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Res. 03481-2003 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 02/05/2003
OutcomeResultado
The judicial interpretation preventing claims regarding acts not mentioned in the filing writ is declared unconstitutional for violating the right to prompt and complete justice.Se declara inconstitucional la interpretación judicial que impedía deducir pretensiones sobre actos no mencionados en el escrito de interposición, por violar el derecho a la justicia pronta y cumplida.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber declares unconstitutional the judicial interpretation of the First Chamber of Cassation and the Superior Contentious-Administrative Tribunal regarding Article 60(f) of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, which held that asserting claims related to administrative acts not mentioned in the initial filing writ constitutes a formal defect barring a decision on the merits. The Chamber reasons that the filing writ has limited content (announcing the proceeding, identifying the contested act, and stating the amount in controversy) and its purpose is to allow the plaintiff to examine the administrative record before formalizing the demand. Interpreting that the plaintiff is bound solely to the acts mentioned in that initial writ violates the right to prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), the principle of proportionality, and the 'indubio pro actione' principle. Procedural congruence must be assessed between the formalization writ and the judgment, not between the filing writ and the formal demand. The judgment emphasizes that excessive requirements or unnecessary formalities violate the fundamental right of access to justice.La Sala Constitucional declara inconstitucional la interpretación judicial de la Sala Primera de Casación y del Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo del artículo 60, inciso f), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, que sostenía que la deducción de pretensiones relacionadas con actos administrativos no mencionados en el escrito de interposición constituye un defecto formal que impide un pronunciamiento sobre el fondo. La Sala razona que el escrito de interposición tiene un contenido limitado (anunciar el proceso, indicar el acto impugnado y fijar la cuantía) y su propósito es permitir al actor conocer el expediente administrativo antes de formalizar la demanda. Interpretar que el acto queda vinculado únicamente a los actos indicados en ese escrito inicial viola el derecho a la justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), el principio de proporcionalidad y el principio 'indubio pro actione'. La congruencia procesal debe verificarse entre el escrito de formalización de la demanda y la sentencia, no entre el escrito de interposición y la demanda formalizada. La sentencia enfatiza que los requisitos excesivos o formalismos innecesarios quebrantan el derecho fundamental de acceso a la justicia.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The fundamental right to prompt and complete justice under Article 41 of the Political Constitution includes, among other elements, the right to access a proceeding where, in light of the factual and legal arguments presented, the claims asserted therein by the parties are discussed and resolved through a judgment grounded in the legal order, regardless of whether it is favorable or adverse to those requests—that is, the effective assistance of the jurisdictional bodies for the purpose of guaranteeing peaceful and harmonious social coexistence. From this perspective, any excessive requirement or unnecessary formality that runs counter to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness violates the right to prompt and complete justice. In the matter under review, it is evident that the requirement to indicate the administrative acts being challenged in the filing writ is intended to enable the respondent public authority to transmit the administrative record so that the private party may formulate its claims accurately and with full knowledge of the facts, meaning that it cannot be interpreted that the plaintiff is bound to that initial indication, since, as already stated, after studying the administrative record, the plaintiff may become aware of an unavoidable need to challenge other administrative acts, regarding which it must formulate an explicit claim in the formalization writ. Consequently, interpreting that in the formalization writ claims may only be asserted in relation to the administrative acts mentioned in the filing writ constitutes an interpretation that infringes the principle of proportionality and amounts to an extreme and unnecessary formality.El derecho fundamental a una justicia pronta y cumplida del ordinal 41 de la Constitución Política, comprende, entre otros contenidos, el derecho a acceder a un proceso donde se discutan, a la luz de las argumentaciones fácticas y jurídicas formuladas, las pretensiones deducidas en éste por las partes y a que se resuelvan mediante una sentencia fundada en el Ordenamiento Jurídico, independientemente que ésta sea favorable o adversa a tales pedimentos, esto es, a la asistencia efectiva de los órganos jurisdiccionales con el propósito de garantizar una coexistencia social pacífica y armónica. Desde esta perspectiva, todo requisito excesivo o formalismo innecesario, que resulte contrario a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad quebranta el derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida. En el asunto bajo examen, es evidente que la necesidad de indicar los actos administrativos que se impugnan en el escrito de interposición tiene por finalidad que la administración pública demandada envíe el expediente administrativo para que el administrado pueda formular las pretensiones en forma acertada y con conocimiento de causa, siendo que no se puede interpretar que el actor queda atado a esa primera indicación, puesto que, como ya se ha indicado, después de estudiar el expediente administrativo puede percatarse de la necesidad ineludible de atacar otros actos administrativos, respecto de los cuales debe formular una pretensión explícita en el escrito de formalización de la demanda. Consecuentemente, interpretar que en el escrito de formalización de la demanda sólo se pueden deducir pretensiones en relación con los actos administrativos mencionados en el de interposición, resulta una interpretación que infringe el principio de proporcionalidad y se erige en un formalismo extremo e innecesario.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El derecho fundamental a una justicia pronta y cumplida del ordinal 41 de la Constitución Política, comprende, entre otros contenidos, el derecho a acceder a un proceso donde se discutan, a la luz de las argumentaciones fácticas y jurídicas formuladas, las pretensiones deducidas en éste por las partes y a que se resuelvan mediante una sentencia fundada en el Ordenamiento Jurídico."
"The fundamental right to prompt and complete justice under Article 41 of the Political Constitution includes, among other elements, the right to access a proceeding where, in light of the factual and legal arguments presented, the claims asserted therein by the parties are discussed and resolved through a judgment grounded in the legal order."
Considerando VII
"El derecho fundamental a una justicia pronta y cumplida del ordinal 41 de la Constitución Política, comprende, entre otros contenidos, el derecho a acceder a un proceso donde se discutan, a la luz de las argumentaciones fácticas y jurídicas formuladas, las pretensiones deducidas en éste por las partes y a que se resuelvan mediante una sentencia fundada en el Ordenamiento Jurídico."
Considerando VII
"Todo requisito excesivo o formalismo innecesario, que resulte contrario a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad quebranta el derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida."
"Any excessive requirement or unnecessary formality that runs counter to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness violates the right to prompt and complete justice."
Considerando VII
"Todo requisito excesivo o formalismo innecesario, que resulte contrario a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad quebranta el derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida."
Considerando VII
"La congruencia como un principio procesal de trascendental relevancia debe producirse, entonces, en el proceso contencioso administrativo, entre el escrito de formalización pues es éste el que contiene la pretensión y la parte dispositiva –“Por Tanto”- de la sentencia y no entre el escrito de interposición y la última."
"Congruence, as a procedural principle of transcendental relevance, must therefore be established, in the contentious-administrative proceeding, between the formalization writ—since it is this that contains the claim—and the operative part (“Therefore”) of the judgment, and not between the filing writ and the latter."
Considerando VI
"La congruencia como un principio procesal de trascendental relevancia debe producirse, entonces, en el proceso contencioso administrativo, entre el escrito de formalización pues es éste el que contiene la pretensión y la parte dispositiva –“Por Tanto”- de la sentencia y no entre el escrito de interposición y la última."
Considerando VI
"El principio general del Derecho Procesal común indubio pro actione, que tiene fuerte asidero constitucional en el derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida, le impone a los órganos jurisdiccionales interpretar de forma benigna cualquier formalidad o requisito procesal que pueda enervar el dictado de un pronunciamiento de fondo."
"The general principle of common procedural law, indubio pro actione, which has strong constitutional grounding in the right to prompt and complete justice, imposes on jurisdictional bodies the duty to interpret benignly any procedural formality or requirement that may prevent the issuance of a decision on the merits."
Considerando VII
"El principio general del Derecho Procesal común indubio pro actione, que tiene fuerte asidero constitucional en el derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida, le impone a los órganos jurisdiccionales interpretar de forma benigna cualquier formalidad o requisito procesal que pueda enervar el dictado de un pronunciamiento de fondo."
Considerando VII
Full documentDocumento completo
Res: 2003-03481 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fourteen hours and three minutes on May second, two thousand three.- Unconstitutionality action brought by Auto Fácil de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, represented by its absolute legal representative (apoderado generalísimo) Mario Arana García, of legal age, married, businessman, identity card number CED62246 and resident of Playas del Coco, against the reiterated judicial interpretation by the Sala de Casación and the Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, regarding Article 60, subsection f), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa.
Resultando:
Justice Jinesta Lobo writes; and,
Considerando:
I.- ADMISSIBILITY. Article 74 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that "An unconstitutionality action shall not be admissible against jurisdictional acts of the Poder Judicial...". However, as indicated in Judgment of this Chamber No. 4587-97 at 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, the unconstitutionality action has been admitted against reiterated criteria by jurisdictional bodies that have created a jurisprudential guideline (pauta jurisprudencial), given that Article 3 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that the Constitución Política shall be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation made by public authorities of the norms. In the case at bar (sub-judice), the representative of the challenging company attacks the reiterated jurisprudence of the Sala Primera de Casación and the Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo in the sense that the claim of the contentious-administrative process is definitively established in the initial filing brief, for which he provides certified copies of Judgments of the Sala de Casación No. 149 at 2:45 p.m. on October 18, 1974, of the Sala Primera de Casación No. 235 at 2:25 p.m. on July 27, 1990, of the Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, Nos. 150-93 at 11:15 a.m. on July 12, 1993 and 359-95 at 9:00 a.m. on September 29, 1995, which follow the jurisprudential line established by the Sala Primera de Casación, whereby the action is admissible. It should be noted that the knowledge and resolution of this unconstitutionality action is limited to the pronouncements issued by the Sala de Casación by virtue of what is provided in Article 9 of the Código Civil.
II.- STANDING. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes, as one of the prerequisites for filing an unconstitutionality action, in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts in which it is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation that is deemed harmed. In the present matter, it has been fully accredited that the representative of the appellant company uses as the underlying case the contentious-administrative process of Auto Fácil de Costa Rica S.A. against the State, expediente No. 98-000941-163-CA, from which he files this action and in which, by a document filed on June 18, 2002 with the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo (visible on folio 297 of the judicial file), he alleged unconstitutionality.
III.- FINALIST AND EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL NORMS. The interpretation of legal norms by legal operators for the purpose of applying them cannot be done solely and exclusively based on their literal wording, since, in order to decipher, understand, and comprehend their true sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to various hermeneutic instruments such as the finalist, institutional, systematic, and historical-evolutive methods. On this subject, the Título Preliminar of the Código Civil in its Article 10 establishes that "Norms shall be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose." Normative propositions are composed of linguistic terms that have an area of meaning or field of reference as well as a zone of uncertainty or indeterminacy, which can cause serious misunderstandings in their interpretation and eventual application. By virtue of the foregoing, when interpreting a norm, it is necessary to investigate its objective (ratio) or proposed and assumed purpose, regarding which the norm has an instrumental nature –teleological method–. The interpreter must, likewise, confront, relate, and reconcile it with the rest of the legal norms that make up a particular legal institution –institutional method– and, in general, the legal system –systematic method–, since norms are not watertight and isolated compartments but are explicitly or implicitly connected and coordinated with others. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the socio-economic and historical reality to which a legal norm is applied, which is variable and mutable due to its enormous dynamism, such that it must be applied to historical conjunctures in constant mutation –historical-evolutive method–. When it comes to interpreting a legal norm, the interpreter cannot use only one of the indicated instruments, as they are not exclusive in character, but rather they are diverse, essential moments or stages of the entire and transcendent interpretive act.
IV.- NORMATIVE CONTEXT AND PURPOSES OF THE INITIAL FILING BRIEF FOR THE COMPLAINT. The contentious-administrative process is initiated with a simple brief called "initial filing of the complaint" (interposición de la demanda), which has limited legal-procedural effects, which are inferred from the relationship of Articles 28, paragraph 1, and 36, paragraph 1, of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. The second of the cited articles stipulates that "The action, when not involving a process of lesividad, shall be initiated by a brief limited to indicating the act or provision on the basis of which the claim is made and requesting that the process be deemed filed," the first cited norm prescribes that the amount in controversy shall be set in the initial filing brief. Under this understanding, the initial filing brief must contain, from a substantial point of view and without detriment to the documents that paragraph 2 of Article 36 ibidem orders to be attached, the following: a) an express statement by the plaintiff party that the process is deemed filed, b) indication of the challenged act or provision, and c) the estimation of the amount in controversy. The rationale and purpose of the initial filing brief is to guarantee the plaintiff party respect for a series of fundamental rights and constitutional principles such as due process, defense (Articles 39, paragraph 1, of the Constitución Política), procedural equality (Article 33 ibidem), and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) (Articles 41 and 49 of the Constitución Política). Indeed, the administered party faces a public entity endowed with a series of privileges and prerogatives of a material and formal nature, so in order to present its claim (petitum), it must fully and completely know the administrative case file, to be informed of the factual and legal background ("causa petendi") of the act or provision it is challenging. Actually, the initial filing brief makes sense for contentious-administrative processes in which what is challenged is a specific manifestation of the formal activity of the public administration, such as an administrative act, whether it is a process for mere nullity or full jurisdiction in which, in addition to the nullity of an administrative act, the reestablishment of a substantial legal situation is sought. Obviously, in the case of civil treasury processes (e.g., claims aimed at discussing the tort liability of public administrations, the existence of a de facto action, the recovery of public domain assets, the execution and termination of an administrative contract, or any other dispute in which a public entity has acted in the exercise of its private law capacity), the initial filing brief has no utility, since what is challenged is not a formal act but a material act or omission of the public administration. The foregoing is without prejudice, for this particular case –civil treasury cases–, to the importance, as evidentiary element, of the documents found in archives, registries, and administrative case files. In essence, the purpose of the initial filing brief is to bring into the process the administrative case file that supports the challenged administrative act and to give the plaintiff party time to become aware of its content in order to formulate a proper complaint. It is sufficiently clear that it was designed to benefit the individual seeking justice who appears before the Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa and not the public administration being sued.
V.- SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCESS AND INITIAL FILING BRIEF. The administrative acts that are the object of challenge in a contentious-administrative process should not be confused with the subject matter of the process, since the first concept pertains to the scope, extension, and limits of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction and the second to the claim. The initial filing brief does not define or delimit the subject matter of the process, if by this is meant the claim duly presented. In procedural doctrine, it is a peaceful and sufficiently debated aspect that the subject matter of the process is constituted by the claim, since the answer to the complaint, any eventual defenses (excepciones) filed, and the very pronouncements of the judgment on the merits revolve around it. As indicated in Considerando IV, the initial filing brief has a limited content that is circumscribed to announcing the filing of a process, the acts being challenged, and setting the amount in controversy. Article 48, paragraph 1, of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa stipulates that in the brief formulating the complaint, the facts, the legal grounds, and the claims brought must be indicated, among others, separately. The procedural principle of congruence (congruencia) must be verified between the claims formulated in the formalization brief and the judgment, and not between the administrative acts whose challenge is announced in the initial filing brief and the claim in the formalization brief, since, otherwise, it is distorted.
VI.- EVENTUAL DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE INITIAL FILING BRIEF AND THE BRIEF FORMULATING THE COMPLAINT. This tribunal indicated in Considerando IV that the purpose and aim of the initial filing brief is to announce the contentious-administrative process so that the judge may order the defendant public administration to remit the administrative case file, so that, in this way, the administered plaintiff may learn the factual and legal background that led to the issuance of the challenged administrative act. It may happen that the administered plaintiff does not know that the final act has normative coverage –legal basis– in a general administrative act (decree) and, eventually, of normative effects (regulation or regulatory decree), and becomes aware of this aspect only when he examines the content of the administrative case file. In such a case, and according to the jurisprudential guideline whose constitutionality is challenged in this action, the plaintiff party would be inhibited or prevented from claiming –in the brief formulating the complaint– the nullity of the general administrative act, given that he omitted to mention or announce it in the initial filing brief, thereby producing a "procedural deviation". It should be noted that if the fundamental purpose of the initial filing brief is to ensure that the plaintiff party can fully know the administrative case file in order to present a complaint in due form, it would be completely illogical to limit the possibility of bringing claims only with respect to the administrative acts indicated in that brief, when in that phase it is still to be expected that the grounds and details are unknown because the administrative case file is not at hand. For the eventual success of a contentious-administrative process, it may be unavoidably necessary for the administered party to challenge a series of administrative acts that are not a reproduction, confirmation, or execution of the challenged one or that do not have any type of direct connection with it –cases in which joinder of claims and amendment of the action are possible, Articles 25, 26, and 27 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa– but which, in one way or another, do provide normative coverage, so it is necessary to remove them from the legal world. In this hypothesis, the contentious-administrative judge may well suspend the proceedings and order the publication of the legal edict in order to summon all third parties who derive a substantial legal situation from the new challenged administrative act and, if applicable and the administered party does not waive it, request the remittance of the administrative case file, which, in the case of regulations or decrees, only matters when formal defects in their preparation are alleged. Congruence as a procedural principle of transcendental relevance must, therefore, occur in the contentious-administrative process between the formalization brief, since it is this which contains the claim, and the operative part –"Por Tanto"– of the judgment, and not between the initial filing brief and the latter.
VII.- CHALLENGED JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINE AND THE RIGHT TO PROMPT AND COMPLETE JUSTICE. The fundamental right to prompt and complete justice under Article 41 of the Constitución Política, includes, among other contents, the right to access a process where, in light of the factual and legal arguments formulated, the claims brought by the parties are discussed and to have them resolved by a judgment grounded in the Legal System, regardless of whether this is favorable or adverse to such requests, that is, the effective assistance of jurisdictional bodies for the purpose of ensuring peaceful and harmonious social coexistence. From this perspective, any excessive requirement or unnecessary formalism that is contrary to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness violates the right to prompt and complete justice. In the matter under examination, it is evident that the need to indicate the administrative acts being challenged in the initial filing brief is aimed at having the defendant public administration send the administrative case file so that the administered party can formulate the claims correctly and with full knowledge of the facts, and it cannot be interpreted that the plaintiff is bound by that first indication, since, as has already been indicated, after studying the administrative case file, he may realize the unavoidable need to attack other administrative acts, regarding which he must formulate an explicit claim in the brief formulating the complaint. Consequently, interpreting that in the brief formulating the complaint, claims can only be brought in relation to the administrative acts mentioned in the initial filing brief, is an interpretation that infringes the principle of proportionality and stands as an extreme and unnecessary formalism. In any case, the general principle of Common Procedural Law in dubio pro actione, which has strong constitutional grounding in the right to prompt and complete justice, imposes on jurisdictional bodies the duty to interpret in a benign manner any formality or procedural requirement that may frustrate the issuance of a ruling on the merits.
VIII.- COROLLARY. By virtue of the foregoing, the action filed must be upheld and the judicial interpretation by the Sala Primera de Casación of Article 60, subsection f), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa must be declared unconstitutional, in the sense that the bringing of claims in relation to administrative acts not indicated in the initial filing brief of the complaint is a formal defect that prevents issuing a ruling on the merits because it contravenes the Right to prompt and complete justice as well as the principles of proportionality and in dubio pro actione.
Por tanto:
The action filed is declared with merit. The judicial interpretation by the Sala Primera de Casación of Article 60, subsection f), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa is declared unconstitutional, in the sense that the bringing of claims in relation to administrative acts not indicated in the initial filing brief of the complaint is a formal defect that prevents issuing a ruling on the merits. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects, all without prejudice to acquired rights and consolidated legal situations by virtue of a final judgment having the authority of material res judicata. Record it in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta and publish it in full in the Boletín Judicial. Notify the Legislative and Executive Branches. Notify.
Luis Fernando Solano C.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Carlos M. Arguedas R.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. Adrián Vargas B.
Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.
It is worth noting that the hearing and resolution of this action of unconstitutionality are limited to the pronouncements issued by the Chamber of Cassation by virtue of what is established in Article 9 of the Civil Code.
II.- STANDING. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes, as one of the prerequisites for filing an action of unconstitutionality in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts in which it is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation deemed harmed. In this case, it has been fully demonstrated that the representative of the plaintiff company uses as its base matter the contentious-administrative proceeding of Auto Fácil de Costa Rica S.A. against the State, expediente No. 98-000941-163-CA, from which it files this action and in which, by brief submitted on June 18, 2002, to the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo (visible at folio 297 of the judicial expediente), it alleged unconstitutionality.
III.- PURPOSIVE AND EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL NORMS. The interpretation of legal norms by legal operators for the purpose of applying them cannot be done solely and exclusively based on their literal tenor, since, to unravel, understand, and comprehend their true sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to various hermeneutical instruments such as the purposive, institutional, systematic, and historical-evolutionary methods. On this matter, the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code in its Article 10 establishes that "Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose." Normative propositions are composed of linguistic terms that have an area of meaning or field of reference as well as a zone of uncertainty or indeterminacy, which can cause serious misunderstandings in their interpretation and eventual application. By virtue of the foregoing, when interpreting a norm it is necessary to investigate its objective (ratio) or proposed and supposed end, in relation to which the norm has an instrumental nature – teleological method. The interpreter must also confront, relate, and harmonize it with the rest of the legal norms that constitute a particular legal institution – institutional method – and, in general, the legal system – systematic method – since norms are not watertight and isolated compartments but are connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the socio-economic and historical reality to which a legal norm is applied, which is variable and mutable due to its enormous dynamism, such that it must be applied to historical conjunctures in constant mutation – historical-evolutionary method. When it comes to interpreting a legal norm, the interpreter cannot use only one of the indicated instruments, as they do not have an exclusive character; rather, they are different indispensable moments or stages of the entire and transcendent interpretive act.
IV.- NORMATIVE CONTEXT AND PURPOSES OF THE WRIT OF FILING OF THE COMPLAINT (ESCRITO DE INTERPOSICIÓN DE LA DEMANDA). The contentious-administrative proceeding begins with a simple writ called "filing of the complaint" (interposición de la demanda), which has limited legal-procedural effects, which are inferred from the relation of Articles 28, paragraph 1, and 36, paragraph 1, of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. The second of the cited articles stipulates that "The action, when it is not a proceeding regarding a challenge to the legality of an act (proceso de lesividad), shall be initiated by a brief writ limited to indicating the act or provision by reason of which the claim is made and to requesting that the proceeding be considered filed," and the first norm cited prescribes that the amount in dispute shall be fixed in the writ of filing (escrito de interposición). Under this understanding, the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) must contain, from a substantial point of view and without detriment to the documents that paragraph 2 of Article 36 ibidem commands to be attached, the following: a) an express manifestation of the plaintiff party to the effect that the proceeding is considered filed, b) indication of the challenged act or provision, and c) the estimation of the amount in dispute. The raison d'être and the purpose of the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) is to guarantee the plaintiff party the respect of a series of fundamental rights and constitutional principles such as due process, the right to a defense (Article 39, paragraph 1, of the Constitución Política), procedural equality (Article 33 ibidem), and effective judicial protection (Articles 41 and 49 of the Constitución Política). Indeed, the individual faces a public entity endowed with a series of privileges and prerogatives of a material and formal nature, so to deduce their claim – petitium – they must fully and completely know the administrative expediente to be aware of the factual and legal antecedents – "causa petendi" – of the act or provision they challenge. In reality, the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) has sense for contentious-administrative proceedings in which what is challenged is a specific manifestation of the formal activity of the public administration, such as an administrative act, whether it concerns a proceeding of mere nullity or of full jurisdiction in which it is sought, in addition to the nullity of an administrative act, the restoration of a substantial legal situation. Obviously, in the case of civil proceedings against the public treasury (v. gr. claims aimed at discussing the tort liability of public administrations, the existence of a de facto pathway, the recovery of public domain assets, the execution and extinction of an administrative contract, or any other dispute in which a public entity has acted in the exercise of its private law capacity) the writ of filing of the complaint (escrito de interposición de la demanda) has no utility, since what is challenged is not a formal act but a material action or omission of the public administration. The foregoing notwithstanding, for this particular case – civil proceedings against the public treasury – the importance, as an evidentiary element, of documents contained in administrative archives, records, and expedientes is acknowledged. Essentially, the purpose of the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) is to bring into the proceeding the administrative expediente that supports the challenged administrative act and to give the plaintiff party time to become aware of its content in order to formalize a proper complaint. It is sufficiently clear that it was designed for the benefit of the justiciable party who appears before the Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa and not for the benefit of the public administration sued.
V.- OBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING AND WRIT OF FILING (ESCRITO DE INTERPOSICIÓN). The administrative acts that are the object of challenge in a contentious-administrative proceeding must not be confused with the object of the proceeding, since the first concept pertains to the ambit, extension, and limits of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction and the second to the claim. The writ of filing (escrito de interposición) does not define or delimit the object of the proceeding, if by such is understood the claim duly deduced. In procedural doctrine, it is a settled and sufficiently debated aspect that the object of the proceeding is constituted by the claim, since the answer to the complaint, any potential exceptions raised, and the very pronouncements of the judgment on the merits revolve around it. As indicated in Considerando IV, the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) has a limited content circumscribed to announcing the filing of a proceeding, the acts being challenged, and fixing the amount in dispute. Article 48, paragraph 1, of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa stipulates that in the writ of formalization of the complaint (escrito de formalización de la demanda) the facts, the legal grounds, and the claims deduced must be indicated, among others, separately. The procedural principle of congruence must be verified between the claims formulated in the writ of formalization (escrito de formalización) and the judgment, and not between the administrative acts whose challenge is announced in the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) and the claim of the writ of formalization (escrito de formalización), since otherwise it would be distorted.
VI.- POTENTIAL DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE WRIT OF FILING (ESCRITO DE INTERPOSICIÓN) AND THE WRIT OF FORMALIZATION OF THE COMPLAINT (ESCRITO DE FORMALIZACIÓN DE LA DEMANDA). This tribunal indicated in Considerando IV that the objective and purpose of the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) is to announce the contentious-administrative proceeding so that the judge orders the sued public administration to send the administrative expediente, so that, in this way, the plaintiff individual can know the factual and legal antecedents that led to the issuance of the challenged administrative act. It may happen that the plaintiff individual is unaware that the final act has normative coverage – legal basis – in an administrative act of general scope (decree) and, eventually, of normative effects (regulation or regulatory decree) and only gains knowledge of this extreme until they become aware of the content of the administrative expediente. In such a case, and in accordance with the jurisprudential guideline whose constitutionality is challenged in this action, the plaintiff party would be inhibited or prevented from seeking – in the writ of formalization of the complaint (escrito de formalización de la demanda) – the nullity of the administrative act of general effects, given that they omitted to mention or announce it in the writ of filing (escrito de interposición), which would produce a "procedural deviation." It should be noted that if the fundamental purpose of the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) is to ensure the plaintiff party can fully know the administrative expediente in order to deduce a complaint in due form, it would be illogical to limit their possibility of deducing claims with respect solely to the administrative acts indicated in that writ, when still, in that phase, it is to be supposed that the grounds and details are not known because the administrative expediente is not at hand. For the eventual success of a contentious-administrative proceeding, it may be unavoidably necessary for the individual to challenge a series of administrative acts that are not a reproduction, confirmation, or execution of the one challenged, or that do not bear any type of direct connection with it – cases in which the joinder of claims and the expansion of the action are possible, Articles 25, 26, and 27 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa – but which, in one way or another, do provide it with normative coverage, so it is necessary to remove them from the legal world. In this hypothesis, the contentious-administrative judge may well suspend the proceeding and order the publication of the legal edict in order to summon all third parties who derive a substantial legal situation from the new challenged administrative act and, if it is the case and the individual does not waive it, request the submission of the administrative expediente which, in the case of regulations or decrees, only matters when formal defects in its elaboration are alleged. Congruence, as a procedural principle of transcendental relevance, must then occur, in the contentious-administrative proceeding, between the writ of formalization (escrito de formalización) since it is the one that contains the claim and the operative part – "Por Tanto" – of the judgment, and not between the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) and the latter.
VII.- CHALLENGED JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINE AND THE RIGHT TO A SWIFT AND FULFILLED JUSTICE. The fundamental right to a swift and fulfilled justice of Article 41 of the Constitución Política includes, among other contents, the right to access a proceeding where the claims deduced by the parties are discussed in light of the factual and legal arguments formulated and to have them resolved by means of a judgment based on the Legal System, regardless of whether it is favorable or adverse to such petitions, that is, the right to the effective assistance of jurisdictional organs for the purpose of guaranteeing peaceful and harmonious social coexistence. From this perspective, any excessive requirement or unnecessary formalism that is contrary to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness violates the right to a swift and fulfilled justice. In the matter under examination, it is evident that the need to indicate the administrative acts being challenged in the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) has the purpose of ensuring the sued public administration sends the administrative expediente so that the individual can formulate the claims accurately and with knowledge of the facts, such that one cannot interpret that the plaintiff is bound to that first indication, since, as already indicated, after studying the administrative expediente, they may realize the unavoidable need to attack other administrative acts, with respect to which they must formulate an explicit claim in the writ of formalization of the complaint (escrito de formalización de la demanda). Consequently, interpreting that in the writ of formalization of the complaint (escrito de formalización de la demanda) only claims related to the administrative acts mentioned in the filing writ can be deduced, constitutes an interpretation that infringes the principle of proportionality and stands as an extreme and unnecessary formalism. In any case, the general principle of Common Procedural Law in dubio pro actione, which has strong constitutional grounding in the right to a swift and fulfilled justice, requires jurisdictional organs to interpret benignly any procedural formality or requirement that could frustrate the issuance of a ruling on the merits.
VIII.- COROLLARY. In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to grant the action filed and declare unconstitutional the judicial interpretation by the Sala Primera de Casación of Article 60, subsection f), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, in the sense that the deduction of claims in relation to administrative acts not indicated in the writ of filing of the complaint (escrito de interposición de la demanda) is a formal defect that prevents issuing a pronouncement on the merits, because it contravenes the Right to a swift and fulfilled justice as well as the principles of proportionality and in dubio pro actione.
Por tanto:
The action filed is granted. The judicial interpretation by the Sala Primera de Casación of Article 60, subsection f), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa is declared unconstitutional, in the sense that the deduction of claims in relation to administrative acts not indicated in the writ of filing of the complaint (escrito de interposición de la demanda) is a formal defect that prevents issuing a pronouncement on the merits. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects, all without prejudice to acquired rights and consolidated legal situations by virtue of a final judgment passed with the authority of material res judicata. Publish in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and publish integrally in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial). Notify the Legislative and Executive Powers. Notify.
Luis Fernando Solano C.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Carlos M. Arguedas R.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. Adrián Vargas B.
Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.
**Exp:** 02-005586-0007-CO **Res:** 2003-03481 **SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.** San José, at fourteen hours and three minutes on May second, two thousand three.- Action of unconstitutionality brought by Auto Fácil de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, represented by its general agent Mario Arana García, of legal age, married, businessman, identity card number CED62246 and resident of Playas del Coco, against the reiterated judicial interpretation of the Sala de Casación and the Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, regarding article 60, subsection f), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa.
**Resultando:** **1)** By brief filed on July 4, 2002 (visible at folios 2-10), the representative of the plaintiff company challenges the reiterated judicial interpretation of the Sala de Casación and the Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, of article 60, subsection f), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, in the sense that if a specific administrative act is not mentioned or referred to in the brief of interposition, subsequently, in the brief formalizing the complaint, no claim may be brought against it, whereby, in the opinion of the indicated jurisdictional bodies, a formal defect arises between both briefs that prevents issuing a pronouncement on the merits, resulting, consequently, in a judgment declaring the action inadmissible. In the opinion of the appellant company, such interpretation violates the right of access to the jurisdiction or effective judicial protection (article 41 of the Constitución Política), due process in its specific manifestation of the “pro sententia” principle, and the principle of equality before the law.
**2)** In the contentious-administrative proceedings being processed between the plaintiff company and the State in the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda (expediente number 98-0941-162-CA), the special judicial attorney of the former, by memorial of June 18, 2002, invoked the unconstitutionality of the judicial interpretation referred to in the immediately preceding resultando (visible at folios 13-18).
**3)** By resolution at 10:45 hrs. on October 1, 2002, this action of unconstitutionality was given course and a hearing was granted to the Procuraduría General de la República (visible at folio 44).
**4)** The Procuraduría General de la República, by brief filed on October 23, 2002 (visible at folios 47-70), recommends dismissing the action of unconstitutionality brought, since the brief of interposition must “set the object of the process,” therefore it must indicate the administrative act or acts being challenged, given that, “In the brief of deduction of the complaint, other administrative acts cannot be challenged, but new claims in relation to those acts can be set.” This advisory body concludes by indicating that “...if the plaintiff introduces new acts or general provisions -without following the procedure for expanding the complaint or joinder- in the deduction of the complaint, the prior defense of formal defects that prevents issuing a pronouncement on the merits is configured...a formal defect in the brief of interposition is not indicating the act or provision for reason of which one is claiming.” **5)** In the processing of the case, the prescriptions of law have been observed.
Written by Magistrate **Jinesta Lobo**; and, **Considerando:** ** I.- ADMISSIBILITY.** Article 74 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that “The action of unconstitutionality is not admissible against jurisdictional acts of the Poder Judicial...”. Notwithstanding, as indicated in Ruling No. 4587-97 of this Chamber at 15:45 hrs. on August 5, 1997, the action of unconstitutionality has been admitted against criteria reiterated by jurisdictional bodies that have created a jurisprudential guideline, since article 3 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that the Constitución Política will be considered infringed when this results from the interpretation made by public authorities of the norms. In the sub-judice case, the representative of the challenging company attacks the reiterated jurisprudence of the Sala Primera de Casación and the Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo in the sense that the brief of interposition definitively sets the claim of the contentious-administrative process, for which it provides a certified copy of the Judgments of the Sala de Casación No. 149 at 14:45 hrs. on October 18, 1974, of the Sala Primera de Casación No. 235 at 14:25 hrs. on July 27, 1990, of the Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, Nos. 150-93 at 11:15 hrs. on July 12, 1993 and 359-95 at 9 hrs. on September 29, 1995, which follow the jurisprudential line established by the Sala Primera de Casación, whereby the action is admissible. It should be noted that the hearing and resolution of this action of unconstitutionality is limited to the pronouncements issued by the Sala de Casación by virtue of what is stipulated in article 9 of the Código Civil.
** II.- STANDING.** Numeral 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for bringing the action of unconstitutionality, in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts in which it is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation that is deemed harmed. In the present matter, it has been fully accredited that the representative of the appellant company uses as a base matter the contentious-administrative process of Auto Fácil de Costa Rica S.A. against the State, expediente No. 98-000941-163-CA, from which it brings the present action and in which, by memorial filed on June 18, 2002 before the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo (visible at folio 297 of the judicial expediente), it alleged the unconstitutionality.
** III.- FINALIST AND EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL NORMS.** The interpretation of legal norms by legal operators for the purpose of applying them cannot be done solely and exclusively based on their literal tenor, since, to unravel, understand, and comprehend their true sense, meaning, and scopes, it is necessary to resort to various hermeneutic instruments such as the finalist, the institutional, the systematic, and the historical-evolutive. On this particular matter, the Título Preliminar of the Código Civil, in its numeral 10, establishes that “Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they must be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.” Normative propositions are composed of linguistic terms which have an area of meaning or field of reference, as well as a zone of uncertainty or indeterminacy, which can cause serious misunderstandings in their interpretation and eventual application. By virtue of the foregoing, when interpreting a norm it is necessary to investigate its objective (ratio) or proposed and supposed purpose, regarding which the norm has an instrumental nature –teleological method-. The interpreter must, likewise, confront it, relate it, and reconcile it with the rest of the legal norms that particularly make up a legal institution –institutional method- and, in general, the legal system –systematic method-, since norms are not isolated watertight compartments but are connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the socio-economic and historical reality to which a legal norm is applied, which is variable and mutable due to its enormous dynamism, such that it must be applied to historical junctures in constant mutation –historical-evolutive method-. When it comes to interpreting a legal norm, the interpreter cannot use only one of the indicated instruments, since they do not have an exclusionary character, but rather they are diverse, indispensable moments or stages of the entire and transcendent interpretive act.
** IV.- NORMATIVE CONTEXT AND PURPOSES OF THE BRIEF OF INTERPOSITION OF THE COMPLAINT.** The contentious-administrative process begins with a simple brief called “interposition of the complaint,” which has limited legal-procedural effects, which are inferred from the relationship between articles 28, paragraph 1, and 36, paragraph 1, of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. The second of the cited numerals stipulates that “The action, when it is not a lesivity process, shall be initiated by a brief reduced to indicating the act or provision for reason of which one is claiming and to requesting that the process be deemed interposed,” the first cited norm precepts that the amount in controversy shall be set in the brief of interposition. Under this understanding, the brief of interposition must contain, from a substantial point of view and without detriment to the documents that paragraph 2 of article 36 ibidem orders to be attached, the following: a) an express manifestation of the plaintiff party to the effect of deeming the process interposed, b) indication of the challenged act or provision, and c) the estimation of the amount in controversy. The rationale and purpose of the brief of interposition is to guarantee the plaintiff party the respect of a series of fundamental rights and constitutional principles such as due process, defense (articles 39, paragraph 1, of the Constitución Política), procedural equality (article 33 ibidem), and effective judicial protection (articles 41 and 49 of the Constitución Política). Indeed, the individual faces a public entity endowed with a series of privileges and prerogatives of a material and formal nature, so to deduce their claim –petitium- they must fully and completely know the administrative expediente, in order to be aware of the factual and legal antecedents –“causa petendi”- of the act or provision they challenge. The brief of interposition truly has meaning for contentious-administrative processes in which what is challenged is a specific manifestation of the formal activity of the public administration, such as an administrative act, whether it is a process of mere nullity or of full jurisdiction in which it is intended, in addition to the nullity of an administrative act, to restore a substantial legal situation. Obviously, in the case of civil treasury proceedings (e.g., claims directed at discussing the extracontractual liability of public administrations, the existence of a de facto path, the recovery of public domain assets, the execution and termination of an administrative contract, or any other dispute in which a public entity has acted in the exercise of its capacity under private law) the brief of interposition of the complaint has no utility, since a formal act is not challenged but a material action or omission of the public administration. The foregoing is without demerit, for this particular case –civil treasury-, of the importance, as a probative element, of the documents contained in the administrative archives, registries, and expedientes. In essence, the purpose of the brief of interposition is to bring into the process the administrative expediente that supports the challenged administrative act and to give time to the plaintiff party to become aware of its content in order to formalize a good complaint. It is sufficiently clear that it was designed for the benefit of the person seeking justice who comes before the Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa and not for the defendant public administration.
** V.- OBJECT OF THE PROCESS AND BRIEF OF INTERPOSITION.** The administrative acts that are the object of challenge in a contentious-administrative process should not be confused with the object of the process, since the first concept pertains to the ambit, extension, and limits of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction and the second to the claim. In the brief of interposition, the object of the process is not defined or delimited, if by such is understood the claim opportunely deduced. In procedural doctrine, it is a peaceful and sufficiently debated aspect that the object of the process is constituted by the claim, since the response to the complaint, any opposed exceptions, and the pronouncements of the judgment on the merits revolve around it. As indicated in Considerando IV, the brief of interposition has a limited content that is circumscribed to announcing the interposition of a process, the acts that are being challenged, and setting the amount in controversy. Article 48, paragraph 1, of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa stipulates that in the brief formalizing the complaint, among other things, the facts, the legal foundations, and the claims being deduced must be indicated separately.
The procedural principle of conformity must be verified between the claims formulated in the formal complaint brief and the judgment, and not between the administrative acts whose intent to challenge is announced in the filing brief and the claim in the formal complaint brief, since otherwise it would be distorted.
**VI.- POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE FILING BRIEF AND THE FORMAL COMPLAINT BRIEF.** This court indicated in recital IV that the end and purpose of the filing brief is to announce the contentious-administrative proceeding so that the judge may compel the defendant public administration to remit the administrative file, so that, in this manner, the plaintiff individual may learn the factual and legal antecedents that led to the issuance of the challenged administrative act. It may happen that the plaintiff individual is unaware that the final act has normative coverage – legal basis – in an administrative act of general scope (decree) and, possibly, of normative effects (regulation or regulatory decree) and becomes aware of this point only upon reviewing the content of the administrative file. In that scenario, and according to the jurisprudential guideline whose constitutionality is challenged in this action, the plaintiff party would be inhibited or prevented from seeking – in the formal complaint brief – the nullity of the administrative act of general effects, given that it omitted mentioning or announcing it in the filing brief, which would result in a “procedural deviation.” Note that if the fundamental purpose of the filing brief is to ensure the plaintiff party can fully understand the administrative file in order to file a complaint in proper form, it would be entirely illogical to limit the possibility of raising claims solely with respect to the administrative acts indicated in that brief, when, at that stage, it is reasonable to assume that the grounds and details are not yet known because the administrative file is not at hand. For the eventual success of a contentious-administrative proceeding, it may be unavoidably necessary for the individual to challenge a series of administrative acts that are not a reproduction, confirmation, or execution of the one challenged, nor have any type of direct connection with it – scenarios in which the joinder of claims and the extension of the action are permissible, Articles 25, 26, and 27 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction – but which, in one way or another, provide it with normative coverage, thus making it necessary to remove them from the legal world. In this hypothesis, the contentious-administrative judge may well suspend the proceeding and order the publication of the legal edict in order to summon all third parties who derive a substantial legal situation from the new challenged administrative act and, if applicable and the individual does not waive it, request the remission of the administrative file, which, in the case of regulations or decrees, only matters when formal defects in their drafting are alleged. Conformity, as a procedural principle of transcendental relevance, must therefore occur, in the contentious-administrative proceeding, between the formal complaint brief – since it is this one that contains the claim – and the operative part – “Por Tanto” – of the judgment, and not between the filing brief and the latter.
**VII.- CHALLENGED JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINE AND THE RIGHT TO PROMPT AND COMPLETE JUSTICE.** The fundamental right to prompt and complete justice under Article 41 of the Political Constitution includes, among other elements, the right to access a proceeding where the claims raised by the parties are discussed, in light of the factual and legal arguments formulated, and are resolved by means of a judgment grounded in the Legal System, regardless of whether it is favorable or adverse to those petitions, that is, the effective assistance of the jurisdictional bodies with the purpose of guaranteeing a peaceful and harmonious social coexistence. From this perspective, any excessive requirement or unnecessary formalism that is contrary to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness violates the right to prompt and complete justice. In the matter under review, it is evident that the need to indicate the administrative acts being challenged in the filing brief has the purpose of ensuring that the defendant public administration sends the administrative file so that the individual can formulate the claims accurately and with full knowledge of the facts, and it cannot be interpreted that the plaintiff is bound to that initial indication, since, as already indicated, after studying the administrative file, they may realize the unavoidable need to attack other administrative acts, regarding which they must formulate an explicit claim in the formal complaint brief. Consequently, interpreting that only claims related to the administrative acts mentioned in the filing brief can be raised in the formal complaint brief is an interpretation that infringes the principle of proportionality and constitutes an extreme and unnecessary formalism. In any case, the general principle of Common Procedural Law, *in dubio pro actione*, which has strong constitutional grounding in the right to prompt and complete justice, imposes upon jurisdictional bodies the duty to interpret benignly any procedural formality or requirement that could frustrate the issuance of a decision on the merits.
**VIII.- COROLLARY.** In light of the foregoing, it is necessary to uphold the action filed and declare unconstitutional the judicial interpretation by the First Chamber of Cassation of Article 60, subsection f), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in the sense that the raising of claims in relation to administrative acts not indicated in the filing brief of the complaint is a formal defect that prevents rendering a decision on the merits, because it contravenes the Right to prompt and complete justice as well as the principles of proportionality and *in dubio pro actione*.
**Por tanto:** The action filed is declared with merit. The judicial interpretation by the First Chamber of Cassation of Article 60, subsection f), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is declared unconstitutional, in the sense that the raising of claims in relation to administrative acts not indicated in the filing brief of the complaint is a formal defect that prevents rendering a decision on the merits. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects, all without prejudice to acquired rights and consolidated legal situations by virtue of a final judgment having the authority of material res judicata. Let it be recorded in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin. Let the Legislative and Executive Branches be notified. Notifíquese.
Luis Fernando Solano C.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Carlos M. Arguedas R.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. Adrián Vargas B.
Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.
Res: 2003-03481 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas con tres minutos del dos de mayo del dos mil tres.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por interpuesta por Auto Fácil de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, representada por su apoderado generalísimo Mario Arana García, mayor de edad, casado, empresario, cédula de identidad número CED62246 y vecino de Playas del Coco, contra la interpretación judicial reiterada de la Sala de Casación y del Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, respecto del artículo 60, inciso f), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa.
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Resultando:
Redacta el magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,
Considerando:
I.- ADMISIBILIDAD. El artículo 74 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que “No cabrá la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los actos jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial...”. No obstante, tal y como se indicó en la Sentencia de esta Sala No. 4587-97 de las 15:45 hrs. del 5 de agosto de 1997, se ha admitido la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los criterios reiterados por los órganos jurisdiccionales que han creado una pauta jurisprudencial, puesto que, cuando el artículo 3 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que se tendrá por infringida la Constitución Política cuando ello resulte de la interpretación que hagan las autoridades públicas de las normas. En el sub-judice, el representante de la empresa impugnante ataca la jurisprudencia reiterada de la Sala Primera de Casación y del Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo en el sentido que en el escrito de interposición se fija, definitivamente, la pretensión del proceso contencioso administrativo para lo cual aporta copia certificada de las Sentencias de la Sala de Casación de No. 149 de las 14:45 hrs. del 18 de octubre de 1974, de la Sala Primera de Casación No. 235 de las 14:25 hrs. del 27 de julio de 1990, del Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, las Nos. 150-93 de las 11:15 hrs. del 12 de julio de 1993 y 359-95 de las 9 hrs. del 29 de septiembre de 1995, que siguen la línea jurisprudencial establecida por la Sala Primera de Casación, con lo cual la acción resulta admisible. Cabe advertir que el conocimiento y resolución de la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad se circunscribe a los pronunciamientos vertidos por la Sala de Casación en virtud de lo estatuido en el ordinal 9° del Código Civil.
II.- LEGITIMACIÓN. El numeral 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, en el caso del control concreto, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los tribunales en el que se invoque como un medio razonable para tutelar la situación jurídica sustancial que se estima lesionada. En el presente asunto, ha quedado plenamente acreditado que el representante de la empresa recurrente emplea como asunto base el proceso contencioso administrativo de Auto Fácil de Costa Rica S.A. contra el Estado, expediente No. 98-000941-163-CA, a partir del cual interpone la presente acción y en el que por memorial presentado el 18 de junio del 2002 al Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo (visible a folio 297 del expediente judicial) alegó la inconstitucionalidad.
III.- INTERPRETACIÓN FINALISTA Y EVOLUTIVA DE LAS NORMAS JURÍDICAS. La interpretación de las normas jurídicas por los operadores jurídicos con el propósito de aplicarlas no puede hacerse, única y exclusivamente, con fundamento en su tenor literal, puesto que, para desentrañar, entender y comprender su verdadero sentido, significado y alcances es preciso acudir a diversos instrumentos hermenéuticos tales como el finalista, el institucional, el sistemático y el histórico-evolutivo. Sobre este particular, el Título Preliminar del Código Civil en su numeral 10 establece que “Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas”. Las proposiciones normativas se componen de términos lingüísticos los que tienen una área de significado o campo de referencia así como, también, una zona de incertidumbre o indeterminación, que puede provocar serios equívocos en su interpretación y eventual aplicación. En virtud de lo anterior, al interpretar una norma es preciso indagar su objetivo (ratio) o fin propuesto y supuesto, respecto del cual la norma tiene naturaleza instrumental –método teleológico-. El interprete debe, asimismo, confrontarla, relacionarla y concordarla con el resto de las normas jurídicas que conforman en particular una institución jurídica –método institucional- y, en general, el ordenamiento jurídico –método sistemático-, puesto que, las normas no son compartimentos estancos y aislados sino que se encuentran conexas y coordinadas con otras, de forma explícita o implícita. Finalmente, es preciso tomar en consideración la realidad socio-económica e histórica a la cual se aplica una norma jurídica, la cual es variable y mutable por su enorme dinamismo, de tal forma que debe ser aplicada para coyunturas históricas en constante mutación –método histórico-evolutivo-. Cuando de interpretar una norma jurídica se trata el interprete no puede utilizar uno solo de los instrumentos indicados, por no tener un carácter excluyente, sino que los mismos son diversos momentos o estadios imprescindibles del entero y trascendente acto interpretativo.
IV.- CONTEXTO NORMATIVO Y FINES DEL ESCRITO DE INTERPOSICIÓN DE LA DEMANDA. El proceso contencioso administrativo se inicia con un simple escrito denominado “interposición de la demanda”, el cual tiene limitados efectos jurídico-procesales, los cuales se infieren de la relación de los ordinales 28, párrafo 1°, y 36, párrafo 1°, de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa. El segundo de los numerales citados estipula que “La acción, cuando no se trate de un proceso de lesividad, se iniciará por un escrito reducido a indicar el acto o disposición por razón del cual se reclama y a solicitar que se tenga interpuesto el proceso”, la primera norma citada preceptúa que en el escrito de interposición se fijará la cuantía. Bajo esta inteligencia, el escrito de interposición debe contener, desde el punto de vista sustancial y sin detrimento de los documentos que el párrafo 2° del artículo 36 ibidem manda que se adjunten, lo siguiente: a) una manifestación expresa de la parte actora en el sentido de tenerse por interpuesto el proceso, b) indicación del acto o disposición impugnados y c) la estimación de la cuantía. La razón de ser y el fin del escrito de interposición es garantizarle a la parte actora el respeto de una serie de derechos fundamentales y de principios constitucionales tales como el debido proceso, la defensa (artículos 39, párrafo 1°, de la Constitución Política), la igualdad procesal (artículo 33 ibidem) y la tutela judicial efectiva (artículos 41 y 49 de la Constitución Política). En efecto, el administrado se enfrenta a un ente público dotado de una serie de privilegios y prerrogativas de carácter material y formal, por lo que para deducir su pretensión –petitium- debe conocer cabal y plenamente el expediente administrativo, para estar impuesto de los antecedentes fácticos y jurídicos –“causa petendi”- del acto o disposición que impugna. Realmente, el escrito de interposición tiene sentido para los procesos contencioso administrativos en los cuales lo impugnado es una manifestación específica de la actividad formal de la administración pública, como lo es un acto administrativo, ya sea que se trate de un proceso de mera nulidad o de plena jurisdicción en el que se pretenda, además de la nulidad de un acto administrativo, el restablecimiento de una situación jurídica sustancial. Obviamente, en tratándose de los procesos civiles de hacienda (v. gr. pretensiones dirigidas a discutir la responsabilidad extracontractual de las administraciones públicas, la existencia de una vía de hecho, la recuperación de bienes del dominio público, la ejecución y extinción de un contrato administrativo o cualquier otro diferendo en el que un ente público haya actuado en el ejercicio de su capacidad de derecho privado) el escrito de interposición de la demanda no tiene ninguna utilidad, puesto que, no se impugna un acto formal sino una actuación u omisión material de la administración pública. Lo anterior sin demérito, para este caso particular –civiles de hacienda-, de la importancia, como elemento probatorio, de los documentos que consten en los archivos, registros y expedientes administrativos. En esencia, el fin del escrito de interposición es traer al proceso el expediente administrativo que le da sustento al acto administrativo impugnado y brindarle tiempo a la parte actora para que se imponga de su contenido para formalizar una buena demanda. Es suficientemente claro que fue diseñado en beneficio del justiciable que acude ante la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y no de la administración pública demanda.
V.- OBJETO DEL PROCESO Y ESCRITO DE INTERPOSICION. No debe confundirse los actos administrativos que son objeto de impugnación en un proceso contencioso-administrativo con el objeto del proceso, puesto que, el primer concepto atañe al ámbito, extensión y límites de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativo y el segundo a la pretensión. En el escrito de interposición no se define o delimita el objeto del proceso, si por tal se entiende la pretensión oportunamente deducida. En la doctrina procesal es un aspecto pacífico y suficientemente debatido que el objeto del proceso lo constituye la pretensión, puesto que, sobre ésta giran la contestación de la demanda, las eventuales excepciones opuestas y los propios pronunciamientos de la sentencia de fondo. Tal y como se indicó en el considerando IV, el escrito de interposición tiene un contenido limitado que se circunscribe a anunciar la interposición de un proceso, los actos que se impugnan y a fijar la cuantía. El artículo 48, párrafo 1°, de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa estipula que en el escrito de formalización de la demanda deberán indicarse, entre otros, separadamente, los hechos, los fundamentos de derecho y las pretensiones que se deduzcan. El principio procesal de la congruencia debe verificarse entre las pretensiones formuladas en el escrito de formalización y la sentencia y no entre los actos administrativos cuyo anuncio de impugnación se hace en el escrito de interposición y la pretensión del escrito de formalización, puesto que, de lo contrario se desnaturaliza.
VI.- EVENTUALES DISCORDANCIAS ENTRE EL ESCRITO DE INTERPOSICIÓN Y EL DE FORMALIZACION DE LA DEMANDA. Este tribunal indicó en el considerando IV que el fin y propósito del escrito de interposición es anunciar el proceso contencioso administrativo para que el juez conmine a la administración pública demandada a remitir el expediente administrativo, para que, de esa forma, el administrado actor pueda conocer los antecedentes fácticos y jurídicos que llevaron al dictado del acto administrativo impugnado. Puede acontecer que el administrado actor desconozca que el acto final tiene cobertura normativa –fundamento jurídico- en un acto administrativo de alcance general (decreto) y, eventualmente, de efectos normativos (reglamento o decreto reglamentario) y cobra conocimiento de tal extremo hasta que se impone del contenido del expediente administrativo. En tal supuesto, y, de acuerdo con la pauta jurisprudencial cuya constitucionalidad se impugna en la presente acción, la parte actora estaría inhibida o impedida para pretender –en el escrito de formalización de la demanda- la nulidad del acto administrativo de efectos generales, dado que, omitió mencionarlo o anunciarlo en el escrito de interposición, con lo cual se produciría una “desviación procesal”. Nótese que si el escrito de interposición tiene por propósito fundamental asegurarle a la parte actora conocer cabalmente el expediente administrativo para deducir una demanda en debida forma, no tendría ninguna lógica limitarle la posibilidad de deducir pretensiones con respecto, únicamente, a los actos administrativos indicados en ese escrito, cuando todavía, en esa fase, es de suponer que no se conocen los fundamentos y detalles por no tener a mano el expediente administrativo. Para el éxito eventual de un proceso contencioso-administrativo puede serle ineludiblemente necesario al administrado impugnar una serie de actos administrativos que no son reproducción, confirmación, ejecución del impugnado o que no guarden ningún tipo de conexión directa con éste –supuestos en los que cabe la acumulación de pretensiones y la ampliación de la acción, artículos 25, 26 y 27 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa- pero que, de una u otra forma, sí le brindan cobertura normativa, por lo que es preciso removerlos del mundo jurídico. En esta hipótesis el juez contencioso-administrativo bien puede suspender el trámite del proceso y ordenar la publicación del edicto de ley a fin de emplazar a todos los terceros que deriven una situación jurídica sustancial del nuevo acto administrativo impugnado y, si es del caso y el administrado no renuncia a ello, solicitar la remisión del expediente administrativo el que, en tratándose de reglamentos o de decretos, sólo importa cuando se aducen vicios formales en su elaboración. La congruencia como un principio procesal de trascendental relevancia debe producirse, entonces, en el proceso contencioso administrativo, entre el escrito de formalización pues es éste el que contiene la pretensión y la parte dispositiva –“Por Tanto”- de la sentencia y no entre el escrito de interposición y la última.
VII.- PAUTA JURISPRUDENCIAL IMPUGNADA Y DERECHO A UNA JUSTICIA PRONTA Y CUMPLIDA. El derecho fundamental a una justicia pronta y cumplida del ordinal 41 de la Constitución Política, comprende, entre otros contenidos, el derecho a acceder a un proceso donde se discutan, a la luz de las argumentaciones fácticas y jurídicas formuladas, las pretensiones deducidas en éste por las partes y a que se resuelvan mediante una sentencia fundada en el Ordenamiento Jurídico, independientemente que ésta sea favorable o adversa a tales pedimentos, esto es, a la asistencia efectiva de los órganos jurisdiccionales con el propósito de garantizar una coexistencia social pacífica y armónica. Desde esta perspectiva, todo requisito excesivo o formalismo innecesario, que resulte contrario a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad quebranta el derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida. En el asunto bajo examen, es evidente que la necesidad de indicar los actos administrativos que se impugnan en el escrito de interposición tiene por finalidad que la administración pública demandada envíe el expediente administrativo para que el administrado pueda formular las pretensiones en forma acertada y con conocimiento de causa, siendo que no se puede interpretar que el actor queda atado a esa primera indicación, puesto que, como ya se ha indicado, después de estudiar el expediente administrativo puede percatarse de la necesidad ineludible de atacar otros actos administrativos, respecto de los cuales debe formular una pretensión explícita en el escrito de formalización de la demanda. Consecuentemente, interpretar que en el escrito de formalización de la demanda sólo se pueden deducir pretensiones en relación con los actos administrativos mencionados en el de interposición, resulta una interpretación que infringe el principio de proporcionalidad y se erige en un formalismo extremo e innecesario. En todo caso, el principio general del Derecho Procesal común indubio pro actione, que tiene fuerte asidero constitucional en el derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida, le impone a los órganos jurisdiccionales interpretar de forma benigna cualquier formalidad o requisito procesal que pueda enervar el dictado de un pronunciamiento de fondo.
VIII.- COROLARIO. En mérito de lo expuesto, se impone acoger la acción interpuesta y declarar inconstitucional la interpretación judicial de la Sala Primera de Casación del artículo 60, inciso f), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa en el sentido que la deducción de pretensiones en relación a actos administrativos no indicados en el escrito de interposición de la demanda es un defecto formal que impide verter pronunciamiento en cuanto al fondo por contrariar el Derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida así como los principios de proporcionalidad e indubio pro actione.
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Por tanto:
Se declara con lugar la acción interpuesta. Se declara inconstitucional la interpretación judicial de la Sala Primera de Casación del artículo 60, inciso f), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa en el sentido que la deducción de pretensiones en relación a actos administrativos no indicados en el escrito de interposición de la demanda es un defecto formal que impide verter pronunciamiento en cuanto al fondo. Esta sentencia tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos todo sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas en virtud de sentencia firme pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material. Reséñese en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Comuníquese a los Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo. Notifíquese.
<![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> Luis Fernando Solano C.
<![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> Luis Paulino Mora M. Carlos M. Arguedas R.
<![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> Ana Virginia Calzada M. Adrián Vargas B.
<![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.
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