Affirmation of agrarian usucapion by a non domino purchaseRatificación de usucapión agraria por compra a non domino

Res. 001762-F-S1-2021 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours twenty-two minutes on the twelfth of October two thousand twenty-one.

Ordinary proceeding established in the Civil and Agrarian Court of Puntarenas by OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA against LA FLORIDA SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA, represented by its unlimited general agent Franklin Rodríguez Soto, and ÓSCAR SOTO JIMÉNEZ. Appearing for the counterclaim defendant are special judicial agents Ramón Jiménez Castro and Victoria Jiménez Rodríguez, with attorney Máximo Corrales Vega; for the co-defendant counterclaimant La Florida S.R.L., attorney Franklin Rodríguez Soto acted; for the co-defendant counterclaimant Soto Jiménez, Jorge Arias Barrantes and José Badilla Villanueva.

Drafted by Magistrate López González

CONSIDERING

I.In accordance with the facts that the Court held as demonstrated, after adopting those proven by the Trial Court, which are not contested at this stage, it is established that by public deed granted at 18 hours on 26 March 1985 before notary public Oscar Omar Monge, Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez and his relatives, Mesdames: Dora Jiménez Granados, ID 2-272-967, Vecsi Soto Jiménez, ID 2-169-325; Aracelly Soto Jiménez, ID 2-195-031; Flor Soto Jiménez, ID 9-041-222; incorporated the company La Florida S.R.L., in which Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez contributed two properties for the incorporation, from the province of Puntarenas, registration numbers 20679 and 11883. In the year 1988 (without a specific date), Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez sold farm 6-20679 to Mr. Ronulfo González Vega (brother of Mr. Octaviano González Vega). As of 4 March 1988, the registered owner of farm 6-20679 was Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez. On that date, by deed granted at 12 hours before notary public Olivier Rojas Benavides, Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez sold to Octaviano González Vega, for the sum of ₡150,000.00, received to his full satisfaction, farm 6-20679, located in the fifth district, first canton, with a measurement of 57 hectares 77 ares 45 centiares. On 23 September 1994, farm 6-20679 was registered in the name of La Florida S.R.L. Farm 6-20679 forms an agrarian unit with other adjacent properties along the northwest and west boundaries, which have been possessed by the brothers of Mr. Octaviano González Vega. Mr. Octaviano González Vega has exercised possession of property 6-20679 openly and with the tolerance of the representatives of La Florida S.R.L. since the year 1988; time during which he has maintained the fences and in some areas or sectors, for his own benefit, has maintained livestock activity, through the renovation of improved grass; there are no buildings on the farm, the corral that is found there has no value, it was built by Mr. Elier Soto, brother of Mr. Oscar Soto. On this farm 6-20679, a lien (anotación de demanda) is recorded under volume 421, entry 15708, of 3 September 1995, corresponding to ordinary civil proceeding 138-1-95, issued by the Civil and Labor Court of Puntarenas at 15 hours 30 minutes on 16 June 1995; likewise, a lien to volume 552 entry 11129 filed at 11 hours 3 minutes on 24 May 2005, from preliminary proceedings number 04-3546-175-PE, criminal proceeding against Franklin Rodríguez Soto and another for the crime of Fraudulent Administration, issued at 15 hours 30 minutes on 13 May 2005 by the Criminal Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. In the name of La Florida S.R.L., real estate taxes for the periods 2003, 2004, and 2005 were paid at the Municipal District Council of Cóbano for an amount of ₡427,705.45; likewise, Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez paid taxes on several farms, including 20679, up to the second quarter of the year 2003, with receipt 13306 dated 24 July 2003.

II.Mr. Octaviano González Vega sued La Florida S.R.L. and Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez; he sought in judgment that: "1) This Ordinary proceeding be upheld in all its parts and THAT ACQUISITIVE USUCAPION BE DECLARED IN MY FAVOR, OVER THE PROPERTY THAT I HAVE POSSESSED FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS, IN A PUBLIC, PEACEFUL, UNINTERRUPTED, AND GOOD-FAITH MANNER, WHICH IS THE REGISTERED FARM OF THE PUNTARENAS REGION, REAL FOLIO REGISTRATION NUMBER TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE-ZERO ZERO ZERO, (LOCATED IN District 5 OF PAQUERA, OF CANTON 01 OF THE PROVINCE OF PUNTARENAS. I REQUEST THAT THE REGISTERED TITLE OF THE PREVIOUS OWNER BE CANCELED AND THE PROPERTY BE REGISTERED IN MY NAME, WHICH SHALL BE ORDERED IN JUDGMENT TO THE PUBLIC PROPERTY REGISTRY. THAT THE DEFENDANTS PAY BOTH COSTS OF THE PROCEEDING. 2) IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THAT THE LAWSUIT BE DECLARED WITH MERIT AND THAT I BE PAID ALL TYPES OF IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FARM IN QUESTION, WHICH SHALL BE DONE IN EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AND ALSO BOTH COSTS OF THE PROCEEDING". The defendants were notified on 23 December 2005.

III.La Florida S.R.L. answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of "lack of cause (falta de causa)", "lack of active and passive standing (falta de personería activa y pasiva)" and lack of right; as well as the generic phrase "sine actione agit". In turn, it counterclaimed against Mr. Octaviano González Vega so that in judgment it be declared "a) That my represented party LA FLORIDA SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA, is the registered owner and absolute owner of the farm of the Puntarenas Region, real folios registration number TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE-ZERO ZERO ZERO, cadastral map P-50299-1956. b) That my represented party LA FLORIDA S.R.L., AS ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE FARM OF THE PUNTARENAS REGION, REAL FOLIOS REGISTRATION NUMBER TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE-ZERO ZERO ZERO, HAS THE RIGHT TO POSSESS IT, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY OTHER PERSON, AND TO DISPOSE OF IT AS IT SEES FIT FOR ITS INTERESTS, FOR WHICH, IF NECESSARY, IT SHALL BE PLACED IN EFFECTIVE AND MATERIAL POSSESSION OF THE SAME, THROUGH THIS COURT OR THE COURT OR AUTHORITY THAT THIS JUDICIAL OFFICE COMMISSIONS FOR THAT PURPOSE, WITH THE SUPPORT AND BACKING OF THE PUBLIC FORCE, OR DIRECTLY THROUGH IT, THUS DELIVERING THE SAME. c) That the counterclaim defendant or cross-defendant OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA, be ordered to pay to my represented party LA FLORIDA S.R.L., the sum of ONE HUNDRED MILLION COLONES, for the fruits (frutos) received by him from the exploitation that he has carried out on said farm over the last ten years, in cattle ranching. Also, that said gentleman be ordered to pay to my represented party, the fruits from the use and usufruct of said farm that he realizes until its definitive delivery, which shall be liquidated in execution of this judgment. d) That the cross-defendant or counterclaim defendant be ordered to pay to my represented party, both costs of this counterclaim".

IV.Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez also opposed the lawsuit and raised the defenses of lack of standing and lack of right. He counterclaimed against Mr. Octaviano González Vega so that "This counterclaim be declared with merit. The Usucapion claim demanded by the plaintiff be rejected, and he be ordered to pay procedural and personal costs and, accessorily, damages and losses caused by the reprehensible conduct of the plaintiff".

V.In judgment 11-2017 of 16 hours 15 minutes on 27 February 2017, the Civil and Agrarian Court of Puntarenas ordered: "(…) The defenses of lack of right and lack of standing in its passive form are upheld, and without special pronouncement on the sine actione agit, as it is encompassed by the lack of right. Likewise, the defense of lack of cause is rejected because it is not contemplated within the list of claims indicated by law and the defense of lack of active standing is rejected because the company La Florida S.R.L. is the registered titleholder, to PARTIALLY DECLARE WITH MERIT the ordinary lawsuit of OCTAVIANO GONZALEZ VEGA against LA FLORIDA S.R.L., in the following order: The claim to declare the Institution of Positive Prescription in his favor is rejected. The alternative claim is upheld regarding the payment of improvements in favor of the plaintiff, which shall be liquidated in execution of judgment, in accordance with the parameters established in considering vi. point c). Since the plaintiff is a good-faith possessor, he has a right of retention over the property until the company La Florida S.R.L. pays the total amount set for this concept. The plaintiff and the registered owner may terminate the claim granted for improvements, through a conciliatory settlement. Where no pronouncement is made regarding the lawsuit, it shall be understood as not granted. On the other hand, the defenses of lack of right and lack of standing in the active and passive form are upheld, to declare WITHOUT MERIT in all its aspects the lawsuit filed by Octaviano Gonzalez Vega against Oscar Soto Jimenez. The defense of lack of right is upheld, and the defenses of negative and positive prescription raised by the plaintiff counterclaim defendant are rejected to declare WITHOUT MERIT in all its aspects the counterclaim of Mr. OSCAR SOTO JIMENEZ against OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA. The defenses of lack of right and those of prescription in both forms are rejected to PARTIALLY DECLARE WITH MERIT the counterclaim filed by LA FLORIDA S.R.L. against OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA. Consequently, it is declared that the company LA FLORIDA S.R.L. is the sole and legitimate owner of the farm registered in the Province of Puntarenas TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE-TRIPLE ZERO. The defense of lack of right is upheld, and as unnecessary, the defense of negative prescription is rejected, and as improper, the defense of positive prescription is rejected, to declare that the registered titleholder counterclaimant has no right to claim present and future fruits (frutos), as determined in considering vi. letter b). Where no pronouncement is made, it shall be understood as not granted. Because the replevin (reivindicación) of the property has been ordered in favor of the registered titleholder, the ABSOLUTE NULLITY is declared of deed number forty of notary public Olivier Rojas Fernández granted on the fourth of March nineteen eighty-eight in favor of the plaintiff; for being contrary to the provisions of article 836 of the Civil Code, since the transferor had executed a previous liberatory act in favor of another legal entity over the same object and consequently, the request for a declaration of absolute nullity requested by the defendant party is admitted, as established in article 837 of the Civil Code. Once the judgment is final, issue the respective cancellation order to the Registry. The order for the lien (anotación de demanda) shall remain recorded until the registered owner pays the amounts for improvements that are liquidated in execution of judgment. Personal and procedural costs: In accordance with the merit of the record and article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, costs are declared without special pronouncement". In resolution 336-F-18 of 16 hours 30 minutes on 20 April 2018, the Agrarian Court of the II Judicial Circuit of San José ordered: "Regarding the appeal by the plaintiff Octaviano González Vega, the appealed judgment is REVOKED. Instead, it is resolved: Regarding the LAWSUIT, the defenses of lack of right, and lack of active and passive standing, as well as the lack of cause, raised by the defendants, regarding the main claim, are rejected. 1.- The positive prescription lawsuit filed by OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA against LA FLORIDA S.R.L. and Oscar Soto Jiménez is upheld, over the property he has possessed for more than ten years, in a public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and good-faith manner, which is the registered farm of the Puntarenas Region, real folio registration number twenty thousand six hundred seventy-nine-zero zero zero, (located in district 5 of paquera, of canton 01 of the province of puntarenas), (sic) with the boundaries, measurement, and nature indicated by the Public Registry. 2.- The cancellation of the registered title of the previous owner, La Florida S.R.L., is ordered and it shall be registered in the name of Octaviano González Vega, of legal age, married once, farmer and rancher, resident of Concepción de Naranjo, identity card number nine-zero nineteen-three hundred ninety, which shall be ordered in the execution order to the public property registry, once this ruling is final, and any other lien (anotación) that is expired or prescribed must be disregarded, in accordance with the provisions of articles 853 of the Civil Code, in relation to 471 of the same. Once this judgment is final, the lower court shall issue the corresponding execution order to the Public Property Registry. REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM, the resolution is revoked: The defenses raised by Octaviano González Vega of lack of right and prescription (in its positive and negative forms) are upheld, in accordance with the provisions of articles 851 to 855 of the Civil Code, to instead declare WITHOUT MERIT, in all its aspects, the counterclaim filed by LA FLORIDA S.R.L. and Oscar Soto Jiménez. In accordance with the foregoing, in accordance with articles 54 and 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, since the plaintiff prevailed in his claims, regarding the lawsuit, and the defenses, regarding the counterclaim, it is appropriate to revoke the ruling on costs, to instead order the co-defendants counterclaimants to pay both costs of this proceeding, both personal and procedural". In resolution 400-A-18 of 16 hours 40 minutes on 2018, the Court ordered "The request for clarification and addition is rejected. The purely material error is corrected, in the operative part of Judgment No. 336-F-18 of the Agrarian Court, so that regarding the counterclaim, instead of the phrase "...para en su lugar SIN LUGAR", it shall read, "...para en su lugar declarar SIN LUGAR, en todos sus extremos, la contrademanda interpuesta...". This order is declared final".

VI.Dissatisfied, La Florida S.R.L. and Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez filed separate cassation appeals, which were admitted by this Chamber. The company formulates 7 grievances (of which the last concerns —at its core— the costs imposed). For his part, Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez presents 2 grievances. Prior to the particular examination of the charges, it is pertinent to note that, as indicated in the admission order, in this matter, the scheduling of the evidentiary hearing occurred before the entry into force of the reform to the Labor Code, effected through Law 9343, Labor Procedural Reform, of 25 January 2016, effective from 25 July 2017, so that, in accordance with the Transitory Provision I, paragraph 2) of that legal body, it constitutes a case of exception to its application, so the decision is made according to the previous wording of that codification. Likewise, it is noted that because the appealed judgment was issued prior to the current Civil Procedure Code, Law 9342, according to Transitory Provision II, the hearing and decision of the cassation appeals are conducted in accordance with the former Civil Procedure Code, Law 7130, hereinafter referred to as CPC.

Cassation appeal of the defendant counterclaimant company

VII.La Florida S.R.L., as outlined below, raised 2 grievances of a procedural nature. In agrarian matters, as established by precept 61 of Law 6734 of Agrarian Jurisdiction of 29 March 1982, the appeal before this Chamber is governed by chapter V of title VII of the Labor Code, whose canon 559 —as indicated, with the wording prior to the reform effected through Law 9343— established the outright rejection of that appeal in which the correction, reinstatement, or execution of procedural steps was requested. Based on this rule, this Chamber previously held the criterion that in this matter, the cassation appeal only proceeded for substantive defects. However, since judgment 583-2004 of 14 July 2004, this Chamber admitted the examination of procedural defects when they fall directly on the judgment; excluding those that fall on the procedural iter (iter procesal), which are those expressly excluded by precept 559 of the Labor Code insofar as it refers to "procedural steps". In this, it has been maintained, one must adhere to the regulation of the grounds contained in mandate 594 of the CPC, by express reference of article 452 of the Labor Code. In this regard, it has been accepted that in agrarian matters, procedural errors of incongruence and reforma in perjuicio are admissible. Claims for deficiency in the composition of the litis have also been admitted, due to their incidence on the effectiveness of the ruling and because it is a prerequisite of every procedural relationship. In this sense, one may consult, among many others, resolutions 971-F-S1-2011, 691-F-S1-2012, 1513-F-S1-2012, 1425-F-S1-2013, 29-F-S1-2015, and 2039-F-S1-2019. For this reason, we proceed to the analysis of the defects of form raised by the appellant.

VIII.First. La Florida S.R.L. censures that "the judgment is poorly reasoned (escasamente fundamentada) and violates the right to a double instance". It states that it appealed the lower court's ruling only as it granted the plaintiff payment of the improvements made to the property and a right of retention. However, the Court only heard the appeal of the plaintiff and regarding its own, it decided it would not hear it as unnecessary; which —it argues— is contrary to the duty to state reasons, to article 155 of the CPC, to the right to a double instance, and to due process. The Court, it denounces, declined its obligation to resolve; it disregarded the impugnation action of one of the parties and preferred that of the other, without indicating the reasons why it dismissed it, "we must suppose, and only suppose, that the ruling issued by the COURT was sufficient in itself to reject our appeal, which is unheard of, because the COURT would be resolving the case in a single instance".

IX.Given that, when dealing with procedural defects that fall on the judgment, one must resort to mandate 594 of the CPC, it is clear that neither the lack of reasoning nor resolution in a single instance, which is what the company complains of, are among the grounds provided. Therefore, the grievance will be denied. In any case, the appellant in cassation is made aware that the Court stated it would not hear the grievances relating to the payment of improvements, as unnecessary; and this is clear to this Chamber because the payment of improvements was one of the aspects that, upon upholding the appeal of the plaintiff counterclaim defendant, was revoked. Since the main claim for usucapion in favor of Mr. Octaviano González Vega was upheld; consequently, the upholding of the claim of this same subject for the payment of improvements, which was alternative, could not proceed, nor could it be maintained. Therefore, the grievances of his appeal that precisely attacked the estimation of that alternative request of the plaintiff became moot, as that grant no longer existed. Therefore, the censure will be denied.

X.Second. The company denounces the defect of incongruence, in that "something that was never requested (sic) (extra petita)" was granted, in violation of article 155 of the CPC. It transcribes the plaintiff's claim requesting the declaration of acquisitive usucapion of the property. This, it says, was what was requested by the plaintiff; however, the Court unilaterally granted a mode of acquisition of ownership not requested, namely acquisition a non domino, validating a supposed translative title of ownership under the justification that the social function of property allows disregarding the fixing of the facts and the claims of the parties.

XI.In this regard, it is worth noting that this Chamber has reiterated on numerous occasions that for common agrarian usucapion, as requested in this matter by the plaintiff counterclaim defendant, the just title (justo título) required "must emanate from one who in Law is not the owner. The thing is acquired from another, who behaved and was reputed as such, without being so; the transferor is a non-owner, either because he has never held title, or because his right has been extinguished or resolved, or because the one he exhibits is insufficient to produce the transfer; in this last case is, for example, the usufructuary who appears transferring ownership. Usucapion operates, consequently, when the title of transmission or acquisition is a non domino, from one who is not the owner, but not when it is a domino or a verus domino, that is, when it emanates from the true owner, because in this case, if the title is perfect, it immediately produces all its effects. And if it has some defect of another nature, because it emanates from the true owner, its validation can occur through negative or extinctive prescription of the nullity action and not through acquisitive prescription or usucapion. Regarding the just title, one may consult, from this body, judgment No. 821 of 15 hours 35 minutes on 1 November 2000, 856 of 15 hours 25 minutes on 15 November 2000, and 320 of 15 hours on 27 April 2001" (emphasis added; as noted in precedent 178-F-S1-2007, likewise in 536-F-2007, and along the same lines are also resolutions 891-F-S1-2007 and 945-F-S1-2018). Thus, in this case, the main claim of the plaintiff counterclaim defendant imposed upon the adjudicating bodies the analysis of the just title (justo título), which required examining whether it was issued by the verus domino or whether it was a non domino. Consequently, when the Court determined that the sale and purchase document of 4 March 1988 constitutes a sale a non domino by Mr. Oscar Soto to Mr. Octaviano González, said body would not have incurred the defect of extra petita as alleged; this formed part of the cause of action (causa de pedir).

XII.Third. La Florida maintains that the judgment has "contradictory reasoning". It states, it validates the list of proven and unproven facts of the lower court's judgment, except for proven fact 4 which it suppresses; which reveals a problem of logical structure because if it maintains such circumstances, it cannot validly, logically, arrive at conclusions different from those of the lower court. It warns that the Court carried out a decontextualized analysis of the testimony of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez. It only copied and pasted a part of her statement. It transcribes, the witness also indicated: "I clarify that I was not there the day Octaviano bought the farm, I found out because Octaviano told me about it. Ronulfo and Oscar when they sold this farm did not make papers, back then, things were very expensive and they left it for later. It was later that Octaviano's documents were made but the deed did not pass in the Registry and that is why they began to investigate. That document was signed on 4 March 1988, Mr. Olivier Rojas was there and Octaviano, Ronulfo, and Oscar were also there... when the deed was made in Palmares no investigation was done as to whether the farm was registered because the farm was Mr. Oscar's. I can attest that no study was done at that time in the Registry. They began to investigate some time later why the deed would not pass in the Registry.... I do not know (sic) on what date Mr. Olivier filed the deed for this purchase in the Registry...". From this, it argues, it is concluded that the plaintiff says he bought the farm from his brother in 1984, that due to the latter's death he decided to make the papers with the true owner Oscar in 1988, "that is, if the plaintiff bought in the year 1984 and only 4 years later he opts to make papers with the true owner, it is clear that just 4 years after having bought from his brother, he managed to realize that the land was registered, otherwise, what need would there have been to locate Oscar and make papers with him? They simply seek out Oscar because it is recognized that the property is registered and that the signature of the registered owner (Oscar) was needed to register the plaintiff's acquisition, therefore, from the very beginning the plaintiff's good faith is questionable". It continues, "Then, the hearsay witness says: 'That document was signed on 4 March 1988, Mr. Olivier Rojas was there and Octaviano, Ronulfo, and Oscar were also there... when the deed was made in Palmares no investigation was done as to whether the farm was registered because the farm was Mr. Oscar's...' an assertion that the COURT analyzes in isolation from the general context and abstracted from the totality of the evidentiary record in the proceeding. First, if the three characters were there it was because a situation that was not clear needed to be resolved, that is, that the property appeared registered in Oscar's name, therefore, the COURT's thesis regarding that the plaintiff did not know or had no reason to know if the farm was registered or if it was or was not Oscar's is not true. Later, in the same acquisition document provided by the plaintiff it is clearly read that Oscar 'sells him his registered farm', therefore, the COURT's reasoning regarding what the witness stated is totally contradictory with the same weighing of that testimony as well as with the same document that provides that the registration of the property was already a reality, and this occurs only a supposed 4 years in which the plaintiff had acquired from his brother, therefore, the act of signing the document with Oscar is a clear and determining element of proof to demonstrate that the plaintiff, from that date, was already fully aware that the property was registered and that it was in Oscar's name, therefore, what was really important in the case was to determine if the plaintiff knew or not if the property was registered in the Public Registry, and both the witness and the same document, prove that the plaintiff did know". This, it asserts, is sufficient to deny positive prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership, since by accepting that it was registered, he does not have the necessary good faith; "any consequence derived from the document he decided to sign (...) must be assumed by the plaintiff, and this includes the fact that the farm no longer belonged to the person who claimed to sell it to him, because he had already contributed it to the company at an earlier date". It adds, if the plaintiff did not want to check the Registry, that does not excuse him; therefore, the Court's decision violates the principles of juridical security and certainty, of efficacy erga omnes, and of registry publicity. It highlights, since the property is registered, "any particular situation derived from that property is recorded in the Public Registry, just as the annotation related to the contribution of the farm to the claimant company was already publicized by the Public Registry since the year 1986 and was definitively registered in the year 1994. Rather, the same witness says that they began to make inquiries because the deed would not pass, then it is clear that they could have had full knowledge of the registry situation of the property both before carrying out the deed with Oscar and after having carried it out, and if they still persisted in it, that was a clearly assumed risk that must now have consequences for them, since it constitutes neither an acquisition a non domino nor one suitable for usucapion, given that their good faith is diminished by the circumstances that surrounded that acquisition". It indicates, "the COURT indicates the following: 'On the other hand, both the plaintiff, and his prior possessor, that is, his brother Ronulfo, to whom Mr. Oscar Soto confesses he sold before later transferring the property to Octaviano, were unaware that La Florida S.A. appeared as registered owner as of 1994, in the Public Registry' when what should really have called the COURT's attention is that the plaintiff participates in an act of deed signing, for a farm that was registered, according to the witness: '...when the deed was made in Palmares no investigation was done as to whether the farm was registered because the farm was Mr. Oscar's...' what the COURT must understand is that the witness refers that she assumed the farm was Oscar's, which contradicts the document provided and the version given by the plaintiff in his lawsuit, since the document is clear in indicating that it is a registered farm that Oscar was selling to the plaintiff and that pure and simple fact should have set the standard for the COURT to determine that the plaintiff does not have protectable possession, much less good faith or just title, either understood as a document or understood as the same possessory act, because we already said, he was fully aware that the property was reduced to private ownership, that being the case, the possession he may have been exercising is tainted as anti-juridical and is not capable of being protected through the means of positive prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership."

Therefore, what is truly important here is not to establish whether the actor knew that the farm belonged to the plaintiff company or not, since what is relevant is to establish whether the actor had knowledge that the property was registered." It concludes, the judgment is contradictory because it validates a supposed document transferring ownership, when this is full proof that the farm was registered, and therefore it cannot be acquired by usucapion, much less as an "acquisition a non domino"; "one thing is the possession exercised over a lawful and possible object, in good faith and under the terms required by agrarian law to usucapt, and quite another is to pass off an illegal act as justified ignorance in good faith and social function."

XIII.For the decision on this grievance, it is advisable to be clear on the arguments of the Court in the appealed judgment, in their entirety, so that, beforehand, this Chamber may make some general clarifications on the subject of agrarian usucapion. Thus, it is noted that in recitals I and II, the Court shared the facts that the Trial Court had deemed proven, with the exception of the fourth, which it eliminated; likewise, it shared the circumstances it deemed unproven. In recitals III and IV it summarized the appeal of the plaintiff and that of Florida S.R.L. In recital V it explained in general terms the institution of usucapion. In VI it also set forth in general terms the distinction that for several years said body has considered exists between civil and agrarian usucapion. To do so, it inserted a long quote (whose source it does not specifically identify), but from which it is worth highlighting that it reads that it is by virtue of the agrarian principle of the "social function of property" that "various requirements are established in Agrarian Usucapion," which—it continues reading—are: 1) the animus; 2) the "just title in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem" and 3) the "good faith in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem." It detailed: " 1.- The animus, must be projected through the effective exercise of agrarian possessory acts, the agrarian property becoming the habitual abode of the possessor; but it is reflected more intensely through the economic appropriation of the profits obtained through his cultivation work; it is presumed that he who works the land in this manner is always a possessor in the capacity of owner. 2.-The just title in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem, is constituted by agrarian work, since it is through it that ownership of the land is acquired. \"On the other hand, the non-requirement of just title allows usucapion to be presented contra-tábulas, that is, against a title registered in the name of a third party in the Public Registry. By virtue of the considerations regarding just title made in the theory of agrarian possession, it can be said that, agrarian usucapion, by not taking into account the prior relationship that may exist between the possessor and the transferor, is a truly original mode of acquisition.\" (Meza Lázarus, op. cit., page 158). 3.- Good faith in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem: In agrarian usucapion, there is no categorization of possession of good or bad faith, (sic) since Agrarian Law is not so much interested in the attitude of the possessor, but above all in his productive agrarian activity; \"In Agrarian Law, the existence of this requirement cannot be conceived by virtue of the fact that it is linked to the just title which is discarded as a requirement of possession suitable for usucapion. Agrarian possession has a personal character in which its foundation turns out to be work. Since the existence of a title and its validity is not necessary, the requirement of special good faith (sic) in agrarian possession lacks any reason for being.\"(Meza Lázarus, op.cit., pages 160-161)” (the bold text is removed from the original quote now transcribed). Continuing in recital VII, it affirmed the appellant partially bears reason (what is deduced is the plaintiff). It explained, the plaintiff directed his claim against La Florida S.R.L, who appears as the registered owner as of 1994, and against Oscar Soto Vega, who sold to him in 1988. It is proven, it continued, that Oscar Soto Jiménez accepted having sold to Ronulfo González Vega and "and the latter in turn to the here actor Octaviano González Vega, therefore the sale was made directly from Oscar Soto to Octaviano, the latter acquiring under the belief that the person selling to him was the true owner of the property, however, it is also true that the sale is a non domino, (not from the true owner), since if this occurred on March 4, 1988 (see document at folio 3) by means of a public deed -possessory transfer title-, and Oscar Soto had transferred the ownership of said property since March 23, 1985 to La Florida Sociedad Anónima (see folios 5 to 8), Mr. Octaviano had no reason (sic) to know or be aware of said transfer, which was registered in the Public Registry only until September 23, 1995 (see folios 5 to 17). The domain transfer title exhibited by the plaintiff, is suitable, valid, true and effective, since the parties gave their consent -nudo consensu- and from then on, the contract was perfected, Mr. Octaviano behaving from that moment as the legitimate owner and real proprietor of the property." It added, "It is not true, as affirmed by the a-quo that Octaviano had knowledge that the sale in his favor was not carried out because there was a document prior to the registration in favor of La Florida S.R.L., because the notary made it known. That affirmation by the trial judge is based on an error in the evaluation of the evidence, specifically a material error or error of fact, since it puts into the mouth of the witness Sancho Ramírez something that she did not say in her declaration. Indeed, if it is read in its entirety, a different conclusion is reached. Mrs. Alicia Sánchez Ramírez clearly stated: \"...After Octaviano acquired it I never saw Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar work the farm. Never, since Octaviano acquired (sic) the farm did Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar indicate to Mr. Octaviano that he could not work the farm. The farm was indeed registered, I do not know if Octaviano knew that when he bought it. I found out in the Registry after Octaviano had bought. I started taking some computer courses and since they had us practice, using the computer I found that it was registered in the name of the Society La Florida, that was about eight years ago. From that date forward never has anyone from that society indicated or claimed from Octaviano regarding the farm...\"(see folios 1439-1440). That is to say, the inquiries began some time after the year 2000, when the plaintiff already had more than ten years of possessing the property in a public, peaceful manner, with just title and good faith, a situation that was consolidated, undoubtedly as of the fulfillment of the ten years, that is March 5, 1998." It adds, "On the other hand, both the plaintiff, and his prior possessor, that is his brother Ronulfo, to whom Mr. Oscar Soto confesses he sold and then transferred the property to Octaviano, were unaware that La Florida S.A. appeared as the registered owner as of 1994, in the Public Registry. Much less can that event be deemed -as the a-quo erroneously did, as an act interrupting possession, as a material fact. Nothing more erroneous regarding the normative application of the provisions of Article 853 and following of the Civil Code, since a mere registry inscription (publicity) is not capable of interrupting positive prescription, as it does not correspond to the causes of interruption recognized by the legislator (Articles 875 and 876 of the Civil Code)." The Court indicated that the witness Sancho Ramírez stated that they "found out" that the property was registered in the name of the society, but that occurred when the usucapion period had already elapsed. It detailed, the plaintiff's possession had been for more than 10 years as owner and with a just title "real and existing since by means of No. 40 (…) of March 4, 1988 (folios 3 and 4) Oscar Soto Jiménez sells to Octaviano González Vega" the registered farm, which the former had contributed to the society, a situation unknown to the latter. It then highlighted, the buyer and his transferor are those who have behaved as the real owners of the property, paying laborers, caring for and improving the property, maintaining grazing divisions, planting improved pastures, dedicating it to livestock activity for more than 20 years, that is, fulfilling the exercise of the social function of property, as deduced from "the declaration of: Blanca Ester Rojas Zúñiga who affirmed: \"...Who works this farm is Octaviano, he acquired this farm because he bought it from my spouse Ronulfo González Vega, that was more than twenty years ago. My spouse bought this farm from Oscar Soto Jiménez...Mr. Octaviano currently dedicates this farm to livestock, on occasions corn, yuca have also been planted...In the village they recognize Octaviano González Vega as the owner of these lands, he maintains the fences and the farm with his laborers...it is in better conditions now, Octaviano planted improved pastures, before there were \"burros\" grasses, he has also improved the fences \"(see folio 1436). The witness Mainor Francisco Castro Jiménez stated: \"They, I clarify, the González family have worked this farm for about eighteen years approximately...\"(folio 1437)...Those who work this farm are the González brothers and their laborers, they dedicate it to livestock...\"(folio 1438). The witness Alicia Sancho Ramírez explains in more detail: \"The farm is divided into grazing divisions six in total, ...Since Octaviano acquired the farm never has anyone interrupted him...he is the one who buys all the wires for the fences and the laborers are the ones who maintain them, they plant improved pastures throughout the farm. Octaviano is the one who buys them, as well as the herbicides, I am sure because I am the one who makes the checks...\" (folio 1439). The witness Fernando Enrique Castro Jiménez, referring to the time of the possession states: \"The González family have had the farm for approximately eighteen or nineteen years. This farm what I have observed from the outside has always been maintained the same...For the maintenance of the farm the González family uses a Chapulín and also laborers...\"(folio 1441). The witness Dagoberto Suárez Araya added the following: \"I have known the farm subject to this proceeding for approximately twenty-three years, I have worked with Octaviano on that farm for that same time, I help him with the livestock and fix the fences. Since I have known the farm I have worked there...he dedicates the farm to livestock, he has planted Brisante and Braquiar type grass, there are approximately sixty head of Brahman breed cattle....\"(folio 1443-1445). (sic) See in the same sense the remaining declarations of Luis Alberto Barrientos Mora (folio 1445), and Alfredo Ramírez Sandi (at folios 1448-1449)." It reiterated, from the foregoing, the behavior of the plaintiff as the legitimate owner is evident, by disposing of the property in agrarian activities of livestock farming, maintenance of pastures and fences, planting of improved pastures and "also the inertia of the holder in the exercise of his rights of restitution over the property, having allowed more than ten years to elapse." It continued, "the plaintiff has, as indicated, the possessory transfer title, and good faith, since he has maintained the conviction that he acquired from the true owner (a non domino)." It held, if the plaintiff and his transferor had as of 1998 more than 10 years of continuous exercise of possession in good faith, the second paragraph of Article 285 applies to them regarding that if the possession was of good faith in its beginning, it does not lose that character by the mere fact that the possessor later doubts the legitimacy of his right, therefore in this case good faith must be presumed in favor of the usucaptor.

XIV.It is deemed appropriate to warn that, contrary to what was held by the Court regarding the different requirements for agrarian usucapion, this Chamber in judgment 920-F-2000 of 15 hours 25 minutes of December 13, 2000, indicated that "the mere exercise of acts said to be possessory does not substitute for the legal conditions that the law requires for usucapting, relating to just title and good faith. Consequently, the trial judges have erred in providing that, in what they call 'agrarian usucapion', a series of elements that appear in civil law as requirements for possession suitable for usucapion must be discarded, such as just title and good faith, since, as they express it, the just title is constituted by agrarian work and good faith is not relevant, to the extent that the attitude of the possessor is not of interest, but rather his productive activity. That reasoning is openly contrary to what is expressed in Articles 853, 855 and 856 of the Civil Code, which are applicable in the species. In this sense, in cases processed under agrarian jurisdiction, the said legal conditions, necessary for positive prescription to operate, must not be obviated, since, except for the situation contemplated, expressly, by Articles 92 and 101 of the Posesory Information Law [it concerns the Land and Colonization Law, and not as was indicated in error], relating to precarious possessors and under the strict observance of the procedures and processes that said law provides to that effect –matters unrelated to the case at hand-, in our legal regime, regarding the usucapion of the right of property over real estate, absolutely no legal provision establishes the exemption from the duty of concurrence of just title and good faith. Quite the contrary, the law requires both conditions, together with the possession qualified by Article 856 of the Civil Code, for positive prescription to be admissible, (…) [.-] VI.- This Chamber has already reiterated the need for the usucaptor to meet the three legal conditions for usucapion to operate, equally, in cases processed under agrarian jurisdiction, precisely because the applicable law so determines (the following judgments of this Chamber may be consulted, for example: number 4 of fourteen hours forty-five minutes of January twenty-eighth of nineteen ninety-eight; number 50 of fifteen hours twenty minutes of May twentieth of nineteen ninety-eight; number 95 of fifteen hours thirty minutes of October second of nineteen ninety-eight; number 1 of fourteen hours of January sixth of nineteen ninety-nine)." Previously, in resolution 821-F-2000 of 15 hours 35 minutes of November first of 2000 (civil matter although not for that reason does it result in a different treatment for agrarian matters, as expressed in the antecedent just cited), this Chamber had pronounced on the just title as follows: "in accordance with our legal system, this requirement refers to the domain transfer title and not to the qualities of possession, since the latter enjoys autonomy, and must present, as stated, the characteristics of being public, peaceful, uninterrupted and in the capacity of owner. The domain transfer title constitutes the justifying element of the possession -not the reverse-, and must have this characteristic before or at the moment of possessing. It must also not be confused with good faith, since the latter is a subjective requirement related to the acquirer's belief of being assisted by the right in the possession exercised. The justice of the title lies, according to what has been developed by doctrine, ancient and recent, in its veracity and validity. The first characteristic refers to its real existence, excluding as such the putative and the simulated title. In both cases, there is no operating just title, only the appearance of one." Likewise, on this same occasion it was pointed out regarding the proof of just title by the acquirer that "Our Civil Code, in its Article 854, requires proof of this requirement, except in cases where there are possessory presumptions - in the case of movable goods or the right of possession, or it is not required at all for usucapting continuous and apparent easements-. The reason for the exceptions is easy to understand, due to the different treatment given to the cases indicated. Regarding the right to possess, the form of acquisition is more agile than that provided for the right of property, since its content is not full and permanent like that of the latter. Indeed, to acquire this right, possession for one year suffices (Articles 279 and 869, in fine, of the Civil Code). But this, by virtue of a possessory presumption valid only for the right to possess, as stated in Article 281 ibidem, but not referring to the acquisitive cause of property, which, according to ordinal 854, must always be proven. In other words, one cannot assimilate the justifying title of simple possession with the true and valid title of acquisition, as indicated, of property. Ordinal 281 and 854, far from contradicting each other, find correspondence in their respective scopes of application. At this point, it is timely to recall the real rights susceptible to being acquired by usucapion, in which proof of just title is indeed required. Among them is the right of property -as a full right- and the rights of usufruct, use and habitation as derived rights-. In these cases, it is not enough to presume the right to possess; it is necessary to demonstrate a just acquisitive cause of ownership, usufruct, use or habitation. The function of the possessory presumption, fully applicable to the simple right to possess -real right in another's property, which, despite its enormous relevance, has a lower rank than property- or to ownership over movable goods -which is based on the publicity system applicable to them-, has not been extended by our legislation to the proof of just title in other cases. In these, the different nature and socio-economic consideration of the rights require, in the complex factual assumption of the original acquisition analyzed, a cause justifying the possession, which is explicit and allows, not only analyzing if the title is just (valid and true), but also its concordance with the property being possessed. In this regard, the following judgments of this Chamber, among others, may be consulted: numbers 19 of 14:00 hrs. of April 7, 1993; 45 of 15:05 hrs of May 22, 1996; and, 1 of 14 hrs. of January 6, 1999." Subsequently, in resolution 178-F-2007 of 9 hours 50 minutes of March 14, 2007, it was specified that there are two types of agrarian usucapion, the common and the special, between which there is a difference regarding their requirements. It was explained, special agrarian usucapion is regulated in the Land and Colonization Law, mandates 92 and 101, the foundation of which is precarious possession out of necessity to exploit the agrarian property, as a means of subsistence for oneself or the family nucleus; "In this precarious possession of lands, alimentary need and family agrarian work prevail. The simple ánimo of possessing is not required; one must possess in an effective, direct and personal manner, to satisfy the feeding needs of the family group. Hence, for it to operate, the existence of good or bad faith is not determinative, insofar as this element is substituted by necessity." For its part, it continued, common agrarian usucapion is governed by the general regulations of the Civil Code, therefore, in accordance with precept 853, just title and good faith must be demonstrated, as well as possession; it was emphasized that the general regulation of usucapion "requires the concurrence of certain requirements: habile thing, that is, susceptible to private property; located within the commerce of men; just domain transfer title; good faith; possession and passage of time, that possession exercised in the capacity of owner, in a continuous, public, peaceful manner and for ten years or more (Articles 853 and 860 of the Civil Code). Said requirements are concurrent, so that if only one of them is absent, then the acquisitive prescription will be inadmissible." A position that more specifically reiterates the criterion expressed in the cited precedent 920-F-2000 of 15 hours 25 minutes of December 13, 2000. In this line, of more recent date, in judgment 945-F-S1-2018 of 10 hours 35 minutes of November 1, 2018, issued within an ordinary agrarian proceeding, it was indicated that " XI.- Regarding the institution of usucapion, this Chamber, in a reiterated manner has provided, based on the applicable regulations, that certain requirements are necessary for it to be configured, namely, domain transfer title, good faith, possession exercised in the capacity of owner in a continuous, public and peaceful manner, as well as the passage of time, that is 10 years at a minimum. On the subject, it has so considered in judgment no. 114 of 12 hours 11 minutes of February 5, 2016, the following: 'Regarding agrarian usucapion, this Chamber on other occasions has already indicated that for it to prosper the fulfillment of several requirements is needed: domain transfer title, good faith and possession; but this must be in the capacity of owner, in a public, peaceful and uninterrupted manner for a period of 10 years, taking into account that in agrarian matters, the aspect of possession transcends simple occupation [understood as, possession] of the property, since in these cases it is required that there be agrarian possessory acts, aimed at cultivating and improving the property that one seeks to usucapt. The resolution of 9 hours 50 minutes of September 18, 2013, corresponding to vote number 1196, may be consulted in this sense.' –the highlighted text is not from the original-". Later it was expressed: "(…) the fact that the plaintiff continued working the land, the foundation of which, the plaintiff says, is found in the meeting of the minds carried out verbally, between him and the Cooperative -regarding the future return of the portion of land in litis-, this does not possess the necessary characteristics for configuring the transfer title suitable for usucapting –since it is not a transfer title from someone who is not the owner-. Therefore, this Chamber conceives, one of the requirements of usucapion is not configured. As set forth in the preceding lines, it is not the mere fact of possession that must be valued when reviewing the requirements of usucapion, but rather the prior legal situation or the cause for which one possesses. And in this case, the cause or the reason for which the plaintiff says he finds himself in possession of the land, is far from that which is considered suitable for usucapting." Thus, from all the foregoing it follows that although this Chamber has held a distinctive note between ordinary or civil usucapion and common agrarian usucapion, this is reduced to the fact that the requirement of possession in agrarian matters is not constituted by any possessory acts, but rather consists of agrarian possessory acts, such as cultivation actions, livestock, beekeeping, among others. The thesis that agrarian possession relieves, substitutes or constitutes the domain transfer title has been discarded by this Chamber since long ago, in the antecedents cited.

XV.Now, although this Chamber does not share what was stated by the Court in general terms about the just title or domain transfer title in ordinary agrarian usucapion; the truth is that, despite those more abstract considerations, in recital VII of the appealed judgment, upon entering the analysis of the present matter, said body identified the "domain transfer title exhibited by the plaintiff" as the sale agreement between Oscar Soto and the plaintiff, in which it insisted that "the sale is a non domino, (not from the true owner)", occurring "on March 4, 1988 (see document at folio 3) by means of public deed –possessory transfer title-, and Oscar Soto had transferred the ownership of said property since March 23, 1985 to La Florida Sociedad Anónima (see folios 5 to 8)." The Court understood that that 1988 sale is both "domain transfer title" and "possessory transfer title", it used both phrases; which —this Chamber in turn understands— is not different or an error starting from the basis that ownership has possession as an attribute. Then that 1988 transaction is the cause of the transmission of ownership (from a non domino subject who appeared to be so) as a requirement of usucapion, but it is also the cause by which the fact of possession by Octaviano González began, through which the Court ultimately decreed that he acquired the right of ownership or property versus that of the registered society. In this way, aside from the discrepancy regarding the general thesis on the requirements of agrarian usucapion held by the Court, the decision of this body was not founded on the fact of possession as a domain transfer title for the purposes of the right of property or ownership itself as it set forth in that general part; it was founded on the sale deed of March 4, 1988 between Oscar Soto and the plaintiff, a moment at which the former, despite being the registered owner, was not the owner of the property (the latter circumstance which —it is observed— not being publicized on the property itself in the Public Registry, could not be held automatically to be known by Mr. Octaviano, barring proof to the contrary). With these warnings and this clarification, we proceed to resolve the charge.

XVI.The core argument of the appellant society is that the plaintiff knew that the farm was registered, since this is deduced from the testimony of Mrs. Alicia Sánchez Ramírez and from the deed itself between the plaintiff and Oscar Soto; therefore, since he knew it was registered, usucapion is not admissible. It is observed that the claimant does not realize that indeed the property was registered, but in the name of Oscar Soto, who appeared in 1988 before a notary public to sell said registered farm to the plaintiff. This fact, that the farm was registered, was not denied by the plaintiff; in any case, it was deemed proven by the Trial Court and was upheld by the Court. Therefore, up to this point his argument is useless to break the judgment, since the Court never denied that the plaintiff knew that the farm was registered; the fundamental point is that it was registered indeed, in the name of Oscar Soto, who was no longer in reality its owner. On the other hand, regarding its affirmation that "the annotation related to the contribution of the farm to the appellant society was already recorded, which the Public Registry was already publicizing since the year 1986 and which becomes definitively registered in the year 1994," the cassation appellant does not refer to any element of conviction from which that factual conclusion can be extracted, which the trial bodies did not deem proven. The society makes it seen that the witness Alicia Sánchez Ramírez related that she and Octaviano "began making inquiries because the deed was not going through," and from that it deduces that "it is clear that they were able to have full knowledge of the registry situation of the property both before carrying out the deed with Oscar and afterwards." A deduction that cannot be followed. Note that the appellant does not specify any proof whatsoever from which it can be extracted that in 1988 it was recorded in the Public Registry of Immovable Property that said property had been contributed upon its constitution, through —at least— a marginal annotation on that farm or that the ownership of La Florida S.R.L. was recorded in said Registry. This Chamber does not fully understand the censure because within the same grievance it states that the farm was indeed in the name of Oscar Soto. As it was registered in the Public Registry of Immovable Property that Mr. Oscar Soto was the owner of the property, without him actually being so (due to having contributed it in 1985 upon the constitution of La Florida S.R.L.), the sale that he made in 1988 to Octaviano González constitutes, as the Court well indicated, a transaction a non domino. This is the characteristic that —as already indicated in recital XI— the domain transfer title required by canon 853 of the Civil Code to usucapt property must meet, just as this Chamber has established in a reiterated manner, thus in the already referenced judgment 178-F-2007, a criterion reiterated in resolutions 536-F-2007, 891-F-S1-2007 and 945-F-S1-2018. In this last, more recent precedent, this Chamber first cited: "judgment no. 536 of 10 hours 30 minutes of July 27, 2007, this Judicial body stated: 'Regarding the just title for usucapting. In the species, the appellant indicates that the just title in agrarian matters is determined by the possession itself. However, that objection is not receivable. Touching on this requirement, it is necessary to point out that it consists of the prior legal relationship, by reason of which the thing is obtained with aptitude for usucapting. This Chamber has repeatedly stated that it must emanate from someone who in Law is not the owner. The thing is acquired from another, who behaved and was reputed as such, without being so; the transferor is a non-owner, either because he has never held the ownership, or because his right has been extinguished or resolved, or because the one he exhibits is not sufficient to produce the transmission; in this last case is, for example, the usufructuary who appears transmitting the property.'

Adverse possession (usucapión) operates, consequently, when the title of transfer or acquisition is a non domino, from one who is not the owner, but not when it is a domino or a verus domino, that is, when it emanates from the true owner, because in that case, if the title is perfect, it immediately produces all its effects. And if it has a defect of another nature, because it emanates from the true owner, its validation can occur through negative or extinctive prescription of the nullity action and not through acquisitive prescription or adverse possession (usucapión). Regarding the just title, reference may be made, from this body, to judgment no. 821 of 15 hours 35 minutes of November 1, 2000, 856 of 15 hours 25 minutes of November 15, 2000, and 320 of 15 hours of April 27, 2001." –the highlighting is not from the original–". Subsequently, when analyzing the specific case, it stated: "It is not alleged in this matter, the existence of a title transferring ownership, from a non-owner to the plaintiff, where possession is transferred to the plaintiff, so that he believed himself to be the true owner of the land. For its part, the fact that the plaintiff continued working the land, whose basis, the claimant says, is found in the agreement of wills made verbally, between him and the Cooperative –regarding the future return of the portion of land in dispute–, this does not have the necessary characteristics for the configuration of the transferable title suitable for adverse possession (usucapir) –because it is not a transferable title from one who is not the owner–. Therefore, this Chamber believes, one of the prerequisites of adverse possession (usucapión) is not configured. As stated in preceding lines, it is not the mere fact of possession that must be assessed when reviewing the prerequisites of adverse possession (usucapión), but rather the preceding legal situation or the cause for which one possesses. And in this case, the cause or the reason why the plaintiff claims to be in possession of the land, is far from that which is considered suitable for adverse possession (usucapir)" (the underlining and bold are added). In short, the appellant's argument is not useful to distort what was ordered by the Tribunal because it insists that —in her opinion— a registered real estate property cannot be acquired by adverse possession because that necessarily means she lacks good faith and a title transferring ownership; which is incorrect because, in accordance with mandates 853 and 856 of the Civil Code, adverse possession (usucapión) must be decreed if, in addition to the title transferring ownership emanating from a non domino, but who appeared to be so by virtue —as in this case— of the registry ownership, the claimant meets the requirements of good faith and possession in the capacity of owner, continuous, public, and peaceful. In this case, the registration of the property belonging to Oscar Soto, far from diminishing the plaintiff's good faith, confirms it; without the appellant alleging in this grievance other circumstances that lead to the contrary conclusion and their evidentiary support. It only remains to point out that there is no contradiction whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal for having maintained the factual framework of the Trial Court and arriving at a different decision. The subsumption of those same circumstances to the legal regulations will give one result or another depending on the application and interpretation of the Law carried out by the judging body, and it will be the superior —as in the present case— who defines what is the correct application and interpretation.

XVII.Fourth. It accuses an erroneous "analysis of the evidentiary element," for being decontextualized and divorced from the rest of the evidence, specifically referring to the testimonies of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez, Blanca Ester Rojas Zúñiga, Mainor Francisco Castro Jiménez, Fernando Enrique Castro Jiménez, Dagoberto Suárez Araya, Luis Alberto Barrientos Mora, and Alfredo Ramírez Sandí. It repeats that the plaintiff's acquisition document shows that it concerns a property registered in the Public Registry, so the Tribunal's conclusion about good faith is wrong. Although, it affirms, according to canon 286 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt good faith is presumed, but evidence to the contrary is also admitted and when the law requires possession in good faith, a possessor in good faith is considered to be the one who at the act of possession believed he had the right to possess, but if there was sufficient reason for him to doubt that such right corresponded to him, he should not be considered in good faith. In this case, it maintains, "there was sufficient reason for him to doubt that such right corresponded to him, because the signed document indicates that the property is registered in the Public Registry, but despite that, as the witness SANCHEZ RAMIREZ stated: \"I know that no study was done at that time in the Registry\" which allows establishing that if they did not do those studies, that is their absolute responsibility and that on the contrary, they acted with clear and evident bad faith." It says that the Tribunal did not make a weighing of the evidence, which the first-instance judge did; it transcribes a long segment of this judgment. Following this, it maintains, "From the exposed analysis we can determine that the first-instance judge is correct when carrying out the same, because she does say, in a clear and concrete way, what evidentiary value she assigns to each of those evidentiary elements and also sets forth the reasons why she does so. The TRIBUNAL does not do this," it settles for a "very lax analysis of the testimonies and that violates the duty to provide reasoning." It highlights that the A quo analyzed the documentary evidence, dedicating a section to it; something the Tribunal did not do, but rather in an excessively summarized manner intends to grant value without expressing reasons. It emphasizes that for the first-instance judgment, the "plaintiff's possession is not protectable, because he does not possess a just or transferable title and there is also no good faith, a conclusion reached after analyzing in detail the testimonial and documentary evidentiary elements. Contrary to the duty to provide reasoning, the TRIBUNAL did not substantiate the appealed judgment in any way, it does not refer specifically or in detail why another evidentiary value should be granted to these elements of proof, nor does it make a relation of all the evidentiary elements among themselves, to appreciate them as a whole." It maintains that it has been a victim of dispossession of its property, protected by "false documents that cannot even be registered in the Public Registry (they were not even filed contrary to the company's acquisition via contribution made by filing it in the year 1986)", therefore it has the right to recover that property "even when there are third-party acquirers in good faith, which is not the case here, because the plaintiff (...) intentionally and directly avoided trusting in the registry publicity that showed him that the person selling to him had no right to sell." This, it continues, does not imply ignoring third parties in good faith, since they have the mechanisms provided for in civil legislation to claim from the seller the guarantee or the payment of damages and losses. It reiterates that since 1986 it has been publicized that the real estate property was contributed in its incorporation. It continues, "In this case, the transparency of a transaction is very dubious, in which an acquisition is made of a registered real estate property without even carrying out the corresponding studies. The protection of third-party acquirers in good faith, in the terms sought by the plaintiff, implies dispossessing the legitimate owner of the property that belongs to him. Such a solution is, without a doubt, excessive, disproportionate, and, finally, unjust. The importance of registry publicity and its principles cannot prevail over the right of the first victim -the legitimate owner, originally dispossessed in a fraudulent manner- to maintain full ownership over their property or in any case, the right to be restored in the enjoyment thereof." It concludes that acquisition a non domino cannot become a shield to legitimize criminal acts and turn into an obstacle for the true dispossessed owner to recover the property.

XVIII.The grievance is a mixture of arguments that by itself, due to lack of precision, requires its denial. Thus, on one hand, it devotes itself to affirming that the analysis of the evidence by the Trial Court is correct, but not so the one carried out by the Tribunal. That is, it focuses on directly contrasting the decisions, to then affirm that the Tribunal incurred a failure in its duty to provide reasoning. A claim that, as already indicated, constitutes a procedural defect that although it falls on the decision, the truth is that it does not constitute a ground for cassation in accordance with article 594 of the CPC, whose supplementary application is established by norm 452 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, the appellant reiterates what was argued in the previous defect in the sense that since the property was registered in the Public Registry, the plaintiff could not acquire by adverse possession because that registration by itself eliminates the plaintiff's good faith. Refer to what was indicated regarding the preceding grievance in the sense that the fact that the property was registered in the Public Registry in the name of Oscar Soto, determines that the deed of March 4, 1988, constitutes the title transferring ownership a non domino under the terms of canon 853 of the Civil Code; likewise, it is the criterion of this Chamber that, contrary to what you say, far from breaking the good faith that is presumed for the plaintiff, it reinforces it, because indeed the plaintiff believed that the person selling to him had the right to do so according to what the Public Property Registry indicated. Thus, mandate 285 establishes: "In all cases in which the law requires possession in good faith, a possessor in good faith is considered to be the one who at the act of taking possession believed he had the right to possess." The norm continues: "If there was sufficient reason for him to doubt that such right corresponded to him, he cannot be considered in good faith"; this Chamber does not find it was demonstrated that in 1988, Mr. Octaviano had reason to doubt that by acquiring the property from the one who appeared as the owner in the Registry, he would not have been entitled to exercise possession as an attribute of ownership. The public faith of the registry supports a good faith that was not rebutted. The mandate continues; "but if the possession was in good faith in its beginning, it does not lose that character solely because the possessor later doubts the legitimacy of his right. Possession ceases to be in good faith at the moment of acquiring certainty that possession is held improperly, and it also ceases from the notification of the lawsuit in which another claims the right to possess"; this Chamber does not observe that given a title in which Oscar Soto participated in 1988, owner according to the Registry, it can be concluded with total certainty that, once the ownership of La Florida S.R.L. over the property was registered in the Registry in 1994, not even having knowledge of this registration, Mr. Octaviano González acquired certainty that he possessed the property improperly; it had been about 6 years since he bought it when La Florida's ownership was registered in the Registry, and it was not demonstrated that between that purchase in 1988 until the filing of this matter, that is, about 17 years, the company attempted any action against him. He might have doubted, but mere doubt would not have detracted from his good faith. Additionally, the charge in itself is also confusing, because, on one hand, it says that the plaintiff is not a third-party acquirer in good faith because he could verify that the person selling to him had no right to do so, about which —it is repeated— it does not identify in which evidence it is recorded that this information was annotated or registered on the property, but rather seems to deduce it from the filing of its incorporation with the Public Registry itself, a fact that by itself clearly does not constitute publicity because its registration in the Legal Entities Registry and the granting of an identification number does not publicize the transfer of a real estate property (these are different registries). But at the same time, it suggests that as an acquirer in good faith, the plaintiff could well have claimed damages and losses and the improvements he introduced to the property from Mr. Oscar Soto. That is, on one hand it recognizes Mr. Octaviano bought protected by the Registry; but on the other, it affirms that the Registry recorded other information, for which reason —it would be understood, it alleges— he was not protected by the Registry. For all these reasons, the charge will be dismissed.

XIX.Fifth. It claims "incorrect application of acquisition a non domino." It says the Tribunal made an effort to legitimize the document provided by the plaintiff as a title transferring ownership, for which it resorted to the figure of acquisition a non domino, thereby distorting its prerequisites. It explains what real estate fraud consists of —in its opinion—. It asserts that for the acquisition a non domino of a real estate property to occur, the following fundamental requirements must concur jointly: a) that the acquirer has the condition of a third party, b) that he acquired his right for valuable consideration, in good faith, and from a person who according to the Property Registry has the authority to transfer it, and, c) that he has also registered his acquisition. These prerequisites are not present in this process. It reproaches, "acquisition a non domino is not a valid or suitable instrument to validate the document in question, but a way of acquiring ownership itself"; furthermore, the facts in this matter do not fit this figure, because "the transferable title, as such in agrarian law, should not be understood as a document, but as an acquisitive cause and which can turn out to be possession itself." It continues, "the plaintiff raises a legal problem related to positive prescription or adverse possession (usucapión) and not about acquisition a non domino. In applying substantive law, the TRIBUNAL decides by indicating that concerning the title, there is acquisition a non domino, when just title is only one of the requirements demanded by agrarian law for adverse possession (usucapir) and, moreover, just title must be understood as a licit cause or acquisitive cause constituted by the mere fact of possessing. This being so, the TRIBUNAL cannot validate the transferable title by adducing that there is acquisition a non domino, because it is one thing that acquisition a non domino exists and another thing that the transferable title exists or is licit." It maintains that the document presented by the plaintiff does not prove the acquisition a non domino because it is a deed that was never filed in the Registry, so based on this, "the acquirer a non domino [who] can claim that his acquisition is certain, from someone who apparently had the right to alienate, even if that right is resolved or annulled" as provided in article 456 of the Civil Code, is not configured. It reiterates that, on the contrary, it was proven that the property has been registered since 1974 and that it was contributed in its incorporation on March 26, 1985, filed to the Commercial Registry's Daily Entry Journal in the year 1986 and subsequently registered in volume 352, entry 15789 on September 3, 1994; therefore, the deed of sale between the plaintiff and Oscar Soto of March 4, 1988, never filed nor registered, cannot have the capacity to displace the primacy of its prior real right "that by effects of registry publicity and successive tract, already existed recorded since the year 1986 informing the parties and the public in general, that Oscar Soto had already alienated the real estate property by contributing it to a family company." It cites precept 455 of the Civil Code, by which titles subject to registration do not harm third parties except from the date of their filing, and reaffirms that the deed by which the property was contributed to it was filed with the Registry since the year 1986. It introduces an extensive quote from what it identifies as resolution 1-1999 of this Chamber, and following that, it asserts, "In other words, the TRIBUNAL incurs a serious error in the application of substantive law because it takes the application of acquisition a non domino to other dimensions, dimensions that are very dangerous, because they cause the order established in the law to fail regarding the real prerequisites that must exist for the application of true acquisition a non domino, as well as the absolute and harmful omission of the principles of legal security and certainty provided by registration and registry publicity, as well as the supremacy of real rights contained in article 455 of the Civil Code and the erga omnes effectiveness of the same registry publicity." It also assures that the fact of the plaintiff's possession is not true because it (the company) disposed of the property prior to this process with the constitution of mortgage liens, thus in the year 2004, to which it had to resort to finance the processes filed against it by Mr. Oscar Soto and Mr. Octaviano González (it transcribes the information it says appears in the Registry). Hence, it says, "the plaintiff's supposed possession is merely circumstantial, an act of bad faith that is inherited from the problems that have existed between Oscar Soto and the company." It highlights that the Tribunal should have decided on what was requested, that is, on the adverse possession (usucapión), determining whether the document provided by the plaintiff was or was not a just title or transferable title; which it is not, because he knew it was registered and chose not to carry out the registry studies, in addition to which this eliminates the presumption of good faith and thus his possession is not protectable, since it was in bad faith, in dubious circumstances, for which reason he loses the right to charge for improvements, which should also have been rejected.

XX.The grievance is confusing, it mixes a series of themes without a clear direction. Thus, it raises 4 autonomous ideas. The first, which is a reiteration of previous grievances, namely that the Tribunal applies the figure of acquisition a non domino, when the object of the process was adverse possession (usucapión), and that the former is not applicable to the present matter, in which the prerequisites for it are not met. The second, that just title in agrarian matters is not constituted by a document; but rather, by possession itself. The third, that its prior real property right "already existed recorded since the year 1986 informing the parties and the public in general, that Oscar Soto had already alienated the real estate property." And the fourth, that the plaintiff's possession is not true because it disposed of the property, thus in 2004 when it imposed mortgage liens. Regarding the first aspect, it has already been indicated on the preceding grievances that it is an unaddressable argument because precisely the figure of adverse possession (usucapión), as this Chamber has reiterated, requires the title transferring ownership from someone who is not the owner. Regarding the second idea, that in agrarian matters the document transferring ownership is not important, but rather possession, it is also not correct because —as was extensively explained— for common agrarian adverse possession, the title transferring ownership is required, without it being confused with the requirements of the special agrarian adverse possession contemplated in the Land and Colonization Law, which was not the one alleged in this process. Consequently, up to this point, in addition to that argumentative mixture, its thesis would not have found support in the jurisprudence of this Chamber either. Regarding the third proposition, on which the appellant insists, now more punctually, that having its incorporation deed been filed in the Commercial Registry, the plaintiff should have known that Mr. Oscar Soto was not the owner of the real estate property, but rather that it was she because "it existed recorded," the following must be said. Just as has already been indicated, the Trial Court and the Tribunal did not record that as of 1985, 1986, much less in 1988, any annotation was recorded on property 6-20679 that warned the public that the farm had been contributed to a company; nor does the appellant specify a specific piece of evidence that allows concluding that fact. On the contrary, the company rather again admits that the transaction was carried out by Mr. Oscar Soto, who despite appearing as the owner in the Public Registry, was not such; all of which precisely configures the title transferring ownership a non domino that the Tribunal found, while excluding the application of precept 455 of the Civil Code in the line that the appellant adduces. Finally, regarding the addition, on the other hand, of a questioning of the plaintiff's possession, because it mortgaged the property prior to this process, the argument is incomprehensible to this Chamber, because it seems to forget that possession is in itself a fact, which in this case was proven as of 1988 and occurred for more than 10 years, without it alleging non-existence or denying this particular fact (immediate possession). The constitution and registration of a mortgage guarantee does not contradict the plaintiff's possessory fact. That kind of disposition of the property was enabled by the registry ownership it has enjoyed since 1994, but it implied nothing regarding the immediate possession that the plaintiff exercised. Therefore, the grievance will also be rejected.

XXI.Sixth. It argues "lack of application of the prerequisites of the action for recovery of possession" thereby omitting the application of canon 45 of the Political Constitution. It states that possession is only an attribute of ownership; for possession to originate the right of property, it must comply with all the requirements demanded by the legal system for it to operate as a way of acquiring ownership, which corresponds to acquisitive prescription, "which is a way of acquiring ownership of things belonging to others by having possessed them for a certain period, and with the concurrence of the other legal requirements known by all, such as just title, uninterruptedly, with the claim of ownership, and in good faith, for a minimum period of ten years." It is unthinkable, it expresses, that "a person like the plaintiff can access the right of property when in this case, another holds that right and the former does not meet all the requirements for adverse possession (usucapir). That being the case, the TRIBUNAL incurs a lack of application of substantive law, by rejecting what was requested in the counterclaim." It repeats, "our right of property obliges us to the corresponding registration in the Public Registry, a fact that we managed to publicize with the contribution made to the company since the year 1986 and for this reason, the TRIBUNAL cannot come to decimate our rights fully guaranteed at a constitutional and legal level, validating a rickety acquisition embodied in a questioned document that according to the law does not even have the power to produce legal effects against third parties since it was never filed with the Public Registry." It highlights that its right of property is inviolable, imprescriptible according to article 320 of the Civil Code. It insists that the plaintiff lacks the requirements of just title and good faith, therefore he cannot access ownership. It also cites as violated precepts 316, 317, 318, and 321 of the same legal body, because it does not recognize its right to claim in judgment the thing that is the object of its property, the free enjoyment of all and each of the rights that property comprises, its "right as possessors of the real estate property (attribute of ownership)" and to claim its possession, its right to be restored in possession. It adds, "the judgment incurs a failure in its duty to apply the right we have to proceed with the action for recovery of possession (acción reinvindicatoria) against one who possessed in bad faith and has ceased to possess." It refers that the plaintiff does not meet the subjective conditions to be considered an agrarian possessor "since with the same evidentiary elements gathered in the process, it is established that the plaintiff is the owner of other real estate properties, that he does not even live on this property, so it is clear that he lacks the principle of inmanence, which would be a pure and simple fact very important to consider, because in that sense the plaintiff is not an agricultural producer or one involved in agricultural activities by connection as a means of subsistence, he lacks the inmanence that allows him to be linked in an obligatory, social, and solidary manner with the farm, therefore, it is not true that there is social justification in the execution of the acts of possession that the plaintiff comes to claim, note that there is talk of maintenance of fences, there is no talk of true agricultural production, nor is it mentioned that the plaintiff or his family depend economically on that production. The witnesses come to establish that the plaintiff is a great cattle entrepreneur, he is not a subsistence farmer, and that the supposed possession he engages in is through other people, it is not even him, therefore, it is ruled out that he is an agrarian possessor who meets the subjective requirements for adverse possession (usucapir)." It adds that the judicial inspection was ignored by the Tribunal; "these neglects generate such a terrible result as that obtained in the appealed decision, in that way, nothing good comes from keeping the TRIBUNAL's decision intact, when what it deserves is to be annulled."

XXII.Once again the appellant mixes a series of ideas or themes that it sets forth without much structure, and that would ultimately have to receive autonomous treatment or at least be concatenated with clarity. This lack of precision determines by itself the dismissal of this charge. Aside from that, insofar as a core argument can be extracted, which is that the plaintiff did not acquire ownership by adverse possession (usucapión), for which it concludes that its counterclaim for recovery of possession must then be granted, it is noted that such a premise is incorrect. According to what was determined by the Tribunal, which the appellant could not break in the preceding grievances, Mr. Octaviano did acquire the right of ownership over the real estate property because he has a title transferring ownership that a non domino extended to him, he exercised possession for more than 10 years in the capacity of owner, in a public, peaceful, and continuous manner, and the good faith that is presumed for him was not rebutted in this process. Consequently, its premise being erroneous, the conclusion is also so; that is, the Tribunal did not incur an infringement of constitutional mandate 45 nor of the legal norms of recovery of possession. Insofar as it shows disagreement with the acceptance of the adverse possession by considering that the plaintiff's possession is not "agrarian possession"; it is pointed out to it that the qualification of "agrarian" was of interest for the purposes of the competent jurisdiction to resolve this controversy, but not regarding the acceptance of the claim for adverse possession (usucapión) that was requested, because it was common adverse possession. What matters is that possession was accredited, it could well have been labeled agrarian or another type, but possession ultimately. The subsistence production for his family, to which the appellant refers, is of interest for the purposes of the special agrarian adverse possession of the Land and Colonization Law (which was not the one requested), without these being determining aspects in civil adverse possession and in common agrarian adverse possession. In any case, it is incomprehensible that the appellant denies the agrarian qualification of the possession, while at the same time classifying the plaintiff as a cattle entrepreneur. Agrarian nature is not only found in the sowing of crops for personal and family consumption, as the company seems to understand. Finally, regarding the insistently alleged publicity of the contribution of the property in 1985, refer to what was said in the preceding recitals in the sense that the filing with the Public Registry of the incorporation deed by itself does not grant publicity, this is configured with the registration or, at least, the marginal annotation on the property itself. The incorporation of the legal entity by itself did not alert the public that a transfer of the right of property over the real estate property had occurred. Thus, for the foregoing, this censure will be dismissed.

XXIII.Seventh. It argues "scarce reasoning regarding the imposition of costs of the claim and counterclaim to this party." It describes that the Tribunal considered that the claim should be declared with merit; however, it did not substantiate for what reason it condemned it to pay the costs of the claim and counterclaim. It adds that it also failed to fulfill its duty to substantiate the reasons why it declared its counterclaim without merit. It maintains that, in accordance with the legal system, exemption from the payment of costs is allowed when the party has litigated with evident good faith; which, it says, it proved since it claims the land that Oscar Soto voluntarily contributed to it. It continues, "In any case, the analysis of the substantive issue carried out contains serious errors of fact and law derived from granting evidentiary values to certain elements of proof that are actually the product of their incorrect analysis as well as it disdained to grant them the true evidentiary value they have, furthermore, it omitted to give content and value to a large quantity of evidentiary elements that demonstrate the existence of merit to declare the action for recovery of possession with merit and the action for adverse possession without merit, all of which stands as the correct response against the inappropriate refusal of the appealed Tribunal to analyze the evidence as the legal system establishes." It adds that the Tribunal opted to "incorrectly apply the maximum sanction of condemnation to the payment of costs contained in article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code," without realizing that it had sufficient motive to litigate, since the plaintiff admitted that the property was registered, so he did not have good faith. It points out that the Tribunal cannot ignore that it "has sufficient right to claim, since the property is registered in its favor." It insists that the plaintiff wove a picture in which he appears as the sole possessor, but there are evidentiary elements "that accredit the acts of disposition," for which reason it "was wrong not to adequately justify the decision adopted regarding costs." It also mentions canons 54 and 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law and 222 of the CPC.

Transcribe the section of the appealed ruling on costs and reiterates it does not comply with the duty to provide reasons.

XXIV.As indicated, the lack of reasoning, which is now alleged regarding the pronouncement on costs, does not constitute a ground for cassation according to those provided for in mandate 594 of the CPC. Therefore, from a procedural perspective, the grievance will be denied. Regarding what the appellant claims against the award of costs itself, she is not clear; she seems to justify her good faith in litigating or sufficient reason to litigate by insisting that she was right in her defenses and claims, which the Court did not grant due to the alleged improper valuation of evidence and incorrect application of the law. In this way, she again starts from an erroneous premise, as she did not succeed with the preceding recriminations. In this order, since such a premise is not verified, one could not arrive at the conclusion she exhibits, which in any case would have been incompatible, since if she had achieved a decision on the matter in her favor, the imposition of costs would have fallen on her losing counterpart, unless exempt. And in that case, it would have been useless to examine the "good faith" or "sufficient reason to litigate" of the winning party. Aside from the foregoing, her exposition of the grievance does not reveal any element by which she could be considered to fall under the exemption scenario contemplated in precept 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria (which is the relevant rule for her claim), that is, litigation in good faith for having sufficient reason to litigate. It has long been noted that this scenario of sufficient reason to litigate does not consist of the mere conviction in the thesis one supports, but rather that the conviction of one's own thesis must necessarily respond to objective data from the proceedings that allow one to deduce the soundness of their claims or defenses; as objective data from the proceedings, the subtlety in the "legal question" has been identified, which consists, for example, of the discussion being based on a pure interpretation of legal norms when the factual framework is not controversial (in this sense, resolution 222-F-S1-2019). Consequently, for all the reasons noted, the cassation appellant is not correct.

Cassation appeal of the defendant and counterclaimant Oscar Soto Jiménez

XXV.First. He alleges improper valuation of evidence. He cites canons 38 subsection b) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, 341 of the Código Procesal Civil, and 853 of the Código Civil. He maintains that the Court erred in valuing facts 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint and the testimony of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez, the plaintiff's spouse. He details that in facts 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint (which he transcribes), the plaintiff confesses and admits having known prior to 1988—which is the date the Court determined the period for usucaption began—that "legal problems existed." He alleges they constitute a spontaneous confession that he had knowledge of the real situation of the farm and the existing family conflicts. Furthermore, his wife also confirmed it by admitting that both Franklin (representative of the company) and he had told him they could not work the farm. From that statement, he transcribes "the following is of interest [.-] '(...) When Octaviano bought the farm from Ronulfo, no document was signed, he bought it verbally from him. I am unaware of how much Octaviano paid Ronulfo for the farm. As far as I know, don Ronulfo sold the farm to Octaviano, Octanio (sic) took responsibility for the farm and he worked it. Since I have known the farm, I only saw don Oscar, and don Ronulfo, and now don Octanio (sic) working it. After Octaviano acquired it, I never saw don Franklin or don Oscar work the farm; never, since Octaviano acquired the farm, don Franklin or don Oscar told don Octaviano he could not work the farm.' (highlighting is ours) (see statement on folios 1439 to 1440)." He explains that the discussion revolved around the date of acquisition of the farm; the plaintiff party claimed to have acquired it in 1984 through purchase from his brother Ronulfo, not from Oscar Soto; but "why (sic)—even though he could not have demonstrated having acquired it on that date—did the plaintiff party insist on indicating his purchase date as 1984 and not 1988, which is the year of the sale celebrated before a notary public? (sic) Well, precisely because it is from the year 1985 when the transfer of the property to the Sociedad La Florida S.R.L. occurred, and indeed, as demonstrated in the facts of the plaintiff party's complaint, as well as the statement of the witness—(sic) his wife—Alicia Sánchez, that prior to the year 1988, he already knew of the litigious situation of the property." He continues, by knowing of that litigious legal situation prior to the purchase of the farm, that purchase does not fulfill one of the essential requirements of possession, which is good faith.

XXVI.On folio 1465 it is read that, contrary to what was affirmed by the cassation appellant, the witness Alicia Sánchez Ramírez stated: "After Octaviano acquired it, I never saw don Franklin or don Oscar work the farm. Never, since Octaniano (sic) acquired the farm, don Franklin or don scar (sic) told Octanio (sic) he could not work the farm" (underline and bold are added). On the other hand, it is observed in the complaint that Mr. Octaviano González related in facts 3 and 4 that Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez verbally sold farm 6-20679 to his brother Ronulfo González Vega in 1981, after which his brother entered into possession; that approximately in 1984, he (Octaviano) also verbally acquired said farm from his brother, after which he has been in possession of it, which he has maintained since then, totaling 21 years, to which the years his brother possessed are added, for a total of 24 years of possession. During this time, he said, he has not been disturbed by any person. In facts 5, 6, and 7, he expressed that Mr. Oscar Soto, "registered owner (dueño Registral) of the farm," and he formalized the sale through public deed on 4 March 1988, before notary public Olivier Rojas Fernández, number 40 of volume 11 of the protocol; which was not registered in the Public Registry because "Oscar Soto Jiménez himself had contributed it to a company formed with his relatives prior to the sale he made to me," a company whose name is La Florida S.R.L. and whose incorporation dates from 26 March 1985. These actions, he said, both the contribution to the company and the sale, may be vitiated by nullity, but "in no way affect nor have they affected" the possession he has exercised, for more than 20 years, without being disturbed by anyone. From the narration of these facts in the complaint, what can be extracted is that he affirmed he bought the estate from the registered owner Oscar Soto and that when that deed was presented to the Public Registry, it was rejected because the farm was then in the name of La Florida, but he did not even specify on what date that deed of sale was presented to the Public Registry. It cannot be extracted that he expressed, with the value of a confession, that on 4 March 1988 he became aware that the appellant had contributed the farm to La Florida in 1985. Furthermore, although the plaintiff stated that he had purchased from his brother Ronulfo in 1984, at which time he entered into possession, and that he formalized that sale with Oscar Soto, "registered owner of the farm," in 1988, the truth is that both the A quo and Ad quem courts held the plaintiff's possession as proven starting from the 1988 deed; but they also showed that Mr. Oscar Soto acknowledged having sold to Ronulfo, although not in 1981, but in 1988. The witnesses Alicia Sánchez and Blanca Ester Rojas, the plaintiff's wife and sister-in-law, stated they knew about that negotiation between Ronulfo and Octaviano (folios 1462 to 1463 and 1465 to 1466). This Chamber verified that the co-defendant Oscar Soto himself admitted and reiterated in his response to the complaint and counterclaim, although with the date of 1988 (folios 120 to 135), hence the Court found that circumstance proven. Then, from all this, what is deduced is that although in the plaintiff's thesis his possessory conduct regarding the farm began in 1984 and Oscar Soto was the registered owner, he affirmed this with respect to his brother Ronulfo, never in relation to the company; and, moreover, that among the three, Oscar, Ronulfo, and Octaviano, there was the will to transfer the farm, all in 1988 (according to the date determined by the Court and confirmed by the Tribunal), so the plaintiff believed there was a successive chain of title. It cannot be deduced that Octaviano González knew that the now appellant, Mr. Oscar Soto, had previously contributed that farm to a company. Thus, contrary to what was affirmed by the cassation appellant, from the facts of the complaint and the testimony it cannot be held that Octaviano González knew that before 1988 "legal problems" or family problems existed in relation to the farm; even less that he specifically knew that the farm had been transferred in the incorporation of La Florida S.R.L. (which would actually be the fact of importance), as—it is repeated from the consideration regarding the company's appeal—it was not demonstrated that in 1988 and earlier, even an annotation regarding the contribution of the property to La Florida appeared in the Public Registry of Property. Ergo, the recrimination is not admissible.

XXVII.Second. He denounces improper application of mandates 455 and 853 of the Código Civil. He claims the Court erred in considering that usucaption operated in this case upon finding "the existence of a titulus transferendi domini 'a non domino'." He explains that the transfer he made to Octaviano in the year 1988 is not a transfer a non domino, because at that time he was the registered owner of the property. Therefore, he continues, usucaption does not apply since one of the essential requirements set forth in article 853 of the Código Civil is not met, which is that the titulus transferendi domini must be, according to jurisprudence, a non domino, and not from the registered owner. He explains, "The dilemma with the effective registration transfer of that property occurred due to an event that happened years before (1985), (sic) in which the undersigned—through deception—did not have control of the situation, as the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada La Florida was incorporated, to which as a contribution I transferred the property subject to this litigation, which is why when Octaviano attempted to present the deed before the Public Registry, he could not register it because there was a prior registration in the Property Registry, and following the maxim first in time, first in right, the first one prevailed, which is finally registered in the name of the company La Florida S.R.L. in the year 1994."

XXVIII.This Chamber is surprised by the assertions of the appellant Soto. The discrepancy between the registry information and reality is a fact that only he, as a party to the contract he signed in a public deed in 1988, was aware of; it was not proven to be known to the plaintiff. He contributed the real property in the incorporation of La Florida S.R.L. in 1985, and therefore, he undoubtedly knew that he was not the owner of that estate from then on and that he did not have the capacity to dispose of it, as he did. Without being the holder of domain over the farm, he sold it to Mr. Octaviano González. It is then incomprehensible that he, taking advantage of the title he displayed in the Public Registry of Property in 1988, without being so, now alleges he was the true owner and, based on that false appearance, intends to prevent the plaintiff's usucaption. The fact that the Public Registry did not record the true ownership of the real property in 1988 does not mean he was the verus domino. It is undeniable that the titulus transferendi domini that the plaintiff has emanated from a non domino, the cassation appellant himself. Thus, it will be appropriate to deny this grievance.

XXIX.Consequently, it will be appropriate to declare both cassation appeals without merit. The appealed judgment, regarding what was the object of these appeals, is confirmed.

POR TANTO

Se declaran sin lugar sendos recursos de casación planteados; en lo recurrido, se confirma la sentencia recurrida.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Rocío Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez Jorge Alberto López González Jéssica Alejandra Jiménez Ramírez MACUNAQ were paid before the District Municipal Council of Cóbano property taxes for the periods 2003, 2004, and 2005 in the amount of ¢427,705.45; likewise, Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez paid taxes on several properties, including property 20679, up to the second quarter of 2003, with receipt 13306 dated July 24, 2003. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">II.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> Mr. Octaviano González Vega sued La Florida S.R.L. and Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez; he sought in the judgment to: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">1)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">Grant this ordinary proceeding in all its parts and DECLARE IN MY FAVOR ACQUISITIVE USUCAPION, OVER THE PROPERTY THAT I HAVE POSSESSED FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS, IN A PUBLIC, PEACEFUL, UNINTERRUPTED, AND GOOD FAITH MANNER, WHICH IS THE REGISTERED PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF PUNTARENAS, REAL PROPERTY REGISTRATION NUMBER TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE-ZERO ZERO ZERO, (LOCATED IN District 5 OF PAQUERA, CANTON 01 OF THE PROVINCE OF PUNTARENAS). I REQUEST THAT THE REGISTERED TITLE OF THE PREVIOUS OWNER BE CANCELLED AND THE PROPERTY BE REGISTERED IN MY NAME, WHICH SHALL BE ORDERED IN THE JUDGMENT TO THE PUBLIC PROPERTY REGISTRY. THAT THE DEFENDANTS PAY BOTH COSTS OF THE PROCEEDING. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">2) </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THAT THE CLAIM BE DECLARED WITH MERIT AND THAT I BE PAID ALL TYPES OF IMPROVEMENTS ON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, WHICH SHALL BE DONE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT, AND ALSO BOTH COSTS OF THE PROCEEDING</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. The defendants were notified on December 23, 2005.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><a name=\"_Hlk64393508\"></a><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">III.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> La Florida S.R.L. answered the claim negatively and raised the defenses of </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">lack of cause (falta de causa)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">lack of active and passive standing (falta de personería activa y pasiva)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> and lack of right (falta de derecho); as well as the generic phrase </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">sine actione agit</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. In turn, it counterclaimed against Mr. Octaviano González Vega so that the judgment declares </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">a) </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">That my represented party LA FLORIDA SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA, is the registered owner and absolute owner of the property of the Party of Puntarenas, real property registration number TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE-ZERO ZERO ZERO, cadastral map P-50299-1956. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">b) </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">That my represented party LA FLORIDA S.R.L., AS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF PUNTARENAS, REAL PROPERTY REGISTRATION NUMBER TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE-ZERO ZERO ZERO, HAS THE RIGHT TO POSSESS IT, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY OTHER PERSON, AND TO DISPOSE OF IT AS BEST SUITS ITS INTERESTS, AND THEREFORE, IF NECESSARY, IT SHALL BE GIVEN EFFECTIVE AND MATERIAL POSSESSION OF THE SAME, THROUGH THIS COURT OR THE COURT OR AUTHORITY THAT THIS JUDICIAL OFFICE COMMISSIONS FOR THIS PURPOSE, WITH THE SUPPORT AND BACKING OF THE PUBLIC FORCE, OR DIRECTLY THROUGH THE LATTER, THUS DELIVERING THE SAME. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">c) </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">That the counter-defendant OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA be ordered to pay my represented party LA FLORIDA S.R.L., the sum of ONE HUNDRED MILLION COLONES, for the fruits (frutos) he has received from the exploitation of said property over the last ten years, in cattle ranching. Also, that said gentleman be ordered to pay my represented party, the fruits of the use and usufruct of said property until its definitive delivery, which shall be liquidated in the execution of this judgment. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">d) </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">That the counter-defendant be ordered to pay my represented party, both costs of this counterclaim</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">IV.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez also opposed the claim and raised the defenses of lack of standing (falta de legitimación) and lack of right. He counterclaimed against Mr. Octaviano González Vega so that </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">This counterclaim be declared with merit. The Usucapion claim requested by the plaintiff be rejected, and he be obligated to pay procedural and personal costs and, accessorily, damages and losses caused by the reprehensible conduct of the plaintiff</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">V. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">In judgment 11-2017 of 4:15 p.m. on February 27, 2017, the Civil and Agrarian Court of Puntarenas ordered: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">(</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">…</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">) </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">The exceptions of lack of right and lack of standing in its passive modality are granted, and without special ruling on the sine actione agit, as it is encompassed by the lack of right exception. Likewise, the exception of lack of cause is dismissed because it is not contemplated within the list of claims indicated by the law, and the exception of lack of active standing is dismissed because the company La Florida S.R.L. is the registered titleholder, to partially declare </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">WITH MERIT</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\"> the ordinary claim of </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">OCTAVIANO GONZALEZ VEGA</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\"> against </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">LA FLORIDA S.R.L</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">., in the following order: The claim to declare in his favor the Positive Prescription (Instituto de Prescripción Positiva) is dismissed. The alternative claim for the payment of improvements (mejoras) in favor of the plaintiff is granted, which shall be liquidated in the execution of the judgment, according to the parameters established in recital </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">vi. point c)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">. The plaintiff being a good faith possessor, he has the right of retention (derecho de retención) of the property until the company La Florida S.R.L. pays the total amount established for this concept. The plaintiff and the registered owner may terminate the claim granted for improvements by means of a conciliation agreement. Any point on which no ruling is made regarding the claim is to be understood as not granted. On the other hand, the exceptions of lack of right and lack of standing in the active and passive modality are granted, to declare </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">WITHOUT MERIT</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\"> in all its aspects the claim brought by Octaviano González Vega against Oscar Soto Jiménez. The exception of lack of right is granted and the exceptions of negative and positive statute of limitations (prescripción negativa y positiva) raised by the counter-defendant plaintiff are dismissed to declare WITHOUT MERIT in all its aspects the counterclaim of Mr. OSCAR SOTO JIMENEZ against OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA. The exceptions of lack of right and those of statute of limitations in its two modalities are dismissed to partially declare </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">WITH MERIT</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\"> the counterclaim brought by </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">LA FLORIDA S.R.L. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">against OCTAVIANO</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> GONZÁLEZ VEGA. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">Consequently, it is declared that the company LA FLORIDA S.R.L. is the sole and legitimate owner of the property registered in the Province of Puntarenas TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE- TRIPLE ZERO. The exception of lack of right is granted, and the exception of negative statute of limitations is dismissed as unnecessary, and the exception of positive statute of limitations is dismissed as improper, to declare that the counterclaimant registered titleholder has no right to claim present and future fruits, as determined in recital </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">vi. letter b)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">. Any point on which no ruling is made is to be understood as not granted. Having ordered the revendication (reivindicación) of the property in favor of the registered titleholder, the </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">ABSOLUTE NULLITY</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\"> of deed number forty of notary public Olivier Rojas Fernández, granted on March four, nineteen eighty-eight in favor of the plaintiff, is declared; for being contrary to the provisions of article 836 of the Civil Code, given that the transferor had performed a prior liberating act in favor of another legal entity over the same object, and consequently, the request for declaration of absolute nullity sought by the defendant is admitted, pursuant to article 837 of the Civil Code. Once the judgment is final, issue the respective cancellation order (mandamiento de cancelación) to the Registry. The annotation of the notice of lis pendens (mandamiento de anotación de demanda) shall remain noted, until the registered owner pays the amounts to be liquidated for improvements in the execution of the judgment. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Personal and procedural costs</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">: In accordance with the merits of the case file and article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is declared without special ruling on costs</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. In resolution 336-F-18 of 4:30 p.m. on April 20, 2018, the Agrarian Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José ordered: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">Regarding the matters appealed by the plaintiff Octaviano González Vega, the appealed judgment is REVOKED. In its place, it is resolved: Regarding the CLAIM, the exceptions of lack of right, and lack of active and passive standing, as well as lack of cause, filed by the defendants regarding the main claim, are dismissed. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">1.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">- The positive prescription claim filed by OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA against LA FLORIDA S.R.L. and Oscar Soto Jiménez is granted over the property he has possessed for more than ten years, in a public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and good faith manner, which is the registered property of the Party of Puntarenas, real property registration number </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">twenty thousand six hundred seventy-nine-zero zero zero</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">, (located in district 5 of paquera, canton 01 of the province of puntarenas),</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> (sic)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\"> with the boundaries, measurements, and nature indicated by the Public Registry. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">2.- </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">The cancellation of the registered title of the previous owner, La Florida S.R.L., is ordered, and it shall be registered in the name of Octaviano González Vega, of legal age, married once, farmer and cattle rancher, resident of Concepción de Naranjo, identity card number nine-zero nineteen-three hundred ninety, which shall be ordered by the writ of execution (ejecutoria) to the public property registry, once this judgment is final, and any other annotation that is lapsed or prescribed must be dispensed with, in accordance with articles 853 of the Civil Code, in relation to 471 of the same. Once this judgment is final, the lower court (a-quo) must issue the corresponding writ of execution to the Public Property Registry. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">the decision is revoked: The exceptions of lack of right and statute of limitations (in its positive and negative modalities) filed by Octaviano González Vega are granted, pursuant to articles 851 to 855 of the Civil Code, to instead DECLARE WITHOUT MERIT, in all its aspects, the counterclaim filed by LA FLORIDA S.R.L. and Oscar Soto Jiménez. In accordance with the foregoing, pursuant to articles 54 and 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, since the plaintiff prevailed in his claims regarding the claim, and the exceptions, regarding the counterclaim, it is appropriate to revoke the ruling on costs, to instead, order the defendant-counterclaimants to pay both costs of this proceeding, both personal and procedural</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. In resolution 400-A-18 of 4:40 p.m. on 2018, the Tribunal ordered </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">The request for clarification and addition is denied. The purely material error in the operative part of Judgment No. 336-F-18 of the Agrarian Tribunal is corrected, so that regarding the counterclaim, instead of the phrase \"...to instead WITHOUT MERIT\", it shall read, \"...to instead </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">declare WITHOUT MERIT</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">, in all its aspects, the counterclaim filed...\". This order is declared final</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">VI.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> Unconforming, La Florida S.R.L. and Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez each filed an appeal in cassation (recurso de casación), which were admitted by this Chamber. The company formulates 7 grievances (agravios) (of which, the last concerns </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">—</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">essentially</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">—</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> the costs imposed). For his part, Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez presents 2 grievances. Before the particular examination of the charges, it is pertinent to note that, as indicated in the admission order, in this matter, the scheduling for the evidentiary hearing took place prior to the entry into force of the reform to the Labor Code, enacted by Law 9343, Labor Procedural Reform, of January 25, 2016, effective as of July 25, 2017, so in accordance with Transitory Provision I, subsection 2) of that legal body, it constitutes an exception case to its application, and therefore the decision is made in accordance with the previous wording of that codification. Likewise, it is noted that since the appealed judgment was issued prior to the current Code of Civil Procedure, Law 9342, according to Transitory Provision II, the hearing and decision of the appeals in cassation are conducted in accordance with the previous Code of Civil Procedure, Law 7130, hereinafter referred to as CPC. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">Appeal in cassation of the defendant-counterclaimant company</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">VII.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> La Florida S.R.L., as summarized below, raised 2 grievances of a procedural nature. In agrarian matters, as established by Article 61 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law 6734 of March 29, 1982, the appeal before this Chamber is governed by Chapter V of Title VII of the Labor Code, whose canon 559 </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">—</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">as indicated, with the wording prior to the reform enacted by Law 9343</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">—</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> established the outright rejection of any appeal seeking the correction, reinstatement, or execution of procedural steps. Based on this rule, this Chamber previously held the view that in this matter the appeal in cassation was only admissible for substantive defects.</span></p> Notwithstanding, since judgment 583-2004 of July 14, 2004, this Chamber has admitted the examination of procedural defects (vicios procesales) when they directly affect the judgment; excluding those that affect the procedural iter (iter procesal), which are those expressly excluded by precept 559 of the Labor Code insofar as it refers to "procedural steps (trámites procesales)". In this regard, it has been held that one must therefore adhere to the regulation of the grounds contained in mandate 594 of the CPC, by express remission of article 452 of the Labor Code. In this vein, it has been accepted that in agrarian matters, procedural errors of incongruence and reformatio in peius (reforma en perjuicio) are admissible. The claim for deficiency in the composition of the litis has also been admitted, by virtue of its impact on the efficacy of the ruling and because it is a prerequisite of any procedural relationship. In this sense, one may consult, among many others, resolutions 971-F-S1-2011, 691-F-S1-2012, 1513-F-S1-2012, 1425-F-S1-2013, 29-F-S1-2015, and 2039-F-S1-2019. For this reason, we proceed to the analysis of the defects of form raised by the appellant.

**VIII.** **First**. La Florida S.R.L. reproaches that "the judgment is scarcely reasoned and violates the right to a double instance". It states that it appealed the A quo ruling only insofar as it granted the plaintiff the payment of improvements made to the property and a right of retention. Nevertheless, the Tribunal only heard the plaintiff's appeal and, regarding its own, ordered it would not be heard as unnecessary; which—it argues—is contrary to the duty to provide reasoning, to article 155 of the CPC, to the right to a double instance, and to due process. The Tribunal, it denounces, declined its obligation to resolve; it disregarded the impugnatory action of one of the parties and preferred that of the other, without indicating the reasons for which it dismissed it, "we must suppose, and only suppose, that the ruling issued by the TRIBUNAL sufficed in itself to reject our appeal, which is unheard of, because the TRIBUNAL would be resolving the case in a single instance." **IX.** Given that, when dealing with procedural defects that affect the judgment, one must resort to mandate 594 of the CPC, it is clear that neither the lack of reasoning nor the resolution in a single instance, which is what the company accuses, are found within the provided grounds. Therefore, the grievance will be denied. In any case, it is pointed out to the cassation appellant that the Tribunal referred to not hearing the grievances related to the payment of improvements, as unnecessary; and this is clear to this Chamber insofar as the payment of improvements was one of the aspects that, upon upholding the appeal of the plaintiff-counter-defendant, was revoked. With the main claim of usucapion (usucapión) upheld in favor of Mr. Octaviano González Vega, the upholding of this same subject's claim consisting of the payment of improvements, which was subsidiary, was therefore not appropriate, nor could it be maintained. Consequently, the grievances of his appeal that precisely attacked the estimation of that subsidiary petition of the plaintiff became moot, as such an estimation no longer existed. Ergo, the censure will be denied.

**X.** **Second**. The company denounces the defect of incongruence, in granting "something that was never requested (sic) (extra petita)" in violation of article 155 of the CPC. It transcribes the plaintiff's claim in which he requests the declaration of acquisitive usucapion (usucapión adquisitiva) of the property. This, it says, was what was requested by the plaintiff; however, the Tribunal unilaterally granted a mode of acquisition of ownership not requested, which is acquisition a non domino, validating a supposed translative title of ownership under the justification that the social function of property allows disregarding the facts and claims established by the parties.

**XI.** In this regard, it is worth noting that this Chamber has reiterated on numerous occasions that for common agrarian usucapion (usucapión agraria común), such as that requested in this matter by the plaintiff-counter-defendant, the just title that is required "must emanate from one who in Law is not the owner. The thing is acquired from another, from one who behaved and was reputed as such, without being so; the transferor is a non-owner, either because he has never held title, or because his right has been extinguished or resolved, or because the one he exhibits is not sufficient to produce the transfer; in this last case is, for example, the usufructuary who appears transferring the property. Usucapion (usucapión) operates, consequently, when the title of transmission or acquisition is a non domino, from one who is not the owner, but not when it is a domino or a verus domino, that is, when it emanates from the true owner, because in this case, if the title is perfect, it immediately produces all its effects. And if it has some defect of another nature, by emanating from the true owner, its validation can occur through negative or extinctive prescription of the nullity action and not through acquisitive prescription or usucapion (usucapión). Regarding the just title, one may see, from this organ, judgment no. 821 of 15 hours 35 minutes of November 1, 2000, 856 of 15 hours 25 minutes of November 15, 2000, and 320 of 15 hours of April 27, 2001" (emphasis added; thus it was indicated in precedent 178-F-S1-2007, likewise in 536-F-2007, and in the same line are also resolutions 891-F-S1-2007 and 945-F-S1-2018). Thus, in the present matter, the main claim of the plaintiff-counter-defendant imposed on the adjudicating bodies the analysis of the just title, which required examining whether it was issued by the verus domino or whether it was a non domino. Consequently, when the Tribunal determined that the purchase-sale document of March 4, 1988, constitutes a sale a non domino by Mr. Oscar Soto to Mr. Octaviano González, said body would not have incurred the accused defect of extra petita; this was part of the cause of action.

**XII.** **Third**. La Florida maintains the judgment presents "contradictory reasoning". It expounds, it validates the list of proven and unproven facts from the A quo judgment, except for proven fact 4 which it suppresses; this reveals a problem of logical structure because if it maintains such circumstances, it cannot validly, by logic, arrive at conclusions different from those of the A quo. It warns, what the Tribunal did was a decontextualized analysis of the testimony of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez. It only copied and pasted a part of her declaration. It transcribes, the witness also indicated: "\"I clarify that I was not present the day Octaviano bought the farm, I found that out because Octaviano told me about it. Ronulfo and Oscar when they sold this farm did not make papers; at that time, things cost a lot and they left it for later. It was some time later that Octaviano's documents were made but the deed would not pass in the Registry and that is why inquiries began. That document was signed on March 4, 1988, there was Lic. Olivier Rojas and also Octaviano, Ronulfo and Oscar were there... when the deed was made in Palmares it was not investigated whether the farm was registered because the farm belonged to Don Oscar. I am certain that no study was done at that time in the Registry. They began to investigate some time later why the deed would not pass in the Registry.... I do not know (sic) on what date Lic. Olivier presented the deed of this purchase in the Registry...\"". From this, it maintains, it is concluded that the plaintiff says he bought the farm from his brother in 1984, that due to his brother's death he decided to make papers with the true owner Oscar in 1988, "that is, if the plaintiff bought in the year 1984 and just 4 years later chooses to make papers with the true owner, it is clear that just 4 years after having bought from his brother, he managed to learn that the land was registered, otherwise, what need would there have been to locate Oscar and make papers with him? He is simply sought out Oscar because it is recognized that the property is registered and that it was necessary to have the signature of the registered owner (Oscar), to register the plaintiff's acquisition, therefore, already from the beginning the plaintiff's good faith is questionable." It continues, "Then, the witness under comment says: \"That document was signed on March 4, 1988, there was Lic. Olivier Rojas and also Octaviano, Ronulfo and Oscar were there... when the deed was made in Palmares it was not investigated whether the farm was registered because the farm belonged to Don Oscar...\" a statement that the TRIBUNAL analyzes in isolation from the general context and abstracted from the totality of the probative list recorded in the process; firstly, if the three individuals were there it was because it was necessary to arrange a situation that was not clear, that is, that the property appeared registered in Oscar's name; therefore, the TRIBUNAL's thesis that the plaintiff did not know or had no reason to know whether the farm was registered or whether or not it belonged to Oscar is not true; then, in the same acquisition document that the plaintiff provides it is clearly read that Oscar \"sells him his registered farm\", therefore, the TRIBUNAL's reasoning regarding what was affirmed by the witness is totally contradictory to the same evaluation of that testimony as well as to the same document that dictates that the registration of the property was already a reality, and this occurs just 4 supposed years after the plaintiff had acquired it from his brother; therefore, the act of signing the document with Oscar is a clear and decisive element of proof to accredit that the plaintiff, from that date, already had full knowledge that the property was registered and that it was in Oscar's name; therefore, what was really important in the case was to determine whether or not the plaintiff knew if the property was registered in the Public Registry, and both the witness and the same document, accredit that the plaintiff did know." This, it asserts, is sufficient to deny positive prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership, because by accepting that it was registered, he lacks the necessary good faith; "any consequence derived from the document he decided to sign (…) must be assumed by the plaintiff, and this includes the fact that the farm no longer belonged to the one who purported to sell it to him, because on a previous date he had contributed it to the company." It adds, if the plaintiff did not want to check the Registry, that does not excuse him; therefore, the Tribunal's decision violates the principles of legal security and certainty, of erga omnes effectiveness, and of registry publicity. It highlights, since the property is registered, "any particular situation derived from that property, is recorded in the Public Registry, just as the annotation related to the contribution of the farm to the claimant company was already recorded and publicized by the Public Registry since the year 1986 and which was definitively registered in the year 1994. Rather, the same witness says that they began to make inquiries because the deed would not pass, so that is clear that they could have had full knowledge of the registry situation of the property both before executing the deed with Oscar and after having executed it, and if they nonetheless persisted in that, it was a clearly assumed risk that must now generate consequences for them, since it does not constitute an acquisition a non domino nor one suitable for usucapion (usucapión), given that their good faith is diminished by the circumstances surrounding that acquisition." It indicates, "the TRIBUNAL indicates the following: \"On the other hand, both the plaintiff and his previous possessor, that is, his brother Ronulfo, to whom Mr. Oscar Soto confesses he sold the property to later transfer it to Octaviano, were unaware that La Florida S.A. appeared as registered owner starting in 1994, in the Public Registry\" when what the TRIBUNAL really should have drawn attention to is that the plaintiff participates in an act of signing a deed, for a farm that was registered, as the witness says: \"...when the deed was made in Palmares it was not investigated whether the farm was registered because the farm belonged to Don Oscar...\" what the TRIBUNAL must understand is that the witness relates that she assumed the farm belonged to Oscar, which contradicts the document provided and the version given by the plaintiff in his claim, since the document is clear in indicating that it is a registered farm that Oscar was selling to the plaintiff and that pure and simple fact should have set the guideline for the TRIBUNAL to determine that the plaintiff does not have possessory rights capable of protection (posesión amparable), much less good faith nor just title, neither understood as a document nor understood as the very fact of possessing, because as we said, he had full knowledge that the property was reduced to private domain; that being so, the possession he may have been exercising is tainted as unlawful and is not capable of protection through positive prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership. Therefore, what is really important here is not to establish whether the plaintiff knew the farm belonged to the plaintiff company or not, because what is relevant is to establish whether the plaintiff had knowledge that the property was registered." Finally, the judgment is contradictory because it validates an alleged document transferring ownership, when this is full proof that the property was registered, and therefore it cannot be acquired by adverse possession (usucapión) nor much less as a "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">acquisition a non domino</span>"; "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">one thing is the possession exercised over a lawful and possible object, in good faith and under the terms required by agrarian law for adverse possession, and quite another is to pass off an illegal act as justified ignorance based on good faith and the social function</span>".

**XIII.** For the decision on this grievance, it is convenient to be clear about the arguments of the Court in the appealed judgment, in its entirety, so that, beforehand, this Chamber may make some general clarifications on the subject of agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria). Thus, it is understood that in whereas clauses (considerandos) I and II, the Court shared the facts that the Trial Court had deemed proven, with the exception of the fourth, which it eliminated; likewise, it shared the circumstances it deemed unproven. In whereas clauses III and IV it summarized the appeal of the plaintiff and that of Florida S.R.L. In whereas clause V it explained in general terms the institution of adverse possession (usucapión). In VI it also expounded in general terms on the distinction that said body has considered for several years exists between civil and agrarian adverse possession (usucapión civil y la agraria). To this end, it inserted a long quote (whose source it does not specifically identify), but from which it is important to highlight that it reads that it is by virtue of the agrarian principle of the "social function of property (función social de la propiedad)" that "various requirements are established in Agrarian adverse possession (Usucapión agraria)", which—one continues reading—are: 1) the animus; 2) the "just title in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem (justo título en la posesión agraria ad-usucapionem)" and 3) the "good faith in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem (buena fe en la posesión agraria ad-usucapionem)". It detailed: " 1.- The animus, must be projected through the effective exercise of agrarian possessory acts, converting the agrarian property into the habitual dwelling of the possessor; but it is reflected more intensely through the economic appropriation of the profits obtained through his cultivation work; it is presumed that whoever works the land in that way is always a possessor with title of owner. 2.- The just title in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem, is constituted by agrarian work, since it is through it that ownership of the land is acquired. 'On the other hand, the non-requirement of a just title means that adverse possession can be presented contra-tabulas, that is, against a title registered in the name of a third party in the Public Registry. By virtue of the considerations that regarding just title are made in the theory of agrarian possession, it can be said that, agrarian adverse possession, by not taking into account the prior relationship that may exist between the possessor and the transferor, is a truly original mode of acquisition.' (Meza Lázarus, op. cit., page 158). 3.- Good faith in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem (buena fe en la posesión agraria ad-usucapionem): In agrarian adverse possession, there is no categorization of possession of good or bad faith, (sic) since Agrarian Law is not so much interested in the attitude of the possessor, but above all in his productive agrarian activity; 'In Agrarian Law, the existence of this requirement cannot be conceived by virtue of it being linked to the just title which is discarded as a requirement of possession suitable for adverse possession. Agrarian possession has a personal character in which its foundation turns out to be work. Since the existence of a title and its validity are not necessary, the requirement of special good faith in agrarian possession lacks any reason for being.' (Meza Lázarus, op.cit., page 160-161)" (the bold text from the original quote now transcribed is eliminated). Next, in whereas clause VII, it affirmed that the appellant (which is extracted to be the plaintiff) is partially correct. It explained that the plaintiff directed his claim against La Florida S.R.L, who appears as the registered owner as of 1994, and against Oscar Soto Vega, who sold to him in 1988. It is proven, it continued, that Oscar Soto Jiménez accepted having sold to Ronulfo González Vega and "and the latter in turn to the plaintiff here, Octaviano González Vega, so the sale was made directly from Oscar Soto to Octaviano, the latter acquiring under the belief that the person selling to him was the true owner of the property, however, it is also true that the sale is **a non domino**, (not from the true owner), since if it occurred on March 4, 1988 (see document on page 3) by public deed—a possessory transfer title (título traslativo posesorio)—, and Oscar Soto had transferred ownership of said property since March 23, 1985, to La Florida Sociedad Anónima (see pages 5 to 8), Mr. Octaviano had no reason (sic) to know or be aware of said transfer, which was registered in the Public Registry until September 23, 1995 (see pages 5 to 17). The transfer-of-ownership title (título traslativo de dominio) exhibited by the plaintiff is suitable, valid, true, and effective, since the parties gave their consent—nudo consensu—and from then on, the contract was perfected, and from that moment Mr. Octaviano behaved as the legitimate owner and real proprietor of the property." It added, "It is not true, as the lower court (a-quo) states, that Octaviano had knowledge that the sale in his favor did not take place because there existed a document prior to the registration in favor of La Florida S.R.L., because the notary made it known. That affirmation by the trial judge is based on an error in the assessment of the evidence, specifically a material or factual error, since she puts in the mouth of the witness Sancho Ramírez something she did not say in her statement. Indeed, if it is read in its entirety, a different conclusion is reached. Ms. Alicia Sánchez Ramírez clearly stated: '...After Octaviano acquired it I never saw Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar work the farm. Never, since Octaviano acquired (sic) the farm, did Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar indicate to Mr. Octaviano that he could not work the farm. The farm was registered, I do not know if Octaviano knew that when he bought it. I found out in the Registry after Octaviano had bought. I started taking some computer courses and as they had us practice, using the computer I found that it was registered in the name of the Sociedad La Florida, that was about eight years ago. From that date forward, no one from that company has ever indicated or claimed the farm from Octaviano...' (see pages 1439-1440). That is, the inquiries began sometime after the year 2000, when the plaintiff had already possessed the property for more than ten years in a public, peaceful manner, with just title and good faith, a situation that was consolidated, undoubtedly, upon the completion of ten years, that is, **March 5, 1998**." It adds, "On the other hand, both the plaintiff and his prior possessor, that is, his brother Ronulfo, to whom Mr. Oscar Soto confesses he sold in order to then transfer the property to Octaviano, were unaware that La Florida S.A. appeared as the registered owner as of 1994, in the Public Registry. Much less can that event be considered—as the lower court erroneously did—as an act interrupting the possession, as a material fact. Nothing could be more erroneous regarding the normative application of the provisions of Article 853 and following of the Civil Code, since a mere registry inscription (publicity) is not capable of interrupting positive prescription, as it does not correspond to the causes of interruption recognized by the legislator (Articles 875 and 876 of the Civil Code)." The Court pointed out that the witness Sancho Ramírez indicated that they "found out" that the property was registered in the name of the company, but that occurred after the adverse possession period had already passed. It detailed that the plaintiff's possession had been for more than 10 years as owner and with a "real and existent just title since through No. 40 (...) of March 4, 1988 (pages 3 and 4) Oscar Soto Jiménez sells to Octaviano González Vega" the registered farm, which the former had contributed to the company, a situation unknown to the latter. It then highlighted that the buyer and his transferor are those who have behaved as the real owners of the property, paying laborers, caring for and improving the property, maintaining paddocks (apartos), sowing improved pastures, dedicating it to livestock activity for more than 20 years, that is, fulfilling the exercise of the social function of property, as is evident from "from the statement of: Blanca Ester Rojas Zúñiga who affirmed: '...Who works this farm is Octaviano, he acquired this farm because he bought it from my husband Ronulfo González Vega, that was already more than twenty years ago. My husband bought this farm from Oscar Soto Jiménez...Mr. Octaviano dedicates this farm to livestock currently, corn and yucca have also been planted at times... In the town, who they recognize as the owner of these lands is Octaviano González Vega, he maintains the fences and the farm together with his laborers...it is in better conditions now, Octaviano sowed improved pastures, before there were only "burros" [a type of pasture], he has also improved the fences' (see page 1436). The witness Mainor Francisco Castro Jiménez stated: 'They, I clarify, the González family, have been working this farm for about eighteen years now...' (page 1437)... 'Who work this farm are the González brothers and their laborers, they dedicate it to livestock...' (page 1438). The witness Alicia Sancho Ramírez explains in more detail: 'The farm is divided into paddocks (apartos), six in total, ...Since Octaviano acquired the farm no one has ever interrupted him...he is the one who buys all the wires for the fences and the laborers are the ones who maintain them, they sow improved pastures on the whole farm. Octaviano is the one who buys them, as well as the herbicides, I know for a fact because I am the one who writes the checks...' (page 1439). The witness Fernando Enrique Castro Jiménez, referring to the time of possession states: 'The González family has had the farm for approximately eighteen or nineteen years. This farm, from what I have observed from the outside, has always been maintained the same...For the maintenance of the farm the González family use a Chapulín [machine brand] and also laborers...' (page 1441). The witness Dagoberto Suárez Araya added the following: 'I have known the farm that is the object of this process for approximately twenty-three years, I have worked with Octaviano on that farm since that same time, I help him with the cattle and fix the fences. Since I have known the farm I have worked there...he dedicates the farm to cattle, he has sown Brisante and Braquiar type pasture, there are approximately sixty head of Brahman breed cattle...' (pages 1443-1445). (sic) See in the same vein the remaining statements of Luis Alberto Barrientos Mora (page 1445), and Alfredo Ramírez Sandi (on pages 1448-1449)." It reiterated that the above demonstrates the plaintiff's behavior as the legitimate owner, by disposing of the property in agrarian activities of livestock, maintenance of grazing areas (repastos) and fences, sowing of improved pastures, and "also the inertia of the titleholder in the exercise of his rights of restitution over the property, having allowed more than ten years to pass." It continued, "the plaintiff has, as indicated, the transfer title of possession (título traslativo de la posesión), and good faith, since he has maintained the conviction that he acquired from the true owner (a non domino)." It held that if the plaintiff and his transferor had, by 1998, more than 10 years of continuous exercise of possession in good faith, the second paragraph of Article 285 applies to them, regarding that if the possession was in good faith at its beginning, it does not lose that character merely because the possessor later doubts the legitimacy of his right, and therefore in this case good faith must be presumed in favor of the adverse possessor (usucapiente).

**XIV.** It is deemed timely to warn that, contrary to what was held by the Court regarding the different requirements for agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria), this Chamber, in judgment 920-F-2000 of 3:25 p.m. on December 13, 2000, indicated that "the mere exercise of acts said to be possessory does not replace the legal conditions that the law demands for adverse possession (usucapir), related to just title and good faith. Consequently, the trial judges have erred in ordering that, in what they call 'agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria)', a series of elements that appear in civil law as requirements for possession suitable for adverse possession must be discarded, such as just title and good faith, since, as they express it, the just title is constituted by agrarian work and good faith is not relevant, to the extent that the attitude of the possessor is not of interest, but rather his productive activity. That reasoning is openly contrary to that expressed in Articles 853, 855, and 856 of the Civil Code, which are applicable in the case. In this sense, when dealing with matters processed under agrarian jurisdiction, the said legal conditions necessary for positive prescription to operate must not be obviated, since, except for the situation expressly contemplated by Articles 92 and 101 of the Law of Possessory Informations [it is the Law of Lands and Colonization, and not as was erroneously indicated], relating to precarious possessors and under the strict observance of the procedures and processes that said law provides for that purpose—matters unrelated to the case before us—, in our legal system, regarding the adverse possession (usucapión) of the right of ownership over real estate, absolutely no legal provision establishes the exoneration from the duty of the concurrence of just title and good faith." On the contrary, the law requires both conditions, together with the qualified possession under Article 856 of the Civil Code, for positive prescription to be applicable, (…) [.-] VI.- This Chamber has already reiterated the need for the adverse possessor to meet the three legal conditions for adverse possession (usucapión) to operate, likewise, in cases processed under agrarian jurisdiction, precisely because the applicable law so determines (see, for example, the following judgments of this Chamber: number 4 of fourteen hours forty-five minutes of January twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-eight; number 50 of fifteen hours twenty minutes of May twentieth, nineteen ninety-eight; number 95 of fifteen hours thirty minutes of October second, nineteen ninety-eight; number 1 of fourteen hours of January sixth, nineteen ninety-nine). Previously, in resolution 821-F-2000 of 15 hours 35 minutes of November first, 2000 (a civil matter although not resulting in a different treatment for agrarian matters, as stated in the immediately preceding precedent), this Chamber had ruled on the just title (justo título) as follows: “according to our legal system, this requirement refers to the title transferring ownership (título traslativo de dominio) and not to the qualities of possession, since the latter enjoys autonomy, and must present, as stated, the characteristics of being public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and in the capacity of owner. The title transferring ownership is constituted as a justifying element of possession -not the other way around-, and must have this characteristic before or at the time of possessing. Nor should it be confused with good faith (buena fe), since the latter is a subjective requirement related to the acquirer's belief of being assisted by the right in the possession exercised. The justness of the title lies, according to the doctrine developed, ancient and recent, in its truthfulness and validity. The first characteristic refers to its real existence, thereby excluding the putative title and the simulated one. In both cases, there is no operative just title, only the appearance of one.” Likewise, on this same occasion it was noted regarding the proof of the just title by the acquirer that “Our Civil Code, in its Article 854, requires proof of this requirement, but excepting cases in which there are possessory presumptions -in the case of movables or the right of possession (derecho de posesión), or it is not required at all to acquire continuous and apparent easements (servidumbres) by adverse possession-. The reason for the exceptions is easy to understand, due to the different treatment given to the indicated cases. In the case of the right to possess (derecho de poseer), the form of acquisition is more agile than that provided for the right of ownership (derecho de propiedad), since its content is not full and permanent like the latter. Indeed, to acquire this right, possession for one year is sufficient (Articles 279 and 869, in fine, of the Civil Code). But this, due to a possessory presumption valid only for the right to possess (derecho de poseer), according to Article 281 ibid, but not referring to the acquisitive cause of ownership, which, pursuant to section 854, must always be proven. In other words, the justifying title of simple possession cannot be equated with the true and valid title of acquisition, as indicated, of ownership. Section 281 and section 854, far from contradicting each other, find correspondence in their respective fields of application. At this point, it is appropriate to recall the real rights susceptible to being acquired by adverse possession, in which the demonstration of the just title is indeed required. Among them is the right of ownership (derecho de propiedad) -as a full right- and the rights of usufruct, use, and habitation as derived rights-. In these cases, it is not enough to presume the right to possess; it is necessary to demonstrate a just acquisitive cause of ownership, usufruct, use, or habitation. The function of the possessory presumption, fully applicable to the simple right to possess -a real right in another's property, which, despite its enormous relevance, has a lower rank than ownership- or to ownership over movable goods -which is based on the publicity system applicable to them-, has not been extended by our legislation to the proof of the just title in other cases. In these, the different nature and socio-economic consideration of the rights require, in the complex factual situation of the original acquisition analyzed, a justifying cause for the possession, which must be explicit and allow, not only an analysis of whether the title is just (valid and true), but also its concordance with the property being possessed. In relation, one may consult, among others, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 19 of 14:00 hrs. of April 7, 1993; 45 of 15:05 hrs. of May 22, 1996; and, 1 of 14 hrs. of January 6, 1999.” Subsequently, in resolution 178-F-2007 of 9 hours 50 minutes of March 14, 2007, it was specified that there are two types of agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria), the common and the special, between which there is a difference in terms of their requirements. It was explained that the special agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria especial) is regulated in the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, mandates 92 and 101, whose basis is precarious possession by necessity of exploiting the agrarian estate, as a means of subsistence for oneself or the family nucleus; “In this precarious possession of lands, the need for food and family agrarian work prevail. The simple intention to possess is not required; one must possess in an effective, direct, and personal manner, to satisfy the food needs of the family group. Hence, for it to operate, the existence of good or bad faith is not decisive, as this element is replaced by necessity.” On the other hand, it continued, the common agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria común) is governed by the general regulations of the Civil Code, therefore, in accordance with precept 853, the just title and good faith, as well as possession, must be demonstrated; the general regulation of adverse possession was emphasized: “requires the concurrence of certain requirements: a suitable thing, that is, susceptible to private property; located within the commerce of men; just title transferring ownership; good faith; possession and passage of time, exercised in the capacity of owner, continuously, publicly, peacefully, and for ten years or more (Articles 853 and 860 of the Civil Code). Said requirements are concurrent, such that if only one of them is absent, then the acquisitive prescription will be inadmissible.” A position that reiterates in a more precise manner the criterion expressed in the cited precedent 920-F-2000 of 15 hours 25 minutes of December 13, 2000. In this line, more recently, in judgment 945-F-S1-2018 of 10 hours 35 minutes of November first, 2018, issued within an ordinary agrarian process, it was indicated that “ XI.- Regarding the institution of adverse possession, this Chamber, in a reiterated manner, has provided, based on the applicable regulations, that certain requirements are needed for it to be configured, namely, title transferring ownership, good faith, possession exercised in the capacity of owner continuously, publicly, and peacefully, as well as the passage of time, be it 10 years minimum. On the subject, it has considered in judgment no. 114 of 12 hours 11 minutes of February 5, 2016, the following: ‘On agrarian adverse possession, this Chamber has already indicated on other occasions that for it to prosper, the fulfillment of several requirements is needed: title transferring ownership, good faith, and possession; but this must be in the capacity of owner, in a public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner for a period of 10 years, taking into account that in agrarian matters, the aspect of possession transcends simple occupation [meaning, possession] of the estate, since in these cases, agrarian possessory acts must exist, aimed at cultivating and improving the property one intends to acquire by adverse possession. In this sense, one may consult the resolution of 9 hours 50 minutes of September 18, 2013, which corresponds to vote number 1196.’ –the highlighting is not from the original–.” Further on it was expressed: “(…) the fact that the plaintiff continued working the land, whose basis, the plaintiff says, is found in the agreement of wills made verbally, between him and the Cooperative -regarding the future return of the portion of land in dispute-, this does not possess the characteristics necessary to constitute a title transfer suitable for adversely possessing –since it is not a title transferring ownership from someone who is not the owner-. Therefore, this Chamber conceives that one of the requirements of adverse possession is not configured. As set forth in preceding lines, it is not the mere fact of possession that must be assessed when reviewing the requirements of adverse possession, but rather the antecedent legal situation or the cause for which one possesses. And in this case, the cause or reason why the plaintiff claims to be in possession of the land is far from that which is considered suitable for adverse possession.” Thus, from all of the foregoing, it follows that although this Chamber has held a distinctive note between ordinary or civil adverse possession and common agrarian adverse possession, this is reduced to the fact that the requirement of possession in agrarian matters is not constituted by just any possessory acts, but rather consists of agrarian possessory acts, such as actions of cultivation, livestock farming, beekeeping, among others. The thesis that agrarian possession relieves, substitutes, or constitutes the title transferring ownership has been discarded by this Chamber since old date, in the indicated precedents.

XV.Now, although this Chamber does not share what was indicated by the Tribunal in general terms regarding the just title or title transferring ownership in ordinary agrarian adverse possession; the truth is that, despite those more abstract considerations, in considerando VII of the appealed judgment, upon entering the analysis of the present matter, said body identified the "title transferring ownership exhibited by the plaintiff" as the sale and purchase contract between Oscar Soto and the plaintiff, in which it insisted that "the sale is a non domino, (not from the true owner)", which occurred "on March 4, 1988 (see document on folio 3) by public deed –possessory transfer title-, and Oscar Soto had transferred the ownership of said property since March 23, 1985, to La Florida Sociedad Anónima (see folios 5 to 8)". The Tribunal understood that this 1988 sale and purchase is both a "title transferring ownership" and a "possessory transfer title", it used both phrases; which —this Chamber in turn understands— is not different or an error based on the fact that ownership has possession as an attribute. Then that 1988 transaction is the cause of the transfer of ownership (from a non domino subject who appeared to be so) as a requirement of adverse possession, but it is also the cause by which the fact of possession by Octaviano González began, through which the Tribunal ultimately decreed he acquired the right of ownership or property against that of the registered company. In this way, aside from the discrepancy regarding the general thesis on the requirements of agrarian adverse possession held by the Tribunal, this body's decision was not based on the fact of possession as a title transferring ownership for the purposes of the right of property or ownership itself as stated in that general part; it based it on the sale and purchase deed of March 4, 1988, between Oscar Soto and the plaintiff, a moment in which the former, despite being the registered owner, was not the owner of the property (this last circumstance which —it is noted— not being publicized on the property itself in the Public Registry, could not automatically be sustained to have been known by Mr. Octaviano, barring proof to the contrary). With these warnings and this clarification, we proceed to resolve the grievance.

XVI.The core argument of the appellant company is that the plaintiff knew that the property was registered, as this is deduced from the testimony of Mrs. Alicia Sánchez Ramírez and from the deed itself between the plaintiff and Oscar Soto; therefore, by knowing it was registered, adverse possession is not applicable. It is observed, the claimant does not realize that indeed the property was registered, but in the name of Oscar Soto, who appeared in 1988 before a notary public to sell said registered property to the plaintiff. This fact, that the property was registered, was not denied by the plaintiff; in any case, the Court held it as proven and it was adopted by the Tribunal. Thus, up to this point, its argument is useless to break the judgment, since the Tribunal never denied that the plaintiff knew the property was registered; the fundamental point is that it was registered, yes, in the name of Oscar Soto, who was already not, in reality, its owner. On the other hand, insofar as it affirms that "the annotation related to the contribution of the property to the appellant company already appeared, which the Public Registry already publicized since 1986 and which becomes definitively registered in 1994", the cassation appellant does not refer to any element of conviction from which that factual conclusion can be drawn, which the instance bodies did not hold as accredited. The company suggests that the witness Alicia Sánchez Ramírez related that she and Octaviano "began to make inquiries because the deed was not being processed", and from there it deduces that "it is clear that they could have had full knowledge of the registry situation of the property both before carrying out the deed with Oscar and after". A deduction that cannot follow. Note that the appellant does not specify any proof from which it can be drawn that in 1988 it was recorded in the Public Registry of Real Property that this estate had been contributed in its constitution, through —at least— a marginal annotation on that property or that the ownership of La Florida S.R.L. was recorded in said Registry. This Chamber does not fully understand the criticism because within the same grievance it states that the property was indeed in the name of Oscar Soto.

Given that it was registered in the Public Registry of Real Property that Mr. Oscar Soto was the owner of the property, without him actually being so (having contributed it in 1985 upon the constitution of La Florida S.R.L.), the sale he made in 1988 to Octaviano González constitutes, as the Tribunal correctly indicated, a transaction a non domino. This is the characteristic that—as already indicated in Considerando XI—the title transferring ownership required by Article 853 of the Civil Code to acquire property by usucapion (usucapión) must possess, as this Chamber has repeatedly established, thus in the already referenced ruling 178-F-2007, a criterion reiterated in resolutions 536-F-2007, 891-F-S1-2007 and 945-F-S1-2018. In this latter, more recent precedent, this Chamber first cited: “ruling no. 536 of 10 hours 30 minutes of July 27, 2007, this judicial Body stated: ‘Regarding the just title for usucapion. In the instant case, the appellant indicates that the just title in agrarian matters is determined by the possession itself. However, that objection is not well-founded. Concerning this requirement, it is necessary to point out that it consists of the antecedent legal relationship, by reason of which one obtains the thing with the capacity to acquire by usucapion. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that it must emanate from one who, in Law, is not the owner. The thing is acquired from another, who behaved and was reputed as such, without being so; the alienator is a non-owner, either because he has never held ownership, or because his right has been extinguished or resolved, or because the right he exhibits is not sufficient to produce the transfer; this last case includes, for example, the usufructuary who appears transferring the property. Usucapion operates, consequently, when the title of transfer or acquisition is a non domino, from one who is not the owner, but not when it is a domino or a verus domino, that is, when it emanates from the true owner, because in this case, if the title is perfect, it immediately produces all its effects. And if it has some defect of another nature, because it emanates from the true owner, its validation can be produced by the negative or extinctive prescription of the nullity action and not by the acquisitive prescription or usucapion. Regarding the just title, see, from this body, ruling no. 821 of 15 hours 35 minutes of November 1, 2000, 856 of 15 hours 25 minutes of November 15, 2000 and 320 of 15 hours of April 27, 2001.’ – the highlighting is not from the original-”. Immediately following, upon analyzing the specific case, it stated: “It is not alleged in this matter that there exists a title transferring ownership, from a non-owner to the plaintiff, where the possession is transferred to the actor, so that he believed he was the true owner of the land. For its part, the fact that the actor continued working the land, whose basis, the plaintiff says, lies in the verbal agreement of wills between him and the Cooperative—regarding the future return of the portion of land in dispute—this does not possess the necessary characteristics to constitute a transfer title suitable for usucapion – for it is not a transfer title from one who is not the owner. Therefore, this Chamber conceives that one of the prerequisites for usucapion is not established. As set forth in preceding lines, it is not the mere fact of possession that must be evaluated when reviewing the prerequisites of usucapion, but the antecedent legal situation or the cause by which one possesses. And in this case, the cause or the reason for which the plaintiff claims to be in possession of the land is far from that which is considered suitable for usucapion” (the underlining and boldface are added). In sum, the appellant's argument is not useful to undermine what the Tribunal ordered, as it merely reiterates that—in her view—a registered property cannot be acquired by usucapion because that necessarily means there is no good faith (buena fe) nor a title transferring ownership; which is incorrect because, according to mandates 853 and 856 of the Civil Code, usucapion must be decreed if, in addition to the title transferring ownership emanating from a non domino, but who appeared to be so by virtue—as in this case—of registered ownership, the plaintiff meets the requirements of good faith and possession as owner, which is continuous, public, and peaceful. In this case, the registration of the farm showing ownership by Oscar Soto, far from diminishing the plaintiff's good faith, confirms it; without the appellant alleging in this grievance other circumstances that lead to a contrary conclusion and their evidentiary support. It only remains to point out that there is no contradiction whatsoever by the Tribunal for having maintained the factual framework of the Trial Court and arriving at a different decision. The subsumption of those same circumstances to the legal norms will yield one result or another according to the application and interpretation of the Law carried out by the judging body, and it will be the superior—as in the present case—who defines which is the correct application and interpretation.

XVII.Fourth. She accuses an erroneous “analysis of the probative element”, for being decontextualized and divorced from the rest of the evidence, specifically referring to the testimonies of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez, Blanca Ester Rojas Zúñiga, Mainor Francisco Castro Jiménez, Fernando Enrique Castro Jiménez, Dagoberto Suárez Araya, Luis Alberto Barrientos Mora and Alfredo Ramírez Sandí. She repeats that the plaintiff's acquisition document shows that it is a farm registered in the Public Registry, so the Tribunal's conclusion about good faith is wrong. Although, she affirms, according to Article 286 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt good faith is presumed, but evidence to the contrary is also admitted and when the law requires possession in good faith, a possessor in good faith is considered to be one who, at the time of the act of possession, believed he had the right to possess, but if there was sufficient reason for him to doubt that such a right corresponded to him, he should not be considered in good faith. In this case, she maintains, “there was sufficient reason for him to doubt that such a right corresponded to him, because the signed document indicates that the farm is registered in the Public Registry, but despite this, as the witness SANCHEZ RAMIREZ stated: 'I attest that no study was done at that time in the Registry,' which allows us to establish that if they did not carry out those studies, that is their absolute responsibility and that, on the contrary, they acted with clear and evident bad faith.” She says the Tribunal did not weigh the evidence, which the first-instance judge did; she transcribes a long segment of that judgment. Immediately following, she maintains, “From the analysis set forth, we can determine that the first-instance judge is correct when carrying out the same analysis, because she does say, in a clear and concrete way, what probative value she assigns to each of those probative elements and also sets forth the reasons why she does so. The TRIBUNAL does not do it that way,” it merely conforms with a “very lax analysis of the testimonies and that violates the duty to provide reasons.” She emphasizes that the A quo analyzed the documentary evidence, dedicating a section to it; something the Tribunal did not do, but instead, in an excessively summarized manner, attempts to grant value without expressing reasons. She emphasizes that for the first-instance judgment, the “plaintiff’s possession is not protectable, because he does not possess a just title nor a transfer title and there is also no good faith, a conclusion reached after meticulously analyzing the testimonial and documentary probative elements. Contrary to the duty to provide reasons, the TRIBUNAL did not provide any grounding for the appealed judgment, it does not refer specifically or in detail as to why another probative value should be granted to these elements of proof, nor does it carry out a relation of all the probative elements among themselves, to evaluate them as a community.” She maintains that she has been the victim of a dispossession of her property, under the protection of “false documents that cannot even be registered in the Public Registry (they were not even filed, contrary to the company’s acquisition via contribution through its filing in 1986),” for which she has the right to recover that farm “even if there are third-party purchasers in good faith, something that does not happen in the present case, because the plaintiff (…) intentionally and directly evaded trusting in the registry publicity that showed him that the person selling to him did not have the right to sell.” This, she continues, does not imply ignoring third parties in good faith, as they have the mechanisms provided for in civil legislation to claim from the seller the guarantee or the payment of damages. She reiterates that since 1986 it has been publicized that the property was contributed at its constitution. She continues, “In this case, the transparency of a transaction is very dubious, in which one acquires a registered property without even carrying out the corresponding studies. The protection of third-party purchasers in good faith, in the terms sought by the plaintiff, implies dispossessing the legitimate owner of the property that belongs to him. Such a solution is, without any doubt, excessive, disproportionate, and, finally, unjust. The importance of registry publicity and its principles cannot prevail over the right of the first victim—the legitimate owner, originally dispossessed in a fraudulent manner—to maintain full ownership of his property or, in any case, the right to be restored to its enjoyment.” She concludes that an acquisition a non domino cannot become a screen for legitimizing criminal acts and become an obstacle for the true dispossessed owner to recover the property.

XVIII.The grievance constitutes a mixture of arguments that, by itself, due to lack of precision, imposes its denial. Thus, on one hand, she dedicates herself to affirming that the analysis of the evidence by the Trial Court is correct, but not the one carried out by the Tribunal. That is, she concentrates on directly contrasting the rulings, to then affirm that the Tribunal incurred in a failure of its duty to provide reasons. A complaint that, as already indicated, constitutes a procedural defect that, although it falls upon the ruling, the truth is it does not constitute a ground for cassation (casación) in accordance with Article 594 of the CPC, whose supplementary application is established by Article 452 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, the appellant reiterates what was argued in the previous defect in the sense that, as the farm was registered in the Public Registry, the plaintiff could not acquire by usucapion because that registration by itself eliminates the plaintiff's good faith. Refer to what was indicated regarding the preceding grievance in the sense that the fact that the farm was registered in the Public Registry in the name of Oscar Soto determines that the deed of March 4, 1988, constitutes the title transferring ownership a non domino in the terms of Article 853 of the Civil Code; likewise, it is the criterion of this Chamber that, contrary to what she says, far from breaking the good faith presumed for the plaintiff, it reinforces it, because precisely the plaintiff believed that the person selling to him had the right to do so according to what the Public Registry of Property indicated. Thus, Article 285 establishes: “In all cases in which the law requires possession in good faith, a possessor in good faith is considered to be one who, at the time of taking possession, believed he had the right to possess.” The norm continues: “If there was sufficient reason for him to doubt that such a right corresponded to him, he cannot be considered in good faith”; this Chamber does not find that it was demonstrated that in 1988, Mr. Octaviano had reason to doubt that, upon acquiring the farm from who appeared in the Registry as owner, he would not have been entitled to exercise possession as an attribute of ownership (domino). The public registry faith supports a good faith that was not undermined. The mandate continues; “but if the possession was in good faith at its beginning, it does not lose that character by the mere fact that the possessor subsequently doubts the legitimacy of his right. Possession ceases to be in good faith at the moment of acquiring certainty that one possesses improperly, and it also ceases from the notification of the lawsuit in which another claims the right to possess”; this Chamber does not observe that, when faced with a title in which Oscar Soto appeared in 1988, as owner according to the Registry, it can be concluded with total certainty that, once the ownership of La Florida S.R.L. over the farm was registered in the Registry in 1994, not even having knowledge of this registration, Mr. Octaviano González acquired certainty that he possessed the property improperly; he had had about 6 years since he bought it when La Florida's ownership was registered in the Registry, and it was not demonstrated that, between that purchase in 1988 and the filing of this matter, that is, about 17 years, the company attempted any action against him. He may have doubted, but mere doubt would not have diminished his good faith. Additionally, the complaint itself is also confusing, because, on one hand, she says that the plaintiff is not a third-party purchaser in good faith because he could verify that the person selling to him had no right to do so, about which—it is repeated—she does not identify in which evidence it appears that this information was annotated or registered on the farm, but rather seems to deduce it from the filing of its constitution to the Public Registry itself, a fact which by itself clearly does not constitute publicity because its registration in the Registry of Legal Persons and the granting of an identification number does not publicize the transfer of a property (these are different registries). But at the same time, she makes it appear that as a purchaser in good faith, the plaintiff could well have claimed damages and the improvements he introduced to the property from Mr. Oscar Soto. That is, on one hand, she recognizes that Mr. Octaviano purchased protected by the Registry; but on the other, she affirms that the Registry recorded other information, so—it would be understood, she alleges—he was not protected by the Registry. For all these reasons, the complaint will be dismissed.

XIX.Fifth. She claims an “incorrect application of a non domino acquisition.” She says the Tribunal made an effort to legitimize the document contributed by the plaintiff as a title transferring ownership, for which it resorted to the figure of acquisition a non domino, thereby distorting its prerequisites. She explains what real estate fraud consists of—in her opinion. She asserts that for the acquisition a non domino of a property to occur, the following fundamental requirements must concur jointly: a) that the acquirer has the status of a third party, b) that he has acquired his right for valuable consideration, in good faith, and from a person who, according to the Property Registry, has the faculties to transmit it, and, c) that he has also registered his acquisition. These prerequisites are not met in this process.

It criticizes, "acquisition a non domino is not a valid or suitable instrument to validate the document in question, but rather a mode of acquiring ownership (dominio) as such"; furthermore, the facts in this matter do not fit with this figure, because "the transferable title (título traslativo), as such in agrarian law, should not be understood as a document, but as an acquisitive cause and which can become possession (posesión) itself." It continues, "the plaintiff raises a legal problem related to positive prescription or usucapion (prescripción positiva o usucapión) and not about acquisition a non domino. In application of substantive law, the TRIBUNAL resolves by indicating that in what refers to the title, acquisition a non domino exists, when the just title (justo título) is only one of the requirements demanded by agrarian law for usucapion and, in addition, just title must be understood as a lawful or acquisitive cause constituted by the mere fact of possessing. This being so, the TRIBUNAL cannot validate the transferable title by adducing that acquisition a non domino exists, because it is one thing for acquisition a non domino to exist and another thing for the transferable title to exist or be lawful." It maintains that the document presented by the plaintiff does not prove the acquisition a non domino because it is a deed that was never filed with the Registry, so that on that basis it does not configure "the acquirer a non domino [who] can claim that their acquisition is certain, from someone who apparently had the right to alienate, even though that right is resolved or annulled" as provided by Article 456 of the Civil Code. It reiterates, on the contrary, it was proven that the farm (finca) has been registered since 1974 and that it was contributed upon its incorporation on March 26, 1985, presented to the Daily of the Mercantile Registry in the year 1986, and subsequently registered in volume 352, entry 15789 on September 3, 1994; therefore, the purchase-sale deed between the plaintiff and Oscar Soto of March 4, 1988, never presented or registered, cannot have the capacity to displace the primacy of its prior real right (derecho real) "which, by effects of registry publicity (publicidad registral) and successive tract (tracto sucesivo), had already been noted since the year 1986 informing the parties and the public in general, that Oscar Soto had already alienated the property by contributing it to a family company." It cites precept 455 of the Civil Code, by which titles subject to registration do not harm a third party except from the date of their presentation, and reaffirms that the deed by which the farm was contributed to it was presented to the Registry since the year 1986. It introduces an extensive citation of what it identifies as resolution 1-1999 of this Chamber, and then asserts, "Stated another way, the TRIBUNAL incurs a serious error in the application of substantive law because it takes the application of acquisition a non domino to other dimensions, dimensions that are very dangerous, because they cause the order established by law to fail regarding the real assumptions that must exist for the application of true acquisition a non domino as well as the absolute and harmful omission of the principles of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and certainty provided by registration and registry publicity, as well as the supremacy of real rights contained in Article 455 of the Civil Code and the erga omnes effectiveness of that same registry publicity." It also asserts that the fact of the plaintiff's possession is not true because it (the company) disposed of the asset prior to this proceeding with the constitution of mortgage encumbrances (gravámenes hipotecarios), thus in the year 2004, which it had to resort to in order to finance the proceedings filed against it by Mr. Oscar Soto and Mr. Octaviano González (it transcribes the information it says appears in the Registry). Hence, it says, "the supposed possession of the plaintiff is merely circumstantial, an act of bad faith inherited from the problems that have existed between Oscar Soto and the company." It highlights that the Tribunal should have resolved on what was requested, that is, on the usucapion, determining whether the document provided by the plaintiff was or was not a just title or transferable title; which it was not, since it knew it was registered and chose not to carry out the registry studies, in addition to eliminating the presumption of good faith (buena fe) and thus his possession is not protectable, since it was in bad faith, under murky circumstances, thereby losing the right to collect for improvements (mejoras), which should also have been rejected.

**XX.** The grievance is confused, mixing a series of themes without a clear direction. Thus, it raises 4 autonomous ideas. The first, which is a reiteration of previous grievances, is that the Tribunal applies the figure of acquisition a non domino, when the object of the proceeding was usucapion, and that the former is not applicable to the present matter, in which the assumptions for it are not met. The second, the just title in agrarian matters does not constitute a document; if not, possession itself. The third, that its prior real right of ownership "had already been noted since the year 1986 informing the parties and the public in general, that Oscar Soto had already alienated the property." And the fourth, that the plaintiff's possession is not true because it disposed of the asset, thus in 2004 when it imposed mortgage encumbrances on it. Regarding the first aspect, it has already been indicated on the preceding grievances that it is an unheeded argument because precisely the figure of usucapion, as this Chamber has reiterated, requires the transferable title of ownership (título traslativo de dominio) from someone who is not the titleholder or owner. With respect to the second idea, that in agrarian matters the transferable ownership document does not matter, but rather possession, it is also not correct because —as was amply explained— for common agrarian usucapion (usucapión agraria común) the transferable title of ownership is required, without this being confused with the requirements of the special agrarian usucapion (usucapión agraria especial) contemplated in the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which is not the one alleged in this proceeding. Consequently, up to here, in addition to that argumentative mix, neither would its thesis have found support in the jurisprudence of this Court. On the third proposition, in which the cassation appellant insists, now more specifically, that because its incorporation deed was presented in the Mercantile Registry, the plaintiff must have known that Mr. Oscar Soto was not the owner of the property, but rather it was because "it was noted," the following must be said. As already indicated, the Court and the Tribunal did not record that from 1985, 1986, much less in 1988, any annotation was recorded on farm 6-20679 warning the public that the estate had been contributed to a company; nor does the appellant specify concrete evidence that allows for concluding that fact. On the contrary, the company rather again admits that the transaction was carried out by Don Oscar, who despite appearing as the owner in the Public Registry, was not such; all of which precisely configures the transferable title of ownership a non domino that the Tribunal found, while excluding the application of precept 455 of the Civil Code in the line adduced by the cassation appellant. Lastly, insofar as it adds, on the other hand, a questioning of the plaintiff's possession, because it mortgaged the farm prior to this proceeding, the argument is incomprehensible to this Chamber, because it seems to forget that possession is in itself a fact, which in this case was verified starting in 1988 and occurred for more than 10 years, without it alleging non-existence or denying this particular fact (immediate possession). The constitution and registration of a mortgage guarantee does not contradict the possessory fact of the plaintiff. That kind of disposition of the asset was enabled by the registry title (titularidad registral) it has enjoyed since 1994, but implied nothing regarding the immediate possession exercised by the plaintiff. Therefore, the grievance will also be rejected.

**XXI. Sixth.** It argues "failure to apply the assumptions of the reivindication action (acción reivindicatoria)" with which it omits the application of canon 45 of the Political Constitution. It states that possession is only an attribute of ownership; for possession to give rise to the right of property it must meet all the requirements demanded by the legal system for it to operate as a mode of acquiring ownership, which corresponds to acquisitive prescription (prescripción adquisitiva), "which is a mode of acquiring ownership of the things of others by having possessed them for a certain period, and with the concurrence of the other legal requisites known to all such as just title, uninterruptedly, as owner and in good faith, for a minimum space of ten years." It is unthinkable, it expresses, that "a person like the plaintiff can access the right of property when in the case another holds that right and the former does not meet all the requirements for usucapion. This being so, the TRIBUNAL incurs in failure to apply the substantive law, by rejecting what was requested in the counterclaim." It repeats, "our right of property obliges us to the corresponding registration in the Public Registry, a fact which we managed to publicize with the contribution made to the company since the year 1986 and for this reason, the TRIBUNAL cannot come to decimate our rights fully guaranteed at the constitutional and legal level, validating a rickety acquisition embodied in a questioned document that according to the law does not even have the power to produce legal effects before third parties since it was never filed with the Public Registry." It highlights that its right of property is inviolable, imprescriptible according to Article 320 of the Civil Code. It insists that the plaintiff lacks the requirements of just title and good faith, and therefore cannot access ownership. It cites as violated also precepts 316, 317, 318, and 321 of the same legal body, because it does not recognize its right to claim in court the thing that is the object of its property, the free enjoyment of each and every one of the rights that property comprises, its "right as possessors of the property (attribute of ownership)" and to claim its possession, its right to be restored in possession. It adds, "the sentence incurs in failure of its duty to apply the right we have to proceed with the reivindication action (sic) against the one who possessed in bad faith and has ceased possessing." It refers that the plaintiff does not meet the subjective conditions to be considered an agrarian possessor (poseedor agrario) "since with the same evidentiary elements gathered in the proceeding, it is established that the plaintiff owns other properties, that he does not even live on this property, so it is clear that he lacks the principle of inmanence (inmanencia), which would be a pure and simple fact very important to consider, because in that sense the plaintiff is not an agricultural producer or of agricultural activities by connection as a means of subsistence, he lacks inmanence that allows him to be obligatorily, socially, and solidarily linked with the estate, therefore, it is not true that there exists social justification in the execution of the acts of possession that the plaintiff comes to claim. Note that there is talk of maintenance of fences, there is no talk of a true agricultural production, nor is there talk that the plaintiff or his family depends economically on that production. The witnesses come to establish that the plaintiff is a great livestock businessman, not a subsistence farmer, and that the supposed possession he carries out is through other persons, it is not even him, therefore, it is ruled out that he is an agrarian possessor who meets the subjective requirements for usucapion." It adds that the judicial inspection was preterited by the Tribunal; "these inattentions generate a result as terrible as the one obtained in the appealed ruling, in this way, nothing good leads to keeping the TRIBUNAL's ruling unscathed, when what it deserves is to be annulled." **XXII.** Once again the cassation appellant mixes a series of ideas or themes it exposes without greater structure, and which finally would have to receive autonomous treatment or at least be clearly concatenated. This lack of precision determines by itself the dismissal of this charge. Aside from the foregoing, insofar as a core argument can be extracted, which is that the plaintiff did not acquire ownership by usucapion, for which it concludes that the reivindicatory claim of its counterclaim must then be granted, it is warned that such premise is incorrect. According to what was determined by the Tribunal, which the cassation appellant did not manage to break in the preceding grievances, Mr. Octaviano did acquire the right of ownership over the real property because he has a transferable title of ownership that a non domino extended to him, he exercised possession for more than 10 years as owner, in a public, peaceful, and continuous manner, and the good faith he is presumed to have was not disproved in this proceeding. Consequently, since its premise is erroneous, the conclusion is also; that is, the Tribunal did not incur in an infraction of constitutional mandate 45 nor of the legal norms of reivindication. Insofar as it expresses disagreement with the acceptance of the usucapion by estimating that the plaintiff's possession is not "agrarian possession (posesión agraria)"; it is pointed out that the qualification of "agrarian" was of interest for the effects of the competent jurisdiction to resolve this controversy, but not in regard to the acceptance of the usucapion claim that was requested, since it was the common one. What matters is that the possession was proven, it could well be labeled as agrarian or of another class, but possession finally. The production of subsistence for his family, to which the cassation appellant refers, is of interest for the effects of the special agrarian usucapion of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización (which was not the one petitioned), without these being determining aspects in civil usucapion and in common agrarian usucapion. In any case, it is incomprehensible that the cassation appellant denies the classification of agrarian to the possession, while qualifying the plaintiff as a livestock businessman. Agrarian character (agrariedad) is not only found in the planting of crops for personal and family consumption, as the company seems to understand. Finally, regarding the insistently alleged publicity of the contribution of the farm in 1985, refer to what was said in the preceding considering clauses in the sense that the presentation to the Public Registry of the incorporation deed by itself does not grant publicity; this is configured with the registration or, at least, the marginal annotation on the farm itself. The constitution of the legal entity by itself did not alert the public that a transmission of the property right over the real estate had occurred. Thus, for what has been said, this censure will be dismissed.

**XXIII. Seventh.** It argues "scant reasoning regarding the imposition of costs (costas) of the claim and counterclaim on this party." It describes that the Tribunal estimated that the claim should be declared with merit; however, it did not ground the reason why it condemned it to pay the costs of the claim and counterclaim. It adds, it also failed in its duty to ground the reasons for which it declared its counterclaim without merit. It maintains, in accordance with the legal system, exoneration from the payment of costs is permitted when the party has litigated with evident good faith; which, it says, it proved because it claims the land that Oscar Soto voluntarily contributed to it. It continues, "In any case, the analysis of the substantive question carried out contains grave errors of fact and of law derived from granting probative value to certain evidentiary elements that are in reality the product of their incorrect analysis, as well as it disdained to grant them the true probative value they have; furthermore, it omitted to give content and value to a large quantity of evidentiary elements that demonstrate the existence of the merit to declare the action for reivindication with merit and the action for usucapion without merit, all of which stands as the correct response to the inappropriate refusal of the appealed Tribunal to analyze the evidence as the legal system establishes." It adds, the Tribunal opted for "incorrectly applying the maximum sanction of condemnation to the payment of costs contained in Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)," without noticing that it had sufficient reason to litigate, because the plaintiff admitted that the farm was registered so he did not have good faith. It points out that the Tribunal cannot ignore that it "has sufficient right to claim, since the farm is registered in its favor." It insists, the plaintiff wove a picture in which he appears as the sole possessor, but evidentiary elements exist "that prove the acts of disposition," for which "it erred in not adequately justifying the decision adopted regarding costs." It also mentions canons 54 and 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria and 222 of the CPC. It transcribes the subsection of the appealed ruling on costs and repeats it does not meet the duty to ground.

**XXIV.** As indicated, the lack of reasoning, which is now accused regarding the pronouncement on costs, does not constitute a cassation ground according to those provided in mandate 594 of the CPC. Therefore, from the procedural perspective, the grievance will be denied. Insofar as it complains about the condemnation itself, the appellant is not clear; it seems it justifies its good faith in litigating or sufficient reason to litigate because —it insists— it was correct in its defenses and claims, to which the Tribunal did not accede due to the supposed improper valuation of the evidence and incorrect application of the law. In this way, it again starts from an erroneous premise, since it was not correct with the preceding recriminations. In this order, since such premise is not verified, one could not arrive at the conclusion it exhibits, which in any case would have been incompatible, since had it achieved a decision of the matter in its favor, the imposition of costs would have fallen on its losing counterpart, except for exoneration. And in that case it would have been useless to enter into examining the "good faith" or "sufficient reason to litigate" of the winning party. Aside from the foregoing, no element is observed from its exposition of the grievance by which it can be considered it is within the exoneration assumption contemplated by precept 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria (which is the norm pertaining to its claim), that is, litigation in good faith for having sufficient reason to litigate. It has long been pointed out that this hypothesis of sufficient reason to litigate does not consist of the mere conviction in the thesis one supports, but that necessarily the conviction in one's own thesis must respond to objective data of the proceeding that allow for deducing the soundness of its claims or defenses; as objective data of the proceeding, the subtlety in the "legal question" has been identified, which consists, for example, in that what is discussed is based on a pure interpretation of the legal norms as the factual framework is not controverted (in this sense resolution 222-F-S1-2019).

Consequently, for all the reasons noted, the appellant is incorrect.

**Cassation appeal of the defendant-counterclaimant Oscar Soto Jiménez** **XXV.** **First**. He alleges improper evidentiary assessment. He cites canons 38(b) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, 341 of the Código Procesal Civil, and 853 of the Código Civil. He maintains that the Tribunal erred in evaluating facts 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint and the testimony of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez, the plaintiff’s spouse. He details that in facts 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint (which he transcribes), the plaintiff confesses and admits to having known prior to 1988—which is the date the Tribunal determined the period for usucapion began—that “legal problems existed.” He alleges that these constitute a spontaneous confession that he had knowledge of the real situation of the farm and the existing family conflicts. Furthermore, his wife also confirmed this by admitting that both Franklin (the company’s representative) and he had told him that they could not work the farm. From that statement, he transcribes: “the following is of interest [.-] ‘(...) When Octaviano bought the farm from Ronulfo, no document was signed, he (sic) bought it verbally. I do not know how much Octaviano paid for the farm to Ronulfo. As far as I know, Mr. Ronulfo sold the farm to Octaviano, Octanio (sic) took responsibility for the farm and he worked it. Ever since I have known the farm, I have only seen it worked by Mr. Oscar, and by Mr. Ronulfo, and now by Mr. Octanio. (sic) After Octaviano acquired it, I never saw Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar work the farm, never, since Octaviano acquired the farm Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar told Mr. Octaniano that he could not work the farm.’ (emphasis added) (see statement on folios 1439 to 1440).” He explains that the discussion revolved around the date of acquisition of the farm; the plaintiff party stated they acquired it in 1984 by purchase from his brother Ronulfo, not Oscar Soto; but “why (sic)—even though he could not have proven having acquired it on that date—did the plaintiff party insist on indicating their purchase date as the year 1984 and not 1988, which is the year of the purchase-sale executed before a notary public? (sic) Precisely because it is from the year 1985 onwards when the transfer of the property to the company La Florida S.R.L. occurred, and indeed, as is proven in the facts of the plaintiff party’s complaint, as well as the testimony of the witness—(sic) his wife—Alicia Sánchez, that prior to the year 1988, he already knew of the litigious situation of the property.” He continues, since he knew of that litigious legal situation prior to purchasing the farm, that purchase does not meet one of the essential requirements of possession, which is good faith.

**XXVI.** At folio 1465, it is read that, contrary to what the appellant stated, the witness Alicia Sánchez Ramírez declared: “After Octaviano acquired it, I never saw Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar work the farm. Never, since Octaniano (sic) acquired the farm, Mr. Franklin or Mr. scar (sic), told Octanio (sic) that he could not work the farm” (underlining and bold added). On the other hand, it is observed in the complaint that Mr. Octaviano González related in facts 3 and 4 that Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez verbally sold farm 6-20679 to his brother Ronulfo González Vega in 1981, from which point his brother entered into possession; that approximately in 1984, he (Octaviano) also verbally acquired said farm from his brother, from which point he has been in possession of it, which he has maintained since then, totaling 21 years, to which are added the years his brother possessed it, for a total of 24 years of possession. During this time, he said, he has not been disturbed by any person. In facts 5, 6, and 7, he stated that Mr. Oscar Soto, “registered owner of the farm,” and he formalized the purchase-sale by public deed dated March 4, 1988, before the notary public Olivier Rojas Fernández, number 40 of volume 11 of the protocol; which was not recorded in the Public Registry because “Oscar Soto Jiménez himself had contributed it to a company formed with his relatives prior to the sale he made to me,” a company whose name is La Florida S.R.L. and whose formation dates from March 26, 1985. These actions, he said, both the contribution to the company and the sale may be vitiated by nullity, but “they in no way affect nor have affected” the possession he has exercised for more than 20 years without being disturbed by anyone. From the narration of these facts in the complaint, what can be extracted is that he affirmed he bought the property from the registered owner Oscar Soto and that when that deed was submitted to the Public Registry, it was rejected because the farm was then in the name of La Florida, but he did not even specify on what date that purchase-sale deed was submitted to the Public Registry. It cannot be extracted that he stated, with the value of a confession, that on March 4, 1988, he became aware that the appellant had contributed the farm to La Florida in 1985. Furthermore, although the plaintiff stated that he had bought from his brother Ronulfo in 1984, at which time he entered into possession, and that he formalized that sale with Oscar Soto, “registered owner of the farm,” in 1988, the truth is that the lower court and the appellate court found the plaintiff’s possession to be proven as of the 1988 deed; but they also demonstrated that Mr. Oscar Soto acknowledged that he had sold to Ronulfo, although not in 1981, but in 1988. The witnesses Alicia Sánchez and Blanca Ester Rojas, the plaintiff’s wife and sister-in-law, stated they knew about that negotiation between Ronulfo and Octaviano (folios 1462 to 1463 and 1465 to 1466). This Chamber verified that the co-defendant Oscar Soto himself admitted and reiterated in his briefs contesting the complaint and counterclaim, although with a date of 1988 (folios 120 to 135), hence the Court found that circumstance to be proven. Therefore, from all of this, what is deduced is that even though the plaintiff’s theory was that his possessory conduct regarding the farm began in 1984 and that Oscar Soto was the registered owner, he stated this with respect to his brother Ronulfo, never in relation to the company; and, moreover, that among the three—Oscar, Ronulfo, and Octaviano—there was a will to transfer the farm, all in 1988 (according to the date set by the Court and confirmed by the Tribunal), for which reason the plaintiff believed there was a successive chain of title. It cannot be deduced that Octaviano González knew that the current appellant, Mr. Oscar Soto, had previously contributed that farm to a company. This being the case, contrary to what was stated by the appellant, from the facts of the complaint and the testimony, it cannot be held that Octaviano González knew that before 1988 “legal problems” or family problems existed regarding the farm; even less that he knew punctually that the farm had been transferred upon the formation of La Florida S.R.L. (which would be the fact of actual importance), since—it is repeated from the consideration regarding the company’s appeal—it was not demonstrated that in 1988 and previously, the Public Registry of Property contained even an annotation regarding the contribution of the property to La Florida. Ergo, the complaint is inadmissible.

**XXVII.** **Second**. He alleges improper application of mandates 455 and 853 of the Código Civil. He claims the Tribunal erred in considering that usucapion operated in this case upon finding “the existence of a ‘non domino’ transfer of ownership title (título traslativo de dominio a non domino).” He states the transfer he made to Octaviano in the year 1988 is not a non domino transfer, since he was the registered owner of the property at that time. Therefore, he continues, usucapion is not applicable since one of the essential requirements set forth in article 853 of the Código Civil is not met, which is that the transfer of ownership title must be, according to jurisprudence, a non domino, and not from the registered owner. He explains, “The dilemma with the effective registration transfer of that property occurred due to an event that happened years earlier (1985), (sic) in which the undersigned—through deception—did not have control of the situation, given that the Limited Liability Company La Florida was formed, to which I transferred, as a contribution, the property subject to this litigation, which is why when Octaviano tried to submit the deed to the Public Registry, he could not register it because there was a prior record in the Property Registry, and following the maxim first in time, first in right, the first one prevailed, which was finally registered in the name of the company La Florida S.R.L. in the year 1994.” **XXVIII.** The statements of the appellant Soto surprise this Chamber. The discrepancy between the registry information and reality is a fact that only he, as a party to the contract he signed in a public deed in 1988, was aware of; it was not proven that it was known to the plaintiff. He contributed the property upon the formation of La Florida S.R.L. in 1985, and therefore, he undoubtedly knew he was not the owner of that property from that point on and that he did not have the capacity to dispose of it, as he did. Without being the titleholder of the domain over the farm, he sold it to Mr. Octaviano González. It is therefore incomprehensible that, leveraging the ownership the Public Registry of Property exhibited in 1988, without being the owner, he now alleges he was the true titleholder and, based on that false appearance, intends to prevent the plaintiff's usucapion. The fact that the Public Registry did not record the true ownership of the property in 1988 does not mean that he was the true owner (verus domino). It is undeniable that the transfer of ownership title held by the plaintiff originated from a non domino, the appellant himself. Thus, it is appropriate to dismiss this grievance.

**XXIX.** Consequently, it will be appropriate to declare both cassation appeals without merit. The appealed judgment will be confirmed in what was the subject of these.

**POR TANTO** Both cassation appeals filed are declared without merit; in the appealed portion, the appealed judgment is confirmed.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Rocío Rojas Morales** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** **Jorge Alberto López González** **Jéssica Alejandra Jiménez Ramírez** MACUNAQ Likewise, since the appealed judgment was issued prior to the current Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) (Law 9342), according to Transitory Provision II, the hearing and decision of cassation appeals is conducted under the former Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) (Law 7130) (voto 1762-F-2021).

In agrarian matters, according to precept 61 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), the cassation appeal before this Chamber is governed by Chapter V of Title VII of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), whose canon 559—with the wording prior to the reform effected through Law 9343—established its outright rejection when the correction, replacement, or execution of procedural steps was requested. Therefore, this appeal only proceeded for substantive defects. However, since judgment 583-2004, this Chamber has admitted the examination of procedural defects when they directly affect the judgment, with inconsistency and reformatio in peius (reforma en perjuicio) being admissible; as well as claims for deficiency in the composition of the litis, due to its impact on the effectiveness of the ruling and because it is a prerequisite of every procedural relationship. See resolutions 971-2011, 691-2012, 1513-2012, 1425-2013, 29-2015, and 2039-2019. Consequently, neither the lack of proper reasoning nor the resolution in a single instance, which is what is alleged, are among the grounds provided (mandate 594 Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)) (voto 1762-F-2021).

In the specific case, the main claim for adverse possession (usucapión) having been granted in favor of the plaintiff, it was consequently not appropriate to grant his subsidiary claim for the payment of improvements (mejoras). Therefore, the grievances in the appeal that challenged the upholding of that subsidiary petition became moot (voto 1762-F-2021).

Analysis of the concurrent requirements (inadmissible if one is lacking) for common agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria), specifically, a suitable thing (cosa hábil), susceptible to private property, located within the commerce of men, a just title translative of ownership (justo título traslativo de dominio), good faith (buena fe), and possession (posesión) (agrarian possessory acts or farming, livestock, beekeeping activities, among others) exercised in the capacity of owner, continuously, publicly, peacefully, and for 10 years or more (rules 279, 281, 853, 854, 856, 860, and 869 Civil Code (Código Civil)) (see resolutions 19-1993, 45-1996, 4-1998, 50-1998, 95-1998, 1-1999, 821-2000, 856-2000, 920-2000, 320-2001, 178-2007, 536-2007, 891-2007, 1196-2013, 114-2016, and 945-2018 of the First Chamber); as well as its distinction from special agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria especial) (mandates 92 and 101 Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización)). Adverse possession operates when the title of transfer or acquisition is a non domino, from one who is not the owner, but not when it is a domino or a verus domino, that is, when it emanates from the true owner, because in this case, if the title is perfect, it immediately produces all its effects. According to what was determined by the Tribunal, which the appellant could not break in her grievances, the plaintiff did acquire the right of ownership (derecho de dominio) over the property, since he has a title translative of ownership granted to him by a non domino, he exercised possession for more than 10 years in the capacity of owner, publicly, peacefully, and continuously, and the good faith presumed in his favor was not rebutted in this proceeding (voto 1762-F-2021).

The main claim of the counterclaiming plaintiff required the judges to analyze the just title (justo título), which required examining whether it was issued by the verus domino (true owner) or whether it was a non domino (one who is not the owner). In determining that the purchase-sale document constitutes a sale a non domino, the Tribunal would not have incurred the claimed vice of extra petita; as it was part of the cause of action (causa de pedir) (voto 1762-F-2021).

The presentation to the Public Registry (Registro Público) of the deed of constitution does not, in itself, grant publicity. This is configured with the registration or, at least, the marginal notation on the property (voto 1762-F-2021).

Analysis of the sufficient reason to litigate. See resolution 222-2019 of the First Chamber. The appellant challenges the award of costs (costas). However, she justifies her good faith in litigating or sufficient reason to litigate on the grounds that she was right in her defenses and claims, to which the Tribunal did not agree. In this way, she starts from an erroneous premise, as she did not succeed with the preceding recriminations. Had she achieved a decision in her favor, the imposition of costs would have fallen on her losing counterpart, barring an exemption. And in that case, it would have been useless to examine the "good faith" or "sufficient reason to litigate" of the winning party.

On the other hand, from the exposition of the grievance, no element is observed by which it could be considered that he is under the exemption of precept 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, that is, the litigation being in good faith due to having sufficient grounds to litigate (vote 1762-F-2021)." In ruling 11-2017 of 4:15 p.m. on February 27, 2017, the Civil and Agrarian Court of Puntarenas ordered: "(…) *The exceptions of lack of right and lack of standing in their passive form are upheld, and without specific ruling on the sine actione agit, as it is encompassed by the lack of right. Likewise, the exception of lack of cause is rejected because it is not contemplated within the list of claims indicated by law, and the exception of lack of active standing is rejected because the company La Florida S.R.L. is the registered titleholder, to partially declare* **WITH MERITS** *the ordinary lawsuit of* **OCTAVIANO GONZALEZ VEGA** *against* **LA FLORIDA S.R.L.** *, in the following order: The claim to declare the Institute of Positive Prescription in his favor is rejected. The subsidiary claim is accepted regarding the payment of improvements (mejoras) in favor of the plaintiff, which shall be liquidated during the execution of the judgment, according to the parameters established in recital* **vi. point c)** *. Since the plaintiff is a possessor in good faith, he has a right of retention (derecho de retención) of the property until the company La Florida S.R.L. pays the total amount set for that concept. The plaintiff and the registered owner may terminate the claim granted for improvements (mejoras) by means of a conciliatory settlement. Any omission of a ruling regarding the lawsuit shall be understood as not granted. On the other hand, the exceptions of lack of right and lack of standing in their active and passive forms are upheld, to declare* **WITHOUT MERITS** *in all its aspects the lawsuit filed by Octaviano González Vega against Oscar Soto Jiménez. The exception of lack of right is upheld and the exceptions of negative and positive prescription filed by the defendant/counterclaimant are rejected to declare WITHOUT MERITS in all its aspects the counterclaim of Mr. OSCAR SOTO JIMENEZ against OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA. The exceptions of lack of right and those of prescription in both forms are rejected to partially declare* **WITH MERITS** *the counterclaim filed by* **LA FLORIDA S.R.L.** *against OCTAVIANO* **GONZÁLEZ VEGA.** *Consequently, it is declared that the company LA FLORIDA S.R.L. is the sole and legitimate owner of the property registered in the Province of Puntarenas under number TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE- TRIPLE ZERO. The exception of lack of right is upheld, and as unnecessary, the exception of negative prescription is rejected, and as improper, the exception of positive prescription is rejected, to declare that the registered owner/counterclaimant has no right to claim present and future fruits (frutos), as determined in recital* **vi. letter b)** *. Any omission of a ruling shall be understood as not granted. Because the replevin (reivindicación) of the property has been ordered in favor of the registered titleholder, the* **ABSOLUTE NULLITY** *of deed number forty of notary public Olivier Rojas Fernández, granted on March 4, 1988, in favor of the plaintiff, is declared; as it is contrary to the provisions of article 836 of the Civil Code, given that the transferor had performed a prior liberatory act in favor of another legal entity over the same object, and consequently, the request for a declaration of absolute nullity requested by the defendant is admitted, in accordance with article 837 of the Civil Code. Once the judgment becomes final, issue the respective cancellation order (mandamiento de cancelación) to the Registry. The notation of the court order for the annotation of the lawsuit (mandamiento de anotación de demanda) shall remain recorded until the registered owner pays the amounts for improvements (mejoras) to be liquidated during the execution of the judgment.* **Personal and procedural costs** *: In accordance with the merits of the case records and article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is declared without special ruling on costs*".

In resolution 336-F-18 of 4:30 p.m. on April 20, 2018, the Agrarian Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José ordered: "*Regarding the appeal filed by the plaintiff Octaviano González Vega, the appealed judgment is REVOKED. In its place, it is resolved: Regarding the LAWSUIT, the exceptions of lack of right, lack of active and passive standing, as well as lack of cause, filed by the defendants regarding the principal claim, are rejected.* **1.** *- The lawsuit for positive prescription (prescripción positiva) filed by OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA against LA FLORIDA S.R.L. and Oscar Soto Jiménez is accepted, concerning the property which he has possessed for more than ten years, in a public, peaceful, uninterrupted manner and in good faith, which is the property registered in the Canton (Partido) of Puntarenas, under the real folio registration number* **twenty thousand six hundred seventy-nine-zero zero zero** *, (located in district 5 of Paquera, canton 01 of the province of Puntarenas),* (sic) *with the boundaries, measurements, and nature indicated by the Public Registry.* **2.** *- The cancellation of the registered title of the previous owner, La Florida S.R.L., is ordered, and it shall be registered in the name of Octaviano González Vega, of legal age, married once, farmer and cattle rancher, resident of Concepción de Naranjo, identity card number nine-zero nineteen-three hundred ninety, which shall be ordered in the executory order (ejecutoria) to the Public Registry of Property, once this ruling becomes final, and any other annotation found to be expired or prescribed must be dispensed with, in accordance with the provisions of articles 853 of the Civil Code, in relation to 471 of the same. Once this judgment becomes final, the lower court shall issue the corresponding executory order (ejecutoria) to the Public Registry of Property.* **REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM,** *the ruling is revoked: The exceptions filed by Octaviano González Vega of lack of right and prescription (in its positive and negative forms) are upheld, in accordance with the provisions of articles 851 to 855 of the Civil Code, to instead declare WITHOUT MERITS, in all its aspects, the counterclaim filed by LA FLORIDA S.R.L. and Oscar Soto Jiménez. In accordance with the foregoing, under articles 54 and 55 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, having the plaintiff prevailed on his claims regarding the lawsuit, and on his exceptions regarding the counterclaim, it is appropriate to revoke the ruling on costs, to instead, order the co-defendants/counterclaimants to pay both costs of this proceeding, both personal and procedural*".

In resolution 400-A-18 of 4:40 p.m. on 2018, the Tribunal ordered: "*The request for clarification and addition is rejected. The purely material error in the operative part of judgment No. 336-F-18 of the Agrarian Tribunal is corrected, so that regarding the counterclaim, instead of the phrase '...to instead WITHOUT MERITS', it shall read, '...to instead* **declare WITHOUT MERITS** *, in all its aspects, the counterclaim filed...'. This interlocutory ruling is declared final*".

**VI.** Dissatisfied, La Florida S.R.L. and Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez filed separate cassation appeals (recursos de casación), which were admitted by this Chamber. The company raises 7 grievances (the last of which concerns—at its core—the imposed costs). For his part, Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez presents 2 grievances. Prior to the specific examination of the complaints, it should be noted that, as indicated in the admission order, in the present matter, the scheduling of the evidentiary hearing occurred before the entry into force of the amendment to the Code of Labor Law (Código de Trabajo), effected via Ley 9343, Reforma Procesal Laboral, of January 25, 2016, which became effective as of July 25, 2017. Therefore, in accordance with Transitory Provision I, subsection 2) of that legal body, this constitutes a case of exception to its application, so the decision is made according to the previous wording of that codification. Likewise, it is noted that since the appealed judgment was issued prior to the current Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), Ley 9342, according to Transitory Provision II, the hearing and decision of the cassation appeals is performed in accordance with the former Code of Civil Procedure, Ley 7130, hereinafter referred to as the CPC.

**Cassation appeal of the defendant/counterclaimant company** **VII.** La Florida S.R.L., as summarized below, raised 2 grievances of a procedural nature. In agrarian matters, according to precept 61 of Ley 6734 de Jurisdicción Agraria of March 29, 1982, the appeal before this Chamber is governed by chapter V of title VII of the Code of Labor Law, whose canon 559—as indicated, with the wording prior to the amendment effected via Ley 9343—established the outright rejection of that appeal in which the correction, reversal, or execution of procedural acts (trámites procesales) was requested. Based on this rule, this Chamber previously held the criterion that in this matter the cassation appeal was only available for substantive defects. However, since judgment 583-2004 of July 14, 2004, this Chamber has admitted the examination of procedural defects when they fall directly upon the judgment; excluding those that fall upon the procedural process (iter procesal), which are those expressly excluded by precept 559 of the Code of Labor Law insofar as it refers to "procedural acts (trámites procesales)". In this regard, it has been sustained, the regulation of the grounds contained in mandate 594 of the CPC must be followed, by express referral of article 452 of the Code of Labor Law. In this vein, it has been accepted that in agrarian matters, the procedural errors of incongruence and reformation in pejus (reforma en perjuicio) are admissible. Claims for deficiency in the composition of the litigation (litis) have also been admitted, due to its impact on the effectiveness of the ruling and because it is a prerequisite of any procedural relationship. In this sense, among many others, resolutions 971-F-S1-2011, 691-F-S1-2012, 1513-F-S1-2012, 1425-F-S1-2013, 29-F-S1-2015, and 2039-F-S1-2019 can be consulted. For this reason, the analysis of the defects of form raised by the appellant proceeds.

**VIII.** **First**. La Florida S.R.L. censures that "*the judgment is scarcely reasoned and violates the right to a double instance*". It states that it appealed the lower court's ruling only regarding the granting to the plaintiff of the payment for improvements (mejoras) introduced to the property and a right of retention. However, the Tribunal only heard the plaintiff's appeal and, regarding its own, ruled it would not hear it as unnecessary; which—it argues—is contrary to the duty to provide reasoning, to article 155 of the CPC, to the right to a double instance, and to due process. The Tribunal, it denounces, declined its obligation to resolve; it disregarded the challenge action of one of the parties and preferred that of the other, without indicating the reasons for its dismissal, "*we must suppose, and only suppose, that the ruling issued by the TRIBUNAL sufficed in itself to reject our appeal, which is unheard of, because the TRIBUNAL would be resolving the case in a single instance*".

**IX.** Given that for procedural defects falling upon the judgment, one must resort to mandate 594 of the CPC, it is clear that neither the lack of reasoning nor the resolution in a single instance, which is what the company accuses, are among the grounds provided. Therefore, the grievance will be denied. In any case, the appellant is made aware that the Tribunal stated it would not hear the grievances related to the payment of improvements (mejoras) because it was unnecessary; and this is clear to this Chamber because the payment of improvements (mejoras) was one of the aspects that, upon accepting the appeal of the plaintiff/counter-defendant, was revoked. The principal claim of usucapion (usucapión) having been granted in favor of Mr. Octaviano González Vega; consequently, the acceptance of the claim of this same subject consisting of the payment of improvements (mejoras), which was subsidiary, could not proceed nor be maintained. Therefore, the grievances of his appeal challenging the estimation of that subsidiary request of the plaintiff became moot, as such acceptance no longer existed. Ergo, the censure will be denied.

**X.** **Second**. The company denounces the defect of incongruence, for granting "*something that was never requested* (sic) *(extra petita)*" in violation of article 155 of the CPC. It transcribes the plaintiff's claim in which he requests the declaration of acquisitive usucapion (usucapión adquisitiva) of the property. That, it says, was what the plaintiff requested; however, the Tribunal unilaterally granted a mode of acquisition of ownership (dominio) that was not requested, which is acquisition a non domino, validating a supposed title of transfer of ownership under the justification that the social function of property allows disregarding the fixing of facts and the parties' claims.

**XI.** In this regard, it is worth noting that this Chamber has repeatedly stated that for **common agrarian usucapion (usucapión agraria común)**, such as that requested in this matter by the plaintiff/counter-defendant, the just title that is required "*must emanate from one who in Law is not the owner. The thing is acquired from another, who behaved as and was reputed as such, without being so; the transferor is a non-owner, either because they have never held title, or because their right has been extinguished or resolved, or because the one they exhibit is insufficient to produce the transfer; in this last case is, for example, the usufructuary who appears to be transferring the property. The* usucapion operates, consequently, when the title of transmission or acquisition is a non domino, from one who is not the owner*, but not when it is a domino or a verus domino, that is, when it emanates from the true owner, because in this case, if the title is perfect it produces all its effects immediately. And if it has some defect of another nature, because it emanates from the true owner, its validation can be produced by the negative or extinctive prescription (prescripción negativa o extintiva) of the nullity action and not by the acquisitive prescription or usucapion. Regarding the just title, see, from this body, judgment no. 821 of 3:35 p.m. on November 1, 2000, 856 of 3:25 p.m. on November 15, 2000, and 320 of 3:00 p.m. on April 27, 2001*" (emphasis added; as stated in precedent 178-F-S1-2007, similarly in 536-F-2007, and along the same line are also resolutions 891-F-S1-2007 and 945-F-S1-2018). Thus, in the present matter, the principal claim of the plaintiff/counter-defendant imposed upon the adjudicating bodies the analysis of the just title, which required examining whether it was issued by the verus domino or whether it was a non domino. Consequently, when the Tribunal determined that the purchase-sale document of March 4, 1988, constitutes a sale a non domino by Mr. Oscar Soto to Mr. Octaviano González, that body would not have incurred the defect of extra petita alleged; this formed part of the cause of action (causa de pedir).

**XII.** **Third**. La Florida maintains the judgment presents "*contradictory reasoning*". It states that it validates the list of proven and unproven facts from the lower court's judgment, except for proven fact 4, which it suppresses; this reveals a problem of logical structure because if it maintains such circumstances, it cannot validly, by logic, reach conclusions different from those of the lower court. It notes that what the Tribunal did was a decontextualized analysis of the testimony of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez. It only copied and pasted a part of her statement.

Transcribe, the witness further stated: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">"I clarify that I was not there the day Octaviano bought the farm, I found out about that because Octaviano told me. When Ronulfo and Oscar sold this farm they did not do any paperwork, at that time, things were very expensive and they left it for later. It was sometime later that Octaviano's documents were drawn up, but the deed would not go through in the Registry and that is why inquiries began. That document was signed on March 4, 1988, Mr. Olivier Rojas was there and Octaviano, Ronulfo and Oscar were also there... when the deed was executed in Palmares no inquiry was made as to whether the farm was registered because the farm belonged to Mr. Oscar. I am certain that no study was done at that time in the Registry. Inquiries began sometime later as to why the deed would not go through in the Registry.... I do not know (sic) on what date Mr. Olivier submitted the deed for this purchase to the Registry..."</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. From this, it maintains, it is concluded that the plaintiff says he bought the farm from his brother in 1984, that due to his brother's death he decided to do the paperwork with the true owner Oscar in 1988, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">that is, if the plaintiff bought in the year 1984 and only 4 years later opts to do paperwork with the true owner, it is clear that only 4 years after having bought from his brother, he managed to learn that the land was registered, otherwise, what need would there have been to locate Oscar and do paperwork with him? Simply, Oscar is sought out because it is recognized that the property is registered and that the signature of the registered owner (Oscar) was required to register the plaintiff's acquisition, therefore, from the very beginning the plaintiff's good faith is questionable</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. It continues, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">Then, the witness under comment says: "That document was signed on March 4, 1988, Mr. Olivier Rojas was there and Octaviano, Ronulfo and Oscar were also there... when the deed was executed in Palmares no inquiry was made as to whether the farm was registered because the farm belonged to Mr. Oscar..." an assertion that the COURT analyzes in isolation from the general context and abstracted from the totality of the evidentiary record in the proceeding, in the first place, if the three individuals were there it was because it was necessary to resolve a situation that was not clear, that is, that the property appeared registered in the name of Oscar, therefore, the COURT's thesis regarding the fact that the plaintiff did not know or had no reason to know whether the farm was registered or whether or not it belonged to Oscar is not true, furthermore, in the same acquisition document provided by the plaintiff it is clearly read that Oscar "sells him his registered farm", therefore, the COURT's reasoning in relation to what was stated by the witness is totally contradictory with the same weighing of that testimony as well as with the same document which provides that the registration of the property was already a reality, and this occurs only 4 supposed years in which the plaintiff had acquired it from his brother, therefore, the act of signing the document with Oscar is a clear and decisive element of proof to establish that the plaintiff, from that date, already had full knowledge that the property was registered and that it was in the name of Oscar, therefore, what was really important in the case was to determine whether or not the plaintiff knew if the property was registered in the Public Registry, and both the witness and the document itself, prove that the plaintiff did know</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. This, it asserts, is sufficient to deny positive prescription (prescripción positiva) as a means of acquiring ownership, since by accepting that it was registered, he lacks the necessary good faith; </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">any consequence derived from the document he decided to sign </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">(</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">…</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">) </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">must be assumed by the plaintiff, and this includes the fact that the farm no longer belonged to the person who claimed to sell it to him, because at an earlier date he had already contributed it to the company</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. It adds, if the plaintiff did not wish to check the Registry, that does not excuse him; therefore </span><a name=\"_Hlk65258298\"></a><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">the Court's decision violates the principles of legal certainty and security, effectiveness erga omnes, and registry publicity. It emphasizes, since the property is registered, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">any particular situation arising from that property is recorded in the Public Registry, just as the annotation related to the contribution of the farm to the claimant company was already recorded, which the Public Registry had been publicizing since 1986 and which was definitively registered in 1994. Rather, the same witness says that they began to make inquiries because the deed would not go through, so it is clear that they could have had full knowledge of the registry status of the property both before executing the deed with Oscar and after having executed it, and if they still persisted in doing so, that was a clearly assumed risk that must now bring them consequences, since it constitutes neither an acquisition a non domino nor one suitable for usucapion (usucapión), given that his good faith is diminished by the circumstances surrounding that acquisition</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. It indicates, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">the COURT states the following: "On the other hand, both the plaintiff, and his prior possessor, namely his brother Ronulfo, to whom Mr. Oscar Soto confesses he sold the property to later transfer it to Octaviano, were unaware that La Florida S.A. appeared as the registered owner starting in 1994, in the Public Registry" when what really should have drawn the COURT's attention is that the plaintiff concurred in an act of signing a deed, for a farm that was registered, according to the witness: "...when the deed was executed in Palmares no inquiry was made as to whether the farm was registered because the farm belonged to Mr. Oscar..." what the COURT must understand is that the witness states that she assumed the farm belonged to Oscar, which contradicts the document provided and the version given by the plaintiff in his claim, since the document is clear in indicating that it is a registered farm that Oscar was selling to the plaintiff and that pure and simple fact should have guided the COURT to determine that the plaintiff does not have protectable possession (posesión), much less good faith or just title (justo título), either understood as a document or understood as the very act of possessing, because as we have already said, he had full knowledge that the property had been reduced to private ownership, this being so, the possession he may have been exercising is tainted as unlawful and cannot be protected by way of positive prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership. Therefore, what is really important here is not to establish whether the plaintiff knew the farm belonged to the plaintiff company or not, since the relevant point is to establish whether the plaintiff had knowledge that the property was registered</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. It concludes, the ruling is contradictory because it validates a supposed document of title transfer, when this is full proof that the farm was registered, so it cannot be acquired by usucapion much less as an </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">acquisition a non domino</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">; </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">the possession exercised over a licit and possible object, in good faith and under the terms required by agrarian law for usucapion is one thing, and making an illegal act pass as justified ignorance based on good faith and the social function is something very different</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">XIII.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> For the decision on this grievance, it is helpful to be clear on the Court's arguments in the appealed judgment, in their entirety, so that, beforehand, this Chamber can make some general clarifications on the topic of agrarian usucapion. Thus, it is noted that in Considerandos I and II, the Court shared the facts that the Trial Court had deemed proven, with the exception of the fourth, which it eliminated; likewise, it shared the circumstances it had deemed not proven. In Considerandos III and IV it summarized the appeal of the plaintiff party and that of Florida S.R.L. In Considerando V it explained in general terms the institution of usucapion. In VI it also set forth </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline\">in general terms</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> on the distinction that said body has for several years considered exists between civil usucapion and agrarian usucapion. To that end, it inserted a long quotation (whose source it does not specifically identify), but from which it is important to highlight that it reads that it is by virtue of the agrarian principle of the </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">social function of property</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> that </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">various requirements are established in Agrarian Usucapion</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">, which </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">—</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">it continues reading</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">—</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> are: 1) the animus; 2) the </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">just title in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem (justo título en la posesión agraria ad-usucapionem)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> and 3) </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">good faith in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. It detailed: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\"> 1.- The animus, must be projected through the effective exercise of agrarian possessory acts, the agrarian estate becoming the possessor's habitual abode; but it is reflected more intensely through the economic appropriation of the profits obtained through his cultivation work; it is presumed that whoever works the land in that manner is always a possessor as owner. 2.- The just title in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem, is constituted by agrarian work, since it is through it that ownership of the land is acquired. "On the other hand, the non-requirement of just title gives rise to the possibility that usucapion may occur contra-tabulas, that is, against a title registered in the name of a third party in the Public Registry. By virtue of the considerations regarding just title that are made in the theory of agrarian possession, it can be said that agrarian usucapion, by not taking into account the prior relationship that may exist between the possessor and the transferor, is a truly original mode of acquisition." (Meza Lázarus, op. cit., page 158). 3.- Good faith in agrarian possession ad-usucapionem: In agrarian usucapion, the categorization of possession in good or bad faith does not exist (sic), since Agrarian Law is not so much interested in the attitude of the possessor, but above all in his productive agrarian activity; "In Agrarian Law the existence of this requirement cannot be conceived by virtue of the fact that it is linked to the just title which is discarded as a requirement of possession suitable for usucapion. Agrarian possession has a personal character in which its foundation turns out to be work. Since the existence of a title and its validity is not necessary, the requirement of special good faith (sic) in agrarian possession lacks any reason to be." (Meza Lázarus, op.cit., page 160-161)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> (the bold text is removed from the original citation now transcribed). Immediately following in Considerando VII it stated that the appellant is partially correct (what is inferred is the plaintiff party). It explained that the plaintiff party directed its claim against La Florida S.R.L, who appears as the registered owner as of 1994, and against Oscar Soto Vega, who sold to it in 1988. It is proven, it continued, that Oscar Soto Jiménez accepted having sold to Ronulfo González Vega and </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">and the latter in turn to the plaintiff herein Octaviano González Vega, so the sale was made directly from Oscar Soto to Octaviano, the latter acquiring under the belief that the person selling to him was the true owner of the property, however, it is also true that the sale is a non domino, (not from the true owner), since if this occurred on March 4, 1988 (see document on folio 3) by public deed - possessory title of transfer -, and Oscar Soto had transferred ownership of said property since March 23, 1985 to La Florida Sociedad Anónima (see folios 5 to 8), Mr. Octaviano had no reason (sic) to know or be aware of said transfer, which was registered in the Public Registry only on September 23, 1995 (see folios 5 to 17). The title of transfer of ownership exhibited by the plaintiff is suitable, valid, true and effective, since the parties gave their consent -nudo consensu- and from that point on, the contract was perfected, Mr. Octaviano behaving from that moment as the legitimate owner and real proprietor of the estate</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. It added, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">It is not true, as the trial judge states, that Octaviano had knowledge that the sale in his favor was not carried out because a document existed prior to the registration in favor of La Florida S.R.L., because the notary made it known. That assertion by the trial judge is based on an error in the weighing of evidence, specifically a material error or error of fact, as it puts in the mouth of the witness Sancho Ramírez something she did not say in her statement. Indeed, if her statement is read in its entirety, a different conclusion is reached. Mrs. Alicia Sánchez Ramírez clearly stated: \"...After Octaviano acquired it I never saw Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar work the farm.

Never, since Octaviano acquired the farm from don Franklin or don Oscar, was don Octaviano told that he could not work the farm. The farm was indeed registered, I do not know if Octaviano knew that when he bought it. I found out at the Registry after Octaviano had bought it. I started taking some computer courses and since they had us practice, using the computer I found that it was registered in the name of the Sociedad La Florida, that was about eight years ago. From that date forward, never has anyone from that company indicated or claimed against Octaviano regarding the farm..." (see folios 1439-1440). That is, the inquiries began some time after the year 2000, when the plaintiff had already been in possession of the property publicly, peacefully, with just title and good faith (justo título y buena fe) for more than ten years, a situation that was consolidated, undoubtedly, upon the completion of ten years, that is, on 5 de marzo de 1998." It adds, "On the other hand, both the plaintiff and his previous possessor, namely his brother Ronulfo, from whom Mr. Oscar Soto confesses he sold it in order to subsequently transfer the property to Octaviano, were unaware that La Florida S.A. appeared as the registered owner starting in 1994, in the Public Registry. Much less can this occurrence be considered—as the lower court erroneously did—as an act interrupting possession, as a material fact. Nothing could be more erroneous regarding the normative application of what is stipulated in article 853 (artículo 853) and following of the Civil Code (Código Civil), since a mere registration entry (public notice) is not capable of interrupting adverse possession (prescripción positiva), as it does not correspond to the causes of interruption recognized by the legislator (articles 875 and 876 of the Civil Code, artículos 875 y 876 del Código Civil)." The Court indicated that the witness Sancho Ramírez stated that they "realized" that the property was registered in the name of the company, but that occurred when the usucapion (usucapión) period had already passed. It detailed that the plaintiff's possession had been for more than 10 years as owner and with a "real and existing" just title (justo título) "since through No. 40 (...) of 4 de marzo de 1988 (folios 3 and 4) Oscar Soto Jiménez sells to Octaviano González Vega" the registered farm, which the former had contributed to the company, a situation unknown to the latter. It then highlighted that the buyer and his transferor are the ones who have behaved as the real owners of the land, paying laborers (peones), taking care of and improving the land, maintaining paddocks (apartos), planting improved pastures, dedicating it to livestock activity for more than 20 years, that is, fulfilling the social function of property, as is evident from "the declaration of: Blanca Ester Rojas Zúñiga who affirmed: '...The one who works this farm is Octaviano, he acquired this farm because he bought it from my husband Ronulfo González Vega, that was already more than twenty years ago. My husband bought this farm from Oscar Soto Jiménez... Don Octaviano currently dedicates this farm to cattle ranching; occasionally corn, cassava has also been planted... In the town, the one recognized as owner of these lands is Octaviano González Vega, he maintains the fences and the farm along with his laborers... it is in better conditions now, Octaviano planted improved pastures, before there was only 'burro' grass, he has also improved the fences' (see folio 1436). The witness Mainor Francisco Castro Jiménez indicated: 'They, I clarify, the González family have been working this farm for approximately eighteen years now...' (folio 1437)... 'Those who work this farm are the González brothers and their laborers, they dedicate it to cattle ranching...' (folio 1438). The witness Alicia Sancho Ramírez explains in more detail: 'The farm is divided into six paddocks (apartos) in total,... Ever since Octaviano acquired the farm, no one has ever interrupted him... he is the one who buys all the wire for the fences and the laborers are the ones who maintain them, they plant improved pastures throughout the farm. Octaviano is the one who buys them, as well as the herbicides, I know this because I am the one who writes the checks...' (folio 1439). The witness Fernando Enrique Castro Jiménez, referring to the time of possession, indicates: 'The González family have had the farm for approximately eighteen or nineteen years. This farm, from what I have observed from the outside, has always been maintained the same... For the maintenance of the farm, the González family use a Chapulín (airplane) and also laborers...' (folio 1441). The witness Dagoberto Suárez Araya added the following: 'I have known the farm that is the subject of this proceeding for approximately twenty-three years, I have worked with Octaviano on that farm since that same time, I help him with the cattle and fix the fences. Since I have known the farm I have worked there... he dedicates the farm to cattle, he has planted Brisante and Braquiar type grass, there are approximately sixty head of Brahman breed cattle...' (folio 1443-1445)." (sic) See, in the same sense, the remaining declarations of Luis Alberto Barrientos Mora (folio 1445), and Alfredo Ramírez Sandi (at folios 1448-1449)." It reiterated that the foregoing demonstrates the plaintiff's behavior as the legitimate owner, by disposing of the property in agricultural livestock activities, maintenance of pastures and fences, planting of improved pastures, and "also the inaction of the titleholder in the exercise of their rights of restitution over the property, having allowed more than ten years to elapse." It continued, "the plaintiff has, as indicated, the translative title of possession, and good faith (buena fe), as he has maintained the conviction that he acquired it from the true owner (a non domino)." It held that if the plaintiff and his transferor had, by 1998, more than 10 years of continuous exercise of possession in good faith, the second paragraph of article 285 applies to them, whereby if possession was in good faith (buena fe) at its beginning, it does not lose that character solely because the possessor later doubts the legitimacy of his right, and therefore, in this case, good faith must be presumed in favor of the usucapion claimant (usucapiente).

XIV.It is deemed appropriate to note that, contrary to what the Court held regarding the different requirements for agrarian usucapion (usucapión agraria), this Chamber in judgment 920-F-2000 of 15 hours 25 minutes on 13 de diciembre de 2000, indicated that "the mere exercise of acts that are claimed as possessory does not substitute for the legal conditions that the law requires for usucapion, relating to just title (justo título) and good faith (buena fe). Consequently, the instance judges have erred in ruling that, in what they call 'agrarian usucapion' (usucapión agraria), a series of elements that appear in civil law as requirements for possession suitable for usucapion must be discarded, such as just title (justo título) and good faith (buena fe), because, as they express it, the just title is constituted by agrarian labor and good faith is not relevant, insofar as the attitude of the possessor is not of interest, but rather his productive activity. That reasoning is, openly, contrary to what is expressed in articles 853, 855, and 856 of the Civil Code (artículos 853, 855 y 856 del Código Civil), which are applicable in this case. In this sense, in the case of matters processed under agrarian jurisdiction, the aforementioned legal conditions necessary for adverse possession (prescripción positiva) to operate must not be obviated, since, except for the situation expressly contemplated by articles 92 and 101 of the Possessory Information Law (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) [this refers to the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), and not as erroneously indicated], concerning precarious possessors and under strict observance of the formalities and procedures that that law provides for that purpose – matters unrelated to the case at hand – in our legal system, regarding the usucapion of the property right over real estate, absolutely no legal provision establishes an exemption from the duty of concurrence of just title (justo título) and good faith (buena fe). Quite the contrary, the law requires both conditions, together with the qualified possession under article 856 of the Civil Code (artículo 856 del Código Civil), for adverse possession (prescripción positiva) to be applicable, (...)[.-] VI.- This Chamber has already reiterated the need for the usucapion claimant to meet the three legal conditions for usucapion to operate, likewise, in cases processed under agrarian jurisdiction, precisely because the applicable law so determines (for example, the following judgments of this Chamber can be consulted: number 4 of fourteen hours forty-five minutes on twenty-eight of January of nineteen ninety-eight; number 50 of fifteen hours twenty minutes on twenty of May of nineteen ninety-eight; number 95 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on two of October of nineteen ninety-eight; number 1 of fourteen hours on six of January of nineteen ninety-nine)." Previously, in resolution 821-F-2000 of 15 hours 35 minutes on 1 de noviembre de 2000 (a civil matter although it does not result in different treatment for agrarian matters, as expressed in the immediately cited antecedent), this Chamber had ruled on just title (justo título) as follows: "In accordance with our legal system, this requirement refers to the translative title of ownership and not to the qualities of possession, since the latter enjoys autonomy and must present, as stated, the characteristics of being public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and in the capacity of titleholder. The translative title of ownership constitutes the justifying element of possession—not the other way around—and must have this characteristic before or at the moment of possessing. Neither should it be confused with good faith (buena fe), as the latter is a subjective requirement related to the belief of the acquirer that he is assisted by the right in the possession exercised. The justness of the title lies, according to what the doctrine, ancient and recent, has developed, in its veracity and validity. The first characteristic refers to its real existence, thus excluding the putative title and the simulated one. In both cases, there is no operative just title, only the appearance of one." Likewise, on this same occasion, it was indicated regarding the proof of just title (justo título) by the acquirer that "Our Civil Code (Código Civil), in its article 854, requires proof of this requirement, but excepting cases in which possessory presumptions exist—in the case of movables or the right of possession (derecho de posesión), or not requiring it at all to usucapt continuous and apparent easements (servidumbres continuas y aparentes). The reason for the exceptions is easy to understand, due to the diverse treatment given to the indicated cases. In the case of the right to possess (derecho de poseer), the form of acquisition is more agile than that foreseen for the right of property (derecho de propiedad), because its content is not full and permanent like the latter. Indeed, to acquire this right, possession for one year is sufficient (Articles 279 and 869, in fine, of the Civil Code, Artículos 279 y 869 del Código Civil). But this is due to a possessory presumption valid only for the right to possess, according to article 281 ibidem, but it does not refer to the acquisitive cause of property, which, according to the provision of article 854, must always be proven. In other words, the justifying title of simple possession cannot be assimilated with the true and valid title of acquisition, as indicated, of property. Article 281 and article 854, far from contradicting each other, find correspondence in their respective fields of application. At this point, it is appropriate to recall the real rights susceptible to being acquired by usucapion, in which demonstration of just title is indeed required. Among them is the right of property (derecho de propiedad)—as a full right—and the rights of usufruct, use, and habitation—as derived rights. In these cases, it is not enough to presume the right to possess; it is necessary to demonstrate a just acquisitive cause of ownership, of usufruct, of use, or of habitation. The function of the possessory presumption, fully applicable to the simple right to possess—a real right in another's property, which, despite its enormous relevance, has a lower rank than that of property—or to ownership over movable goods—which is based on the publicity system applicable to them—has not been extended by our legislation to the proof of just title in other cases. In these, the different nature and socio-economic consideration of the rights require, in the complex factual assumption of the original acquisition analyzed, a justifying cause of possession, which is explicit and allows for the analysis not only of whether the title is just (valid and true), but also its concordance with the property object of possession. In relation, one can consult, among others, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 19 of 14:00 hrs. on 7 de abril de 1993; 45 of 15:05 hrs. on 22 de mayo de 1996; and 1 of 14 hrs. on 6 de enero de 1999."

Subsequently, in resolution 178-F-2007 of 9 hours 50 minutes on 14 de marzo de 2007, it was specified that there are two types of agrarian usucapion (usucapión agraria), the common and the special, between which there is a difference regarding their prerequisites. It was explained that the special agrarian usucapion (usucapión agraria especial) is regulated in the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), mandates 92 and 101, whose foundation is precarious possession by necessity of exploitation of the agrarian land, as a means of subsistence for oneself or the family unit; "In this precarious possession of lands, food necessity and family agrarian labor prevail. The simple intention to possess is not required; one must possess effectively, directly, and personally, to satisfy the food needs of the family group. Hence, for it to operate, the existence of good or bad faith is not determinant, as this element is substituted by necessity." For its part, it was continued, the common agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria común) is governed by the general rules of the Civil Code, so that in accordance with precept 853, just title and good faith must be demonstrated, as well as possession; the general regulation of adverse possession (usucapión) was emphasized: "requires the concurrence of certain requirements: a thing capable, that is, susceptible of private property; located within the commerce of men; just title translative of ownership; good faith; possession and the passage of time, exercised in the capacity of owner, continuously, publicly, peacefully, and for ten years or more (articles 853 and 860 of the Civil Code). These requirements are concurrent, such that if even one of them is absent, then the acquisitive prescription (prescripción adquisitiva) shall be inadmissible." A position that more precisely reiterates the criterion expressed in the cited precedent 920-F-2000 of 15 hours 25 minutes on December 13, 2000. Along these lines, more recently, in judgment 945-F-S1-2018 of 10 hours 35 minutes on November first, 2018, issued within an ordinary agrarian proceeding, it was indicated that: "XI.- Regarding the institute of adverse possession (usucapión), this Chamber has repeatedly established, based on applicable legislation, that certain requirements are necessary for it to be configured, namely, title translative of ownership, good faith, possession exercised in the capacity of owner continuously, publicly, and peacefully, as well as the passage of time, being at least 10 years. On the matter, it has thus considered in judgment no. 114 of 12 hours 11 minutes on February 5, 2016, the following: 'Regarding agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria), this Chamber has already indicated on other occasions that for it to prosper, the fulfillment of several requirements is needed: title translative of ownership, good faith, and possession; but this must be in the capacity of owner, publicly, peacefully, and uninterruptedly for a period of 10 years, taking into account that in agrarian matters, the aspect of possession transcends mere occupation [understood as possession] of the land, since in these cases agrarian possessory acts are required, aimed at cultivating and improving the property sought to be acquired by usucapion. Resolution at 9 hours 50 minutes on September 18, 2013, corresponding to vote number 1196, may be consulted in this regard.' –emphasis not in the original–". Further on it was expressed: "(…) the fact that the plaintiff continued working the land, the basis for which, the claimant says, is found in the verbal agreement of wills between him and the Cooperative—regarding the future return of the portion of land in litis—, does not have the necessary characteristics to configure the translative title suitable for usucapion—for it is not a translative title from one who is not the owner-. Therefore, this Court conceives that one of the requirements of adverse possession (usucapión) is not configured. As set forth in preceding lines, it is not the mere fact of possession that must be assessed when reviewing the requirements of adverse possession (usucapión), but the antecedent legal situation or the cause by which one possesses. And in this case, the cause or the reason by which the actor claims to be in possession of the land is far from that which is considered suitable for usucapion." Thus, from all the foregoing it is clear that although this Chamber has maintained a distinguishing feature between ordinary or civil adverse possession (usucapión ordinaria o civil) and common agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria común), this is reduced to the fact that the requirement of possession in agrarian matters is not constituted by any acts of possession, but rather consists of agrarian acts of possession, such as cultivation, livestock, beekeeping actions, among others. The thesis that agrarian possession relieves, substitutes, or constitutes the title translative of ownership has been discarded by this Chamber since long ago, in the noted precedents.

XV.Now, although this Chamber does not share what was stated by the Court in general terms regarding the just title or title translative of ownership in ordinary agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria ordinaria); the truth is that, despite those more abstract considerations, in considerando VII of the appealed judgment, when entering the analysis of this matter, said body identified the "title translative of ownership exhibited by the plaintiff" as the purchase-sale agreement between Oscar Soto and the plaintiff, in which it insisted that "the sale is a non domino, (not from the true owner)", occurring "on March 4, 1988 (see document on folio 3) by public deed –possessory translative title–, and Oscar Soto had transferred the ownership of said property since March 23, 1985 to La Florida Sociedad Anónima (see folios 5 to 8)". The Court understood that this 1988 purchase-sale is both "title translative of ownership" and "possessory translative title", it used both terms; which —this Chamber in turn understands— is not different or an error, given that ownership has possession as an attribute. Then, that 1988 transaction is the cause of the transmission of ownership (from a non domino subject who appeared to be so) as a requirement of adverse possession (usucapión), but it is also the cause by which the fact of possession began on the part of Octaviano González, through which the Court ultimately decreed that the right of ownership or property was acquired against that of the registered company. Thus, aside from the discrepancy regarding the general thesis on the requirements of agrarian adverse possession (usucapión agraria) held by the Court, the decision of this body was not based on the fact of possession as a title translative of ownership for the purposes of the right of property or ownership itself as it set forth in that general part; it based it on the purchase-sale deed of March 4, 1988 between Oscar Soto and the plaintiff, a time at which the former, despite being the registered titleholder, was not the owner of the property (this last circumstance —it is observed—, not being publicized on the property itself in the Public Registry, could not automatically be held to be known to Mr. Octaviano, unless there is proof to the contrary). With these warnings and this clarification, we proceed to resolve the charge.

XVI.The core argument of the appellant company is that the plaintiff knew the property was registered, as this is deduced from the testimony of Mrs. Alicia Sánchez Ramírez and from the deed itself between the plaintiff and Oscar Soto; therefore, since he knew it was registered, adverse possession (usucapión) is not applicable. It is observed that the claimant does not realize that the property was indeed registered, but in the name of Oscar Soto, who appeared in 1988 before a public notary to sell said registered property to the plaintiff. This fact, that the property was registered, was not denied by the plaintiff; in any case, it was proven by the Trial Court and adopted by the Court. Hence, up to this point, its argument is useless to break the judgment, for the Court never denied that the plaintiff knew the property was registered; the fundamental point is that it was registered, yes, in the name of Oscar Soto, who was no longer in reality its owner. On the other hand, regarding its assertion that "the annotation related to the contribution of the property to the claimant company already appeared, publicized by the Public Registry since 1986 and definitively registered in 1994", the cassation appellant does not refer to an element of conviction from which that factual conclusion can be drawn, which the lower courts did not consider accredited. The company makes it appear that the witness Alicia Sánchez Ramírez recounted that she and Octaviano "began to make inquiries because the deed was not being finalized", and from there deduces that "it is clear that they could have had full knowledge of the registry situation of the property both before carrying out the deed with Oscar and afterwards". A deduction that cannot follow. Note that the appellant does not specify any evidence from which it can be drawn that in 1988, the Public Registry of Immovable Property indicated that this land had been contributed upon its incorporation, through —at the very least— a marginal annotation on that property, or that the ownership of La Florida S.R.L. appeared in said Registry. This Chamber does not fully understand the grievance, for within the same complaint it states that the property was indeed in the name of Oscar Soto. Since it was registered in the Public Registry of Immovable Property that Mr. Oscar Soto was the owner of the estate, without him actually being so (having contributed it in 1985 upon the incorporation of La Florida S.R.L.), the purchase-sale he executed in 1988 to Octaviano González constitutes, as the Court correctly indicated, a non domino transaction. This is the characteristic that —as already indicated in considerando XI— the title translative of ownership required by canon 853 of the Civil Code to acquire property by usucapion must possess, as this Chamber has repeatedly established, such as in the already referenced judgment 178-F-2007, a criterion reiterated in resolutions 536-F-2007, 891-F-S1-2007, and 945-F-S1-2018. In this latter, more recent precedent, this Chamber first cited: "judgment no. 536 of 10 hours 30 minutes on July 27, 2007, this Judicial Body stated: 'Regarding the just title for usucapion. In the present case, the appellant indicates that the just title in agrarian matters is determined by possession itself. However, that objection is not acceptable. Regarding this requirement, it is necessary to point out that it consists of the antecedent legal relationship, by reason of which the thing is obtained with aptitude for usucapion. This Chamber has repeatedly stated that it must emanate from one who in Law is not the owner. The thing is acquired from another, who behaved and was reputed as such, without being so; the transferor is a non-owner, either because he has never held title, or because his right has been extinguished or resolved, or because that which he exhibits is not sufficient to produce the transmission; in this last case is, for example, the usufructuary who appears transmitting property. Adverse possession (usucapión) operates, consequently, when the title of transmission or acquisition is a non domino, from one who is not the owner, but not when it is a domino or a verus domino, that is, when it emanates from the true owner, because in this case, if the title is perfect it immediately produces all its effects. And if it has some vice of another nature, emanating from the true owner, its validation can be produced by negative or extinctive prescription (prescripción negativa o extintiva) of the nullity action and not by acquisitive prescription (prescripción adquisitiva) or adverse possession (usucapión). Regarding the just title, see, from this body, judgment no. 821 of 15 hours 35 minutes on November 1, 2000, 856 of 15 hours 25 minutes on November 15, 2000, and 320 of 15 hours on April 27, 2001.' –emphasis not in the original–". Immediately following, when analyzing the specific case, it stated: "In this matter, the existence is not alleged of a title translative of ownership, from a non-owner to the petitioner, where possession is transferred to the plaintiff, so that he believed himself to be the true titleholder of the land. For its part, the fact that the plaintiff continued working the land, the basis for which, the claimant says, is found in the verbal agreement of wills between him and the Cooperative—regarding the future return of the portion of land in litis—, does not have the necessary characteristics to configure the translative title suitable for usucapion—for it is not a translative title from one who is not the owner-. Therefore, this Court conceives that one of the requirements of adverse possession (usucapión) is not configured. As set forth in preceding lines, it is not the mere fact of possession that must be assessed when reviewing the requirements of adverse possession (usucapión), but the antecedent legal situation or the cause by which one possesses. And in this case, the cause or the reason by which the actor claims to be in possession of the land is far from that which is considered suitable for usucapion" (underlining and bold added). In summary, the appellant's argument is not useful to refute what was decided by the Court because it hinges on that —in its view— a registered immovable property cannot be acquired by usucapion since that necessarily means one has neither good faith nor a title translative of ownership; which is incorrect because, pursuant to mandates 853 and 856 of the Civil Code, adverse possession (usucapión) must be decreed if, in addition to the title translative of ownership emanating from a non domino, but who appeared to be so by virtue —as in this case— of the registry title, the claimant meets good faith and possession in the capacity of owner, continuously, publicly, and peacefully. In this case, the registration of the property as belonging to Oscar Soto, far from detracting from the plaintiff's good faith, confirms it; the appellant does not allege in this grievance other circumstances that lead to the opposite conclusion and their evidentiary support. It only remains to note that there is no contradiction whatsoever on the part of the Court for having maintained the factual framework of the Trial Court and arriving at a different decision. The subsumption of those same circumstances to the legal framework will yield one result or another depending on the application and interpretation of the Law carried out by the judging body, and it is the superior —as in the present case— who defines what is the correct application and interpretation.

XVII. Fourth

It accuses an erroneous "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">analysis of the evidentiary element</span>" as being decontextualized and divorced from the rest of the evidence; specifically, it refers this to the testimonies of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez, Blanca Ester Rojas Zúñiga, Mainor Francisco Castro Jiménez, Fernando Enrique Castro Jiménez, Dagoberto Suárez Araya, Luis Alberto Barrientos Mora, and Alfredo Ramírez Sandí. It repeats that the plaintiff's acquisition document shows that it concerns a farm (finca) registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público), so the Tribunal's conclusion on good faith (buena fe) is erroneous. Although, it affirms, according to canon 286 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt good faith is presumed, but evidence to the contrary is also admitted, and when the law requires possession in good faith, a possessor in good faith is considered to be one who, at the act of possession, believed they had the right to possess; but if there was sufficient reason for them to doubt that such right corresponded to them, they must not be considered in good faith. In this case, it maintains, "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">there was sufficient reason for him to doubt that such right corresponded to him, because the signed document indicates that the farm is registered in the Public Registry, but despite this, as the witness SANCHEZ RAMIREZ stated: 'I am certain that no study was done in the Registry at that time,' which allows one to establish that if they did not do those studies, that is their absolute responsibility and that, on the contrary, they acted with clear and evident bad faith</span>". It says the Tribunal did not weigh the evidence, which the first-instance judge did do; it transcribes a long segment of that judgment. Following that, it maintains, "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">From the foregoing analysis, we can determine that the first-instance judge is correct in her analysis, because she does say, clearly and specifically, what probative value she assigns to each of those evidentiary elements and also sets forth the reasons why she does so. The TRIBUNAL does not do so</span>", it settles for a "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">very lax analysis of the testimonies, and that violates the duty to state reasons</span>". It highlights that the A quo judge analyzed the documentary evidence, for which she dedicated a section; something the Tribunal did not do, but rather in an excessively summarized manner it attempts to assign value without expressing reasons. It emphasizes that for the first-instance judgment, the "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">plaintiff's possession is not protectable, because he does not possess a just title (título justo) or a translative title (título traslativo), and there is also no good faith, a conclusion reached after analyzing in a detailed manner the testimonial and documentary evidentiary elements. Contrary to the duty to state reasons, the TRIBUNAL did not state reasons in any way for the appealed judgment; it does not refer specifically or in a detailed manner to why a different probative value should be assigned to these elements of evidence, nor does it make a connection among all the evidentiary elements to appreciate them as a whole</span>". It maintains that it has been the victim of a dispossession of its property, under the protection of "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">false documents that could not even be registered in the Public Registry (they were not even presented, contrary to the company's acquisition via contribution through its presentation in the year 1986)</span>", therefore it has the right to recover that farm "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">even if there are third-party acquirers in good faith, which in the present case does not occur, because the plaintiff (...) intentionally and directly evaded trusting in the registry publicity (publicidad registral) that showed him that the person selling to him had no right to sell</span>". This, it continues, does not imply ignoring third parties in good faith, for they have the mechanisms provided for in civil legislation to claim guarantee or payment of damages from the seller. It reiterates that since 1986, it has been publicized that the property was contributed upon its incorporation. It continues, "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">In this case, the transparency of a transaction is very doubtful, in which a registered property is acquired and they did not even carry out the corresponding studies. The protection of third-party acquirers in good faith, on the terms intended by the plaintiff, implies dispossessing the legitimate owner of the property that belongs to them. Such a solution is, without any doubt, excessive, disproportionate, and, finally, unjust. The importance of registry publicity and its principles cannot prevail over the right of the first victim —the legitimate owner, originally dispossessed in a fraudulent manner— to maintain full ownership of their assets or, in any case, the right to be restored to the enjoyment thereof</span>". It ends by stating that acquisition a non domino (adquisición a non domino) cannot become a screen to legitimize criminal acts and turn into an obstacle so that the true dispossessed owner can recover the property.

**XVIII.** The grievance is a mixture of arguments that, in itself, due to a lack of precision, mandates its denial. Thus, on the one hand, it dedicates itself to affirming that the analysis of the evidence by the Court is correct, but not the one carried out by the Tribunal. That is, it concentrates on directly contrasting the rulings, to then affirm that the Tribunal incurred in a failure of its duty to state reasons. A complaint that, as already indicated, constitutes a procedural defect (vicio procesal) which, although it falls upon the ruling, the truth is that it does not constitute a ground for cassation in accordance with Article 594 of the CPC, whose supplementary application is established by rule 452 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, the appellant reiterates what was argued in the previous defect, in the sense that since the farm was registered in the Public Registry, the plaintiff could not acquire by usucapion (usucapir) because that registration by itself eliminates the plaintiff's good faith. Refer to what was indicated regarding the preceding grievance in the sense that the fact that the farm was registered in the Public Registry in the name of Oscar Soto determines that the deed of March 4, 1988, constitutes the translative title of domain a non domino in the terms of canon 853 of the Civil Code; likewise, that it is the criterion of this Chamber that, contrary to what it says, far from breaking the good faith presumed for the plaintiff, it reinforces it, since precisely the plaintiff believed that the person selling to him had the right to do so according to what the Public Registry of Property indicated. Thus, mandate 285 establishes: "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">In all cases in which the law requires possession in good faith, the possessor in good faith is considered to be one who, at the act of taking possession, believed they had the right to possess</span>". The rule continues: "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">If there was sufficient reason for them to doubt that such right corresponded to them, they cannot be considered in good faith</span>"; this Chamber does not find it was demonstrated that in 1988, Mr. Octaviano had reason to doubt that, upon acquiring the farm from the person who appeared in the Registry as the owner, it would not have been his right to exercise possession as an attribute of domain. The public registry faith (fe pública registral) supports a good faith that was not disproven. The mandate continues; "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">but if the possession was in good faith at its beginning, it does not lose that character solely because the possessor later doubts the legitimacy of their right. Possession ceases to be in good faith at the moment of acquiring certainty that one possesses improperly, and it also ceases from the notification of the lawsuit in which another claims the right to possess</span>"; this Chamber does not observe that, given a title in which Oscar Soto participated in 1988, owner according to the Registry, it could be concluded with total certainty that, once the domain of La Florida S.R.L. over the farm was registered in the Registry in 1994, and not even Mr. Octaviano González having knowledge of this registration, he acquired <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline;">certainty that he possessed the property improperly</span>; approximately 6 years had passed since he had purchased it when La Florida's ownership was registered in the Registry, and it was not demonstrated that between that purchase in 1988 until the filing of this matter, that is, around 17 years, the company had attempted any action against him. He might have doubted, but the mere doubt would not have deprived him of good faith. Additionally, the charge itself is also confusing, since, on the one hand, it says the plaintiff is not a third-party acquirer in good faith because he could verify that the person selling to him had no right to do so, regarding which —it is repeated— it does not identify in which evidence it is recorded that this information was noted or registered on the farm, but rather it seems to deduce this from the presentation of its incorporation to the Public Registry itself, a fact that by itself clearly does not constitute publicity, because its registration in the Registry of Legal Entities and the granting of an identification number do not give publicity to the transfer of real estate (they are different registries). But at the same time, it suggests that as an acquirer in good faith, the plaintiff could well have claimed damages and the improvements he introduced to the property from Mr. Oscar Soto. <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; -aw-import:spaces"> </span>That is, on the one hand, it acknowledges Mr. Octaviano purchased protected by the Registry; but on the other, it affirms that the Registry recorded other information, therefore —it would be understood, it alleges— he was not protected by the Registry. For all these reasons, the charge will be dismissed.

**XIX. Fifth.** It claims "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">incorrect application of acquisition a non domino</span>". It says the Tribunal made an effort to legitimize the document contributed by the plaintiff as a translative title of domain, for which it resorted to the figure of acquisition a non domino, which distorted its requirements. It explains what —in its view— real estate fraud consists of. It asserts that for the acquisition a non domino of real estate to occur, the following fundamental requirements must be jointly met: a) that the acquirer has the status of a third party, b) that they have acquired their right for consideration (a título oneroso), in good faith, and from a person who, according to the Property Registry, has the power to transfer it, and, c) that they have also registered their acquisition. These requirements are not present in this process. It recriminates, "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">acquisition a non domino is not a valid or suitable instrument to validate the document in question, but rather a mode of acquiring domain as such</span>"; furthermore, the facts in this matter do not fit this figure, because "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">the translative title, as such in agrarian law, should not be understood as a document, but as an acquisitive cause, which can even be possession in itself</span>". It continues, "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">the plaintiff poses a legal problem related to positive prescription (prescripción positiva) or usucapion and not about acquisition a non domino. In application of substantive law, the TRIBUNAL resolves by indicating that regarding the title, there is acquisition a non domino, when the just title is only one of the requirements demanded by agrarian law to acquire by usucapion and, moreover, just title must be understood as a lawful or acquisitive cause constituted by the mere fact of possessing. That being so, the TRIBUNAL cannot validate the translative title by alleging that there is acquisition a non domino, because it is one thing that acquisition a non domino exists and another thing that the translative title exists or is lawful</span>". It maintains that the document presented by the plaintiff does not prove the acquisition a non domino because it is a deed that was never presented to the Registry, so based on that, "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">the acquirer a non domino</span> [who] <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">can claim that their acquisition is certain, from one who apparently had the right to alienate, even if that right is resolved or annulled</span>" cannot be configured, as provided by Article 456 of the Civil Code. It reiterates that, on the contrary, it was proven that the farm has been registered since 1974 and that it was contributed upon its incorporation on March 26, 1985, presented to the Diary of the Mercantile Registry in 1986, and subsequently registered in volume 352, entry 15789 on September 3, 1994; therefore, the purchase-sale deed between the plaintiff and Oscar Soto of March 4, 1988, never presented nor registered, cannot have the capacity to displace the primacy of its prior real right "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">which, by the effects of registry publicity and successive tract (tracto sucesivo), was already noted since 1986, informing the parties and the public in general that Oscar Soto had already alienated the property by contributing it to a family corporation</span>". It cites precept 455 of the Civil Code, by which titles subject to registration do not prejudice a third party except from the date of their presentation, and reaffirms that the deed by which the farm was contributed to it was presented to the Registry since 1986. It introduces an extensive quote from what it identifies as <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; -aw-import:spaces"> </span>Resolution 1-1999 of this Chamber, and subsequently asserts, "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">Stated another way, the TRIBUNAL incurs a serious error in the application of substantive law because it takes the application of acquisition a non domino to other dimensions, dimensions that are very dangerous, because they cause the failure of the order established in the law with regard to the real requirements that must exist for the application of the true acquisition a non domino, as well as the absolute and harmful omission of the principles of legal security and certainty that registration and registry publicity provide, as well as the supremacy of real rights contained in Article 455 of the Civil Code and the erga omnes effectiveness of that same registry publicity</span>". It also assures that the fact of the plaintiff's possession is not true because it (the corporation) disposed of the property prior to this process by constituting mortgage liens (gravámenes hipotecarios), specifically in 2004, to which it had to resort to finance the proceedings filed against it by Mr. Oscar Soto and Mr. Octaviano González (it transcribes the information it says is recorded in the Registry). Hence, it says, "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">the plaintiff's supposed possession is merely circumstantial, an act of bad faith inherited from the problems that have existed between Oscar Soto and the company</span>". It highlights that the Tribunal should have resolved on what was requested, that is, on the usucapion, determining whether or not the document contributed by the plaintiff was a just title or translative title; which it is not, since he knew it was registered and chose not to carry out the registry studies, in addition to which this eliminates the presumption of good faith, and thus his possession is not protectable, since it was in bad faith, in murky circumstances, for which he loses the right to collect for improvements, which should also have been rejected.

**XX.** The grievance is confusing; it mixes a series of themes without a clear direction. Thus, it poses 4 autonomous ideas. The first, which is a reiteration of previous grievances, is that the Tribunal applies the figure of acquisition a non domino when the object of the process was usucapion, and that the former is not applicable to the present matter, in which the conditions for it are not met. The second, that the just title in agrarian matters is not constituted by a document, but rather possession itself. The third, that its prior real property right "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">was already noted since 1986, informing the parties and the public in general that Oscar Soto had already alienated the property</span>". And the fourth, that the plaintiff's possession is not true because it disposed of the property, specifically in 2004 when it imposed mortgage liens. Regarding the first aspect, it has already been indicated about the preceding grievances that it is an unaddressable argument because precisely the figure of usucapion, as this Chamber has reiterated, requires the translative title of domain from someone who is not the titleholder or owner. Regarding the second idea, that in agrarian matters the translative document of domain, but possession, is not of interest, it is also not correct because —as was amply explained— common agrarian usucapion requires the translative title of domain, without it being possible to confuse it with the requirements of the special agrarian usucapion contemplated in the Land and Colonization Law, which is not the one alleged in this process. Consequently, up to this point, in addition to that argumentative mix, its thesis would also not have found support in the jurisprudence of this Chamber. Regarding the third proposition, on which the appellant now more punctually insists, that having its incorporation deed been presented to the Mercantile Registry, the plaintiff should have known that Mr. Oscar Soto was not the owner of the property, but rather that it was, because it "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">was noted</span>", the following must be said. Just as already indicated, the Court and the Tribunal did not record that as of 1985, 1986, much less in 1988, any notation was recorded on farm 6-20679 that warned the public that the property had been contributed to a corporation; nor does the appellant specify any concrete evidence that allows that fact to be concluded. On the contrary, the corporation once again admits that the transaction was carried out by Mr. Oscar, who, despite appearing as the owner in the Public Registry, was not such; all of which precisely configures the translative title of domain a non domino that the Tribunal found, while at the same time excluding the application of precept 455 of the Civil Code along the lines argued by the appellant. Lastly, regarding its addition, on another note, of a challenge to the plaintiff's possession, because it mortgaged the farm prior to this process, the argument is incomprehensible to this Chamber, as it seems to forget that possession is in itself a fact, which in this case was proven as of 1988 and occurred for more than 10 years, without it alleging the non-existence of or denying this particular fact (immediate possession). The constitution and registration of a mortgage guarantee does not contradict the possessory fact of the plaintiff. That type of disposal of the property was enabled by the registered ownership it has held since 1994, but it implied nothing regarding the immediate possession exercised by the plaintiff. Hence, the grievance will also be rejected.

**XXI. Sixth.** It argues "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic;">lack of application of the requirements of the action for recovery of possession (acción reivindicatoria)</span>", thereby omitting the application of canon 45 of the Political Constitution.

He explains that possession is only an attribute of ownership (dominio); for possession to give rise to the right of property, it must meet all the requirements demanded by the legal system to operate as a means of acquiring ownership, which corresponds to acquisitive prescription (prescripción adquisitiva), “which is a means of acquiring ownership of things belonging to others by having possessed them for a certain period, and with the concurrence of the other legal requirements known by all, such as just title (justo título), uninterrupted, in the capacity of owner and in good faith, for a minimum period of ten years.” He states that it is unthinkable that “a person like the plaintiff can accede to the right of property when in this case another holds that right and the former does not meet all the requirements for usucapion (usucapir). That being the case, the COURT incurs in a failure to apply substantive law, by rejecting what was sought in the counterclaim.” He repeats, “our right of property obliges us to the corresponding registration in the Public Registry (Registro Público), a fact that we managed to publicize with the contribution made to the company since 1986 and for this reason, the COURT cannot come to decimate our rights fully guaranteed at the constitutional and legal level, validating a flimsy acquisition embodied in a questioned document that, according to the law, does not even have the power to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties since it was never presented to the Public Registry (Registro Público).” He highlights that his right of property is inviolable, imprescriptible according to Article 320 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). He insists that the plaintiff lacks the requirements of just title (justo título) and good faith, and therefore cannot accede to ownership (dominio). He also cites as violated provisions 316, 317, 318, and 321 of the same legal body, since it does not recognize his right to claim in court the thing that is the object of his property, the free enjoyment of each and every one of the rights that comprise property, his “right as possessors of the property (an attribute of ownership) (dominio)” and to claim his possession, his right to be restored to possession. He adds, “the judgment incurs in a failure of its duty to apply the right we have to proceed with the reivindicatory action (acción reivindicatoria) (sic) against the one who possessed in bad faith and has ceased to possess.” He remarks that the plaintiff does not meet the subjective conditions to be considered an agrarian possessor (poseedor agrario) “since with the very evidentiary elements gathered in the process, it is established that the plaintiff is the owner of other properties, that he does not even live on this property, so it is clear that he lacks the principle of immanence (inmanencia), which would be a very important pure and simple fact to consider, because in that sense the plaintiff is not an agricultural producer or one engaged in agricultural activities by connection as a means of subsistence, he lacks the immanence (inmanencia) that allows him to be obligatorily, socially, and solidarily linked to the land, therefore, it is not true that there is social justification in the execution of the acts of possession that the plaintiff comes to claim, note that it speaks of maintenance of fences, it does not speak of true agricultural production, nor does it speak of the fact that the plaintiff or his family depends economically on that production. The witnesses come to establish that the plaintiff is a large cattle businessman, he is not a subsistence farmer, and that the supposed possession he carries out is through other persons, it is not even him, therefore, it is ruled out that he is an agrarian possessor (poseedor agrario) who meets the subjective requirements for usucapion (usucapir).” He adds that the judicial inspection was pretermitted by the Court; “these inattentions generate a result as terrible as that obtained in the appealed ruling, in this way, nothing good is achieved by keeping the ruling of the COURT intact, when what it deserves is to be annulled.” **XXII.** Once again, the appellant mixes a series of ideas or topics that she presents without much structure, and that would ultimately need autonomous treatment or at least be clearly concatenated. This lack of precision itself determines the dismissal of this charge. Aside from the foregoing, to the extent a core argument can be extracted, which is that the plaintiff did not acquire ownership (dominio) by usucapion, for which she concludes that the reivindicatory claim of her counterclaim must therefore be granted, it is noted that this premise is incorrect. According to what was determined by the Court, which the appellant failed to break in the preceding grievances, Mr. Octaviano did acquire the right of ownership over the real property because he has a translative title (título traslativo de dominio) of ownership granted to him by a non domino, he exercised possession for more than 10 years in the capacity of owner, in a public, peaceful, and continuous manner, and the good faith presumed for him was not disproven in this proceeding. Consequently, since her premise is erroneous, the conclusion is also erroneous; that is to say, the Court did not incur an infraction of constitutional mandate 45 or of the legal rules of reivindication. Insofar as she disagrees with the acceptance of usucapion by considering that the plaintiff's possession is not “agrarian possession (posesión agraria)”; she is made to see that the qualification of “agrarian” was relevant for the purposes of the competent jurisdiction to resolve this controversy, but not with respect to the acceptance of the usucapion claim that was sought, since it was the common one. What matters is that possession was accredited, it could well have been labeled agrarian or of another kind, but possession in the end. The subsistence production for his family, to which the appellant refers, is relevant for the purposes of the special agrarian usucapion of the Law of Lands and Colonization (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) (which was not the one requested), without these being determining aspects in civil usucapion and in common agrarian usucapion. In any case, it is incomprehensible that the appellant denies the qualification of agrarian to the possession, while at the same time qualifying the plaintiff as a cattle businessman. Agrarianism is not only found in the planting of crops for one's own and family consumption, as the company seems to understand. Finally, regarding the insistently alleged publicity of the contribution of the farm in 1985, let what was said in the preceding recitals be abided by, in the sense that the presentation to the Public Registry (Registro Público) of the incorporation deed by itself does not grant publicity, this is configured with the registration or, at least, the annotation on the margin of the farm itself. The constitution of the legal entity by itself did not alert the public that a transfer of the right of property over the real property had occurred. Thus, for what has been said, this censure will be dismissed.

**XXIII. Seventh.** She argues “scant reasoning regarding the imposition of costs of the claim and counterclaim on this party.” She describes that the Court considered that the claim should be declared granted; however, it did not justify the reason why it condemned her to pay the costs of the claim and counterclaim. She adds that it also failed in its duty to justify the reasons why it declared her counterclaim without merit. She maintains that, in accordance with the legal system, exemption from the payment of costs is permitted when the party has litigated with evident good faith; which, she says, she proved since she claims the land that Oscar Soto voluntarily contributed to her. She continues, “In any case, the analysis of the substantive issue carried out contains grave errors of fact and of law derived from granting probative values to certain elements of evidence which are in reality the product of their incorrect analysis, as well as that it disdained granting them the true probative value they have, in addition, it omitted to give content and value to a large quantity of evidentiary elements that demonstrate the existence of the merit to declare the reivindication action granted and the usucapion action without merit, all of which stands as the correct response to the inappropriate refusal of the appealed Court to analyze the evidence in accordance with what the legal system establishes.” She adds that the Court opted to “incorrectly apply the maximum sanction of condemnation to the payment of costs contained in Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil),” without realizing that she had sufficient reason to litigate, since the plaintiff admitted that the farm was registered, so he did not have good faith. She points out that the Court cannot ignore that she “has sufficient right to claim, since the farm is registered in her favor.” She insists that the plaintiff wove a picture in which he appears as the sole possessor, but there exist evidentiary elements “that accredit the acts of disposition,” for which reason he “erred in not adequately justifying the decision adopted regarding costs.” She also mentions canons 54 and 55 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria) and 222 of the CPC. She transcribes the section of the appealed ruling on costs and repeats that it does not fulfill the duty to provide reasoning.

**XXIV.** As indicated, the lack of reasoning, which is now alleged regarding the pronouncement on costs, does not constitute a ground for cassation according to those provided in mandate 594 of the CPC. Therefore, from a procedural perspective, the grievance will be denied. Insofar as she complains about the condemnation itself, the appellant is not clear, she seems to justify her good faith in litigating or sufficient reason to litigate due to—she insists—the fact that she was right in her defenses and claims, to which the Court did not accede due to the alleged improper assessment of evidence and incorrect application of the law. In this way, she again starts from an erroneous premise, as she did not succeed with the preceding recriminations. In this vein, since such a premise is not verified, the conclusion she exhibits could not be reached, which in any case would have been incompatible, since had she achieved a decision of the matter in her favor, the imposition of costs would have fallen on her losing counterpart, save for an exemption. And in that case, it would have been useless to examine the “good faith” or “sufficient reason to litigate” of the winning party. Aside from the foregoing, no element is observed from her exposition of the grievance by which it can be considered that she is in the scenario of exemption contemplated by precept 55 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria) (which is the standard relevant to her complaint), namely, litigation in good faith for having sufficient reason to litigate. It has long been pointed out that this hypothesis of sufficient reason to litigate does not consist of the mere conviction of the thesis one sustains, but rather the conviction of one's own thesis must necessarily respond to objective data of the proceeding that allow one to deduce the soundness of their claims or defenses; as objective data of the proceedings, the subtlety of the “legal issue” has been identified, which consists, for example, in that what is discussed is based on a pure interpretation of legal norms as the factual picture is not disputed (in this sense, resolution 222-F-S1-2019). Consequently, for all the reasons noted, the appellant is not correct.

**Cassation appeal of the defendant- counterclaimant Oscar Soto Jiménez** **XXV. First.** He accuses improper evidentiary assessment. He cites canons 38 subsection b) of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria), 341 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), and 853 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). He maintains that the Court incurred an error when assessing facts 4, 5, and 6 of the claim and the testimony of Alicia Sánchez Ramírez, the plaintiff's spouse. He details that in facts 4, 5, and 6 of the claim (which he transcribes), the plaintiff confesses and admits having known prior to 1988—which is the date on which the Court determined the period for usucapion began—that “legal problems existed.” He alleges that they constitute a spontaneous confession that he had knowledge of the real situation of the farm and the existing family conflicts. On the other hand, his wife also confirmed it by admitting that both Franklin (representative of the company) and he had told him that they could not work the farm. From that statement, he transcribes “the following is of interest [.-] \'(...) When Octaviano bought the farm from Ronulfo, no document was signed, he (sic) bought it from him verbally. I do not know how much Octaviano paid for the farm to Ronulfo. As far as I know, Mr. Ronulfo sold the farm to Octaviano, Octanio (sic) took responsibility for the farm and he worked it. Since I have known the farm I have only seen it (sic) worked by Mr. Oscar, and by Mr. Ronulfo and now by Mr. Octanio. (sic) After Octaviano acquired it, I never saw Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar work the farm, never, since Octaviano acquired the farm Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar, indicated to Mr. Octaniano that he could not work the farm.\' (highlighting is ours) (see statement at folios 1439 to 1440).” He explains that the discussion revolved around the date of acquisition of the farm; the plaintiff claimed to have acquired it in 1984 by purchase from his brother Ronulfo, not from Oscar Soto; but “why (sic) —despite the fact that he could not have demonstrated having acquired it on that date— was the plaintiff insistent on indicating his purchase date as the year 1984 and not 1988, which is the year of the purchase-sale executed before a notary public? (sic) Precisely because it is from the year 1985, when the transfer of the property to the Company La Florida S.R.L. occurred, it being that in effect, as demonstrated in the facts of the plaintiff\'s claim, as well as the declaration of the witness- (sic) his wife- Alicia Sánchez, that prior to the year 1988, he already knew of the litigious situation of the property.” He continues that by knowing of that litigious legal situation prior to the purchase of the farm, that purchase does not meet one of the essential presuppositions of possession, which is good faith.

**XXVI.** At folio 1465 it is read that, contrary to what was affirmed by the appellant, the witness Alicia Sánchez Ramírez stated: “After Octaviano acquired it I never saw Mr. Franklin or Mr. Oscar work the farm. Never, since Octaniano (sic) acquired the farm Mr. Franklin or Mr. scar (sic), **they told Octanio (sic) that he could not work the farm**” (underlining and bold added). On the other hand, it is observed in the claim, Mr. Octaviano González recounted in facts 3 and 4 that Mr. Oscar Soto Jiménez verbally sold farm 6-20679 to his brother Ronulfo González Vega in 1981, after which his brother entered into possession; that approximately in 1984, he (Octaviano) also acquired said farm verbally from his brother, after which he has been in possession of it, which he has maintained since then, summing 21 years, to which are added the years in which his brother possessed, for a total of 24 years of possession. In this time, he said, he has not been disturbed by any person. In facts 5, 6, and 7, he expressed that Mr. Oscar Soto, “registered owner (dueño Registral) of the farm,” and he formalized the purchase-sale by public deed of March 4, 1988, before notary public Olivier Rojas Fernández, number 40 of volume 11 of the protocol; which was not registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público) because “Oscar Soto Jiménez himself, had given it as a contribution, to a company incorporated with his relatives prior to the sale he made to me,” a company whose name is La Florida S.R.L. and whose incorporation dates from March 26, 1985. These actions, he said, both the contribution to the company and the sale may be tainted by nullity, but “in no way affect nor have they affected” the possession he has exercised, for more than 20 years, without being disturbed by anyone. From the narration of these facts of the claim, what can be extracted is that he affirmed he bought the estate from the registered owner Oscar Soto and that when that deed was presented to the Public Registry (Registro Público), it was rejected because the farm was then in the name of La Florida, but he did not even specify on what date that purchase-sale deed was presented to the Public Registry (Registro Público). It cannot be extracted that he expressed with the value of a confession that on March 4, 1988, he became aware that the appellant had contributed the farm to La Florida in 1985. Moreover, although the plaintiff stated that he had bought from his brother Ronulfo in 1984, at which time he entered into possession, and that he formalized that sale with Oscar Soto, “registered owner (dueño Registral) of the farm,” in 1988, the truth is that the A quo and Ad quem courts had the plaintiff\'s possession as accredited as of the 1988 deed; but they also evidenced that Mr. Oscar Soto recognized that he had sold to Ronulfo, although not in 1981, but in 1988. The witnesses Alicia Sánchez and Blanca Ester Rojas, wife and sister-in-law of the plaintiff, stated they knew about that transaction between Ronulfo and Octaviano (folios 1462 to 1463 and 1465 to 1466). This Chamber verified that the co-defendant Oscar Soto himself admitted and reiterated in his briefs of answer to the claim and counterclaim, although with the date of 1988 (folios 120 to 135), hence the Court had that circumstance as demonstrated. Therefore, from all of this, what is deduced is that despite the fact that in the plaintiff's thesis his possessory conduct with respect to the farm began in 1984 and that Oscar Soto was the registered owner, this he affirmed in relation to his brother Ronulfo, never in relation to the company; and, in addition, that among the three Oscar, Ronulfo, and Octaviano, there was the will to transfer the farm all in 1988 (in accordance with the date set by the Court and confirmed by the Tribunal), for which reason the plaintiff believed there was successive tract (tracto sucesivo). Without it being deducible that Octaviano González knew that the now appellant, Mr. Oscar Soto, had previously contributed that farm to a company. Thus, contrary to what was affirmed by the appellant, from the facts of the claim and the testimony it cannot be held that Octaviano González knew that before 1988 “legal problems existed” or family problems regarding the farm; even less that he knew specifically that the farm had been delivered in the incorporation of La Florida S.R.L. (which would in reality be the fact of importance), since—it is repeated from the recital regarding the company's appeal—it was not demonstrated that in 1988 or previously, the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad) contained even a notation regarding the contribution of the property to La Florida.

Therefore, the reproach is not admissible.

**XXVII.** **Second.** Improper application of mandates 455 and 853 of the Civil Code. The appellant claims the Tribunal erred by considering that adverse possession (usucapión) operated in this case upon finding “the existence of a transferable title of ownership (título traslativo de dominio) ‘a non domino’.” He explains that the transfer he made to Octaviano in 1988 is not a transfer a non domino, because at that time he was the registered owner of the property. Therefore, he continues, adverse possession (usucapión) does not apply because one of the essential requirements set forth in Article 853 of the Civil Code is not met, that being that the transferable title of ownership (título traslativo de dominio) must be, according to case law, a non domino, and not from the registered owner. He explains: “The problem with the effective registry transfer of that property occurred due to an event that happened years earlier (1985), (sic) in which the undersigned—through deception—did not have control of the situation, resulting in the incorporation of the Limited Liability Company La Florida, to which, as a contribution, I transferred the property that is the object of this litigation, which is why when Octaviano tried to file the deed with the Public Registry, he could not register it because there was a prior registration in the Property Registry and following the maxim first in time, first in right, the first one prevailed, which was finally registered in the name of the company La Florida S.R.L. in 1994.” **XXVIII.** The assertions of the appellant Soto surprise this Chamber. The discrepancy between the registry information and reality is a fact that only he, as a party to the contract he signed in a public deed in 1988, was aware of; it was not proven to be known by the plaintiff. He contributed the property upon the incorporation of La Florida S.R.L. in 1985 and therefore, undoubtedly knew that he was not the owner of that property from then on and that he did not have the capacity to dispose of it, as he did. Without being the holder of ownership of the farm, he sold it to Mr. Octaviano González. It is then incomprehensible that, using the title the Public Registry of Property showed in 1988, without being so, he now claims he was the true owner and, based on that false appearance, seeks to prevent the plaintiff’s adverse possession (usucapión). The fact that the Public Registry did not record the true ownership of the property in 1988 does not mean he was the verus dominus. It is undeniable that the transferable title of ownership (título traslativo de dominio) the plaintiff has came from a non domino, the cassation appellant himself. Consequently, the appropriate course of action will be to deny this grievance.

**XXIX.** Consequently, it will be appropriate to declare both cassation appeals without merit. The appealed judgment will be confirmed in what was the object of these appeals.

**POR TANTO** Both cassation appeals filed are declared without merit; as appealed, the appealed judgment is confirmed.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Rocío Rojas Morales** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** **Jorge Alberto López González** **Jéssica Alejandra Jiménez Ramírez** MACUNAQ

20180004000566-4400920-1.rtf  Res. 001762-F-S1-2021 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas veintidós minutos del doce de octubre de dos mil veintiuno.

Proceso ordinario establecido en el Juzgado Civil y Agrario de Puntarenas por OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA contra LA FLORIDA SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA, representada por su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma Franklin Rodríguez Soto, y ÓSCAR SOTO JIMÉNEZ. Figuran por el actor reconvenido, como apoderados especiales judiciales Ramón Jiménez Castro y Victoria Jiménez Rodríguez, como abogado Máximo Corrales Vega; por la codemandada reconventora La Florida S.R.L., actuó como abogado Franklin Rodríguez Soto; por el codemandado reconventor Soto Jiménez, Jorge Arias Barrantes y José Badilla Villanueva.

Redacta el magistrado López González

CONSIDERANDO

I.De conformidad con los hechos que tuvo por demostrados el Tribunal, luego de prohijar los acreditados por el Juzgado, sin que sean controvertidos en esta fase, se tiene que mediante escritura pública otorgada a las 18 horas del 26 de marzo de 1985 ante el notario público Oscar Omar Monge, el señor Oscar Soto Jiménez y sus familiares, señoras: Dora Jiménez Granados, cédula 2-272-967, Vecsi Soto Jiménez, cédula 2-169-325; Aracelly Soto Jiménez, cédula 2-195-031; Flor Soto Jiménez, cédula 9-041-222; constituyeron la sociedad La Florida S.R.L., en lo cual, el señor Oscar Soto Jiménez aportó para la constitución dos inmuebles, de la provincia de Puntarenas, matrículas 20679 y 11883. En el año 1988 (sin fecha determinada), el señor Oscar Soto Jiménez vendió la finca 6-20679 al señor Ronulfo González Vega (hermano del señor Octaviano González Vega). Para el 4 de marzo de 1988, aparecía como propietario registral de la finca 6-20679 el señor Oscar Soto Jiménez. En esa data, mediante escritura otorgada a las 12 horas ante el notario público Olivier Rojas Benavides, el señor Oscar Soto Jiménez vendió a Octaviano González Vega, por la suma de ¢150.000,00, recibidos a entera satisfacción, la finca 6-20679, sita en el distrito quinto, cantón primero, con una medida de 57 hectáreas 77 áreas 45 centiáreas. En fecha 23 de setiembre de 1994 se inscribió la finca 6-20679 a nombre de La Florida S.R.L. La finca 6-20679 conforma una unidad agraria con otros inmuebles colindantes por el rumbo noroeste y oeste los que han poseído los hermanos del señor Octaviano González Vega. El señor Octaviano González Vega ha ejercido la posesión del inmueble 6-20679 a vista y paciencia de los representantes de La Florida S.R.L. desde el año 1988; tiempo durante el cual le ha dado mantenimiento a las cercas y en algunos apartos o sectores, para su propio beneficio, ha mantenido la actividad ganadera, mediante la renovación de zacate mejorado; no existen construcciones en la finca, el corral que se halla no tiene ningún valor, fue construido por el señor Elier Soto, hermano del señor Oscar Soto. Sobre esta finca 6-20679 consta anotación de demanda bajo el tomo 421, asiento 15708, del 3 de setiembre de 1995, correspondiente juicio ordinario civil 138-1-95, expedida por el Juzgado Civil y de Trabajo de Puntarenas a las 15 horas 30 minutos del 16 de junio de 1995; asimismo, anotación al tomo 552 asiento 11129 presentado a las 11 horas 3 minutos del 24 de mayo de 2005, de la sumaria número 04-3546-175-PE, proceso penal seguido contra Franklin Rodríguez Soto y otro por el delito de Administración Fraudulenta, expedida a las 15 horas 30 minutos del 13 de mayo de 2005 por el Juzgado Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. A nombre de La Florida S.R.L. se canceló ante el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano impuestos de bienes inmuebles del período 2003, 2004 y 2005 por un monto de ¢427.705,45; asimismo, don Oscar Soto Jiménez canceló impuestos de varias fincas, incluida la 20679 hasta el segundo trimestre del año 2003, con el recibo 13306 de fecha 24 de julio de 2003.

II.El señor Octaviano González Vega demandó a La Florida S.R.L. y al señor Oscar Soto Jiménez; pretendió en sentencia se: “1) Se acoja en todas sus partes este Proceso ordinario y se DECLARE EN MI FAVOR LA USUCAPIÓN ADQUISITIVA, SOBRE EL INMUEBLE QUE HE POSEÍDO POR MÁS DE DIEZ AÑOS, EN FORMA PÚBLICA, PACÍFICA, ININTERRUMPIDA Y DE BUENA FE, QUE SE TRATA DE LA FINCA INSCRITA DEL PARTIDO DE PUNTARENAS, MATRÍCULA DE FOLIO REAL NÚMERO VEINTE MIL SEISCIENTOS SETENTA Y NUEVE-CERO CERO CERO, (SITUADA EN Distrito 5 DE PAQUERA, DEL CANTÓN 01 DE LA PROVINCIA DE PUNTARENAS. PIDO QUE SE CANCELE EL TÍTULO INSCRITO DEL ANTERIOR PROPIETARIO Y SE INSCRIBA A MI NOMBRE EL INMUEBLE, LO QUE SE ORDENARÁ EN SENTENCIA AL REGISTRO PÚBLICO DE LA PROPIEDAD. QUE LOS DEMANDADOS PAGUEN AMBAS COSTAS DEL PROCESO. 2) EN FORMA SUBSIDIARIA, QUE SE DECLARE CON LUGAR LA DEMANDA Y SE ME PAGUEN TODO TIPO DE MEJORAS DE LA FINCA DE MARRAS, LO QUE SE HARÁ EN EJECUCIÓN DE SENTENCIA Y TAMBIÉN AMBAS COSTAS DEL PROCESO”. Los demandados fueron notificados el día 23 de diciembre de 2005.

III.La Florida S.R.L. contestó de forma negativa la demanda y estableció las defensas de “falta de causa”, “falta de personería activa y pasiva” y falta de derecho; así como la frase genérica “sine actione agit”. A su vez, contrademandó al señor Octaviano González Vega para que en sentencia se declare “a) Que mi representada LA FLORIDA SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA, es la propietaria registral y dueña absoluta de la finca del Partido de Puntarenas, folios real matrícula número VEINTE MIL SEISCIENTOS SETENTA Y NUEVE-CERO CERO CERO, plano catastrado P-50299-1956. b) Que mi representada LA FLORIDA S.R.L., COMO PROPIETARIA ABSOLUTA DE LA FINCA DEL PARTIDO DE PUNTARENAS, FOLIOS REAL MATRÍCULA NÚMERO VEINTE MIL SEISCIENTOS SETENTA Y NUEVE-CERO CERO CERO, TIENE DERECHO DE POSEERLA, CON EXCLUSIÓN DE CUALQUIER OTRA PERSONA, Y DISPONER DE ELLA A COMO MEJOR LE CONVENGA A SUS INTERESES, POR LO QUE SI FUERE NECESARIO, SE LE PONDRÁ EN POSESIÓN EFECTIVA Y MATERIAL DE LA MISMA, POR MEDIO DE ESTE TRIBUNAL O DEL TRIBUNAL O AUTORIDAD QUE ESTE DESPACHO JUDICIAL COMISIONE AL EFECTO, CON EL APOYO Y RESPALDO DE LA FUERZA PÚBLICA, O POR MEDIO DE ESTA DIRECTAMENTE, ENTREGÁNDOSE DE ESA FORMA LA MISMA. c) Que se le condene al reconvenido o contrademandado OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA, a pagarle a mi representada LA FLORIDA S.R.L., la suma de CIEN MILLONES DE COLONES, por los frutos por él percibidos con la explotación que de dicha finca ha realizado en los últimos diez años, en ganadería. También que se le condene a dicho señor a pagar a mi representada, los frutos del uso y usufructo de dicha finca que realice su entrega definitiva, los que se liquidarán en ejecución de la presente sentencia. d) Que se le condene al contrademandado o reconvenido a pagarle a mi representada, ambas costas de esta contrademanda”.

IV.El señor Oscar Soto Jiménez también se opuso la demanda y planteó las defensas de falta de legitimación y falta de derecho. Reconvino al señor Octaviano González Vega para que “Se declare con lugar la presente contrademanda. Se rechace la solicitud de Usucapión exigida por el actor, se le obligue al pago de las costas procesales y personales y accesoriamente daños y perjuicios ocasionados por el actuar reprensible del actor”.

V.En sentencia 11-2017 de las 16 horas 15 minutos del 27 de febrero de 2017, el Juzgado Civil y Agrario de Puntarenas dispuso: “(…) Se acogen las excepciones de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación en su modalidad pasiva, y sin especial pronunciamiento sobre la sine actione agit, por ser comprensiva de la de falta de derecho. Asimismo, se rechaza la excepción de falta de causa por no estar contemplada dentro del elenco de pretensiones que señala la ley y se rechaza la excepción de falta de legitimación activa por cuanto la empresa La Florida S.R.L. es la titular registral, para declarar parcialmente CON LUGAR la demanda ordinaria de OCTAVIANO GONZALEZ VEGA contra LA FLORIDA S.R.L., en el siguiente orden: Se rechaza la pretensión para declarar a su favor el Instituto de Prescripción Positiva. Se acoge la pretensión subsidiaria en cuanto al pago de mejoras a favor del actor, las que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia, conforme lo parámetros establecidos en el considerando vi. punto c). Siendo el actor un poseedor de buena fe, tiene derecho de retención del inmueble hasta tanto la sociedad La Florida S.R.L. cancelé la totalidad del monto que se fije por ese concepto. El actor y la propietaria registral podrán dar por terminado el reclamo concedido por concepto de mejoras, mediante un arreglo conciliatorio. En lo que se omite pronunciamiento respecto a la demanda entiéndase no concedido. Por otra parte, se acogen las excepciones de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación en la modalidad activa y pasiva, para declarar SIN LUGAR en todos los extremos la demanda establecida por Octaviano González Vega contra Oscar Soto Jiménez. Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y se rechazan las excepciones de prescripción negativa y positiva que opuso el actor reconvenido para declarar SIN LUGAR en todos sus extremos la contrademanda de don OSCAR SOTO JIMENEZ contra OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA. Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho y las de prescripción en sus dos modalidades para declarar parcialmente CON LUGAR la contrademanda establecida por LA FLORIDA S.R.L. contra OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA. Consecuentemente, se declara que la sociedad LA FLORIDA S.R.L. es la única y legítima propietaria de la finca inscrita en la Provincia de Puntarenas VEINTE MIL SEISCIENTOS SETENTA Y NUEVE- TRIPLE CERO. Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y por innecesaria se rechaza la excepción de prescripción negativa y por improcedente se rechaza la excepción de prescripción positiva, para declarar que la titular registral reconventora no tiene derecho a reclamar frutos presentes y futuros, según se determinó en el considerando vi.letra b). En lo que se omite pronunciamiento entiéndase no concedido. Por haberse ordenado la reivindicación del inmueble a favor de la titular registral, se declara la NULIDAD ABSOLUTA de la escritura número cuarenta del notario público Olivier Rojas Fernández otorgada el cuatro de marzo de mil novecientos ochenta y ocho a favor del actor; por ser contraria a lo establecido en el artículo 836 del Código Civil, siendo que el transmitente había realizado un acto liberatorio anterior a favor de otra persona jurídica sobre el mismo objeto y consecuentemente, se admite la solicitud de declaratoria de nulidad absoluta solicitada por la parte demandada, conforme lo establece el artículo 837 del Código Civil. Una vez firme la sentencia, expídase el mandamiento de cancelación respectivo ante el Registro. Se mantiene anotada el mandamiento de anotación de demanda, hasta que la propietaria registral cancele los montos que por concepto de mejoras se liquiden en ejecución de sentencia. Costas personales y procesales: De conformidad con el mérito de los autos y el artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil. Se declara sin especial pronunciamiento en costas”. En resolución 336-F-18 de las 16 horas 30 minutos del 20 de abril de 2018, el Tribunal Agrario del II Circuito Judicial de San José dispuso: “En lo apelado por el actor Octaviano González Vega, se REVOCA la sentencia recurrida. En su lugar se resuelve: Respecto a la DEMANDA, se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho, y falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, así como la falta de causa, interpuesta por los demandados, respecto a la pretensión principal. 1.- Se acoge la demanda de prescripción positiva interpuesta por OCTAVIANO GONZÁLEZ VEGA contra LA FLORIDA S.R.L. y Oscar Soto Jiménez sobre el inmueble que ha poseído por más de diez años, en forma pública, pacífica, ininterrumpida y de buena fe, que se trata de la finca inscrita del Partido de Puntarenas, matrícula de folio real número veinte mil seiscientos setenta y nueve-cero cero cero, (situada en distrito 5 de paquera, del cantón 01 de la provincia de puntarenas), (sic) con las colindancias medida y naturaleza que indica el Registro Público. 2.- Se ordena la cancelación del título inscrito del anterior propietario, La Florida S.R.L. y se inscriba a nombre de Octaviano González Vega, mayor, casado una vez, agricultor y ganadero, vecino de Concepción de Naranjo, cédula de identidad nueve-cero diecinueve-trescientos noventa, lo que se ordenará en ejecutoria al registro público de la propiedad, una vez firme este fallo, debiendo prescindirse de cualquier otra anotación que se encuentre caduca o prescrita, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 853 del Código Civil, en relación al 471 del mismo. Una vez firme esta sentencia, el a-quo deberá expedir la ejecutoria correspondiente ante el Registro Público de la Propiedad. EN CUANTO A LA CONTRADEMANDA, se revoca lo resuelto: Se acogen las excepciones interpuesta por Octaviano González Vega de falta de derecho y prescripción (en sus modalidades positiva y negativa), al tenor de lo dispuesto en los artículos 851 al 855 del Código Civil, para en su lugar SIN LUGAR, en todos sus extremos la contrademanda interpuesta por LA FLORIDA S.R.L. y Oscar Soto Jiménez. De conformidad con lo expuesto, al tenor de los artículos 54 y 55 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, al haber vencido en sus pretensiones el actor, en cuanto a la demanda, y las excepciones, en cuanto a la contrademanda, lo procedente es revocar lo resuelto en cuanto a costas, para en su lugar, condenar a los co-demandados reconventores, al pago de ambas costas de este proceso, tanto personales como procesales”. En resolución 400-A-18 de las 16 horas 40 minutos del 2018, el Tribunal dispuso “Se rechaza la solicitud de aclaración y adición. Se corrige el error puramente material, de la parte dispositiva de la sentencia No. 336-F-18 del Tribunal Agrario, para que en lo relativo a la contrademanda, en lugar de la frase "...para en su lugar SIN LUGAR", se lea, "...para en su lugar declarar SIN LUGAR, en todos sus extremos, la contrademanda interpuesta...". Se declara firme este auto”.

VI.Inconformes, plantearon sendos recursos de casación La Florida S.R.L. y el señor Oscar Soto Jiménez, los cuales fueron admitidos por esta Sala. La sociedad formula 7 agravios (de los cuales, el último versa —en lo medular— sobre las costas impuestas). Por su parte, el señor Oscar Soto Jiménez presenta 2 agravios. De previo al examen particular de los cargos, conviene advertir que, tal y como se indicó en el auto de admisión, en el presente asunto, el señalamiento para la audiencia de pruebas se efectuó de previo a la entrada en vigencia de la reforma al Código de Trabajo, operada mediante Ley 9343, Reforma Procesal Laboral, del 25 de enero de 2016, con vigencia a partir del 25 de julio de 2017, por lo que de conformidad con el transitorio I inciso 2) de ese cuerpo legal, constituye un caso de excepción a la aplicación de esta, por lo que la decisión se efectúa conforme a la redacción anterior de esa codificación. Asimismo, se advierte que al haber sido emitida la sentencia recurrida con anterioridad al vigente Código Procesal Civil, Ley 9342, según el transitorio II, el conocimiento y decisión de los recursos de casación se realiza de conformidad con el anterior Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130, que en lo sucesivo se referirá como CPC.

Recurso de casación de la sociedad demandada reconventora

VII.La Florida S.R.L., como de seguido se reseña, planteó 2 agravios de índole procesal. En materia agraria, según establece el precepto 61 de la Ley 6734 de Jurisdicción Agraria del 29 de marzo de 1982, el recurso ante esta Sala se rige por el capítulo V del título VII del Código de Trabajo, cuyo canon 559 —como se indicó, con la redacción anterior a la reforma operada mediante Ley 9343— establecía el rechazo de plano de aquel recurso en el que se pidiese la corrección, reposición o práctica de trámites procesales. Con fundamento en esta norma, con anterioridad esta Sala fue del criterio que en esta materia el recurso de casación únicamente procedía por vicios sustantivos. No obstante, desde la sentencia 583-2004 del 14 de julio de 2004, esta Cámara admitió el examen de vicios procesales cuando recaigan directamente sobre la sentencia; excluyendo aquellos que lo hagan sobre el iter procesal, que son los que expresamente excluye el precepto 559 del Código de Trabajo en cuanto refiere a “trámites procesales”. En ello, se ha sostenido, ha de estarse entonces a la regulación de las causales contenidas en el mandato 594 del CPC, por remisión expresa del artículo 452 del Código de Trabajo. En este orden, se ha aceptado que en materia agraria resultan admisibles los yerros procesales de incongruencia y reforma en perjuicio. También se ha admitido el reclamo por deficiencia en la composición de la litis, en virtud de su incidencia en la eficacia del fallo y por tratarse de un presupuesto de toda relación procesal. En este sentido, pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las resoluciones 971-F-S1-2011, 691-F-S1-2012, 1513-F-S1-2012, 1425-F-S1-2013, 29-F-S1-2015 y 2039-F-S1-2019. Por esta razón, se procede al análisis de los vicios que por la forma plantea la recurrente.

VIII.Primero. La Florida S.R.L. recrimina “la sentencia se encuentra escasamente fundamentada y es violatoria del derecho a la doble instancia”. Manifiesta, recurrió el fallo del A quo únicamente en cuanto otorgó a la parte actora el pago de las mejoras introducidas al inmueble y un derecho de retención. No obstante, el Tribunal solamente conoció el recurso de la parte actora y sobre el suyo dispuso no lo conocía por innecesario; lo cual —argumenta— es contrario al deber de fundamentar, al artículo 155 del CPC, al derecho a la doble instancia y al debido proceso. El Tribunal, denuncia, declinó su obligación de resolver; desatendió la acción impugnatoria de una de las partes y prefirió la de la otra, sin indicar las razones por las que la desechó, “debemos de suponer, y solo suponer, que el fallo dictado por el TRIBUNAL bastó a sí mismo para rechazar nuestra apelación, lo cual es inaudito, porque el TRIBUNAL estaría resolviendo el caso en una única instancia”.

IX.Visto que tratándose de vicios procesales que recaen sobre la sentencia ha de recurrirse al mandato 594 del CPC, resulta claro que ni la falta de fundamentación o la resolución en única instancia, que es lo que acusa la sociedad, se encuentran dentro de las causales previstas. Luego, el agravio será denegado. En todo caso, se hace ver a la casacionista que el Tribunal refirió no conocía los agravios relativos al pago de las mejoras, por innecesario; y ello es claro a esta Cámara por cuanto el pago de las mejoras fue uno de los aspectos que, al acoger el recurso de la parte actora reconvenida, quedó revocado. Acogida la pretensión principal de usucapión a favor del señor Octaviano González Vega; no procedía en consecuencia, ni podía mantenerse el acogimiento de la pretensión de este mismo sujeto consistente en el pago de mejoras, que era subsidiaria. Por consiguiente, los agravios de su recurso de apelación que precisamente atacaban la estimación de ese pedimento subsidiario del actor, pues quedaron insubsistentes al no existir más tal acogimiento. Ergo, la censura se denegará.

X.Segundo. La sociedad denuncia el vicio de incongruencia, al concederse “algo que nunca le fue pedio (sic) (extra petita)” con infracción del artículo 155 del CPC. Trascribe la pretensión de la parte actora en la que solicita la declaratoria de usucapión adquisitiva del inmueble. Ello, dice, fue lo peticionado por la parte actora; sin embargo, el Tribunal de manera unilateral concedió un modo de adquisición del dominio no solicitado, cual es la adquisición a non domino, validando un supuesto título traslativo de dominio bajo la justificación de que la función social de la propiedad permite desdeñar la fijación de los hechos y las pretensiones de las partes.

XI.Al respecto, valga señalar que esta Sala ha reiterado en numerosas ocasiones que para la usucapión agraria común, como la peticionada en este asunto por la parte actora reconvenida el justo título que se exige “debe emanar de quien en Derecho no es dueño. La cosa se adquiere de otro, de quien se comportaba y era reputado como tal, sin serlo; el enajenante es un no propietario, bien porque nunca ha ostentado la titularidad, o porque se ha extinguido o resuelto su derecho, o porque el que exhibe no es suficiente para producir la transferencia; en este último caso está por ejemplo, el usufructuario que aparece transmitiendo la propiedad. La usucapión opera, en consecuencia, cuando el título de transmisión o adquisición es a non domino, de quien no es dueño, mas no cuando es a domino o a verus domino, sea cuando emana del verdadero dueño, porque en este caso, si el título es perfecto surte de inmediato todos sus efectos. Y si tiene algún vicio de otra índole, por emanar del verdadero propietario, su convalidación puede producirse por la prescripción negativa o extintiva de la acción de nulidad y no por la prescripción adquisitiva o usucapión. Respecto del justo título, puede verse, de este órgano, la sentencia no. 821 de las 15 horas 35 minutos del 1 de noviembre del 2000, 856 de las 15 horas 25 minutos del 15 de noviembre del 2000 y 320 de las 15 horas del 27 de abril del 2001” (el subrayado se agrega; así se señaló en el antecedente 178-F-S1-2007, de igual manera en el 536-F-2007, y en la misma línea se encuentran también las resoluciones 891-F-S1-2007 y 945-F-S1-2018). Así, en el presente asunto, la pretensión principal de la parte actora reconvenida imponía a los órganos juzgadores el análisis del justo título, lo que requería se examinase si fue emitido por el verus domino o si lo fue a non domino. Por consiguiente, al determinar el Tribunal que el documento de compraventa del 4 de marzo de 1988 constituye una venta a non domino por parte del señor Oscar Soto al señor Octaviano González, no habría incurrido dicho órgano en el vicio de extra petita acusado; ello formaba parte de la causa de pedir.

XII.Tercero. La Florida sostiene la sentencia presenta “fundamentación contradictoria”. Expone, valida el elenco de hechos probados y no probados de la sentencia del A quo, salvo por el hecho probado 4 que suprime; lo cual revela un problema de estructura lógica pues si mantiene tales circunstancias, no puede válidamente, por lógica, arribar a conclusiones distintas a las del A quo. Advierte, el Tribunal lo que hizo fue un análisis descontextualizado del testimonio de Alicia Sánchez Ramírez. Solo copió y pegó una parte de su declaración. Trascribe, la testigo indicó además: “"Aclaro que yo no estuve el día en que Octaviano compró la finca, eso me enteré porque Octaviano me lo comentó. Ronulfo y Oscar cuando vendieron esta finca no hicieron papeles, en ese entonces, las cosas costaban mucho y lo dejaron para después. Al tiempo fue que se hizo los documentos de Octaviano pero la escritura no pasaba en el Registro y fue por eso que se empezó a indagar. Ese documento se firmó el 4 de marzo de 1988, ahí estaba el Lic. Olivier Rojas y también estaba Octaviano, Ronulfo y Oscar...cuando se hizo la escritura en Palmares no se indagó si la finca estaba inscrita porque la finca era de don Oscar. Me consta que no se hizo ningún estudio en ese entonces en el Registro. Se empezó a indagar al tiempo después por qué la escritura no pasaba en el Registro....desconozco (sic) en qué fecha presentó el Lic. Olivier la escritura de esta compra en el Registro..."”. De esto, sostiene, se concluye que el actor dice le compró la finca a su hermano en 1984, que por el fallecimiento de este decidió hacer los papeles con el verdadero dueño Oscar en 1988, “es decir, si el actor compró en el año 1984 y tan solo 4 años después opta por hacer papeles con el verdadero propietario, es claro que a tan solo 4 años después de haberle comprado a su hermano, se logró imponer de que el terreno se encontraba inscrito, de lo contrario, qué necesidad hubiera habido de localizar a Oscar y hacer papeles con él? Simplemente, se busca a Oscar porque se reconoce que la propiedad se encuentra inscrita y que se debía de contar con la firma del propietario registral (Oscar), para inscribir la adquisición del actor, por lo tanto, ya desde el inicio la buena fe del actor es cuestionable”. Continúa, “Luego, la testigo de comentario dice: "Ese documento se firmó el 4 de marzo de 1988, ahí estaba el Lic. Olivier Rojas y también estaba Octaviano, Ronulfo y Oscar...cuando se hizo la escritura en Palmares no se indagó si la finca estaba inscrita porque la finca era de don Oscar..." afirmación que el TRIBUNAL analiza de forma aislada del contexto general y abstraída de la totalidad del elenco probatorio que consta en el proceso, en primer lugar, si estaban los tres personajes era porque se necesitaba arreglar una situación que no era clara, esto es, que la propiedad aparecía inscrita a nombre de Oscar, por lo tanto, la tesis del TRIBUNAL al respecto de que el actor no sabía o no tenía por qué saber si la finca se encontraba inscrita o si era o no era de Oscar no es cierta, luego, en el mismo documento de adquisición que aporta el actor se lee claramente que Oscar "le vende su finca inscrita", por lo tanto, el razonamiento del TRIBUNAL con relación a lo afirmado por la testigo es totalmente contradictorio con la misma ponderación de ese testimonio así como con el mismo documento que dispone que la inscripción de la propiedad era ya una realidad, y esto ocurre a tan solo 4 supuestos años en los cuales el actor había adquirido de su hermano, por lo tanto, el hecho de firmar el documento con Oscar, es un elemento de prueba claro y determinante para acreditar que el actor, desde esa fecha, ya tenía pleno conocimiento de que la propiedad se encontraba inscrita y que estaba a nombre de Oscar, por lo tanto, lo realmente importante en el caso era determinar si el actor conocía o no si la propiedad se encontraba inscrita en el Registro Público, y tanto la testigo como el mismo documento, acreditan que el actor sí sabía”. Esto, asevera, es suficiente para denegar la prescripción positiva como modo de adquirir el dominio, pues al aceptar que estaba inscrita, no tiene la buena fe necesaria; “cualquier consecuencia derivada del documento que decidió firmar (…) debe ser asumida por el actor, y esto incluye el hecho de que ya la finca no pertenecía a quien le dijo vender, porque ya con fecha anterior la había aportado a la sociedad”. Agrega, si el actor no quiso revisar el Registro ello no le excusa; por lo que la decisión del Tribunal atenta contra los principios de seguridad y certeza jurídicas, de eficacia erga omnes y de la publicidad registral. Destaca, al estar inscrito el inmueble, “cualquier situación particular derivado de ese inmueble, consta en el Registro Público, tal y como ya constaba la anotación relacionada con el aporte de la finca a la sociedad reclamante que ya publicitaba el Registro Público desde el año 1986 y que queda inscrita de forma definitiva en el año 1994. Antes bien, la misma testigo dice que empezaron a realizar averiguaciones porque la escritura no pasaba, entonces eso es claro de que pudieron tener pleno conocimiento de la situación registral del inmueble tanto antes de llevar a cabo la escritura con Oscar como después de haberla llevado a cabo, y si aun así persistieron en ello eso fue un riesgo claramente asumido que ahora les debe generar consecuencias, ya que no constituye una adquisición ni a non domino ni tampoco apta para usucapir, puesto que su buena fe viene a menos por las circunstancias que rodearon esa adquisición”. Indica, “el TRIBUNAL indica lo siguiente: "Por otra parte, tanto el actor, como su anterior poseedor, sea su hermano Ronulfo, a quien confiesa el señor Oscar Soto le vendió para luego traspasar el inmueble a Octaviano, desconocían que La Florida S.A. aparecía como propietaria registral a partir de 1994, en el Registro Público" cuando lo que realmente debió de llamar la atención el TRIBUNAL es que el actor concurre a un acto de firma de escritura, de una finca que se encontraba inscrita, al decir de la testigo: “...cuando se hizo la escritura en Palmares no se indagó si la finca estaba inscrita porque la finca era de don Oscar...” lo que el TRIBUNAL debe comprender es que la testigo refiere que ella asumió que la finca era de Oscar, lo cual contradice el documento aportado y la versión dada por el actor en su demanda, ya que el documento es claro en indicar que se trata de una finca inscrita que Oscar vendía al actor y ese hecho tan puro y simple debió de marcar la pauta al TRIBUNAL para determinar que el actor no tiene posesión amparable, ni mucho menos buena fe ni justo título, ni entendido como documento ni entendido como el mismo hecho de poseer, porque ya como dijimos, tenía pleno conocimiento de que la propiedad se encontraba reducida a dominio privado, siendo así, la posesión que haya venido ejerciendo se tiñe de antijuridica y no es capaz de ser amparable por la vía de la prescripción positiva como modo de adquirir el dominio. Por lo tanto, lo realmente importante aquí no es establecer si el actor sabía que la finca pertenecía a la empresa actora o no, ya que lo relevante es establecer si el actor tenía conocimiento de que la propiedad se encontraba inscrita”. Finaliza, el fallo es contradictorio porque valida un supuesto documento traslativo de dominio, cuando este es plena prueba de que la finca se encontraba inscrita, por lo que no puede adquirirse por usucapión ni mucho menos como “adquisición a non domino”; “una cosa es la posesión ejercida sobre un objeto lícito y posible, de buena fe y en los términos exigidos por la ley agraria para usucapir y otra muy diferente es hacer pasar un acto ilegal como una ignorancia justificada en la buena fe y la función social”.

XIII.Para la decisión de este agravio, conviene tener claros los argumentos del Tribunal en la sentencia recurrida, en su integralidad, para que, de previo, pueda esta Cámara efectuar algunas precisiones generales sobre el tema de la usucapión agraria. Así, se tiene que en los considerandos I y II, el Tribunal compartió los hechos que tuvo por acreditados el Juzgado, con la salvedad del cuarto, que eliminó; asimismo, compartió las circunstancias que tuvo por indemostradas. En los considerandos III y IV resumió el recurso de la parte actora y el de Florida S.R.L. En el considerando V explicó en términos generales el instituto de la usucapión. En el VI expuso también en términos generales sobre la distinción que desde hace varios años estima dicho órgano existe entre la usucapión civil y la agraria. Para ello, insertó una cita larga (cuya fuente no identifica específicamente), pero de la cual interesa destacar que se lee que es en virtud del principio agrario de la “función social de la propiedad” que “se establecen diversos requisitos en la Usucapión agraria”, cuales —se continúa leyendo— son: 1) el animus; 2) el “justo título en la posesión agraria ad-usucapionem” y 3) la “buena fe en la posesión agraria ad-usucapionem”. Detalló: “ 1.- El animus , debe proyectarse a través del ejercicio efectivo de actos posesorios agrarios, convirtiéndose el fundo agrario en la morada habitual del poseedor; pero se refleja más intensamente a través de la apropiación económica de las ganancias obtenidas a través de su trabajo de cultivación; se presume que quien trabaja la tierra de esa forma es siempre poseedor a título de dueño. 2.-El justo título en la posesión agraria ad-usucapionem , lo constituye el trabajo agrario, pues es a través de él que se adquiere la propiedad de la tierra. "Por otra parte, la no exigencia del justo título da lugar a que la usucapión pueda presentarse contra-tábulas, es decir, en contra de un título inscrito a nombre de un tercero en el Registro Público. En virtud de las consideraciones que sobre justo título son hechas en la teoría de la posesión agraria, puede decirse que, la usucapión agraria, al no tomar en cuenta la relación anterior que pueda existir entre el poseedor y el transmitente, es un modo de adquisición verdaderamente originario." (Meza Lázarus, op. cit., página 158). 3.- La buena fe en la posesión agraria ad-usucapionem: En la usucapión agraria, no existe la categorización de la posesión de buena o mala fé, (sic) pues al Derecho Agrario no le interesa tanto la actitud del poseedor, sino sobre todo su actividad productiva agraria; "En el Derecho Agrario no puede concebirse la existencia de este requisito en virtud de que el mismo se encuentra ligado al justo título que es desechado como requisito de la posesión apta para la usucapión. La posesión agraria reviste un carácter de personal en la que su fundamento resulta ser el trabajo. Al no ser necesaria la existencia de un título y su validez, carece de toda razón de ser el requisito de la buena fé (sic) especial en la posesión agraria."(Meza Lázarus, op.cit., página 160-161)” (se eliminan las negritas de la cita original que ahora se trascribe). De seguido en el considerando VII afirmó lleva parcialmente la razón la apelante (lo que se extrae es la parte actora). Explicó, la parte actora dirigió su demanda contra La Florida S.R.L, quien aparece como dueña registral a partir de 1994, y contra Oscar Soto Vega, quien le vendiera en 1988. Está demostrado, continuó, que Oscar Soto Jiménez aceptó haber vendido a Ronulfo González Vega y “y éste a su vez al aquí actor Octaviano González Vega, por lo que la venta se hizo directamente de Oscar Soto a Octaviano, adquiriendo éste bajo la creencia de que quien le estaba vendiendo era el verdadero dueño del inmueble, sin embargo, también es cierto que la venta es a non domino, (no del verdadero propietario), pues si ésta ocurrió el 4 de marzo de 1988 (ver documento de folio 3) mediante escritura pública -título traslativo posesorio-, y Oscar Soto había trasmitido el dominio de dicho inmueble desde el 23 de marzo de 1985 a La Florida Sociedad Anónima (ver folios 5 a 8), don Octaviano no tenía porqué (sic) saber o conocer de dicho traspaso, que fue inscrito en el Registro Público hasta el año 23 de setiembre de 1995 (ver folios 5 a 17). El título traslativo de dominio exhibido por el actor, es idóneo, válido, verdadero y eficaz, pues las partes dieron su consentimiento -nudo consensu- y a partir de ahí, se perfeccionó el contrato, comportándose a partir de ese momento don Octaviano como el legítimo dueño y propietario real del fundo”. Añadió, “No es cierto, como lo afirma la a-quo que Octaviano tuvo conocimiento que la venta a su favor no se realizó porque existía un documento antes de la inscripción a favor de La Florida S.R.L., porque así lo hizo saber el notario. Esa afirmación de la jueza de instancia, está fundada en un error en la valoración de la prueba, concretamente un error material o de hecho, pues pone en boca de la testigo Sancho Ramírez algo que no dijo en su declaración. En efecto, si se lee integralmente la misma, se llega a una conclusión diferente. La señora Alicia Sánchez Ramírez señaló con claridad: "...Después de que Octaviano la adquirió nunca vi que dono Franklin o don Oscar trabajaran la finca. Nunca, desde que Octaviano adquirio (sic) la finca don Franklin o don Oscar, le indicaron a don Octaviano que no podía trabajar la finca. La finca si estaba inscrita, desconozco si Octaviano sabría eso cuando la compró. Yo lo averigüe en el Registro después de que Octaviano había comprado. Yo empecé a hacer unos cursos de computación y como nos ponían a practicar, usando la computadora encontré que estaba inscrita a nombre de la Sociedad La Florida, eso hace unos ocho años. Desde esa fecha en adelante nunca nadie de esa sociedad ha indicado o reclamado a Octaviano por la finca...".(ver folios 1439-1440). Es decir, las averiguaciones comenzaron tiempo después del año 2000, cuando ya el actor tenía más de diez años de poseer el inmueble en forma pública, pacífica, con justo título y buena fe, situación que se consolidó, indudablemente a partir del cumplimiento de los diez años, sea el 5 de marzo de 1998”. Agrega, “Por otra parte, tanto el actor, como su anterior poseedor, sea su hermano Ronulfo, a quien confiesa el señor Oscar Soto le vendió para luego traspasar el inmueble a Octaviano, desconocían que La Florida S.A. aparecía como propietaria registral a partir de 1994, en el Registro Público. Mucho menos ese acaecimiento puede tenerse -como lo tuvo erróneamente la a-quo, como un acto interruptor de la posesión, como hecho material. Nada más errado en cuanto a la aplicación normativa de lo dispuesto en el artículo 853 y siguientes del Código Civil, pues una mera inscripción registral (publicidad) no es capaz de interrumpir la prescripción positiva, pues no corresponde a las causas de interrupción reconocidas por el legislador (artículos 875 y 876 del Código Civil)”. Señaló el Tribunal que la testigo Sancho Ramírez indicó que se “dieron” cuenta de que la propiedad estaba inscrita a nombre de la sociedad, pero eso ocurrió cuando ya había pasado el plazo de la usucapión. Detalló, la posesión del actor había sido durante más de 10 años como dueño y con justo título “real y existente pues mediante No. 40 (…) del 4 de marzo de 1988 (folios 3 y 4) Oscar Soto Jiménez le vende a Octaviano González Vega” la finca inscrita, la cual había el primero aportado a la sociedad, situación que desconocía el segundo. Resaltó de seguido, comprador y su transmitente son quienes se han comportado como dueños reales del fundo, pagando peones, cuidando y mejorando el fundo, manteniendo apartos, sembrando pastos mejorados, dedicándolo a la actividad ganadera por más de 20 años, es decir, cumpliendo el ejercicio de la función social de la propiedad, según se desprende de “de la declaración de: Blanca Ester Rojas Zúñiga quien afirmó: "...Quien trabaja esta finca es Octaviano, él adquirió esta finca porque se la compró a mi esposo Ronulfo González Vega, eso hace ya más de veinte años. Mi esposo compró esta finca a Oscar Soto Jiménez...Esta finca don Octaviano la dedica a la ganadería actualmente, también se ha sembrado en ocasiones maíz, yuca...En el pueblo a quien reconocen como dueño de estos terrenos es a Octaviano González Vega, él le da mantenimiento a las cercas y a la finca junto a sus peones...se encuentra en mejores condiciones ahora, Octaviano sembró pastos mejorados, antes lo que había era pastos "burros", también ha mejorado las cercas "(ver folio 1436). El testigo Mainor Francisco Castro Jiménez señaló: "Ellos, aclaro, la familia González tienen de trabajar esta finca ya hace como dieciocho años aproximadamente..."(folio 1437)...Quienes trabajan esta finca son los hermanos González y sus peones, ellos la dedican a la ganadería..."(folio 1438). La testigo Alicia Sancho Ramírez explica con más detalle: "La finca está dividida en apartos seis en total, ...Desde que Octaviano adquirió la finca nunca nadie lo ha interrumpido...es quien compra todos los alambres para las cercas y los peones son los que le dan mantenimiento, siembran pastos mejorados en toda la finca. Octaviano es quien los compra, así como los herbicidas, me consta porque yo soy la que hago los cheques..." (folio 1439). El testigo Fernando Enrique Castro Jiménez, refiriéndose al tiempo de la posesión señala: "Los González tienen aproximadamente unos dieciocho o diecinueve años de tener la finca. Esta finca lo que he apreciado desde afuera siempre se ha mantenido igual...Para el mantenimiento de la finca los González utilizan un Chapulín y también peones..."(folio 1441). El testigo Dagoberto Suárez Araya agregó lo siguiente: "Yo conozco la finca objeto de este proceso desde hace veintitrés años aproximadamente, yo he trabajado con Octaviano en esa finca desde ese mismo tiempo, yo le ayudo con el ganado y arreglo las cercas. Desde que conozco la finca he trabajado ahí...dedica la finca para ganado, tiene sembrado pasto de tipo Brisante y Braquiar, hay aproximadamente unas sesenta cabezas de ganado vacuno de raza Braman...."(folio 1443-1445). (sic) Ver en el mismo sentido las restantes declaraciones de Luis Alberto Barrientos Mora (folio 1445), y Alfredo Ramírez Sandi (a folios 1448-1449)”. Reiteró, de lo anterior se desprende el comportamiento del actor como legítimo dueño, al disponer del bien en actividades agrarias de ganadería, mantenimiento de repastos y cercas, siembras de pastos mejorados y “también la inercia del titular en el ejercicio de sus derechos de restitución sobre el inmueble, al haber dejado de transcurrir más de diez años”. Continuó, “el actor tiene, como se indicó, el título traslativo de la posesión, y la buena fe, pues ha mantenido la convicción de que adquirió del verdadero propietario (a non domino)”. Sostuvo, si el actor y su transmitente tenían para 1998 más de 10 años de ejercicio continuado de posesión de buena fe, les aplica el párrafo segundo del artículo 285 sobre que si la posesión fuere de buena fe en su principio, no pierde ese carácter por el solo hecho de que el poseedor dude posteriormente de la legitimidad de su derecho, por lo que en este caso debe presumirse la buena fe a favor del usucapiente.

XIV.Se estima oportuno advertir que, contrario a lo sostenido por el Tribunal sobre los distintos requisitos para la usucapión agraria, esta Sala en la sentencia 920-F-2000 de las 15 horas 25 minutos del 13 de diciembre de 2000, indicó que “el mero ejercicio de actos que se dicen posesorios no suple las condiciones legales que la ley exige para usucapir, relativas al justo título y a la buena fe. De consiguiente, los juzgadores de instancia han errado al disponer que, en lo que denominan “usucapión agraria”, se han de desechar una serie de elementos que aparecen en el derecho civil como requisitos de la posesión apta para la usucapión, como lo son el justo título y la buena fe, por cuanto, según lo expresan, el justo título lo constituye el trabajo agrario y la buena fe no es relevante, en la medida en que no interesa la actitud del poseedor, sino su actividad productiva. Ese razonamiento es, abiertamente, contrario a lo expresado en los artículos 853, 855 y 856 del Código Civil, que resultan aplicables en la especie. En este sentido, en tratándose de asuntos tramitados bajo la competencia agraria, no se deben obviar las condiciones legales dichas, necesarias para que opere la prescripción positiva, pues, salvo la situación contemplada, expresamente, por los artículos 92 y 101 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias [se trata de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, y no como por error se indicó], relativa a los poseedores en precario y bajo la estricta observancia de los trámites y procedimientos que esa ley prevé al efecto –cuestiones ajenas al caso que nos ocupa-, en nuestro régimen jurídico, en lo que a la usucapión del derecho de propiedad sobre bienes inmuebles se refiere, absolutamente, ninguna disposición jurídica establece la exoneración al deber de concurrencia del justo título y la buena fe. Todo lo contrario, la ley exige ambas condiciones, junto con la posesión calificada por el artículo 856 del Código Civil, para que resulte procedente la prescripción positiva, (…) [.-] VI.- Ya esta Sala ha reiterado la necesidad de que el usucapiente reúna las tres condiciones legales para que opere la usucapión, igualmente, en casos tramitados bajo la competencia agraria, precisamente, porque la ley aplicable así lo determina (pueden consultarse, por ejemplo, las siguientes sentencias de esta Sala: número 4 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiocho de enero de mil novecientos noventa y ocho; número 50 de las quince horas veinte minutos del veinte de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho; número 95 de las quince horas treinta minutos del dos de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho; número 1 de las catorce horas del seis de enero de mil novecientos noventa y nueve)”. Con anterioridad, en la resolución 821-F-2000 de las 15 horas 35 minutos del primero de noviembre de 2000 (asunto civil aunque no por ello resulta en un tratamiento diverso para la materia agraria, como se expresó en el antecedente de recién cita), esta Cámara se había pronunciando sobre el justo título de la siguiente manera: “de conformidad con nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, este requisito se refiere al título traslativo de dominio y no a las cualidades de la posesión, por cuanto ésta última goza de autonomía, y ha de presentar, según se expuso, las características de pública, pacífica, ininterrumpida y en condición de titular. El título traslativo de dominio se constituye en elemento justificante de la posesión -no a la inversa-, y debe contar con esta característica antes o al momento de poseer. Tampoco ha de confundirse con la buena fe, pues ésta es un requisito subjetivo relacionado con la creencia del adquirente de estar asistido por el derecho en la posesión ejercida. La justicia del título radica, según lo ha desarrollado la doctrina, antigua y reciente, en su veracidad y validez. La primera característica se refiere a su existencia real, excluyéndose como tal al título putativo y al simulado. En ambos casos, no hay un justo título operante, sólo la apariencia de éste”. Asimismo, en esta misma oportunidad se señaló sobre la prueba del justo título por parte del adquirente que “Nuestro Código Civil, en su artículo 854, exige la prueba de este requisito, pero exceptuando los casos en los cuales existen presunciones posesorias - tratándose de muebles o del derecho de posesión, o no lo requiere del todo para usucapir servidumbres continuas y aparentes-. La razón de las excepciones resulta fácil de entender, por el diverso tratamiento dado a los casos señalados. Tratándose del derecho de poseer, la forma de adquisición es más ágil que la prevista para el derecho de propiedad, pues su contenido no es pleno y permanente como el de ésta. En efecto, para adquirir este derecho, basta la posesión por un año (Artículos 279 y 869, in fine, del Código Civil). Pero ello, por una presunción posesoria válida tan sólo para el derecho de poseer, según reza el artículo 281 ibídem, mas no referida a la causa adquisitiva de la propiedad, la cual, a tenor del ordinal 854, siempre debe probarse. En otras palabras, no puede asimilarse el título justificativo de la simple posesión, con el título de adquisición verdadero y válido, según se indicó, de la propiedad. El ordinal 281 y el 854, lejos de contradecirse, encuentran correspondencia en sus respectivos ámbitos de aplicación. A este punto, es oportuno recordar los derechos reales susceptibles de ser adquiridos por usucapión, en los cuales sí se requiere la demostración del justo título. Entre ellos se encuentra el derecho de propiedad -como derecho pleno- y los derechos de usufructo, uso y habitación como derechos derivados-. En estos casos, no basta con presumir el derecho de poseer; es necesario demostrar una justa causa adquisitiva del dominio, del usufructo, del uso o de la habitación. La función de la presunción posesoria, plenamente aplicable al simple derecho de poseer -derecho real en cosa ajena, el cual, pese a su enorme relevancia, tiene un rango inferior al de propiedad- o al de dominio sobre bienes muebles -lo cual se funda en el sistema de publicidad a éstos aplicable-, no ha sido extendida por nuestra legislación a la prueba del justo título en otros casos. En éstos, la diferente naturaleza y consideración socio económica de los derechos, requieren, en el complejo supuesto de hecho de la adquisición originaria analizada, una causa justificante de la posesión, la cual sea explícita y permita, no sólo analizar si el título es justo (válido y verdadero), sino también su concordancia con el bien objeto de posesión. En relación, pueden consultarse, entre otras, las sentencias de esta Sala números 19 de las 14:00 hrs. del 7 de abril de 1993; 45 de las 15:05 hrs del 22 de mayo de 1996; y, 1 de las 14 hrs. del 6 de enero de 1999”. Posteriormente, en la resolución 178-F-2007 de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 14 de marzo de 2007 se precisó existen dos tipos de usucapión agraria, la común y la especial, entre las que hay diferencia en cuanto a sus presupuestos. Se explicó, la usucapión agraria especial se encuentra regulada en la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, mandatos 92 y 101, cuyo fundamento es la posesión precaria por necesidad de explotación del fundo agrario, como medio de subsistencia propia o del núcleo familiar; “En esta posesión precaria de tierras prevalecen la necesidad alimentaria y el trabajo familiar agrario. No se requiere el simple ánimo de poseer, se debe poseer en forma efectiva, directa y personal, para satisfacer necesidades de alimentación del grupo familiar. De ahí que para que opere, no es determinante la existencia de buena o mala fe, en tanto este elemento es sustituido por la necesidad”. Por su parte, se continuó, la usucapión agraria común se rige por la normativa general del Código Civil, por lo que de conformidad con el precepto 853 debe demostrarse el justo título y la buena fe, así como la posesión; se enfatizó la regulación general de la usucapión “requiere la concurrencia de ciertos requisitos: cosa hábil, sea, susceptible de propiedad privada; ubicada dentro del comercio de los hombres; justo título traslativo de dominio; buena fe; posesión y transcurso del tiempo, ejercida aquélla en calidad de propietario, en forma continua, pública, pacífica y por diez años o más (artículos 853 y 860 del Código Civil). Dichos presupuestos son concurrentes, de modo que de estar ausente solo uno de ellos, será entonces improcedente la prescripción adquisitiva”. Posición que reitera de manera más puntual el criterio expresado en el precedente citado 920-F-2000 de las 15 horas 25 minutos del 13 de diciembre de 2000. En esta línea, de más reciente data, en la sentencia 945-F-S1-2018 de las 10 horas 35 minutos del primero de noviembre de 2018, dictada dentro de proceso ordinario agrario, se indicó que “ XI.- Respecto del instituto de la usucapión, esta Sala, de forma reiterada ha dispuesto con base en la normativa aplicable, se necesitan determinados requisitos para que se configure, a saber, título traslativo de dominio, buena fe, posesión ejercida en calidad de propietario de forma continua, pública y pacífica, así como el transcurso del tiempo, sean 10 años como mínimo. Sobre el tema, así ha estimado en sentencia no. 114 de las 12 horas 11 minutos del 5 de febrero de 2016, lo siguiente : “Sobre la usucapión agraria, ya esta Sala en otras ocasiones ha indicado que para que prospere se requiere el cumplimiento de varios requisitos: título traslativo de dominio, buena fe y posesión; pero esta debe ser a título de dueño, en forma pública, pacífica e ininterrumpida por un período de 10 años, tomándose en cuenta que en materia agraria, el aspecto de la posesión trasciende de la simple ocupación [entiéndase, posesión] del fundo, pues en estos casos se requiere existan actos posesorios agrarios, tendentes a cultivar y mejorar el bien que se pretende usucapir. Puede consultarse en este sentido la resolución de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 18 de septiembre de 2013, que responde al voto número 1196.” –lo resaltado no es del original-”. Adelante se expresó: “(…) el hecho de que el actor siguiera trabajando el terreno, cuyo fundamento, dice el demandante, se encuentra en el acuerdo de voluntades realizado en forma verbal, entre él y la Cooperativa -en cuanto a la devolución futura de la porción de terreno en litis-, ello no reviste las características necesarias para que se configure el título traslativo apto para usucapir –pues no es un título traslativo de quien no es dueño-. Por ello, concibe esta Cámara, no se configura uno de los presupuestos de la usucapión. Según se expuso en líneas precedentes, no es el mero hecho de la posesión lo que debe valorarse cuando se revisan los presupuestos de la usucapión, sino la situación jurídica antecedente o la causa por la cual se posee. Y en este caso, la causa o la razón por la cual dice el actor encontrarse en posesión del terreno, dista de aquella que se considera apta para usucapir”. Así las cosas, de todo lo anterior se desprende que si bien esta Sala ha sostenido una nota distintiva entre la usucapión ordinaria o civil y la usucapión agraria común, esta se reduce a que el presupuesto de la posesión en materia agraria no lo constituye cualesquiera actos de posesión, sino que consiste en actos de posesión agrarios, como los serían las acciones de cultivo, de ganadería, la apicultura, entre otros. La tesis de que la posesión de carácter agrario releva, sustituye o constituye el título traslativo de dominio ha sido descartada por esta Sala ya desde vieja data, en los antecedentes señalados.

XV.Ahora, si bien esta Sala no comparte lo señalado por el Tribunal en términos generales sobre el justo título o título traslativo de dominio en la usucapión agraria ordinaria; lo cierto es que, pese a esas consideraciones más abstractas, en el considerando VII del fallo recurrido, al ingresar al análisis del presente asunto, dicho órgano identificó el “título traslativo de dominio exhibido por el actor” como el contrato de compraventa entre Oscar Soto y el actor, en lo que insistió que “la venta es a non domino, (no del verdadero propietario)”, ocurrida “el 4 de marzo de 1988 (ver documento de folio 3) mediante escritura pública –título traslativo posesorio-, y Oscar Soto había trasmitido el dominio de dicho inmueble desde el 23 de marzo de 1985 a La Florida Sociedad Anónima (ver folios 5 a 8)”. El Tribunal entendió que esa compraventa de 1988 es tanto “título traslativo de dominio” como “título traslativo posesorio”, utilizó ambas locuciones; lo cual —a su vez comprende esta Sala— no resulta distinto o un error partiendo de que el dominio tiene por atributo la posesión. Luego ese negocio de 1988 es la causa de la transmisión del dominio (de un sujeto non domino que aparentaba serlo) como requisito de la usucapión, pero también es la causa por la cual inició el hecho de la posesión por parte de Octaviano González, por la que finalmente el Tribunal decretó adquirió el derecho de dominio o de propiedad frente al de la sociedad inscrito. De esta manera, al margen de la discrepancia en cuanto a la tesis general que sobre los presupuestos de la usucapión agraria sostuvo el Tribunal, la decisión de este órgano no la fundó en el hecho de la posesión como título traslativo de dominio a los efectos del derecho de propiedad o dominio mismo como expuso en esa parte general; la fundó sobre la escritura de compraventa del 4 de marzo de 1988 entre Oscar Soto y el actor, momento para el cual el primero pese a ser el titular registral, no era el dueño del inmueble (circunstancia esta última que —se observa— al no estar publicitada en la finca misma en el Registro Público, no podría sostenerse automáticamente era de conocimiento del señor Octaviano, salvo prueba en contrario). Con estas advertencias y esta aclaración, se procede a resolver el cargo.

XVI.El argumento medular de la sociedad recurrente es que el actor conocía que la finca se encontraba inscrita, pues ello se deduce del testimonio de la señora Alicia Sánchez Ramírez y de la escritura misma entre el actor y Oscar Soto; por lo que al conocer que estaba inscrita, no procede la usucapión. Se observa, no se percata la reclamante de que en efecto el bien se encontraba inscrito, pero a nombre de Oscar Soto, quien compareció en 1988 ante notario a público a vender dicha finca inscrita al actor. No fue este hecho, que la finca se encontraba inscrita, negado por el actor; en todo caso, lo tuvo por demostrado el Juzgado y fue prohijado por el Tribunal. Luego, hasta aquí resulta inútil su argumento para quebrar el fallo, pues nunca negó el Tribunal que el actor conociese que la finca se encontraba inscrita; el punto fundamental es que estaba inscrita sí, a nombre de Oscar Soto, quien ya no era en realidad su dueño. Por otra parte, en cuanto afirma que “ya constaba la anotación relacionada con el aporte de la finca a la sociedad reclamante que ya publicitaba el Registro Público desde el año 1986 y que queda inscrita de forma definitiva en el año 1994”, no refiere la casacionista elemento de convicción del que se extraiga esa conclusión fáctica, la cual no la tuvieron por acreditada los órganos de instancia. Hace ver la sociedad que la testigo Alicia Sánchez Ramírez relató que ella y Octaviano “empezaron a realizar averiguaciones porque la escritura no pasaba”, y de ahí deduce que “es claro de que pudieron tener pleno conocimiento de la situación registral del inmueble tanto antes de llevar a cabo la escritura con Oscar como después”. Deducción que no podría seguirse. Véase que no puntualiza la recurrente prueba alguna de la que se extraiga que en 1988 constara en el Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble, que ese fundo había sido aportado en su constitución, a través —cuando menos— de una anotación al margen de esa finca o que constara la titularidad de La Florida S.R.L. en dicho Registro. No comprende a cabalidad esta Cámara la censura pues dentro del mismo agravio manifiesta que la finca se encontraba en efecto a nombre de Oscar Soto. Al estar inscrito en el Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble que el señor Oscar Soto era el dueño de la heredad, sin que en realidad lo fuera (por haberla aportado en 1985 en la constitución de La Florida S.R.L.), la compraventa que este efectuó en 1988 a Octaviano González configura, como bien indicó el Tribunal, un negocio a non domino. Esta es la característica que —según ya se indicó en el considerando XI— debe reunir el título traslativo de dominio que exige el canon 853 del Código Civil para usucapir la propiedad, tal cual ha establecido esta Sala de manera reiterada, así en el ya referido fallo 178-F-2007, criterio reiterado en las resoluciones 536-F-2007, 891-F-S1-2007 y 945-F-S1-2018. En este último precedente de más reciente data, esta Sala primero citó: “la sentencia no. 536 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 27 de julio de 2007, este Órgano judicial señaló: “Sobre el justo título para usucapir. En la especie, el recurrente indica que el justo título en materia agraria está determinado por la posesión misma. Empero, ese reparo no es de recibo. Tocante a este presupuesto, precisa señalar que consiste en la relación jurídica antecedente, en razón de la cual se obtiene la cosa con aptitud para usucapir. Reiteradamente ha señalado esta Sala que debe emanar de quien en Derecho no es dueño. La cosa se adquiere de otro, de quien se comportaba y era reputado como tal, sin serlo; el enajenante es un no propietario, bien porque nunca ha ostentado la titularidad, o porque se ha extinguido o resuelto su derecho, o porque el que exhibe no es suficiente para producir la transmisión; en este último caso está por ejemplo, el usufructuario que aparece transmitiendo la propiedad. La usucapión opera, en consecuencia, cuando el título de transmisión o adquisición es a non domino, de quien no es dueño, mas no cuando es a domino o a verus domino, sea cuando emana del verdadero dueño, porque en este caso, si el título es perfecto surte de inmediato todos sus efectos. Y si tiene algún vicio de otra índole, por emanar del verdadero propietario, su convalidación puede producirse por la prescripción negativa o extintiva de la acción de nulidad y no por la prescripción adquisitiva o usucapión. Respecto del justo título, puede verse, de este órgano, la sentencia no. 821 de las 15 horas 35 minutos del 1 de noviembre del 2000, 856 de las 15 horas 25 minutos del 15 de noviembre del 2000 y 320 de las 15 horas del 27 de abril del 2001.” –lo resaltado no es del original-”. De seguido, al analizarse el caso concreto señaló: “No se alega en este asunto, la existencia de un título traslativo de dominio, de un no dueño al accionante, donde se le traslade la posesión al actor, para que éste creyese ser el verdadero titular del terreno. Por su parte, el hecho de que el actor siguiera trabajando el terreno, cuyo fundamento, dice el demandante, se encuentra en el acuerdo de voluntades realizado en forma verbal, entre él y la Cooperativa -en cuanto a la devolución futura de la porción de terreno en litis-, ello no reviste las características necesarias para que se configure el título traslativo apto para usucapir –pues no es un título traslativo de quien no es dueño-. Por ello, concibe esta Cámara, no se configura uno de los presupuestos de la usucapión. Según se expuso en líneas precedentes, no es el mero hecho de la posesión lo que debe valorarse cuando se revisan los presupuestos de la usucapión, sino la situación jurídica antecedente o la causa por la cual se posee. Y en este caso, la causa o la razón por la cual dice el actor encontrarse en posesión del terreno, dista de aquella que se considera apta para usucapir” (el subrayado y negrita se agregan). En suma, el argumento de la recurrente no resulta útil para desvirtuar lo dispuesto por el Tribunal pues redunda en que —en su parecer— no puede usucapirse un bien inmueble que se encuentre inscrito pues eso significa necesariamente que no tiene buena fe ni título traslativo de dominio; lo cual es incorrecto pues, conforme a los mandatos 853 y 856 del Código Civil, la usucapión ha de decretarse si, además del título traslativo de dominio emanado de un non domino, pero que aparentaba serlo en virtud —como en este caso— de la titularidad registral, el demandante reúne la buena fe y la posesión en calidad de propietario, continua, pública y pacífica. En este caso, la inscripción de la finca con pertenencia a Oscar Soto, lejos de restar buena fe al actor, la confirma; sin que en este agravio alegue la recurrente otras circunstancias que hagan concluir lo contrario y su sustento probatorio. Resta señalar únicamente que no existe contradicción alguna por parte del Tribunal por haber mantenido el cuadro fáctico del Juzgado y arribar a una decisión diversa. La subsunción de esas mismas circunstancias a la normativa jurídica dará uno u otro resultado según la aplicación e interpretación del Derecho que realice el órgano juzgador, y será el superior —como en el presente— quien defina cual es la recta aplicación e interpretación.

XVII.Cuarto. Acusa erróneo “análisis del elemento probatorio”, por descontextualizado y divorciado de la demás prueba, en concreto lo refiere a los testimonios de Alicia Sánchez Ramírez, Blanca Ester Rojas Zúñiga, Mainor Francisco Castro Jiménez, Fernando Enrique Castro Jiménez, Dagoberto Suárez Araya, Luis Alberto Barrientos Mora y Alfredo Ramírez Sandí. Repite, el documento de adquisición del actor da cuenta de que se trata de una finca inscrita en el Registro Público, por lo que la conclusión del Tribunal sobre la buena fe es errada. Si bien, afirma, según el canon 286 del Código Civil, en caso de duda la buena fe se presume, pero también se admite prueba en contrario y cuando la ley exige la posesión de buena fe, se considera poseedor de buena fe al que en el acto de posesión creía tener el derecho de poseer, pero si había motivo suficiente para que dudara de corresponderle tal derecho, no se le debe considerar de buena fe. En este caso, sostiene, “existía motivo suficiente para que dudara corresponderle tal derecho, porque en el documento suscrito se indica que la finca se encuentra inscrita en el Registro Público, pero que a pesar de ello, como refirió la testigo SANCHEZ RAMIREZ: "Me consta que no se hizo ningún estudio en ese entonces en el Registro" lo cual permite establecer que si no hicieron esos estudios eso es de su absoluta responsabilidad y que por el contrario, obraron con clara y evidente mala fe”. Dice, el Tribunal no hizo una ponderación de la prueba, lo que sí hizo la juzgadora de primera instancia; transcribe un segmento largo de esta sentencia. De seguido, sostiene, “Del análisis expuesto podemos determinar que la juzgadora de primera instancia incurre en acierto al momento de realizar el mismo, porque sí dice, de forma clara y concreta, cuál es el valor probatorio que le asigna a cada uno de esos elementos probatorio y expone además las razones por las cuales lo hace. El TRIBUNAL no lo hace así”, se conforma con un “análisis muy laxo de los testimonios y eso es violatorio del deber de fundamentar”. Destaca, la A quo analizó las pruebas documentales para lo que dedicó un acápite; cosa que no hizo el Tribunal, sino que de forma excesivamente resumida pretende otorgar valor sin expresar razones. Enfatiza, para la sentencia de primera instancia la “posesión del actor no es amparable, porque no posee un título justo ni traslativo y tampoco existe buena fe, conclusión a la cual llega después de analizar de forma pormenorizada los elementos probatorios testimoniales y documentales. Contrario al deber de fundamentar, el TRIBUNAL no fundamentó de ninguna forma la sentencia recurrida, no se refiere en concreto ni de forma pormenorizada por qué se le debe de otorgar otro valor probatorio a estos elementos de prueba, tampoco realiza una relación de todos los elementos probatorios entre sí, para apreciarlos en comunidad”. Sostiene, ha sido víctima de un despojo de su bien, al amparo de “documentos falsos que ni siquiera logran ser inscritos en el Registro Público (ni siquiera fueron presentado a contrapelo de la adquisición de la empresa vía aporte mediante su presentación en el año 1986)”, por lo que tiene derecho a recuperar esa finca “aun cuando haya terceros adquirentes de buena fe, cosa que en el presente caso no sucede, porque el actor (…) evadió de forma intencional y directa el confiar en la publicidad registral que le mostraba que la persona que le vendía no tenía derecho a vender”. Esto, prosigue, no implica desconocer a terceros de buena fe, pues ellos tienen los mecanismos previstos en la legislación civil para reclamar al vendedor la garantía o el pago de daños y perjuicios. Reitera, desde 1986 está publicitado que el inmueble fue aportado en su constitución. Continúa, “En este caso es muy dudosa la transparencia de un negocio, en el que se adquiere de un inmueble inscrito ni siquiera hizo los estudios correspondientes. La tutela de los terceros adquirentes de buena fe, en los términos que se pretenden por el actor, implican despojar al legítimo propietario del bien que le pertenece. Tal solución resulta, sin duda alguna, desmedida, desproporcionada y, finalmente, injusta. La importancia de la publicidad registral y sus principios, no pueden prevalecer sobre el derecho de la primer víctima -el legítimo propietario, originariamente despojado en forma fraudulenta- de mantener la titularidad plena sobre sus bienes o en todo caso, el derecho a ser restituido en el goce de los mismos”. Finaliza, la adquisición a non domino no puede constituirse en mampara de legitimación de hechos delictivos y se torne en obstáculo para que el verdadero propietario despojado pueda recuperar el bien.

XVIII.El agravio resulta una mezcla de argumentos que por sí misma, por falta de precisión impone su denegatoria. Así, por un lado, se dedica a afirmar que el análisis de las pruebas por parte del Juzgado es correcto, más no así el que efectuó el Tribunal. Es decir, se concentra en contrastar directamente los fallos, para luego afirmar que el Tribunal incurrió en una falta a su deber de fundamentar. Reclamo que como ya se indicó constituye un vicio procesal que si bien recae sobre el fallo, lo cierto es que no constituye una causal de casación de conformidad con el artículo 594 del CPC, cuya aplicación supletoria establece la norma 452 del Código de Trabajo. Por otra parte, la recurrente reitera lo argüido en el vicio antecedente en el sentido de que al estar inscrita la finca en el Registro Público, la parte actora no podía usucapir por cuanto esa inscripción por sí elimina la buena fe del actor. Estese a lo indicado respecto del agravio precedente en el sentido de que el hecho de que la finca se encontrara inscrita en el Registro Público a nombre de Oscar Soto, determina que la escritura del 4 de marzo de 1988 constituye el título traslativo de dominio a non domino en los términos del canon 853 del Código Civil; asimismo, que es criterio de esta Sala que, contrario a su decir, lejos de quebrar la buena fe que se presume a la parte actora, la refuerza, pues precisamente el actor creía que quien le vendía tenía derecho para ello según lo indicaba el Registro Público de la Propiedad. Así establece el mandato 285: “En todos los casos en que la ley exige posesión de buena fe, se considera poseedor de buena fe al que en el acto de la toma de posesión creía tener el derecho de poseer”. Continua la norma: “Si había motivo suficiente para que dudara de corresponderle tal derecho no se le puede considerar de buena fe”; no encuentra esta Sala se hubiese demostrado que en 1988, el señor Octaviano tuviese motivo para dudar de que al adquirir la finca de quien en el Registro aparecía como dueño, no le habría correspondido ejercer la posesión como atributo del domino. La fe pública registral da sustento a una buena fe que no fue desvirtuada. Prosigue el mandato; “pero si la posesión fuera de buena fe en su principio, no pierde ese carácter por el solo hecho de que el poseedor dude posteriormente de la legitimidad de su derecho. Cesa de ser de buena fe la posesión en el momento de adquirir la certidumbre de que se posee indebidamente, y cesa también desde la notificación de la demanda en que otro reclame el derecho de poseer”; no observa esta Sala que ante un título en el cual concurrió Oscar Soto en 1988, dueño según el Registro, pueda concluirse con total seguridad que, una vez inscrito el dominio de La Florida S.R.L. sobre la finca en el Registro en 1994, ni siquiera teniendo conocimiento de esta inscripción el señor Octaviano González, este adquirió certidumbre sobre que poseía indebidamente el predio, tenía alrededor de 6 años desde que lo había comprado cuando se inscribió en el Registro la titularidad de La Florida, y no quedó demostrado que entre esa compra en 1988 hasta la interposición del este asunto, es decir, alrededor de 17 años, la sociedad haya intentado alguna acción en su contra. Podría haber dudado, pero la sola duda no le habría restado buena fe. Adicionalmente, en sí el cargo resulta además confuso, por cuanto, por una parte dice que el actor no es un tercero adquirente de buena fe pues podía comprobar que quien le vendía no tenía derecho para ello, sobre lo que —se repite— no identifica en qué prueba consta que esa información estaba anotada o registrada en la finca, sino que parece deducirlo de la presentación de su constitución al Registro Público mismo, hecho que por sí mismo claramente no constituye publicidad pues su inscripción en el Registro de Personas Jurídicas y el otorgamiento de un número de cédula, no da publicidad a la transmisión de un bien inmueble (se trata de registros distintos). Pero al mismo tiempo, hace ver que como adquirente de buena fe, el actor bien pudo reclamar al señor Oscar Soto los daños y perjuicios y las mejoras que introdujo al inmueble. Es decir, por una parte reconoce el señor Octaviano compró amparado en el Registro; pero por otra, afirma que el Registro hacía constar otra información, por lo que —se entendería, alega— no estuvo amparado en el Registro. Por todas estas razones, el cargo será desestimado.

XIX.Quinto. Reclama “incorrecta aplicación de la adquisición a non domino”. Dice, el Tribunal hizo un esfuerzo por legitimar el documento aportado por el actor como título traslativo de dominio por lo que recurrió a la figura de la adquisición a non domino, con lo cual desfiguró los presupuestos de esta. Explica en qué consiste –en su criterio— el fraude inmobiliario. Asevera, para que se produzca la adquisición a non domino de un bien inmueble es necesario que concurran conjuntamente los siguientes requisitos fundamentales: a) que el adquirente tenga la condición de tercero, b) que haya adquirido su derecho a título oneroso, con buena fe y de persona que conforme al Registro de la Propiedad tenga facultades para transmitirlo, y, c) que además haya inscrito su adquisición. Estos presupuestos no se dan en este proceso. Recrimina, “la adquisición a non domino no es un instrumento válido ni idóneo para validar el documento en cuestión, sino un modo de adquirir el dominio como tal”; además, los hechos en este asunto no calzan con esta figura, porque “el título traslativo, como tal en derecho agrario, no debe entenderse como documento, sino como causa adquisitiva y que puede llegar a ser la posesión en sí misma”. Prosigue, “el actor plantea un problema jurídico relacionado con la prescripción positiva o usucapión y no sobre la adquisición a non domino. En aplicación del derecho de fondo, el TRIBUNAL resuelve por indicar que en lo que se refiere al título existe adquisición a non domino, cuando el justo título es solamente uno de los requisitos exigidos por la ley agraria para usucapir y además, debe de entenderse justo titulo como causa licita o adquisitiva constituida por el mero hecho de poseer. Siendo así, no puede el TRIBUNAL validar el título traslativo aduciendo que existe adquisición a non domino, porque una cosa es que exista adquisición a non domino y otra cosa es que el titulo traslativo exista o sea lícito”. Sostiene, el documento presentado por el actor no acredita la adquisición a non domino pues es una escritura que nunca fue presentada en el Registro, de manera que con base en ello no se configura “el adquirente a non domino [que] pueda reclamar que su adquisición es cierta, de quien en apariencia tenía derecho a enajenar, a pesar de que ese derecho sea resuelto o anulado” como dispone el artículo 456 del Código Civil. Reitera, por el contrario se probó que la finca se encuentra inscrita desde 1974 y que fue aportada en su constitución el 26 de marzo de 1985, presentada al Diario del Registro Mercantil en el año de 1986 y posteriormente inscrita al tomo 352, asiento 15789 el 3 de setiembre de 1994; por lo que la escritura de compraventa entre el actor y Oscar Soto del 4 de marzo de 1988 nunca presentada ni inscrita no puede tener la capacidad de desplazar la primacía de su derecho real anterior “que por efectos de la publicidad registral y del tracto sucesivo, ya existía anotado desde el año 1986 informando a las partes y al público en general, que Oscar Soto ya había enajenado el inmueble aportándolo a una sociedad familiar”. Cita el precepto 455 del Código Civil, por el cual los títulos sujetos a inscripción no perjudican a tercero sino desde la fecha de su presentación, y reafirma, la escritura por la cual se le aportó la finca se presentó al Registro desde el año 1986. Introduce una cita extensa de lo que identifica como la resolución 1-1999 de esta Sala, y de seguido asevera, “Dicho de otro modo, el TRIBUNAL incurre en un grave error de aplicación de la ley sustantiva porque lleva a otras dimensiones la aplicación de la adquisición a non domino, dimensiones que son muy peligrosas, porque hacen fracasar el orden establecido en la ley en lo que se refiere a los presupuestos reales que deben existir para la aplicación de la verdadera adquisición a non domino así como la omisión absoluta y nociva de los principios de seguridad y certeza jurídicas que brinda la inscripción y la publicidad registral, así como la supremacía de los derechos reales contenida en el artículo 455 del Código Civil y la eficacia erga omnes de la misma publicidad registral”. Asegura además, el hecho de la posesión del actor no es cierto pues ella (sociedad) dispuso del bien con anterioridad a este proceso con la constitución de gravámenes hipotecarios, así en el año 2004, a los cuales debió recurrir para financiar los procesos presentados en su contra por el señor Oscar Soto y el señor Octaviano González (trascribe la información que dice consta en el Registro). De ahí, dice, “la supuesta posesión del actor es meramente circunstancial, un acto de mala fe que viene heredado por los problemas que se han tenido entre Oscar Soto y la empresa”. Destaca, el Tribunal debió resolver sobre lo pedido, es decir, sobre la usucapión, determinando si el documento aportado por el actor era o no un justo título o título traslativo; lo que no, pues conocía que estaba inscrito y optó por no hacer los estudios registrales, además de que elimina la presunción de buena fe y así su posesión no es amparable, ya que fue de mala fe, en circunstancias turbias por lo que pierde el derecho al cobro de mejoras, que también debió ser rechazado.

XX.El agravio resulta confuso, mezcla una serie de temas sin un claro norte. Así, plantea 4 ideas autónomas. La primera, que es reiteración de anteriores agravios, cual es que el Tribunal aplica la figura de la adquisición a non domino, cuando el objeto del proceso era la usucapión, y que aquella no resulta de aplicación al presente asunto, en el cual no se cumplen los presupuestos para esta. La segunda, el justo título en materia agraria no lo constituye un documento; si no, la posesión misma. La tercera, que su derecho real anterior de propiedad “ya existía anotado desde el año 1986 informando a las partes y al público en general, que Oscar Soto ya había enajenado el inmueble”. Y la cuarta, que la posesión del actor no es cierta pues ella dispuso del bien, así en el 2004 cuando le impuso gravámenes hipotecarios. En cuanto al primer aspecto, ya se indicó sobre los agravios precedentes que se trata de un argumento inatendible pues precisamente la figura de la usucapión, como ha reiterado esta Sala, exige el título traslativo de dominio de quien no es el titular o dueño. Respecto de la segunda idea, de que en materia agraria no interesa el documento traslativo de dominio, sino la posesión, tampoco lleva razón por cuanto —según se explicó ampliamente— para la usucapión agraria común se requiere el título traslativo de dominio, sin que pueda confundirse con los requerimientos de la usucapión especial agraria contemplada en la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, no es la que se alegó en este proceso. En consecuencia, hasta aquí, además de esa mezcla argumentativa, tampoco su tesis habría encontrado sustento en la jurisprudencia de esta Cámara. Sobre la tercera proposición, en la cual insiste la casacionista, ahora sí más puntualmente, que al haber sido presentada en Registro Mercantil su escritura de constitución, el actor debió conocer que el señor Oscar Soto no era el dueño del inmueble, sino que lo era ella pues “existía anotado”, debe decirse lo siguiente. Tal cual ya se indicó, el Juzgado y el Tribunal no consignaron que a partir de 1985, 1986, ni mucho menos en 1988 estuvo consignada alguna anotación en la finca 6-20679 que advirtiese al público que el fundo había sido aportado a una sociedad; tampoco la recurrente especifica una prueba en concreta que permita concluir ese hecho. Por el contrario, la sociedad más bien de nuevo admite que el negocio lo efectuó don Oscar, quien a pesar de aparecer como el dueño en el Registro Público, no era tal; todo lo cual configura precisamente el título traslativo de dominio a non domino que encontró el Tribunal, al tiempo que excluye la aplicación del precepto 455 del Código Civil en la línea que aduce la casacionista. Por último, en cuanto agrega, por otro lado, un cuestionamiento a la posesión del actor, por cuanto ella hipotecó la finca con anterioridad a este proceso, el argumento incomprensible a esta Cámara, pues parece olvidar que la posesión es en sí un hecho, que en este caso fue comprobada a partir de 1988 y se produjo por más de 10 años, sin que contra este particular hecho (posesión inmediata) alegue inexistencia o la niegue. La constitución e inscripción de una garantía hipotecaria no desdice el hecho posesorio del actor. Esa clase de disposición del bien se encontró habilitada por la titularidad registral con la que goza desde 1994, más nada implicó sobre la posesión inmediata que ejercía el actor. Luego, el agravio también será rechazado.

XXI.Sexto. Arguye “falta de aplicación de los presupuestos de la acción reivindicatoria” con lo cual omite la aplicación del canon 45 de la Constitución Política. Expone, la posesión es solo un atributo del dominio; para que la posesión origine el derecho de propiedad debe de cumplir con todos los requisitos exigidos por el ordenamiento jurídico para que opere como modo de adquirir el dominio, lo que corresponde a la prescripción adquisitiva, “que es un modo de adquirir el dominio de las cosas ajenas por haberlas poseído durante cierto lapso, y concurriendo los demás requisitos legales por todos conocidos como el justo título, de forma ininterrumpida, a título de dueño y de buena fe, por espacio mínimo de diez años”. Es impensable, expresa, que “una persona como el actor pueda acceder al derecho de propiedad cuando en la especie otro ostenta ese derecho y aquel no cumple con todos los requisitos para usucapir. Siendo de ese modo, el TRIBUNAL incurre en falta de aplicación de la ley de fondo, al rechazar lo pedido en la contrademanda”. Repite, “nuestro derecho de propiedad nos obliga a la correspondiente inscripción en el Registro Público, hecho éste que logramos publicitar con el aporte realizado a la empresa desde el año 1986 y por razón de esto, el TRIBUNAL no puede venir a diezmar nuestros derechos plenamente garantizados a nivel constitucional y legal, validando una adquisición raquítica plasmada en un documento cuestionado que de acuerdo con la ley no tiene siquiera la facultad de surtir efectos jurídicos ante terceros desde que nunca fue presentado al Registro Público”. Resalta, su derecho de propiedad es inviolable, imprescriptible según el artículo 320 del Código Civil. Insiste, al actor faltan los requisitos del justo título y buena fe, por lo que no puede acceder al dominio. Cita violentados además los preceptos 316, 317, 318 y 321 del mismo cuerpo legal, pues no reconoce su derecho a reclamar en juicio la cosa objeto de su propiedad, el libre goce de todos y cada uno de los derechos que comprende la propiedad, su “derecho como poseedores del inmueble (atributo del dominio)” y a reclamar su posesión, su derecho a ser restituido en la posesión. Agrega, “la sentencia incurre en falta a su deber de aplicar el derecho que tenemos de proceder con la acción reinvindicatoria (sic) contra el que poseía de mala fe y ha dejado de poseer”. Refiere, el actor no reúne las condiciones subjetivas para ser considerado como un poseedor agrario “puesto que con los mismos elementos probatorios recabados en el proceso, se tiene establecido que el actor es dueño de otros inmuebles, que ni siquiera vive en esta propiedad, por lo que es claro que adolece del principio de inmanencia, que sería un hecho puro y simple muy importante a considerar, porque en ese sentido el actor no es un productor agrícola o de actividades agrícolas por conexión como medio de subsistencia, carece de inmanencia que le permite vincularse de manera obligada, social y solidaria con el fundo, por lo tanto, no es cierto que exista justificación social en la ejecución de los actos de posesión que viene a reclamar el actor, nótese que se habla de mantenimiento de cercas, no se habla de una verdadera producción agrícola, tampoco se habla de que de esa producción depende económicamente ni el actor ni su familia. Los testigos llegan a establecer que el actor es un gran empresario ganadero, no es un agricultor de subsistencia, y que la supuesta posesión que hace es por intermedio de otras personas, ni siquiera es él, por lo tanto, se descarta que sea un poseedor agrario que reúna los requisitos subjetivos para usucapir”. Añade, la inspección judicial fue preterida por el Tribunal; “estas desatenciones generan un resultado tan terrible como el obtenido en el fallo recurrido, de ese modo, a nada bueno conduce mantener incólume el fallo del TRIBUNAL, cuando lo que merece es ser anulado”.

XXII.Una vez más la casacionista mezcla una serie de ideas o temas que expone sin mayor estructura, y que finalmente habrían de tener un tratamiento autónomo o al menos concatenado con claridad. Esta falta de precisión determina por sí la desestimación de este cargo. Al margen de lo anterior, en cuanto puede extraerse un argumento medular, cual es que el actor no adquirió el dominio por usucapión, por lo que concluye, debe entonces accederse a la pretensión reivindicatoria de su reconvención, se advierte que tal premisa es incorrecta. Conforme a lo determinado por el Tribunal, lo cual no logró la casacionista quebrar en los agravios antecedentes, el señor Octaviano sí adquirió el derecho de dominio sobre el bien inmueble por cuanto tiene un título traslativo de dominio que le extendió un non domino, ejerció la posesión durante más de 10 años en calidad de propietario, de forma pública, pacífica y continua, y la buena fe que se le presume no fue desvirtuada en este proceso. En consecuencia, al ser errada su premisa, la conclusión también lo es; es decir, no incurrió el Tribunal en infracción del mandato constitucional 45 ni de las normas legales de la reivindicación. En cuanto se muestra disconforme por el acogimiento de la usucapión al estimar que la posesión del actor no es “posesión agraria”; se le hace ver que la calificación de “agraria” interesaba a los efectos de la jurisdicción competente para resolver esta controversia, no así respecto del acogimiento de la pretensión de usucapión que se pidió, pues fue la común. Lo que interesa es que se acreditó la posesión, bien pudo tildarse de agraria o de otro clase, pero posesión finalmente. La producción de subsistencia para su familia, a la que refiere la casacionista, interesa a los efectos de la usucapión agraria especial de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización (que no fue la peticionada), sin que estos sean aspectos determinantes en la usucapión civil y en la usucapión agraria común. En todo caso, resulta incomprensible que la casacionista niegue la calificación de agraria a la posesión, al tiempo que califica al actor como empresario ganadero. La agrariedad no solo se encuentra en la siembra de cultivos para el consumo propio y familiar, como parece entender la sociedad. Por último, sobre la insistentemente alegada publicidad de la aportación de la finca en 1985, estese a lo dicho en los considerandos precedentes en el sentido de que la presentación al Registro Público de la escritura de constitución por sí no concede la publicidad, esta se configura con la inscripción o, al menos, la anotación al margen de la finca misma. La constitución de la persona jurídica por sí no alertaba al público de que operó una transmisión del derecho de propiedad sobre el inmueble. Así, por lo dicho, se desestimará esta censura.

XXIII.Sétimo. Arguye “escasa fundamentación en cuanto a la imposición de costas de la demanda y contrademanda a esta parte”. Describe, el Tribunal estimó que la demanda debía ser declarada con lugar; sin embargo no fundamentó por qué motivo le condenó a ella al pago de costas de la demanda y contrademanda. Agrega, también incumplió con su deber de fundamentar las razones por las que declaró sin lugar su contrademanda. Sostiene, de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico se permite la exención del pago de costas cuando la parte haya litigado con evidente buena fe; lo cual, dice, probó pues reclama el terreno que Oscar Soto le aportó voluntariamente. Prosigue, “En todo caso, el análisis de la cuestión de fondo que se realiza contiene graves errores de hecho y de derecho derivados de otorgar valores probatorios a ciertos elementos de prueba que en realidad son producto del análisis incorrecto de los mismos así como que desdeñó otorgarles el verdadero valor probatorio que tienen, además, omitió dar contenido y valor a una gran cantidad de elementos probatorios que demuestran la existencia del mérito para declarar con lugar la acción de reivindicación y sin lugar la acción de usucapión todo lo cual se erige como respuesta correcta ante la negativa inapropiada del Tribunal recurrido de analizar la prueba conforme el ordenamiento jurídico establece”. Añade, optó el Tribunal por “aplicar de forma incorrecta la sanción máxima de condena al pago de las costas contenida en el artículo 222 del Código Procesal Civil”, sin percatarse que ella tuvo motivo bastante para litigar, pues el actor admitió que la finca estaba inscrita por lo que no tuvo buena fe. Señala, no puede obviar el Tribunal que ella “tiene derecho suficiente para reclamar, desde que la finca se encuentra inscrito a su favor”. Insiste, el actor tejió un cuadro en el aparece como único poseedor, pero existente elementos de prueba “que acreditan los actos de disposición”, por lo que “hizo mal en no justificar adecuadamente la decisión adoptada en cuanto a las costas”. Menciona además los cánones 54 y 55 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria y 222 del CPC. Trascribe el acápite del fallo recurrido sobre las costas y repite no cumple con el deber de fundamentar.

XXIV.Conforme se indicó, la falta de fundamentación, que se acusa ahora sobre el pronunciamiento sobre las costas, no constituye una causal de casación conforme a las previstas en el mandato 594 del CPC. Por lo que desde la perspectiva procesal se denegará el agravio. En cuanto reclama por sí la condenatoria, la recurrente no es clara, parece que justifica su buena fe al litigar o motivo suficiente para litigar en razón —insiste— de que llevaba razón en sus defensas y pretensiones, a las que no accedió el Tribunal por la supuesta indebida valoración de las probanzas e incorrecta aplicación del derecho. De esta manera, parte de nuevo de una premisa errónea, pues no acertó con las recriminaciones precedentes. En este orden, al no verificarse tal premisa no podría arribarse a la conclusión que exhibe, la que en todo caso habría sido incompatible, ya que de haber logrado una decisión del asunto a su favor, la imposición de las costas habría recaído sobre su contraparte perdidosa, salvo exención. Y en ese caso habría resultado inútil ingresar a examinar la “buena fe” o “motivo suficiente para litigar” de la parte vencedora. Al margen de lo anterior, no se observa de su exposición del agravio algún elemento por el cual pueda considerarse se encuentra en el supuesto de exención que contempla el precepto 55 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria (que es la norma atinente a su reclamo), cual es, litigio de buena fe por tener motivo suficiente para litigar. Desde vieja data se ha señalado que esta hipótesis de motivo suficiente para litigar no consiste en la mera convicción de la tesis que sustenta, sino que necesariamente el convencimiento de la propia tesis ha de responder a datos objetivos del proceso que permitan deducir la bondad de sus pretensiones o defensas; como datos objetivos del proceso se ha identificado la sutileza en la “cuestión legal”, que consiste, por ejemplo, en que lo discutido se funde en una interpretación pura de las normas jurídicas al no resultar controvertido el cuadro fáctico (en este sentido la resolución 222-F-S1-2019). Consecuentemente, por todas las razones anotadas, no lleva razón la casacionista.

Recurso de casación del demandado reconventor Oscar Soto Jiménez

XXV.Primero. Acusa indebida valoración probatoria. Cita los cánones 38 inciso b) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, 341 del Código Procesal Civil y 853 del Código Civil. Sostiene, el Tribunal incurrió en error al valorar los hechos 4, 5 y 6 de la demanda y el testimonio de Alicia Sánchez Ramírez, cónyuge del actor. Detalla, en los hechos 4, 5 y 6 de la demanda (que trascribe), el actor confiesa y admite haber conocido de previo a 1988, que es la fecha para la que para el Tribunal inició el plazo para usucapir- que “existían problemas legales”. Alega, constituyen confesión espontánea de que tenía conocimiento de la situación real de la finca y los conflictos familiares existentes. Por otra parte, su esposa también lo confirmó al admitir que tanto Franklin (representante de la sociedad) como él le habían indicado que no podían trabajar la finca. Trascribe de esa declaración “interesa lo siguiente [.-] "(...) Cuando Octaviano le compró la finca a Ronulfo no se firmó ningún documento, el (sic) se lo compró verbalmente. Desconozco cuanto pagó Octaviano por la finca a Ronulfo. Que yo sepa, don Ronulfo le vendió la finca a Octaviano, Octanio (sic) tomó la responsabilidad de la finca y él la trabajaba. Desde que yo conozco la finca solo ví (sic) trabajada por don Oscar, y por don Ronulfo y ahora por don Octanio. (sic) Después que Octaviano la adquirió nunca vi que don Franklin o don Oscar trabajaron la finca nunca, desde que Octaviano adquirió la finca don Franklin o don Oscar, le indicaron a don Octaniano que no podría trabajar la finca." (el resaltado es nuestro) (ver declaración en folios 1439 a 1440) ”. Explica, la discusión giró en torno a la fecha de adquisición de la finca; la parte actora dijo haber adquirido en 1984 por compra a su hermano Ronulfo, no a Oscar Soto; pero “porqué (sic) -a pesar de que no pudo haber demostrado haber adquirido en esa fecha- la parte actora se empecinó en señalar su fecha de compra en el año 1984 y no 1988, que es el año de la compraventa celebrada ante notario público?. (sic) Pues precisamente porque es a partir del año 1985, en donde se ocurrió la cesión del inmueble a la Sociedad La Florida S.R.L., siendo que en efecto tal y como queda demostrado en los hechos de la demanda de la parte actora, así como la declaración de la testigo- (sic) su esposa- Alicia Sánchez, que previo al año 1988, ya conocía de la situación litigiosa del bien”. Continúa, al conocer de previo a la compra de la finca esa situación jurídica litigiosa, esa compra no cumple con uno de los presupuestos esenciales de la posesión, cual es la buena fe.

XXVI.A folio 1465 se lee que, contrario a lo afirmado por el casacionista, la testigo Alicia Sánchez Ramírez manifestó: “Despues (sic) que Octaviano la adquirió nunca vi que don Franklin o don Oscar trabajaran la finca. Nunca, desde que Octaniano (sic) adquirió la finca don Franklin o don scar (sic), le indicaron a Octanio (sic) que no podía trabajar la finca” (subrayado y negrita se agregan). Por otra parte, se observa en la demanda, el señor Octaviano González relató en los hechos 3 y 4 que el señor Oscar Soto Jiménez vendió en forma verbal la finca 6-20679 a su hermano Ronulfo González Vega en 1981, a partir de lo cual su hermano entró en posesión; que aproximadamente en 1984, él (Octaviano) adquirió también de forma verbal dicha finca de su hermano, a partir de lo cual ha estado en posesión de esta, la que ha mantenido desde entonces, sumando 21 años, a los cuales se suman los años en que su hermano poseyó, para un total de 24 años de posesión. En este tiempo, dijo, no ha sido molestado por persona alguna. En los hechos 5, 6 y 7, expresó que el señor Oscar Soto, “dueño Registral de la finca”, y él formalizaron la compraventa mediante escritura pública del 4 de marzo de 1988, ante el notario público Olivier Rojas Fernández, número 40 del tomo 11 del protocolo; lo cual no se inscribió en el Registro Público por cuanto “el mismo Oscar Soto Jiménez, la había dado como aporte, en una sociedad constituida con sus familiares con antelación a la venta que me hizo”, sociedad cuyo nombre es La Florida S.R.L. y cuya constitución data del 26 de marzo de 1985. Estas acciones, dijo, tanto el aporte a la sociedad como la venta pueden estar viciadas de nulidad, pero “en nada afectan ni han afectado” la posesión que ha ejercido, por más de 20 años, sin ser molestado por nadie. De la narración de estos hechos de la demanda lo que se puede extraer es que afirmó compró la heredad al dueño registral Oscar Soto y que en el momento que fue presentada al Registro Público esa escritura, esta fue rechazada pues la finca estaba entonces a nombre de La Florida, pero no precisó siquiera en qué data fue presentada al Registro Público esa escritura de compraventa. No puede extraerse que haya expresado con el valor de una confesión que el 4 de marzo de 1988 tuvo conocimiento de que el recurrente había aportado la finca a La Florida en 1985. Por demás, si bien manifestó el actor que había comprado a su hermano Ronulfo en 1984, momento en que entró en posesión, y que formalizó esa venta con Oscar Soto, “dueño Registral de la finca”, en 1988, lo cierto es que el A quo y Ad quem tuvieron por acreditada la posesión del actor a partir de la escritura de 1988; pero además evidenciaron que el señor Oscar Soto reconoció que había vendido a Ronulfo, aunque no en 1981, sino en 1988. Las testigos Alicia Sánchez y Blanca Ester Rojas, esposa y cuñada del actor, manifestaron conocer sobre esa negociación entre Ronulfo y Octaviano (folios 1462 a 1463 y 1465 a 1466). Verificó esta Sala que el propio codemandado Oscar Soto admitió y reiteró en sus escritos de contestación de demanda y reconvención aunque con data de 1988 (folios 120 a 135), de ahí que el Juzgado tuvo por demostrada esa circunstancia. Luego, de todo esto, lo que se deduce es que pese a que en tesis del actor su conducta posesoria respecto de la finca inició en 1984 y que Oscar Soto era el dueño registral, esto lo afirmó con respecto a su hermano Ronulfo, nunca con relación a la sociedad; y, además, que entre los tres Oscar, Ronulfo y Octaviano, se dio la voluntad de transmitir la finca todo en 1988 (acorde con la data dispuesta por el Juzgado y confirmada por el Tribunal), por lo que el actor creía había tracto sucesivo. Sin que pueda deducirse que Octaviano González conocía que el ahora recurrente, señor Oscar Soto, había aportado esa finca con anterioridad a una sociedad. Así las cosas, contrario a lo afirmado por el casacionista, de los hechos de la demanda y del testimonio no puede tenerse que Octaviano González que conocía que antes de 1988 “existían problemas legales” o problemas familiares con relación a la finca; menos aún que conocía puntualmente que la finca había sido entregada en la constitución de La Florida S.R.L. (que sería en realidad el hecho de importancia), pues —se repite de la considerado respecto del recurso de la sociedad— no quedó demostrado que en 1988 y con anterioridad en el Registro Público de la Propiedad constara siquiera una anotación sobre la aportación del inmueble a La Florida. Ergo, la recriminación no es de recibo.

XXVII.Segundo. Denuncia indebida aplicación de los mandatos 455 y 853 del Código Civil. Reclama, el Tribunal erró al considerar que en este caso operó la usucapión al encontrar “la existencia de un título traslativo de dominio “a non domino””. Expone, el traspaso que él realizó a Octaviano en el año de 1988 no es un traspaso a non domino, pues él en ese momento era el propietario registral del bien. Por lo que, prosigue, no procede la usucapión ya que no se cumple uno de los requisitos esenciales dispuestos en el artículo 853 del Código Civil, cual es, el título traslativo de dominio que debe ser, según la jurisprudencia, a non domino, y no por parte del propietario registral. Explica, “El dilema con el efectivo traspaso registral de esa propiedad, acaeció debido a un acontecimiento que ocurrió años atrás (1985) , (sic) en la cual el suscrito -por medio de engaños- no tuvo el dominio de la situación, siendo que se constituyó la Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada La Florida, a la cual como aporte cedí el inmueble objeto de este litigio, razón por la cual cuando Octaviano intentó presentar la escritura ante el Registro Público, no pudo inscribirla porque la misma había una inscripción previa en el Registro de la Propiedad y siguiendo la máxima de primero en tiempo primero en derecho, fue que prevaleció la primera, la cual se inscribe finalmente a nombre de la sociedad La Florida S.R.L. en el año de 1994”.

XXVIII.Sorprenden a esta Sala las afirmaciones del recurrente Soto. La discrepancia entre la información registral y la realidad, es un hecho que solamente a él, como parte del contrato que firmó en escritura pública en 1988 le constaba; no quedó acreditado que fuera del conocimiento del actor. Él aportó el bien inmueble en la constitución de La Florida S.R.L. en 1985 y por ende, indudablemente conocía que no era el dueño de esa heredad desde entonces y que no tenía capacidad para disponer de este, como lo hizo. Sin ser el titular del dominio sobre la finca la vendió al señor Octaviano González. Luego resulta incompresible que valiéndose de la titularidad que exhibía en 1988 el Registro Público de la Propiedad, sin serlo, alegue ahora era el titular verdadero y a partir de esa falsa apariencia pretenda impedir la usucapión del actor. El que el Registro Público no consignara la titularidad verdadera del bien inmueble en 1988, no significa que era él el verus domino. Es innegable que el título traslativo de dominio que tiene el actor emanó de un non domino, el propio casacionista De este modo lo procedente será denegar este agravio.

XXIX.En consecuencia, procederá declarar sin lugar sendos recursos de casación. Se confirmará la sentencia recurrida en lo que fue objeto de estos.

POR TANTO

Se declaran sin lugar sendos recursos de casación planteados; en lo recurrido, se confirma la sentencia recurrida.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Rocío Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez Jorge Alberto López González Jéssica Alejandra Jiménez Ramírez MACUNAQ