Strict Liability of Heavy Vehicle Lessor for Worker's Death at Construction SiteResponsabilidad civil objetiva de empresa arrendante de vehículo pesado por muerte de trabajador en construcción

**IV.-** The civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. merits separate consideration. The legal regime of civil liability of third parties for damages and losses caused in traffic accidents is determined by the Traffic Law and the Civil Code, according to the factual assumptions that determine it. Article 197 of Traffic Law No. 9078, currently in force, establishes: "In any traffic accident in which the driver is not identified, the registered owner shall be strictly liable for the consequences arising from the use, handling, possession, or tenure of the vehicle. In such case, the interested party may bring a civil proceeding against the registered owner. Said owner may be released from liability by means of a document demonstrating that the vehicle was sold, transferred to a third party, stolen, or is not within their control, with a date prior to the traffic accident. If the foregoing is proven, the proceeding must be directed against the new acquirer or possessor, and the same shall apply for any other legitimately valid exception. In accidents where the driver is identified, the joint and several civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria) of the owner or possessor may be processed within the respective traffic proceeding, in accordance with the provisions of Article 199 and following of this law. (...)" (the highlighting was supplied). This legal provision existed at the date of the events and corresponded to Article 7 of Traffic Law No. 7331. From the cited norm, two forms of civil liability of third parties in matters of traffic accidents are derived. The first, of a strict nature, for the case where the identity of the driver of the vehicle that caused the traffic accident is unknown, a scenario in which the vehicle owner is strictly liable up to the value of the vehicle, because if strict civil liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) depends exclusively on the condition of vehicle owner, it is logical that such liability be restricted to the value of the property causing the accident and the consequent damages, hence the same Traffic Law provides in Article 200 that "The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain encumbered until the conclusion of the respective proceeding and at the order of the judicial authority hearing it." Said legal provision corresponded to Article 188 of Traffic Law No. 7331 in force at the date of the events. The limitation of the owner's civil liability up to the value of the vehicle has been the subject of repeated pronouncements by the Criminal Cassation Jurisprudence: "VIII. [...] The decision to convict the company that owns the motor vehicle, only up to the value thereof, is based on the principle of legality and is not a decision to the detriment of the interests of the victims as the complainant indicates. While it is true, Articles 187 of the Traffic Law and 106 of the Criminal Code determine solidarity in civil liability jointly with the perpetrators of the punishable act regarding the payment of damages and losses, this refers to exhaustively indicated situations or grounds, within which the cause in question is not included; in other cases, in accordance with the traffic regulations in force at the time of the events – Law No. 7331 – the civil liability of third-party civil defendants is determined up to the value of the vehicle with which the damage is caused – Article 188 – it not being possible to encumber other property, except that of the civil defendant, because even though Article 263 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows the civil plaintiff to formulate the attachment request in the complaint or subsequently, without prejudice to the power to request it preventively, it is required that the property subject to attachment be registered in the name of the civil defendant, additionally holding the condition of accused, or be contemplated within the assumptions of civil solidarity, which does not occur in the case file. Consequently, the claim must be declared without merit." (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, among others, Judgment No. 367-2010 of 08:48 hours on May 7, 2010). The strict civil liability of the vehicle owner is only excluded when they demonstrate that they transferred it to a third party, it was stolen from them, or it is not within their control, with a date prior to the traffic accident. The second form of civil liability extracted from the transcribed norm is the joint and several civil liability of the vehicle owner, for the case where the driver of the motor vehicle causing the accident is identified. In such case, the vehicle owner is jointly and severally liable with the driver, if in addition to being the owner, the requirements of Article 199 of the Traffic Law are met; outside of these, and in consideration of the civil liability regime established in the Traffic Law, the civil liability would be exclusively that of the driver. The joint and several civil liability of the owner in the hypothesis under discussion is not autonomous, but depends on that of the driver, which, as already stated, is of a subjective nature, and is not limited to the value of the vehicle; rather, solidarity obliges the owner to respond for the entirety of the judgment and with all their assets, since in accordance with Article 637 of the Civil Code "In a solidary obligation among debtors, each one of them is held, in their relations with the creditor, as the sole debtor of the total performance." In the above scenario, if the absence of civil liability is decreed in favor of the driver, the civil claim against the owner must likewise be rejected, since the latter does not have an obligation independent of that of the driver. The strict liability provided in the Traffic Law is not applicable to the present case because the driver of the vehicle causing the accident is identified. The joint and several liability of the owner also does not apply because, as already indicated, the driver was released from civil liability as it was certain that they acted without intent (dolo) or fault (culpa). There is another possibility of strict civil liability, no longer determined by the condition of owner but by that of operator of a source of danger such as a motive machine (máquina motiva), which is provided in paragraph 5 of Article 1048 of the Civil Code. Said norm provides the following: "And if a person dies or is injured by a motive machine, or a vehicle of a railroad, tramway, or other analogous mode of transport, the operating company or person is obliged to repair the harm resulting therefrom, if it does not prove that the accident was caused by force majeure or by the own fault (falta) of the deceased or injured person." Regarding said norm, the criminal cassation jurisprudence has stated the following: "The claim is admissible. In Article 1048 of the Civil Code, fifth paragraph, the duty to indemnify for death or injury caused by a motive machine is established, and with respect to the operating company or person. Said assumption responds to what has been theoretically called 'strict liability' (responsabilidad objetiva). However, that statute is limited by two circumstances that exonerate such liability, namely; force majeure and the fault of the victim. Consequently, that liability in principle that the law envisages, may be excluded if one of those two situations can be proven. Stated differently, in strict civil liability it is not necessary to prove fault, so evidence of possible negligence or imprudence is unnecessary and inconsequential, since in civil matters liability does not necessarily arise from a subjective circumstance, as has been indicated in doctrine, stating that: '...It concerns, first of all, activities that are permitted, but that oblige compensation for the damages arising from them; the notion of risk replaces the concepts of fault and unlawfulness... Unlike 'liability for fault', strict liability resides in the fact that he who for his own benefit creates a source of probable damages and exposes persons and property of others to danger, becomes obliged if the damage materializes... From a practical point of view, strict liability is summarized as an advantage in favor of the injured party that signifies a partial reversal of the burden of proof, such that the latter is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault (fault or intent) of the person causing the damage, and any attempt by the latter to prove their lack of fault would be in vain, unlike what occurs in cases of subjective liability...' (PEREZ, [Name1]. Private Law. Publitex, San José, 1988, pp. 415-417)" (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment No. 734-210 of 10:28 hours on July 2, 2010). The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has also referred to the topic of strict liability, setting forth the foundations of said type of liability: "It is the result of a revision of the institute of liability that became necessary when there was awareness that the mold of fault was too narrow to contain the aspirations for justice that clamored in an increasingly complex world. Real-world demands, the multiplication of dangers and damages typical of modern life, justified that in certain situations liability be treated as a credit of the victim that the defendant had to rebut. The theory of risk, according to which whoever exercises or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements for others, must also bear its inconveniences, permeated most legislation and in the case of Costa Rica originates the fifth paragraph under discussion. This theory is also called the created damage theory, whose paradigm of imputation, as stated by Professor [Name2], '...consists in attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society a virtual element capable of producing it...' it, she adds, '...dispenses with the subjectivity of the agent, and centers the problem of reparation and its limits around material causation, investigating only which fact was, materially, the cause of the effect, to attribute it to them without further ado. The production of the harmful result is enough for it; it does not require the configuration of an illicit act through traditional elements...' ([Name2], [Name3]. Responsabilidad Civil, [Name4], III Ed., Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 106). Consequently, the source of the obligation, in strict liability, is not the fault, negligence, etc., of the agent. Therefore, to refute liability, it is of no importance that the agent succeeds in demonstrating that they were not imprudent, negligent, or inexperienced." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 61, of 14:50 hours on June 19, 1997). The Trial Court dismissed the existence of strict civil liability, in the terms set forth above, of the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., pointing out that the death of the victim had occurred due to a fault attributable to the victim themselves, which this Chamber of Appeals dismissed in the second considerando (Whereas Clause), to which reference is made. For the determination of strict civil liability of the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., also, in light of the jurisprudence set forth that is shared by this Chamber of Appeals, it is completely irrelevant that the accused [Name5] could not be attributed conduct involving intent or fault causing the death of the victim [Name [Name6]]. Although it was not analyzed in any way, it was stated in the reasoning that the causal link between the action and the result was missing, an argument that must be rejected, because there is a clear causal relationship between the activity of the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. of acquiring and leasing heavy cargo vehicles necessary for road construction and the result of the victim's death [[Name7]], run over and crushed by one of them, since with said commercial activity, the cited co-defendant introduces into society an element capable of producing the result of death, so much so that said causation can be determined in light of the equivalence of conditions theory, insofar as, if the cited acquisition of the property and the corresponding lease to the company Constructora Santa Fe S. A. is eliminated, the concrete risky activity deployed by the heavy vehicle causing the victim [[Name7]]'s death disappears, so there indeed exists a causal relationship between the activity of the defendant and the result of said death.

Regarding the passive legitimacy of the civil claim, we have that even though the Trial Court considered it proven that the victim worked for Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., the truth is that with the statements of [Name8] and [Name9] (sheets 372 to 375 and 375 to 377), evidence that the Trial Court found credible, it was proven that the victim worked for the company Constructora Santa Fe. Likewise, as analyzed in Considerando II of this resolution, the victim performed tasks in a road construction zone under the orders of the cited company and died when, in the fulfillment of said tasks, they were run over and crushed by a dump truck used in said construction tasks, specifically vehicle plate [LicensePlate], which is undoubtedly a motive machine, that is, "That moves or has efficacy or virtue to move," according to the definition of the term "motiva" from the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy. In accordance with the evidence admitted for better resolution (pursuant to Article 462 paragraph 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code) by this Chamber of Appeals, specifically the certification on sheets 38 to 40 of the civil compensation action file, the registered owner of the cited vehicle is the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. Said company had leased the cited vehicle to Constructora Santa Fe Ltda, as shown by the Framework Operating Lease Agreement for financial function CR-IL0565-06, visible from sheets 51 to 67 of the civil compensation action file, a fact that its legal representative also accepts in the response to the civil compensation action (brief on sheets 45 to 46). In such circumstances, it is clear that the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. derived financial benefit from the operation of a potentially risky activity such as the operating lease of heavy machinery for the road construction industry, acquiring machinery necessary for carrying it out and leasing it to other companies (Constructora Santa Fe), an activity that uses elements potentially dangerous for others, such as heavy vehicles and specifically the dump truck plate [LicensePlate], whose use constitutes in itself a dangerous activity for property and persons and whose immediate operation was carried out by the company Constructora Santa Fe, the cited civil co-defendant benefiting in this way from the risky activity that the operation of the cited motor vehicle entailed, and which it itself acquired and leased so that it would be used according to its economic function, for which it must, in such circumstances, be strictly liable for the damages and losses that were produced in the exercise of said risky activity, under the protection of the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 1048 of the Civil Code transcribed above. For the dump truck plate [LicensePlate] to operate, the participation of two companies was necessary: Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. and Constructora Santa Fe; the first as the acquiring owner and lessor of the cited property, and therefore immediate operator on a financial level of the same and mediate operator on an operational level; and the second as the lessee builder and immediate operator of the cited vehicle, establishing between both companies a contractual network that links them and obliges them to respond jointly and severally for the harmful consequences that occurred as a materialization of the risky activity that is inherent to the operation of heavy vehicles for construction, and from which both derived the same economic purpose. Regarding contractual networks, the jurisprudence has stated the following: "Doctrinally, it is established: '...economically efficient contractual networks are phenomena that cannot be considered as simple obligatory contractual relations, since their density is such that the network presents itself to third parties as a unit... In these cases, it is clearly necessary to introduce the principle of liability of the entire contractual network, which can be reached through the theory of double imputation. - The central idea is, then, that what appears as a unit in the commerce of men, must be considered, in the legal plane, as a unit. The collective must respond, then, as a whole. Later they can internally distribute the risks.' ([Name10], [Name11]. "Civil Liability. Volume II". Second Edition, Ediciones Jurídicas Areté. 2001. pp. 200-202). According to this approach, it is not necessary to determine the scope of the actions of the persons in charge of bank security, whether there was fault, negligence, incompetence, or a contractual breach, as the appellants intend to prove in their arguments, since what is important in the species, is the role played by the security company in question, as part of 'a contractually efficient network'. Said position finds support in the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, which in its Article 32 indicates: 'The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond, concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, by inadequate or insufficient information about them, or by their utilization and risks.' That is, as dictated by this norm, every participant in the production chain of the good or service possesses strict liability (independently of fault), and at the same time solidary liability (concurrently) among themselves and vis-à-vis the consumer or recipient of the service. [...] That is, it is clearly understood that they are two entities of a different nature (legal, organizational, and operational), but that both form part of the production chain of a service, or of an 'economically efficient contractual network', and consequently, are viewed as 'a unit' vis-à-vis the recipient of the service. In this sense, Article 2 of the cited Law states: ' (...) For the purposes of this Law, the producer, as a supplier of goods, is also obliged to the consumer, to respect their rights and legitimate interests (...)'. In other words, the law empowers the consumer, user, or final recipient of a good or service, to take action against the merchant, producer, or supplier indistinctly, understanding the latter as members of the so-called 'production chain', so that they take responsibility for the damages and losses caused by reason of the goods and services provided by them, regardless of whether this is their main or accessory activity. At this level, it is clear that while the damages and losses arise from the illicit act perpetrated by the accused, the truth is that this occurs within the sphere of the banking service provided in the Branch of [...], in whose establishment, the defendant company was committed to providing efficient mechanisms to guarantee the security and integrity of the users by reason of the contract governing between both sued institutions, thus forming an intrinsic part within the civilly responsible unit and as such, legally legitimized to respond in accordance with Law 7472." (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote No. [Telf1] of 10:15 hours on November 2, 2007. The highlighting was supplied). Undoubtedly, as has been set forth, the civil defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. was a participant in the production chain of the road construction service directly provided by the company Constructora Santa Fe, hence there is an identity of reason between the scenarios regulated in Article 32 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, to admit strict liability of all participants in the service production chain for the damages and losses caused to the consumer. In the same manner, said extension of liability to all participants in the contractual network must be applied analogically in favor of the workers of the companies providing the service, who are affected by it as a consequence of the materialization of the risks inherent to the exercise of the service provision. The analogical application of norms is expressly authorized in the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, specifically in Article 12 which establishes: "The analogical application of norms shall proceed when these do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is perceived, except when some norm prohibits that application." In matters of strict civil liability for the death of a worker caused by the operation of a motive machine, under the terms established in paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, no express norm is found that allows holding civilly liable all the companies that make up the contractual network that makes the operation of the motive machine possible, but since there is an identity of reason with respect to the extension of that liability established in favor of consumers, the analogical application of Article 32 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense to the present case is also appropriate.

In any case, as already stated, from a strictly objective point of view, the company Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. is civilly liable by virtue of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, insofar as it was dedicated to the acquisition and lease of heavy machinery with a very specific finality and use: for construction, being part of an operation chain for that machinery and the specific risky activity linked to it, as was verified in the particular case, reason for which it is strictly liable for the results that occurred linked to said activity that generated the risk that materialized in the result.

In the reasoning of the appealed judgment, as an argument to reject the civil compensation action, the lack of evidence proving moral damage and material damage was also pointed out, which is also inadmissible, because the declaration of the victim, assessed as credible by the Trial Court, was received during the trial. Said civil plaintiff refers in her statement that she lived under the same roof as the victim in Puerto Jiménez, they got along very well, they never separated, they had a baby girl named [Name12] who was born on March 13, 2008, they went many places together, he was very affectionate. The witness states that at the date of the events, she was exclusively dedicated to household tasks, her partner supported her and provided the maintenance expenses for the girl. She stated that the news of the death of [Name [Name6]] was very hard, she was left with a 6-month-old baby, she felt very sad, she cried, worried about everything, did not know what to do, the sadness lasted about a year, currently the sadness has disappeared a little, but she continues thinking, her daughter asks her about her father, gets sad because she does not have a father, tells her she wants to be with him. Mrs. [Name9] stated that she had no family in Puerto Jiménez, had no one to look after the baby, had to "work," had difficulty finding a job, had to do it in Matapalo which was very far, what she earned she had to give to the babysitter, the girl got sick all over, it took her more than two years to get a job and she could not go far because of the baby. The INS gave her nothing, nor did the company, she has been working as a maid for about three years, her daughter has "more or less" been told how her father died and tells her to be careful when crossing the street. The birth certification admitted by the Trial Court as evidence for better resolution (cf. sheet 363 back), corroborates that the civil plaintiff [Name13] is the daughter of the also civil plaintiff [Name9] and the victim [Name [Name6]]. According to said evidence, the existence of a moral damage and material or economic damage derived from the death of the aggrieved party [Name [Name6]] was fully proven.

Regarding the proof of moral damage, it can be taken as proven based on simple human presumptions, starting from the harmful event and the conditions surrounding the injured party. In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has resolved: "... This implies that starting from the harmful event, and from the conditions surrounding the injured party, applying human presumptions, the judge can infer, even without direct evidence corroborating it, afflictions such as worry, sadness, affliction, pain, stress, because it is presumable that given a certain harmful event and the particularities in which it occurs, the affected person has experienced them." (Vote No. 97 of 16 hours 03 minutes on January 29, 2009). In the specific case, there has been evidence demonstrating the moral damage suffered by the civil plaintiffs as the daughter and the common-law partner of the deceased victim, for the mere loss of their sentimental partner and father, for ceasing to receive his attentions, affection, and company, for ceasing to carry out activities together, etc. Also, in the specific case, the loss of the economic support that the aggrieved party meant to the victims forced them to face serious inconveniences and even the loss of health for the civil plaintiff [Name13], who had to be left in the care of third parties by her mother so she could work, as well as the suffering for said victim for having to face a whole life without her father, whom she still misses. The compensation for moral damage is done through economic remuneration determined by the judging authority (sic) through criteria of proportionality and reasonableness: "Bearing in mind that the proof of this type of injury is 'in re ipsa', the fixing of the amount must be according to the prudent discretion of the judges and based on the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. That assessment must be in accordance with the Law so that it does not lead to disproportionate compensations that unjustifiably benefit one of the parties. Consequently, they must maintain a fair balance derived from the specific factual framework. What is at issue is '...to fix a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism to which the law can resort, in order to repair, at least in part, their offense.'" (First Chamber, resolutions numbers 537 of 10 hours 40 minutes on September 3, 2003, 845 of 10 hours 5 minutes on November 23, 2007, and 662-F-S1-2010 of 14 hours 20 minutes on May 26, 2010). Said jurisprudential criterion of prudential fixing of compensation for moral damage is legally supported by Article 125 of the Rules in Force on Civil Liability of the Criminal Code of 1941. The statement of Mrs. [Name9] also demonstrated the existence of material or economic damage, mainly represented by the economic contribution that the victim [[Name7]] provided to the home, although she did not provide elements for its quantification.

In light of all the foregoing, this Chamber of Appeals finds that the first ground of the appeal must be partially granted, and the second ground must be fully granted, whereby the appealed judgment is declared partially ineffective solely insofar as it dismissed the civil compensation action against the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. and ordered the civil plaintiffs to pay costs in favor of the civil defendants, resolving in this same venue to sentence said legal entity to pay each of the civil plaintiffs the sum of FIFTEEN MILLION COLONES for moral damage, and additionally the material or economic damage, which, for lack of a sufficient basis to be fixed, will be determined in execution of sentence.

Likewise, the condemnation extends to the payment of personal and procedural costs, which shall also be liquidated in the execution of the sentence once the material or economic damage has been determined. The approved sum of fifteen million colones for moral damages (daño moral), in this Chamber's opinion, is reasonable and proportional in light of the proven circumstances, consisting of the suffering caused to the civil plaintiffs by the loss of their sentimental partner in the case of civil plaintiff [Nombre9], with whom she had managed to build an affectionate, harmonious, stable, permanent, and exclusive relationship, in addition to having procreated a daughter with the victim, suffering that was exacerbated by the economic abandonment in which the family was left with the loss of [[Nombre7]], the sole economic provider of the family nucleus, forcing the civil plaintiff to have to look for work, for which she had to leave her daughter in the hands of third parties, a situation that additionally and repeatedly caused the girl to fall ill, which undoubtedly produced anguish and worry in the mother, at not being able to personally provide [Nombre14] with the care she required. For her part, the civil co-plaintiff [Nombre15], being very young, lost her father, an affectionate, loving person who covered her basic needs, a figure who is also relevant in the formation process of every human being and is a relevant figure and a reference point in all stages of people's lives, so that the moral damage (daño moral) caused to said civil plaintiff will extend for the rest of her existence, being evidenced currently when she asks her mother about her father and becomes sad due to the parent's absence. The first ground of appeal is rejected insofar as it sought to annul the sentence issued in favor of the defendant [Nombre5], where he was absolved of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of negligent homicide (homicidio culposo) to the detriment of [Nombre [Nombre6]] and the declaration upholding the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought against him. In relation to said civil co-defendant, this is resolved without special condemnation on costs in the civil matter, as this Chamber considers that the civil plaintiff had ample reason to litigate, to the extent that with respect to another civil co-defendant, the claims of the lawsuit have been fully granted. In all other respects, the sentence remains unaltered.

folio 363 vlto), corroborates that the civil plaintiff [Nombre13] is the daughter of the also civil plaintiff [Nombre9] and of the offended party [Nombre [Nombre6]]. According to said evidence, the existence of moral and material or economic harm (daño moral y material o económico) derived from the death of the aggrieved party [Nombre [Nombre6]] was fully accredited. In relation to the accreditation of moral harm, it can be taken as demonstrated from simple human presumptions, starting from the injurious event and the conditions that surrounded the victim. In this regard, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled: “… This means that starting from the injurious event, and from the conditions that surrounded the victim, applying human presumptions, the judge can infer, even without direct evidence to corroborate it, afflictions such as worry, sadness, affliction, pain, stress, because it is presumable that given a certain injurious event and the particularities in which it occurs, the affected party has experienced them”. (Voto N° 97 of 4:03 p.m. on January 29, 2009). In the specific case, there has been evidence that demonstrates the moral harm suffered by the civil plaintiffs as the daughter and common-law partner of the deceased offended party, for the mere loss of the life partner and father, for having ceased to receive his attentions, his affection and company, for ceasing to carry out activities together, etc. Also in the specific case, the loss of the economic support that the aggrieved party meant for the victims led them to have to face serious inconveniences and even the loss of health for the civil plaintiff [Nombre13], who had to be left in the hands of third parties by her mother in order to work, likewise for the suffering for said offended party for having to face an entire life without her father, whom she continues to miss. The compensation for moral harm is made through an economic remuneration that the adjudicating authority determines (sic) through criteria of proportionality and reasonableness: "Bearing in mind that the proof of this type of injury is “in re ipsa”, the setting of the amount must be according to the prudent discretion of the judges and based on the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. That assessment must be in accordance with the Law so that it does not lead to disproportionate compensation that unjustifiably benefits one of the parties. Consequently, they must maintain a fair balance derived from the specific factual picture. What is involved is, ‘…setting a monetary compensation for his injury, the only mechanism that law can resort to, in order to thus repair, at least in part, his offense.’ " (First Chamber, resolutions numbers 537 of 10:40 a.m. on September 3, 2003, 845 of 10:05 a.m. on November 23, 2007 and 662-F-S1-2010 of 2:20 p.m. on May 26, 2010). Said jurisprudential criterion for the discretionary setting of compensation for moral harm is legally supported by numeral 125 of the Current Rules on Civil Liability of the 1941 Penal Code. The statement of Mrs. [Nombre9] also demonstrated the existence of material or economic harm, represented fundamentally by the economic contribution that the offended party [[Nombre7] ] provided to the home, although it does not provide elements for its quantification. In light of all the foregoing, this Court of Appeals considers that the first ground of the appeal must be partially upheld and the second entirely, by virtue of which the appealed judgment is declared partially ineffective only insofar as it dismissed the civil action for damages against the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. and ordered the civil plaintiffs to pay costs in favor of the civil defendants, resolving in this same venue to order said legal entity to pay to the civil plaintiffs the sum of FIFTEEN MILLION COLONES to each one for moral harm and also the material or economic harm, which, due to there being no sufficient basis to be fixed, will be determined in the execution of the judgment. Likewise, the order extends to the payment of personal and procedural costs that will also be liquidated in the execution of the judgment once the material or economic harm is determined. The approved sum of fifteen million colones for moral harm, in the opinion of this Chamber, is reasonable and proportional in light of the accredited circumstances, consisting of the suffering caused to the civil plaintiffs for the loss of the life partner in the case of the civil plaintiff [Nombre9], with whom she had managed to build an affectionate, harmonious, stable, permanent and exclusive relationship, in addition to having procreated a daughter with the offended party, suffering that was exacerbated by the economic helplessness in which the family was left with the loss of [[Nombre7] ], the sole economic provider of the family nucleus, the civil plaintiff having to seek work, for which she had to leave her daughter in the hands of third parties, a situation that additionally and repeatedly caused the girl to fall ill, which undoubtedly produced anguish and worry in the mother, at not being able to personally provide [Nombre14] with the care she required. For her part, the civil co-plaintiff [Nombre15], being very young lost her father, an affectionate, loving person who covered her basic needs, a figure that is also relevant in the formation process of every human being and is a relevant figure and a reference in all stages of people's lives, such that the moral harm caused to said civil plaintiff will extend for the rest of her existence, being evidenced currently when she asks her mother about her father and becomes sad due to the absence of the parent. The first ground of appeal is rejected insofar as it sought to annul the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant [Nombre5], where he was absolved of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of negligent homicide to the detriment of [Nombre [Nombre6]] and the declaration upholding the civil action for damages filed against him. In relation to said civil co-defendant, it is resolved without special award of costs in the civil matter, as this Chamber considers that the civil plaintiff party has had ample reasons to litigate, to the degree that with respect to another civil co-defendant, the claims of the lawsuit have been fully upheld. In all other respects, the judgment remains unchanged.” of acquiring and leasing load vehicles necessary for road construction and the resulting death of the victim [[Nombre7]], run over and crushed by one of them, since with said commercial activity the cited co-defendant introduces into society an element capable of producing the death result, so much so that said causation can be determined in light of the theory of the equivalence of conditions, insofar as, if the cited acquisition of the good and the corresponding lease to the company Constructora Santa Fe S. A. are eliminated, the specific risky activity deployed by the heavy vehicle causing the death result of the victim [[Nombre7]] disappears, so a causal relationship does exist between the activity of the defendant and said death result. Regarding the passive legitimacy of the civil action, we have that even though the Trial Court held it as proven that the deceased worked for Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., the truth is that with the statements of [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] (folios 372 to 375 and 375 to 377), evidence to which the Trial Court granted credibility, it was proven that the deceased worked for the company Constructora Santa Fe. Likewise, as analyzed in Considerando II of this resolution, the victim performed work in a road construction zone under the orders of the cited company and died when, in the fulfillment of said work, he was run over and crushed by a dump truck used in said construction work, specifically the vehicle license plate [Placa1], which is undoubtedly a motive machine, that is, "That moves or has efficacy or virtue to move," according to the definition of the term "motiva" from the Diccionario de la Real Academia Española. In accordance with the evidence incorporated for better resolution (pursuant to article 462 subsection 3 of the Código Procesal Penal) by this Court of Appeals, specifically the certification from folios 38 to 40 of the civil damages action file, the registered owner of the cited vehicle is the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. Said company had leased the cited vehicle to Constructora Santa Fe Ltda, as demonstrated by the Master Operating Lease Agreement in financial function CR-IL0565-06, visible at folios 51 to 67 of the civil damages action file, a fact that its legal representative furthermore accepts in the response to the civil damages action (brief at folios 45 to 46). Under such circumstances, it is clear that the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. derived financial benefit from the exploitation of a potentially risky activity such as the operating lease of heavy machinery for the road construction industry, acquiring machinery necessary for carrying out the same and leasing it to other companies (Constructora Santa Fe), an activity that uses elements potentially dangerous to others, such as heavy vehicles and specifically the dump truck license plate [Placa1], the use of which in itself constitutes a dangerous activity for property and persons and the immediate exploitation of which was carried out by the company Constructora Santa Fe, the cited civil co-defendant thus benefiting from the risky activity implied by the exploitation of the cited motor vehicle and which it itself acquired and leased to be used in accordance with its economic function, for which reason it must, under such circumstances, respond objectively for the damages that occurred in the exercise of said risky activity, under the protection of what is established in paragraph 5 of numeral 1048 of the Civil Code transcribed above. For the dump truck license plate [Placa1] to operate, the participation of two companies was necessary: Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. and Constructora Santa Fe, the first as the owner acquirer and lessor of the cited good and therefore its immediate exploiter at the financial level and mediate exploiter at the operational level; and the second as the builder lessee and immediate exploiter of the cited vehicle, establishing between both companies a contractual network that binds them and obliges them to respond jointly and severally for the harmful consequences that occurred as a realization of the risky activity that is consubstantial to the exploitation of heavy vehicles for construction and from which both derived the same economic purpose. Regarding contractual networks, the jurisprudence has stated the following: “Doctrinally it is established: '…economically efficient contractual networks are phenomena that cannot be considered as simple obligatory contractual relationships, since their density is such that the network presents itself before third parties as a unit… In these cases it is evident that it is necessary to introduce the principle of the liability of the entire contractual network, which can be reached through the theory of double imputation.- The central idea is, then, that what in the commerce of men appears as a unit, must be held, on the legal plane, as a unit. The collective must respond, then, as a whole. Later they can internally distribute the risks.' ([Nombre10], [Nombre11]. "Responsabilidad Civil. Tomo II". Second Edition, Ediciones Jurídicas Areté. 2001. pp. 200-202). In accordance with this approach, it is not necessary to determine the scope of the actions of the persons in charge of bank security, whether there was fault, negligence, lack of skill, or a contractual breach, as the appellants seek to demonstrate in their arguments, since what is important in the case is the role played by the security company in question, as part of 'an economically efficient contractual network.' Said position finds support in the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, which in its article 32 indicates: 'The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond, concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or the service, of inadequate or insufficient information about them or of their use and risks.' That is, as this norm dictates, every participant in the production chain of the good or service possesses strict liability (independent of fault), and at the same time joint and several liability (concurrently) among themselves and before the consumer or recipient of the service. […] That is, it is clear that they are two entities of a different nature (legal, organizational, and operational), but both form part of the production chain of a service, or of an 'economically efficient contractual network,' and consequently, seen as 'a unit' before the recipient of the service. In this sense, article 2 of the cited Law states: ' (…) For the effects of this Law, the producer, as a supplier of goods, is also obligated to the consumer, to respect their legitimate rights and interests (…)'. In other words, the law empowers the consumer, user, or final recipient of a good or service to bring action against the merchant, producer, or supplier indistinctly, understanding the latter as members of the so-called 'production chain,' so that they are held liable for the damages caused by reason of the goods and services provided by them, regardless of whether these are their main or accessory activity. On this plane, it is clear that although the damages arise from the illicit act perpetrated by the accused, the truth is that this occurs within the sphere of the banking service provided at the Branch of […], in whose establishment, the defendant company was committed to providing efficient mechanisms to guarantee the security and integrity of the users by reason of the contract that governed between both sued institutions, thus forming an intrinsic part within the civilly responsible unit and therefore, legally legitimized to respond in accordance with Law 7472. (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, vote No. [Telf1] of 10:15 a.m. on November 2, 2007. The emphasis was supplied). Undoubtedly, as has been stated, the civil defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. was a participant in the production chain of the road construction service directly provided by the company Constructora Santa Fe, hence there exists an identity of reason between the cases regulated in article 32 of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, to admit strict liability of all participants in the service production chain for the damages caused to the consumer. In the same manner, said extension of liability to all participants in the contractual network must be applied by analogy in favor of the workers of the companies providing the service, who are affected by the same as a consequence of the realization of the risks inherent to the exercise of the service provision. The analogical application of norms is expressly authorized in the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, specifically in numeral 12 which establishes: "The analogical application of norms shall proceed when they do not contemplate a specific case, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, unless some norm prohibits that application." In matters of strict civil liability for the death of a worker due to the exploitation of a motive machine, in the terms established in paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, there is no express norm that allows holding civilly liable all the companies that make up the contractual network that makes the operation of the motive machine possible, but since there is an identity of reason regarding the extension of that liability established in favor of consumers, the analogical application of numeral 32 of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor to the present case is also pertinent. In any case, as already advanced, from the objective point of view, the company Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. is civilly liable by virtue of article 1048 of the Civil Code, insofar as it was dedicated to the acquisition and lease of heavy machinery with a very specific purpose and use: for construction, being part of a chain of exploitation of that machinery and the specific risky activity linked to it, as was verified in the particular case, reason for which it is strictly liable for the results that occurred linked to said activity that generated the risk that materialized in the result. In the intellectual reasoning of the appealed judgment, as an argument for rejecting the civil damages action, the lack of evidence proving the non-material damage (daño moral) and material damage was also pointed out, which is also inadmissible, because during the debate, the statement of the victim was received, valued as credible by the Trial Court. Said civil plaintiff refers in her statement to having lived under the same roof as the deceased in Puerto Jiménez, they got along very well, they never separated, they had a baby girl named [Nombre12] who was born on March 13, 2008, they went to many places together, he was very affectionate. The witness states that on the date of the facts she dedicated herself solely to domestic work, her partner supported her and gave her the expenses for the child's maintenance. She stated that the news of the death of [Nombre [Nombre6]] was very hard, she was left with a 6-month-old baby, she felt very sad, she cried, she worried about everything, she did not know what to do, the sadness lasted about a year, currently the sadness has disappeared a little, but she continues thinking, her daughter asks her about her father, gets sad because she does not have a father, tells her she wants to be with him. Mrs. [Nombre9] stated that she had no family in Puerto Jiménez, she had no one to take care of the baby, she had to 'work,' it was hard for her to find a job, she had to do it in Matapalo which was very far, what she earned she had to give to the babysitter, the girl got sick all over, it took her more than two years to find a job and she could not go far because of the baby. The INS gave her nothing nor did the company, she has been working as a maid for about three years, her daughter 'more or less' has been told how her father died and tells her to be careful crossing the street. The birth certificate admitted by the Trial Court as evidence for better resolution (cfr. folio 363 verso), corroborates that the civil plaintiff [Nombre13] is the daughter of the also civil plaintiff [Nombre9] and the deceased [Nombre [Nombre6]]. According to said evidence, the existence of a non-material damage (daño moral) and material or economic damage derived from the death of the aggrieved [Nombre [Nombre6]] was fully proven. In relation to the proof of non-material damage, it can be held as proven based on simple human presumptions, starting from the harmful event and the conditions that surrounded the injured party. In this regard, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has resolved: "… This means that starting from the harmful event, and from the conditions that surrounded the injured party, applying human presumptions, the judge can infer, even without direct evidence that corroborates it, afflictions such as worry, sadness, distress, pain, stress, because it is presumable that before a certain harmful event and the particularities in which it occurs, the affected party experienced them." (Vote No. 97 of 4:03 p.m. on January 29, 2009). In the specific case, we have had evidence that demonstrates the non-material damage suffered by the civil plaintiffs as the daughter and cohabitant in a common-law marriage of the deceased, for the mere loss of the sentimental partner and father, for having ceased to receive his attentions, his affection and company, for ceasing to carry out activities together, etc. Also in the specific case, the loss of the economic support that the aggrieved meant for the victims led them to face serious inconveniences and even the loss of health for the civil plaintiff [Nombre13], who had to be left in the hands of third parties by her mother in order to work, likewise for the suffering for said victim from having to face a whole life without her father, whom she does not stop missing. The compensation for non-material damage is done through an economic remuneration determined by the judicial authority (sic) through criteria of proportionality and reasonableness: "Bearing in mind that the proof of this type of injury is 'in re ipsa,' the setting of the amount must be done in accordance with the prudent discretion of the judges and based on the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. That valuation must be in accordance with Law so that it does not lead to disproportionate compensations that unjustifiably benefit one of the parties. Consequently, they must maintain a just balance derived from the specific factual picture. What is involved is '…setting a monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism to which law can resort, to thus repair, at least in part, their offense.'" (Sala Primera, resolutions numbers 537 of 10:40 a.m. on September 3, 2003, 845 of 10:05 a.m. on November 23, 2007, and 662-F-S1-2010 of 2:20 p.m. on May 26, 2010). Said jurisdictional criterion of prudential setting of the compensation for non-material damage is legally supported by numeral 125 of the Reglas Vigentes Sobre Responsabilidad Civil of the Código Penal of 1941. The statement of Mrs. [Nombre9] also demonstrated the existence of a material or economic damage, represented fundamentally by the economic contribution that the deceased [[Nombre7]] provided to the household, although it did not provide elements for its quantification. In light of all the foregoing, this Cámara de Apelación considers that the first ground of the appeal must be partially upheld and the second ground fully upheld, by virtue of which the appealed judgment is declared partially ineffective only insofar as it declared the civil damages action without merit against the civil co-defendant Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. and ordered the civil plaintiffs to pay costs in favor of the civil defendants, resolving in this same venue to order said legal entity to pay the civil plaintiffs the sum of FIFTEEN MILLION COLONES each for non-material damage (daño moral) and additionally the material or economic damage, which, for lack of sufficient basis to be fixed, shall be determined in execution of judgment. Likewise, the order extends to the payment of personal and procedural costs that shall also be liquidated in execution of judgment once the material or economic damage is determined. The approved sum of fifteen million colones for non-material damage, in the opinion of this Chamber, is reasonable and proportional in light of the proven circumstances, consisting of the suffering caused to the civil plaintiffs by the loss of the sentimental partner in the case of the civil plaintiff [Nombre9], with whom she had managed to build an affectionate, harmonious, stable, permanent, and exclusive relationship, in addition to the fact that she had procreated a daughter with the deceased, suffering that was aggravated by the economic helplessness in which the family was left with the loss of [[Nombre7]], the sole economic provider of the family nucleus, the civil plaintiff having to seek work, for which she had to leave her daughter in the hands of third parties, a situation that additionally and repeatedly caused the girl to fall ill, which undoubtedly produced anguish and worry in the mother, at not being able to personally provide [Nombre14] the care she required. For her part, the civil co-plaintiff [Nombre15], being very young, lost her father, an affectionate, caring person who covered her basic needs, a figure who is also relevant in the formation process of every human being and is a relevant figure and a point of reference in all stages of people's lives, so the non-material damage caused to said civil plaintiff will extend for the rest of her existence, evidenced currently by asking her mother about her father and becoming sad due to the absence of her progenitor. The first ground of appeal is rejected insofar as it sought to annul the judgment issued in favor of the defendant [Nombre5], where he was absolved of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of negligent homicide (homicidio culposo) to the detriment of [Nombre [Nombre6]] and the declaration with merit of the civil damages action filed against him. In relation to said civil co-defendant, it is resolved without a special order as to costs in the civil matter, as this Chamber considers that the civil plaintiff party has had ample reasons to litigate, to the degree that with respect to another civil co-defendant, the claims of the lawsuit have been fully upheld. In all other respects, the judgment remains unaltered.”

“IV.- Consideración aparte merece la codemandada civil Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. El régimen jurídico de la responsabilidad civil de terceros frente a los daños y perjuicios que se causan en accidentes de tránsito está determinado por la Ley de Tránsito y por el Código Civil, según los presupuestos fácticos que la determinan. El numeral 197 de la Ley de Tránsito N° 9078, vigente en la actualidad, establece: " En todo accidente de tránsito en el que no esté identificado el conductor , el propietario registral será el responsable civil objetivo de las consecuencias que se deriven del uso, manipulación, posesión o tenencia del vehículo. En tal caso, el interesado podrá plantear un proceso civil en contra del propietario registral. Dicho propietario podrá liberarse de responsabilidad mediante documento que demuestre que el vehículo fue vendido, traspasado a un tercero, sustraído, o no se encuentra dentro de su apoderamiento, con fecha anterior al accidente de tránsito. De comprobarse lo anterior, se tendrá que encausar el proceso en contra del nuevo adquirente o poseedor e igualmente se actuará por cualquier otra salvedad legítimamente válida. En los accidentes en que el conductor sea identificado, la responsabilidad civil solidaria del propietario o poseedor podrá tramitarse dentro del proceso de tránsito respectivo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 199 y siguientes de la presente ley. (...)" (el resaltado fue suplido) . Dicha disposición legal existía para la fecha de los hechos y correspondía al numeral 7 de la Ley de Tránsito N° 7331. De la citada norma se derivan dos formas de responsabilidad civil de terceras personas en materia de accidentes de tránsito. La primera de ellas, de naturaleza objetiva, para el supuesto de que se desconozca la identidad del conductor del vehículo con el que se causó el accidente de tránsito, hipótesis en la que el propietario del vehículo responde objetivamente hasta por el valor del vehículo, lo anterior porque si la responsabilidad civil objetiva depende exclusivamente de la condición de propietario del vehículo, lo lógico es que dicha responsabilidad se restrinja al valor del bien causante del accidente y los consecuentes daños, de ahí que la misma Ley de Tránsito dispone en el numeral 200 que "El vehículo con el se cause un daño, se mantendrá gravado hasta la finalización del proceso respectivo y a la orden de la autoridad judicial que conozca este". Dicha disposición legal correspondía al numeral 188 de la Ley de Tránsito N° 7331 vigente para la fecha de los hechos. La limitación de la responsabilidad civil del propietario hasta por el valor del vehículo, ha sido objeto de reiterados pronunciamientos por parte de la Jurisprudencia de Casación Penal: “VIII. […] La decisión de condenar a la empresa propietaria del automotor, únicamente en cuanto al valor de éste se ampara en el principio de legalidad y no es una decisión en perjuicio de los intereses de las víctimas como lo indica el quejoso. Si bien es cierto, los artículos 187 de la Ley de Tránsito y 106 del Código Penal, determinan la solidaridad en la responsabilidad civil conjuntamente con los autores del hecho punible relativa al pago de los daños y perjuicios, ello se refiere a situaciones o causales taxativamente señaladas, dentro de las que no se incluye la causa en cuestión, en los demás casos, conforme a la normativa de tránsito vigente al momento de los hechos – ley número 7331 – la responsabilidad civil de los terceros demandados civiles se encuentra determinada hasta por el valor del vehículo con el cual se cause el daño – artículo 188 – no pudiendo gravarse otros bienes, salvo los del demandado civil, pues aun cuando el numeral 263 del Código Procesal Penal, permite al actor civil formular la solicitud de embargo en el escrito de constitución o con posterioridad, sin perjuicio de la facultad de solicitarlo preventivamente, se requiere que los bienes sujetos a embargo, se encuentren registralmente a nombre del demandado civil, ostentándose adicionalmente la condición de acusado, o estar contemplado dentro de los presupuestos de solidaridad civil, lo que no sucede en autos. En consecuencia, el reclamo debe ser declarado sin lugar.” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, entre otras, la sentencia N° 367-2010 de las 08:48 horas del 7 de mayo de 2010). La responsabilidad civil objetiva del propietario del vehículo solamente se excluye cuando demuestra que lo traspasó a un tercero, le fue sustraído, o no se encuentra dentro de su apoderamiento, con fecha anterior al accidente de tránsito. La segunda forma de responsabilidad civil que se extrae de la norma transcrita es la responsabilidad civil solidaria del propietario del vehículo, para el supuesto de que el conductor del automotor causante del accidente se encuentre individualizado. En tal supuesto, el propietario del vehículo responde solidariamente con el conductor, si además de ser propietario, se cumplen los requisitos del numeral 199 de la Ley de Tránsito, fuera de los mismos, y en atención al régimen de responsabilidad civil establecido en la Ley de Tránsito, la responsabilidad civil sería exclusiva del conductor. La responsabilidad civil solidaria del propietario en la hipótesis de comentario no es autónoma, sino que depende de la del conductor, que como ya se ha adelantado, es de naturaleza subjetiva, y no está limitada al valor del vehículo, sino que la solidaridad obliga al propietario a responder por la totalidad de la condena y con todo su patrimonio, puesto que de conformidad con el numeral 637 del Código Civil “En la obligación solidaria entre los deudores, cada uno de éstos es tenido en sus relaciones con el acreedor, como deudor único de la prestación total”. En el anterior supuesto, si a favor del conductor se decreta la ausencia de responsabilidad civil, de igual manera se debe rechazar el reclamo civil contra el propietario, puesto que éste no tiene una obligación independiente de la del conductor. La responsabilidad objetiva prevista en la Ley de Tránsito no es aplicable al presente caso porque el conductor del vehículo causante del accidente se encuentra individualizado. La responsabilidad solidaria del propietario tampoco procede porque, conforme ya se indicó, el conductor fue liberado de responsabilidad civil por tenerse la certeza de que actuó sin dolo o culpa. Existe otra posibilidad de responsabilidad civil objetiva, ya no determinada por la condición de propietario sino de explotador de una fuente de peligros como lo es una máquina motiva, que es la prevista en el párrafo 5° del numeral 1048 del Código Civil. Dicha norma dispone lo siguiente: "Y si una persona muriere o fuere lesionada por una maquina motiva, o un vehículo de un ferrocarril, tranvía u otro modo de transporte análogo, la empresa o persona explotadora está obligada a reparar el perjuicio que de ello resulte, si no prueba que el accidente fue causado por fuerza mayor o por la propia falta de la persona muerta o lesionada". Respecto de dicha norma la jurisprudencia de casación penal ha dicho lo siguiente: "El reclamo es de recibo. En el artículo 1048 del Código Civil, párrafo quinto, se establece el deber de indemnizar la muerte o lesión ocasionada por una máquina motiva, y respecto de la empresa o persona explotadora. Dicho presupuesto, responde a lo que teóricamente se ha denominado “responsabilidad objetiva”. Sin embargo, ese estatuto se ve limitado por dos circunstancias que exoneran tal responsabilidad, a saber; la fuerza mayor y la culpa de la víctima. Por consiguiente, esa responsabilidad de principio que prevé la ley, puede verse excluida si se logra acreditar alguna de esas dos situaciones. Dicho sea de otro modo, en la responsabilidad civil objetiva no se precisa demostrar la culpa, por lo que la prueba de la posible negligencia o imprudencia es innecesaria e inconducente, pues en sede civil no necesariamente la responsabilidad deviene de una circunstancia subjetiva, tal y como en doctrina se ha indicado, al decirse que: “…Se trata, en primer término, de actividades que son permitidas, pero que obligan al resarcimiento de los daños que de ellas derivan; la noción de riesgo viene a reemplazar los conceptos de culpa y antijuridicidad... A diferencia de ‘responsabilidad por culpa’, la responsabilidad objetiva reside en el hecho de que aquel que para su propio provecho crea una fuente de probables daños y expone a las personas y los bienes ajenos a peligro, queda obligado si el daño se verifica... Desde el punto de vista práctico, la responsabilidad objetiva se resume en una ventaja a favor del lesionado que significa una parcial inversión de la carga de la prueba, en el sentido de este queda exonerado de la carga de probar la culpa (culpa o dolo) del causante del daño y vano sería el intento de este de probar su falta de culpa, a diferencia de lo que ocurre en los casos de responsabilidad subjetiva…” (PEREZ, [Nombre1]. Derecho Privado. Publitex, San José, 1988, págs. 415-417)" (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia N° 734-210 de las 10:28 horas del 2 de julio de 2010). La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia también se ha referido al tema de la responsabilidad objetiva exponiendo los fundamentos de dicho tipo de responsabilidad: “Es el resultado de una revisión del instituto de la responsabilidad que vino a ser necesaria cuando se tomó conciencia que el molde de la culpa era estrecho para contener las aspiraciones de justicia que clamaban en un mundo cada vez más complejo. Exigencias de la realidad, la multiplicación de los peligros y daños propios de la vida moderna, justificaron que en determinadas situaciones la responsabilidad fuese tratada como un crédito de la víctima que el demandado debía desvirtuar. La teoría del riesgo, según la cual quien ejerce o se aprovecha de una actividad con elementos potencialmente peligrosos para los demás, debe también soportar sus inconveniencias, permeó la mayor parte de las legislaciones y en el caso de Costa Rica origina el párrafo V de comentario. Esta teoría es también denominada del daño creado, cuyo paradigma de imputación, según lo refiere el Profesor [Nombre2], "...estriba en atribuir el daño a todo el que introduce en la sociedad un elemento virtual de producirlo...ella, agrega, "...prescinde de la subjetividad del agente, y centra el problema de la reparación y sus límites en torno de la causalidad material, investigando tan solo cual hecho fue, materialmente, causa del efecto, para atribuírselo sin más. Le basta la producción del resultado dañoso, no exige la configuración de un acto ilícito a través de los elementos tradicionales..." ([Nombre2], [Nombre3]. Responsabilidad Civil, [Nombre4] , III Edic., Buenos Aires, 1987, pág 106). Consecuentemente, la fuente de la obligación, en la responsabilidad objetiva, no es la culpa, la negligencia, etc., del agente. Por eso para desvirtuar la responsabilidad ninguna importancia tiene que éste logre demostrar que no fue imprudente, negligente o inexperto” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, N° 61, de las 14:50 horas del 19 de junio de 1997). El Tribunal de Juicio descartó la existencia de responsabilidad civil objetiva, en los términos antes expuestos, de la co demanda civil Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., señalando que la muerte de la víctima había acontecido por una falta o culpa atribuible a ella misma, lo cual descartó esta Cámara de Apelación en el segundo considerando, a lo cual se remite. Para la determinación de responsabilidad civil objetiva de la codemandada civil Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., también, a la luz de la jurisprudencia expuesta que se comparte por esta Cámara de Apelación, carece de toda relevancia que al imputado [Nombre5] no se le haya podido atribuir una conducta a título de dolo o culpa causante de la muerte de la víctima [Nombre [Nombre6]]. Aunque no se analizó en modo alguno, se afirmó en la fundamentación intelectiva que faltaba el nexo causal entre la acción y el resultado, argumento que debe rechazarse, pues existe una clara relación de causalidad entre la actividad de la codemandada Civil Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. de adquirir y arrendar vehículos de carga necesarios para la construcción de carreteras y el resultado muerte de la víctima [[Nombre7] ], atropellado y aplastado por uno de ellos, ya que con dicho actuar comercial la citada codemandada introduce en la sociedad un elemento capaz de producir el resultado muerte, tanto así que dicha causalidad puede determinarse a la luz de la teoría de la equivalencia de las condiciones, en el tanto, si se elimina la citad a adquisición del bien y el correspondiente arrendamiento a la empresa Constructora Santa Fe S. A., desaparece la actividad riesgosa concreta desplegada por el vehículo pesado causante del resultado muerte de la víctima [[Nombre7] ], de manera sí existe relación de causalidad entre la actividad de la demandada y el resultado muerte dicho. En relación a la legitimación pasiva de la demanda civil, tenemos que a pesar de que el Tribunal de Juicio tuvo por demostrado que el ofendido laboraba para Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., lo cierto es que con las declaraciones de [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] (folios 372 a 375 y 375 a 377) prueba a la que el Tribunal de Juicio le otorgó credibilidad, se demostró que el ofendido laboraba para la empresa Constructora Santa Fe. Así mismo, según se analizó en el Considerando II de esta resolución, la víctima desempeñaba labores en una zona de construcción de una carretera a las órdenes de la citada empresa y murió cuando en el cumplimiento de dichas labores fue atropellado y aplastado por una vagoneta empleada en las labores de construcción dichas, concretamente el vehículo placa [Placa1] , que es sin duda una máquina motiva, es decir, "Que mueve o tiene eficacia o virtud para mover", según definición del término "motiva" del diccionario de la Real Academia Española. De acuerdo con la prueba incorporada para mejor resolver (conforme al artículoo 462 p. 3° del Código Procesal Penaol) por este Tribunal de Apelación, concretamente la certificación de folios 38 a 40 del legajo de acción civil resarcitoria, la propietaria registral del citado vehículo lo es la codemanda civil Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. Dicha empresa había arrendado el citado vehículo a Constructora Santa Fe Ltda, según se demuestra con el Contrato Marco de Arrendamiento Operativo en función financiera CR-IL0565-06, visible de folios 51 a 67 de la legajo de acción civil resarcitoria, hecho que además acepta su representante legal en la contestación de la acción civil resarcitoria (memorial de folios 45 a 46). En tales circunstancias, es claro que la codemandada civil Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., sacaba provecho financiero de la explotación de una actividad potencialmente riesgosa como lo es el arrendamiento operativo de maquinaria pesada para la industria de la construcción de carreteras, adquiriendo maquinaria necesaria para la realización de la misma y dándola en arriendo a otras empresas (Constructora Santa Fe), actividad que utiliza elementos potencialmente peligrosos para los demás, como lo son los vehículos pesados y concretamente la vagoneta placa [Placa1] , cuyo empleo en sí mismoconstituye una actividad peligrosa para bienes y personas y cuya explotación inmediata la efectuaba la empresa Constructora Santa Fe, beneficiándose de esa manera la citada codemandada civil de la actividad riesgosa que implicaba la explotación del citado automotor y que ella misma adquirió y arrendó para que fuera utilizado conforme a su función económica, por lo que debe, en tales circunstancias , responder objetivamente de los daños y perjuicios que en el ejercicio de dicha actividad riesgosa se produjeron, al amparo de lo establecido en el párrafo 5º del numeral 1048 del Código Civil supra transcrito. Para que la vagoneta placa [Placa1] pudiera operar, fue necesaria la participación de dos empresas: Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. y Constructora Santa Fe, la primera como propietaria adquirente y arrendante del citado bien y por lo tanto explotadora inmediata a nivel financiero del mismo y mediata a nivel operativo; y la segunda como constructora arrendataria y explotadora inmediata del citado vehículo, estableciéndose entre ambas sociedades una red contractual que las vincula y obliga a responder solidariamente por las consecuencias dañinas que se produjeron como concreción de la actividad riesgosa que es consustancial a la explotación de vehículos pesados para la construcción y de la cual ambas sacaban una misma finalidad económica . En relación a las redes contractuales ha dicho la jurisprudencia lo siguiente: “ Doctrinalmente se establece: “…las redes contractuales económicamente eficientes se tratan de fenómenos que no pueden ser considerados como simples relaciones contractuales obligatorias, ya que su densidad es tal que la red se presenta frente a terceros como una unidad...En estos casos resulta evidente que es necesario introducir el principio de la responsabilidad de toda red contractual, al que se puede llegar por medio de la teoría de la doble imputación .- La idea central es, entonces que lo que en el comercio de los hombres aparece como una unidad, debe tenerse, en el plano jurídico, como una unidad. Lo colectivo debe responder, entonces, como un todo. Luego pueden repartirse internamente los riesgos”.([Nombre10] , [Nombre11] .“Responsabilidad Civil. Tomo II”. Segunda Edición, Ediciones Jurídicas Areté. 2001. pp. 200-202). Conforme a este enfoque, no es necesario determinar los alcances de la actuación de las personas a cargo de la seguridad bancaria, si medió culpa, negligencia, impericia o un incumplimiento contractual, como pretenden demostrar los recurrentes en sus alegatos, ya que lo importante en la especie, es el papel que juega la empresa de seguridad en cuestión, como parte de “una red contractualmente eficiente”. Dicha posición encuentra respaldo en la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, que en su artículo 32 indica: “El productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder, concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos”. Es decir, conforme lo dicta esta norma, todo interviniente en la cadena de producción del bien o el servicio, posee una responsabilidad objetiva (independientemente de la culpa), y a la vez solidaria (concurrentemente) entre si y frente al consumidor o destinatario del servicio. […] Es decir, se tiene claro que son dos entidades de distinta naturaleza (jurídica, organizacional y operacional), pero que ambas forman parte de la cadena de producción de un servicio, o bien de una “red contractual económicamente eficiente”, y por consiguiente, vistas como “una unidad” frente al destinatario del servicio. En tal sentido, el artículo 2 de la citada Ley expresa: “ (…) Para los efectos de esta Ley, el productor, como proveedor de bienes, también está obligado con el consumidor, a respetarle sus derechos e intereses legítimos (...)”. En otras palabras, la ley faculta al consumidor, usuario o destinatario final de un bien o servicio, accionar en contra del comerciante, productor o proveedor indistintamente, entendiendo a estos últimos como miembros de la denominada “cadena de producción”, para que se responsabilicen por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados en razón de los bienes y servicios brindados por ellos, sin importar si estos son su actividad principal o bien accesoria. En este plano, queda claro que si bien los daños y perjuicios surgen del ilícito perpetrado por el imputado, lo cierto es que esto ocurre dentro de la esfera del servicio bancario brindado en la Sucursal del […], en cuyo establecimiento, la empresa demandada se encontraba comprometida a proveer los mecanismos eficientes para garantizar la seguridad e integridad de los usuarios en razón del contrato que regía entre ambas instituciones accionadas, conformando de tal manera parte intrínseca dentro de la unidad civilmente responsable y por tal, legalmente legitimada para responder de acuerdo a la Ley 7472. (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto Nº [Telf1] de las 10:15 horas del 2 de noviembre de 2007. El destacado fue suplido). Indudablemente, según se ha expuesto, la demandada civil Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., era un interviniente en la cadena de producción del servicio de construcción de carreteras que brindada directamente la empresa Constructora Santa Fe, de ahí que exista identidad de razón entre los supuestos regulados en el artículo 32 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, para admitir una responsabilidad objetiva de todos los intervinientes en la cadena de producción del servicio, por los daños y perjuicios que se cause al consumidor. De la misma manera dicha ampliación de la responsabilidad de todos los intervinientes en la red contractual debe aplicarse por analogía a favor de los trabajadores de las empresas que prestan el servicio, que resultan afectados por el mismo como consecuencia de la concreción de los riesgos inherentes al ejercicio de la prestación del servicio. La aplicación analógica de las normas se encuentra autorizada expresamente en el Título Preliminar del Código Civil, concretamente en el numeral 12 que establece: “ Procederá la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando éstas no contemplen un supuesto específico, pero regulen otro semejante en el que se aprecie identidad de razón, salvo cuando alguna norma prohíba esa aplicación”. En materia de responsabilidad civil objetiva por muerte de un trabajador a causa de la explotación de una máquina motiva, en los términos establecidos en el párrafo 5º del Código Civil, no se encuentra norma expresa que permita responsabilizar civilmente a todas las empresas que conforman la red contractual que hace posible la operación de la maquina motiva, pero al existir identidad de razón respecto de la extensión de esa responsabilidad establecida a favor de los consumidores, también resulta procedente la aplicación analógica del numeral 32 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor al presente caso. En todo caso como ya se adelantó, desde el punto de vista objetivo la empresa Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A., es responsable civilmente en virtud del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, en el tanto que se dedicaba a la adquisición y arriendo de maquinaria pesada con una finalidad y uso muy específico: para la construcción, siendo parte de una cadena de explotación de esa maquinaria y de la actividad riesgosa concreta vinculada a ella, tal como se constató en el caso particular, razón por la cual es responsable objetivamente por los resultados acaecidos vinculados a dicha actividad que generaba el riesgo que se concretó en el resultado. En la fundamentación intelectiva de la sentencia impugnada, como argumento para rechazar la acción civil resarcitoria, también se señaló la falta de pruebas que acrediten el daño moral y material, lo que tampoco es admisible, porque en el debate se recibió la declaración de la víctima, valorada como creíble por el Tribunal de Sentencia. Dicha actora civil hace referencia en su declaración a que vivió bajo el mismo techo que el ofendido en Puerto Jiménez, se llevaban muy bien, nunca se separaron, tuvieron una bebé de nombre [Nombre12] quien nación el 13 de marzo de 2008, iban a muchas partes juntos, él era muy cariñoso. Refiere la testigo que para la fecha de los hechos ella se dedicaba únicamente a labores del hogar, su compañero la mantenía y le daba los gastos de manutención de la niña. Refirió que la noticia de la muerte de [Nombre [Nombre6]] fue muy duro, ella quedó con una bebé de 6 meses, ella se sintió muy triste, lloraba, se preocupaba por todo, no sabía que hacer, la tristeza le duró como un año, en la actualidad la tristeza ha desaparecido un poco, pero continúa pensando, su hija le pregunta por el papá, se pone triste porque no tiene papá, le dice que quiere estar con él. Manifiesto la señora [Nombre9] que ella no tenía familia en Puerto Jiménez, no tenía quien le cuidara a la bebé, tuvo que "chambear", le costó conseguir trabajo, tenía que hacerlo en Matapalo que quedaba larguísimo, lo que ganaba tenía que dárselo a la niñera, la niña se enfermaba por todos lados, tardó más de dos años en conseguir trabajo y no podía irse largo por la bebé. El INS no le dio nada ni la empresa, trabaja como mucama hace como tres años, a su hija "más o menos" le han contado como murió el papá y le dice a ella que tenga cuidado al cruzar la calle. La certificación de nacimiento admitida por el Tribunal de Juicio como prueba para mejor resolver (cfr. folio 363 vlto), corrobora que la actora civil [Nombre13] es hija de la también actora civil [Nombre9] y del ofendido [Nombre [Nombre6]]. De acuerdo con dicha prueba, se acreditó plenamente la existencia de un daño moral y material o económico derivado del fallecimiento del agraviado [Nombre [Nombre6]]. En relación a la acreditación del daño moral, el mismo puede tenerse por demostrado a partir de simples presunciones humanas, partiendo del evento lesivo y las condiciones que rodeaban al damnificado. Al respecto la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha resuelto: “… Esto supone que partiendo del evento lesivo, y de las condiciones que rodeaban al damnificado, aplicando presunciones humanas, el juzgador puede inferir, aún sin prueba directa que lo corrobore, aflicciones tales como preocupación, tristeza, aflicción, dolor, estrés, porque resulta presumible que ante un determinado evento lesivo y las particularidades en las que se produce, el afectado les haya experimentado”. (Voto N° 97 de 16 horas 3 minutos del 29 de enero de 2009). En el caso concreto se ha contado con prueba que demuestra el daño moral sufrido por las actoras civiles como hija y conviviente en unión de hecho del ofendido fallecido, por la sola pérdida del compañero sentimental y del padre, por haber dejado de percibir sus atenciones, su afecto y compañía, por dejar de realizar actividades juntos, etc. También en el caso concreto, la pérdida del respaldo económico que significaba el agraviado para las víctimas las llevó a tener que enfrentar serios inconvenientes y hasta la pérdida de salud para la actora civil [Nombre13] , quien tuvo que ser dejada en manos de terceros por su madre para poder trabajar, así mismo por el sufrimiento para dicha ofendida por tener que enfrentar toda una vida sin su padre, el cual no deja de extrañar. La indemnización del daño moral se hace mediante una remuneración económica que determina la autoridad jusgadora (sic) mediante criterios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad: "Teniéndose en cuenta que la prueba de este tipo de lesión es “in re ipsa”, la fijación del monto debe serlo de acuerdo con el prudente arbitrio de los juzgadores y con base en los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Esa valoración debe ser acorde a Derecho de modo que no lleve a indemnizaciones desproporcionadas que beneficien injustificadamente a una de las partes. Consecuentemente, deben guardar un justo equilibrio derivado del cuadro fáctico específico. De lo que se trata, es “…de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión, único mecanismo al cual puede acudir el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte, su ofensa.” (Sala Primera, resoluciones números 537 de 10 horas 40 minutos del 3 de septiembre de 2003, 845 de 10 horas 5 minutos del 23 de noviembre de 2007 y 662-F-S1-2010 de las 14 horas 20 minutos del 26 de mayo de 2010). Dicho criterio jurisprudencial de fijación prudencial de la indemnización por daño moral, se encuentra respaldado legalmente por el numeral 125 de las Reglas Vigentes Sobre Responsabilidad Civil del Código Penal de 1941. La declaración de la señora [Nombre9] también demostró la existencia de un daño material o económico, representado fundamentalmente por el aporte económico que brindaba al hogar el ofendido [[Nombre7] ], aunque no aporta elementos para su cuantificación. A la luz de todo lo expuesto, estima esta Cámara de Apelación que se debe acoger parcialmente el primer motivo del recurso de apelación e íntegramente el segundo, en virtud de lo cual se declara parcialmente ineficaz la sentencia impugnada únicamente en cuanto declaró sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria contra la codemanda civil Improsa Servicios Internacionales S. A. y condenó a las actoras civiles al pago de las costas a favor de los demandados civiles, resolviendo en esta misma sede condenar a dicha persona jurídica a pagarle a las actoras civiles la suma de QUINCE MILLONES DE COLONES a cada una por concepto de daño moral y además el daño material o económico, el cual, por no haber base suficiente para ser fijado, se determinará en ejecución de sentencia. Así mismo la condena se extiende al pago de la costas personales y procesales que también se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia una vez determinado el daño material o económico. La suma aprobada de quince millones de colones por concepto de daño moral, en criterio de esta Cámara, es la razonable y proporcional a la luz de las circunstancias acreditadas, consistentes en el sufrimiento provocado a las actoras civiles por la pérdida del compañero sentimental en el caso de la actora civil [Nombre9] , con quien había logrado contruir una relación afectuosa, armoniosa, estable, permanente y exclusiva, además de que había procreado con el ofendido una hija, sufrimiento que se agudizó por el desamparo económico en que quedó la familia con la pérdida de [[Nombre7] ], único proveedor a nivel económico del núcleo familiar, debiendo la actora civil tener que buscar trabajo, para lo cual tuvo que dejar a su hija en manos de terceros, situación que provocó adicionalmente y de manera reiterada que la niña se enfermera, lo que sin duda produjo angustia y preocupación en la madre, al no poderle brindar personalmente a [Nombre14] los cuidados que requería. Por su parte la coactora civil [Nombre15] , siendo muy pequeña perdió a su padre, una persona afectuosa, cariñosa y quien cubría sus necesidades básicas, figura que además es relevante en el proceso de formación de todo ser humano y es una figura relevante y un referente en todas las etapas de la vida de las personas, de manera que el daño moral causado a dicha actora civil se prolongará por el resto de su existencia, evidenciándose actualmente al preguntar a la madre por su padre y ponerse triste por la ausencia del progenitor. Se rechaza el primer motivo de apelación en tanto pretendió que se anulara la sentencia dictada a favor del justiciable [Nombre5] , donde se le absolvió de toda pena y responsabilidad por el delito de homicidio culposo en perjuicio de [Nombre [Nombre6]] y la declaración con lugar de la acción civil resarcitoria instaurada en su contra. En relación con dicho codemandado civil, se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas en lo civil, por estima esta Cámara que la parte actora civil ha tenido sobradas razones para litigar, al grado de que con respecto a otra codemandada civil, las pretensiones de la demanda han sido acogidas íntegramente. En todo lo demás se mantiene incólume la sentencia.”