Constitutional challenge to Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge decrees dismissedRechazo de inconstitucionalidad contra decretos del Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo

*050151650007CO* *050151650007CO* Res: 2006-005975 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and fourteen minutes on the third of May of two thousand six.- Unconstitutionality action filed by Nombre01, of legal age, Municipal Mayor of the canton of Talamanca, holder of identity card number CED01, resident of Bribrí; against Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG which created the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta 277 of November 27, 1985, Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulations for the Participatory Management of Natural Resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000, Executive Decree No. 32633, Regulations to the Wildlife Conservation Law, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005, and Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE published in La Gaceta No. 228 of November 25, 2005.

Whereas:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at sixteen hours fifteen minutes on November 23, 2005, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG which created the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulations for the Participatory Management of Natural Resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, and Executive Decree No. 32633, which is the Regulations to the Wildlife Conservation Law, be declared. He alleges that the unconstitutionality of the mentioned decrees derives from serious legal inconsistencies, confronting not only the constitutional order as a whole, but also environmental norms created by the legislator. These decrees have created a situation of legal confusion and insecurity in the Southern zone of Limón such that neither the local government, nor investors, nor other agents of sustainable development can work with clear and precise rules. The Gandoca Manzanillo Refuge has a unique value, full of genetic diversity and ecosystems, with mangrove areas, freshwater swamps, plant associations, and very particular fauna, which must be safeguarded and protected seriously. In relation to Decree 16614-MAG, which created the Gandoca Manzanillo Refuge, it was issued based on Article 140 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution and Article 2 of Forest Law No. 4465 of November 25, 1969. A reading of it allows one to conclude that the majority of the requirements demanded for this purpose were not fulfilled. It is unconstitutional to issue decrees that do not comply with the provisions of the law that serves as their basis, as this violates the hierarchy of norms. In this case, there was no land tenure study, census of inhabitants, evaluation of the lands to be purchased or expropriated, form of financing, nor real definition of objectives. Likewise, and in accordance with Articles 71 and 72 of Forest Law No. 4565, in the case of privately owned properties, as is the case of the Gandoca Manzanillo Refuge, if the owner did not avail themselves of the forest regime inherent to the protected wildlife area, the State was obligated to purchase or expropriate the properties, which in this case has not occurred to date. Thus, there are owners – natural or legal persons – whose use of their land is limited without having availed themselves of any regime and without having been expropriated and compensated. There is no record that anyone has voluntarily availed themselves of the established Refuge Regime. While Article 18 of Law 6919 authorized the Executive Branch to create National Wildlife Refuges, it did not grant it such broad powers as MINAE has intended. This article limited the power to create wildlife refuges on State-owned lands and that they be created only in forest reserves; such is not the case of the Gandoca Manzanillo Refuge, where there are many private properties. The consequences of all this are that many owners were subjected to use permits granted by MINAE that should never have been granted by that institution, as it lacked the competence to do so, and which rather corresponded to the respective Municipality to grant. On the other hand, it is important to note that Forest Law No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, which was one of the legal bases for the creation of the Refuge, was replaced by Forest Law No. 7032 of May 2, 1986, which served as the basis for the issuance of several Executive Decrees related to the Refuge. However, by judgment 546-90, the Constitutional Chamber declared the total unconstitutionality of Law No. 7032, leaving No. 4465 in force. Hence, the subsequent Executive Decrees, issued from May 7, 1986, until the new legislative repeal of Law No. 4465, were obligated to adapt to and comply with the requirements established in the Law of November 25, 1969; by not doing so, they violated the constitutional hierarchy of the norm. When the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge was created in the territorial jurisdiction of the canton of Talamanca, the local Government was completely ignored, thereby injuring municipal autonomy. Constitutional Article 169 clearly establishes that the administration of the local interests and services of each canton shall be in charge of the municipal government; hence, it is not reasonable, neither politically nor legally, to completely exclude the Municipality from the subjection of part of its territory. In ruling 5445-99, the Constitutional Chamber pointed out that "to disregard and dismantle the municipalities in their local interests is to empty the constitutional content of them." What good will municipal autonomy be if state entities fabricate legal covers over their territories without intervention, opinion, and/or coordination with local governments, whether those covers be reserves, national parks, refuges, zona protectora (protected zones), or any other management category? While absolute autonomy cannot be spoken of, to the point of dismembering the National State, it can also not be so precarious that state entities disregard or ignore it. In relation to Executive Decree 29019-MINAE, which repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM and extended the limits of the refuge, it suffers from the same defect pointed out above, that is, it was issued without taking into account the criterion of the local government and reduced the area that had been extended by the former. This injures Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, as well as Article 45, since by extending the Refuge, private properties were added (it is a mixed refuge) without there having been any expropriation or compensation in between, nor did the inhabitants voluntarily submit themselves to the Refuge. This Decree did not provide reasons or studies to justify the reduction of the refuge. The creation, increase, or decrease of new protected areas cannot respond to a simple whim of public authorities; compliance with the requirements established in the Law is a control mechanism to guarantee the rights of the administered and the satisfaction of the environmental public interest. Many of the country's protected areas have been created to the detriment of the acquired rights of individuals and peasant populations, and of legal companies that have legitimately acquired properties many years ago. Article 8 of Decree 29019 repeals Decree 23069, which had expanded the Refuge; that expansion is unconstitutional, as it did not respect constitutional Article 45 nor the procedure that must be followed for this purpose.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing he holds to file this unconstitutionality action, he indicates it comes from Article 75, second paragraph. The Municipality as a local Government has the obligation not only to protect the environment, but also to defend municipal autonomy.

3.- By brief received at eleven hours forty minutes on December 3, 2005, the Mayor of the Municipality of Talamanca adds grounds for unconstitutionality. He points out that by Decree 32753-MINAE, the validity of Executive Decree 16614-MAG of June 1, 1985, is ratified regarding Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, in the terms in which it was declared. The Decree repeals Articles 5 and 6 of Decree 16614-MAG, thereby including in the zone the urban zones excluded from the original Decree. He considers that Decree 32753-MINAE exhibits the same grounds of unconstitutionality alleged against the other challenged decrees, thus injuring Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, relating to municipal powers and autonomy. Furthermore, the Decree intends to retroact its effects to situations created in the past, thereby violating constitutional Article 34. Article 2 is unconstitutional because by repealing Articles 5 and 6 of Executive Decree 16614-MAG, it integrates into the Refuge the urban zones that were excluded from the original Decree, injuring the aforementioned Article 34 and constitutional Article 45. There are important urban populations that were excluded from the original Decree, which have not formed part of the Refuge, and which, as a consequence of the promulgation of the Decree, MINAE integrates them into the Refuge almost manu militari, as neither the local Government nor the inhabitants of the zone were consulted. Likewise, Decree 32753-MINAE injures the hierarchy of norms and violates Articles 36 and 37 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Article 45 of the Constitution is also violated because 85% of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge belongs to private individuals; it constitutes a mixed Refuge. They cannot be effectively subjected to any refuge if there is no voluntary request from the owners, which is not recorded in the Decree, nor has there been expropriation or payment. It is not viable to incorporate into the Refuge urban areas such as the City of Puerto Viejo, Gandoca, and Manzanillo, without prior studies and consultations with the INVU, with the Municipality of the canton, and with the inhabitants. The severe impact on the private property of those who inhabit these urban zones and on municipal powers is more than evident.

4.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at fifteen hours fifty-two minutes on January twenty-fifth, two thousand six, Walter Coto Molina appears, stating he appears as special attorney-in-fact for the Municipality of Salamanca. He indicates he attaches a copy of a brief signed by more than two hundred forty-five requests from inhabitants and companies of the canton of Talamanca, sent to the Minister of Environment and Energy, in which they pronounce themselves in relation to Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE (folio 44). The petitioner does not provide any certification of his status as attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff.

5.- Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any petition brought to its attention that turns out to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient grounds for judgment to reject it, or that it is the mere reiteration or reproduction of an equal or similar previously rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Solano Carrera; and,

Considering:

I.- On the admissibility of the action.

The petitioner challenges several Executive Decrees that regulate various aspects of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge. He claims that his standing derives from the defense of collective interests, as the challenged Decrees are contrary to the legal and constitutional interests and powers that the Legal System grants to his represented party.

In relation to the standing of a Mayor to directly file an unconstitutionality action, the Chamber, in judgment number 1999-05669 at 15:21 hours on July 21, 1999, considered that he is entitled to do so when alleging a violation of municipal autonomy and powers, as he acts in defense of the interests of the entity, of which he is the representative (subsection n) of Article 17 of the Municipal Code). In this case, and because the violation of such aspects is alleged, the Court reiterates the reasoning set out in that ruling and admits the Mayor's standing to bring the unconstitutionality action.

II.- Object of the action.- The following decrees are challenged:

1. Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG which created the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta 277 of November 27, 1985; 2. Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulations for the Participatory Management of Natural Resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000; 3. Executive Decree No. 32633, Regulations to the Wildlife Conservation Law, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005.

4. Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE published in La Gaceta No. 228 of November 25, 2005.

III.- Allegations of the petitioner.

The petitioner's allegations regarding the unconstitutionality of the cited Decrees can be classified into three groups: lack of consultation with the municipal government regarding modifications to the extent and administration of the forest heritage located in its jurisdiction; lack of compensation to the owners of the expropriated lands; and non-compliance with the requirements established by Law for the creation – via Decree – of protected zones.

IV.- Universal nature of the right to a healthy environment.

The doctrine of Constitutional Law has classified constitutional rights as fundamental rights of the first, second, and third generation, terminology intended to establish the stages through which the process of recognition and positivization of human rights has passed in the various international instruments issued for this purpose. The first are characteristic of liberal constitutionalism; ideologically, this category responds to the thinking in vogue in the 18th and early 19th centuries. These are rights generally conferred only on individuals. Among them stand out the right to property, to security, and, in general, rights enforceable against the State. The doctrine considers second-generation rights to be those characteristic of social constitutionalism, whose ideological content can be placed in the currents of the 20th century. These are rights granted mainly to workers and unions, to the family; that is, related to what is called the "social question." These rights are asserted against the State and against other subjects. Finally, the so-called third-generation rights emerge from constitutionalism after the Second World War. They are modern rights, with diffuse contours. Due to their own characteristics, their holders are groups, and even society as a whole. Forming part of this group are, for example, the right to peace, consumer protection, and of course, the protection of the environment.

At the international level, the first forum for the discussion of problems related to the environment was the "United Nations Conference on Human Development," held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972. It served as a framework so that that same year, the U.N., in its XXVII General Assembly, and through resolution 2997, established the "United Nations Environment Program." There was a conviction regarding the need for prompt and effective implementation by governments and the international community of measures aimed at safeguarding and increasing environmental protection for the benefit of current and future generations, as indicated in the preamble of the resolution that served as the legal framework for this program (free translation).

Since then, environmental protection has gained greater importance, being today one of the main topics on the agenda of governments and international organizations. This has resulted in the promulgation of a large number of conventions of an international (some promoted by the United Nations Organization) and/or regional nature, many of which have been signed by Costa Rica. Among them are the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Montreal Protocol, the Regional Convention for the Management and Conservation of Natural Forest Ecosystems and the Development of Forest Plantations, and some of a more regional nature such as the Central American Convention on the Protection of the Environment, the Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and the Natural Scenic Beauties of the Countries of America, the Convention for the Conservation of Biodiversity and the Protection of Priority Wildland Areas in Central America.

Thus, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment today has a universal profile. It is a right of humanity, which is reflected in the multiple conventions that countries have signed in order to protect biodiversity. These considerations have found echo in the Court's jurisprudence; thus, in Judgment No. 2485-94, it stated:

"This phenomenon of internationalization of environmental law has followed, by the way, a development pattern similar to that of human rights, for it has gone from being a matter of domestic jurisdiction of States to being part of international jurisdiction." V.- On the role of the State as guarantor of environmental law.

The Chamber, since its creation, and in addressing the environmental issue, pointed out that Article 50 of the Political Charter implicitly protected the right to the environment as a fundamental right (judgment No. 2233-93). However, and from the reform introduced through Law number 7412 of June 3, 1994 (published in La Gaceta No. 111 of June 10, 1994), the article expressly provides for the obligation of the State to protect the environment and grants citizens full standing to defend it:

Article 50: The State shall ensure the greatest well-being for all inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, they are entitled to denounce acts that infringe upon this right and to claim reparation for the damage caused. The State will guarantee, defend, and preserve this right. The law will determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions." This Constitutional Court has recognized the duty of protection owed to the right to enjoy a healthy and harmonious environment, as set forth in Articles 21, 50, and 89 of the Political Constitution:

"III.– On the right. Article 50 of the Political Constitution establishes that every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. The right to a healthy environment has a broad content that is equivalent to the aspiration to improve the living environment of the human being, such that it overflows the criteria of natural conservation to place itself within every sphere in which the person develops, be it the family, work, or the environment in which they live. Hence, it is affirmed that it is a transversal right, that is, one that moves throughout the entire legal system, modeling and reinterpreting its institutions. The environment is defined by the Royal Spanish Academy of Language as the 'set of physical circumstances that surround living beings,' which further emphasizes the general character of the right. In contrast, the right to an ecologically balanced environment is a more restricted concept referring to an important part of that environment in which the human being develops, to the balance that must exist between the advancement of society and the conservation of natural resources. Both rights are expressly recognized in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, which outlines the Social State of Law. The placement of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment within the constitutional regulations of the Social State of Law is the point from which it must be analyzed. The Social State of Law produces the phenomenon of incorporating into the fundamental text a series of political objectives of great social relevance and the introduction of an important number of social rights that ensure the common good and the satisfaction of the elementary needs of people. In this perspective, the Political Constitution emphasizes that the protection of natural resources is an adequate means to protect and improve the quality of life for all, which necessitates the intervention of public authorities over factors that can alter the balance of natural resources and, more broadly, hinder a person's development and unfolding in a healthy environment. (...) The Political Constitution establishes that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve this right. Prima facie, to guarantee is to secure and protect the right against some risk or need, to defend is to forbid, prohibit, and impede any activity that threatens the right, and to preserve is an action aimed at safeguarding the right in advance from possible dangers in order to make it endure for future generations. The State must assume a double behavior of acting and not acting; on one hand, it must refrain from attacking the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment itself, and on the other hand, it must assume the task of issuing the measures that allow it to comply with constitutional requirements." (Judgment number 00644–99 at eleven hours twenty-four minutes on January twenty-ninth, nineteen ninety-nine; in the same vein, number 4947-2002 at nine hours twenty-four minutes on May twenty-fourth, two thousand two, can be consulted) Likewise, in a recent judgment, the following was added:

"Our Political Constitution, in its Article 50, expressly recognizes the right of all present and future inhabitants of this country to enjoy a healthy and perfectly balanced environment. Compliance with this requirement is a fundamental guarantee for the protection of public life and health, not only of Costa Ricans but also of all members of the world community. The violation of these fundamental precepts entails the possibility of injury to or endangerment of short-, medium-, and long-term interests. Environmental pollution is one of the ways through which the integrity of the environment can be broken, with results that are most often everlasting and cumulative. The Costa Rican State is obliged to act preventively, avoiding—through oversight and direct intervention—the commission of acts that harm the environment, and under the correlative and equally unavoidable prohibition of fostering its degradation" (Judgment number 2002-04830 at 16:00 hours on May 21, 2000, criterion reiterated in judgment 2002-8996 at 10:14 hours on September 6, 2002.)

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that we are facing a right whose protection transcends the local interests that any municipal corporation is called upon to administer and protect autonomously. The State is therefore obliged to take the necessary precautions aimed at protecting the environment. The concept of the State must be understood in a broad sense, inclusive of other public entities that, by having their own legal personality, are no less equally destined to satisfy the general interest, and particularly to protect the environment. However, the primary responsibility for the defense of the environment corresponds to the central State.

Constitutional Article 50 has been developed by the ordinary legislator through various laws that seek to enhance and make effective the protection of the environment in the different scopes of application of these normative bodies, reserving to the Executive Branch the powers of administration and protection of natural assets. Law No. 7152 of June 5, 1990, created the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines, which it constituted as the governing body of the environmental sector and entrusted, due to its technical specialty, the task of "(…)Issuing, through executive decree, obligatory norms and regulations relating to the rational use and protection of natural resources, energy, and mines" (Article 2, subsection ch). The Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, No. 7554 of October 4, 1995, delegates to the Ministry of Environment and Energy a good part of the powers in this matter, without relieving other public entities of their responsibilities in this field. The power of the Executive Branch (President of the Republic and Minister of Environment and Energy) to proceed with the establishment of protected areas through the Ministry of Environment and Energy derives from the relationship of Articles 32 subsections e) and f) and 42 of Law No. 7554, Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, Articles 82 and 84 of Law No. 7317, the Wildlife Conservation Law, and 13 of Law No. 7575, Ley Forestal.

Thus, the central State, as delegate of the Nation for the fulfillment of its associative purposes, fulfills a unifying function and assumes the administration and protection of natural assets, with the support of other institutions—autonomous, semi-autonomous, and municipal corporations—as corresponds to their organic and territorial powers and, in the case of Municipalities, in relation to the local interests they are called upon to protect.

The actions of the Executive Branch are not only framed within the limits of its competence to fulfill the duty imposed upon it by Article 50 of the Political Constitution, but also conform to the copious regulation produced by International Law regarding the unavoidable obligation of the State to protect the environment, adopting all suitable measures to achieve integral and effective guarantee.

In this sense, although municipalities have undeniable duties in this field, it is evident that environmental protection transcends merely local interest, constituting a matter of national interest, so the actions of the central State, as delegate of the sovereign Nation for the fulfillment of its associative purposes, insofar as they promote an effective defense of its natural assets, are not only valid but also indispensable.

VI.- On the forest heritage of the State.

Within this framework of strict protection for the environment, the Political Constitution also provides specific rules regarding the legal regime applicable to public domain assets. Thus, Article 121 subsection 14) regulates it generically, by providing that assets "belonging to the Nation" may only permanently leave its domain by means of authorization from the Legislative Assembly. These are assets that, due to their legal nature and ownership, insofar as they belong to the Nation and are destined to satisfy the general interest, enjoy special legal protection. Therefore, they are not susceptible to being appropriated by private individuals, nor even by the Public Administration, for purposes other than those derived from their own essence and nature. Their protection and administration correspond to the State, on behalf of the Nation (cfr. Volume III of the Proceedings of the National Constituent Assembly, Session number 168).

In its case law, this Chamber has established the basic principles of the legal regime governing public domain assets; specifically, in ruling number 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on November 6, 1991, it determined the following rules, which have continued to be applied consistently since that decision:

\"…The public domain is comprised of assets that express, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. These are the so-called demanial assets, public domain assets, public things or public assets, which do not belong individually to private persons and are intended for public use and subject to a special regime, outside of commerce among men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected to the service they provide, and that service is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to any encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action replaces possessory interdicts to recover ownership. As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use (aprovechamiento) can be acquired, though not a right to property. The use permit (permiso de uso) is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private individual is the useful domain (dominio útil) of the asset, with the State always reserving direct ownership (dominio directo) over the thing…\" A corollary of the foregoing is that only by Law can they be stripped of the special regime that regulates them, by disaffecting them, separating them from the public purpose to which they are linked. An express and concrete legislative act is required, in such a way that there is no doubt whatsoever of the legislator's will to remove a specific and individualized asset from the public domain. Article 14 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), number 7575, of February 13, 1996, grants forestry lands and forests the character of public domain assets:

\"Article 14.- Unseizable and inalienable condition of the natural heritage The forestry lands and forests that constitute the natural heritage of the State, detailed in the preceding article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor, and the State's action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) over these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they cannot be registered in the Public Registry by means of possessory information, and both the invasion and occupation thereof shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law.\" According to the classification provided by environmental regulations, the forestry or natural heritage of the State is composed of forest reserves, biological reserves, protected zones (zonas protectoras), wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments (Article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law, number 7554, of September 18, 1995). Thus, it is clear that the Costa Rican legal system confers special and qualified protection on assets affected for public use or enjoyment, and clothes such protection with even greater care when regulating public environmental assets. These are assets belonging to the Nation, being affected for a purpose of undeniable general utility, and for which their administration has been entrusted, in cases where expressly determined by Law, to the central State, so that environmental policies follow consistent parameters aligned with the need for integral and continuous environmental protection. Even though for registry purposes, public domain assets can be registered in the name of the public entity entrusted with their stewardship, the truth is that these assets do not belong to any particular public entity, but to the Nation.

The importance of protecting certain geographical areas by affecting them to the public domain regime constitutes a matter of national interest. This has been recognized by this Court:

\"The creation of protected areas under the categories of Forest Reserve, Private or Mixed Wildlife Refuge, National Parks, Biological Reserves, and Protected Zones, entails the imposition of a Public property Regime under the category of State Forestry Heritage which changes ipso facto the legal nature of the lands included within the area, that is, from a private regime manifested in various forms or states of tenure to a public regime of State property. Article 13 of Forestry Law No. 7575 establishes that the natural heritage of the State shall consist of the forests and forestry lands of the national reserves, of areas declared inalienable, of properties registered in its name, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other Public Administration bodies, except for real estate that guarantees credit operations with the national Banking System and becomes part of its assets. In the same vein, Article 14 of the same Law provides that the forestry lands and forests that constitute this natural heritage of the State are unseizable and inalienable; that their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor; and that the State's action for recovery over these lands is imprescriptible.

Regarding forest reserves, there is a great need to protect timber species not only because of the value of the species themselves from an economic standpoint, but also because some of them have great scientific value, and these plant species are part of renewable natural resources, but they will cease to be so to the extent that they become extinct.

(…)In this same sense, wildlife refuges are defined in Forestry Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, in Article 35 subsection ch), as \"those forests and lands whose principal use is the protection, conservation, increase, and management of species of wild flora and fauna.\" These sites have as their primary purpose the protection of endangered species of flora and fauna, which possess, among other values, great scientific value, hence the interest in conserving them. Their conservation aims to guarantee the perpetuity of wildlife species, their populations, and habitats, and to provide opportunities for scientific, educational, and recreational activities, when these do not undermine the objectives of each refuge. Within National Wildlife Refuges, the biota can be very varied depending on the diversity of natural associations existing within the refuge, according to the variety of local geographical conditions, which means appreciating the differences that arise from a diversity of geological, edaphic, topographic conditions, and animal and human activity, hence the legal protection of these areas and of the other constituent parts of forestry agrarian property is necessary. (ruling 1999-2988) The law empowers the Executive Branch to determine, through Decree, which geographical areas of the national territory (marine, coastal, insular, or continental) may be protected under one of the management categories established by law. For this purpose, the legal regime of the property—public or private—is irrelevant, nor which entity or body has administered it up to that moment, since from the declaration onwards it is administered by MINAE. On this aspect, ruling 1999-2988 stated:

\"In our country, as already mentioned, the interest in protecting forest resources dates back years. For example, in Decree No. 5 of June 26, 1945, this tendency towards the protection of forest lands and the forest resources derived from them was made manifest, not only for the value of the resources as such, but also for the role they play within what are, in this case, protected zones. The State is interested in them by acquiring lands for forest protection, to determine whether, due to their scenic, cultural, scientific, or protective conditions, they constitute an asset that must be preserved as land of incalculable value. By reason of this assessment, the State creates the so-called protected zones, which constitute wooded areas or areas of forestry suitability where the conservation of the forest and the conservation of forest lands is inspired by purposes of soil protection, or to maintain and regulate the hydrological regime, the climate, and the environment. They are suitable for soil protection, because tree roots hold and retain the topsoil, and the leaves that fall from them cover the ground where water runs, preventing the dragging of soil particles, that is, they halt or at least diminish the erosion process, which brings with it the nutritional imbalance of the soil by dragging important nutrients from the earth, necessary for plant growth. Protected zones play a preponderant role in the balance of the environment, understood as the set of things that surround the individual, such as: climate, soil, light, wind, rain, food, cold, heat, habitat, etc., and in the balance of the ecosystem through the exchange relationship between the living part of nature and its inert part. Hence the need to protect the soil, the regulation of the hydrological regime, the conservation of the environment, and that of watersheds. These zones are created by law or by decree of the Executive Branch, and in them, also by legal provision, it is prohibited to carry out agricultural activities or destruction of vegetation. Located within the protected zones are lands situated in national reserves, a certain strip along rivers, a strip on either side of the maximum depression of hydrological basins, lands bordering springs (nacientes) that rise in the hills and also those that rise in flatlands, a certain area on the banks of rivers, streams, lakes, lagoons, or natural reservoirs.\" VII.- Regarding the increase and reduction of protected wild areas.

In the brief filing the unconstitutionality action, the petitioner challenges—and points out as a ground of unconstitutionality—the repeal of Decree 23069-MIRENEM by Decree 29019-MINAE, as it tacitly reduced the extent of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo), given that the latter had expanded the limits of the Refuge.

Analyzing the decrees promulgated related to the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge, it is observed that the Executive Branch has issued several in an attempt to regulate its situation. In order to clarify the current situation, it is convenient to recount those related to the object of this action. We have, in the first place, DE-16614-MAG of October 29, 1985, which creates the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (REGAMA). The legal basis of the decree lies specifically in Article 2 of Law No. 4465, but especially in Article 18 of Law No. 6919, Wildlife Conservation Law, now repealed, but which at that time provided:

\"Article 18.- National wildlife refuges are those that the Executive Branch declares as such, for the protection and research of wild flora and fauna, especially those in danger of extinction. The Executive Branch is authorized to establish, within forest reserves and on private lands, areas under the classification of national wildlife refuges, which, for purposes of wildlife conservation, shall be under the administration of the Wildlife Department of the General Forestry Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. (…)\" Article 6 of Decree 16614-MAG expressly excluded from that refuge the urban area of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo. Subsequently, DE-23069-MIRENEM of April 5, 1994, was issued; Article 16 of that Decree repealed Art. 6 of DE-16614. The immediate consequence of this was that the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo became part of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge. Later, Decree DE-29019-MINAE of October 31, 2000, was promulgated, which, through Article 8, repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM; thereby, Article 6 of DE-16614 tacitly regained effect. A tacit reduction of the reserve's territory occurred at that moment, once again excluding the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo, which left things in the situation as provided by Decree No. 16614-MAG. However, subsequently, the Executive Branch issued DE-32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, which expressly repealed Article 6 of DE-16614; once again, the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo become part of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, a situation that continues to date.

Regarding the increase and/or decrease of the territorial limits of the forestry heritage, this Court, in ruling No. 1999-5399 of 16:39 hours on October 26, 1993, in which the Chamber stated:

\"…if the Executive Branch is authorized to determine the limits of its forestry heritage, it shall be through regulatory means and not by legislative means, with the due compensation of the properties over which the forestry heritage extends, since by virtue of Article 9 of the Constitution and the theory of Separation of Powers, the Legislative Assembly is the only constitutional body empowered to enact laws. Therefore, when dealing with a public domain asset, it is illogical to think that the State is limited or hindered in its actions to safeguard the flora and fauna of our lands.

II.In this line of thought, since this action is directed against an executive decree that expanded the limits of a national park—Isla del Coco—extending it to a distance of fifteen kilometers over the sea, measured from the low-tide line of the coast, it is important to determine that it does so in the full exercise of its powers, both legal and constitutional, as it concerns a public domain asset. (…)

V.Regarding the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and the Natural Scenic Beauties of the Countries of the Americas—approved by Law number 3763, of October 1, 1966—in relation to Article 7 of the Constitution, which, in the relevant part, reads as follows:

\"The Contracting Governments agree that the boundaries of national parks shall not be altered nor any part thereof alienated except by action of the competent legislative authority. The riches existing in them shall not be exploited for commercial purposes.

The Contracting Governments agree to prohibit the hunting, killing, and capture of specimens of fauna and the destruction and collection of specimens of flora in national parks, except when done by the park authorities or under their order or supervision, or for duly authorized scientific research.\" These norms must be interpreted in a restrictive sense, such that the requirement to establish the limits of national parks through a law is only applicable when it is to their detriment, that is, when their extent is to be reduced, and not when the limits of the State's forest heritage protected zones are to be extended. This article must be read in conjunction with Article 40 of the Forestry Law, which states:

\"The area of forest reserves, protected zones, national parks, wildlife refuges, and biological reserves of the forestry heritage may only be reduced by law of the Republic, after corresponding technical studies justifying this measure.\" And this is so by virtue of the fact that the legal interest protected is the \"forest resource,\" a term that \"means the protection and preservation of the integrity of the natural environment,\" (resolution of the Constitutional Chamber number 2233-93, of nine hours thirty-six minutes on May twenty-eighth) that exists in the area declared as a national park, and that is recognized by international legislation, by the special laws enacted to that effect, and by the texts of political charters. In this sense, Article 69 of the Political Constitution speaks of \"rational exploitation of the land,\" establishing its protection as a fundamental principle (…).\" (the bold text is not from the original) It is evident, then, that the Executive Branch cannot reduce the territorial limits of a wild area, but it can extend them. Hence, Decrees whose repeal or entry into force have had the immediate consequence of increasing the territory of a specific protected area are constitutional.

VIII.- Regarding the lack of compensation to the owners of expropriated lands and the failure to comply with the requirements established by Law.

The petitioner's other arguments contest the lack of compensation to owners for expropriated lands and the failure to comply with the requirements established in the Law for the establishment (by Decree) of forest reserves, protected wild areas, etc.; likewise, they challenge the scope of the provisions of Forestry Law No. 446 and Article 18 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which served as the basis for the issuance of Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG. However, both issues constitute matters of ordinary legality, the cognizance of which corresponds to the ordinary jurisdiction (see, among others, rulings 2001-4530, 2002 4254, 2002-4878, 2002-5203, and 2003-3653).

Regarding the second aspect, contradiction of a regulatory norm with legal provisions, the Court has stated:

\"The petitioner alleges that the challenged Decree is unconstitutional because it was issued without complying with the requirements established for that purpose by the Organic Environmental Law. The problem thus framed refers exclusively to the violation of the principle of administrative legality derived from Article 11 of the Constitution: contradiction of the challenged norm with legal provisions. In accordance with the provisions of Article 49 of the Political Constitution, matters of legality must be submitted to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, in order to maintain a uniform distribution of competences and respect for all the rules that make up the Political Constitution. As has been repeatedly stated by this Court:

\"It is clear that any challenge such as the one raised implicitly entails a presumed violation of the Political Constitution, given that the entire legal system derives from it, but the Constitution itself contains a distribution of competences in order to guarantee the citizen a way to protect the different kinds of rights and interests they possess. Thus, the contentious and labor jurisdictions are regulated in the Political Constitution (Articles 49 and 70), and it is within this context that constitutional jurisdiction must be embedded, in the understanding that its competence complements and does not overlap with those mentioned, for the purposes of citizen protection\" (in this sense, see, among others, rulings number 0843-95, of 15:45 hours on February 14, 1995, 0404-96, of 15:33 hours on January 23, 3379-96; of 10:57 hours on July 5, 6471-96, of 15:39 hours on November 27; 6692-96 of 16:03 hours on December 10; 6689-96, of 15:54 hours on December 10, all from 1996, and 4261-97, of 16:03 hours on July 22, 1997).

In this sense, delineating constitutional jurisdiction from ordinary jurisdiction becomes delicate, since the violation of the principle of legality stems precisely from constitutional norms—Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Political Constitution—and what is specifically requested is that this principle be made to prevail by declaring the existence of a violation of legal precepts by the challenged Decree. The transcendence of this principle does not prevent, however, that in order to successfully invoke it, at least one other constitutional norm or principle must have been violated, when dealing with constitutional jurisdiction, which does not occur in relation to the challenged norm, insofar as what is claimed is that it was not issued in conformity with other norms of legal rank. The contrary opinion would end up blurring the distinction between constitutional matters and matters of mere legality—if we speak of Article 11—since violations of the Constitution could not be differentiated from violations of a legal nature. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that, even though it can be validly stated that matters of legality have a direct relationship with Article 11 of the Political Constitution, the truth is that the issue of the conformity of legal norms with one another falls rather within the specialty of the matter that Article 49 of the Constitution assigned to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, which is why, in compliance therewith, the petitioner must be referred to that jurisdiction to submit the issue raised.\" (ruling 2004-03579 of 14:42 hours on April 14, 2004. In the same sense, rulings numbers 2002-4452 and 2005-5899) IX.- Conclusion.- The Executive Branch has no obligation to consult the Municipalities regarding the measures to be adopted in relation to the so-called \"protected zones,\" since its competence over such zones—as the administrator—is exclusive. It could do so, and perhaps it would be advisable to gather their opinion, with a view to harmonizing the provisions related to their administration and management with local interests. However, this constitutes a matter of timeliness and advisability, which remains at the discretion of that branch. The alleged failure to comply with the requirements established in the law for issuing a decree, as well as the alleged lack of compensation to owners, are matters of legality whose cognizance does not correspond to this Court; rather, they must be heard and resolved in the ordinary jurisdiction. On the other hand, although Decree DE-29019-MINAE of October 31, 2000, repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM, and in doing so excluded the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo from REGAMA (resulting in a tacit reduction of REGAMA's territory), the Executive Branch subsequently issued DE-32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, which repealed Article 6 of Decree 16614-MAG. By doing so, the reserve's territory returned to its original situation. This is not only constitutional but consistent with the case law of this Court on this matter. By virtue of the foregoing, and in accordance with Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the appropriate course is to dismiss the action.

Therefore:

The action is dismissed on the merits in relation to Decree 32753-MINAE. In all other respects, it is dismissed outright.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

President Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Name02 Consequently, the subsequent Executive Decrees, issued from May 7, 1986, onward and until the new legislative repeal of Law No. 4465, were obligated to adapt to and comply with the requirements established in the Law of November 25, 1969; by failing to do so, they violated the constitutional hierarchy of the norm. When the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge was created, within the territorial jurisdiction of the canton of Talamanca, the local Government was completely ignored, thereby injuring municipal autonomy. Article 169 of the Constitution clearly establishes that the administration of the local interests and services of each canton shall be the responsibility of the municipal government; consequently, it is neither politically nor legally reasonable to completely exclude the Municipality from the subjection of part of its territory. In Voto 5445-99, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that “ignoring and dismantling the municipalities in their local interests is to empty them of their constitutional content.” What good is municipal autonomy if state entities fabricate legal coverages in their territories without intervention, opinion, and/or coordination with the local governments, whether those coverages are reserves, national parks, refuges, protective zones, or any other management category? While one cannot speak of absolute autonomy, to the point of dismembering the National State, it can also not be so precarious that state entities disregard or ignore it. Regarding Executive Decree 29019-MINAE, which repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM and expanded the refuge boundaries, it suffers from the same defect noted above, that is, it was issued without taking into account the opinion of the local government and reduced the area that had been expanded by the former. This injures articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, as well as 45, because by expanding the Refuge, private properties were added (it is a mixed refuge) without any expropriation or indemnification having taken place, nor did the inhabitants voluntarily submit themselves to the Refuge. This Decree did not provide reasons or studies justifying the reduction of the refuge. The creation, increase, or decrease of new protection areas cannot respond to a simple whim of the public authorities; compliance with the requirements established by Law is a control mechanism to guarantee the rights of the administered parties and the satisfaction of the environmental public interest. Many of the country's protected areas have been created to the detriment of the vested rights of individuals and peasant populations and of legal entities that have legitimately acquired properties many years ago. Article 8 of Decree 29019 repeals Decree 23069, which had expanded the Refuge; this expansion is unconstitutional, as it did not respect Article 45 of the Constitution nor the procedure that must be followed for that purpose.

**2.-** In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, he indicates that it derives from Article 75, second paragraph. The Municipality, as local Government, has the obligation not only to protect the environment, but also to defend municipal autonomy.

**3.-** By a brief received at eleven hours forty minutes on December 3, 2005, the Mayor of the Municipality of Talamanca adds grounds for unconstitutionality. He indicates that by Decree 32753-MINAE, the validity of Executive Decree 16614-MAG of June 1, 1985, is ratified as to articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, in the terms in which it was declared. The Decree repeals articles 5 and 6 of Decree 16614-MAG, thereby including in the zone the urban areas excluded from the original Decree. He considers that Decree 32753-MINAE exhibits the same grounds of unconstitutionality adduced against the other challenged decrees, thus injuring articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, relating to municipal powers and autonomy. In addition, the Decree purports to retroact its effects to situations created in the past, thereby violating Article 34 of the Constitution. Article 2 is unconstitutional because, by repealing articles 5 and 6 of Executive Decree 16614-MAG, it integrates into the Refuge the urban areas that were excluded from the original Decree, injuring the referenced Article 34 and Article 45 of the Constitution. There are important urban populations that were excluded from the original Decree, that have not been part of the Refuge, and which, as a consequence of the promulgation of the Decree, MINAE integrates into the Refuge almost *manu militari*, since neither the local Government nor the inhabitants of the zone were consulted. Likewise, Decree 32753-MINAE injures the hierarchy of norms and violates articles 36 and 37 of the Organic Law of the Environment. Article 45 of the Constitution is also violated since 85% of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge is comprised of private land; it constitutes a mixed Refuge; they cannot effectively be subject to any refuge if there is no voluntary request from the owners, which is not recorded in the Decree, nor has there been any expropriation or payment. It is not viable to incorporate into the Refuge urban areas such as the City of Puerto Viejo, Gandoca, and Manzanillo, without studies or prior consultations with INVU, the Municipality of the canton, or the inhabitants. The severe impact on the private property of those who inhabit these urban areas and on municipal powers is more than evident.

**4.-** By a brief received at the Secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at fifteen hours fifty-two minutes on January 25, two thousand six, Walter Coto Molina appears, stating that he appears as special attorney-in-fact for the Municipality of Salamanca. He indicates that he attaches a copy of a brief signed by more than two hundred forty-five requests from inhabitants and businesses of the canton of Talamanca, sent to the Minister of Environment and Energy, in which they pronounce themselves regarding Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE (folio 44). The petitioner does not provide any certification of his status as attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff.

**5.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient evidentiary elements to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, equal, or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate **Solano Carrera** ; and, **Considering:** **I.- On the admissibility of the action**.

The plaintiff challenges several Executive Decrees that regulate various aspects of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge. He claims that his standing derives from the defense of collective interests, because the challenged Decrees are contrary to the interests and legal and constitutional powers that the Legal System grants to his represented entity.

Regarding the standing of a Mayor to directly file an unconstitutionality action, the Chamber, in judgment number 1999-05669 of 15:21 hours on July 21, 1999, considered that he has standing to do so when he alleges a violation of municipal autonomy and powers, as he acts in defense of the interests of the entity of which he is the representative (Article 17, subsection n) of the Municipal Code). In this case, and because the violation of such aspects is alleged, the Court reiterates the reasoning set forth in that vote and admits the Mayor's standing to file the unconstitutionality action.

**II.- Object of the action.-** The following decrees are challenged:

1. Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG that created the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, published in La Gaceta 277 of November 27, 1985; 2. Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulation for the Participatory Management of Natural Resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000; 3. Executive Decree No. 32633, Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005. 4. Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE, published in La Gaceta No. 228 of November 25, 2005.

**III.- Plaintiff's allegations.** The plaintiff's allegations regarding the unconstitutionality of the cited Decrees can be classified into three groups: lack of consultation with the municipal government regarding modifications to the extent and administration of the forest patrimony (patrimonio forestal) located within its jurisdiction; lack of indemnification to the owners of expropriated lands; and non-compliance with the requirements established by Law for the creation –via Decree– of protected zones.

**IV.- Universal nature of the right to a healthy environment.** Constitutional Law doctrine has classified constitutional rights as fundamental rights of the first, second, and third generation, terminology whose purpose is to establish the stages through which the process of recognition and positivization of human rights has passed in the various international instruments issued for that purpose. The first are characteristic of liberal constitutionalism; ideologically, this category responds to the thinking in vogue in the 18th and early 19th centuries. These are rights generally conferred only upon individuals. Among them are the right to property, to security, and, in general, rights enforceable against the State. The doctrine considers second-generation rights to be those characteristic of social constitutionalism, whose ideological content can be placed in the currents of the 20th century. They are rights granted mainly to workers and unions, to the family, that is, related to what is called the "social question." These rights are raised against the State and against other subjects. Finally, the rights called third-generation rights emerge from post-World War II constitutionalism. They are modern rights, with diffuse contours. Due to their own characteristics, their holders are groups, and even society as a whole. Part of this group are, for example, the right to peace, consumer protection, and of course, the protection of the environment.

At the international level, the first forum for the discussion of problems related to the environment was the "United Nations Conference on the Human Environment," held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972. It served as a framework so that in the same year, the U.N., at its XXVII General Assembly, and through resolution 2997, established the "United Nations Environment Programme." There was a conviction regarding the need for prompt and effective implementation by governments and the international community of measures aimed at safeguarding and increasing environmental protection for the benefit of present and future generations, as indicated in the preamble of the resolution that served as the legal framework for this program (free translation).

Since then, environmental protection has acquired greater importance, being, today, one of the main topics on the agenda of governments and international organizations. This has resulted in the promulgation of a large number of international (some promoted by the United Nations Organization) and/or regional conventions, many of which have been signed by Costa Rica. Among them are the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Montreal Protocol, the Regional Convention for the Management and Conservation of Natural Forest Ecosystems and the Development of Forest Plantations, and some of a more regional nature such as the Central American Convention on the Protection of the Environment, the Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and Natural Scenic Beauties of the Countries of America, the Convention for the Conservation of Biodiversity and Protection of Priority Wilderness Areas in Central America.

Thus, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment has, today, a universal profile. It is a right of humanity, which is reflected in the multiple conventions that countries have signed with the purpose of protecting biodiversity. These considerations have found an echo in the Court's jurisprudence; thus, in judgment No. 2485-94, it stated:

*“This phenomenon of the internationalization of environmental law has followed, certainly, a development pattern similar to that of human rights, as it has gone from being a matter of domestic jurisdiction of States to being part of international jurisdiction.”* **V.- On the role of the State as guarantor of environmental law**.

The Chamber, since its creation, and when addressing the environmental issue, indicated that Article 50 of the Political Charter implicitly protected the right to the environment as a fundamental right (judgment No. 2233-93). However, and as of the reform introduced by Law number 7412 of June 3, 1994 (published in La Gaceta No. 111 of June 10, 1994), the article expressly provides for the State's obligation to protect the environment and grants citizens full action to defend it:

***Article 50**: The State shall procure the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, they are entitled to denounce acts that infringe upon that right and to claim reparation for the damage caused. The State shall guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions."* This Constitutional Court has recognized the duty of protection owed to the right to enjoy a healthy and harmonious environment, set forth in articles 21, 50, and 89 of the Political Constitution:

*“III.– On the right**. **Article 50 of the Political Constitution establishes that every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. The right to a healthy environment has a broad content that equates to the aspiration to improve the living environment of the human being, in such a way that it overflows the criteria of natural conservation to locate itself within every sphere in which the person develops, be it family, work, or the environment in which they live. Hence, it is affirmed that it is a transversal right, that is, it moves throughout the entire legal system, modeling and reinterpreting its institutions. The environment is defined by the Royal Spanish Academy of Language as the 'set of physical circumstances that surround living beings,' which further emphasizes the general character of the right. In contrast, the right to an ecologically balanced environment is a more restricted concept referring to an important part of that environment in which the human being develops, to the balance that must exist between the advancement of society and the conservation of natural resources. Both rights are expressly recognized in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, which outlines the Social State of Law. The location of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment within the constitutional regulations of the Social State of Law is the point from which it must be analyzed. The Social State of Law produces the phenomenon of incorporating into the fundamental text a series of political objectives of great social relevance and the introduction of an important number of social rights that ensure the common good and the satisfaction of the basic needs of persons. In this perspective, the Political Constitution emphasizes that the protection of natural resources is an adequate means to protect and improve the quality of life for all, which makes necessary the intervention of public powers over factors that can alter the balance of natural resources and, more broadly, hinder the person from developing and functioning in a healthy environment. (...) The Political Constitution establishes that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. Prima facie, to guarantee is to secure and protect the right against some risk or necessity, to defend is to forbid, prohibit, and impede any activity that threatens the right, and to preserve is an action directed at sheltering the right in advance from possible dangers in order to make it endure for future generations. The State must assume a double behavior of doing and not doing; on one hand, it must refrain from itself threatening the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and on the other hand, it must assume the task of dictating the measures that allow it to comply with constitutional requirements.”* (Judgment number 00644–99 of eleven hours twenty-four minutes on January twenty-nine, nineteen ninety-nine; in the same sense, see number 4947-2002 of nine hours twenty-four minutes on May twenty-four, two thousand two) Likewise, in a recent judgment, the following was added:

*"Our Political Constitution, in its Article 50, expressly recognizes the right of all present and future inhabitants of this country to enjoy a healthy and perfectly balanced environment. Compliance with this requirement is a fundamental guarantee for the protection of public life and health, not only of Costa Ricans, but also of all members of the world community. The violation of these fundamental precepts entails the possibility of injury or endangerment of short, medium, and long-term interests. Contamination of the environment is one of the ways through which the integrity of the environment can be broken, with results that are most often imperishable and cumulative. The Costa Rican State is obligated to act preventively, avoiding—through oversight and direct intervention—the carrying out of acts that harm the environment, and in the correlative and equally unavoidable prohibition of promoting its degradation.”* (Judgment number 2002-04830 of 16:00 hours on May 21, 2000, criterion reiterated in judgment 2002-8996 of 10:14 hours on September 6, 2002.)

From the foregoing, it is evident that we are facing a right whose protection transcends the local interests that any municipal corporation is called upon to administer and protect autonomously. The State is then obligated to take the necessary precautions aimed at protecting the environment. The concept of the State must be understood in a broad sense, inclusive of other public entities that, by having their own legal personality, are nonetheless equally destined to satisfy the general interest, and particularly to protect the environment. However, the central State bears the primary responsibility for the defense of the environment.

Article 50 of the Constitution has been developed by the ordinary legislator through various laws that seek to enhance and make effective the protection of the environment in the different scopes of application of those normative bodies, reserving to the Executive Branch the powers of administration and protection of natural assets. Law No. 7152 of June 5, 1990, created the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines, which it constituted as the governing body of the environmental sector and entrusted, due to its technical specialty, with the task of *"(…) Issuing, by executive decree, norms and regulations, of a mandatory nature, relating to the rational use and protection of natural resources, energy, and mines"* (Article 2, subsection ch). The Organic Law of the Environment, No. 7554 of October 4, 1995, delegates to the Ministry of Environment and Energy a good part of the powers in this matter, without discharging other public entities from their responsibilities in this field. The power of the Executive Branch (President of the Republic and Minister of Environment and Energy) to proceed with the establishment of protected areas through the Ministry of Environment and Energy derives from the relationship of Articles 32 subsections e) and f) and 42 of Law No. 7554, the Organic Law of the Environment, Articles 82 and 84 of Law No. 7317, the Wildlife Conservation Law, and 13 of Law No. 7575, the Forest Law (Ley Forestal).

Thus, the central State, as a delegate of the Nation for the fulfillment of its associative purposes, fulfills a unifying function and assumes the administration and protection of natural assets, with the support of the other institutions—autonomous, semi-autonomous, and municipal corporations—in what corresponds to their organic and territorial powers, and in the case of the Municipalities, in relation to the local interests they are called upon to protect.

The actions of the Executive Branch are not only framed within the limits of its competence to fulfill the duty imposed upon it by Article 50 of the Political Constitution, but also conform to the copious regulation produced by International Law regarding the unavoidable obligation of the State to protect the environment, adopting all suitable measures to achieve comprehensive and effective guarantee.

In this sense, although the municipalities have undeniable duties in this field, it is evident that environmental protection transcends merely local interest, becoming a matter of national interest, such that the actions of the central State, as delegate of the sovereign Nation for the fulfillment of its associative purposes, insofar as they foster an effective defense of its natural assets, are not only valid, but even indispensable.

**VI.- On the forest patrimony (patrimonio forestal) of the State.** Within this framework of strict environmental protection, the Political Constitution also provides specific rules regarding the legal regime applicable to public domain assets. Thus, Article 121, subsection 14) regulates it generically, by providing that assets “belonging to the Nation” may only permanently leave its domain by means of authorization from the Legislative Assembly. These are assets that, due to their legal nature and ownership, insofar as they belong to the Nation and are destined to satisfy the general interest, enjoy special legal protection. Therefore, they are not susceptible to being appropriated by private individuals, nor even by the Public Administration, for purposes other than those derived from their own essence and nature. Their protection and administration correspond to the State, in the name of the Nation (cf. volume III of the Acts of the National Constituent Assembly, Session number 168).

In its jurisprudence, this Chamber has laid down the basic principles of the legal regime of public domain assets (bienes dominiales); in particular, in judgment number 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on November 6, 1991, it determined the following rules, which have continued to be consistently applied since that resolution:

*"…The public domain is comprised of assets that manifest, by express will of the legislator, a special destiny to serve the community, the public interest.- These are called dominical assets, dominial assets, public assets or things, or public goods, which do not belong individually to private persons and that are intended for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men.- That is, affected by their own nature and vocation.- Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected to the service they provide, and are invariably essential by virtue of express norm.- Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for the interdicts to recover domain.- As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use (aprovechamiento) can be acquired, though not a right to property.- The use permit is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private individual is the useful domain of the asset, the State always reserving for itself the direct domain over the thing…"* A corollary of the foregoing is that only by Law can they be deprived of the special regime that regulates them, disaffecting them, separating them from the public purpose to which they are linked. An express and concrete legislative act is required, in such a way that there is no doubt whatsoever of the legislator's will to remove a specific and individualized asset from the public domain. Article 14 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), number 7575, of February thirteen, nineteen ninety-six, gives forest lands and forests the character of public domain assets (bienes dominiales):

*“Article 14.- Unattachable and inalienable condition of the natural patrimony (patrimonio natural)* *The forest lands and forests that constitute the natural patrimony (patrimonio natural) of the State, detailed in the preceding article, shall be unattachable and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not cause any right in their favor, and the State's action for revindication of these lands is imprescriptible.* Consequently, they cannot be registered in the Public Registry by means of possessory information, and both the invasion and the occupation of them shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>According to the classification provided by environmental regulations, the forest or natural heritage (patrimonio forestal o natural) of the State is comprised of forest reserves, biological reserves, protected zones (zonas protectoras), wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments (Article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law, number 7554, of September eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five). Thus, it is clear that the Costa Rican legal system confers special and qualified protection upon assets designated for public use or enjoyment, and further reinforces that guardianship when regulating public environmental assets. These are assets belonging to the Nation, by virtue of being designated for a purpose of undeniable general utility, and for which their administration has been entrusted, in cases expressly determined by law, to the central State, so that environmental policies follow consistent parameters aligned with the need for comprehensive and continuous environmental protection. Even though for registration purposes, public domain assets (bienes demaniales) may be registered in the name of the public entity responsible for their stewardship, the truth is that these assets do not belong to any particular public entity, but to the Nation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The importance of protecting certain geographical areas by designating them under the public domain regime constitutes a matter of national interest. This Court has recognized as much</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">“The establishment of protected areas under the categories of Forest Reserve, Private or Mixed Wildlife Refuge, National Parks, Biological Reserves, and Protected Zones (Zonas Protectoras), entails the imposition of a Public Property Regime under the category of State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) which changes ipso facto the legal nature of the lands included within the area, that is, from a private regime manifesting in various forms or tenure statuses to a public regime of State ownership. Article 13 of the Forestry Law No. 7575 establishes that the natural heritage (patrimonio natural) of the State shall consist of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of areas declared inalienable, of properties registered in its name, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except for real estate guaranteeing credit operations with the national Banking System that becomes part of its assets. In the same vein, Article 14 of the same Law provides that the forest lands and forests constituting that natural heritage of the State are unattachable and inalienable; that their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor; and that the State's action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) of these lands is imprescriptible. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Regarding forest reserves, there is a great need to protect timber species, not only for their inherent economic value, but also because some of them have great scientific value, and these plant species are part of the renewable natural resources, but will cease to be so to the extent they become extinct.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">(…)In this same sense, wildlife refuges are defined in the Forestry Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, in Article 35 subsection ch), as \"those forests and lands whose main use is the protection, conservation, increase, and management of wild flora and fauna species.\" These sites have as their primary purpose the protection of endangered flora and fauna species that possess, among other values, great scientific value, hence the interest in conserving them. Their conservation aims to guarantee the perpetuity of wildlife species, their populations, and habitats, and to provide an opportunity for scientific, educational, and recreational activities, provided they do not detract from the objectives of each refuge. Within National Wildlife Refuges, the biota can be highly varied depending on the diversity of natural associations existing within the refuge, according to the variety of local geographical conditions, which means appreciating differences stemming from diversity in geological, edaphic, topographic conditions and animal and human activity, hence the need for legal protection of these areas and the other constituents of forested agrarian property. (judgment 1999-2988)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The law empowers the Executive Branch to determine, through Decree, which geographical zones of the national territory (marine, coastal, insular, or continental) may be protected under one of the management categories established by law. For this purpose, the legal regime of the property—public or private—and which entity or body has administered it up to that moment are irrelevant, since from the declaration forward, it shall be administered by MINAE. Regarding this aspect, judgment 1999-2988 stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">“In our country, as previously mentioned, the interest in the protection of forest resources dates back years. For example, in Decree No. 5 of June 26, 1945, this tendency towards the protection of forest lands and the forest resources derived from them is evident, not only for the value of the resources as such, but also for the function they perform within what are, in this case, protected zones (zonas protectoras). The State is interested in them for acquiring lands for forest protection, to determine whether, due to their scenic, cultural, scientific, or protective conditions, they constitute an asset that must be preserved as land of incalculable value. By reason of this assessment, the State creates the so-called protected zones (zonas protectoras), which come to constitute wooded areas or areas of forest aptitude wherein the conservation of the forest and the conservation of forest lands is inspired by purposes of soil protection, or to maintain and regulate the hydrological regime, the climate, the environment. They are suitable for soil protection, since tree roots hold and retain the topsoil and the leaves that fall from them cover the ground where water runs and prevent the dragging of soil particles, that is, they stop or at least reduce the erosion process, which brings with it the nutritional imbalance of the soil by dragging important nutrients from the earth necessary for plant growth. Protected zones (zonas protectoras) play a preponderant role in the equilibrium of the environment, understood as the set of things surrounding the individual such as climate, soil, light, wind, rain, food, cold, heat, habitat, etc., and in the equilibrium of the ecosystem through the exchange relationship that occurs between the living part of nature and the inert part thereof. Hence, the soil, the regulation of the hydrological regime, the conservation of the environment, and that of hydrographic basins must be protected. These zones are created by law or via decree of the Executive Branch, and in them, also by legal provision, it is forbidden to carry out agricultural activities or destruction of vegetation. Within the protected zones are included lands located in national reserves, a certain zone along rivers, a strip on both sides of the maximum depression of hydrographic basins, lands bordering springs (manantiales) that rise in the hills and also those rising on flat terrain, a certain area on the banks of rivers, streams, lakes, lagoons, or natural reservoirs.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">VII.- Regarding the increase and reduction of protected wild areas</span><span>.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>In the brief filing the unconstitutionality action, the claimant challenges—and points out as grounds for unconstitutionality—the repeal of Decree 23069-MIRENEM by Decree 29019-MINAE, since it tacitly reduced the extent of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, given that the latter had expanded the limits of the Refuge.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Analyzing the decrees promulgated related to the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge, it is observed that the Executive Branch has issued several in an effort to regulate its situation. In order to clarify the current situation, it is convenient to recount those related to the object of this action. We have, in the first place, DE-16614-MAG of October 29, 1985, which created the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (REGAMA). The legal basis of the decree is specifically in Article 2 of Law No. 4465, but especially in Article 18 of Law No. 6919, Wildlife Conservation Law, now repealed, but which at that time provided:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">“Article 18.- National wildlife refuges are those declared as such by the Executive Branch, for the protection and research of wild flora and fauna, especially those in danger of extinction. The Executive Branch is authorized to establish, within forest reserves and on private lands, areas under the classification of national wildlife refuges, which, for purposes of wildlife conservation, shall be under the administration of the Wildlife Department of the General Forestry Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. (…)”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Article 6 of Decree 16614-MAG expressly excluded from that refuge the urban zone of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo. Subsequently, DE-23069-MIRENEM of April 5, 1994, was issued; Article 16 of that Decree repealed Art. 6 of DE-16614. The immediate consequence thereof was that the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo became part of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge. Later, Decree DE-29019-MINAE of October 31, 2000, was promulgated, which, through Article 8, repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM; thereby, Article 6 of DE-16614 tacitly regained validity. At that moment, a tacit reduction of the reserve’s territory occurred by once again excluding the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo, which left things in the situation as provided by Decree No. 16614-MAG. However, subsequently, the Executive Branch issued DE-32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, which expressly repealed Article 6 of DE-16614; once again, the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo became part of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, a situation that remains to date.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Regarding the increase and/or decrease of the territorial limits of the forest heritage (patrimonio forestal), this Court, in Judgment No. 1999-5399 of 16:39 hours on October 26, 1993, in which the Chamber stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">“…</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">if the Executive Branch is empowered to establish the limits of its forest heritage (patrimonio forestal), it shall be through the regulatory and not the legislative channel, with due compensation for the properties over which the forest heritage extends, since by virtue of Article 9 of the Constitution and the theory of the separation of Powers, the Legislative Assembly is the sole constitutional body empowered to issue laws. Therefore, when dealing with a public domain asset (bien demanial), it is illogical to think that the State is limited or disabled in its action to safeguard the flora and fauna of our lands. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">II. In this line of reasoning, since this action is directed against an executive decree that expanded the limits of a national park—Isla del Coco—extending to a distance of fifteen kilometers over the sea, measured from the low-tide line of the coast, it is important to determine that it does so in full exercise of its powers, both legal and constitutional, as it involves a public domain asset (bien demanial). (…) </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">V. In relation to the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and Scenic Natural Beauties of the American Countries—approved by Law number 3763, of October first, nineteen sixty-six—in relation to Article 7 of the Constitution, which, in relevant part, states:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">\"The Contracting Governments agree that the boundaries of national parks shall not be altered, nor any part of them alienated, except by action of the competent legislative authority. The resources existing in them shall not be exploited for commercial purposes.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">The Contracting Governments agree to prohibit the hunting, killing, and capture of fauna specimens and the destruction and collection of flora specimens in national parks, except when carried out by the park authorities or by order or under their supervision, or for duly authorized scientific research.\" </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">These norms must be interpreted in a restrictive sense, so that </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the requirement to establish the limits of national parks through a law is only when it is to their detriment, that is, when their extension is sought to be reduced, and not when the limits of the protected zones (zonas protectoras) of the State’s forest heritage (patrimonio forestal del Estado) are sought to be extended.</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> This article must be complemented with Article 40 of the Forestry Law, which states:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">\"The area of forest reserves, protected zones (zonas protectoras), national parks, wildlife refuges, biological reserves of the forest heritage (patrimonio forestal), may only be reduced by law of the Republic, following the corresponding technical studies that justify such measure.\" </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">And this is so by virtue of the fact that the legal right protected is the \"forest resource,\" a term that \"signifies the protection and preservation of the integrity of the natural environment\" (resolution of the Constitutional Chamber number 2233-93, of nine hours thirty-six minutes on May twenty-eighth) existing in the zone declared a national park, and which is recognized both by international legislation, by the special laws enacted for this purpose, and by the texts of the political charters. In this sense, Article 69 of the Political Constitution speaks of \"rational exploitation of the land,\" constituting a fundamental principle of its protection (…).” (boldface not in original)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>It is evident, then, that the Executive Branch cannot reduce the territorial limits of a wild area, but it can extend them. Hence, Decrees whose repeal or entry into force have produced as an immediate consequence the increase of the territory of a specific protected area are constitutional.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">VIII.- Regarding the lack of compensation to the owners of the expropriated lands and non-compliance with the requirements provided by Law.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The other arguments of the claimant challenge the lack of compensation to the owners for the expropriated lands and non-compliance with the requirements established in the Law for the establishment (by Decree) of forest reserves, protected wild areas, etc.; likewise, they challenge the scope of the provisions of Forestry Law No. 446 and Article 18 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which served as the basis for the issuance of Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG. However, both topics constitute questions of ordinary legality, the cognizance of which corresponds to the ordinary jurisdiction (see, among others, votes 2001-4530, 2002-4254, 2002-4878, 2002-5203, and 2003-3653).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Regarding the second aspect, contradiction of a regulatory norm with legal provisions, the Court has stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">“The claimant alleges that the challenged Decree is unconstitutional because it was enacted without fulfilling the requirements provided for that purpose by the Organic Environmental Law. The problem thus presented refers exclusively to the violation of the principle of administrative legality derived from Article 11 of the Constitution: contradiction of the challenged norm with legal provisions. In accordance with the provisions of Article 49 of the Political Constitution, questions of legality must be submitted to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, for the purpose of maintaining a uniform distribution of competences and respect for all the rules composing the Political Constitution. As this Court has reiteratedly and repeatedly stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">\"It is clear that any challenge such as the one raised implicitly entails an alleged violation of the Political Constitution, given that the entire legal system derives from it, but the Constitution itself contains a distribution of competences in order to guarantee the citizen a means of protecting the different classes of rights and interests they possess. Thus, the contentious and labor jurisdictions are regulated in the Political Constitution (Articles 49 and 70), and it is within this context that the constitutional jurisdiction must be embedded, on the understanding that its competence complements and does not overlap with those mentioned, for the purposes of citizen protection\" (in this sense, among others, see judgments number 0843-95, of 15:45 hours on February 14, 1995, 0404-96, of 15:33 hours on January 23, 3379-96; of 10:57 hours on July 5, 6471-96, of 15:39 hours on November 27; 6692-96 of 16:03 hours on December 10; 6689-96, of 15:54 hours on December 10, all from 1996, and 4261-97, of 16:03 hours on July 22, 1997).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">In this sense, demarcating the constitutional jurisdiction from the ordinary one becomes delicate, since the infraction of the principle of legality derives precisely from constitutional norms—Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Political Constitution—and what is precisely requested is that this principle prevails by declaring the existence of a violation of legal precepts by the challenged Decree. The transcendence of this principle notwithstanding, in order for it to be fruitfully invoked, at least one other constitutional norm or principle must have been breached, when dealing with the constitutional jurisdiction, which does not occur in relation to the challenged norm, insofar as the claim is that it was not enacted in accordance with other legal rank norms. The contrary opinion would ultimately blur the distinction between constitutional matters and matters of mere legality—with regard to Article 11—insofar as infractions of the Constitution could not be differentiated from infractions of a legal nature. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that, although it can be validly asserted that questions of legality have a direct relationship with Article 11 of the Political Constitution, the fact is that the issue of the compatibility of legal norms with one another fits rather within the specialty of the matter that Article 49 of the Constitution assigned to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, a reason for which, in compliance therewith, it is appropriate to refer the claimant to that jurisdiction to submit the matter raised.” (judgment 2004-03579 of 14:42 hours on April 14, 2004. In the same sense, votes numbers 2002-4452 and 2005-5899)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">IX.- Conclusion.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The Executive Branch is not obligated to consult the Municipalities regarding measures to be adopted in relation to the so-called “protected zones,” since its competence over such zones—as administrator—is exclusive. It could do so, and it would perhaps be advisable to seek their opinion, with a view to harmonizing the provisions related to their administration and management with local interests. However, this constitutes a matter of timeliness and convenience, which remains at the discretion of that branch. The alleged non-compliance with the requirements established in the law for issuing a decree, as well as the alleged failure to compensate the owners, are questions of legality whose cognizance does not correspond to this Court, but rather must be heard and resolved in the ordinary jurisdiction. On the other hand, although Decree DE-29019-MINAE of October 31, 2000, repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM, and in doing so excluded the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo from the REGAMA (thereby effecting a tacit reduction of the territory of the REGAMA), the Executive Branch subsequently issued DE-32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, which repealed Article 6 of Decree 16614-MAG. In doing so, the territory of the reserve returned to its original status. This is not only constitutional but also consistent with the case law of this Court on this matter. By virtue of the foregoing, and in accordance with Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the appropriate course is to dismiss the action.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Por tanto:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The action is dismissed on the merits in relation to Decree 32753-MINAE. In all other respects, it is dismissed outright.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center\"><span>Luis Fernando Solano C.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center\"><span>Presidente</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Nombre02</span></p> Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG creating the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta 277 of November 27, 1985, Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulations for the Participatory Management of Natural Resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000, Executive Decree No. 32633, Regulations to the Wildlife Conservation Law, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005, and Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE published in La Gaceta No. 228 of November 25, 2005." }, "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [] } ], "contenidosInteresOrden": "4", "despacho": "Constitutional Chamber", "despachoOrden": "8", "enteSistematizador": "CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER", "esCambioCriterio": "0", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "esNotaSeparada": "0", "esProtegida": "0", "esResolucionClave": "0", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionOral": "0", "esResolucionRelevante": "1", "esVotoSalvado": "0", "expediente": "050151650007CO", "fecha": "2006-05-03", "formatoDocumento": "WRITTEN", "hora": "15:14", "id": "sen-1-0007-348471", "numeroDocumento": "05975", "redactor": "Luis Fernando Solano Carrera", "sentenciasRelacionadas": "sen-1-0034-658964", "sourceName": "Documents", "subNumeroDocumento": "1", "tipoDocumento": "SNT", "tipoInformacion": "Judicial Resolution", "tipoResolucion": "On the Merits", "resultado": "Interlocutory Hearing", "controlCons": "Rejection on the Merits", "tipoTexto": "1", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [], "html": "<html><head><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Style-Type\" content=\"text/css\" /><meta name=\"generator\" content=\"Aspose.Words for .NET 23.6.0\" /><title>*050151650007CO*</title></head><body style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\"><div><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:right; font-size:13.5pt\"><span>*050151650007CO*</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Exp: 05-015165-0007-CO</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Res: 2006-005975</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">San José, at fifteen hours and fourteen minutes on the third of May of two thousand six.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Action of unconstitutionality brought by Nombre01, of legal age, Municipal Mayor of the canton of Talamanca, bearer of identity card number CED01, resident of Bribrí; against Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG which created the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta 277 of November 27, 1985, Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulations for the Participatory Management of Natural Resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000, Executive Decree No. 32633, Regulations to the Wildlife Conservation Law, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005, and Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE published in La Gaceta No. 228 of November 25, 2005.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Whereas:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">1.- </span><span>In a brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at sixteen hours fifteen minutes on November 23, 2005, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG which created the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, of Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulations for the Participatory Management of Natural Resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, and of Executive Decree No. 32633, which is the Regulations to the Wildlife Conservation Law, be declared. He alleges that the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned decrees derives from serious legal inconsistencies, confronting not only the constitutional order as a whole, but also environmental norms created by the legislator. These decrees have created a situation of such legal confusion and insecurity in the Southern zone of Limón that neither the local government, nor investors, nor other agents of sustainable development can work with clear and precise rules. The Gandoca Manzanillo Refuge has a unique value, full of genetic diversity and ecosystems, with mangrove areas, freshwater swamps, plant associations, and very particular fauna, which must be seriously safeguarded and protected. In relation to Decree 16614-MAG, which created the Gandoca Manzanillo Refuge, it was issued based on Article 140, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution and Article 2 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) No. 4465 of November 25, 1969. Reading it allows one to conclude that the majority of the requirements demanded for such purpose were not met. It is unconstitutional to issue decrees that do not comply with the provisions of the law that serves as their basis, as this violates the hierarchy of norms. In this case, there was no study of land tenure (estudio de tenencia de tierra), no census of inhabitants, no evaluation of the lands to be purchased or expropriated, no form of financing, and no real definition of objectives. Likewise, and in accordance with Articles 71 and 72 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) No. 4565, in the case of privately owned estates (fundos de dominio particular), as is the case of the Gandoca Manzanillo Refuge, if the owner did not submit to the forest regime inherent to the protected wilderness area (área silvestre de protección), the State was obligated to purchase or expropriate the properties, which in this case has not happened to date. Thus, there are owners – natural or legal persons – whose use of their land is limited without having submitted to any regime and without having been expropriated and compensated. There is no record that anyone has voluntarily submitted to the established Refuge Regime. While Article 18 of Law 6919 authorized the Executive Branch to create National Wildlife Refuges, it did not grant it such broad powers as MINAE has attempted to exercise. This article limited the power to create wildlife refuges to lands owned by the State and that they be created only in forest reserves; such is not the case of the Gandoca Manzanillo Refuge, where there are many private estates. The consequences of all this are that many owners were subjected to use permits issued by MINAE that should never have been issued by that institution, as it was not competent to do so, and that it was rather the respective Municipality that should have granted them. On the other hand, it is important to note that the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, which was one of the legal bases for the creation of the Refuge, was replaced by the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7032 of May 2, 1986, which served as the basis for the issuance of several Executive Decrees related to the Refuge. However, by judgment 546-90, the Constitutional Chamber declared the total unconstitutionality of Law No. 7032, leaving No. 4465 in force. Hence, the subsequent Executive Decrees, issued as of May 7, 1986, and until the new legislative repeal of Law No. 4465, were obligated to adapt to and comply with the requirements established in the Law of November 25, 1969; by not doing so, they violated the constitutional hierarchy of the norm. When the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge was created, within the territorial jurisdiction of the canton of Talamanca, the local Government was completely ignored, thereby damaging municipal autonomy. Constitutional Article 169 clearly establishes that the administration of the local interests and services of each canton shall be the responsibility of the municipal government; hence, it is not reasonable, politically or legally, to completely exclude the Municipality in the subjection of part of its territory. In vote 5445-99, the Constitutional Chamber stated that “ignoring and disarticulating municipalities in their local interests is to empty their constitutional content.” What good is municipal autonomy if State entities fabricate legal coverages (coberturas jurídicas) in their territories without intervention, opinion, and/or coordination with local governments, be they reserves, national parks, refuges, protective zones, or any other management category? While one cannot speak of absolute autonomy, to the point of dismembering the National State, it also cannot be so precarious that State entities disregard or ignore it. In relation to Executive Decree 29019-MINAE, which repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM and which extended the limits of the refuge, it suffers from the same vice pointed out previously, that is, it was issued without taking into account the opinion of the local government and it reduced the area that had been expanded by the former. This harms Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, as well as Article 45, because when expanding the Refuge, private properties were added (it is a mixed refuge) without any expropriation or compensation, nor did the inhabitants voluntarily submit to the Refuge. This Decree did not provide reasons or studies justifying the reduction of the refuge. The creation, increase, or reduction of new protected areas cannot respond to a simple whim of public authorities; compliance with the requirements set forth in the Law is a control mechanism to guarantee the rights of those administered and the satisfaction of the public environmental interest. Many of the country's protected areas have been created to the detriment of the acquired rights of individuals, peasant populations, and corporate entities that have legitimately acquired properties for many years. Article 8 of Decree 29019 repeals Decree 23069, which had expanded the Refuge; that expansion is unconstitutional, as it did not respect Constitutional Article 45 nor the procedure that must be followed for this purpose.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">2.- </span><span>In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, he states that it derives from Article 75, second paragraph. The Municipality, as local Government, has the obligation not only to protect the environment, but also to defend municipal autonomy.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">3.- </span><span>By brief received at eleven hours forty minutes on December 3, 2005, the Mayor of the Municipality of Talamanca adds grounds of unconstitutionality. He states that Decree 32753-MINAE ratifies the validity of Executive Decree 16614-MAG of June 1, 1985, regarding Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, in the terms in which it was declared. The Decree repeals Articles 5 and 6 of Decree 16614-MAG, thereby including in the zone the urban areas excluded from the original Decree. He considers that Decree 32753-MINAE exhibits the same grounds of unconstitutionality adduced against the other challenged decrees, thus harming Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, relating to municipal powers and autonomy. Furthermore, the Decree attempts to retroact its effects to situations created in the past, thereby violating Constitutional Article 34. Article 2 is unconstitutional because by repealing Articles 5 and 6 of Executive Decree 16614-MAG, it integrates into the Refuge the urban areas that were excluded from the original Decree, harming the mentioned Article 34 and Constitutional Article 45. There are important urban populations that were excluded from the original Decree, that have not formed part of the Refuge, and which, as a consequence of the promulgation of the Decree, MINAE integrates into the Refuge almost manu militari, since neither the local Government nor the inhabitants of the zone were consulted. Likewise, Decree 32753-MINAE harms the hierarchy of norms and violates Articles 36 and 37 of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente). Constitutional Article 45 is also violated because 85% of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge is privately owned; it constitutes a mixed refuge. They cannot effectively be subjected to any refuge if there is no voluntary request from the owners, which is not recorded in the Decree, nor have they been expropriated or paid. It is not viable to incorporate into the Refuge urban areas such as the Town of Puerto Viejo, Gandoca, and Manzanillo, without studies or prior consultation with INVU, the Municipality of the canton, or the inhabitants. The severe impact on the private property of those who inhabit these urban areas and on municipal powers is more than evident.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">4.- </span><span>By brief received at the Secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at fifteen hours fifty-two minutes on January twenty-fifth, two thousand six, Walter Coto Molina appears, stating that he appears as special attorney-in-fact (apoderado especial) of the Municipality of Salamanca. He indicates that he attaches a copy of a brief signed by more than two hundred and forty-five requests from inhabitants and businesses of the canton of Talamanca, sent to the Minister of Environment and Energy, in which they pronounce themselves on Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE (folio 44). The petitioner does not provide any certification of his status as attorney for the claimant. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">5.- </span><span>Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, including from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it concerns the simple reiteration or reproduction of an equal or similar previous petition that was rejected.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Drafted by Magistrate </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Solano Carrera</span><span>; and,</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Considering:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">I.- On the admissibility of the action</span><span>.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The claimant challenges several Executive Decrees that regulate various aspects of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge. He alleges that his standing derives from the defense of collective interests, since the challenged Decrees are contrary to the interests and legal and constitutional powers that the Legal System grants to his represented entity. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Regarding the standing of a Mayor to directly file an action of unconstitutionality, the Chamber, in judgment number 1999-05669 at 15:21 hours on July 21, 1999, held that he has standing to do so when he alleges a violation of municipal autonomy and powers, as he acts in defense of the interests of the entity, of which he is the representative (Article 17, subsection n) of the Municipal Code). In this case, and because the violation of such aspects is alleged, the Court reiterates the reasoning set forth in that vote and admits the standing of the Mayor to file the action of unconstitutionality. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">II.- Object of the action.- </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The following decrees are challenged:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>1. Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG which created the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta 277 of November 27, 1985;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>2. Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulations for the Participatory Management of Natural Resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>3. Executive Decree No. 32633, Regulations to the Wildlife Conservation Law, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>4. Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE published in La Gaceta No. 228 of November 25, 2005.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">III.- Arguments of the claimant.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The claimant's arguments regarding the unconstitutionality of the cited Decrees can be classified into three groups: lack of consultation with the municipal government regarding modifications to the extension and administration of the forest heritage located in its jurisdiction; lack of compensation to the owners of expropriated lands; and failure to comply with the requirements established by Law for the creation – via Decree – of protected zones.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">IV.- Universal nature of the right to a healthy environment.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Constitutional Law doctrine has classified constitutional rights as fundamental rights of the first, second, and third generation, terminology that aims to establish the stages through which the process of recognition and positivization of human rights has passed in the various international instruments issued for this purpose. The first are characteristic of liberal constitutionalism; ideologically, this category responds to the thinking in vogue in the 18th and early 19th centuries. These are rights usually granted only to individuals. Notable among them are the right to property, to security, and, in general, rights opposable against the State. Doctrine considers second-generation rights to be those characteristic of social constitutionalism, whose ideological content we can locate in the currents of the 20th century. They are rights granted mainly to workers and guilds, to the family, that is, related to what is called the "social question." These rights are asserted against the State and against other subjects. Finally, the so-called third-generation rights emerge from post-World War II constitutionalism. They are modern rights, with diffuse contours. Due to their own characteristics, their holders are groups, and even society as a whole. Part of this group are, for example, the right to peace, consumer protection, and of course, environmental protection.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>At the international level, the first forum for discussing problems related to the environment was the “United Nations Conference on Human Development,” held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972. It served as the framework for the U.N., that same year, at its XXVII General Assembly, and through resolution 2997, to establish the “United Nations Environment Programme.” There was a conviction regarding the need for prompt and effective implementation by governments and the international community of measures aimed at safeguarding and increasing environmental protection for the benefit of current and future generations, as indicated in the preamble of the resolution that served as the legal framework for this program (free translation). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Since then, environmental protection has gained greater importance, being today one of the main topics on the agenda of governments and international organizations. This has resulted in the promulgation of a large number of international (some promoted by the United Nations Organization) and/or regional conventions, many of which have been signed by Costa Rica. Among them are the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Montreal Protocol, the Regional Convention for the Management and Conservation of Natural Forest Ecosystems and the Development of Forest Plantations, and some of a more regional nature such as the Central American Convention on the Protection of the Environment, the Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and Natural Scenic Beauties of the Countries of the Americas, and the Convention for the Conservation of Biodiversity and Protection of Priority Wilderness Areas in Central America.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Thus, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment has today a universal profile. It is a right of humanity, which is reflected in the multiple conventions that countries have signed with the aim of protecting biodiversity. These considerations have found echo in the Court's jurisprudence; thus, in judgment No. 2485-94, it stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">“This phenomenon of the internationalization of environmental law has followed, certainly, a development pattern similar to that of human rights, as it has gone from being a matter of domestic jurisdiction of States to being part of international jurisdiction.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">V.- On the role of the State as guarantor of environmental law</span><span>.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The Chamber, since its creation, and when addressing the environmental issue, noted that Article 50 of the Political Charter implicitly protected the right to the environment as a fundamental right (judgment No. 2233-93). However, following the reform introduced by Law number 7412 of June 3, 1994 (published in La Gaceta No. 111 of June 10, 1994), the article expressly provides for the State's obligation to protect the environment and grants citizens full standing to defend it:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Article 50</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">: The State shall procure the greatest welfare for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, they have standing to denounce acts that infringe upon that right and to claim reparation for the damage caused. The State shall guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>This Constitutional Court has recognized the duty of protection that the right to enjoy a healthy and harmonious environment deserves, established in Articles 21, 50, and 89 of the Political Constitution:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">“III.– On the right</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">. </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Article 50 of the Political Constitution establishes that every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. The right to a healthy environment has a broad content that equates to the aspiration of improving the living environment of human beings, so that it overflows the criteria of natural conservation to be situated within every sphere in which a person develops, be it family, work, or the environment in which they live. Hence, it is affirmed that it is a transversal right, meaning that it moves throughout the entire legal system, modeling and reinterpreting its institutes. The environment is defined by the Real Academia Española de la Lengua as the ‘set of physical circumstances that surround living beings,’ which further emphasizes the general character of the right. In contrast, the right to an ecologically balanced environment is a more restricted concept referring to an important part of that environment in which human beings develop, to the balance that must exist between the advancement of society and the conservation of natural resources. Both rights are expressly recognized in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, which shapes the Social State of Law. The location of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment within the constitutional regulations of the Social State of Law is the point from which it must be analyzed. The Social State of Law produces the phenomenon of incorporating into the fundamental text a series of political objectives of great social relevance and the introduction of an important number of social rights that ensure the common good and the satisfaction of the elementary needs of individuals. In this perspective, the Political Constitution emphasizes that the protection of natural resources is an adequate means to protect and improve the quality of life for all, which makes necessary the intervention of public powers over factors that can alter the balance of natural resources and, more broadly, hinder the person from developing and unfolding in a healthy environment. (...) The Political Constitution establishes that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. Prima facie, to guarantee is to secure and protect the right against some risk or need; to defend is to forbid, prohibit, and prevent any activity that threatens the right; and to preserve is an action aimed at sheltering the right in advance from possible dangers in order to make it endure for future generations. The State must assume a dual behavior of doing and not doing; on one hand, it must refrain from threatening the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment itself, and on the other hand, it must assume the task of issuing the measures that allow compliance with the constitutional requirements.” </span><span>(Judgment number 00644–99 at eleven hours twenty-four minutes on January twenty-ninth, nineteen ninety-nine; in the same sense, see number 4947-2002 at nine hours and twenty-four minutes on May twenty-fourth, two thousand two)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Likewise, in a recent judgment, the following was added:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">\"Our Political Constitution, in its Article 50, expressly recognizes the right of all present and future inhabitants of this country to enjoy a healthy and perfectly balanced environment. Compliance with this requirement is a fundamental guarantee for the protection of public life and health, not only of Costa Ricans, but also of all members of the world community. The violation of these fundamental precepts entails the possibility of harming or endangering interests in the short, medium, and long term. Pollution of the environment is one of the ways through which the integrity of the environment can be broken, with results that are most often imperishable and cumulative. The Costa Rican State is obligated to act preventively by avoiding – through oversight and direct intervention – the performance of acts that damage the environment, and has the correlative and equally unavoidable prohibition against fostering its degradation\" (Judgment number 2002-04830 at 16:00 hours on May 21, 2000, criterion reiterated in judgment 2002-8996 at 10:14 hours on September 6, 2002.)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>From the foregoing, it is evident that we are facing a right whose protection transcends the local interests that any municipal corporation is called to administer and protect autonomously. The State is therefore obligated to take the necessary precautions aimed at protecting the environment. The concept of the State must be understood in a broad sense, inclusive of other public entities that, having their own legal personality, are nonetheless also destined to satisfy the general interest, and particularly to protect the environment. However, the central State bears the primary responsibility for the defense of the environment. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Constitutional Article 50 has been developed by the ordinary legislator through various laws that seek to enhance and make effective the protection of the environment in the different spheres of application of those regulatory bodies, reserving to the Executive Branch the powers of administration and protection of natural assets.</span></p></div></body></html> Law No. 7152 of June 5, 1990, created the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines, constituted it as the governing body of the environmental sector, and entrusted it, by its technical specialty, with the task of "(…)</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Issuing, by executive decree, mandatory norms and regulations regarding the rational use and protection of natural resources, energy, and mines</span><span>" (Article 2, subsection ch). The Organic Environmental Law, No. 7554 of October 4, 1995, delegates to the Ministry of Environment and Energy a good part of the competencies in this matter, without relieving other public entities of their responsibilities in this field. The authority of the Executive Branch (President of the Republic and Minister of Environment and Energy) to proceed with the establishment of protected areas through the Ministry of Environment and Energy derives from the relationship of Articles 32 subsections e) and f) and 42 of Law No. 7554, the Organic Environmental Law, Articles 82 and 84 of Law No. 7317, the Wildlife Conservation Law, and 13 of Law No. 7575, the Forestry Law.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Thus, the central State, as delegate of the Nation for the fulfillment of its associative purposes, fulfills a unifying function and assumes the administration and guardianship of natural assets, with the support of other institutions—autonomous, semi-autonomous, and municipal corporations—in what corresponds to their organic and territorial competencies, and in the case of Municipalities, in relation to the local interests they are called upon to protect.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The actions of the Executive Branch are not only framed within the limits of its competence to fulfill the duty imposed by Article 50 of the Political Constitution, but also conform to the copious regulation produced by International Law regarding the unavoidable obligation of the State to protect the environment, adopting all suitable measures to achieve comprehensive and effective guarantee.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>In this sense, although municipalities have undeniable duties in this field, it is evident that environmental protection transcends merely local interest to become a matter of national interest. Therefore, the actions of the central State, as delegate of the sovereign Nation for the fulfillment of its associative purposes, insofar as they promote an effective defense of its natural assets, are not only valid but even indispensable.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">VI.- Regarding the State's forest heritage (patrimonio forestal del Estado).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Within this framework of strict environmental protection, the Political Constitution also provides specific rules concerning the legal regime applicable to public domain assets (bienes de dominio público). Thus, Article 121, subsection 14) regulates it generically, by providing that assets "belonging to the Nation" may only permanently leave its domain through authorization by the Legislative Assembly. These are assets that, due to their legal nature and ownership, insofar as they belong to the Nation and are intended to satisfy the general interest, enjoy special legal protection. For this reason, they are not susceptible to appropriation by private individuals, nor even by the Public Administration, for purposes other than those derived from their own essence and nature. Their guardianship and administration correspond to the State, in the name of the Nation (cfr. Volume III of the Acts of the National Constituent Assembly, Session number 168).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>In its jurisprudence, this Chamber has established the basic principles of the legal regime of domanial assets (bienes dominiales); in particular, in ruling number 2306-91 of 2:45 p.m. on November 6, 1991, it determined the following rules, which have continued to be consistently applied since that decision:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>"…</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">The public domain (dominio público) is composed of assets that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special purpose of serving the community, the public interest. They are the so-called domanial assets, public things or public assets, which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected to the service they provide—which is invariably essential by virtue of an express rule. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged or subject to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for possessory actions to recover domain. As they are outside commerce, these assets cannot be the object of possession, though one may acquire a right to use (derecho al aprovechamiento), but not a right to property. The use permit (permiso de uso) is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private individual is the useful domain (dominio útil) of the asset, the State always reserving the direct domain (dominio directo) over the thing…</span><span>"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>A corollary of the foregoing is that only by Law can they be deprived of the special regime that regulates them, by disaffecting (desafectándolos) them, separating them from the public purpose to which they are linked. An express and concrete legislative act is required, such that there is no doubt whatsoever of the legislator's will to remove a specific, individualized asset from the public domain. Article 14 of the Forestry Law, number 7575, of February 13, nineteen ninety-six, gives forest lands and forests the character of domanial assets (bienes dominiales):</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"Article 14.- Unseizable and inalienable condition of natural heritage (patrimonio natural)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">The forest lands and forests that constitute the natural heritage (patrimonio natural) of the State, detailed in the preceding article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor, and the State's action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) over these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they cannot be registered in the Public Registry by means of possessory information (información posesoria), and both the invasion and occupation thereof shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>According to the classification given by environmental regulations, the forest or natural heritage (patrimonio forestal o natural) of the State is composed of forest reserves (reservas forestales), biological reserves (reservas biológicas), protected zones (zonas protectoras), wildlife refuges (refugios de vida silvestre), wetlands (humedales), and natural monuments (monumentos naturales) (Article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law, number 7554, of September 18, nineteen ninety-five). Thus, it is clear that the Costa Rican legal system confers special and qualified protection on assets affected to public use or enjoyment, and clothes that guardianship with even greater care when regulating public environmental assets. These are assets belonging to the Nation, because they are affected to a purpose of undeniable general utility, and for which their administration has been entrusted—in cases where the Law expressly so determines—to the central State, so that environmental policies follow consistent parameters in accordance with the need for comprehensive and continuous environmental protection. Even though, for registry purposes, domanial assets (bienes demaniales) may be registered in the name of the public entity charged with their guardianship, the truth is that these assets do not belong to any particular public entity, but to the Nation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The importance of protecting certain geographical zones by subjecting them to the public domain regime constitutes a matter of national interest. This has been recognized by this Court</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"The creation of protected areas under the categories of Forest Reserve, Private or Mixed Wildlife Refuge, National Parks, Biological Reserves, and Protected Zones, entails the imposition of a Public property Regime under the category of State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) which changes ipso facto the legal nature of the lands included within the area, that is, from a private regime manifested in various forms or tenure statuses to a public regime of State property. Article 13 of the Forestry Law No. 7575 establishes that the natural heritage (patrimonio natural) of the State shall consist of the forests and forest lands of national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in its name, and those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except properties that guarantee credit operations with the National Banking System and become part of its assets. In the same sense, Article 14 of the same Law provides that the forest lands and forests that constitute that natural heritage (patrimonio natural) of the State are unseizable and inalienable; that their possession by private individuals shall not create any right in their favor; and that the State's action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) over these lands is imprescriptible.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">Regarding forest reserves (reservas forestales), there is a great need to protect timber species, not only for the value of the same from an economic point of view, but also because some of them have great scientific value, and these plant species are part of the renewable natural resources, but they will cease to be so as they become extinct.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">(…) In this same sense, wildlife refuges (refugios de vida silvestre) are defined in the Forestry Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, in Article 35 subsection ch), as 'those forests and lands whose primary use is the protection, conservation, increase, and management of species of wild flora and fauna.' These sites have the fundamental purpose of protecting species of flora and fauna in danger of extinction, which possess, among other values, great scientific value, hence the interest in conserving them. Their conservation aims to guarantee the perpetuity of wildlife species, their populations, and habitats, and to provide opportunities for scientific, educational, and recreational activities, when these are not detrimental to the objectives of each refuge. Within the National Wildlife Refuges, the biota may be very varied depending on the diversity of natural associations existing within the refuge, according to the variety of local geographical conditions, which means appreciating the differences arising from a diversity in geological, edaphic, topographic, and animal and human activity conditions. Hence, it becomes necessary to legally protect these areas and the other constituent parts of the agrarian forest property. (Ruling 1999-2988)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The law empowers the Executive Branch to determine, through Decree, which geographical zones of the national territory (marine, coastal, insular, or continental) may be protected under any of the management categories established by law. For this purpose, neither the legal ownership regime—public or private—nor which entity or body has administered it up to that moment is relevant, because from the declaration onward, it comes to be administered by MINAE. On this aspect, ruling 1999-2988 stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"In our country, as has already been mentioned, interest in protecting forest resources dates back years. For example, in Decree No. 5 of June 26, 1945, this tendency toward the protection of forest lands and forest resources derived from them became evident, not only for the value of the resources as such but for the function they perform within what are, in this case, the protected zones (zonas protectoras). The State is interested in them for acquiring lands as forest protection, to determine if, due to their scenic, cultural, scientific, or protective conditions, they constitute an asset that should be preserved as land of incalculable value. By reason of this valuation, the State creates the so-called protected zones (zonas protectoras), which come to constitute forested areas or areas with forestry aptitude, where the conservation of the forest and the conservation of forest lands is inspired by purposes of soil protection, or to maintain and regulate the hydrological regime, the climate, and the environment. They are suitable for soil protection, insofar as tree roots hold and retain the topsoil layer, and the leaves that fall from them cover the ground where water runs, preventing the dragging of soil particles—that is, they stop or at least diminish the erosion process, which entails the nutritional imbalance of the soil by dragging important nutrients from the earth necessary for plant growth. Protected zones (zonas protectoras) play a preponderant role in the equilibrium of the environment, understood as the set of things surrounding the individual such as climate, soil, light, wind, rain, food, cold, heat, habitat, etc., and in the equilibrium of the ecosystem due to the exchange relationship between the living part of nature and its inert part. Hence, the soil, the regulation of the hydrological regime, the conservation of the environment, and that of hydrographic basins must be protected. These zones are created by law or by executive decree, and in them, also by legal provision, agricultural activities or destruction of vegetation are prohibited. Within the protected zones are comprised lands located in national reserves, a certain zone along rivers, a strip on either side of the maximum depression of hydrological basins, lands bordering springs (manantiales) that rise in the hills and also those that rise in flat lands, a certain area on the banks of rivers, streams, lakes, lagoons, or natural reservoirs."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">VII.- Regarding the expansion and reduction of protected wild areas</span><span>.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>In the brief filing the unconstitutionality action, the petitioner challenges—and points out as a ground for unconstitutionality—the repeal of Decree 23069-MIRENEM by Decree 29019-MINAE, because it tacitly reduced the extension of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo), given that the latter had expanded the Refuge's boundaries.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Analyzing the promulgated decrees related to the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge, it is observed that the Executive Branch has issued several in an effort to regulate its situation. In order to clarify the current situation, it is convenient to review those related to the object of this action. We have, first, DE-16614-MAG of October 29, 1985, which creates the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo) (REGAMA). The legal basis of the decree is concretely in Article 2 of Law No. 4465, but especially in Article 18 of Law No. 6919, the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Fauna Silvestre), now repealed, but which at that time provided:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"Article 18.- National wildlife refuges (refugios nacionales de fauna silvestre) are those declared as such by the Executive Branch for the protection and research of wild flora and fauna, especially those in danger of extinction. The Executive Branch is authorized to establish, within forest reserves and on private lands, areas under the classification of national wildlife refuges, which, for purposes of wildlife conservation, shall be under the administration of the Wildlife Department of the General Forestry Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. (…)"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Article 6 of Decree 16614-MAG expressly excluded from that refuge the urban zone of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo. Subsequently, DE-23069-MIRENEM of April 5, 1994, was issued; Article 16 of that Decree repealed Article 6 of DE-16614. The immediate consequence of this is that the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo became part of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge. Later, Decree DE-29019-MINAE of October 31, 2000, was promulgated, which, through Article 8, repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM; thereby, Article 6 of DE-16614 tacitly regained force. A tacit reduction of the reserve's territory occurred at that time by again excluding the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo, which left things in the situation as had been provided by Decree No. 16614-MAG. However, subsequently, the Executive Branch issued DE-32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, which expressly repealed Article 6 of DE-16614; once again, the urban zones of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo become part of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, a situation that remains to date.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Regarding the expansion and/or reduction of the territorial boundaries of the forest heritage, this Court, in ruling No. 1999-5399 of 4:39 p.m. on October 26, 1993, in which the Chamber stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">"…</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">if the Executive Branch is empowered to set the boundaries of its forest heritage, it shall be through the regulatory and not the legislative channel, with due compensation for the properties over which the forest heritage is extended, since by virtue of Article 9 of the Constitution and the theory of the separation of Powers, the Legislative Assembly is the sole constitutional organ empowered to issue laws. Therefore, when dealing with a domanial asset (bien demanial), it is illogical to think that the State is limited or hindered in its actions to safeguard the flora and fauna of our lands.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">II. In this order of ideas, since this action is directed against an executive decree that expanded the boundaries of a national park—Isla del Coco—extending it to a distance of fifteen kilometers over the sea, measured from the low-tide line of the coast, it is important to determine that it does so in full exercise of its powers, both legal and constitutional, as it concerns a domanial asset (bien demanial). (…)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">V. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of the Flora, Fauna, and Natural Scenic Beauties of the Countries of America—approved by Law number 3763 of October 1, nineteen sixty-six—in relation to Article 7 of the Constitution, which, as relevant, reads as follows:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">'The Contracting Governments agree that the boundaries of national parks shall not be altered, nor any part of them alienated, except by action of the competent legislative authority. The resources existing in them shall not be exploited for commercial purposes.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">The Contracting Governments agree to prohibit hunting, killing, and capture of specimens of fauna, and the destruction and collection of specimens of flora in national parks, except when done by the park authorities or by order or under the supervision of the same, or for duly authorized scientific research.'</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">These norms must be interpreted restrictively, such that </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">the requirement to establish the boundaries of national parks through a law is only when it is to the detriment of the same, that is, when one wants to reduce its extension, and not when one wants to extend the boundaries of the protective zones of the State's forest heritage.</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> This article must be completed with Article 40 of the Forestry Law, which states:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">'The area of forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, wildlife refuges, biological reserves of the forest heritage, may only be reduced by law of the Republic, following the corresponding technical studies that justify this measure.'</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">And this is so by virtue of the fact that the protected legal interest is the 'forest resource,' a term that 'signifies the protection and preservation of the integrity of the natural environment' (resolution of the Constitutional Chamber number 2233-93, at nine thirty-six a.m. on May twenty-eighth) which exists in the zone declared a national park, and which is recognized both by international legislation, by the special laws enacted to that effect, and by the texts of the political charters. In this sense, Article 69 of the Political Constitution speaks of 'rational exploitation of the land,' its protection becoming a fundamental principle (....)" (emphasis not in original)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>It is evident, then, that the Executive Branch cannot reduce the territorial boundaries of a wild area, but it can expand them. Hence, the Decrees whose repeal or entry into force has produced, as an immediate consequence, the increase of the territory of a specific protected area are constitutional.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">VIII.- Regarding the lack of compensation to the owners of expropriated lands and the failure to comply with the requirements established by Law.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The petitioner's other arguments contest the lack of compensation to owners for the expropriated lands and the failure to comply with the requirements established in the Law for the establishment (by Decree) of forest reserves, protected wild areas, etc.; likewise, they challenge the scope of the provisions of Forestry Law No. 446 and Article 18 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which served as the basis for the issuance of Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG. However, both topics constitute matters of ordinary legality, the cognizance of which falls to the ordinary jurisdiction (see, among others, rulings 2001-4530, 2002-4254, 2002-4878, 2002-5203, and 2003-3653).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Regarding the second aspect, contradiction of a regulatory provision with provisions of a legal nature, the Court has stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"The petitioner alleges that the challenged Decree is unconstitutional because it was issued without complying with the requirements that the Organic Environmental Law provides for that purpose. Formulated thusly, the problem refers exclusively to the violation of the principle of administrative legality derived from Article 11 of the Constitution: contradiction of the challenged provision with provisions of a legal nature. In accordance with the provisions of Article 49 of the Political Constitution, matters of legality must be submitted to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, with the purpose of maintaining a uniform distribution of competencies and respect for all the rules that make up the Political Constitution. As has been repeatedly and consistently stated by this Court:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">'It is clear that any challenge such as the one raised implicitly entails a presumed violation of the Political Constitution, given that the entire legal system derives from it, but within the Constitution itself, there is a distribution of competencies in order to guarantee the citizen a way to protect the different classes of rights and interests they hold. In this way, the contentious and labor jurisdictions are regulated in the Political Constitution (Articles 49 and 70), and it is within this context that the constitutional jurisdiction must be embedded, on the understanding that its competence complements and does not overlap with the aforementioned ones, for the purposes of protecting the citizen' (in this sense, see among others rulings number 0843-95 at 3:45 p.m. on February 14, 1995; 0404-96 at 3:33 p.m. on January 23; 3379-96 at 10:57 a.m. on July 5; 6471-96 at 3:39 p.m. on November 27; 6692-96 at 4:03 p.m. on December 10; 6689-96 at 3:54 p.m. on December 10, all of 1996; and 4261-97 at 4:03 p.m. on July 22, 1997).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-style:italic\">In this sense, delimiting constitutional jurisdiction from ordinary jurisdiction becomes delicate, since the infringement of the principle of legality derives precisely from constitutional-level norms—Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Political Constitution—and what is precisely requested is that this principle prevail by declaring the existence of a violation of legal precepts by the challenged Decree. The transcendence of this principle does not, however, prevent that, for it to be fruitfully invoked, at least one other constitutional norm or principle must have been breached, when it comes to constitutional jurisdiction, which is not the case with respect to the challenged provision, insofar as what is claimed is that it was not issued in accordance with other legal-level norms. The contrary opinion would end up diluting the distinction between constitutional matters and matters of mere legality—if we speak of Article 11—insofar as infractions of the Constitution could not be differentiated from infractions of a legal nature. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that, even though it can validly be affirmed that matters of legality have a direct relationship with Article 11 of the Political Constitution, the truth is that the issue of the conformity of legal norms with one another fits rather within the specialty of the matter that Article 49 of the Constitution assigned to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, which is why, in compliance therewith, it is appropriate to refer the petitioner to that jurisdiction to submit the matter raised therein." (Ruling 2004-03579 at 2:42 p.m. on April 14, 2004. In the same sense, rulings number 2002-4452 and 2005-5899)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">IX.- Conclusion.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The Executive Branch has no obligation to consult the Municipalities about the measures to be adopted in relation to the so-called "protected zones," because its competence over such zones—as administrator—is exclusive. It could do so, and it might perhaps be advisable for it to seek their opinion, with a view to harmonizing the provisions relating to their administration and management with local interests. However, that constitutes a matter of opportunity and convenience, which remains at the discretion of that branch. The alleged non-compliance with the requirements established in the law for the issuance of a decree, as well as the alleged lack of compensation to the owners, are matters of legality whose cognizance does not correspond to this Court but must be heard and resolved in the ordinary jurisdiction.</span></p> On the other hand, even though Decree DE-29019-MINAE of October 31, 2000, repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM, and in doing so excluded the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo from REGAMA (thereby producing a tacit reduction of the territory of REGAMA), the Executive Branch subsequently issued DE-32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, which repealed Article 6 of Decree 16614-MAG. In doing so, the territory of the reserve returned to its original situation. This is not only constitutional, but consistent with the jurisprudence of this Court on the matter. In light of the foregoing, and in accordance with Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is appropriate to dismiss the action.

**Por tanto:** The action is dismissed on the merits in relation to Decree 32753-MINAE. In all other respects, it is summarily dismissed.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

**Nombre02**

*050151650007CO* *050151650007CO* Res: 2006-005975 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas con catorce minutos del tres de mayo del dos mil seis.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre01, mayor, Alcalde Municipal del cantón de Talamanca, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED01, vecino de Bribrí; contra el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 16614-MAG que creó el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo publicado en La Gaceta 277 del 27 de noviembre de 1985, el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29019-MINAE, Reglamento para el Manejo Participativo de los Recursos Naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo publicado en La Gaceta N° 208 del 31 de octubre del 2000, el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 32633, Reglamento a la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, publicado en La Gaceta N° 180 del 20 de setiembre del 2005 y el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 32753-MINAE publicado en La Gaceta N° 228 del 25 de noviembre del 2005.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las dieciséis horas quince minutos del 23 de noviembre del 2005, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 16614-MAG que creó el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29019-MINAE, Reglamento para el Manejo Participativo de los Recursos Naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo y el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 32633 que es Reglamento a la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre. Alega que la inconstitucionalidad de los decretos mencionados deriva de graves inconsistencias legales, al enfrentar no solo el ordenamiento constitucional como un todo, sino normas ambientales creadas por el legislador. Esos decretos han creado en la zona Sur de Limón una situación de confusión jurídica e inseguridad tal, que no permite que ni el gobierno local, ni los inversionistas ni otros agentes de desarrollo sostenible puedan trabajar con reglas claras y precisas. El Refugio Gandoca Manzanillo tiene un valor único, lleno de diversidad genética y ecosistemas, con áreas de manglar, pantanos de aguas dulces, asociaciones vegetales y fauna muy particular, que debe ser resguardado y protegido con seriedad. En relación con el Decreto 16614-MAG, que creó el Refugio Gandoca Manzanillo, fue emitido con fundamento en el artículo 140 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política y artículo 2 de la Ley Forestal N° 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969. Su lectura permite concluir que la mayoría de los requisitos exigidos a tal efecto no fueron cumplidos. Es inconstitucional que se emitan decretos que no cumplen lo dispuesto en la ley que les sirve de base, pues se viola la jerarquía de las normas. En este caso, no hubo estudio de tenencia de tierra, censo de pobladores, evaluación de los terrenos a comprar o expropiar, forma de financiación ni definición real de objetivos. Asimismo y de conformidad con los artículos 71 y 72 de la Ley Forestal N° 4565, en el caso de los fundos de dominio particular como es el caso del Refugio Gandoca Manzanillo, si el propietario no se acogía al régimen forestal inherente al área silvestre de protección, el Estado estaba obligado a la compra o expropiación de los inmuebles, lo que en este caso a la fecha no ha ocurrido. Así, hay propietarios –personas físicas o jurídicas-, a quienes se les limita el uso de su tierra sin haberse acogido a ningún régimen y sin haber sido expropiados e indemnizados. No consta que nadie se haya acogido voluntariamente al Régimen de Refugio establecido. Si bien el artículo 18 de la Ley 6919 autorizó al Poder Ejecutivo para crear Refugios Nacionales de Vida Silvestre, no otorgó a éste facultades tan amplias cómo el MINAE ha pretendido. Este artículo limitó la facultad de crear refugios de vida silvestre en terrenos propiedad del Estado y que se crearan únicamente en reservas forestales; tal no es el caso del Refugio Gandoca Manzanillo, donde hay muchos fundos privados. Las consecuencias de todo esto son que muchos propietarios fueron sometidos a permisos de uso dados por el MINAE que nunca debieron darse por esa institución, por no ser competente para ello y que más bien correspondía otorgar a la Municipalidad respectiva. Por otro lado, es importante señalar que la Ley Forestal N° 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969, que fue uno de los fundamentos legales para la creación del Refugio, fue sustituida por la Ley Forestal N° 7032 del 2 de mayo de 1986, la cual sirvió de base para la emisión de varios Decretos Ejecutivos relacionados con el Refugio. Sin embargo, por sentencia 546-90 la Sala Constitucional declaró la inconstitucionalidad total de la Ley N° 7032, dejando vigente la N° 4465. De ahí que los Decretos Ejecutivos posteriores, dictados a partir del 7 de mayo de 1986 y hasta la nueva derogatoria legislativa de la Ley N° 4465, estaban en la obligación de adecuarse y cumplir las exigencias establecidas en la Ley del 25 de noviembre de 1969; al no hacerlo, violaron la jerarquía constitucional de la norma. Al crearse el Refugio de Gandoca-Manzanillo, en la jurisdicción territorial del cantón de Talamanca, se ignoró por completo al Gobierno local, con lo cual se lesionó la autonomía municipal. El artículo 169 constitucional establece claramente que la administración de los intereses y servicios locales de cada cantón, estará a cargo del gobierno municipal; de ahí que no sea razonable, ni política ni jurídicamente, excluir completamente en la sujeción de parte de su territorio a la Municipalidad. En el voto 5445-99 la Sala Constitucional señaló que “desconocer y desarticular las municipalidades en sus intereses locales es vaciar el contenido constitucional de las mismas”. De qué servirá la autonomía municipal, si las entidades estatales fabrican coberturas jurídicas en sus territorios sin intervención, opinión y/o coordinación con los gobiernos locales, sean aquellas reservas, parques nacionales, refugios, zonas protectoras, o cualquiera otra categoría de manejo? Si bien no puede hablarse de autonomía absoluta, al punto de desvertebrar el Estado Nacional, tan poco puede ser tan precaria como para que las entidades estatales la desconozcan o ignoren. En relación con el Decreto Ejecutivo 29019-MINAE, que derogó el Decreto 23069-MIRENEM y que amplió los límites del refugio, adolece del mismo vicio apuntado anteriormente, es decir, se dictó sin tomar en cuenta el criterio del gobierno local y redujo el área que había sido ampliada por aquel. Ello lesiona los artículos 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, así como el 45, pues al ampliar el Refugio se agregaron propiedades privadas (es un refugio mixto) sin que hubiese de por medio expropiación o indemnización, ni que los pobladores se sometieran voluntariamente al Refugio. Este Decreto no aportó razones ni estudios que justificaran la disminución del refugio. La creación, aumento o disminución de nuevas áreas de protección no puede responder a un simple capricho de las autoridades públicas; el cumplimiento de los requisitos fijados en la Ley es un mecanismo de control para garantizar los derechos de los administrados y la satisfacción del interés público ambiental. Muchas de las áreas protegidas del país se han creado en detrimento de los derechos adquiridos de las personas y poblaciones campesinas y de las empresas jurídicas que legítimamente han adquirido propiedades desde muchos años atrás. El artículo 8 del Decreto 29019 deroga el Decreto 23069 que había ampliado el Refugio; esa ampliación es inconstitucional, pues no respetó el artículo 45 constitucional ni el procedimiento que debe seguirse al efecto.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señala que proviene del artículo 75 párrafo segundo. La Municipalidad como Gobierno local, tiene la obligación no solo de proteger el medio ambiente, sino también de defender la autonomía municipal.

3.- Por escrito recibido a las once horas cuarenta minutos del tres de diciembre del 2005, el Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Talamanca adiciona motivos de inconstitucionalidad. Señala que por Decreto 32753-MINAE se ratifica la vigencia del Decreto Ejecutivo 16614-MAG del 1° de junio de 1985 en cuanto a los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, en los términos en que fue declarado. El Decreto deroga los artículos 5 y 6 del Decreto 16614-MAG, con lo cual se incluyen en la zona las zonas urbanas excluidas del Decreto original. Estima que el Decreto 32753-MINAE acusa los mismos motivos de inconstitucionalidad aducidos contra los otros decretos impugnados, lesionando así los artículos 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, relativos a las competencias y autonomía municipal. Además, el Decreto pretende retrotraer sus efectos a situaciones creadas en el pasado, con lo cual viola el artículo 34 constitucional. El artículo 2 es inconstitucional pues al derogar los artículos 5 y 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo 16614-MAG, integra al Refugio las zonas urbanas que fueron excluidas del Decreto original, lesionando el artículo 34 referido y el 45 constitucional. Hay importantes poblaciones urbanas que fueron excluidas del Decreto original, que no han formado parte del Refugio y que, como consecuencia de la promulgación del Decreto, el MINAE las integra al Refugio casi manu militari, pues no se consultó ni al Gobierno local, ni a los pobladores de la zona. Asimismo, el Decreto 32753-MINAE lesiona la jerarquía de las normas y se viola los artículos 36 y 37 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. También se viola el artículo 45 de la Constitución pues el 85% del Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo es de particulares, constituye un Refugio mixto; no pueden sujetarse efectivamente a ningún refugio si no hay requerimiento voluntario de los propietarios, lo cual no consta en el Decreto, ni se ha expropiado o pagado. No es viable incorporar al Refugio, áreas urbanas como la Ciudad de Puerto Viejo, Gandoca y Manzanillo, sin estudios ni consultas previa al INVU, a la Municipalidad del cantón ni a los pobladores. La afectación severa a la propiedad privada de quienes habitan esas zonas urbanas y a las competencias municipales son más que evidentes.

4.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala Constitucional a las quince horas cincuenta y dos minutos del veinticinco de enero del dos mil seis, se apersona Walter Coto Molina, quien manifiesta comparecer como apoderado especial de la Municipalidad de Salamanca. Señala que adjunta copia de un escrito firmado por más de doscientas cuarenta y cinco solicitudes de pobladores y empresas del cantón de Talamanca, enviadas al Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, en el cual se pronuncian en relación con el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 32753-MINAE (folio 44). El gestionante no aporta certificación alguna de su condición de apoderado de la accionante.

5.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Solano Carrera; y,

Considerando:

I.- Sobre la admisibilidad de la acción.

El accionante impugna varios Decretos Ejecutivos que regulan diversos aspectos del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo. Alega que su legitimación se deriva de la defensa de intereses colectivos, pues los Decretos impugnados son contrarios a los intereses y potestades legales y constitucionales que el Ordenamiento Jurídico concede a su representada.

En relación con la legitimación de un Alcalde para presentar en forma directa una acción de inconstitucionalidad, la Sala en la sentencia número 1999-05669 de las 15:21 horas del 21 de julio de 1999 estimó que está legitimado para hacerlo, cuando alegue violación a la autonomía y competencias municipales, pues actúa en defensa de los intereses del ente, del cual es su representante (artículo 17 inciso n) del Código Municipal). En este caso y por alegarse la violación de tales aspectos, el Tribunal reitera el razonamiento expuesto en ese voto y admite la legitimación del Alcalde para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad.

II.- Objeto de la acción.- Se impugnan los siguientes decretos:

1. Decreto Ejecutivo N° 16614-MAG que creó el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo publicado en La Gaceta 277 del 27 de noviembre de 1985; 2. Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29019-MINAE, Reglamento para el Manejo Participativo de los Recursos Naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo publicado en La Gaceta N° 208 del 31 de octubre del 2000; 3. Decreto Ejecutivo N° 32633, Reglamento a la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, publicado en La Gaceta N° 180 del 20 de setiembre del 2005.

4. Decreto Ejecutivo N° 32753-MINAE publicado en La Gaceta N° 228 del 25 de noviembre del 2005.

III.- Alegatos del accionante.

Los alegatos del accionante en cuanto a la inconstitucionalidad de los Decretos citados se pueden clasificar en tres grupos: falta de consulta al gobierno municipal en relación con modificaciones a la extensión y administración del patrimonio forestal ubicando en su jurisdicción; falta de indemnización hacia los propietarios de los terrenos expropiados e incumplimiento de los requisitos dispuestos por Ley para la creación –vía Decreto-, de zonas protegidas.

IV.- Naturaleza universal del derecho a un medio ambiente sano.

La doctrina del Derecho Constitucional ha clasificado los derechos constitucionales como derechos fundamentales de la primera, segunda y tercera generación, terminología que tiene como propósito establecer las etapas por las que ha pasado el proceso de reconocimiento y positivización de los derechos humanos en los diversos instrumentos internacionales dictados al efecto. Los primeros son propios del constitucionalismo liberal; ideológicamente, esta categoría responde al pensamiento en boga en los siglos XVIII y comienzos del XIX. Se trata de derechos conferidos, por lo común, sólo a individuos. Destacan entre ellos el derecho a la propiedad, a la seguridad y, en general, los derechos oponibles frente al Estado. La doctrina considera derechos de la segunda generación aquellos que son propios del constitucionalismo social, cuyo contenido ideológico podemos ubicar en las corrientes del siglo XX. Son derechos concedidos principalmente a los trabajadores y gremios, a la familia, es decir, relacionados con lo que se denomina la "cuestión social". Estos derechos se plantean frente al Estado y frente a otros sujetos. Finalmente, los derechos denominados de la tercera generación emergen del constitucionalismo posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Son derechos modernos, de contornos difusos. Por sus características propias, sus titulares son los grupos, e incluso, la sociedad como un todo. Forman parte de este grupo, por ejemplo, el derecho a la paz, la protección al consumidor, y por supuesto, la tutela del medio ambiente.

A nivel internacional, el primer foro para la discusión de los problemas relacionados con el medio ambiente lo constituye la “Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Desarrollo Humano”, celebrada en Estocolmo, Suecia en 1972. Ella sirvió de marco para que ese mismo año, la O.N.U., en su XXVII Asamblea General, y mediante la resolución 2997 estableciera el “Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente”. Existía la convicción sobre la necesidad de una pronta y efectiva implementación por parte de los gobiernos y la comunidad internacional de medidas destinadas a salvaguardar y aumentar la protección al ambiente para beneficio de las generaciones actuales y futuras, tal y como se indica en el preámbulo de la resolución que sirvió de marco legal a este programa (traducción libre).

Desde entonces, la protección al medio ambiente ha adquirido mayor importancia, siendo hoy por hoy, uno de los principales temas en la agenda de los gobiernos y organismos internacionales. Ello ha dado como resultado la promulgación de una gran cantidad de convenciones de carácter internacional (algunas promovidas por la Organización de Naciones Unidas) y/o regional, muchas de las cuales han sido suscritas por Costa Rica. Entre ellas están la Declaración de Río sobre el Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo, la Convención Marco sobre Cambio Climatológico, el Convenio sobre Diversidad Biológica, el Protocolo de Montreal, el Convenio Regional para el Manejo y Conservación de los Ecosistemas Naturales Forestales y el Desarrollo de Plantaciones Forestales y algunas de carácter más regional como el Convenio Centroamericano sobre la Protección de Ambiente, la Convención para la Protección de la Flora, de la fauna, y de las bellezas escénicas naturales de los países de América, el Convenio para la Conservación de la Biodiversidad y protección de áreas silvestres prioritarias en América Central.

Así, el derecho a un medio ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado tiene hoy día un perfil universal. Se trata de un derecho de la humanidad, lo cual se ve reflejado en las múltiples convenciones que han suscrito los países con el objeto de proteger la biodiversidad. Estas consideraciones han encontrado eco en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal; así en la sentencia N° 2485-94, manifestó:

“Este fenómeno de internacionalización del derecho ambiental ha seguido, por cierto un patrón de desarrollo similar al de los derechos humanos, pues ha pasado de ser materia de jurisdicción doméstica de los Estados, a ser parte de la jurisdicción internacional.” V.- Sobre el papel del Estado como garante del derecho ambiental.

La Sala, desde su creación, y al abordar el tema ambiental señaló que el artículo 50 de la Carta Política tutelaba de manera implícita el derecho al ambiente como un derecho fundamental (sentencia N° 2233-93). Sin embargo, y a partir de la reforma introducida mediante Ley número 7412 del 3 de junio de 1994 (publicada en La Gaceta N° 111 del 10 de junio de 1994), el artículo dispone en forma expresa sobre la obligación del Estado de proteger el ambiente y otorga a los ciudadanos plena acción para defenderlo:

Artículo 50: El Estado procurará el mayor bienestar a todos los habitantes del país, organizando y estimulando la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza. Toda persona tiene derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Por ello, está legitimado para denunciar actos que infrinjan ese derecho y para reclamar la reparación del daño causado. El Estado garantizará, defenderá y preservará ese derecho. La ley determinará las responsabilidades y sanciones correspondientes." Este Tribunal Constitucional ha reconocido el deber de protección que merece el derecho a disfrutar de un medio ambiente sano y armonioso, dispuesto en los artículos 21, 50 y 89 de la Constitución Política:

“III.– Sobre el derecho. El artículo 50 de la Constitución Política establece que toda persona tiene derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. El derecho a un ambiente sano tiene un contenido amplio que equivale a la aspiración de mejorar el entorno de vida del ser humano, de manera que desborda los criterios de conservación natural para ubicarse dentro de toda esfera en la que se desarrolle la persona, sea la familiar, la laboral o la del medio en el cual habita. De ahí que se afirme que se trata de un derecho transversal, es decir, que se desplaza a todo lo largo del ordenamiento jurídico, modelando y reinterpretando sus institutos. El ambiente es definido por la Real Academia Española de la Lengua como el ‘conjunto de circunstancias físicas que rodean a los seres vivos’, lo que recalca aún más el carácter general del derecho. En cambio el derecho a un ambiente ecológicamente equilibrado es un concepto más restringido referido a una parte importante de ese entorno en el que se desarrolla el ser humano, al equilibrio que debe existir entre el avance de la sociedad y la conservación de los recursos naturales. Ambos derechos se encuentran reconocidos expresamente en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, que perfila el Estado Social de Derecho. La ubicación del derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado dentro de las regulaciones constitucionales del Estado Social de Derecho es el punto a partir del cual debe éste ser analizado. El Estado Social de Derecho produce el fenómeno de incorporación al texto fundamental de una serie de objetivos políticos de gran relevancia social y de la introducción de un importante número de derechos sociales que aseguran el bien común y la satisfacción de las necesidades elementales de las personas. En esta perspectiva, la Constitución Política enfatiza que la protección de los recursos naturales es un medio adecuado para tutelar y mejorar la calidad de vida de todos, lo que hace necesaria la intervención de los poderes públicos sobre los factores que pueden alterar el equilibrio de los recursos naturales y, más ampliamente, obstaculizar que la persona se desarrolle y desenvuelva en un ambiente sano. (...) La Constitución Política establece que el Estado debe garantizar, defender y preservar ese derecho. Prima facie garantizar es asegurar y proteger el derecho contra algún riesgo o necesidad, defender es vedar, prohibir e impedir toda actividad que atente contra el derecho, y preservar es una acción dirigida a poner a cubierto anticipadamente el derecho de posibles peligros a efectos de hacerlo perdurar para futuras generaciones. El Estado debe asumir un doble comportamiento de hacer y de no hacer; por un lado debe abstenerse de atentar él mismo contra el derecho a contar con un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, y por otro lado, debe asumir la tarea de dictar las medidas que permitan cumplir con los requerimientos constitucionales.” (Sentencia número 00644–99 de las once horas veinticuatro minutos del veintinueve de enero de mil novecientos noventa y nueve; en el mismo sentido se puede consultar la número 4947-2002 de las nueve horas con veinticuatro minutos del veinticuatro de mayo de dos mil dos) Asimismo, en una sentencia de fecha reciente se agregó lo siguiente:

"Nuestra Constitución Política, en su artículo 50, reconoce expresamente el derecho de todos los habitantes presentes y futuros de este país, de disfrutar de un medio ambiente saludable y en perfecto equilibrio. El cumplimiento de este requisito es fundamental garantía para la protección de la vida y la salud públicas, no sólo de los costarricenses, sino además de todos los miembros de la comunidad mundial. La violación a estos fundamentales preceptos conlleva la posibilidad de lesión o puesta en peligro de intereses a corto, mediano y largo plazo. La contaminación del medio es una de las formas a través de las cuales puede ser rota la integridad del ambiente, con resultados la mayoría de las veces imperecederos y acumulativos. El Estado costarricense se encuentra en la obligación de actuar preventivamente evitando -a través de la fiscalización y la intervención directa- la realización de actos que lesionen el medio ambiente, y en la correlativa e igualmente ineludible prohibición de fomentar su degradación" (Sentencia número 2002-04830 de las 16:00 horas del 21 de mayo del 2000, criterio reiterado en la sentencia 2002-8996 de las 10:14 horas del 6 de setiembre del 2002.)

A partir de lo expuesto, resulta evidente que estamos de cara a un derecho cuya protección trasciende los intereses locales que está llamada a administrar y tutelar en forma autónoma cualquier corporación municipal. El Estado está obligado entonces, a tomar las previsiones necesarias tendientes a la protección del medio ambiente. El concepto de Estado deberá entenderse en un sentido amplio, inclusivo de otros entes públicos que por tener personalidad jurídica propia no dejan de estar igualmente destinados a satisfacer el interés general, y particularmente a tutelar el ambiente. Sin embargo, corresponde al Estado central la responsabilidad primaria de la defensa del medio ambiente.

El artículo 50 constitucional ha sido desarrollado por el legislador ordinario a través de diversas leyes que procuran potenciar y hacer efectiva la tutela del medio ambiente en los distintos ámbitos de aplicación de esos cuerpos normativos, reservando al Poder Ejecutivo las competencias de administración y tutela de los bienes naturales. La Ley N° 7152 del 5 de junio de 1990 creó el Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, al que constituyó rector del sector ambiental y encomendó por su especialidad técnica, la labor de "(…)Dictar, mediante decreto ejecutivo, normas y regulaciones, con carácter obligatorio, relativas al uso racional y a la protección de los recursos naturales, la energía y las minas" (artículo 2 inciso ch). La Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, N° 7554 de 4 de octubre de 1995, delega en el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía buena parte de las competencias en esta materia, sin descargar a los otros entes públicos de sus responsabilidades en este campo. La potestad del Poder Ejecutivo (Presidente de la República y Ministro de Ambiente y Energía) para proceder al establecimiento de áreas protegidas a través del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, deriva la relación de los artículos 32 incisos e) y f) y 42 de la Ley N° 7554, Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, artículos 82 y 84 de la Ley N° 7317 Ley de la Conservación Silvestre y 13 de la Ley N° 7575, Ley Forestal.

Así, el Estado central como delegado de la Nación para el cumplimiento de sus fines asociativos, cumple una función unificadora y asume la administración y tutela de los bienes naturales, con el apoyo de las demás instituciones -autónomas, semiautónomas y corporaciones municipales-, en lo que corresponda a sus competencias orgánicas y territoriales y en el caso de las Municipalidades, en relación con los intereses locales que está llamada a tutelar.

Las actuaciones del Poder Ejecutivo no solo se enmarcan dentro de los límites de su competencia para cumplir con el deber que le impone el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, sino que se ajustan a la copiosa regulación producida por el Derecho Internacional en relación la obligación insoslayable del Estado de proteger el medio ambiente, adoptando todas las medidas idóneas para lograr una garantía integral y efectiva.

En este sentido, aunque las municipalidades tienen innegables deberes en este campo, es evidente que la protección del ambiente trasciende el interés meramente local, para constituirse un asunto de interés nacional, por lo que las acciones del Estado central como delegado de la Nación soberana para el cumplimiento de sus fines asociativos, en tanto propicien una efectiva defensa de sus bienes naturales, resultan no sólo válidas, sino incluso indispensables.

VI.- Sobre el patrimonio forestal del Estado.

En este marco de estricta protección hacia el medio ambiente, la Constitución Política también dispone reglas concretas relativas al régimen jurídico aplicable a los bienes de dominio público. Así, el artículo 121 inciso 14) lo regula en forma genérica, al disponer que los bienes “propios de la Nación”, solo podrán salir definitivamente de su dominio por medio de autorización de la Asamblea Legislativa. Se trata de bienes que por su naturaleza jurídica y titularidad, en tanto pertenecen a la Nación y están destinados a satisfacer el interés general, gozan de una especial protección jurídica. Por ello, no son susceptibles de ser apropiados por particulares, y ni siquiera por la Administración Pública, para fines distintos de los que se derivan de su propia esencia y naturaleza. Su tutela y administración corresponden al Estado, en nombre de la Nación (cfr. tomo III. de las Actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, Sesión número 168).

En su jurisprudencia, esta Sala ha sentado los principios básicos del régimen jurídico de los bienes dominiales; en particular, en la sentencia número 2306-91 de las 14:45 horas del 6 de noviembre de 1991, determinó las siguientes reglas, que han seguido siendo aplicadas en forma consistente a partir de dicha resolución:

"…El dominio público se encuentra integrado por bienes que manifiestan, por voluntad expresa del legislador, un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, al interés público.- Son los llamados bienes dominicales, bienes dominiales, bienes o cosas públicas o bienes públicos, que no pertenecen individualmente a los particulares y que están destinados a un uso público y sometidos a un régimen especial, fuera del comercio de los hombres.- Es decir, afectados por su propia naturaleza y vocación.- En consecuencia, esos bienes pertenecen al Estado en el sentido más amplio del concepto, están afectados al servicio que prestan y que invariablemente es esencial en virtud de norma expresa.- Notas características de estos bienes, es que son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables, no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos del Derecho Civil y la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para recuperar el dominio.- Como están fuera del comercio, estos bienes no pueden ser objeto de posesión, aunque se puede adquirir un derecho al aprovechamiento, aunque no un derecho a la propiedad.- El permiso de uso es un acto jurídico unilateral que lo dicta la Administración, en el uso de sus funciones y lo que se pone en manos del particular, es el dominio útil del bien, reservándose siempre el Estado, el dominio directo sobre la cosa…" Corolario de lo anterior es que solamente por Ley se les pueda privar del régimen especial que los regula, desafectándolos, separándolos del fin público al que están vinculados. Se requiere de un acto legislativo expreso y concreto, de manera tal que no quede duda alguna de la voluntad del legislador de sacar del dominio público un bien determinado e individualizado. El artículo 14 de la Ley Forestal, número 7575, de trece de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y seis, da a los terrenos forestales y bosques el carácter de bienes dominiales:

“Artículo 14.- Condición inembargable e inalienable del patrimonio natural Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el patrimonio natural del Estado, detallados en el artículo anterior, serán inembargables e inalienables; su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible. En consecuencia, no pueden inscribirse en el Registro Público mediante información posesoria y tanto la invasión como la ocupación de ellos será sancionada conforme a lo dispuesto en esta ley.” Según la clasificación dada por la normativa ambiental, el patrimonio forestal o natural del Estado está conformado por reservas forestales, reservas biológicas, zonas protectoras, refugios de vida silvestre, humedales y monumentos naturales (artículo 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, número 7554, de dieciocho de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). Así las cosas, es claro que el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense confiere una especial y calificada protección a los bienes afectados al uso o disfrute público, y reviste dicha tutela de mayores cuidados todavía al regular los bienes públicos ambientales. Se trata de bienes pertenecientes a la Nación, por estar afectados a una finalidad de innegable utilidad general, y que para ello ha sido encomendada su administración, en los casos en que así lo determina expresamente la Ley, al Estado central, con el objeto de que las políticas en materia de ambiente sigan parámetros congruentes y acordes con la necesidad de una integral y continua protección del ambiente. Aun cuando para efectos registrales los bienes demaniales pueden ser inscritos a nombre del ente público encargado de su tutela, lo cierto es que estos bienes no le pertenecen a ninguna entidad pública en particular, sino a la Nación.

La importancia de proteger algunas zonas geográficas mediante su afectación al régimen de dominio público constituye un asunto de interés nacional. Así lo ha reconocido este Tribunal:

“La conformación de áreas protegidas bajo las categorías de Reserva Forestal, Refugio de Vida Silvestre Privado o Mixto, Parques Nacionales, Reservas Biológicas y Zonas Protectoras, conlleva a la imposición de un Régimen de propiedad Pública bajo la categoría de Patrimonio Forestal del Estado que cambia ipso facto la naturaleza jurídica de los terrenos incluidos dentro del área, esto es de un régimen de privado que se manifiesta en diversas formas o estado de tenencia a un régimen público de propiedad Estatal. El artículo 13 de la Ley Forestal No.7575 establece que el patrimonio natural del Estado estará constituido por los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su nombre y de las pertenecientes a municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y demás organismos de la Administración Pública, excepto inmuebles que garanticen operaciones crediticias con el Sistema Bancario nacional e ingresen a formar parte de su patrimonio. En el mismo sentido, el artículo 14 de la misma Ley dispone que los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen ese patrimonio natural del Estado, son inembargables e inalienables; que su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y que la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible.

En cuanto a las reservas forestales existe una gran necesidad de proteger las especies maderables no solo por el valor en sí de las mismas desde el punto de vista económico, sino también porque algunos de ellos tienen gran valor científico y son estas especies vegetales parte de los recursos naturales renovables pero que dejarán de serlo en la medida en que se vayan extinguiendo.

(…)En este mismo sentido, los refugios de vida silvestre son definidos en la Ley Forestal No.7032 del 7 de abril de 1986, en el artículo 35 inciso ch), como "aquellos bosques y terrenos cuyo uso principal sea la protección, conservación, incremento y manejo de especies de flora y fauna silvestre." Dichos sitios tienen como fin primordial la protección de las especies de flora y fauna en extinción y que poseen entre otros valores, un gran valor científico, de ahí el interés de conservarlos. Con su conservación se pretende garantizar la perpetuidad de las especies de vida silvestre, sus poblaciones y hábitats, y dar oportunidad para realizar actividades de tipo científico, educativo y recreativo, cuando no vayan en detrimento de los objetivos de cada refugio. Dentro de los Refugios Nacionales de Vida Silvestre, la biota puede ser muy variada dependiendo de la diversidad de asociaciones naturales existentes dentro del refugio, según la variedad de condiciones geográficas locales, lo que significa apreciar las diferencias que provienen de una diversidad en condiciones geológicas, edáficas, topográficas y de actividad animal y humana, de ahí que se haga necesario la protección legal de estas áreas y de las demás constituyentes de la propiedad agraria forestal.(sentencia 1999-2988) La ley faculta al Poder Ejecutivo para que, a través de Decreto, determine cuáles zonas geográficas del territorio nacional (marina, costera, insular o continental) se pueden proteger bajo alguna de las categorías de manejo que la ley establece. Para ello no tiene relevancia el régimen jurídico de la propiedad -público o privado- ni cuál ente u órgano lo ha administrado hasta ese momento, pues a partir de la declaratoria pasa a ser administrado por el MINAE. Sobre este aspecto, en la sentencia 1999-2988 se indicó:

“En nuestro país, como ya se ha mencionado, el interés por la protección de los recursos forestales data de años atrás, así por ejemplo en decreto No. 5 del 26 de junio de 1945 se hace manifiesto esta tendencia a la protección de las tierras forestales y de los recursos forestales derivados de estas, no solo por el valor de los recursos como tales, sino por la función que los mismos desempeñan dentro de lo que son en este caso las zonas protectoras. El Estado se interesa en ellas por adquirir tierras como protección forestal, para determinar si por sus condiciones escénicas, culturales, científicas o protectoras, constituyen un bien que debe ser preservado como terreno de valor incalculable. En razón de esta valoración, el Estado crea las denominadas zonas protectoras, las cuales vienen a constituir áreas boscosas o de aptitud forestal en que la conservación del bosque y la conservación de los terrenos forestales, está inspirada en propósitos de protección de suelos, o de mantener y regular el régimen hidrológico, el clima, el medio ambiente. Son aptas para la protección de los suelos, por cuanto las raíces de los árboles sujetan y retienen la capa vegetal y las hojas que de ella caen cubren el suelo por donde corre el agua y evita el arrastre de partículas de tierra, es decir detienen o por lo menos disminuyen el proceso de erosión, el cual acarrea consigo el desequilibrio nutritivo del suelo al arrastrar nutrientes importantes de la tierra, necesarios para el crecimiento de las plantas. Las zonas protectoras juegan un papel preponderante en el equilibrio del medio ambiente entendido este como el conjunto de cosas que rodean al individuo tales como: clima, suelo, luz, viento, lluvia, alimentación, frío, calor, hábitat, etc. y en el equilibrio del ecosistema por la relación de intercambio que se da entre la parte viviente de la naturaleza y la parte inerte de la misma. De ahí que deba protegerse el suelo, la regulación del régimen hidrológico, la conservación del ambiente, y la de las cuencas hidrográficas. Estas zonas son creadas por ley o vía decreto del Poder Ejecutivo y en ellas, también por disposición legal, está prohibido efectuar labores agrícolas o de destrucción de la vegetación. Dentro de las zonas protegidas quedan comprendidos los terrenos que se encuentran situados en las reservas nacionales, cierta zona a lo largo de los ríos, una faja a uno y otro lado de la depresión máxima de las cuencas hidrológicas, los terrenos que bordean los manantiales que nacen en los cerros y también los que nacen en terrenos planos, cierta área en la ribera de los ríos arroyos, lagos, lagunas, o embalses naturales.” VII.- Sobre el aumento y reducción de las áreas silvestres protegidas.

En el memorial de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, el accionante impugna –y lo señala como motivo de inconstitucionalidad-, la derogatoria del Decreto 23069-MIRENEM por el Decreto 29019-MINAE pues tácitamente redujo la extensión del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, dado que éste último había ampliado los límites del Refugio.

Analizando los decretos promulgados relacionados con el Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo, se observa como el Poder Ejecutivo ha emitido varios en procura de regular la situación del mismo. Con el objeto de aclarar la situación actual, es conveniente hacer un recuento de los relacionados con el objeto de esta acción. Tenemos en primer término el DE-16614-MAG de 29 de octubre de 1985, que crea el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo (REGAMA). El fundamento legal del decreto está concretamente en el artículo 2 de la Ley N° 4465, pero especialmente en el artículo 18 de la Ley N° 6919, Ley de Conservación de la Fauna Silvestre, ya derogada, pero que en aquel momento disponía:

“Artículo 18.- Son refugios nacionales de fauna silvestre los que el Poder Ejecutivo declare como tales, para la protección y la investigación de la flora y la fauna silvestre, en especial de aquella en vías de extinción. Queda autorizado el Poder Ejecutivo para establecer, dentro de las reservas forestales y en terrenos particulares, áreas bajo la clasificación de refugios nacionales de fauna silvestre, las que, para efectos de conservación de la fauna silvestre, quedarán bajo la administración del Departamento de Vida Silvestre de la Dirección General Forestal del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería.(…)” El artículo 6° del Decreto 16614-MAG excluyó expresamente de ese refugio la zona urbana de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo. Posteriormente se emitió el DE-23069-MIRENEM de 5 de abril de 1994; el artículo 16 de ese Decreto derogó el art. 6 del DE-16614. La consecuencia inmediata de ello, es que las áreas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo pasaron a formar parte del Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo. Más adelante se promulgó el Decreto DE-29019-MINAE de 31 de octubre del 2000, el cual, a través del artículo 8°, derogó el Decreto 23069-MIRENEM; con ello, tácitamente recobró vigencia el artículo 6 del DE-16614. Se produce en ese momento una disminución tácita del territorio de la reserva al excluirse de nuevo las áreas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo, lo que dejaba las cosas en la situación en que lo habría dispuesto el Decreto N° 16614-MAG. Sin embargo, posteriormente el Poder Ejecutivo emitió el DE-32753-MINAE de 16 de mayo del 2005, el cual derogó expresamente el artículo 6 del DE-16614; nuevamente las zonas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo pasan a formar parte del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, situación que se mantiene a la fecha.

Sobre el aumento y/o disminución de los límites territoriales del patrimonio forestal, este Tribunal, en la sentencia N° 1999-5399 de las 16:39 horas del 26 de octubre de 1993, en la cual la Sala señaló:

“…si el Poder Ejecutivo está legitimado para señalar los límites de su patrimonio forestal lo será a través de la vía reglamentaria y no la legal, con la debida indemnización de las propiedades sobre las que se extienda el patrimonio forestal, ya que en virtud del artículo 9 constitucional y de la teoría de la separación de Poderes, la Asamblea Legislativa es el único órgano constitucional facultado para emitir leyes. Por ello cuando se trate de un bien demanial resulta ilógico pensar que el Estado esté limitado o imposibilitado en su actuación en resguardo de la flora y la fauna de nuestras tierras.

II.En este orden de ideas, puesto que esta acción se dirige contra un decreto ejecutivo que amplió los límites de un parque nacional -Isla del Coco- extendiéndose a una distancia de quince kilómetros sobre el mar, medida desde la línea de bajamar de la costa, es que es importante determinar que lo hace en el pleno ejercicio de sus facultades, tanto legales como constitucionales, por tratarse de un bien demanial.(…)

V.En relación con la alegada violación del artículo 3 del Convenio para la protección de la flora, de la fauna y de las bellezas escénicas naturales de los países de América -aprobado por Ley número 3763, de primero de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y seis- en relación con el artículo 7 constitucional, que en lo que interesa dice así:

"Los Gobiernos Contratantes convienen en que los límites de los parques nacionales no serán alterados ni enajenada parte alguna de ellos sino por acción de la autoridad legislativa competente. Las riquezas existentes en ellos no se explotarán con fines comerciales.

Los Gobiernos Contratantes convienen en prohibir la caza, la matanza y la captura de especimenes de la fauna y la destrucción y recolección de ejemplares de la flora en los parques nacionales, excepto cuando se haga por las autoridades del parque o por orden o bajo vigilancia de las mismas o para investigaciones científicas debidamente autorizadas." Deben esas normas interpretarse en sentido restrictivo, de manera que, la exigencia de establecer los límites de los parques nacionales a través de una ley es únicamente cuando va en detrimento del mismo, es decir, cuando se quiera reducir su extensión, y no cuando se quieran extender los límites de las zonas protectoras del patrimonio forestal del Estado. Este artículo debe completarse con el artículo 40 de la Ley Forestal que dice:

"El área de las reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, refugios de vida silvestre, reservas biológicas del patrimonio forestal, sólo podrá ser reducida por ley de la República, previos estudios técnicos correspondientes que justifiquen esta medida." Y esto es así en virtud de que el bien jurídico que se protege es el "recurso forestal", término que "significa la protección y preservación de la integridad del medio ambiente natural," (resolución de la Sala Constitucional número 2233-93, de las nueve horas treinta y seis minutos del veintiocho de mayo) que existe en la zona declarada como parque nacional, y que es reconocido tanto por la legislación internacional, por las leyes especiales dictadas al efecto, como por los textos de las cartas políticas. En este sentido, el artículo 69 de la Constitución Política es que habla de "explotación racional de la tierra", constituyéndose un principio fundamental su protección (…).” (la negrita no es de original) Es evidente entonces que el Poder Ejecutivo, no puede reducir los límites territoriales un área silvestre, pero sí puede extenderlos. De ahí que los Decretos cuya derogación o puesta en vigencia hayan producido como consecuencia inmediata el aumento del territorio de una determinada área protegida, son constitucionales.

VIII.- En relación con la falta de indemnización hacia los propietarios de los terrenos expropiados y el incumplimiento de los requisitos dispuestos por Ley.

Los otros argumentos del accionante combaten la falta de indemnización a los propietarios por los terrenos expropiados y el incumplimiento de los requisitos establecidos en la Ley para el establecimiento (por Decreto) de reservas forestales, áreas silvestres protegidas, etc.; asimismo impugna el alcance de las disposiciones de la Ley Forestal N° 446 y del artículo 18 de la Ley de Conservación de la Fauna Silvestre, los cuales sirvieron de fundamento a la emisión del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 16614-MAG. Sin embargo, ambos temas constituyen cuestiones de legalidad ordinaria, cuyo conocimiento corresponde a la jurisdicción ordinaria (ver entre otros los votos 2001-4530, 2002 4254, 2002-4878, 2002-5203 y 2003-3653).

Sobre el segundo aspecto, contradicción de una norma reglamentaria con disposiciones de carácter legal, el Tribunal ha señalado:

“Alega el accionante que el Decreto impugnado es inconstitucional por haber sido dictado sin cumplir los requisitos que al efecto dispone la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Planteado así el problema, se refiere en exclusiva a la violación del principio de legalidad administrativa que se desprende del artículo 11 constitucional: contradicción de la norma impugnada con disposiciones de carácter legal. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política, las cuestiones de legalidad han de someterse a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, con el propósito de mantener una uniforme distribución de las competencias y el respeto de todas las reglas que conforman la Constitución Política. Como se ha señalado en forma reiterada y repetida por este Tribunal:

"Es claro que cualquier impugnación como la que se plantea, conlleva implícita una presunta violación a la Constitución Política, dado que de ella se deriva todo el ordenamiento jurídico, pero en la propia Constitución existe un reparto de competencias con el fin de garantizar al ciudadano una manera de proteger las distintas clases de derechos e intereses que posee. De esa forma, se regulan en la Constitución Política, las jurisdicciones contenciosa y de trabajo (artículos 49 y 70) y es dentro de este contexto que debe incrustarse la jurisdicción constitucional, en el entendido que su competencia se complementa y no se superpone a las señaladas, a los fines de protección del ciudadano" (en este sentido, entre otras ver las sentencias número 0843-95, de las 15:45 horas del 14 de febrero de 1995, 0404-96, de las 15:33 horas del 23 de enero, 3379-96; de las 10:57 horas del 5 de julio, 6471-96, de las 15:39 horas del 27 de noviembre; 6692-96 de las 16:03 horas del 10 de diciembre; 6689-96, de las 15:54 horas del 10 de diciembre, todas de 1996, y 4261-97, de las 16:03 horas del 22 de julio de 1997).

En este sentido, deslindar la jurisdicción constitucional de la común se torna delicado, ya que la infracción al principio de legalidad se desprende precisamente de normas de rango constitucional -artículos 11, 49, 121 y 140 de la Constitución Política-; y lo que precisamente se solicita es que se haga prevalecer ese principio al declarar la existencia de violación de preceptos legales por parte del Decreto impugnado. No obsta la trascendencia de este principio; sin embargo, para que pueda invocársele fructíferamente debe haberse quebrantado, por lo menos, otra norma o principio constitucional, cuando de la jurisdicción constitucional se trata, lo cual no se da en relación con la norma impugnada, en tanto lo que se reclama es que es no se dictó de conformidad con otras normas de rango legal. La opinión contraria terminaría por diluir la distinción entre asuntos constitucionales y asuntos de mera legalidad -si hablamos del artículo 11-, en tanto no podrían diferenciarse las infracciones de la Constitución de las infracciones de orden legal. Por lo dicho se puede concluir que, aún cuando puede válidamente afirmarse que las cuestiones de legalidad tienen una directa relación con el artículo 11 de la Constitución Política, lo cierto es que el tema de la adecuación de las normas legales unas con otras, encuadra más bien dentro de la especialidad de la materia que el artículo 49 constitucional asignó a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, motivo por el que, en su acatamiento, procede remitir al accionante a esa jurisdicción para que someta a ella la cuestión planteada.” (sentencia 2004-03579 de las 14:42 horas del 14 de abril del 2004. En el mismo sentido votos números 2002-4452 y 2005-5899) IX.- Conclusión.- El Poder Ejecutivo no tiene obligación de consultar a las Municipalidades sobre las medidas a adoptar en relación con las llamadas “zonas protegidas”, pues su competencia sobre tales zonas –como administrador-, es exclusiva. Podría hacerlo y quizás sería conveniente que recabara el criterio de aquellas, con miras a que las disposiciones relacionadas con la administración y manejo de las mismas armonicen con los intereses locales. Sin embargo, ello constituye una cuestión de oportunidad y conveniencia, que queda a discreción de ese poder. El presunto incumplimiento de los requisitos establecidos en la ley para la emisión de un decreto, así como la alegada falta de indemnización a los propietarios, son cuestiones de legalidad cuyo conocimiento no corresponde a este Tribunal, sino que deben ser conocidas y resueltas en la jurisdicción ordinaria. Por otra parte si bien el Decreto DE-29019-MINAE de 31 de octubre del 2000, derogó el Decreto 23069-MIRENEM, y al hacerlo excluyó de la REGAMA las áreas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo (con lo que se produjo una disminución tácita del territorio de la REGAMA), posteriormente el Poder Ejecutivo emitió el DE-32753-MINAE de 16 de mayo del 2005 que derogó el artículo 6° del Decreto 16614-MAG. Al hacerlo, el territorio de la reserva volvió a su situación original. Ello no solo es constitucional, sino acorde con la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal en esa materia. En virtud de lo expuesto, y de conformidad con el artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, lo procedente es rechazar la acción.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción en relación con el Decreto 32753-MINAE. En lo demás, se rechaza de plano.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

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