Natural Drainage Easement Inapplicable in Urbanized Housing DevelopmentsInaplicabilidad de servidumbre natural de aguas en urbanizaciones

The appeal is against judgment No. 189-2001, issued by the lower court (a-quo) at fifteen hours forty-five minutes on September eleventh, two thousand one, in which the claim filed by the Estate of Horacio Smith Hill, represented by its executor Fernando Alberto Smith Brown against Xinia Brenes Rodríguez, was dismissed, with the objection of lack of right being upheld. The prior ruling was supplemented by a resolution at eight hours fifty minutes on September twenty-eighth, two thousand one, to order the plaintiff to pay the personal and procedural costs of the proceedings.

IV.-) The plaintiff, in her brief filing her appeal, maintains among other things, that the judgment issued by the lower court (a-quo) has nullity defects (vicios de nulidad), since according to her claim the legal order was distorted by denying the hierarchy of the law over the regulation. It is argued that superiority has been given to the application of a regulation, substituting it for the law. It is argued that the Ley de Aguas was substituted in its Article 94 et seq., and the same occurred with Article 76 and others of the Ley de Construcciones. That by not applying the previous argument, the law is injured, causing defenselessness, thus constituting a nullity defect (vicio de nulidad) of the judgment. In a second argument, the plaintiff states that both the testimonial evidence received in the record, as well as the expert evidence, were not analyzed or weighed at the time of issuing judgment. It is said that the expert report was ignored by the lower court judge to avoid holding the defendant to a liability as mandated by Article 1045 of the Código Civil. That the foregoing casts doubt on the objectivity in reaching judgment. In a third challenge, it is maintained that the judge performed a biased and subjective analysis of the Ley de Salud, analyzing only Article 313 of the cited legislation, ignoring other articles such as 262, 263, and 313. It is argued that the claim had referred to the risks run with stagnant waters, which have no outlet, due to the lack of an opening in the wall built by the defendant; since they are waters that are at a level lower than the public street; and this is so, the appellant states, since over time, these natural or rainwater (pluvial) waters have had their only natural outlet, flowing from south to north, ever since it was urbanized by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. It is stated by the appellant that the cited state institution created those conditions, where these waters flowed from pedestrian mall to pedestrian mall (alameda a alameda), crossing all those yards. In a fourth argument, it is said that since that dwelling was acquired twenty-five years ago, the waters in conflict have only had that natural drainage route, until the defendant arrived and maliciously built the wall, violating rule 94 and subsection c.-) of Article 100 of the Ley de Aguas, as well as Article 76 of the Ley de Construcciones, as well as Article 868 of the Código Civil, in that the defendant's right prescribed negatively, because the waters had been flowing as indicated for more than ten years. It is established by the appellant that the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo was the institution in charge of creating the natural conditions for the rainwater (pluvial) waters to follow their course, that the foregoing became abundantly clear with the declaration of the witness Gerardo and others. That the community of Los Corales in Limón was transferred more than eight years ago to the Municipalidad de Limón, hence the regulation on which the first-instance judgment is based has no validity; since Article 94 of the Ley de Aguas and 76 of the Ley de Construcciones cannot be separated from the substantive analysis of this process. The appellant maintains that there cannot be bad faith in litigating if he is proceeding in accordance with Article 41 of the Constitución Política. That the damages caused by the defendant, by not leaving a drainage for the rainwater (pluvial) waters, are enormous and must be resolved according to Article 1045 of the Código Civil.

V.-) Each and every one of the arguments put forth by the plaintiff appellant, which have been summarized in the preceding recital (considerando), are not acceptable to this Jurisdictional Body. In the grievances of the plaintiff, there is an error of conceptualization and interpretation of Article 94 of the Ley de Aguas. When our legislator, in the referenced rule, spoke of natural easements (servidumbres naturales), providing that lower lands are obliged to receive the waters that naturally and without human intervention flow from the higher lands, it was because it was conceiving large tracts of land and not residential lands like the lands belonging to the litigating parties in this case, which are the product of a human work of urbanization that modified the configuration of the property. Human urbanization works must provide the owners of the properties with the necessary gutters (caños), ditches (cunetas), channeling, pipes, and sewers for the orderly evacuation of rainwater (pluvial) waters, since the hydrology of the land is disrupted by the division of the property and the constructions made. The waters no longer flow naturally then, because man has intervened, so the alleged Article 94 is not applicable. Regarding the case law provided by the plaintiff in this instance, it is not applicable to the specific case, because from a careful reading, it is easily inferred that it refers to the owner of a farm who verbally allowed the waters coming from the defendants' property to pass underground through his property. In the present case, we are faced with a housing complex, which is totally different from what is referred to in the cited case law. For these properties, residential homes, the regulations governing the matter, regarding rainwater (pluvial) waters, which is the point under discussion in this process, is subsection 8, b-), of Article 313 of the Ley General de Salud, which literally provides: "Every individual, family, or multifamily dwelling must comply with the following sanitary requirements: 8-)... b-) Adequate systems for the disposal of excreta, black water, gray water (aguas servidas), and rainwater (pluviales) approved by the health authority..." The aforementioned health legal order obliges every individual, family, or multifamily dwelling, such as the dwelling of the plaintiff, to have an adequate system, among others, for the disposal of rainwater (pluvial) waters. This system is regulated by a regulation, the Reglamento de Construcciones, de Edificios para Habitación Unifamiliar y Multifamiliar, which in its Article VI.14, when regulating rainwater drainage (desagües pluviales), establishes: "...Rainwater (pluvial) from roofs, terraces, and yards must be conducted to storm sewer systems (sistemas de alcantarillado pluvial) or natural water courses..." The aforementioned legal order is clear, precise, and specific, in the sense that when dealing with urban homes, their rainwater (pluvial) must be conducted through a storm sewer system (sistema de alcantarillado pluvial) or, failing that, to natural water courses. The cited regulations do not provide that when it concerns a higher property in relation to a lower one, those rainwater (pluvial) waters must be borne by the lower property, as the plaintiff intends regarding the defendant's property.

VI.-) In accordance with the foregoing analysis, there is no nullity defect (vicio de nulidad) whatsoever in the appealed judgment, because the procedures have not been violated such that one of the parties to the process was caused defenselessness. Nullity for nullity's sake has been eradicated from our jurisdictional courts, so that the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice without denial of terms is fulfilled. According to what has been said by this Court in the preceding recital (considerando), the distortion of the legal order, as intended by the appellant in his brief filing the appeal, also does not occur. It is true that the testimonial evidence and the expert could have determined that the plaintiff's rainwater (pluvial) waters flowed through the defendant's property, before the construction of the referred wall occurred, and it is also true that after the cited construction is when the problems of water stagnation and others arise. But nothing of the foregoing could influence a resolution of this matter against the regulations previously transcribed by this Court. It is not true then that the defendant is being spared liability under Article 1045 of the Código Civil. Nor is it correct when it is stated that the lower court judge performed a biased and subjective analysis; the appealed judgment has an adequate application of the regulations governing the matter of rainwater (pluvial) waters, when we are faced with a housing complex, such as Barrio Los Corales, in the province of Limón, a housing complex that was built by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. There is no doubt that the plaintiff, to avoid all the inconveniences she has with stagnant rainwater (pluvial) waters, must properly channel them toward the public road that has gutters (caños). If the slope of the properties runs from south to north, according to the plans provided in the record, the plaintiff must seek the evacuation of rainwater (pluvial) waters toward the front of her property, on the east boundary that borders the public street. The fact that these rainwater (pluvial) waters have been flowing across the defendant's property for twenty-five years does not constitute any right against the plaintiff, because as discontinuous easements (servidumbres discontinuas), they can only be constituted by agreement or by last will. Possession, even immemorial, as alleged by the plaintiff, is not sufficient to establish them; the foregoing is doctrine from Article 379 of the Código Civil.

Thus, the appropriate course is to confirm the judgment submitted on appeal regarding what has been the subject of grievances for the appellant.

It is established by the appellant that the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo was the institution responsible for creating the natural conditions for rainwater to follow its course, and that this was made abundantly clear by the testimony of the witness Gerardo and others. That the community of Los Corales in Limón was transferred more than eight years ago to the Municipalidad de Limón; hence, the regulation on which the first-instance judgment is based has no validity whatsoever; given that Article 94 of the Ley de Aguas and Article 76 of the Ley de Construcciones cannot be separated from the substantive analysis of this proceeding. The appellant maintains that there can be no bad faith in litigating if it is proceeding in accordance with Article 41 of the Constitución Política. That the damages caused by the defendant, by failing to provide a drain for rainwater, are enormous and must be resolved in accordance with Article 1045 of the Código Civil.

V.-) Each and every one of the arguments put forth by the plaintiff-appellant, which have been summarized in the preceding whereas clause, are not well received by this Jurisdictional Body. In the plaintiff’s grievances there is an error in conceptualizing and interpreting Article 94 of the Ley de Aguas. When our legislator, in the cited provision, spoke of natural easements (servidumbres naturales), providing that lower lands are obliged to receive the waters that naturally and without human intervention flow from higher lands, it was because it was conceiving of large tracts of land and not residential lots such as the lots belonging to the litigating parties in this proceeding, which are the product of a human urban development work that modified the configuration of the property. Human urban development works must provide the owners of the properties with the ditches, gutters, channeling, pipes, and culverts necessary for the orderly evacuation of rainwater, since the hydrology of the lands is disrupted by the subdivision (división del fundo) and the constructions carried out. The waters no longer flow naturally because man has intervened; therefore, the alleged Article 94 is not applicable. With regard to the case law contributed by the plaintiff at this stage, it is not applicable to the specific case, since a careful reading readily reveals that it refers to the owner of a farm who verbally permitted waters originating from the defendants’ property to pass underground through his property. In the present case, we are faced with a housing complex, which is completely different from what is referred to in the cited case law. For these properties, residential dwellings, the legal framework that regulates the matter regarding rainwater, which is the issue under discussion in this proceeding, is subsection 8, b-), of Article 313 of the Ley General de Salud, which literally provides: Every individual, family, or multi-family dwelling must meet the following sanitary requirements: 8-)…b-) Adequate systems for the disposal of excreta, black water, gray water, and rainwater approved by the health authority… The health legal framework transcribed above obliges every individual, family, or multi-family dwelling, as is the dwelling of the plaintiff, to have an adequate system for, among other things, the disposal of rainwater; that system is regulated by a regulation, the Reglamento de Construcciones, de Edificios para Habitación Unifamiliar y Multifamiliar, which in its Article VI.14, when regulating rainwater drains, establishes: …Rainwater from roofs, terraces, and patios must be conveyed to rainwater sewer systems or to natural watercourses… The legal framework indicated above is clear, precise, and concrete, to the effect that when dealing with urban dwellings, their rainwater must be conveyed by a rainwater sewer system or, failing that, to natural watercourses. The cited regulations do not provide that, when dealing with a higher property relative to a lower one, that rainwater must be borne by the lower property, as the plaintiff intends in relation to the defendant’s property.

VI.-) In accordance with the foregoing analysis, there is no defect whatsoever of nullity for the appealed judgment, as the procedures have not been violated such that one of the parties to the proceeding was left defenseless. Nullity for nullity’s sake has been eradicated from our jurisdictional courts, so as to fulfill the constitutional principle of speedy and complete justice without denial of terms. According to what has been stated by this Tribunal in the preceding whereas clause, neither does the denaturalization of the legal framework occur as the appellant claims in its filing of the appeal. It is true that the testimonial evidence and the expert witness may have determined that the plaintiff’s rainwater flowed across the defendant’s property before the construction of the referenced wall, and it is also true that the problems of water stagnation and others arose after the cited construction. But none of the foregoing could influence the resolution of this matter contrary to the regulations transcribed above by this Tribunal. It is therefore not true that the defendant is being absolved of liability pursuant to Article 1045 of the Código Civil. Nor is there merit in the claim that the trial judge conducted a biased and subjective analysis; the appealed judgment contains an adequate application of the legal framework governing matters of rainwater when we are faced with a housing complex, such as Barrio Los Corales, in the province of Limón, a housing complex that was built by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. There is no doubt that the plaintiff, in order to avoid all the inconveniences caused by stagnant rainwater, must properly channel it toward the public road, which has gutters. If the grade change of the properties runs from south to north, according to the plans submitted to the case file, the plaintiff must seek the evacuation of rainwater toward the front of its property, on the eastern boundary that faces the public street. The fact that this rainwater has been draining through the defendant’s property for twenty-five years does not constitute any right against the plaintiff, since they are discontinuous easements (servidumbres discontinuas) and can only be constituted by agreement or by last will. Possession, even immemorial, alleged by the plaintiff is insufficient to establish them; this is doctrine from Article 379 of the Código Civil. This being the case, the appropriate course is to confirm the judgment appealed in what has been the subject of grievances for the appellant."

"Se recurre de la sentencia N° 189-2001, dictada por el a-quo a las quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del once de setiembre del año dos mil uno, en donde se declara sin lugar la demanda establecida por la Sucesión de Horacio Smith Hill, representada por su albacea Fernando Alberto Smith Brown contra Xinia Brenes Rodríguez, acogiéndose la excepción de falta de derecho.El fallo anterior se adicionó por resolución de las ocho horas cincuenta minutos del veintiocho de setiembre del año dos mil uno, para condenar al actor al pago de las costas personales y procesales del proceso. IV.-) La actora en el escrito de interposición de su recurso de apelación sostiene entre otras cosas, que la sentencia dictada por el a-quo tiene vicios de nulidad, ya que según su dicho se desnaturalizó el ordenamiento jurídico al negársele la jerarquización de la ley sobre el reglamento. Se aduce que se le ha dado superioridad en la aplicación de un reglamento sustituyéndose a la ley. Se argumenta que se sustituyó la Ley de Aguas en su artículo 94 siguientes y concordantes, lo mismo sucedió con el artículo 76 y otras de la Ley de Construcciones. Que al no aplicarse el anterior argumento se lastima el derecho, causándose indefensión, por lo que se constituye en un vicio de nulidad de la sentencia.En un segundo argumento la actora afirma que tanto la prueba testimonial recibida en autos, así como la prueba pericial no fueron analizadas, ni valoradas al momento de dictar sentencia. Se dice que el informe pericial fue obviado por parte de la juzgadora de instancia, para así evitarle a la demandada una responsabilidad conforme lo manda el artículo 1045 del Código Civil. Que lo anterior hace que se tenga duda de la objetividad para llegar a sentencia. En un tercer cuestionamiento se sostiene que la juzgadora realizó un análisis parcializado y subjetivo de la Ley de Salud, analizando únicamente el artículo 313 de la citada legislación, obviando otros artículos como el 262, 263 y 313. Se aduce que en la demanda se había hecho referencia de los riesgos que se corren con las aguas estancadas, que no tienen salida, por falta de un hueco en el muro construido por la demandada; ya que son aguas que se encuentran en un nivel inferior al de la calle pública; y lo anterior es así, afirma la recurrente, ya que a lo largo del tiempo, esas aguas naturales o pluviales han tenido como única salida natural, escurriéndose de sur a norte, todo desde que se urbanizó por parte del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. Se afirma por parte de la recurrente, que la citada institución estatal creó esas condiciones, en donde esas aguas se escurrieran de alameda a alameda, atravesando todos esos patios. En un cuarto argumento se dice, que desde que se adquirió esa vivienda hace veinticinco años, las aguas en conflicto solo han tenido esa vía de desagüe natural, hasta que llegó la demandada a construir el muro en forma maliciosa, violándose la norma 94 y el inciso c.-) del artículo 100 de la Ley de Aguas, así como el artículo 76 de la Ley de Construcciones, así como el artículo 868 del Código Civil, en cuanto a que el derecho de la demandada prescribió en forma negativa, por tener más de diez años escurriéndose las aguas en la forma indicada. Se establece por parte de la recurrente, que el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo fue la institución encargada de crear las condiciones naturales para que las aguas pluviales siguieran el curso, que lo anterior quedó sumamente claro con la declaración del testigo Gerardo y otros. Que la comunidad de Los Corales en Limón, fue traspasada hace más de ocho años a la Municipalidad de Limón, de ahí que el reglamento en que se basa la sentencia de primera instancia no tenga ninguna vigencia; ya que el artículo 94 de la Ley de Aguas y el 76 de la Ley de Construcciones no pueden ser separados del análisis de fondo de este proceso. Sostiene el apelante que no puede haber mala fe al litigar, si está procediendo conforme al artículo 41 de la Constitución Política. Que los perjuicios causados por la demandada, al no dejar un desagüe para las aguas pluviales, son enormes y los cuales deben resolverse conforme al artículo 1045 del Código Civil.V.-)Todos y cada uno de los argumentos esgrimidos por el actor recurrente, los cuales han sido resumidos en el considerando anterior, no son de recibo para este Órgano Jurisdiccional. En los agravios de la parte actora hay un error de conceptualización e interpretación del artículo 94 de la Ley de Aguas. Cuando nuestro legislador, en la referida norma habló de servidumbres naturales, disponiendo que los terrenos inferiores están obligados a recibir las aguas que naturalmente y sin intervención del hombre fluyan de los superiores, era porque estaba concibiendo grandes extensiones de terreno y no terrenos habitacionales como los terrenos que pertenecen a las partes litigantes de este proceso, los cuales son producto de una obra humana de urbanización que modificó la configuración del predio. Las obras humanas de urbanización deben proveer a los dueños de los fundos los caños, cunetas, canalizaciones, tuberías y alcantarillas necesarios para la evacuación ordenada de las aguas pluviales, pues la hidrología de los terrenos se ve trastornada por la división del fundo y las construcciones que se hagan. Ya las aguas no discurren entonces naturalmente pues el hombre ha intervenido, por lo que no resulta aplicable el artículo 94 alegado. Con relación a la jurisprudencia que aporta la parte actora en esta instancia, no es de aplicación al caso en concreto, pues de una detenida lectura, se desprende con facilidad, que se refiere al dueño de una finca quien permitió verbalmente, que las aguas provenientes del fundo de los demandados pasaran subterráneamente por su inmueble. En el presente caso, nos encontramos ante un complejo habitacional, que es totalmente diferente a lo referido en la jurisprudencia de cita. Para estas propiedades, viviendas habitacionales, el ordenamiento que regula la materia, con relación a las aguas pluviales, que es el punto que se discute en este proceso, es el inciso 8, b-), del artículo 313 de la Ley General de Salud, el cual a la letra dispone: Toda vivienda individual, familiar o multifamiliar, deberá cumplir con los siguientes requisitos sanitarios: 8-)...b-)Sistemas adecuados de eliminación de excretas, de aguas negras, servidas y pluviales aprobadas por la autoridad de salud...El ordenamiento jurídico de salud antes trascrito obliga, a toda vivienda individual, familiar o multifamiliar, como lo es la vivienda de la parte accionante, a tener un sistema adecuado, entre otros, para la eliminación de las aguas pluviales, ese sistema está regulado por un reglamento, el Reglamento de Construcciones, de Edificios para Habitación Unifamiliar y Multifamiliar, que en su artículo VI.14, cuando regula los desagües pluviales establece:...Las aguas pluviales de techos, terrazas y patios, deberán ser conducidas a sistemas de alcantarillado pluvial o a cursos de aguas naturales...El ordenamiento jurídico antes señalado es claro, preciso y concreto, en el sentido de que cuando se trate de viviendas urbanas, sus aguas pluviales hay que conducirlas por un sistema de alcantarillado pluvial o en su defecto a cursos de aguas naturales. No se dispone en la normativa citada, que cuando se trata de un fundo superior con relación a uno inferior, esas aguas pluviales tenga que soportarlas el fundo inferior, como lo pretende la accionante con relación al inmueble de la demandada. VI.-)De conformidad con el anterior análisis no existe vicio alguno de nulidad para la sentencia recurrida, pues no se han violado los procedimientos, como para que una de las partes del proceso se le haya causado indefensión. La nulidad por la nulidad misma ha sido erradicada de nuestros tribunales jurisdiccionales, a fin de que se cumpla el principio constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida sin denegación de términos.Según lo dicho por este Tribunal en el considerando anterior, tampoco se da la desnaturalización del ordenamiento jurídico como lo pretende el recurrente en su escrito de interposición del recurso de apelación. Es cierto que la prueba testimonial y el perito pudieron haber determinado que las aguas pluviales de la actora discurrían por el inmueble de la demandada, antes de que se diera la construcción del referido muro, y también es cierto que después de la citada construcciónes cuando se vienen los problemas de estancamiento de aguas y otros.Pero nada de lo anterior podría influir para que se tenga que resolver el presente asunto en contra de la normativa antes transcrita por este Tribunal. No es cierto entonces que se le esté evitando a la demandada una responsabilidad conforme al artículo 1045 del Código Civil. Tampoco se lleva razón cuando se afirma que la juzgadora de instancia haya realizado un análisis parcializado y subjetivo; la sentencia recurrida tiene una aplicación adecuada del ordenamiento que rige la materia de aguas pluviales, cuando nos encontramos ante un complejo habitacional, como lo es el Barrio Los Corales, en la provincia de Limón, complejo habitacional que fuera construido por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. No hay duda que la parte accionante para evitar todos los inconvenientes que tiene con las aguas pluviales estancadas, deberá de canalizarlas adecuadamente hacia la vía pública que cuenta con caños.i el desnivel de las propiedades va de sur a norte, de acuerdo con los planos aportados a los autos, el actor debe procurar la evacuación de aguas pluviales hacia el frente de su fundo, en el lindero este que da a la calle pública.El hecho de que esas aguas pluviales tengan veinticinco años de estarse escurriendo a través del inmueble de la demandada, no constituye ningún derecho frente a la actora, pues al ser servidumbres discontinuas, solo puede constituirse por convenio o por última voluntad. La posesión, aún la inmemorial, alegada por la actora, no basta para establecerlas, lo anterior es doctrina del artículo 379 del Código Civil.Así las cosas, lo procedente es confirmar la sentencia venida en apelación en lo que ha sido motivo de agravios para la parte recurrente."