Prescription of disciplinary liability for public servantsPrescripción de responsabilidad disciplinaria de servidores públicos

VIII.- As stated by the appellant, it is the Court’s criterion that the applicable statute of limitations in this case is the 5-year period set forth in canon 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, by express reference from precept 44 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito. They reached this conclusion because the regulations cited as violated by the plaintiff in the order initiating the proceedings (auto de apertura del procedimiento) are those contained in precepts 3 and 4 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, which refer to the duty of probity (deber de probidad), given that the directing body (órgano director) considered that the investigated facts could constitute an act of corruption in the exercise of public office. Specifically, the Court held: “In this case, the plaintiff could make decisions related to funds destined for the Municipality through business license fees (patentes), due to his status as an inspector, so much so that in both criminal and administrative proceedings, he was accused of directly charging money without the businesses having the corresponding permit. The foregoing regulations were cited not only in the act initiating the proceedings, but were also mentioned again in the heading of the final act, specifically referencing Articles 71 and 72 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría, and Article 45 of the Ley de Control Interno; moreover, in the recitals section (parte considerativa), it is established that the prescription of the right for the employer to exercise disciplinary authority does not prescribe in the one-month period, as provided by Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo, but rather in the five-year period, as was resolved, because the nature of the alleged misconduct determines the applicable prescriptive period, and for that reason the expiration of disciplinary liability, now called caducity (caducidad) by the Sala Primera, could not have materialized. For this Court, the Directing Body correctly classified the investigated facts in accordance with the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, and based on that normative framework, applied a different prescriptive period.” This Chamber agrees with what was decided by the Court, as will be explained below.

IX.- The Legislature, given the need to ensure greater and better control of public funds, as well as to hold accountable those who mismanage them, established a differentiated disciplinary regime for servants of the Public Treasury (servidores de la Hacienda Pública) from that established in the Código de Trabajo, particularly regarding the statute of limitations: "Article 71°- Prescription of disciplinary liability. The disciplinary liability of the servant of the Public Treasury shall prescribe within a period of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the misconduct by the competent body to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. For these purposes, Article 603 of the Código de Trabajo and any other legal provisions that oppose it are hereby amended with respect to public officials or public servants. Proof of knowledge of the misconduct may be made by any means of evidence, with the value it holds, in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública and, supplementarily, in accordance with common law. When the perpetrator of the misconduct is the head of the entity (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. It shall be deemed serious misconduct on the part of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning procedure if he fails to initiate it in a timely manner or allows the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause”. In this way, it was specially and clearly established that the disciplinary liability of a servant in duties related to the Public Treasury, understood in general terms as one whose functional scope includes competencies for the management and disposition of public funds, whether from an accounting or legal perspective, is governed by the provisions of the precept just transcribed. This provision was amended by subsection a) of Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002 (Ley General de Control Interno). Currently, the provision under discussion states: "Article 71.- Prescription of disciplinary liability. The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight framework shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: /a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. /b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as an act that requires an inquiry or an audit study to inform of its possible irregularity—the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head of the entity or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. / The prescription shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure. /When the perpetrator of the misconduct is the head of the entity, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body./ It shall be deemed serious misconduct on the part of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning procedure if he fails to initiate it in a timely manner or allows the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause”. With the amendment, as can be observed, not only was the statute of limitations increased from 2 to 5 years, but the concept of “servant of the Public Treasury” was eliminated, moving from a subjective system, in which the special conditions of the servant were assessed (whether or not an official of the public treasury), to an objective one, where the period to sanction a misconduct committed by a public official (in the sense given by numeral 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) is defined no longer solely by their status as such, but by the very nature of the conduct. Thus, there will be acts that qualify as a misconduct according to the provisions of the Código de Trabajo, and therefore, prescribe within the period stipulated in that latter body of law (one month), and acts that fall within the specific misconducts provided for either in the LOCGR, or in the higher control and oversight framework, and which, consequently, prescribe according to the rules defined in numeral 71 of the same law. Therefore, only those specific misconducts are now subject to the extended 5-year prescriptive period. (Judgment of the Court of Cassation No. 69 of 10:15 a.m. on August 14, 2014). From the foregoing, it is been derived that the primary factor in establishing whether the caducity period of the LOCGR applies in an administrative sanctioning procedure is the nature of the conduct, that is, whether the alleged misconduct corresponds to those regulated in any of the higher control and oversight laws, or whether it corresponds to an ordinary activity, in which case the period must be calculated as established in canon 603, now 414, of the Código de Trabajo. The Court considered that the conduct attributed to the plaintiff precisely constitutes a violation of the duty of probity in accordance with the provisions of numerals 3 and 4 of the Ley de Control Interno. Note that canon 3 states: “Article 3º—Duty of probity. The public official shall be obliged to direct his management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to the priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, and continuous manner, under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions he adopts in fulfillment of his duties conform to impartiality and the institution's own objectives and, finally, by managing public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily.”. Clearly, the conduct attributed to the plaintiff contravenes the duty of probity, as he was charged with a lack of rectitude and good faith in the exercise of his function. Although the management of public resources was not part of his duties, he abused his status as an inspector to obtain economic benefits that he would not have otherwise achieved. In addition, those resources should have entered the Public Treasury had the business patent been processed before the Municipality, as legally required, making the diversion of funds clear according to the charges and what was proven. Such conduct in no way resembles a course of action directed toward the satisfaction of the public interest; on the contrary, it violates the ethical and moral duties in public service that every server must respect, hence from the initiation order (auto de apertura) he was charged with the infraction of the aforesaid canons, which, as the Court stated, were the legal grounds for his dismissal (cese), set forth and developed in the final act of the procedure. Being clear that due to the nature of the charged conduct, the alleged misconduct corresponds to those regulated in any of the higher control and oversight laws, the caducity period is that contained in ordinal 71 of the LOCGR, a provision which, as transcribed above, establishes a 5-year period counted from the occurrence of the act, to carry out the sanctioning procedure, and not, as the plaintiff erroneously indicates, to initiate the procedure. In summary, even considering that the counting of the period began with the appointment of the Directing Body on December 9, 2008, by the date the final act was issued on February 18, 2011, the aforementioned 5 years had not elapsed, and therefore the alleged caducity cannot be considered to have occurred. It is worth clarifying that the periods contained in precepts 261 and 319 of the LGAP do not apply in this case, given that they are general norms that apply when there is no special norm regulating the matter, and in the case under study, such special norms did exist. The foregoing leads to the rejection of the two objections raised.

**VIII.-** As the appellant states, it is the Court’s criterion that the statute of limitations period applicable to this case is the 5-year period contained in article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, by express referral of article 44 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito. They reached this conclusion because the regulations cited as violated by the plaintiff in the order initiating proceedings are those contained in articles 3 and 4 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, which refer to the duty of probity, given that the directing body deemed that the facts investigated could constitute an act of corruption in the exercise of public office. Specifically, the Court considered: “In this case, the plaintiff could make decisions related to funds destined for the Municipality for business license fees (patentes), due to his condition as inspector, so much so that in criminal and administrative proceedings, he was accused of directly collecting money, without the businesses having the corresponding permit. The aforementioned regulations were cited not only in the act initiating proceedings, but were mentioned again in the heading of the final act, specifically referring to articles 71 and 72 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría, and article 45 of the Ley de Control Interno, but also in the recitals, it is established that the statute of limitations for the employer’s right to exercise disciplinary power does not expire in the one-month period, as provided by article 603 of the Código de Trabajo, but rather in the five-year period, as was decided, because the nature of the attributed misconduct determines the applicable prescriptive period, for that reason the statute of limitations for disciplinary liability, now called caducity (caducidad) by the Sala Primera, could not have been configured. For this Court, the Directing Body correctly pleaded the investigated facts pursuant to the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, and from that normative framework, the application of a different prescriptive period.” This Chamber agrees with the decision of the Court, as will be explained below.

**IX.-** The Legislature, based on the need to ensure greater and better control of public funds, as well as to hold accountable those who mismanaged them, established a differentiated disciplinary regime for public treasury (Hacienda Pública) servants with respect to that established in the Código de Trabajo, particularly regarding the statute of limitations period: "Article 71.- Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability. The disciplinary liability of the public treasury servant shall prescribe in a period of two years, counted from the verified knowledge of the misconduct by the competent body to initiate the respective disciplinary procedure. For these purposes, article 603 of the Código de Trabajo and any other legal provisions that oppose it are hereby reformed with respect to public officials or servants. The verification of knowledge of the misconduct may be carried out by any means of proof, with the value it holds, in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública and, supplementarily, in accordance with common law. When the author of the misconduct is the head of the entity (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. Failure to initiate the disciplinary procedure in a timely manner or allowing the infractor's liability to prescribe, without justified cause, shall be deemed a serious misconduct of the competent official to initiate the disciplinary procedure.” In this way, it was specifically and clearly provided that the disciplinary liability of the servant in duties related to the public treasury, understood in general terms, as one whose functional sphere includes competencies for the management and disposition of public funds, whether from an accounting or legal point of view, is governed by the provisions of the article just transcribed. This provision was reformed by subsection a) of article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002 (Ley General de Control Interno). Currently, the provision in question states: "Article 71.- Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability. The administrative liability of the public official for violations provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal framework, shall prescribe according to the following rules: /a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. /b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as an act that requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the knowledge of the head of the entity or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. /The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure. /When the author of the misconduct is the head of the entity, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. /Failure to initiate the disciplinary procedure in a timely manner or allowing the infractor's liability to prescribe, without justified cause, shall be deemed a serious misconduct of the competent official to initiate the disciplinary procedure.” With the reform, as observed, not only was the statute of limitations period increased from 2 to 5 years, but the concept of “public treasury servant” was eliminated, moving from a subjective system, in which the special conditions of the servant (whether or not a public treasury official) were assessed, to an objective one, where the period to punish a misconduct committed by a public official (in the sense given by article 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) is defined no longer solely by his status as such, but by the very nature of the conduct. Thus, there will be acts that qualify as misconduct under the provisions of the Código de Trabajo, and therefore, prescribe within the period stipulated in that latter legal body (one month), and acts that fall within the specific misconducts provided for either in the LOCGR, or in the superior control and oversight legal framework, and that, consequently, prescribe according to the rules defined in article 71 of the same law. Therefore, only those misconducts are the ones that now prescribe within the extended 5-year term. (Judgment of the Tribunal de Casación No. 69 of 10:15 a.m. on August 14, 2014). From the foregoing, it is extracted that the primary factor to establish whether the caducity period of the LOCGR applies in an administrative disciplinary procedure is the nature of the conduct, i.e., whether the alleged misconduct corresponds to those regulated in any of the superior control and oversight laws, or corresponds to ordinary activity, in which case the period must be computed according to the provisions of article 603, today article 414 of the Código de Trabajo. The Court deemed that the conduct attributed to the plaintiff precisely constitutes a violation of the duty of probity as established in articles 3 and 4 of the Ley de Control Interno. Note that article 3 provides: “Article 3.—Duty of probity. The public official shall be obligated to orient his management toward the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in fulfillment of his attributions conform to impartiality and the proper objectives of the institution where he performs his duties and, finally, by administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, satisfactorily rendering accounts.” Clearly, the conduct attributed to the plaintiff contravenes the duty of probity, since he was accused of lacking rectitude and good faith in the exercise of his function. Even though the management of public resources was not part of his duties, he abused his position as inspector to obtain economic benefits, which he would not otherwise have achieved. Furthermore, these resources should have entered the public treasury, had the business license been processed before the Municipality, as legally corresponded, so the diversion of funds is clear according to the accusation and what was deemed accredited. Such action in no way resembles a procedure oriented toward the satisfaction of the public interest; on the contrary, it transgresses the ethical and moral duties in public office that every servant must respect, hence from the opening order he was accused of violating the aforementioned articles, which, as the Court stated, were the legal basis for the dismissal, provided and developed in the final act of the procedure. Having established that, due to the nature of the imputed conduct, the alleged misconduct corresponds to those regulated in one of the superior control and oversight laws, the caducity period is the one contained in article 71 of the LOCGR, a provision which, as transcribed above, sets a period of 5 years counted from the occurrence of the act, to carry out the disciplinary procedure, and not, as the plaintiff erroneously indicates, to initiate the procedure. In sum, even considering that the counting of the period began with the appointment of the Directing Body on December 9, 2008, by the date the final act was issued, February 18, 2011, the 5 years in question had not elapsed, so it could not be considered that the alleged caducity has occurred. It is worth clarifying that in this case the periods contained in articles 261 and 319 of the LGAP are not applicable, given that they are general rules that apply when there is no special rule regulating the matter, and in the case under study, such rules did exist. The foregoing leads to the rejection of the two objections raised."

"VIII.- Tal y como manifiesta el recurrente, es criterio del Tribunal que el plazo de prescripción aplicable a la especie es el de 5 años contenido en el canon 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, por remisión expresa del precepto 44 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito. Llegaron a tal conclusión por cuanto la normativa citada como trasgredida por el actor en el auto de apertura del procedimiento, es la contenida en los preceptos 3 y 4 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, los cuales refieren al deber de probidad, habida cuenta de que el órgano director estimó que los hechos investigados, podían constituir un acto de corrupción en el ejercicio de la función pública. En concreto consideró el Tribunal: “En la especie el actor podía tomar decisiones relacionadas con fondos destinados a la Municipalidad por concepto de patentes, por su condición de inspector, tan es así que en sede penal y administrativa, se le atribuyó cobrar dinero de forma directa, sin que los negocios tuvieran el permiso correspondiente. La anterior normativa se citó no solo en el acto de apertura del procedimiento, sino que volvió a ser mencionada en el encabezado del acto final, concretamente se hace referencia a los artículo 71 y 72 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría, y el artículo 45 de la Ley de Control Interno, pero además en la parte considerativa, se establece que la prescripción del derecho para que el patrono pueda ejercer la potestad disciplinaria, no prescribe en el plazo de un mes, según lo disponía el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, sino en el plazo de cinco años, tal y como se resolvió, porque la naturaleza de la falta endilgada determina el plazo prescriptivo aplicable, por esa razón la prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria, ahora denominada caducidad por la Sala Primera no pudo configurarse. Para este Tribunal, el Órgano Director intimó correctamente los hechos investigados conforme a Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, y a partir de ese marco normativo, la aplicación de un plazo prescriptivo diferente.”. Esta Cámara coincide con lo resuelto por el Tribunal, tal y como se pasa a explicar.

IX.- El Legislador, en función de la necesidad de asegurar un mayor y mejor control de los fondos públicos, así como de responsabilizar a quienes incurrieran en un mal manejo de ellos, estableció un régimen disciplinario diferenciado para los servidores de la Hacienda Pública respecto al establecido en el Código de Trabajo, en particular en punto al plazo de prescripción: "Artículo 71°- Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor de la Hacienda Pública prescribirá en el plazo de dos años, contados a partir del conocimiento comprobado de la falta por parte del órgano competente, para iniciar el respectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. Para estos efectos, quedan reformados, respecto de los funcionarios o de los servidores públicos, el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo y cualesquiera otras disposiciones jurídicas que se le opongan. La comprobación del conocimiento de la falta podrá efectuarse por cualquier medio de prueba, con el valor que esta tenga, de acuerdo con la Ley General de la Administración Pública y, supletoriamente, de acuerdo con el derecho común. Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente, para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar prescribir la responsabilidad del infractor, sin causa justificada”. De esta manera se dispuso de forma especial y clara, que la responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor en labores relacionadas con la Hacienda Pública, entendido en términos generales, como aquél en cuya órbita funcional se incluyen competencias para el manejo y disposición de fondos públicos, sea desde el punto de vista contable o jurídico, se rige por lo dispuesto en el precepto recién trascrito. Esta disposición fue reformada por el inciso a) del artículo 45 de la Ley no. 8292 de 31 de julio de 2002 (Ley General de Control Interno). Actualmente la norma de comentario dispone: "Artículo 71.- Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: /a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. /b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio -entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. / La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. /Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo./ Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada”. Con la reforma, como se observa, no solo se aumentó el plazo de prescripción de 2 a 5 años, sino que se eliminó el concepto de “servidor de la Hacienda Pública”, pasándose de un sistema subjetivo, en el cual se valoraban las especiales condiciones del servidor (funcionario o no de la hacienda pública), a uno objetivo, donde el plazo para sancionar una falta cometida por un funcionario público (en el sentido dado por el numeral 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) se define ya no sólo por su carácter de tal, sino por la naturaleza misma de la conducta. Así, habrá hechos que califican como una falta conforme a las disposiciones propias del Código de Trabajo, y por tanto, prescriben en el plazo estipulado en este último cuerpo legal (un mes) y hechos que se enmarcan en las faltas específicas previstas ya sea en la LOCGR, o bien en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, y que, en consecuencia, prescriben conforme las reglas definidas en el numeral 71 ídem. Por consiguiente, únicamente esas faltas son las que ahora prescriben en el término ampliado de 5 años. (Sentencia del Tribunal de Casación no. 69 de las 10 horas con 15 minutos del 14 de agosto de 2014). De lo indicado se extrae, lo primordial para establecer si en un procedimiento administrativo sancionador aplica el plazo de caducidad de la LOCGR, es la naturaleza de la conducta, sea, si la falta acusada corresponde a las reguladas en alguna de las leyes de control y fiscalización superior, o bien, corresponde a una actividad ordinaria con lo cual se debe computar el plazo conforme lo establecido en el canon 603 hoy 414 del Código de Trabajo. El Tribunal estimó que la conducta achacada al actor configura precisamente como una violación al deber de probidad conforme a lo establecido en los numerales 3 y 4 de la Ley de Control Interno. Obsérvese que el canon 3 dispone: “Artículo 3º—Deber de probidad. El funcionario público estará obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público. Este deber se manifestará, fundamentalmente, al identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias, de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; asimismo, al demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña y, finalmente, al administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente.”. Claramente la conducta achacada al accionante contraviene el deber de probidad, pues se le imputó falta de rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de su función. Si bien, el manejo de recursos públicos no era parte de sus funciones, abusó de su condición de inspector para obtener beneficios económicos, que de otra manera no hubiera logrado. Amén de que esos recursos debieron entrar a la Hacienda Pública, de haberse gestionado la patente ante en la Municipalidad, como en derecho correspondía, por lo que es claro el desvío de fondos según la imputación y lo que se tuvo por acreditado. Dicho actuar en nada se asemeja a un proceder orientado a la satisfacción del interés público, por el contrario, transgrede los deberes éticos y morales en la función pública que debe respetar todo servidor, de ahí que desde el auto de apertura se le achacó la infracción de los cánones supra indicados, los cuales, como externó el Tribunal, fueron el fundamento legal del cese, dispuestos y desarrollados en el acto final del procedimiento. Teniendo claro que por la naturaleza de la conducta imputada, la falta acusada corresponde a las reguladas en alguna de las leyes de control y fiscalización superior, el plazo de caducidad es el contenido en el ordinal 71 de la LOCGR, norma que como se transcribió líneas antes, decanta un plazo de 5 años contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho, para realizar el procedimiento sancionatorio, y no como erradamente indica el actor para iniciar el procedimiento. En suma, aun considerando que el conteo del plazo inició con el nombramiento del Órgano Director el 9 de diciembre del 2008, a la fecha en que se dictó el acto final 18 de febrero del 2011, no habían trascurrido los 5 años en mención, por lo que no podría considerarse ha operado la caducidad acusada. Es de mérito aclarar, que en la especie no son de aplicación los plazos contenidos en los preceptos 261 y 319 de la LGAP, habida cuenta de que son normas generales que aplican cuando no hay norma especial que regule la materia, y en el caso en estudio si existían. Lo anterior lleva al rechazo de los dos reparos expuestos".