear to those now deciding that the defendant, as recorded in these proceedings, indeed incurred an omission in the fulfillment of her duties.

Therefore, and in accordance with articles 193, 194, and 195 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and since the alleged fault has been proven, the appropriate course is to classify the committed fault as **MINOR (LEVE)** and to impose on the defendant [Name 001] the disciplinary sanction of **WARNING (ADVERTENCIA)** , which is considered consistent with the merits of the case file and the gravity, as has been stated, of what occurred, in such a way that this sanction serves as a corrective measure so that situations like the one that occurred in the case at hand do not happen again.

The quantum of the sanction imposed by this Tribunal is justified by the very nature of the attributed and demonstrated fault, insofar as her behavior, without any right, turned the official's workplace into a place of psychological violence, including the constant acts of workplace harassment against the complainant. On this topic, the Constitutional Chamber has also considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Ruling No. 3933-98 of 09:50 hrs. on June 12, 1998, it indicated the following: *"(...) Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought with the contested act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited. Suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such an objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person. Proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'unreasonable' for the individual (...)."* For this reason, it is considered that the imposed sanction is in accordance with the committed fault and fulfills the corrective purpose of the disciplinary process.

Regarding the principle of proportionality, it is understood that it seeks for the imposed sanction to be fair and proportionate to the committed fault; it consists of the adequate correlation that must exist between the sanction susceptible to being applied and the infraction committed, in accordance with the gravity thereof and the degree of culpability of the accused. In relation to the reasonableness and proportionality thereof, the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 1699-94 of eleven hours twelve minutes on April 8, 1994, resolved as follows: *"...I. The principle of reasonableness implies equity and justice between the rule and its application in the specific case, in such a way that the decision is consistent with the cause that motivates it. In the sanctioning field, this constitutional principle implies that the sanction imposed must be adjusted to the illegitimate act that was performed, so that the greater the gravity of the fault, the greater the gravity of the penalty, which implies a 'proportionality' from cause to effect, resulting in that sanction which does not maintain that 'proportion' being illegitimate. The sanctioning measure must not only be proportionate to its cause but must also 'explain' why a specific sanction is taken and not another, so that the legal subject who suffers the sanction has a 'description' of the reasons why they suffer that sanctioning measure..."* Regarding the Principle of proportionality and reasonableness, it establishes the necessity that the imposed sanction be fair and proportionate to the committed fault, and it consists of the adequate correlation that must exist between the sanction susceptible to being applied and the infraction committed, in accordance with the gravity thereof and the degree of culpability of the accused. On this topic, the Constitutional Chamber has considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Ruling No. 3933-98 of 09:50 hrs. on June 12, 1998, it indicated the following: *"(...) Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought with the contested act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited. Suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such an objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person. Proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'unreasonable' for the individual..."* For this reason, it is considered that the imposed sanction is in accordance with the committed fault and fulfills the corrective purpose of the disciplinary process.

For the purposes of imposing a sanction, this instance insists that the actions carried out by the employee [Name 001], valued as a whole, the circumstantial aspects surrounding the case, and the purposes of the disciplinary regime allow this Chamber to subsume what has been verified here as a **MINOR (LEVE)** fault, whose sanction must correspond to a **WARNING (ADVERTENCIA)** , taking into consideration the years of service of the accused, as well as the fact that she has no record of disciplinary sanctions. Notify the Human Resources Department and the defendant's Superior for their respective action.

                                                          **THEREFORE (POR TANTO)** For the reasons stated and in accordance with articles 192, 194, 195, and subsequent and concordant articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, Ms. [Name 001] is considered responsible for negligence in the fulfillment of the duties inherent to her position. Subsumed within the provisions of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch under the assumptions of a **MINOR FAULT (FALTA LEVE).** The disciplinary sanction of **WARNING (ADVERTENCIA)** is imposed on the individual investigated here. Notify the Human Resources Department and the defendant's Superior for their respective action. **That is all.** Let it be notified.

Ericka Quesada Madrigal.

María Mora Saprissa. Christian Hernández Agüero.

General Judicial Inspectors (Inspectores Generales Judiciales) Based on the document's characteristics:

Edificio O.I.J.

First Floor Telephones: 2295-3729 or 2295-3730 or 2295-4338. Fax: 2257-5592. Email: [email protected] Subsequently, the Preliminary Investigation was ordered by the investigating body on March 14 and 22 (see virtual file) and the charges were transferred to the accused, who was notified thereof on April 2, 2019, within the month provided for in Article 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, so this Chamber does not observe that the alleged prescription or expiration (caducidad) periods have been violated, given that precisely the superior body, that is, the Superior Council, refers the complaint to this Court, which has the disciplinary power to investigate this type of infractions in accordance with Article 174 and following of the Organic Law of this Branch of the Republic. For all the foregoing, the expiration exception (excepción de caducidad) raised by the technical defense is declared without merit." TRIBUNAL DE LA INSPECCIÓN JUDICIAL. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-six minutes on April fifteenth, two thousand twenty.- Disciplinary proceeding number 19-000650-0031-IJ, filed by CONSEJO SUPERIOR, against [Name 001], for OMISSION IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES.

WHEREAS

I- By transfer of charges at nine hours and forty-seven minutes on April second, two thousand nineteen, the server [Name 001], [...] Judicial 2 of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, was accused: "...OMISSION IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES (ARTICLE 194 OF THE ORGANIC LAW OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH). Specifically, the following is attributed to her: 1. That you, [Name 001], have held the position of [...] Judicial 2 at the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José on a permanent basis, from October third, two thousand seventeen, to date, and therefore during that period you were responsible, among other tasks, for attending to requests for information made by the Superior Council. 2. That you, [Name 001], during the period from January seventh, two thousand nineteen, to February first of that same year, were the person in charge of the email account [...], assigned to the Second Family Court of San José, and that on January tenth, two thousand nineteen, you received in that institutional email account, the email with the subject "Oficio 113-2019", sent by the General Secretariat of the Court, through which you were notified of the agreement adopted by the Superior Council, in session number 106 of December sixth, two thousand eighteen, Article LI, in which the following was ordered: "...1.) To take note of report No. DGAN-DAN-1101-2018 of November 28, 2018, rendered by licensed [Name 012], [...] of the Notarial Archive Department of the National Archive, regarding the protocol volumes and notarial index files seized or loaned to different judicial offices. 2.) To order the offices indicated in the new attached list to return to the National Archive, within a period of 15 business days counted from the notification of this agreement, the documents indicated, and they must inform the General Secretariat of the Court of compliance with the foregoing, and in the event that this is not possible for a justified reason they must communicate it, so they must take the corresponding measures for their return as soon as possible. As a result, the General Secretariat of the Court will make known to this Council only the list of offices that failed to comply with what was requested. 3.) The General Secretariat of the Court must issue the corresponding circular informing the offices that when they transfer protocol volumes and notarial index files to another office, they must inform the National Archive. The exception is made that the cited documents should not be sent by mail, the foregoing in the interest of safeguarding their security..." (The underlining is not from the original). 3. That within the list attached to the email indicated in the previous fact (see Excel table called "Informe SECUESTROS Y PRESTAMOS DGAN-DAN-1101-2018"), the report that you, [Name 001], had to render in your capacity as Judicial [...] of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, was related to the notarial index of the following Notaries Public, [Name 014], [Name 015], [Name 016], corresponding respectively to the following proceedings: 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, which were seized respectively on the following dates: July tenth, two thousand seventeen, April sixth, two thousand seventeen, and November sixteenth, two thousand seventeen. 4. That despite the foregoing, you, [Name 001], as of February first, two thousand nineteen, had not fulfilled your duty to render the report requested by the Superior Council regarding the seized notarial indexes indicated in the previous fact, and therefore, by agreement adopted by the Superior Council in session number 11 of February twelfth, two thousand nineteen, Article XCI, it ordered that this situation be referred to the Judicial Inspection. 5. That based on the above facts, you, [Name 001], are accused of an omission in the performance of your duties as Judicial [...] of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, for having failed to prepare and send to the Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice, within the period of fifteen days, the report requested via email dated January tenth, two thousand nineteen, with the subject "Oficio 113-2019", regarding the notarial indexes seized in proceedings number 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, given that as of February first, two thousand nineteen, and having exceeded the granted period, you had not rendered the cited report..." II.-) The accused responded to the transfer of charges, accepted them, and offered evidence. (See virtual file).

III.-) That the legal requirements have been followed, without defects or omissions capable of generating nullity or defenselessness (indefensión). This resolution is issued within the legal deadlines.

Drafted by Inspector General Quesada Madrigal, with the affirmative vote of Inspectors General Mora Saprissa and Hernández Agüero, and;

CONSIDERING

I.-) PROVEN FACTS: Of importance for the resolution of this complaint, the following are listed: 1- That the accused [Name 001], has held the position of [...] Judicial 2 at the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José on a permanent basis, from October third, two thousand seventeen, to date, and therefore during that period she was responsible, among other tasks, for attending to requests for information made by the Superior Council. (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence contained in the file). 2- That the server [Name 001], during the period from January seventh, two thousand nineteen, to February first of that same year, was the person in charge of the email account [...], assigned to the Second Family Court of San José, and that on January tenth, two thousand nineteen, she received in that institutional email account, the email with the subject "Oficio 113-2019", sent by the General Secretariat of the Court, through which she was notified of the agreement adopted by the Superior Council, in session number 106 of December sixth, two thousand eighteen, Article LI, in which the following was ordered: "...1.) To take note of report No. DGAN-DAN-1101-2018 of November 28, 2018, rendered by licensed [Name 012], [...] of the Notarial Archive Department of the National Archive, regarding the protocol volumes and notarial index files seized or loaned to different judicial offices. 2.) To order the offices indicated in the new attached list to return to the National Archive, within a period of 15 business days counted from the notification of this agreement, the documents indicated, and they must inform the General Secretariat of the Court of compliance with the foregoing, and in the event that this is not possible for a justified reason they must communicate it, so they must take the corresponding measures for their return as soon as possible. As a result, the General Secretariat of the Court will make known to this Council only the list of offices that failed to comply with what was requested. 3.) The General Secretariat of the Court must issue the corresponding circular informing the offices that when they transfer protocol volumes and notarial index files to another office, they must inform the National Archive. The exception is made that the cited documents should not be sent by mail, the foregoing in the interest of safeguarding their security..." (The underlining is not from the original). (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence contained in the file). 3- That within the list attached to the email indicated in the previous fact (see Excel table called "Informe SECUESTROS Y PRESTAMOS DGAN-DAN-1101-2018"), the report that the investigated [Name 001] had to render, in her capacity as Judicial [...] of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, was related to the notarial index of the following Notaries Public, [Name 014], [Name 015], [Name 016], corresponding respectively to the following proceedings: 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, which were seized respectively on the following dates: July tenth, two thousand seventeen, April sixth, two thousand seventeen, and November sixteenth, two thousand seventeen. (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence contained in the file). 4- That despite the foregoing, the defendant [Name 001], as of February first, two thousand nineteen, had not fulfilled her duty to render the report requested by the Superior Council regarding the seized notarial indexes indicated in the previous fact, and therefore, by agreement adopted by the Superior Council in session number 11 of February twelfth, two thousand nineteen, Article XCI, it ordered that this situation be referred to the Judicial Inspection. (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence contained in the file). 5- That based on the above facts, the server [Name 001] incurred an omission in the performance of her duties as Judicial [...] of the Second Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, for having failed to prepare and send to the Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice, within the period of fifteen days, the report requested via email dated January tenth, two thousand nineteen, with the subject "Oficio 113-2019", regarding the notarial indexes seized in proceedings number 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA, 14-001383-187-FA, given that as of February first, two thousand nineteen, and having exceeded the granted period, the accused had not rendered the cited report. (Statements of [Name 017], [Name 024], and documentary evidence contained in the file).

II.-) UNPROVEN FACTS: None of importance for this resolution.

III-) POSITION OF THE TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL DEFENSE: Licensed Alejandra Quesada Chaves, Public Defender of the accused [Name 001], indicated that from the response she accepts that due to a matter without serious or intentional fault, she omitted to send the email to the superior council. She requests that it be valued that she has 25 years in the Judicial Branch and has no sanctions. And that the defense's thesis is that her client was on a promotion ascent between 2017 and 2018 and upon returning to the Family Court she found some irregularities in the Family Court, she set about organizing the issue of the protocols, and those indicated in the official letter were not ready, and that her substitute in the position did not maintain that control, and therefore she assumed the position under that situation and devised a work plan, and even so she could not send the email to the Superior Council, and as of today those protocols have already been sent to the Archive, and that the accused has been committed to the work, and therefore all those aspects should be assessed along with the principles of the disciplinary regime, and that no harm was caused by the omission, and she be acquitted of all disciplinary responsibility. The accused, for her part, indicated that she accepts the charges and that everything was due to an involuntary error, she apologized, and requests to be exempted from responsibility.

IV.) REGARDING THE INCIDENTS RAISED BY THE MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL DEFENSE:

1- INCOMPETENCE EXCEPTION (EXCEPCIÓN DE INCOMPETENCIA): The accused requested that in application of Article 185 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the present proceedings be referred due to incompetence to the Office Chief.

The respondent is incorrect, given that pursuant to numeral 185 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, this Tribunal is responsible for exercising regular and constant oversight over all judicial employees of this Branch of the Republic; therefore, her arguments are unfounded, and for this reason, the preliminary objection (excepción) raised is declared without merit.

2- REGARDING THE LAPSE OF THE ACTION (CADUCIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN): The defense argues that in these proceedings, the lapse of the action (caducidad de la acción) has occurred, as the initial one-month period established by Article 211 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial expired without her client having been notified of a statement of charges (traslado de cargos). In her view, these proceedings began with the email dated March 4, 2019, based on the agreement reached by the Consejo Superior in session No. 11-19 held on February 12, 2019, and that for the Consejo Superior, the highest disciplinary body for this type of procedure, the initial monthly period regulated by the cited rule begins to run from the moment it takes cognizance of the matter. Therefore, since the statement of charges was not notified until April 2, 2019, she concludes that the lapse of the action has occurred and that there is no reasoned order in the proceedings that would have interrupted the initial monthly period by way of a preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar).

Regarding this, the following is resolved: As this section of the Tribunal has reiterated in various rulings (votos), such as numbers 863-2014 and 614-2015, among others, it is established that “… regarding the rule contained in Article 211 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, over the years since its entry into force following the enactment of the LOPJ in 1994, it has given rise to multiple interpretations. It has been said that it contemplates statutes of limitations (plazos de prescripción), or lapses (caducidad), the latter, according to recent rulings of the Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo (see ruling number 99-F-TC-2014), referring to the month related to the action for investigating offenses (that is, the period of lapse or statute of limitations of the disciplinary action). Regarding the statute of limitations and lapse, it has been said that they are two legal concepts that, as doctrine has indicated, intend to react to the inactivity of the subjects involved in the respective legal relationships or, in other terms, the legal system establishes a timeframe that delimits the period in which a specific action can be carried out. This timeframe can have retroactive effects, causing the loss of what one had—extinctive statute of limitations (prescripción extintiva)—or forward-looking effects, causing the loss of what one could achieve—lapse (caducidad). Now, regarding the statute of limitations for the DISCIPLINARY ACTION, it is necessary to mention that the release from liability requires the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia on the part of the holder of a right in its exercise, b) the passage of the time established by the legal system, and; c) the assertion or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship to invoke the statute of limitations. This means that no liberating effect exists if, despite elements a and b being present, the claim is not made. Hence, the statute of limitations follows a principle of party presentation and, unlike lapse (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. The foregoing, with respect to disciplinary authority, implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective authority only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, upon the expiration of which, their power to demand recognition of the loss of the hierarchical authority arises. Now, from that perspective, the corrective authority of the superior over the employees who depend on him, for reasons of legal certainty, is subject to an extinctive timeframe. Generically, this timeframe is regulated by Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo, which sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive authority. However, it is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations that incorporate different rules regarding that point. For example, in public finance matters, the applicable period is that regulated and specified by Law No. 8292 in its Article 43, Law No. 8422 in its Article 44, or Law No. 8131 in its Article 112, matters that are therefore subject to this particular regime. It is a normative system constituted as a sectoral legal order containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over general regulations. At their core, these rules refer to the regime provided in Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428. The same occurs with the Ley General de Policía, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, published in Alcance No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 103 of May 30, 1994, in whose numeral 83 a particular statute of limitations regime is set, namely: "Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated." (ruling 185-2012 of September 13. (Sección Sexta of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo)).- Similarly and in comparable terms, the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, in its Article 211, refers to three periods: the one-month period, which refers precisely to the statute of limitations for the disciplinary action (understood as the initial month to issue and notify the statement of charges); the one-year period; and the one-month period to impose the sanction. Now, in relation to these three periods, similar to those established in Articles 261 and 319.1 of the LGAP, “the principle of swift and complete justice implies, in the case of administrative procedures, that they must be resolved, in principle, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional periods, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unjustifiably long procedures. It therefore constitutes an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, to the extent that it requires the definition of the matter within a reasonable timeframe. The complexity or lack thereof of the procedure could not justify arbitrarily long procedures, as this would imply admitting an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its own discretion, the authority to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of said certainty and in clear violation of due process. In that sense, numeral 261.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública states: 'The administrative procedure must be concluded, by a final act, within the two months following its initiation or, as the case may be, following the filing of the claim or petition by the administered party, except as otherwise provided in this law.' The same period is set by numeral 32 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.- (…) Now, the violation of the periods set by the legal system for the exercise of a competence may well incorporate a pathology in the act, due to an infringement of the subjective element of competence. It must be remembered that in light of Article 255 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, legal periods bind both the Administration and the administered parties. From this postulate, it follows that competences subject to a period may result in null acts (doctrine of numeral 60.1 of that normative body). However, a correct understanding of this last assertion must lead to the following: Sovereign powers are imprescriptible, as determined by Article 66, subsection 1 of the LGAP, a situation that aligns perfectly with what is stated in numeral 329, subsection 3 of the cited Law, to the effect that an act issued outside the period shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless otherwise expressly provided by law. That being said, it is worth clarifying that, despite its drafting in imperative language, the two-month period set by Article 261, subsection 2 of the LGAP is not peremptory, but merely directory, which follows from what has been stated regarding the Administration's duty to exercise its competences and the initial validity of 'untimely' acts. Such a position can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia. This applies both to procedures initiated ex officio and those initiated by a party…”, and having analyzed this case, this Tribunal considers that the Defense is incorrect, given that from the study of the case file, it is evident that on March 1, 2019, the Consejo Superior sent the agreement reached in session No. 11-19 held on February 12, 2019, which originated this complaint and was received by this Office on March 4 via email. Subsequently, the Preliminary Investigation was ordered by the investigating body on March 14 and 22 (See virtual case file), and charges were brought against the accused, and she was notified thereof on April 2, 2019, within the month established by numeral 211 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Therefore, this Chamber does not observe that the alleged statute of limitations or lapse periods have been violated, since precisely the superior body, the Consejo Superior, referred the complaint to this Tribunal, which is the body with the disciplinary authority to investigate this type of offense in accordance with numeral 174 and following of the Ley Orgánica of this Branch of the Republic.

For all the foregoing, the exception of lapse (excepción de caducidad) raised by the technical defense is declared without merit.

V.) ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS, CLASSIFICATION OF THE OFFENSE, AND SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED: Based on the account of facts presented, which is fully supported by the body of evidence, primarily the documentary and testimonial evidence, this Tribunal, after a detailed study of the present summary proceeding (sumaria), determines that the accused [Name 001] has indeed incurred the disciplinary offenses charged, thus warranting the application of the disciplinary regime. According to the constitutive elements of a disciplinary offense and in accordance with Ruling No. 5594-94 of the Sala Constitucional, 3:48 p.m. on September 27, 1994, it addressed the issue stating: "... A disciplinary offense or infraction has been defined as a violation of the functioning of any duty inherent to one's condition, even if it has not been specifically defined, though it must be provided for. The acts determining disciplinary offenses are innumerable, as they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conduct of 'subordinate' subjects, behaviors or conduct that are truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of a disciplinary offense can be deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the attribution of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or the immediate or possible affectation of its efficiency ...”. Indeed, in this process, the commission of the offenses by the employee [Name 001] was proven.

The accused responded to the statements of charges brought against her, indicating that as [...] her duties include, among other tasks, attending to requests for information made by the Consejo Superior, and that the indicated email was received by her, and she proceeded to locate the protocols, and at that moment they were not ready to be sent; and that she likewise proceeded to review the incoming logbook and determined that no volume of other protocols had been loaned or transferred to another Office, and that she did this by virtue of what the Archivo Notarial was indicating to the Consejo Superior, that is, she went beyond what was being requested. She also pointed out that, according to the chain of custody (cadena de custodia) of the protocols corresponding to files 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-0187-FA, and 14-001383-187-FA, they were seized on the indicated dates and that they were delivered to the Office without passing through her hands, and that only the protocol of the first file indicated, that is, 14-000333-0187-FA, was delivered to her on December 13, 2018, when she was returning from the handwriting analysis test (prueba grafoscópica), without being ready to be sent to the Archivo Notarial, because in the months of January and February 2019, the technician in charge at that time of processing the Nonexistent Marriage cases had to review whether the test had been performed satisfactorily or, if not, whether a new date for the corresponding test had to be set, and that the protocols indicated in the preceding paragraph were returned to the Archivo Notarial on March 21, 2019, as observed in the chain of custody corresponding to each file. She also indicated that it is true that due to an involuntary omission, due to the heavy workload, the requested report was not sent within the indicated time, and that although she knows it is not an excuse, during the months of January and February there were some internal changes in the Office, such as employees who went on vacation and the general services assistant, Mrs. [Name 017], went to fulfill a promotion, the judicial technician [Name 020] who was in charge of processing files corresponding to Nonexistent Marriages was relieved of that position and the employee [Name 021] was assigned in her place, so they had to conduct an inventory of the files; also, among the functions of the [...] is the processing of marriage applications, and for those months several applications were filed; in addition to the above, she had to urgently prepare a list of files to be delivered to the Office of the Centro de Apoyo y Mejoramiento a la función Jurisdiccional, since they were going to collaborate in resolving files pending judgment, given the large number that the judges of the Office have; and apart from what was indicated, she had to take a day of vacation to attend to a personal matter, and also that the work of file destruction had to be initiated because the Office was in the process of converting to an electronic Court; and that although she accepts the fault of not having sent the report, she indicates that it was not intentional, in view of the fact that she did carry out the procedures related to what was requested by the Consejo Superior and even before the information was requested from them, the failure to send said report within the indicated period being an error of omission resulting properly from the heavy workload, and she requests that it be taken into consideration that during her 25 years of service to this Institution, this is the only time that a report requested by the Consejo Superior has not been delivered, given that she has always tried to perform her duties adequately and be responsible with her position, and that having not acted with malice (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), no harm having been produced, and the purpose having been fulfilled by returning the protocols in a proper manner, she requests to be exempted from disciplinary liability and with the commitment that such a situation will not happen again.

Licda. Alejandra Quesada, Public Defender of the accused, likewise requested the dismissal of the complaint, considering that her client has not incurred any disciplinary offense. (See response to the final hearing added to the file).

Regarding the testimonial evidence, the testimony of [Name 017] was received, who stated that she had worked as a judicial technician and as a general services assistant for the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the I Circuito Judicial de San José for two years and the last year as a judicial technician, and that the accused, who is the [...] in the Juzgado de Familia, is a work colleague. She stated that her duties in the judicial technician position are to resolve files for the court in general, and that during this time [Name 022] has had promotions, but she does not remember well where she is appointed. She noted that in 2018 she was in promotions for the most part; in December 2018, she was in the office, and at that time she was a general services assistant, and what she did was cleaning and taking documents to the offices and internal mail for marriages to the civil registry, and by January 2019, several restructurings and the office's work system took place, they changed positions, and they had to organize files and transfer files to the archive to improve the office in general; and in the case of the [...], she has to be aware of all the changes that are made, and that office became electronic, and the change of files had to be made and learning to use the new system; she does not specify the date they started well; and in the case of [Name 022]'s workload, when she returned to her position, she had to be aware of all the work of everyone who worked there, and they frequently turn to her. On the subject of the protocols, she told them that they had to keep a control of the protocols; the only thing she knows is that she must take them to San Joaquín for handwriting analysis tests; she does not know how they come in and go out, and what she was told was that a control of the office's protocols had to be kept; that was what she learned, and she had never taken files to the Archivo Notarial; that order to keep controls was at the end of 2018, and she was told that some protocols had to be taken to the Archivo Notarial, that was by order of [Name 022], and she requested a vehicle from the administration to take them; that was in December 2018, and after that she does not know what has happened because she changed position to technician, and that this control is indeed kept, and she remembers that one of the colleagues who assumed the position entered the document in the registry to take those protocols, that she knows a control exists and cannot say since when. This witness referred to the work dynamics in the office and the functions within the office. She also referred to the workload in the office and the multiple functions of the accused due to her position as [...]. For her part, Mrs. [Name 024] works as a professional 2 in the administration and is in charge of the administration of the Juzgado Segundo de Familia of the I Circuito Judicial de San José, in addition to other offices, and regarding the facts, she indicated that her functions are to provide collaboration with active reports and different needs, and that she visits them once a month, and she does not recall that [Name 022] has been appointed in the Auditoría since last year and this year, and that while in the position of [...] at the end of November 2018, she sent an email about the protocols that had to be sent to the Archivo Notarial; she asked her colleague [Name 027] and therefore proceeded to request a date to send them, and they gave her December 6 of last year, and in the case of [Name 022], she sent her the email where she indicates that she had asked [Name 027], who is an administration official; she takes up the matter again and that is why she coordinated the return of the protocols, and in the event that administrative transport does not provide service for taking files, then we give her help since one of our vehicles goes to those offices every day, whether San Joaquín or the archive. This deponent similarly testified about the office's workloads and the tasks they have from the Administration area, as well as about [Name 022]'s sending of the email regarding the protocols that had to be sent to the Juzgado Notarial.

In relation to the documentary evidence, there are copies of the agreements of the Consejo Superior and the report of Lic. [Name 028], Judge [...] of the Juzgado de Familia of San José, and the record of positions held by the accused, evidence that, together with the testimonial evidence and the response to the charges by the accused, allows the facts to be considered proven.

In the present case, the facts charged against the employee [Name 001] are considered duly proven, based on both the accused's response and the evidentiary elements gathered in the case file (autos).

Having analyzed the foregoing, it is clear to those now deciding that the accused, as recorded in these proceedings, indeed incurred an omission in the fulfillment of her duties.

Therefore, pursuant to articles 193, 194, and 195 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), and the accused misconduct having been proven, the appropriate course is to classify the committed misconduct as **MINOR (LEVE)** and to impose upon the respondent [Nombre 001] the disciplinary sanction of **WARNING (ADVERTENCIA)**, which is considered commensurate with the merits of the case record and the described severity of the events, so that such sanction serves as a corrective measure to prevent situations like the one in the case at hand from recurring.

The quantum of the sanction imposed by this Tribunal is justified by the very nature of the attributed and demonstrated misconduct, insofar as her behavior wrongfully turned the official workplace into a place of psychological violence through constant acts of workplace harassment (hostigamiento laboral) against the complainant. On this matter, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has also considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Ruling No. 3933-98 of 09:50 hrs. on June 12, 1998 (Voto No. 3933-98), it stated the following: "(...) Legitimacy refers to the fact that the intended objective of the challenged act or provision must not, at the very least, be legally prohibited. Suitability indicates that the state measure in question must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that, among several equally apt measures to achieve said objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the individual's legal sphere. Proportionality in the strict sense dictates that, apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be disproportionate with respect to the intended objective; that is, it must not be 'unperformable' for the individual (...)." For this reason, it is considered that the imposed sanction is consistent with the committed misconduct and fulfills the corrective purpose of the disciplinary process.

Regarding the principle of proportionality, it is understood that it seeks to ensure the imposed sanction is fair and proportionate to the committed misconduct, consisting of the adequate correlation that must exist between the sanction liable to be applied and the committed infraction, in accordance with its severity and the degree of culpability of the accused. In relation to the reasonableness and proportionality thereof, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in ruling No. 1699-94 (voto Nº 1699-94) at eleven hours twelve minutes on April eighth, nineteen ninety-four, resolved the following: "...I. The principle of reasonableness implies equity and justice between the rule and its application in the specific case, such that the decision is consistent with the cause that motivates it. In the sanctioning field, this constitutional principle implies that the imposed sanction must be adjusted to the illegal act committed, so that the greater the severity of the misconduct, the greater the severity of the penalty, which implies a 'proportionality' of cause to effect, making any sanction that does not maintain that 'proportion' illegitimate. The sanctioning measure must not only be proportionate to its cause but must also 'explain' why a particular sanction is chosen and not another, so that the legal subject who suffers the sanction has a 'description' of the reasons why they suffer that sanctioning measure..." Regarding the Principle of proportionality and reasonableness, it establishes the need for the imposed sanction to be fair and proportionate to the committed misconduct, and it consists of the adequate correlation that must exist between the sanction liable to be applied and the committed infraction, in accordance with its severity and the degree of culpability of the accused. On this matter, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Ruling No. 3933-98 of 09:50 hrs. on June 12, 1998 (Voto No. 3933-98), it stated the following: "(...) Legitimacy refers to the fact that the intended objective of the challenged act or provision must not, at the very least, be legally prohibited. Suitability indicates that the state measure in question must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that, among several equally apt measures to achieve said objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the individual's legal sphere. Proportionality in the strict sense dictates that, apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be disproportionate with respect to the intended objective; that is, it must not be 'unperformable' for the individual..." For this reason, it is considered that the imposed sanction is consistent with the committed misconduct and fulfills the corrective purpose of the disciplinary process.

For the purposes of imposing a sanction, this instance insists that the actions carried out by the public servant [Nombre 001], assessed as a whole, the circumstantial aspects surrounding the case, and the purposes of the disciplinary regime, allow this Chamber (Cámara) to subsume what has been verified here as a **MINOR (LEVE)** misconduct, the sanction for which must correspond to a **WARNING (ADVERTENCIA)**, taking into consideration the years of service of the accused, as well as the fact that she has no record of disciplinary sanctions. Notify the Human Resources Management Department (Departamento de Gestión Humana) and the Superiors of the respondent for their respective actions.

**THEREFORE (POR TANTO)** For the reasons stated and in accordance with articles 192, 194, 195, and following and concordant articles of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), Mrs. [Nombre 001] is considered responsible for negligence in the fulfillment of the duties inherent to her position. Subsumed within the provisions of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) under the assumptions of a **MINOR MISCONDUCT (FALTA LEVE).** The disciplinary sanction of **WARNING (ADVERTENCIA)** is imposed on the investigated party here. Notify the Human Resources Management Department (Departamento de Gestión Humana) and the Superiors of the respondent for their respective actions. That is all.

Notify.

Ericka Quesada Madrigal.

María Mora Saprissa. Christian Hernández Agüero.

General Judicial Inspectors (Inspectores Generales Judiciales) Edificio O.I.J.

First Floor Telephones: 2295-3729 or 2295-3730 or 2295-4338. Fax: 2257-5592. Email: [email protected]</sub></span></span></p> </div> <div align="left"><span style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">_&nbsp;</span></span></div>

*190006500031IJ* 19-000650-0031-IJ.

CONTRA:

[Nombre 001].

OFENDIDO:

[Nombre 005] N° 2186-2019.

Voto 1162-2020.

TRIBUNAL DE LA INSPECCIÓN JUDICIAL. San José, al ser las quince horas y treinta y seis minutos del quince de abril de dos mil veinte.- Proceso disciplinario número 19-000650-0031-IJ, interpuesto por CONSEJO SUPERIOR, contra [Nombre 001], por OMISIÓN EN EL CUMPLIMIENTO DE SUS DEBERES.

RESULTANDO

I- Mediante traslado de cargos de las nueve horas y cuarenta y siete minutos del dos de abril del año dos mil diecinueve, se le acusó a la servidora [Nombre 001] , [...] Judicial 2 del Juzgado Segundo de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, se le acusó:“...OMISIÓN EN EL CUMPLIMIENTO DE SUS DEBERES (ARTÍCULO 194 DE LA LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL). Concretamente se le atribuye lo siguiente: 1. Que usted [Nombre 001], se ha desempeñado en propiedad, en el puesto de [...] Judicial 2 en el Juzgado Segundo de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, desde el tres de octubre del año dos mil diecisiete a la fecha, por lo que durante dicho periodo a su persona le correspondía entre otras labores, atender solicitudes de información formuladas por el Consejo Superior. 2. Que usted [Nombre 001], durante el periodo del siete de enero del año dos mil diecinueve al primero de febrero de ese mismo año, fue la persona quien tenía a cargo la cuenta de correo electrónico [...], asignada al Juzgado Segundo de Familia de San José, siendo que en fecha diez de enero del año dos mil diecinueve, recibió en dicha cuenta de correo electrónico institucional, el correo electrónico con asunto el “Oficio 113-2019”, remitido por la Secretaría General de la Corte, mediante el cual se le comunicaba el acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo Superior, en la sesión número 106 del seis de diciembre del dos mil dieciocho, artículo LI, en el cual se dispuso lo siguiente: “… 1.) Tomar nota del informe N° DGAN-DAN-1101-2018 del 28 de noviembre de 2018, rendido por la licenciada [Nombre 012], [...] del Departamento de Archivo Notarial del Archivo Nacional, referente a los tomos de protocolo y expedientes de índices notariales secuestradas o prestados a distintos despachos judiciales. 2.) Ordenar a los despachos que se indican en el nuevo listado adjunto, devolver al Archivo Nacional dentro del plazo de 15 hábiles días contados a partir de la comunicación de este acuerdo, los documentos que se señalan, debiendo informar a la Secretaría General de la Corte el cumplimiento de lo indicado, y en caso de que ello no sea posible por una razón justificada deberán comunicarlo, por lo que deberán de tomar las medidas que correspondan para la devolución lo antes posible. Debido a lo anterior, la Secretaría General de la Corte hará de conocimiento de este Consejo, únicamente el listado de los despachos que incumplieron con lo solicitado. 3.) Deberá la Secretaría General de la Corte emitir la circular correspondiente donde se comunique a los despachos que cuando trasladen los tomos de protocolo y expedientes de índices notariales, a otro despacho, deberán de informarlo al Archivo Nacional. Se hace la salvedad, que los citados documentos no deberán remitirse por medio de correo lo anterior en aras de salvaguardar la seguridad de los mismos...” (El subrayado no corresponde al original) 3.Que dentro del listado adjunto al correo electrónico indicado en el hecho anterior (ver tabla de Excel denominada “Informe SECUESTROS Y PRESTAMOS DGAN-DAN-1101-2018”), el informe que debía rendir usted [Nombre 001], en su condición de [...] Judicial del Juzgado Segundo de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, se encontraba relacionado con el índice notarial de los siguientes Notarios Públicos, [Nombre 014] , [Nombre 015] , [Nombre 016], correspondientes de manera respectiva a los siguiente procesos: 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA,14-001383-187-FA, los cuales fueron secuestrados de manera respectiva en las siguientes fechas: diez de julio de dos mil diecisiete, seis de abril del dos mil diecisiete y dieciséis de noviembre del dos mil diecisiete. 4. Que a pesar de lo anterior, usted [Nombre 001], al día primero de febrero del año dos mil diecinueve, no había cumplido con su deber de rendir el informe solicitado por el Consejo Superior, con respecto a los índices notariales secuestrados indicados en el hecho anterior, por lo que mediante acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo Superior en la sesión número 11 del doce de febrero del año dos mil diecinueve, artículo XCI, dispuso trasladar dicha situación ante la Inspección Judicial. 5. Que con base en los anteriores hechos, se le acusa a usted [Nombre 001], una omisión en el cumplimiento de sus deberes como [...] Judicial del Juzgado Segundo de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, al no haber confeccionado y remitido a la Secretaría de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, dentro del plazo de quince días, el informe solicitado vía correo electrónico de fecha diez de enero del año dos mil diecinueve, con el asunto “Oficio 113-2019”, con respecto a los índices notariales secuestrados en los procesos número 14-000333-187- FA, 14-000419-187-FA,14-001383-187-FA, toda vez que hasta el día primero de febrero del dos mil diecinueve y habiendo sobrepasado el plazo otorgado, su persona no había rendido el citado informe...” II.-) La encausada contestó el traslado de cargos, aceptó los mismos y ofreció prueba. (Ver expediente virtual).

III.-) Que se han seguido las prescripciones legales, sin que existan defectos u omisiones capaces de generar nulidad o indefensión. Se dicta la presente resolución dentro de los plazos legales.

Redacta la Inspectora General Quesada Madrigal, con el voto afirmativo de los Inspectores Generales Mora Saprissa y Hernández Agüero y;

CONSIDERANDO

I.-) HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para la resolución de la presente queja, se enlistan los siguientes:1- Que la acusada [Nombre 001], se ha desempeñado en propiedad, en el puesto de [...] Judicial 2 en el Juzgado Segundo de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, desde el tres de octubre del año dos mil diecisiete a la fecha, por lo que durante dicho periodo le correspondía entre otras labores, atender solicitudes de información formuladas por el Consejo Superior. (Declaraciones de [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] y prueba documental que consta agregada a los autos). 2-Que la servidora [Nombre 001], durante el periodo del siete de enero del año dos mil diecinueve al primero de febrero de ese mismo año, fue la persona quien tenía a cargo la cuenta de correo electrónico [...] , asignada al Juzgado Segundo de Familia de San José, siendo que en fecha diez de enero del año dos mil diecinueve, recibió en dicha cuenta de correo electrónico institucional, el correo electrónico con asunto el “Oficio 113-2019”, remitido por la Secretaría General de la Corte, mediante el cual se le comunicaba el acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo Superior, en la sesión número 106 del seis de diciembre del dos mil dieciocho, artículo LI, en el cual se dispuso lo siguiente: “… 1.) Tomar nota del informe N° DGAN-DAN-1101-2018 del 28 de noviembre de 2018, rendido por la licenciada [Nombre 012], [...] del Departamento de Archivo Notarial del Archivo Nacional, referente a los tomos de protocolo y expedientes de índices notariales secuestradas o prestados a distintos despachos judiciales. 2.) Ordenar a los despachos que se indican en el nuevo listado adjunto, devolver al Archivo Nacional dentro del plazo de 15 hábiles días contados a partir de la comunicación de este acuerdo, los documentos que se señalan, debiendo informar a la Secretaría General de la Corte el cumplimiento de lo indicado, y en caso de que ello no sea posible por una razón justificada deberán comunicarlo, por lo que deberán de tomar las medidas que correspondan para la devolución lo antes posible. Debido a lo anterior, la Secretaría General de la Corte hará de conocimiento de este Consejo, únicamente el listado de los despachos que incumplieron con lo solicitado. 3.) Deberá la Secretaría General de la Corte emitir la circular correspondiente donde se comunique a los despachos que cuando trasladen los tomos de protocolo y expedientes de índices notariales, a otro despacho, deberán de informarlo al Archivo Nacional. Se hace la salvedad, que los citados documentos no deberán remitirse por medio de correo lo anterior en aras de salvaguardar la seguridad de los mismos...” (El subrayado no corresponde al original). (Declaraciones de [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] y prueba documental que consta agregada a los autos).3-Que dentro del listado adjunto al correo electrónico indicado en el hecho anterior (ver tabla de Excel denominada “Informe SECUESTROS Y PRESTAMOS DGAN-DAN-1101-2018”), el informe que debía rendir la investigada [Nombre 001] , en su condición de [...] Judicial del Juzgado Segundo de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, se encontraba relacionado con el índice notarial de los siguientes Notarios Públicos, [Nombre 014] , [Nombre 015], [Nombre 016], correspondientes de manera respectiva a los siguiente procesos: 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-187-FA,14-001383-187-FA, los cuales fueron secuestrados de manera respectiva en las siguientes fechas: diez de julio de dos mil diecisiete, seis de abril del dos mil diecisiete y dieciséis de noviembre del dos mil diecisiete. (Declaraciones de [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] y prueba documental que consta agregada a los autos). 4-Que a pesar de lo anterior, la denunciada [Nombre 001], al día primero de febrero del año dos mil diecinueve, no había cumplido con su deber de rendir el informe solicitado por el Consejo Superior, con respecto a los índices notariales secuestrados indicados en el hecho anterior, por lo que mediante acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo Superior en la sesión número 11 del doce de febrero del año dos mil diecinueve, artículo XCI, dispuso trasladar dicha situación ante la Inspección Judicial. (Declaraciones de [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] y prueba documental que consta agregada a los autos). 5- Que con base en los anteriores hechos la servidora [Nombre 001], incurrió una omisión en el cumplimiento de sus deberes como [...] Judicial del Juzgado Segundo de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, al no haber confeccionado y remitido a la Secretaría de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, dentro del plazo de quince días, el informe solicitado vía correo electrónico de fecha diez de enero del año dos mil diecinueve, con el asunto “Oficio 113-2019”, con respecto a los índices notariales secuestrados en los procesos número 14-000333-187- FA, 14-000419-187-FA,14-001383-187-FA, toda vez que hasta el día primero de febrero del dos mil diecinueve y habiendo sobrepasado el plazo otorgado, la encausada no había rendido el citado informe. (Declaraciones de [Nombre 017], [Nombre 024] y prueba documental que consta agregada a los autos).

II.-) HECHOS NO PROBADOS: Ninguno de importancia para la presente resolución.

III-) POSICIÒN DE LA DEFENSA TÈCNICA Y MATERIAL: La Licda. Alejandra Quesada Chaves, Defensora Pública de la encausada [Nombre 001] , indicó que desde la contestación ella acepta que por una cuestión sin cumpla grave o dolosamente ella omitió enviar el correo al consejo superior. Solicita se valore que ella tiene 25 años en el Poder Judicial y que no tiene sanciones. Y que la tesis de defensa es que su defendida estuvo en ascenso entre el 2017 y 2018 y al regresar al Juzgado de Familia se encuentra con algunas irregularidades en el Juzgado de Familia, ella se avocó a poner en orden el tema de los protocolos y los que se indicaban en el oficio no estaban listos y que la sustituta suya en el puesto no llevaba ese control y por lo tanto ella asumió el puesto con esa situación y por ello ideó un plan de trabajo y aún así no pudo enviar el correo al Consejo Superior y a la fecha esos protocolos ya fueron enviados al Archivo y que la encausada ha sido comprometida con el trabajo y por eso se valoren todos esos aspectos y se valore el tema de los principios del régimen disciplinarios y que no se causó un perjuicio con la omisión y se absuelva de toda responsabilidad disciplinaria. La encausada por su parte indicó que acepta los cargos y que todo se debió a un error involuntario, pidió disculpas y solicita se le exima de responsabilidad.

IV.) SOBRE LAS INCIDENCIAS PLANTEADAS POR LA DEFENSA MATERILA Y TÉCNICA:

1- EXEPCIÓN DE INCOMPETENCIA: Solicitó la encausada que en aplicación del artículo 185 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial las presentes diligencias se remitieran por incompetencia al Jefe de Oficina. No lleva razón la denunciada toda vez que de conformidad con los numerales 185 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, compete a este Tribunal ejercer control regular y constante sobre todos los servidores judiciales de este Poder de la República, por lo que no lleva razón en sus alegatos y por esta razón se declara sin lugar la excepción interpuesta.

2- SOBRE LA CADUCIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN: Alega la defensa que en las presentes diligencias operó la caducidad de la acción, al haberse vencido el plazo del mes inicial que regula el artículo 211 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, sin haberle notificado un traslado de cargos a su representada, ya que en su criterio en el correo electrónico de fecha 4 de marzo de 2019, las presentes diligencias inician en razón del acuerdo tomado por el Consejo Superior en la sesión N° 11-19 celebrada el 12 de febrero de 2019 y que el Consejo Superior, máximo órgano disciplinario de este tipo de procedimientos, es a partir de su conocimiento que empieza a contabilizarse el plazo mensual inicial que regula la norma citada y por ello habiendo sido notificado el traslado de cargos hasta el 2 de abril de 2019, se concluye que operó la caducidad de la acción y que no existe en las diligencias ningún auto fundado que haya interrumpido a modo de investigación preliminar el plazo mensual inicial.

Al respecto se resuelve lo siguiente: Como lo ha reiterado esta sección del Tribunal en diversos votos como los número 863-2014 y el 614-2015, entre otros, se tiene que “… respecto que la norma contenida en el artículo 211 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, a lo largo de los años desde su vigencia a partir de la promulgación de la LOPJ en 1994, ha dado pie a múltiples interpretaciones. Se ha dicho que lo que contempla son plazos de prescripción, o bien de caducidad, esto último, según recientes votos del Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo (ver voto número 99-F-TC-2014), referente al mes relacionado con la acción para investigar las faltas (es decir, el plazo de caducidad o prescripción de la acción disciplinaria). En cuanto a la prescripción y la caducidad se ha dicho que son dos institutos que, como ha venido señalando la doctrina, pretenden reaccionar ante la inactividad de los sujetos que intervienen en las respectivas relaciones jurídicas o, en otros términos, el ordenamiento jurídico establece un plazo que delimita el período de tiempo en el que puede llevarse a cabo una determinada actuación. Ese plazo puede tener efectos hacía atrás, provocando la pérdida de lo que se tenía, prescripción extintiva-, o hacía adelante, provocando la pérdida de lo que se podría alcanzar, caducidad.- Ahora bien, en cuanto a la prescripción de la ACCIÓN DISCIPLINARIA tenemos que es preciso hacer mención a que la liberatoria supone la concurrencia de tres elementos fundamentales: a) inercia del titular de un derecho en su ejercicio, b) transcurso del tiempo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico y; c) alegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica de hacer valer la prescripción. Ello supone que no existe efecto liberatorio si pese a concurrir los presupuestos a y b, la articulación no se formula. De ahí que la prescripción atienda a un principio rogatorio y a diferencia de la caducidad (en términos procesales), no pueda ser considerada de oficio. Lo anteriormente expuesto en cuanto a la potestad disciplinaria implica que el titular del derecho es el jerarca administrativo y el sujeto pasivo el funcionario público, quien en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa aplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Ahora bien, desde esa perspectiva, la potestad correctiva del jerarca respecto de los funcionarios que de él dependen, por un tema de seguridad jurídica, se encuentra sujeta a plazo extintivo. De manera genérica, ese plazo se regula por el mandato 603 del Código de Trabajo, el cual fija un plazo de un mes para el ejercicio de esa potestad represiva. Sin embargo, se trata de una norma que cede frente a regulaciones particulares y especiales, que incorporan reglas diversas en cuanto a ese extremo. Por ejemplo, en materia de hacienda pública, el plazo aplicable resulta el regulado y precisado por la Ley N°. 8292 en su artículo 43, Ley N° 8422 en su artículo 44 o Ley N° 8131 en su artículos 112, materia que por ende está afecta a éste régimen particular. Se trata de un sistema normativo que se constituye como un ordenamiento sectorial que contiene reglas concretas, que en tanto especiales, prevalecen sobre la normativa general. En lo medular, estas normas remiten al régimen previsto en el precepto 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428. Ocurre lo mismo con la Ley General de Policía, N°. 7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994, publicada en el Alcance No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 103 del 30 de Mayo de 1994, en cuyo numeral 83 se fija un régimen de prescripción particular, a saber: "Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario ." (voto 185-2012 del 13 de setiembre. (Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo).- De igual forma y en términos similares ocurre con la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, que en su artículo 211 hace alusión a tres plazos, el del mes que se refiere justamente a la prescripción de la acción disciplinaria (entiéndase el mes inicial para hacer y notificar el traslado de cargos) el plazo de un año y el del mes para imponer la sanción. Ahora bien, en relación con estos tres plazos, similares a los establecidos en los artículos 261 y 319.1 de la LGAP, “el principio de justicia pronta y cumplida supone, para el caso de los procedimientos administrativos, que deben ser resueltos, en tesis de principio, por acto final, dentro de plazos razonables y proporcionales, evitando someter al destinatario a procedimientos infundadamente largos. Constituye por ende una expresión de la máxima de seguridad jurídica, en la medida en que exige la definición de la causa dentro de un espacio temporal razonable. La complejidad o no del procedimiento no podría justificar procedimientos arbitrariamente largos, pues ello supondría admitir un poder incontrolable de la Administración para ejercitar, en cualquier tiempo y bajo su propio arbitrio, la potestad de resolver el conflicto, en detrimento evidente de la aludida certeza y en clara lesión del debido proceso. En ese sentido, el numeral 261.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública señala: "El procedimiento administrativo deberá concluirse, por acto final, dentro de los dos meses posteriores a su iniciación o, en su caso, posteriores a la presentación de la demanda o petición del administrado, salvo disposición en contrario de esta ley." Ese mismo plazo fija el numeral 32 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.- (…) Ahora, la lesión de los plazos fijados por el ordenamiento para el ejercicio de una competencia, bien puede llegar a incorporar una patología en el acto, por infracción al elemento subjetivo competencia. Debe recordarse que a la luz del precepto 255 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, los plazos legales vinculan tanto a la Administración como a los administrados. De tal postulado se desprende entonces que las competencias sujetas a plazo pueden desembocar en actos nulos (doctrina del numeral 60.1 de ese cuerpo normativo). No obstante, la correcta comprensión de esa última afirmación debe llevar a lo siguiente: Las potestades de imperio son imprescriptibles tal y como lo determina el artículo 66 inciso 1 de la LGAP, situación que compagina perfectamente con lo enunciado por el numeral 329 inciso 3 de la citada Ley en cuanto a que el acto dictado fuera de plazo será válido para todo efecto legal, salvo mención expresa de ley. Dicho esto vale aclarar, pese a su redacción en lenguaje imperativo, el plazo bimensual que fija el canon 261 inciso 2 de la LGAP no es perentorio, sino solo ordenatorio, lo que se desprende de lo expuesto en cuanto al deber de la Administración de ejercitar sus competencias y la validez inicial de los actos "extemporáneos". Tal postura puede verse además en el fallo No. 34-F-S1-2011 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Esto aplica tanto para los procedimientos instaurados de oficio como los de gestión de parte…”, y analizado que ha sido este caso considera este Tribunal que no lleva razón la Defensa por cuanto del estudio del expediente se desprende que en fecha 1 de Marzo del 2019 el Consejo Superior remite el acuerdo tomado en sesión N° 11-19 celebrada el 12 de febrero del 2019, mismo que origina esta queja y que ingresa a este Despacho en fecha 4 de Marzo mediante correo electrónico. Posteriormente se ordena la Investigación Preliminar por parte del órgano instructor en fechas 14 y 22 de marzo (Ver expediente virtual) y se trasladan cargos a la encausada y es notificada de éste en fecha 2 de abril del 2019, dentro del mes que dispone el numeral 211 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, por lo que no observa esta Cámara que se hayan violentado los plazos de prescripción o caducidad alegados, toda vez que precisamente el órgano superior, sea el Consejo Superior remite la queja a este Tribunal quien es el que tiene la potestad disciplinaria para investigar este tipo de faltas de conformidad con el numeral 174 y siguientes de la Ley Orgánica de este Poder de la República.

Por todo lo expuesto de declara sin lugar la excepción de caducidad planteada por la defensa técnica.

V.) ANÁLISIS DE FONDO, CALIFICACIÓN DE LA FALTA Y SANCIÓN A IMPONER: Con base en la relación de hechos expuestos, los cuales tienen pleno sustento en el elenco probatorio primordialmente en la prueba documental y la testimonial este Tribunal luego del estudio pormenorizado de la presente sumaria, llega a determinar que efectivamente la encausada [Nombre 001], ha incurrido en las faltas disciplinarias acusadas por lo que amerita la aplicación del régimen disciplinario. Conforme los elementos constitutivos de la falta disciplinaria y conforme al Voto No. 5594-94 de la Sala Constitucional, 15:48 horas del 27 de setiembre de 1994, ésta se refirió al tema indicando: “... La falta o infracción disciplinaria se ha definido diciendo que es una violación al funcionamiento de cualquier deber propio de su condición, aún cuando no haya sido especialmente definida aunque sí prevista. Los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables, pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos 'subordinados', comportamientos o conductas en verdad ilimitados en número dada su variedad; por ello se deduce la existencia de tres elementos de la falta disciplinaria: 1.- un elemento material: que es un acto o una omisión; 2.- un elemento moral: que es la imputación del acto a una voluntad libre; y 3.- un elemento formal: que es la perturbación al funcionamiento del servicio o afectación inmediata o posible de su eficacia ...”, efectivamente en este proceso se acreditó la comisión de las faltas por parte de la servidora [Nombre 001].

La encausada contestó los traslados de cargos imputados indicando que como [...] le corresponde entre otras labores, atender solicitudes de información formuladas por el Consejo Superior y que el correo indicado fue recibido por su persona y se procedió a localizar los protocolos y en ese momento no se encontraban listos para enviar y que de igual manera se procedió a revisar el libro de recibidos y se determinó que ningún tomo de otros protocolos habían sido prestado o trasladado a otro Despacho y que esto lo hizo en virtud de lo que estaba indicándole el Archivo Notarial al Consejo Superior, es decir que fue más allá de lo que se le estaba solicitando. Además señaló que según la cadena de custodia de los protocolos correspondientes a los expedientes 14-000333-187-FA, 14-000419-0187-FA y 14-001383-187-FA fueron secuestrados en las fechas indicadas y que fueron a entregados en el Despacho sin pasar por sus manos y que únicamente el protocolo del primer expediente indicado, sea el 14-000333-0187-FA le fue entregado el día 13-12- 2018 cuando regresaba de la prueba grafoscópica, sin estar listo para enviar al Archivo Notarial, por cuanto en los meses de enero y febrero del 2019 la técnica encargada en ese momento del trámite de los procesos de Matrimonio Inexistentes, debía de revisar si la prueba se había realizado en forma satisfactoria o bien, si tenía que volver a señalar para la correspondiente prueba y que los protocolos indicados en el párrafo anterior, fueron devueltos al Archivo Notarial en fecha 21 de marzo del 2019, según lo observado en la cadena de custodia correspondiente a cada expediente. También señaló que es cierto que por una omisión involuntaria, debido a la gran carga de trabajo, el informe solicitado no fue remitido en el tiempo indicado y que aunque sabe que no es excusa, durante los meses de enero y febrero tuvimos algunos cambios en lo interno del Despacho, como servidoras que salieron a vacaciones y la auxiliar de servicios generales, la señora [Nombre 017], pasó a realizar el ascenso, la técnica judicial [Nombre 020] que tenía a cargo el trámite de los expedientes correspondientes a Matrimonios Inexistentes fue relevada de ese puesto y fue asignado en su lugar al servidor [Nombre 021], por lo que tuvieron que realizar inventario de los expedientes, también, dentro de las funciones de la [...] se encuentra el trámite de las solicitudes de matrimonio y para dichos meses se presentaron varias solicitudes y aunado a lo anterior tuvo que realizar un listado de expedientes en forma urgente, para ser entregados a la Oficina del Centro de Apoyo y Mejoramiento a la función Jurisdiccional, por cuanto iban a colaborar con la resolución de expedientes pendientes de fallo, dada la gran cantidad con la que cuentan las personas juzgadoras del Despacho, y aparte de lo indicado, tuve que sacar un día de vacaciones para atender un asunto personal y que también se tuvo que iniciar con la labor de destrucción de expedientes, por cuanto el Despacho estaba en proceso de convertirse a Juzgado electrónico y que aunque acepta la culpa de no haber enviado el informe indica que no fue al propio dicho incumplimiento, en vista de que si realizó los procedimientos referentes a lo solicitado por el Consejo Superior y desde antes que les fuera solicitada la información, siendo un error de omisión el no haber enviado dicho informe en el plazo indicado producto propiamente de la gran carga laboral y solicita tomar en consideración que durante mis 25 años de servicio ante esta Institución, esta es la única vez que no se ha entregado un informe solicitado por el Consejo Superior en vista de que siempre ha tratado de realizar en forma adecuada mis labores y ser responsable con su puesto y que al haber no haber actuado con dolo ni culpa grave, no haberse producido un perjuicio y haberse cumplido con el fin al haber devuelto los protocolos de manera conforme, solicito se me exima de responsabilidad disciplinaria y con el compromiso de que una situación así no volverá a suceder.

La Licda. Alejandra Quesada, Defensora Pública de la acusada de igual manera solicitó el archivo de la queja por considerar que su patrocinada no ha incurrido en falta disciplinaria alguna. ( Ver contestación de audiencia final agregada al expediente).

En relación a la prueba testimonial se recibió el testimonio de [Nombre 017] quien dijo laborar como técnica judicial y como auxiliar de servicios generales del Juzgado Segundo de Familia del I Circuito Judicial de San José desde dos años y el último año como técnica judicial y que es compañera de trabajo la acusada quien es la [...] en el Juzgado de Familia. Refirió que sus labores en el puesto de técnico judicial es resolver expedientes del juzgado en general y que en este tiempo [Nombre 022] ha hecho ascensos pero no recuerda bien dónde es que esta nombrada. Acotó que en el 2018 estuvo en ascensos la mayor parte, en diciembre del 2018 sí estuvo en la oficina y para ese momento ella estaba como auxiliar de servicios generales y lo que hacía era limpieza y lleva documentos a las oficinas y correo interno matrimonios al registro civil y para enero del 2019 se dieron varias restructuraciones y el sistema de trabajo del despacho y se pasaron de puestos y tuvieron que ordenar expedientes y remesar expedientes para el archivo para mejorar el despacho en general y que en el caso de la [...] ella tiene que estar pendiente de todos los cambios que se hacen y ese despacho pasó a electrónico y se tuvo que hacer el cambio de los expedientes y aprender a usar el nuevo sistema, no precisa bien la fecha en que comenzaron y que en el caso de la carga de trabajo de [Nombre 022] cuando ella regresó al puesto ella debía de estar pendiente de todo el trabajo de todos los que laboraban ahí y recurren mucho a ella. Sobre el tema de los protocolos ella les dijo que tenían que llevar un control de los protocolos, lo único que se es que yo debo llevarlos a San Joaquín para pruebas grafoscópicas, no sé como entran y salen y lo que se le dijo era que había llevar un control de los protocolos del despacho, eso fue lo que supo y al archivo notarial nunca había llevado expedientes, esa orden de llevar controles fue a finales del 2018 y le dice que hay que llevar unos protocolos al Archivo Notarial y eso fue por orden de [Nombre 022] y ella pedí un vehículo a la administración para llevarlos eso fue en diciembre de 2018 y luego de eso no sabe qué ha pasado porque cambió de puesto a técnico y que ese control si se lleva y recuerda que a uno de los compañeros que asumió el puesto metió el documento en el registro para llevar esos protocolos que sí sabe que existe control y no puede decir desde cuándo. Esta testigo se refirió a la dinámica de trabajo en el despacho y las funciones dentro del despacho. Además se refirió a la carga de trabajo en el despacho y las múltiples funciones de la encausada por su puesto de [...] . Por su parte la señora [Nombre 024] labora como profesional 2 en la administración y tiene a cargo la administración del Juzgado Segundo de Familia del I Circuito Judicial de San José además de otras oficinas y en cuanto a los hechos indicó que sus funciones son prestar colaboración con los informes activos y diferentes necesidades y que los visita una vez al mes y que no recuerda que [Nombre 022] ha estado nombrada en la Auditoría desde el año pasado y éste y que estando ella en el puesto de [...] a finales de noviembre de 2018 envió un correo sobre los protocolos que debían enviarse al archivo notarial y le preguntó a su compañera [Nombre 027] y por eso procedió a pedir fecha para enviarlos y le dieron el 6 de diciembre del año pasado y que en el caso de [Nombre 022] ella le envió el correo dónde le indica que ella le había preguntado a [Nombre 027] que es funcionaria de la administración, ella retoma el tema y por eso es que coordinó el tema de la devolución de los protocolos y que en el caso de que transportes administrativos no se les da servicio de llevar expedientes entonces nosotros le da ayuda dado que un vehículo nuestro va todos los días a esa oficinas sea San Joaquín o archivo. Esta deponente en igual sentido declaró sobre las cargas de trabajo del despacho y las labores que tienen desde el área de la Administración, así como sobre el envió que hizo [Nombre 022] del correo electrónico sobre los protocolos que debían enviarse al Juzgado Notarial.

En relación a la prueba documental se cuenta con las copias de los acuerdos del Consejo Superior y el informe del Lic. [Nombre 028] , Juez [...] del Juzgado de Familia de San José y las constancia de puestos desempeñados por la acusada, prueba que aunada la testimonial y a la contestación del traslado de la denunciada, permiten tener por acreditados los hechos.

En el presente caso, se tiene por debidamente demostrados los hechos que se acusaron a la servidora [Nombre 001], lo anterior con base tanto en la contestación de la encausada así como con los elementos probatorios recabados en autos.

Analizado lo anterior resulta claro para quienes ahora resuelven que efectivamente la encausada, tal y como consta en las presentes diligencias incurrió en omisión en el cumplimiento de sus deberes.

Por lo anterior y de conformidad con los numerales, 193 194, 195 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y al haberse dado por probada la falta acusada, lo procedente es calificar la falta cometida como LEVE e imponerle a la encausada [Nombre 001], la sanción disciplinaria de ADVERTENCIA, la que se considera acorde al mérito de los autos y a la gravedad que se ha expuesto de lo acontecido, de tal manera que, tal sanción sirva como correctivo, para que situaciones como la ocurrida en el caso que nos ocupa no se vuelvan a presentar.

El quantum de la sanción impuesta por parte de este Tribunal, se justifica en la naturaleza misma de la falta atribuida y demostrada, en el tanto con su comportamiento, convirtió sin ningún derecho, el centro de trabajo del funcionario en un lugar de violencia psicológica y los constantes actos de hostigamiento laboral en contra de la señora quejosa. Sobre el tema también la Sala Constitucional ha considerado que los componentes básicos de la proporcionalidad lo son la legitimidad, la idoneidad, la necesidad y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. Así, en el Voto No. 3933-98 de las 09:50 hrs. del 12 de junio de 1998, indicó lo siguiente: “(…) La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado, no debe estar al menos legalmente prohibido. La idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido. La necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona. La proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, es decir, no le sea "inexigible" al individuo (…).” Por ello se considera que la sanción impuesta es acorde con la falta cometida y cumple con el fin correctivo del proceso disciplinario.

Respecto al principio de proporcionalidad, se tiene que ésta busca que la sanción impuesta sea justa y proporcionada con la falta cometida consiste en la correlación adecuada que debe existir entre la sanción susceptible de ser aplicada y la infracción cometida, de conformidad con la gravedad de ésta y el grado de culpabilidad de la acusada.En relación a la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la misma, la Sala Constitucional en el voto Nº 1699-94 de las once horas doce minutos del ocho de abril de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro resolvió lo siguiente: “...I. El principio de razonabilidad implica la equidad y la justicia entre la norma y su aplicación en el caso concreto, de manera tal que la decisión sea acorde a la causa que la motiva. En el campo sancionatorio este principio constitucional implica que la sanción que se imponga debe estar ajustada al acto ilegítimo que se realizó, de forma tal que a mayor gravedad de la falta, mayor gravedad de la pena, lo que implica una “proporcionalidad” de causa a efecto, resultando ilegítima aquella sanción que no guarde esa “proporción”. La medida sancionatoria no sólo debe ser proporcionada a su causa sino que debe “explicarse” el porqué se toma determinada sanción y no otra, de manera que el sujeto de derecho que sufre la sanción cuente con una “descripción” de las razones por las cuales sufre esa medida sancionatoria...”Respecto al Principio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad establece la necesidad de que la sanción impuesta sea justa y proporcionada con la falta cometida y consiste en la correlación adecuada que debe existir entre la sanción susceptible de ser aplicada y la infracción cometida, de conformidad con la gravedad de ésta y el grado de culpabilidad del acusado. Sobre el tema la Sala Constitucional ha considerado que los componentes básicos de la proporcionalidad lo son la legitimidad, la idoneidad, la necesidad y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. Así, en el Voto No. 3933-98 de las 09:50 hrs. del 12 de junio de 1998, indicó lo siguiente: “(…) La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado, no debe estar al menos legalmente prohibido. La idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido. La necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona. La proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, es decir, no le sea "inexigible" al individuo...” Por ello se considera que la sanción impuesta es acorde con la falta cometida y cumple con el fin correctivo del proceso disciplinario.

Para efectos de la imposición de una sanción insiste esta instancia que las actuaciones desplegadas por la servidora [Nombre 001], valoradas en su conjunto, los aspectos circunstanciales que rodearon el caso y los fines del régimen disciplinario, permiten a esta Cámara subsumir lo aquí verificado como una falta LEVE, cuya sanción debe corresponder a una ADVERTENCIA , tomando en consideración los años de servicio de la acusada, así como el hecho de que no reporta sanciones disciplinarias. Comuníquese al Departamento de Gestión Humana y la Jefatura de la encausada para lo de su cargo.

POR TANTO

Por las razones expuestas y conforme a los artículos 192, 194, 195, siguientes y concordantes de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, se considera la señora [Nombre 001] , como responsable de negligencia en el cumplimiento de los deberes propios de su cargo. Subsumida dentro de las previsiones de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial bajo los supuestos de una FALTA LEVE. Se le impone a la aquí investigada la sanción disciplinaria de ADVERTENCIA. Comuníquese al Departamento de Gestión Humana y la Jefatura de la encausada para lo de su cargo. Es todo. Notifìquese.

Ericka Quesada Madrigal.

María Mora Saprissa. Christian Hernández Agüero.

Inspectores Generales Judiciales *GG2DHAIRSVW61* ERICKA QUESADA MADRIGAL - INSPECTOR/A INSTRUCTOR/A *TTESQ43IJ7KA61* MARIA MORA SAPRISSA - INSPECTOR/A INSTRUCTOR/A *SNBVZ0WYUQ061* CRISTIAN HERNANDEZ AGUERO - INSPECTOR/A INSTRUCTOR/A Edificio O.I.J. Primer Piso Teléfonos: 2295-3729 ó 2295-3730 ó 2295-4338. Fax: 2257-5592. Correo electrónico: [email protected]