Outright rejection of same-sex common-law marriage claim violates effective judicial protectionRechazo ad portas de unión de hecho entre personas del mismo sexo viola tutela judicial efectiva

*130017090165FA* *130017090165FA* TRIBUNAL CASE NUMBER: 979-13 (2) (13-001709-0165-FA) PROCEEDING FOR RECOGNITION OF DE FACTO UNION BROUGHT BY: [Nombre1]. and another .- VOTE NUMBER: 20-14 FAMILY COURT. San José, at sixteen hours and seventeen minutes on January eighth, two thousand fourteen.- Proceeding for recognition of de facto union (unión de hecho) brought by [Nombre1]., […] and [Nombre2]., […]. Acting as Special Judicial Representative for the petitioner [Nombre1]. is Attorney [Nombre3]. This Court hears this matter by virtue of the appeal filed by the petitioner's representative against the ruling issued by the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at eleven hours and two minutes on September eleventh, two thousand thirteen.- Drafted by Judge [Nombre4], and;

CONSIDERING

I.- Mr. [Nombre1]. seeks the legal recognition of the couple relationship that, he states, he has maintained with Mr. [Nombre2]. in a public, notorious, stable, and singular manner for more than three years. He expressly claims the application of subparagraph m) of section 4 of the General Law on Young Persons, in conjunction with section 242 of the Family Code. He also bases his claim on sections 1, 2, and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 5 of the Ibero-American Convention on the Rights of Youth; 48 of the General Law on HIV-AIDS; 7 and 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and 7 and 33 of the Political Constitution (folios 5-8). In the appealed order, issued at 11:02 hours on last September 11th, the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José rejected the complaint at the threshold (ad portas) because it determined that section 242 of the Family Code only permits the recognition of a de facto union between a man and a woman who have the freedom of status (libertad de estado) to marry (folio 10). In this venue, Mr. [Nombre1].'s special judicial representative defends that it was based primarily on the norm of the General Law on Young Persons and not on the provisions of the Family Code, as the first-instance judge incorrectly understood (folios 11-13).- II.- As we pointed out in vote no. 132-10, of 8:40 hours on January 26, and reiterated in nos. 1313-10 of 9:30 hours on September 21, both of 2010; 975-11, of 13:55 hours on August 23, and 644-11, of 14:18 hours on September 7, both of 2011, "In the modern State, the proscription of violence and the prohibition of self-help make it necessary to resort to the Judicial Branch to effectively exercise the freedoms and rights guaranteed by the legal system when they are threatened or disregarded by the actions of another person. Therefore, section 153—in concordance with section 9—of the Political Constitution regulates the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the courts of justice (see, in this regard, Constitutional Chamber vote no. 1148-90, of 17 hours on September 21, 1990) when it provides that 'It corresponds to the Judicial Branch, in addition to the functions this Constitution assigns to it, to hear civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and contentious-administrative cases, as well as others established by law, whatever their nature and the status of the persons involved; to resolve them definitively and to execute the rulings it pronounces, with the aid of the public force if necessary.' Under these conditions, as [Nombre5]. [Nombre6] points out, it is necessary, therefore, '(…) that there be a broad possibility of access to an impartial body to settle conflicts that persons may have. Otherwise, this position that self-help be exceptional would be illusory, and those who have a disagreement, if they fail to overcome it—and it is not a matter concerning non-disposable rights—must resolve it through the process. (…). If the State or organized society has—in principle—monopolized the resolution of disputes, it must [sic] do so in exchange for giving all persons the certain possibility of being able to easily access that instrument or means (…). There are multiple factors that affect that access or that obstruct it, sometimes in an absolute manner or in a way that becomes so.' [A Fundamental Human Right: Access to Justice. Yearbook of Latin American Constitutional Law, Montevideo: 2003, 291-292. Retrieved on May 12, 2007, from http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/dconstla/cont/2003/pr/pr16.pdf). When a person wishes to exercise a judicial action, they must, therefore, be in a real position to do so. The same must be required when they are threatened by one brought against them by another person; in which case they must be able to appear and defend themselves effectively. Both requirements, configured as a fundamental right, are embodied in section 41 of the Political Constitution: 'Resorting to the laws, all must find redress for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, fulfilled justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws.' Various international instruments applicable in Costa Rica contain similar provisions. By virtue of section 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 'Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.' Section 18 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man provides that 'Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.' The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, approved by Law No. 4229, of December 11, 1968, enshrines that 'All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.' (Article 14, paragraph 1). In paragraph 1) of its section 8, the American Convention on Human Rights or 'Pact of San José, Costa Rica', approved by Law No. 4534 of February 23, 1970, stipulates that 'Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any criminal accusation made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.' In section 25, it recognizes that '1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the exercise of their official functions. / 2. The States Parties undertake: / a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state; / b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and / c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.' As is easily deduced from reading them, these precepts recognize in favor of any subject a set of entitlement rights that configure the minimum or basic content of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva). Furthermore, they make express reference to the fundamental right to equality as its transversal axis. Finally, they highlight some of the many obstacles that can be decisive in hindering or frustrating them, and they entrust the State to take the necessary measures to remove them. In any case, the latter is a consequence of their fundamental nature. In its advisory opinion no. OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whose jurisdiction was recognized by Costa Rica by Executive Decree No. 7060 of May 26, 1977, in accordance with the provisions of section 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights, expressly specified those scopes: 'The protection of the law is basically constituted by the remedies that it provides for the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Convention, which, in light of the positive obligation that Article 1.1 contemplates for the States to respect and guarantee them, implies, as the Court has already stated, the duty of the States Parties to organize all the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which the exercise of public power is manifested, in such a way that they are capable of legally ensuring the free and full exercise of human rights (Case of [Nombre7], Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series [Nombre2] No. 4, para. 166; Case of [Nombre8], Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series [Nombre2] No. 5, para. 175). / (…).' / (…). In relevant part, in its cited advisory opinion no. OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that '(…) / Article 1 of the Convention obligates the States Parties not only to respect the rights and freedoms recognized therein, but also to guarantee their free and full exercise to every person subject to their jurisdiction. The Court has already expressed that this provision contains a positive duty for the States. It must also be specified that to guarantee implies the obligation of the State to take all necessary measures to remove the obstacles that may exist for individuals to enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State's tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic remedies to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention.'"- III.- In summary, access to effective judicial protection is a fundamental right in itself, but it is also an instrument to guarantee the validity of enjoyment rights; that is, those whose enjoyment immediately satisfies the needs or interests of the human being. Two of its essential contents are the power of its holder to demand from the competent jurisdictional body, once the respective procedure has been substantiated (due process), a reasoned decision based in Law on the claims timely deduced, which resolves the debated issues and, of course, the power to obtain it. Certainly, given its entitlement nature, it is a right of legal configuration; that is, its exercise is subject to the concurrence of the requirements that, in each matter, the current regulations have established. However, it must not be overlooked that it is not permitted to prevent or obstruct it by imposing arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or disproportionate barriers. The basic principles derived from section 41 of the Political Constitution and from the international precepts already cited, to which all persons and bodies in the jurisdictional sphere must adjust our conduct, oblige, on the one hand, the Legislative Assembly to enact the legal provisions necessary to regulate the rights of persons, as well as the appropriate channels and procedures to procure their effective jurisdictional protection when they have been violated, and, on the other hand, the various Courts to interpret and apply them in such a way that they do not hinder the proper verification of the grievance and guarantee, if it is proven, the full and timely reestablishment of those rights (see extraordinary session of the Full Court of October 11, 1982). Hence, judges violate the fundamental right under discussion when we make access to the stipulated procedures impossible or difficult, or when we reject or deny, without any reason or by invoking an insufficient or spurious one, a petition that we should have processed and resolved in a judgment. To counteract that risk, it is required, in principle, that any decision that prevents hearing a complaint on the merits find support in a legal cause and in a reasonable reading of it, because, being in the presence of a fundamental right, the principles pro actione and pro sententia come into full force, obliging the interpretation and application of procedural requirements or conditions restrictively and in the manner most favorable to the effectiveness of judicial protection. This makes it necessary to contextualize any factual situation that leads to issuing a ruling whose consequence is to prevent defining whether the claim is admissible or not. An excessive formalism always entails a denial of justice (see extraordinary session of the Full Court of April 26, 1984).- IV.- In its emblematic vote no. 1739-92, of 11:45 hours on July 1, 1992, reiterated in part in nos. 1562-93, of 15:06 hours on March 30, 1993, and 2005-10604, of 15:44 hours on August 16, 2005, the Constitutional Chamber established that, as a set of guarantees for enjoyment rights, the concept of due process comprises, among others, the right to a just judgment. This is linked, in turn, to certain constitutional principles and, especially, to the pro sententia principle. According to it, '(…) all procedural rules exist and must be interpreted to facilitate the administration of justice and not as obstacles to achieving it; which obliges one to consider procedural requirements, especially inadmissions of any nature, restrictively and only by express provision, while everything that leads to the decision of substantive issues in a judgment must be interpreted extensively and with the greatest formalism [sic] possible; furthermore, procedural infractions should only give rise to relative nullities and, therefore, always correctable, as long as they do not produce defenselessness.' In that same ruling, that body noted that '(…) laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity, not only to have been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures, but also to pass the substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, freedom, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified in accordance with constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the means selected have a real and substantial relationship with their objective. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially to the rights and freedoms recognized or implied by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society.'- V.- Based on those criteria, this Chamber has insisted that the power to reject at the threshold (ad portas) any petition, including the act of initiating proceedings (that is, the complaint and the counterclaim), which paragraph 1 of article 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly attributes to jurisdictional bodies, must be exercised in a reasonable and cautious manner, insofar as it can translate, in certain situations, into an evident obstacle to the effective enjoyment of the fundamental right to judicial protection and, in this specific matter, into a breach of the mandate contained in section 51 of the Political Constitution, according to which 'The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State.' (See, in the same sense, votes nos. 1288-03, of 8:30 hours on September 25; 1331-03, of 8:10 hours on October 2, both of 2003; 207-04, of 13 hours on February 11; 682-04, of 11:10 hours on April 28; 1091-04, of 8:10 hours on June 30; 1277-04, of 9:40 hours on July 27, the last of 2004; 585-06, of 10:10 hours on May 10, 2006; 80-08, of 11 hours on January 18, 2008; 595-10 of 9:50 hours on May 3; 822-10, of 11:30 hours on June 22; 848-10, of 8:30 hours on June 28; 1139-10, of 8:10 hours on August 23; 1176-10, of 9:40 hours on August 24; 1589-10, of 10:30 hours on November 17, all of 2010; 469-11, of 10:50 hours on April 5; 605-11, of 16:24 hours on May 17; 852-11, of 8:21 hours on July 5; 975-11, of 13:55 hours on August 23, the six of 2011; 95-12, of 15:21 hours on February 21; 269-12, of 16:26 hours on June 19; 510-12, of 10:53 hours on November 28; 821-12, of 11:18 hours on October 9, the four of 2012; 54-13, of 11:01 hours on January 30; 328-13, of 15:11 hours on July 24; 419-13, of 8:01 hours on September 26; 842-13, of 8:36 hours on October 9, and 505-13, of 16:15 hours on November 6, the last of 2013). Precisely to reduce that danger, such power-duty is mediated by the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, preclusion, procedural impetus, and procedural economy. Since its recognition seeks to prevent the loss of economic resources and time that a useless procedure entails for the persons involved and for the State, as a general rule, it must be exercised in the preliminary stage and must be based on a well-founded analysis of the different factual and legal possibilities of the petition succeeding. With that objective, the competent authority must review the legislation, doctrine, and jurisprudence to be able to correctly establish the absolute inviability of what is requested; that is, its 'evident' inadmissibility (see this body's votes nos. 207-04; 822-10; 469-11; 95-12; 510-12; 328-13; 419-13; 842-13, and 505-13, already cited), especially when it concerns the initial act, a case in which 'The outright rejection (rechazo de plano) must be based on an unquestionable criterion that makes the complaint non-deducible or non-proposable. Then, section 41 of our fundamental law becomes key at this point (…). Now, it is important to review in our case whether the rejection at the initial threshold (ad limine litis) is correct because the complaint is a legal nonsense, or whether, on the contrary, it can be understood that there is a denial of justice (…).' (Vote no. 1288-03, of 8:30 hours on September 25, 2003, reiterated in nos. 682-04, of 11:10 hours on April 28, and 1277-04, of 9:40 hours on July 27, both of 2004) VI.- Without a doubt, this matter is the product of the exercise, by Mr. [Nombre1]., of his fundamental right to effective judicial protection. For that very reason, the rejection at the threshold of his complaint not only must find legal support and conform to the standard of reasonableness previously outlined, but it must also be duly reasoned. If, according to what is recorded in the ruling under appeal, that decision was based on that 'The regulations governing the filing of proceedings for recognition of de facto union, article 242 of the Family Code, are clear in indicating that a de facto union may be recognized between a man and a woman who have the freedom of status to marry. So it is also clear that one of the unavoidable requirements is that this union occurred between a man and a woman, which is not the case in the matter at hand, as it seeks recognition of a union between two men, which is illegal and therefore, -as stated- there is no other recourse than to reject outright (rechazar de plano) the complaint.' (Folio 10), it is evident, in the first place, that the dismissal of the claim is not due to the absence of a procedural requirement, a matter proper to a preliminary ruling, but rather to a substantive reason; which, as a general rule, should be decided in a judgment. If, moreover, one notices that, as well pointed out in the appeal, that reasoning does not weigh the principal legal basis invoked by the plaintiff; that is, subparagraph m) of section 4 of the General Law on Young Persons, added by Law no. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta no. 130 of the following July 8 and, especially, the scope of the prohibition of '(…) discrimination contrary to human dignity (…)' contained therein, in the context of Human Rights Law, it is unquestionable that we are in the presence of one interpretation, among other possible ones, of how this matter could be decided and, for that very reason, it does not qualify as a legitimate and sufficient cause to dismiss at the threshold the action filed. Having refused to give it course constitutes, therefore, a serious error, without prejudice, of course, to what is definitively decided at the time of issuing the ruling. As was well pointed out in vote no. 1460-05, of 15 hours on September 27, 2005, 'That absolute inviability does not exist since there is no express rule that makes the complaint and the process clearly inadmissible, non-proposable, or useless. It must be sufficiently clear that this resolution does not mean that the criteria or argumentation followed regarding the merits of the matter are endorsed or not endorsed, but rather, this Court does not find the grounds to close the route at the threshold (ad límine) to the complaint (…).' In short and with absolute independence '(…) from the admissibility or not of what is claimed (…), which will necessarily have to be analyzed in the decision on the merits and not now, it is estimated that the outright rejection implies a violation of the right of access to Justice. This is the proper route to claim, discuss, and decide if (…)' (vote no. 740-10, of 10:10 hours on June 2, 2010), in accordance with the current regulations, it is appropriate or not to consider it proven that a couple relationship exists between the parties and, if so, what the legal consequences that could be recognized would be.- VII.- It is true that in vote no. [Telf1], of 14:46 hours on May 23, 2006, reiterated in no. [Telf2], of 13:13 hours on July 27, 2011, the Constitutional Chamber deemed legitimate the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in subparagraph 6 of article 14 of the Family Code, but it also ruled out '(…) that there is any impediment whatsoever for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is empirical confirmation to indicate that they have [sic] increased. With this, a problem arises that does not lie in the norm challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate normative regulation to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of such types of unions, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not of justice, makes it necessary.' If we add that in no. 2010-13313, of 16:31 hours on August 10, 2010, that body synthesized its criteria on the topic in the following terms: 'From this judgment [referring to no. [Telf1], cited above], several aspects of importance for resolving the sub-lite become clear, which are the following: / 1°) Relationships between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or sidestepped. / 2°) It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relationships between persons of the same sex. / 3°) There is a normative vacuum by the ordinary legislator [sic] that must be filled, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relationships between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator [sic] must issue a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relationships between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by the provisions of article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers, precisely, for that reason, the ordinary legislator [sic] undertook the task of discussing the timeliness and advisability of regulating relationships between persons of the same sex.' (The bold is added); that, in the exercise of its own functions, the Legislative Assembly enacted the cited Law no. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta no. 130 of the following July 8, which added subparagraph m) to section 4 of the General Law on Young Persons and thus introduced an element of judgment whose consequences have not been the subject of any pronouncement by jurisprudence, which is the referred prohibition of '(…) discrimination contrary to human dignity (…)' when it comes to guaranteeing the right to the recognition of the social and patrimonial effects of the de facto unions that a young person constitutes in a public, notorious, unique, and stable manner; that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Law no. 7615, of July 24, 1996, and duly ratified by Costa Rica, obliges the State parties to comply in good faith with the agreements in force (article 26); that since 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has posited its doctrine of 'conventionality control', according to which '(…) the legislative obligation of Article 2 of the American Convention [on Human Rights] also has the purpose of facilitating the function of the Judicial Branch in such a way that the applicator of the law has a clear option of how to resolve a particular case. However, when the Legislative Branch fails in its task of suppressing and/or adapting laws contrary to the American Convention, the Judicial Branch remains bound to the duty of guarantee established in Article 1.1 thereof [sic] and, consequently, must refrain from applying any normative contrary to it. Compliance by agents or officials of the State with a law that violates the Convention produces international responsibility of the State, and it is a basic principle of international State responsibility, embodied in international human rights law, that every State is internationally responsible for acts or omissions of any of its powers or organs in violation of internationally enshrined rights, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention. / (…) The Court is aware that internal judges and tribunals are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are obliged to apply the provisions in force in the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State apparatus, are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the effects of the Convention's provisions are not diminished by the application of laws contrary to its object and purpose, and which from the beginning lack legal effects. In other words, the Judicial Branch must exercise a kind of 'conventionality control' between the domestic legal norms applicable in specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In this task, the Judicial Branch must take into account not only the treaty but also the interpretation that the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention, has made of it [sic].' (Judgment of September 26, 2006, case of [Nombre9] vs. Chile); that two months later, in the case of Dismissed Workers of Congress vs.

Peru (judgment of November 24, 2006), that international body reiterated that precedent, specifying that such review proceeds "ex officio," without the need for the parties to request it; that in vote no. 2313-95, at 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, the Constitutional Chamber noted that "(…) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural body for interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normative framework, whether in a contentious case or a mere advisory opinion, will have—in principle—the same value as the interpreted norm. Not merely ethical or scientific value, as some have understood it. This thesis that we now uphold, moreover, is incorporated into our law, when the General Law of Public Administration provides that unwritten norms—such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law—shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of written law and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.)."; that in the judgment of February 24, 2012, case [Nombre10] and [Nombre11] v. Chile, the Inter-American Court solidified its doctrine on discrimination based on sexual orientation in the following terms: "(…) any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on a person's sexual orientation is proscribed by the [American Convention on Human Rights]. Consequently, no internal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may diminish or restrict, in any way, a person's rights based on their sexual orientation." and reaffirmed "(…) that the American Convention does not establish a closed concept of family, much less does it protect only one 'traditional' model of the same [sic]. In this regard, the Tribunal reiterates that the concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage and must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties have a life in common outside of marriage." whereby denying a non-heterosexual couple the status of a family group "(…) reflects a limited and stereotyped perception of the concept of family that has no basis in the Convention, as there is no specific model of family (the 'traditional family')." and that the essential content of the aforementioned fundamental right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) undoubtedly comprises the principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system, addressed by numerals 6 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, which prevents the outright rejection of a claim on the pretext that a specific regulation has not been issued on the subject matter of the litigation (see, in similar terms although regarding another topic, the vote of the Second Chamber no. 2003-143, at 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003), since, as the magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber emphasized: "In our capacity as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to consider when making decisions on matters submitted to our knowledge (…)." (Vote no. [Telf1], at 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006), it is not feasible to summarily dismiss the action brought by Mr. [Nombre1] by considering it inadmissible. Note that in this state of affairs, no long-standing, consistent line of jurisprudence can be identified that supports the decision of the first-instance judge. In summary, the fact that numeral 242 of the Family Code has not been expressly reformed and that some jurisprudential precedents issued based on it could provide grounds for what was decided does not authorize ignoring the cited legal reform and, in particular, the need for a review of such criteria in accordance with the prevailing hermeneutical principles. Therefore, because, as this Chamber highlighted in judgment no. 585-06, at 10:10 a.m. on May 10, 2006, "(…) the reference to a vote (…) does not render the matter absolutely non-viable, since (…) it is not an absolutely clear and settled issue in the jurisprudence." (See, in a similar sense, vote no. 682-04, at 11:10 a.m. on April 28, 2004) and because the merits could even be the subject of a cassation appeal, it is imperative to grant the challenger the possibility of obtaining, within the framework of a proceeding conducted with all the requisite guarantees, among them, the right to present his arguments and to prove his assertions, a definitive jurisdictional pronouncement on his petition.

VIII.- For greater abundance, it is necessary to emphasize that, by virtue of the cited Article 6 of the Civil Code, "The Courts have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which purpose they shall adhere to the system of sources established." And that pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, "The courts may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling on matters within their competence due to a lack of applicable norm and must do so in conformity with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources." Moreover, that same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supply the absence of legal norms: "The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of written law and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit. When it concerns supplying the absence and not the insufficiency of the provisions that regulate a matter, said sources shall have the force of law." (Bold added). Consequently, as already noted, we jurisdictional bodies are prohibited from alleging the lack of applicable norm(s) to the specific case to excuse ourselves from ruling on the merits of a process such as this one. In such a scenario, the dogma of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system obliges us to resort, in integrative application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and implement the best solution to the controversy raised, whereby, in safeguard of the pro sententia principle, the possibility of hearing the filed claim through this avenue and deciding at the appropriate time the applicable regulations remains valid. On this matter, in vote no. 36-F-94, at 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber noted that "(…) jurisprudence, as an informing source of the legal system, is called upon to supply, through extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms charged with resolving legal conflicts when no norm exists for the specific case or when it was not conceived for the new legal requirements (Article 9 of the Civil Code)." In votes nos. 112-F-92, at 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, at 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001 and 360-F-02, at 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it stated that "(…) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allow referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system), furthermore, Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allows the analogical application of norms provided that identity of reason exists and no norm prohibits it." For its part, the Second Chamber, in vote no. 415, at 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, framed it in the following terms: "(…) in any event, one must turn, in pursuit of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly addressed, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity and even, (…), to common sense, that is, what people normally have to judge things reasonably (Articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary)." In vote no. 2004-200, at 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that ordinal 6 of the Civil Code "(…) develops a right of a fundamental nature, contained in numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now, to fulfill such a task, consideration must be given to Article 12 of that Code, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when they do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one where identity of reason is apparent, unless a norm prohibits such application. In a case such as the present one, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not uncommon in our environment, which is the cohabitation of two people, (…) who are/were united only by affective ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient basis to, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, order the liquidation of assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. But also, to resolve the question, considering the above, a response can be provided to the situation raised, resorting 'mutatis mutandi' to the regulations provided by law for similar institutions." Lastly, in vote no. 769-93, at 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, the Constitutional Chamber recognized that "Here, as the consulting Tribunal itself anticipates, another normative framework could be resorted to (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a particular matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which Article 12 following authorizes. It must be added to the above that, according to the first norm cited, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of applicable law to the case presented. Judges, therefore, have at their disposal, broad possibilities to resolve with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation) and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. / (…) / The power of Family Law jurisprudence in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, including some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not thereby devoid of justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that this behavior has been noticed most rapidly here." In summary, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh the factual situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Branch at a given historical moment, in order to adequately integrate the legal system, such that we can offer any person adequate satisfaction of their claim. In the words of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, set forth in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case [Nombre12] Vs. Panama), given the compelling need to offer some response to the claim made in the sub-lite, "(…) there is a duty to use those remedies (…) that relate to the protection of the fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as for example the right to liberty, to personal integrity and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention." IX.- With his usual clarity and eloquence, [Nombre13] has highlighted that legal texts "(…) whatever they may be, are fabrics of language. This means that their basic characteristics are not, nor can they be, alien to the essential features of languages, fundamentally those of ordinary language. One of these features is indeterminacies: differences in how different people come to understand the same linguistic formulation, in communication. When such cases arise, which constitutes the core of a good part of the discussions among jurists, it is inevitable to choose between different interpretations that present themselves: whether one or other meanings will be accepted for the same text. Numerous discussions revolve around which interpretation should be accepted; very often, agreement among different interpreters is not reached. (…). It means that, in practice, the 'letter' of the positive law precept considered, be they constitutional or generally legal provisions, provides no more than a framework (…) within which the choice of a legal meaning takes place, at the appropriate time, that meaning which the interpreter himself prefers to decide upon. (…). It is in the very nature of legal discourse, one could say, this condition that its texts usually admit different interpretations, to a greater or lesser degree, before such or such classes of cases. 'Do all persons with normal mental aptitudes extract the same conclusions from a given legal text? Posing the question means, as every jurist knows, answering it in the negative' ([Nombre14] 1977: 254). Consequently: 'The judge or the jurist, although they may not wish to acknowledge it, construct the norms from the legal text. They do not limit themselves, not even did they in the glory days of the Exegesis, to fitting the case they examine into a provision of the law. Why "construct"? Because the reader of the Constitution [or of other Positive Law texts], permit me the expression, has to "assemble" the norms from the text' ([Nombre15] 1995: 113)." [Fundamental legal axiology (Axiología II). Valuation bases in legal discourse. Materials for discerning in an analytical-realist manner the rhetorical keys of those discourses, San José: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2004, pp. 255-257]. Precisely for this reason it is not surprising that the current Civil Code provides in its numeral 10 that "The norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose." And that, as the Constitutional Chamber has repeatedly noted, the objective (ratio) or proposed and assumed purpose, with respect to which the precept has an instrumental nature —teleological or purposive method—; its confrontation and concordance with the rest of those that, in particular, make up a legal institution —institutional method— and, in general, with the entire legal system —systematic method—, since it cannot be conceived as a sealed, isolated compartment as it is connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly, and finally, the consideration of the socio-economic and historical reality to which it is to be applied, which is, by definition, variable and changeable given its enormous dynamism —historical-evolutionary method— are the minimal indispensable instruments to which the interpreter must jointly resort when applying one or several specific provisions (vote no. 3481-03, at 2:03 p.m. on May 2, 2003, reiterated, among others, in nos. [Telf3], at 3:02 p.m. on January 30; 13902-2007, at 3:24 p.m. on October 3, both from 2007; 2008-13424, at 9:31 a.m. on September 2, 2008; 2009-315, at 3:23 p.m. on January 14; [Telf4], at 12:50 p.m. on January 30; [Telf5], at 4:47 p.m. on April 30; 2009-10553, at 2:54 p.m. on July 1; 2009-15194, at 10:53 a.m. on September 25, all five from 2009; [Telf6], at 2:50 p.m. on March 10, 2010; [Telf7], at 3:00 p.m. on February 23; [Telf8], at 3:27 p.m. on April 6 and 2011-7955, at 10:46 a.m. on June 17, the last ones from 2011). This evolutionary interpretation in light of the prevailing social reality or context at a specific historical moment is even more forcefully required in conjunctures such as the current one, which are highly variable and changing. It is clear, then, that no legal precept can be applied solely and exclusively based on its literal wording, as the first-instance judge seems to have done in the sub-lite, since, to unravel and understand its sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to the various hermeneutical instruments mentioned, which represent different stages of the interpretive act and do not have an exclusionary character. Furthermore, it must always be borne in mind that, as required by Article 11 of the Civil Code, "Equity shall be weighed in the application of the norms (…)." Consequently, the reading of current regulations cannot be done in an isolated, decontextualized, and undiscriminating manner; on the contrary, it must be adjusted to the specialty of the matter and the particularities of the conflict being aired in this venue and must respond to elementary rules of reasonableness and proportionality. This reaffirms the need to offer Mr. [Nombre1] the broadest possibility to present and discuss the current scope of the regulations in force regarding common-law marriage (unión de hecho). This is the way to guarantee his fundamental rights, both those of a procedural nature and those of substance. It is worth citing here, in support of the foregoing, the reasoning set forth by the Constitutional Chamber in recent vote no. [Telf8], at 3:27 p.m. on April 6, 2011, issued in respect of subsection 4) of Article 572 of the Civil Code, which imposed a limitation on certain relatives to access the status of legitimate heirs, "(…) hence it is necessary to review these legal aspects, in favor of current family economic realities and social structures, which requires a purposive and evolutionary interpretation of legal norms, since the questioning made in the action brings to light legal and historical vestiges that still impede the transmission of property to the detriment of certain persons by reason of coming from a genetic line founded on the male gender, and it compels resolving the problem in adherence to the fundamental rights that govern us today." X.- We cannot fail to mention that in vote no. 48-13, at 2:20 p.m. on January 17, 2013, the majority of this panel confirmed the outright rejection of a process similar to this one, based on reasoning identical to that contained in the appealed ruling: "In view of the above, and having reaffirmed the criterion that the common-law marriage based on Article 242 of the Family Code must be between a man and a woman, the majority of this panel must proceed by upholding the decision brought on appeal." However, as already noted, in this instance the legislative scenario is different, since the cited reform to the General Law of the Young Person by Law no. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta no. 130 of the following July 8, introduced new elements for judgment that demand their adequate assessment and weighing in a pronouncement on the merits. Note also that, by reason of a constitutional consultation on that recent legal text, the specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice resolved the following: "(…) the consulting judge states that from the reform introduced by literal m) of Article 4 of the Law of the Young Person, two interpretive possibilities arise. The first, from a negative perspective, in the sense that persons between the ages of 15 and 35 must go to the Family Courts for the recognition of their common-law marriage, so that it produces both patrimonial effects and personal effects. The second interpretation, from a positive perspective, implies that persons between the ages of 15 and 35 do not have to go to different State agencies for the recognition of the common-law marriage, since for all purposes, it is sufficient to have the recognition made in a Family Court. The judge considers that this second interpretation is dangerous, not only because of the uncertainty that may arise in the sense that it would not be possible to know with certainty whether the common-law marriage relationship remained public, notorious, unique, and stable at the moment of invoking State protection, but mainly because of the extensive effects that such recognition could produce. In the first place, it is observed that the consultant does not present a problem of constitutional validity that provokes his doubt; what the judge seeks with the consultation is for this Chamber to indicate which of the two interpretations he presents is the correct one to resolve the specific case, which is improper, since on repeated occasions this Tribunal has indicated that judicial consultations promoted by judges must be formulated in relation to the norms or acts they must apply, but not in relation to the specific case. It is not appropriate for this jurisdiction to tell the judge which norms he must apply or their correct legal interpretation. Moreover, it is confirmed that the questions raised by the judge regarding this point, i.e., whether young people between 15 and 35 years of age must or must not go to the Family Court for the recognition of the patrimonial and personal effects of the common-law marriage, are related to aspects of legality and not constitutionality, which the judge must resolve." (Vote no. 2013-10828, at 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 2013).

XI.- Based on all of the foregoing, we cannot share the decision of the a quo body and as we do not identify the absence of any procedural prerequisite that makes it impossible to proceed with the claim, this matter must continue to be processed in such a way that, once the proceedings are complete, it is determined, by judgment, whether the claim is or is not admissible. Only in this way are Mr. [Nombre1]'s fundamental rights to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) and due process guaranteed, and even the right to appeal to the Second Chamber, via a cassation appeal, in the event that his claim is dismissed in the first and second instances. The appealed order exceeds the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality that should govern the exercise of the jurisdictional function and, therefore, we must revoke it and order the continuation of the process.

POR TANTO

The appealed decision is revoked and it is ordered that the claim filed by Mr. [Nombre1] be given course.

Licenciado [Nombre3]. This Tribunal hears the present matter by virtue of the appeal filed by the legal representative of the petitioner against the decision issued by the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at eleven hours two minutes on September eleventh, two thousand thirteen.- Judge [Nombre4] writes, and; **CONSIDERANDO** **I.-** Mr. [Nombre1] seeks the legal recognition of the couple relationship that, as he indicates, he maintains with Mr. [Nombre2] in a public, notorious, stable, and exclusive manner for more than three years. He expressly claims the application of subsection m) of numeral 4 of the *Ley General de la Persona Joven*, in accordance with 242 of the *Código de Familia*. It is also based on Articles 1, 2, and 24 of the *Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos*; 5 of the *Convención Iberoamericana de derechos de los jóvenes*; 48 of the *Ley General sobre VIH-SIDA*; 7 and 12 of the *Declaración Universal sobre Derechos Humanos*; 5 of the *Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos*; and 7 and 33 of the *Constitución Política* (folios 5-8). In the appealed order, issued at 11:02 hours on the past September 11, the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José rejected the lawsuit *ad portas* because it considered that ordinal 242 of the *Código de Familia* only allows the recognition of a common-law marriage (unión de hecho) between a man and a woman who are free to marry (folio 10). In this venue, the special judicial attorney of Mr. [Nombre1] argues that his client relied primarily on the norm of the *Ley General de la Persona Joven* and not on the provisions of the *Código de Familia*, as the first-instance judge incorrectly understood (folios 11-13).- **II.-** As we pointed out in ruling (voto) n.º 132-10, of 8:40 hours on January 26, and reiterated in rulings nos. 1313-10 of 9:30 hours on September 21, both from 2010; 975-11, of 13:55 hours on August 23, and 644-11, of 14:18 hours on September 7, both from 2011, *"In the modern State, the proscription of violence and the prohibition of self-help make it necessary to resort to the Judicial Branch to make effective the exercise of the freedoms and rights guaranteed by the legal system when they are threatened or disregarded by the action of another person. Therefore, numeral 153 —in accordance with 9— of the Constitución Política regulates the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the courts of justice (see, in this regard, ruling of the Sala Constitucional n.º 1148-90, of 17 hours on September 21, 1990) when it provides that 'The Judicial Branch is responsible, in addition to the functions this Constitution assigns to it, for hearing civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and contentious-administrative cases, as well as others established by law, whatever their nature and the status of the persons involved; resolving them definitively and executing the decisions it pronounces, with the help of public force if necessary.' Under these conditions, as noted by [Nombre5] [Nombre6], it is necessary, then, '(…) that there be a broad possibility of access to an impartial body to resolve conflicts that people may have. Otherwise, this approach that self-help is exceptional would be illusory, and those who have a disagreement, if they fail to overcome it—and it is not a matter concerning inalienable rights—must settle it through the process. (…). If the State or organized society has monopolized—in principle—the settlement of disputes, it must [sic] do so in exchange for giving all people the certain possibility of being able to easily access that instrument or means (…). There are multiple factors that affect this access or that obstruct it, sometimes absolutely or that become so.' [An essential human right: access to justice. Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano, Montevideo: 2003, 291-292. Retrieved May 12, 2007, from http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/dconstla/cont/2003/pr/pr16.pdf). When a person wishes to exercise a judicial action, they must, then, be in a real position to do so. The same must be required when they are threatened by one filed against them by another; in which case they must be able to appear and defend themselves effectively. Both requirements, configured as a fundamental right, are encompassed by numeral 41 of the Constitución Política: 'Occurring to the laws, everyone shall find redress for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws.' Various international instruments applicable in Costa Rica contain similar provisions. By virtue of numeral 10 of the Declaración universal de los derechos humanos, 'Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.' Article 18 of the Declaración americana de los derechos y deberes del hombre provides that 'Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his rights. Likewise, he must have available a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him against acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.' The Pacto internacional de derechos civiles y políticos, approved by Law N.° 4229, of December 11, 1968, establishes that 'All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.' (Article 14, paragraph 1). In paragraph 1) of its ordinal 8, the Convención americana sobre derechos humanos or 'Pacto de San José de Costa Rica', approved by Law N.° 4534 of February 23, 1970, stipulates that 'Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.' In Article 25, it recognizes that '1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties. / 2. The States Parties undertake: / a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state; / b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and / c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.' As is easily deduced from their reading, these precepts recognize in favor of any subject a set of benefit rights that configure the minimum or basic content of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva). In addition, they make express reference to the fundamental right to equality as its transversal axis. Finally, they highlight some of the many obstacles that can prove determinant in hindering or frustrating them and entrust the State to take the necessary measures to remove them. In any case, the latter is a consequence of their fundamental nature. In its advisory opinion n.º OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whose jurisdiction was recognized by Costa Rica by Decreto Ejecutivo N.° 7060 of May 26, 1977, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 62 of the Convención americana sobre derechos humanos, expressly detailed these scopes: 'The protection of the law is basically constituted by the remedies that it (sic) provides for the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Convention, which, in light of the positive obligation that Article 1.1 contemplates for the States to respect and guarantee them, implies, as the Court has already stated, the duty of the States Parties to organize all the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which the exercise of public power is manifested, in such a way that they are capable of legally ensuring the free and full exercise of human rights (Case of [Nombre7], Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series [Nombre2] No. 4, para. 166; Case of [Nombre8], Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series [Nombre2] No. 5, para. 175). / (…).' / (…). As relevant, in its cited advisory opinion n.º OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that '(…) / Article 1 of the Convention obligates the States Parties not only to respect the rights and freedoms recognized therein, but also to guarantee their free and full exercise to every person subject to their jurisdiction. The Court has already expressed that this provision contains a positive duty for the States. It must also be specified that to guarantee implies the obligation of the State to take all necessary measures to remove the obstacles that may exist so that individuals may enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State's tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic remedies to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention.'"*- **III.-** In sum, access to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) is a fundamental right in itself, but it is also an instrument to guarantee the validity of enjoyment rights; that is, those whose enjoyment immediately satisfies the needs or interests of the human being. Two of its essential contents are the power of its holder to demand from the competent jurisdictional body, once the respective procedure has been substantiated (due process), a reasoned decision founded in Law on the claims timely deduced, which resolves the debated issues and, of course, the power to obtain it. Certainly, given its benefit nature, it is a right of legal configuration; that is, its exercise is subject to the concurrence of the prerequisites that, in each matter, have been established by the current regulations. However, it must not be overlooked that it is not permitted to prevent or hinder it by imposing arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or disproportionate obstacles. The basic principles derived from numeral 41 of the *Constitución Política* and from the international precepts already cited, to which all of us, persons and bodies in the jurisdictional sphere, must adjust our actions, oblige, on one hand, the Legislative Assembly to enact the legal provisions necessary to regulate the rights of persons, as well as the appropriate channels and procedures to ensure their effective jurisdictional protection when they have been breached and, on the other, the different Courts to interpret and apply them in such a way that they do not hinder the proper verification of the grievance and guarantee, in the event it is proven, the full and timely reestablishment of those (see extraordinary session of the Corte Plena of October 11, 1982). Hence, we judges violate the fundamental right under comment when we make access to the stipulated procedures impossible or difficult or when we reject or deny, without any reason or invoking an insufficient or spurious one, a petition that we should have processed and resolved in a judgment. To counteract this risk, it is required, in principle, that any decision preventing a lawsuit from being heard on its merits (fondo) finds support in a legal cause and in a reasonable reading of it, since, being in the presence of a fundamental right, the principles *pro actione* and *pro sententia* come fully into force, obliging us to interpret and apply procedural prerequisites or requirements restrictively and in the manner most favorable to the effectiveness of judicial protection. This makes it necessary to contextualize every factual situation that leads to issuing a ruling whose consequence is to prevent a definition of whether the claim is admissible or not. Excessive formalism always entails a denial of justice (see extraordinary session of Corte Plena of April 26, 1984).- **IV.-** In its emblematic ruling n.º 1739-92, of 11:45 hours on July 1, 1992, reiterated in part in rulings nos. 1562-93, of 15:06 hours on March 30, 1993, and 2005-10604, of 15:44 hours on August 16, 2005, the Sala Constitucional established that, as a set of guarantees for enjoyment rights, the concept of due process includes, among others, the right to a just judgment. This is linked, in turn, to certain constitutional principles and, especially, to *pro sententia*. According to it, *"(…) all procedural norms exist and must be interpreted to facilitate the administration of justice and not as obstacles to achieving it; which obliges us to consider procedural requirements, especially inadmissibilities of any nature, restrictively and only as expressly stated, while everything that leads to the decision of the merits of the matter in a judgment must be interpreted extensively and with the greatest formalism [sic] possible; furthermore, procedural infractions should only give rise to relative nullities and, therefore, always correctable, as long as they do not cause defenselessness (indefensión)."* In that same ruling, that body noted that *"(…) laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity, not only to have been promulgated by competent bodies and due procedures, but also to pass substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, liberty, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to constitutional ideology. In this way it is sought, not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with their object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness (razonabilidad técnica), which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; juridical reasonableness (razonabilidad jurídica), or the adaptation to the Constitution in general, and in particular, to the rights and liberties recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights (razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales), in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society."*- **V.-** Based on these criteria, this Chamber has insisted that the power to reject *ad portas* any petition, including the act of procedural initiation (that is, the lawsuit and the counterclaim), which paragraph 1 of Article 97 of the *Código Procesal Civil* expressly attributes to jurisdictional bodies, must be exercised reasonably and with caution, since it can translate, in certain situations, into an evident obstacle to the effective enjoyment of the fundamental right to judicial protection and, in this specific matter, into a breach of the mandate contained in Article 51 of the *Constitución Política*, according to which *"The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State."* (See, in the same sense, rulings nos. 1288-03, of 8:30 hours on September 25; 1331-03, of 8:10 hours on October 2, both from 2003; 207-04, of 13:00 hours on February 11; 682-04, of 11:10 hours on April 28; 1091-04, of 8:10 hours on June 30; 1277-04, of 9:40 hours on July 27, the latter from 2004; 585-06, of 10:10 hours on May 10, 2006; 80-08, of 11:00 hours on January 18, 2008; 595-10 of 9:50 hours on May 3; 822-10, of 11:30 hours on June 22; 848-10, of 8:30 hours on June 28; 1139-10, of 8:10 hours on August 23; 1176-10, of 9:40 hours on August 24; 1589-10, of 10:30 hours on November 17, all from 2010; 469-11, of 10:50 hours on April 5; 605-11, of 16:24 hours on May 17; 852-11, of 8:21 hours on July 5; 975-11, of 13:55 hours on August 23, the six from 2011; 95-12, of 15:21 hours on February 21; 269-12, of 16:26 hours on June 19; 510-12, of 10:53 hours on November 28; 821-12, of 11:18 hours on October 9, the four from 2012; 54-13, of 11:01 hours on January 30; 328-13, of 15:11 hours on July 24; 419-13, of 8:01 hours on September 26; 842-13, of 8:36 hours on October 9, and 505-13, of 16:15 hours on November 6, the latter from 2013). Precisely to reduce this danger, such power-duty appears mediated by the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, preclusion, procedural momentum (impulso), and procedural economy. Since its recognition aims to prevent the loss of economic resources and time that a useless proceeding entails for the people involved and for the State, as a general rule, it must be exercised in the preliminary stage and must be based on a substantiated analysis of the different factual and legal possibilities of the petition succeeding.- With that objective, the competent authority must review legislation, doctrine, and jurisprudence in order to correctly establish the absolute infeasibility of what was requested; that is, its *"evident"* inadmissibility (see the rulings of this body nos. 207-04; 822-10; 469-11; 95-12; 510-12; 328-13; 419-13; 842-13 and 505-13, already cited), especially when it concerns the initial act, a case in which *"The outright rejection (rechazo de plano) must be based on an unquestionable criterion that renders the claim non-deductible or non-proposable. Then, article 41 of our fundamental law becomes key at this point (…). Now, it is important to review in our case whether the rejection ad limine litis is correct because the claim constitutes a legal unreasonableness, or whether, on the contrary, it can be understood that there is a denial of justice (…)."* (Ruling No. 1288-03, of 8:30 a.m. on September 25, 2003, reiterated in nos. 682-04, of 11:10 a.m. on April 28, and 1277-04, of 9:40 a.m. on July 27, both of 2004) **VI.-** Undoubtedly, this matter is the product of Mr. [Nombre1] exercising his fundamental right to effective judicial protection. For this very reason, the rejection *ad portas* of his claim must not only find legal support and conform to the reasonableness standard outlined above, but must also be properly reasoned. If, according to what is stated in the appealed order, that decision was based on the fact that *"The regulations governing the filing of processes for the recognition of a de facto union (unión de hecho), article 242 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), are clear in indicating that the de facto union (unión de hecho) may be recognized between a man and a woman who have the freedom of status to marry. Thus, it is also clear that one of the unavoidable requirements is that this union occurred between a man and a woman, which is not the case in the matter before us, as recognition of a union between two men is sought, which is illegal and therefore, -as stated- there is no other path but to reject the claim outright (rechazar de plano la demanda)."* (Page 10), it is evident, first of all, that the dismissal of the claim does not arise from the absence of a procedural prerequisite (presupuesto procesal), which is the proper subject of a preliminary ruling, but from a reason concerning the merits; which, as a general rule, should be decided in a final judgment. If, furthermore, one considers that, as rightly noted in the appeal, this reasoning does not weigh the principal legal ground invoked by the plaintiff; that is, subsection m) of article 4 of the *General Law on Young Persons (Ley General de la Persona Joven)*, added by Law No. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta No. 130 of the following July 8, and, especially, the scope of the prohibition of *"(…) discrimination contrary to human dignity (…)"* contained therein, in the context of Human Rights Law, it is unquestionable that we are in the presence of one interpretation, among other possible ones, of how this matter could be decided and, for that very reason, it does not qualify as a legitimate and sufficient cause to dismiss *ad portas* the filed action. Having refused to process it constitutes, therefore, a serious error, without prejudice, of course, to what is ultimately decided at the time of issuing the ruling. As was rightly noted in ruling No. 1460-05, of 3:00 p.m. on September 27, 2005, *"That absolute infeasibility does not exist because there is no express rule that makes the claim and the process clearly inadmissible, non-proposable, or useless. It must be sufficiently clear that this resolution does not mean that the criterion or argumentation followed regarding the merits of the matter is endorsed or not endorsed, but rather, this Court does not find the prerequisites to close the path ad limine to the claim (…)."* In short, and with absolute independence *"(…) of the admissibility or not of what is claimed (…), which will necessarily have to be analyzed in the decision on the merits and not now, it is considered that the outright rejection (rechazo de plano) implies a violation of the right of access to Justice, this is the path to claim, discuss, and decide whether (…)"* (ruling No. 740-10, of 10:10 a.m. on June 2, 2010), in accordance with current regulations, it is or is not appropriate to consider it proven that a couple relationship exists between the parties and, if so, what the legal consequences would be that could be recognized.- **VII.-** It is true that in ruling No. [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, reiterated in No. [Telf2], of 1:13 p.m. on July 27, 2011, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) deemed legitimate the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in subsection 6 of article 14 of the *Family Code (Código de Familia)*, but it also ruled out *"(…) that there is any impediment of any nature for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is an empirical verification to indicate that they have increased. With this, a problem arises that lies not in the rule challenged here but, rather, in the absence of appropriate normative regulation, to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of union, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not of justice, makes it necessary."* If one adds that in No. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010, that body synthesized its criteria on the subject in the following terms: *"From this judgment [referring to No. [Telf1], cited above] several aspects of importance for resolving the sub-lite become clear, which are the following: / 1°) Relationships between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or circumvented. / 2°) **It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relationships between persons of the same sex.** / 3°) **There is a normative vacuum (vacío normativo)** on the part of the ordinary legislator **that must be filled**, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relationships between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator must issue a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relationships between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by virtue of the provisions of article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), has effects erga omnes, for all constituted powers, precisely, for that reason, the ordinary legislator assumed the task of discussing the opportunity and convenience of regulating relationships between persons of the same sex."* (The bold print is added); that, in the exercise of its proper functions, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) enacted the cited Law No. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta No. 130 of the following July 8, which added subsection m) to article 4 of the *General Law on Young Persons (Ley General de la Persona Joven)* and thus introduced an element of judgment whose consequences have not been the subject of any pronouncement by jurisprudence, which is the referred prohibition of *"(…) discrimination contrary to human dignity (…)"* when guaranteeing the right to recognition of the social and patrimonial effects of the de facto unions (uniones de hecho) that a young person constitutes in a public, notorious, unique, and stable manner; that the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Convención de Viena sobre derecho de los Tratados)*, approved by Law No. 7615, of July 24, 1996, and duly ratified by Costa Rica, obligates States Parties to comply in good faith with the conventions in force (article 26); that since 2006 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has postulated its doctrine of "conventionality control (control de convencionalidad)", according to which the *"(…) legislative obligation of Article 2 of the [American] Convention [on Human Rights] also has the purpose of facilitating the function of the Judicial Branch so that the law applier has a clear option on how to resolve a particular case. However, when the Legislature fails in its task of suppressing and/or adapting laws contrary to the American Convention, the Judiciary remains bound by the duty of guarantee established in Article 1.1 of the same and, consequently, must refrain from applying any regulation contrary to it. Compliance by State agents or officials with a law that violates the Convention produces international responsibility of the State, and it is a basic principle of the international responsibility of the State, recognized in international human rights law, in the sense that every State is internationally responsible for acts or omissions of any of its powers and organs in violation of internationally enshrined rights, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention. / (…) The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are obligated to apply the provisions in force in the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State apparatus, are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the effects of the Convention's provisions are not diminished by the application of laws contrary to its object and purpose, and that from the outset lack legal effects. In other words, the Judicial Branch must exercise a kind of ‘conventionality control (control de convencionalidad)’ between the domestic legal norms they apply in concrete cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In this task, the Judicial Branch must take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation that the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention, has made of it."* (Judgment of September 26, 2006, case [Nombre9] vs. Chile); that two months later, in the case of Dismissed Congressional Employees vs. Peru (judgment of November 24, 2006), that international body reiterated this precedent, specifying that said control proceeds "ex officio," without the need for the parties to request it; that in ruling No. 2313-95, of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) noted that *"(…) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural organ to interpret the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this regulation, whether in a contentious case or a mere advisory opinion, will have -in principle- the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now maintain, moreover, is received in our law, when the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provides that unwritten norms -such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law- shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (article 7.l.)."*; that in the judgment of February 24, 2012, case [Nombre10] and [Nombre11] vs. Chile, the Inter-American Court concretized its doctrine on discrimination based on sexual orientation in the following terms: *"(…) any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on a person's sexual orientation is proscribed by the [American] Convention [on Human Rights]. Consequently, no norm, decision, or practice of domestic law, whether by State authorities or by private individuals, can diminish or restrict, in any way, a person's rights based on their sexual orientation."* and reaffirmed *"(…) that the American Convention does not define a closed concept of family, much less does it protect only a ‘traditional’ model of it. In this regard, the Tribunal reiterates that the concept of family life is not limited only to marriage and must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties live together outside of marriage."* with which, denying a non-heterosexual couple the status of a family group *"(…) reflects a limited and stereotyped perception of the concept of family that has no basis in the Convention as there is no specific model of family (the ‘traditional family’)."* and that the essential content of the referred fundamental right to effective judicial protection undoubtedly includes the principle of *hermetic plenitude of the legal system (plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico)*, addressed by articles 6 of the *Civil Code (Código Civil)* and 5 of the *Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)*, which prevents outrightly rejecting a claim under the pretext that specific regulations on the subject of the litigation have not been issued (see, in similar terms although regarding another subject, ruling of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) No. 2003-143, of 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003), because, as the magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) emphasized: *"In our capacity as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to consider in decision-making regarding matters submitted to our knowledge (…)."* (Ruling No. [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006), it is not feasible to dismiss outright (desestimar de plano) the action filed by Mr. [Nombre1] deeming it non-proposable. Note that in that state of affairs, an inveterate jurisprudential line that supports the decision of the first-instance judge cannot be identified. In summary, the fact that article 242 of the *Family Code (Código de Familia)* has not been expressly reformed and that some jurisprudential precedents issued based on it could provide a basis for what was decided does not authorize ignoring the cited legal reform and, in particular, the need for a review of such criteria according to the current hermeneutical principles. Therefore, because, as this Chamber highlighted in judgment No. 585-06, of 10:10 a.m. on May 10, 2006, *"(…) the referral to a ruling (…) does not provide the absolute infeasibility of the matter, because (…) it is not an absolutely clear and settled topic in jurisprudence."* (See, in a similar sense, ruling No. 682-04, of 11:10 a.m. on April 28, 2004) and because the merits could even be the subject of an appeal for cassation (recurso de casación), it is imperative to grant the appellant the possibility of obtaining, within the framework of a process conducted with all the rigorous guarantees, among them, the right to present arguments and to prove assertions, a definitive jurisdictional pronouncement on his petition.- **VIII.-** Furthermore, it is necessary to emphasize that, by virtue of the cited article 6 of the *Civil Code (Código Civil)*, *"The Courts have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which they shall attend to the system of sources established."* And that according to the second paragraph of article 5 of the *Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)*, *"The courts may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling on matters within their competence due to a lack of a norm to apply and must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of their sources."* Furthermore, this same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supply the absence of legal norms: *"The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit. **When it is a matter of supplying the absence** and not the insufficiency **of the provisions that regulate a subject matter**, said sources shall have the rank of law."* (The bold print is added). Consequently, as already noted, we, the jurisdictional bodies, are prohibited from alleging the lack of norm(s) applicable to the specific case to excuse ourselves from ruling on the merits of a process like this one. In such a case, the dogma of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system obliges us to resort, in integrative application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and implement the best solution to the controversy raised, whereby, in safeguarding the principle *pro sententia*, the possibility of hearing the filed claim in this venue and deciding, in due course, the applicable regulations, remains in force. On this matter, in ruling No. 36-F-94, of 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) noted that *"(…) jurisprudence, as a source informing the legal system, is the one called upon to supply, through extensive interpretation, the scopes of the norms responsible for resolving legal conflicts when no norm exists for the specific case or was not conceived for the new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code)."* In Nos. 112-F-92, of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, of 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001, and 360-F-02, of 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it expressed that *"(…) article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admit the referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system), on the other hand, article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admits the analogical application of norms provided there is identity of reason and no norm prohibits it."* For its part, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), in No. 415, of 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, posed it in the following terms: *"(…) in any case, in the interest of the best solution, one must resort to analogous situations expressly dealt with, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity and even, (…), common sense, that is, what people normally have to judge things reasonably (articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code, and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch)."* In No. 2004-200, of 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, this same body held that article 6 of the *Civil Code (Código Civil)* *"(…) develops a right of a fundamental nature, contained in article 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice."* Now, to fulfill such a task, consideration must be taken of Article 12 of that Code, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when they do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits that application. In a case like the present one, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not uncommon in our environment, which is the cohabitation of two people, (…) who are or were united only by affective ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, to order the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. But also, to resolve the question, in light of what has been stated, a response can be provided to the situation raised, resorting “mutatis mutandi” to the regulations given by law to similar institutions.” Finally, in No. 769-93, at 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) recognized that “Here, as the consulting Tribunal itself anticipates, one could turn to other regulations (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and Article 1 of the Código Civil; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Código Civil, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the above that, according to the first cited norm, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of applicable law to the case presented. Judges [and female judges], therefore, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. / (…) / The power of Family Law jurisprudence in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Código de Familia have their origin in court decisions, some even of a markedly dissident or minority tone, but not for that reason lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that this behavior has been noticed with greater speed here.” In summary, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh the factual situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Power at a given historical moment, in order to adequately integrate the legal system, in such a way that we can offer any person adequate satisfaction of their claim. In the words of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos), embodied in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case [Name12] v. Panama), given the imperative need to offer some response to the claim formulated in the sub-lite, “(…) there exists the duty to use those remedies (…) that relate to the protection of fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as for example the right to liberty, to personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention.”- IX.- With his usual clarity and eloquence, [Name13] has made evident that legal texts “(…) whatever they may be, are fabrics of language. This means that their basic characteristics are not, nor can they be, alien to the essential features of languages, fundamentally those of common language. One of these features is indeterminacies: differences as to how different people come to understand the same linguistic formulation in communication. When such cases arise, which constitutes the crux of a good part of the discussions among jurists, it is inevitable to choose between the different interpretations that present themselves: whether one or another sense for the same text will be accepted. Numerous discussions concern which interpretation is to be the accepted one; very often, no agreement is reached among different interpreters. (…). It means that, in practice, the ‘letter’ of the considered positive law precept, be they constitutional provisions or laws in general, provides no more than a framework (…) within which the choice of a legal meaning is eventually made, that which the interpreter himself prefers to decide upon. (…). It is in the very nature of legal discourse, one might say, that condition that its texts usually admit different interpretations, to a greater or lesser degree, before such or such classes of cases. ‘Do all persons with normal mental aptitudes extract the same conclusions from a given legal text? To pose the question means, as every jurist knows, to answer it in the negative’ ([Name14] 1977: 254). Consequently: ‘The judge or the jurist, even if they do not wish to recognize it, constructs the norms from the legal text. They do not limit themselves, nor did they even in the glory days of the Exegesis, to fitting the case they examine into a provision of the law. Why “construct”? Because the reader of the Constitution [or of other Positive Law texts], if I may use the expression, has to “assemble” the norms from the text’ ([Name15] 1995: 113).” [Axiología jurídica fundamental (Axiología II). Bases de valoración en el discurso jurídico. Materiales para discernir en forma analítico-realista las claves retóricas de esos discursos, San José: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2004, pp. 255-257]. Precisely for this reason, it is not surprising that the current Código Civil provides in its section 10 that “Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.” And that, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has repeatedly pointed out, the objective (ratio) or purpose proposed and presupposed, regarding which the precept has an instrumental nature —teleological or purposive method—; its confrontation and concordance with the rest of those which, in particular, make up a legal institution —institutional method— and, in general, with the entire legal system —systematic method—, since it cannot be conceived as a sealed and isolated compartment as it is connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly, and, finally, the consideration of the socio-economic and historical reality to which it must be applied, which is, by definition, variable and mutable given its enormous dynamism —historical-evolutionary method— are the indispensable minimum instruments to which the interpreter must jointly resort when applying one or several concrete provisions (vote No. 3481-03, at 2:03 p.m. on May 2, 2003, reiterated, among others, in Nos. [Telf3], at 3:02 p.m. on January 30; 13902-2007, at 3:24 p.m. on October 3, both from 2007; 2008-13424, at 9:31 a.m. on September 2, 2008; 2009-315, at 3:23 p.m. on January 14; [Telf4], at 12:50 p.m. on January 30; [Telf5], at 4:47 p.m. on April 30; 2009-10553, at 2:54 p.m. on July 1st; 2009-15194, at 10:53 a.m. on September 25, the five from 2009; [Telf6], at 2:50 p.m. on March 10, 2010; [Telf7], at 3:00 p.m. on February 23; [Telf8], at 3:27 p.m. on April 6 and 2011-7955, at 10:46 a.m. on June 17, the latter from 2011). This evolutionary interpretation in the light of the reality or the social context prevailing at a given historical moment becomes more imperative in junctures like the current one, which are highly variable and changing. It is clear, then, that no legal precept can be applied solely and exclusively based on its literal text, as the first-instance judge seems to have done in the sub-lite, since, to unravel and understand its sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to the various hermeneutical instruments mentioned, which represent different stages of the interpretive act and are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it must always be kept in mind that, as required by Article 11 of the Código Civil, “Equity must be weighed in the application of norms (…).” Consequently, the reading of the current regulations cannot be done in an isolated, decontextualized, and indiscriminate manner; on the contrary, it is necessary to adjust it to the specialty of the matter and the particularities of the conflict being ventilated in this venue, and it must respond to elementary rules of reasonableness and proportionality. This reaffirms the need to offer Mr. [Name1] the broadest possibility to expound upon and discuss the current scope of the regulation in force regarding common-law marriage (unión de hecho). It is the way to guarantee his fundamental rights, both those of an instrumental nature and those concerning the merits. It is worth citing here, in support of the above, the reasoning set forth by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in the recent vote No. [Telf8], at 3:27 p.m. on April 6, 2011, issued concerning subsection 4) of Article 572 of the Código Civil, which imposed a limitation on certain relatives to access the status of legitimate heirs, “(…) hence it becomes necessary to review these legal aspects, in favor of current family economic realities and social structures, for which a purposive and evolutionary interpretation of legal norms is required, since the questioning made in the action brings to light legal and historical residues that still impede the transmission of property to the detriment of certain persons by reason of coming from a genetic line founded on the male gender, and it requires resolving the problem in accordance with the fundamental rights that currently govern us.”- X.- We cannot fail to mention that in vote No. 48-13, at 2:20 p.m. on January 17, 2013, the majority of this panel confirmed the outright rejection of a proceeding similar to this one, based on reasoning identical to that contained in the appealed order: “Given the foregoing, and having reaffirmed the criterion that a common-law marriage (unión de hecho) based on Article 242 of the Código de Familia must be between a man and a woman, the majority of this panel must proceed by confirming the decision brought on appeal.” However, as already noted, on this occasion the legislative scenario is different, since the cited amendment to the Ley General de la Persona Joven by No. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta No. 130 of the following July 8, introduced new elements of judgment that demand their adequate assessment and weighing in a pronouncement on the merits. Note, furthermore, that due to a constitutionality consultation on that recent legal text, the specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) resolved the following: “(…) the consulting judge states that from the amendment introduced by literal m) of Article 4 of the Ley de la Persona Joven, two possibilities of interpretation arise. The first, from a negative perspective, in the sense that persons between the ages of 15 and 35 must go to the Family Courts (Juzgados de Familia) for the recognition of their common-law marriage (unión de hecho), so that it produces both patrimonial and personal effects. The second interpretation, from a positive perspective, implies that persons between the ages of 15 and 35 do not have to go to different State offices for the recognition of the common-law marriage (unión de hecho), since for all effects, it is sufficient to have the recognition made in a Family Court (Juzgado de Familia). The judge considers that this second interpretation is dangerous, not only because of the uncertainty that can be generated in the sense that it could not be known with certainty whether the common-law marriage (unión de hecho) relationship remained public, notorious, unique, and stable at the time of invoking State protection, and mainly, because of the extensive effects that such recognition could be given. In the first place, it is observed that the consultant does not expose a problem of constitutional validity that provokes his doubt; what the judge intends with the consultation is for this Chamber to indicate which of the two interpretations he presents is the correct one to resolve the specific case, which is improper, since on repeated occasions this Court has indicated that judicial consultations promoted by judges must be formulated in relation to the norms or acts they must apply, but not in relation to the specific case. It is not appropriate for this jurisdiction to tell the judge which norms to apply or their correct legal interpretation. On the other hand, it is verified that the questions raised by the judge regarding this point, i.e., whether young people between 15 and 35 years of age must or must not go to the Family Court (Juzgado de familia) for the recognition of the patrimonial and personal effects of a common-law marriage (unión de hecho), are related to aspects of legality and not constitutionality, which the judge must resolve.” (Vote No. 2013-10828, at 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 2013).- XI.- Based on all the foregoing, we cannot share the decision of the a quo body, and as we do not identify the absence of any procedural prerequisite that makes it impossible to process the claim, this matter must continue to be processed so that, once instructed, it is determined, by means of a judgment, whether or not what is sought is admissible. Only in this way are Mr. [Name1]'s fundamental rights to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) and due process (debido proceso) guaranteed, and even the right to resort to the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), via cassation appeal (recurso de casación), in the event that it is dismissed in the first and second instances. The appealed order exceeds the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality that must govern the exercise of the jurisdictional function and, therefore, we proceed to revoke it and order the continuation of the proceeding.-

POR TANTO

Se revoca la resolución recurrida y se ordena darle curso a la demanda interpuesta por el señor [Name1].- Alexis Vargas Soto Randall Esquivel Quirós Luis Héctor Amoretti Orozco r.s.

I.- Mr. G. seeks the legal recognition of the couple relationship that, as he indicates, he has maintained with Mr. C. publicly, notoriously, stably, and singularly for more than three years. He expressly claims the application of subsection m) of numeral 4 of the *Ley General de la Persona Joven*, in accordance with 242 of the *Código de Familia*. He also bases his claim on 1, 2, and 24 of the *Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos*; 5 of the *Convención Iberoamericana de derechos de los jóvenes*; 48 of the *Ley General sobre VIH-SIDA*; 7 and 12 of the *Declaración Universal sobre Derechos Humanos*, 5 of the *Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos*, and 7 and 33 of the *Constitución Política* (folios 5-8). In the appealed order, issued at 11:02 a.m. on the past 11th of September, the Juzgado de Familia of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José rejected *ad portas* the lawsuit because it considered that article 242 of the *Código de Familia* only allows the recognition of a de facto union between a man and a woman who are free to marry (folio 10). In this venue, the special judicial attorney of Mr. G. argues that he primarily relied on the norm of the *Ley General de la Persona Joven* and not on the provisions of the *Código de Familia*, as the first instance judge incorrectly understood (folios 11-13).- II.- As we pointed out in vote no. 132-10, of 8:40 a.m. on January 26th and reiterated in nos. 1313-10 of 9:30 a.m. on September 21st, both from 2010; 975-11, of 1:55 p.m. on August 23rd and 644-11, of 2:18 p.m. on September 7th, both from 2011, “In the modern State, the proscription of violence and the prohibition of self-help make it necessary to resort to the Judicial Branch to make effective the exercise of the freedoms and rights guaranteed by the legal system when they are threatened or are disregarded by the action of another person. For this reason, numeral 153 -in accordance with 9- of the *Constitución Política* regulates the exclusivity and universality of the jurisdictional function in the courts of justice (see, in this regard, the vote of the Sala Constitucional no. 1148-90, of 5:00 p.m. on September 21st, 1990) when it provides that “It corresponds to the Judicial Branch, in addition to the functions that this Constitution assigns to it, to hear civil, criminal, commercial, labor, and contentious-administrative cases, as well as others established by law, whatever their nature and the status of the persons involved; to resolve definitively on them and to execute the resolutions it pronounces, with the assistance of public force if necessary.” Under these conditions, as Jorge A. MARABOTTO LUGARO points out, it is necessary, then, “(…) that there be a wide possibility of access to an impartial body to settle the conflicts that people may have. Otherwise, this thesis that self-help is exceptional would be illusory and those who have a disagreement, if they fail to overcome it –and it is not a matter concerning non-waivable rights–, must resolve it through the process. (…).

If the State or organized society has monopolized –in principle– the adjudication of disputes, it must do so in exchange for giving all persons the genuine possibility of easily accessing that instrument or means (…). There are many factors that affect that access or that obstruct it, sometimes in an absolute manner or that become so characterized.” [A fundamental human right: access to justice. Yearbook of Latin American Constitutional Law, Montevideo: 2003, 291-292. Retrieved May 12, 2007, from http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/dconstla/cont/2003/pr/pr16.pdf). When a person wishes to pursue a judicial action, they must therefore be in real conditions to be able to do so. The same must be demanded when threatened by one filed against them by another; a case in which they must be able to appear and defend themselves effectively. Both requirements, configured as a fundamental right, are embodied in article 41 of the Political Constitution: “By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have suffered to their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt and complete justice must be delivered, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws.” Various international instruments applicable in Costa Rica contain similar provisions. By virtue of article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” Article 18 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man provides that “Every person may resort to the courts to enforce his rights. He must also have available a simple and brief procedure by which justice will protect him against acts of the authority that violate, to his detriment, any of the fundamental rights enshrined constitutionally.” The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, approved by Ley N.° 4229, of December 11, 1968, establishes that “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” (Article 14, paragraph 1). In paragraph 1) of its article 8, the American Convention on Human Rights or “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, approved by Ley N.° 4534 of February 23, 1970, stipulates that “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.” Article 25 recognizes that “1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the exercise of their official functions. / 2. The States Parties undertake: / a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state; / b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and / c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.” As can easily be gleaned from their reading, these precepts recognize in favor of any subject a set of prestational rights that configure the minimum or basic content of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva). Furthermore, they make express reference to the fundamental right to equality as its cross-cutting axis. Finally, they highlight some of the many obstacles that can be decisive in hindering or frustrating them and entrust the State to take the necessary precautions to remove them. In any case, this latter point is a consequence of their fundamental nature. In its advisory opinion n.º OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whose jurisdiction was recognized by Costa Rica by Decreto Ejecutivo N.° 7060 of May 26, 1977, in accordance with the provisions of article 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights, expressly detailed these scopes: “The protection of the law consists, fundamentally, of the remedies that it provides for the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Convention, which, in light of the positive obligation that Article 1.1 contemplates for the States to respect and guarantee them, implies, as the Court has already stated, the duty of the States Parties to organize all the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which the exercise of public power is manifested, in such a way that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full exercise of human rights (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 166; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, para. 175). / (…).” / (…). In relevant part, in its cited advisory opinion n.º OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that “(…) / Article 1 of the Convention obligates the States Parties not only to respect the rights and freedoms recognized therein, but also to ensure their free and full exercise to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. The Court has already expressed that this provision contains a positive duty for the States. It must also be specified that to ensure implies the obligation of the State to take all necessary measures to remove the obstacles that may exist so that individuals can enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State's tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic remedies to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention.””</i>-</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class=SpellE>III</span>.-</span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS"; mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> In summary, access to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) is a fundamental right in itself, but it is also an instrument to guarantee the validity of rights of enjoyment; that is, those whose enjoyment immediately satisfies the needs or interests of the human being. Two of its essential contents are the power of its holder to demand from the competent jurisdictional organ, once the respective procedure has been substantiated (due process), a reasoned decision grounded in Law on the claims timely adduced, which resolves the debated issues and, of course, the power to obtain it. Certainly, given its prestational nature, it is a right of legal configuration; that is, its exercise is subject to the concurrence of the prerequisites that, in each matter, have been established by the current regulations. However, it must not be overlooked that it is not permitted to impede or obstruct it by imposing arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or disproportionate barriers. The basic principles derived from article 41 of the Political Constitution and from the international precepts already cited, to which all persons and organs in the jurisdictional sphere must adjust our actions, obligate, on the one hand, the Legislative Assembly to enact the necessary legal provisions to regulate the rights of individuals, as well as the appropriate avenues and procedures for the purpose of procuring their effective jurisdictional protection when they have been violated and, on the other hand, the different Tribunals to interpret and apply them in such a way that they do not hinder the proper verification of the grievance and guarantee, if it is accredited, the full and timely reestablishment of those rights (see extraordinary session of the Full Court of October 11, 1982). Hence, we judges violate the fundamental right under discussion when we make impossible or hinder access to the stipulated procedures or when we reject or deny, without any reason or invoking an insufficient or spurious one, a petition that we should have processed and resolved in a judgment. To counteract that risk, it is required, in principle, that any resolution that prevents hearing a claim on its merits find support in a legal cause and in a reasonable reading of it, since, being in the presence of a fundamental right, the principles pro actione and pro sententia come into full force, which obligate interpreting and applying the procedural prerequisites or requirements restrictively and in the manner most favorable to the effectiveness of judicial protection. This makes it necessary to contextualize any factual situation that leads to issuing a decree whose consequence is to prevent defining whether the claim is admissible or not. Excessive formalism always entails a denial of justice (see extraordinary session of the Full Court of April 26, 1984).-</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:36.85pt;line-height:150%'><span class=SpellE><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language: ES-CR'>IV</span></b></span><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS"; mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>.-</span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS"; mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> In its emblematic Vote n.º 1739-92, of 11:45 hours on July 1, 1992, reiterated in part in n.os 1562-93, of 15:06 hours on March 30, 1993 and 2005-10604, of 15:44 hours on August 16, 2005, the Constitutional Chamber established that, as a set of guarantees for rights of enjoyment, the concept of due process includes, among others, the right to a just judgment. This is linked, in turn, to certain constitutional principles and, especially, to pro sententia. According to it, “(…) all procedural norms exist and must be interpreted to facilitate the administration of justice and not as obstacles to achieving it; which obligates considering procedural requirements, especially inadmissions of any nature, restrictively and only by express text, while everything that leads to the decision on the merits in a judgment must be interpreted extensively and with the greatest possible emphasis on substantive justice [sic]; furthermore, procedural infractions should only give rise to relative nullities and, therefore, always correctable, as long as they do not produce defenselessness.” In that same ruling, that organ pointed out that “(…) laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity, not only to have been promulgated by competent organs and due procedures, but also to pass a substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, freedom, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with their purpose. A distinction is thus made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; juridical reasonableness, or the adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially to the rights and freedoms recognized or presupposed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society.”-</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;V.-</span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> Based on those criteria, this Chamber has insisted that the power to reject ad portas any filing, including the act of procedural initiation (that is, the complaint and the counterclaim), which paragraph 1 of Article 97 of the Civil Procedure Code expressly attributes to jurisdictional organs, must be exercised in a reasonable manner and with reticence, since it can translate, in certain situations, into an evident obstacle to the effective enjoyment of the fundamental right to judicial protection and, in this specific matter, into a breach of the mandate contained in Article 51 of the Political Constitution, according to which “The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State.” (See, in the same vein, Votes n.os 1288-03, of 8:30 hours on September 25; 1331-03, of 8:10 hours on October 2, both of 2003; 207-04, of 13:00 hours on February 11; 682-04, of 11:10 hours on April 28; 1091-04, of 8:10 hours on June 30; 1277-04, of 9:40 hours on July 27, the latter of 2004; 585-06, of 10:10 hours on May 10, 2006; 80-08, of 11:00 hours on January 18, 2008; 595-10 of 9:50 hours on May 3; 822-10, of 11:30 hours on June 22; 848-10, of 8:30 hours on June 28; 1139-10, of 8:10 hours on August 23; 1176-10, of 9:40 hours on August 24; 1589-10, of 10:30 hours on November 17, all of 2010; 469-11, of 10:50 hours on April 5; 605-11, of 16:24 hours on May 17; 852-11, of 8:21 hours on July 5; 975-11, of 13:55 hours on August 23, the six of 2011; 95-12, of 15:21 hours on February 21; 269-12, of 16:26 hours on June 19; 510-12, of 10:53 hours on November 28; 821-12, of 11:18 hours on October 9, the four of 2012; 54-13, of 11:01 hours on January 30; 328-13, of 15:11 hours on July 24; 419-13, of 8:01 hours on September 26; 842-13, of 8:36 hours on October 9 and 505-13, of 16:15 hours on November 6, the latter of 2013). Precisely to reduce that danger, such power-duty appears mediated by the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, preclusion, procedural impulse, and procedural economy. Since its recognition aims to prevent the loss of economic resources and time that a useless proceeding entails for the persons involved and for the State, as a general rule, it must be exercised in the preliminary stage and must be based on a substantiated analysis of the different factual and legal possibilities that the petition may succeed. With that objective, the competent authority must review the legislation, doctrine, and jurisprudence to be able to correctly establish the absolute unfeasibility of what is requested; that is, its “evident” inadmissibility (see the votes of this organ n.os 207-04; 822-10; 469-11; 95-12; 510-12; 328-13; 419-13; 842-13 and 505-13, already cited), especially when it concerns the initial act, a scenario in which “The outright rejection must be based on an unquestionable criterion that makes the complaint non-deducible or non-proposable. Thus, article 41 of our fundamental law is key at this point (…). However, it is important to review in our case whether the rejection ad limine litis is correct because the complaint constitutes a legal groundlessness, or whether, to the contrary, it can be understood that there is a denial of justice (…).” (Vote n.º 1288-03, of 8:30 hours on September 25, 2003, reiterated in n.os 682-04, of 11:10 hours on April 28 and 1277-04, of 9:40 hours on July 27, both of 2004)</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;VI.-</span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> Without a doubt, this matter is a product of the exercise, by Mr. G., of his fundamental right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva). For that very reason, the rejection ad portas of his complaint must not only find legal support and conform to the parameter of reasonableness previously outlined, but it must also be duly reasoned. If, according to what is recorded in the decree challenged on appeal, that decision was based on the fact that “The regulations that govern the filing of proceedings for the recognition of a de facto union, article 242 of the Family Code, are clear in indicating that a de facto union may be recognized between a man and a woman who have the freedom of status to marry. Thus, it is also clear that one of the inescapable requirements is that this union occurred between a man and a woman, which does not happen in the case that concerns us, since a recognition of a union between two men is sought, which is illegal and therefore, -as stated- there is no other path than to reject the complaint outright.” (Folio 10), it is evident, in the first place, that the dismissal of the claim does not stem from the absence of any procedural prerequisite, a matter proper to a preliminary resolution, but from a reason on the merits; something that, as a general rule, should be decided in a judgment. If, in addition, it is noted that, as is rightly pointed out in the appeal, that reasoning does not weigh the main legal basis invoked by the plaintiff; that is, paragraph m) of article 4 of the General Law on Young Persons, added by Law n.º 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta n.º 130 of the following July 8 and, especially, the scope of the prohibition of “(…) discrimination contrary to human dignity (…)”, contained therein, in the context of Human Rights Law, it is unquestionable that we are in the presence of an interpretation, among other possible ones, of how this matter could be decided and, for that very reason, it does not qualify as a legitimate and sufficient cause to dismiss ad portas the action initiated. Having refused to give it course constitutes, therefore, a serious error, without prejudice, of course, to what is definitively decided at the time of issuing the judgment. As was rightly pointed out in Vote n.º 1460-05, of 15:00 hours on September 27, 2005, “There is no such absolute unfeasibility since there is no express norm that makes the complaint and the process clearly inadmissible, non-proposable, or useless. It must be made sufficiently clear that this resolution does not mean endorsing or not endorsing the criterion or argumentation followed regarding the merits of the matter, but rather, that this Tribunal does not find the prerequisites to close the avenue ad limine to the complaint (…).” Ultimately and with absolute independence “(…) from the admissibility or not of what is claimed (…), which will necessarily have to be analyzed in the resolution on the merits and not now, it is considered that the outright rejection implies a violation of the right of access to Justice, this is the avenue to claim, discuss, and decide if (…)” (Vote n.º 740-10, of 10:10 hours on June 2, 2010), according to the current regulations, it is appropriate or not to consider it accredited that a couple relationship exists between the parties and, if so, what would be the legal consequences that could be recognized.-</span><span lang=ES-CR style='mso-ansi-language: ES-CR'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span class=SpellE>VII</span>.-</span></b><span lang=ES-CR style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS"; mso-ansi-language:ES-CR'> It is true that in Vote n.º 2006-7262, of 14:46 hours on May 23, 2006, reiterated in n.º 2011-9765, of 13:13 hours on July 27, 2011, the Constitutional Chamber deemed legitimate the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in paragraph 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code, but it also ruled out “(…) that there is any impediment of any nature to the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is an empirical verification to indicate that they have [sic] increased. With this, a problem arises that does not lie in the norm challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate regulatory norm to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of union, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not of justice, makes it necessary.” If it is added that in n.º 2010-13313, of 16:31 hours on August 10, 2010, that organ synthesized its criteria on the subject in the following terms: “From this judgment [referring to n.º 2006-7262, cited above], several aspects of importance for resolving the sub-lite are clear, which are the following: / 1°) Relationships between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or evaded. / 2°) It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relationships between persons of the same sex. / 3°) There exists a normative vacuum by the ordinary legislator that must be filled, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relationships between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator must enact a regulatory framework that governs the legal consequences of such relationships between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by virtue of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, has erga omnes effects for all constituted powers; precisely for that reason, the ordinary legislator undertook the task of discussing the timeliness and advisability of regulating relationships between persons of the same sex.” (The bold type is added); that, in the exercise of its own functions, the Legislative Assembly enacted the cited Ley n.º 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta n.º 130 of the following July 8, which added paragraph m) to article 4 of the General Law on Young Persons and thus introduced an element of judgment whose consequences have not been the subject of any pronouncement by the jurisprudence, which is the referred prohibition of “(…) discrimination contrary to human dignity (…)” when it comes to guaranteeing the right to the recognition of the social and patrimonial effects of the de facto unions that a young person constitutes in a public, notorious, unique, and stable manner; that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Ley n.º 7615, of July 24, 1996, and duly ratified by Costa Rica, obligates the States Parties to perform their treaty obligations in good faith (Article 26); that since 2006 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has postulated its doctrine of “conventionality control”, according to which “(…) the legislative obligation of Article 2 of the [American Convention on Human Rights] also has the purpose of facilitating the function of the Judiciary in such a way that the applier [masculine or feminine] of the law has a clear option of how to resolve a particular case. However, when the Legislative branch fails in its task of abolishing and/or adapting laws contrary to the American Convention, the Judicial branch remains bound to the duty of guarantee established in Article 1.1 thereof and, consequently, must refrain from applying any regulation contrary to it.

Compliance by agents or officials of the State with a law that violates the Convention generates international responsibility of the State, and it is a basic principle of the international responsibility of the State, enshrined in international human rights law, in the sense that every State is internationally responsible for acts or omissions of any of its powers or organs in violation of internationally enshrined rights, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention. / (…) The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are obliged to apply the provisions in force within the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the apparatus of the State, are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the effects of the provisions of the Convention are not diminished by the application of laws contrary to its object and purpose, and which from the outset lack legal effects. In other words, the Judicial Branch must exercise a kind of ‘conventionality control’ between the domestic legal norms that they apply in specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In this task, the Judicial Branch must take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.” (Judgment of September 26, 2006, case of Almonacid Arellano vs. Chile); that two months later, in the case of Dismissed Congressional Employees vs. Peru (judgment of November 24, 2006), that international body reiterated that precedent, specifying that such control proceeds “ex officio”, without the need for the parties to request it; that in Vote No. 2313-95, at 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) noted that “(…) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural body for interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normative framework, whether in a contentious case or a mere advisory opinion, will have—in principle—the same value as the norm being interpreted. Not merely ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now uphold, moreover, is embraced in our law, when the General Law of Public Administration provides that unwritten norms—such as custom, jurisprudence (case law), and general principles of law—shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.).”; that in the judgment of February 24, 2012, case of Atala Riffo and daughters vs. Chile, the Inter-American Court specified its doctrine on discrimination based on sexual orientation in the following terms: “(…) any discriminatory rule, act, or practice based on a person’s sexual orientation is proscribed by the [American] Convention [on Human Rights]. Consequently, no domestic rule, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, can in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation.” and reaffirmed “(…) that the American Convention does not establish a closed concept of family, much less does it protect only a ‘traditional’ model thereof. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage and must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties share a life in common outside of marriage.” with which, denying a non-heterosexual couple the status of a family group “(…) reflects a limited and stereotyped perception of the concept of family that has no basis in the Convention, as there is no specific model of family (the ‘traditional family’).” and that the essential content of the referred fundamental right to effective judicial protection undoubtedly includes the principle of the hermetic completeness of the legal system (plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico), addressed by numerals 6 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), which prevents the outright rejection of a complaint under the pretext that no specific regulation has been issued regarding the subject matter of the litigation (see, in similar terms although regarding another matter, Vote of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) No. 2003-143, at 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003), for, as the magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) emphasized: “In our capacity as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to consider in making decisions regarding matters submitted to our knowledge (…).” (Vote No. 2006-7262, at 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006), it is not feasible to dismiss outright the action brought by Mr. G. by deeming it unstateable (improponible). It should be noted that in this state of affairs, no long-established (inveterada) jurisprudential line can be identified that supports the decision of the first-instance judge. In summary, the fact that numeral 242 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) has not been expressly reformed and that some jurisprudential precedents issued based on it could provide a foundation for what was decided does not authorize disregarding the cited legal reform and, particularly, the need for a review of such criteria in accordance with the hermeneutical principles in force. Therefore, because as this Chamber highlighted in judgment No. 585-06, at 10:10 a.m. on May 10, 2006, “(…) the reference to a vote (…) does not render the matter absolutely non-viable, since (…) it is not an absolutely clear and settled issue in jurisprudence (case law).” (See, in a similar sense, Vote No. 682-04, at 11:10 a.m. on April 28, 2004) and because the merits could even be the subject of a cassation appeal, it is imperative to grant the challenger the possibility of obtaining, within the framework of a process conducted with all the strict guarantees, among them, the right to present their arguments and prove their assertions, a definitive jurisdictional ruling on their petition.- VIII.- For greater abundance, it is necessary to emphasize that, by virtue of the cited Article 6 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), “The Courts have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which they shall adhere to the system of sources established.” And that pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), “The courts may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling on matters within their competence due to a lack of applicable norm and shall do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of their sources.” Moreover, that same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supply the absence of legal norms: “The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence (Case Law) shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit. When it comes to supplying the absence and not the insufficiency of the provisions regulating a matter, such sources shall have the rank of law.” (Emphasis added). Consequently, as already noted, we jurisdictional bodies are prohibited from alleging the lack of an applicable norm(s) to the specific case to excuse ourselves from ruling on the merits of a process such as this. In such a case, the dogma of the hermetic completeness of the legal system obliges us to resort, in integrative application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and put into practice the best solution to the controversy raised, whereby, in safeguard of the pro sententia principle, the possibility remains of hearing the filed complaint through this avenue and deciding, in due course, the applicable law. On this matter, in Vote No. 36-F-94, at 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) noted that “(…) jurisprudence (case law) as an informing source of the legal system is called upon to supply, through extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms tasked with resolving legal conflicts when there is no norm for the specific case or it has not been conceived for the new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code).” In No. 112-F-92, at 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; No. 151-F-01, at 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001; and No. 360-F-02, at 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it expressed that “(…) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admit referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic completeness of the legal system); on the other hand, Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admits the analogical application of norms provided there is identity of reason and there is no norm that prohibits it.” For its part, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), in No. 415, at 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, framed it in the following terms: “(…) in any case, one must resort, for the sake of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly dealt with, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity and even, (…), to common sense, that is, the way people normally have of judging things reasonably (Articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code, and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch).” In No. 2004-200, at 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that Article 6 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) “(…) develops a fundamental right, contained in numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now, to fulfill such a task, Article 12 of that Code must be taken into consideration, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when they do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits such application. In a case like the present, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not foreign to our environment, which is the cohabitation of two persons, (…) who only were or were united by affective ties, without protection by the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds to, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, order the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. But also, to resolve the question, considering the foregoing, a response can be provided to the situation raised, resorting ‘mutatis mutandis’, to the regulations given by law to similar institutions.” Finally, in No. 769-93, at 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) recognized that “Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could resort to other legislation (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code; and even analogical application, which the subsequent Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the foregoing, that according to the first norm cited, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of law applicable to the case raised. Judges, then, have at their disposal, broad possibilities to resolve with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient norm. / (…) / The power that the jurisprudence (case law) of Family Law in our country has had is such, that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, even some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not for that reason lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that it is where such behavior has most rapidly been noted.” In summary, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh factual situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Branch at a specific historical moment, in order to adequately integrate the legal system, so that we can offer any person adequate satisfaction of their demand. In the words of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, set forth in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case of Heliodoro Portugal Vs. Panama), given the pressing need to offer some response to the claim formulated in the sub-lite, “(…) there is a duty to use those resources (…) that relate to the protection of fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as, for example, the right to liberty, to personal integrity, and the right to life, as the case may be, which are recognized in the American Convention.”- IX.- With his customary clarity and eloquence, Pedro HABA has highlighted that legal texts “(…) whatever they may be, are fabrics of language. This means that their basic characteristics are not, nor can be, alien to the essential features of languages, fundamentally those of common language. One of these features is indeterminacies: differences in how different people come to understand the same linguistic formulation, in communication. When such cases occur, which constitutes the core of a good part of the discussions among jurists, it is inevitable to choose between different interpretations that present themselves: whether one or other meanings will be accepted for the same text. Numerous discussions revolve around which interpretation should be accepted; very often, no agreement is reached among different interpreters. (…). It means that, in practice, the ‘letter’ of the positive law precept under consideration, be they constitutional or generally legal provisions, provides no more than a framework (…) within which the choice of a legal meaning is operated, in due course, the one the interpreter themselves prefers to decide upon. (…). It is in the very nature of legal discourse, it could be said, that its texts usually admit different interpretations, to a greater or lesser degree, before such or such classes of cases. ‘Do all persons with normal mental aptitudes extract the same conclusions from a given legal text? Asking the question means, as every jurist knows, answering it in the negative’ (LAUN 1977: 254). Consequently: ‘The judge or the jurist, even if they do not wish to recognize it, construct norms from the legal text. They do not limit themselves, nor did they even do so in the glory days of Exegesis, to fitting the case they examine into a provision of the law. Why ‘construct’? Because the reader of the Constitution [or of other Positive Law texts], if I may be allowed the expression, has to ‘assemble’ the norms from the text’ (RODRÍGUEZ OCONITRILLO 1995: 113).” [Fundamental Legal Axiology (Axiología II). Bases of Valuation in Legal Discourse. Materials for Discerning in an Analytical-Realist Manner the Rhetorical Keys of Those Discourses, San José: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2004, pp. 255-257]. Precisely for this reason, it is not surprising that the current Civil Code (Código Civil) provides in its numeral 10 that “Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose.” And that, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has repeatedly noted, the objective (ratio) or proposed and intended purpose, with respect to which the precept has an instrumental nature—teleological or finalist method—; its comparison and concordance with the rest of those that, in particular, make up a legal institution—institutional method—and, in general, with the entire legal system—systematic method—, given that it cannot be conceived as a watertight and isolated compartment since it is connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly, and, finally, the consideration of the socio-economic and historical reality to which it is to be applied, which is, by definition, variable and mutable given its enormous dynamism—historical-evolutionary method—are the minimum indispensable instruments that the interpreter must resort to jointly when applying one or several specific provisions (Vote No. 3481-03, at 2:03 p.m. on May 2, 2003, reiterated, among others, in Nos. 2007-1125, at 3:02 p.m. on January 30; 13902-2007, at 3:24 p.m. on October 3, both of 2007; 2008-13424, at 9:31 a.m. on September 2, 2008; 2009-315, at 3:23 p.m. on January 14; 2009-1328, at 12:50 p.m. on January 30; 2009-7010, at 4:47 p.m. on April 30; 2009-10553, at 2:54 p.m. on July 1; 2009-15194, at 10:53 a.m. on September 25, the five from 2009; 2010-4806, at 2:50 p.m. on March 10, 2010; 2011-2105, at 3:00 p.m. on February 23; 2011-4575, at 3:27 p.m. on April 6; and 2011-7955, at 10:46 a.m. on June 17, the last from 2011). This evolutionary interpretation in light of the prevailing reality or social context at a given historical moment is imposed with greater force in situations like the current one, highly variable and changing. It is clear, then, that no legal precept can be applied, solely and exclusively, based on its literal wording, as the first-instance judge seems to have done in the sub-lite, since, to unravel and understand its sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to the various hermeneutical instruments mentioned, which represent different stages of the interpretative act and are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it must always be kept in mind that, as required by Article 11 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), “Equity must be weighed in the application of norms (…).” Consequently, the reading of the legislation in force cannot be done in an isolated, decontextualized, and indiscriminate manner; on the contrary, it must be adjusted to the specialty of the subject matter and the particularities of the conflict being aired in this venue and must respond to elementary rules of reasonableness and proportionality. This reaffirms the need to offer Mr. G. the broadest possible opportunity to present and discuss the current scope of the regulation in force regarding de facto unions (unión de hecho). This is the way to guarantee his fundamental rights, both those of a procedural nature and those of substance. It is worth citing here, in support of the foregoing, the reasoning set forth by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in recent Vote No. 2011-4575, at 3:27 p.m. on April 6, 2011, issued regarding subsection 4) of Article 572 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which imposed a limitation on certain relatives from attaining the status of legitimate heirs, “(…) hence it is necessary to review these legal aspects, in favor of current family economic realities and social structures, whereby a finalist and evolutionary interpretation of the legal norms is required, for the questioning made in the action brings to light legal and historical remnants that still impede the transmission of property to the detriment of certain persons by reason of coming from a genetic line founded on the male gender, and requires resolving the problem in accordance with the fundamental rights that govern us today.”- X.- We cannot fail to mention that in Vote No. 48-13, at 2:20 p.m. on January 17, 2013, a majority of this panel confirmed the flat rejection of a process similar to this one, based on an argument identical to that contained in the appealed order: “Given the foregoing, and having reaffirmed the criterion that the de facto union (unión de hecho) based on Article 242 of the Family Code must be between a man and a woman, the majority of this panel must proceed by confirming the resolution brought on appeal.” However, as already noted, in this instance the legislative scenario is different, since the cited reform to the General Law of the Young Person (Ley General de la Persona Joven) by Law No. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta No. 130 of the following July 8, introduced new elements of judgment that require their adequate assessment and weighing in a ruling on the merits. Note also, that by reason of a constitutional consultation on that recent legal text, the specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice resolved the following: “(…) the consulting judge states that from the reform introduced by literal m) of Article 4 of the Law of the Young Person, two possibilities of interpretation arise. The first, from a negative perspective, in the sense that persons between the ages of 15 and 35 years of age must go to the Family Courts for the recognition of their de facto union, so that it produces both property effects and personal effects. The second interpretation, from a positive perspective, implies that persons between 15 and 35 years of age do not have to go to different State agencies for the recognition of the de facto union, since for all purposes, it is sufficient to have the recognition made in a Family Court. The judge considers this second interpretation dangerous, not only because of the uncertainty that could be generated in the sense that it would not be possible to know, with certainty, if the de facto union relationship remained public, notorious, unique, and stable at the time of invoking the protection of the State, and mainly, because of the expansive effects that could be given to such recognition.

First, it is observed that the consultant does not set forth a problem of constitutional validity that gives rise to his doubt; what the judge seeks with the consultation is for this Chamber to indicate which of the two interpretations he presents is the correct one to resolve the specific case, which is improper, since on repeated occasions this Court has indicated that judicial consultations promoted by judges must be formulated in relation to the norms or acts they must apply, but not in relation to the specific case. It is not appropriate for this jurisdiction to indicate to the judge which norms he should apply or their correct legal interpretation. Furthermore, it is verified that the questions raised by the judge regarding this point, that is, whether young people between 15 and 35 years of age must or must not go to the Family Court for the recognition of the patrimonial and personal effects of a common-law marriage (unión de hecho); are related to aspects of legality and not constitutionality, which the judge must resolve." </i>(Voto n.º 2013-10828, of 15:00 hours on August 14, 2013).- **XI.-** Based on all the foregoing, we cannot share the decision of the lower court (órgano *a quo*) and as we do not identify the absence of any procedural prerequisite (presupuesto procesal) that makes it impossible to proceed with the lawsuit, this matter must continue being processed in such a way that, once instructed, it is determined, by means of a judgment, whether that which is sought is admissible or not. Only in this way are Mr. G.'s fundamental rights to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), due process (debido proceso), and even the right to appeal before the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) via an appeal in cassation (recurso de casación), in the event that his claim is dismissed in the first and second instances, guaranteed. The appealed order exceeds the parameters of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality that must govern the exercise of the jurisdictional function and, therefore, we proceed to revoke it and order the continuation of the process.

In accordance with it, "(…) all procedural rules exist and must be interpreted to facilitate the administration of justice and not as obstacles to achieving it; which obliges procedural requirements, especially inadmissibilities of any nature, to be considered restrictively and only as expressly set forth in the text, while everything that leads to the decision of substantive issues in a judgment must be interpreted extensively and with the greatest possible formalism [sic]; furthermore, procedural infractions should only give rise to relative nullities and, therefore, always curable, as long as they do not produce defenselessness." In that same ruling, that body noted that "(…) laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity, not only having been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures, but also to pass substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, liberty, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified in accordance with the constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with its object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness (razonabilidad técnica), which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; juridical reasonableness (razonabilidad jurídica), or the adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and liberties recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights (razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales), in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society."- V.- Based on those criteria, this Chamber has insisted that the power to reject ad portas any petition, including the act of procedural initiation (i.e., the complaint and the counterclaim), which subsection 1 of Article 97 of the Código Procesal Civil expressly attributes to jurisdictional bodies, must be exercised reasonably and with suspicion, since it can translate, in certain situations, into an evident obstacle to the effective enjoyment of the fundamental right to judicial protection and, in this specific matter, into a breach of the mandate contained in Article 51 of the Constitución Política, according to which "The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State." (See, in the same sense, rulings no. 1288-03, of 8:30 a.m. on September 25; 1331-03, of 8:10 a.m. on October 2, both of 2003; 207-04, of 1:00 p.m. on February 11; 682-04, of 11:10 a.m. on April 28; 1091-04, of 8:10 a.m. on June 30; 1277-04, of 9:40 a.m. on July 27, the last of 2004; 585-06, of 10:10 a.m. on May 10, 2006; 80-08, of 11:00 a.m. on January 18, 2008; 595-10 of 9:50 a.m. on May 3; 822-10, of 11:30 a.m. on June 22; 848-10, of 8:30 a.m. on June 28; 1139-10, of 8:10 a.m. on August 23; 1176-10, of 9:40 a.m. on August 24; 1589-10, of 10:30 a.m. on November 17, all of 2010; 469-11, of 10:50 a.m. on April 5; 605-11, of 4:24 p.m. on May 17; 852-11, of 8:21 a.m. on July 5; 975-11, of 1:55 p.m. on August 23, all six of 2011; 95-12, of 3:21 p.m. on February 21; 269-12, of 4:26 p.m. on June 19; 510-12, of 10:53 a.m. on November 28; 821-12, of 11:18 a.m. on October 9, all four of 2012; 54-13, of 11:01 a.m. on January 30; 328-13, of 3:11 p.m. on July 24; 419-13, of 8:01 a.m. on September 26; 842-13, of 8:36 a.m. on October 9 and 505-13, of 4:15 p.m. on November 6, the last of 2013). Precisely to reduce that danger, such power-duty appears mediated by the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, preclusion, procedural impetus, and procedural economy. As its recognition seeks to prevent the loss of economic resources and time that a useless proceeding entails for the persons involved and for the State, as a general rule, it must be exercised at the preliminary stage and must be based on a reasoned analysis of the different factual and legal possibilities that the petition may prosper. With that objective, the competent authority must review the legislation, doctrine, and jurisprudence to be able to establish with certainty the absolute inviability of what is requested; that is, its "evident" impropriety (see rulings of this body no. 207-04; 822-10; 469-11; 95-12; 510-12; 328-13; 419-13; 842-13 and 505-13, already cited), especially when it concerns the initial act, an assumption in which "The outright rejection must be based on an unquestionable criterion that makes the claim non-deductible or non-proposable. Therefore, Article 41 of our fundamental law is key at this point (…). However, it is important to review in our case whether the rejection ad limine litis is correct because the claim constitutes a legal unreasonableness, or whether, on the contrary, it can be understood that there is a denial of justice (…)." (Ruling no. 1288-03, of 8:30 a.m. on September 25, 2003, reiterated in no. 682-04, of 11:10 a.m. on April 28 and 1277-04, of 9:40 a.m. on July 27, both of 2004) VI.- Without a doubt, this matter is the product of the exercise, by Mr. [Name1]., of his fundamental right to effective judicial protection. For that very reason, the ad portas rejection of his claim must not only find legal support and conform to the parameter of reasonableness outlined above, but must also be duly reasoned. If, according to what is recorded in the appealed order, that decision was based on the fact that "The regulations governing the filing of common-law marriage (unión de hecho) recognition proceedings, Article 242 of the Código de Familia, are clear in indicating that a common-law marriage may only be recognized between a man and a woman who have the freedom of status to marry. Therefore, it is also clear that one of the unavoidable requirements is that this union must have occurred between a man and a woman, which does not happen in the case at hand, as recognition of a union between two men is sought, which is illegal and therefore, -as stated- there is no other option but to reject the claim outright." (Folio 10), it is evident, first of all, that the dismissal of the claim is not due to the absence of some procedural prerequisite, a matter proper to a preliminary resolution, but to a substantive reason; which, as a general rule, should be decided in a judgment. If, moreover, one notices that, as is well pointed out in the appeal, that reasoning does not weigh the principal legal basis invoked by the plaintiff; that is, subsection m) of Article 4 of the Ley General de la Persona Joven, added by Law No. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta No. 130 of the following July 8 and, especially, the scope of the prohibition of "(…) discrimination contrary to human dignity (…)" contained therein, in the context of Human Rights Law, it is unquestionable that we are in the presence of an interpretation, among other possible ones, of how this matter could be decided and, for that very reason, it does not qualify as a legitimate and sufficient cause to dismiss ad portas the action filed. Having refused to give it course constitutes, therefore, a serious error, without prejudice, of course, to what is definitively decided at the time of issuing the judgment. As was well pointed out in ruling no. 1460-05, of 3:00 p.m. on September 27, 2005, "That absolute inviability does not exist since there is no express rule that makes the claim and the proceeding clearly improper, non-proposable, or useless. It must be sufficiently clear that this resolution does not mean that the criterion or argumentation followed regarding the substance of the matter is endorsed or not endorsed, but rather that this Tribunal does not find the prerequisites to close the way ad limine to the claim (…)." In short and with absolute independence "(…) of the merits or not of what is claimed (…), which will necessarily have to be analyzed in the substantial resolution and not now, it is considered that the outright rejection implies a violation of the right of access to Justice, this is the way to claim, discuss, and decide whether (…)" (ruling no. 740-10, of 10:10 a.m. on June 2, 2010), in accordance with the current regulations, it is appropriate or not to consider it accredited that a couple relationship exists between the parties and, if so, what the legal consequences that could be recognized would be.- VII.- It is true that in ruling no. [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, reiterated in no. [Telf2], of 1:13 p.m. on July 27, 2011, the Sala Constitucional deemed legitimate the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Código de Familia, but also ruled out "(…) that there is any impediment of any nature for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is empirical evidence to indicate that they have [sic] increased. With this, a problem arises that does not lie in the rule challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate normative regulation, to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of unions, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because a mandate of legal certainty, if not justice, makes it necessary." If one adds that in no. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010, that body synthesized its criteria on the subject in the following terms: "From this judgment [referring to no. [Telf1], previously cited] several aspects of importance for resolving the sub-lite case become clear, which are the following: / 1°) Relations between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or circumvented. / 2°) It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relations between persons of the same sex. / 3°) There is a normative vacuum (vacío normativo) on the part of the ordinary legislator [sic] that must be filled, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relations between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator [sic] must issue a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relations between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by virtue of the provisions of Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers, precisely, for that reason, the ordinary legislator [sic] undertook the task of discussing the opportunity and convenience of regulating relations between persons of the same sex." (The bold type is added); that, in the exercise of its proper functions, the Asamblea Legislativa enacted the cited Law No. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta No. 130 of the following July 8, which added subsection m) to Article 4 of the Ley General de la Persona Joven and thus introduced an element of judgment whose consequences have not been the subject of any pronouncement by jurisprudence, which is the referred prohibition of "(…) discrimination contrary to human dignity (…)" when it comes to guaranteeing the right to the recognition of the social and patrimonial effects of the common-law marriages (uniones de hecho) that a young person establishes in a public, notorious, unique, and stable manner; that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Law No. 7615, of July 24, 1996, and duly ratified by Costa Rica, obliges the States parties to comply in good faith with the conventions in force (Article 26); that since 2006 the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos has postulated its doctrine of "conventionality control" (control de convencionalidad), according to which the "(…) the legislative obligation of Article 2 of the [American] Convention [on Human Rights] also has the purpose of facilitating the function of the Judicial Power in such a way that the applier of the law has a clear option on how to resolve a particular case. However, when the Legislative branch fails in its task of suppressing and/or adapting laws contrary to the American Convention, the Judiciary remains bound by the duty of guarantee established in Article 1.1 thereof [sic] and, consequently, must refrain from applying any normative contrary to it. Compliance, by agents or officials of the State, with a law that violates the Convention produces international responsibility of the State, and it is a basic principle of the international responsibility of the State, recognized in International Human Rights Law, in the sense that every State is internationally responsible for acts or omissions of any of its powers and organs in violation of internationally enshrined rights, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention. / (…) The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are obliged to apply the provisions in force in the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State apparatus, are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the effects of the provisions of the Convention are not diminished by the application of laws contrary to its object and purpose, and that from the outset lack legal effects. In other words, the Judicial Power must exercise a kind of 'conventionality control' between the domestic legal norms it applies in specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In this task, the Judicial Power must take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof [sic] made by the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention." (Judgment of September 26, 2006, case [Name9] vs. Chile); that two months later, in the case of Dismissed Workers of Congress vs. Peru (judgment of November 24, 2006), that international body reiterated that precedent, specifying that said control proceeds "ex officio," without the need for the parties to request it; that in ruling no. 2313-95, of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, the Sala Constitucional noted that "(…) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural organ for interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normative, whether in a contentious case or in a mere advisory opinion, will have -in principle- the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now sustain, moreover, is accepted in our law, when the Ley General de la Administración Pública provides that unwritten norms -such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law- shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.)."; that in the judgment of February 24, 2012, case [Name10] and [Name11] vs. Chile, the Inter-American Court specified its doctrine on discrimination based on sexual orientation in the following terms: "(…) any discriminatory rule, act, or practice based on a person's sexual orientation is proscribed by the [American] Convention [on Human Rights]. Consequently, no domestic rule, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation." and reaffirmed "(…) that in the American Convention a closed concept of family is not determined, nor is only one 'traditional' model thereof [sic] protected. In this regard, the Tribunal reiterates that the concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage and must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties have a life in common outside of marriage1." whereby denying a non-heterosexual couple the condition of a family group "(…) reflects a limited and stereotyped perception of the concept of family that has no basis in the Convention as there is no specific model of family (the 'traditional family')." and that the essential content of the referred fundamental right to effective judicial protection comprises, without a doubt, the principle of hermetic plenitude of the legal system (plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico), which is dealt with in Articles 6 of the Código Civil and 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, which prevents rejecting a claim outright on the pretext that no specific regulation has been issued on the object of the litigation (see, in similar terms although regarding another topic, the ruling of the Sala Segunda no. 2003-143, of 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003), since, as the magistrates of the Sala Constitucional highlighted: "In our capacity as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to consider in making decisions regarding matters submitted to our knowledge (…)." (Ruling no. [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006), it is not feasible to dismiss outright the action brought by Mr. [Name1]. by deeming it non-proposable. Note that in this state of things, an inveterate jurisprudential line that supports the decision of the first-instance judge cannot be identified.

In summary, the fact that Article 242 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) was not expressly reformed and that some jurisprudential precedents issued based on it could support the decision made does not authorize disregarding the cited legal reform and, in particular, the need for a review of such criteria in accordance with the current hermeneutical principles. For this reason, because as this Chamber highlighted in judgment No. 585-06, of 10:10 a.m. on May 10, 2006, “(...) the reference to a vote (...) does not render the matter absolutely unviable, since (...) it is not an absolutely clear and settled issue in the case law.” (See, in a similar vein, vote No. 682-04, of 11:10 a.m. on April 28, 2004) and because the merits could even be the subject of a cassation appeal (recurso de casación), it is imperative to grant the challenger the possibility of obtaining, within the framework of a process conducted with all the rigorous guarantees, including the right to present his arguments and to prove his assertions, a definitive jurisdictional pronouncement on his petition.- VIII.- Furthermore, it is necessary to emphasize that, by virtue of the cited Article 6 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), “The Courts have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which they shall adhere to the established system of sources.” And that pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), “The courts may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling on matters within their competence due to a lack of a rule to apply and must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten rules of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources.” Moreover, that same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to fill the absence of legal rules: “The general principles of Law and Case Law shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the rule they interpret, integrate, or delimit. When it comes to filling the absence and not the insufficiency of the provisions that regulate a matter, such sources shall have the rank of law.” (Emphasis added). Consequently, as already noted, we jurisdictional bodies are prohibited from alleging the lack of applicable rule(s) to the specific case to excuse ourselves from ruling on the merits of a process such as this one. In such a scenario, the dogma of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system obliges us to resort, in an integrative application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and put into practice the best solution to the dispute raised, whereby, safeguarding the pro sententia principle, the possibility remains to hear the filed lawsuit through this channel and to decide in due course the applicable regulations. On this matter, in vote No. 36-F-94, of 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) noted that “(...) case law, as an informing source of the legal system, is called upon to fill, through extensive interpretation, the scope of the rules responsible for resolving legal conflicts when there is no rule for the specific case or it was not conceived for new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code).” In Nos. 112-F-92, of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, of 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001, and 360-F-02, of 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it stated that “(...) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allow for the reference to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable rule (principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system); on the other hand, Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allows for the analogical application of rules provided there is an identity of reason and no rule prohibiting it.” For its part, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), in No. 415, of 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, framed it in the following terms: “(...) in any case, one must resort, for the sake of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly addressed, to the general principles of law, such as (...) good faith and equity, and even (...), to common sense, that is, the sense that people normally have to judge things reasonably (Articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code, and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch).” In No. 2004-200, of 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that Article 6 of the Civil Code “(...) develops a fundamental right, contained in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now, to fulfill this task, one must take into consideration Article 12 of that Code, according to which the analogical application of rules is appropriate when they do not contemplate a specific scenario but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when a rule prohibits such application. In a case like the present one, denying any effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not uncommon in our environment, which is the cohabitation of two persons, (...) whose only bond was affective ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds to, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, order the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. But also, to resolve the issue, given what has been stated, one can provide a response to the situation raised, resorting “mutatis mutandi” to the regulations given by law to similar institutions.” Finally, in No. 769-93, of 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) recognized that “Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations (...), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which Article 12 following authorizes. It must be added to the foregoing that, according to the first rule cited, a court cannot refuse to hear a matter, nor resolve it negatively, claiming a lack of applicable law to the case presented. Judges, therefore, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve with an express rule, with extensive application (analogical interpretative), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. / (...) / The power that Family Law case law has had in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the rules of the Family Code originated from court decisions, including some of a markedly dissident or minority tone, but not for that reason lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field, and it could even be said that it is where this behavior has been noticed most rapidly.” In summary, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh the factual situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Branch at a specific historical moment, in order to adequately integrate the legal system, in such a way that we can offer any person an adequate satisfaction to their claim. In the words of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, expressed in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case [Name12] Vs. Panama), given the pressing need to offer some response to the claim formulated in the sub-lite, “(...) there is a duty to use those remedies (...) that relate to the protection of fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as the right to liberty, personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention.”- IX.- With his usual clarity and eloquence, [Name13] has demonstrated that legal texts “(...) whatever they may be, are fabrics of language. This means that their basic characteristics are not, nor can they be, alien to the essential features of languages, fundamentally those of common language. One of these features is indeterminacies: differences in how different people come to understand the same linguistic formulation, in communication. When such cases occur, which constitutes the crux of a good part of the discussions among jurists, it is inevitable to choose between different interpretations that arise there: whether one meaning or other meanings will be accepted for the same text. Numerous discussions revolve around which interpretation should be accepted, and very often agreement is not reached among different interpreters. (...). It means that, in practice, the “letter” of the positive law precept considered, be they constitutional or generally legal provisions, provides no more than a framework (...) within which, at the right moment, the election of a legal meaning operates, the one the interpreter themselves prefers to decide for. (...). It is in the very nature of legal discourse, one could say, this condition that its texts tend to admit different interpretations, to a greater or lesser degree, before certain kinds of cases. “Would all persons with normal mental aptitudes extract the same conclusions from a given legal text? To ask the question means, as every jurist knows, to answer it negatively” ([Name14] 1977: 254). Consequently: “The judge or the jurist, even if they do not wish to acknowledge it, constructs the rules from the legal text. They do not limit themselves, nor did they even do so in the glorious days of Exegesis, to fitting the case they examine into a provision of the law. Why “construct”? Because the reader of the Constitution [or other Positive Law texts], if I may use the expression, has to “assemble” the rules from the text” ([Name15] 1995: 113).” [Fundamental Legal Axiology (Axiología II). Bases of Valuation in Legal Discourse. Materials for Analytically-Realistically Discerning the Rhetorical Keys of Those Discourses (Axiología jurídica fundamental (Axiología II). Bases de valoración en el discurso jurídico. Materiales para discernir en forma analítico-realista las claves retóricas de esos discursos), San José: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2004, pp. 255-257]. Precisely for this reason, it is not surprising that the current Civil Code provides in its Article 10 that “Rules shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose.” And that, as the Constitutional Chamber has repeatedly pointed out, the objective (ratio) or proposed and supposed end, with respect to which the precept has an instrumental nature —teleological or finalist method—; its confrontation and concordance with the rest of those that, in particular, make up a legal institution —institutional method— and, in general, with the entire legal system —systematic method—, since it cannot be conceived as a watertight and isolated compartment as it is connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly, and, finally, the consideration of the socio-economic and historical reality to which it is to be applied, which is, by definition, variable and changeable given its enormous dynamism —historical-evolutionary method—, are the minimal essential instruments to which the interpreter must jointly resort when applying one or several specific provisions (vote No. 3481-03, of 2:03 p.m. on May 2, 2003, reiterated, among others, in Nos. [Telf3], of 3:02 p.m. on January 30; 13902-2007, of 3:24 p.m. on October 3, both of 2007; 2008-13424, of 9:31 a.m. on September 2, 2008; 2009-315, of 3:23 p.m. on January 14; [Telf4], of 12:50 p.m. on January 30; [Telf5], of 4:47 p.m. on April 30; 2009-10553, of 2:54 p.m. on July 1; 2009-15194, of 10:53 a.m. on September 25, all five of 2009; [Telf6], of 2:50 p.m. on March 10, 2010; [Telf7], of 3:00 p.m. on February 23; [Telf8], of 3:27 p.m. on April 6, and 2011-7955, of 10:46 a.m. on June 17, the last ones from 2011). This evolutionary interpretation in light of the prevailing reality or social context at a specific historical moment is imposed with greater force in situations like the current one, which are highly variable and changing. It is clear, then, that no legal precept can be applied solely and exclusively based on its literal wording, as the first instance judge seems to have done in the sub-lite, since, to unravel and understand its sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to the various hermeneutical instruments mentioned, which represent different stages of the interpretive act and are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it must always be kept in mind that, as required by Article 11 of the Civil Code, “Equity shall be weighed in the application of the rules (...).” Consequently, the reading of the current regulations cannot be done in an isolated, decontextualized, and indiscriminate manner; on the contrary, it must be adjusted to the specialty of the matter and the particularities of the conflict being aired in this venue and must respond to elementary rules of reasonableness and proportionality. This reaffirms the need to offer Mr. [Name1] the broadest possibility to expose and discuss the current scope of the regulation in force regarding common-law marriage (unión de hecho). This is the way to guarantee his fundamental rights, both those of an instrumental nature and those concerning the merits. It is worth citing here, in support of the foregoing, the reasoning set out by the Constitutional Chamber in the recent vote No. [Telf8], of 3:27 p.m. on April 6, 2011, issued regarding subsection 4) of Article 572 of the Civil Code, which imposed a limitation on certain relatives to access the status of legitimate heirs, “(...) hence it is necessary to review these legal aspects, in favor of the current family economic realities and social structures, whereby a purposive and evolutionary interpretation of legal rules is required, since the questioning made in the action brings to light legal and historical remnants that still prevent the transmission of property to the detriment of certain persons by reason of coming from a genetic line based on the male gender, and imposes resolving the problem in adherence to the fundamental rights that now govern us.”- X.- We cannot fail to mention that in vote No. 48-13, of 2:20 p.m. on January 17, 2013, the majority of this panel confirmed the outright rejection of a process similar to this one, based on an argument identical to the one contained in the appealed decision: “In view of the foregoing, and since the criterion has been reaffirmed that common-law marriage based on Article 242 of the Family Code must be between a man and a woman, the majority of this panel must proceed to confirm the decision subject to appeal.” However, as already noted, on this occasion the legislative scenario is different, since the cited reform to the General Law of the Young Person (Ley General de la Persona Joven) by Law No. 9155, of July 3, 2013, published in La Gaceta No. 130 of the following July 8, introduced new elements of judgment that demand their adequate assessment and consideration in a ruling on the merits. Also note that, by reason of a consultation on the constitutionality of that recent legal text, the specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice resolved the following: “(...) the consulting judge states that from the reform introduced by subsection m) of Article 4 of the Law of the Young Person, two possibilities of interpretation arise. The first, from a negative perspective, in the sense that persons between the ages of 15 and 35 years must go to the Family Courts for the recognition of their common-law marriage, so that it produces both patrimonial and personal effects. The second interpretation, from a positive perspective, implies that persons between the ages of 15 and 35 do not have to go to different State offices for the recognition of the common-law marriage, since for all purposes, it is sufficient to have the recognition made in a Family Court. The judge considers that this second interpretation is dangerous, not only due to the uncertainty that can be generated in the sense that it could not be known with certainty whether the common-law marriage relationship remained public, notorious, unique, and stable, at the moment of invoking the State's protection, and mainly, due to the extensive effects that such recognition could have. In the first place, it is observed that the consultant does not expose a problem of constitutional validity that provokes his doubt; what the judge intends with the consultation is for this Chamber to indicate which of the two interpretations he sets out is the correct one to resolve the specific case, which is improper, since on repeated occasions this Court has indicated that judicial consultations promoted by judges must be formulated in relation to the rules or acts they must apply, but not in relation to the specific case. It is not appropriate for this jurisdiction to indicate to the judge which rules they should apply or their correct legal interpretation. On the other hand, it is verified that the questions raised by the judge regarding this point, that is, whether young people between 15 and 35 years of age should or should not go to the Family Court for the recognition of the patrimonial and personal effects of common-law marriage, are related to aspects of legality and not of constitutionality, which the judge must resolve.” (Vote No. 2013-10828, of 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 2013).- XI.- Based on all the foregoing, we cannot share the decision of the a quo body, and since we do not identify the absence of any procedural prerequisite that makes it impossible to proceed with the lawsuit, this matter must continue to be processed in such a way that, once instructed, it is determined, by means of a judgment, whether or not what is sought is admissible. Only in this way are Mr. [Name1]'s fundamental rights to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) and due process (debido proceso) guaranteed, and even the right to appeal before the Second Chamber, via a cassation appeal, in the event that it is dismissed in the first and second instances.

The appealed order exceeds the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality that must govern the exercise of the jurisdictional function and, therefore, we proceed to revoke it and order the continuation of the proceedings.-

POR TANTO

Se revoca la resolución recurrida y se ordena darle curso a la demanda interpuesta por el señor [Nombre1].- Alexis Vargas Soto Randall Esquivel Quirós Luis Héctor Amoretti Orozco r.s.

*130017090165FA* *130017090165FA* PROCESO DE RECONOCIMIENTO DE UNIÓN DE HECHO PROMUEVE: [Nombre1]. y otro .- VOTO NUMERO: 20-14 TRIBUNAL DE FAMILIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas y diecisiete minutos del ocho de enero de dos mil catorce.- Proceso de reconocimiento de unión de hecho establecido por [Nombre1]., […] y [Nombre2]., […]. Funge como Apoderado Especial Judicial del promovente [Nombre1]. el Licenciado [Nombre3]. Conoce este Tribunal del presente asunto en virtud del recurso de apelación interpuesto por el apoderado del promovente contra la resolución dictada por el Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, al ser las once horas dos minutos del once de setiembre del dos mil trece.- Redacta el juez [Nombre4], y;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- El señor [Nombre1]. pretende el reconocimiento legal de la relación de pareja que, según indica, mantiene con el señor [Nombre2]. en forma pública, notoria, estable y singular desde hace más de tres años. De modo expreso reclama la aplicación del inciso m) del numeral 4 de la Ley General de la Persona Joven, en concordancia con el 242 del Código de Familia. Se fundamenta también en el 1, 2 y 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; 5 de la Convención Iberoamericana de derechos de los jóvenes; 48 de la Ley General sobre VIH-SIDA; 7 y 12 de la Declaración Universal sobre Derechos Humanos, 5 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y 7 y 33 de la Constitución Política (folios 5-8). En el auto apelado, emitido a las 11:02 horas del pasado 11 de setiembre, el Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José rechazó ad portas la demanda porque estimó que el ordinal 242 del Código de Familia solo permite reconocer la unión de hecho entre un hombre y una mujer que cuenten con libertad de estado para contraer matrimonio (folio 10). En esta sede, el apoderado especial judicial de don [Nombre1]. defiende que se amparó principalmente en la norma de la Ley General de la Persona Joven y no en lo dispuesto por el Código de Familia, como lo entendió incorrectamente la señora jueza de primera instancia (folios 11-13).- II.- Como lo puntualizamos en el voto n.º 132-10, de las 8:40 horas del 26 de enero y lo reiteramos en los n.os 1313-10 de las 9:30 horas del 21 de setiembre, ambos de 2010; 975-11, de las 13:55 horas del 23 de agosto y 644-11, de las 14:18 horas del 7 de setiembre, los dos de 2011, “En el Estado moderno la proscripción de la violencia y la prohibición de la autotutela hacen necesario acudir al Poder Judicial para hacer efectivo el ejercicio de las libertades y derechos garantizadas por el ordenamiento jurídico cuando se ven amenazados o son desconocidos por la acción de otra persona. Por eso, el numeral 153 -en concordancia con el 9- de la Constitución Política regula la exclusividad y universalidad de la función jurisdiccional en los tribunales de justicia (ver, al respecto, el voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º 1148-90, de las 17 horas del 21 de setiembre de 1990) cuando dispone que “Corresponde al Poder Judicial, además de las funciones que esta Constitución le señala, conocer de las causas civiles, penales, comerciales, de trabajo y contencioso-administrativas, así como de las otras que establezca la ley, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza y la calidad de las personas que intervengan; resolver definitivamente sobre ellas y ejecutar las resoluciones que pronuncie, con la ayuda de la fuerza pública si fuere necesario.” En esas condiciones, como señala [Nombre5]. [Nombre6], es preciso, entonces, “(…) que haya una amplia posibilidad de acceso a un órgano imparcial para dirimir los conflictos que las personas puedan tener. De otro modo, sería ilusoria esta tesitura de que la autotutela sea excepcional y quienes tengan una discrepancia, si no logran superarla –y no es cuestión que ataña a derechos indisponibles–, la deban dilucidar a través del proceso. (…). Si el Estado o la sociedad organizada han monopolizado –en principio– el dilucidar las contiendas, debe [sic] hacerlo a cambio de darles a todas las personas la posibilidad cierta de poder acceder fácilmente a ese instrumento o medio (…). Múltiples son los factores que afectan ese acceso o que lo traban, a veces de manera absoluta o que deviene con esas características.” [Un derecho humano esencial: el acceso a la justicia. Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano, Montevideo: 2003, 291-292. Recuperado el 12 de mayo de 2007, de http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/dconstla/cont/2003/pr/pr16.pdf). Cuando una persona desea ejercer una acción judicial debe estar, entonces, en condiciones reales de poder hacerlo. Lo mismo cabe exigir cuando se ve amenazada por la interpuesta en su contra por otro u otra; caso en el cual ha de poder apersonarse y defenderse en forma efectiva. Ambos requerimientos, configurados como un derecho fundamental, son recogidos por el numeral 41 de la Constitución Política: “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes.” Diversos instrumentos internacionales aplicables en Costa Rica contienen disposiciones similares. En virtud del numeral 10 de la Declaración universal de los derechos humanos “Toda persona tiene derecho, en condiciones de plena igualdad, a ser oída públicamente y con justicia por un tribunal independiente e imparcial, para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones y para el examen de cualquier acusación contra ella en materia penal.” El 18 de la Declaración americana de los derechos y deberes del hombre dispone que “Toda persona puede ocurrir a los tribunales para hacer valer sus derechos. Asimismo debe disponer de un procedimiento sencillo y breve por el cual la justicia la ampare contra actos de la autoridad que violen, en perjuicio suyo, alguno de los derechos fundamentales consagrados constitucionalmente.” El Pacto internacional de derechos civiles y políticos, aprobado por Ley N.° 4229, de 11 de diciembre de 1968, consagra que “Todas las personas son iguales ante los tribunales y cortes de justicia. Toda persona tendrá derecho a ser oída públicamente y con las debidas garantías por un tribunal competente e imparcial, establecido por la ley, en la substanciación de cualquier acusación de carácter penal formulada contra ella y para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de carácter civil.” (Artículo 14, inciso 1). En el inciso 1) de su ordinal 8, la Convención americana sobre derechos humanos o “Pacto de San José de Costa Rica”, aprobada por Ley N.° 4534 de 23 de febrero de 1970, estipula que “Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contra ella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter.” En el 25 reconoce que “1. Toda persona tiene derecho a un recurso sencillo y rápido o a cualquier otro recurso efectivo ante los jueces o tribunales competentes, que la ampare contra actos que violen sus derechos fundamentales reconocidos por la Constitución, la ley o la presente Convención, aun cuando tal violación sea cometida por personas que actúen en ejercicio de sus funciones oficiales. / 2. Los Estados Partes se comprometen: / a) a garantizar que la autoridad competente prevista por el sistema legal del Estado decidirá sobre los derechos de toda persona que interponga tal recurso; / b) a desarrollar las posibilidades del recurso judicial, y / c) a garantizar el cumplimiento, por las autoridades competentes, de toda decisión en que se haya estimado procedente el recurso.” Como se desprende fácilmente de su lectura, esos preceptos reconocen a favor de cualquier sujeto un conjunto de derechos prestacionales que configuran el contenido mínimo o básico de la tutela judicial efectiva. Además, hacen expresa referencia al derecho fundamental a la igualdad como su eje transversal. Por último, ponen en evidencia algunos de los muchos obstáculos que pueden resultar determinantes para dificultarlos o frustrarlos y le encomiendan al Estado tomar las previsiones necesarias para removerlos. En todo caso, esto último es consecuencia de su carácter fundamental. En su opinión consultiva n.º OC-11/90 del 10 de agosto de 1990, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, cuya competencia fue reconocida por Costa Rica por Decreto Ejecutivo N.° 7060 de 26 de mayo de 1977 de conformidad con lo previsto en el numeral 62 de la Convención americana sobre derechos humanos, puntualizó en forma expresa esos alcances: “La protección de la ley la constituyen, básicamente, los recursos que ésta (sic) dispone para la protección de los derechos garantizados por la Convención, los cuales, a la luz de la obligación positiva que el artículo 1.1 contempla para los Estados de respetarlos y garantizarlos, implica, como ya lo dijo la Corte el deber de los Estados Partes de organizar todo el aparato gubernamental y, en general, todas las estructuras a través de las cuales se manifiesta el ejercicio del poder público, de manera tal que sean capaces de asegurar jurídicamente el libre y pleno ejercicio de los derechos humanos (Caso [Nombre7], Sentencia de 29 de julio de 1988. Serie [Nombre2] No. 4, párr. 166; Caso [Nombre8], Sentencia de 20 de enero de 1989. Serie [Nombre2] No. 5, párr. 175). / (…).” / (…). En lo conducente, en su citada opinión consultiva n.º OC-11/90 del 10 de agosto de 1990, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos determinó que “(…) / El artículo 1 de la Convención obliga a los Estados Partes no solamente a respetar los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella, sino a garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio a toda persona sujeta a su jurisdicción. La Corte ya ha expresado que esta disposición contiene un deber positivo para los Estados. Debe precisarse, también, que garantizar implica la obligación del Estado de tomar todas las medidas necesarias para remover los obstáculos que puedan existir para que los individuos puedan disfrutar de los derechos que la Convención reconoce. Por consiguiente, la tolerancia del Estado a circunstancias o condiciones que impidan a los individuos acceder a los recursos internos adecuados para proteger sus derechos, constituye una violación del artículo 1.1 de la Convención.””- III.- En suma, el acceso a la tutela judicial efectiva es un derecho fundamental en sí mismo, pero también es un instrumento para garantizar la vigencia de los derechos de goce; es decir, de aquellos cuyo disfrute satisface de manera inmediata las necesidades o intereses del ser humano. Dos de sus contenidos esenciales son la potestad de su titular de reclamar del órgano jurisdiccional competente, una vez sustanciado el procedimiento respectivo (debido proceso), una decisión razonada y fundada en Derecho sobre las pretensiones oportunamente deducidas, que resuelva las cuestiones debatidas y, por supuesto, la de obtenerla. Ciertamente, dada su naturaleza prestacional, se trata de un derecho de configuración legal; o sea, que su ejercicio está supeditado a la concurrencia de los presupuestos que, en cada materia, haya establecido la normativa vigente. Sin embargo, no ha de obviarse que no está permitido impedirlo u obstaculizarlo imponiendo trabas arbitrarias, caprichosas, irracionales o desproporcionadas. Los principios básicos derivados del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política y de los preceptos internacionales ya citados, a los que debemos ajustar nuestra actuación todas las personas y órganos en el ámbito jurisdiccional, obligan, por una parte, a la Asamblea Legislativa a promulgar las disposiciones legales necesarias para regular los derechos de las personas, así como las vías y procedimientos adecuados a efecto de procurar su efectiva tutela jurisdiccional cuando hayan sido quebrantados y, por la otra, a los distintos Tribunales a interpretarlas y aplicarlas de manera tal que no entorpezcan la debida comprobación del agravio y garanticen, en caso de ser acreditado, el pleno y oportuno restablecimiento de aquellos (ver sesión extraordinaria de Corte Plena de 11 de octubre de 1982). De ahí que los jueces y las juezas vulneramos el derecho fundamental de comentario cuando imposibilitamos o dificultamos el acceso a los trámites estipulados o cuando rechazamos o denegamos, sin motivo alguno o invocando uno insuficiente o espurio, una petición que debimos tramitar y resolver en sentencia. Para contrarrestar ese riesgo, se exige, en principio, que cualquier resolución que impida conocer por el fondo una demanda encuentre amparo en una causa legal y en una lectura razonable de ella, pues, al estar en presencia de un derecho fundamental, cobran plena vigencia los principios pro actione y pro sententia que obligan a interpretar y a aplicar los presupuestos o requisitos procesales en forma restrictiva y del modo más favorable a la efectividad de la tutela judicial. Eso hace necesario contextualizar toda situación fáctica que conduzca a dictar un proveído cuya consecuencia sea impedir que se defina si la pretensión es procedente o si no lo es. Un formalismo excesivo conlleva siempre una denegación de justicia (ver sesión extraordinaria de Corte Plena de 26 de abril de 1984).- IV.- En su emblemático voto n.º 1739-92, de las 11:45 horas del 1º de julio de 1992, reiterado en parte en los n.os 1562-93, de las 15:06 horas del 30 de marzo de 1993 y 2005-10604, de las 15:44 horas del 16 de agosto de 2005, la Sala Constitucional estableció que, en tanto conjunto de garantías de los derechos de goce, el concepto de debido proceso comprende, entre otros, el derecho a una sentencia justa. Este se vincula, a su vez, con ciertos principios constitucionales y, en especial, con el pro sententia. De acuerdo con él, “(…) todas las normas procesales existen y deben interpretarse para facilitar la administración de la justicia y no como obstáculos para alcanzarla; lo cual obliga a considerar los requisitos procesales, especialmente las inadmisiones de cualquier naturaleza, restrictivamente y sólo a texto expreso, mientras que debe interpretarse extensivamente y con el mayor formalismo [sic] posible todo aquello que conduzca a la decisión de las cuestiones de fondo en sentencia; además, las infracciones procesales sólo deben dar lugar a nulidades relativas y, por ende, siempre subsanables, mientras no produzcan indefensión.” En ese mismo fallo, ese órgano apuntó que “(…) las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sólo haber sido promulgados por órganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino también pasar la revisión de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constitución (formal y material), como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc., que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad. Es decir, que una norma o acto público o privado sólo es válido cuando, además de su conformidad formal con la Constitución, esté razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideología constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sólo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino además que los medios seleccionados tengan una relación real y sustancial con su objeto. Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurídica, o la adecuación a la Constitución en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad.”- V.- Con base en esos criterios, esta Cámara ha insistido en que la potestad de rechazar ad portas cualquier gestión, incluido el acto de iniciación procesal (o sea, la demanda y la reconvención), que el inciso 1º del artículo 97 del Código Procesal Civil les atribuye de manera expresa a los órganos jurisdiccionales, debe ser ejercida de manera razonable y con recelo, por cuanto puede traducirse, en determinados situaciones, en un evidente obstáculo al disfrute efectivo del derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial y, en esta materia específica, en un incumplimiento del mandato contenido en el 51 de la Constitución Política, al tenor del cual “La familia, como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado.” (Ver, en igual sentido, los votos n.os 1288-03, de las 8:30 horas del 25 de setiembre; 1331-03, de las 8:10 horas del 2 de octubre, ambos de 2003; 207-04, de las 13 horas del 11 de febrero; 682-04, de las 11:10 horas del 28 de abril; 1091-04, de las 8:10 horas del 30 de junio; 1277-04, de las 9:40 horas del 27 de julio, los últimos de 2004; 585-06, de las 10:10 horas del 10 de mayo de 2006; 80-08, de las 11 horas del 18 de enero de 2008; 595-10 de las 9:50 horas del 3 de mayo; 822-10, de las 11:30 horas del 22 de junio; 848-10, de las 8:30 horas del 28 de junio; 1139-10, de las 8:10 horas del 23 de agosto; 1176-10, de las 9:40 horas del 24 de agosto; 1589-10, de las 10:30 horas del 17 de noviembre, todos de 2010; 469-11, de las 10:50 horas del 5 de abril; 605-11, de las 16:24 horas del 17 de mayo; 852-11, de las 8:21 horas del 5 de julio; 975-11, de las 13:55 horas del 23 de agosto, los seis de 2011; 95-12, de las 15:21 horas del 21 de febrero; 269-12, de las 16:26 horas del 19 de junio; 510-12, de las 10:53 horas del 28 de noviembre; 821-12, de las 11:18 horas del 9 de octubre, los cuatro de 2012; 54-13, de las 11:01 horas del 30 de enero; 328-13, de las 15:11 horas del 24 de julio; 419-13, de las 8:01 horas del 26 de setiembre; 842-13, de las 8:36 horas del 9 de octubre y 505-13, de las 16:15 horas del 6 de noviembre, los últimos de 2013). Precisamente para reducir ese peligro, tal poder-deber aparece mediatizado por los principios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, preclusión, impulso y economía procesal. Como su reconocimiento pretende impedir la pérdida de recursos económicos y de tiempo que un trámite inútil supone para las personas involucradas y para el Estado, por regla general, ha de ejercerse en la etapa preliminar y ha de basarse en un fundamentado análisis de las distintas posibilidades fácticas y jurídicas de que la petición prospere. Con ese objetivo, la autoridad competente debe revisar la legislación, la doctrina y la jurisprudencia para poder establecer con acierto la inviabilidad absoluta de lo solicitado; o sea, su “evidente” improcedencia (ver los votos de este órgano n.os 207-04; 822-10; 469-11; 95-12; 510-12; 328-13; 419-13; 842-13 y 505-13, ya citados), sobre todo cuando del acto inicial se trata, supuesto en el cual “El rechazo de plano ha de fundarse en un criterio incuestionable que haga a la demanda indeducible o improponible. Entonces resulta clave en este punto el numeral 41 de nuestra ley fundamental (…). Ahora bien, resulta importante revisar en nuestro caso si el rechazo ad limine litis resulta correcto por tratarse la demanda de una sinrazón jurídica, o bien, si al contrario se puede entender que exista una denegación de justicia (…).” (Voto n.º 1288-03, de las 8:30 horas del 25 de setiembre de 2003, reiterado en los n.os 682-04, de las 11:10 horas del 28 de abril y 1277-04, de las 9:40 horas del 27 de julio, ambos de 2004) VI.- Sin duda, este asunto es producto del ejercicio, por parte del señor [Nombre1]., de su derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva. Por eso mismo, el rechazo ad portas de su demanda no solo debe encontrar sustento legal y ajustarse al parámetro de razonabilidad antes reseñado, sino que ha de ser motivado en forma debida. Si, de acuerdo con lo consignado en el proveído venido en alzada, esa decisión se fundamentó en que “La normativa que regula la presentación de los procesos de reconocimiento de unión de hecho, artículo 242 del Código de Familia, es clara al indicar, que se podrá reconocer la unión de hecho, entre un hombre y una mujer que cuenten con libertad de estado para contraer matrimonio. De modo que resulta claro también que uno de los requisitos ineludibles consiste en que esta unión se haya producido entre un hombre y una mujer, lo cual no ocurre en el caso que nos atañe, pues se pretende un reconocimiento de una unión entre dos hombres, lo cual resulta ilegal y por ende, -como se dijo- no queda otro camino que rechazar de plano la demanda.” (Folio 10), resulta evidente, en primer lugar, que la desestimatoria de la pretensión no obedece a la ausencia de algún presupuesto procesal, materia propia de una resolución preliminar, sino a una razón de fondo; lo que, por regla general, debería ser decidido en sentencia. Si, además, se repara en que, como bien se apunta en el recurso, ese razonamiento no pondera el principal fundamento jurídico invocado por el actor; es decir, el inciso m) del numeral 4 de la Ley General de la Persona Joven, adicionado por la n.º 9155, del 3 de julio de 2013, publicada en La Gaceta n.º 130 del 8 de julio siguiente y, en especial, el alcance de la prohibición de “(…) discriminación contraria a la dignidad humana (…)”, contenida en él, en el contexto del Derecho de los Derechos Humanos, es incuestionable que se está en presencia de una interpretación, entre otras posibles, de cómo podría decidirse este asunto y, por eso mismo, no califica como causa legítima y suficiente para desestimar ad portas la acción incoada. Haberse negado a darle curso constituye, entonces, un grave yerro, sin perjuicio, claro está, de lo que se decida en definitiva en el momento de emitir el fallo. Como bien se apuntó en el voto n.º 1460-05, de las 15 horas del 27 de setiembre de 2005, “No existe esa inviabilidad absoluta puesto que no existe una norma expresa que haga a todas luces, improcedente, improponible o inútil la demanda y el proceso. Ha de quedar suficientemente claro, que esta resolución no quiere decir que se avala o no se avala el criterio o argumentación seguida en cuanto al fondo del asunto, sino que, no encuentra este Tribunal los presupuestos para cerrar la vía ad límine a la demanda (…).” En definitiva y con absoluta independencia “(…) de la procedencia o no de lo reclamado (…), lo que tendrá que ser necesariamente analizado en la resolución de fondo y no ahora, se estima que el rechazo de plano implica una violación del derecho de acceso a la Justicia, esta es la vía para reclamar, discutir, y decidir si (…)” (voto n.º 740-10, de las 10:10 horas del 2 de junio de 2010), de conformidad con la normativa vigente, procede o no tener por acreditada que entre las partes existe una relación de pareja y, de ser así, cuáles serían las consecuencias legales que cabría reconocerle.- VII.- Es cierto que en el voto n.º [Telf1], de las 14:46 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006, reiterado en el n.º [Telf2], de las 13:13 horas del 27 de julio de 2011, la Sala Constitucional estimó legítima la imposibilidad legal del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, establecida en el inciso 6º del artículo 14 del Código de Familia, pero también descartó “(…) que haya impedimento de alguna naturaleza para la existencia de uniones homosexuales. Más bien, hay una constatación empírica para indicar que han [sic] incrementado. Con ello, se presenta un problema que no radica en la norma aquí impugnada sino, más bien, en la ausencia de una regulación normativa apropiada, para regular los efectos personales y patrimoniales de ese tipo de uniones, sobre todo si reúnen condiciones de estabilidad y singularidad, porque un imperativo de seguridad jurídica, si no de justicia, lo hace necesario.” Si se agrega que en el n.º 2010-13313, de las 16:31 horas del 10 de agosto de 2010, ese órgano sintetizó sus criterios sobre el tema en los siguientes términos: “A partir de esta sentencia [se refiere a la n.º [Telf1], antes citada] quedan claros varios aspectos de importancia para resolver el sub-lite, que son los siguientes: / 1°) Las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo son una realidad social que no puede ignorarse o soslayarse. / 2°) Es preciso regular, legislativamente, los efectos patrimoniales y personales de tales relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. / 3°) Existe un vacío normativo del legislador [sic] ordinario que debe ser colmado, habida cuenta que la institución del matrimonio no puede aplicarse a las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. / 4°) El legislador [sic] ordinario debe dictar una marco normativo que regule las consecuencias jurídicas de tales relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. Esta Sentencia, por lo dispuesto en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tiene efectos erga omnes, para todos los poderes constituidos, precisamente, por tal razón, el legislador [sic] ordinario asumió la tarea de discutir la oportunidad y conveniencia de regular las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo.” (La negrita es agregada); que, en el ejercicio de sus funciones propias, la Asamblea Legislativa promulgó la citada Ley n.º 9155, del 3 de julio de 2013, publicada en La Gaceta n.º 130 del 8 de julio siguiente, que adicionó el inciso m) al numeral 4 de la Ley General de la Persona Joven e introdujo así un elemento de juicio cuyas consecuencias no han sido objeto de pronunciamiento alguno por la jurisprudencia, cual es la referida prohibición de “(…) discriminación contraria a la dignidad humana (…)” cuando de garantizar el derecho al reconocimiento de los efectos sociales y patrimoniales de las uniones de hecho que una persona joven constituya en forma pública, notoria, única y estable; que la Convención de Viena sobre derecho de los Tratados, aprobada por Ley n.º 7615, del 24 de julio de 1996 y debidamente ratificada por Costa Rica, obliga a los Estados parte a cumplir de buena fe los convenios en vigor (artículo 26); que desde 2006 la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos postuló su doctrina del “control de convencionalidad”, de acuerdo con la cual la “(…) la obligación legislativa del artículo 2 de la Convención [americana de derechos humanos] tiene también la finalidad de facilitar la función del Poder Judicial de tal forma que el aplicador [o la aplicadora] de la ley tenga una opción clara de cómo resolver un caso particular. Sin embargo, cuando el Legislativo falla en su tarea de suprimir y/o adaptar leyes contrarias a la Convención Americana, el Judicial permanece vinculado al deber de garantía establecido en el artículo 1.1 de la misma [sic] y, consecuentemente, debe abstenerse de aplicar cualquier normativa contraria a ella. El cumplimiento por parte de agentes o funcionarios del Estado de una ley violatoria de la Convención produce responsabilidad internacional del Estado, y es un principio básico de la responsabilidad internacional del Estado, recogido en el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, en el sentido de que todo Estado es internacionalmente responsable por actos u omisiones de cualesquiera de sus poderes y órganos en violación de los derechos internacionalmente consagrados, según el artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana. / (…) La Corte es consciente que los jueces [las juezas] y tribunales internos están sujetos al imperio de la ley y, por ello, están obligados a aplicar las disposiciones vigentes en el ordenamiento jurídico. Pero cuando un Estado ha ratificado un tratado internacional como la Convención Americana, sus jueces [y juezas], como parte del aparato del Estado, también están sometidos a ella, lo que les obliga a velar porque los efectos de las disposiciones de la Convención no se vean mermadas por la aplicación de leyes contrarias a su objeto y fin, y que desde un inicio carecen de efectos jurídicos. En otras palabras, el Poder Judicial debe ejercer una especie de ‘control de convencionalidad’ entre las normas jurídicas internas que aplican en los casos concretos y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. En esta tarea, el Poder Judicial debe tener en cuenta no solamente el tratado, sino también la interpretación que del mismo [sic] ha hecho la Corte Interamericana, intérprete última de la Convención Americana.” (Sentencia de 26 de septiembre de 2006, caso [Nombre9] vs. Chile); que dos meses después, en el caso Trabajadores cesados del Congreso vs. Perú (sentencia de 24 de noviembre de 2006), ese órgano internacional reiteró ese precedente puntualizando que dicho control procede “de oficio”, sin necesidad de que las partes lo soliciten; que en el voto n.º 2313-95, de las 16:18 horas del 9 de mayo de 1995, la Sala Constitucional apuntó que “(…) si la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos es el órgano natural para interpretar la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José de Costa Rica), la fuerza de su decisión al interpretar la convención y enjuiciar leyes nacionales a la luz de esta normativa, ya sea en caso contencioso o en una mera consulta, tendrá -de principio- el mismo valor de la norma interpretada. No solamente valor ético o científico, como algunos han entendido. Esta tesis que ahora sostenemos, por lo demás, está receptada en nuestro derecho, cuando la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que las normas no escritas -como la costumbre, la jurisprudencia y los principios generales del derecho- servirán para interpretar, integrar y delimitar el campo de aplicación del ordenamiento escrito y tendrán el rango de la norma que interpretan, integran o delimitan (artículo 7.l.).”; que en la sentencia de 24 de febrero de 2012, caso [Nombre10] y [Nombre11] vs. Chile, la Corte Interamericana concretó su doctrina sobre la discriminación por razones de orientación sexual en los siguientes términos: “(…) está proscrita por la Convención [americana sobre derechos humanos] cualquier norma, acto o práctica discriminatoria basada en la orientación sexual de la persona. En consecuencia, ninguna norma, decisión o práctica de derecho interno, sea por parte de autoridades estatales o por particulares, pueden disminuir o restringir, de modo alguno, los derechos de una persona a paritr de su orientación sexual.” y reafirmó “(…) que en la Convención Americana no se encuentra determinado un concepto cerrado de familia, ni mucho menos se protege sólo un modelo “tradicional” de la misma [sic]. Al respecto, el Tribunal reitera que el concepto de vida familiar no está reducido únicamente al matrimonio y debe abarcar otros lazos familiares de hecho donde las partes tienen vida en común por fuera del matrimonio1.” con lo cual, negarle a una pareja no heterosexual la condición de grupo familiar “(…) refleja una percepción limitada y estereotipada del concepto de familia que no tiene base en la Convención al no existir un modelo específico de familia (la “familia tradicional”).” y que el contenido esencial del referido derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva comprende, sin duda, el principio de plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico, del que se ocupan los numerales 6 del Código Civil y 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, que impide rechazar de plano una demanda so pretexto de que no se ha emitido una normativa específica sobre el objeto del litigio (ver, en similares términos aunque respecto de otro tema, el voto de la Sala Segunda n.º 2003-143, de las 9:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2003), pues, como lo destacaron las magistradas y los magistrados de la Sala Constitucional: “En nuestra condición de jueces [y juezas], (…) no podemos obviar la realidad social como un elemento a considerar en la toma de decisiones respecto de los asuntos sometidos a nuestro conocimiento (…).” (Voto n.º [Telf1], de las 14:46 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006), no es factible desestimar de plano la acción ejercida por el señor [Nombre1]. por estimarla improponible. Nótese que en ese estado de cosas no puede identificarse una línea jurisprudencial inveterada que sustente la decisión de la jueza de primera instancia. En síntesis, el hecho de que el numeral 242 del Código de Familia no haya sido reformado en forma expresa y que algunos precedentes jurisprudenciales emitidos con base en él pudieran otorgarle fundamento a lo resuelto no autoriza para desconocer la reforma legal citada y, en particular, la necesidad de una revisión de tales criterios de acuerdo con los principios hermenéuticos vigentes. Por eso, porque como lo destacó esta Cámara en la sentencia n.º 585-06, de las 10:10 horas del 10 de mayo de 2006, “(…) la remisión a un voto (…) no da la inviabilidad absoluta del asunto, pues (…) no se trata de un tema absolutamente claro y pacífico en la jurisprudencia.” (Ver, en similar sentido, el voto n.º 682-04, de las 11:10 horas del 28 de abril de 2004) y porque el fondo podría, incluso, ser objeto de un recurso de casación, es imperativo otorgarle al impugnante la posibilidad de obtener, en el marco de un proceso tramitado con todas las garantías de rigor, entre ellas, el derecho a plantear sus alegatos y a probar sus asertos, un pronunciamiento jurisdiccional definitivo sobre su petitoria.- VIII.- A mayor abundamiento, es necesario destacar que, en virtud del citado artículo 6 del Código Civil, “Los Tribunales tienen el deber inexcusable de resolver, en todo caso, los asunto [sic] que conozcan, para lo que se atenderán al sistema de fuentes establecido.” Y que al tenor del párrafo segundo del 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, “Los tribunales no podrán excusarse de ejercer su autoridad o de fallar en los asuntos de su competencia por falta de norma que aplicar y deberán hacerlo de conformidad con las normas escritas y no escritas del ordenamiento, según la escala jerárquica de sus fuentes.” Es más, esa misma disposición reconoce, como parte de la potestad jurisdiccional, el deber de suplir la ausencia de normas legales: “Los principios generales del Derecho y la Jurisprudencia servirán para interpretar, integrar y delimitar el campo de aplicación del ordenamiento escrito y tendrán el rango de la norma que interpreten, integren o delimiten. Cuando se trate de suplir la ausencia y no la insuficiencia de las disposiciones que regulen una materia, dichas fuentes tendrán rango de ley.” (La negrita es agregada). Por consiguiente, como ya se apuntó, a los órganos jurisdiccionales nos está vedado alegar la falta de norma (s) aplicable (s) al caso concreto para excusarnos de fallar por el fondo un proceso como este. En tal supuesto, el dogma de la plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico nos obliga a recurrir, en aplicación integradora, a las fuentes escritas y a las no escritas en aras de identificar y poner en práctica la mejor solución a la controversia planteada, con lo cual, en resguardo del principio pro sententia, sigue en pie la posibilidad de conocer en esta vía la demanda incoada y decidir en su momento la normativa aplicable. Sobre el particular, en el voto n.º 36-F-94, de las 9:40 horas del 27 de mayo de 1994, la Sala Primera apuntó que “(…) la jurisprudencia como fuente informadora del ordenamiento jurídico es la llamada a suplir, por la vía de interpretación extensiva, los alcances de las normas encargadas de resolver los conflictos jurídicos cuando no exista norma para el caso concreto o no haya sido concebida para las nuevas exigencias jurídicas (Artículo 9 del Código Civil).” En los n.os 112-F-92, de las 14:15 horas del 15 de julio de 1992; 151-F-01, de las 15:20 horas del 14 de febrero de 2001 y 360-F-02, de las 11:10 horas del 3 de mayo de 2002, expresó que “(…) el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y 6 del Título Preliminar del Código Civil admiten la remisión a otras fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico y a los Principios Generales del Derecho cuando no hay norma aplicable (principio de la plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico), por otra parte el artículo 12 del Título Preliminar del Código Civil, admite la aplicación analógica de las normas siempre que medie identidad de razón y no haya norma que la prohíba.” Por su parte, la Sala Segunda, en el n.º 415, de las 9 horas del 22 de diciembre de 1994, lo planteó en los siguientes términos: “(…) en todo caso, debe acudirse, en aras de la mejor solución, a las situaciones análogas expresamente tratadas, a los principios generales del derecho, como (…) la buena fe y la equidad e incluso, (…), al sentido común, o sea, el que las personas normalmente tienen de juzgar razonablemente las cosas (artículos 10 a 12 del Código Civil, 15 del Código de Trabajo y 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial).” En el n.º 2004-200, de las 10 horas del 24 de marzo de 2004, ese mismo órgano sostuvo que el ordinal 6 del Código Civil “(…) desarrolla un derecho de carácter fundamental, contenido en el numeral 41 de la Constitución Política, que garantiza a todas las personas el acceso a la justicia. Ahora bien, para cumplir tal cometido, se debe tomar en consideración el artículo 12 de aquel Código, según el cual es procedente la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando éstas no contemplen un supuesto específico, pero regulen otro semejante en que se aprecie identidad de razón, salvo cuando una norma prohíba esa aplicación. En un caso como el presente, el negarle todo efecto a la relación que interesa, además, de injusto, significa desconocer una realidad, no extraña en nuestro entorno, cual es la convivencia de dos personas, (…) que lo único que los une o los unió fueron lazos afectivos, sin protección por parte del ordenamiento jurídico. Lo anterior, constituye fundamento suficiente para, en atención del valor justicia que inspira el ordenamiento jurídico, disponer la liquidación de los bienes adquiridos y producidos durante la larga relación, dándole a la actora lo que le corresponde. Mas, también, para resolver la cuestión, atendiendo a lo expuesto, se puede brindar una respuesta a la situación planteada, recurriendo “mutatis mutandi”, a las regulaciones dadas por la ley a instituciones similares.” Por último, en el n.º 769-93, de las 15:48 horas del 16 de febrero de 1993, la Sala Constitucional reconoció que “Aquí, como lo anticipa el propio Tribunal consultante, podría acudirse a otra normativa (…), o a otros parámetros igualmente autorizados por el ordenamiento, cuando haya insuficiencia en la regulación de una determinada materia. Esos criterios podrían ser los principios generales de derecho, que están autorizados por el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el artículo 1 del Código Civil; la equidad, que podría utilizarse a tenor de lo dispuesto por el artículo 11 del Código Civil, y hasta la aplicación analógica, que el artículo 12 siguiente autoriza. Debe agregarse a lo anterior, que conforme a la primera norma citada, un tribunal no puede excusar el conocimiento de un asunto, ni resolverlo negativamente, alegando falta de ley aplicable al caso planteado. Tienen los jueces [y las juezas], pues, a su haber, amplias posibilidades para resolver con norma expresa, con aplicación extensiva (interpretativa analógica) y hasta mediante la re-creación normativa a base de otra insuficiente. / (…) / El poder que la jurisprudencia del Derecho de Familia en nuestro país ha sido tal, que también se ha afirmado con carácter categórico, que muchas de las normas del Código de Familia tienen su origen en decisiones de los tribunales, incluso algunas de tono marcadamente disidente o minoritario, pero no por ello ayunas de justicia o equidad. Por el contrario, el desarrollo histórico del Derecho de Familia nos indica cómo el paso del tiempo ha sido determinante para una evolución de sus conceptos y sus soluciones. Nuestro país no es excepción en este campo e incluso podría decirse que es donde con más celeridad ese comportamiento se ha notado.” En síntesis, es imposible hacer caso omiso de nuestro deber de ponderar las situaciones de hecho que escapan a las soluciones preconcebidas por el Poder Legislativo en un momento histórico determinado, a efecto de integrar adecuadamente el ordenamiento jurídico, de manera tal que podamos ofrecerle a cualquier persona una satisfacción adecuada a su demanda. En palabras de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, plasmadas en la sentencia del 12 de agosto de 2008 (Caso [Nombre12] Vs. Panamá), ante la imperiora necesidad de ofrecerle alguna respuesta a la pretensión formulada en el sub-lite, “(…) existe el deber de utilizar aquellos recursos (…) que guarden relación con la protección de los derechos fundamentales que se pueden ver afectados en tales casos, como por ejemplo el derecho a la libertad, a la integridad personal y el derecho a la vida, en su caso, que están reconocidos en la Convención Americana.”- IX.- Con su claridad y elocuencia habitual, [Nombre13] ha puesto en evidencia que los textos jurídicos “(…) sean cuales fueren, son unos tejidos de lenguaje. Esto significa que sus características básicas no son, ni pueden ser, ajenas a los rasgos esenciales de los idiomas, fundamentalmente los del lenguaje común. Uno de estos rasgos son las indeterminaciones: diferencias en cuanto a cómo unas y otras personas llegan a entender una misma formulación lingüística, en la comunicación. Al darse tales casos, lo cual constituye el meollo de buena parte de las discusiones entre juristas, es inevitable optar entre distintas interpretaciones que ahí se presentan: si se aceptará uno u otros sentidos para el mismo texto. Sobre cuál ha de ser la interpretación aceptada versan numerosas discusiones, muy a menudo no se arriba al acuerdo entre distintos intérpretes. (…). Significa que, en la práctica, la “letra” del precepto de Derecho positivo considerado, sean disposiciones constitucionales o en general legales, no proporciona más que un marco (…) dentro del cual se opera, en su momento, la elección de un sentido jurídico, aquel por el cual prefiera decidirse el propio intérprete. (…). Está en la naturaleza misma del discurso jurídico, podría decirse, esa condición de que sus textos suelen admitir intepretaciones distintas, en mayor o menor grado, ante tales o cuales clases de casos. “¿Acaso todas las personas con aptitudes mentales normales van a extraer las mismas conclusiones de un determinado texto legal? Plantear la pregunta significa, como todo jurista sabe, contestarla en forma negativa” ([Nombre14] 1977: 254). En consecuencia: “El juez o el jurista, aunque no lo deseen reconocer construyen las normas a partir del texto legal. No se limitan, ni siquiera lo hacían en los tiempos de gloria de la Exégesis, a encajar el caso que examinan en una disposición de la ley. ¿Por qué “construir”? Porque el lector de la Constitución [o de otros textos de Derecho Positivo], permítaseme la expresión, tiene que “armar” las normas a partir del texto” ([Nombre15] 1995: 113).” [Axiología jurídica fundamental (Axiología II). Bases de valoración en el discurso jurídico. Materiales para discernir en forma analítico-realista las claves retóricas de esos discursos, San José: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2004, pp. 255-257]. Justamente por eso no es de extrañar que el Código Civil vigente disponga en su numeral 10 que “Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas.” Y que, como lo ha apuntado en forma reiterada la Sala Constitucional, el objetivo (ratio) o fin propuesto y supuesto, respecto del cual el precepto tiene naturaleza instrumental —método teleológico o finalista—; su confrontación y concordancia con el resto de los que, en particular, conforman una institución jurídica —método institucional— y, en general, con todo el ordenamiento jurídico —método sistemático—, toda vez que no se le puede concebir como un compartimento estanco y aislado pues se encuentra conectado y coordinado con otros, de forma explícita o implícita y, finalmente, la consideración de la realidad socio-económica e histórica a la cual se ha de aplicar, que es, por definición, variable y mutable dado su enorme dinamismo —método histórico-evolutivo— sean los instrumentos mínimos imprescindibles a los que el o la intérprete debe recurrir en forma conjunta a la hora de aplicar una o varias disposiciones concretas (voto n.° 3481-03, de las 14:03 horas del 2 de mayo de 2003, reiterado, entre otros, en los n.os [Telf3], de las 15:02 horas del 30 de enero; 13902-2007, de las 15:24 horas del 3 de octubre, ambos de 2007; 2008-13424, de las 9:31 horas del 2 de setiembre de 2008; 2009-315, de las 15:23 horas del 14 de enero; [Telf4], de las 12:50 horas del 30 de enero; [Telf5], de las 16:47 horas del 30 de abril; 2009-10553, de las 14:54 horas del 1º de julio; 2009-15194, de las 10:53 horas del 25 de setiembre, los cinco de 2009; [Telf6], de las 14:50 horas del 10 de marzo de 2010; [Telf7], de las 15 horas del 23 de febrero; [Telf8], de las 15:27 horas del 6 de abril y 2011-7955, de las 10:46 horas del 17 de junio, los últimos de 2011). Esa interpretación evolutiva a la luz de la realidad o del contexto social imperante en un momento histórico determinado se impone con mayor fuerza en coyunturas como la actual, altamente variables y cambiantes. Es claro, entonces, que ningún precepto legal puede aplicarse, única y exclusivamente, con fundamento en su tenor literal, como parece haberlo hecho en el sub-lite la juzgadora de primera instancia, puesto que, para desentrañar y comprender su sentido, significado y alcances es preciso acudir a los diversos instrumentos hermenéuticos mencionados, los cuales representan diferentes estadios del acto interpretativo y no tienen un carácter excluyente. Además, siempre debe tenerse en cuenta que, conforme lo exige el artículo 11 del Código Civil, “La equidad habrá de ponderarse en la aplicación de las normas (…).” Por consiguiente, la lectura de la normativa vigente no puede hacerse de manera aislada, descontextualizada e indiscriminada; por el contrario, es preciso ajustarla a la especialidad de la materia y a las particularidades del conflicto que en esta sede se ventila y ha de responder a reglas elementales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Con ello se reafirma la necesidad de ofrecerle al señor [Nombre1]. la más amplia posibilidad de exponer y discutir el alcance actual de la regulación vigente en materia de unión de hecho. Es la forma de garantizarle sus derechos fundamentales, tanto los de índole instrumental como los de fondo. Valga citar aquí, en apoyo de lo anterior, el razonamiento expuesto por la Sala Constitucional en el reciente voto n.º [Telf8], de las 15:27 horas del 6 de abril de 2011, emitido a propósito del inciso 4) del artículo 572 del Código Civil, que imponía una limitación a determinados familiares para acceder a la condición de herederos legitimos, “(…) de ahí que se hace necesario revisar estos aspectos jurídicos, a favor de las realidades económicas familiares y estructuras sociales actuales, con lo cual se requiere de una interpretación finalista y evolutiva de las normas jurídicas, pues el cuestionamiento que se hace en la acción pone a la luz resabios jurídicos e históricos que aún impiden la transmisión de la propiedad en perjuicio de ciertas personas en razón de provenir de una línea genética fundada en el género masculino, e impone resolver el problema con apego a los derechos fundamentales que nos rige [sic] en la actualidad.”- X.- No podemos dejar de mencionar que en el voto n.º 48-13, de las 14:20 horas del 17 de enero de 2013, la mayoría de esta integración confirmó el rechazo de plano de un proceso similar a este, con base en una argumentación idéntica a la que contiene el auto apelado: “Ante lo anterior, y al haberse reafirmado el criterio en torno a que la unión de hecho fundamentada en el articulo 242 del Código de Familia debe ser entre hombre y mujer, la mayoría de esta integración debe proceder confirmando la resolución venida en alzada.” Sin embargo, como ya se apuntó, en esta oportunidad el escenario legislativo es otro, toda vez que la citada reforma a la Ley General de la Persona Joven por la n.º 9155, del 3 de julio de 2013, publicada en La Gaceta n.º 130 del 8 de julio siguiente, introdujo nuevos elementos de juicio que reclaman su adecuada valoración y ponderación en un pronunciamiento de fondo. Repárese, además, que en razón de una consulta de constitucional sobre ese reciente texto legal, la Sala especializada de la Corte Suprema de Justicia resolvió lo siguiente: “(…) el juez consultante manifiesta que de la reforma introducida por el literal m) del Artículo 4 de la Ley de la Persona Joven, surgen dos posibilidades de interpretación. La primera, desde una perspectiva negativa, en el sentido de que las personas que están en edades entre los 15 y los 35 años de edad, tienen que acudir a los Juzgados de Familia para el reconocimiento de su unión de hecho, para que esta produzca tanto efectos patrimoniales como efectos personales. La segunda interpretación, desde una perspectiva positiva, implica que las personas que están entre los 15 y 35 años no tienen que acudir a distintas dependencias del Estado para el reconocimiento de la unión de hecho, pues para todos los efectos, basta contar con el reconocimiento que se hace en un Juzgado de Familia. Estima el juzgador que esta segunda interpretación resulta peligrosa, no solo por la incertidumbre que se puede generar en el sentido de que no se podría conocer, a ciencia cierta, si la relación de unión de hecho se mantuvo pública, notoria, única y estable, al momento de invocar la protección del Estado, y principalmente, por los efectos extensivos que se podría dar a ese reconocimiento. En primer término, se observa que el consultante no expone un problema de validez constitucional que provoque su duda, lo que el juez pretende con la consulta, es que esta Sala le indique cuál de las dos interpretaciones que expone es la correcta para resolver el caso concreto, lo cual resulta improcedente, pues en reiteradas ocasiones este Tribunal ha indicado que las consultas judiciales que promuevan los jueces deben formularse en relación con las normas o actos que deban aplicar, pero no en relación con el caso concreto. No procede que en esta jurisdicción se le indique al juez cuáles son las normas que debe aplicar o su correcta interpretación legal. Por otra parte, se constata, que los cuestionamientos que plantea el juzgador en cuanto a este extremo, sea, si los jóvenes entre los 15 y 35 años de edad deben acudir o no al Juzgado de familia para el reconocimiento de los efectos patrimoniales y personales de la unión de hecho; están relacionados con aspectos de legalidad y no de constitucionalidad, que debe resolver el juez.” (Voto n.º 2013-10828, de las 15 horas del 14 de agosto de 2013).- XI.- Con base en todo lo expuesto, no podemos compartir la decisión del órgano a quo y como no identificamos la ausencia de algún presupuesto procesal que torne imposible darle curso a la demanda, este asunto debe seguir tramitándose de manera tal que, una vez instruido, se determine, mediante sentencia, si lo pretendido es o no procedente. Solo de ese modo se le garantizan a don [Nombre1]. sus derechos fundamentales a la tutela judicial efectiva y al debido proceso e, incluso, el de acudir ante la Sala Segunda, vía recurso de casación, en el supuesto de que sea desestimado en primera y segunda instancias. El proveído apelado rebasa los parámetros de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que deben regir el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional y, por eso, procede lo revocamos y ordenamos la continuación del proceso.-

POR TANTO

Se revoca la resolución recurrida y se ordena darle curso a la demanda interpuesta por el señor [Nombre1].- Alexis Vargas Soto Randall Esquivel Quirós Luis Héctor Amoretti Orozco r.s.