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Res. 15760-2008 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 22/10/2008
OutcomeResultado
The articles postponing the EIA until after the concession, the exemption of state liability, and part of Transitory II are declared unconstitutional; Transitory IV is upheld.Se declaran inconstitucionales los artículos que posponían la EIA hasta después de otorgada la concesión, la exención de responsabilidad estatal, y parte del Transitorio II; se valida el Transitorio IV.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber examined a legislative consultation regarding the proposed reform of the Tourist Marina Law. By majority, it found essential procedural flaws: failure to consult municipalities on a motion allowing them to provide facilities for marina patents, and violation of the publicity principle by not re-publishing the amended text. Unanimously on the merits, it declared unconstitutional: i) articles that postponed the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) until after the concession was granted, violating the State's duty of preventive environmental protection and limiting citizen participation; ii) the clause that exempted the Administration from liability if the EIA was negative; iii) Transitory Provision II insofar as it exempted illegally operating marinas from EIA, incentivizing irregularities. Transitory Provision IV, on renewal of concessions without new works, was upheld. The Chamber affirmed the prior EIA as a constitutional principle, the preventive and precautionary principles, and State liability.La Sala Constitucional examinó la consulta legislativa sobre el proyecto de reforma a la Ley de Marinas Turísticas. Por mayoría, encontró vicios esenciales en el procedimiento: falta de consulta a las municipalidades sobre una moción que les permitía brindar facilidades para patentes en marinas, y violación al principio de publicidad al no re-publicar el texto modificado. Por unanimidad en el fondo, declaró inconstitucionales: i) los artículos que posponían la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) para después de otorgada la concesión, violando el deber estatal de protección preventiva del ambiente y limitando la participación ciudadana; ii) la cláusula que eximía a la Administración de responsabilidad si la EIA resultaba negativa; iii) el Transitorio II en lo que exoneraba de EIA a marinas ilegales en operación, incentivando irregularidades. El Transitorio IV, sobre renovación de concesiones sin nuevas obras, fue declarado constitucional. La Sala reivindicó la EIA previa como principio constitucional, los principios preventivo y precautorio, y la responsabilidad del Estado.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In sum, the procedure devised in the consulted bill for granting concessions for the construction, administration and operation of tourist marinas and docks is unconstitutional. First, because it ignores that the Environmental Impact Study must be carried out prior to any concession, and furthermore, it is unconstitutional for the State to exclude its liability through legislation.En suma, el procedimiento ideado en el proyecto de ley consultado, para el otorgamiento de las concesiones para la construcción, administración y explotación de marinas y atracaderos turísticos es inconstitucional. En primer término, por desconocer que el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental se debe realizar de previo a cualquier concesión, siendo que, por lo demás, es inconstitucional que el Estado excluya por vía legislativa su responsabilidad.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"La Sala afirmó que del derecho a la vida y de la obligación estatal de “proteger las bellezas naturales” contenidos en los artículos 21 y 89 de la Constitución, surgen otros derechos de obligada protección e igual rango como la salud y el derecho a un ambiente sano, en ausencia de los cuales o no sería posible el ejercicio de los primeros, o su disfrute se vería severamente limitado."
"The Chamber affirmed that from the right to life and the State obligation to 'protect natural beauties' contained in Articles 21 and 89 of the Constitution, other rights of mandatory protection and equal rank arise, such as health and the right to a healthy environment, without which the exercise of the former would not be possible or their enjoyment would be severely limited."
Considerando VII, cita jurisprudencial
"La Sala afirmó que del derecho a la vida y de la obligación estatal de “proteger las bellezas naturales” contenidos en los artículos 21 y 89 de la Constitución, surgen otros derechos de obligada protección e igual rango como la salud y el derecho a un ambiente sano, en ausencia de los cuales o no sería posible el ejercicio de los primeros, o su disfrute se vería severamente limitado."
Considerando VII, cita jurisprudencial
"Uno de los principios rectores del Derecho Ambiental lo constituye el precautorio o de evitación prudente. (...) Cuando haya peligro de daño grave e irreversible, la falta de certeza científica absoluta no deberá utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces en función de los costos para impedir la degradación del medio ambiente."
"One of the guiding principles of Environmental Law is the precautionary principle or principle of prudent avoidance. (...) When there is a threat of serious and irreversible damage, the lack of absolute scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
Considerando VII, principio precautorio
"Uno de los principios rectores del Derecho Ambiental lo constituye el precautorio o de evitación prudente. (...) Cuando haya peligro de daño grave e irreversible, la falta de certeza científica absoluta no deberá utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces en función de los costos para impedir la degradación del medio ambiente."
Considerando VII, principio precautorio
"En el caso concreto y después del examen del iter legislativo, es posible corroborar que, en términos generales –y salvo lo que se dirá en relación al artículo 9 de la ley que se pretende reformar-, las instituciones citadas, a saber, las municipalidades costeras y el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo han sido ampliamente consultadas..."
"In the specific case, after examining the legislative process, it is possible to corroborate that, in general terms –and except for what will be said regarding Article 9 of the law to be reformed–, the cited institutions, namely the coastal municipalities and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, have been extensively consulted..."
Considerando V, análisis de consultas
"En el caso concreto y después del examen del iter legislativo, es posible corroborar que, en términos generales –y salvo lo que se dirá en relación al artículo 9 de la ley que se pretende reformar-, las instituciones citadas, a saber, las municipalidades costeras y el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo han sido ampliamente consultadas..."
Considerando V, análisis de consultas
Full documentDocumento completo
*080125520007CO* Res: 2008-015760 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at two thirty in the afternoon on October twenty-second, two thousand eight.
Optional legislative consultation of constitutionality filed by deputies OLIVIER PÉREZ GONZÁLEZ, LEDA ZAMORA CHAVES, RONALD SOLÍS BOLAÑOS, GRETTEL ORTIZ ALVAREZ, ORLANDO HERNÁNDEZ MURILLO, PATRICIA ROMERO B., JOSÉ JOAQUÍN SALAZAR, SERGIO ALFARO SALAS, JOSÉ MERINO, LESVIA VILLALOBOS SALAS, ALBERTO SALOM ECHEVERRÍA, RAFAEL ELÍAS MADRIGAL BRENES, and ELIZABETH FONSECA CORRALES regarding the bill initially called "Ley de Simplificación de Trámites para la Instalación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos" (Law for the Simplification of Procedures for the Installation of Marinas and Tourist Docks), now called "Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas" (Amendment of several articles of Law No. 7744, Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas), processed in legislative file No. 14.836.
WHEREAS:
1.- The consultation was received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:29 p.m. on September 16, 2008. The certified copies of legislative file No. 14.836, "Ley de Simplificación de Trámites para la Instalación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos," or rather, "Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas," were deemed received in the Chamber by resolution on September 23, 2008. Consequently, the deadline to evacuate the consultation expires on October 23, 2008.
2.- The consulting legislators consider that in the procedure followed for processing the bill being considered in legislative file No. 14.836, formal aspects were violated and it contains substantive defects of unconstitutionality. Firstly, they question that Articles 170 and 190 of the Political Constitution were violated by omitting to conduct a series of mandatory consultations. They allege that, in total, 29 substantive motions were introduced in the Plenary and that, subsequently, the bill was not consulted again with the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT), the Municipalities of the coastal zones, the Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico (INCOP), and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM). They affirm that this duty was stated in the Report of the Department of Technical Services of November 2006. They explain that, originally, the consultations regarding the base text were carried out by the Special Commission that was processing it. All were sent on October 24, 2002, and it was sent for publication. However, subsequently, the text underwent new substantial modifications, and the Tourism Commission sent it for consultation between March 8 and 14, 2007. They allege that, subsequently, the bill received substantive motions in the Legislative Plenary, which were admitted; however, these last changes were not consulted. They affirm that such modifications to the bill directly affect the institutions involved, and, therefore, they have been left defenseless. Specifically, they refer to the content of Articles 2, 5, 8, and 9. Firstly, they refer to the powers of the Municipalities and the ICT to grant the corresponding concessions. Regarding Article 5 of the bill, they affirm that there is interference in the powers of the coastal municipalities, as it establishes a right for the administered party to continue the concession process before the Municipality by merely presenting the technical viability of the project, and the ICT's powers regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies are also affected. They insist, additionally, that Articles 8 and 9 of the bill affect municipal powers. Secondly, the consulting legislators indicate that the principle of publicity was violated, since the new text, with the changes included, was not duly published, despite being reforms that address essential aspects, such as those incorporated in the 29 motions approved in Plenary. They point out that the last changes the bill underwent were made between June 6, 2007, and June 25, 2008, during the processing of substantive motions regulated by Article 137 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, and even though it refers to essential aspects of the bill, it was not published. Next, the grievances indicated by the consulting legislators regarding the substance of the bill are listed. They claim violation of the constitutional right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. This is due to the elimination of the obligation to have the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) duly approved by SETENA as a prerequisite for granting concessions to private parties over public domain assets of environmental importance (zona marítimo terrestre and territorial sea) for the construction and operation of tourist marinas, through the repeal of subsection f) of Article 8, the modification of Articles 8 and 5, subsection c), of Law No. 7744, and the addition of an Article 9 bis to that law, contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the bill under consultation. They explain that, instead, to process and obtain these concessions, it is only required to "inform" about the status of the processing of said evaluation, which, in their opinion, includes the possibility that this process may not even have concluded and the applicant lacks environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) granted by the competent technical authority at the time of obtaining the concession. They state that as a prerequisite for granting concessions to private subjects over public domain assets such as the territorial sea and the zona marítimo terrestre, the amendment to Article 5, subsection c), of Law No. 7774, only contemplates the presentation of a Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial) granted by SETENA and managed through an Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EAI). They point out that regarding this requirement, it is essential to remember that it can in no way be equated to a true Environmental Impact Assessment, duly approved. They maintain that in accordance with the General Regulations on Environmental Assessment Procedures (Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación Ambiental), the EAI is only the first stage of the assessment procedure. That is, it constitutes a preliminary study on the environmental characteristics of an activity, to determine the significance of the eventual impact it will generate and proceed to its categorization, but it lacks the analytical elements and depth characteristic of an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental) or the other instruments that are part of the assessment procedure. They insist that the function of this first stage is precisely to determine the scope, components, and depth of the technical studies that will have to be carried out to meet the EIA requirement. Thus, they conclude that what was established, at the time, as a prior preventive control, is being regulated as a subsequent requirement. In particular, they allege that compliance with the requirement of a duly approved EIA by SETENA is being promoted to occur after the granting of permits or concessions to carry out activities for which this requirement is demanded, that is, when the competent Administration has already granted the permits or concessions to the interested party. They consider that postponing the approval of environmental impact assessments until after the granting of permits or concessions to carry out activities that require this requirement has serious consequences for the State's capacity to effectively protect the environment. They assert that one of the main consequences is that it allows the granting of acquired rights to private parties over public domain assets (territorial sea, zona marítimo terrestre) to carry out activities that could alter or damage the environment without prior verification of the environmental impacts of the proposed projects and without the concessionaires having demonstrated that the activities they intend to carry out are environmentally viable. They affirm that constitutional jurisprudence has indicated, in repeated resolutions, that it is contrary to Constitutional Law to grant concession contracts to third parties over public domain assets of environmental importance (natural resources having the character of public domain assets) to carry out activities that should be subject to environmental impact assessments, granted by the competent technical authority of the Costa Rican State (SETENA). They conclude that with the rules consulted, the natural resources constitutionally protected, such as the zona marítimo terrestre and the territorial sea (Articles 6 and 121, subsection 14, of the Magna Carta), would be left unprotected, and the preventive and precautionary principles would be ignored and violated. In another line of thought, they consider that the consulted rules unnecessarily increase the risk of lawsuits and litigation against the Costa Rican State and favor the exercise of pressure so that the competent authorities endorse environmentally questioned projects. On the other hand, they indicate that it cannot be ignored that an increase in the threats of million-dollar lawsuits against the State, for alleged violation of "acquired rights" of holders of concession contracts, can translate into an increase in internal and external pressures on the authorities responsible for ruling on the environmental impact assessments presented by those concessionaires. The risk of substantial lawsuits against the State for the breach of already signed concession contracts can affect the quality of the decisions adopted by the bodies responsible for resolving the environmental viability of marina projects, as these decisions become "contaminated" with pressures unrelated to the strict technical analysis of the impact of such projects on the environment. The risks of a notable increase in litigation against the State and local governments as a consequence of the consulted rules occur not only in the sphere of domestic jurisdiction but are also likely to increase claims before international arbitral tribunals filed by foreign investors, based on bilateral investment protection treaties signed by Costa Rica. Several of these treaties establish dispute resolution mechanisms between the Costa Rican State and investors from other parties, to whose jurisdiction our country assumed the obligation to submit when such investors so request, considering that actions or decisions by national authorities affect their investments in the country. In the case of these treaties, the consulted rules facilitate the filing of such international claims against the country because they unjustifiably facilitate the configuration of the requirements contained in the cited international instruments for the admissibility of disputes. They conclude that the rules under consultation would be expanding the possibilities of constant international lawsuits against the State in the event that SETENA rejects an EIA after the granting of a concession. Secondly, they accuse a violation of the right to citizen participation in deciding matters related to the environment (Articles 9 and 50 of the Political Constitution). This is because, they affirm, granting concessions for the construction of marinas on public domain assets, prior to the definitive approval of an Environmental Impact Assessment by SETENA, also violates the right to citizen participation of the population that could eventually be affected by said concession. They consider that this situation weakens the right of inhabitants to pronounce themselves and participate in a timely manner in decision-making that affects the environment and the way of life of their communities, because it displaces its exercise to a stage where government authorities have already made decisions regarding a specific permit or concession application and there are acquired rights over the activity that is the subject of controversy. Thirdly, they indicate that Transitory Provision II of the consulted bill is unconstitutional because it violates the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, due to the exemption from the obligation to carry out environmental impact assessments for those who have illegally built tourist marinas and docks. The rule consulted refers to the case of illegally built tourist marinas and docks that, at the time of approval of this legal reform, are in operation. That is, marinas and docks that today exploit assets belonging to the Nation (zona marítimo terrestre and territorial sea) contrary to the principles established in current legislation and without having obtained the respective permits or concessions to use said public domain assets. In relation to these projects, the cited transitory article establishes that they are granted a one-year period to regularize their situation and obtain the respective permits and concessions for their operation. They already consider this measure to be quite debatable, since the State's obligation is to protect the Nation's own assets and order the immediate eviction of any private party that intends to appropriate them illegitimately. They believe that the mere inclusion of such a provision in the consulted bill could be incentivizing and promoting the start or acceleration of illegal works, under the expectation of those responsible to benefit from the approval of this transitory article. Finally, they indicate that Transitory Provision IV of the bill in question states that the Environmental Impact Assessment must be carried out only for the case of new activities that are not in operation. For this reason, in the case of renewal, transfer, or adjudication of rights, or granting of a new concession, for those marinas, tourist docks, or similar projects that were in operation and do not involve modifications, meaning the construction or execution of new works or activities, they will not be required to carry out an environmental impact assessment. Such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority. However, they indicate that it is known, and numerous studies have proven it, that environmental impact is cumulative, and given that the term of the concessions is increased to up to 35 years and can be extended without a new environmental impact study being conducted where there are already marina construction plans, this would be proceeding against the logic intrinsic to the precautionary principle (in dubio pro natura) and contrary to the requirements that, for the protection of the Caribbean Sea, the country is obligated to fulfill according to the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and its Protocol concerning Cooperation in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region, Law No. 7227, specifically, in its Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8. If this situation is observed carefully, it can be concluded that 35 years after a marina has started operations, the environmental conditions will have changed, potentially generating new and different risks compared to the initial conditions. Sound science indicates that there should be environmental controls throughout the entire term of the concession and that, furthermore, as a requirement for the renewal of the permit, a new environmental impact study should be carried out, even if the structure of the marina is not modified, since the viability of continuing the operation would be evaluated. All of which, in their opinion, is violating the precautionary principle in environmental matters.
3.- By resolution of 8:45 a.m. on September 19, 2008, the consultation was deemed filed, and the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly was requested to remit legislative file No. 14.836, or a certified copy thereof (see folios 48-50).
4.- By resolution of 9:42 a.m. on September 23, 2008, the certified copy of the legislative file was deemed received (see resolution on folio 55 of the file).
5.- Through a brief filed with the Secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at 10:52 a.m. on September 24, 2008, the Regional Director and the Political Advocacy Manager of MarViva requested that their statements regarding the substance of the consulted bill be taken into account (see folios 56-60).
6.- In a memorial received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 7:32 a.m. on September 30, 2008, deputies Ana Helena Chacón, Oscar Núñez Calvo, Gladis González, Yalile Esna, Sandra Quesada, José A. Ocampo, Fernando Sánchez, Jorge Méndez, Lorena Vásquez Badilla, Bienvenido Venegas, Olga Marta Corrales, Salvador Quirós Conejo, Mayi Antillón Guerrero, Francisco Marín Monge, Xinia Nicolás Alvarado, Carlos Gutiérrez, Olivier Jiménez, Andrea Morales, and Luis Antonio Barrantes appeared and, in their capacity as "amicus curiae," extensively addressed the questions raised by the consulting legislators. They request that this Court endorse the constitutionality of the procedure and the substance of the bill, since, in their opinion, the process has been in accordance with constitutionality in all its aspects (see folios 62-86).
7.- Through a memorial received in the Secretariat of the Chamber on October 16, 2008, the Comité Unido por Talamanca-Caribe Sur (United Committee for Talamanca-South Caribbean), residents of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca, appeared to file an active joinder action. This is based on the defense of diffuse interests. They express their opposition to the bill and question that a consultation with the coastal marine communities regarding the text in question was not carried out. They consider that the bill intends to restrict the use of the zona marítimo terrestre and would grant more facilities to business owners regarding the presentation of requirements to obtain the corresponding concession. They also question the deadlines for granting concessions (see folios 87-92).
8.- In the substantiation of the process, the prescriptions of law have been observed.
Drafted by Judge Jinesta Lobo; and,
WHEREAS:
I.- REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION. This optional consultation of constitutionality was made by thirteen deputies of the Legislative Assembly after the approval in the first debate of the bill "Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas" processed in legislative file No. 14.836. Additionally, it should be noted that the cited bill was consulted before its definitive approval. Based on the foregoing and in accordance with the provisions of Article 96, subsection b), of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, this legislative consultation of constitutionality is admissible, and we proceed to evacuate it.
II.- REGARDING THE JOINDER ACTION. Through a memorial appearing on folio 87 et seq. of the file, the Comité Unido por Talamanca-Caribe Sur filed a joinder action, with the purpose that their statements and disagreements regarding the bill submitted for consultation be taken into consideration. However, said action is inadmissible. Note that active or passive joinder intervention is provided for amparo processes in which there are interested third parties and, particularly, for anyone who derives a legitimate interest from the final judgment (Article 34 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) and not for consultation mechanisms in which simple opposing legal opinions may exist about the constitutional regularity of a bill (see Rulings Nos. 2003-14606 of 12:30 p.m. on December 12, 2003, and 2004-01603 of 9:30 a.m. on February 17, 2004).
III.- OBJECT OF THE CONSULTATION. The consultation is raised so that this Constitutional Court rules on two alleged essential defects in the substantiation of the legislative procedure of legislative file No. 14.836, the bill "Ley de Simplificación de Trámites para la Instalación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos", as well as some substantive aspects related to the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution.
IV.- REGARDING THE PROCESSING OF LEGISLATIVE FILE No. 14.836. Before analyzing in detail the points consulted by the legislators, it is appropriate to briefly recount the vicissitudes of the legislative procedure to which legislative file No. 14.836 was subjected, in which the bill called "Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas" is being considered:
<![if !supportLists]>1) <![endif]>The bill "Simplificación de Trámites y Creación de Incentivos en Atracaderos y Marinas Turísticas" (Simplification of Procedures and Creation of Incentives for Tourist Docks and Marinas) was filed with the Secretariat of the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly on July 29, 2002, by deputies Jorge Álvarez Pérez, Sigifredo Aiza Campos, Peter Guevara Guth, and Edwin Paterson Bent (see folios 1-20 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I).
<![if !supportLists]>2) <![endif]>On September 18, 2002, the copy of the file was delivered to the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services (see folio 21 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I).
<![if !supportLists]>3) <![endif]>The bill was published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 190 on October 3, 2002 (see folio 22 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I).
<![if !supportLists]>4) <![endif]>The file was remitted on October 9, 2002, to the "Special Commission on Tourism that will identify and study both the obstacles affecting tourism activity and the necessary stimuli required by that sector, promote necessary stimuli, hear and report on bills related to tourism activity" (see folio 22 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I).
<![if !supportLists]>5) <![endif]>On October 24, 2002, a series of motions were approved in the Special Commission so that the bill would be consulted with the Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos (CIMAT), Marina Los Sueños, Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, coastal municipalities, Marina Banana Bay, CENTRAMAR, SAMOA, Cámara Nacional de Turismo, Marina Flamingo, all known marinas and docks in the country, Ministerio de Hacienda, Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura, Instituto Nacional de Seguros, Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería (see folios 23, 26, 28, and 32-37 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I).
<![if !supportLists]>6) <![endif]>Through official letters of October 30, 2002, the President of the Special Commission on Tourism requested opinions regarding the bill from the Municipalities of Limón, Golfito, Parrita, Garabito, Esparza, Osa, Puntarenas, Santa Cruz, Aguirre, Nandayure, Carrillo, Hojancha, Cañas, Bagaces, Tilarán, Liberia, Nicoya, Abangares, Siquirres, Pococí, Guácimo, Matina, La Cruz, Talamanca, the Manager of the Marina and Flamingo Yacht Club, the Golfito Yacht Club Dock, the Director of Samoa del Sur, the Manager of Banana Bay, the Ministerio de Hacienda, the Instituto Costarricense de Pesca, the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, the Cámara Nacional de Turismo, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, Marina Los Sueños, and the Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos (see folios 77-113 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I).
<![if !supportLists]>7) <![endif]>On March 3, 2005, the Legislative Subcommission responsible for reviewing the bill submitted its unanimous affirmative report to the Special Commission. To this end, a substitute text was provided (see folios 500-570 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume II).
<![if !supportLists]>8) <![endif]>In the session of March 3, 2005, a motion was approved before the Special Commission to accept the attached text as the substitute text, and a series of motions were approved so that the text of the substitute bill would be consulted with the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, the CIMAT, the coastal municipalities, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, the Ministerio de Salud, the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, the Cámara Nacional de Turismo, and the Procuraduría General de la República (see folios 541-549 and 572-595 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume II).
<![if !supportLists]>9) <![endif]>Through official letters of March 3, 2005, the Special Commission requested opinions on the approved substitute text from the following institutions: the Cámara Nacional de Turismo, the Municipalities of Nicoya, Liberia, Tilarán, Cañas, Carrillo, La Cruz, Puntarenas, Coto Brus, Corredores, Osa, Esparza, Siquirres, Talamanca, Pococí, Matina, Limón, Montes de Oro, Santa Cruz, Hojancha, Nandayure, Garabito, Parrita, Guácimo, Golfito, Abangares, Bagaces, Aguirre, and Buenos Aires, the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, the CIMAT, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, the Ministerio de Salud, the Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, the Procuraduría General de la República, the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (see folios 596-632 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume II).
<![if !supportLists]>10) <![endif]>In session No. 58 of March 31, 2005, of the Special Commission, the text of the bill "Ley de Simplificación de Trámites y Creación de Incentivos en Atracaderos y Marinas Turísticas" was approved, and deputy Álvarez Pérez was commissioned to prepare the corresponding report (see folios 704-735 and the affirmative report on folios 739-754 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume III).
<![if !supportLists]>11) <![endif]>On May 5, 2005, the Special Commission delivered the corresponding affirmative majority report on the bill to the Executive Directorate of the Legislative Assembly (see folio 756 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume III).
<![if !supportLists]>12) <![endif]>In ordinary session No. 149 of March 28, 2006, the discussion of the bill in the first debate began in the Plenary, with a series of motions via Article 137 being presented, which were forwarded to the Reporting Commission (see folios 802-810 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume III).
<![if !supportLists]>13) <![endif]>On April 4, 11, 18, and 20, 2006, the Special Commission on Tourism rendered its reports on motions via Article 137 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (826-829 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume III, folios 860-875, 941-954, 968-1003 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume IV).
<![if !supportLists]>14) <![endif]>In ordinary session No. 66 of September 4, 2006, the discussion of the bill in the Plenary continued, and a four-year term motion under Article 119 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly was approved, along with a motion for the bill to be sent for review to the Permanent Commission for a period of ninety calendar days (see folios 1054-1076 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume IV).
<![if !supportLists]>15) <![endif]>The bill was remitted to the Permanent Special Commission on Tourism on September 7, 2006, so that it could be reviewed within the period of ninety days (see folio 1077 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume IV).
<![if !supportLists]>16) <![endif]>Through official letters of October 19, 2006, the Head of the Area of the Special Commission on Tourism remitted the bill with the modifications made to that date to the following institutions: Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, Procuraduría General de la República, Contraloría General de la República, Instituto Geográfico Nacional, Universidad de Costa Rica, and Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica. This was for the purpose of requesting collaboration in the drafting of the bill (see folios 1174-1191 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume V).
CONSULTATION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS V.- CONCERNING THE LACK OF CONSULTATION OF THE BILL WITH SEVERAL AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 190 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. As the first defect in the legislative procedure, the consulting Deputies question whether, in application of articles 170 and 190 of the Political Constitution, it was an unavoidable duty that the bill be mandatorily consulted with the following institutions: Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT), the Municipalities of coastal zones, the Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico (INCOP), and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM). This, because, during the process of considering substantive motions filed via article 137 of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, a total of twenty-nine motions were approved before the Permanent Special Commission on Tourism which, in their opinion, modify substantial aspects of the bill, and therefore, these changes should have been consulted with the indicated institutions. Specifically, they refer to article 2 of the bill, which intends to reform articles 1, 5, 8, and 9 of Law No. 7744 of December 19, 1997, that is, the Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas. However, a careful reading of the aforementioned numerals, as well as of the consultation raised by the legislators, does not reveal any relationship with the competencies of the Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico (INCOP), and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM). Indeed, the legislators completely omitted to establish a relationship between the competencies of the referred autonomous institutions and the content of the consulted bill. Thus, given the noted omission, no substantial modification of the bill is observed that affects the competencies of the cited institutions. Consequently, it is appropriate to focus on municipal competencies, mainly in relation to the issue of granting concessions and, additionally, the competencies of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, regarding concessions in the Golfo de Papagayo zone. As the consulting legislators point out, article 190 of the Political Constitution provides that for the discussion and approval of bills related to an autonomous institution, the Legislative Assembly shall previously hear the opinion of that institution. In the specific case and after examining the legislative iter, it is possible to corroborate that, in general terms – and except for what will be said in relation to article 9 of the law intended to be reformed – the cited institutions, namely, the coastal municipalities and the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, have been extensively consulted regarding the texts that have served for discussion within the Legislative Assembly, concerning the approval of a reform to the Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas, Law No. 7744 of February 6, 1998. Indeed, note that the first text submitted for discussion was consulted with all the coastal municipalities, as well as with the Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos (CIMAT), as a maximum deconcentration body attached to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, by means of official letters dated October 30, 2002 (see folios 77-113 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I). Subsequently, in the session of March 3, 2005, a motion was approved in the Special Commission on Tourism to adopt a substitute text, which was also submitted for consultation to the coastal municipalities and CIMAT. This was done by official letters dated March 3, 2005 (see folios 596-632 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume II). Finally, we have that on March 8, 2007, a motion was approved in the Permanent Special Commission on Tourism to adopt a substitute text and use it as the base discussion document. This Commission approved, additionally, a motion so that the bill would be consulted with various institutions, among them, the municipalities of the entire country, the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, and the Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos, which was carried out through official letters dated March 14, 2007 (see folios 1511-1550 of the copy of the legislative file). Now, the consulting legislators consider it unconstitutional that, from this point on, no new consultations were carried out, despite the fact that, in their opinion, substantial modifications to the analyzed bill were approved. It should be emphasized that, in accordance with the jurisprudential line of this Constitutional Court, article 190 of the Political Constitution does not imply that every bill or any modification introduced to the text, through the exercise of the right of amendment, must be consulted with the relevant autonomous institution, but rather, only those aspects referring to its constitution or organic structure, or those relating to the essential scope of the competencies of the involved institutions. On this matter, in ruling No. 2008-004569 of 14:30 hrs. of March 26, 2008, this Constitutional Court, with the drafting of the reporting Magistrate, considered the following:
"(...) It should be noted that since Vote No. 1633-93 of 14:33 hrs. of April 13, 1993, this Constitutional Court has repeatedly indicated (see, among others, Votes Nos. 3625-1996 of 15:18 hrs. of July 16, 1996, 4717-1997 of 16:39 hrs. of August 19, 1997, 9137-2001 of 14:48 hrs. of September 12, 2001), that any bill is susceptible to being modified during the parliamentary iter, via the legislators' right of amendment, as long as the essential or material content is not altered, in which case the constitutional norms that regulate initiative in the formation of law, publicity, and, of course, the substantial procedure of consultation with autonomous institutions under article 190 of the Constitution shall be considered infringed (...)"
Under this approach, it remains to analyze whether the introduced modifications affect the competency framework or organic structure of the indicated institutions to the point that a new consultation would be warranted. This, based on the observations raised by the consulting legislators themselves (see folios 5-10 of the file):
"Article 1.- Concession (...)
The municipality of the place shall be the competent authority to grant the concession. (...) Regarding concessions requested in the Proyecto Turístico Golfo de Papagayo, the competent authority to grant them shall be the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT), in accordance with the Law regulating the development and execution of the Proyecto Turístico Golfo de Papagayo, No. 6758, of June 4, 1982. (...)" (The highlighting corresponds to the approved motion).
From the analysis of the transcribed text, as well as the current legislation, it is clear that no substantial modification is being made to any of the competencies of the involved institutions. It is evident that it is up to the municipalities to grant the respective concessions for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas and docks. Even the current and valid regulation provides in article 1, the following:
"ARTICLE 1.- Authorization Concessions may be granted in the areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone and the adjacent area permanently covered by the sea, in accordance with the provisions of this law; with the exception of mangrove areas, national parks, and biological reserves, for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas and docks.
The municipality of the place shall be the competent authority to grant the concession. In case of an express request from the respective municipality to state institutions, these must provide technical advice.
The respective institutions of the Costa Rican State shall, within their spheres of competence, periodically supervise and oversee the operation and functioning of tourist marinas and docks.
The concession shall be granted while safeguarding the environment and natural resources of the zone." Now, regarding the competencies of the Instituto Costarricense del Turismo, we have that Law No. 6758, of June 25, 1982, regulating the Execution of the Papagayo Tourism Project, provides, in the relevant parts, the following:
"Article 9.- To execute and develop the project, the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo shall create an executing office that shall have, exclusively, the powers to direct, coordinate, administer, and control the development referred to in this law. This office shall be attached to the Institute, reporting directly to its Board of Directors." "Article 12.- The Board of Directors of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo may grant concessions on the use of the project lands in the zone designated for it, in accordance with the terms and conditions that the Institute establishes for this purpose, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 107 of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic". (The highlighting is not in the original).
In accordance with the above, it is evident that by legal provision, it is the responsibility of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo to direct, coordinate, administer, and control the tourism development carried out in the Papagayo Tourism Project, and, for this purpose, it is responsible for granting the corresponding tourism concessions, including, of course, those for the construction and administration of tourist marinas. On this matter, in session No. 34 of the Legislative Plenary of July 9, 2007, legislator Vásquez Badilla introduced motion No. 55 which proposed the questioned text (see folio 1803 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume VII). In the corresponding discussion, the proposing deputy stated the following:
"(...) It seems to me that this project contemplates a problem that this Commission must correct, which is when it refers to the competent authority to grant the concession, because it indicates that it is the municipality of the respective place.
(...)
However, there is an issue here, which is that of the Papagayo tourism project, which, indeed, has a specific Law and where it is not the Municipality of Carrillo, for example, that grants those concessions in that area.
I believe it is important to clarify the incorporation of the last paragraph, regarding the concessions requested in the Golfo de Papagayo tourism project, as there is a gap at this moment, in my judgment, because the competent authority, in this case, is not the Municipality but the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, according to Law No. 6758 of May 6, 1982. (...)" A motion which was finally approved unanimously in session No. 7 of the Permanent Special Commission on Tourism, held on July 18, 2007 (see folios 1967-1968 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume VII). In accordance with the above, it is reiterated that it is evident that a new consultation is not necessary, whether with the Municipality of Carrillo or the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, because it is clear that the competence for granting concessions conferred in the Papagayo Tourism Project is held, by special law, by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo. Thus, it is observed that its essential competencies are not being modified, but rather the respective clarification is being made in application of the special legislation provided for the Papagayo Tourism Zone. Consequently, regarding this point, no defect of unconstitutionality is proven that would invalidate the legislative procedure.
"The appeal remedy must be filed before the head of the ICT. The decision of said entity shall exhaust the administrative channel, which does not constitute an impediment to resort to the jurisdictional channel." The legislators question that in the substitute text approved before the Permanent Special Commission in March 2007, the competence to exhaust the administrative channel was conferred to CIMAT. However, in the current regulation, this competence is held by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, as it is contemplated in article 7 of Law No. 7744 on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas, which provides, in the relevant parts, the following:
"(...) Against the resolutions of the Commission, the remedies of reconsideration and appeal shall be available, under the terms and conditions established in the General Public Administration Law.
The appeal remedy must be filed before the head of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo.
In this last resolution, the administrative channel shall be considered exhausted for the purposes of the contentious-administrative action, under the terms and effects indicated by the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction." (The highlighting is not in the original).
Thus, it was not essential to grant a new hearing to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo if the current regulation confers upon it, just as the valid text does, the power to resolve appeal remedies filed against the decisions of the Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos and, therefore, to exhaust the administrative channel in this matter. Consequently, since the competencies of the ICT were not modified, it was not necessary to carry out a new consultation because it is evident that the regulation seeks to be maintained in accordance with the current situation.
"(...) The municipalities may provide the facilities for the granting of the licenses that are required for the proper functioning of the marina projects they grant a concession for and, consequently, for the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law."
Legislator Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, on November 13, 2007, that is, after the last consultation carried out with the coastal municipalities, introduced the text of this motion, which was approved within the Permanent Special Commission on Tourism on June 17, 2008 (see folios 2353-2360 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume IX). To analyze this point of the consultation, it is necessary, beforehand, to define the contours of municipal autonomy, enshrined in article 170 of the Political Constitution by providing that "Municipal corporations are autonomous." On this matter, in ruling No. 5445-1999 of 14:30 hrs. of July 14, 1999, this Constitutional Court developed the aspects that comprise the autonomy recognized for municipal corporations:
"(...) III.- GENERAL CONCEPTS ON THE MUNICIPAL REGIME. In Costa Rica, the municipal regime is a form of territorial decentralization, as inferred from the first paragraph of article 168 of the Constitution. It is defined, mainly, in articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution which indicate, as relevant, that the 'administration of local interests and services shall be in charge of the Municipal Government formed by a deliberative body of popular election and an executive official designated by law' (nowadays the Mayor); it is a 'corporate system that enjoys autonomy and its own economic resources (budgetary competence)'. From this enunciation of the main legal features of the municipal institution, it is absolutely clear that certain elements are derived, namely: the existence of a territorial jurisdiction to address the interests and services of the local level; the constitution of a population based on neighborhood ties, such that every inhabitant of the Canton is a resident; the government formed by two differentiated bodies (Council and Mayor) with defined functions and relationships between them; the corporate nature of the institution; constitutional guarantee of independence (autonomy); and the subject matter of its administration, which is formed by everything that is or constitutes 'local interest and service'. From the political standpoint, municipalities are representative governments with competence over a specific territory (canton), with their own legal personality and public powers over their residents (inhabitants of the canton); they operate in a decentralized manner from the Government of the Republic, and enjoy constitutionally guaranteed and reinforced autonomy which manifests in political matters, by determining their own goals and the normative and administrative means in fulfillment of all kinds of public service for the satisfaction of the common good in their community. It can be said, in synthesis, that municipalities or local governments are territorial entities of a corporate and public non-state nature, endowed with independence in matters of government and operation, which means, for example, that municipal autonomy involves tax aspects, which for their validity require legislative authorization, the contracting of loans, and the preparation and disposition of their own income and expenses, with generic powers. All this implies, necessarily, that to correctly define the conformation of the Costa Rican State, there must be an exact assembly in the sum of the Municipal Governments as a whole and individually, regarding the relations and coordinated functioning with the Government of the Republic, to avoid the simultaneous coexistence of spheres of power of different origin and essence, the duplication of national and local efforts, and the confusion of rights and obligations among the various parties involved. What has been expressed leads, consequently, to the need to define, from the constitutional perspective, what the municipal sphere is, which will be done in the following recitals, to examine, subsequently and against the general framework of the local, the scope and compatibility of the norms that have been challenged.
IV.- MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY. GENERALITIES. Grammatically, it is usual to say that the term 'autonomy' can be defined as 'the power that, within the State, municipalities, provinces, regions, or other entities thereof may enjoy, to govern peculiar interests of their internal life, through their own norms and governing bodies'. From a legal-doctrinal point of view, this autonomy must be understood as the capacity that Municipalities have to freely decide and under their own responsibility, everything concerning the organization of a specific locality (the canton, in our case). Thus, a sector of the doctrine has said that this autonomy implies the free election of their own authorities; free management in matters of their competence; the creation, collection, and investment of their own income; and specifically, it refers to encompassing political, normative, tax, and administrative autonomy, defining them, in very general terms, as follows: political autonomy: as that which gives rise to self-government, entailing the election of its authorities through democratic and representative mechanisms, as indicated by our Political Constitution in article 169; normative autonomy: by virtue of which municipalities have the power to issue their own regulations in matters of their competence, a power which in our country refers only to the regulatory power that internally governs the organization of the corporation and the services it provides (autonomous regulations of organization and service); tax autonomy: also known as taxing power, and refers to the fact that the initiative for the creation, modification, extinction, or exemption of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, a power subject to the approval indicated in article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution when applicable; and administrative autonomy: as the power that implies not only self-regulation, but also self-administration and, therefore, freedom from the State for the adoption of the entity's fundamental decisions. Our doctrine, for its part, has said that the Political Constitution (article 170) and the Municipal Code (article 7 of the former Municipal Code, and 4 of the current one) have not limited themselves to attributing to municipalities the capacity to manage and promote local interests and services, but have expressly provided that this municipal management is and must be autonomous, which is defined as freedom from the other entities of the State for the adoption of its fundamental decisions. This autonomy is given in direct relation to the electoral and representative character of its Government (Council and Mayor) that are elected every four years, and means the capacity of the municipality to set its own action and investment policies independently, and more specifically, vis-à-vis the Executive Power and the governing party. It is the capacity to establish plans and programs of the local government, which is why it is linked to the power of the municipality to issue its own budget, an expression of the policies previously defined by the Council, a capacity that, in turn, is political. This position coincides with the majority doctrine, in which it has been said that the typical rank of local autonomy resides in the fact that the fundamental body of the territorial entity is the people as an electoral body and that, consequently, its political-administrative orientation derives from that body, not from the State, but from the community itself, that is, from the electoral majority of that same community, with the consequence that such political orientation may diverge from that of the Government of the Republic and even contradict it, where there is no correspondence of majorities between the state community and the local one; or, that political autonomy is a legal position, which is expressed in the power to lead an own political line understood as the possibility, in order to a determined sphere of interests and competencies, to establish a line of action or own program, with own powers and own responsibility regarding the timeliness and utility of its acts.
(...)” (The highlighted text is not part of the original).
From the foregoing, it follows that municipalities are territorial entities with administrative and political or governmental autonomy, which translates into the power to define the institution's goals and guidelines and the means to achieve them. Additionally, it should be noted that everything related to the granting of licenses for the exercise of commerce in its widest range of activities, and its natural consequence of collecting the so-called patent tax, has been classified as an exclusively municipal matter. Thus, for example, in ruling No. 6469-1997 of 4:20 p.m. on October 8, 1997, this Constitutional Court highlighted that everything concerning licenses for the exercise of lucrative activities will always be a municipal competence as it integrates the generic concept of "local matters," enshrined in Article 169 of the Political Constitution. In said resolution, the position of this Chamber was summarized, stating the following:
"(...) Recapitulating what has been expressed in this ruling, everything related to the granting of licenses (patents, as they are commonly called) for the sale of liquor is a municipal matter; consequently, for a premises to open its doors and dedicate itself to such activity, it is sufficient that it possesses the respective 'patent' and complies with the formal requirements established by law, always within the scope of local matters and, eventually, with executive or municipal service regulations, when applicable. Governors are expressly prohibited by the Political Constitution - through the articulation of numerals 169 and 170 - from intervening in the processes of granting licenses or so-called operating permits, which is not possible without violating municipal autonomy. (...)"
Consequently, the granting of municipal licenses for the exercise of any lucrative activity, as provided for in Article 79 of the Municipal Code, is an essential and typical competence of the municipalities, as it integrates the indeterminate legal concept of administration of local interests and services from Article 169 of the Constitution. Based on the foregoing, the State cannot, through a legislative guideline or directive such as the one contemplated in the analyzed numeral, affect municipal autonomy. By virtue of the foregoing, prior to the imposition of a legislative directive related to the management of municipal licenses and patents, the legislators should have sought the opinion of the involved municipal corporations; otherwise, their constitutionally recognized autonomy would be disregarded. In summary, although the legislative proposal that seeks to modify Article 9 of the current legislation is drafted in facultative or optional terms, the fact is that it entails a legislative directive regarding two aspects that classically constitute a fundamental part of local competences, such as the issue of patents in the maritime-terrestrial zone that must be administered by the municipalities. In any case, the proposed legislative directive, despite its facultative nature, touches upon aspects inherent to local autonomy, such as the management of human, material, and financial resources for streamlining or making more flexible the granting of patents required by concession marinas, a point on which consultation is imperative not only for strictly formal reasons but to ensure the technical correctness of the legislation that may be enacted. As a conclusion of the foregoing, regarding this aspect of the consultation, an essential defect that violated the constitutionality of the legislative procedure is indeed accredited. The foregoing, because it was demonstrated that through an approved motion, in accordance with the procedure of Article 137 of the Legislative Assembly Regulations, a substantial modification was introduced to the bill that was not consulted with the municipal corporations.
VI.- ON THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLICITY IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE. Secondly, the legislators state that just as the substantial changes that the bill underwent were not consulted, neither was the new text published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, thereby violating the principle of publicity. They observe that the last modifications the bill underwent were made between June 6, 2007, and June 25, 2008, during the process of hearing substantive motions, regulated by Article 137 of the Legislative Assembly Regulations. On this point, it is observed that the legislators raise the consultation in the abstract without specifying to this Constitutional Court what the alleged substantial modifications are that were introduced during the process of hearing substantive motions and which, in their opinion, warranted a new publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. Under such a scenario, it is worth reiterating with respect to this aspect that, in application of Article 99 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, there is reiterated jurisprudence from this Court to the effect that this body pronounces on what is expressly consulted and motivated, but not in the abstract (see rulings Nos. 5399-1995 of 3:54 p.m. on October 3, 1995, 9530-1999 of 9:15 a.m. on December 3, 1999, 2001-12420 of 9:21 a.m. on December 7, 2001, and 2004-07242 of 5:03 p.m. on June 30, 2004, among others). Despite this omission, and on the occasion of what was analyzed in the preceding whereas clause, this Court considers that a substantial modification was indeed introduced to the consulted bill, which required a new publication to provide greater publicity to the text. Indeed, as noted, it was proven that through the approval of a substantive motion, the text of the bill was modified to impose a guideline on the municipalities so that they provide the corresponding facilities for the granting of the patents required for the proper functioning of the marina projects that are granted in concession. The foregoing, without having previously heard their opinion on the matter, as required by Article 190 of the Political Constitution. Additionally, it is proven that a new publication was not made in the Official Gazette La Gaceta either, violating the principle of publicity in the processing of the legislative procedure, an essential defect that, being intrinsically related to the democratic principle, affected the constitutional regularity of the parliamentary process. Note that an essential element in the law-making procedure is publicity, insofar as it seeks to guarantee a broad debate that facilitates contact with public opinion in general and, in particular, with those who might have an interest, by reason of their activities, in knowing about and even participating in the deliberation of the matter or, even, the possibility of hearing public entities, in this case, the municipalities, upon whom a legislative directive related to their exclusive competences is being imposed. Furthermore, this Court has indicated that the publicity of parliamentary procedures is essential due to the representative nature of the national community held by the Legislative Assembly, given that sovereignty resides in the people and the deputies are only their representatives, as provided for in Article 105 of the Political Constitution. In the case under examination, it is proven that the bill "Modification of several articles of Law No. 7744, Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas" submitted for consultation to this Court was duly published in La Gaceta No. 190 of October 3, 2002. It should be taken into consideration, in this regard, that this reform proposal was presented before the Secretariat of the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly on July 29, 2002. However, despite the approval of motion No. 12-04 (33-137), heard in extraordinary session No. 4 of the Special Permanent Commission of Tourism on June 17, 2008, the bill was not published again in the Official Gazette. This, despite the fact that, as noted supra, a substantial modification was introduced to the bill seeking to establish directives in relation to the most essential competences of municipal corporations. Consequently, the omission to carry out a new publication of the bill, in order to guarantee the publicity of the text, as well as to seek citizen and institutional participation, violated an essential aspect of the parliamentary procedure, whose omission entails a defect of unconstitutionality in the legislative procedure.
SUBSTANTIVE CONSULTATION VII.- ON THE LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO THE GRANTING OF THE CONCESSION. INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. The consulting legislators question that through the reform intended to be approved within the Legislative Assembly, the aim is to repeal and, therefore, disregard the requirement of an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) approved by the National Technical Environmental Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) prior to the granting of the concession for the construction of a tourist marina or dock. They argue that this requirement is currently contemplated in Article 8, subsection f), of Law No. 7744 of December 19, 1997, on "Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas." However, the attempt is to reform said article and, instead, Article 9 bis establishes that the approval by SETENA of an EIA will be a requirement subsequent to the granting of the respective concession to build and operate tourist marinas. They cite Article 8 of the consulted bill, which stipulates that for the processing of the concession contract, the presentation of a certification issued by SETENA is required, reporting on the current status of the EIA. That is, it does not require having an assessment to process a public domain concession; rather, it only requires reporting on the status of the procedure. Furthermore, they insist that to initiate the procedure, only the presentation of a Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP) managed through an Initial Environmental Assessment is contemplated, which is characterized by being a preliminary study lacking depth. The consulting legislators consider that this provision contravenes the principles of environmental protection, mainly the precautionary principle. On the other hand, they consider that the consulted rules unnecessarily increase the risk of filing lawsuits and litigation against the Costa Rican State and, additionally, favor the exertion of pressure for the competent authorities to endorse environmentally questioned projects. They insist that with the consulted reforms, those interested in building tourist marinas or docks will hold the title of concessionaires when SETENA rules on the environmental impact studies. In such a case, if the endorsement is not obtained, the municipalities must annul the acts granting the concessions, in which case, the concessionaires could allege infringement of acquired rights or contractual breaches and file million-dollar claims. In addition to the foregoing, they consider that claims before international arbitration tribunals filed by foreign investors must be taken into account, such as, for example, the "Investor-State" dispute settlement mechanism contained in Chapter 10 of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. Having examined the grievances presented by the consulting legislators, this section of the consultation is divided into the analysis of two aspects: one related to environmental protection, and secondly, the provision that exempts the State's liability is analyzed as a mechanism to evade lawsuits due to the denial of the environmental impact study once the corresponding concession has been granted.
"Among the cultural goals of the Republic are: to protect natural beauties, to conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation, and to support private initiative for scientific and artistic progress." The Chamber affirmed that from the right to life and the state obligation to "protect natural beauties" contained in Articles 21 and 89 of the Constitution, other rights of obligatory protection and equal rank arise, such as health and the right to a healthy environment, in the absence of which the exercise of the former would not be possible, or their enjoyment would be severely limited. Likewise, the Chamber concorded a series of international treaties and conventions of mandatory observance in our territory to finally conclude, in the aforementioned vote, that what was provided in then Article 41, second paragraph, of the Hydrocarbons Bill was unconstitutional. The foregoing, for inverting the natural order of the procedure and granting the concession prior to conducting the corresponding environmental studies, concluding the following:
"(...) Consequently, what is provided by Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Bill, which requires environmental impact studies after the exploration or exploitation concession has been approved, especially in the case of private parties, is contrary to the constitutional goals, purposes, and obligations in environmental matters, insofar as the contract, once signed, creates rights in favor of the interested party. For this reason, the Chamber considers that Article 41, paragraph 2 is unconstitutional in this aspect. (...)"
In the international context, we find that the obligation for environmental impact assessment studies is expressly enshrined in Principle No. 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, signed by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992:
"PRINCIPLE 17 Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority." Previously, in June 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment highlighted in the Stockholm Declaration the need to promote rational and planned development, in accordance with environmental protection, "Principle 2 The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate.
(...)
Principle 17 Appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of planning, administering or controlling the use of the environmental resources of States with the aim of improving the quality of the environment." Even, and in attention to the matter at hand in this consultation, said Declaration called the attention of States to take "all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea." Additionally, the World Charter for Nature approved by the United Nations in 1982, highlights that activities that may pose serious dangers to nature shall be preceded by a thorough examination, indicating, as relevant, the following:
"(...) 11- Activities which might have an impact on Nature shall be controlled, and the best available techniques that minimize significant risks to Nature or other adverse effects shall be used; in particular:
"Article 14. Impact Assessment and Minimizing Adverse Impacts 1. Each Contracting Party, as far as possible and as appropriate:
It being understood in said declaration that biological diversity refers to the variability among living organisms from all sources, including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine, and other ecosystems. In other latitudes, for example, at the European level, the Council of the European Communities in June 1985 issued Directive No. 85/337/EEC, on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, in which States are urged to incorporate the environmental assessment study as a prerequisite for their authorization and stipulates the factors that should be taken into consideration in their analysis, as follows:
"Article 2 1. Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects.
(...)
2. The environmental impact assessment may be integrated into the existing procedures for consent to projects in the Member States, or, failing this, into other procedures or into procedures to be established to comply with the aims of this Directive." Article 3 The environmental impact assessment will identify, describe and assess in an appropriate manner, in the light of each individual case and in accordance with Articles 4 to 11, the direct and indirect effects of a project on the following factors:
- human beings, fauna and flora, - soil, water, air, climate and the landscape, - the interaction between the factors mentioned in the first and second indents, - material assets and the cultural heritage." Similar provisions were adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which promoted the conclusion of a Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, signed in Espoo, Finland, on February 25, 1991. At the national legislative level and as a development of the precept enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, we find Article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment, which stipulates the following:
"Article 17.- Environmental impact assessment Human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials, shall require an environmental impact assessment by the National Technical Environmental Secretariat created in this law. Its prior approval by this agency shall be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works, or projects. The laws and regulations shall indicate which activities, works, or projects shall require the environmental impact assessment." Likewise, the Biodiversity Law No. 7788 of April 30, 1998, in Articles 92 to 97 requires the submission of an environmental impact study when the realization of certain projects could compromise the biodiversity of the area in which it is intended to be executed, which must be approved under the terms provided by the Organic Law of the Environment. Said regulation defines what should be understood by Environmental Impact Assessment in Article 7, stating the following:
"Article 7.- Definitions This law must be interpreted according to the following definitions (...)
18.- Environmental impact assessment: Scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting what effects a specific action or project will have on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to lead to decision-making. It includes the specific effects, their global evaluation, the alternatives of greater environmental benefit, a program for the control and minimization of negative effects, a monitoring program, a recovery program, as well as the guarantee of environmental compliance. (...)" Similar definitions are also found in Article 3 of Law No. 7593, Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services of August 1996, and in Article 2 of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Law No. 8436 of March 2005, concluding that the environmental impact assessment is a prior technical study carried out by professionals and technicians whose purpose is to identify and predict the eventual effects that a specific project will have on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to determine the corresponding mitigation measures, as well as for the competent authority to grant or deny its authorization. It seeks to identify the risk elements of a project, either to eliminate them, reduce their incidence, or, where appropriate, advise the withdrawal of the action. By virtue of the foregoing, the prior EIA constitutes the ideal technical instrument to comply with the preventive and precautionary principles that govern in environmental matters, and this Constitutional Court has come to hold that dispensing with it implies omitting due prevention in the case of human intervention in the environment. Regarding the precautionary principle, this Constitutional Court, in ruling No. 2004-1923 of 2:55 p.m. on February 25, 2004, authored by the reporting Magistrate, provided the following:
"(...) XV.- PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PROTECTION OF GROUNDWATER. One of the guiding principles of Environmental Law is the precautionary principle or principle of prudent avoidance. This principle is set forth in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development or Rio Declaration, which literally states 'Principle 15.- In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation'. In the domestic legal system, the Biodiversity Law (No. 7788 of April 30, 1998), in its Article 11, sets out the following principles as hermeneutical parameters: '1.- Preventive criterion: It is recognized that it is of vital importance to anticipate, prevent and address the causes of biodiversity loss or its threats. 2.- Precautionary or in dubio pro natura criterion: When there is danger or threat of serious or imminent damage to the elements of biodiversity and the knowledge associated with them, the absence of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing the adoption of effective protection measures'. In Vote No. 1250-99 of 11:24 a.m. on February 19, 1999 (reiterated in Votes Nos. 9773-00 of 9:44 a.m. on November 3, 2000, 1711-01 of 4:32 p.m. on February 27, 2001, and 6322-03 of 2:14 p.m. on July 3, 2003) this Court considered the following: '(...) Prevention aims to anticipate negative effects and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or people's health. In this way, if there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage—or a doubt in this regard—a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question postponed. This is because in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, since if the socially harmful biological consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance but will hardly compensate for the damage caused to the environment'. Subsequently, in Vote No. 3480-03 of 2:02 p.m. on May 2, 2003, this Court indicated that 'Properly understood, the precautionary principle refers to the adoption of measures not in the face of ignorance of facts generating risk, but in the face of a lack of certainty regarding whether such facts will effectively produce harmful effects on the environment'.(...)"
The jurisprudence rendered by this Constitutional Court has linked the duty imposed in Article 50 of the Political Constitution with the precautionary and preventive principles and the obligation of environmental assessments as a prerequisite for any activity that may negatively impact the environment. It is necessary to cite, on this matter, ruling No. 6322-2003 of 2:14 p.m. on July 3, 2003, in which this Chamber categorically developed a series of principles of constitutional rank related to the state duty to defend the environment in a timely manner and linked the duty to carry out environmental impact studies with the precautionary and preventive principles, stating the following:
"(...) 4.- Precautionary principle: One of the essential principles that make up environmental law is the 'precautionary principle' or 'principle of prudent avoidance,' which is contained in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration, (...)
The term prevention derives from the Latin 'praeventio', which alludes to the action and effect of preventing, to those preparations and dispositions made in advance to avoid a risk or execute something. Prevention aims to anticipate negative effects and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or people's health.
Thus, in the event that there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage—or any doubt thereof—a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question must be postponed. The foregoing is because in environmental matters, ex post coercion proves ineffective, since if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, the repression may have moral significance but will hardly compensate the damages caused to the environment.
5.- On the completion of the environmental impact assessment prior to the initiation of works: This is based on the principle that environmental standards must have a technical basis, since their application must stem from limits that determine the conditions under which the use and exploitation of natural resources must be undertaken. This is so because since environmental damages and pollution are assessable—such as the presence of toxic substances or external elements that cause negative characteristics in the environment, both for biological diversity—including flora and fauna—and, especially, for human life, as reflected in human health or well-being—soil, habitat, air, water, etc.—the impact of these elements requires scientific evaluation and treatment. Therefore, this principle (of the prior completion of the environmental impact assessment) constitutes a corollary of the preceding principle, and its completion is of special importance for all ‘[...] human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate toxic or hazardous material waste shall require an environmental impact assessment by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat created in this Law. Its prior approval by this agency shall be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works, or projects.’ (Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law, number 7554, of the eighteenth of September, nineteen ninety-five). It is thus that the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment obligates the State to take preventive measures to avoid its harm; and among the principal measures provided by the legislator in this regard are the Environmental Impact Assessments, which find their foundation in the provisions of the aforementioned Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law. For this purpose, it is important to emphasize that by virtue of a constitutional mandate—Article 50—and in the Law—Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law—it is established as a general principle that every human activity modifying the surroundings shall require the environmental impact assessment, and therefore, it is the condition of the project or work that shall determine in each case whether or not the referenced technical study is required, and not the establishment of arbitrary conditions, whether administrative or regulatory (as indicated by this Court, in judgment number 1220-2002, of fourteen hours forty-eight minutes on the sixth of February, two thousand two).
It is under the tenor of this provision that constitutional jurisprudence has recently required this technical study prior to the undertaking of any project that may affect the environment, as a guarantee to make the environmental right effective, and by way of example, it has required it in the following activities, with the caveat that this in no way implies a closed enumeration (numerus clausus): tree felling in a wildlife refuge (judgment number 1888-95, cited above), siting of a "waste transfer center" (judgment number 2671-95, of sixteen hours forty-five minutes on the twenty-fourth of May, nineteen ninety-five), decision to determine the closure or continued operation of the "Río Azul dump" (judgment number 1154-96, of sixteen hours on the sixth of March, nineteen ninety-six), the reduction of the area of a protected zone (judgment number 7294-98, of sixteen hours fifteen minutes on the thirteenth of October, nineteen ninety-eight), treatment of orange peels on plantations (judgment 1999-2219, of fifteen hours eighteen minutes on the twenty-fourth of March, nineteen ninety-nine), urban planning and approval of developments (judgments number 2001-3694, of sixteen hours twenty-six minutes on the fifteenth of May, two thousand one, and number 2002-1220, of fourteen hours forty-eight minutes on the sixth of February, two thousand two), construction of hydroelectric plants (judgment number 2000-10466, of ten hours seventeen minutes on the twenty-fourth of November, two thousand), construction of dikes in rivers (judgment number 2001-6503, of nine hours twenty-six minutes on the sixth of July, two thousand one), construction and operation of manual landfills (judgments number 2002-5977 and 2002-6782), operation of a nursery and fern plantation (judgments number 2000-9735 and 2001-3840); with which, it can well be said that the completion of this technical study constitutes a principle of constitutional order, and consequently, of mandatory compliance, both for private parties, and with greater reason, for State institutions; as this Court has previously considered:
‘III.- Obligation of State institutions to comply with environmental legislation in their ordinary activity: The third paragraph of Article 50 of the Constitution clearly states that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve the right of every person to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment; which implies affirming that public entities are not only obliged to enforce—upon private parties and other public entities—environmental legislation, but also, above all, that they must adjust their actions to the dictates of those protective normative bodies. State institutions are the first called upon to comply with protective environmental legislation, with no justification existing to exempt them from compliance with environmental requirements such as, by way of example, the environmental impact assessment required by the Organic Environmental Law for activities undertaken by public entities that, by their nature, may alter or destroy the environment.’ (judgment number 2001-6503, cited above).
The legislator entrusted to the ‘National Environmental Technical Secretariat’ the assessments to be carried out by ‘an interdisciplinary team of professionals, registered and authorized by the Secretariat… in accordance with the guides prepared by it. The cost of the environmental impact assessments shall be borne by the interested party’. Article 19 of the Organic Environmental Law established that ‘the resolutions of the Environmental Technical Secretariat must be substantiated and reasoned’, thereby incorporating in this matter the general principle of substantiation of administrative acts also developed by the General Law of Public Administration, which is itself a guarantee that integrates substantive due process. The approval of an environmental impact assessment requires, in accordance with the international commitments undertaken by Costa Rica and entrusted to SETENA, a detailed analysis that includes, as required by Article 24 of the Environmental Law, the technical criteria and the weighting percentages that make the approval of the study possible. Furthermore, it must respond to the norms, management objectives, and environmental priorities of the national State and the local government, as set forth in Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration. The damage that can be caused to the environment is always difficult or impossible to repair, and the approval of an environmental impact assessment requires total certainty of minimal impact on natural resources, as Article 50 of the Political Constitution inherently imposes. In any event, it must be noted that the completion and approval of the environmental impact assessment does not in itself imply the commencement of the project in question, as it is only one of the requirements demanded to complete the authorization process (judgment number 5321-96, cited above), which in some cases will be the obtaining of the health permit, the approval of the development plans by the respective municipality, the approval of the concession by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, the granting of commercial licenses, etc. This is so because, when dealing with the environment, one cannot speak of unchangeable variables; quite the contrary, by its very nature, the environment is, in itself and to an even greater degree through human intervention, changeable. The approval of an environmental impact assessment in the terms stated by the Organic Environmental Law also does not constitute an unmodifiable authorization to carry out a specific human project, since through the oversight work under the Administration’s charge, upon detecting damage to the environment, the permit must be revoked, in order to guarantee the right established in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. (...)” In addition to all the foregoing and taking into consideration the purposes of the provision under consultation—that is, the simplification of the corresponding procedures for approving concessions for the administration, construction, and operation of tourist marinas—the principle of sustainable development must be weighed in the specific case, which is provided for in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which states in its Principle 3, the following:
“The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.” Under this principle, the need to achieve the country’s development is recognized in order to address the social and economic insufficiencies suffered, for example, in coastal zones. But, additionally, it proclaims that development and, in this specific case, the construction and operation of tourist marinas, be carried out without destroying the environment. The principle of sustainable development—widely recognized by this Court—transcends purely environmental issues, because it stands as an objective in the field of economic science, since besides seeking to preserve the natural resources that support human life, it also pursues efficiency in the use of resources so that development is achieved that meets the needs of present and future generations, without compromising the availability of natural resources in general. In accordance with the foregoing, sustainable management of resources implies satisfying the needs of countries, taking into consideration the requirements of present and future generations, and balancing three main objectives: environmental, social, and economic. The foregoing, in order to avoid trends that threaten the quality of life of human beings and an increase in costs for society. In that sense, it is necessary to halt continuous environmental degradation with measures that seek to mitigate the negative effects of economic and social development and ensure the existence of a sustainable link between humanity and nature. Indeed, the adoption of sustainable policies is based on the concordance between economic growth, social equity, and the conservation of natural resources. Based on the considerations made, we proceed to analyze the legislative bill submitted for consultation. As the legislators point out, the regulation intended to be approved eliminates the requirement of the Environmental Impact Assessment duly approved by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat as an ex ante or a priori requirement for the granting of the concession (see Article 8, subsection f) of the current Law on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas). In its place, a different mechanism is opted for, which is briefly explained. In effect, the regulation provides for a preliminary stage that must be managed before the Interinstitutional Commission for Tourist Marinas and Docks to obtain a technical viability (viabilidad técnica) for the construction, administration, and operation of a tourist marina or dock. Article 5, intended to be amended, indicates in subsection c) that to process said technical endorsement, only a Potential Environmental Viability (VAP), granted by the National Technical Secretariat and managed by means of an Initial Environmental Assessment (EAI) through the current procedure, is required to be submitted. Now, in accordance with the General Regulation on Procedures for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Executive Decree No. 31849, of June 28, 2004, VAP is defined as follows:
“(...) 64. Potential Environmental Viability (VAP): It is the temporary environmental approval granted by SETENA to those activities, works, or projects that complete the Initial Environmental Assessment and still require the submission of other EIA documents to obtain the definitive VLA.”
Now then, a favorable technical viability would empower the interested party to continue with the second stage of the procedure, that is, the concession application process before the competent authority, in which case, to initiate the concession application process, the individual must present only a “certification issued by Setena, reporting on the current status of the Environmental Impact Assessment” (Article 8, subsection d). Only with this requirement may the municipality grant the concession conditionally. Article 9 of the bill provides, in pertinent part, the following:
“(...) The municipality shall grant the concession conditionally, until Setena notifies it in writing that the Environmental Impact Assessment (hereinafter EIA) has been approved. However, if the EIA is unfavorable, the concession shall become void and shall not generate any liability for the Administration.
The concessionaire may not take possession of any of the concessioned assets until the Cimat certifies that it has fulfilled all the requirements set forth in Article 9 bis of this Law and has obtained the corresponding municipal construction permit. (...)” Thus, prior to the granting of the concession, the environmental impact assessment is not required; rather, a mere report on the progress of the evaluation would be demanded. The third stage of the procedure involves obtaining construction permits from the competent municipality. This process is regulated in Article 3 of the bill, through which Article 9 bis is introduced into the current regulation, stating the following:
“Article 9 bis.- Procedure for construction plans Once the concession has been granted and within a maximum period of one hundred eighty (180) calendar days, the concessionaire must conclude the EIA process before Setena.
Upon approval of the EIA, through the granting of the viability (license) by Setena, the concessionaire shall have a period of one hundred twenty (120) calendar days to submit the following documents to the single window of the Cimat:
The Cimat must request from the interested party, within a period of twenty (20) business days, any clarification for the processing of the corresponding technical recommendation on the approval of the plans. Once the clarifications are submitted to the Cimat, it shall have an additional period of twenty (20) days to issue the corresponding technical recommendation on the endorsement.
The concessionaire shall have a period of up to one (1) year to begin construction of the works, once the construction permit is granted by the respective municipality. After this period, the municipality shall request that the Cimat issue a report documenting the investment and the progress of the work; to issue said report, the Cimat shall have a period of up to twenty (20) business days. If the report determines that the works have not begun, the municipality shall immediately initiate a concession cancellation procedure.” In accordance with the foregoing, through the regulation intended to be approved, the aim is to invert the normal and natural order of administrative procedures, granting the concession for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas before the Environmental Impact Assessment has been completed. The conceived procedure would be unconstitutional since it reverses the logical order of procedures, disregarding the State’s duty to protect the integrity of the environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. Furthermore, if we adhere to the binding jurisprudence of this Court, it is not admissible to deconstitutionalize the guarantee of a State response in defense of the environment, which must be timely and prior to the granting of corresponding permits or concessions (see judgments numbers 6240-1993, 4245-2001, 1220-2002, 1221-2002, 6466-2002).
“(...) IV.- CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY. Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of the patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries they cause to individuals in the exercise of the administrative function. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution and can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of various constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution provides that “The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…)”, thereby taking for granted the liability of the greater public entity or State and its various organs—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers—. Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the “(…) criminal liability (…)” of public officials, and the second paragraph refers to the “(…) personal liability for officials in the performance of their duties (…)”. Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects “acquired patrimonial rights” and “consolidated legal situations”, which can only be effectively and truly protected with a broad-spectrum system of administrative liability, without immune or exempt zones, when they are violated by public administrations in the execution of their public functions or duties. Article 41 ibidem establishes that “Occurring to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…)”, this precept imposes on the author and party responsible for the damage the duty to compensate for the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by individuals as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of public entities, thereby becoming the constitutional cornerstone for the legislative development of a system of objective and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on moral and subjective reproach of the public official’s conduct for intent or negligence, but solely and exclusively on having been inflicted or effectively received “(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…)”, that is, an unlawful injury they are not obliged to bear and, consequently, must be compensated for. Article 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the individual who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity—through its normal or abnormal operation or its lawful or unlawful conduct—and the correlative obligation of the latter to compensate or repair it integrally; access to the jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept thus becomes an instrumental right to forcibly ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the injured party’s compensatory right when the party obliged to provide reparation voluntarily fails to comply with the referenced obligation. Article 45 of the Magna Carta embraces the principle of the inviolability of property when it provides that “Property is inviolable; no one may be deprived of their own unless for legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law (…)”, it is recognized, in this manner, by the fundamental text that special sacrifices or singular burdens that the individual does not have the duty to bear or tolerate, even if they arise from a lawful activity—such as the exercise of the expropriation power—must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, by implicitly recognizing legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in court when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear foundation of administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of Article 49 already cited provides that “The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of individuals”, one of the principal forms of guarantee of these being an objective, direct, broad, and complete system of administrative liability. The final paragraph of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, regarding environmental damage, establishes that “The law shall determine the corresponding liability and sanctions”, a liability regime from which, obviously, public economic entities (called public enterprises-public entity) and public enterprises (also called public enterprises-private law entity) cannot exempt themselves when they cause pollution by carrying out an industrial, commercial, or service activity, and, in general, the State when it fails in its obligations to defend and preserve the environment through deficient monitoring or control activities over public and private activities that are actually or potentially polluting. In the case of members of the Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions, Article 188 of the fundamental norm provides that “Their directors are liable for their management”. Regarding the Executive Power, Title X of the constitutional text contains a Chapter V whose heading is “Liabilities of those who exercise the Executive Power”, with Article 148 enshrining the liability of the President for the “use made of those powers that according to this Constitution correspond to them exclusively”, the joint liability of the latter with the respective Minister of the sector “regarding the exercise of the powers that this Constitution grants to both”—which is specified by Article 149 ibidem—and the liability of the Government Council for the agreements it adopts. The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents imposing on individuals a singular or special burden or sacrifice they have no duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more individuals and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that the Political Constitution includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, that of individuals to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of Articles 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law, interpreted a contrario sensu, insofar as they include, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the “proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies”, “sound operation of the Government”, and “efficiency of the administration”. This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their competencies and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this manner, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly included the principle of the liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for an unlawful injury caused by its normal or abnormal operation or its lawful or unlawful conduct to the patrimonial and non-patrimonial sphere of individuals.
V.- ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY IN THE SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW. The liability of public administrations for the exercise of the administrative function forms part, as we have verified in the preceding recital, of the constitutional conception thereof. It is a key and essential piece of the social and democratic Rule of Law, given the aims toward which a system of administrative liability strives. In general terms, administrative liability has the basic function of repairing or compensating for the unlawful injuries caused to an individual (victim or injured party) in their patrimonial or non-patrimonial sphere by a public entity in the exercise of the administrative function. One of its classic and traditional purposes is to serve as a control or guarantee for the substantial legal situations of individuals that are injured by a public entity in the exercise of its powers or in the provision of public services expressly assigned by the Constitution or the law. Administrative liability, together with the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), are the key pieces of a Constitutional State for the defense of individuals against the formal and material prerogatives and privileges with which the Constitution itself provides public entities for the fulfillment of their duties. This purpose determines that the constitutional principle of administrative liability must be strengthened and accentuated through an extensive rather than restrictive interpretation; likewise, the legislator, when developing systems of administrative liability, must conform to the constitutional parameter of an objective and direct administrative liability, being prohibited from establishing administrative conduct that is exempt or immune to it and undermining the fundamental compensatory rights and the right to the proper functioning of public services held by all individuals.
Furthermore, administrative liability allows the constitutional principles of administrative efficiency and effectiveness to be put into practice (Article 140, subsection 8°, insofar as it imposes on the Executive Branch the duty to “Monitor the proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,” Article 139, subsection 4°, to the extent that it incorporates the concept of “proper functioning of the Government,” and Article 191 by embracing the principle of “efficiency of the administration”), since the duty to repair or compensate the unlawful injuries inflicted upon the administered parties compels them to act correctly, prudently, reflectively, and in accordance with Law. In accordance with these two principles that inform administrative organization and function, public administrations must provide high-quality public services with high standards for the due satisfaction of the needs of the administered parties who are their recipients, and exercise their powers fully and normally. Efficiency and effectiveness are, therefore, constitutional obligations or imperatives that necessarily obligate public entities to act responsibly in the exercise of the administrative function in its various manifestations (material or technical actions and formal activity). As a corollary to such constitutional duties of the public administrations, the administered parties are holders of the unnamed fundamental right to the good and efficient functioning of public services, with high-quality standards, which can be inferred, a contrario sensu, from the aforementioned Articles 140, subsection 8°, 139, subsection 4°, and 191 of the Political Constitution).
VI.- UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY OF THE INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS. Subsection a) of Article 5 of the Constitutive Law of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados exempts that entity from liability “(…) in cases of damages and losses caused by the impurity, irregularity, or insufficiency, real or alleged, of the supplied water (…)”. Evidently, that subsection frontally violates the constitutional principle of administrative liability, since, for a specific hypothesis of abnormal functioning of the public service –lack of service, understood as a non-compliance with the pre-existing legal obligations imposed by the legal system– such as impurity, irregularity, or insufficiency in the supply of drinking water, the legislature graciously exempts the entity from responding for the unlawful injuries caused to the administered parties. By exonerating the ICAA from all administrative liability in the provision of the public service that constitutes its core or raison d'être, the subsection violates the principle of inviolability of patrimony (Article 45 of the Political Constitution), the right of the administered parties to obtain prompt and effective judicial protection to achieve full reparation for the damages and losses they have suffered in their patrimonial and non-patrimonial sphere as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function by any public entity (Articles 41 and 49 ibidem). In the same manner, the exemption infringes the right to health (Article 21 ibidem), when, eventually, the injury affects that precious right of the service users, as is foreseeable when impure water is provided or the supply is not regular –adjusted to the duties and obligations imposed by the legal system– and continuous –without interruptions or continuity gaps– and in sufficient quantities to meet the basic and daily hygienic needs of the administered parties. Finally, this Tribunal considers that the exoneration from liability provided by the legislature for the indicated hypotheses violates the implicit or virtual constitutional right of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services (Articles 140, subsection 8°, 139, subsection 4°, and 191, all interpreted a contrario sensu). Lastly, this Constitutional Tribunal does not find that the impugned precept infringes the Right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, since the norm refers to a public service relationship and to the liability of the entity that provides it regarding its purity, regularity, and quantity. Nor does this Tribunal consider that it violates the principle of legality enshrined in numeral 11 of the Political Constitution, but rather, solely and exclusively, insofar as it serves as a partial foundation for the principle of liability of public administrations. (…)” Such considerations are fully applicable to the specific case, in which, it would be unconstitutional for the legislature to disregard the implicit constitutional principle of the liability of the public administration, derived from the constitutionality block, enunciated in the partially cited judgment. Consequently, the mechanism provided for circumventing potential lawsuits for disregard of acquired rights over the granted concession is unconstitutional.
In summary, the procedure devised in the consulted bill for the granting of concessions for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas and docks (marinas y atracaderos turísticos) is unconstitutional. Firstly, for disregarding that the environmental impact assessment (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) must be carried out prior to any concession, and furthermore, it is unconstitutional for the State to exclude its liability through legislative means.
VIII.- REGARDING THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT. CORRELATION OF ARTICLES 9 AND 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. In another line of thought, the consulting legislators consider that granting concessions for the construction of tourist marinas on public domain property, prior to the definitive approval of an environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) by the competent technical authority, could be a violation of the right to citizen participation of the population that, eventually, could be affected by the concession. They insist that constitutional jurisprudence has highlighted the relevance of the right to citizen participation in relation to decisions linked to the environment. The foregoing, as a right derived from Articles 1 and 50 of the Political Constitution, which recognizes broad standing for all persons to participate in this type of procedure. In their opinion, these principles have been reinforced with the approval of the constitutional amendment that modified Article 9 of the Political Constitution to establish that the Government of Costa Rica is participatory. On this matter, and based on the development carried out regarding the importance of the EIA, it bears reiterating that, according to the most qualified doctrine, the assessment is a mainly participatory procedure for the anticipatory weighting of the environmental consequences of a decision to approve or deny a specific project. According to the doctrine, the environmental impact assessment appeared, from its origins, related to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of surveys and public hearings, thus the guarantee must be emphasized that throughout the assessment and in its different moments, those affected by the final decision will be heard, which may include not only the immediately involved communities or subjects, but also groups that defend diffuse interests, such as the timely protection of the environment. Regarding the promotion of public participation in relation to environmental matters, the Rio Declaration provides the following:
“PRINCIPLE 10 Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.” The World Charter for Nature cited supra, in Principle No. 23 provides the following:
“23. All persons, in accordance with their national legislation, shall have the opportunity to participate, individually or with others, in the formulation of decisions of direct concern to their environment, and shall have access to means of redress when their environment has suffered damage or degradation.” At the domestic level, the Organic Law of the Environment provides the following:
“Article 22.- Assessment file Individuals or legal entities, public or private, shall have the right to be heard by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, at any stage of the assessment process and in the operational phase of the work or project. The observations of interested parties shall be included in the file and assessed for the final report.
Within the five business days following receipt of an environmental impact assessment, the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental shall send an extract thereof to the municipalities in whose jurisdiction the work, activity, or project will be carried out. Likewise, it shall widely disseminate, through mass media, the list of studies submitted for its consideration.
Article 23.- Publicity of information The information contained in the environmental impact assessment file shall be of a public nature and shall be available for consultation by any person or organization.
However, interested parties may request that information integrated into the study be kept confidential, if its publication would affect industrial property rights.” For its part, the Biodiversity Law provides, in relevant part, the following:
“Article 95.- Public hearings The Secretaría Técnica Nacional shall conduct public hearings for information and analysis regarding the specific project and its impact, when it deems it necessary. The cost of the publication shall be borne by the interested party.
Participation is any process that involves society in the adoption of proposals, resolution of problems, and decision-making regarding the approval of a specific activity or project.” In judgment No. 10693-2002 of 6:20 p.m., November 7, 2002, this Constitutional Tribunal highlighted that the guarantee of citizen participation is a tool through which citizens are empowered to make effective their right to a healthy environment, hence it is an intrinsic part of the guarantees enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. Said resolution provided the following:
“(…) this Chamber considers that derived properly from the democratic framework that informs the entire legal order and which is provided by Article One of the Political Constitution, in conjunction with the right to a healthy environment established in Article 50 of said Charter, in addition to the international instruments and the respective legal norms, it is necessary to extract as certain the existence of a right of all persons to participation in decision-making concerning matters of public interest, in this case the protection of the environment. This right to participate is thus constituted as an essential instrument for inhabitants to assert their right to a healthy environment; however, it cannot be understood as a mere exercise of an opinion, since contrary to what one might consider at first glance, this participation demands to be understood broadly, and consequently, it implies three basic dimensions –as recognized by the 1992 Rio Declaration–: the right of access to information, the right to participation ‘per se,’ and the right of access to justice in environmental matters. These three dimensions contain, in turn, a series of basic rights of a procedural nature –in both administrative and judicial venues– which together ensure persons that their opinions will not become an empty and rhetorical exercise of freedom of opinion, and that on the contrary, they will effectively be taken into account by the public authority.
(…)
ii.– The right to public participation. This aspect implies the possibility for those persons who may be affected or who have an interest in a decision regarding the environment, to express their criteria, opinions, points of view, or questions about it early on, without these having to be subject to specific formalities to be taken into account. Consequently, the information given to the administered party must contain non-technical summaries, allowing people to understand the magnitude of the discussion. Likewise, it entails the existence of adequate timeframes so that, prior to participation, a stage is carried out for citizens to become informed.
The environmental impact assessment procedure is characterized by being an administrative procedure with a differentiating note, since what it seeks is to avoid or minimize the eventual configuration of environmental damage, within the execution of activities about which there is certainty regarding the harmful effect they would produce on the environment, if carried out without any containment measures. In other words, this instrument corresponds to the materialization of the principle of prevention, since in the face of an activity known beforehand to be harmful to the environment, the interested party proposes a series of measures aimed at avoiding or mitigating the ecological detriment, to the public agency or entity –in this case SETENA– which is responsible for determining whether these measures are the most appropriate for such purpose. Consequently, since this procedure constantly pursues foreseeing any negative consequence, through a broad flow of information, it is natural to understand that one of its characteristics is that persons who may be affected by the development of the project can provide fundamental data or points of view, which the competent authorities, due to an omissive or arbitrary conduct, could ignore or set aside, consequently leaving the environment unprotected. It is thus that the principle or right to participation implies, within the environmental impact assessment procedure, a high degree of publicity, to the point that any act or request that has a significant effect on the final outcome thereof must be of general scope for all interested parties, so that they can exercise their opinions at any time and not be pigeonholed into a specific procedural moment. The role of the population as defender of a healthy environment goes ‘from cradle to grave,’ that is, from the beginning of the productive activity as a project, until the end of its useful life, so it would not be admissible that in an operation intended to last for an indefinite period, even decades –as is the case of hydroelectric projects–, and with irreversible consequences, the participation of those social sectors that may be affected is limited to a procedural stage, which, like a hearing, may last only a few hours. Thus, by reason of its preventive nature, it is demandable that from the very moment of its initiation, a project subjected to environmental impact assessment must be brought to the knowledge of the population for the purpose of initiating an open phenomenon of participation. (…)” The text that is highlighted does not correspond to the original.
By virtue of the foregoing, the consulting deputies are correct since the regulation intended to be approved within the Legislative Assembly defers the right to citizen participation to a moment after the concession for the construction, operation, and administration of tourist marinas has been granted. Consequently, it intensely limits the rights of interested parties to pronounce themselves regarding the advisability of the project in question. Although Article 9 of the bill provides for a procedure of consultation, public hearings, and oppositions before the authorities competent to grant the concession, the truth is that, at that moment, the appropriate technical information from professionals in the field, which would allow a substantiated participation by the interested parties, is lacking. As has been developed throughout this consultation, the environmental impact assessment is characterized by being a process of information flow related to the advisability of the project, the eventual effects, and the damages sought to be minimized. Consequently, carrying out a consultative procedure without having prior appropriate information from professionals in the field, sensitively limits the right of persons to actively participate in the procedure under analysis because they lack, up to that moment, the necessary information to oppose or support the project in question. In effect, a consultative stage is carried out without, up to that moment, making the detail of the project as well as the eventual effects on the environment known to the citizenry, given that, as analyzed in the judgment cited above, access to information is a transcendental element in promoting the right to participation. Said purpose is highlighted, likewise, in the General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Procedures (Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental), which highlights that the intention of the hearing conducted within the framework of the EIA is, precisely, to inform civil society about the activity, work, or project intended to be developed and its impacts (see Article 3, subsection 12). In light of the foregoing, postponing the environmental impact assessment to a moment after the granting of the concession, sensitively limits the right of persons to participate in relation to the defense of a diffuse interest, such as the effective and timely protection of the environment.
IX.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITORY II AND THE INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. The legislators question the constitutionality of Transitory II of the consulted bill. Said numeral provides the following:
“TRANSITORY II.- The owner of any work, project, or infrastructure similar and/or resembling a tourist marina and/or dock (atracadero turístico), which has been developed and is operating contrary to the principles and regulations of this Law, as well as lacking permits, authorizations, approvals, and/or concessions, shall have a non-extendable and peremptory term of (1) one year, starting from the publication of this Law, to legalize their situation before the Cimat; otherwise, the agency may recommend its technical closure to the municipality. When the activities are in operation, it shall not be required to carry out an EIA; said activities shall be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority.” (They question what is highlighted in bold).
In relation to the transcribed norm, the legislators consider that said provision violates the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, because it exempts marinas that are operating illegally from carrying out environmental impact assessments. They explain that the consulted norm refers to the case of tourist marinas and docks built illegally that, at the time of the reform, are in operation. They state that it is not constitutionally valid to seek to establish a priori a generic exoneration directed at certain types of activities, without a necessary assessment of the particular conditions of each specific case having mediated. In another line of thought, they consider that said norm constitutes a dangerous incentive for the construction and operation of tourist marinas and docks, outside the legal provisions that regulate the matter. The foregoing, with the purpose of evading the submission of an environmental impact assessment. Regarding this aspect of the consultation, this Tribunal considers that the reflections made in Considerandos VII and VIII of this judgment are equally applicable, since the legislature is disregarding the mandatory nature of carrying out an environmental impact assessment as an unavoidable requirement for the approval of an activity or project of this nature, which could be affecting or generating potential dangers to the environment. In this context, it is necessary to highlight, again, that Article 50 of the Political Constitution imposes on the State, in environmental matters, a positive or proactive attitude that it cannot disregard. Consequently, disregarding the mandatory nature of the environmental impact assessment for the approval of a project that in some way may affect the environment would be unconstitutional. The foregoing, for disregarding the guarantee of defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, especially if one considers that a transitory norm with such wording could incentivize or motivate the acceleration of the irregular construction of marinas and tourist docks in order to, subsequently, omit compliance with an environmental impact assessment.
X.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITORY IV OF THE BILL. Finally, the consulting legislators question the inclusion of Transitory IV in the bill, which provides the following:
“TRANSITORY IV.- The EIA must be carried out only in the case of new activities that are not in operation. In the case of renewal, transfer or adjudication of rights, or granting of a new concession, for marinas, tourist docks, and/or similar projects that are in operation and do not imply modifications, that is, the construction or execution of new works or activities, they shall not be required to carry out an EIA. Said activities shall be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority.” The consulting legislators state that the environmental impact assessment must be carried out only for the case of new activities that are not in operation. For this reason, in the case of renewal, transfer or adjudication of rights, or granting of a new concession for those marinas, tourist docks, and/or similar projects that are in operation and do not imply modifications, they shall not be required to carry out a new assessment, but rather such activities shall be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority. However, they allege that there are numerous studies that have demonstrated that environmental impact is cumulative and given that the term of concessions is increased up to 35 years and can be extended without a new environmental impact assessment mediating, this would be proceeding against the logic of the precautionary principle. On this matter, as this Constitutional Tribunal already pointed out in judgment No. 2007-013574 of 9:30 a.m., September 19, 2007, environmental impact assessments are carried out prior to the development of the project in question, and, in the specific case, what is being regulated is the transfer of rights over an infrastructure that is in operation and that is in compliance with the law. That is, the questioned Transitory applies to marinas and tourist docks built in accordance with the provisions in force, which require the submission of the EIA. Consequently, there is no irregularity whatsoever, since, for activities outside the current regulations, Transitory II applies, as has already been analyzed; whereas constructions carried out under the corresponding authorizations from SETENA do not require a new assessment when it only involves “renewal, transfer or adjudication of rights, or granting of a new concession,” since it does not imply the construction of new works that could compromise the environment. Having overcome the foregoing, it is fitting to note that it is not for this Constitutional Tribunal to determine the frequency with which this type of assessments should be carried out and, rather, for those purposes, we have that the current regulations provide for the figure of an “environmental manager,” who is responsible for verifying and reporting to SETENA compliance with the obligations acquired for both the construction stage and the operational or functioning stage of the activity, work, or project according to the period established by SETENA. Likewise, said figure is responsible for issuing the necessary environmental recommendations according to the diverse situations that may arise in any of the execution stages of the activity, work, or project (see Articles 79-85 of the General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Procedures). Consequently, in the opinion of this Tribunal, the analyzed provision is not unconstitutional.
XI.- COROLLARY. Based on the considerations made, the conclusion is reached that, indeed, the legislative procedure followed for the approval of the consulted project presents essential constitutional defects by violating Article 190 of the Political Constitution and, additionally, for disregarding the principle of publicity. In relation to the substance of the bill submitted for consultation, this Tribunal considers that the procedure for granting a concession for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas and docks is unconstitutional for violation of Articles 9 and 50 of the Political Constitution, by authorizing the granting of a concession prior to the completion of the corresponding environmental impact assessment. Likewise, the text proposed for Article 9, paragraph 6°, is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional principle of the liability of the Public Administration implicit in the Fundamental Norm. Additionally, the phrase “When the activities are in operation, it shall not be required to carry out an EIA; said activities shall be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority” contained in Transitory II of the bill is unconstitutional for infringement of Article 50 of the Political Constitution. Regarding Transitory IV, it is not unconstitutional, to the extent that it is understood to refer to the renewal, transfer, or adjudication of rights that does not imply the carrying out of new works that may affect the environment.
THEREFORE.
By unanimous vote, the joinder is declared inadmissible. The legislative consultation on the constitutionality of the bill “Modification of various articles of Law No. 7744, Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas,” processed under file 14,836, is answered by majority vote, in the sense that there are two essential or substantial defects in the legislative procedure, which are the following: a) The lack of mandatory consultation of the bill to the municipalities due to the introduction of the motion made to Article 9 of the legislation being reformed, adding a paragraph that indicates “(…) The municipalities may provide the facilities for the granting of the licenses that are required, for the proper functioning of the marina projects that are concessioned and, consequently, of the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law.” and b) Infringement of the principle of publicity due to the lack of a new publication of the bill upon the introduction of the motion indicated in the previous point. Magistrates Mora, Vargas, and Certad dissent regarding the essential procedural defects, considering that they do not exist. Regarding the merits, by unanimous vote, the consultation on constitutionality is answered in the sense that: a) Article 2 of the bill, the purpose of which is to reform Articles 8 and 9 of the Law on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas, is unconstitutional, specifically, the texts proposed for Article 8, subsection d), and Article 9, paragraph 5°.
The foregoing, by postponing the submission of the environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) until after the concession for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas and docks (marinas y atracaderos turísticos) has been granted, disregarding the State's duty to preventively protect the environment and by limiting the right to citizen participation in the decision of matters related to it; b) The proposed text for Article 9, paragraph 6, is unconstitutional because it violates the principle of responsibility of Public Administrations implicit in the Fundamental Norm; c) Transitory Provision II of the bill is unconstitutional due to violation of Article 50 of the Constitución Política in that it states the following: "When the activities are in operation, it will not be required to carry out an EIA; such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority"; and d) Transitory Provision IV of the bill under consultation is not unconstitutional. Notify the Directorio of the Asamblea Legislativa and the consulting deputies.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Acting Presidenta a.i.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Rosa María Abdelnour G. Gastón Certad M.
Dissenting vote (Voto salvado) of Magistrates Mora Mora, Vargas Benavides, and Certad Maroto, with drafting by the second.
The undersigned Magistrates depart from the majority vote, considering that there are no essential procedural defects in the consulted bill. On other occasions, this Chamber has already indicated that it is not illegitimate for the Asamblea Legislativa to issue rules that refer to the powers of municipal corporations, provided that they do not imply an imposition that substantially varies the content of those acts. In that sense, the Chamber, in ruling number 2006-06589 at twelve hours and twenty-eight minutes on May twelfth, two thousand six, already considered by majority that the fact that the Asamblea Legislativa created a rule allowing municipalities to condone debts for tax concepts did not imply an injury to Article 170 of the Constitución Política, since said rule had a permissive nature, as it did not impose any obligation on the corporations. In the specific case, Article 9 under consultation, by stating that "(…) The municipalities may provide the facilities for the granting of the licenses (patentes) required for the proper functioning of the marina projects they concession and, consequently, of the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law," does not imply an intrusion into municipal autonomy, because the cited rule only authorizes municipalities to be able to, at their discretion, decide whether to provide the relevant facilities for the granting of the licenses required for the effective functioning of the marinas intended to be developed within their jurisdictions. In our view, this article merely seeks to give a general authorization for each local government to adopt the decision it deems most convenient for its district. We consider that the bill contains a permissive or authorizing rule, which imposes nothing on the municipalities, but rather grants them a license to act in accordance with their own assessment of local interest and to decide, in each case, whether or not to grant the facilities described by the motion. Thus, if in the specific case we were dealing with an impositive rule, the bill would indeed injure the autonomy of local governments; however, in the way it was designed, it does not oblige municipalities that deem it appropriate to approve the facilities for the granting of licenses. In this way, the fact that the bill is an initiative of a Central State body and not of the municipalities themselves in no way affects their autonomy, nor does it imply an invasion of constitutional powers by Parliament. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we deem it appropriate to point out that the power granted by the aforementioned article can in no way imply a reduction of the controls and requirements that municipalities must apply and enforce as provided by the other rules regulating the matter.
On the other hand, regarding the alleged violation of the Principle of Publicity, it should be indicated that the variation introduced to Article 9 of the bill does not substantially change the bill, so we consider that there is no reason to publish it in the official gazette La Gaceta, as the majority of the Chamber alleges.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B. Gastón Certad M.
6.- In a brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 07:32 hrs. on September 30, 2008, the deputies Ana Helena Chacón, Oscar Núñez Calvo, Gladis González, Yalile Esna, Sandra Quesada, José A. Ocampo, Fernando Sánchez, Jorge Méndez, Lorena Vásquez Badilla, Bienvenido Venegas, Olga Marta Corrales, Salvador Quirós Conejo, Mayi Antillón Guerrero, Francisco Marín Monge, Xinia Nicolás Alvarado, Carlos Gutiérrez, Olivier Jiménez, Andrea Morales, Luis Antonio Barrantes appeared, in their capacity as “amicus curiae,” and extensively addressed the questions raised by the consulting legislators. They request that this Court endorse the constitutionality of the procedure and the substance of the bill, since, in their opinion, the process has been in accordance with constitutionality in all its aspects (see folios 62-86).
7.- By means of a brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on October 16, 2008, the Comité Unido por Talamanca-Caribe Sur, residents of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca, appeared to file an active joinder action. The foregoing, based on the defense of diffuse interests. They express their opposition to the bill and question that a consultation with the coastal-marine communities on the text in question was not carried out. They consider that the bill seeks to restrict the use of the maritime-terrestrial zone and would grant more facilities to business owners regarding the submission of requirements to obtain the corresponding concession. They also question the deadlines for the granting of concessions (see folios 87-92).
8.- In the substantiation of the process, the prescriptions of law have been observed.
Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,
CONSIDERING:
I.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION. This optional consultation of constitutionality was made by thirteen deputies of the Legislative Assembly after the approval in the first debate of the bill “Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas” being processed in legislative file No. 14.836. Additionally, it should be noted that the cited bill was consulted before its final approval. For the foregoing reasons and in accordance with the provisions of Article 96, subsection b), of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, this legislative consultation of constitutionality is admissible, and we proceed to resolve it.
II.- ON THE JOINDER ACTION. By means of a brief visible at folio 87 and following of the file, the Comité Unido por Talamanca-Caribe Sur filed a joinder action, with the purpose that its statements and disagreements regarding the bill under consultation be taken into consideration. However, said action is inadmissible. Note that active or passive joinder is provided for amparo proceedings in which there are third-party interested parties and, particularly, for those who derive a legitimate interest from the final judgment (Article 34 Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and not for consultation mechanisms in which there may simply be opposing legal opinions regarding the constitutional regularity of a bill (see Votos Nos. 2003-14606 of 12:30 hrs. on December 12, 2003, and 2004-01603 of 9:30 hrs. on February 17, 2004).
III.- OBJECT OF THE CONSULTATION. The consultation is posed so that this Constitutional Court may rule on two alleged essential defects in the substantiation of the legislative procedure of legislative file No. 14.836, the bill “Ley de Simplificación de Trámites para la Instalación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos,” as well as some substantive aspects related to the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitución Política.
IV.- ON THE PROCESSING OF LEGISLATIVE FILE No. 14.836. Prior to analyzing in detail the points consulted by the legislators, it is appropriate to provide a brief recount of the vicissitudes of the legislative procedure to which legislative file No. 14.836, in which the bill called “Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas,” is being heard:
**CONSULTATION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS** **V.- ON THE FAILURE TO CONSULT THE BILL WITH SEVERAL AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS. INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 190 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.** As a first procedural defect in the legislative process, the consulting Deputies question that, pursuant to Articles 170 and 190 of the Political Constitution, it was an unavoidable duty for the bill to be mandatory consulted with the following institutions: the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT), the Municipalities of the coastal zones, the Port Administration and Atlantic Coast Development Board (Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), the Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports (Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, INCOP), and the Institute for Municipal Development and Advisory (Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, IFAM). The foregoing, because during the process of hearing substantive motions via Article 137 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, a total of twenty-nine motions were approved before the Permanent Special Commission on Tourism, which, in their opinion, modify substantial aspects of the bill and, therefore, these changes should have been consulted with the indicated institutions. Specifically, they refer to Article 2 of the bill, which seeks to reform Articles 1, 5, 8, and 9 of Law No. 7744 of December 19, 1997, that is, the Law on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas (Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas). However, from a careful reading of the cited articles, as well as from the consultation raised by the legislators, no relationship with the competencies of the Port Administration and Atlantic Coast Development Board (JAPDEVA), the Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports (INCOP), and the Institute for Municipal Development and Advisory (IFAM) is inferred. Indeed, the legislators completely omitted to make a connection between the competencies of the aforementioned autonomous institutions and the content of the consulted bill. As such, given the noted omission, no substantial modification of the bill is observed that affects the competencies of the cited institutions. Consequently, it is appropriate to focus on municipal competencies, mainly regarding the granting of concessions, and, additionally, the competencies of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, concerning concessions in the Gulf of Papagayo zone. As the consulting legislators point out, Article 190 of the Political Constitution provides that for the discussion and approval of bills relating to an autonomous institution, the Legislative Assembly shall previously hear the opinion of that institution. In the specific case and after examination of the legislative *iter*, it is possible to corroborate that, in general terms –and except for what will be stated in relation to Article 9 of the law intended to be reformed–, the cited institutions, namely, the coastal municipalities and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, have been broadly consulted regarding the texts that have served as the basis for discussion within the Legislative Assembly concerning the approval of a reform to the Law on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas, Law No. 7744 of February 6, 1998. Indeed, note that the first text submitted for discussion was consulted with all coastal municipalities, as well as with the Inter-Institutional Commission for Marinas and Tourist Docks (CIMAT), as a body of maximum deconcentration attached to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, through official letters of **October 30, 2002** (see folios 77-113 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I). Subsequently, in the session of **March 3, 2005**, a motion was approved in the Special Commission on Tourism to adopt a substitute text, which was also submitted for consultation before the coastal municipalities and CIMAT. This was done through official letters of **March 3, 2005** (see folios 596-632 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume II). Finally, we have that on **March 8, 2007**, a motion was approved in the Permanent Special Commission on Tourism to adopt a substitute text and use it as the base document for discussion. Said Commission also approved a motion for the bill to be consulted with several institutions, including all the country's municipalities, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, and the Inter-Institutional Commission for Marinas and Tourist Docks, which was carried out through official letters of **March 14, 2007** (see folios 1511-1550 of the copy of the legislative file). Now, the consulting legislators consider it unconstitutional that, from this moment on, no new consultations were carried out, despite the fact that, in their opinion, substantial modifications to the analyzed bill were approved. It should be emphasized that, according to the jurisprudential line of this Constitutional Court, Article 190 of the Political Constitution does not imply that every bill or any modification introduced to the text, through the exercise of the right of amendment, must be consulted with the autonomous institution in question, but only those aspects referring to its constitution or organic structure, or those related to the essential scope of the competencies of the involved institutions. In this regard, in ruling No. 2008-004569 of 2:30 p.m. on March 26, 2008, this Constitutional Court, drafted by the reporting Magistrate, considered the following:
"*(...) It should be noted that since Vote No. 1633-93 of 2:33 p.m. on April 13, 1993, this Constitutional Court has repeatedly indicated (see, among others, Votes Nos. 3625-1996 of 3:18 p.m. on July 16, 1996, 4717-1997 of 4:39 p.m. on August 19, 1997, 9137-2001 of 2:48 p.m. on September 12, 2001), that any bill is susceptible to being modified during the parliamentary iter, via the legislators' right of amendment, as long as the essential or material content is not altered, in which case the constitutional norms regulating the initiative in the formation of the law, publicity, and, of course, the substantial procedure of consultation with autonomous institutions ex Article 190 of the Constitution will be deemed infringed (...)*" Under this perspective, it would remain to analyze whether the introduced modifications affect the competency or organic framework of the indicated institutions, to the point that they warranted a new consultation. The foregoing, based on the observations raised by the consulting legislators themselves (see folios 5-10 of the file):
**1)** In the first place, the deputies who signed the consultation consider that the motion introduced in Article 1 of the regulation intended to be reformed relates to the competencies of the municipalities and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute regarding the granting of concessions for the construction, administration, and exploitation of tourist marinas and docks, "*which could lead to a conflict of competencies that should have been consulted with both the respective municipalities and the ICT itself*." The text in question states the following:
"***Article 1.- Concession** (...)
*The municipality of the place shall be the competent authority to grant the concession.* (...)
***As for the concessions requested in the Golfo de Papagayo Tourist Project, the competent authority to grant them shall be the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT), in accordance with the Law regulating the development and execution of the Golfo de Papagayo Tourist Project, No. 6758, of June 4, 1982***. (...)*" (The highlighted text corresponds to the approved motion).
From the analysis of the transcribed text, as well as the current regulations, it follows that no substantial modification is being made to any of the competencies of the involved institutions. It is evident that the municipalities are responsible for granting the respective concessions for the construction, administration, and exploitation of tourist marinas and docks. In fact, the current and in-force regulation provides in Article 1, the following:
"***ARTICLE 1.- Authorization** *Concessions may be granted in areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone and the adjacent area permanently covered by the sea, in accordance with the provisions of this law; with the exception of mangrove areas, national parks, and biological reserves, for the construction, administration, and exploitation of tourist marinas and docks.* ***The municipality of the place shall be the competent authority to grant the concession**. In case of an express request from the respective municipality to state institutions, these must provide technical advisory.* *It shall correspond to the respective institutions of the Costa Rican State, within their areas of competence, to periodically supervise and oversee the operation and functioning of tourist marinas and docks.* *The concession shall be granted while protecting the environment and natural resources of the zone."* Now, regarding the competencies of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, we have that Law No. 6758, of June 25, 1982, which Regulates the Execution of the Papagayo Tourist Project, provides, where relevant, the following:
"***Article 9.-** To execute and develop the project, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute shall create an executing office that shall have, exclusively,* ***the authority to direct, coordinate, administer, and control the development to which this law refers***." This office will be attached to the Institute, reporting directly to its Board of Directors." **Article 12.**- The Board of Directors of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo **may grant concessions for the use of the project lands in the area designated for the same**, in accordance with the terms and conditions that the Institute establishes for that purpose, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 107 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República". (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).
In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that by legal provision, the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo is responsible for directing, coordinating, administering, and controlling the tourism development carried out in the Proyecto Turístico de Papagayo and, to that end, it is responsible for granting the corresponding tourism concessions, including, of course, those for the construction and administration of tourist marinas. On this matter, in Session No. 34 of the Legislative Plenary on **July 9, 2007**, legislator Vásquez Badilla introduced Motion No. 55 that proposed the questioned text (see folio 1803 of the copy of the legislative record, Volume VII). In the corresponding discussion, the proposing deputy stated the following:
"(...) It seems to me that this bill contemplates a problem that this Committee must correct, which is that when it speaks of the competent authority to grant the concession, because it indicates that it is the municipality of the respective place. (...) However, there is an issue here, which is that of the Papagayo tourism project, which, effectively, has a specific Law and where it is not the Municipalidad de Carrillo, for example, that grants those concessions in that area. I believe it is important to clarify the incorporation of the last paragraph, regarding the concessions requested in the Golfo de Papagayo tourism project, as there is a gap at this time, in my opinion, because the competent authority, in this case, is not the Municipality but the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, according to Law No. 6758 of May 6, 1982. (...)"
Motion that, finally, was approved unanimously in Session No. 7 of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo, held on **July 18, 2007** (see folios 1967-1968 of the copy of the legislative record, Volume VII). In accordance with the foregoing, it is reiterated that it is evident that a new consultation is not necessary, whether to the Municipalidad de Carrillo or to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, since it is clear that the competence for granting concessions conferred in the Proyecto Turístico Papagayo is held, by special law, by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo. Thus, it is seen that its essential competencies are not being modified, but rather that the respective clarification is being made in application of the special legislation provided for the Zona Turística de Papagayo. Consequently, regarding this point, no defect of unconstitutionality is proven that would invalidate the legislative procedure.
**2)** Secondly, the consulting legislators refer to the modifications made to Article 5 of the law intended to be reformed, highlighting the following phrase: "*The favorable technical feasibility of the preliminary project shall enable the interested party to continue with the concession application process before the municipality*." However, from the analysis of its content, it appears that said provision was already included in the substitute text that was submitted for consultation in **March 2007** to the coastal municipalities (see folios 1410 and 1587 of the copy of the legislative record). Secondly, in the same article, they question the approval of the following motion:
"The appeal shall be filed before the head of the ICT. The resolution of said entity shall exhaust the administrative remedy, which does not constitute an impediment to resorting to the judicial remedy." The legislators question that in the substitute text approved before the Comisión Permanente Especial in **March 2007**, the competence to exhaust the administrative remedy was conferred on CIMAT. However, in the current regulation, said competence is held by the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, as it is contemplated in Article 7 of Law No. 7744 on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas, which provides, where relevant, as follows:
"(...) Resolutions of the Commission may be appealed through the remedies of reconsideration and appeal, under the terms and conditions established in the Ley General de la Administración Pública. **The appeal shall be filed before the head of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo.** **This latter resolution shall exhaust the administrative remedy for the purposes of contentious action,** under the terms and effects indicated by the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa." (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).
Thus, it was not essential to grant a new hearing to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo if the current regulation confers upon it, just as the current text does, the power to resolve appeals filed against the decisions of the Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos and, therefore, exhaust the administrative remedy in the matter. Thus, since the competencies of the ICT are not being modified, it was not necessary to carry out a new consultation, as it is evident that the regulation is intended to be maintained in accordance with the current situation.
**3)** In the third place, the legislators formulating the consultation allege that in Article 8, municipal competencies are affected by providing the following: "*From the notification of the administrative resolution on the favorable technical feasibility by Cimat, the interested party may go to the municipality, in order to process the acquisition of the concession contract to develop a tourist marina or docking facility, according to the requirements of this Law.*" However, on this point, no procedural defect is observed, since said provision was foreseen in the substitute text of March 2007 that was submitted for consultation to the municipalities (see folios 1412 and 1589 of the copy of the legislative record). Likewise, the legislators highlight the following phrase from the bill: "*Written request before the respective municipality, accompanied by a certified copy of the administrative record processed before Cimat, with the certified copy of the preliminary project plans. The cost of the copy shall be borne by the interested party.*" Requirements that, likewise, were foreseen in the substitute text that was sent for consultation to the institutions involved (folios 1412 and 1589 of the copy of the legislative record). In any case, no substantial modification of the competencies of the municipalities is proven in relation to the granting of concessions for the construction and administration of tourist marinas. Consequently, in relation to these points, the need to carry out a new consultation in light of the provisions of Article 190 of the Constitution is not demonstrated.
**4)** Finally, the consulting deputies question the lack of consultation in relation to the approval of a substantive motion that intends to modify Article 9 of the current legislation, adding a paragraph that indicates the following:
"(...) Municipalities may provide the facilities for granting the business licenses that are required, for the proper functioning of the marina projects they concession and, consequently, of the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law."
Legislator Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, on **November 13, 2007**, that is, after the last consultation carried out with the coastal municipalities, introduced the text of this motion, which was approved within the Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo on **June 17, 2008** (see folios 2353-2360 of the copy of the legislative record, Volume IX). To analyze this point of the consultation, it is first necessary to define the contours of municipal autonomy, enshrined in Article 170 of the Constitución Política by providing that "*Municipal corporations are autonomous*." On this matter, in judgment No. 5445-1999 of 2:30 p.m. on July 14, 1999, this Tribunal Constitucional developed the aspects that make up the autonomy recognized to municipal corporations:
"(...) III.- GENERAL CONCEPTS ON THE MUNICIPAL REGIME. In Costa Rica, the municipal regime is a form of territorial decentralization, as derived from the first paragraph of Article 168 of the Constitution. It is defined, mainly, in Articles 169 and 170 of the Constitución Política which indicate, in what is relevant, that the 'administration of local interests and services shall be in charge of the Municipal Government formed by a deliberative body of popular election and an executive official designated by law' (today, the Alcalde Municipal); it is a 'corporate system that enjoys autonomy and its own economic resources (budgetary competence).' From this enunciation of the main legal features of the municipal institution, it results absolutely clear that certain elements are derived, namely: the existence of a territorial jurisdiction to attend to interests and services at the local level; the constitution of a population rooted in neighborhood ties, such that every inhabitant of the Canton is a resident (munícipe); the government formed by two distinct bodies (Council and Mayor) with defined functions and relationships between them; the corporate nature of the institution; constitutional guarantee of independence (autonomy); and the matter subject to its administration, which is formed by everything that is or constitutes 'local interest and service.' From the political point of view, municipalities are representative governments with competence over a determined territory (canton), with their own legal personality and public powers vis-à-vis their residents (inhabitants of the canton); **they operate in a decentralized manner vis-à-vis the Government of the Republic, and enjoy constitutionally guaranteed and reinforced autonomy that manifests itself in political matters, by determining their own goals and the normative and administrative means in fulfillment of all types of public service for the satisfaction of the common good in their community.** It can be said, in summary, that municipalities or local governments are territorial entities of a corporate and public non-state nature, endowed with independence in matters of government and operation, which means, for example, that municipal autonomy involves tax aspects, which for their validity require legislative authorization, the contracting of loans, and the preparation and disposition of their own revenues and expenses, with generic powers. All this implies, necessarily, that in order to correctly define the conformation of the Costa Rican State, there must be an exact assembly in the sum of the Municipal Governments as a whole and individually, in order to the relations and coordinated functioning with the Government of the Republic, to avoid the simultaneous coexistence of spheres of power of different origin and essence, the duplication of national and local efforts, and the confusion of rights and obligations between the various parties involved. What has been expressed leads, consequently, to the need to define, from the constitutional perspective, what the municipal scope is, which will be done in the following considering clauses, to subsequently examine, against the general framework of the local, the scope and compatibility of the norms that have been challenged.
IV.- MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY. GENERALITIES. Grammatically, it is usual to say that the term 'autonomy' can be defined as 'the power that within the State, municipalities, provinces, regions or other entities thereof may enjoy, to govern peculiar interests of their internal life, through their own norms and governing bodies.' From a legal-doctrinal point of view, this autonomy must be understood as the capacity that Municipalities have to freely decide and under their own responsibility, everything referring to the organization of a certain locality (the canton, in our case). Thus, some sector of the doctrine has said that this autonomy implies the free election of their own authorities; free management in the matters of their competence; the creation, collection, and investment of their own revenues; and specifically, it refers to encompassing political, normative, tax, and administrative autonomy, defining them, in very general terms, as follows: political autonomy: as that which gives origin to self-government, which entails the election of its authorities through democratic and representative mechanisms, as indicated by our Constitución Política in its Article 169; normative autonomy: by virtue of which municipalities have the power to issue their own regulations in the matters of their competence, a power that in our country refers only to the regulatory power that internally regulates the organization of the corporation and the services it provides (autonomous regulations of organization and service); tax autonomy: also known as taxing power, and refers to the fact that the initiative for the creation, modification, extinction, or exemption of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, a power subject to the approval indicated in Article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitución Política when so corresponds; and **administrative autonomy: as the power that implies not only self-regulation, but also self-administration and, therefore, freedom from the State for the adoption of the fundamental decisions of the entity.** Our doctrine, for its part, has said that the Constitución Política (Article 170) and the Código Municipal (Article 7 of the former Código Municipal, and 4 of the current one) have not limited themselves to attributing to municipalities the capacity to manage and promote local interests and services, but have expressly provided that this municipal management is and must be autonomous, which is defined as freedom vis-à-vis the other entities of the State for the adoption of their fundamental decisions. This autonomy is given in direct relation to the electoral and representative character of its Government (Council and Mayor) that is elected every four years, and means the capacity of the municipality to set its policies of action and investment independently, and more specifically, vis-à-vis the Executive Branch and the governing party. It is the capacity to set plans and programs of the local government, for which it is linked to the power of the municipality to issue its own budget, an expression of the policies previously defined by the Council, a capacity which, in turn, is political. This position coincides with the majority of the doctrine, in which it has been said that the typical rank of local autonomy resides in the fact that the fundamental body of the territorial entity is the people as an electoral body and that, consequently, its political-administrative orientation derives not from the State, but from the community itself, that is, from the electoral majority of that same community, with the consequence that such political orientation may diverge from that of the Government of the Republic and even contradict it, where there is no correspondence of majorities between the state community and the local one; or, that political autonomy is a legal position, which is expressed in the power to conduct one's own political line understood as a possibility, in order to a determined sphere of interests and competencies, to establish one's own line of action or one's own program, with one's own powers and own responsibility regarding the timeliness and utility of its acts. (...)" (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).
From the foregoing, it results that municipalities are territorial entities that have administrative and political or governmental autonomy, which translates into the power to define the ends and guidelines of the institution and the means to fulfill them. Additionally, it is worth noting that everything that refers to the granting of licenses for the exercise of commerce in its most varied range of activities, and its natural consequence which is to collect the so-called business license tax (impuesto de patente), has been qualified as an exclusively municipal matter. Thus, for example, in judgment No. 6469-1997 of 4:20 p.m. on October 8, 1997, this Tribunal Constitucional highlighted that everything concerning licenses for the exercise of lucrative activities will always be municipal competence because it comprises the generic concept of "*the local*", enshrined in Article 169 of the Constitución Política.
In that resolution, the position of this Chamber was summarized, stating the following:
"(...) Recapitulating what has been expressed in this judgment, everything concerning the granting of licenses (patentes, as they are commonly called) for the sale of liquor is a municipal matter; consequently, it is sufficient for an establishment to open its doors and engage in such activity that it possess the respective ‘patente’ and comply with the formal requirements established by law, always within the local sphere and, eventually, with executive or municipal service regulations, when applicable. Governors are expressly prohibited by the Political Constitution—through the articulation of articles 169 and 170—from intervening in the processes of granting licenses or so-called operating permits, which is not possible without violating municipal autonomy. (...)"
Consequently, the granting of municipal licenses for the exercise of any lucrative activity, as provided in Article 79 of the Municipal Code, is an essential and typical competence of the municipalities, as it forms part of the indeterminate legal concept of administration of local interests and services contained in Article 169 of the Constitution. Based on the foregoing, the State cannot, through a legislative guideline or directive such as that contemplated in the analyzed article, affect municipal autonomy. By virtue of the above, prior to the imposition of a legislative directive related to the management of municipal licenses and patentes, the legislators should have sought the opinion of the involved municipal corporations, for otherwise, their constitutionally recognized autonomy would be disregarded. In summary, although the legislative proposal that seeks to modify Article 9 of the current legislation is drafted in facultative or optional terms, the truth is that it implies a legislative directive regarding two aspects that classically constitute a fundamental part of local competences, such as the issue of patentes in the maritime-terrestrial zone, which must be administered by the local councils. In any case, the proposed legislative directive, despite its facultative nature, touches upon aspects inherent to local autonomy, such as the management of human, material, and financial resources for streamlining or making more flexible the granting of the patentes required by the concession-operated marinas, a point on which consultation is required not only for strictly formal reasons but also to ensure the technical soundness of any legislation that may be enacted. As a conclusion to the foregoing, regarding this aspect of the consultation, an essential defect that violated the constitutionality of the legislative procedure is indeed proven. The foregoing, because it was demonstrated that, through an approved motion, in accordance with the procedure of Article 137 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, a substantial modification was introduced to the bill that was not consulted with the municipal corporations.
**VI.- REGARDING THE VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLICITY IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE**. Secondly, the legislators state that just as the substantial changes undergone by the bill were not consulted, neither was the new text published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, thereby violating the principle of publicity. They note that the last modifications to the bill were made between June 6, 2007, and June 25, 2008, during the procedure for considering substantive motions, regulated by Article 137 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly. On this point, it is observed that the legislators present the consultation in the abstract without specifying to this Constitutional Court what the supposed substantial modifications introduced during the consideration of substantive motions were, which, in their opinion, warranted a new publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. Under such circumstances, it is worth reiterating regarding this point that, in application of Article 99 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, there is reiterated jurisprudence of this Court to the effect that this body rules on what is expressly consulted and reasoned, but not in the abstract (see judgments No. 5399-1995 of 3:54 p.m. on October 3, 1995, 9530-1999 of 9:15 a.m. on December 3, 1999, 2001-12420 of 9:21 a.m. on December 7, 2001, and 2004-07242 of 5:03 p.m. on June 30, 2004, among others). Despite this omission, and on the occasion of what was analyzed in the preceding whereas clause, this Court considers that a substantial modification was indeed introduced to the bill under consultation, which required a new publication in order to provide greater publicity to the text. Indeed, as noted, it was proven that through the approval of a substantive motion, the text of the bill was modified to impose on the municipalities a guideline to provide the corresponding facilities for the granting of the patentes required for the proper functioning of the marina projects that are concessioned. The foregoing was done without previously hearing their opinion on the matter, as required by Article 190 of the Political Constitution. Additionally, it is proven that a new publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta was also not carried out, violating the principle of publicity in the legislative procedure, an essential defect that, being intrinsically related to the democratic principle, affected the constitutional regularity of the parliamentary *iter*. Note that an essential element in the law-making procedure is that of publicity, insofar as it seeks to guarantee broad debate that facilitates contact with public opinion in general and, in particular, with those who might have an interest, by reason of their activities, in knowing about and even participating in the deliberation of the matter or, even, the possibility of hearing public entities, in this case, the municipalities, upon whom a legislative directive related to their exclusive competences is being imposed. Furthermore, this Court has pointed out that the publicity of parliamentary proceedings is essential due to the representative character of the national community held by the Legislative Assembly, given that sovereignty resides in the people and the deputies are only their representatives, as provided in Article 105 of the Political Constitution. In the case under examination, it is proven that the bill *"Modification of Several Articles of Law No. 7744, Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas"* submitted for the consultation of this Court, was duly published in La Gaceta No. 190 of **October 3, 2002.** It should be taken into consideration, on this point, that this reform proposal was presented before the Secretariat of the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly on **July 29, 2002.** However, and despite the approval of Motion No. 12-04 (33-137) heard in the extraordinary session No. 4 of the Permanent Special Commission on Tourism on **June 17, 2008**, the bill was not published again in the Official Gazette. The foregoing, despite the fact that, as noted *supra*, a substantial modification was introduced to the bill that seeks to establish directives concerning the most essential competences of the municipal corporations. Consequently, the omission of a new publication of the bill, in order to guarantee the publicity of the text, as well as to seek citizen and institutional participation, violated an essential aspect of the parliamentary procedure, an omission which results in a defect of unconstitutionality in the legislative procedure.
**CONSULTATION ON THE MERITS** **VII.- REGARDING THE LACK OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO THE GRANTING OF THE CONCESSION. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESPONSIBILITY.** The consulting legislators question that through the reform intended to be approved within the Legislative Assembly, it is sought to repeal and, therefore, disregard the requirement of an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) approved by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) prior to the granting of the concession for the construction of a tourist marina or docking facility. They argue that this requirement is currently contemplated in Article 8, subsection f), of Law No. 7744 of December 19, 1997, on *"Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas"*. However, it is sought to reform said article and, in its place, Article 9 bis establishes that the approval by SETENA of an EIA will be a requirement subsequent to the granting of the respective concession to build and operate tourist marinas. They cite Article 8 of the bill under consultation, which provides that for the processing of the concession contract, the presentation of a certification issued by SETENA is required, informing about the current status of the EIA. That is, having an assessment to process a public domain concession is not required; rather, only reporting on the status of the procedure is required. Furthermore, they insist that to initiate the procedure, only the presentation of a Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP), processed through an Initial Environmental Assessment, is contemplated, which is characterized as a preliminary study that lacks depth. The consulting legislators consider that this provision contravenes the principles of environmental protection, mainly the precautionary principle. On the other hand, they consider that the consulted rules unnecessarily increase the risk of lawsuits and litigation against the Costa Rican State and, additionally, favor the exertion of pressure to get competent authorities to endorse environmentally questionable projects. They insist that with the consulted reforms, those interested in building tourist marinas or docking facilities will hold the title of concessionaires when SETENA rules on the environmental impact studies. In such a case, should the endorsement not be obtained, the municipalities must nullify the acts granting the concessions, in which case the concessionaires could allege violation of acquired rights or contractual breaches and file million-dollar claims. In addition to the foregoing, they consider that the claims before international arbitration tribunals filed by foreign investors should be taken into account, such as, for example, the "Investor-State" dispute settlement mechanism contained in Chapter 10 of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. Having seen the grievances presented by the consulting legislators, this section of the consultation is divided into the analysis of two points: one related to environmental protection, and secondly, an analysis of the provision that exempts the State from liability as a mechanism to evade lawsuits due to the denial of the environmental impact study once the corresponding concession has been granted.
**1) REGARDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AS A REQUIREMENT PRIOR TO THE GRANTING OF A CONCESSION**. The legislators question that the bill submitted for consultation seeks to circumvent the requirement of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) approved by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA), prior to the granting of the concession by the competent municipality for the construction and administration of a tourist marina or docking facility. Before analyzing the procedure provided for in the bill, it is necessary to refer to the purposes and scope of environmental assessment studies as mechanisms for preventing serious damage to the environment. This Constitutional Court, in ample jurisprudence, has reiterated that these preventive assessments are an unavoidable requisite for guaranteeing the environment, in consistent application of Articles 21, 50, and 89 of the Political Constitution. Note that, specifically, Article 50 of the Fundamental Law provides that it is the responsibility of the State to guarantee, defend, and preserve the right of every human being to "*a healthy and ecologically balanced environment*". Even prior to the constitutional reform of Article 50, this Court highlighted the requirement of environmental assessment studies, conceived as technical studies on environmental matters, prior to the granting of rights in activities that could potentially harm the environment. Thus, in judgment No. 6240-1993 of 2:00 p.m. on November 26, 1993, this Court highlighted the precept enshrined in Article 89 of the Constitution, which provides the following:
"Among the cultural purposes of the Republic are: to protect natural beauties, to conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation, and to support private initiative for scientific and artistic progress." The Chamber affirmed that from the right to life and the state obligation to "*protect natural beauties*" contained in Articles 21 and 89 of the Constitution, other rights of obligatory protection and equal rank arise, such as health and the right to a healthy environment, in the absence of which the exercise of the former would not be possible, or their enjoyment would be severely limited. Likewise, the Chamber harmonized a series of international treaties and conventions of mandatory compliance in our territory to, finally, conclude in the vote cited *supra* that what was provided in the then Article 41, second paragraph, of the Hydrocarbons Law bill was unconstitutional. The foregoing, because it inverted the natural order of the procedure and granted the concession prior to carrying out the corresponding environmental studies, concluding the following:
"(...) Consequently, what is provided by Article 41, 2nd paragraph, of the Bill, which requires environmental impact studies after the exploration or exploitation concession is approved, particularly in the case of private parties, is contrary to the ends, purposes, and constitutional obligations regarding environmental matters, insofar as the contract, once signed, creates rights in favor of the interested party. For this reason, the Chamber finds that Article 41, 2nd paragraph, is unconstitutional in this aspect. (...)"
In the international context, we find that the obligation of environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) studies is expressly enshrined in Principle No. 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, signed by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992:
"**PRINCIPLE 17** Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority." Previously, in June 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment highlighted in the Stockholm Declaration the need to promote rational and planned development, consistent with environmental protection, "**Principle 2** The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate. (...) **Principle 17** Planning, managing or controlling the use of the environmental resources of States must be entrusted to the appropriate national institutions with the aim of improving the quality of the environment." Even, and in attention to the topic at hand in this consultation, said Declaration called upon States to take "*all possible measures to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that may endanger human health, harm living resources and marine life, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea*". Additionally, in the World Charter for Nature approved by the United Nations in 1982, it is emphasized that activities that might pose significant risks to nature shall be preceded by a thorough examination, indicating, as pertinent, the following:
"(...) 11- Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled, and the best available techniques shall be used to minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse effects; in particular, the following shall be avoided: a) Activities which are likely to cause irreversible damage to nature; b) Activities which are likely to entail significant risks to nature shall be preceded by a thorough examination, and their proponents shall demonstrate that the expected benefits outweigh the potential damage to nature."
Likewise, those activities shall not be carried out when their possible harmful effects are not fully known;</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 68.05pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">c) Activities that may disturb Nature shall be preceded by an assessment of their consequences, studying, with sufficient advance notice, the effects that development projects may have on Nature; should such activities be carried out, they shall be planned and executed with a view to reducing their possible harmful effects to a minimum; (...)” </span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Additionally, we find that the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity provided the following:<span style=\"mso-spacerun: yes;\"> </span></span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">“Article 14. Impact Assessment and Minimizing Adverse Impacts</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">1. Each Contracting Party, as far as possible and as appropriate:</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">a) </span></em><strong><em><u><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">Shall establish appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) of its proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, shall allow for public participation in such procedures</span></u></em></strong><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">.</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">b) Shall establish appropriate arrangements to ensure that the environmental consequences of its programmes and policies that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on biological diversity are duly taken into account; (...)”</span></em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"><span style=\"mso-spacerun: yes;\"> </span></span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin-right: 2.2pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">It being understood in said declaration that biological diversity refers to the variability of living organisms from any source, including, among other things, terrestrial, marine, and other ecosystems. In other latitudes, for example, at the European level, the Council of the European Communities in June 1985 issued Directive No. 85/337/EEC, concerning the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, in which States are urged to incorporate the environmental assessment study as a prerequisite for their authorization and provides which factors should be taken into consideration in their analysis, as follows: </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">“</span></em><strong><em><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">Article 2</span></em></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">1. Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before authorization is granted, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects.</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">(...)</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">2. The assessment of environmental effects may be integrated into the existing procedures for authorization of projects in the Member States, or, failing this, into other procedures or into procedures to be established to meet the aims of this Directive.”</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><strong><em><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">Article 3</span></em></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">The environmental impact assessment shall identify, describe and assess in an appropriate manner, in the light of each individual case and in accordance with Articles 4 to 11, the direct and indirect effects of a project on the following factors:</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">- human beings, fauna and flora,</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">- soil, water, air, climate and the landscape,</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">- the interaction between the factors mentioned in the first and second indents,</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 74.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">- material assets and the cultural heritage.”</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Similar provisions were adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which promoted the conclusion of a Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, signed in Espoo, Finland, on February 25, 1991. At the national legislative level and as a development of the precept enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, we find Article 17 of the Organic Law on the Environment, which provides as follows: </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 68.05pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-no-proof: yes;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 68.05pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-no-proof: yes;\">“</span></strong><strong><em><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">Article 17.- Environmental impact assessment</span></em></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 68.05pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials, shall require an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) created in this law. Its prior approval by this body shall be an indispensable requirement to begin the activities, works, or projects. The laws and regulations shall indicate which activities, works, or projects shall require the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental).”</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Likewise, the Biodiversity Law No. 7788 of April 30, 1998, in articles 92 to 97 requires the submission of an environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental) when the execution of certain projects may compromise the biodiversity of the area where it is intended to be carried out, which must be approved under the terms provided by the Organic Law on the Environment. Said regulation defines what is meant by Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) in Article 7, stating the following: </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 58.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">“</span></em><strong><em><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">Article 7.- Definitions</span></em></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 58.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">This law must be interpreted according to the following definitions<span style=\"mso-spacerun: yes;\"> </span></span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 58.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">(...)</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 58.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">18.- Environmental impact assessment: Scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting what effects a specific action or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to lead to decision-making. It includes the specific effects, their global assessment, the alternatives of greatest environmental benefit, a program for the control and minimization of negative effects, a monitoring program, a recovery program, as well as the guarantee of environmental compliance. (...)”</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Similar definitions are also found in Article 3 of Law No. 7593, Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services of August 1996, and in Article 2 of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Law No. 8436 of March 2005, concluding that the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) is a prior technical study carried out by professionals and technicians whose purpose is to identify and predict the eventual effects that a specific project will produce on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to determine the corresponding mitigation measures, as well as for the competent authority to grant or deny its authorization. It seeks to identify the risk elements of a project, whether to eliminate them, reduce their incidence, or, if applicable, advise the withdrawal of the action. By virtue of the foregoing, the prior EIA constitutes the ideal technical instrument to comply with the preventive and precautionary principles that govern environmental matters, and this Constitutional Court has gone so far as to hold that dispensing with it implies omitting due prevention when dealing with human intervention in the environment. Regarding the precautionary principle, this Constitutional Court in judgment No. 2004-1923 of 2:55 p.m. on February 25, 2004, authored by the Reporting Magistrate, provided the following:<span style=\"mso-spacerun: yes;\"> </span></span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 40.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">“(…) </span></em><strong><em><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">XV.- PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PROTECTION OF GROUNDWATER</span></em></strong><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">. One of the guiding principles of Environmental Law is the precautionary principle or principle of prudent avoidance. This principle is embodied in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development or Rio Declaration, which literally states: “Principle 15.- In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. In the domestic legal system, the Biodiversity Law (No. 7788 of April 30, 1998), in its article 11, sets forth the following principles as hermeneutical parameters: “1.- Preventive criterion: It is recognized that it is vitally important to anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of biodiversity loss or its threats. 2.- Precautionary criterion or in dubio pro natura: When there is danger or threat of serious or imminent damage to the elements of biodiversity and the knowledge associated with them, the absence of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective protection measures”. In Ruling (Voto) No. 1250-99 of 11:24 a.m. on February 19, 1999 (reiterated in Rulings (Votos) Nos. 9773-00 of 9:44 a.m. on November 3, 2000, 1711-01 of 4:32 p.m. on February 27, 2001, and 6322-03 of 2:14 p.m. on July 3, 2003), this Court held the following: “(...) Prevention seeks to anticipate negative effects and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or people's health. Thus, should there be a risk of serious or irreversible damage –or any doubt regarding it–, a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question postponed. This is because in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, since if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance but will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment”. Subsequently, in Ruling (Voto) No. 3480-03 of 2:02 p.m. on May 2, 2003, this Court indicated that “Properly understood, the precautionary principle refers to the adoption of measures not in the face of ignorance of risk-generating facts, but rather in the face of a lack of certainty that such facts will actually produce harmful effects on the environment”.(…)”<span style=\"mso-spacerun: yes;\"> </span></span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">The jurisprudence issued by this Constitutional Court has linked the duty imposed in Article 50 of the Political Constitution with the precautionary and preventive principles and the obligation of environmental assessments as a prerequisite to any activity that may negatively affect the environment. It is necessary to cite, on this point, judgment No. 6322-2003 of 2:14 p.m. on July 3, 2003, in which this Chamber categorically developed a series of constitutional principles related to the State's duty to defend the environment in a timely manner and linked the duty to carry out environmental impact studies (estudios de impacto ambiental) with the precautionary and preventive principles, stating the following: </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; tab-stops: 360.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 65.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">“(...) </span></em><strong><em><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">4.- Precautionary principle</span></em></strong><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">: One of the essential principles that make up environmental law is the "precautionary principle" or "principle of prudent avoidance", which is contained in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration, (...)</span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; tab-stops: 360.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 65.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">The term prevention derives from the Latin ‘praeventio’, which refers to the action and effect of preventing, to those preparations and arrangements made in advance to avoid a risk or execute something. Prevention seeks to anticipate negative effects and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or people's health. Thus, should there be a risk of serious or irreversible damage –or any doubt regarding it–, a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question postponed. This is because in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, since if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance but will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment. </span></em></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; tab-stops: 360.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 65.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><strong><em><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">5.- Of the completion of the environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental) prior to the initiation of works</span></em></strong><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">: It is based on the principle that environmental norms must have a technical basis, since their application must start from limits that determine the conditions under which the use and exploitation of natural resources must be subjected. This is so because, since environmental damage and contamination are assessable, such as the presence of toxic substances or external elements that produce negative characteristics in the environment, both for biological diversity –comprising flora and fauna–, and –above all– for human life, which is reflected in people's health or well-being –soil, habitat, air, water, etc.–, the impact of these elements requires scientific evaluation and treatment. Therefore, this principle (of prior completion of the environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental)) constitutes a corollary to the previous principle, and its completion is particularly important for all ‘[...] human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials, shall require an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) created in this Law. Its prior approval by this body shall be an indispensable requirement to begin the activities, works, or projects.’ (Article 17 of the Organic Law on the Environment, number 7554, of September eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five). </span></em><strong><em><u><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">Thus, the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment obliges the State to take preventive measures to avoid its impairment; and among the main measures provided by the legislator in this regard are Environmental Impact Studies (Estudios de Impacto Ambiental), which find their basis in the provisions of the aforementioned Article 17 of the Organic Law of the </span></u></em></strong><strong><u><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt;\">(sic)<em> Environment. </em></span></u></strong><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">To this effect, it is important to highlight that by virtue of constitutional mandate –Article 50–, and in the Law –Article 17 of the Organic Law on the Environment–, it is established as a general principle that all human activity modifying the environment shall require an environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental), from which it will be the condition of the project or work that determines in each case whether or not said technical study is required, and not the establishment of arbitrary conditions, whether administrative or regulatory (as indicated by this Court in judgment number 1220-2002, of two forty-eight in the afternoon of February sixth, two thousand two).</span></em></p> </span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; tab-stops: 360.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 65.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">It is in accordance with this provision that constitutional jurisprudence has recently required this technical study prior to carrying out any project that may affect the environment, as a guarantee to make the environmental right effective, and by way of example it has required it in the following activities, with the warning that it can in no way imply a closed list (numerus clausus): felling of trees in a wildlife refuge (judgment number 1888-95, cited above), location of a "waste transfer center" (judgment number 2671-95, of sixteen hours forty-five minutes of May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-five), decision to determine the closure or continuation of operation of the "Río Azul landfill" (judgment number 1154-96, of sixteen hours of March sixth, nineteen ninety-six), the reduction of the size of a protected area (judgment number 7294-98, of sixteen hours fifteen minutes of October thirteenth, nineteen ninety-eight), treatment of orange peels in plantations (judgment 1999-2219, of fifteen hours eighteen minutes of March twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-nine), urban planning and approval of urban developments (judgments number 2001-3694, of sixteen hours twenty-six minutes of May fifteenth, two thousand one, and number 2002-1220, of fourteen hours forty-eight minutes of February sixth, two thousand two), construction of hydroelectric plants (judgment number 2000-10466, of ten hours seventeen minutes of the twenty-fourth of two thousand), construction of dikes in rivers (judgment number 2001-6503, of nine hours twenty-six minutes of July sixth, two thousand one), construction and operation of manual sanitary landfills (judgments number 2002-5977 and 2002-6782), operation of nurseries and fern planting (judgments number 2000-9735 and 2001-3840); with which, it can well be said, that </span></em><strong><em><u><span style="font-size: 14.0pt;">the completion of this technical study constitutes a principle of constitutional order, and consequently, is mandatory, both for private individuals, and with greater reason, for State institutions; as this Court has previously considered</span></u></em></strong><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">: </span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; tab-stops: 360.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 65.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">'III.- Obligation of State institutions to comply with environmental legislation in their ordinary activity: The third paragraph of Constitutional numeral 50 clearly states that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve the right of every person to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment; which implies affirming that public entities are not only obligated to enforce environmental legislation –on private individuals and other public entities– but also, above all, that they must adjust their actions to the dictates of those protective normative bodies. State institutions are the first called upon to comply with protective environmental legislation, without any justification existing to exempt them from compliance with environmental requirements such as, for example, the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) required by the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente for activities undertaken by public entities that, by their nature, may alter or destroy the environment.' (judgment number 2001-6503, cited above).</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; tab-stops: 360.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 65.2pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">The legislator entrusted the 'Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental' with the evaluations to be carried out by 'an interdisciplinary team of professionals, registered and authorized by the Secretariat… in accordance with the guides prepared by it. The cost of the environmental impact assessments shall be borne by the interested party'. Article 19 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente established that 'the resolutions of the Secretaría Técnica Ambiental must be grounded and reasoned', thereby incorporating in this matter the general principle of grounding of administrative acts also developed by the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which is in turn a guarantee that integrates substantive due process. The approval of an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) requires, in accordance with the international commitments acquired by Costa Rica and entrusted to SETENA, a detailed analysis that includes, as required by Article 24 of the Ley del Ambiente, the technical criteria and the weighting percentages that make the approval of the study possible. Furthermore, it must respond to the norms, management objectives, and environmental priorities of the national State and local government, as set forth in Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration. The damage that can be caused to the environment is always difficult or impossible to repair, and the approval of an environmental impact assessment requires total certainty of minimal impact on natural resources, as is forcefully imposed by Article 50 of the Political Charter. In any case, it must be cautioned that the completion and approval of the environmental impact assessment does not in itself imply the start-up of the project in question, since it is only one of the requirements demanded to complete the authorization process (judgment number 5321-96, cited above), which in some cases will be obtaining the health permit, the approval of the urban development plans by the respective municipality, the approval of the concession by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the granting of commercial licenses, etc. This is so because, when dealing with the environment, one cannot speak of unmodifiable variables; on the contrary, by its very nature the environment is, by itself and to a greater degree by human intervention, changeable. The approval of an environmental impact assessment under the terms indicated by the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente also does not constitute an unmodifiable authorization to carry out a specific human project, since through the control work carried out by the Administration, upon detecting damage to the environment, the permit must be revoked, in order to guarantee the right established in numeral 50 of the Constitución Política. (...)"</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">In addition to all the foregoing and taking into consideration the purposes of the consulted regulation, that is, the simplification of the corresponding procedures for the approval of concessions for the administration, construction, and operation of tourist marinas, the principle of sustainable development must be weighed in the specific case, which is provided for in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which states in numeral 3, the following: </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.85pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.85pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">"The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations."</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">Under this principle, the need to achieve the country's development is recognized in order to address the social and economic insufficiencies suffered, for example, in coastal areas. But, additionally, it proclaims that development and, in this specific case, the construction and operation of tourist marinas, be carried out without destroying the environment. The principle of sustainable development –widely recognized by this Court– transcends purely environmental issues, because it stands as an objective in the field of economic science, since in addition to seeking to preserve the natural resources that support the life of human beings, it also pursues efficiency in the use of resources so that development is achieved that meets the needs of present and future generations, without compromising the availability of natural resources in general. In accordance with the foregoing, sustainable management of resources implies meeting the needs of countries, taking into consideration the requirements of present and future generations and balancing three main objectives: environmental, social, and economic. The foregoing, in order to avoid trends that threaten the quality of life of human beings and an increase in costs for society. In that sense, it is necessary to halt continuous environmental degradation with measures that seek to mitigate the negative effects of economic and social development and ensure the existence of a sustainable link between humanity and nature. Indeed, the adoption of sustainable policies is based on the concordance between economic growth, social equity, and conservation of natural resources. Based on the considerations made, we proceed to analyze the bill under consultation. As the legislators point out, the regulation intended to be approved eliminates the requirement of the Environmental Impact Assessment duly approved by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, as an ex ante or a priori requirement for the granting of the concession (see Article 8, subsection f), of the current Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas). Instead, a different mechanism is chosen, which is briefly described. Indeed, the regulation provides for a preliminary stage that must be processed before the Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos, to obtain a technical viability for the construction, administration, and exploitation of a tourist marina or dock. Article 5 that is intended to be amended indicates in subsection c) that to process said technical endorsement, it is required to submit, only, a Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP), granted by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional, processed through an Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EAI), by means of the current procedure. Now, in accordance with the Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA), Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31849, of June 28, 2004, the VAP is defined as follows: </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.85pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">"(...) 64. Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial) (VAP): It is the temporary environmental approval, granted by SETENA to those activities, works, or projects that carry out the Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial) and still require the submission of other EIA documents for obtaining the definitive Environmental Viability (License) (Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental, VLA)."</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">Now, the favorable technical viability would empower the interested party to continue with the second stage of the procedure, that is, the concession application process before the competent authority, in which case, to initiate the concession application process, the administered party must submit only a "<em>certification issued by Setena, informing on the current status of the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental)</em>" (Article 8, subsection d). Only with that requirement, the municipality may conditionally grant the concession. Article 9 of the bill provides, in what is relevant, the following: </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.85pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">"(...) The municipality shall grant the concession conditionally, until Setena communicates, in writing, that the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) (hereinafter EIA) was approved. However, if the EIA is negative, the concession shall be rendered void and shall not generate any liability for the Administration.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.85pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">The concessionaire may not take possession of any of the concessioned assets, until Cimat certifies that it has fulfilled all the requirements set forth in Article 9 bis of this Law and has obtained the corresponding municipal construction permit. (...)"</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">Thus, the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) is not required prior to the granting of the concession; rather, a mere report on the progress of the evaluation would be required. The third stage of the procedure entails obtaining construction permits from the competent municipality. This process is regulated in Article 3 of the bill, through which Article 9 bis is introduced to the current regulation, which states the following: </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">"</span></em><strong><em><span style="font-size: 14.0pt;">Article 9 bis.- Procedure for construction plans</span></em></strong></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">Once the concession is granted and within a maximum period of one hundred eighty (180) calendar days, the concessionaire must conclude the EIA process before Setena.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">Upon approval of the EIA, through the granting of the Environmental Viability (License) (VLA) by Setena, the concessionaire shall have a period of one hundred twenty (120) calendar days to submit, before the single window of Cimat, the following documents:</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">a) The final construction plans.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">b) The studies and calculation reports.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">c) The technical specifications of materials, sources, procedures, and construction methods.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">d) The budget and the schedule for the execution of the works.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">e) The certified copy of the Environmental Viability (License) (VLA) from Setena.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">f) The notarial or registry certification of the registration of the concession contract.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">g) The insurance policy covering the concessionaire's civil liability.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">h) Demonstrate the financial capacity to develop the project by the mechanisms established in the Regulations of this Law.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">Cimat must request from the interested party, within a period of twenty (20) business days, any clarification for the processing of the corresponding technical recommendation regarding the approval of the plans. Once the clarifications are submitted to Cimat, it shall have an additional period of twenty (20) days to issue the corresponding technical recommendation on the approval.</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 67.95pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">The concessionaire shall have a period of up to one (1) year to begin construction of the works, once the construction permit is granted by the respective municipality. After this period, the municipality shall request Cimat to issue a report confirming the investment and the progress of the work; to issue said report, Cimat shall have a period of up to twenty (20) business days. In the event the report determines that the works have not begun, the municipality shall immediately initiate a concession cancellation procedure."</span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 67.95pt; text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></em></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 4.8pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">In accordance with the foregoing, through the regulation intended to be approved, an attempt is made to invert the normal and natural order of administrative procedures, granting the concession for the construction, administration, and exploitation of tourist marinas prior to the completion of the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental). The conceived procedure would be unconstitutional since it reverses the logical order of procedures, disregarding the State's duty to protect the integrity of the environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitución Política. Moreover, if we adhere to the binding jurisprudence of this Court, it is not admissible to deconstitutionalize the guarantee of a State response in defense of the environment, which must be timely and prior to the granting of the corresponding permits or concessions (see judgments numbers 6240-1993, 4245-2001, 1220-2002, 1221-2002, 6466-2002).</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 35.4pt; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><strong><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;">2) ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY</span></strong><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">. Intimately related to the foregoing, it is necessary to point out that the procedure used for the approval of the concession, subject to the result of the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental), is additionally unconstitutional because the legislative proposal is eliminating, in an a priori manner, the State's liability in the event of a potential denial of the study carried out by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental. Indeed, as transcribed <em>supra</em>, the intended amendment to Article 9 of the Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas provides for the granting of the concession conditionally until SETENA communicates in writing that the EIA has been approved, and the following phrase is highlighted: "<em>However, if the EIA is negative, the concession shall be rendered void and shall not generate any liability for the Administration</em>". In this regard, this Constitutional Court, with the wording of the Reporting Magistrate, issued Judgment No. 2004-05207 of 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004, in which the following was considered: </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.85pt .0001pt 72.0pt;"><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">"(...) </span></em><strong><em><span style="font-size: 14.0pt;">IV.- CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY</span></em></strong><em><span lang="ES-CR" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;">. Our Constitución Política does not explicitly enshrine the principle of patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of administrative function, they cause to administered parties. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that "The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…)", whereby the liability of the principal public entity or State and its various organs –Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers– is taken as a given.</span></em></p> Section 11°, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the “(…) criminal liability (…)”(responsabilidad penal) of public officials, and the second paragraph refers us to the “(…) personal liability for officials in the performance of their duties (…)” (responsabilidad personal para los funcionarios en el cumplimiento de sus deberes). Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects “acquired patrimonial rights” (derechos patrimoniales adquiridos) and “consolidated legal situations” (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), which can only be effectively and truly protected by a broad-spectrum administrative liability (responsabilidad administrativa) system without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the course of their public activity or performance. Numeral 41 ibidem states that “By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…)” this precept imposes on the perpetrator and party responsible for the damage the duty to compensate for the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered parties as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of public entities, thereby becoming the constitutional cornerstone for the legislative development of a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official’s conduct for intent or fault, but solely and exclusively, for having effectively inflicted or received “(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…),” that is, an unlawful injury that they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Numeral 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental right to compensation in favor of the administered party who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity—through its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct—and the correlative obligation of the latter to fully compensate or repair it; the access to jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept thus becomes an instrumental right to forcefully ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the injured party’s right to compensation when the party obligated to repair voluntarily fails to comply with the referenced obligation. Article 45 of the Magna Carta embraces the principle of the intangibility of property by providing that “Property is inviolable; no one may be deprived of their own except for legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law (…),” thus recognizing, through the fundamental text, that the special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered party has no duty to bear or tolerate, even if they arise from a lawful activity—such as the exercise of expropriation power—must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, by implicitly recognizing legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in judicial courts when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear foundation of administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the already cited numeral 49 provides that “The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered parties,” with one of the principal forms of guarantee of these being an objective, direct, comprehensive, and complete regime of administrative liability. The final paragraph of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, regarding environmental damage, establishes that “The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities (responsabilidad) and sanctions,” a liability regime from which, obviously, public economic entities (denominated public company-public entity) (empresas públicas-ente público) and public companies (also called public company-private law entity) (empresas públicas-ente de Derecho privado) cannot be excluded when they pollute while carrying out an industrial, commercial, or service activity, and, in general, the State when it fails to comply with its obligations to defend and preserve the environment through deficient oversight or control activities of public and private activities that are actually or potentially polluting. In the case of members of the Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions, Article 188 of the fundamental norm provides that “Their directors are responsible for their management.” Regarding the Executive Branch, Title X of the constitutional text contains a Chapter V whose heading is “Responsibilities of Those Who Exercise the Executive Branch,” with Article 148 enshrining the responsibility of the President for the “use he makes of those powers that according to this Constitution correspond to him exclusively,” the joint responsibility of the latter with the respective Minister of the sector “regarding the exercise of the powers that this Constitution grants to both”—which is specified by Article 149 ibidem—and that of the Government Council for the agreements it adopts. The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents imposing on the administered parties a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they have no duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and carried out for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more administered parties and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that the Political Constitution includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services, which can be clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the Fundamental Law, interpreted a contrario sensu, insofar as they include, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the “proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,” “smooth running of the Government,” and “efficiency of the administration.” This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their competencies and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. Thus, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly incorporated the principle of responsibility (responsabilidad) of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury caused to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered parties by its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct.
**V.- ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY IN THE SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW.** The liability of public administrations for the exercise of the administrative function forms part, as we have confirmed in the preceding recital, of their constitutional conception. It is a key and essential piece of the Social and Democratic Rule of Law, given the aims to which an administrative liability regime aspires. In general, administrative liability has the basic function of repairing or compensating the unlawful injuries caused to an administered party (victim or injured party) in their patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere by a public entity in the exercise of the administrative function. One of its classic and traditional purposes is to serve as a control or guarantee for the substantial legal situations of administered parties that are injured by a public entity in the exercise of its competencies or in the provision of public services expressly assigned by the Constitution or the law. Administrative liability together with the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Article 49 of the Political Constitution) are the key pieces of a Constitutional State for the defense of administered parties against the formal and material prerogatives and privileges with which the Constitution itself provides public entities for the fulfillment of their tasks. This purpose determines that the constitutional principle of administrative liability must be strengthened and accentuated through an extensive and not restrictive interpretation; likewise, the legislator, when developing administrative liability systems, must adapt to the constitutional parameter of an objective and direct administrative liability, being prohibited from establishing administrative conduct exempt or immune to it and from impairing the fundamental rights to compensation and to the proper functioning of public services held by all administered parties. On the other hand, administrative liability allows the constitutional principles of administrative efficiency and effectiveness to be realized (Articles 140, subsection 8, insofar as it imposes on the Executive Branch the duty to “Oversee the proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,” 139, subsection 4, insofar as it incorporates the concept of “smooth running of the Government,” and 191 by including the principle of “efficiency of the administration”), since the duty to repair or indemnify the unlawful injuries inflicted on administered parties imposes on them the obligation to act correctly, prudently, thoughtfully, and in accordance with the Law. According to these two principles that inform administrative organization and function, public administrations must provide good quality public services with high standards for the due satisfaction of the needs of the administered parties who are their recipients and exercise their competencies fully and normally. Efficiency and effectiveness are, then, constitutional obligations or imperatives that necessarily compel public entities to act responsibly in the exercise of the administrative function in its various manifestations (material or technical actions and formal activity). As a correlative of such constitutional duties of public administrations, the administered parties hold the unnamed fundamental right to the proper and efficient functioning of public services, with high quality standards, which can be inferred, a contrario sensu, from the abovementioned Articles 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the Political Constitution).
**VI.- UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY OF THE COSTA RICAN INSTITUTE OF AQUEDUCTS AND SEWERS**. Subsection a) of Article 5 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers exempts that entity from liability “(…) in cases of damages and losses caused by the impurity, irregularity, or insufficiency, real or alleged, of the water supplied (…).” Evidently, that subsection frontally transgresses the constitutional principle of administrative liability, since, for a specific hypothesis of abnormal functioning of the public service—lack of service, understood as a breach of pre-existing legal obligations imposed by the legal system—such as impurity, irregularity, or insufficiency in the supply of drinking water, the legislator graciously exempts the entity from responding for the unlawful injuries caused to the administered parties. By exonerating ICAA from all administrative liability in the provision of the public service that constitutes its core or reason for being, the subsection violates the principle of the intangibility of property (Article 45 of the Political Constitution), the right of administered parties to obtain prompt and complete judicial protection to achieve integral reparation for the damages and losses they have suffered in their patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function by any public entity (Articles 41 and 49 ibidem). In the same way, the exemption infringes the right to health (Article 21 ibidem), when, eventually, the injury affects that precious right of the service users, as is to be expected when impure water is provided or the supply is not regular—adjusted to the duties and obligations imposed by the legal system—and continuous—without interruptions or solution of continuity—and in sufficient quantities to meet the basic and daily hygienic needs of the administered parties. Finally, this Tribunal considers that the exoneration from liability provided by the legislator for the indicated hypotheses violates the implicit or virtual constitutional right of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services (Articles 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191, all interpreted a contrario sensu). Lastly, this Constitutional Tribunal does not find that the challenged precept infringes the Right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, since the norm refers to a public service relationship and the liability of the entity that provides it regarding its purity, regularity, and quantity. Nor does this Tribunal consider that it violates the principle of legality enshrined in numeral 11 of the Political Constitution, except solely and exclusively insofar as it serves as a partial foundation for the principle of liability of public administrations. (...)” Such considerations are fully applicable to the specific case, in which it would be unconstitutional for the legislator to disregard the implicit constitutional principle of public administration liability, derived from the block of constitutionality, stated in the partially cited judgment. Consequently, the mechanism provided to circumvent potential lawsuits for disregard of acquired rights over the granted concession is unconstitutional.
In summary, the procedure devised in the consulted bill for the granting of concessions for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas and docks is unconstitutional. In the first place, for disregarding that the environmental impact assessment (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) must be carried out prior to any concession, and furthermore, it is unconstitutional for the State to exclude its liability through legislative means.
**VIII.- REGARDING THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT. CORRELATION OF ARTICLES 9 AND 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION**. In another vein, the consulting legislators consider that the granting of concessions for the construction of tourist marinas on public domain property, prior to the final approval of an EIA by the competent technical authority, could be violative of the right to citizen participation of the population that could eventually be affected by the concession. They insist that constitutional jurisprudence has highlighted the relevance of the right to citizen participation in relation to decisions linked to the environment. The foregoing, as a right derived from Articles 1 and 50 of the Political Constitution, which recognizes broad standing for all persons to participate in this type of procedure. In their view, these principles have been reinforced with the approval of the constitutional amendment that modified Article 9 of the Political Constitution to establish that the Government of Costa Rica is participatory. Regarding this point and based on the development carried out around the importance of the EIA, it must be reiterated that, according to the most qualified doctrine, the assessment is a principally participatory procedure for the anticipatory weighing of the environmental consequences of a decision to approve or deny a specific project. According to the doctrine, the environmental impact study appeared, from its origins, related to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of public inquiries and hearings, and therefore the guarantee must be highlighted that throughout the assessment, and at its different stages, those affected by the final decision will be heard, who may be not only the communities or immediately involved subjects, but also groups defending diffuse interests, such as the timely protection of the environment. Regarding the promotion of public participation in relation to environmental matters, the Rio Declaration provides the following:
| “ | **PRINCIPLE 10** | ” |
|---|---|---|
| Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided. |
The World Charter for Nature cited supra, in Principle No. 23, provides the following:
| “23- | All persons, in accordance with national legislation, shall have the opportunity to participate, individually or collectively, in the process of preparing decisions that directly concern their environment and, when it has been the object of damage or deterioration, may exercise the necessary remedies to obtain compensation.” |
|---|
At the domestic level, the Organic Environmental Law provides the following:
| **“Article 22.- | Assessment File |
|---|---|
| Individuals or legal entities, public or private, shall have the right to be heard by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA), at any stage of the assessment process and in the operational phase of the work or project. The observations of interested parties shall be included in the file and evaluated for the final report. | |
| Within the five business days following receipt of an environmental impact assessment, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat shall send an extract thereof to the municipalities in whose jurisdiction the work, activity, or project will be carried out. |
Likewise, it shall give extensive dissemination, through the mass media, to the list of studies submitted for its consideration.
**Article 23.- Publicity of information** The information contained in the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) file shall be public and shall be available to be consulted by any person or organization.
However, interested parties may request that information integrated into the study be kept confidential, if its publication would affect industrial property rights." For its part, the Biodiversity Law provides, in what is relevant, the following:
"**Article 95.- Public hearings** The National Technical Secretariat must hold public hearings for information and analysis on the specific project and its impact, when it deems it necessary. The cost of the publication shall be borne by the interested party.
Participation is any process that involves society in the adoption of proposals, problem-solving, and decision-making regarding the approval of a specific activity or project." In judgment No. 10693-2002 of 18:20 hrs. on November 7, 2002, this Constitutional Court stressed that the guarantee of citizen participation is a tool through which citizens are empowered to enforce their right to a healthy environment, hence it is an intrinsic part of the guarantees enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. Said resolution provided the following:
"(...) this Chamber considers that, properly derived from the democratic framework that informs the entire legal system and which is established by Article 1 of the Political Constitution, in conjunction with the right to a healthy environment established in Article 50 of said Charter, in addition to international instruments and the respective legal norms, it is necessary to extract as certain the presence of a right of all persons to participate in decision-making concerning matters of public interest, in this case environmental protection. This right to participate is thus constituted as an essential instrument for inhabitants to assert their right to a healthy environment; however, it cannot be understood as a mere exercise of an opinion, since contrary to what might be considered at first glance, this participation must be understood broadly, and consequently, it implies three basic dimensions –as recognized by the Río Declaration of 1992–: the right of access to information, the right to participation "per se," and the right of access to justice in environmental matters. These three dimensions, in turn, contain a series of basic procedural rights –both in administrative and judicial venues– which together assure persons that their opinions will not become an empty and rhetorical exercise of freedom of opinion, and that, on the contrary, they will effectively be taken into account by the public authority.
(...)
ii.– The right to public participation. This aspect implies the possibility for those persons who may be affected or who have an interest in a decision concerning the environment, to express their criteria, opinions, points of view, or questions about it early on, without these having to be subject to specific formalities to be taken into account. Consequently, the information provided to the administered party must contain non-technical summaries, allowing people to understand the magnitude of the discussion. Likewise, it entails the existence of adequate deadlines for, prior to participation, a stage for citizens to become informed to take place.
The environmental impact assessment procedure is characterized by being an administrative procedure with a differentiating note, as it seeks to avoid or minimize the eventual configuration of environmental damage, within the execution of activities about which there is certainty regarding the harmful effect they would produce on the environment if carried out without any contention. In other words, this instrument corresponds to the materialization of the principle of prevention, insofar as, faced with an activity known beforehand to be harmful to the environment, the interested party proposes a series of measures aimed at avoiding or mitigating ecological detriment, to the public organ or entity –in this case SETENA– which is in charge of determining if these are the most suitable for such purpose. Consequently, **<u>given that this procedure constantly seeks to foresee any negative consequence, through a broad flow of information, it is natural to understand that one of its characteristics is that the people who may be affected by the development of the project can provide fundamental data or points of view, which the competent authorities, due to an omission or arbitrary conduct, could ignore or set aside, consequently leaving the environment unprotected</u>**. This is how the principle or right of participation implies, within the environmental impact assessment procedure, a high degree of publicity, to the point that any act or request that has a significant effect on its final result must be of general scope for all interested parties, so that they can exercise their opinions at any time and not be pigeonholed into a specific procedural moment. The role of the population as defender of a healthy environment goes 'from cradle to grave,' that is, from the beginning of the productive activity as a project, until the end of its useful life, so it would not be admissible that, in an exploitation intended to last for an indefinite period, even decades –as is the case with hydroelectric projects–, and with irreversible consequences, the participation of those social sectors that may be affected is limited to a procedural stage, which, like a hearing, may last only a few hours. Thus, due to its preventive nature, it is demandable that from the very moment of its initiation, a project subjected to environmental impact assessment must be made known to the population for the purpose of initiating an open phenomenon of participation. (...)" The highlighted text does not correspond to the original.
By virtue of the foregoing, the consulting deputies are correct, since the regulation intended for approval within the Legislative Assembly defers the right to citizen participation to a moment after the concession for the construction, operation, and administration of the tourist marinas has been granted. Consequently, it intensely limits the rights of interested parties to pronounce on the advisability of the project in question. Although Article 9 of the bill provides for a consultation procedure, public hearings, and objections before the authorities competent to grant the concession, the truth is that, at that moment, the appropriate technical information from professionals in the field is lacking, which would allow for a substantiated participation by the interested parties. As has been developed throughout this consultation, the environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) is characterized by being a process of information flow related to the advisability of the project, the eventual effects, and the damages sought to be minimized. Consequently, conducting a consultative procedure without first having appropriate information from professionals in the field sensibly limits the right of individuals to actively participate in the procedure under analysis, as they lack, up to that point, the necessary information to oppose or support the project in question. Indeed, a consultative stage is carried out without the detail of the project and the eventual effects on the environment being made known to the citizenry up until that moment, considering that, as analyzed in the *supra* cited judgment, access to information is a transcendental element in promoting the right to participation. Said purpose is highlighted, likewise, in the General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Procedures (Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA)), which makes evident that the intention of the hearing conducted within the framework of the EIA is, precisely, to inform civil society about the activity, work, or project intended for development and its impacts (see Article 3, subsection 12). In light of the foregoing, postponing the environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) to a moment after the granting of the concession sensibly limits the right to participation of individuals in relation to the defense of a diffuse interest, such as the effective and timely protection of the environment.
**IX.- ON THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITORY PROVISION II AND THE INFRACTION OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION**. The legislators question the constitutionality of Transitory Provision II of the consulted bill. Said numeral provides the following:
"**TRANSITORY PROVISION II.-** The owner of any work, project, or infrastructure similar and/or analogous to a tourist marina and/or dock, that has been developed and is operating contrary to the principles and regulations of this Law, as well as lacking permits, authorizations, approvals and/or concessions, shall have a non-extendable and peremptory period of (1) one year, from the publication of this Law, to legalize their situation before the Cimat; otherwise, the body may recommend its technical closure to the municipality. **<u>When the activities are in operation, an EIA will not be required</u>**; said activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority." (They question what is highlighted in bold).
In relation to the transcribed norm, the legislators consider that said provision violates the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, because it exempts marinas that are operating illegally from conducting environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental). They set forth that the consulted norm refers to the case of illegally built tourist marinas and docks that, at the time of the reform, are in operation. They affirm that it is not constitutionally valid to attempt to establish *a priori* a generic exemption directed at certain types of activities, without a necessary assessment of the particular conditions of each specific case having taken place. In another order of ideas, they consider that said norm constitutes a dangerous incentive for the construction and operation of tourist marinas and docks, outside the legal provisions that regulate the matter. The foregoing, with the purpose of evading the presentation of an environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA). In relation to this end of the consultation, this Court believes that the reflections made in Considering VII and VIII of this judgment are equally applicable, insofar as the legislator is ignoring the mandatory nature of conducting an environmental impact assessment as an unavoidable requirement for the approval of an activity or project of this nature, which could be affecting or generating potential dangers to the environment. In this context, it is necessary to highlight, again, that Article 50 of the Political Constitution imposes on the State, in environmental matters, a positive or proactive attitude that cannot be ignored. Consequently, ignoring the mandatory nature of the environmental impact assessment for the approval of a project that could somehow affect the environment would be unconstitutional. The foregoing, for ignoring the guarantee of defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, especially if it is taken into consideration that a transitory norm with such wording could incentivize or motivate the acceleration of the irregular construction of marinas and tourist docks to, subsequently, omit the fulfillment of an environmental impact assessment.
**X.- ON THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITORY PROVISION IV OF THE BILL**. Finally, the consulting legislators question the inclusion of Transitory Provision IV in the bill, which provides the following:
"**TRANSITORY PROVISION IV.-** The EIA must be conducted, only, in the case of new activities that are not in operation. In case of renewal, assignment or adjudication of rights or granting of a new concession, of marinas, tourist docks and/or similar projects that are in operation and do not imply modifications, that is, the construction or execution of new works or activities, they will not require an EIA. Said activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority." The consulting legislators state that the environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) must be conducted only for the case of new activities not in operation. Therefore, in cases of renewal, assignment or adjudication of rights, or granting of a new concession of those marinas, tourist docks and/or similar projects that were in operation and do not involve modifications, they will not require a new assessment, but rather such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority. However, they allege that there are numerous studies that have demonstrated that environmental impact is cumulative, and given that the term of the concessions is increased to 35 years and can be extended without a new environmental impact study, this would be proceeding against the logic of the precautionary principle. On the matter, as this Constitutional Court already indicated in judgment No. 2007-013574 of 9:30 hrs. on September 19, 2007, environmental impact assessments are conducted prior to the development of the project in question and, in the specific case, the assignment of rights over an infrastructure that is in operation and is in good standing is being regulated. That is, the questioned Transitory Provision applies to marinas and tourist docks built in accordance with the provisions in force, which require the presentation of the EIA. Consequently, there is no irregularity whatsoever, since, for activities outside the current regulations, Transitory Provision II applies, as already analyzed; while constructions carried out under the corresponding authorizations of SETENA do not require a new evaluation when it is only a matter of "renewal, assignment or adjudication of rights or granting of a new concession," as this does not imply the construction of new works that could compromise the environment. Having overcome the above, it is worth noting that it is not for this Constitutional Court to determine the periodicity with which this type of evaluation must be carried out, and rather, for these purposes, we have that the current regulations provide for the figure of an "environmental manager (responsable ambiental)", who is responsible for verifying and reporting to SETENA on the fulfillment of the obligations acquired both for the construction and the operational or functioning stages of the activity, work, or project according to the period established by SETENA. Likewise, it is incumbent upon said figure to issue the necessary environmental recommendations according to the diverse situations that arise in any of the execution stages of the activity, work, or project (see Articles 79-85 of the General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures (Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental)). Consequently, in the opinion of this Tribunal, the analyzed provision is not unconstitutional.
**XI.- COROLLARY.** Based on the considerations made, the conclusion is reached that, effectively, the legislative procedure followed for the approval of the consulted project presents essential defects of constitutionality by violating Article 190 of the Political Constitution and, additionally, by ignoring the principle of publicity. In relation to the substance of the bill submitted for consultation, this Tribunal believes that the procedure for granting a concession for the construction, administration, and exploitation of tourist marinas and docks is unconstitutional due to violation of Articles 9 and 50 of the Political Constitution, by authorizing the granting of a concession prior to the completion of the corresponding environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental). Likewise, the text proposed for Article 9, paragraph 6, is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional principle of Public Administration liability implicit in the Fundamental Norm. Additionally, the phrase "When the activities are in operation, an EIA will not be required; said activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority" contained in Transitory Provision II of the bill is unconstitutional due to infraction of Article 50 of the Political Constitution.
Regarding Transitory Provision IV, it is not unconstitutional, to the extent that it is understood to involve the renewal, assignment, or adjudication of rights that does not entail the execution of new works that could affect the environment.
**POR TANTO**.
By unanimity, the joinder is declared inadmissible. The legislative consultation on the constitutionality of the bill "Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas", processed under expediente 14.836, is answered, by majority, in the sense that there are two essential or substantial defects in the legislative procedure, which are the following: a) The lack of mandatory consultation of the bill with the municipalities due to the introduction of the motion made to Article 9 of the legislation intended to be reformed, adding a paragraph that indicates "(...) The municipalities may provide the facilities for the granting of the required licenses, for the proper functioning of the marina projects they concession and, consequently, of the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law." and b) Infringement of the principle of publicity due to the lack of a new publication of the bill upon the introduction of the motion indicated in the previous point. Magistrates Mora, Vargas, and Certad dissent regarding the essential procedural defects, considering that they do not exist. On the merits, by unanimity, the constitutionality consultation is answered in the sense that: a) Article 2 of the bill, whose purpose is to reform Articles 8 and 9 of the Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas, is unconstitutional, specifically, the texts proposed for Article 8, subsection d), and Article 9, paragraph 5. This is because it postpones the submission of the environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) until after the concession for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas and docks has been granted, disregarding the State's duty to preventively protect the environment and limiting the right to citizen participation in the decision-making of matters related to it; b) The text proposed for Article 9, paragraph 6, is unconstitutional for violating the principle of Public Administration responsibility implicit in the Fundamental Norm; c) Transitory Provision II of the bill is unconstitutional for violating Article 50 of the Constitución Política insofar as it indicates the following "When the activities are in operation, it will not be required to carry out an environmental impact assessment (EIA); said activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority" and d) Transitory Provision IV of the consulted bill is not unconstitutional. **Comuníquese al Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa y a los diputados consultantes.-** **Ana Virginia Calzada M.** **Presidenta a.i.** **Luis Paulino Mora M.** **Adrián Vargas B.** **Ernesto Jinesta L.** **Fernando Cruz C.** **Rosa María Abdelnour G.** **Gastón Certad M.** **Dissenting vote of Magistrates Mora Mora, Vargas Benavides and Certad Maroto, written by the latter.** The undersigned Magistrates dissent from the majority vote, as we consider that there are no essential defects in the procedure of the consulted bill. Previously, this Chamber has indicated that it is not illegitimate for the Asamblea Legislativa to issue norms that refer to the competencies of municipal corporations, provided they do not entail an imposition that substantially alters the content of said acts. In that sense, the Chamber, in judgment number 2006-06589 at twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on May twelve, two thousand six, considered by majority that the fact that the Asamblea Legislativa created a norm allowing municipalities to forgive tax debts did not imply an injury to Article 170 of the Constitución Política, since said norm was permissive in nature, as it did not impose any obligation on the corporations. In the specific case, the consulted Article 9, by stating that *"(...) The municipalities may provide the facilities for the granting of the required licenses, for the proper functioning of the marina projects they concession and, consequently, of the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law"*, does not imply an intrusion on municipal autonomy, because the cited norm only authorizes municipalities to, at their discretion, decide whether to provide the facilities for granting the licenses required for the effective functioning of the marinas intended to be developed within their jurisdictions. In our view, this numeral merely seeks to grant a general authorization for each local government to adopt the decision it deems most convenient for its district. We consider that the bill contains a permissive or authorizing norm, which imposes nothing on the municipalities but grants them a license to act in accordance with their own assessment of local interest and to decide, in each case, whether or not to grant the facilities described by the motion. Thus, if this were an imposing norm, the bill would indeed harm the autonomy of local governments; however, in the way it was designed, it does not oblige municipalities that deem it appropriate to approve the facilities for granting licenses. In this way, the fact that the bill is an initiative of a Central State body and not of the municipalities themselves in no way affects their autonomy, nor does it imply an invasion of constitutional competencies by Parliament. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we deem it appropriate to point out that the power granted by the aforementioned article can in no way imply a reduction of the controls and requirements that municipalities must apply and demand in accordance with the other norms regulating the matter.
Regarding the alleged violation of the Principle of Publicity, it must be noted that the change introduced to Article 9 of the bill does not substantially alter the bill, and therefore we consider that there is no reason to publish it in the official newspaper La Gaceta, as the majority of the Chamber argues.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B. Gastón Certad M.
They explain that, instead, to process and obtain these concessions, it is only required to "<em>inform</em>" on the status of the processing of said assessment, which, in their view, includes the possibility that this process may not even have concluded and the applicant lacks environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) granted by the competent technical authority at the time of obtaining the concession. They state that as a prerequisite to granting concessions to private parties over public domain assets such as the territorial sea and the maritime terrestrial zone, the reform to Article 5, subsection c), of Law No. 7774, only contemplates the submission of a Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial) granted by SETENA and processed through an Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EIA). They point out that regarding this requirement, it is essential to remember that it can in no way be equated to a true Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental), duly approved. They argue that in accordance with the General Regulation on Environmental Assessment Procedures, the EIA is only the first stage of the assessment procedure. That is, it constitutes a preliminary study of the environmental characteristics of an activity, to determine the significance of the eventual impact it will generate and proceed to its categorization, but it lacks the analytical elements and the depth of an Environmental Impact Study or the other instruments that form part of the assessment procedure. They insist that the function of this first stage is, precisely, to determine the scope, components, and degree of depth of the technical studies that will have to be carried out to comply with the EIA requirement. Thus, they conclude that what was established, at the time, as a prior preventive control, is being regulated as a subsequent requirement. In particular, they allege that compliance with the requirement of an EIA duly approved by SETENA is being promoted as subsequent to the granting of permits or concessions to carry out activities for which this requirement is demanded, that is, when the competent Administration has already granted the permits or concessions to the interested party. They consider that postponing the approval of environmental impact assessments until after the granting of permits or concessions to carry out activities that require this requirement has serious consequences on the State's capacity to effectively safeguard the environment. They assert that one of the main consequences is that it allows the granting of acquired rights to private parties over public domain assets (territorial sea, maritime terrestrial zone) to carry out activities that could alter or damage the environment without prior verification of the environmental impacts of the proposed projects and without the concessionaires having demonstrated that the activities they intend to carry out are environmentally viable. They affirm that constitutional jurisprudence has indicated, in repeated resolutions, that granting concession contracts to third parties over public domain assets of environmental importance (natural resources having the character of public domain assets) to carry out activities that should be subject to environmental impact assessments, granted by the competent technical authority of the Costa Rican State (SETENA), is contrary to Constitutional Law. They conclude that the norms under consultation would leave constitutionally protected natural resources, such as the maritime terrestrial zone and the territorial sea, unprotected (Articles 6 and 121, subsection 14, of the Magna Carta) and disregard and violate the preventive and precautionary principles. In another line of thought, they consider that the norms under consultation unnecessarily increase the risk of filing lawsuits and litigation against the Costa Rican State and favor the exercise of pressure so that the competent authorities endorse environmentally questioned projects. On the other hand, they indicate that it cannot be ignored that an increase in the threat of multimillion-dollar lawsuits against the State, for alleged violation of "<em>acquired rights</em>" of holders of concession contracts, can translate into an increase of internal and external pressures on the authorities responsible for ruling on the environmental impact assessments submitted by those concessionaires. The risk of substantial lawsuits against the State for the breach of already signed concession contracts can affect the quality of the decisions adopted by the bodies responsible for resolving on the environmental viability of marina projects, by "<em>contaminating</em>" these decisions with pressures extraneous to the strict technical analysis of the impact of such projects on the environment. The risks of a notable increase in litigation against the State and local governments as a consequence of the norms under consultation not only occur in the realm of domestic jurisdiction; they are also susceptible to increasing claims before international arbitral tribunals filed by foreign investors, based on bilateral investment protection treaties signed by Costa Rica. Several of these treaties establish dispute settlement mechanisms between the Costa Rican State and investors from other parties, to whose jurisdiction our country assumed the obligation to submit when so requested by said investors for considering that actions or decisions of national authorities affect their investments in the country. In the case of these treaties, the norms under consultation facilitate the filing of such international claims against the country, because they unjustifiably facilitate the configuration of the requirements contained in the cited international instruments for the admissibility of disputes. They conclude that the norms under consultation would be expanding the possibilities of constant international lawsuits against the State in the event that SETENA rejects an EIA after the granting of a concession. Secondly, they accuse a violation of the right of citizen participation in the decision of matters related to the environment (Articles 9 and 50 of the Political Constitution). The above, because they affirm that granting concessions for the construction of marinas on public domain assets, prior to the definitive approval of an Environmental Impact Assessment by SETENA, is also a violation of the right to citizen participation of the population that could eventually be affected by said concession. They consider that this situation weakens the right of inhabitants to pronounce themselves and participate, in a timely manner, in the making of decisions that affect the environment and the way of life of their communities, because it displaces its exercise to a stage in which government authorities have already made decisions on a specific permit or concession application and there are acquired rights over the activity that is the subject of controversy. Thirdly, they point out that Transitory Provision II of the consulted project is unconstitutional because it violates the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, by exempting those who have illegally built marinas and tourist docks from the obligation to conduct environmental impact assessments. The norm under consultation refers to the case of illegally built marinas and tourist docks that, at the time of approval of this legal reform, are in operation. That is, marinas and docks that today exploit assets belonging to the Nation (maritime terrestrial zone and territorial sea) contrary to the principles established in current legislation and without having obtained respective permits or concessions to use said public domain assets. In relation to these projects, the cited transitory article establishes that they are granted a period of one year to comply with the law and obtain the respective permits and concessions for their operation. They consider this measure alone to be quite debatable, since the State's obligation is to protect the Nation's own assets and order the immediate eviction of any individual who attempts to appropriate them illegitimately. They deem that the mere inclusion of such a provision in the consulted bill could be incentivizing and promoting the initiation or acceleration of illegal works, under the expectation of those responsible of benefiting from the approval of this transitory article. Finally, they indicate that Transitory Provision IV of the project in question points out that the Environmental Impact Assessment must be carried out, only, for the case of new activities that are not in operation. For this reason, in the case of renewal, assignment or adjudication of rights, or granting of a new concession, for those marinas, tourist docks, or similar projects that are in operation and do not imply modifications, meaning, the construction or execution of new works or activities, they will not be required to conduct an environmental impact assessment. Such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority. However, they indicate that it is known, and numerous studies have proven it, that environmental impact is cumulative, and given that the term of concessions is increased to up to 35 years and can be extended without a new environmental impact study where there are already marina construction plans, this would be proceeding against the intrinsic logic of the precautionary principle (in dubio pro natura) and contrary to the requirements that, for the protection of the Caribbean Sea, the country has the obligation to fulfill according to the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and its Protocol of Cooperation to Combat Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region, Law No. 7227, specifically, in its Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8. If this situation is carefully observed, it can be concluded that 35 years after a marina has started operations, the environmental conditions will have changed, possibly generating new and different risks, compared to the initial conditions. Sound science indicates that there should be environmental controls throughout the entire concession period and that, furthermore, as a requirement for permit renewal, a new environmental impact study should be conducted, even if the marina structure is not modified, since the viability of continuing the operation would be evaluated. All of which, in their view, is violating the precautionary principle in environmental matters.
**3.-** By resolution of 08:45 hrs. on September 19, 2008, the formulated consultation was deemed submitted, therefore the Board of Directors of the Legislative Assembly was requested to remit legislative file No. 14.836, or a certified copy thereof (see sheets 48-50).
**4.-** By resolution of 09:42 hrs. on September 23, 2008, the certified copy of the legislative file was deemed received (see resolution on sheet 55 of the file).
**5.-** Through a brief filed before the Secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at 10:52 hrs. on September 24, 2008, the Regional Director and the Political Advocacy Manager of MarViva requested that their statements regarding the merits of the consulted bill be taken into account (see sheets 56-60).
**6.-** In a memorial received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 07:32 hrs. on September 30, 2008, deputies Ana Helena Chacón, Oscar Núñez Calvo, Gladis González, Yalile Esna, Sandra Quesada, José A. Ocampo, Fernando Sánchez, Jorge Méndez, Lorena Vásquez Badilla, Bienvenido Venegas, Olga Marta Corrales, Salvador Quirós Conejo, Mayi Antillón Guerrero, Francisco Marín Monge, Xinia Nicolás Alvarado, Carlos Gutiérrez, Olivier Jiménez, Andrea Morales, Luis Antonio Barrantes appeared, and in their capacity as "<em>amicus curiae</em>" they refer, extensively, to the questioning by the consulting legislators. They request that this Court endorse the constitutionality of the procedure and the merits of the project, since, in their view, the proceedings have been in accordance with constitutionality in all its aspects (see sheets 62-86).
**7.-** By means of a memorial received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on October 16, 2008, the Comité Unido por Talamanca-Caribe Sur, residents of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca, appeared to file an active joinder action. The above, based on the defense of diffuse interests. They state their opposition to the bill and question that no consultation was carried out with marine-coastal communities about the text in question. They consider that the project intends to restrict the use of the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) and would grant more facilities to business owners in relation to the presentation of requirements to obtain the corresponding concession. They also question the terms for granting concessions (see sheets 87-92).
**8.-** In the processing of this case, the prescriptions of law have been observed.
Drafted by **Magistrate Jinesta Lobo**; and, **CONSIDERING**:
**I.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION.** This facultative consultation of constitutionality was made by thirteen deputies of the Legislative Assembly after the approval in the first debate of the project "<em>Modification of various articles of Law No. 7744, Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas</em>" processed in legislative file No. 14.836. Additionally, it should be noted that the cited bill was consulted before its definitive approval. For the foregoing and in accordance with the provisions of Article 96, subsection b), of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, this legislative consultation of constitutionality is admissible, and we proceed to resolve it.
**II.- ON THE JOINDER ACTION.** Through a memorial visible at sheet 87 and following of the file, the Comité Unido por Talamanca-Caribe Sur filed a joinder action, with the purpose that their statements and disagreements regarding the bill submitted for consultation be taken into consideration. However, said action is inadmissible. Note that active or passive joinder intervention is provided for amparo proceedings in which there are interested third parties and, particularly, for someone who derives a legitimate interest from the final judgment (Article 34 Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) and not for consultation mechanisms in which there may be simple opposing legal opinions about the constitutional regularity of a bill (see Votes Nos. 2003-14606 of 12:30 hrs. on December 12, 2003, and 2004-01603 of 9:30 hrs. on February 17, 2004).
**III.- PURPOSE OF THE CONSULTATION.** The consultation is raised so that this Constitutional Court rules on two alleged essential defects in the processing of the legislative procedure of legislative file No. 14.836, bill "<em>Law for the Simplification of Procedures for the Installation of Marinas and Tourist Docks</em>", as well as some aspects of the merits, related to the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution.
**IV.- ON THE PROCESSING OF LEGISLATIVE FILE No. 14.836**. Before analyzing in detail the points consulted by the legislators, it is pertinent to make a brief account of the vicissitudes of the legislative procedure undergone by legislative file No. 14.836, dealing with the bill named "<em>Modification of various articles of Law No. 7744, Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas</em>":
**CONSULTATION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS** **V.- ON THE FAILURE TO CONSULT THE BILL WITH SEVERAL AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 190 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.** As the first defect in the legislative procedure, the consulting Deputies question whether, in application of articles 170 and 190 of the Political Constitution, there was an unavoidable duty to mandatorily consult the bill with the following institutions: the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT), the Municipalities of the coastal zones, the Port Administration and Development Board of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), the Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports (INCOP), and the Institute for Municipal Development and Advisory (IFAM). The foregoing, given that during the consideration of substantive motions under article 137 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, a total of twenty-nine motions were approved before the Permanent Special Tourism Commission which, in their view, modify substantial aspects of the bill and, therefore, these changes should have been consulted with the indicated institutions. Specifically, they refer to article 2 of the bill, which seeks to reform articles 1, 5, 8, and 9 of Law No. 7744 of December 19, 1997, that is, the Law on the Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas. Now, from a careful reading of the numerals cited *supra*, as well as the consultation raised by the legislators, no relationship with the competencies of the Port Administration and Development Board of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), the Costa Rican Institute of Pacific Ports (INCOP), and the Institute for Municipal Development and Advisory (IFAM) is inferred. Indeed, the legislators completely omitted to establish a link between the competencies of the referenced autonomous institutions and the content of the consulted bill. As things stand, given the noted omission, no substantial modification to the bill that affects the competencies of the cited institutions is observed. Consequently, the appropriate course is to focus on municipal competencies, mainly in relation to the issue of granting concessions, and additionally, the competencies of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, concerning concessions in the Gulf of Papagayo area. As the consulting legislators point out, article 190 of the Political Constitution provides that for the discussion and approval of bills relating to an autonomous institution, the Legislative Assembly shall hear, previously, the opinion of that institution.
In the specific case and after examining the legislative *iter*, it is possible to corroborate that, in general terms—and except for what will be said in relation to Article 9 of the law being reformed—, the cited institutions, namely, the coastal municipalities and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, have been widely consulted regarding the texts that have served as discussion within the Legislative Assembly, concerning the approval of a reform to the Law on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas, Law No. 7744 of February 6, 1998. Indeed, it should be noted that the first text submitted for discussion was consulted with all the coastal municipalities, as well as with the Interinstitutional Commission on Tourist Marinas and Docks (CIMAT), as a body of maximum deconcentration, attached to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, through official letters dated **October 30, 2002** (see folios 77-113 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume I). Subsequently, in the session of **March 3, 2005**, a motion was approved in the Special Tourism Commission to adopt a substitute text, which was also submitted for consultation to the coastal municipalities and CIMAT. The foregoing was done through official letters dated **March 3, 2005** (see folios 596-632 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume II). Finally, we have that on **March 8, 2007**, a motion was approved in the Permanent Special Tourism Commission to adopt a substitute text and use it as the base document for discussion. Said Commission additionally approved a motion for the bill to be consulted with various institutions, among them, the municipalities of the entire country, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, and the Interinstitutional Commission on Tourist Marinas and Docks, which was carried out through official letters dated **March 14, 2007** (see folios 1511-1550 of the copy of the legislative file). Now, the consulting legislators consider it unconstitutional that, from this moment on, no new consultations were carried out, despite the fact that, in their opinion, substantial modifications were approved to the analyzed bill. It should be emphasized that, according to what has been the jurisprudential line of this Constitutional Court, Article 190 of the Political Constitution does not imply that every bill or any modification introduced to the text, through the exercise of the right of amendment, must be consulted with the autonomous institution in question, but only those aspects related to its constitution or organic structure, or those relative to the essential scope of the powers of the involved institutions. On this matter, in ruling No. 2008-004569 of 2:30 p.m. on March 26, 2008, this Constitutional Court, with the writing of the reporting Magistrate, considered the following:
“(...) It should be noted that since Ruling No. 1633-93 of 2:33 p.m. on April 13, 1993, this Constitutional Court has repeatedly indicated (see, among others, Rulings Nos. 3625-1996 of 3:18 p.m. on July 16, 1996, 4717-1997 of 4:39 p.m. on August 19, 1997, 9137-2001 of 2:48 p.m. on September 12, 2001), that any bill is susceptible to being modified during the parliamentary *iter*, via the legislators' right of amendment, as long as the essential or material content is not altered, in which case the constitutional norms that regulate initiative in the formation of the law, publicity, and, of course, the substantial procedure of consultation with autonomous institutions under Article 190 of the Constitution, will be considered infringed (...)”
Under this approach, it would remain to analyze whether the introduced modifications affect the jurisdictional or organic framework of the indicated institutions, to the point that they would warrant a new consultation. The foregoing is based on the observations raised by the consulting legislators themselves (see folios 5-10 of the file):
**1)** In the first place, the deputies who signed the consultation consider that the motion introduced in Article 1 of the regulation being reformed relates to the powers of the municipalities and the Costa Rican Tourism Institute concerning the granting of concessions for the construction, administration, and exploitation of tourist marinas and docks, “*which could lead to a collision of powers that should have been consulted with both the respective municipalities and the ICT itself*”. The text in question states the following:
“**Article 1.- Concession** (...) The municipality of the place shall be the competent authority to grant the concession. (...) ***As for concessions requested within the Golfo de Papagayo Tourist Project, the competent authority to grant them shall be the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT), in accordance with the Law regulating the development and execution of the Golfo de Papagayo Tourist Project, No. 6758, of June 4, 1982***. (...)” (The highlighted portion corresponds to the approved motion).
From the analysis of the transcribed text, as well as the current regulation, it is clear that the powers of the involved institutions are not being substantially modified. It is evident that the municipalities are responsible for granting the respective concessions for the construction, administration, and exploitation of tourist marinas and docks. In fact, the current and effective regulation provides in Article 1, the following:
“**ARTICLE 1.- Authorization** Concessions may be granted in the areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone and the adjacent area permanently covered by the sea, in accordance with the provisions of this law; with the exception of mangrove areas, national parks, and biological reserves for the building, administration, and exploitation of tourist marinas and docks. ***The municipality of the place shall be the competent authority to grant the concession***. In the event of an express request from the respective municipality to state institutions, these must provide technical advice. The respective institutions of the Costa Rican State shall be responsible, within their scope of competence, for periodically supervising and overseeing the operation and functioning of tourist marinas and docks. The concession shall be granted while protecting the environment and the natural resources of the area.” Now, regarding the powers of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, we have that Law No. 6758, of June 25, 1982, which Regulates the Execution of the Papagayo Tourist Project, provides, as relevant, the following:
“**Article 9.-** To execute and develop the project, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute shall create an executing office that shall have, exclusively, ***the powers to direct, coordinate, administer, and control the development to which this law refers***. This office shall be attached to the Institute, depending directly on its Board of Directors.” “**Article 12.-** The Board of Directors of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute ***may grant concessions for the use of the project's lands in the zone designated for it***, in accordance with the terms and conditions that the Institute establishes for this purpose, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 107 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic”. (The highlighted portion does not correspond to the original).
In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that by legal provision, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute is responsible for directing, coordinating, administering, and controlling the tourist development carried out in the Papagayo Tourist Project and, for this purpose, it is responsible for granting the corresponding tourist concessions, including, of course, those for the construction and administration of tourist marinas. On this point, in Session No. 34 of the Legislative Plenary on **July 9, 2007**, legislator Vásquez Badilla introduced Motion No. 55 which proposed the questioned text (see folio 1803 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume VII). In the corresponding discussion, the proposing deputy stated the following:
“(...) It seems to me that this project contemplates a problem that this Commission must correct, and that is when it speaks of the competent authority to grant the concession, because it indicates that it is the municipality of the respective place. (...) However, here there is an issue which is that of the Papagayo tourist project which, effectively, has a specific Law and where it is not the Municipality of Carrillo, for example, that grants those concessions in that area. I believe it is important to clarify the incorporation of the last paragraph, regarding the concessions requested in the Golfo de Papagayo tourist project, since there is a gap at this time, in my opinion, because the competent authority, in this case, is not the Municipality but the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, according to Law No. 6758 of May 6, 1982. (...)”
A motion that, finally, was approved unanimously in Session No. 7 of the Permanent Special Tourism Commission, held on **July 18, 2007** (see folios 1967-1968 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume VII). In accordance with the above, it is reiterated that it is evident that a new consultation, whether to the Municipality of Carrillo or to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, is not necessary, since it is clear that the competence for granting the concessions awarded within the Papagayo Tourist Project is held, by special law, by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute. Thus, it is apparent that their essential powers are not being modified, but rather that the respective clarification is being made in application of the special legislation established for the Papagayo Tourist Zone. Consequently, regarding this point, a defect of unconstitutionality that invalidates the legislative procedure is not substantiated.
**2)** In the second place, the consulting legislators refer to the modifications made to Article 5 of the law being reformed and highlight the following phrase “*The technical viability favorable to the preliminary project shall empower the interested party to continue with the concession application procedure before the municipality*”. However, from the analysis of its content, it is clear that said provision was already included in the substitute text that was submitted for consultation in **March 2007** to the coastal municipalities (see folios 1410 and 1587 of the copy of the legislative file). Secondly, in the same article, they question the approval of the following motion:
“*The appeal must be filed before the head of the ICT. The decision by said entity shall exhaust the administrative avenue, which does not constitute an impediment to resorting to the jurisdictional avenue.*” The legislators question that in the substitute text approved before the Permanent Special Commission in **March 2007**, the power to exhaust the administrative avenue was conferred upon CIMAT. However, in the current regulation, said power is held by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, as it is contemplated in Article 7 of Law No. 7744 on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas, which provides as relevant, the following:
“(...) Appeals for reversal and appeal may be filed against the Commission's resolutions, under the terms and conditions established in the General Public Administration Law. ***The appeal must be filed before the head of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute.*** ***In this last resolution, the administrative avenue shall be considered exhausted for the purposes of contentious-administrative action***, in the terms and effects indicated by the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction.” (The highlighted portion does not correspond to the original).
Thus, it was not essential to grant a new hearing to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute if the current regulation confers upon it, just like the effective text, the power to resolve the appeals filed against the decisions of the Interinstitutional Commission on Tourist Marinas and Docks and, therefore, to exhaust the administrative avenue in the matter. Consequently, since the powers of the ICT are not modified, it was not necessary to carry out a new consultation since it is evident that the aim is to maintain the regulation in accordance with the current situation.
**3)** In the third place, the legislators formulating the consultation allege that Article 8 affects municipal powers by providing the following: “*From the notification of the administrative resolution on the favorable technical viability from CIMAT, the interested party may go to the municipality, in order to process the obtention of the concession contract to develop a tourist marina or dock, according to the requirements of this Law*.” However, on this point, no procedural defect is observed, given that said provision was foreseen in the March 2007 substitute text that was submitted for consultation to the municipalities (see folios 1412 and 1589 of the copy of the legislative file). Likewise, the legislators highlight the following phrase from the bill: “*Written request before the respective municipality, accompanied by a certified copy of the administrative file processed before CIMAT, with the certified copy of the preliminary project plans. The cost of the copy shall be borne by the interested party*.” Requirements that, equally, were foreseen in the substitute text that was sent for consultation to the involved institutions (folios 1412 and 1589 of the copy of the legislative file). In any case, no substantial modification of the municipalities' powers in relation to granting concessions for the construction and administration of tourist marinas is substantiated. Consequently, regarding these points, the need to carry out a new consultation is not demonstrated in light of the provisions of Article 190 of the Constitution.
"(...) Municipalities may provide facilities for the granting of the licenses required for the proper operation of the marina projects that are granted under concession and, consequently, of the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law."
Legislator Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, on November 13, 2007, that is, after the last consultation made to the coastal municipalities, introduced the text of this motion, which was approved within the Special Permanent Commission on Tourism on June 17, 2008 (see folios 2353-2360 of the copy of the legislative file, Volume IX). To analyze this aspect of the inquiry, it is necessary, beforehand, to define the contours of municipal autonomy, enshrined in Article 170 of the Political Constitution by providing that "Municipal corporations are autonomous." On this matter, in judgment No. 5445-1999 of 2:30 p.m. on July 14, 1999, this Constitutional Court developed the aspects that make up the autonomy recognized to municipal corporations:
"(...) III.- GENERAL CONCEPTS ON THE MUNICIPAL REGIME. In Costa Rica, the municipal regime is a modality of territorial decentralization, as can be inferred from the first paragraph of Article 168 of the constitution. It is defined, mainly, in Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution which state, as relevant, that the 'administration of local interests and services shall be in charge of the Municipal Government formed by a deliberative body of popular election and an executive official designated by law' (today the Municipal Mayor); it is a 'corporate system that enjoys autonomy and its own economic resources (budgetary competence)'. From this enunciation of the main legal features of the municipal institution, it is absolutely clear that certain elements are derived, namely: the existence of a territorial jurisdiction to attend to the interests and services of the local level; the constitution of a population rooted in neighborhood ties, so that every inhabitant of the Canton (cantón) is a resident (munícipe); the government formed by two differentiated organs (Council and Mayor) with defined functions and relations between them; the corporate nature of the institution; constitutional guarantee of independence (autonomy); and the subject matter of its administration, which is formed by everything that is or constitutes a 'local interest and service'. From a political point of view, municipalities are representative governments with competence over a specific territory (canton), with their own legal personality and public powers over their residents (inhabitants of the canton); they operate in a decentralized manner in relation to the Government of the Republic, and enjoy constitutionally guaranteed and reinforced autonomy that is manifested in political matters, by determining their own goals and the normative and administrative means in fulfillment of all types of public service for the satisfaction of the common good in their community. It can be said, in summary, that municipalities or local governments are territorial entities of a corporate and public non-state nature, endowed with independence in matters of government and operation, which means, for example, that municipal autonomy involves tax aspects, which for their validity require legislative authorization, the contracting of loans, and the preparation and disposition of their own income and expenses, with generic powers. All of this necessarily implies that, in order to correctly define the configuration of the Costa Rican State, there must be an exact assembly in the sum of the Municipal Governments as a whole and individually, in order for the relations and coordinated functioning with the Government of the Republic to avoid the simultaneous coexistence of spheres of power of different origin and essence, the duplication of national and local efforts, and the confusion of rights and obligations among the various parties involved. What has been expressed leads, consequently, to the need to define, from the constitutional perspective, what the municipal scope is, which will be done in the following considerandos, to examine, subsequently and against the general framework of the local, the scope and compatibility of the norms that have been challenged.
IV.- MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY. GENERALITIES. Grammatically, it is usual to say that the term 'autonomy' can be defined as 'the power that, within the State, municipalities, provinces, regions, or other entities thereof may enjoy, to govern peculiar interests of their internal life, through their own norms and government organs'. From a legal-doctrinal point of view, this autonomy must be understood as the capacity that Municipalities have to freely decide and under their own responsibility, everything referring to the organization of a specific locality (the canton, in our case). Thus, a sector of the doctrine has said that this autonomy implies the free election of their own authorities; free management in the matters of their competence; the creation, collection, and investment of their own income; and specifically, it refers to encompassing political, normative, tax, and administrative autonomy, defining them, in very general terms, as follows: political autonomy: as that which gives rise to self-government, which entails the election of its authorities through democratic and representative mechanisms, as indicated by our Political Constitution in its Article 169; normative autonomy: by virtue of which municipalities have the power to issue their own regulations in the matters of their competence, a power that in our country refers only to the regulatory power that internally regulates the organization of the corporation and the services it provides (autonomous organization and service regulations); tax autonomy: also known as tax power, and refers to the fact that the initiative for the creation, modification, extinction, or exemption of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, a power subject to the approval indicated in Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution when applicable; and administrative autonomy: as the power that implies not only self-regulation, but also self-administration and, therefore, freedom from the State for the adoption of the fundamental decisions of the entity. Our doctrine, for its part, has said that the Political Constitution (Article 170) and the Municipal Code (Article 7 of the previous Municipal Code, and 4 of the current one) have not limited themselves to attributing to municipalities the capacity to manage and promote local interests and services, but have expressly provided that such municipal management is and must be autonomous, which is defined as freedom from the other entities of the State for the adoption of their fundamental decisions. This autonomy is given in direct relation to the electoral and representative character of its Government (Council and Mayor) that are elected every four years, and means the capacity of the municipality to set its action and investment policies independently, and more specifically, against the Executive Branch and the governing party. It is the capacity for setting plans and programs of the local government, for which reason it is linked to the power of the municipality to issue its own budget, an expression of the policies previously defined by the Council, a capacity that, in turn, is political. This position coincides with the majority of the doctrine, in which it has been said that the typical rank of local autonomy resides in the fact that the fundamental organ of the territorial entity is the people as an electoral body and that, consequently, its political-administrative orientation derives not from the State, but from the community itself, that is, from the electoral majority of that same community, with the consequence that such political orientation can diverge from that of the Government of the Republic and even contradict it, where there is no correspondence of majorities between the state community and the local one; or that political autonomy is a legal position, which is expressed in the power to conduct its own political line understood as the possibility, in order to a certain sphere of interests and competences, to establish its own line of action or its own program, with its own powers and its own responsibility regarding the timeliness and utility of its acts. (...)" (The highlighted text does not correspond to the original).
From the foregoing, it is inferred that municipalities are territorial entities that have administrative and political or governmental autonomy, which translates into the power to define the goals and guidelines of the institution and the means to fulfill them. Additionally, it should be noted that everything referring to the granting of licenses for the exercise of commerce in its most varied range of activities, and its natural consequence which is to collect the so-called patent tax (impuesto de patente), has been classified as an exclusively municipal matter. Thus, for example, in judgment No. 6469-1997 of 4:20 p.m. on October 8, 1997, this Constitutional Court highlighted that everything concerning licenses for the exercise of lucrative activities will always be municipal competence because it integrates the generic concept of "the local," enshrined in Article 169 of the Political Constitution. In said resolution, the position of this Chamber was summarized, stating the following:
"(...) Recapitulating what has been expressed in this judgment, everything concerning the granting of licenses (patentes, as they are commonly called) for the sale of liquor is a municipal matter; consequently, for a premises to open its doors and dedicate itself to such activity, it is sufficient that it possesses the respective 'patente' and complies with the formal requirements established by law, always within the local scope and eventually, of the executive or municipal service regulations, when applicable. It is expressly prohibited by the Political Constitution for governors - the articulation of numerals 169 and 170 - to intervene in the processes of granting licenses or so-called operating permits, which is not possible without harming municipal autonomy. (...)"
Consequently, the granting of municipal licenses for the exercise of any lucrative activity, provided for in Article 79 of the Municipal Code, is an essential and typical competence of municipalities, as it integrates the indeterminate legal concept of administration of local interests and services of Article 169 of the constitution. Based on the foregoing, the State cannot, through a guideline or legislative directive such as the one contemplated in the analyzed numeral, affect municipal autonomy. By virtue of the foregoing, prior to the imposition of a legislative directive related to the issue of managing municipal licenses and patents, the legislators should have gathered the opinion of the municipal corporations involved, because, otherwise, their autonomy, recognized constitutionally, would be disregarded. In summary, although the legislative proposal that seeks to modify Article 9 of the current legislation is drafted in facultative or permissive terms, the fact is that it supposes a legislative directive regarding two aspects that, classically, constitute a fundamental part of local competences, such as the issue of patents in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) that must be administered by the town councils. In any case, the proposed legislative directive, despite its facultative nature, touches upon aspects inherent to local autonomy such as the management of human, material, and financial resources for a streamlining or flexibilization in the granting of the patents required by the marinas under concession, a point on which the inquiry is required not only for strictly formal reasons, but to ensure the technical correctness of the legislation that may be enacted. As a conclusion of the foregoing, regarding this aspect of the inquiry, an essential defect that violated the constitutionality of the legislative procedure is indeed accredited. The foregoing, inasmuch as it was demonstrated that through an approved motion, in accordance with the procedure of Article 137 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, a substantial modification was introduced to the bill that was not consulted with the municipal corporations.
VI.- ON THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLICITY IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE. In the second term, the legislators state that just as the substantial changes the bill underwent were not consulted, the new text was not published in the official gazette La Gaceta, thereby violating the principle of publicity. They observe that the last modifications the project underwent were made between June 6, 2007, and June 25, 2008, during the proceeding for considering substantive motions, regulated by Article 137 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly. On this matter, it is observed that the legislators raise the inquiry in the abstract without specifying for this Constitutional Court what the alleged substantial modifications introduced in the proceeding for considering substantive motions are that, in their opinion, warranted a new publication in the official gazette La Gaceta. Under such a panorama, it is worth reiterating concerning this point that, in application of Article 99 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, there is reiterated jurisprudence of this Court to the effect that this body rules on what is expressly consulted and reasoned, but not in the abstract (see judgments Nos. 5399-1995 of 3:54 p.m. on October 3, 1995, 9530-1999 of 9:15 a.m. on December 3, 1999, 2001-12420 of 9:21 a.m. on December 7, 2001, and 2004-07242 of 5:03 p.m. on June 30, 2004, among others). Despite said omission and on the occasion of what was analyzed in the preceding considerando, this Court deems that a substantial modification was indeed introduced to the bill under inquiry, which required a new publication in order to give greater publicity to the text. Indeed, as pointed out, it was accredited that through the approval of a substantive motion, the text of the bill was modified in order to impose on the municipalities a guideline to provide the corresponding facilities for granting the patents required for the proper operation of the marina projects that are granted under concession. The foregoing, without first having heard their opinion on the matter, as required by Article 190 of the Political Constitution. Additionally, it is accredited that a new publication in the official gazette La Gaceta was not made, violating the principle of publicity in the processing of the legislative procedure, an essential defect that, being intrinsically related to the democratic principle, affected the constitutional regularity of the parliamentary iter. Note that an essential element in the law-making procedure is that of publicity, insofar as it seeks to guarantee a broad debate that facilitates contact with public opinion in general and, in particular, with those who might have an interest, due to their activities, in knowing about and even participating in the deliberation of the matter or, even, the possibility of hearing public entities, in this case, the municipalities, on whom a legislative directive related to their exclusive competences is being imposed. Furthermore, this Court has indicated that the publicity of parliamentary procedures is essential due to the representative character of the national community that the Legislative Assembly holds, given that sovereignty resides in the people and the deputies are only their representatives, as provided by Article 105 of the Political Constitution. In the case under examination, it is accredited that the bill "Modification of several articles of Law No. 7744, Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas" that is submitted to the inquiry of this Court, was duly published in La Gaceta No. 190 of October 3, 2002. It should be taken into consideration, regarding this matter, that this reform proposal was presented before the Secretariat of the Directory of the Legislative Assembly on July 29, 2002. However, and despite the approval of motion No. 12-04 (33-137) heard in extraordinary session No. 4 of the Special Permanent Commission on Tourism on June 17, 2008, the bill was not published again in the official gazette. The foregoing, despite the fact that, as noted supra, a substantial modification was introduced to the bill that seeks to establish directives in relation to the most essential competences of the municipal corporations. Consequently, the omission of a new publication of the bill, in order to guarantee the publicity of the text, as well as to procure citizen and institutional participation, violated an essential aspect of the parliamentary procedure, whose omission carries an unconstitutionality defect over the legislative procedure.
REVIEW ON THE MERITS VII.- ON THE LACK OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO THE GRANTING OF THE CONCESSION. INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. The inquiring deputies question that through the reform intended to be approved within the Legislative Assembly, it is sought to repeal and, therefore, disregard the requirement of an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) approved by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA) prior to the granting of the concession for the construction of a marina or tourist dock. They argue that this requirement is currently contemplated in Article 8, subsection f), of Law No. 7744 of December 19, 1997, on "Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas." However, it is sought to reform said article and, instead, Article 9 bis establishes that approval by SETENA of an EIA will be a requirement subsequent to the granting of the respective concession to build and operate tourist marinas. They cite Article 8 of the bill under inquiry, which provides that for the processing of the concession contract, the submission of a certification issued by SETENA is required, informing about the current status of the EIA. That is to say, it is not required to have an assessment to process a public domain (demanial) concession, but rather only to report on the status of the proceeding. Furthermore, they insist that to initiate the procedure, only the submission of a Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP) managed through an Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial) is contemplated, which is characterized by being a preliminary study that lacks depth. The inquiring deputies consider that this provision contravenes the principles of environmental protection, mainly, the precautionary principle. On the other hand, they consider that the consulted norms unnecessarily increase the risk of presentation of claims and litigation against the Costa Rican State and, additionally, favor the exercise of pressures so that the competent authorities endorse environmentally questioned projects. They insist that with the reforms consulted, those interested in building marinas or tourist docks will hold the title of concessionaires when SETENA rules on the environmental impact assessments. In such a case, if the endorsement is not obtained, the municipalities must annul the acts of granting the concessions, in which case, the concessionaires could allege infringement of acquired rights or contractual breaches and file million-dollar claims. Coupled with the foregoing, they consider that one must take into account the claims before international arbitral tribunals presented by foreign investors, such as, for example, the "Investor-State" dispute resolution mechanism contained in Chapter 10 of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic.
Having reviewed the grievances presented by the consulting legislators, this section of the consultation is divided into the analysis of two points: one related to environmental protection, and secondly, the provision that exempts the State's liability is analyzed as a mechanism to evade lawsuits for the denial of the environmental impact study once the corresponding concession has been granted.
**1) ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT EVALUATION AS A PREREQUISITE TO THE GRANTING OF A CONCESSION**. The legislators question that the bill submitted for consultation intends to circumvent the requirement of the environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) approved by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA), prior to the competent municipality granting the concession for the construction and administration of a marina or a tourist dock. Before analyzing the procedure provided for in the bill, it is necessary to refer to the purposes and scope of environmental evaluation studies as mechanisms to prevent serious damage to the environment. This Constitutional Court, in extensive jurisprudence, has reiterated that such preventive evaluations are an unavoidable requirement for guaranteeing the environment, in concordant application of Articles 21, 50, and 89 of the Political Constitution. Note that, specifically, Article 50 of the Fundamental Norm provides that the State is responsible for guaranteeing, defending, and preserving the right of every human being to “*a healthy and ecologically balanced environment*.” Even prior to the constitutional reform of Article 50, this Court highlighted the requirement of environmental evaluation studies, conceived as technical studies on environmental matters, prior to the granting of rights in activities that could potentially harm the environment. Thus, in ruling No. 6240-1993 of 2:00 p.m. on November 26, 1993, this Court emphasized the precept enshrined in Article 89 of the Constitution, which provides the following:
“*Among the cultural goals of the Republic are: to protect natural beauties, to conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation, and to support private initiative for scientific and artistic progress.*” The Chamber affirmed that from the right to life and the State's obligation to “*protect natural beauties*” contained in Articles 21 and 89 of the Constitution, other rights of mandatory protection and equal rank arise, such as health and the right to a healthy environment, in the absence of which the exercise of the former would not be possible, or their enjoyment would be severely limited. Likewise, the Chamber harmonized a series of international treaties and conventions of mandatory observance in our territory to, finally, conclude in the *supra* cited vote that the provision in the then Article 41, second paragraph, of the Hydrocarbons Law bill, was unconstitutional. The foregoing, because it inverted the natural order of the procedure and granted the concession prior to conducting the corresponding environmental studies, concluding the following:
“*(...) Consequently, the provision of Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Bill that requires environmental impact studies after the exploration or exploitation concession is approved, especially in the case of private parties, is contrary to the purposes, objectives, and constitutional obligations in environmental matters, insofar as the contract, once signed, creates rights in favor of the interested party. Therefore, the Chamber considers that Article 41, paragraph 2 is unconstitutional in this aspect. (...)*” In the international context, we find that the obligation of environmental impact assessment (estudios de evaluación de impacto ambiental) is expressly enshrined in Principle No. 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, signed by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992:
“***PRINCIPLE 17** *Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.*” Earlier, in June 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment highlighted in the Stockholm Declaration the need to promote rational and planned development in accordance with environmental protection, “***Principle 2** The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate. (...) **Principle 17** Appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of planning, managing or controlling the environmental resources of States with the view to enhancing environmental quality.*" Indeed, and regarding the subject of this consultation, said Declaration called the attention of States to take "*all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea*". Additionally, the World Charter for Nature approved by the United Nations in 1982 highlights that activities which might pose serious dangers to nature shall be preceded by a thorough examination, indicating, as relevant, the following:
“*(...) 11. Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled, and the best available techniques that minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse effects shall be used; in particular: (a) Activities which may cause irreversible damage to nature shall be avoided; (b) Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature. Where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, such activities should not proceed; (c) Activities which may disturb nature shall be preceded by an assessment of their consequences, and environmental impact studies of development projects shall be conducted sufficiently in advance; if they are to be undertaken, such activities shall be planned and carried out so as to minimize potential adverse effects; (...)*” Additionally, we find that the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity provided the following:
“*Article 14. Impact Assessment and Minimizing Adverse Impacts 1. Each Contracting Party, as far as possible and as appropriate: (a) **Shall introduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects and, when appropriate, allow for public participation in such procedures**. (b) Shall introduce appropriate arrangements to ensure that the environmental consequences of its programmes and policies that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on biological diversity are duly taken into account; (...)*” (The highlighting is not from the original).
It being understood in said declaration that biological diversity refers to the variability among living organisms from all sources, including, *inter alia*, terrestrial, marine, and other ecosystems. In other latitudes, for example, at the European level, the Council of the European Communities in June 1985 issued Directive No. 85/337/EEC, on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, in which States are urged to incorporate the environmental evaluation study as a prerequisite for their authorization and provides which factors should be taken into consideration in its analysis, as follows:
“***Article 2** 1. Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment of their effects. (...) 2. The assessment of environmental effects may be integrated into the existing procedures for consent to projects in the Member States, or, failing this, into other procedures or into the procedures to be established to comply with the aims of this Directive.* ***Article 3** The environmental impact assessment will identify, describe and assess in an appropriate manner, in the light of each individual case and in accordance with Articles 4 to 11, the direct and indirect effects of a project on the following factors:- human beings, fauna and flora, - soil, water, air, climate and the landscape, - the inter-action between the factors mentioned in the first and second indents, - material assets and the cultural heritage.*” Similar provisions were adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which promoted the conclusion of a Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, signed in Espoo, Finland, on February 25, 1991. At the national legislative level and as a development of the precept enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, we find Article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment, which provides the following:
“***Article 17.- Environmental Impact Assessment** Human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials, will require an environmental impact assessment by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat created in this law. Its prior approval by this body will be an indispensable requirement to start the activities, works or projects. Laws and regulations will indicate which activities, works or projects will require the environmental impact assessment.*” Likewise, Law No. 7788 on Biodiversity of April 30, 1998, in Articles 92 to 97, requires the submission of an environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental) when the execution of certain projects may compromise the biodiversity of the area in which it is intended to be carried out, which must be approved under the terms provided by the Organic Law of the Environment. Said regulation defines what should be understood by Environmental Impact Assessment in Article 7, indicating the following:
“***Article 7.- Definitions** This law shall be interpreted in accordance with the following definitions (...) 18.- Environmental Impact Assessment: A scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting the effects that a specific action or project will have on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to lead to decision-making. It includes the specific effects, their global evaluation, the alternatives of greatest environmental benefit, a program for control and minimization of negative effects, a monitoring program, a recovery program, as well as the guarantee of environmental compliance. (...)*” Similar definitions are also found in Article 3 of Law No. 7593, Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services of August 1996, and in Article 2 of Law No. 8436 on Fishing and Aquaculture of March 2005, concluding that the environmental impact assessment is a prior technical study conducted by professionals and technicians whose purpose is to identify and predict the potential effects that a specific project will produce on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to determine the corresponding mitigation measures, as well as for the competent authority to grant or deny its authorization. It seeks to identify the risk elements of a project, either to eliminate them, reduce their incidence, or, if applicable, recommend desisting from the action.
By virtue of the foregoing, the prior EIA constitutes the appropriate technical instrument to fulfill the preventive and precautionary principles that govern environmental matters, and this Constitutional Court has come to hold that dispensing with it implies omitting the due prevention when dealing with human intervention in the environment. Regarding the precautionary principle, this Constitutional Court, in judgment No. 2004-1923 of 14:55 hrs. on February 25, 2004, authored by the Presiding Magistrate, ordered the following:
"(...) XV.- PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PROTECTION OF GROUNDWATER. One of the guiding principles of Environmental Law is the precautionary principle or principle of prudent avoidance. This principle is enshrined in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, or Rio Declaration, which literally states 'Principle 15.- In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.' In the domestic legal system, the Biodiversity Law (No. 7788 of April 30, 1998), in its article 11, incorporates the following principles as hermeneutical parameters: '1.- Preventive criterion: It is recognized that it is vitally important to anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of biodiversity loss or its threats. 2.- Precautionary criterion or in dubio pro natura: When there is danger or threat of serious or imminent damage to the elements of biodiversity and the knowledge associated with them, the absence of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective protection measures.' In Ruling of this Chamber No. 1250-99 of 11:24 hrs. on February 19, 1999 (reiterated in Rulings Nos. 9773-00 of 9:44 hrs. on November 3, 2000, 1711-01 of 16:32 hrs. on February 27, 2001, and 6322-03 of 14:14 hrs. on July 3, 2003), this Court considered the following: '(...) Prevention seeks to anticipate negative effects and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or people's health. Thus, if there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage—or any doubt in this regard—a precautionary measure must be adopted, and even the activity in question must be postponed. The foregoing is because, in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, since if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance, but it will hardly compensate for the damage caused to the environment.' Subsequently, in Ruling No. 3480-03 of 14:02 hrs. on May 2, 2003, this Court indicated that 'Properly understood, the precautionary principle refers to the adoption of measures not in the face of ignorance of risk-generating facts, but in the face of a lack of certainty that such facts will indeed produce harmful effects on the environment.' (...)"
The jurisprudence rendered by this Constitutional Court has linked the duty imposed in article 50 of the Political Constitution with the precautionary and preventive principles and the obligation of environmental assessments as a prerequisite to any activity that may negatively affect the environment. It is necessary to cite, on this point, judgment No. 6322-2003 of 14:14 hrs. on July 3, 2003, in which this Chamber categorically developed a series of constitutional principles related to the state's duty to defend the environment in a timely manner and linked the duty to conduct environmental impact assessments with the precautionary and preventive principles, by stating the following:
"(...) 4.- Precautionary principle: One of the essential principles that comprise environmental law is the 'precautionary principle' or 'principle of prudent avoidance,' which is contained in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration, (...)
The term prevention derives from the Latin ‘praeventio,’ which refers to the action and effect of preventing, to those preparations and arrangements made in advance to avoid a risk or execute something. Prevention seeks to anticipate negative effects and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or people's health. Thus, if there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage—or any doubt in this regard—a precautionary measure must be adopted, and even the activity in question must be postponed. The foregoing is because, in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, since if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance, but it will hardly compensate for the damage caused to the environment.
5.- on conducting the environmental impact assessment prior to the start of works: It is based on the principle that environmental standards must have a technical basis, because their application must stem from limits that determine the conditions under which the use and exploitation of natural resources must be subjected. This is so because, since environmental damage and contamination are assessable—such as the presence of toxic substances or external elements that cause negative characteristics in the environment, both for biological diversity—including flora and fauna—as well as—and especially—for human life, which is reflected in man's health or well-being—soil, habitat, air, water, etc.—, the impact of these elements requires a scientific evaluation and treatment. Therefore, this principle (of conducting the environmental impact assessment beforehand) is a corollary of the previous principle, and its completion is especially important for all '[...] human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate toxic or hazardous waste materials will require an environmental impact assessment by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat created in this Law. Its prior approval by this body will be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works, or projects.' (Article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment, number 7554, of September 18, 1995). Thus, the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment obliges the State to take preventive measures to avoid its impact; and among the main measures provided by the legislator in this regard are the Environmental Impact Assessments, which are based on the provisions of the aforementioned Article 17 of the Organic Law of the (sic) Environment. To this end, it is important to highlight that by virtue of a constitutional mandate –Article 50–, and in the Law –Article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment–, it is established as a general principle that all human activity that modifies the environment will require an environmental impact assessment, from which it will be the condition of the project or work that will determine, in each case, whether or not the referred technical study is required, and not the establishment of arbitrary conditions, whether administrative or regulatory (as indicated by this Court, in judgment number 1220-2002, of fourteen hours forty-eight minutes on February 6, 2002).
It is in accordance with this provision that constitutional jurisprudence has recently required this prior technical study for the execution of any project that may affect the environment, as a guarantee to enforce the right to the environment, and by way of example, it has been required in the following activities, with the warning that this can in no way imply a closed list (numerus clausus): felling of trees in a wildlife refuge (judgment number 1888-95, cited above), location of a 'waste transfer center' (judgment number 2671-95, of sixteen hours forty-five minutes on May 24, 1995), decision to determine the closure or continued operation of the 'Río Azul landfill' (judgment number 1154-96, of sixteen hours on March 6, 1996), reduction of the area of a protected zone (judgment number 7294-98, of sixteen hours fifteen minutes on October 13, 1998), treatment of orange peels in plantations (judgment 1999-2219, of fifteen hours eighteen minutes on March 24, 1999), urban planning and approval of developments (judgments number 2001-3694, of sixteen hours twenty-six minutes on May 15, 2001, and number 2002-1220, of fourteen hours forty-eight minutes on February 6, 2002), construction of hydroelectric plants (judgment number 2000-10466, of ten hours seventeen minutes on November 24, 2000), construction of dikes in rivers (judgment number 2001-6503, of nine hours twenty-six minutes on July 6, 2001), construction and operation of manual sanitary landfills (judgments number 2002-5977 and 2002-6782), keeping of nurseries and planting of ferns (judgments number 2000-9735 and 2001-3840); with which, it can well be said that conducting this technical study constitutes a principle of constitutional order, and consequently, of mandatory compliance, both for private individuals, and with greater reason, for State institutions; as previously considered by this Court:
'III.- Obligation of State institutions to comply with environmental legislation in their ordinary activity: The third paragraph of Constitutional provision 50 clearly indicates that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve the right of every person to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment; which implies affirming that public entities are not only obliged to enforce—on private individuals and other public entities—environmental legislation, but also, above all, that they must adjust their actions to the dictates of those protective regulatory bodies. State institutions are the first ones called upon to comply with environmental protective legislation, without any justification to exempt them from compliance with environmental requirements such as, for example, the environmental impact assessment required by the Organic Law of the Environment for activities undertaken by public entities that, by their nature, may alter or destroy the environment.' (judgment number 2001-6503, cited above).
The legislator entrusted to the 'National Environmental Technical Secretariat' the assessments to be carried out by 'an interdisciplinary team of professionals, registered and authorized by the Secretariat... in accordance with the guidelines developed by it. The cost of the environmental impact assessments shall be borne by the interested party'. Article 19 of the Organic Law of the Environment establishes that 'the resolutions of the Environmental Technical Secretariat must be substantiated and reasoned', thereby incorporating in this matter the general principle of substantiation of administrative acts also developed by the General Law of Public Administration, which is in turn a guarantee that integrates substantive due process. The approval of an environmental impact assessment requires, in accordance with the international commitments acquired by Costa Rica and entrusted to SETENA, a detailed analysis that includes, as required by Article 24 of the Environment Law, the technical criteria and the weighting percentages that make the study's approval possible. Furthermore, it must respond to the norms, the planning objectives, and environmental priorities of the national State and the local government, as enshrined in Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration. The damage that can be caused to the environment is always difficult or impossible to repair, and the approval of an environmental impact assessment requires total certainty of minimal impact on natural resources, as imposed by its own force by Article 50 of the Political Constitution. In any case, it should be noted that the completion and approval of the environmental impact assessment does not in itself imply the implementation of the project in question, as it is only one of the requirements needed to complete the authorization process (judgment number 5321-96, cited above), which in some cases will be obtaining the health permit, the approval of the development plans by the respective municipality, the approval of the concession by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, the granting of commercial licenses, etc. This is so because, when dealing with the environment, one cannot speak of unmodifiable variables; quite the contrary, by its very nature, the environment is, by itself and to a greater degree through human intervention, changeable. The approval of an environmental impact assessment under the terms set forth in the Organic Law of the Environment does not imply an unmodifiable authorization to carry out a specific human project either, since through the oversight work carried out by the Administration, upon detecting environmental damage, the permit must be revoked in order to guarantee the right established in provision 50 of the Political Constitution. (...)" In addition to all of the foregoing and taking into consideration the purposes of the provision under review, i.e., the simplification of the corresponding procedures for the approval of concessions for the administration, construction, and operation of tourist marinas, the principle of sustainable development must be weighed in this specific case, which is set forth in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which provides in Principle 3, the following:
"The right to development must be exercised in such a way as to equitably meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations." Under this principle, the need to achieve national development is recognized in order to address the social and economic insufficiencies suffered, for example, in coastal zones. But, additionally, it proclaims that development and, in this specific case, the construction and operation of tourist marinas, must be carried out without destroying the environment. The principle of sustainable development—widely recognized by this Court—transcends merely environmental issues, because it stands as an objective in the field of economic science, since besides seeking to preserve the natural resources that support the life of human beings, it also pursues efficiency in the use of resources so that development is achieved that meets the needs of present and future generations, without compromising the availability of natural resources in general. In accordance with the foregoing, sustainable resource management implies meeting the needs of countries, taking into account the requirements of present and future generations and balancing three main objectives: environmental, social, and economic. The foregoing, in order to avoid trends that threaten the quality of life of human beings and an increase in costs for society. In that sense, it is necessary to halt continuous environmental degradation with measures that seek to mitigate the negative effects of economic and social development and ensure the existence of a sustainable link between humanity and nature. Indeed, the adoption of sustainable policies is based on the concordance between economic growth, social equity, and the conservation of natural resources. Based on the considerations made, we proceed to analyze the legislative bill submitted for consultation. As indicated by the legislators, the regulation intended to be approved eliminates the requirement of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) duly approved by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, as an ex ante or a priori requirement for granting the concession (see article 8, subsection f), of the current Law on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas). In its place, a different mechanism is chosen, which is briefly described below. Indeed, the regulation provides for a preliminary stage that must be processed before the Inter-Institutional Commission for Tourist Marinas and Docks (Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos), to obtain technical viability for the construction, administration, and exploitation of a tourist marina or dock. Article 5 intended to be reformed indicates in subsection c) that to process said technical approval, it is required to present, solely, a Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP), granted by the National Technical Secretariat, processed through an Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EAI), via the current procedure. However, in accordance with the General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Procedures, Executive Decree No. 31849, of June 28, 2004, VAP is defined as follows:
"(...) 64. Potential Environmental Viability (VAP): It is the temporary environmental approval granted by SETENA to those activities, works, or projects that carry out the Initial Environmental Assessment and still require the submission of other EIA documents to obtain the definitive VLA."
Now then, a favorable technical viability would empower the interested party to continue with the second stage of the procedure, i.e., the concession application procedure before the competent authority, in which case, to initiate the concession application procedure, the applicant must only present a "certification issued by Setena, reporting the current status of the Environmental Impact Assessment" (article 8, subsection d). Only with this requirement, the municipality can grant the concession conditionally. Article 9 of the bill provides, as relevant, the following:
"(...) The municipality shall grant the concession conditionally, until Setena communicates to it in writing that the Environmental Impact Assessment (hereinafter EIA) has been approved. However, if the EIA is negative, the concession shall become void and shall not generate any liability for the Administration.
The concessionaire may not take possession of any of the conceded assets until Cimat certifies that it has fulfilled all the requirements set forth in article 9 bis of this Law and has obtained the corresponding municipal construction permit." As such, prior to the granting of the concession, the environmental impact assessment is not required; rather, a mere report on the progress of the evaluation would be demanded. The third stage of the procedure involves obtaining construction permits from the competent municipality. This procedure is regulated in Article 3 of the bill, through which Article 9 bis is introduced into the current regulations, stating the following:
"**Article 9 bis.- Procedure for construction plans** Once the concession is granted and within a maximum period of one hundred eighty (180) calendar days, the concessionaire must conclude the EIA process before SETENA. Once the EIA is approved, through the granting of viability (license) by SETENA, the concessionaire shall have a period of one hundred twenty (120) calendar days to submit, before the single window of CIMAT, the following documents: a) The final construction plans. b) The studies and calculation reports. c) The technical specifications of the materials, sources, procedures, and construction methods. d) The budget and the work execution schedule. e) The certified copy of the Environmental Viability (License) (VLA) from SETENA. f) The notarial or registry certification of the registration of the concession contract. g) The insurance policy covering the civil liability of the concessionaire. h) Demonstrate the financial capacity to develop the project through the mechanisms established in the Regulation of this Law. CIMAT must request from the interested party, within a period of twenty (20) business days, any clarification for the processing of the corresponding technical recommendation regarding the approval of the plans. Once the clarifications are submitted to CIMAT, it shall have an additional period of twenty (20) days to issue the corresponding technical recommendation on the approval. The concessionaire shall have a period of up to one (1) year to begin the construction of the works, once the construction permit is granted by the respective municipality. After this period, the municipality shall request CIMAT to issue a report attesting to the investment and progress of the work; to issue said report, CIMAT shall have a period of up to twenty (20) business days. In the event that the report determines that the works have not begun, the municipality shall initiate a procedure for the cancellation of the concession, immediately." In accordance with the foregoing, through the regulations intended to be approved, an attempt is made to invert the normal and natural order of administrative procedures, granting the concession for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas prior to the completion of the Environmental Impact Assessment. The conceived procedure would be unconstitutional since it reverses the logical order of procedures, disregarding the State's duty to protect the integrity of the environment, enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. Furthermore, if we adhere to the binding jurisprudence of this Court, it is not admissible to deconstitutionalize the guarantee of state response in defense of the environment, which must be timely and prior to the granting of corresponding permits or concessions (see rulings number 6240-1993, 4245-2001, 1220-2002, 1221-2002, 6466-2002).
**2) ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY**. Closely related to the above, it is necessary to point out that the procedure used for the approval of the concession, subject to the result of the Environmental Impact Assessment, is unconstitutional, additionally, because the legislative proposal is eliminating a priori the State's responsibility in the face of the eventual denial of the study conducted by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat. Indeed, as transcribed *supra*, the intended reform to Article 9 of the Law on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas provides for the granting of the concession in a conditional manner until SETENA communicates in writing that the EIA has been approved, and the following phrase stands out: "*However, if the EIA is negative, the concession shall be rendered void and shall not generate any liability for the Administration*". Regarding this matter, this Constitutional Court, with the drafting of the Reporting Magistrate, issued ruling No. 2004-05207 at 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004, in which the following was considered:
"*(...) **IV.- CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY**. Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of patrimonial responsibility of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and it can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter states that "The Government of the Republic is (...) responsible (...)", thereby taking for granted the responsibility of the major public entity or State and its various organs –Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers-. Ordinal 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the "(...) criminal liability (...)" of public officials and the second paragraph refers us to the "(...) personal liability for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (...)." Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects "acquired patrimonial rights" and "consolidated legal situations," which can only be, effectively and truly, protected with a broad-spectrum administrative liability system without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their public function or performance. Numeral 41 ibidem establishes that "Occurring to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (...)", this precept imposes the duty on the author and person responsible for the damage to compensate the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of public entities, thereby becoming the fundamental cornerstone at the constitutional level for the legislative development of a system of strict and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the conduct of the public official for malice or fault, but, solely and exclusively, for having been inflicted or received, effectively, "(...) injuries or damages (...) in their person, property, or moral interests (...)", that is, an unlawful injury that they do not have the duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Numeral 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental right to compensation in favor of the administered who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity –through its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct- and the correlative obligation of the latter to fully compensate or repair it; the access to the jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept thus becomes an instrumental right to forcibly ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the compensation right of the injured party when the subject obliged to repair voluntarily fails to comply with the referred obligation. Article 45 of the Magna Carta embraces the principle of the inviolability of patrimony by providing that "Property is inviolable; no one may be deprived of their own except for legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law (...)", it is thus recognized by the fundamental text that the special sacrifices or singular charges that the administered does not have the duty to bear or tolerate, even if they derive from a lawful activity –such as the exercise of expropriation power- must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, insofar as it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in courts when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear foundation of administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of ordinal 49 already cited provides that "The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered," and one of the main forms of guarantee of these is an objective, direct, broad, and complete regime of administrative liability. The final paragraph of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, regarding environmental damage, establishes that "The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions," a liability regime from which, obviously, public entities of an economic nature (called public companies-public entity) and public companies (also called public companies-private law entity) cannot be exempted when they pollute by deploying an industrial, commercial, or service activity and, in general, the State when it fails to comply with its obligations of defense and preservation of the environment through deficient supervision or control of potentially or actually polluting public and private activities. In the case of the members of the Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions, Article 188 of the fundamental norm provides that "Their directors are responsible for their management." Regarding the Executive Branch, Title X of the constitutional text contains a Chapter V whose heading is "Responsibilities of Those Who Exercise the Executive Power," with Article 148 establishing the responsibility of the President for the "use he may make of those powers that according to this Constitution correspond to him exclusively," the joint responsibility of the latter with the respective Minister of the sector "regarding the exercise of the powers that this Constitution grants to both" –which is specified by Article 149 ibidem- and that of the Government Council for the agreements it adopts. The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in the bearing of public burdens (Articles 18 and 33) which prevents imposing on the administered a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they do not have the duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or several administered and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that the Political Constitution enshrines an unnamed or atypical fundamental right of the administered to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals, interpreted, *a contrario sensu*, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law insofar as they encompass, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the "proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies," "good progress of the Government," and "efficiency of the administration." This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly incorporated the principle of liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter to interpret, apply, integrate, and delimit the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury caused to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered by its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct.
**V.- ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY IN THE SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW.** The liability of public administrations for the exercise of the administrative function forms part, as we have verified in the preceding recital, of the constitutional conception thereof. It is a key and essential piece of the Social and Democratic Rule of Law, given the purposes to which a regime of administrative liability tends. Generally speaking, the basic function of administrative liability is the repair or compensation for unlawful injuries caused to an administered (victim or injured party) in their patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere by a public entity in the exercise of the administrative function. One of its classic and traditional purposes is to serve as a control or guarantee for the substantial legal situations of the administered that are injured by a public entity in the exercise of its powers or in the provision of public services expressly assigned by the Constitution or the law. Administrative liability, together with the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), are the key pieces of a Constitutional State for the defense of the administered against the formal and material prerogatives and privileges with which the Constitution itself provides public entities for the fulfillment of their tasks. This purpose determines that the constitutional principle of administrative liability must be strengthened and accentuated through an extensive and not restrictive interpretation; similarly, the legislator when developing administrative liability systems must adapt to the constitutional parameter of objective and direct administrative liability, being prohibited from establishing administrative conducts that are exempt or immune to it and impairing the fundamental rights to compensation and to the proper functioning of public services held by all the administered. On the other hand, administrative liability allows the implementation of the constitutional principles of administrative efficiency and efficacy (Articles 140, subsection 8, insofar as it imposes on the Executive Branch the duty to "Monitor the proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies," Article 139, subsection 4, insofar as it incorporates the concept of "good progress of the Government," and Article 191 by incorporating the principle of "efficiency of the administration"), since the duty to repair or compensate for unlawful injuries inflicted on the administered forces them to act correctly, prudently, thoughtfully, and in accordance with the Law. According to these two principles that inform administrative organization and function, public administrations must provide high-quality public services with high standards for the due satisfaction of the needs of the administered who are their recipients, and exercise their powers fully and normally. Efficiency and efficacy are, therefore, constitutional obligations or imperatives that necessarily obligate public entities to act responsibly in the exercise of the administrative function in its various manifestations (material or technical actions and formal activity). As a correlate of such constitutional duties of public administrations, the administered are holders of the unnamed fundamental right to the proper and efficient functioning of public services, with high-quality standards, which can be inferred, *a contrario sensu*, from the aforementioned Articles 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the Political Constitution).
**VI.- UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY OF THE COSTA RICAN INSTITUTE OF AQUEDUCTS AND SEWERS.** Subsection a) of Article 5 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers exempts that entity from liability "(...) in cases of damages and losses caused by the impurity, irregularity, or insufficiency, real or alleged, of the supplied water (...)." Evidently, this subsection directly violates the constitutional principle of administrative liability, since, for a specific hypothesis of abnormal functioning of the public service –lack of service, understood as a breach of pre-existing legal obligations imposed by the legal system- such as impurity, irregularity, or insufficiency in the supply of drinking water, the legislator graciously exempts the entity from being liable for the unlawful injuries caused to the administered. By exonerating ICAA from all administrative liability in the provision of the public service that constitutes its core or reason for being, the subsection violates the principle of inviolability of patrimony (Article 45 of the Political Constitution), the right of the administered to obtain prompt and complete judicial protection to achieve full reparation for the damages and losses they have suffered in their patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function by any public entity (Articles 41 and 49 ibidem). In the same way, the exemption infringes the right to health (Article 21 ibidem), when, eventually, the injury affects that precious right of the service users, as is expectable when impure water is provided or the supply is not regular –adjusted to the duties and obligations imposed by the legal system- and continuous –without interruptions or lack of continuity- and in sufficient quantities to meet the basic and daily hygienic needs of the administered. Finally, this Court considers that the exoneration from liability provided by the legislator for the indicated hypotheses violates the implicit or virtual constitutional right of the administered to the proper functioning of public services (Articles 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191, all interpreted *a contrario sensu*). Lastly, this Constitutional Court does not find that the challenged precept infringes the Right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, since the norm refers to a public service relationship and the responsibility of the entity providing it regarding its purity, regularity, and quantity. Nor does this Court consider that it violates the principle of legality enshrined in numeral 11 of the Political Constitution, except solely and exclusively insofar as it serves as a partial foundation for the principle of liability of public administrations.*" Such considerations are fully applicable to the specific case, in which it would be unconstitutional for the legislator to disregard the implicit constitutional principle of public administration liability, derived from the constitutional block, as set forth in the partially cited judgment. Consequently, the mechanism envisioned to circumvent potential lawsuits for the disregard of acquired rights over the granted concession is unconstitutional.
In summary, the procedure devised in the consulted bill for granting concessions for the construction, administration, and operation of tourist marinas and docks is unconstitutional. Firstly, because it disregards the fact that the Environmental Impact Assessment must be conducted prior to any concession, and it is, moreover, unconstitutional for the State to exclude its liability through legislative means.
**VIII.- ON THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS. CORRELATION OF ARTICLES 9 AND 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION**. In another vein, the consulting legislators consider that granting concessions for the construction of tourist marinas on public domain property, prior to the final approval of an Environmental Impact Assessment by the competent technical authority, could violate the right to citizen participation of the population that could eventually be affected by the concession. They insist that constitutional jurisprudence has highlighted the relevance of the right to citizen participation in relation to environmental decisions. The foregoing is a right derived from Articles 1 and 50 of the Political Constitution, which recognizes broad standing for all persons to participate in such procedures. In their view, these principles have been reinforced by the approval of the constitutional amendment that modified Article 9 of the Political Constitution to establish that the Government of Costa Rica is participatory. On this matter, and based on the development carried out regarding the importance of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA), it must be reiterated that, according to the most qualified doctrine, assessment is a primarily participatory procedure for the prior weighing of the environmental consequences of a decision to approve or deny a specific project. According to doctrine, the environmental impact assessment arose, from its origins, in connection with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of surveys and public hearings, which is why the guarantee must be emphasized that, throughout the assessment and at its different stages, those affected by the final decision will be heard; these may include not only the immediately involved communities or subjects, but also groups defending diffuse interests, such as the timely protection of the environment. Regarding the promotion of public participation in environmental matters, the Rio Declaration provides the following:
“**PRINCIPLE 10** *Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.*” The World Charter for Nature cited *supra*, in Principle No. 23, provides the following:
“*23- All persons, in accordance with their national legislation, shall have the opportunity to participate, individually or with others, in the formulation of decisions of direct concern to their environment, and shall have access to means of redress when their environment has suffered damage or degradation.*” At the domestic level, the Organic Environmental Law provides the following:
**“Article 22.- Assessment file** *Physical or legal persons, whether public or private, shall have the right to be heard by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), at any stage of the assessment process and during the operational phase of the work or project. The observations of interested parties shall be included in the file and assessed for the final report.* *Within the five business days following receipt of an environmental impact assessment, the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) shall forward an extract thereof to the municipalities in whose jurisdiction the work, activity, or project will be carried out. Likewise, it shall widely disseminate, through mass media, the list of studies submitted for its consideration.* **Article 23.- Publicity of information** *The information contained in the environmental impact assessment file shall be public in nature and shall be available for consultation by any person or organization.* *Notwithstanding, interested parties may request that information integrated into the study be kept confidential if its publication would affect industrial property rights.*” For its part, the Biodiversity Law provides, to the extent relevant, the following:
“**Article 95.- Public hearings** *The National Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional) must hold public hearings for information and analysis on the specific project and its impact, when it deems it necessary. The cost of the publication shall be borne by the interested party.* *Participation is any process that involves society in the adoption of proposals, problem-solving, and decision-making regarding the approval of a specific activity or project.*” In judgment No. 10693-2002 of 6:20 p.m. on November 7, 2002, this Constitutional Court highlighted that the guarantee of citizen participation is a tool through which citizens are empowered to enforce their right to a healthy environment; hence, it is an intrinsic part of the guarantees enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. That resolution provided the following:
“*(...) this Chamber considers that, derived properly from the democratic framework that informs the entire legal system and is provided for by Article 1 of the Political Constitution, in conjunction with the right to a healthy environment established in Article 50 of said Charter, in addition to international instruments and respective legal norms, it is necessary to extract as certain the existence of a right of all persons to participate in decision-making concerning matters of public interest, in this case, environmental protection. This right to participate constitutes, therefore, an essential instrument for inhabitants to enforce their right to a healthy environment; however, it cannot be understood as a mere exercise of an opinion, because, contrary to what might be considered at first glance, this participation must be understood broadly, and consequently, it implies three basic dimensions –as recognized by the 1992 Rio Declaration–: the right of access to information, the right to participation “per se”, and the right of access to justice in environmental matters. These three dimensions, in turn, contain a series of basic procedural rights –both in administrative and judicial venues– that together ensure that individuals’ opinions do not become an empty and rhetorical exercise of freedom of opinion, and on the contrary, will effectively be taken into account by the public authority.* *(...)* *ii.– The right to public participation. This aspect implies the possibility for those persons who may be affected or have an interest in a decision regarding the environment to express their criteria, opinions, points of view, or questions about it early on, without needing to be subject to specific formalities to be taken into account. Consequently, the information provided to the administered party must contain non-technical summaries that allow people to understand the magnitude of the discussion. Likewise, it entails the existence of adequate deadlines so that, prior to participation, a stage is carried out for citizens to become informed.* *6) The right to participation within the environmental impact assessment procedure. This Chamber, in a recent precedent (see judgment number 2002-06466 of three-fifty p.m. on July 2, 2002), has established that the obligation of prior environmental impact assessment derives as a necessary consequence of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, being established in Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law* *(...)* *The environmental impact assessment procedure is characterized as an administrative procedure with a differentiating note, as it seeks to avoid or minimize the eventual configuration of environmental damage, within the execution of activities regarding which there is certainty about the harmful effect they would produce on the environment if carried out without any contention. In other words, this instrument corresponds to the materialization of the principle of prevention, since, faced with an activity that is known in advance to be harmful to the environment, the interested party proposes a series of measures aimed at avoiding or mitigating ecological detriment, to the public body or entity –in this case SETENA– which is responsible for determining whether these are the most suitable for that purpose. Therefore,* ***given that this procedure seeks at all times to foresee any negative consequence, through a broad flow of information, it is natural to understand that one of its characteristics is that persons who may be affected by the project’s development can provide fundamental data or points of view, which the competent authorities, due to omissive or arbitrary conduct, could ignore or set aside, consequently leaving the environment unprotected***. *Thus, the principle or right to participation implies, within the environmental impact assessment procedure, a high degree of publicity, to the point that any act or request that has a significant effect on its final result must be of general scope for all interested parties, so that they can exercise their opinions at any time and not be pigeonholed to a specific procedural moment. The role of the population as a defender of a healthy environment extends ‘from cradle to grave’, that is, from the start of the productive activity as a project, to the end of its useful life; therefore, it would not be admissible that in an exploitation intended to last for an indefinite period, even decades –as is the case with hydroelectric projects–, and with irreversible consequences, the participation of those social sectors that may be affected is limited to a procedural stage that, like a hearing, may last only a few hours. Thus, due to its preventive nature, it is required that from the very moment of its inception, a project subject to an environmental impact assessment must be brought to the attention of the population for the purpose of initiating an open phenomenon of participation. (...)*” The text emphasized does not correspond to the original.
By virtue of the foregoing, the consulting deputies are correct, since the regulation sought to be approved within the Legislative Assembly defers the right to citizen participation to a moment after the concession for the construction, operation, and administration of tourist marinas has been granted. Consequently, it intensely limits the rights of interested parties to pronounce on the advisability of the project in question. Although Article 9 of the bill provides for a consultation procedure, public hearings, and objections before the authorities competent to grant the concession, the truth is that, at that point, the appropriate technical information from professionals in the field, which would allow duly informed participation by interested parties, is lacking. As has been developed throughout this consultation, the Environmental Impact Assessment is characterized by being a process of information flow related to the project’s advisability, the potential effects, and the damages sought to be minimized. Consequently, conducting a consultative procedure without first having appropriate information from professionals in the field significantly limits the right of individuals to participate actively in the procedure under analysis, due to the lack, up to that moment, of the necessary information to oppose or support the project in question. Indeed, a consultative stage is carried out without, up to that point, the detail of the project and its potential effects on the environment being made known to the citizenry, it being the case that, as analyzed in the judgment *supra* cited, access to information is a transcendental element in promoting the right to participation. This purpose is also highlighted in the General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Procedures, which shows that the intention of the hearing conducted within the EIA framework is precisely to inform civil society about the activity, work, or project intended to be developed and its impacts (see Article 3, subsection 12). In light of the foregoing, postponing the Environmental Impact Assessment to a moment after the granting of the concession significantly limits the right of individuals to participate in the defense of a diffuse interest, such as the effective and timely protection of the environment.
**IX.- ON THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITORY II AND THE INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION**. The legislators challenge the constitutionality of Transitory II of the consulted bill. This provision states the following:
“**TRANSITORY II.-** *The owner of any work, project, or infrastructure similar and/or comparable to a tourist marina and/or dock, which has been developed and is operating contrary to the principles and regulations of this Law, as well as lacking permits, authorizations, approvals, and/or concessions, shall have a non-extendable and peremptory period of one (1) year, from the publication of this Law, to legalize their situation before CIMAT; otherwise, the body may recommend its technical closure to the municipality.* ***When the activities are in operation, an EIA shall not be required***; *such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority.*” (They challenge the text highlighted in bold).
In relation to the transcribed norm, the legislators consider that said provision violates the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, because it exempts marinas operating illegally from conducting environmental impact assessments. They state that the consulted norm refers to the case of illegally constructed tourist marinas and docks that, at the time of the amendment, are in operation. They affirm that it is not constitutionally valid to seek to establish *a priori* a generic exemption directed at certain types of activities, without an essential evaluation of the particular conditions of each specific case having taken place. In another vein, they consider that said norm constitutes a dangerous incentive for the construction and operation of tourist marinas and docks outside the legal provisions regulating the matter, for the purpose of evading the submission of an Environmental Impact Assessment.
Regarding this point of the consultation, this Court considers that the reflections made in Considerandos VII and VIII of this judgment are equally applicable, since the legislator is disregarding the mandatory nature of conducting an environmental impact assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) as an unavoidable requirement for the approval of an activity or project of this nature, which could be affecting or generating potential dangers to the environment. In this context, it is necessary to emphasize, once again, that Article 50 of the Political Constitution imposes on the State, in environmental matters, a positive or proactive attitude that it cannot ignore. Consequently, disregarding the mandatory nature of the environmental impact assessment for the approval of a project that may somehow affect the environment would be unconstitutional. The foregoing, for disregarding the guarantee of defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, especially if it is taken into consideration that a transitory provision with such wording could incentivize or motivate the acceleration of the irregular construction of marinas and tourist docks so as to subsequently omit compliance with an environmental impact assessment.
**X.- ON THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITORIO IV OF THE BILL.** Finally, the consulting legislators question the inclusion of Transitorio IV in the bill, which provides as follows:
“***TRANSITORIO<span> </span>IV.-***</p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 0cm 76.85pt .0001pt 72.0pt;\"><em><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">The EIA must be carried out, only, in the case of new activities that are not in operation. In the event of renewal, assignment or adjudication of rights or granting of a new concession, for marinas, tourist docks and/or similar projects that are in operation and do not imply modifications, that is, the construction or execution of new works or activities, they will not be required to carry out an EIA.<span> </span>Such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority.” The consulting legislators state that the environmental impact assessment should be performed only for new activities that are not in operation. For this reason, in the event of renewal, assignment or adjudication of rights, or granting of a new concession for those marinas, tourist docks and/or similar projects that were in operation and do not imply modifications, they will not be required to carry out a new assessment; rather, such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority. However, they allege that numerous studies have demonstrated that environmental impact is cumulative, and given that the term of concessions is increased to 35 years and can be extended without a new environmental impact study, this would be proceeding against the logic of the precautionary principle. On this particular matter, as this Constitutional Court already indicated in judgment No. 2007-013574 of 9:30 a.m. on September 19, 2007, environmental impact assessments are carried out prior to the development of the project in question, and, in the specific case, what is being regulated is the assignment of rights over an infrastructure that is in operation and legally compliant. That is, the challenged Transitorio applies to marinas and tourist docks built in accordance with the provisions in force, which require the submission of the EIA. Consequently, there is no irregularity whatsoever, since Transitorio II applies to activities outside the current regulations, as already analyzed; while constructions carried out under the corresponding authorizations of SETENA do not require a new assessment when it involves only “*renewal, assignment or adjudication of rights or granting of a new concession*”, as this does not imply the construction of new works that could compromise the environment. Having overcome the foregoing, it is appropriate to point out that it is not for this Constitutional Court to determine the periodicity with which this type of assessment must be performed, and rather, for these purposes, we have that the current regulations provide for the figure of an “*environmental manager (responsable ambiental)*”, who is responsible for verifying and reporting to SETENA compliance with the obligations acquired for both the construction stage and the operational or functional stage of the activity, work or project according to the period established by SETENA. Likewise, this figure is responsible for issuing the necessary environmental recommendations according to the diverse situations that arise in any of the stages of the execution of the activity, work or project (see articles 79-85 of the Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental). Consequently, in the opinion of this Court, the provision analyzed is not unconstitutional.
**<span> </span>XI.- COROLLARY.** Based on the considerations made, the conclusion is reached that, indeed, the legislative procedure followed for the approval of the consulted bill presents essential defects of constitutionality by violating Article 190 of the Political Constitution and, additionally, by disregarding the principle of publicity. In relation to the merits of the bill submitted for consultation, this Court considers that the procedure for granting a concession for the construction, administration, and exploitation of marinas and tourist docks is unconstitutional for violation of Articles 9 and 50 of the Political Constitution, by authorizing the granting of a concession prior to the completion of the corresponding environmental impact assessment. Likewise,<span> </span>the text proposed for Article 9, 6th paragraph, is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional principle of the responsibility of the Public Administration implicit in the Fundamental Norm. Additionally, the phrase “*When activities are in operation, it will not be required to carry out an EIA; such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority*” contained in Transitorio II of the bill is unconstitutional for violation of Article 50 of the Political Constitution. Regarding Transitorio IV, it is not unconstitutional, to the extent that it is understood to refer to the renewal, assignment or adjudication of rights that does not imply the realization of new works that could affect the environment.<span> </span> **POR TANTO**.
Unanimously, the joinder is declared inadmissible. The legislative consultation of constitutionality regarding the bill "Modification of several articles of Law No. 7744, Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas", processed under expediente 14.836, is answered, by majority, in the sense that there exist two essential or substantial defects in the legislative procedure, which are the following: a) The lack of mandatory consultation of the bill to the municipalities due to the introduction of the motion made to Article 9 of the legislation intended to be reformed, adding a paragraph that states "(...) The municipalities may provide facilities for the granting of the licenses required for the proper functioning of the marina projects that are concessioned and, consequently, of the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law." and b)<span> </span>Violation of the principle of publicity due to the lack of a new publication of the bill upon the introduction of the motion indicated in the previous point. Magistrates Mora, Vargas and Certad dissent regarding the essential defects in the procedure, considering that they do not exist.<span> </span>Regarding the merits, unanimously, the consultation of constitutionality is answered in the sense that: a)<span> </span>Article 2 of the bill, whose purpose is to reform Articles<span> </span>8 and 9 of the Law on Concession and Operation of Tourist Marinas, is unconstitutional, specifically, the texts proposed for Article 8, subsection d), and Article 9, 5th paragraph. The foregoing, by postponing the submission of the environmental impact assessment until after the concession for the construction, administration, and exploitation of marinas and tourist docks has been granted, disregarding the State's duty to preventively protect the environment and by limiting the right to citizen participation in the decision of matters related thereto; b) The text proposed for Article 9, 6th paragraph, is unconstitutional for violating the principle of the responsibility of Public Administrations implicit in the Fundamental Norm; c) Transitorio II of the bill is unconstitutional for violation of Article 50 of the Political Constitution insofar as it indicates the following: "When activities are in operation, it will not be required to carry out an EIA; such activities must be governed by the procedure established to obtain authorization from the corresponding environmental authority" and d) Transitorio IV of the consulted bill is not unconstitutional. **Let it be communicated to the Directorial Board of the Legislative Assembly and to the consulting deputies.-** <span style=\"color: black;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><span style=\"font-size: 8.0pt; color: black;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: center; line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\" align=\"center\"><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Ana Virginia Calzada M.</span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: center; line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\" align=\"center\"><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Presiding Judge a.i.</span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: center; line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\" align=\"center\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: center; line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\" align=\"center\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"line-height: 21.0pt; tab-stops: 323.05pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Luis Paulino Mora M.</span></strong> <strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"><span> </span>Adrián Vargas B.</span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"line-height: 21.0pt; tab-stops: 326.6pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Ernesto Jinesta L.</span></strong><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black;\"> <span> </span></span></strong><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Fernando Cruz C.</span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 21.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; line-height: 21.0pt; tab-stops: 326.6pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\">Rosa María Abdelnour G.</span></strong> <strong><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"font-size: 14.0pt; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"><span> </span>Gastón Certad M.</span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;\"><strong><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\"> </span></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: center; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 5.0pt 0cm 5.0pt 0cm;\" align=\"center\"><strong><u>Dissenting vote of Magistrates Mora Mora, Vargas Benavides and Certad Maroto, drafted by the second.</u></strong></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: justify; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 5.0pt 0cm 5.0pt 0cm;\">The undersigned Magistrates depart from the majority vote, considering that there are no essential defects in the procedure of the consulted bill. On other occasions, this Chamber has indicated that it is not illegitimate for the Legislative Assembly to issue norms that refer to the powers of municipal corporations, as long as they do not imply an imposition that substantially varies the content of said acts. In this sense, the Chamber, in judgment number 2006-06589 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes of May twelve, two thousand six, considered by majority that the fact that the Legislative Assembly created a norm that allowed municipalities to forgive tax debts did not imply a violation of Article 170 of the Political Constitution, since said norm had a permissive nature, as it did not impose any obligation on the corporations. In the specific case, the consulted Article 9, by indicating that “*(…) The municipalities may provide facilities for the granting of the licenses required for the proper functioning of the marina projects that are concessioned and, consequently, of the commercial premises and annexes required by this Law*”, does not imply an intrusion into municipal autonomy, since the cited norm only authorizes municipalities so that they may, at their discretion, decide whether to provide the facilities in question for the granting of the licenses required for the effective functioning of the marinas intended to be developed within their jurisdictions. In our view, said numeral merely seeks to give a general authorization for each local government to adopt the decision it deems most appropriate for its constituency. We consider that the bill contains a permissive or authorizing norm, which imposes nothing on the municipalities, but rather grants them a license to act according to their own assessment of local interest and to decide, in each case, whether or not to grant the facilities described by the motion. Thus, if in the specific case we were faced with an imposing norm, the bill would indeed violate the autonomy of local governments; however, in the way it was designed, it does not oblige municipalities that deem it appropriate to approve the facilities for granting licenses. In this way, the fact that the bill is an initiative of a Central State body and not of the municipalities themselves in no way affects their autonomy, nor does it imply an invasion of constitutional powers by Parliament. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we consider it appropriate to point out that the power granted by the aforementioned article can in no way imply a reduction of the controls and requirements that municipalities must apply and demand as provided by the other norms regulating the matter.
On the other hand, regarding the alleged violation of the Principle of Publicity, it must be indicated that the variation introduced to Article 9 of the bill does not substantially change the bill, which is why we consider there is no reason whatsoever to publish it in the official gazette La Gaceta, as the majority of the Chamber argues.
<span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 5.0pt 0cm 5.0pt 0cm;\"><span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"> </span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none; margin: 5.0pt 0cm 5.0pt 0cm;\">Luis Paulino Mora M. <span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"><span> </span></span>Adrián Vargas B. <span lang=\"ES-CR\" style=\"mso-ansi-language: ES-CR;\"><span> </span></span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-ansi-language: EN-US;\">Gast</span>ó<span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-ansi-language: EN-US;\">n Certad M.</span></p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\"> </p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\"> </p>\n</div>
* 080125520007CO * usuario1 usuario1 4 5 2008-11-25T22:13:00Z 2009-03-26T15:20:00Z 1 23281 128048 Poder Judicial 1067 302 151027 11.6505 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 *080125520007CO* Res: 2008-015760 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas treinta minutos del veintidós de octubre de dos mil ocho.
Consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad interpuesta por los diputados OLIVIER PÉREZ GONZÁLEZ, LEDA ZAMORA CHAVES, RONALD SOLÍS BOLAÑOS, GRETTEL ORTIZ ALVAREZ, ORLANDO HERNÁNDEZ MURILLO, PATRICIA ROMERO B., JOSÉ JOAQUÍN SALAZAR, SERGIO ALFARO SALAS, JOSÉ MERINO, LESVIA VILLALOBOS SALAS, ALBERTO SALOM ECHEVERRÍA, RAFAEL ELÍAS MADRIGAL BRENES Y ELIZABETH FONSECA CORRALES del proyecto inicialmente denominado “Ley de Simplificación de Trámites para la Instalación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos”, ahora llamado “Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas” que se tramita en el expediente legislativo No. 14.836.
RESULTANDO:
1.- La consulta se recibió en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:29 hrs. del 16 de setiembre de 2008. Las copias certificadas del expediente legislativo No. 14.836, “Ley de Simplificación de Trámites para la Instalación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos”, o bien, “Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas” se tuvieron por recibidas en la Sala mediante resolución del día 23 de setiembre de 2008. En consecuencia, el plazo para evacuar la consulta vence el día 23 de octubre de 2008.
2.- Consideran los legisladores consultantes que en el procedimiento seguido en la tramitación del proyecto ley que se conoce en el expediente legislativo No. 14.836, se infringieron aspectos de forma y contiene vicios de inconstitucionalidad por el fondo. En primer término, cuestionan que se violentaron los artículos 170 y 190 de la Constitución Política, al omitir realizarse una serie de consultas obligatorias. Alegan que, en total, se introdujeron 29 mociones de fondo en el Plenario y que, posteriormente no se consultó el proyecto, nuevamente, al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT), a las Municipalidades de las zonas costeras, a la Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), al Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico (INCOP) y al Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM). Afirman que dicho deber quedó consignado en el Informe del Departamento de Servicios Técnicos de noviembre de 2006. Exponen que, originalmente, las consultas, en relación al texto base, se realizaron por parte de la Comisión Especial que llevaba su trámite. Todas se enviaron el 24 de octubre de 2002 y se envió a publicar. No obstante, posteriormente, el texto sufrió nuevas modificaciones sustanciales y la Comisión de Turismo lo mandó a consultar entre el 8 y el 14 de marzo de 2007. Alegan que, posteriormente, el proyecto recibió mociones de fondo en el Plenario Legislativo, las cuales, fueron admitidas; sin embargo, estos últimos cambios no se consultaron. Afirman que tales modificaciones al proyecto de ley afectan, de manera directa, a las instituciones involucradas y, por lo anterior, han quedado en indefensión. Específicamente, se refieren al contenido de los artículos 2, 5, 8 y 9. En primer término, hacen referencia a las competencias de las Municipalidades y el ICT para otorgar las concesiones correspondientes. En relación al artículo 5 del proyecto de ley, afirman que existe una injerencia en las competencias de las municipalidades costeras, pues establece una facultad para el administrado de continuar con el trámite de concesión ante la Municipalidad con la sola presentación de la viabilidad técnica del proyecto y también se afectan las competencias del ICT en cuanto al agotamiento de la vía administrativa. Insisten, adicionalmente, que los artículos 8 y 9 del proyecto, afectan las competencias municipales. En segundo lugar, los legisladores consultantes indican que se violentó el principio de publicidad, toda vez que, el nuevo texto, con los cambios incluidos, no fue debidamente publicado, a pesar de ser reformas que tratan aspectos esenciales, como las incorporadas en las 29 mociones aprobadas en Plenario. Hacen ver que los últimos cambios que sufrió el proyecto se realizaron entre los días 6 de junio de 2007 y el 25 de junio de 2008, durante el trámite de mociones de fondo regulado por el artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa y pese a que se refiere a aspectos esenciales del proyecto, no fue publicado. A continuación, se enumeran los agravios que señalan los legisladores consultantes, en relación al fondo del proyecto de ley. Refieren violación del derecho constitucional a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, consagrado en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. Lo anterior, al haberse eliminado la obligación de contar con la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental debidamente aprobada por SETENA como un requisito previo al otorgamiento de concesiones a particulares sobre bienes demaniales de importancia ambiental (zona marítimo terrestre y mar territorial) para la construcción y operación de marinas turísticas, por la derogatoria del inciso f) del artículo 8, la modificación de los artículos 8 y 5, inciso c), de la Ley No. 7744 y la adición de un artículo 9 bis a esa ley, contenidas en los artículos 2 y 3 del proyecto de ley en consulta. Explican que, en su lugar, para tramitar y obtener estas concesiones sólo se requiere "informar" sobre el estado en que se encuentra el trámite de dicha evaluación, lo que, en su criterio, incluye la posibilidad que este trámite ni siquiera haya concluido y el solicitante carezca de viabilidad ambiental otorgada por la autoridad técnica competente, al momento de obtener la concesión. Manifiestan que como requisito previo al otorgamiento de concesiones a sujetos privados sobre bienes de dominio público como el mar territorial y la zona marítimo terrestre, la reforma al artículo 5, inciso c), de la Ley No. 7774, únicamente, contempla la presentación de una Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial otorgada por la SETENA y gestionada a través de una Evaluación Ambiental Inicial (EAI). Señalan que sobre este requisito, es indispensable recordar que, de ninguna manera, puede ser equiparado a una verdadera Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, debidamente aprobada. Sostienen que de conformidad con el Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación Ambiental, la EAI es sólo la primera etapa del procedimiento de evaluación. Es decir, constituye un estudio preliminar sobre las características ambientales de una actividad, para determinar la significancia del eventual impacto que generará y proceder a su categorización, pero carece de los elementos de análisis y de la profundidad propia de un Estudio de Impacto Ambiental o de los otros instrumentos que forman parte del procedimiento de evaluación. Insisten que la función de esta primera etapa es, precisamente, determinar los alcances, los componentes y el grado de profundidad de los estudios técnicos que se tendrán que realizar para cumplir con el requisito del EIA. Así, concluyen que lo establecido, en su momento, como un control previo de carácter preventivo, se está regulando como un requisito posterior. En particular, alegan que se está promoviendo que el cumplimiento del requisito de una EIA debidamente aprobada por la SETENA sea posterior al otorgamiento de permisos o concesiones para realizar actividades, para las cuales, este requisito es exigido, sea, cuando la Administración competente ya ha otorgado los permisos o concesiones al interesado. Consideran que postergar la aprobación de las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental hasta después del otorgamiento de permisos o concesiones para realizar actividades que exigen este requisito, tiene graves consecuencias sobre la capacidad del Estado de tutelar de manera efectiva el medio ambiente. Aseveran que una de la principales consecuencias es que se permite el otorgamiento de derechos adquiridos a particulares sobre bienes de dominio público (mar territorial, zona marítimo terrestre) para realizar actividades que podrían alterar o dañar el ambiente sin la previa constatación de los impactos ambientales de los proyectos planteados y sin que los concesionarios hayan demostrado que las actividades que pretenden realizar son viables ambientalmente. Afirman que la jurisprudencia constitucional ha señalado, en reiteradas resoluciones, que es contrario al Derecho de la Constitución el otorgamiento de contratos de concesión a terceros sobre bienes demaniales de importancia ambiental (recursos naturales con carácter de bienes de dominio público) para realizar actividades que deberían estar sujetas a evaluaciones de impacto ambiental, otorgadas por la autoridad técnica competente del Estado costarricense (SETENA). Concluyen que con las normas consultadas se desampararían los recursos naturales protegidos constitucionalmente como la zona marítimo terrestre y el mar territorial (artículos 6 y 121, inciso 14, de la Carta Magna) y se desconocen y violentan los principios preventivo y precautorio. En otro orden de ideas, consideran que las normas consultadas incrementan, innecesariamente, el riesgo de presentación de demandas y litigios contra el Estado costarricense y favorecen el ejercicio de presiones para que las autoridades competentes avalen proyectos cuestionados ambientalmente. Por otra parte, indican que tampoco se puede ignorar que un incremento de las amenazas de demandas millonarias contra el Estado, por supuesta violación de “derechos adquiridos” a titulares de contratos de concesión, puede traducirse en un aumento de presiones internas y externas sobre las autoridades encargadas de pronunciarse sobre las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental presentadas por esos concesionarios. El riesgo de cuantiosas demandas contra el Estado por la ruptura de contratos de concesión ya firmados puede repercutir en la calidad de las decisiones que adopten los órganos encargados de resolver sobre la viabilidad ambiental de los proyectos de marinas, al “contaminarse” estas decisiones con presiones ajenas al estricto análisis técnico del impacto de dichos proyectos en el ambiente. Los riesgos de un incremento notable de los litigios contra el Estado y los gobiernos locales como consecuencia de las normas consultadas, no sólo se dan en el ámbito de la jurisdicción interna, también son susceptibles de aumentar los reclamos ante tribunales arbitrales internacionales que presenten inversionistas extranjeros, con base en tratados bilaterales de protección de inversiones suscritos por Costa Rica. Varios de estos tratados establecen mecanismos de solución de controversias entre el Estado costarricense e inversionistas de otras partes, a cuya jurisdicción nuestro país asumió la obligación de someterse cuando así lo soliciten dichos inversionistas por considerar que actuaciones o decisiones de las autoridades nacionales afectan sus inversiones en el país. En el caso de estos tratados, las normas consultadas facilitan la presentación de dichos reclamos internacionales contra el país, porque facilitan de forma injustificada la configuración de los requisitos contenidos en los instrumentos internacionales citados para la admisibilidad de las controversias. Concluyen que las normas en consulta estarían ampliando las posibilidades de constantes demandas internacionales contra el Estado en caso de que SETENA rechace un EIA con posterioridad al otorgamiento de una concesión. En segundo lugar, acusan violación al derecho de participación ciudadana en la decisión de asuntos relacionados con el ambiente (artículos 9 y 50 de la Constitución Política). Lo anterior, por cuanto, afirman que el otorgamiento de concesiones para la construcción de marinas en bienes de dominio público, de previo a la aprobación definitiva de una Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental por SETENA, también es violatorio del derecho a la participación ciudadana de la población que, eventualmente, podría resultar afectada por dicha concesión. Consideran que esa situación, debilita el derecho de los habitantes a pronunciarse y participar, oportunamente, en la toma de decisiones que afectan el ambiente y la forma de vida de sus comunidades, porque desplaza su ejercicio a una etapa en la que las autoridades gubernamentales ya han tomado decisiones sobre una determinada solicitud de permiso o concesión y existen derechos adquiridos sobre la actividad que es objeto de controversia. En tercer lugar, señalan que el Transitorio II del proyecto consultado es inconstitucional porque viola el derecho a tener un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, por la exoneración de la obligación de realizar evaluaciones de impacto ambiental a quienes hayan construido marinas y atracaderos turísticos de forma ilegal. La norma consultada se refiere al caso de marinas y atracaderos turísticos construidos ilegalmente que, al momento de aprobación de esta reforma legal, se encuentran en operación. Es decir, marinas y atracaderos que hoy en día explotan bienes que pertenecen a la Nación (zona marítimo terrestre y mar territorial) de forma contraria a los principios establecidos en la legislación vigente y sin haber obtenido permisos o concesiones respectivas para hacer uso de dichos bienes demaniales. En relación con estos proyectos, el citado artículo transitorio establece que se les otorga el plazo de un año para ponerse a derecho y obtener los respectivos permisos y concesiones para su funcionamiento. Ya esta medida consideran que es bastante discutible, pues la obligación del Estado es proteger los bienes propios de la Nación y ordenar el desalojo inmediato de cualquier particular que pretenda apropiarse de ellos ilegítimamente. Estiman que la sola inclusión de semejante disposición en el proyecto de ley consultado, podría estar incentivando y fomentando el inicio o la aceleración de obras ilegales, bajo la expectativa de los responsables de beneficiarse con la aprobación de este artículo transitorio. Finalmente, indican que el Transitorio IV del proyecto en cuestión señala que la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental debe realizarse, únicamente, para el caso de actividades nuevas que no estén en operación. Por tal razón, en caso de renovación, cesión o adjudicación de derechos, u otorgamiento de una nueva concesión, de aquellas marinas, atracaderos turísticos o proyectos similares que se encontrasen en operación y no impliquen modificaciones, o sea que, la construcción o ejecución de nuevas obras o actividades, no requerirán realizar una evaluación de impacto ambiental. Tales actividades deberán regirse por el procedimiento establecido para obtener la autorización por parte de la autoridad ambiental correspondiente. No obstante, indican que se sabe y así lo han probado numerosos estudios, que el impacto ambiental es acumulativo, y dado que el plazo de las concesiones se aumenta hasta 35 años y puede prorrogarse sin que medie un nuevo estudio de impacto ambiental donde ya hay planes de construcción de marinas, se estaría procediendo en contra de la lógica intrínseca al principio precautorio (in dubio pro natura) y en sentido contrario a las exigencias que, para la protección del Mar Caribe, el país tiene obligación de cumplir según el Convenio para la Protección y Desarrollo del Medio Ambiente y su Protocolo de Cooperación para combatir los derrames de hidrocarburos en la Región del Gran Caribe Ley No. 7227, específicamente, en sus artículos 5, 6, 7 y 8. Si se observa con detenimiento esta situación, se puede concluir que 35 años después que haya iniciado operaciones una marina, las condiciones del medio ambiente habrán cambiado, pudiendo generarse nuevos y diferentes riesgos, en comparación con las condiciones iniciales. La buena ciencia indica que deberían haber controles ambientales a lo largo de todo el tiempo de la concesión y que, además, como requisito para la renovación del permiso, debería realizarse un nuevo estudio de impacto ambiental, aunque no se modifique la estructura de la marina, puesto que se evaluaría la viabilidad de la continuación de la operación. Todo lo cual, en su criterio, está vulnerando el principio precautorio en materia ambiental.
3.- Por resolución de las 08:45 hrs. de 19 de setiembre de 2008, se tuvo por presentada la consulta formulada, por lo que se solicitó al Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa la remisión del expediente legislativo No. 14.836, o bien, copia certificada del mismo (ver folios 48-50).
4.- Mediante resolución de las 09:42 hrs. de 23 de setiembre de 2008 se tuvo por recibida la copia certificada del expediente legislativo (ver resolución a folio 55 del expediente).
5.- A través de escrito presentado ante la Secretaría de la Sala Constitucional a las 10:52 hrs. del 24 de setiembre de 2008, el Director Regional y la Gerente de Incidencia Política de MarViva solicitaron que se tuvieran en cuentas sus manifestaciones en relación al fondo del proyecto de ley consultado (ver folios 56-60).
6.- En memorial recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 07:32 hrs. del 30 de setiembre 2008, se apersonaron los diputados Ana Helena Chacón, Oscar Núñez Calvo, Gladis González, Yalile Esna, Sandra Quesada, José A. Ocampo, Fernando Sánchez, Jorge Méndez, Lorena Vásquez Badilla, Bienvenido Venegas, Olga Marta Corrales, Salvador Quirós Conejo, Mayi Antillón Guerrero, Francisco Marín Monge, Xinia Nicolás Alvarado, Carlos Gutiérrez, Olivier Jiménez, Andrea Morales, Luis Antonio Barrantes y en su condición de “amicus curiae” se refieren, ampliamente, a los cuestionamientos de los legisladores consultantes. Solicitan a este Tribunal avalar la constitucionalidad del procedimiento y el fondo del proyecto, pues, en su criterio, el trámite ha estado apegado a la constitucionalidad en todos sus aspectos (ver folios 62-86).
7.- Por medio de memorial recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el 16 de octubre de 2008, se apersonó el Comité Unido por Talamanca-Caribe Sur, vecinos de Puerto Viejo de Talamanca a interponer una gestión de coadyuvancia activa. Lo anterior, con fundamento en la defensa de los intereses difusos. Manifiestan su oposición al proyecto de ley y cuestionan que no se realizó una consulta a las comunidades marino costeras sobre el texto en cuestión. Consideran que el proyecto pretende restringir el uso de la zona marítimo terrestre y otorgaría más facilidades a los empresarios en relación a la presentación de requisitos para obtener la concesión correspondiente. Cuestionan, además, los plazos para el otorgamiento de las concesiones (ver folios 87-92).
8.- En la substanciación del proceso se han observado las prescripciones de ley.
Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
I.- SOBRE LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA CONSULTA. La presente consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad fue efectuada por trece diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa luego de la aprobación en primer debate del proyecto “Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas” que se tramita en el expediente legislativo No. 14.836. Adicionalmente, cabe apuntar que el citado proyecto de ley fue consultado antes de su aprobación definitiva. Por lo expuesto y de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 96, inciso b), de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, esta consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad resulta admisible y se procede a evacuarla.
II.- SOBRE LA GESTIÓN DE COADYUVANCIA. Mediante memorial visible a folio 87 y siguientes del expediente, el Comité Unido por Talamanca-Caribe Sur presentó una gestión de coadyuvancia, con el propósito que se tomen en consideración sus manifestaciones y disconformidades en relación al proyecto de ley sometido a consulta. Sin embargo, dicha gestión es inadmisible. Nótese que la intervención adhesiva activa o pasiva está prevista para los procesos de amparo en los que existen contra interesados y, particularmente, para quien deriva un interés legítimo de la sentencia final (artículo 34 Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) y no para los mecanismos de consulta en los que pueden existir simples opiniones jurídicas contrapuestas acerca de la regularidad constitucional de un proyecto de ley (ver Votos Nos. 2003-14606 de las 12:30 hrs. del 12 de diciembre de 2003 y 2004-01603 de las 9:30 hrs. del 17 de febrero de 2004).
III.- OBJETO DE LA CONSULTA. La consulta se plantea para que este Tribunal Constitucional se pronuncie acerca de dos presuntos vicios esenciales en la substanciación del procedimiento legislativo del expediente legislativo No. 14.836, proyecto de ley “Ley de Simplificación de Trámites para la Instalación de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos”, así como, algunos aspectos de fondo, relacionados con el amparo del derecho a un medio ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, consagrado en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política.
IV.- SOBRE EL TRÁMITE DEL EXPEDIENTE LEGISLATIVO No. 14.836. De previo a analizar en detalle los extremos consultados por los legisladores, conviene realizar un recuento somero sobre las vicisitudes del procedimiento legislativo al que fue sometido el expediente legislativo No. 14.836, en el que se conoce el proyecto de ley denominado “Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas”:
<![if !supportLists]>1) <![endif]>El proyecto de ley de “Simplificación de Trámites y Creación de Incentivos en Atracaderos y Marinas Turísticas” fue presentado ante la Secretaría del Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa el 29 de julio de 2002 por los diputados Jorge Álvarez Pérez, Sigifredo Aiza Campos, Peter Guevara Guth y Edwin Paterson Bent (ver folios 1-20 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo I).
<![if !supportLists]>2) <![endif]>El 18 de setiembre de 2002 se procedió a la entrega de la copia del expediente al Departamento de Estudios, Referencias y Servicios Técnicos (ver folio 21 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo I).
<![if !supportLists]>3) <![endif]>El proyecto de ley fue publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 190 del 3 de octubre de 2002 (ver folio 22 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo I).
<![if !supportLists]>4) <![endif]>El expediente fue remitido en fecha 9 de octubre de 2002 ante la “Comisión Especial de Turismo que identificará y estudiará tanto los obstáculos que afecta la actividad turística, así como los estímulos necesarios que requiere ese sector, promueva estímulos necesarios, conozca y dictamine los proyectos de ley que estén relacionados con la actividad turística” (ver folio 22 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo I).
<![if !supportLists]>5) <![endif]>El 24 de octubre de 2002 se aprobaron en la Comisión Especial una serie de mociones para que el proyecto de ley fuera consultado a la Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos (CIMAT), Marina Los Sueños, Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, municipalidades costeras, Marina Banana Bay, CENTRAMAR, SAMOA, Cámara Nacional de Turismo, Marina Flamingo, a todas las marinas y atracaderos de que se tenga conocimiento en el país, Ministerio de Hacienda, Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura, Instituto Nacional de Seguros, Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, (ver folios 23, 26, 28 y 32-37 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo I).
<![if !supportLists]>6) <![endif]>Mediante oficios del 30 de octubre de 2002, el Presidente de la Comisión Especial de Turismo solicitó el criterio en relación al proyecto de ley de las Municipalidades de Limón, Golfito, Parrita, Garabito, Esparza, Osa, Puntarenas, Santa Cruz, Aguirre, Nandayure, Carrillo, Hojancha, Cañas, Bagaces, Tilarán, Liberia, Nicoya, Abangares, Siquirres, Pococí, Guácimo, Matina, La Cruz, Talamanca, Gerente de la Marina y Club de Yates Flamingo, Atracadero Club de Yates de Golfito, Director de Samoa del Sur, Gerente de Banana Bay, Ministerio de Hacienda, Instituto Costarricense de Pesca, Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, Cámara Nacional de Turismo, Instituto Nacional de Seguros, Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, Marina Los Sueños, Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos (ver folios 77-113 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo I).
<![if !supportLists]>7) <![endif]>El 3 de marzo de 2005, la Subcomisión Legislativa encargada de conocer el proyecto de ley, rindió ante la Comisión Especial su informe unánime afirmativo. Al efecto, se aportó un texto sustitutivo (ver folios 500-570 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo II).
<![if !supportLists]>8) <![endif]>En la sesión del 3 de marzo de 2005 se aprobó una moción ante la Comisión Especial para que se acogiera el texto adjunto como texto sustitutivo y se aprobaron una serie de mociones para que el texto del proyecto sustitutivo fuera consultado a la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, al CIMAT, a las municipalidades costeras, al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, al Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Ministerio de Salud, Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, a la Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, Cámara Nacional de Turismo y a la Procuraduría General de la República (ver folios 541-549 y 572-595 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo II).
<![if !supportLists]>9) <![endif]>Mediante oficios del 3 de marzo de 2005, la Comisión Especial solicitó el criterio sobre el texto sustitutivo aprobado, a las siguientes instituciones: a la Cámara Nacional de Turismo, Municipalidades de Nicoya, Liberia, Tilarán, Cañas, Carrillo, La Cruz, Puntarenas, Coto Brus, Corredores, Osa, Esparza, Siquirres, Talamanca, Pococí, Matina, Limón, Montes de Oro, Santa Cruz, Hojancha, Nandayure, Garabito, Parrita, Guácimo, Golfito, Abangares, Bagaces, Aguirre y Buenos Aires, Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, al CIMAT, Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, Ministerio de Salud, Unión Nacional de Gobiernos Locales, Procuraduría General de la República, Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (ver folios 596-632 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo II).
<![if !supportLists]>10) <![endif]>En la sesión No. 58 del 31 de marzo de 2005 de la Comisión Especial se aprobó el texto del proyecto “Ley de Simplificación de Trámites y Creación de Incentivos en Atracaderos y Marinas Turísticas”, comisionándose al diputado Álvarez Pérez para elaborar el dictamen correspondiente (ver folios 704-735 y el dictamen afirmativo a folios 739-754 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo III).
<![if !supportLists]>11) <![endif]>El 5 de mayo de 2005 la Comisión Especial entregó a la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Asamblea Legislativa el dictamen afirmativo de mayoría correspondiente al proyecto de ley (ver folio 756 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo III).
<![if !supportLists]>12) <![endif]>En la sesión ordinaria No. 149 del 28 de marzo de 2006 se inició en el Plenario la discusión del proyecto de ley en primer debate, presentándose una serie de mociones vía artículo 137, las cuales, fueron trasladadas a la Comisión Dictaminadora (ver folio 802-810 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo III).
<![if !supportLists]>13) <![endif]>En fechas 4, 11, 18 y 20 de abril de 2006 la Comisión Especial de Turismo rindió sus informes de mociones vía artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa (826-829 de la copia del expediente legislativo del Tomo III, folios 860-875, 941-954, 968-1003 de la copia del expediente legislativo del Tomo IV).
<![if !supportLists]>14) <![endif]>En la sesión ordinaria No. 66 del 4 de setiembre de 2006 se continuó la discusión del proyecto de ley en el Plenario y se aprobó una moción de plazo cuatrienal del artículo 119 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa y una moción para que el proyecto fuera enviado a dictaminar a la Comisión Permanente por un plazo de noventa días naturales (ver folios 1054-1076 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo IV).
<![if !supportLists]>15) <![endif]>El proyecto de ley fue remitido a la Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo en fecha 7 de setiembre de 2006, para que en el plazo de noventa días fuera dictaminado (ver folio 1077 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo IV).
<![if !supportLists]>16) <![endif]>Mediante oficios del 19 de octubre de 2006, la Jefe del Área de la Comisión Especial de Turismo remitió el proyecto de ley con las modificaciones realizadas a esa fecha, a las siguientes instituciones: Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal, Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, Procuraduría General de la República, Contraloría General de la República, Instituto Geográfico Nacional, Universidad de Costa Rica y Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica. Lo anterior, con el propósito de solicitar la colaboración para la redacción del proyecto de ley (ver folios 1174-1191 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo V).
<![if !supportLists]>17) <![endif]>El 8 de marzo de 2007 se aprobó en la Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo una moción para que se acogiera un texto sustitutivo que se utilizara como texto base de discusión para el expediente (ver folios 1406-1417 y folios 1473-1510 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomos V y VI).
<![if !supportLists]>18) <![endif]>La Comisión Especial aprobó una moción en fecha 8 de marzo de 2007 para que el proyecto de ley fuera consultado a todas las municipalidades del país, Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos turísticos, Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, Cámaras y Federaciones de Turismo, Ministerio de Salud, Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Contraloría General de la República, Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de Aduanas, Procuraduría General de la República (ver folio 1464 de la copia del expediente legislativo, ver Tomo VI).
<![if !supportLists]>19) <![endif]>Mediante oficios del 14 de marzo de 2007 se sometió a consulta el texto sustitutivo al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, Contraloría General de la República, Dirección General de Aduanas, Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Procuraduría General de la República, Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, al CIMAT, a todas las municipalidades del país, cámaras y federaciones de turismo (folios 1511-1550 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo IV).
<![if !supportLists]>20) <![endif]>El 21 de marzo de 2007 la Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo rindió su dictamen unánime afirmativo en relación al proyecto de ley consultado y lo entregó a la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver folios 1580-1597 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo VI).
<![if !supportLists]>21) <![endif]>En la sesión ordinaria No. 12 del 21 de mayo de 2007 se inició la discusión del proyecto de ley y, posteriormente, se anunció que se habían presentado varias mociones vía artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, las cuales, pasaron a la Comisión Dictaminadora (ver folios 1627-1633 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo VI).
<![if !supportLists]>22) <![endif]>En fechas 11 de junio, 9 de julio, 19 de setiembre de 2007 y 30 de junio de 2008, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo rindió ante el Plenario sus informes de mociones vía artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver folios 1672-1685 de la copia del expediente en el Tomo VI, folios 1713-1778 y 1816-1821 de la copia del expediente legislativo en el Tomo VII, folios 2164-2172 de la copia del expediente, Tomo VIII).
<![if !supportLists]>23) <![endif]>En la sesión ordinaria No. 34 del 30 de junio de 2008, se continuó la discusión del proyecto de ley en su trámite de primer debate. Posteriormente, el Presidente del Directorio anunció que se había recibido el último informe de mociones vía artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver folios 2420-2432 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo IX).
<![if !supportLists]>24) <![endif]>En la sesión ordinaria No. 038 del 8 de julio de 2008 se inició en el Plenario la discusión por el fondo del proyecto de ley, conociéndose una serie de mociones de reiteración (ver folios 2434-2455 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo IX).
<![if !supportLists]>25) <![endif]>El expediente legislativo fue conocido por el fondo en las sesiones ordinarias No. 040 del 10 de julio, No. 41 del 14 de julio, No. 42 del 15 de julio, No. 065 del 2 de setiembre, No. 067 del 4 de setiembre, No. 068 del 8 de setiembre de 2008 (ver folios 2456-2751 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomos IX-X).
<![if !supportLists]>26) <![endif]>En la sesión ordinaria No. 069 del 9 se setiembre de 2008 se continuó la discusión por el fondo del proyecto de ley, aprobándose en primer debate por una mayoría de cuarenta y un diputados (ver folios 2752-2791 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo XI).
CONSULTA POR LA FORMA V.- SOBRE LA FALTA DE CONSULTA DEL PROYECTO DE LEY A VARIAS INSTITUCIONES AUTÓNOMAS. INFRACCIÓN AL ARTÍCULO 190 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. Como primer vicio en el procedimiento legislativo, los Diputados consultantes cuestionan que en aplicación de los artículo 170 y 190 de la Constitución Política, era un deber ineludible que el proyecto de ley se consultara, obligatoriamente, a las siguientes instituciones: Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT), a las Municipalidades de las zonas costeras, a la Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), al Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico (INCOP) y al Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM). Lo anterior, por cuanto, en el trámite de conocimiento de mociones de fondo vía artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, se aprobaron ante la Comisión Especial Permanente de Turismo un total de veintinueve mociones que, en su criterio, modifican aspectos sustanciales del proyecto de ley y, por lo tanto, dichos cambios debieron ser consultados a las instituciones indicadas. Específicamente, se refieren al artículo 2 del proyecto de ley, que pretende reformar los artículos 1, 5, 8 y 9 de la Ley No. 7744 del 19 de diciembre de 1997, sea, la Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas. Ahora bien, de la atenta lectura de los numerales supra citados, así como, de la consulta planteada por los legisladores no se colige ninguna relación con las competencias de la Junta Administrativa Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), el Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico (INCOP) y el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM). En efecto, los legisladores omitieron por completo hacer una relación entre las competencias de las referidas instituciones autónomas y el contenido del proyecto de ley consultado. Así las cosas, ante la omisión apuntada, no se observa ninguna modificación sustancial del proyecto de ley, que afecte las competencias de las citadas instituciones. En consecuencia, lo procedente es centrarse en las competencias municipales, principalmente en relación al tema del otorgamiento de las concesiones y, adicionalmente, las competencias del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, en lo tocante a las concesiones en la zona del Golfo de Papagayo. Tal y como lo señalan los legisladores consultantes, el artículo 190 de la Constitución Política dispone que para la discusión y aprobación de proyectos de ley relativos a una institución autónoma, la Asamblea Legislativa oirá, previamente, la opinión de aquélla. En el caso concreto y después del examen del iter legislativo, es posible corroborar que, en términos generales –y salvo lo que se dirá en relación al artículo 9 de la ley que se pretende reformar-, las instituciones citadas, a saber, las municipalidades costeras y el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo han sido ampliamente consultadas en relación a los textos que han servido de discusión en el seno de la Asamblea Legislativa, respecto a la aprobación de una reforma a la Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas, Ley No. 7744 del 6 de febrero de 1998. En efecto, nótese que el primer texto sometido a discusión fue consultado a todas las municipalidades costeras, así como, a la Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos (CIMAT), como órgano de desconcentración máxima, adscrito al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, mediante oficios del 30 de octubre de 2002 (ver folios 77-113 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo I). Posteriormente, en la sesión del 3 de marzo de 2005 se aprobó una moción en la Comisión Especial de Turismo para que se acogiera un texto sustitutivo, el cual, también fue sometido a consulta ante las municipalidades costeras y el CIMAT. Lo anterior, mediante oficios del 3 de marzo de 2005 (ver folios 596-632 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo II). Finalmente, tenemos que el 8 de marzo de 2007 se aprobó en la Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo, una moción para que se acogiera un texto sustitutivo y se utilizara como documento base de discusión. Dicha Comisión aprobó, adicionalmente, una moción para que el proyecto de ley fuera consultado a varias instituciones, entre ellas, las municipalidades de todo el país, el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo y la Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos, lo cual, se concretó mediante oficios del 14 de marzo de 2007 (ver folios 1511-1550 de la copia del expediente legislativo). Ahora bien, los legisladores consultantes consideran inconstitucional que, a partir de este momento, no se realizaron nuevas consultas, pese a que, en su criterio, se aprobaron modificaciones sustanciales al proyecto de ley analizado. Cabe recalcar que, conforme a lo que ha sido la línea jurisprudencial de este Tribunal Constitucional, el artículo 190 de la Constitución Política no implica que todo proyecto de ley o cualquier modificación introducida al texto, a través del ejercicio del derecho de enmienda, deba ser consultada a la institución autónoma de que se trate, sino, solamente, aquellos aspectos referidos a su constitución o estructura orgánica, o bien, los relativos al ámbito esencial de las competencias de las instituciones involucradas. Sobre el particular, en sentencia No. 2008-004569 de las 14:30 hrs. de 26 de marzo de 2008, este Tribunal Constitucional, con redacción del Magistrado ponente, consideró lo siguiente:
“(...) Cabe advertir que desde el Voto No. 1633-93 de las 14:33 hrs. de 13 de abril de 1993, este Tribunal Constitucional ha indicado, reiteradamente (ver, entre otros, Votos Nos. 3625-1996 de las 15:18 hrs. de 16 de julio de 1996, 4717-1997 de las 16:39 hrs. de 19 de agosto de 1997, 9137-2001 de las 14:48 hrs. de 12 de septiembre de 2001), que cualquier proyecto de ley es susceptible de ser modificado durante el iter parlamentario, vía el derecho de enmienda de los legisladores, siempre y cuando no se altere el contenido esencial o material, en cuyo caso se tendrán por infringidas las normas constitucionales que regulan la iniciativa en la formación de la ley, la publicidad y, desde luego, el trámite sustancial de consulta a las instituciones autónomas ex artículo 190 constitucional (...)”
Bajo esa tesitura, restaría por analizar si las modificaciones introducidas inciden en el marco competencial u orgánico de las instituciones señaladas, al punto, que ameritaran una nueva consulta. Lo anterior, con fundamento en las observaciones planteadas por los propios legisladores consultantes (ver folios 5-10 del expediente):
“Artículo 1.- Concesión (...)
La municipalidad del lugar será la autoridad competente para otorgar la concesión. (...) En cuanto a las concesiones que se soliciten en el Proyecto Turístico Golfo de Papagayo, la autoridad competente para otorgarlas será el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT), de conformidad con la Ley reguladora de desarrollo y ejecución del Proyecto Turístico Golfo de Papagayo, N.º 6758, de 4 de junio de 1982. (...)” (Lo resaltado corresponde a la moción aprobada).
Del análisis del texto trascrito, así como de la normativa vigente, se desprende que no se está modificando, sustancialmente, alguna de las competencias de las instituciones involucradas. Es evidente que les corresponde a las municipalidades otorgar las respectivas concesiones para la construcción, administración y explotación de las marinas y los atracaderos turísticos. Inclusive, la regulación actual y vigente dispone en el artículo 1°, lo siguiente:
“ARTÍCULO 1.- Autorización Podrán otorgarse concesiones en las áreas de la zona marítimo- terrestre y el área adyacente cubierta permanentemente por el mar, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en la presente ley; con excepción de las áreas de manglar, los parques nacionales y las reservas biológicas para la edificación, administración y explotación de marinas y atracaderos turísticos.
La municipalidad del lugar será la autoridad competente para otorgar la concesión. En caso de petición expresa de la municipalidad respectiva a las instituciones estatales, estas deberán brindar el asesoramiento técnico.
Corresponderá a las instituciones respectivas del Estado costarricense, en los ámbitos de su competencia, supervisar y fiscalizar, en forma periódica, la operación y el funcionamiento de las marinas y los atracaderos turísticos.
La concesión se otorgará resguardando el ambiente y los recursos naturales de la zona.” Ahora bien, en relación a las competencias del Instituto Costarricense del Turismo, tenemos que la Ley No. 6758, de 25 de junio de 1982 que Regula la Ejecución del Proyecto Turístico de Papagayo, dispone, en lo conducente, lo siguiente:
“Artículo 9º.- Para ejecutar y desarrollar el proyecto, el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo creará una oficina ejecutora que tendrá, en forma exclusiva, las facultades de dirigir, coordinar, administrar y controlar el desarrollo a que esta ley se refiere. Esta oficina estará adscrita al Instituto, dependiendo directamente de su Junta Directiva.” “Artículo 12.- La Junta Directiva del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo podrá otorgar concesiones sobre el uso de las tierras del proyecto en la zona destinada al mismo, de conformidad con los plazos y las condiciones que el Instituto establezca al efecto, y de conformidad con las disposiciones del Artículo 107 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República”. (Lo resaltado no corresponde al original).
De conformidad con lo anterior, es evidente que por disposición legal le corresponde al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, dirigir, coordinar, administrar y controlar el desarrollo turístico que se realiza en el Proyecto Turístico de Papagayo y, al efecto, le compete otorgar las concesiones turísticas correspondiente, entre ellas, claro está, las de construcción y administración de marinas turísticas. Sobre el particular, en la sesión No. 34 del Plenario Legislativo del 9 de julio de 2007, la legisladora Vásquez Badilla introdujo la moción No. 55 que propuso el texto cuestionado (ver folio 1803 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo VII). En la discusión correspondiente, la diputada proponente afirmó lo siguiente:
“(...) Me parece que este proyecto contempla un problema que esta Comisión debe corregir, y es que cuando se habla de la autoridad competente para otorgar la concesión, porque se indica que es la municipalidad del lugar respectivo.
(...)
Sin embargo, aquí hay un tema que es el del proyecto turístico de Papagayo que, efectivamente, tiene una Ley específica y donde no es la Municipalidad de Carrillo, por ejemplo, la que otorga esas concesiones en esa área.
Creo importante dejar clara la incorporación del último párrafo, en cuanto a las concesiones que se solicitan en el proyecto turístico del Golfo de Papagayo, pues hay un vacío en este momento, a mi juicio, porque la autoridad competente, en este caso, no es la Municipalidad sino el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, según la Ley No. 6758 del 6 de mayo de 1982. (...)” Moción que, finalmente, fue aprobada por unanimidad en la sesión No. 7 de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo, llevada a cabo el 18 de julio de 2007 (ver folios 1967-1968 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo VII). Conforme con lo anterior, se insiste que es evidente que no es necesaria una nueva consulta, sea, a la Municipalidad de Carrillo o al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, pues es claro que la competencia para el otorgamiento de las concesiones que se confieran en el Proyecto Turístico Papagayo, la ostenta, por ley especial, el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo. De este modo, se aprecia que no se están modificando sus competencias esenciales, sino que se está haciendo la aclaración respectiva en aplicación de la legislación especial dispuesta para la Zona Turística de Papagayo. En consecuencia, respecto a este extremo, no se acredita un vicio de inconstitucionalidad que invalide el procedimiento legislativo.
“El recurso de apelación deberá ser interpuesto ante el jerarca del ICT. Lo resuelto por dicho ente dará por agotada la vía administrativa, lo que no constituye impedimento para acudir a la vía jurisdiccional.” Los legisladores cuestionan que en el texto sustitutivo aprobado ante la Comisión Permanente Especial en marzo de 2007, se le confería la competencia para agotar la vía administrativa al CIMAT. Sin embargo, en la regulación vigente, dicha competencia la ostenta el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, pues así está contemplado en el artículo 7 de la Ley No. 7744 de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas, que dispone en lo conducente, lo siguiente:
“(...) Contra las resoluciones de la Comisión, cabrán los recursos de revocatoria y de apelación, en los términos y las condiciones establecidos en la Ley General de la Administración Pública.
El recurso de apelación deberá ser interpuesto ante el jerarca del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo.
En esta última resolución se dará por agotada la vía administrativa para los efectos de la acción contenciosa, en los términos y efectos señalados por la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa.” (Lo resaltado no corresponde al original).
Así las cosas, no resultaba esencial otorgar una nueva audiencia al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo si la regulación actual le confiere, al igual que el texto vigente, la potestad de resolver los recursos de apelación interpuestos contra las decisiones de la Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos y, por ende, agotar la vía administrativa en la materia. Así las cosas, al no modificarse las competencias del ICT, no era necesario realizar una nueva consulta pues es evidente que se procura mantener la regulación conforme a la situación actual.
“(...) Las municipalidades podrán brindar las facilidades para el otorgamiento de las patentes que se requieran, para el buen funcionamiento de los proyectos de marinas que concesionen y, por consiguiente, de los locales comerciales y anexos exigidos por la presente Ley.”
La legisladora, Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, en fecha 13 de noviembre de 2007, es decir, con posterioridad a la última consulta realizada a las municipalidades costeras, introdujo el texto de esta moción, aprobándose en el seno de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo en fecha 17 de junio de 2008 (ver folios 2353-2360 de la copia del expediente legislativo, Tomo IX). Para analizar este extremo de la consulta es preciso, de previo, definir los contornos de la autonomía municipal, consagrada en el artículo 170 de la Constitución Política al disponer que “Las corporaciones municipales son autónomas”. Sobre el particular, en la sentencia No. 5445-1999 de las 14:30 hrs. del 14 de julio de 1999, este Tribunal Constitucional desarrolló los aspectos que integran la autonomía reconocida a las corporaciones municipales:
“(...) III.- CONCEPTOS GENERALES SOBRE EL RÉGIMEN MUNICIPAL. En Costa Rica el régimen municipal es una modalidad de la descentralización territorial, según se desprende del párrafo primero del artículo 168 constitucional. Se define, principalmente, en los artículos 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política que señalan, en lo que interesa, que la ‘administración de los intereses y servicios locales estará a cargo del Gobierno Municipal formado por un cuerpo deliberante de elección popular y de un funcionario ejecutivo que designa la ley’ (hoy día Alcalde Municipal); es un ‘sistema corporativo que goza de autonomía y de recursos económicos propios (competencia presupuestaria)’. De esta enunciación de los principales rasgos jurídicos de la institución municipal, resulta absolutamente claro que se derivan ciertos elementos, a saber: la existencia de una jurisdicción territorial para atender los intereses y servicios del nivel local; la constitución de una población fincada en lazos de vecindad, de manera que todo habitante del Cantón es munícipe; el gobierno formado por dos órganos diferenciados (Concejo y Alcalde) con funciones y relaciones entre ellos definidas; la naturaleza corporativa de la institución; garantía constitucional de independencia (autonomía); y la materia objeto de su administración, que está formada por todo aquello que sea o constituya ‘interés y servicio local’. Desde el punto de vista político, las municipalidades son gobiernos representativos con competencia sobre un determinado territorio (cantón), con personalidad jurídica propia y potestades públicas frente a sus munícipes (habitantes del cantón); operan de manera descentralizada frente al Gobierno de la República, y gozan de autonomía constitucionalmente garantizada y reforzada que se manifiesta en materia política, al determinar sus propias metas y los medios normativos y administrativos en cumplimiento de todo tipo de servicio público para la satisfacción del bien común en su comunidad. Puede decirse, en síntesis, que las municipalidades o gobiernos locales son entidades territoriales de naturaleza corporativa y pública no estatal, dotadas de independencia en materia de gobierno y funcionamiento, lo que quiere decir, por ejemplo, que la autonomía municipal involucra aspectos tributarios, que para su validez requieren de la autorización legislativa, la contratación de empréstitos y la elaboración y disposición de sus propios ingresos y gastos, con potestades genéricas. Todo esto implica, necesariamente, que para poder definir correctamente la conformación del Estado Costarricense, debe existir un ensamble exacto en la suma de los Gobiernos Municipales en su conjunto e individualmente, en orden a las relaciones y funcionamiento coordinado con el Gobierno de la República, para evitar la coexistencia simultánea de esferas de poder de diferente origen y esencia, la duplicación de los esfuerzos nacionales y locales, y la confusión de derechos y obligaciones entre las diversas partes involucradas. Lo expresado conduce, en consecuencia, a la necesidad de definir, desde la perspectiva constitucional, cuál es el ámbito municipal, lo que se hará en los siguientes considerandos, para examinar, posteriormente y contra el marco general de lo local, los alcances y la compatibilidad de las normas que han sido impugnadas.
IV.- AUTONOMÍA MUNICIPAL. GENERALIDADES. Gramaticalmente, es usual que se diga que el término ‘autonomía’, puede ser definido como ‘la potestad que dentro del Estado pueden gozar municipios, provincias, regiones u otras entidades de él, para regir intereses peculiares de su vida interior, mediante normas y órganos de gobierno propios’. Desde un punto de vista jurídico-doctrinario, esta autonomía debe ser entendida como la capacidad que tienen las Municipalidades de decidir libremente y bajo su propia responsabilidad, todo lo referente a la organización de determinada localidad (el cantón, en nuestro caso). Así, algún sector de la doctrina ha dicho que esa autonomía implica la libre elección de sus propias autoridades; la libre gestión en las materias de su competencia; la creación, recaudación e inversión de sus propios ingresos; y específicamente, se refiere a que abarca una autonomía política, normativa, tributaria y administrativa, definiéndolas, en términos muy generales, de la siguiente manera: autonomía política: como la que da origen al autogobierno, que conlleva la elección de sus autoridades a través de mecanismos de carácter democrático y representativo, tal y como lo señala nuestra Constitución Política en su artículo 169; autonomía normativa: en virtud de la cual las municipalidades tienen la potestad de dictar su propio ordenamiento en las materias de su competencia, potestad que en nuestro país se refiere únicamente a la potestad reglamentaria que regula internamente la organización de la corporación y los servicios que presta (reglamentos autónomos de organización y de servicio); autonomía tributaria: conocida también como potestad impositiva, y se refiere a que la iniciativa para la creación, modificación, extinción o exención de los tributos municipales corresponde a estos entes, potestad sujeta a la aprobación señalada en el artículo 121, inciso 13 de la Constitución Política cuando así corresponda; y autonomía administrativa: como la potestad que implica no sólo la autonormación, sino también la autoadministración y, por lo tanto, la libertad frente al Estado para la adopción de las decisiones fundamentales del ente. Nuestra doctrina, por su parte, ha dicho que la Constitución Política (artículo 170) y el Código Municipal (artículo 7 del Código Municipal anterior, y 4 del vigente) no se han limitado a atribuir a las municipalidades de capacidad para gestionar y promover intereses y servicios locales, sino que han dispuesto expresamente que esa gestión municipal es y debe ser autónoma, que se define como libertad frente a los demás entes del Estado para la adopción de sus decisiones fundamentales. Esta autonomía viene dada en directa relación con el carácter electoral y representativo de su Gobierno (Concejo y Alcalde) que se eligen cada cuatro años, y significa la capacidad de la municipalidad de fijarse sus políticas de acción y de inversión en forma independiente, y más específicamente, frente al Poder Ejecutivo y del partido gobernante. Es la capacidad de fijación de planes y programas del gobierno local, por lo que va unida a la potestad de la municipalidad para dictar su propio presupuesto, expresión de las políticas previamente definidas por el Concejo, capacidad, que a su vez, es política. Esta posición coincide con la mayoritaria de la doctrina, en la que se ha dicho que el rango típico de la autonomía local reside en el hecho de que el órgano fundamental del ente territorial es el pueblo como cuerpo electoral y de que, consiguientemente, de aquél deriva su orientación política-administrativa, no del Estado, sino de la propia comunidad, o sea, de la mayoría electoral de esa misma comunidad, con la consecuencia de que tal orientación política puede diverger de la del Gobierno de la República y aún contrariarla, ahí donde no haya correspondencia de mayorías entre la comunidad estatal y la local; o bien, que la autonomía política es una posición jurídica, que se expresa en la potestad de conducir una línea política propia entendida como posibilidad, en orden a una determinada esfera de intereses y competencias, de establecer una línea propia de acción o un programa propio, con poderes propios y propia responsabilidad acerca de la oportunidad y la utilidad de sus actos. (...)” (Lo resaltado no corresponde al original).
De lo anterior, se desprende que las municipalidades son entes territoriales que tienen autonomía administrativa y política o de gobierno, la cual, se traduce en la potestad para definir los fines y lineamientos de la institución y los medios para cumplirlos. Adicionalmente, cabe señalar que ha sido calificada como una materia exclusivamente municipal, todo lo que se refiere al otorgamiento de las licencias para el ejercicio del comercio en su más variada gama de actividades, y su natural consecuencia que es percibir el llamado impuesto de patente. Así, por ejemplo, en la sentencia No. 6469-1997 de las 16:20 hrs. del 8 de octubre de 1997, este Tribunal Constitucional destacó que todo lo concerniente a las licencias para el ejercicio de actividades lucrativas, será siempre competencia municipal por integrar el concepto genérico de “lo local”, consagrado en el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política. En dicha resolución se resumió la posición de esta Sala, al señalar lo siguiente:
“(...) Recapitulando lo expresado en esta sentencia, todo lo concerniente al otorgamiento de las licencias (patentes, como comúnmente se les denomina) para la venta de licores, es materia municipal; consecuentemente, basta para que un local abra sus puertas y se dedique a tal actividad, que posea la respectiva ‘patente’ y cumpla con los requisitos formales que establezca la ley, siempre dentro del ámbito de lo local y eventualmente, de los reglamentos ejecutivos o municipales de servicio, cuando sean procedentes. Le está vedado expresamente por Constitución Política a los gobernadores -articulación de los numerales 169 y 170- intervenir en los procesos de otorgamiento de las licencias o de los llamados permisos de funcionamiento, lo que no es posible sin lesionar la autonomía municipal. (...)”
En consecuencia, el otorgamiento de las licencias municipales para el ejercicio de cualquier actividad lucrativa, previstas en el artículo 79 del Código Municipal, se trata de una competencia esencial y típica de las municipalidades, por integrar el concepto jurídico indeterminado de administración de los intereses y servicios locales del artículo 169 constitucional. Partiendo de lo anterior, el Estado no puede, a través de un lineamiento o directiva legislativa como la contemplada en el numeral analizado, afectar la autonomía municipal. En virtud lo expuesto, de previo a la imposición de una directiva legislativa, relacionada con el tema de la gestión de las licencias y patentes municipales, los legisladores debieron recabar el criterio de las corporaciones municipales involucradas, pues, de lo contrario, se desconocería su autonomía, reconocida constitucionalmente. En suma, si bien la propuesta legislativa que pretende modificar el artículo 9 de la legislación vigente, se encuentra redactada en términos facultativos o potestativos, es lo cierto que supone una directiva legislativa respecto de dos aspectos que, clásicamente, constituyen parte fundamental de las competencias locales, tales como el tema de las patentes en la zona marítimo terrestre que debe ser administrada por los ayuntamientos. En todo caso, la directiva legislativa propuesta, pese a su naturaleza facultativa, toca aspectos propios de la autonomía local tales como la gestión de los recursos humanos, materiales y financieros para una agilización o flexibilización en el otorgamiento de las patentes requeridas por las marinas concesionadas, punto sobre el cual se impone la consulta no solo por razones estrictamente formales, sino para asegurar el acierto técnico de la legislación que pueda ser promulgada. Como conclusión de lo expuesto, en cuanto a este extremo de la consulta, sí se acredita un vicio esencial que vulneró la constitucionalidad del procedimiento legislativo. Lo anterior, por cuanto, se demostró que mediante una moción aprobada, de conformidad con el trámite del artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, se introdujo una modificación sustancial al proyecto de ley que no fue consultada a las corporaciones municipales.
VI.- SOBRE LA INFRACCIÓN AL PRINCIPIO DE PUBLICIDAD EN EL PROCEDIMIENTO LEGISLATIVO. En segundo término, los legisladores refieren que así como no se consultaron los cambios sustanciales que sufrió el proyecto de ley, tampoco se publicó el nuevo texto en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, violentándose con ello el principio de publicidad. Hacen la observación que las últimas modificaciones que sufrió el proyecto se realizaron entre los días 6 de junio de 2007 y el 25 de junio de 2008, durante el trámite de conocimiento de mociones de fondo, regulado por el artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. Sobre el particular, se observa que los legisladores plantean la consulta en abstracto sin puntualizarle a este Tribunal Constitucional cuáles son las supuestas modificaciones sustanciales introducidas en el trámite de conocimiento de mociones de fondo y que, en su criterio, ameritaban una nueva publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Bajo tal panorama, cabe reiterar en cuanto a este extremo se refiere, que en aplicación del artículo 99 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, existe reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal en el sentido que este órgano se pronuncia sobre lo expresamente consultado y motivado, pero no en abstracto (ver sentencias Nos. 5399-1995 de las 15:54 hrs. del 3 de octubre 1995, 9530-1999 de las 9:15 hrs. 3 de diciembre de 1999, 2001-12420 de las 9:21 hrs. del 7 de diciembre de 2001 y 2004-07242 de las 17:03 hrs. del 30 de junio de 2004, entre otras). Pese a dicha omisión y con ocasión de lo analizado en el considerando antecedente, estima este Tribunal que sí se introdujo una modificación sustancial al proyecto de ley consultado, lo que, exigía una nueva publicación a fin de brindarle una mayor publicidad al texto. En efecto, como se apuntó, se acreditó que mediante la aprobación de una moción de fondo, se modificó el texto del proyecto de ley a fin de imponerle a las municipalidades un lineamiento para que brinden las facilidades correspondientes para el otorgamiento de las patentes requeridas para el buen funcionamiento de los proyectos de marinas que se concesionen. Lo anterior, sin que de previo se escuchara su opinión al respecto, tal y como lo exige el artículo 190 de la Constitución Política. Adicionalmente, se acredita que tampoco se realizó una nueva publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, violentándose el principio de publicidad en el trámite del procedimiento legislativo, vicio esencial que, al estar intrínsecamente relacionado con el principio democrático, afectó la regularidad constitucional del iter parlamentario. Nótese que un elemento esencial en el procedimiento de formación de las leyes, es el de publicidad, en el tanto, procura garantizar un amplio debate que facilite el contacto con la opinión pública en general y, en particular, con quienes pudieran tener interés, por razón de sus actividades, en conocer y hasta participar en la deliberación del asunto o, inclusive, la posibilidad de escuchar a entes públicos, en este caso, a las municipalidades, a quienes se les está imponiendo una directriz legislativa relacionada con sus competencias exclusivas. Además, este Tribunal ha señalado que la publicidad de los procedimientos parlamentarios, resulta esencial debido al carácter representativo de la comunidad nacional que ostenta la Asamblea Legislativa, siendo que, la soberanía reside en el pueblo y los diputados solamente son sus representantes, según lo dispone el artículo 105 de la Constitución Política. En el caso que se examina, se acredita que el proyecto de ley “Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas” que se somete a consulta de este Tribunal, fue debidamente publicado en La Gaceta No. 190 del 3 de octubre de 2002. Tómese en consideración, sobre el particular, que esta propuesta de reforma fue presentada ante la Secretaría del Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa desde el 29 de julio de 2002. Sin embargo, y pese a la aprobación de la moción No. 12-04 (33-137) conocida en la sesión extraordinaria No. 4 de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Turismo en fecha 17 de junio de 2008, el proyecto de ley no fue publicado, nuevamente, en el Diario Oficial. Lo anterior, pese a que, como se señaló supra, se introdujo una modificación sustancial al proyecto de ley que procura establecer directivas en relación a las competencias más esenciales de las corporaciones municipales. En consecuencia, la omisión de realizar una nueva publicación del proyecto de ley, a fin de garantizar la publicidad del texto, así como, procurar la participación ciudadana e institucional, violentó un aspecto esencial en el procedimiento parlamentario, cuya omisión acarrea un vicio de inconstitucionalidad sobre el procedimiento legislativo.
CONSULTA POR EL FONDO VII.- SOBRE LA FALTA DE EVALUACIÓN DE IMPACTO AMBIENTAL DE PREVIO AL OTORGAMIENTO DE LA CONCESIÓN. INFRACCIÓN AL ARTÍCULO 50 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA Y AL PRINCIPIO DE RESPONSABILIDAD DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA. Los legisladores consultantes cuestionan que a través de la reforma que se intenta aprobar en el seno de la Asamblea Legislativa, se pretende derogar y, por ende, desconocer el requisito de una Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) aprobada por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental de previo al otorgamiento de la concesión para la construcción de una marina o atracadero turístico. Aducen que dicho requisito está, actualmente, contemplado en el artículo 8, inciso f), de la Ley No. 7744 de 19 de diciembre de 1997 sobre “Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas”. Sin embargo, se procura reformar dicho artículo y, en su lugar, se establece en el artículo 9 bis que la aprobación por parte de la SETENA de una EIA será un requisito posterior al otorgamiento de la respectiva concesión para construir y operar marinas turísticas. Citan el artículo 8 del proyecto de ley consultado que dispone que para el trámite del contrato de concesión se requiere la presentación de una certificación extendida por la SETENA en la que se informe sobre el estado actual de la EIA. Es decir, que no se exige contar con una evaluación para tramitar una concesión demanial, sino que sólo se requiere informar sobre el estado en que se encuentra el trámite. Además, insisten que para iniciar el procedimiento, únicamente, se contempla la presentación de una Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial (VAP) gestionada a través de una Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, la cual, se caracteriza por ser un estudio preliminar que carece de profundidad. Los legisladores consultantes consideran que esa disposición contraviene los principios de tutela medio ambiental, principalmente, el principio precautorio. De otra parte, consideran que las normas consultadas incrementan de forma innecesaria el riesgo de presentación de demandas y litigios contra el Estado costarricense y, adicionalmente, favorecen el ejercicio de presiones para que las autoridades competentes avalen proyectos cuestionados ambientalmente. Insisten que con las reformas consultadas, los interesados en construir marinas o atracaderos turísticos ostentarán el título de concesionarios cuando la SETENA se pronuncie sobre los estudios de impacto ambiental. En tal caso, de no obtenerse el aval, las municipalidades deberán anular los actos de otorgamiento de las concesiones, en cuyo caso, los concesionarios podrían alegar infracción a derechos adquiridos o incumplimientos contractuales y plantear reclamos millonarios. Aunado a lo anterior, consideran que se debe tomar en consideración los reclamos ante los tribunales arbitrales internacionales que presenten los inversionistas extranjeros como, por ejemplo, el mecanismo de solución de controversias “Inversionista-Estado” contenido en el Capítulo 10 del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana. Vistos los agravios presentados por los legisladores consultantes, se divide este apartado de la consulta en el análisis de dos extremos, uno relacionado con la protección al medio ambiente y, en segundo término, se analiza la disposición que exime la responsabilidad del Estado como un mecanismo para evadir las demandas por la denegatoria del estudio de impacto ambiental una vez que se ha otorgado la concesión correspondiente.
“Entre los fines culturales de la República están: proteger las bellezas naturales, conservar y desarrollar el patrimonio histórico y artístico de la Nación, y apoyar la iniciativa privada para el progreso científico y artístico.” La Sala afirmó que del derecho a la vida y de la obligación estatal de “proteger las bellezas naturales” contenidos en los artículos 21 y 89 de la Constitución, surgen otros derechos de obligada protección e igual rango como la salud y el derecho a un ambiente sano, en ausencia de los cuales o no sería posible el ejercicio de los primeros, o su disfrute se vería severamente limitado. Asimismo, la Sala concordó una serie de tratados y convenios internacionales de acatamiento obligatorio en nuestro territorio para, finalmente, concluir en el voto supra citado que lo dispuesto en el entonces artículo 41, párrafo segundo, del proyecto de Ley de Hidrocarburos, era inconstitucional. Lo anterior, por invertir el orden natural del procedimiento y otorgar la concesión de previo a la realización de los correspondientes estudios medioambientales, concluyéndose lo siguiente:
“(...) En consecuencia lo dispuesto por el artículo 41 párrafo 2° del Proyecto que exige los estudios de impacto ambiental después de aprobada la concesión de exploración o explotación sobre todo en caso de particulares, es contraria a los fines, propósitos y obligaciones constitucionales en materia ambiental, en tanto el contrato una vez suscrito crea derechos en favor del interesado. Por ello estima la Sala que el artículo 41 prf. 2° es inconstitucional en este aspecto. (...)”
En el contexto internacional, encontramos que la obligación de los estudios de evaluación de impacto ambiental se encuentra consagrada, expresamente, en el Principio No. 17 de la Declaración de Río sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo, suscrita por la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo en junio de 1992:
“PRINCIPIO 17 Deberá emprenderse una evaluación del impacto ambiental, en calidad de instrumento nacional, respecto de cualquier actividad propuesta que probablemente haya de producir un impacto negativo considerable en el medio ambiente y que este sujeta a la decisión de una autoridad nacional competente.” Anteriormente, sea en junio de 1972, la Conferencia de Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente Humano destacó en la Declaración de Estocolmo, la necesidad de promover un desarrollo racional y planificado, acorde con la protección del medio ambiente, “Principio 2 Los recursos naturales de la tierra, incluidos, el aire, el agua, la tierra, la flora y la fauna y especialmente muestras representativas de los ecosistemas naturales, deben preservarse en beneficio de las generaciones presentes y futuras mediante una cuidadosa planificación u ordenación, según convenga.
(...)
Principio 17 Debe confiarse a las instituciones nacionales competentes la tarea de planificar, administrar o controlar la utilización de los recursos ambientales de los Estados con el fin de mejorar la calidad del medio.” Incluso, y en atención al tema que nos ocupa en esta consulta, en dicha Declaración se llamó la atención de los Estados para que se tomen “todas las medidas posibles para impedir la contaminación de los mares por sustancias que puedan poner en peligro la salud del hombre, dañar los recursos vivos y la vida marina, menoscabar las posibilidades de esparcimiento o entorpecer otras utilizaciones legítimas del mar”. Adicionalmente, en la Carta Mundial de la Naturaleza aprobada por las Naciones Unidas en 1982, se destaca que las actividades que puedan entrañar graves peligros para la naturaleza serán precedidas por un examen de fondo, indicándose, en lo conducente, lo siguiente:
“(...) 11- Se controlarán las actividades que puedan tener consecuencias sobre la Naturaleza y se utilizarán las mejores técnicas disponibles para reducir al mínimo los peligros graves para la Naturaleza y otros efectos perjudiciales; en particular se evitarán:
“Artículo 14. Evaluación del impacto y reducción al mínimo del impacto adverso 1. Cada Parte Contratante, en la medida de lo posible y según proceda:
Entendiéndose en dicha declaración que la diversidad biológica se refiere a la variabilidad de organismos vivos de cualquier fuente, incluidos, entre otras cosas, los ecosistemas terrestres, marinos y otros. En otras latitudes, por ejemplo, a nivel europeo, el Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas en junio de 1985 dictó la Directiva No. 85/337CEE, relativa a la evaluación de las repercusiones de determinados proyectos públicos y privados sobre el medio ambiente, en la cual, se insta a los Estados a incorporar el estudio de evaluación ambiental como un requisito previo a su autorización y dispone cuáles son los factores que deberían tomarse en consideración en su análisis de la siguiente manera:
“Artículo 2 1. Los Estados miembros adoptarán las disposiciones necesarias para que, antes de concederse la autorización, los proyectos que puedan tener repercusiones importantes sobre el medio ambiente, en particular debido a su naturaleza, sus dimensiones o su localización, se sometan a una evaluación en lo que se refiere a sus repercusiones.
(...)
2. La evaluación de las repercusiones sobre el medio ambiente podrá integrarse en los procedimientos existentes de autorización de los proyectos en los Estados miembros o, a falta de ello, en otros procedimientos o en los procedimientos que deberán establecerse para satisfacer los objetivos de la presente Directiva.” Artículo 3 La evaluación de las repercusiones sobre el medio ambiente identificará, describirá y evaluará de forma apropiada, en función de cada caso particular y de conformidad con los artículos 4 a 11, los efectos directos e indirectos de un proyecto sobre los factores siguientes:
- el hombre, la fauna y la flora, - el suelo, el agua, el aire, el clima y el paisaje, - la interacción entre los factores mencionados en los guiones primero y segundo, - los bienes materiales y el patrimonio cultural.” Similares disposiciones fueron adoptadas por la Comisión Económica para Europa de las Naciones Unidas, quienes impulsaron la celebración de un Convenio sobre Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental en un contexto transfronterizo, firmado en Spoo, Finlandia, el 25 de febrero de 1991. En el plano legislativo nacional y como desarrollo del precepto consagrado en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, encontramos el artículo 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, en el cual se dispone lo siguiente:
“Artículo 17.- Evaluación de impacto ambiental Las actividades humanas que alteren o destruyan elementos del ambiente o generen residuos, materiales tóxicos o peligrosos, requerirán una evaluación de impacto ambiental por parte de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental creada en esta ley. Su aprobación previa, de parte de este organismo, será requisito indispensable para iniciar las actividades, obras o proyectos. Las leyes y los reglamentos indicarán cuáles actividades, obras o proyectos requerirán la evaluación de impacto ambiental.” Asimismo, la Ley de Biodiversidad No. 7788 de 30 abril de 1998, en los artículos 92 a 97 exige la presentación de un estudio de impacto ambiental cuando la realización de determinados proyectos puedan comprometer la biodiversidad de la zona en la que se pretende ejecutar, la cual, deberá aprobarse en los términos que dispone la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Dicha normativa define qué se debe entender por la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental en el artículo 7, al señalar lo siguiente:
“Artículo 7.- Definiciones Esta ley deberá ser interpretada de acuerdo con las siguientes definiciones (...)
18.- Evaluación de impacto ambiental: Procedimiento científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente una acción o proyecto específico, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones. Incluye los efectos específicos, su evaluación global, las alternativas de mayor beneficio ambiental, un programa de control y minimización de los efectos negativos, un programa de monitoreo, un programa de recuperación, así como la garantía de cumplimiento ambiental. (...)” Similares definiciones encontramos, también, en el artículo 3 de la Ley No. 7593, Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos de agosto de 1996 y en el artículo 2 de la Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura No. 8436 de marzo de 2005, concluyéndose que la evaluación de impacto ambiental es un estudio técnico previo realizado por profesionales y técnicos cuyo propósito es identificar y predecir los eventuales efectos que producirá un proyecto específico sobre el medio ambiente, cuantificándolo y ponderándolo para determinar las medidas de mitigación correspondientes, así como, para que la autoridad competente conceda o no su autorización. Se procura identificar los elementos de riesgo de un proyecto, ya sea para eliminarlos, disminuir su incidencia o, en su caso, aconsejar el desistimiento de la acción. En virtud de lo anterior, el EIA previo constituye el instrumento técnico idóneo para cumplir con los principios preventivo y precautorio que rigen en la materia ambiental y este Tribunal Constitucional ha llegado a sostener que prescindir de él implica omitir la prevención debida tratándose de la intervención humana en el medio. Sobre el principio precautorio este Tribunal Constitucional en la sentencia No. 2004-1923 de las 14:55 hrs. del 25 de febrero de 2004, con redacción del Magistrado ponente, dispuso lo siguiente:
“(…) XV.- PRINCIPIO PRECAUTORIO DEL DERECHO AMBIENTAL Y PROTECCIÓN DE LAS AGUAS SUBTERRÁNEAS. Uno de los principios rectores del Derecho Ambiental lo constituye el precautorio o de evitación prudente. Este principio se encuentra recogido en la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo o Declaración de Río, la cual literalmente indica “Principio 15.- Con el fin de proteger el medio ambiente, los Estados deberán aplicar ampliamente el criterio de precaución conforme a sus capacidades. Cuando haya peligro de daño grave e irreversible, la falta de certeza científica absoluta no deberá utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces en función de los costos para impedir la degradación del medio ambiente”. En el ordenamiento jurídico interno la Ley de Biodiversidad (No. 7788 del 30 de abril de 1998), en su artículo 11 recoge como parámetros hermenéuticos los siguientes principios: “1.- Criterio preventivo: Se reconoce que es de vital importancia anticipar, prevenir y atacar las causas de la pérdida de biodiversidad o sus amenazas. 2.- Criterios precautorio o indubio pro natura: Cuando exista peligro o amenaza de daños graves o inminentes a los elementos de la biodiversidad y al conocimiento asociado con estos, la ausencia de certeza científica no deberá utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces de protección”. En el Voto de esta Sala No. 1250-99 de las 11:24 horas del 19 de febrero de 1999 (reiterado en los Votos Nos. 9773-00 de las 9:44 horas del 3 de noviembre del 2000, 1711-01 de las 16:32 horas del 27 de febrero del 2001 y 6322-03 de las 14:14 horas del 3 de julio del 2003) este Tribunal estimó lo siguiente: “(...) La prevención pretende anticiparse a los efectos negativos, y asegurar la protección, conservación y adecuada gestión de los recursos. Consecuentemente, el principio rector de prevención se fundamenta en la necesidad de tomar y asumir todas las medidas precautorias para evitar contener la posible afectación del ambiente o la salud de las personas. De esta forma, en caso de que exista un riesgo de daño grave o irreversible –o una duda al respecto-, se debe adoptar una medida de precaución e inclusive posponer la actividad de que se trate. Lo anterior debido a que en materia ambiental la coacción a posteriori resulta ineficaz, por cuanto de haberse producido ya las consecuencias biológicas socialmente nocivas, la represión podrá tener una trascendencia moral, pero difícilmente compensará los daños ocasionados en el ambiente”. Posteriormente, en el Voto No. 3480-03 de las 14:02 horas del 2 de mayo del 2003, este Tribunal indicó que “Bien entendido el principio precautorio, el mismo se refiere a la adopción de medidas no ante el desconocimiento de hechos generadores de riesgo, sino ante la carencia de certeza respecto de que tales hechos efectivamente producirán efectos nocivos en el ambiente”.(…)” La jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal Constitucional ha enlazado el deber impuesto en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, con los principios precautorio y preventivo y la obligación de las evaluaciones ambientales como un requisito previo a cualquier actividad que pueda incidir, negativamente, sobre el medio ambiente. Es menester citar, sobre esta tesitura, la sentencia No. 6322-2003 de las 14:14 hrs. del 3 de julio de 2003, en la que esta Sala, de forma categórica, desarrolló una serie de principios de rango constitucional relacionados con el deber estatal de defender en forma oportuna el medio ambiente y engarzó el deber de realizar los estudios de impacto ambiental con los principios precautorio y preventivo, al señalar lo siguiente:
“(...) 4.- Principio precautorio: Uno de los principios esenciales que componen el derecho ambiental es el "principio precautorio" o "principio de la evitación prudente", el cual está contenido en la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo, Declaración de Río, (...)
El término prevención deriva del latín ‘praeventio’, que alude a la acción y efecto de prevenir, a aquellas preparaciones y disposiciones que se hacen anticipadamente para evitar un riesgo o ejecutar una cosa. La prevención pretende anticiparse a los efectos negativos, y asegurar la protección, conservación y adecuada gestión de los recursos. Consecuentemente, el principio rector de prevención se fundamenta en la necesidad de tomar y asumir todas las medidas precautorias para evitar o contener la posible afectación del ambiente o la salud de las personas. De esta forma, en caso de que exista un riesgo de daño grave o irreversible -o una duda al respecto-, se debe adoptar una medida de precaución e inclusive posponer la actividad de que se trate. Lo anterior debido a que en materia ambiental la coacción a posteriori resulta ineficaz, por cuanto de haberse producido ya las consecuencias biológicas y socialmente nocivas, la represión podrá tener una trascendencia moral, pero difícilmente compensará los daños ocasionados al ambiente.
5.- de la realización del estudio de impacto ambiental previo a la iniciación de obras: Se parte del principio de que las normas ambientales deben tener un sustento técnico, pues su aplicación tiene que partir de límites que determinen las condiciones en las cuáles debe sujetarse el uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales. Esto es así porque al ser los daños y contaminación del medio ambiente evaluables, como la presencia de sustancias tóxicas o elementos externos que provoquen en el ambiente características negativas, tanto para la diversidad biológica -comprendiendo a la flora y la fauna-, como -y sobre todo- para la vida humana, que se ve reflejada en la salud o bienestar del hombre -suelo, hábitat, aire, agua, etc.-, el impacto de estos elementos requiere de una evaluación y tratamiento científico. Por ello, este principio (de la realización previa del estudio de impacto ambiental) se constituye en corolario del principio anterior, y teniendo especial importancia su realización para todas las ‘[...] actividades humanas que alteren o destruyan elementos del ambiente o generen residuos materiales tóxicos o peligrosos, requerirán una evaluación de impacto ambiental por parte de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental creada en esta Ley. Su aprobación previa, de parte de este organismo, será requisito indispensable para iniciar las actividades, obras o proyectos.’ (Artículo 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, número 7554, de dieciocho de septiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). Es así como la protección del derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado obliga al Estado a tomar las medidas de carácter preventivo a efecto de evitar su afectación; y dentro de las principales medidas dispuestas por el legislador en este sentido, se encuentran los Estudios de Impacto Ambiental, los que encuentran fundamento en lo dispuesto en el citado artículo 17 de la Ley Orgánica dl (sic) Ambiente. A este efecto, es importante resaltar en virtud de mandato constitucional –artículo 50-, y en la Ley –artículo 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente-, se establece como principio general, que toda actividad humana de modificación del entorno requerirá el estudio de impacto ambiental, de donde, será la condición del proyecto o de la obra, la que determinará en cada caso, si se requiere o no del referido estudio técnico, y no el establecimiento de condiciones arbitrarias, sean éstas administrativas o reglamentarias (según lo indicado por este Tribunal, en sentencia número 1220-2002, de las catorce horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del seis de febrero del dos mil dos).
Es al tenor de esta disposición que la jurisprudencia constitucional recientemente ha exigido este estudio técnico previo a la realización de cualquier proyecto en que se pueda afectar el medio ambiente, como una garantía para hacer efectivo el derecho del medio ambiente, y a modo de ejemplo lo ha exigido en las siguientes actividades, haciéndose la advertencia de que en modo alguno puede implicar una enumeración cerrada (numerus clausus): tala de árboles en un refugio de vida silvestre (sentencia número 1888-95, supra citada), ubicación de un "centro de transferencia de basura" (sentencia número 2671-95, de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco), decisión para determinar el cierre o continuación de funcionamiento del "botadero de basura Río Azul" (sentencia número 1154-96, de las dieciséis horas del seis de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y seis), la reducción de la cabida de una zona protegida (sentencia número 7294-98, de las dieciséis horas quince minutos del trece de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho), tratamiento de cáscaras de naranja en plantaciones (sentencia 1999-2219, de las quince horas dieciocho minutos del veinticuatro de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y nueve), planeamiento urbano y aprobación de urbanizaciones (sentencias número 2001-3694, de las dieciséis horas veintiséis minutos del quince de mayo del dos mil uno, y número 2002-1220, de las catorce horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del seis de febrero del dos mil dos), construcción de plantas hidroeléctricas (sentencia número 2000-10466, de las diez horas diecisiete minutos del veinticuatro minutos del dos mil), construcción de diques en ríos (sentencia número 2001-6503, de las nueve horas veintiséis minutos del seis de julio del dos mil uno), construcción y operación de rellenos sanitarios manuales (sentencias número 2002-5977 y 2002-6782) tenencia de un viveros y plantación de helechos (sentencias número 2000-9735 y 2001-3840); con lo cual, bien se puede decir, que la realización de este estudio técnico se constituye en un principio de orden constitucional, y en consecuencia, de acatamiento obligatorio, tanto para los particulares, y con mayor razón, para las instituciones del Estado; según lo ha considerado con anterioridad este Tribunal:
‘III.- Obligación de las instituciones del Estado de cumplir con la legislación ambiental en su actividad ordinaria: El párrafo tercero del numeral 50 Constitucional señala con toda claridad que el Estado debe garantizar, defender y preservar el derecho de todas persona a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado; lo que implica afirmar que los entes públicos no sólo están en la obligación de hacer cumplir –a los particulares y otros entes públicos- la legislación ambiental, sino también, ante todo, que deben ajustar su accionar a los dictados de esos cuerpos normativos tutelares. Las instituciones del Estado son las primeras llamadas a cumplir con la legislación tutelar ambiental, sin que exista justificación alguna para eximirlas del cumplimiento de requisitos ambientales como, a manera de ejemplo, el estudio de impacto ambiental que exige la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente para las actividades que emprendan los entes públicos que, por su naturaleza, puedan alterar o destruir el ambiente.’ (sentencia número 2001-6503, supra citada).
El legislador encomendó a la ‘Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental’, las evaluaciones a cargo de ‘un equipo interdisciplinario de profesionales, inscritos y autorizados por la Secretaría… de conformidad con las guías elaboradas por ella. El costo de las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental correrá por cuenta del interesado’. En el artículo 19 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente se estableció que ‘las resoluciones de la Secretaría Técnica Ambiental deberán ser fundamentadas y razonadas’, con lo que se recoge en esta materia el principio general de fundamentación de los actos administrativos desarrollado también por la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que es a su vez una garantía que integra el debido proceso sustantivo. La aprobación de un estudio de impacto ambiental requiere, de acuerdo con los compromisos internacionales adquiridos por Costa Rica y encomendados a SETENA, un análisis pormenorizado que incluya, como lo exige el artículo 24 de la Ley del Ambiente, los criterios técnicos y los porcentajes de ponderación que hacen posible la aprobación del estudio. Además, debe responder a las normas, los objetivos de ordenación y prioridades ambientales del Estado nacional y del gobierno local, tal como lo recoge el principio 11 de la Declaración de Río. El daño que se puede causar al ambiente es siempre de difícil o imposible reparación y la aprobación de un estudio de impacto ambiental requiere de la total certeza de mínima afectación de los recursos naturales, pues así lo impone por fuerza propia el artículo 50 de la Carta Política. En todo caso, debe hacerse la advertencia que la realización y aprobación del estudio de impacto ambiental no implica en sí misma la puesta en funcionamiento del proyecto en cuestión, por cuanto es tan sólo uno de los requisitos exigidos para culminar el proceso de autorización (sentencia número 5321-96, supra citada), que en algunos casos será la obtención del permiso de salud, la aprobación de los planos de la urbanización por la municipalidad respectiva, el visto bueno de la concesión por parte del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, el otorgamiento de las licencias comerciales, etc. Ello es así debido a que, tratándose del ambiente no se puede hablar de variables inmodificables; todo lo contrario, por su propia naturaleza el ambiente es, por sí mismo y con mayor grado por intervención del ser humano, cambiante. La aprobación de un estudio de impacto ambiental en los términos que lo señala la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, tampoco supone una autorización inmodificable para realizar un determinado proyecto humano, toda vez que a través de la labor de fiscalización a cargo de la Administración, al detectarse un daño al ambiente, el permiso debe de revocarse, a fin de garantizar el derecho establecido en el numeral 50 de la Constitución Política. (...)” Aunado a todo lo expuesto y tomando en consideración los fines de la norma consultada, sea, la simplificación de los trámites correspondientes para la aprobación de concesiones para la administración, construcción y operación de las marinas turísticas, se debe ponderar en el caso concreto el principio del desarrollo sostenible, el cual, está previsto en la Declaración de Río de 1992 sobre el Medio Ambiente y de Desarrollo que dispone en el numeral 3°, lo siguiente:
“El derecho al desarrollo debe ejercerse en forma tal que responda equitativamente a las necesidades de desarrollo y ambientales de las generaciones presentes y futuras.” Bajo este principio, se reconoce la necesidad de alcanzar el desarrollo del país en aras de atender las insuficiencias sociales y económicas que se padecen, por ejemplo, en las zonas costeras. Pero, adicionalmente, proclama que el desarrollo y, en este caso concreto, la construcción y operación de las marinas turísticas, se realice sin destruir el medio ambiente. El principio de desarrollo sostenible –ampliamente reconocido por este Tribunal– trasciende las cuestiones meramente ambientales, porque se erige como un objetivo en el ámbito de la ciencia económica, pues además de procurar preservar los recursos naturales que dan soporte a la vida de los seres humanos, también persigue la eficiencia en la utilización de los recursos para que se consiga el desarrollo que satisfaga las necesidades de las generaciones presentes y futuras, sin comprometer la disponibilidad de los recursos naturales en general. Conforme con lo expuesto, una gestión sostenible de los recursos implica satisfacer las necesidades de los países, teniendo en consideración los requerimientos de las generaciones presentes y futuras y balanceando tres objetivos principales: ambiental, social y económico. Lo anterior, en aras de evitar las tendencias que amenazan la calidad de vida de los seres humanos y un aumento de los costos para la sociedad. En ese sentido, es preciso detener la continua degradación ambiental con medidas que procuren atenuar los efectos negativos del desarrollo económico y social y velar por la existencia de un vínculo sostenible entre la humanidad y la naturaleza. Incluso, la adopción de políticas sostenibles está basada en la concordancia entre el crecimiento económico, la equidad social y la conservación de los recursos naturales. Con fundamento en las consideraciones realizadas, se procede a analizar el proyecto de ley sometido a consulta. Tal y como lo señalan los legisladores, la normativa que se pretende aprobar, suprime el requisito de la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental debidamente aprobada por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, como un requisito ex ante o a priori al otorgamiento de la concesión (ver artículo 8, inciso f), de la Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas vigente). En su lugar, se opta por un mecanismo diverso que se expone someramente. En efecto, la normativa prevé una etapa previa que se debe gestionar ante la Comisión Interinstitucional de Marinas y Atracaderos Turísticos, para obtener una viabilidad técnica para la construcción, administración y explotación de una marina o atracadero turístico. El artículo 5 que se pretende reformar indica en el inciso c) que para gestionar dicho aval técnico, se requiere presentar, únicamente, una Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial (VAP), otorgada por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional, gestionada por medio de una Evaluación Ambiental Inicial (EAI), mediante el procedimiento vigente. Ahora bien, de conformidad con el Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA), Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31849, del 28 de junio de 2004, la VAP se define del siguiente modo:
“(...) 64. Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial (VAP): Es el visto bueno ambiental, de tipo temporal, que otorga la SETENA a aquellas actividades, obras o proyectos que realizan la Evaluación Ambiental Inicial y todavía requieren de la presentación de otros documentos de EIA para la obtención de la VLA definitiva.”
Ahora bien, la viabilidad técnica favorable facultaría al interesado para continuar con la segunda etapa del procedimiento, sea, el trámite de solicitud de concesión ante la autoridad competente, en cuyo caso, para iniciar el trámite de solicitud de concesión, el administrado debe presentar, solamente, una “certificación extendida por la Setena, en la que se informe sobre el estado actual de la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental” (artículo 8, inciso d). Únicamente con dicho requisito, la municipalidad puede otorgar en forma condicionada la concesión. El artículo 9 del proyecto dispone, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente:
“(...) La municipalidad otorgará la concesión en forma condicionada, hasta que la Setena le comunique, por escrito, que la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (en adelante EIA) fue aprobada. Sin embargo, si la EIA es negativa, la concesión quedará sin efecto y no generará responsabilidad alguna para la Administración.
El concesionario no podrá entrar en posesión de ninguno de los bienes concesionados, hasta que la Cimat certifique que ha cumplido todos los requisitos previstos en el artículo 9 bis de esta Ley y haya obtenido el permiso de construcción municipal correspondiente. (...)” Así las cosas, de previo al otorgamiento de la concesión no se requiere del estudio de impacto ambiental, sino que, se exigiría un mero informe del avance de la evaluación. La tercera etapa del procedimiento supone la obtención de los permisos de construcción ante la municipalidad competente. Dicho trámite se encuentra regulado en el artículo 3 del proyecto, mediante el cual, se introduce el artículo 9 bis a la normativa vigente, que señala lo siguiente:
“Artículo 9 bis.- Trámite para planos constructivos Otorgada la concesión y en un plazo máximo de ciento ochenta (180) días naturales, el concesionario deberá concluir el proceso de la EIA ante la Setena.
Aprobada la EIA, mediante el otorgamiento de la viabilidad (licencia) por parte de la Setena, el concesionario tendrá un plazo de ciento veinte (120) días naturales para presentar, ante la ventanilla única de la Cimat, los siguientes documentos:
La Cimat deberá solicitar al interesado, dentro de un plazo de veinte (20) días hábiles, cualquier aclaración para el trámite de la recomendación técnica correspondiente sobre el visto bueno de los planos. Presentadas las aclaraciones a la Cimat, esta contará con el plazo de veinte (20) días adicionales, a efecto de expedir la recomendación técnica correspondiente sobre el visado.
El concesionario tendrá un plazo hasta de un (1) año para iniciar la construcción de las obras, una vez otorgado el permiso de construcción de la municipalidad respectiva. Pasado este período, la municipalidad solicitará a la Cimat que rinda un informe en el que conste la inversión y el avance de la obra; para emitir dicho informe, la Cimat contará con un plazo hasta de veinte (20) días hábiles. En caso de que en el informe se determine que las obras no han iniciado, la municipalidad iniciará un procedimiento de cancelación de la concesión, en forma inmediata.” De conformidad con lo expuesto, a través de la normativa que se pretende aprobar, se procura invertir el orden normal y natural de los procedimientos administrativos, otorgando la concesión para la construcción, administración y explotación de marinas turísticas de previo a que se haya finalizado la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental. El procedimiento concebido resultaría inconstitucional toda vez que revierte el orden lógico de los procedimientos, desconociendo el deber del Estado de proteger la integridad del medio ambiente, consagrado en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. Además, si nos atenemos a la jurisprudencia vinculante de este Tribunal, no es admisible desconstitucionalizar la garantía de respuesta estatal en defensa del medio ambiente, la cual, debe ser oportuna y previa al otorgamiento de permisos o concesiones correspondientes (ver sentencias números 6240-1993, 4245-2001, 1220-2002, 1221-2002, 6466-2002).
“(...) IV.- PRINCIPIO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISRATIVA. Nuestra Constitución Política no consagra explícitamente el principio de la responsabilidad patrimonial de las administraciones públicas por las lesiones antijurídicas que, en el ejercicio de la función administrativa, le causen a los administrados. Empero, este principio se encuentra implícitamente contenido en el Derecho de la Constitución, siendo que puede ser inferido a partir de una interpretación sistemática y contextual de varios preceptos, principios y valores constitucionales. En efecto, el artículo 9°, párrafo 1°, de la Carta Política dispone que “El Gobierno de la República es (…) responsable (…)”, con lo cual se da por sentada la responsabilidad del ente público mayor o Estado y sus diversos órganos –Poder Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial-. El ordinal 11°, de su parte, establece en su párrafo primero la “(…) responsabilidad penal (…)” de los funcionarios públicos y el segundo párrafo nos refiere la “(…) responsabilidad personal para los funcionarios en el cumplimiento de sus deberes (…)”. El artículo 34 de la Constitución Política ampara los “derechos patrimoniales adquiridos” y las “situaciones jurídicas consolidadas”, los cuales solo pueden ser, efectiva y realmente, amparados con un sistema de responsabilidad administrativa de amplio espectro sin zonas inmunes o exentas cuando sean vulnerados por las administraciones públicas en el despliegue de su giro o desempeño público. El numeral 41 ibidem, estatuye que “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, este precepto impone el deber al autor y responsable del daño de resarcir las lesiones antijurídicas efectivamente sufridas por los administrados como consecuencia del ejercicio de la función administrativa a través de conductas positivas por acción o negativas por omisión de los entes públicos, con lo cual se convierte en la piedra angular a nivel constitucional para el desarrollo legislativo de un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva y directa en el cual el resarcimiento no depende del reproche moral y subjetivo a la conducta del funcionario público por dolo o culpa, sino, única y exclusivamente, por habérsele inflingido o recibido, efectivamente, “(…) injurias o daños (…) en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, esto es, una lesión antijurídica que no tiene el deber de soportar y, por consiguiente, debe serle resarcida. El numeral 41 de la Constitución Política establece un derecho fundamental resarcitorio a favor del administrado que haya sufrido una lesión antijurídica por un ente –a través de su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita- y la obligación correlativa , de éste de resarcirla o repararla de forma integral, el acceso a la jurisdicción previsto en este mismo precepto constitucional, se convierte, así en un derecho instrumental para asegurar, forzosamente, el goce y ejercicio del derecho resarcitorio del damnificado cuando el sujeto obligado a la reparación incumpla voluntariamente con la obligación referida. El artículo 45 de la Carta Magna acoge el principio de la intangibilidad del patrimonio al disponer que “La propiedad es inviolable; a nadie puede privarse de la suya si no es por interés público legalmente comprobado, previa indemnización conforme a la ley (…)”, se reconoce, de esta forma, por el texto fundamental que los sacrificios especiales o las cargas singulares que el administrado no tiene el deber de soportar o tolerar, aunque devengan de una actividad lícita –como el ejercicio de la potestad expropiatoria- deben resarcirse. El artículo 49, párrafo 1°, de la Constitución Política en cuanto, de forma implícita, reconoce la personalidad jurídica y, por consiguiente, la posibilidad de demandar en estrados judiciales a los entes públicos, cuando incumplan con sus obligaciones constituye un claro basamento de la responsabilidad administrativa. De su parte el párrafo in fine del ordinal 49 ya citado dispone que “La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados”, siendo que una de las principales formas de garantía de éstos lo constituye un régimen de responsabilidad administrativa objetivo, directo, amplio y acabado. El párrafo final del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, en materia del daño ambiental, establece que “La ley determinará las responsabilidad y las sanciones correspondientes”, régimen de responsabilidad del que, obviamente, no pueden abstraerse los entes públicos de carácter económico (denominados empresas públicas-ente público) y empresas públicas (llamadas también empresas públicas-ente de Derecho privado) cuando contaminan al desplegar una actividad industrial, comercial o de servicios y, en general, el Estado cuando incumple sus obligaciones de defensa y preservación del medio ambiente a través de una deficiente actividad de fiscalización o de control de las actividades públicas y privadas actual o potencialmente contaminantes. En la hipótesis de los miembros de las Juntas Directivas de las Instituciones Autónomas, el artículo 188 de la norma fundamental dispone que “Sus directores responden por su gestión”. En lo que se refiere al Poder Ejecutivo, el Título X del texto constitucional contiene un Capítulo V cuyo epígrafe es “Responsabilidades de quienes ejercen el Poder Ejecutivo”, siendo que el artículo 148 consagra la responsabilidad del Presidente por el “uso que hiciera de aquellas atribuciones que según esta Constitución le corresponden en forma exclusiva”, la conjunta de éste con el respectivo Ministro del sector “respecto al ejercicio de las atribuciones que esta Constitución les otorga a ambos” –la cual es especificada por el artículo 149 ibidem- y la del Consejo de Gobierno por los acuerdo que adopte. El principio de responsabilidad administrativa de los entes públicos y de sus funcionarios resulta complementado con la consagración constitucional del principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas (artículos 18 y 33) que impide imponerle a los administrados una carga o sacrificio singular o especial que no tienen el deber de soportar y el principio de la solidaridad social (artículo 74), de acuerdo con el cual si la función administrativa es ejercida y desplegada en beneficio de la colectividad, es ésta la que debe soportar las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a uno o varios administrados e injustamente soportadas por éstos. Finalmente, es menester tomar en consideración que la Constitución Política recoge un derecho fundamental innominado o atípico que es el de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, el que se infiere claramente de la relación de los numerales, interpretados, a contrario sensu, 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191 de la Ley fundamental en cuanto recogen, respectivamente, los parámetros deontológicos de la función administrativa tales como el “buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, “buena marcha del Gobierno” y “eficiencia de la administración”. Este derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos le impone a los entes públicos actuar en el ejercicio de sus competencias y la prestación de los servicios públicos de forma eficiente y eficaz y, desde luego, la obligación correlativa de reparar los daños y perjuicios causados cuando se vulnere esa garantía constitucional. De esta forma, queda en evidencia que el constituyente originario recogió de forma implícita el principio de la responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas, el que, como tal, debe servir a todos los poderes públicos y operadores del Derecho como parámetro para interpretar, aplicar, integrar y delimitar el entero ordenamiento jurídico. Bajo esta inteligencia, un corolario fundamental del principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa lo constituye la imposibilidad para el legislador ordinario de eximir o exonerar de responsabilidad a algún ente público por alguna lesión antijurídica que le cause su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita a la esfera patrimonial y extramatrimonial de los administrados.
V.- CARÁCTER ESENCIAL DEL PRINCIPIO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA EN EL ESTADO SOCIAL Y DEMOCRÁTICO DE DERECHO. La responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas por el ejercicio de la función administrativa forma parte, como lo hemos constatado en el considerando anterior, de la concepción constitucional de éstas. Es una pieza clave y esencial del Estado social y democrático de Derecho, dados los fines a los que propende un régimen de responsabilidad administrativa. De modo general, la responsabilidad administrativa tiene por función básica la reparación o resarcimiento de las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a un administrado (víctima o damnificado) en su esfera patrimonial o extrapatrimonial por un ente público en el ejercicio de la función administrativa. Uno de sus fines clásicos y tradicionales es servir de control o garantía para las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados que sean lesionadas por un ente público en el ejercicio de sus competencias o en la prestación de los servicios públicos expresamente asignados por la Constitución o la ley. La responsabilidad administrativa junto con la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), son las piezas claves de un Estado Constitucional para la defensa de los administrados frente a las prerrogativas y privilegios formales y materiales con que la propia Constitución provee a los entes públicos para el cumplimiento de sus cometidos. Esta finalidad determina que el principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa debe ser fortalecido y acentuado mediante una interpretación extensiva y no restrictiva, de la misma forma el legislador al desarrollar los sistemas de responsabilidad administrativa debe adecuarse al parámetro constitucional de una responsabilidad administrativa objetiva y directa, estándole vedado establecer conductas administrativas exentas o inmunes a éste y menoscabando los derechos fundamentales resarcitorio y al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos de los que son titulares todos los administrados. De otra parte, la responsabilidad administrativa permite actuar los principios constitucionales de eficiencia y eficacia administrativas (artículos 140, inciso 8°, en cuanto le impone al Poder Ejecutivo el deber de “Vigilar el buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, el 139, inciso 4°, en la medida que incorpora el concepto de “buena marcha del Gobierno” y el 191 al recoger el principio de “eficiencia de la administración”), puesto que, el deber de reparar o indemnizar las lesiones antijurídicas infligidas a los administrados les impone actuar de forma correcta, ponderada, reflexiva y ajustada a Derecho. De acuerdo con estos dos principios que informan la organización y función administrativas, las administraciones públicas deben prestar servicios públicos de buena calidad con altos estándares para la debida satisfacción de las necesidades de los administrados que son sus destinatarios y ejercer cumplida y normalmente sus competencias. La eficiencia y la eficacia son, entonces, obligaciones o imperativos constitucionales que necesariamente obligan a los entes públicos a actuar responsablemente en el ejercicio de la función administrativa en sus diversas manifestaciones (actuaciones materiales o técnicas y actividad formal). Como correlato de tales deberes constitucionales de las administraciones públicas, los administrados son titulares del derecho fundamental innominado al buen y eficiente funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, con elevados estándares de calidad, el cual se puede inferir, a contrario sensu, de los supracitados artículos 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191 de la Constitución Política).
VI.- EXENCION INCONSTITUCIONAL DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA DEL INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS. El inciso a) del artículo 5° de la Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados exime de responsabilidad a esa entidad “(…) en los casos de daños y perjuicios causados por la impureza, irregularidad o insuficiencia, real o alegada, del agua suministrada (…)”. Evidentemente, ese inciso transgrede frontalmente el principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa, puesto que, para una hipótesis específica de funcionamiento anormal del servicio público –falta de servicio, entendida como un incumplimiento de las obligaciones jurídicas preexistentes impuestas por el ordenamiento jurídico- como lo es la impureza, irregularidad o insuficiencia en el suministro del agua potable, el legislador exime graciosamente al ente de responder por las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a los administrados. Al exonerar de toda responsabilidad administrativa al ICAA en la prestación del servicio público que constituye el núcleo o razón de ser de éste, el inciso quebranta el principio de intangibilidad del patrimonio (artículo 45 de la Constitución Política), el derecho de los administrados a obtener una tutela jurisdiccional pronta y cumplida para conseguir una reparación integral a los daños y perjuicios que hayan sufrido en su esfera patrimonial y extramatrimonial como consecuencia del ejercicio de la función administrativa por algún ente público (artículos 41 y 49 ibidem). De la misma manera, la exención infringe el derecho a la salud (artículo 21 ibidem), cuando, eventualmente, la lesión afecta ese preciado derecho de los usuarios del servicio, como resulta esperable cuando se provee agua impura o el suministro no es regular –ajustado a los deberes y obligaciones que impone el ordenamiento jurídico- y continuo –sin interrupciones o solución de continuidad- y en cantidades suficientes para atender las necesidades higiénicas básicas y cotidianas de los administrados. Finalmente, estima este Tribunal que la exoneración de responsabilidad dispuesta por el legislador para las hipótesis indicadas vulnera el derecho constitucional implícito o virtual de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos (artículos 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191, todos interpretados a contrario sensu). Por último, no encuentra este Tribunal Constitucional que el precepto impugnado infrinja el Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, puesto que, la norma hace referencia a una relación de servicio público y a la responsabilidad del ente que lo presta en cuanto a su pureza, regularidad y cantidad. Tampoco considera este Tribunal que quebrante el principio de legalidad recogido en el numeral 11 de la Constitución Política, sino, única y exclusivamente, en cuanto sirve de fundamento parcial al principio de responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas. (...)” Tales consideraciones son plenamente aplicables al caso concreto, en el cual, resultaría inconstitucional que el legislador desconozca el principio constitucional implícito de la responsabilidad de la administración pública, derivado del bloque de constitucionalidad, enunciado en la sentencia parcialmente citada. En consecuencia, el mecanismo previsto para obviar las eventuales demandas por desconocimiento de derechos adquiridos sobre la concesión otorgada, resulta inconstitucional.
En suma, el procedimiento ideado en el proyecto de ley consultado, para el otorgamiento de las concesiones para la construcción, administración y explotación de marinas y atracaderos turísticos es inconstitucional. En primer término, por desconocer que el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental se debe realizar de previo a cualquier concesión, siendo que, por lo demás, es inconstitucional que el Estado excluya por vía legislativa su responsabilidad.
VIII.- SOBRE LA INFRACCIÓN AL DERECHO DE PARTICIPACIÓN PÚBLICA EN LA DECISIÓN DE LOS ASUNTOS RELACIONADOS CON EL MEDIO AMBIENTE. CORRELACIÓN DE LOS ARTÍCULOS 9 Y 50 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. En otro orden de ideas, los legisladores consultantes consideran que el otorgamiento de concesiones para la construcción de marinas turísticas en bienes de dominio público, de previo a la aprobación definitiva de una Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental por la autoridad técnica competente, podría ser violatorio del derecho a la participación ciudadana de la población que, eventualmente, podría resultar afectada por la concesión. Insisten que la jurisprudencia constitucional ha destacado la relevancia del derecho de participación ciudadana en relación con las decisiones vinculadas con el medio ambiente. Lo anterior, como un derecho derivado de los artículos 1° y 50 de la Constitución Política, el cual, reconoce una amplia legitimación de todas las personas para participar en este tipo de procedimientos. En su criterio, estos principios han resultado reforzados con la aprobación de la reforma constitucional que modificó el artículo 9 de la Constitución Política para establecer que el Gobierno de Costa Rica es participativo. Sobre el particular y a partir del desarrollo realizado en torno a la importancia de la EIA, cabe reiterar que, según la más calificada doctrina, la evaluación es un procedimiento principalmente participativo para la ponderación anticipada de las consecuencias ambientales de una decisión para aprobar o denegar determinado proyecto. Según la doctrina, el estudio de impacto ambiental apareció, desde sus orígenes, relacionado con la tradición anglosajona de las encuestas y audiencias públicas, por lo que se debe resaltar la garantía que a lo largo de la evaluación y, en sus distintos momentos, serán oídos los afectados por la decisión final, que pueden ser no sólo las comunidades o sujetos inmediatamente involucrados, sino grupos que defienden intereses difusos, como lo es la oportuna protección al medio ambiente. Sobre la promoción de la participación pública en relación a los temas ambientales, la Declaración de Río dispone lo siguiente:
“PRINCIPIO 10 El mejor modo de tratar las cuestiones ambientales es con la participación de todos los ciudadanos interesados, en el nivel que corresponda. En el plano nacional, toda persona deberá tener acceso adecuado a la información sobre el medio ambiente de que dispongan las autoridades públicas, incluida la información sobre los materiales y las actividades que encierran peligro en sus comunidades, así como la oportunidad de participar en los procesos de adopción de decisiones. Los Estados deberán facilitar y fomentar la sensibilización y la participación de la población poniendo la información a disposición de todos. Deberá proporcionarse acceso efectivo a los procedimientos judiciales y administrativos, entre éstos el resarcimiento de daños y los recursos pertinentes.” La Carta Mundial de la Naturaleza citada supra, en el principio No. 23 dispone lo siguiente:
“23- Toda persona, de conformidad con la legislación nacional, tendrá la oportunidad de participar, individual o colectivamente, en el proceso de preparación de las decisiones que conciernan directamente a su medio ambiente y, cuando este haya sido objeto de daño o deterioro, podrá ejercer los recursos necesarios para obtener una indemnización.” En el plano interno, la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente dispone lo siguiente:
“Artículo 22.- Expediente de la evaluación Las personas, físicas o jurídicas, públicas o privadas, tendrán el derecho a ser escuchadas por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, en cualquier etapa del proceso de evaluación y en la fase operativa de la obra o el proyecto. Las observaciones de los interesados serán incluidas en el expediente y valoradas para el informe final.
Dentro de los cinco días hábiles siguientes al recibo de una evaluación de impacto ambiental, la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental remitirá un extracto de ella a las municipalidades en cuya jurisdicción se realizará la obra, la actividad o el proyecto. Asimismo, le dará profusa divulgación, por los medios de comunicación colectiva, a la lista de estudios sometidos a su consideración.
Artículo 23.- Publicidad de la información La información contenida en el expediente de la evaluación de impacto ambiental será de carácter público y estará disponible para ser consultada por cualquier persona u organización.
No obstante, los interesados podrán solicitar que se mantenga en reserva información integrada al estudio, si de publicarse afectare derechos de propiedad industrial.” Por su parte, la Ley de Biodiversidad dispone, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente:
“Artículo 95.- Audiencias públicas La Secretaría Técnica Nacional deberá realizar audiencias públicas de información y análisis sobre el proyecto concreto y su impacto, cuando lo considere necesario. El costo de la publicación correrá a costa del interesado.
La participación es todo proceso que involucra a la sociedad en la adopción de propuestas, solución de problemas y toma de decisiones en relación a la aprobación de determinada actividad o proyecto.” En la sentencia No. 10693-2002 de las 18:20 hrs. del 7 de noviembre de 2002, este Tribunal Constitucional destacó que la garantía de la participación ciudadana es una herramienta mediante la cual se dota a los ciudadanos del poder para hacer efectivo su derecho a un medio ambiente sano, de ahí que sea parte intrínseca de las garantías consagradas en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. En dicha resolución se dispuso lo siguiente:
“(...) considera esta Sala que derivado propiamente del marco democrático que informa todo el ordenamiento y que se encuentra dado por el artículo primero de la Constitución Política, en conjunción con el derecho a un medio ambiente sano establecido en el artículo 50 de dicha Carta, además de los instrumentos internacionales y las normas legales respectivas, es necesario extraer como cierta la presencia de un derecho de todas las personas a la participación en la toma de decisiones que incumben asuntos de interés público, en este caso la protección del ambiente. Este derecho a participar, se constituye entonces como un instrumento esencial de los habitantes para hacer valer su derecho a un ambiente sano, sin embargo, no puede entenderse el mismo como un mero ejercicio de una opinión, pues contrariamente a lo que se podría considerar a primera vista, esta participación exige ser entendida en forma amplia, por lo que consecuentemente, la misma implica tres dimensiones básicas –como lo reconoce la Declaración de Río de 1992–: el derecho de acceso a la información, el derecho a la participación “per se” y el derecho de acceso a la justicia en materia ambiental. Estas tres dimensiones contienen a su vez, una serie de derechos básicos de orden procesal –tanto en sede administrativa como judicial– que en conjunto aseguran a las personas que sus opiniones no se convertirán en un ejercicio vacío y retórico de la libertad de opinión, y que por el contrario, efectivamente serán tomadas en cuenta por la autoridad pública.
(...)
ii.– El derecho a la participación pública. Implica esta vertiente, la posibilidad para aquellas personas que puedan verse afectadas o que tengan interés sobre una decisión referente al ambiente, a manifestar desde temprano sus criterios, opiniones, puntos de vista o cuestionamientos sobre la misma, sin tener estas que encontrarse sometidas a formalidades específicas para llegar a ser tomadas en cuenta. Consecuentemente, la información que se dé al administrado debe contener resúmenes no técnicos, que permita a las personas comprender la magnitud de la discusión. Asimismo, conlleva a la existencia de adecuados plazos para, de previo a la participación, se lleve a cabo una etapa para que los ciudadanos se informen.
El procedimiento de evaluación de impacto ambiental, se caracteriza por ser un procedimiento administrativo con una nota diferenciadora, pues lo que busca es eludir o minimizar la eventual configuración de un daño ambiental, dentro de la ejecución de actividades sobre las que existe certeza acerca del efecto perjudicial que éstas producirían sobre el ambiente, de llevarse a cabo sin mediar contención alguna. En otras palabras, este instrumento corresponde a la materialización del principio de prevención, por cuanto ante una actividad que se sabe de antemano que es dañosa para el ambiente, el interesado propone una serie de medidas tendientes a evitar o mitigar el detrimento ecológico, al órgano o ente público –en este caso la SETENA– que se encarga de determinar si las mismas son las más adecuadas para tal fin. Por consiguiente, dado que este procedimiento lo que persigue en todo momento es el prever cualquier consecuencia negativa, a través de un amplio flujo de información, resulta natural entender que una de sus características es que las personas que puedan verse afectadas por el desarrollo del proyecto puedan aportar datos o puntos de vista fundamentales, que las autoridades competentes a raíz de una conducta omisiva o arbitraria podrían ignorar o dejar de lado, desprotegiendo consecuentemente al ambiente. Es así como el principio o derecho de participación implica dentro del procedimiento de evaluación de impacto ambiental, un alto grado de publicidad, al punto de que cualquier acto o solicitud que tenga un efecto significativo sobre el resultado final del mismo, debe ser de alcance general para todos los interesados, de modo que estos puedan ejercer sus opiniones en cualquier momento y no ser encasillados a un momento procesal determinado. El papel de la población como defensor de un ambiente sano, va desde ‘la cuna hasta la tumba’, es decir, desde el inicio de la actividad productiva como proyecto, hasta el fin de su vida útil, por lo que no sería admisible que en una explotación encaminada a durar por un período de tiempo indefinido, inclusive décadas –como es el caso de los proyectos hidroeléctricos–, y de consecuencias irreversibles, se limite la participación de aquellos sectores sociales que puedan verse afectados, a una etapa procesal, que como una audiencia, puede durar sólo unas cuantas horas. Así, en razón de su naturaleza preventiva, es exigible que desde el mismo momento de su inicio, un proyecto sometido a evaluación de impacto ambiental deba ser puesto en conocimiento de la población a efectos de iniciar un fenómeno abierto de participación. (...)” Lo que se encuentra resaltado no corresponde al original.
En virtud de lo expuesto, llevan razón los diputados consultantes puesto que la regulación que se pretende aprobar en el seno de la Asamblea Legislativa difiere el derecho a la participación ciudadana a un momento posterior a que se haya otorgado la concesión para la construcción, operación y administración de las marinas turísticas. En consecuencia, limita intensamente los derechos de los interesados a pronunciarse en relación a la conveniencia del proyecto en cuestión. Si bien, el artículo 9 del proyecto de ley prevé un procedimiento de consulta, audiencias públicas y oposiciones ante las autoridades competentes de otorgar la concesión, lo cierto es que, para ese momento, se carece de la información técnica apropiada de profesionales en la materia, que permita una participación fundamentada de parte de los interesados. Como se ha desarrollado a lo largo de esta consulta, la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental se caracteriza por ser por un proceso de flujo de información relacionado con la conveniencia del proyecto, los eventuales efectos y los daños que se procuran minimizar. En consecuencia, realizar un procedimiento consultivo sin contar de previo con información apropiada de parte de profesionales en la materia, limita, sensiblemente, el derecho de las personas de participar activamente en el procedimiento que se analiza por carecer, hasta ese momento, de la información necesaria para oponerse o apoyar el proyecto que se trate. En efecto, se realiza una etapa consultiva sin que, hasta ese momento, se ponga en conocimiento de la ciudadanía el detalle del proyecto así como los eventuales efectos sobre el medio ambiente, siendo que, como se analizó en la sentencia supra citada el acceso a la información es un elemento trascendental al promover el derecho a la participación. Dicho propósito es destacado, igualmente, en el Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA), el cual, pone en evidencia que la intención de la audiencia que se realiza en el marco del EIA, es, precisamente, informar a la sociedad civil sobre la actividad, obra o proyecto que se pretende desarrollar y sus impactos (ver artículo 3, inciso 12). A la luz de lo anterior, postergar la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental a un momento posterior al otorgamiento de la concesión, limita, sensiblemente, el derecho a la participación de las personas en relación a la defensa de un interés difuso, como lo es la efectiva y oportuna protección del medio ambiente.
IX.- SOBRE LA ALEGADA INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL TRANSITORIO II Y LA INFRACCIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO 50 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA. Los legisladores cuestionan la constitucionalidad del Transitorio II del proyecto de ley consultado. Dicho numeral dispone lo siguiente:
“TRANSITORIO II.- El propietario de toda obra, proyecto o infraestructura similar y/o semejante a una marina y/o atracadero turístico, que haya sido desarrollado y se encuentre operando contrario a los principios y las regulaciones de la presente Ley, así como desprovisto de permiso, autorizaciones, vistos buenos y/o concesiones, contará con un plazo improrrogable y perentorio de (1) un año, a partir de la publicación de la presente Ley, para legalizar su situación ante la Cimat; de lo contrario, el órgano podrá recomendar su cierre técnico a la municipalidad. Cuando las actividades se encuentran en operación, no se requerirá realizar una EIA; dichas actividades deberán regirse por el procedimiento establecido para obtener la autorización por parte de la autoridad ambiental correspondiente.” (Cuestionan lo que se encuentra destacado en negrita).
En relación a la norma transcrita, los legisladores consideran que dicha disposición violenta el derecho a un medio ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, porque exonera a las marinas que se encuentran operando en forma ilegal, de realizar evaluaciones de impacto ambiental. Exponen que la norma consultada se refiere al caso de las marinas y atracaderos turísticos construidos ilegalmente que, al momento de la reforma, se encuentren en operación. Afirman que no es constitucionalmente válido que se pretenda establecer a priori una exoneración genérica dirigida a cierto tipo de actividades, sin que haya mediado una necesaria valoración de las condiciones particulares de cada caso concreto. En otro orden de ideas, consideran que dicha norma constituye un peligroso incentivo para la construcción y operación de marinas y atracaderos turísticos, al margen de las disposiciones legales que regulan la materia. Lo anterior, con el propósito de evadir la presentación de una Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental. En relación a este extremo de la consulta, estima este Tribunal que son igualmente aplicables las reflexiones realizadas en los Considerandos VII y VIII de esta sentencia, por cuanto, el legislador está desconociendo la obligatoriedad de la realización de una Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental como requisito ineludible para la aprobación de una actividad o proyecto de esta índole, que podría estar afectando o generar peligros potenciales sobre el medio ambiente. En esa tesitura, es menester resaltar, nuevamente, que el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, le impone al Estado, en materia ambiental, una actitud positiva o propositiva que no puede desconocer. En consecuencia, desconocer la obligatoriedad de la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental para la aprobación de un proyecto que de alguna manera pueda afectar el medio ambiente, resultaría inconstitucional. Lo anterior, por desconocer la garantía de defensa y preservación del derecho a un medio ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, máxime, si se toma en consideración que una norma transitoria con tal redacción podría incentivar o motivar la agilización de la construcción irregular de marinas y atracaderos turísticos para, posteriormente, omitir el cumplimiento de una Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental.
X.- SOBRE LA ALEGADA INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL TRANSITORIO IV DEL PROYECTO DE LEY. Finalmente, los legisladores consultantes cuestionan la inclusión del Transitorio IV en el proyecto de ley, el cual, dispone lo siguiente:
“TRANSITORIO IV.- La EIA deberá realizarse, únicamente, en el caso de actividades nuevas que no estén en operación. En caso de renovación, cesión o adjudicación de derechos u otorgamiento de una nueva concesión, de las marinas, los atracaderos turísticos y/o los proyectos similares que se encuentren en operación y no impliquen modificaciones, es decir, la construcción o ejecución de nuevas obras o actividades, no requerirán realizar una EIA. Dichas actividades deberán regirse por el procedimiento establecido para obtener la autorización, por parte de la autoridad ambiental correspondiente.” Los legisladores consultantes manifiestan que la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental debe realizarse, únicamente, para el caso de actividades nuevas que no estén en operación. Por tal motivo, en caso de renovación, cesión o adjudicación de derechos, u otorgamiento de una nueva concesión de aquellas marinas, atracaderos turísticos y/o proyectos similares que se encontrasen en operación y no implique modificaciones, no requerirán realizar una nueva evaluación, sino que tales actividades deberán regirse por el procedimiento establecido para obtener la autorización por parte de la autoridad ambiental correspondiente. No obstante, alegan que hay numerosos estudios que han demostrado que el impacto ambiental es acumulativo y dado que el plazo de las concesiones se aumenta hasta 35 años y puede prorrogarse sin que medie un nuevo estudio de impacto ambiental, se estaría procediendo en contra de la lógica del principio precautorio. Sobre el particular, como ya lo señaló este Tribunal Constitucional en la sentencia No. 2007-013574 de las 9:30 hrs. del 19 de setiembre de 2007, las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental se realizan de previo al desarrollo del proyecto que se trate y, en el supuesto concreto, se está regulando la cesión de derechos sobre una infraestructura en operación y que se encuentra a derecho. Es decir, el Transitorio cuestionado se aplica a las marinas y atracaderos turísticos construidos conforme a las disposiciones vigentes, las cuales, exigen la presentación del EIA. En consecuencia, no existe irregularidad alguna, puesto que, para actividades al margen de la normativa vigente se aplica el Transitorio II, tal y como ya se analizó; mientras que las construcciones realizadas bajo las correspondientes autorizaciones de la SETENA no requieren una nueva evaluación cuando se trate, únicamente, de “renovación, cesión o adjudicación de derechos u otorgamiento de una nueva concesión”, pues no implica la construcción de nuevas obras que puedan comprometer el medio ambiente. Superado lo anterior, conviene señalar que no le corresponde a este Tribunal Constitucional determinar la periodicidad en que se deben realizar este tipo de evaluaciones y, más bien, para esos efectos, tenemos que la normativa vigente prevé la figura de un “responsable ambiental”, a quien le corresponde verificar y reportar a la SETENA el cumplimiento de las obligaciones adquiridas tanto para la etapa constructiva como operativa o de funcionamiento de la actividad, obra o proyecto según el período que establezca la SETENA. Asimismo, a dicha figura le corresponde emitir las recomendaciones ambientales necesarias conforme las situaciones diversas que se vayan presentando en cualquiera de las etapas de la ejecución de la actividad, obra o proyecto (ver artículos 79-85 del Reglamento General sobre los Procedimientos de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental). En consecuencia, en criterio de este Tribunal, la disposición analizada no resulta inconstitucional.
XI.- COROLARIO. Con fundamento en las consideraciones realizadas, se arriba a la conclusión que, efectivamente, el procedimiento legislativo seguido para la aprobación del proyecto consultado presenta vicios esenciales de constitucionalidad al violentarse el artículo 190 de la Constitución Política y, además, por desconocer el principio de publicidad. En relación al fondo del proyecto de ley sometido a consulta, estima este Tribunal que el procedimiento para el otorgamiento de una concesión de construcción, administración y explotación de las marinas y atracaderos turísticos es inconstitucional por violación a los artículos 9 y 50 de la Constitución Política, al autorizar el otorgamiento de una concesión de previo a que se finalice la correspondiente Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental. Asimismo, el texto propuesto para el artículo 9, párrafo 6°, es inconstitucional por violentar el principio constitucional de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública implícito en la Norma Fundamental. Adicionalmente, la frase “Cuando las actividades se encuentran en operación, no se requerirá realizar una EIA; dichas actividades deberán regirse por el procedimiento establecido para obtener la autorización por parte de la autoridad ambiental correspondiente” contenida en el Transitorio II del proyecto de ley es inconstitucional por infracción al artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. En lo relativo al Transitorio IV no es inconstitucional, en la medida que se entienda que se trata de la renovación, cesión o adjudicación de derechos que no implica la realización de nuevas obras que puedan afectar el medio ambiente.
POR TANTO.
Por unanimidad, se declara inadmisible la coadyuvancia. Se evacua, por mayoría, la consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley "Modificación de varios artículos de la Ley No. 7744, Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas", tramitado bajo el expediente 14.836, en el sentido que existen dos vicios esenciales o sustanciales del procedimiento legislativo, que son los siguientes: a) La falta de consulta obligatoria del proyecto de ley a las municipalidades por la introducción de la moción realizada al artículo 9 de la legislación que se pretende reformar, agregándose un párrafo que indica "(...) Las municipalidades podrán brindar las facilidades para el otorgamiento de las patentes que se requieran, para el buen funcionamiento de los proyectos de marinas que concesionen y, por consiguiente, de los locales comerciales y anexos exigidos por la presente Ley." y b) Infracción al principio de publicidad por la falta de una nueva publicación del proyecto de ley ante la introducción de la moción indicada en el punto anterior. Los Magistrados Mora, Vargas y Certad salvan el voto en cuanto a los vicios esenciales del procedimiento, al estimar que no existen. En cuanto al fondo, por unanimidad, se evacua la consulta de constitucionalidad en el sentido que: a) El artículo 2 del proyecto, cuyo propósito es reformar los artículos 8 y 9 de la Ley de Concesión y Operación de Marinas Turísticas son inconstitucionales, específicamente, los textos propuestos para el artículo 8, inciso d), y el artículo 9, párrafo 5°. Lo anterior, al posponer la presentación de la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental para después de otorgada la concesión para la construcción, administración y explotación de marinas y atracaderos turísticos, desconociéndose el deber Estatal de proteger, preventivamente, el medio ambiente y por limitar el derecho a la participación ciudadana en la decisión de asuntos relacionados con éste; b) El texto propuesto para el artículo 9, párrafo 6°, es inconstitucional por violentar el principio de la responsabilidad de las Administraciones Públicas implícito en la Norma Fundamental; c) El Transitorio II del proyecto de ley es inconstitucional por violación al artículo 50 de la Constitución Política en tanto se indica lo siguiente "Cuando las actividades se encuentran en operación, no se requerirá realizar una EIA; dichas actividades deberán regirse por el procedimiento establecido para obtener la autorización por parte de la autoridad ambiental correspondiente" y d) El Transitorio IV del proyecto de ley consultado no es inconstitucional. Comuníquese al Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa y a los diputados consultantes.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta a.i.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Rosa María Abdelnour G. Gastón Certad M.
Voto salvado de los Magistrados Mora Mora, Vargas Benavides y Certad Maroto, con redacción del segundo.
Los suscritos Magistrados nos apartamos del voto de mayoría, por estimar que no existen vicios esenciales en el procedimiento del proyecto consultado. Ya en otras ocasiones esta Sala ha señalado que no resulta ilegítimo, que la Asamblea Legislativa emita normas que se refieran a competencias de las corporaciones municipales, siempre y cuando las mismas no impliquen una imposición que varíen sustancialmente el contenido de dichos actos. En ese sentido, ya la Sala, en la sentencia número 2006-06589 de las doce horas con veintiocho minutos del doce de mayo de dos mil seis, consideró por mayoría que el hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa creara una norma que permitiera a las municipalidades condonar deudas por concepto de impuestos, no implicaba una lesión al artículo 170 de la Constitución Política, toda vez dicha norma tenía un carácter permisivo, pues no imponía obligación alguna a las corporaciones. En el caso concreto, el artículo 9 consultado al señalar que “ (…) Las municipalidades podrán brindar las facilidades para el otorgamiento de las patentes que se requieran, para el buen funcionamiento de los proyectos de marinas que concesiones y, por consiguiente, de los locales comerciales y anexos exigidos por la presente Ley” , no implica una intromisión en la autonomía municipal, pues la norma de cita únicamente autoriza a las municipalidades para que puedan, de manera discrecional, decidir si brindan las facilidades del caso para el otorgamiento de las patentes que se requieran para el funcionamiento efectivo de las marinas que se pretendan desarrollar dentro de sus jurisdicciones. A nuestro parecer, dicho numeral lo que busca es apenas dar una autorización general para que cada gobierno local adopte la decisión que estime más conveniente para su circunscripción. Consideramos, que el proyecto contiene una norma permisiva o autorizante, que no impone nada a las municipalidades, sino que les confiere una licencia para actuar de acuerdo con su propia valoración del interés local y disponer, en cada caso, si otorga o no las facilidades descritas por la moción. Así, si en el caso concreto se estuviera ante una norma impositiva, el proyecto sí lesionaría la autonomía de los gobiernos locales; no obstante, de la manera en que fue diseñado no obliga a las municipalidades que así lo estimen oportuno, aprobar las facilidades para el otorgamiento de patentes. De esta forma, el hecho de que el proyecto sea iniciativa de un órgano del Estado Central y no de las propias municipalidades en nada afecta la autonomía de éstas, ni implica una invasión de competencias constitucionales por parte del Parlamento. No obstante lo anterior, estimamos procedente señalar que la potestad que otorga el artículo antes mencionado, no puede de ningún modo implicar una disminución de los controles y requisitos que las municipalidades deben aplicar y exigir conforme lo disponen las demás normas que regulan la materia.
Por otra parte, en lo que atañe a la supuesta violación al Principio de Publicidad, debe indicarse que la variación introducida al artículo 9 del proyecto, no varía sustancialmente el proyecto, por lo que estimamos que no existe razón alguna para realizar una publicación del mismo en el diario oficial La Gaceta, tal y como aduce la mayoría de la Sala.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B. Gastón Certad M.
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