Failure to carry documents does not constitute illegal timber transportLa omisión de portar documentos no configura transporte ilegal de madera

“**SOLE GROUND** – The prosecution appeals the judgment by which the defendant was acquitted of the crime of illegal transport of timber. The complainant considers that the lower court did not assess the testimonies from which the need to carry the respective documents (transport permit or certificate of origin (certificado de origen)) when transporting timber is inferred. Furthermore, the prosecutor points out that the judge was mistaken in interpreting that Article 28 of the Ley Forestal contains an exception to the rules set forth in Articles 56 and 63 of the same text. **The objections are not admissible.** In this matter, the defendant was accused of transporting 328 plantation timber logs in a vehicle “without having... at the time of his detention a transport permit, certificate of origin, or any type of permit or authorization from the State forest authority.” Now, Article 56 of the current Ley Forestal (No. 7575 of February 13, 1996) provides: *“Timber in logs, squared, or sawn, originating from forests or plantations, may not be moved if the respective documentation is not held”* (emphasis not in the original), while Article 63 punishes the infringement of the prohibitive norm as a crime. As is well known, substantive criminal law rules must be interpreted restrictively, by virtue of the principles of harm (lesividad), *pro libertate*, and the minimal nature of punitive intervention (*ultima ratio*). The appellant proposes an interpretation that, for the crime to be constituted, it is sufficient that the transport is carried out without carrying (bearing) the respective documents, but it is clear that such a hermeneutical path implies broadening the criminal definition (tipo penal), and the issue is important because, in this case, page 11 contains the timber in log transport permit No. 059988, delivered on September 24, 2012, with an expiration date of November 15 of the same year. That document refers to 328 teak logs and identifies the vehicle that would carry out the transport as a “Mack” truck, year 1993, license plate [Placa1] (the one the defendant was driving when he was stopped transporting the 328 logs on October 10, 2012). The transport permit, whose authenticity no one has questioned, was signed and delivered by engineer [Nombre1] based on certificate of origin No. 058276 G, for the company “Blue Zone Development, S.A.”, represented by [Nombre2]. Between pages 18 and 36 is the report of engineer [Nombre3], from the Santa Cruz-Carrillo Subregional Office of the Area de Conservación Tempisque (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación), who states: *“... after reviewing the Timber in Log Transport Permit N° 059988 G of Forest Regent [Nombre1], professional license number 3960; and after reviewing the Information System for Forest Harvesting Control, there exists a Certificate of Origin for Reforestation File in the name of BLUE ZONE DEVELOPMENTS, S.A. ... This file is TE-TE01CO-PF-00172-2012, a certified copy of which is attached”* (sic, page 18). As observed, this report (and the file accompanying it) demonstrates the existence of the necessary documents to harvest the timber and transport it in the vehicle the defendant was driving, it being the responsibility of the timber owner or the holder of CED1 to fill out the transport permit with the data referring to the quantity of timber each time a transport is to be carried out (Article 30 of the Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, No. 25721 of October 17, 1996). The foregoing means that the “respective documentation” referred to in the aforementioned law was indeed held. It must not be forgotten that the essential purpose of said regulation is, as established in its Article 1, *“... to ensure the conservation, protection, and administration of natural forests and the production, harvesting, industrialization, and promotion of the country's forest resources destined for that end, in accordance with the principle of adequate and sustainable use of renewable natural resources.”* Certainly, there is a duty to carry the documents or distinguishing marks provided for in the legal or regulatory norm. Carrying them facilitates the administrative task of identifying and corroborating *in situ* the legitimacy of timber shipments and is expected to discourage illegitimate transport, that is: acts without the permission or approval of the State, which are presumed to be the only ones that cause harm to the protected legal interest (the forest resources). What cannot be maintained is that the mere omission of carrying them (when they actually exist, are valid, complete, and authentic) is the conduct repressed by the legislator as a crime. Such an interpretation was allowed, at least formally, by Article 122 of the former Ley Forestal No. 7032—since its subsection e) punished whoever “transports raw material or forest products without the respective documentation”—but the rule currently in force uses different terminology (“without having”) which implies lacking the documents and not merely not carrying them. It is also obvious that the lack of carrying them justifies the vehicle and timber being detained and the matter reported to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), but, again, this does not imply the configuration of the crime if it is fully demonstrated that the transport could be carried out legitimately and that the timber or forest resources could be harvested. The contrary would mean repressing conduct that neither harmed nor endangered the legal interest. In the trial held in this matter, both the person who hired the defendant and the plantation's forest regent (regente) testified, so that the testimonial and documentary evidence shows that all legal procedures and formalities were complied with and that the only irregularity was the omission of carrying the documents while the transport was taking place. It is worth remembering that the principle of harm of the punishable act is inherent to the punitive system in a democratic rule-of-law state and binds the legislator (prohibiting the criminalization of actions lacking the capacity to harm or endanger a legal interest) as much as the judge (obliging the assessment of harm from the analysis of typicality and not solely through the traditional distinction between formal and material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad)). The principle, of course, is predicated on any class of crime (including those of mere activity, like the one examined here) and is of a material nature, so it must never be lost sight of when interpreting substantive criminal norms (of which it is an inherent prerequisite). The accurate warnings of legal doctrine against the temptation of creating artificial legal interests in order to justify hermeneutical criteria for substantive norms must also be remembered. For example, it is evident that the crimes typified in the Ley Forestal, as stated before, ultimately seek to protect the conservation of forest resources (with everything that implies, among other things, the protection of water resources), but to claim that an autonomous legal interest exists such as “security in the traffic of forest products,” in order to propose that transporting timber without carrying the corresponding transport permit constitutes a crime (even if that transport permit, the CED1, and all other required documents and permits actually exist), is to resort to the old technique questioned, rightly, by legal doctrine for a long time; besides which it promotes an extension of the criminal definition that not even the literal wording of the rule allows, for it must be repeated: the punishable act is that of transporting “without having” (in the same way as occurs with other infractions, such as the unlawful carrying of a permitted weapon) and not that of transporting “without” or “without carrying” the documents. Ultimately, it is obvious that the defendant's conduct did not cause or endanger (nor could it) endanger the legal interest (forest resources) and at most he can be reproached for having made the State waste time and human and economic resources by omitting something as simple as carrying the transport permit that the exploiting company legitimately had at its disposal. The foregoing reflections are sufficient to determine that acquittal due to atypicality was imperative in this case, although for reasons different from those set forth by the lower court; however, it is not superfluous to point out that the issue of the application of Article 42 of the Ley Forestal, regarding the dimensions of the logs and their link to the use of transport permits, is not as undisputed as the appellant claims. Section 2.1 of Chapter III of the Manual de procedimientos para el aprovechamiento maderable en terrenos de uso agropecuario y sin bosque y situaciones especiales en Costa Rica, published in La Gaceta No. 163 of August 23, 2010, has regulatory value (significant with respect to a blank criminal provision like the one that represses illegal timber transport), contains “general provisions for control devices” (as well as specific rules for forest plantations like the one that produced the timber the defendant was transporting), and points out: *“In accordance with Article 42 of the Ley Forestal N° 7575, a log is considered to be the branch-free section of the tree, with a diameter greater than or equal to 29 centimeters at the thinnest end; therefore, roundwood pieces that do not meet this condition will not require transport permits or [Placa2] to be transported. This implies that under no circumstances will transport permits and [Placa2] be issued for roundwood pieces with diameters less than 29 centimeters.”* This point has lost interest in this case, as the acquittal of the accused finds legal support in other reasons, but it highlights that the study of blank criminal provisions sometimes poses some difficulty, especially when they are contained in special laws and completed by regulations of great technical specificity.” ...at the time of his arrest with a transport guide, certificate of origin, or any type of permit or authorization from the state forestry authority." Now, Article 56 of the current Forest Law (Ley Forestal) (No. 7575 of February 13, 1996) provides: "Timber in logs, squared, or sawn from forest or plantation may not be mobilized if the respective documentation is not had" (emphasis not in original), while Article 63 sanctions as a crime the violation of the prohibitive norm. As is known, substantive criminal norms must be interpreted restrictively, by virtue of the principles of harmfulness (lesividad), pro libertate, and the minimal character of punitive intervention (ultima ratio). The appellant proposes it be interpreted that for the crime to be constituted it is sufficient that the transport be carried out without carrying (bearing) the respective documents, but it is obvious that such a hermeneutic approach implies broadening the criminal type, and the matter is important because, in this case, the timber-in-log transport guide No. 059988, delivered on September 24, 2012, with expiration on November 15 of the same year, is recorded on folio 11. That document refers to 328 teak logs and identifies the vehicle that would carry out the transport as the truck brand "Mack," year 1993, license plate [Placa1] (the one the accused was driving when he was arrested transporting the 328 logs on October 10, 2012). The guide, whose authenticity no one has questioned, was signed and delivered by engineer [Nombre1] based on certificate of origin No. 058276 G, for the company "Blue Zone Development, S.A.," represented by [Nombre2]. Between folios 18 and 36 is the report of engineer [Nombre3], of the Santa Cruz-Carrillo Subregional Office of the Tempisque Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Tempisque) (National System of Conservation Areas, SINAC), who indicates: "... having reviewed the Timber-in-Log Transport Guide No. 059988 G of Forest Regent [Nombre1], membership number 3960; and having reviewed the Information System for the Control of Forest Harvesting, a Certificate of Origin for Reforestation File exists in the name of BLUE ZONE DEVELOPMENTS, S.A.,... This file is TE-TE01CO-PF-00172-2012, of which a certified copy is attached" (sic, folio 18). As observed, that report (and the file that accompanies it) demonstrates the existence of the necessary documents to harvest the timber and transport it in the vehicle the accused was driving, with it being the responsibility of the owner of the timber or holder of the CED1 to fill out the guide with the data referring to the quantity of timber each time a transport is to be carried out (Article 30 of the Regulation to the Forest Law, No. 25721 of October 17, 1996). The foregoing means that the "respective documentation" to which the aforementioned law refers was indeed had. It must not be forgotten that the essential purpose of said regulation is, as established by its Article 1, "... to ensure the conservation, protection, and administration of natural forests and the production, harvesting, industrialization, and promotion of the country's forest resources destined for that purpose, in accordance with the principle of adequate and sustainable use of renewable natural resources." Certainly, there is a duty to carry the documents or distinctive marks provided for in the legal or regulatory norm. That carrying facilitates the administrative task of identifying and corroborating in situ the legitimacy of timber mobilizations and is expected to discourage illegitimate transports, that is: acts without the permission or approval of the State, which are presumed to be the only ones that cause damage to the protected legal interest (forest resources). What cannot be maintained is that the mere omission of carrying them (when they actually exist, are valid, complete, and authentic) is the conduct punished by the legislator as a crime. Such an interpretation was permitted, formally at least, by Article 122 of the former Forest Law No. 7032 —since its subsection e) sanctioned whoever "transports raw material or forest products without the respective documentation"—, but the norm currently in force employs different terminology ("without having" [sin contar]) that implies lacking the documents and not merely not carrying them. It is also obvious that the lack of carrying justifies the vehicle and the timber being detained and the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) being informed, but, again, that does not imply the constitution of the crime if it is fully demonstrated that the transport could be legitimately carried out and that the timber or forest resources could be harvested. The contrary would mean punishing conduct that did not damage or endanger the legal interest. In the hearing held in this matter, both the person who hired the accused and the regent of the plantation testified, so that the testimonial and documentary evidence shows that all legal procedures were complied with and that the only irregularity was the omission of carrying the documents while the transport was being carried out. It is worth remembering that the principle of harmfulness (lesividad) of the punishable act is consubstantial to the punitive system in a democratic state of law and binds the legislator (prohibiting the criminalization of actions lacking the capacity to damage or endanger a legal interest), as much as the judge (obliging them to assess harmfulness from the analysis of criminality (tipicidad) and not only through the traditional distinction between formal and material unlawfulness (antijuridicidad)). The principle, of course, is predicated of any class of crime (including those of mere activity, such as the one examined here) and is of a material nature, so it must never be lost sight of when interpreting substantive criminal norms (for which it is an inherent presupposition). Also to be remembered are the doctrine's accurate warnings against the temptation to create artificial legal interests in order to justify hermeneutic criteria of the substantive norms. For example, it is evident that the crimes typified in the Forest Law, as stated before, seek to protect, in sum, the conservation of forest resources (with all that that implies, among other things, the protection of water resources), but to claim that there exists an autonomous legal interest such as "security in the traffic of forest products," in order to propose that transporting timber without carrying the corresponding guide (although that guide actually exists, the CED1 and all other required documents and permits) constitutes a crime, is to resort to the old technique questioned, with reason, for a long time by the doctrine; besides promoting an extension of the type that not even the literal tenor of the norm permits since, it must be repeated: the punishable action is that of transporting "without having" (sin contar) (in the same way as occurs with other infractions, such as the illicit carrying of a permitted weapon) and not that of transporting "without" (sin) or "without carrying" (sin llevar) the documents. Ultimately, it is obvious that the conduct of the accused did not cause or endanger (nor could it) the legal interest (forest resources) and at most he can be reproached for having made the State waste time and human and economic resources by omitting something as simple as carrying the transport guide that the exploiting company legitimately had at its disposal. The foregoing reflections are sufficient to determine that acquittal for atypicality was required in this case, although for reasons different from those set forth by the a quo; however, it is not superfluous to point out that the issue of the application of Article 42 of the Forest Law, as regards the dimensions of the logs and their link to the use of transport guides, is not as settled as the appellant alleges. Section 2.1 of Chapter III of the Procedure Manual for Timber Harvesting on Agricultural-Use and Forestless Lands and Special Situations in Costa Rica (Manual de procedimientos para el aprovechamiento maderable en terrenos de uso agropecuario y sin bosque y situaciones especiales en Costa Rica), published in La Gaceta No. 163 of August 23, 2010, possesses regulatory value (transcendent with respect to a blank criminal norm such as the one that punishes illegal timber transport), contains "general provisions for control devices" (as well as specific rules for forest plantations such as the one that gave rise to the timber the accused was transporting) and states: "In accordance with Article 42 of Forest Law No. 7575, a log (troza) is considered to be the branch-free section of the tree, with a diameter greater than or equal to 29 centimeters at the thinnest end, therefore, roundwood pieces that do not meet this condition shall not require guides or [Placa2] to be transported. This implies that under no reason shall guides and [Placa2] be granted for roundwood pieces with diameters of less than 29 centimeters." The point has lost interest in this case, since the acquittal of the accused finds legal support in other grounds, but it highlights that the study of blank criminal types sometimes poses some difficulty, especially when they are contained in special laws and completed by regulations of great technical specificity."

“ÚNICO- La fiscalía impugna el fallo a través del cual se absolvió al justiciable del delito de transporte ilegal de madera. Estima el quejoso que el a quo no valoró los testimonios de los que se desprende la necesidad de portar los documentos respectivos (guía o certificado de origen) cuando se transporta madera. Además, señala el fiscal que el juez se equivocó al interpretar que el artículo 28 de la Ley Forestal contiene una excepción a las reglas previstas en los artículos 56 y 63 del mismo texto. Las protestas no son de recibo. En este asunto se acusó al justiciable por transportar en un vehículo 328 trozas de madera de plantación "sin contar... al momento de su detención con guía de transporte, certificado de origen ni ningún tipo de permiso ni autorización por parte de la autoridad forestal del Estado". Ahora bien, el artículo 56 de la Ley Forestal vigente (No. 7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996) dispone: "No se podrá movilizar madera en trozas, escuadrada ni aserrada proveniente de bosque ni de plantación, si no se cuenta con la documentación respectiva" (el destacado no aparece en el original), mientras que el artículo 63 sanciona como delito el infringir la norma prohibitiva. Como es sabido, las normas penales de fondo han de interpretarse restrictivamente, en virtud de los principios de lesividad, pro libertate y del carácter mínimo de la intervención punitiva (ultima ratio). El recurrente propone se interprete que para que se configure el delito basta que el transporte se efectúe sin portar (llevar) los documentos respectivos, pero salta a la vista que tal vía hermeneútica implica ampliar el tipo penal y el tema tiene importancia porque, en este caso, consta en el folio 11 la guía de transporte de madera en troza No. 059988 entregada el 24 de setiembre de 2012, con vencimiento el 15 de noviembre del mismo año. Ese documento hace referencia a 328 trozas de teca y se identifica el vehículo que realizaría el transporte como el camión marca "Mack", año 1993, placa [Placa1] (el que conducía el justiciable cuando se le detuvo transportando las 328 trozas el día 10 de octubre de 2012). La guía, cuya autenticidad nadie ha puesto en duda, fue suscrita y entregada por el ingeniero [Nombre1] con base en el certificado de origen No. 058276 G, para la empresa "Blue Zone Development, S.A.", representada por [Nombre2] . Entre los folios 18 y 36 se encuentra el informe del ingeniero [Nombre3] , de la Oficina Subregional Santa Cruz-Carrillo del Área de Conservación Tempisque (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación), quien indica: "... revisada la Guía de Transporte de Madera en Troza N° 059988 G del Regente Forestal [Nombre1] , número de Colegiado 3960; y revisado el Sistema de Información para el Control del Aprovechamiento Forestal, existe Expediente de Certificado de Origen para Reforestación a nombre de BLUE ZONE DEVELOPMENTS, S.A,... Este expediente es el TE-TE01CO-PF-00172-2012, del cual se adjunta copia certificada" (sic, folio 18). Conforme se observa, tal informe (y el expediente que lo acompaña) demuestra la existencia de los documentos necesarios para aprovechar la madera y transportarla en el vehículo que conducía el justiciable, correspondiendo al propietario de la madera o titular del CED1 llenar la guía con los datos referidos a la cantidad de madera cada vez que va a realizar un transporte (artículo 30 del Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, No. 25721 de 17 de octubre de 1996). Lo anterior significa que sí se contaba con la "documentación respectiva" a la que hace referencia la mencionada ley. No debe olvidarse que el propósito esencial de dicha normativa es, según lo establece su artículo 1, "... velar por la conservación, protección y administración de los bosques naturales y por la producción, el aprovechamiento, la industrialización y el fomento de los recursos forestales del país destinados a ese fin, de acuerdo con el principio de uso adecuado y sostenible de los recursos naturales renovables". Ciertamente, existe el deber de portar los documentos o distintivos previstos en la norma legal o en las reglamentarias. Esa portación facilita la tarea administrativa de identificar y corroborar in situ la legitimidad de las movilizaciones de madera y se espera que desestimule los transportes ilegítimos, es decir: los hechos sin el permiso o la aprobación del Estado, que se suponen los únicos que causan daño al bien jurídico protegido (los recursos forestales). Lo que no puede sostenerse es que la sola omisión de portarlos (cuando en realidad existen, se encuentran vigentes, completos y son auténticos) sea la conducta reprimida por el legislador como delito. Tal interpretación la permitía, formalmente al menos, el artículo 122 de la antigua Ley Forestal No. 7032 -pues su inciso e) sancionaba a quien "transporte materia prima o productos forestales sin la documentación respectiva"-, pero la norma actualmente en vigor emplea una terminología distinta ("sin contar") que implica el carecer de los documentos y no solamente el no portarlos. Es obvio también que la falta de portación justifica que el vehículo y la madera sean detenidos y se informe al Ministerio Público, pero, de nuevo, ello no implica la configuración del delito si se demuestra a cabalidad que el transporte podía efectuarse legítimamente y que la madera o recursos forestales podían ser aprovechados. Lo contrario significaría reprimir una conducta que no dañó ni puso en peligro el bien jurídico. En el debate celebrado en este asunto declaró tanto la persona que contrató al justiciable como el regente de la plantación, de manera que la prueba testimonial y la documental evidencia que se cumplieron todos los trámites y procedimientos legales y que la única irregularidad fue la omisión de llevar los documentos mientras se realizaba el transporte. Conviene recordar que el principio de lesividad del hecho punible es consustancial al sistema punitivo en un Estado democrático de derecho y vincula al legislador (prohibiéndole criminalizar acciones carentes de aptitud para dañar o poner en peligro un bien jurídico), tanto como al juez (obligándole a apreciar la lesividad desde el análisis de la tipicidad y no solo a través de la tradicional distinción entre antijuridicidad formal y material). El principio, desde luego, se predica de cualquier clase de delito (incluidos los de mera actividad, como el que aquí se examina) y es de naturaleza material, por lo que nunca debe perderse de vista al interpretar las normas penales sustantivas (de las que es presupuesto inherente). También han de recordarse las acertadas advertencias de la doctrina contra la tentación de crear bienes jurídicos artificiales a fin de justificar criterios hermenéuticos de las normas sustantivas. Por ejemplo, es evidente que los delitos tipificados en la Ley Forestal, como se expuso antes, buscan proteger, en suma, la conservación de los recursos forestales (con todo lo que ello implica, entre otras cosas, la tutela de los recursos hídricos), pero pretender que existe un bien jurídico autónomo como la "seguridad en el tráfico de los productos forestales", para proponer que constituye delito el transportar madera sin llevar la guía correspondiente (aunque en realidad exista esa guía, el CED1 y todos los demás documentos y permisos exigidos), es acudir a la vieja técnica cuestionada, con razón, desde hace mucho tiempo por la doctrina; amén de que propicia una extensión del tipo que ni siquiera el tenor literal de la norma permite pues, debe repetirse: la acción punible es la de transportar "sin contar" (del mismo modo que ocurre con otras infracciones, como la portación ilícita de arma permitida) y no la de transportar "sin" o "sin llevar" los documentos. A fin de cuentas, es obvio que la conducta del justiciable no causó ni puso (ni podía) poner en peligro el bien jurídico (los recursos forestales) y a lo sumo puede reprochársele el haber hecho al Estado desperdiciar tiempo y recursos humanos y económicos por omitir algo tan simple como llevar la guía de transporte que la empresa explotadora tenía legítimamente a su disposición. Las anteriores reflexiones son suficientes para determinar que la absolutoria por atipicidad se imponía en este caso, aunque por razones distintas de las expuestas por el a quo; sin embargo, no sobra señalar que el tema de la aplicación del artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal, en lo que atañe a las dimensiones de las trozas y su vínculo con el uso de guías de transporte, no es lo pacífico que aduce el recurrente. El apartado 2.1 del Capítulo III del Manual de procedimientos para el aprovechamiento maderable en terrenos de uso agropecuario y sin bosque y situaciones especiales en Costa Rica, publicado en La Gaceta No. 163 de 23 de agosto de 2010, posee valor reglamentario (trascendente respecto de una norma penal en blanco como la que reprime el transporte ilegal de madera), contiene "disposiciones generales para los dispositivos de control" (así como reglas específicas para plantaciones forestales como la que dio origen a la madera que transportaba el justiciable) y señala: "De conformidad con el artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal N° 7575, se considera troza a la sección del árbol libre de ramas, con un diámetro mayor o igual a 29 centímetros en el extremo más delgado, por tanto, las piezas rollizas que no cumplen esta condición no requerirán guías ni [Placa2] para ser transportadas. Esto implica que por ninguna razón se otorgará guías y [Placa2] para piezas rollizas con diámetros inferiores a 29 centímetros". El punto ha perdido interés en este caso, pues la absolutoria del encartado encuentra sustento jurídico en otros motivos, pero pone de relieve que el estudio de los tipos penales en blanco plantea en ocasiones alguna dificultad, sobre todo cuando son recogidos en leyes especiales y completados por reglamentos de gran especificidad técnica.”