Prescription of customs obligation due to ineffective tourist exemptionPrescripción de obligación aduanera por ineficacia de exoneración turística

"IV.- Regarding the background of the case. We are in the presence of a monetary order for payment procedure (monitorio dinerario) where the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda) sues Golfito Rancho Pez Vela S.A. for the tax payment of five million eight hundred sixty-five thousand two hundred thirty-six colones with twenty-two céntimos plus any interest generated, an obligation arising from the administrative declaration of ineffectiveness of exemption authorizations for the importation of goods. The defendant company, notified of the judicial action, appears and answers in the negative, raising the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) for both the principal and its interest. The first-instance Judge, in her substantive analysis, determined that, since the defendant company was required by the Public Administration to pay the indicated debt, each and every notification made in the administrative venue is validated, but clarifying that between one act and another, specifically between the payment demand notified on October 30, two thousand fourteen, and the notification of the judicial lawsuit on June 25, two thousand eighteen, more than three years elapsed. Therefore, applying Articles 51 and 52 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), with the regulatory text in force pursuant to law 7900, she determined that the obligation is time-barred. The acting plaintiff entity appeals against what was thus decided, indicating that in this case the statute of limitations for the obligation has not occurred. It considers that the provisions of Article 62 of the General Customs Law (Ley General de Aduanas) should be applied, whose prescriptive period is established at four years. For its part, the defendant company, when expressing grievances, points out that based on the appellant's own arguments, it is determined that from February 26, two thousand nine to October 30, two thousand fourteen, which are the dates on which the collection was managed, more than five years passed; therefore, the declared statute of limitations should be confirmed.

V.- Regarding the statute of limitations. The grievances raised by the State must be addressed and the decision revoked. The generating cause for the collection of the claimed taxes, according to the information contained in the base document of the process and whose content has not been challenged by the defendant company, is because the Golfito Customs Administration verified the use and destination of goods imported by the defendant and exempted from taxes in accordance with Article 7 of Law 6990, specifically regarding the boats registration numbers PG-2685, PG-2686, PG-2687, PG-2688, PG-2689, PG-2690, PG-3335, PG-3336 and the vehicle license plate TUR-02-0074; an exemption act that was declared ineffective, proceeding to collect the emergent tax obligation for a total amount of five million eight hundred sixty-five thousand two hundred thirty-six colones with twenty-two céntimos, plus its legal interest. The foregoing means that in this case, the rule to be applied is that set forth by the General Customs Law in accordance with its Article 1, as well as, supplementarily, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (numeral 272 of the General Customs Law). Being in the presence of a special regulation, the rules to be used are those contained in Articles 62 and 63 ibidem, which establish a four-year statute of limitations period and the grounds for its interruption. This is fundamental because for her decision, the First-Instance Judge based her reasoning on the general regulation established by the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, which is incorrect due to the special nature of the tax and its specific regulation. Having clarified the foregoing, we observe that both in its section on proven facts and on the merits, the ruling develops an explanation of the different interrupting acts that have operated in this matter. It is true that in its opposition, the defendant company questions the proper notification of some of the administrative collection demands, but it is also true that the judge indicated in this regard that: “Under that understanding, the notifications of the payment demands made to the defendant party in the administrative venue, the first demand notified on November 16, 2012, and subsequently the second notification on October 30, 2014, which have interrupting effects on the statute of limitations.” This reasoning has never been the object of protest by the defendant company, which, in its grievances before this Chamber, limits itself to pointing out that in this case periods of inertia exceeding five years have been verified, without questioning the validation of these communications made by the judge. The consequence of the foregoing is that the different interrupting acts indicated by the ruling are truthful and must be considered in the second instance to determine a final solution to the invoked defense. Under that understanding, there are five interrupting acts, the first four operated in the administrative venue and the last in the judicial venue: 1- Notification of resolution N°172-2008 09:30 September 17, 2008, notified to the defendant on September 23, 2008, via Fax 22857-2055. 2- Notification of resolution N°03-09 dated January 15, 2009, notified to the defendant on 26-02-2009. 3- Payment demand notified on November 16, 2012, via fax number 2257-2035. 4- Payment demand notified on October 30, 2014, via fax 2257-2035). 5- Notification of the judicial process on June 25, 2018. Applying Article 62, in conjunction with numeral 63, both of the General Customs Law, and additionally by normative integration of ordinal 52 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (wording in force pursuant to law 7900), it is deduced that between the different describing interrupting acts, the fatal four-year period established by the first rule did not elapse. Thus, the claimed principal subsists as of today, and the ruling deserves to be revoked [...]

By reason of the foregoing, the payment order (auto intimatorio) of two fifty-two in the afternoon of November two, two thousand seventeen, is partially confirmed, the defendant being obliged to pay the principal sum of five million eight hundred sixty-five thousand two hundred thirty-six colones with twenty-two céntimos, plus default interest generated from September 23, 2004 to October 13, 2017 at the legal interest rate in the sum of three million four hundred twenty thousand eight hundred fifty colones with fifteen céntimos, an amount thus limited by the acting entity [...]" The first-instance judge determined in her substantive analysis that, since the defendant company had been required by the Public Administration to pay the indicated debt, each and every notification made in the administrative venue is validated, but clarifying that between one act and another, specifically between the payment requirement notified on October 30, 2014, and the notification of the judicial complaint on June 25, 2018, more than three years elapsed, and therefore, in application of articles 51 and 52 of the Tax Code (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), with the regulatory text in force under Law 7900 (ley 7900), she determined that the obligation is time-barred (prescrita). The plaintiff entity filed an appeal against that ruling, noting that in this case the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the obligation has not occurred. It considers that the provisions of article 62 of the General Customs Law (Ley General de Aduanas) must be applied, whose statute of limitations period (plazo prescriptivo) is established at four years. For its part, the defendant company, in expressing grievances, points out that from the appellant's own arguments, it is determined that from February 27, 2009, to October 30, 2014, which are the dates on which the collection was managed, more than five years passed, hence the decreed statute of limitations must be confirmed.

**V.- On the statute of limitations (prescripción).** The grievances raised by the State must be addressed and the decision revoked.

The cause generating the collection of the taxes claimed, according to the information contained in the foundational document of the proceeding and whose content has not been challenged by the defendant company, is that the Golfito Customs Administration verified the use and destination of goods imported by the defendant and exempted from taxes in accordance with article 7 of Ley 6990, specifically regarding the boats with registration numbers PG-2685, PG-2686, PG-2687, PG-2688, PG-2689, PG-2690, PG-3335, PG-3336 and the vehicle with license plate TUR-02-0074; an exemption act that was declared ineffective, proceeding to the collection of the resulting tax obligation (obligación tributaria) for a total amount of five million eight hundred sixty-five thousand two hundred thirty-six colones with twenty-two céntimos, plus its legal interest. The foregoing means that in this case, the rule to be applied is that provided by the Ley General de Aduanas pursuant to its article 1, as well as, in a supplementary manner, the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (paragraph 272 of the Ley General de Aduanas). Being in the presence of a special regulation, the rules to be used are those contained in articles 62 and 63 ibidem, which establish a four-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period and the grounds for its interruption. This is fundamental because, for her decision, the First Instance Judge relied on the general regulation established by the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, which is incorrect due to the special nature of the tax and its specific regulation.

Having clarified the foregoing, we observe that the judgment develops, both in its proven facts section and in its merits, an explanation of the different interrupting acts that have operated in this matter.

It is true that the defendant company questions the correct notification of some of the administrative payment demands in its opposition, but it is also true that the sentencing judge indicated in this regard that: “In that understanding, the notifications of the payment demands made to the defendant party via administrative channels, with the first demand notified on November 16, 2012, and the second notification on October 30, 2014, have the effect of interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción).” This reasoning has never been challenged by the defendant company, which, in its grievances before this Chamber, merely points out that periods of inactivity exceeding five years have occurred in this case, without questioning the validation of these communications made by the judge. The consequence of the foregoing is that the various interrupting acts indicated in the judgment are valid and must be considered in the second instance to determine a final solution to the invoked defense. In that sense, there are five interrupting acts, the first four having occurred in the administrative venue and the last in the judicial venue: 1- Notification of resolution No. 172-2008 09:30 of September 17, 2008, notified to the defendant on September 23, 2008, via Fax 22857-2055. 2- Notification of resolution No. 03-09 dated January 15, 2009, notified to the defendant on 26-02-2009. 3- Payment demand notified on November 16, 2012, via fax number 2257-2035. 4- Payment demand notified on October 30, 2014, via fax 2257-2035).

</span> <span style="display: inline; font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="display: inline; font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;">5- </span><span style="display: inline; font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;" data-mce-style="display: inline; font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;">Notification of the judicial process of June 25, 2018. In application of article 62, in conjunction with numeral 63, both of the Ley General de Aduanas, and also by normative integration with ordinal 52 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (wording in force pursuant to Law 7900), it follows that among the various interrupting acts described, the fatal four-year period established by the first norm did not elapse. Thus, the principal claimed amount survives to this day and the judgment deserves to be overturned [...]</span></p> <p><span idextracto="278453" class="example1 278453" style="display: inline; font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;"> By reason of the foregoing, the payment order of two-fifty-two in the afternoon of November second, two thousand seventeen, is partially confirmed, </span><a name="_Hlk29454738" class="mce-item-anchor" style="font-size: 14pt; text-align: justify; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"></a><span data-mce-style="display: inline; font-family: 'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size: 9.33pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none; vertical-align: sub;" style="text-align: justify; display: inline; font-family: &quot;TIMES NEW ROMAN&quot;; font-size: 9.33pt; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; vertical-align: sub;">the respondent being required to pay the principal sum of five million eight hundred sixty-five thousand two hundred thirty-six colones and twenty-two céntimos, plus default interest (intereses moratorios) accrued from September 23, 2004, to October 13, 2017, at the legal interest rate in the amount of three million four hundred twenty thousand eight hundred fifty colones and fifteen céntimos, an amount so limited by the plaintiff entity [...]".</span></p> for the tax payment of five million eight hundred sixty-five thousand two hundred thirty-six colones and twenty-two céntimos plus any interest generated, an obligation arising from the administrative declaration of ineffectiveness of exoneration authorizations for the importation of goods. The defendant company, notified of the judicial action, appeared and answered in the negative, raising the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) for both the principal and its interest. The trial judge, in her substantive analysis, determined that, since the defendant company had been requested by the Public Administration to pay the indicated debt, each and every one of the notifications made at the administrative stage are validated, but clarifying that between one act and another, specifically between the payment request notified on October thirtieth, two thousand fourteen, and the notification of the judicial complaint on June twenty-fifth, two thousand eighteen, more than three years elapsed, so in application of Articles 51 and 52 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, with the normative text in force under law 7900, she determined that the obligation is time-barred (prescrita). The plaintiff entity filed an appeal against this ruling, pointing out that in this case the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the obligation has not occurred. It considers that the provisions of Article 62 of the Ley General de Aduanas should be applied, whose statute of limitations period is established at four years.

For its part, the defendant company, when expressing grievances, points out that by the appellant's own arguments, it is determined that from the twenty-seventh of February two thousand nine to the thirtieth of October two thousand fourteen, which are the dates on which the collection was processed, more than five years passed, hence the decreed statute of limitations (prescripción) must be confirmed.

**V.- Regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción).** The grievances expressed by the State must be addressed and the decision revoked. The generating cause for the collection of the claimed taxes, according to the information contained in the foundational document of the proceeding and whose content has not been challenged by the defendant company, is that the Customs Administration of Golfito verified the use and destination of goods imported by the defendant and exempted from taxes in accordance with article 7 of Law 6990, specifically regarding boats with registration numbers PG-2685, PG-2686, PG-2687, PG-2688, PG-2689, PG-2690, PG-3335, PG-3336 and vehicle license plate TUR-02-0074; an exemption (exoneración) act that was declared ineffective, proceeding to collect the resulting tax obligation for a total amount of five million eight hundred sixty-five thousand two hundred thirty-six colones with twenty-two céntimos, plus its legal interest. The foregoing means that in this case, the applicable standard is that provided by the General Customs Law (Ley General de Aduanas) pursuant to its article 1, as well as, in a supplementary manner, the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) (numeral 272 of the General Customs Law). Being in the presence of a special regulation, the rules to be used are those contained in articles 62 and 63 ibidem, which establish a four-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period and the grounds for its interruption.

This is fundamental because, for her decision, the First Instance Judge relied on the general regulations established by the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, which is incorrect given the special nature of the tax and its specific regulation. Having clarified the foregoing, we observe that the judgment develops, both in its section on proven facts and in its merits, an explanation of the distinct interrupting acts that have operated in this matter. It is true that the defendant corporation questions the proper service of process (notificación) of some of the administrative collection requirements in its opposition, but it is also true that the judge pointed out in this regard that: “In this understanding, the service of process of the payment requirements made to the defendant through administrative channels, with the first requirement served on November 16, 2012, and subsequently the second service of process on October 30, 2014, have interrupting effects on the statute of limitations (prescripción).” This reasoning has never been challenged by the defendant corporation, which, in its grievances before this Chamber, limits itself to pointing out that, in this case, periods of inertia exceeding five years have elapsed, without questioning the validation of these communications made by the judge. The consequence of the foregoing is that the distinct interrupting acts indicated by the judgment are valid and must be considered in the second instance to determine a final solution to the defense invoked.

In that understanding, there are five interruptive acts, the first four operated in the administrative venue and the last in the judicial venue: **1-** Notification of Resolution No. 172-2008 09:30 September 17, 2008, notified to the defendant on September 23, 2008, via Fax 22857-2055. **2-** Notification of Resolution No. 03-09 dated January 15, 2009, notified to the defendant on 26-02-2009. **3-** Payment demand notified on November 16, 2012, via fax number 2257-2035. **4-** Payment demand notified on October 30, 2014, via fax 2257-2035). **5-** Notification of the judicial proceeding of June 25, 2018. In application of Article 62, in conjunction with numeral 63, both of the General Customs Law (Ley General de Aduanas), also by normative integration of ordinal 52 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) (wording in force pursuant to Ley 7900), it follows that between the various described interruptive acts, the fatal four-year term established by the first norm did not elapse.

Thus, the main claimed obligation still subsists to this day and the judgment deserves to be overturned [...]

By reason of the foregoing, the payment order issued at fourteen hours and fifty-two minutes on the second of November of two thousand seventeen is partially confirmed, the respondent being obliged to pay the principal sum of five million eight hundred sixty-five thousand two hundred thirty-six colones with twenty-two céntimos, plus default interest (intereses moratorios) generated from September 23, 2004 to October 13, 2017 at the legal interest rate in the sum of three million four hundred twenty thousand eight hundred fifty colones with fifteen céntimos, an amount thus determined by the plaintiff entity [...].

"IV.- Sobre los antecedentes del caso. Estamos en presencia de un monitorio dinerario en donde el Ministerio de Hacienda, demanda a Golfito Rancho Pez Vela S.A. por el pago tributario de cinco millones ochocientos sesenta y cinco mil doscientos treinta y seis colones con veintidós céntimos más los intereses que se generen, obligación que nace a raíz de la declaración administrativa de ineficacia de autorizaciones de exoneración por la importación de bienes. La sociedad demandada, notificada de la acción judicial, se apersona contestando en forma negativa, alegando la defensa de prescripción tanto del principal como de sus intereses. La señora Jueza de primera instancia, determinó en su análisis de fondo, que al haber sido requerida la sociedad demandada por la Administración Pública para el pago del adeudo señalado, se convalidan todas y cada una de las notificaciones realizadas en sede administrativa, pero aclarando que entre uno y otro acto, en concreto entre el requerimiento de pago notificado el treinta de octubre del dos mil catorce y la notificación de la demanda judicial del veinticinco de junio del dos mil dieciocho, transcurrieron más de tres años, por lo que en aplicación de los artículos 51 y 52 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, con el texto normativo vigente por ley 7900, determinó que la obligación está prescrita. Contra lo así resuelto, formula apelación el ente actor, señalando que en este caso no se ha producido la prescripción de la obligación. Considera que, se debe de aplicar lo dispuesto en el artículo 62 de la Ley General de Aduanas, cuyo plazo prescriptivo se establece en cuatro años. Por su parte, la sociedad demandada, al expresar agravios, hace ver que por los propios argumentos del apelante, se determina que desde el veintiséis de febrero del dos mil nueve al treinta de octubre del doscientos catorce, que son las fechas en que se gestionó el cobro, pasaron más de cinco años, de ahí que se debe confirmar la prescripción decretada.

V.- De la prescripción. Los agravios expuestos por el Estado, deben ser atendidos y lo resuelto revocado. La causa generadora del cobro de los tributos reclamados, según la información que consta en el documento base del proceso y cuyo contenido no ha sido impugnado por la sociedad demandada, es por cuanto la Administración Aduanera de Golfito, verificó el uso y destino de bienes importados por el demandado y exonerados de tributos de conformidad con el artículo 7 de la Ley 6990, en concreto sobre los botes matrículas PG-2685, PG-2686, PG-2687, PG-2688, PG-2689, PG-2690, PG-3335, PG-3336 y al vehículo placas TUR-02-0074; acto de exoneración que fue declarado ineficaz, procediendo al cobro de la obligación tributaria emergente por un monto total de cinco millones ochocientos sesenta y cinco mil doscientos treinta y seis colones con veintidós céntimos, más sus intereses de ley. Lo anterior hace que en este caso, la norma a aplicar es la dispuesta por la Ley General de Aduanas conforme a su artículo 1, así como en forma supletoria, el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (numeral 272 de la Ley General de Aduanas). Al estar en presencia de una normativa especial, las reglas a utilizar son las contenidas en los artículos 62 y 63 ibídem, los cuales establecen un plazo cuatrienal de prescripción y los motivos de interrupción de la misma. Esto es fundamental ya que para su decisión, la Jueza de Primera Instancia se fundamentó en la normativa general que establece el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, lo cual es incorrecto por la especialidad del tributo y su regulación concreta. Teniendo claro lo anterior, observamos que el fallo desarrolla tanto en su apartado de hechos probados como en el fondo, una explicación de los distintos actos interruptores que han operado en este asunto. Es cierto que la sociedad demandada cuestiona la correcta notificación de algunos de los requerimientos administrativos del cobro en su oposición, pero también lo es que la sentenciadora señaló al respecto que: “En ese entendido, las notificaciones de los requerimientos de pago que se le hicieron a la parte demandada en vía administrativa, notificada el primer requerimiento en fecha 16 de Noviembre del 2012 y luego la segunda notificación en fecha 30 de octubre del 2014, los cuales tienen efectos interruptores de la prescripción.”. Este razonamiento nunca ha sido objeto de protesta por parte de la sociedad demandada quien, en sus agravios ante esta Cámara, se limita a señalar que en la especie se han verificado plazos de inercia mayores a cinco años, sin cuestionar la convalidación de estas comunicaciones que hizo la juzgadora. Lo anterior tiene como consecuencia que los distintos actos interruptores que señala el fallo, sean verídicos y se deben de considerar en segunda instancia para determinar una solución final a la defensa invocada. En ese entendido, hay cinco actos interruptores, siendo los cuatro primeros operados en sede administrativa y el último en sede judicial: 1- Notificación de la resolución N°172-2008 09:30 17 de setiembre del 2008, notificado al demandado el día 23 de setiembre del 2008, por medio de Fax 22857-2055. 2- Notificación de la resolución N°03-09 de fecha 15 de enero del 2009, notificado al demandado el día 26-02-2009. 3- Requerimiento de pago notificado el 16 de noviembre del 2012, mediante el fax número 2257-2035. 4- Requerimiento de pago notificado en fecha 30 de octubre del año 2014, por medio de fax 2257-2035). 5- Notificación del proceso judicial del 25 de junio del 2018. En aplicación del artículo 62, en concordancia con el numeral 63, ambos de la Ley General de Aduanas, además por integración normativa del ordinal 52 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (redacción vigente conforme a la ley 7900), se deduce que entre los distintos actos interruptores descritos no transcurrió el plazo fatal de cuatro años que establece la primera norma. Así el principal reclamado subsiste al día de hoy y el fallo merece ser revocado [...]

En razón de lo anterior, se confirma parcialmente el auto intimatorio de las catorce horas y cincuenta y dos minutos del dos de noviembre del dos mil diecisiete, debiendo el accionado de pagar la suma capital de cinco millones ochocientos sesenta y cinco mil doscientos treinta y seis colones con veintidós céntimos, más intereses moratorios generados a partir del 23 de setiembre del 2004 y al 13 de octubre del 2017 al tipo de interés legal en la suma de tres millones cuatrocientos veinte mil ochocientos cincuenta colones con quince céntimos, monto asílimitado por el ente actor [...]".