Requirement of defense counsel in final controlled drug buy operations absent urgencyNecesidad de defensa técnica en operativo final de compra controlada de drogas sin urgencia

“II- In our criminal procedural system, there is no legal appraisal of evidence (prueba legal tasada), that is, procedural subjects are not obligated to prove certain facts with a specific or particular means of proof, to which a weight or value is assigned beforehand. Thus, in principle, any fact may be proven by any means of proof, provided it is legitimate ‑numeral 182 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter Cpp.)-. Legitimacy is substantive and formal, since not only is the formal regularity of the act sufficient, but substantively the validity must result from respect for fundamental rights and essential procedural guarantees. Only by fulfilling such requirements can a process be considered fair, in respect of due process, and only under those conditions can evidence be validly considered and weighed. In the investigation of crimes related to the sale of drugs, especially, there is an investigation strategy that has become widespread in our environment and that shares much with the strategies defined in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, approved by Law No. 7198 of November 1, 1990, and also incorporated by the Law on Narcotic Drugs, including the current one, No. 8204 of January 11, 2002 (Articles 10 and 11). We refer specifically to the execution of controlled purchases, carried out from suspects believed to be engaged in drug-selling activity, for which the figure of the undercover agent (agente encubierto) is used. Thus, by police means, the information received is verified, regarding the dynamics of the supposedly carried-out activity, the frequency, the locations, as well as the type and quantity of drug supposedly traded and the price assigned. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) for quite some time analyzed the constitutionality of this investigation strategy, validating it as such, despite which, from the substantive point of view, it specified that each time an undercover agent succeeds in making a “purchase” from the suspect, no crime is constituted because no harm to the legal interest occurs, since the agent is not a consumer, the sale is not real, and everything related to that contact is under police control, such that it would only have value as an indication (indicio), obtained from an investigation procedure, like any other, insufficient, in any case, to support a conviction, if not reinforced with independent elements of proof. This position is maintained by the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) and by the various Criminal Cassation Courts of the country (among others from the Third Chamber, see precedents No. 162-98, of 11:17 a.m., February 20, 1998, [Telf1], of 10:55 a.m., November 12, 2004; [Telf2], of 11:15 a.m., December 23, 2005; CED1, of 9:05 a.m., November 10, 2006; CED2, of 9:55 a.m., May 25, 2007). How this indication arising from police controlled purchases should be reinforced and how an investigation of this nature should be concluded, is something for the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) and the police, directed by the former, to define. The definition of investigation strategies is something that falls to those who are precisely in charge of the task of gathering evidence to verify the commission of a crime and its perpetrators or participants. However, jurisprudence has helped to demonstrate when an investigation has been successful –in terms of good evidentiary results and respect for fundamental rights–; when it has been insufficient; and when it has been ineffective, for obtaining illegitimate evidence that cannot be validly used, for harming fundamental rights and being inadmissible as an element to consider. To measure and weigh the efficiency of a drug investigation (as in any investigation of any other crime), it is not sufficient merely to assess the investigation strategy and its tangible results (in physical evidence, material, and arrests) but also, and rather, it can be stated, whether the path used to obtain that evidence and those results is respectful of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, or whether they are arbitrary acts, involving illegitimate use of the police or investigative powers designed by law. Many discourses circulating in our environment lead one to believe that respect for fundamental rights and guarantees constitutes an obstacle to the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes and to guaranteeing the peace and security to which all inhabitants of our Nation are entitled. In reality, it must be pointed out that respect for rights and guarantees is an obligation of the so-called “law enforcement agents” (prosecutors, police, judges) and only by acting in conformity with the system designed constitutionally, conventionally, and legally, can the work done in an investigation be appreciated and assessed, and the evidence and conclusions obtained be considered valid. Thus, such respect is not a concession or a favor but a duty, to ensure that police procedures and strategies for investigating facts are carried out only within a framework of control and respect, to guarantee to all citizens that there is no abuse, arbitrariness, falsehood, or corruption in the tasks performed by the police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office when they investigate committed criminal acts and collaborate in identifying those responsible. Thus, it has been stated: “The exceptional nature of proceedings tending to restrict fundamental rights within the criminal process means that their application must not only respect parameters of proportionality and reasonableness, but also obliges having jurisdictional control that is reflected –inexorably– in a ruling that clearly sets out the reasons why it is necessary to transgress certain constitutional rights. These requirements must be met in proceedings such as the interception of communications and search (allanamiento), for although in the latter it is permitted in very exceptional cases to dispense with a judge's order, the use of both finds an intrinsic limit in the suitability, necessity, and proportionality of the measure. Respect for those constitutionally required conditions constitutes a brake on the exercise of state power and –correlatively– a guarantee for the accused in the sense that their sphere of privacy, their home, and other fundamental rights will not be violated through illegitimate acts produced in the exercise of abusive power, but rather, within a framework of constitutionality reflected in each of the actions that will aim at developing the criminal process in a State of Law. II.- It is precisely because of the importance of the rights that may be harmed, that the formalities preceding the actions inherent to an investigation cannot be circumvented by police authorities, nor by the judges responsible for examining the legitimacy of the evidence. It must be clear that it is not a mere effort to comply with ritualisms, but a constitutional guarantee that comes to life when a jurisdictional body reasonably sets forth the reasons why it is indispensable for the purposes of the process to violate fundamental rights whose protection derives from the Political Constitution itself […].” [Telf3], of 8:45 a.m., February 11, 2005 of the Third Chamber. These agents are certainly authorized to use force, coercive means, and the harming of certain fundamental rights, with the intervention, in these latter cases, of the judge's authority, necessary to carry out the task of achieving the identification and punishment of those responsible for a crime, but at the same time, the framework within which such force and such harms must and can be carried out is provided. Anything beyond that is abuse, arbitrariness, inadmissible in a State of Law. The calling card, consequently, of a good investigation, is respect for procedures and for fundamental rights and guarantees, which allow achieving successful results from the perspective of the State of Law, keeping clearly in mind, of course, that the scientific rigor with which the inquiries are conducted (a task that falls to the police, in the first instance, regarding the collection of material evidence, its custody, and transfer to the corresponding Departments), also carries indisputable weight. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, especially in precedent No. 5573-96, of 11:06 a.m., October 18, 1996, established, regarding police controlled purchases, the following: “[…] Doctrine clearly distinguishes two figures, which are continually related to what is known as experimental crime (delito experimental): the agent provocateur (agente provocador) and the undercover agent (agente encubierto), but the truth is that not every time an undercover agent participates does provocation exist, that is, the undercover agent does not always determine the subject under investigation to commit a crime –which is what the agent provocateur does–, but rather generally intervenes when the crime has been consummated several times or is already being committed. Regarding experimental crime, it must be pointed out that it is a doctrinal creation applicable –in principle– to any common criminal figure, whose particularity lies in that it begins through provocation or instigation by a police officer, a third-party collaborator of the police, or a private subject, in such a way that the iter criminis begins in appearance, but beforehand the provocateur, whether the State through the police or its collaborator, or the private subject, has controlled the entire development of the conduct and, even though apparently the perpetrator or perpetrators of the act are carrying out the crime according to their plan, the truth is that there is no danger to the legal interest nor possibility of consummation of the act, because its development is being controlled, precisely to prevent that from happening. It is, then, an ‘experiment,’ in which consummation will never occur, nor will there be danger or harm to the protected legal interest. For these reasons, in addition to others that criminal doctrine discusses, such as the fact that in such cases –it is pointed out– there exists, from the point of view of the active subject, an impossible crime (delito imposible), due to an ‘error of type (error de tipo),’ for lack of intent (dolo) in the instigator, etc., the truth is that this action is not criminal and therefore does not merit punishment, as it is nothing more than an experiment without impact on the interests protected by the legal system and that the criminal norm seeks to protect. This is, in general lines, what doctrine proposes in this regard. But it is not for the Chamber to venture into those fields, nor to excessively delimit the doctrinal concept of experimental crime, as those are matters proper to be elucidated by the jurisdictional authorities of the criminal sphere. In the cited precedents, this Chamber indicates that experimental crime cannot be the basis for a trial with independent criminal consequences, for as stated, it is an ‘experiment.’ It has also been indicated that it can indeed be an evidentiary element to prove another fact, specifying that in any case it could never be the sole evidence. This last statement merits clarification. The operations carried out by the police are not in themselves criminal, as they would be experimental crime in most cases, or else, situations in which the officers or their collaborators act as ‘undercover agents,’ posing as third parties who attend to corroborate that a person is already engaged in a specific criminal activity, which in any case was already occurring or had been consummated prior to this participation of the police agent. From such an operation, sufficient indications may result that allow proving that the person has already committed a criminal act, which is only reinforced –from the evidentiary point of view– by the experiment. For example, the officer who buys drugs, that sale in itself is not a crime, because there is no possibility whatsoever of harming the legal interest protected by the norm. But that purchase may have probative force to prove –depending on the circumstances surrounding the specific case– that the seller is habitually engaged in that activity, because the sale, even of minimal quantities, indicates that the person possessed that drug for purposes of commercialization or supply, an action that is also punished by law. Under those conditions, especially due to the principle of freedom of proof (libertad probatoria) that prevails in our system, it will depend on the specific case, and on the weighing of the evidence in light of the rules of sound judicial criticism (sana crítica), to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to reach the necessary demonstration of guilt in the act, constitutionally required in Article 39, on the understanding that this act is not the experiment or the action carried out with the participation of the undercover agent in itself, but another act that is eventually proven by the evidence obtained from the operation. That judgment falls to the criminal judges of merit, and its eventual control falls to the Cassation Chamber, through the assessment of the sufficiency of the ruling’s reasoning. The rigor that must be observed in this matter of ‘experiments’ or simulated operations, is due to the fact that it involves the pre-constitution of evidence (preconstitución de prueba) against the accused. Therefore, the judge must be demanding regarding the assessment of this type of operation. The intervention of the judge of the investigation phase, as guarantor of the legality of the evidence, is advisable, but value could not be denied beforehand to an undercover operation if this judicial participation does not occur. The truth is that, reiterating what this Chamber and its jurisprudence have stated, the judge's intervention is indispensable when there is an intention to intrude upon or harm fundamental rights, for example, if a search is to be carried out; if a wiretap is necessary, in short, if the operation includes the affectation of any fundamental right. In other cases, the judge, when weighing the evidence obtained from police investigations, must be particularly demanding regarding the existence of indications that legitimize the undercover operation, so that it does not serve as a pretext for the authorities to tempt suspects and induce them to become perpetrators of criminal acts that they perhaps had not planned to carry out, acting as typical agents provocateurs, because such police conduct is unconstitutional. Their mission is not to provoke crimes, but to investigate the criminal acts committed and apprehend their presumed perpetrators, without prejudice to the preventive function par excellence that corresponds to the administrative police, which can act as investigation police, in collaboration with or in the absence of the intervention of the judicial police. Thus, if within a police operation carried out with undercover agents, the only existing evidence is precisely the experiment or what was done by the undercover agent, it will fall to the criminal judges in the specific case to determine if that evidence is sufficient to prove the criminal act being investigated, on the understanding that a person could never be convicted for the experimental act, which, as was set forth, is not a crime […]” (emphasis supplied). The statements that the constitutional instance itself had made, in indicating that controlled purchases could in no case give basis to a conviction, statements made in precedents No. 0477-94, of 3:26 p.m., January 25, and No. 1169-94, of 10:57 a.m., March 2, both of 1994, are nuanced in this precedent, because, with good judgment, it is pointed out that everything will depend on the quality of the investigation and the evidence, and that can only be analyzed in light of each specific case. In reality, it could be that the investigation is based solely on police controlled purchases, but with a high degree of control and quality, for example, because they have been video-recorded, so that there is an independent record beyond just the officer's statement; however, it would also be necessary that frequent surveillances (vigilancias) at the site have been carried out and recorded, elements that show that, independently of the controlled purchases, the suspect person is engaged in the indiscriminate sale of drugs; moreover, all of this is significantly reinforced when the statement of the police collaborator is obtained in trial. The latter gains relevance, because it must be noted that there is no authorization to dispense in all cases and in any case, with the statement of the undercover agent or ‘collaborator,’ as prosecutors and police authorities seem to understand. Of course, depending on the conditions under which the infiltration takes place, the type of criminality investigated (whether organized or not), it could be that indeed, the physical integrity or the life of the undercover agent could be in danger. In such a case, the system has designed several options, without it being considered that there exists a full authorization not to summon the undercover agent. Article 11 of Law 8204, already mentioned, as relevant, states: “In investigations, the police may use collaborators or informants, whose identity they must keep confidential, in order to guarantee their safety. If any of them is present at the time of the commission of the criminal act, such circumstance shall be reported to the competent judicial authority, without the need to reveal their identity. Except if their statement is deemed indispensable at any phase of the process, the court shall order them to appear and, in the identification interrogation, may omit data that could pose some risk to them or their family. Said testimony may be automatically incorporated into the plenary trial by reading, except if it is deemed indispensable to hear it live. In this case, they shall render their testimony only before the court, the prosecutor, the accused, and their defender; for this purpose, the temporary clearing of the courtroom shall be ordered […].” It is clear that this law does not exempt or authorize dispensing with the statement of the undercover agent or collaborator in all cases. Furthermore, it should be noted that this law is prior to the recently approved Law 8720 of March 4, 2009, which regulates, in a special law, the issue of procedural and extra-procedural protection of victims and witnesses, which now fully applies to the protection that could be assigned to the undercover agent to secure their statement as a witness, who indeed, in the event they did participate as such, acquires that condition and therefore, their testimony would be relevant and, on occasion, essential. Of course, the incriminating evidence, its selection, is a decision of the accusing body, in this case the Public Prosecutor’s Office when formulating the accusation, such that it will fall to prosecutors to weigh the quality and weight of the evidence with which they decide to bring a person to trial. Thus, continuing with the line of analysis being developed, an investigation could be supported by controlled purchases and surveillances. If such police interventions have been recorded independently and carried out in such a way that they are solid, they could eventually be the basis for a conviction, because there is greater support than just the statement of the police officers or the controlled purchases alone. The call for rigor in their assessment, so punctually made by constitutional jurisprudence, is precisely because it is considered insufficient to convict a person solely on the word of the police officers, who have acted in police controlled purchases and who, in this sense, have produced evidence against the accused, of which only the police can give an account. Such investigation proceedings are considered valid as such, because the law empowers police investigators to carry out inquiries, notwithstanding that by themselves, they barely prove the existence of indications, but they would never be sufficient to convict, if they are only supported by the police account and the evidence supposedly obtained in such contacts or controlled purchases. The weighing of the type of investigation and the elements it yields can only be done in each specific case, keeping clearly in mind that if only police controlled purchases exist, supported, in turn, only by the officers' accounts, this evidence would be insufficient. If these police controlled purchases, for example, are also supported by video recordings; if constant and somewhat frequent surveillances recorded on video have been carried out, or at least, documented in official reports (actas); if, in addition, the testimony of the undercover collaborator or collaborators who made the alleged contacts is available at trial, and it is established that, independently of those contacts, the suspect person carried out an independent activity, then, an investigation of that nature and the elements it provides, could have a different weight than one that relies only on the officers' accounts, as constitutional jurisprudence has well indicated. These police controlled purchases are mere investigative acts and as such, they cannot be equated with acts that, as will be discussed later, must be carried out as jurisdictional advanced evidence (anticipos jurisdiccionales de prueba), with jurisdictional control. They are mere and simple investigative acts that, meeting the expected requirements (official reports, signatures of the participants, record of the prior search of the collaborator, respect for the custody of evidence, etc.), can be appreciated as indications and can even acquire greater strength insofar as there are independent means of control of such proceedings (videos, official reports, third-party testimonies, etc.). Now, from the appellant's arguments, it would seem to emerge that she starts from the assumption that in every investigation of this nature, it is necessary to carry out a “final operation” that must, consequently, involve the participation of the defense. To respond to this argument, again we must bring up the non-existence of a system of legal appraisal of evidence that obliges a final procedure to be performed in every drug investigation. Of course, it is clear that an investigation of this nature, although it could be prolonged in time, cannot become an indefinite situation either, so it is to be expected, according to the rules of experience, that the inquiries will settle on a conclusion, as events develop and always keeping in mind that everything will depend on the conditions present in each specific case. The scope of that outcome and the implications it may have, will define what form is set forth in the Constitution and the law for carrying it out. Thus, if to advance an investigation, it becomes necessary to intercept communications or seize private documents, the authorization and control of a judge is necessarily required for it; also, for example, to enter the home of a suspect, authorization and direct action of the judge is likewise required, as also if it is necessary to seize correspondence or private documentation. The judge who authorizes those acts must make a reasoned analysis of the existence of verified indications that authorize such harm to fundamental rights, as well as the necessity, usefulness, and proportionality of the measure in light of the characteristics of the case and the weight of the existing indications, and therefore the quality of the investigation that precedes or comes before such requests must be carefully weighed by the judge. The law also provides that any act that harms fundamental rights, that is definitive or irreproducible, or when it is necessary to receive a statement that, given the concurrence of some qualified elements developed by law, is presumed not to be obtainable in trial, the proceeding must be carried out according to the rules of what the legislator called jurisdictional advanced evidence, regulated in Article 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code. They are three assumptions that can complement but not exclude each other. The constitutional jurisprudence cited above, explains that in the face of any possible harm to fundamental rights that may occur through any investigation proceeding, the presence and participation of the judge is necessary, and this requirement is unavoidable, if one wishes to obtain evidence that can be legitimately incorporated into the process and not to incur abusive and arbitrary actions, which can not only ruin an investigation, but could eventually even be criminal (e.g., illegal searches, illegitimate interception of communications, etc.). It has already been explained that police controlled purchases are mere investigative proceedings and do not require the presence and control of the judge or the defense, as they are mere investigative acts, which will have indicative value, if the formal requirements of such police intervention have been verified. In this regard, the Third Chamber, in precedent No. [Telf4], of May 20, 2005, stated: “controlled purchases of drugs, made by the police or with the assistance of collaborators, constitute investigation tools that do not require supervision by a judge. These are tasks of a properly investigative nature that are under the responsibility of the competent bodies (police, Public Prosecutor’s Office), they do not affect fundamental rights, and they are lawful, provided they are carried out fulfilling certain requirements that guarantee their purity and legality (v. gr.: that they do not become provocation to commit a crime, that measures are taken to ensure the correct handling of what is obtained, among others). Such purchases, as well as follow-ups and surveillances, are part of a method that allows investigating authorities to obtain more and better information that, in effect, a criminal activity is being carried out and the manner in which it is executed, but, by virtue of the fact that, as stated, they do not affect the fundamental rights of any person and are of an eminently investigative nature, the judge's control will be exercised a posteriori, in the event that a criminal process is initiated, and that control will involve the examination of all police and Public Prosecutor’s Office actions, in order to determine if they complied with the law […].” The Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José has pronounced in the same sense, among others, in precedent No. [Telf5], of 3:10 p.m., October 1, 2010. This position, shared by this Chamber, analyzes police controlled purchases in their proper dimension, as mere investigative proceedings, legitimate, that allow obtaining quality information about the effective (or not) realization of a criminal activity and its presumed responsible party, so that the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which supervises police action in the functional direction, makes decisions about the course of the inquiries and, eventually, the proceedings that need to be carried out. Several controlled purchases, carried out legitimately and also accompanied by frequent records and surveillances, give solidity to a reasonable hypothesis of suspicion about one or more determined persons. And it is here that the decisions of the prosecutor regarding the outcome of the investigation come into play: if to advance it is necessary to harm fundamental rights, it is the Constitution and the procedural law that indicate how those actions must be carried out; if, assessing the entity of the indications that the police investigation yields, they decide that there are sufficient elements to carry out a proceeding with greater probative value, the system imposes the obligation on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, to secure that proceeding, with, at least, the presence of the defender. Article 13 of the Criminal Procedure Code states: “From the first moment of criminal prosecution and until the end of the execution of the sentence, the accused shall have the right to legal assistance and defense. For such purposes, they may choose a defender of their confidence, but, failing to do so, a public defender shall be assigned to them. The right to defense is inalienable. By first act of the procedure, it shall be understood to mean any judicial or police action that points to a person as the possible perpetrator of a punishable act or a participant in it […]” (emphasis supplied).

In some cases, constitutional case law itself has considered that the presence of the defense attorney is not even necessary when, for example, the judge has been present during the proceedings. Thus, in precedent number 1999-6469, of 14:33 hours, of August 18, 1999, it stated: “In the specific case, the appellant indicates that his fundamental right to due process has been seriously affected because in the initial proceedings carried out by the police, consisting of the preparation of the evidentiary elements to make him incur the crime for which he was later accused, no opportunity was given for a public defender to participate representing his interests. In the opinion of the Chamber, and referring exclusively to safeguarding the fundamental rights of the appellant, the participation of the Criminal Judge, who must ensure the effective fulfillment of fundamental guarantees during such actions, is sufficient. In this regard, it should be remembered that one of the main changes carried out with the new Code of Criminal Procedure lies in the nature of the participation of the jurisdictional body, which in the current system serves, among other things, to control that the work of the investigative bodies is carried out in accordance with the rules and principles that oblige respect for human dignity and in particular their constitutional rights. Thus, it is sufficient that the competent judge has supervised and exercised control over the preliminary actions indicated by the appellant for the requirements of due process at the constitutional level to have been satisfied […].” For its part, the case law of the Criminal Chamber has also considered it necessary, not only the presence of the judge in the so-called “final purchases” (compras finales) that have also been called “jurisdictionally controlled purchases” (compras controladas jurisdiccionalmente), especially when they are required beforehand to legitimize the injury to a fundamental right, for example, the search of a domicile, but have also considered legitimate actions by the Public Prosecutor's Office, prepared to obtain direct evidence from the suspect and proceed immediately to their arrest, when in such proceedings, the prosecuting entity has acted with the presence and control of a defense attorney. Thus, for example, in precedent number [Telf6], of 10:26 hours on June 25, 2004, it set forth the following: “it is necessary to indicate that when a drug sale verification operation is carried out and the use of an undercover agent is chosen, all the activity deployed by the police authorities during the investigation must be carefully considered and is taken as a hypothesis of suspicion that must be confirmed or discarded by means of evidentiary elements obtained independently from it, in order to be able to prove the criminal responsibility of the person identified as the perpetrator or participant in the narco-activity being pursued [...] When, to demonstrate a pre-existing criminal activity, in this case narco-activity, the introduction of an undercover agent into the criminal group is chosen as part of the police investigation, it is indispensable that an independent corroboration of the information obtained by said agent is subsequently carried out, culminating in the obtaining of evidentiary elements obtained under judicial supervision that crowns the police thesis of criminal responsibility of the perpetrator or participant […].” The same thesis was affirmed in resolution number [Telf7], of 8:57 hours on June 25, 2004, which considered that “they are not sufficient to support a judgment of certainty about her effective responsibility in the drug sale activity that was being carried out in the dwelling where she lived together with two other persons, hence the judges are correct in stating that the fact that officer [Nombre1] affirmed in trial that the accused sold him drugs on one occasion, on November 18 (without any additional element corroborating his statement), would not allow it to be held as proven that she was engaging in that activity, since it could not be ignored that it was a simple controlled sale carried out by a police officer (acting as an undercover agent) without any type of jurisdictional or prosecutorial supervision or oversight, without, moreover, additional elements having been gathered to corroborate that she was indeed engaging in that activity. Due to this, no logical error is noted from the fact that the trial court assures that the statement of officer [Nombre2], as it describes and affirms that ‘experimental’ purchase (in reality it is a controlled purchase), which was supposedly observed by several officers of the Drug Control Police, must be classified as ‘a purely investigative act […]’.” The same position is seen in the cited precedent number [Telf8] and, additionally, this criterion was reiterated in resolutions number 2001-00781, of August 20, 2001, [Telf9], of 9:45 hours on January 19, [Telf10], of 16:40 hours, on September 16, both of 2007. This position has had nuances, precisely because our system is not one of legally assessed proof and because the quality of the evidence and its possibilities of control must be analyzed in light of each specific case, without, in any case, ceasing to appreciate certain inconsistencies and conflicting criteria in the position of national case law. Whether or not fundamental rights will be injured in the investigation of drug sale crimes is a guideline that has served in some jurisprudential precedents, following the guiding criterion of the Constitutional Chamber, in the cited precedent 1999-6469, which is also based on constitutional and legal requirements, to distinguish when that jurisdictional control is necessary in the so-called “final operation” (operativo final). It has been said that if no injury to fundamental rights will occur, the presence of the guarantees judge is not necessary. In this sense, for example, the precedent [Telf11], of 11:10 hours, on February 8, 2002, in which the Third Chamber stated: “Now, in order to resolve the disagreement raised, it must be noted that in the final operation carried out in an investigation into possession of drugs for sale, the assistance and intervention of the judge is only necessary when it is indispensable to limit the fundamental rights of persons, as happens in the case of a dwelling search. The sentencing judge correctly reasons when indicating that the presence of a jurisdictional authority was unnecessary, because the illicit business was carried out in a public place: the sidewalks of the locality (see folios 119 and 120). In the same order of ideas, it is convenient to clarify that the illicit act for which [Nombre3] was convicted was actually already being executed by him before being captured, since the actions undertaken evidenced the indiscriminate sale he made to habitual consumers. As this Chamber has established, according to the principle of freedom of evidence, except for exceptions relating to fundamental rights, the validity of police action cannot be made subject to jurisdictional control, especially in cases like the present one, where there was clear and concrete coordination with the Public Prosecutor's Office. In this regard, it must be considered that: ‘... In general terms, in matters of psychotropics, the final operation constitutes a police act of verification of an ongoing criminal activity and, at the same time, presents itself as a suitable means of proof to support the claim of the accused. However, because the assessment of evidence does not exist in our system, it cannot be required that the “controlled sale” counting on the presence of the jurisdictional authority and with the use of previously identified [Nombre4], be the only suitable means of proof to base a conviction for drug sale ...’ (See Voto No. 1.033-98, of 8:45 hours on October 30, 1998. In the same sense, the following votes: CED3, of 9:26 hours on November 12, 1999, CED4, of 9:20 hours on March 31, 2000, CED5, of 10:30 hours on February 16, 2001) […].” It should be noted that it is affirmed, along the same lines we have set out in this judgment, that it is not possible to require that in every investigation for the crime of drug sale, it is necessary to carry out a concluding proceeding or final operation that includes the individualization of [Nombre4] and a purchase with control based on that nature. It has also been stated, a criterion that this Chamber, as already said, shares, that jurisdictional control or control by the defense is not necessary in police-controlled purchases, which are mere investigative acts with orienting and indicative value only, even though, depending on the quality of the records of this intervention, by allowing independent control and sources distinct from the mere police intervention and account or its documents, they may come to acquire greater solidity and even provide the basis for a conviction. However, it should be noted that although the case law of the Criminal Chamber, in this instance, has not been constant, it is noticeable, especially in recent case law, that control (either by the defense, or by the judge) is required when an intervention is going to produce direct evidence against the accused and their arrest is imminent, in a controlled operation, as happens when already individualized money is used, whether by the judge or by the prosecutor, since this act is given a different evidentiary purpose than that of mere police-controlled purchases. That is, even when it is accepted that the Public Prosecutor's Office can individualize the money to be used (precedent number [Telf12], of 10:20 hours, on June 7, 2002, of the Third Chamber), it is clear and patent in the jurisprudential position of the Criminal Chamber, and even more so in that of the Constitutional Chamber, that what is important is the control that, either the counterparty—the defense, in this case—or the guarantees judge, can perform over that activity, due to the effects expected and produced from an intervention of this nature: direct incriminating evidence against the accused, such as the finding in their possession of the money previously individualized and that allows linking them directly with the illicit activity that the police, in their investigation, have been able to profile at an indicative level. Consequently, there must be control that this money was individualized prior to its use; that it was given to the collaborator or undercover agent beforehand and that this person was searched; that the collaborator or undercover agent was monitored and surveilled; then, that contact and delivery occurred; and, subsequently, that apparent drugs were obtained from that contact, to proceed with the arrest directed at searching the suspect and verifying if, indeed, they carry the individualized money, compelling proof of their contact with the collaborator, in the activity that, supposedly, they carried out indiscriminately and with other persons distinct from the collaborators, and which legitimizes their immediate arrest. And why is this control necessary? One might think that it is sufficient for the prosecutor to act and supervise everything. In fact, there are jurisprudential criteria in that sense, for example, precedent number [Telf5], of 15:10 hours, on October 1, cited above, from the Court of Cassation of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which in this regard, held: “Regarding the ‘final operation’ (operativo final), that is, the one in which the last controlled drug purchase is made, normally using money identified beforehand and where the sellers are arrested and the drugs, money, and any other evidence of interest are seized, this Chamber does not share the thesis of the trial court (tribunal a quo) that, relying on judgment No. 9-07, issued by the Third Chamber at 9:45 hours on January 19, 2007, requires the participation of the guarantees judge. In reality, that same Chamber has not maintained a uniform criterion, and thus, in resolutions such as No. 780-01, of August 20, 2001, and No. 414-05, of May 20, 2005, it indicated that controlled purchases do not require the presence of the criminal judge. In the latter ruling, it was stated: ‘... controlled purchases of drugs, made by the police or with the assistance of collaborators, constitute investigative tools that do not require supervision by a judge. These are activities of a properly investigative nature that are the responsibility of the competent bodies (police, Public Prosecutor's Office), do not affect fundamental rights, and are lawful, provided they are carried out meeting certain requirements that guarantee their purity and legality (v. gr.: that they do not become an inducement to commit a crime, that measures are adopted to ensure the correct handling of what is obtained, among others). Such purchases, like surveillance and monitoring, form part of a method that allows the investigating authorities to obtain more and better information that a criminal activity is indeed being carried out and the way in which it is executed, but, by virtue of the fact that, as stated, they do not affect the fundamental rights of any person and are of an eminently investigative nature, the judge's control will be effected a posteriori, in the hypothesis that a criminal process is initiated, and that control will entail the examination of all the police and Public Prosecutor's Office actions, in order to determine if they complied with the law.’ This Chamber shares the reasoning expressed in the judgment just transcribed, because controlled purchases of drugs (including that of the 'final operation') do not imply an affectation of fundamental rights, and that is the fundamental parameter the legislator used to require the intervention of the guarantees judge. Nor is the judge's presence required to detain a person or seize any object (unless it were necessary to order the search of an inhabited place), and, from a logical point of view, there is no reason whatsoever to distinguish between the last controlled drug purchase and all those that preceded it and to demand the intervention of the judge in one and not in the rest, if all of them are legally identical. In the end, the fact that the police act without the participation of the judge in an act in which they can legally do so (otherwise, the police function would be delegated to the judiciary), is reduced to a problem of subsequent control of the lawfulness of the action and the examination of the evidence according to sound criticism to establish whether the elements gathered through that action possess evidentiary fitness or if, for some reason, they turned out to be devoid of it (v. gr.: due to an erroneous procedure in the chain of custody, because the police authorities could not give a full account of their actions and that they were lawful). Despite the thesis of the judges which this Chamber does not share, the fact is that the judgment on the merits is also based on the reasons examined in the preceding Considerandos (the notorious deficiencies of the accusation and the scant reliability of the testimonial evidence), and they provide solid support for the decision reached […].” For its part, even the Criminal Chamber, which in many rulings has maintained the necessity of control, does not achieve a constant and clear line in its case law, going so far as to affirm in some resolutions that even the police themselves can identify money and use it. Thus, in precedent number [Telf12], of 10:20 hours, on June 7, 2002, an opportunity in which it analyzed that this individualization or identification of money is not a definitive and irreproducible act, and it is even reasoned that the judicial police themselves can perform it. The scope of this position can also be seen in precedent number 0896-99, of 9:35 hours on July 19, 1999, an opportunity in which it was expressly indicated: “According to the rules established by the new Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no obstacle or prohibition for the prosecutor, as the official in charge of the investigation, to identify the [Nombre4] that will be used in the controlled purchase, except for what may be indicated about the credibility of that evidence when there are grounds for it. As regulated by numeral 62 of said regulation, ‘... The Public Prosecutor's Office shall exercise criminal action in the manner established by law and shall carry out the pertinent and useful proceedings to determine the existence of the criminal act. It will be in charge of the preparatory investigation, under jurisdictional control in the acts that require it...’, from which it follows that, as a general rule, the investigation will be in charge of the prosecutor, who has the power to directly and independently carry out the necessary acts for said purposes, except when—as an exception—these require jurisdictional control or involve those cases in which the rules of advance jurisdiction of evidence (anticipo jurisdiccional de prueba) apply. As understood from the foregoing, the act of identifying [Nombre4] for the purposes of an operation like the one at hand does not legally require jurisdictional order or control. In any case, not all the [Nombre4] used in all the controlled purchases were identified by the Prosecutor's Office (only those used on August 13, 1998), since prior to this date, it was the Contraventional Judge of [Nombre5] who, acting as a guarantees judge, took care of it (see resolution of 15:25 hours on August 11, 1998, folio 4), so the defense's allegations are not admissible. Regarding the absence of a record of the search of the undercover agent, although it is convenient that when said proceeding is carried out, it be recorded in writing, there is no obstacle to it being proven, as happened here, by other lawful evidentiary means such as testimonial evidence, since according to the principle of freedom of evidence contemplated in article 182 ibidem, ‘... facts and circumstances of interest for the solution of the case may be proven by any permitted means of evidence, except for express legal prohibition [...]’. This position was maintained in the first years of the Code of Criminal Procedure's validity, although it has been seen that in many subsequent jurisprudential precedents, it has been considered, in a line that can indeed be described as constant, and that even varies the position just cited, that jurisdictional control is required in the final concluding operation (operativo de desenlace final), although it must also be admitted that, rather than a problem of legitimacy, the scope of the police proceedings and their value is reduced to a problem of evidentiary weight, of sufficiency of elements to convict, the line being constant to the effect that only police-controlled purchases are not sufficient to support a conviction. “Furthermore, even if we started from that fact (namely, the intervention of [Nombre6] in the first transactions carried out by the police), the comprehensive study of the remaining evidence does not derive with absolute certainty the existence of the aggravating circumstance. In this sense, see that three controlled purchases were made from [Nombre7] on June 16, 26, and 28, 2001. The first two were made by the police and only the last one had jurisdictional control (folios 14 to 17, 18 to 20, and 38 front and back). On this last occasion, it should be added, the person who acted in association with [Nombre7] was the convicted [Nombre8]. After that transaction, a search was carried out both in the home of the young person [Nombre9] and in the house of [Nombre7]. In the first property, no evidence of the crime was obtained, and the minor [Nombre10] was not even located (folio 69 front). In the second house, traces of drugs were found (which, it should be noted, [Nombre7] tried to destroy), and the previously identified [Nombre4] were found in the possession of [Nombre8]. Finally, in the vicinity of [Nombre7]'s house, several wrappers containing drugs were located (folios 33 to 35 front, 36 front and back, 37 front, 40 front and back, and 69 to 72 front). As can be seen, regarding the intervention of a minor in the illicit activity, the evidence is reduced to two transactions carried out by the police without any jurisdictional control. The police version regarding the existence of the aggravating factor, in other words, was not confirmed through other evidentiary elements obtained under the supervision of the judge of the preparatory stage or the parties to the process. Although the proceedings carried out on June 28 allowed determining that—as the police maintained—[Nombre7] was dedicated to the sale of drugs, it could not be confirmed that he did so using a minor, since [Nombre10] did not intervene in the transaction, and in the search carried out in this minor's house, no evidence was found linking him to the illicit act [...] Thus, it is undeniable that the Court violated the rules of sound criticism by deriving from the controlled purchases and the results of the search proceedings carried out the aggravating circumstance contemplated in article 71 subsection c) of Law No. 7786 [...]” Third Chamber, [Telf2], of 11:15 hours, on December 23, 2005 (highlights are supplied). Note importantly how it speaks of the importance of control by the judge or the parties, of that concluding activity, which produces direct and “confirmatory” proof of the inquiries made by the police. Several reflections and conclusions can be obtained from all that has been reasoned and the case law that has been cited: our system is one of free assessment of evidence and of freedom of evidence; It is not possible, consequently, to specify that a crime must be investigated in a certain way or must necessarily include a certain proceeding; the Political Constitution and the procedural law establish what the requirements are for the realization of evidence or proceedings that affect or injure fundamental rights, formalities that the Public Prosecutor's Office must respect, without any option; finally, the investigation strategy is defined by the accusing body, through the functional direction of the police, and the decisions it makes in the course of the investigation are its entire responsibility: if it fails in the scope of these, if it does not manage to give solidity to the inquiries, or if it carries out proceedings without complying with the legal or constitutional requirements, the validity, weight, and importance of such elements are to be weighed by the judge. In the opinion of this Chamber, in the carrying out, by the Public Prosecutor's Office, of evidentiary activity that may be decisive, directed against a person for whom there are already solid indications that they carry out a criminal act, who is already individualized throughout an investigation in which sufficient indications have been gathered that this person is committing a crime, adequate control must be guaranteed, which the system already foresees and is the right to have technical defense counsel, as the article 13 Cpp clearly indicates. So it is not a matter of a simple whim, a concession, or a favor that the Public Prosecutor's Office or the police itself have in these cases with these characteristics, but rather it is about compliance with legal requirements. It cannot be stated that in these cases, with the already mentioned characteristics, the presence of the defense is not necessary, since all the requirements that the law establishes to impose the control of the defense attorney are met: the suspect is already individualized and sufficient indicative elements have been gathered pointing to them as the probable perpetrator of a crime, throughout the investigation. Therefore, depending on the nature of the case and the action, under the conditions already stated, the presence and control of the defense attorney is always necessary, and even, additionally, that of the guarantees judge. It is a momentous decision that, in light of respect for fundamental rights, and the right to defense is one, as well as evidentiary purity, the Public Prosecutor's Office must weigh and act accordingly. Whatever the decision, the elements it provides in support of its accusation must, in any case, be weighed by the judge in light of the legal and constitutional requirements and not for reasons of mere convenience or utility. And indeed, even the procedural system, within an internal coherence and protected by respect for the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, contemplates how to act in urgent, unforeseen situations, how to proceed in the face of imponderables, so that authorization to injure fundamental rights without prior jurisdictional control is reasonably contemplated for the police and even any citizen, because the circumstances make such prior authorization unreasonable and impossible: thus, all cases of search without a judicial warrant, a scenario foreseen even in the Political Constitution—numeral 23—and developed in procedural law, article 197 Cpp.; arrest in flagrant crime, even carried out by any person, on the condition that the detainee be placed at the order of a judge within the peremptory period of 24 hours—37 of the Political Constitution. In the case of police officers who catch someone in flagrant crime, they are not only authorized, but it is their unavoidable duty to intervene in their arrest and search them; the search (registro or requisa) in urgent cases, upon well-founded suspicion, can even be carried out by the judicial police—CED6—including the search of vehicles—[Placa1]—which can even cover an indeterminate number of persons, at a specific time and place, in cases of necessity (escape of suspects in recent and serious events, etc. that justify roadblocks due to criminal pursuit), as analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber. If the judicial police observe a subject selling drugs to individuals, they are authorized for the immediate arrest of that person, as it is a flagrant crime, to prepare the respective report for the Public Prosecutor's Office, with the evidence they have gathered. However, since it may happen that this observation proves not to be sufficient to give rise to a process and a conviction, it is preferred in these cases to gather information with greater rigor, which is why such inquiries are entrusted to the police, which is created for these tasks. How this investigation is carried out, the quality of the information produced, the control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the decisions this body makes, will be subject to assessment in each specific case, by the judge, according to the defined procedural rules. And why is this investigative work and its sources of control important? Well, because, in the first place, if it is only a matter of controlled purchases, no matter how much the officers testify about the alleged contact of the collaborator with the suspect person and provide the evidence, how to rule out police inducement? How to prove that, apart from those contacts with the undercover agent, indiscriminate sale is carried out to third parties, which do injure the legal right protected by the norm? For this, surveillance must be accompanied, frequent, continuous, to clearly specify that this activity is carried out independently of the presence and contact controlled by the police. For the analysis of these elements, it is not enough that the police work is considered honest or the officers' accounts sincere; rather, more elements are required in addition to their intervention, because the sole investigative intervention of the police and controller of those contacts is not sufficient, even if these actions are backed by records, because the records and the police testimony revolve around the same point: the police-controlled purchases. If the records are other and allow independent control, the weight could be different, all of which will always depend on the conditions present in each case.

III- What happened in the specific case: Against the defendant [Nombre11], the judicial police received confidential information that he was engaged in the sale of crack in the downtown area of the city of Puntarenas, assisted by another subject nicknamed [Placa2] and also using the vehicle with plates [Placa3] [Placa2]. According to this information, he carries out this activity during the day and at night, every day of the week, with an increase on weekends (cfr. report of *notitia criminis*, folios 1 and 2). It is said that he hides the drugs in the vehicle, and his name and particulars are already given, establishing that the mentioned vehicle is his property. Under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the judicial police of Puntarenas begins the investigation to gather elements that allow verification of the information received. The strategy outlined, because it emerges thus from the actions, was to carry out controlled purchases with a police “collaborator,” which is nothing more than an undercover agent. The first controlled purchase is carried out only by officer [Nombre12], on February 12, 2009, in the afternoon, in the company of that collaborator, who has never been identified nor brought to the stand, but delivers to the investigators what, he said, he obtained from the suspect, which turned out to be a rock of cocaine base crack (cfr.

controlled purchase report, folios 10 to 12, record of verification of drug sale, folio 13, and custody of evidence, folios 14 and 15); a second purchase on February 27, in the afternoon, with the participation of officer [Nombre12]. and [Nombre13]., with “one of our confidential collaborators” (folio 16) from which a search, purchase, and evidence custody record was prepared (folios 16 to 20); third controlled purchase, by the same officers indicated, on March 2, in the afternoon, under the same conditions as the previous ones and at the same location (folios 21 to 25); fourth purchase on March 17, in the morning, specifically at 8:50 a.m., carried out solely by [Nombre13]., indicating that the suspect crouched down and unearthed something from the ground, taking out a jar from which he took what he delivered to the collaborator, which, after being analyzed, was verified to be crack cocaine base (folios 26 to 31). That same day, at 9:00 a.m., officer […] positioned himself “at a strategic point on the north side of the Municipal Market near the site where the suspect [Nombre11] was located” (folio 32) and conducted surveillance “to observe the flow of people who would approach the suspect.” He documented that, within a 30-minute period, four people approached, whom he identified by nicknames and claims are known addicts in the area, who make brief exchanges with the suspect. At folio 36 and at 3:00 p.m. on March 23, 2010, there appears a money identification record, carried out by prosecutor [Nombre14], at the Puntarenas Assistant Prosecutor's Office, of two one-thousand-colón [Nombre4] series D94364544 and D98920165, and it is recorded that they are identified “for the purpose of the anti-drug police operation that the judicial police and the Public Prosecutor's Office will carry out today […] The identified money will remain in the custody of the undersigned Assistant Prosecutor, to later be delivered to the Confidential Collaborator who will attempt to confirm one more sale of unauthorized drugs, in accordance with Article 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and rulings 2002-525 of the Third Chamber, rulings 2005-586 and 2006-966 of the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José […]”. At folio 37 verso, there appears a received stamp on the photocopies of the identified [Nombre4], dated March 23, 3:00 p.m. Documentarily, immediately following that identification record for the [Nombre4], a report appears summarizing that on March 25, 2010, in the morning hours (no longer March 23 as recorded when identifying the [Nombre4]), prosecutor [Nombre15], went with officer [Nombre13] and the “collaborator” to conduct a controlled purchase from the suspect, which is affirmed to have taken place at 10:20 a.m., in the vicinity of Hotel El Río, where, after the search and delivery of money, the purchase of a rock of what turned out to be crack cocaine base was made. Then, on that same date of March 25 (and not March 23 as recorded as the day the money was identified), at 11 a.m., the following record appears at folio 39: “At eleven o'clock on the twenty-fifth of March 2010, the undersigned prosecutor states for the record that a call was placed to the public defender's office requesting the duty defender [Nombre16], in addition, a call was placed to the cell phone on three occasions, the line rang and was not answered; furthermore, a beeper message was sent via radio messages, the location of the defense being unsuccessful, and given that this is a case of drug sales on public thoroughfares with urgency and that a controlled purchase was recently carried out, the location of the suspect being ideal for the final operation, we proceed to carry out the operation without the public defender. That is all. [Nombre17]. Narcotics Prosecutor […]”. Immediately following are the documents: collaborator search record, at 11:03 a.m.; money delivery record, 11:05 a.m.; record at 11:08 a.m., of collaborator tracking; record at 11:30 a.m., of suspect search; vehicle registration record 11:58 a.m. and the evidence seizure records, from folios 40 to 49). We find that four investigative diligence procedures of controlled drug purchases were carried out, with the participation of an undercover agent or unidentified collaborator, and a single surveillance at the site where the defendant was being investigated for the illicit activity. A fifth purchase of the same nature, with the participation of the prosecutor, as another investigator, was carried out at 10:20 a.m. on March 25, without there being records of the search, money delivery, and tracking of the collaborator, a diligence performed by prosecutor [Nombre15] accompanied by officer [Nombre12]. All of these are controlled purchases at the indiciary, police level and allowed them to gather reasonable and well-founded suspicions that the accused was engaged in selling drugs; his modus operandi was outlined in the investigation, and reasonably, these investigative elements allowed them to support a probability of [Nombre11]'s participation in a crime. With this scaffolding of elements, the prosecutor decided to carry out a controlled purchase with individualized money, This Chamber considers, in order to then proceed to the suspect's arrest and search. This decision by the prosecutor is made knowing that he already has reasonable elements to identify [Nombre11]. as responsible for selling crack cocaine base drugs, reasonable elements that the police investigation had allowed to be gathered and that he himself, acting with the officers, verified. Thus, this decision cannot be made without guaranteeing that person the control of the technical defense to which they are entitled. This Chamber considers that, under these conditions, the prosecutor was not authorized to attempt to carry out the operation without the assistance of the public defender and, contrary to the Trial Court's statements, to which reference will be made later, it cannot be left to the discretion of the Public Prosecutor's Office when and how it carries out operations with or without the public defender, because the law imposes that obligation on it. The timing and manner of carrying out the diligence is something indisputably planned by the police and the Public Prosecutor's Office. There are, of course, many logistical, security, and planning aspects involved in an operation of this nature, which are the exclusive domain of the police under the direction of the prosecutor. But just as these aspects are coordinated, it must be clear that the public defender must be included in that planning, even if further details are not provided so as not to risk its outcome. And it is emphasized that this refers to the public defender, because that diligence is about to be carried out to culminate an investigation. That diligence seeks to gather more evidentiary elements that allow the Public Prosecutor's Office to eventually support an accusation against the accused, whom they intend to arrest at the conclusion of that operation, so it is obvious that, under these conditions, such an operation must be carried out respecting the right of the investigated person, already a crime suspect, to have a defender. And it is the public defender, a service paid for by the State, since it would be absurd to forewarn him in advance of the operation and its possible outcome, so that he might appoint a trusted attorney. The public defender is called upon to serve as a technical advisor for that investigated person and to guarantee, as a qualified observer, the manner in which events unfold and to formulate objections and make the claims deemed pertinent to safeguard the rights of that investigated person. They are not there for decoration, nor do they attend "in defense of no one" as the Trial Court surprisingly states, but rather they are a professional paid by the State and assigned the mission of defending the rights of that investigated person in the diligence to be carried out. And, even if it is uncomfortable and not to the liking of some, this is the option our democratic system chose and that the legislator designed for cases where a police or judicial diligence is to be carried out against a person regarding whom sufficient and reasonable indications already exist that they have committed or are committing a crime, as indicated by Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, of course, is not an invention, it is a normative provision of the highest guarantee level that neither hinders, nor obstructs, nor complicates, nor ruins the police investigation activity, nor implies an inadmissible advantage for the investigated person, nor means that information leaks or that procedures are frustrated; that is, it does not imply any risk nor generate any alteration for the success of that diligence, action, or inquiry. It does not imply paralyzing procedures, nor alerting the suspect, nor obstructing the work; that is, there is no reasonable, plausible justification, from the perspective of the right to defense and the purity of evidence, for not complying with the legal requirements in these cases, which mean exercising, with equality of arms, a control, a counterweight, regarding the procedural possibilities of ascertaining the truth, and, if the investigation is solid, if the procedures have no vices, defects, or illegalities, no prosecutor, no police officer should fear any risk, ensuring that their definitive or evidentiary activity against an already individualized person about to be arrested is supervised and monitored by the public defender, because furthermore, the procedural law requires it. Urgent, imminent, and compelling cases do not require functional direction, nor a prosecutor, nor a defender; we are all clear on that and the system has already provided for those contingencies and the validity of actions carried out in that manner. The system has also granted the police, especially the judicial police, significant investigative powers and authorizes them to validly carry out a large number of procedures (articles 67 to 69, 283 to 268, all of the Code of Criminal Procedure), for which they do not require defense oversight; securing the crime scene; lifting fingerprints, indications, and evidence; surveillance, tracking, and controlled purchase operations; interviews with people who may have information; searching for data in public databases to guide investigations; searches, arrests, registrations in specific circumstances; in short, a large number of procedures that only the investigator's preparation, together with the direction and guidance of the prosecutor, can establish and must carry out, document, and advance their task; no one questions that. However, and contrary to the position held by the Trial Court in this case, there is no justification whatsoever that supports the prosecutor's office's decision to carry out that operation in the manner it did, without the participation of the defender, who did not attend not out of negligence or irresponsibility, as the ruling claims without any justification, but due to the hasty and thoughtless manner in which the prosecutor's office decided to act, for which the Public Prosecutor's Office can be blamed for the fact that the procedures carried out in this case, due to the particularities already established, are illegitimate, and so it must be declared. There was no urgency whatsoever that led the prosecutor to act in the manner he did. The entire investigation carried out allowed for the establishment that the defendant, apparently, carried out his presumably criminal activity, every day, at all hours, in public places in Puntarenas. The police-controlled purchases were spread out over time and allowed for the establishment of this circumstance. It must even be noted that the accused was arrested inside his vehicle, while consuming marijuana in the company of a woman, who was momentarily detained at the site (cf. record at folio 44), so there was neither a risk of flight, alerting the suspect, nor any other element that would justify urgent or hasty action, as occurred in this matter. On the contrary, evidence was received indicating that on that day it had been decided to suspend the operation because presumably the defendant noticed the police presence. Thus, at trial, the statement of defender [Nombre18] was received, the content of which is not even mentioned in the judgment, so it is not possible to understand how it is concluded that it was due to her negligence that she did not attend the operation, unless the Trial Court, without explicitly saying so, adopts the opinion expressed by officer [Nombre12]. (DVD, recording at 9:31:20 a.m., September 2, 2010), which likewise lacks support, as will be analyzed later. On the contrary, from listening to the defender's testimony, from the DVD recording at 10:22:04 a.m., on August 20, 2010, it is clear how said professional narrated that from 9 o'clock that morning of March 25, having been informed of an operation, she accompanied the prosecutor, officer [Nombre12]. and the collaborator, in a vehicle heading to conduct the final controlled purchase. She observed the identification record for the [Nombre4] and verified their numbers. She affirmed that they made several rounds, as apparently the suspect ‑whose identity she was unaware of‑ was not in his usual position and suspected the police presence. On one of those rounds, they encountered the investigated person face to face and, suspecting he had seen them, they moved away from the site and then finally communicated by radio that they would suspend the diligence, so all these people moved to the Court building, they were discussing alternatives, and finally, they told her to return to her office and they would be in contact. Even officer [Nombre12] affirmed this, as he said they decided to wait a couple of hours (DVD recording, from 9:28:09 a.m. onwards). She warned that she was going to file a document at the Family Court and would be in her office. The return of all the people occurred around ten-thirty that morning; she took five minutes to go to the Court and waited in her office, where she was fully locatable, besides the fact that it is an office located in the same building as the prosecutor's office and the judicial police. The defender explained that she went to the restroom and therefore left her beeper in the office, to avoid dropping it, and immediately spoke with her boss, always finding herself in the defender's office facilities, where the auxiliary staff already knew of her presence there and where they have office telephone numbers that the Prosecutor's Office and judicial police officers know and constantly use as a means of contact. When she is notified that she is being sought, she called officer [Nombre12]. and was told she was not there; she contacted the prosecutor's cell phone, and he told her he could not attend to her, and several minutes later she found out that the operation was carried out because she did not show up. She explained that she was always in the Public Defender's offices, and even if it were the case that she was not there or was performing other duties, there is always a duty roster and any other defender would be obligated to attend the diligence, because, she literally said, the public defender service cannot be left uncovered. She stated that the beeper is the means of communication assigned to them, when they are available, to be located after 4:30 in the afternoon or when they attend a diligence, they must carry it, in case they are required for another. She clarified that both the prosecutor's office and the judicial police and the Criminal Court know the defender's office working methods and have always coordinated with them. This witness was sincere and clear; she even acknowledged that days before, an attempt had been made to carry out the operation without success, she was unaware of the reasons, which is not even documented in the summary. Furthermore, she affirmed she could not say, when she later attended the investigative statement, whether the accused was an addict or not, as that would be an assumption. And she clearly acknowledged that the defender's office staff always attend these types of operations, which are carried out constantly, to ensure the legality of the procedures and the rights of those investigated. So, in the first place, there is no justification whatsoever for the prosecutor to decide to go out without going to the defender's offices or coordinating by phone within the office, if minutes earlier they had been together and the defender collaborated and accompanied them for a long time; nor are they remote or distant sites with difficult communication; therefore, the urgency and haste with which the prosecutor decides to leave, just minutes after separating from the defender, is not acceptable, and that urgency cannot arise from the prosecutor's simple will, making the immediate presence and availability of a defender—whether the duty defender or any other—dependent on that thoughtless decision. If it was indeed urgent, this has not been proven at all, and there is also no evidence indicating what changed from those prior minutes to the moment when the decision was made to act without being able to notify and locate the defender. Officer [Nombre12]. acknowledges that around 9 o'clock in the morning the operation had been coordinated; they went with the defender, but had to withdraw because they apparently alerted the suspect to the police presence, so they returned to the courts and decided to wait a couple of hours. However, according to the records, already at ten-thirty in the morning he was in the company of the prosecutor carrying out a controlled purchase, which, he said, happened right in front of them. He argues that for that reason they decide to carry out the final operation and returned to the Courts, trying by all means to locate the defender, and “she did not show up,” so the prosecutor, sitting in his offices, decided to carry it out without the defense. That is, finding themselves in the same building, being able to go to the public defender's offices, calling the official telephones, they did not do so, and therefore this officer felt they could not wait for an irresponsible person to disappear to carry out such an important operation (recording from 9:30:30 onwards). However, there is no evidence that it was an urgent action, because even the same officer acknowledged that they were watching the suspect who was there calmly, as always, so that action does not seem reasonable, just as there is no evidence whatsoever that the defender irresponsibly disengaged from the case to frustrate the operation. Note that there are important elements that lead to classifying the prosecutor's decision as hasty and capricious: the identification record for the [Nombre4] was made two days before the operation, because it was said that they were to be used on that date of March 23. However, two days pass without any documentary justification of what happened, and suddenly that same prosecutor appears, in the morning hours of March 25, acting in the company of a police officer and the collaborator, personally carrying out the control of a purchase, which has no particularity distinguishing it from all the previous ones, all of this being done without the presence of the defender, with whom they had tried to carry out the same diligence, minutes earlier. Twenty minutes later, he decides to make a purchase, with the [Nombre4] he had individualized two days earlier and that were not used on the established day; he records for the record that he made some unanswered calls at that moment to the “duty” defense and makes the “urgent” decision to carry out the concluding operation, without specifying that minutes earlier they had tried to carry it out in the company of the defender and had decided to suspend the diligence. None of these considerations, nor the content of the defender's testimony, were analyzed in the judgment, so the Trial Court's conclusions are openly unfounded. The prosecutor went to the site without coordinating again with the defense, decides to carry out the operation, and simply limits himself to sending messages to the beeper; as they do not respond and he does not locate the defender through that means, he makes a record and proceeds, when, from the statement of [Nombre12], it is clear that, according to his account, they returned to the Office to “coordinate” with the defense and were in the same building. This Chamber, from the review of the summary, from listening to the judgment, and from observing the documentary evidence and the trial, finds no basis whatsoever to affirm, as the Trial Court does, that it was the negligence of the public defender's office of the city of Puntarenas that was responsible for the operation being carried out without the participation of the defense. Nor does it have any element indicating that the defender knew of the imminence of the operation and that she deliberately or negligently rid herself of her communication devices or was not locatable, in order to avoid attending the diligence, as the Trial Court suggests, and that these were the only reasonably available means of communication. Those are very serious assertions that lack support. On the contrary, the record of the proceedings allows for an appreciation that the prosecutor acted in a hasty manner, made rushed decisions without any justification, and precisely due to the way he acted, he rendered the oversight of the public defense over his actions nugatory. If the operation was urgent, why did he individualize money two days earlier, to use it on a date different from the one that finally occurred? Why did the prosecutor decide to have prior contact with the suspect and then cannot return and coordinate with the public defender the conclusion and the evidence to be produced, if hours earlier, and even minutes earlier, he was with the public defender and decided to suspend the operation? The Trial Court is correct when it points out that it cannot be at the defense's discretion when and how the operation is carried out, just as the police could not have foreseen that the prosecutor would carry out the conclusion of his inquiries in that manner. In effect, it is the obligation of the public defender's office, according to the legal and regulatory provisions and the directives issued in that regard that regulate its work, to have personnel available for carrying out these types of diligence procedures and operations. If a public defense professional, with the proper information and coordination, does not attend without any justification, it is appropriate to establish whether it is necessary to assign responsibilities at the disciplinary or other level, and the same applies if they give information to the suspects or impede the diligence in some way, all serious conduct for which there is no basis to affirm was present in this case, so that in the same way that the Trial Court defends the honesty of the police and the credibility of their accounts, it should have proceeded with the public defender and the Public Defender's Office of the locality of Puntarenas, because it makes assertions without any support; for, if it had such support, it should have proceeded to file the corresponding complaints and not simply discredit a professional and a service, without foundation. The Trial Court forgot to consider that the Public Prosecutor's Office cannot resort to a non-existent urgency and render nugatory the participation of the defense in a diligence of this nature, which the trial body itself recognizes has a “different” validity from a diligence carried out with judicial oversight or oversight by the public defender. Dealing with people who were together minutes earlier, who work in the same building, and who can communicate more fluidly by internal telephone and even personally, the prosecutor's decision appears completely unjustified. In this Chamber's opinion, it is clear that while the Prosecutor is in charge of investigations, the functional direction over the police, and the duty to act with objectivity, it is also true that he acts in the process as a party, especially in a process that has been called one of “markedly accusatory” features, so his action is that of a party, and for that reason, when in the course of his activity he will affect fundamental rights, he must necessarily obtain the authorization and intervention of the judge, and, when he is going to carry out evidentiary acts that are not urgent, in which he expects to obtain direct evidence of a suspect, whom he already has individualized and against whom he already has reasonable and plausible indications that they are committing or have committed a crime, he must do so as the law requires, with the oversight of, at least, the defender, because the final paragraph of Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure already cited so indicates, and it is imposed by respect for due process, the right to defense, procedural balance, good faith litigation, and the principle of loyalty. If it is decided not to have such oversight, the weight of the procedures carried out in this way weakens and loses effectiveness. Note that we are not talking about that oversight in police purchases, the scope and weight of which have been clearly defined here. We are talking about the accusator's decision to carry out specific, planned procedures, seeking to gather greater evidentiary elements that refer to a person whom the police investigations already allow to be profiled very clearly as a suspect, with information gathered in those investigations that already permits an appreciation of a certain regularity and seriousness of the indications (several controlled purchases, tracking and surveillance operations that allow for the establishment of what type of activity, where and how it is carried out, and what type of substance is being sold, etc.). And this is the most important aspect that must be analyzed in light of the claims in this specific case. Although we have cited and commented on jurisprudential precedents indicating that the presence of the judge is not necessary when an evidentiary activity with money or any other individualized object is to be carried out that will not affect fundamental rights, the truth is that in this specific case, this Chamber considers that the Public Prosecutor's Office had no justification for not coordinating the presence of a public defender to serve as a qualified observer and guarantor of the right to defense of the person investigated in that act with evidentiary force that it intended to carry out. From the result of that diligence, it was expected to obtain decisive evidence for the immediate arrest of the suspect. And we agree with the jurisprudential position that indicates that, in cases like the present one, where there is a prolonged investigative police effort of a certain quality, verified over a period of time, allowing for the location of places and modus operandi of the person investigated, without any urgency mediating, the Public Prosecutor's Office's decision to carry out a concluding intervention, with an evidentiary nature, should have considered the presence of a defender, because there was no justification whatsoever for not doing so, and under these conditions, the law so prescribes. His decision resulted in the identification of [Nombre4] to be used by an undercover agent, who did not testify at trial; in that transaction being supervised only by the prosecutor and the police, without this representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office testifying as a witness at trial, because he acted as the prosecutor, giving his blessing to evidence that he himself produced and controlled, which does not conform to the system of checks and balances underlying the criminal process designed by our legislator (consult in this regard precedent number 965-2004 at 9:50 a.m. on August 13, 2004, of the Third Chamber). This concluding operation, which only the Public Prosecutor's Office's decision defines whether to carry out or not, this Chamber does consider that, to differentiate itself from any of the police-controlled purchases, it must be an act subjected to oversight, to exercise a counterweight, with the necessary participation of the defense and even the judge, in cases where fundamental rights will also be violated. This Chamber is aware of the position held by the Third Chamber indicating that judicial oversight is indispensable in these operations, a position that could be considered even more guarantee-oriented, although it has had its nuances, especially when, as has been seen, the operation is carried out on public thoroughfares and no fundamental rights will be violated. That position of the Chamber was outlined in precedent number [Telf8] at 9:30 a.m., on April 7, 2006, an opportunity in which, as relevant, it stated “[…]In the case examined, just as the applicant claims, judicial oversight was omitted, without any justification, at a transcendent phase within the deployed investigation operation, which was to verify the effective illicit activity attributed to the defendant, referring to the sale of drugs, which would be done, according to the investigative strategy, through a jurisdictionally controlled purchase, in which an undercover agent would acquire a certain amount of drugs from the accused. However, this judicial oversight, as the appellant claims, did not occur in this case, without there being any determining element to prevent it, so that no difference whatsoever is noted between the police-controlled purchases under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor's Office, on February 19, March 5 and 29, all in 2005 (indiciary acts), and the purchase made on the following April 18, at 8:25 p.m., next to the commercial business "Burger King" in Tamarindo, jurisdiction of Santa Cruz de Guanacaste, which came to constitute the final operation that resulted in the arrest of the defendant and the raid carried out on his dwelling house, located a considerable distance from the site where the drugs were acquired.

And this undifferentiated situation is motivated by the fact that this last transaction, like the previous ones, was controlled in its entirety by the Drug Control Police (Policía de Control de Drogas), under the functional direction of the prosecuting body, with the police agents being the actors who, as they indicated at trial (see folios 379 to 386) and as was accredited through the documentary evidence provided to the process, were the only ones who witnessed the drug sale that the defendant made to the undercover agent [Nombre19], and it is the prosecutorial representative who receives the package with marijuana from the police officer (see folio 147), and also searches the accused (see folio 148) […]This guaranteeing task, contrary to what the Trial Court indicated in the judgment (see folios 388, 389 and 394), incurring in a partial and erroneous reading of the jurisprudential precedents of this Chamber (votes 822-04, 1132-04 and 198-05), was not exhausted by the jurisdictional participation in the identification and delivery to the undercover agent of the [Nombre4] used in the final purchase (see folios 144 to 146), nor by its presence during the raid carried out (see folios 151 to 155), insofar as its control was required in the acts prior to and subsequent to the operation: that the undercover agent not interact with other persons before contacting the accused as a seller, thus guaranteeing that he did not acquire drugs from a third party; the seizure from the accused of the identified [Nombre4] with which the purchase was made, which was executed in this case by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, who ultimately, together with the Drug Control Police, were in charge of directing and controlling the purchase operation, replacing the Criminal Judge of the Preparatory Procedure, who was in another location to carry out the raid ordered at the defendant's home, and who comes into contact with the latter and with the evidence collected at the purchase site forty-five minutes after his arrest by the police officers and the prosecutor, who indicated to the Judge at that moment that, upon being detained, [Nombre20] "voluntarily" handed over the previously identified [Nombre4] when he was invited to show his belongings before proceeding to his search, the participation of any representative of the public defender's office being notably absent, who not only was not present to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the accused, who was already fully identified by the time of the final operation, but was also not summoned or invited to witness the actions carried out, aggravated by the absence of the jurisdictional body. It should be noted, on this issue, that although it is true that the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that the absence of the defender in the initial investigative proceedings and in the preliminary acts that will lead to the individualization of the accused does not violate due process and the right to defense, this is so, provided there is participation and sufficient control by the guarantees judge (among others, see vote number 6469-99, at 2:33 p.m. on September 18, 1999. Constitutional Chamber). Based on the foregoing considerations, in this particular case, upon examining the police actions, under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which had as their corollary the arrest of the defendant and the seizure of some evidence, they become unsuitable to prove the charged illicit conduct (that the accused [Nombre20] was indeed engaged in the illicit drug trade, discarding the possibility that his actions were provoked by the police). The following are also insufficient as evidentiary elements to provide effective support for the issued conviction: the surveillances carried out previously and the corresponding controlled purchases by the police agents; the evidence collected there; the testimonies of the police officers who participated in the operation, including that of the undercover officer, who repeated before the Judges the mechanics of the police investigative acts carried out. These are efficient evidentiary elements to support the notitia criminis that allowed requesting the opening of the trial and the raid carried out at the defendant's home, which yielded a minuscule amount of seized drugs (half a cigarette and a "tocola" of marijuana), but not to prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, the hypothesis of the accusation, retaining only an indiciary character, while the unjustified lack of jurisdictional control fostered a clear evidentiary imbalance to the detriment of the accused's interests. […]As this Chamber has stated on other occasions in accordance with constitutional jurisprudence: “...although police activities of controlled drug purchases constitute a useful investigative mechanism to provide support for the received 'notitia criminis' and legitimize subsequent actions that may affect fundamental rights (e.g., the raid of a private enclosure), by themselves they are not sufficient to overcome the state of innocence of the accused, arriving at the necessary certainty of the commission of the crime. It is necessary, then, that this type of investigative tool be supported by other evidentiary elements that corroborate it beyond all doubt. (In this regard, see the resolutions of this Chamber: No. 270-02 at 3:55 p.m. on March 21, No. 1086-02 at 11:10 a.m. on October 25, and No. 1293-02 at 9:36 a.m. on December 20, 2002; all from 2002; as well as No. 78-04 at 9:10 a.m. on February 13, 2004). It is not about pointing out the need for 'legal' or 'weighted' evidence, but rather about specifying the evidentiary scope that can reasonably be recognized for certain investigative acts within the framework of a democratic state of law that grants individual liberty and the principle of innocence a primary and fundamental value..” (cf. vote number 822-04, at 10:02 a.m. on July 9, 2004. Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice) […]”. Even if this position could be considered even more reasonable, at least regarding this case, it is clear that the defense had to be present and that proceeding could not be carried out without guaranteeing the right to technical defense. The evidence gathered by the prosecutor in this case, in open disrespect of the right to defense, is illegitimate, and the purchase that preceded it, although carried out by the prosecutor, is no more than a controlled purchase like those carried out by the police, with the added difficulty that there are no records of prior search (actas de requisa previa), nor of follow-up, nor of money delivery, and the prosecutor who acted did not testify as a witness, nor was offered as evidence, as he is the same person who formulated the accusation and attended the debate. In the opinion of this Court, this proceeding, due to the characteristics present in this case, cannot be controlled by the prosecutor, nor can it be considered that his presence is a guarantee, because he compiles incriminating evidence against a person already individualized as a suspect of a crime, thanks to previous investigations, meaning that the right to defense must be guaranteed, as a counterweight and guarantee of respect for that fundamental right. Although from the considerations set forth in the cited jurisprudential precedent, it seems to be inferred that in a final controlled purchase (outcome of the investigation), jurisdictional control is always required, and keeping in mind that some Courts of Cassation, including this same Chamber, for example, in precedents number 2008-453, at 10:20 a.m., on September 26, and CED7, at 10:00 a.m., on November 14, both from 2008, have considered that such a requirement does not derive from the law and is only demandable when the outcome operation intends to infringe upon a fundamental right, for example when the activity takes place in the home and entry is necessary for its search, the truth is that, to assess its evidentiary weight, this Chamber considers that it is demandable, when not in urgent situations, the control and participation of at least a public defender, as a controller of the way in which such a proceeding was carried out, so that it could serve as a counterweight for the weighing of those elements, already within the process itself. If this participation does not occur and there is no plausible justification for it, the proceeding carried out in this way would not differ from a police-controlled purchase, notwithstanding that due to the violation of the defense guarantee, given the conditions under which it was conducted, the evidence obtained from said intervention cannot be validly used in the process. The contrary, that is, recognizing that a proceeding under those conditions "has lesser validity," as the Trial Court asserts, but giving space and value to the evidence obtained, is simply to circumvent the right to defense and the legal and constitutional norms that give it meaning. Indeed, in the opinion of this Chamber, it cannot be stated that a final proceeding must be carried out in one way or another, and indeed, it cannot even be affirmed that it is necessary in every case to carry it out, however, the truth is that the Código Procesal Penal, which is a normative body of public order, is what indicates the way in which certain acts must be carried out and has express sanctions when the right to defense is violated – numeral 178 subsection a) Cpp.- and for this reason, it is the judge's duty to verify compliance with the substantial requirements prescribed for certain acts, according to their nature. If the investigative strategy of the Public Prosecutor's Office establishes carrying out that outcome operation in a certain way, it will be for the judges to assess the legality and scope of what was done and the evidence gathered, as well as the evidentiary weight that should be assigned to it. It is very important to mention, therefore, that this Chamber does not share the assessment and reasoning made by the Trial Court to consider the search of the person (requisa) and the vehicle search valid in this case. The judges dismissed the defense's arguments by conducting an individual, isolated, and fragmented analysis of each of these proceedings, as if they were not intertwined with a prior intervention, fully coordinated and controlled with the aim of obtaining evidence and detaining the suspect, all carried out without the participation of the defense. The Trial Court thus referred to the police's ability to conduct personal searches (requisas) without an order from a prosecutor or judge and cites numeral 189 Cpp., which, it argues, occurred in this case, so the presence of the defender was not necessary; similarly, it analyzes the vehicle search and again cited the Cpp, article 190, to point out that the police do not need an order from a judge or prosecutor to search vehicles; finally, it again insisted that even if there were no search records for the collaborator in the first purchase on that day, March 25, nor follow-up records, such acts, which the record should prove, can be accredited by other means, in support of which it cites numeral 136 Cpp. All these police powers have already been analyzed and are valid when dealing with urgent, necessary, and indispensable situations for which the police are authorized to act and do not need any order. But it turns out that the Trial Court overlooked that this personal search, that vehicle search, and that detention did not result from an urgent, novel, flagrant situation, but from a completely controlled, anticipated, and planned operation, where each step was previously established to proceed with the arrest of the accused and obtain prepared evidence from him. Therefore, an isolated and disjointed analysis of what really happened in this case cannot be done, because that is a valid reasoning (in theory, in the abstract) but inapplicable to the case under analysis. Despite the Trial Court's evident knowledge of the norms, the same is not true for article 13 Cpp., a norm whose analysis and weighing, as well as its validity for this specific case, is notably missing, a numeral that is not mentioned in the entire judgment, nor is it taken into account in any way by the Trial Court, a norm that, therefore, appears completely diminished and unnoticed. Furthermore, some assertions made in the judgment powerfully attract this Chamber's attention, assertions whose motivation or underlying ideas are unknown, for example, when it was stated, at the 2:14:30 p.m. recording: "The Court does not judge urban legends, it does not judge people's tales, it judges facts that are brought to the attention of the Public Prosecutor's Office and judges them through evidence, not through, I repeat, urban legends presented by other people (…)"; similarly, the way in which the issue of the difference noted in the forensic report regarding the amount of drugs (24 or 4 packages) is resolved when referring to the evidence obtained in the outcome or final operation is surprising, because even though it is not questioned and it could be thought that it is, indeed, a material error, the Trial Court's assertion (recording at 2:14:10 p.m.) in concluding that regardless of whether the amount did not correspond, "what is certain and important is that it contained drugs and that is what is important, regardless of the quantity (…)", is surprising, when what was expected was to weigh how much weight those circumstances could have regarding respect for the chain of custody, for example, of the evidence, which is an integral part of due process, so it is not so certain that one can reason "regardless" of whether the quantities and weights do not match, provided it is drugs, that is what matters. The Trial Court's reasoning, although stated clearly and forcefully, is contradictory, as it analyzes that the so-called final operation in this case, by lacking jurisdictional or defense control, is different, has a different value, but then, when weighing its validity, as the defense counsel rightly claims, it ends up reaffirming all the actions; despite the fact that the basis of its analysis is precisely that for carrying out that operation, a reasonable indication, a founded suspicion based on the whole investigation, already existed that [Nombre22] was committing a crime, although it insists on this idea emphatically, it never manages to link the importance, under those present conditions, for respecting the right to defense, as consecrated in the so many times mentioned by this Chamber, numeral 13 Cpp and its link with articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and precisely all those elements that the Trial Court insists upon, which are present in this case ‑a prior investigation that allowed outlining and establishing the founded and reasonable suspicion of facing a perpetrator of a crime and the need to verify it with greater force for his immediate arrest- are precisely the grounds for the right to defense to enter the scene, a detail of such weight that the Trial Court ignored. Hence, the defense's claims must be upheld. For having been collected in disregard of the fundamental right to defense and, consequently, in violation of due process, the search records (actas de requisa) at folios 40, 43 and 45, the record of money delivery to the collaborator at folio 41, the seizure records (actas de secuestro) at folios 46, 47 and 48, the search and seizure record carried out on the vehicle at folio 49, as well as the results of the analysis of the evidence obtained in that operation, are declared ineffective." "II- In our criminal procedural system, there is no weighted legal evidence (prueba legal tasada), meaning that procedural subjects are not obliged to prove certain facts with a specific or particular means of proof, to which a weight or value is assigned beforehand. Therefore, in principle, every fact can be proved with any means of proof, provided it is legitimate - numeral 182 of the Código Procesal Penal (hereinafter Cpp.)-. Legitimacy is substantial and formal, as it is not enough for the act to be formally regular, but rather its validity must substantially result from respect for fundamental rights and essential procedural guarantees. Only by meeting such requirements can a process be considered fair, in respect of due process, and only under those conditions can the evidence be validly considered and assessed. In the field of investigating crimes related to drug sales, especially, there is an investigative strategy that has become widespread in our environment and which largely shares in the strategies defined by the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, approved by law number 7198 of November 1, 1990, also adopted by the Law on Narcotic Drugs (Ley sobre Estupefacientes), including the current one, number 8204 of January 11, 2002 (articles 10 and 11). We refer specifically to the conduct of controlled purchases, achieved from suspects engaged in drug sales activities, for which the figure of the undercover agent is used. Thus, it is possible for the police to verify the information received regarding the dynamics of the supposedly performed activity, the frequency, the sites, as well as the type and quantity of drugs supposedly traded and the assigned price. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber has long analyzed the constitutionality of this investigative strategy, validating it as such, despite which, from a substantive point of view, it specified that every time an undercover agent manages to make a "purchase" from the suspect, no crime is configured because the harm to the legal interest does not occur, since the agent is not a consumer, the sale is not real, and everything related to that approach is under police control, so it would only have value as an indication, achieved from an investigative proceeding, like any other, insufficient, in any case, to support a conviction if it does not appear reinforced with independent evidentiary elements. This position is held by the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber and by the various Criminal Cassation Courts of the country (among others from the Third Chamber, see precedents number 162-98, at 11:17 a.m., on February 20, 1998, [Telf1], at 10:55 a.m., on November 12, 2004; [Telf2], at 11:15 a.m., on December 23, 2005; CED1, at 9:05 a.m., on November 10, 2006; CED2, at 9:55 a.m., on May 25, 2007). How that indication arising from police-controlled purchases should be reinforced and how an investigation of that nature should be finalized is something for the Public Prosecutor's Office and the police, directed by the former, to define. Defining investigative strategies is something that falls to those who are precisely in charge of the task of gathering evidence to verify the commission of a crime and its perpetrators or participants. However, jurisprudence has contributed to showing when an investigation has been successful – in terms of good evidentiary results and respect for fundamental rights -; when it has been insufficient, and when it has been ineffective, for obtaining illegitimate evidence that cannot be validly used, for harming fundamental rights and being inadmissible as an element to consider. To measure and weigh the efficiency of an investigation in drug matters (as in any investigation of any other crime), it is not enough to only assess the investigative strategy and its tangible results (in physical, material evidence and arrests) but also, and first, it can be affirmed, whether the path used to obtain that evidence and those results is respectful of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, or if they are arbitrary acts, of illegitimate use of the police or investigative powers that the law has designed. Many discourses circulating in our environment lead one to believe that respect for fundamental rights and guarantees constitutes an obstacle to the prosecution of crime perpetrators and to guaranteeing the peace and security to which all inhabitants of our Nation have a right. In reality, it must be pointed out that respect for rights and guarantees is an obligation of the so-called "law enforcement agents" (prosecutors, police officers, judges) and only by acting in accordance with the constitutionally, conventionally, and legally designed system can the work carried out in an investigation be appreciated and assessed, and the evidence and the conclusions obtained be considered valid. Therefore, that respect is not a concession or a favor but a duty, to ensure that police procedures and strategies for investigating facts are only carried out within a framework of control and respect, to guarantee to all citizens that there is no abuse, arbitrariness, falsehood, or corruption in the tasks carried out by the police and the Public Prosecutor's Office when they investigate committed criminal acts and collaborate in identifying those responsible. Thus, it has been stated: "The exceptional nature of proceedings aimed at restricting fundamental rights within the criminal process means that their application must not only respect parameters of proportionality and reasonableness but also obliges having jurisdictional control that is reflected – inexorably - in a resolution that clearly sets out the reasons why it is necessary to transgress certain constitutional rights. These requirements must be met in proceedings such as communication interception and raids, and although it is true that in the latter, dispensing with a judge's order is permitted in very exceptional cases, the use of both finds an intrinsic limit in the suitability, necessity, and proportionality of the measure. Respect for these constitutionally required conditions constitutes a brake on the exercise of state power and -correlatively- a guarantee for the accused in the sense that his sphere of privacy, his home, and other fundamental rights will not be violated through illegitimate actions produced in the exercise of abusive power, but rather within a framework of constitutionality reflected in each of the actions that will have as their goal the development of the criminal process in a State of Law. II.- It is precisely because of the importance of the rights that may be harmed, that the formalities preceding actions proper to an investigation cannot be circumvented by the police authorities, nor by the judges who are in charge of examining the legitimacy of the evidence. It must be clear that it is not about the mere eagerness to comply with rituals, but about a constitutional guarantee that comes to life the moment a jurisdictional body reasonably sets out the reasons why it is essential for the purposes of the process to violate fundamental rights whose protection derives from the Political Constitution itself […]". [Telf3], at 8:45 a.m., on February 11, 2005, of the Third Chamber. These agents are certainly authorized to use force, coercive means, and the infringement of certain fundamental rights, with the intervention, in these latter cases, of the judge's authority, necessary to carry out the task of achieving the identification and sanction of those responsible for a crime, but at the same time, the framework in which such force and such infringements must and can be carried out is given. Anything else is abuse, arbitrariness, inadmissible in a State of Law. The presentation card, consequently, of a good investigation is respect for procedures and fundamental rights and guarantees, which allow achieving successful results from the perspective of the State of Law, keeping in mind, of course, that the scientific rigor with which inquiries are conducted (a task that falls to the police, in the first instance, regarding the collection of material evidence, its custody, and transfer to the corresponding Departments), also has an indisputable weight. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, especially in precedent number 5573-96, at 11:06 a.m., on October 18, 1996, established, regarding police-controlled purchases, the following: “[…] Doctrine clearly distinguishes two figures, which are continually related to what is known as experimental crime: the agent provocateur and the undercover agent, but the truth is that not every time an undercover agent participates does provocation exist, that is, the undercover agent does not always determine the investigated subject to commit a crime -which is what the agent provocateur does-, but rather intervenes generally when the crime has been consummated several times or is already being committed. As for experimental crime, it must be pointed out that it is a doctrinal creation applicable -in principle- to any common criminal figure, whose particularity lies in the fact that it is initiated by provocation or instigation by a police officer, a third-party collaborator, or a private individual, in such a way that the iter criminis begins in appearance, but beforehand the provocateur, whether it be the State through the police or its collaborator, or the private individual, has controlled the entire development of the conduct and, even if apparently the author or authors of the act are carrying out the crime according to their plan, the truth is that there is no danger to the legal interest nor possibility of consummating the act, because its development is being controlled precisely to prevent that from happening. It is, then, an "experiment," in which consummation will never occur, nor will there be danger or harm to the protected legal interest. For these reasons, in addition to others that criminal doctrine discusses, such as the fact that in these cases -it is pointed out- there exists, from the point of view of the active subject, an impossible crime, due to a 'mistake of fact' (error de tipo), because there is no intent (dolo) on the part of the instigator, etc., the truth is that this action is not criminal and is therefore not deserving of punishment, as it is nothing more than an experiment without significance for the interests protected by the legal system and that the criminal norm intends to protect. This is, broadly speaking, what the doctrine states in this regard. But it is not for the Chamber to venture into those fields, nor to overly delimit the doctrinal concept of experimental crime, as these are extremes proper to be elucidated by criminal jurisdictional authorities.” In the precedents cited, this Chamber notes that the experimental crime cannot provide the basis for a trial with independent criminal consequences, since, as stated, it is an "experiment." It has also been noted that it can be probative evidence to prove <span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">another fact</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, specifying that in any case it could never be the sole evidence. This last assertion merits clarification. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">The operations carried out by the police are not, in themselves, criminal, as they would be an experimental crime in most cases, or else, situations in which officers or their collaborators act as "undercover agents," passing themselves off as third parties who are present to corroborate that a person is already engaged in a specific criminal activity, which in any case was already occurring or had been consummated prior to this participation of the police agent. Such an operation can yield sufficient indications (indicios) to prove that the person has already committed a criminal act, which is only reinforced—from an evidentiary standpoint—by the experiment. For example, when a police officer buys drugs, that sale in itself is not a crime, because there is no possibility whatsoever of harming the legally protected interest (bien jurídico protegido) safeguarded by the norm. But that purchase can have probative force to prove </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#x2011;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">depending on the circumstances surrounding the specific case-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> that the seller habitually engages in that activity, because the sale itself, even of minimal quantities, indicates that the drugs were possessed for the purpose of commercialization or supply, an action that is also penalized by law. Under those conditions, especially due to the principle of freedom of evidence (principio de libertad probatoria) that governs our system, it will depend on the specific case, and on the assessment of the evidence in light of the rules of sound criticism (reglas de la sana crítica), to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to reach the necessary demonstration of guilt for the act, as constitutionally required in Article 39, with the understanding that this act is not the experiment or the action carried out with the participation of the undercover agent itself, but rather another act that is eventually proven by the evidence obtained from the operation. That judgment is the responsibility of the criminal trial judges (jueces penales de mérito), and its eventual review is the responsibility of the Chamber of Cassation (Sala de Casación), through the assessment of the sufficiency of the judgment's reasoning. The rigorousness that must be observed in this area of "experiments" or simulated operations is because it involves the pre-constitution of evidence against the accused. Therefore, the adjudicator must be demanding in the assessment of this type of operation. The intervention of the judge from the investigative phase, as guarantor of the legality of the evidence, is advisable, but value cannot be denied outright to an undercover operation if this judicial participation does not occur. The truth is that, reiterating what this Chamber and its jurisprudence have stated, the judge's intervention is essential when the intention is to encroach upon or harm fundamental rights, for example, if a raid (allanamiento) is to be carried out; if a telephone interception is necessary; in short, if the operation includes the violation of any fundamental right. In other cases, the judge, when evaluating the evidence obtained from police investigations, must be particularly demanding regarding the existence of indications (indicios) that legitimize the undercover operation, so that it does not serve as a pretext for the authorities to tempt suspects and induce them to commit criminal acts that they perhaps had not planned to carry out, acting as typical agents provocateurs, because that conduct by the police is unconstitutional.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Its mission is not to provoke crimes, but to investigate the criminal acts that are committed and apprehend their presumed perpetrators, without detriment to the preventive function par excellence that corresponds to the administrative police (policía administrativa), which can act as an investigative police (policía de investigación), in collaboration with or in the absence of the intervention of the judicial police (policía judicial). Thus, if within a police operation carried out with undercover agents, the only existing evidence is precisely the experiment or what the undercover agent did, it will be for the criminal judges in the specific case to determine whether that evidence is sufficient to prove the criminal act under investigation, with the understanding </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">that a conviction could never be based on the experimental act</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, which, as stated, does not constitute a crime […]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">”</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> (emphasis supplied). This precedent nuances the assertions that the constitutional body itself had made, in stating that controlled purchases could in no case serve as a basis for a conviction, assertions that had been made in precedents number 0477-94, at 3:26 p.m. on January 25, and 1169-94, at 10:57 a.m. on March 2, both of 1994, because, with sound judgment, it is noted that everything depends on the quality of the investigation and the evidence, and this can only be analyzed in light of each specific case. In reality, it could be that the investigation was based solely on police-controlled purchases, but with a high degree of control and quality, for example, because they were recorded on video, so that there is an independent record beyond just the officer's statement; however, it would also be necessary that frequent surveillance was conducted at the site and recorded, elements that show that, independently of the controlled purchases, the suspect is engaged in the indiscriminate sale of drugs; furthermore, all of this is significantly reinforced when the testimony of the police collaborator is obtained at trial. This last point is relevant, because it must be noted that there is no authorization to dispense, in all cases and under any circumstances, with the declaration of the undercover agent or "collaborator," as prosecutors and police authorities seem to understand it. Of course, depending on the conditions under which the infiltration occurs and the type of crime being investigated (whether it is organized crime or not), it could be that the physical integrity or life of the undercover agent might indeed be in danger. In such a case, the system has designed several options, without it being considered that there is full authorization to not have the undercover agent appear. Article 11 of the aforementioned Ley 8204, in what is relevant, states: "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">In investigations, the police may use collaborators or informants, whose identity must be kept confidential, in order to guarantee their safety. If any of them is present at the time the criminal act is committed, this circumstance shall be reported to the competent judicial authority, without needing to reveal their identity. Unless their testimony is deemed essential at any stage of the proceedings, the court shall order them to appear, and during the identification questioning, they may omit data that could pose a risk to them or their family. Said testimony may be automatically incorporated into the plenary trial (juicio plenario) by reading, except if it is deemed essential to hear it in person. In this case, they shall give their testimony only before the court, the prosecutor, the accused, and their defense counsel; for this purpose, the temporary clearing of the courtroom shall be ordered […]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">". It is clear that this law does not exempt or authorize dispensing with the declaration of the undercover agent or collaborator in all cases. Furthermore, it should be noted that this law predates the recently approved Ley 8720 of March 4, 2009, which regulates, in a special law, the issue of procedural and extra-procedural protection of victims and witnesses, which now fully applies to the protection that could be assigned to the undercover agent to secure their declaration as a witness, who, indeed, if they participated as such, acquires that condition and therefore, their testimony would be relevant and, on occasion, essential. Of course, the evidence for the prosecution, its selection, is a decision of the accusing body, in this case the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) when formulating the accusation, meaning it will be for the prosecutors to weigh the quality and weight of the evidence with which they decide to bring a person to trial. Thus, continuing with the line of analysis being developed, an investigation could be supported by controlled purchases and surveillance. If such police interventions have been recorded independently and carried out in such a way that they are solid, they could eventually serve as the basis for a conviction, because there is greater support than just the statement of the police officers or just the controlled purchases. The call for rigorousness in their assessment, so punctually made by the constitutional jurisprudence, is precisely because it is considered insufficient to convict a person solely on the word of the police officers who acted in police-controlled purchases and who, in this context, have produced evidence against the accused, evidence of which only the police can give an account. Such investigative procedures (diligencias de investigación) are considered valid as such, since the law empowers police investigators to carry out inquiries (pesquisas), nonetheless, by themselves, they barely prove the existence of indications (indicios), but would never be sufficient to convict, if supported solely by police testimony and the evidence supposedly obtained in such approaches or controlled purchases. The weighing of the type of investigation and the elements it yields can only be done in each specific case, bearing in mind that if only police-controlled purchases are available, supported, in turn,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> solely by the account of the officers, this evidence would be insufficient. If these police-controlled purchases, for example, are also supported by video recordings; if constant and reasonably frequent surveillance has been conducted and recorded on video, or at least documented in written records (actas); if, in addition, the trial includes the testimony of the undercover collaborator(s) who made the alleged contacts, and it is established that, independently of those contacts, the suspect carried out an independent activity, then, an investigation of that nature and the elements it provides could have a different weight than one supported only by the word of the officers, as constitutional jurisprudence has rightly noted. These police-controlled purchases are mere acts of investigation and as such, cannot be equated with acts that, as will be analyzed later, must be carried out as jurisdictional advance evidence (anticipos jurisdiccionales de prueba), with judicial oversight. They are mere and simple acts of investigation that, upon meeting the expected requirements (written records, signatures of the participants, record of the prior search of the collaborator, respect for the chain of custody of the evidence, etc.), can be assessed as indications (indicios) and which may even acquire greater strength as long as there are independent means of control for such procedures (videos, written records, testimony from third parties, etc.). Now, from the arguments of the appellant, it would seem to be inferred that she starts from the premise that in any investigation of this nature, it is necessary to carry out a "final operation" (operativo final) that must, consequently, have the participation of the defense. To respond to this argument, it is again necessary to bring up the non-existence of a system of numbered legal evidence (prueba legal tasada) that mandates a final procedure in every drug investigation. Of course, it is clear that an investigation of this nature, although it could be prolonged in time, cannot become an indefinite situation either, so it is expected, according to the rules of experience, that the inquiries (pesquisas) will gradually reach a conclusion, as events unfold and always taking into account that everything depends on the conditions present in each specific case. The scope of that outcome and the implications it may have will define the form provided for in the Constitution</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> and the law to carry it out. Thus, if, to advance an investigation, it becomes necessary to intercept communications or seize private documents, the authorization and control of a judge is </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">necessarily</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> required; also, for example, to enter a suspect's domicile, authorization and direct action by the judge are equally required, as is also the case if it is necessary to seize correspondence or private documentation. The judge who authorizes those acts must make a reasoned analysis of the existence of proven indications that authorize such an infringement of fundamental rights, as well as the necessity, utility</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> and proportionality of the measure in view of the characteristics of the case and the weight of the existing indications, and for this reason, the quality of the investigation that precedes such requests must be carefully weighed by the judge. The law also provides that any act that harms fundamental rights, that is definitive or irreproducible (irreproductible), or when it is necessary to receive a declaration that, given the concurrence of certain qualified elements defined by law, is presumed unlikely to be obtained at trial, the procedure must be carried out according to the rules of what the legislator called jurisdictional advance evidence (anticipo jurisdiccional de prueba), regulated in Article 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). These are three scenarios that can complement each other but are not mutually exclusive. The constitutional jurisprudence cited above explains that in the face of any possible infringement of fundamental rights that may occur through any investigative procedure, the presence and participation of the judge is necessary, and this requirement is inescapable if one seeks to obtain evidence that can be legitimately incorporated into the proceedings and to avoid abusive and arbitrary actions, which can not only ruin an investigation but could eventually even be criminal (e.g., illegal raids, illegitimate interception of communications, etc.).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> It has already been explained that police-controlled purchases are mere investigative procedures and do not require the presence and control of the</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> judge or the defense, as they are mere acts of investigation, which will have evidential value as indications (indicios), if the formal requirements of such police intervention have been met. In this regard, the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera), in precedent number [Telf4], of May 20, 2005, stated: "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">controlled purchases of drugs, made by the police or with the assistance of collaborators, constitute investigative tools that do not require judicial supervision. These are tasks of a properly investigative nature that are the responsibility of the competent bodies (police, Public Prosecutor's Office), do not affect fundamental rights, and are lawful, provided they are carried out meeting certain requirements that guarantee their integrity and legality (e.g., that they do not become an inducement to commit crime, that measures are adopted to ensure the correct handling of what is obtained, among others). Such purchases, like surveillance and monitoring, are part of a method that allows investigative authorities to obtain more and better information that, in effect, criminal activity is taking place and the manner in which it is executed, but, by virtue of the fact that, as stated, they do not affect the fundamental rights of any person and are of an eminently investigative nature, judicial control shall be exercised a posteriori, in the event that criminal proceedings are initiated, and that control shall entail the examination of all police and Public Prosecutor's Office actions, in order to determine if they were lawful</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> […]".</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> The Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José has ruled in the same vein, among others, in precedent number [Telf5], at 3:10 p.m., on October 1, 2010. This position, shared by this Chamber, analyzes police-controlled purchases in their proper dimension, as mere legitimate investigative procedures that allow obtaining quality information about the actual (or not) carrying out of criminal activity and its presumed perpetrator, so that the Public Prosecutor's Office, which supervises police action in its functional direction, can make decisions about the course of the inquiries (pesquisas) and, eventually, the procedures that need to be carried out. Several controlled purchases, carried out legitimately and further accompanied by records and frequent surveillance, give solidity to a reasonable hypothesis of suspicion about one or several specific persons. And this is where the prosecutor's decisions come into play regarding the outcome of the investigation: if, to advance, it is necessary to infringe fundamental rights, it is the Constitution and procedural law that indicate how those actions must be performed; if, having assessed the substance of the indications (indicios) that the police investigation yields, the prosecutor decides that there are sufficient elements to carry out a procedure with greater probative value, the system imposes the obligation on the Public Prosecutor's Office to ensure that procedure, with at least the presence of the defense counsel. Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">From the first moment of criminal prosecution and until the end of the execution of the sentence, the accused shall have the right to legal assistance and defense. For such purposes, they may choose a defense counsel of their confidence, but, if they do not do so, a public defender shall be assigned to them. The right to defense is inalienable. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">The first act of the procedure shall be understood as any judicial or police action that identifies a person as a possible perpetrator of a punishable act or a participant in it </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">[…]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">" (emphasis supplied). In some cases, constitutional jurisprudence itself has considered that the presence of the defense counsel is not even necessary when, for example, the judge was present during the procedures. Thus, in precedent number 1999-6469, at 2:33 p.m. on August 18, 1999, it stated: "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">In the specific case, the appellant argues that their fundamental right to due process (debido proceso) has been seriously affected because in the initial procedures carried out by the police, consisting of the preparation of the elements of conviction to make them incur the crime for which they were later accused, they were not given the opportunity for a public defender to participate representing their interests. In the Chamber's opinion, and insofar as it refers exclusively to safeguarding the appellant's fundamental rights, the participation of the Criminal Judge, who must ensure the effective fulfillment of fundamental guarantees during such actions, is sufficient. In this regard, it should be recalled that one of the main changes brought about by the new Code of Criminal Procedure lies in the nature of the participation of the jurisdictional body, which in the current system serves, among other things, to control that the work of the investigative bodies is carried out in accordance with the rules and principles that oblige respect for human dignity and, in particular, their constitutional rights. Thus, it is sufficient that the competent judge supervised and exercised control over the preliminary actions to which the appellant refers for the requirements of due process at the constitutional level to have been satisfied [….]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">". For its part, the jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber (Sala Penal) has also considered necessary, not only the presence of the judge in the so-called "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">final purchases</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">" (compras finales) that have also been called "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">jurisdictionally controlled purchases</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">" (compras controladas jurisdiccionalmente), especially when they are required beforehand to legitimize the infringement of a fundamental right, for example, the search of a domicile, but has also considered legitimate actions by the Public Prosecutor's Office, prepared to obtain direct evidence from the suspect and proceed immediately to their arrest, when in such procedures, the prosecuting entity has acted with the presence and control of a defense counsel. Thus, for example, in precedent</span><span style="font-family:Arial\"> number [Telf6], at 10:26 a.m. on June 25, 2004, it stated the following: "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">it is necessary to indicate that when a drug sale verification operation is carried out and the use of an undercover agent is chosen,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">all the activity deployed by the police authorities during the investigation must be carefully considered and is regarded as a hypothesis of suspicion that must be confirmed or discarded through evidence obtained independently of it, in order to be able to prove the criminal liability of the person identified as the perpetrator or participant in the drug activity being pursued [...] When, to demonstrate a pre-existing criminal activity, in this case drug activity, the introduction of an undercover agent into the criminal group is chosen as part of the police investigation, it is essential that an independent corroboration of the information obtained by said agent is subsequently carried out, culminating in the obtaining of evidentiary elements obtained under jurisdictional supervision to crown the police thesis of criminal liability as perpetrator or participant […]".</span><span style="font-family:Arial\"> The same thesis was affirmed in resolution number [Telf7], at 8:57 a.m. on June 25, 2004, which considered that </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"they are not sufficient to support a judgment of certainty regarding their effective responsibility for the drug sales activity that was taking place in the dwelling where they lived with two other people, hence the judges are right in affirming that the fact that Officer [Nombre1]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">stated at trial that the accused sold him drugs on one occasion, that being on November 18 (without any additional element corroborating his statement), would not allow it to be proven that the accused was engaging in that activity, as one could not ignore that it was a simple controlled sale carried out by a police officer (acting as an undercover agent) without any type of jurisdictional or prosecutorial supervision or oversight, and no additional elements were gathered to corroborate that she was indeed engaging in that activity. Due to this, no logical defect is observed in the fact that the trial court asserts that Officer [Nombre2]'s testimony, insofar as it describes and affirms that 'experimental' purchase (in reality, it is a controlled purchase), which was supposedly observed by several officers of the Drug Control Police (Policía de Control de Drogas), must be classified as 'a purely investigative act […]'.</span><span style="font-family:Arial\"> The same position is seen in the already-cited precedent number [Telf8], and, furthermore, this criterion was reiterated in resolutions number 2001-00781, of August 20, 2001, [Telf9], at 9:45 a.m. on January 19, [Telf10], at 4:40 p.m. on September 16, both of 2007. This position has had nuances, precisely because our system is not one of numbered legal evidence and because the quality of the evidence and its possibilities for scrutiny must be analyzed in light of each specific case, without ceasing, in any event, to appreciate certain inconsistencies and conflicting criteria in the position of national jurisprudence. Whether or not fundamental rights will be infringed upon in the investigation of drug sale offenses has been a guideline used in some jurisprudential precedents, following the guiding criterion of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in the cited precedent 1999-6469, which is also based on constitutional and legal requirements, to distinguish when such jurisdictional control is necessary in the so-called "final operation" (operativo final). It has been stated that if there will be no infringement of fundamental rights, the presence of the guarantees judge (juez de garantías) is not necessary. In this sense, for example, the precedent [Telf11], at 11:10 a.m. on February 8, 2002, in which the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) stated: "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Now, in order to resolve the disagreement raised, it must be noted that in the final operation carried out in an investigation for drug possession for sale, the assistance and intervention of the judge is only necessary when it is essential to limit people's fundamental rights, as happens in the case of a raid on a dwelling (allanamiento de morada). The sentencing judge correctly reasons when indicating that the presence of a jurisdictional authority was unnecessary, since the illicit business took place in a public place: the sidewalks of the locality (see folios 119 and 120). In the same vein, it is convenient to clarify that the illicit act for which [Nombre3]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> was convicted, he was actually already perpetrating before being captured, since the actions undertaken evidenced the indiscriminate sale activity he conducted to habitual consumers. As this Chamber has established, according to the principle of freedom of evidence, except for the exceptions relating to fundamental rights, the validity of police action cannot be subject to jurisdictional control, especially in cases like the present one, where there was clear and specific coordination with the Public Prosecutor's Office. In this regard, it must be considered that: '... In general terms, in the area of psychotropic substances, the final operation constitutes a police act to verify ongoing criminal activity and, at the same time, is presented as a</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> suitable means of proof (medio de prueba) to support the claim against the accused. However, because the numbering of evidence does not exist in our assessment system, it cannot be required that the 'controlled sale' with the presence of the jurisdictional authority and the use of previously identified [Nombre4], be the only suitable means of proof to support a conviction for drug sales</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> ...'. (See Ruling No.

1.033-98, of 8:45 a.m. on October 30, 1998. In the same vein, the following votes: CED3, of 9:26 a.m. on November 12, 1999, CED4, of 9:20 a.m. on March 31, 2000, CED5, of 10:30 a.m. on February 16, 2001) [….].” Note that it is affirmed, in the same line we have set out in this judgment, that it is not possible to require that in every investigation for the crime of drug sales, it is necessary to carry out a final outcome diligence or final operation that includes the individualization of [Nombre4] and a controlled purchase based on that nature. It has also been stated, a criterion that this Chamber, as already said, shares, that jurisdictional control or control by the defense is not necessary in police-controlled purchases, which are merely investigative acts with orienting and indicative value only, even though, depending on the quality of the records of this intervention, by allowing independent control and sources other than the mere police intervention and narrative or their documents, they may become more robust and even provide the basis for a conviction. However, it should be noted that although the jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber, in this case, has not been consistent, it is noticeable, especially in recent jurisprudence, that control is required (whether by the defense or the judge) when there is going to be an intervention that will produce direct evidence against the accused and their arrest is imminent, in a controlled operation, as happens when already-individualized money is used, either by the judge or the prosecutor, because this act is given a different evidentiary purpose from that of mere police-controlled purchases. That is to say, even when it is accepted that the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) can individualize the money to be used (precedent number [Telf12], of 10:20 a.m., on June 7, 2002, of the Third Chamber), it is clear and patent in the jurisprudential position of the Criminal Chamber and even more so in that of the Constitutional Chamber, that what is important is the control that either the counterparty—the defense, in this case—or the judge of guarantees, can exercise over that activity, due to the expected and produced effects of an intervention of this nature: direct incriminating evidence against the accused, such as the discovery in their possession of the previously individualized money that allows it to be directly linked to the illicit activity that the police, in their investigation, have been able to profile at an indicative level. Consequently, there must be control that this money was individualized prior to its use; that it was delivered to the collaborator or undercover agent beforehand and that the latter was searched; that the collaborator or undercover agent was followed and monitored, then that there was contact and delivery and, subsequently, that apparent drugs were obtained from that contact, in order to proceed with the arrest directed at searching the suspect and verifying if they indeed carry the individualized money, conclusive proof of their contact with the collaborator, in the activity that they supposedly carried out indiscriminately and with individuals other than the collaborators, which legitimizes their immediate arrest. And why is that control necessary? One might think that it is sufficient for the prosecutor to act and supervise everything. In fact, there are jurisprudential criteria in that sense, for example, precedent number [Telf5], of 3:10 p.m., on October 1st previously cited, the Court of Cassation of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which in this regard, held: “Regarding the 'final operation,' that is: the one in which the last controlled drug purchase is made, normally using previously identified money, and where the sellers are arrested and the drugs, money, and any other relevant evidence are seized, this Chamber does not share the thesis of the lower court (tribunal a quo) that, with support in Judgment No. 9-07, issued by the Third Chamber at 9:45 a.m. on January 19, 2007, requires the participation of the judge of guarantees. In reality, that same Chamber has not held a uniform criterion and, thus, in resolutions such as No. 780-01, of August 20, 2001, and No. 414-05, of May 20, 2005, it indicated that controlled purchases do not demand the presence of the criminal judge. In the latter ruling, it was stated: '... controlled drug purchases, made by the police or with the assistance of collaborators, constitute investigative tools that do not need to be supervised by a judge. These are properly investigative tasks that are the responsibility of the competent bodies (police, Public Prosecutor's Office), do not affect fundamental rights, and are lawful, provided they are carried out fulfilling certain requirements that guarantee their purity and legality (e.g., that they do not become a provocation to commit a crime, that measures are adopted to ensure the correct handling of what is obtained, among others). Such purchases, like tailing and surveillance, are part of a method that allows investigative authorities to obtain more and better information that, in effect, a criminal activity is being carried out and the manner in which it is executed, but, by virtue of the fact that, as stated, they do not affect the fundamental rights of any person and are of an eminently investigative nature, the judge's control will be carried out a posteriori, in the hypothesis that a criminal process is initiated, and that control will involve the examination of all police and Public Prosecutor's Office actions, in order to determine if they complied with the law.' This Chamber shares the reasoning expressed in the just-transcribed judgment, because controlled drug purchases (including that of the 'final operation') do not imply an infringement of fundamental rights, and that is the fundamental parameter to which the legislator resorted to require the intervention of the judge of guarantees. Nor is their presence required to arrest a person or seize an object (unless it is necessary to order a search of an inhabited place), and from a logical point of view, there is no reason to distinguish between the last controlled drug purchase and all those that preceded it and to demand the judge's intervention in one and not in the rest, if all of them are legally identical. Ultimately, the fact that the police act without the judge's participation in an act in which they can legally do so (otherwise, the police function would be delegated to the judiciary), is reduced to a problem of subsequent control of the legality of the action and the examination of the evidence according to the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) to establish whether the elements collected through that action possess evidentiary capacity or whether, for some reason, they resulted devoid of it (e.g., due to an erroneous procedure in the chain of custody, because the police authorities could not give a full account of their actions and that they complied with the law). Despite the thesis of the judges that this Chamber does not share, the truth is that the decision on the merits is also based on the reasons examined in the preceding Considerandos (the notorious deficiencies of the accusation and the scarce reliability of the testimonial evidence) and they provide the decision with solid footing […].” For its part, even the Criminal Chamber, which in many rulings has sustained the need for control, does not achieve a constant and clear line in its jurisprudence, going so far as to affirm in some resolutions that even the police themselves can identify money and use it. Thus, in precedent number [Telf12], of 10:20 a.m., on June 7, 2002, an occasion in which it analyzed that this individualization or identification of money is not a definitive and irreproducible act and it is even reasoned that the judicial police themselves can perform it. The scope of this position can also be seen in precedent number 0896-99, of 9:35 a.m. on July 19, 1999, an occasion in which it was expressly indicated: “According to the rules established by the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), there is no obstacle or prohibition for the prosecutor, as the official in charge of the investigation, to identify the [Nombre4] that will be used in the controlled purchase, except for what may be indicated regarding the credibility of that evidence when there are grounds for it. As regulated by numeral 62 of said regulation, '... The Public Prosecutor's Office shall exercise criminal action in the manner established by law and shall carry out the pertinent and useful proceedings to determine the existence of the criminal act. It shall be in charge of the preparatory investigation, under jurisdictional control in the acts that require it ...', from which it is inferred that, as a general rule, the investigation will be in charge of the prosecutor, who has the power to directly and independently carry out the necessary acts for said purposes, unless - as an exception - these require jurisdictional control or are those cases in which the rules of the jurisdictional advance of evidence (anticipo jurisdiccional de prueba) apply. As is understood from the foregoing, the act of identifying [Nombre4] for the purposes of an operation such as the one at hand, legally does not require jurisdictional order or control. In any case, not all the [Nombre4] used in all the controlled purchases were identified by the Prosecutor's Office (only those used on August thirteenth, 1998), because prior to this date it was the Contravention Judge (Juez Contravencional) of [Nombre5] who, acting as judge of guarantees, took care of it (see resolution of 3:25 p.m. on August 11, 1998, folio 4), so the defense's allegations are not receivable. Regarding the absence of a record of the search of the undercover agent, although it is convenient that when said diligence is performed, it be recorded in writing, there is no obstacle for, as occurred here, it to be accredited by other lawful means of proof such as testimonial evidence, because according to the principle of freedom of proof (libertad probatoria) contemplated in article 182 ibid, '... the facts and circumstances of interest for the solution of the case may be proved by any means of proof permitted, except for express prohibition by law[... ]'.” This position was sustained in the first years of the Code of Criminal Procedure's validity, although it has been seen in many subsequent jurisprudential precedents that it has been considered, in a line that can indeed be qualified as constant, and that even varies the recently cited position, that jurisdictional control is required in the final outcome operation, although it must also be admitted that rather than a problem of legitimacy, the scope of the police proceedings and their value is reduced to a problem of probative weight, of sufficiency of elements to convict, the line being constant in the sense that only police-controlled purchases are not sufficient to support a conviction. “Furthermore, even if we were to start from that fact (namely, the intervention of [Nombre6] in the first transactions carried out by the police), from the integral study of the remaining evidence, the existence of the aggravating circumstance is not derived with absolute certainty. In this sense, see that three controlled purchases were made from [Nombre7] on the 16th, 26th, and 28th of June 2001. The first two were carried out by the police and only the last one had jurisdictional control (folios 14 to 17, 18 to 20 and 38 front and back). On this last occasion, it should be added, the person who acted in association with [Nombre7] was the sentenced [Nombre8]. After that transaction, a raid (allanamiento) was carried out both in the dwelling of the young [Nombre9] and in the house of [Nombre7]. In the first property, no evidence of the crime was obtained and the minor [Nombre10] could not even be located (folio 69 front). In the second house, traces of drugs were found (which, it should be noted, [Nombre7] tried to destroy) and the previously identified [Nombre4] were found in the possession of [Nombre8]. Finally, in the vicinity of [Nombre7]'s dwelling, several wrappers containing drugs were located (folios 33 to 35 front, 36 front and back, 37 front, 40 front and back and 69 to 72 front). As can be seen, regarding the intervention of a minor in the illicit activity, the evidence is reduced to two transactions carried out by the police without any jurisdictional control. The police version regarding the existence of the aggravating circumstance, said in other words, was not confirmed through other elements of proof obtained under the supervision of the judge of the preparatory stage or the parties to the process. Even though the proceedings carried out on June 28th made it possible to determine that - just as the police maintained - [Nombre7] was engaged in drug sales, it could not be confirmed that they did so using a minor, since [Nombre10] did not intervene in the transaction and in the raid carried out in this minor's house, no evidence was found linking them to the illicit act [...] Thus, it is undeniable that the Court violated the rules of sound judgment by deriving from the controlled purchases and the results of the raid proceedings carried out the aggravating circumstance contemplated in article 71 subsection c) of Law No. 7786 [...]” Third Chamber, [Telf2], of 11:15 a.m., on December 23, 2005 (highlights are supplied). Note importantly how reference is made to the importance of control by the judge or the parties, of that outcome activity, which produces direct and “confirmatory” proof of the investigations carried out by the police. Several reflections and conclusions can be obtained from all that has been reasoned and the jurisprudence that has been cited: our system is one of free appraisal of evidence (libre apreciación de la prueba) and freedom of proof (libertad probatoria); It is not possible, consequently, to specify that a crime must be investigated in a certain way or must necessarily include a specific proceeding; The Political Constitution and the procedural law establish what the requirements are for the realization of proof or proceedings that affect or harm fundamental rights, formalities that the Public Prosecutor's Office must respect, with no option otherwise; finally, the investigation strategy is defined by the prosecuting body, through the functional direction of the police, and the decisions made in the course of the investigation are its entire responsibility: if it fails in the scope of these, if it does not manage to give solidity to the investigations, or if it carries out proceedings without meeting the legal or constitutional requirements, the validity, weight, and importance of such elements are to be weighed by the judge. In the opinion of this Chamber, in the carrying out, by the Public Prosecutor's Office, of probative activity that may prove decisive, directed against a person of whom there are already solid indications that they are performing a criminal act, who is already individualized throughout an investigation in which sufficient indications have been gathered that this person is committing a crime, adequate control must be guaranteed, which the system already provides for and it is the right to have technical defense, just as article 13 Cpp clearly indicates. In such a way that this is not a simple whim, a concession, or a grace that the Public Prosecutor's Office or the police themselves have in these cases with these characteristics, but rather it concerns the fulfillment of legal requirements. It cannot be stated that in these cases, with the characteristics already noted, the presence of the defense is not necessary, because all the requirements that the law establishes to impose the defender's control are present: the suspect is already individualized, and sufficient indicative elements have been gathered throughout the investigation that point to them as the probable perpetrator of a crime. Therefore, depending on the nature of the case and the action, under the conditions already stated, the presence and control of the defender is always necessary, and even, additionally, that of the judge of guarantees. It is a transcendental decision that, in light of respect for fundamental rights, and the right to defense is one, as well as probative purity, the Public Prosecutor's Office must weigh and act accordingly. Whatever the decision, the elements it provides as support for its accusation must, in any case, be weighed by the judge in light of the legal and constitutional requirements and not for reasons of mere convenience or utility. And it is that even the procedural system, within internal coherence and protected by respect for the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, contemplates how to act in urgent, unforeseen situations, how to proceed in the face of imponderables, so that it reasonably contemplates the authorization to infringe fundamental rights without prior jurisdictional control, to the police and even to any citizen, because the circumstances make such prior authorization unreasonable and impossible: thus, all cases of raid without a judicial order, an assumption even provided for in the Political Constitution – numeral 23 - and developed in the procedural law, article 197 Cpp.; arrest in flagrante delicto, even carried out by any person, with the condition that the detainee is placed at the order of a judge within the nonextendable period of 24 hours -37 of the Political Constitution-. In the case of police officers who catch someone in flagrante delicto, they are not only authorized, but it is their inescapable duty to intervene in their arrest and search them; the registration or search in urgent cases, upon well-founded suspicion, can even be carried out by the judicial police -CED6, including vehicle registration -[Placa1]-, which can even encompass an indeterminate number of people, at a specific time and place, in cases of necessity (escape of suspects in recent and serious events, etc., that justify road closures for criminal pursuit), as analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber. If the judicial police observe a subject selling drugs to individuals, they are authorized for the immediate arrest of that person, for being a flagrant crime, to prepare the respective report for the Public Prosecutor's Office, with the proof they have collected. However, as that observation may prove insufficient to give rise to a process and a conviction, in these cases it is preferable to collect information with greater rigor, which is why such investigations are entrusted to the police, who are created for those tasks. How this investigation is carried out, the quality of the information produced, the control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the decisions made by this body, will be subject to assessment in each specific case by the judge, according to the defined procedural rules. And why is this investigative work and its control sources important, well because, first of all, if it only concerns controlled purchases, no matter how much the officers testify about the presumed contact of the collaborator with the suspect and provide the evidence, how is police provocation ruled out? How is it accredited that, apart from those contacts with the undercover agent, indiscriminate sales to third parties occur, which indeed harm the legal interest protected by the norm? For that, frequent, continuous surveillance must be accompanied, to clearly specify that this activity is carried out independently of the presence and contact controlled by the police. For the analysis of these elements, it is not enough that the police work is deemed honest or the officers' accounts sincere, but rather, additional to their intervention, more elements are required, because the sole investigative intervention of the police and their control of those contacts is not sufficient, even if these actions are backed by records, because the records and the police testimony revolve around the same point: police-controlled purchases. If the records are different and allow independent control, the weight could be different, all of which will always depend on the conditions present in each case.

III- What happened in the specific case: Against the defendant [Nombre11], the judicial police received confidential information that they were engaged in selling crack in the center of the city of Puntarenas, aided by another subject nicknamed [Placa2] and also using the vehicle with license plates [Placa3] [Placa2]. According to that information, this activity is carried out during the day and at night, every day of the week, with an increase on weekends (cf. criminis report, folios 1 and 2). It is said that the drug is hidden in the vehicle, and their name and personal details are already given, it being established that the mentioned vehicle is their property. Under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the judicial police of Puntarenas began the investigation to gather elements that would allow verifying the information received. The strategy outlined, because it emerges from the proceedings, was to carry out controlled purchases with a police “collaborator,” who is nothing more than an undercover agent. The first controlled purchase was carried out solely by officer [Nombre12], on February 12, 2009, in the afternoon, in the company of that collaborator, who has never been identified or brought to court, but who delivered to the investigators what they said they obtained from the suspect, which turned out to be a stone of cocaine base crack (cf. controlled purchase report, folios 10 to 12, record of verification of drug sale, folio 13, and custody of evidence, folios 14 and 15); a second purchase on February 27, in the afternoon, with the participation of officer [Nombre12] and [Nombre13], with “one of our confidential collaborators” (folio 16) from which a record of search, purchase, and custody of the evidence was prepared (folios 16 to 20); third controlled purchase, by the same indicated officers, on March 2, in the afternoon, under the same conditions as the previous ones and at the same place (folios 21 to 25); fourth purchase on March 17, in the morning, specifically at 8:50 a.m., carried out solely by [Nombre13], indicating that the suspect crouched down and unearthed something from the ground, taking out a bottle from which they took what they delivered to the collaborator, which after being analyzed, was verified to be cocaine base crack (folios 26 to 31). That same day, at 9:00 a.m., officer […] positioned themselves “at a strategic point on the north side of the Municipal Market close to the place where suspect [Nombre11] was located” (folio 32) and conducted surveillance “to observe the flow of people who would approach the suspect.” He documented that within a 30-minute period, four people approached, whom he identified by nicknames and claims are recognized addicts in the area, who conduct brief exchanges with the suspect. At folio 36 and at 3:00 p.m. on March 23, 2010, there appears a money identification record, executed by prosecutor [Nombre14] at the Puntarenas Assistant Prosecutor's Office, identifying two [Nombre4] of one thousand colones, series D94364544 and D98920165, and it is recorded that they are identified “for the purpose of an anti-drug police operation (sic) that the judicial police and the Public Prosecutor's Office will carry out today [...] The identified money will remain in the custody of the undersigned Assistant Prosecutor, to later deliver it to the Confidential Collaborator who will attempt to confirm another sale of a drug of unauthorized use, in accordance with Article 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and rulings 2002-525 of the Third Chamber, rulings 2005-586 and 2006-966 of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José [...]”. At the back of folio 37, there is a received stamp on the photocopies of the identified [Nombre4], dated March 23, 3:00 p.m. Documentarily, immediately following this act of identification of [Nombre4], there appears a report outlining that on the morning of March 25, 2010 (no longer March 23 as recorded when the [Nombre4] were identified), prosecutor [Nombre15], traveled with officer [Nombre13] and the “collaborator” to carry out a controlled purchase from the suspect, which was affirmed to have taken place at 10:20 a.m., in the vicinity of Hotel El Río, where, after the search and delivery of money, the purchase of a rock of what turned out to be crack cocaine base was made. Then, on the same date, March 25 (and not March 23 as the day recorded when the money was identified), at 11:00 a.m., the following record appears at folio 39: “At eleven o'clock on the twenty-fifth of March, 2010, the undersigned prosecutor makes a record that the public defense was called (sic) requesting the public defender on duty [Nombre16] (sic), furthermore, her cellular phone (sic) was called on three occasions, the line ringing and not being answered, furthermore a beeper was sent via radio messages, the location (sic) of the defense being unsuccessful, given that this is a case of drug sale on public roads with urgency and that a controlled purchase was recently carried out (sic), the suspect's location being suitable (sic) for the final operation, we proceed to carry out the operation without public defense (sic). That is all. [Nombre17]. Narcotics Prosecutor [...].” Immediately following appear the following documents: record of the collaborator's search, at 11:03 a.m.; record of money delivery, 11:05 a.m.; record at 11:08 a.m., of the collaborator's surveillance; record at 11:30 a.m., of the suspect's search; record of vehicle registration at 11:58 a.m. and the records of seizure of the evidence, from folios 40 to 49). We have that four investigative proceedings of controlled drug purchases were carried out, with the participation of an undercover agent or unidentified collaborator and a single surveillance at the site where the defendant was being investigated for the illicit activity. A fifth purchase of the same nature, with the participation of the prosecutor, as one more investigator, was carried out at 10:20 a.m. on March 25, without there being records of a search, delivery of money, and surveillance of the collaborator, a proceeding carried out by prosecutor [Nombre15] in the company of officer [Nombre12]. All of those are controlled purchases at an evidentiary, police level and allowed them to gather reasonable and well-founded suspicions that the accused was engaged in the sale of drugs; his modus operandi was delineated in the investigation and, reasonably, those elements of investigation allowed them to support a probability of [Nombre11]'s participation in a crime. With this framework of elements, the prosecutor decided to conduct a controlled purchase with identified money, in order to then proceed to the suspect's arrest and his search. This Chamber considers that this decision by the prosecutor was made knowing that he already had reasonable elements to point to [Nombre11] as being responsible for selling crack cocaine base, reasonable elements that the police investigation had allowed to be gathered and that he himself, acting with the officers, verified. Thus, this decision cannot be taken without guaranteeing that person the control of the technical defense to which he is entitled. This Chamber estimates that, under those conditions, the prosecutor was not authorized to attempt to carry out the operation without the assistance of the public defense and, contrary to the Court's affirmations, which will be referred to later, it cannot be left to the discretion of the Public Prosecutor's Office when and how it carries out operations with or without public defense, because that obligation is imposed by law. The timing and manner of carrying out the proceeding is something that the police and the Public Prosecutor's Office indisputably plan. There are, of course, involved in an operation of this nature, many aspects of logistics, security, and planning, which are the exclusive domain of the police under the prosecutor's direction. But just as those aspects are coordinated, it must be clear that public defense must be included in that planning, even if no further details are reported so as not to risk its outcome. And it is emphasized that it is the public defense, because this proceeding is about to be carried out to culminate an investigation. That proceeding aims to gather more evidentiary elements that will allow the Public Prosecutor's Office to potentially support an accusation against the accused, who is intended to be arrested at the end of that operation, so it is obvious that, under those conditions, such an operation must be conducted while respecting the right of the investigated person, already a suspect of a crime, to have a defense attorney. And it is the public defense, a service paid for by the State, because it would be absurd to notify him in advance of the execution of the operation and its possible outcome, so that he could appoint a trusted attorney. The public defense is called upon to serve as a technical advisor to that investigated person and to guarantee, as a qualified observer, the manner in which events unfold and to formulate objections and make claims deemed pertinent to safeguard that investigated person's rights. They are not there for decoration, nor do they attend “in defense of anyone” as the Court surprisingly states, but rather they are a professional paid by the State and assigned the mission of defending that investigated person's rights in the proceeding to be carried out. And, even if it is uncomfortable and not to the liking of some, it is the option that our democratic system chose and that the legislature designed for cases where a police or judicial proceeding is to be carried out against a person regarding whom there already exist sufficient and reasonable indications that they committed or are committing a crime, and so indicates Article 13 of the CPP, which is, of course, not an invention, but a normative provision of the highest guarantee level that neither hinders, nor obstructs, nor complicates, nor ruins police investigative activity, nor implies an inadmissible advantage for the investigated person, nor means that information leaks or that proceedings are frustrated; that is, it does not imply any risk nor generate any alteration for the success of that proceeding, action, or investigation. It does not imply paralyzing procedures, nor alerting the suspect, nor hindering the work, that is, there is no reasonable, plausible justification, from a reading of the right to defense and the purity of evidence, for not complying with the legal requirements in these cases, which mean exercising, with equality of arms, a control, a counterbalance, regarding the procedural possibilities for investigating the truth, and if the investigation is solid, if the procedures have no flaws, defects, or illegalities, no prosecutor, no police officer should fear any risk, ensuring that their definitive or evidentiary activity against a person already individualized and about to be arrested is supervised and monitored by the public defense, because furthermore, procedural law so demands. Urgent, imminent, and pressing cases do not require functional direction, nor a prosecutor, nor a defender; this is clear to all of us, and the system has already provided for those contingencies and the validity of actions thus carried out. The system has also granted the police, especially the judicial police, important investigative powers and authorizes them to validly carry out a great number of proceedings (numbers 67 to 69, 283 to 268, all from the CPP), for which they do not require control of the defense; securing the scene of the incident; lifting fingerprints, signs, and evidence; surveillance proceedings, tailing, controlled purchases; interviews with people who may know information; searching for data in public databases that guide the investigations; searches, arrests, registrations in certain scenarios; in short, a great number of proceedings that only the investigator and their training, together with the direction and guidance of the prosecutor, can establish and must do, document, and carry forward their task; no one doubts this. However, and contrary to the position held by the Trial Court in this case, there is no justification whatsoever that supports the prosecutor's office's decision to carry out that operation in the manner it did, without participation of the defense, who did not appear not out of negligence or irresponsibility, as is stated without any justification in the ruling, but rather because of the hasty and thoughtless manner in which the prosecutor's office decided to act, for which it is indeed attributable to the Public Prosecutor's Office that those proceedings conducted in this case, due to the particularities already established, are illegitimate and must be declared so. There was no urgency that led the prosecutor to act in the manner he did. The entire investigation carried out allowed establishing that the defendant, apparently, carried out his allegedly criminal activity every day, at all hours, in public places in Puntarenas. The police-controlled purchases were spaced out over time and allowed establishing that circumstance. It should even be noted that the accused was arrested inside his vehicle, while consuming marijuana in the company of a woman, who was momentarily detained at the site (cf. record at folio 44), so there was neither a risk of flight, alerting of the suspect, nor any other element that justified urgent or hasty action, as occurred in this matter. On the contrary, evidence was received indicating that on that day it had been decided to suspend the operation because the defendant presumably noticed the police presence. Thus, at trial, the testimony of public defender [Nombre18] was received, the content of which is not even mentioned in the judgment, so it is not possible to understand how it is concluded that it was due to her negligence that she did not attend the operation, unless the Court, without expressly saying so, adopted the opinion voiced by officer [Nombre12] (DVD, record at 9:31:20 hours, September 2, 2010), which equally lacks support, as will be analyzed later. On the contrary, from listening to the defender's testimony, starting from the recording on the DVD at 10:22:04 hours, on August 20, 2010, it is recorded how this professional narrated that from 9 o'clock in the morning of that day, March 25, having been informed of an operation, she accompanied the prosecutor, officer [Nombre12], and the collaborator, in a vehicle heading to make the final controlled purchase. She observed the identification record of [Nombre4] and verified their numbers. She affirmed that they made several detours, as apparently the suspect —whose identity she was unaware of— was not in his usual position and suspected the police presence. On one of those turns, they came face-to-face with the individual under investigation, and, suspecting that he may have seen them, they left the site and then finally communicated by radio that they would suspend the proceeding, whereupon all these people moved to the Courts building, were talking about the alternatives, and finally, they told her to return to her office and they would be in touch. Even officer [Nombre12] affirmed this, as he said they decided to wait a couple of hours (recording on DVD, from 9:28:09 hours onwards). She warned that she was going to file a document at the Family Court and would be in her office. The return of all the people occurred around ten-thirty that morning; she took five minutes to go to the Court and waited in her office, where she was fully locatable, in addition to it being an office located in the same building as the prosecutor's office and the judicial police. The defender explained that she went to the bathroom and therefore left her beeper in the office, to avoid dropping it, and immediately spoke with her boss, always being in the defense offices, where the auxiliary staff already knew of her presence there and where there are office telephone numbers that the Prosecutor's Office and the judicial police officers know and constantly use as a means of contact. When she is notified that they are looking for her, she called officer [Nombre12] and they told her he was not there; she called the prosecutor's cell phone and he tells her he cannot attend to her, and several minutes later she learns that the operation was carried out because she did not appear. She explained that she was always in the Public Defense offices and even if it had been the case that she was not there or was in other duties, there is always a roster and any other defender would be obligated to attend the proceeding, because, she literally said, the public defense service cannot be left uncovered. She indicated that the beeper is the means of communication assigned to them, when they are available, to be located after 4:30 in the afternoon or when attending a proceeding, she must carry it, in case they require her in another. She clarified that the prosecutor's office, the judicial police, and the Criminal Court know the defense's work method and have always coordinated with them. This witness was sincere and clear; she even acknowledged that days earlier, an attempt had been made to carry out the operation without being able to, the reasons being unknown to her, which is not even documented in the case file. Furthermore, she affirmed she could not say, when she later attended the initial statement, whether the accused was an addict or not, because that would be assuming it. And she clearly acknowledged that defense personnel always attend this type of operation, which are constantly carried out, to ensure the legality of the procedures and the rights of those investigated. So, in the first place, there is no justification for the prosecutor deciding to leave without going to the defense offices or coordinating by telephone at the office, if minutes before they were together and the defender collaborated and accompanied them for a long time; nor are these distant or remote sites or sites with difficult communication; therefore, the urgency and haste with which the prosecutor decides to leave, just minutes after they had separated from the defender, is unacceptable, and that urgency cannot arise from the prosecutor's mere will and make the immediate presence and availability of a defender, whether the duty defender or any other, depend on that hasty decision. If it was indeed urgent, this has not been proven at all, and there is also no evidence indicating what changed from those previous minutes to the moment when it was decided to act without being able to notify and locate the defender. Officer [Nombre12] acknowledges that around 9 o'clock in the morning, the operation had been coordinated; they went with the defender, but had to withdraw because they apparently alerted to the police presence, so they returned to the courts and decided to wait a couple of hours. However, according to the records, already by ten-thirty in the morning, he was in the company of the prosecutor conducting a controlled purchase, which, he said, occurred right in front of them. He asserts that for that reason they decided to carry out the final operation and returned to the Courts, trying by all means to locate the defender and “she did not appear,” whereupon the prosecutor, sitting in his offices, decided to carry it out without the defense. That is, being in the same building, being able to go to the public defense offices, call the official phones, it was not done, and therefore this officer felt they could not wait to carry out such an important operation just because a person irresponsibly disappeared (recording from 9:30:30 onwards). However, there is no evidence that it was an urgent action, because even the same officer acknowledged that they were watching the subject who was there calmly, as always, so that conduct is not reasonable, just as there is no evidence that the defender irresponsibly disregarded the case to frustrate the execution of the operation. Note that there are important elements that lead to qualifying the prosecutor's decision as hasty and arbitrary: the identification record for the [Nombre4] was made two days before the operation, because it was said that it was on that date, March 23, that they were going to be used. However, two days pass, without it being documentarily justified what happened, and suddenly that same prosecutor appears, in the morning hours of March 25, acting in the company of a police officer and the collaborator, personally carrying out the control of a purchase, which has no particularity that distinguishes it from all the previous ones, all of this already carried out without the presence of the defender, with whom they had tried to carry out the same proceeding minutes earlier. Twenty minutes later, he decides to make a purchase, with the [Nombre4] that he had individualized two days before and that were not used on the established day; he records that at that moment he made some unanswered calls to the “duty” defense and makes the “urgent” decision to carry out the culminating operation, without specifying that minutes earlier they had tried to carry it out in the company of the defender and that they had decided to suspend the proceeding. None of these considerations, nor the content of the defender's testimony, was analyzed in the judgment, so the Court's conclusions are openly unfounded. The prosecutor went to the site without coordinating again with the defense, decides to do the operation, and simply sends messages to the beeper; since they are not answered and he does not locate the defender by that means, he records a note and moves forward, when, from the statement of [Nombre12], it is inferred that, according to his account, they returned to the Office to “coordinate” with the defense and were in the same building. This Chamber, from the review of the case file, from listening to the judgment, and from observing the documentary evidence and the trial, finds no basis to affirm, as the Court does, that it was the negligence of the public defense of the city of Puntarenas that was responsible for the operation being carried out without the participation of the defense. Nor does it have any element indicating that the defender knew of the imminence of the operation and that she deliberately or negligently divested herself of her means of communication or was not locatable, so as not to attend the proceeding, as the Court suggests, and that these were the only reasonably available means of communication. These are very serious affirmations, which lack support. On the contrary, the records in the process allow us to appreciate that the prosecutor acted hastily, made rushed decisions without any justification, and precisely because of the way he acted, he nullified the control of the public defense over his actions. If the operation was urgent, why did he individualize money two days before, to use it on a different date than the one that finally resulted? Why did the prosecutor decide to have a prior approach with the suspect and then cannot return and coordinate the outcome and the evidence to be produced with the public defense, if hours before and even minutes before, he was with the public defender and decided to suspend the operation? The Trial Court is correct when it points out that it cannot be left to the judgment of the defense when and how the operation is done, as well as that the police had no way of foreseeing that the prosecutor would carry forward the culmination of his investigations in that manner. Indeed, it is an obligation of the public defense, according to legal provisions, regulations, and the directives issued in that regard that govern its work, to have staff available for carrying out this type of proceeding and operation. If a public defense professional, with due information and coordination, fails to appear without any justification, it is necessary to establish whether it is necessary to assign responsibilities at a disciplinary and other level; the same applies if they give information to the suspects or impede the proceeding in any way, all of which are serious conducts, for which there is no basis to affirm were present in this case, such that in the same way the Court defends the honesty of the police and the credibility of their accounts, it should have proceeded with respect to the public defender and the Public Defense of the locality of Puntarenas, because it makes affirmations without any support, since, if it had such support, it should have proceeded to file the corresponding complaints and not simply discredit a professional and a service, without basis. The Court forgot to consider that the Public Prosecutor's Office also cannot make use of a non-existent urgency and nullify the participation of the defense in a proceeding of this nature, which the trial body itself recognizes has a validity “different” from a proceeding carried out with jurisdictional or public defense control. In the case of people who were together minutes before, who work in the same building and can communicate more fluidly by internal telephone and even personally, the prosecutor's decision appears completely unjustified. In the opinion of this Chamber it is clear that although the Prosecutor is in charge of the investigations, the functional direction over the police, and the duty to act with objectivity, it is also true that he acts in the process as a party, especially in a process that has come to be called of “markedly accusatory” traits, so his action is as a party and therefore, when in the development of his activity he is going to affect fundamental rights, he must necessarily obtain the authorization and intervention of the judge and, when he is going to carry out evidentiary acts that are not urgent, in which he expects to obtain direct evidence on a suspect, whom he already has individualized and against whom he already has reasonable and plausible indications that he commits or is committing a crime, he must do so as required by law, with the control of, at least, the defender, because so indicates the final paragraph of Article 13 of the already-cited CPP, as imposed by respect for due process, the right to defense, procedural balance, litigation in good faith, and the principle of loyalty. If a decision is made not to have such control, the weight of the proceedings thus carried out weakens and loses effectiveness. Note that we are not talking about that control in police purchases, whose scope and weight have been clearly defined here. We are talking about the accuser's decision to carry out specific, planned proceedings, trying to gather further evidentiary elements and that refer to a person whom the police investigations already allow profiling very clearly as a suspect, with information gathered in those investigations that already allows appreciating a certain regularity and gravity of the indications (several controlled purchases, tailing, and surveillance that allow establishing what type of activity, where and how it is carried out, and what type of substance is being sold, etc.). And this is the most important aspect that must be analyzed in light of the claims in this concrete case. Although we have cited and commented on jurisprudential precedents that indicate that the presence of the judge is not necessary when an evidentiary activity is to be carried out with individualized money or any other object that is not going to affect fundamental rights, the truth is that in this concrete case, this Chamber considers that the Public Prosecutor's Office had no justification for not coordinating the presence of a public defender, who would act as a qualified observer and guarantor of the right to defense of the investigated person in that act with probative force that they intended to carry out. From the result of that proceeding, it is expected to obtain determining evidence for the immediate arrest of the suspect.

And we agree with the jurisprudential position that indicates that, in cases such as the present one, in which there is a police investigative effort, prolonged in time, of a certain quality, that has been verified over a period of time, making it possible to locate places and the modus operandi of the person under investigation, without any urgency whatsoever, the Public Prosecutor’s Office’s decision to carry out a culminating operation, with evidentiary character, should have considered the presence of a defense attorney, since there was no justification for not doing so and, under those conditions, the law so prescribes. Its decision led to the identification of [Nombre4] to be used by an undercover agent, who did not testify at trial; to that transaction being supervised only by the prosecutor and the police, without this representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office testifying as a witness at trial, because he acted as the accuser, giving his blessing to evidence that he himself produced and controlled, which is not consistent with the system of checks and balances that underlies the criminal process designed by our legislator (on this matter, see precedent number 965-2004 of 9:50 a.m. on August 13, 2004, of the Third Chamber). This culminating operation, which only the decision of the Public Prosecutor’s Office determines whether or not it will be carried out, this Chamber does consider that, in order to differentiate it from any of the police-controlled purchases, it must be an act subject to control, to exercise a counterbalance, with the necessary participation of the defense and even of the judge, in cases in which fundamental rights will also be affected. This Chamber is aware of the position held by the Third Chamber in which it indicates that in these operations, judicial control is indispensable, a position that can even be considered more protective of guarantees, although it has had its nuances, especially when, as has been seen, the operation is carried out on public roads and fundamental rights are not going to be affected. That position of the Chamber was outlined in precedent number [Telf8] of 9:30 a.m., on April 7, 2006, an opportunity in which, regarding what is of interest, it stated: “[…] In the case examined, as the applicant claims, judicial control was omitted, without any justification, in a transcendent phase within the investigative operation deployed, which was to verify the effective illicit activity attributed to the accused, referring to the sale of drugs, which would be done, according to the investigative strategy, through a judicially controlled purchase, in which an undercover agent would acquire from the accused a certain quantity of drugs. However, this judicial control, as the appellant claims, did not occur in this case, without there being any determining element that prevented it, so that no difference is observed between the purchases controlled by the police under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor’s Office on February 19, March 5, and March 29, all in 2005 (preliminary evidentiary acts), and the purchase made on the following April 18, at 8:25 p.m., next to the ‘Burger King’ commercial establishment in Tamarindo, jurisdiction of Santa Cruz de Guanacaste, which came to constitute the final operation, resulting in the arrest of the accused and the search carried out in his home, located at a considerable distance from the place where the drug was acquired. And this undifferentiated situation is motivated by the fact that this last transaction, like the previous ones, was controlled entirely by the Drug Control Police, under the functional direction of the accusing body, with the police agents being the actors who, as they indicated at trial (see pages 379 to 386) and was accredited through the documentary evidence provided to the process, were the only ones who witnessed the sale of drugs that the accused made to the undercover agent [Nombre19], and it is the prosecutorial representative who receives from the police officer the wrapper with marijuana (see page 147), and also searches the accused (see page 148) […] This safeguarding task, contrary to what the Trial Court stated in the judgment (see pages 388, 389, and 394), incurring a partial and erroneous reading of the jurisprudential precedents of this Chamber (votes 822-04, 1132-04, and 198-05), was not exhausted with the judicial participation in the identification and delivery to the undercover agent of the [Nombre4] used in the final purchase (see pages 144 to 146), nor with his presence during the search carried out (see pages 151 to 155), as much as his control was required in the acts before and after the operation: that the undercover agent did not interact with other persons before contacting the accused as the seller, thereby guaranteeing that he did not acquire drugs from a third party; the seizure from the accused of the identified [Nombre4] with which the purchase was made, which was executed in this case by the representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, who ultimately, together with the Drug Control Police, were in charge of directing and controlling the purchase operation, replacing the Criminal Judge of the Preparatory Procedure, who was in another place, in order to carry out the search ordered in the accused’s home, and who comes into contact with the latter and with the evidence collected at the site of the purchase, forty-five minutes after his arrest by the police officers and the prosecutor, who told the Judge at that moment that upon being arrested, [Nombre20], ‘[Nombre21] voluntarily’, handed over the previously identified [Nombre4] when invited to show his belongings before proceeding to his search, noting the absence of the participation of any public defender’s representative, who was not only not present to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the accused, who was already fully identified by the time of the final operation, but was also not summoned or invited to witness the actions carried out, aggravated by the absence of the judicial body. It should be noted, on this subject, that although it is true that the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that the absence of the defender in the initial investigative proceedings and in the preliminary acts that will lead to the individualization of the accused does not violate due process and the right to defense, this holds true, as long as there is sufficient participation and control on the part of the guarantees judge (among others, see vote number 6469-99, of 2:33 p.m. on September 18, 1999. Constitutional Chamber). Based on the foregoing considerations, in this particular case, having examined the actions of the police, under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which had as its culmination the arrest of the accused and the seizure of some evidence, they become unsuitable to prove the accused illicit conduct (that the accused [Nombre20] indeed was engaged in the illicit trade of drugs, discounting that his actions were provoked by the police), and the following are also insufficient as evidentiary elements that provide effective support to the conviction handed down: the surveillances carried out previously and the corresponding purchases controlled by police agents; the evidence collected therein; the testimonies of the police officers who participated in the operation, including that of the undercover officer, who recounted before the Judges the mechanics of the police investigative acts carried out, evidentiary elements that are effective to support the notitia criminis that allowed requesting the opening of trial and the search carried out in the accused’s home, which yielded a miniscule amount of seized drugs (half a cigarette and a ‘tocola’ of marijuana), but not to prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, the hypothesis of the accusation, retaining only an indicative character, insofar as the unjustified lack of judicial control fostered a clear evidentiary imbalance to the detriment of the accused’s interests. […] As this Chamber has held on other occasions in accordance with constitutional jurisprudence: ‘...although police activities of controlled purchases of drugs constitute a useful investigative mechanism to support the “notitia criminis” received and legitimize subsequent actions that may affect fundamental rights (e.g.: the search of a private premises), by themselves they are not sufficient to overcome the accused’s state of innocence, arriving at the necessary certainty of the commission of the crime. It is necessary, then, that such types of investigative tools are supported by other evidentiary elements that corroborate them beyond all doubt. (In this regard, see the resolutions of this Chamber: No. 270-02 of 3:55 p.m. on March 21, No. 1086-02 of 11:10 a.m. on October 25, and No. 1293-02 of 9:36 a.m. on December 20, 2002; all from the year 2002; as well as No. 78-04 of 9:10 a.m. on February 13, 2004). It is not about pointing out the need for “legal” or “prescribed” evidence, but about specifying the evidentiary scope that can reasonably be recognized to certain investigative acts within the framework of a democratic state of law that grants individual liberty and the principle of innocence a primary and fundamental value...’ (cf. vote number 822-04, of 10:02 a.m. on July 9, 2004. Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice) […]”. Even if this position could be considered even more reasonable, at least, as far as this case is concerned, it is clear that the defense had to be present and that this proceeding could not be carried out without guaranteeing the right to technical defense. The evidence gathered by the prosecutor in this case, in open disrespect for the right to defense, is illegitimate, and the purchase that preceded it, although carried out by the prosecutor, is nothing more than a controlled purchase like those carried out by the police, with the added difficulty that there are no records of prior search, nor of surveillance, nor of delivery of money, and the prosecutor who acted did not testify as a witness, nor was he offered as evidence, since he is the same one who filed the accusation and attended the trial. In the opinion of this Tribunal, this proceeding, due to the characteristics present in this case, cannot be controlled by the prosecutor, nor can it be considered that his presence is a guarantee, because he gathers incriminating evidence against a person already identified as a suspect of a crime, thanks to prior investigations, so the right to defense must be guaranteed, as a counterbalance and guarantee of respect for that fundamental right. Although from the considerations set forth in the cited jurisprudential precedent, the consideration seems to emerge that in a final controlled purchase (culmination of the investigation), judicial control is always required, and bearing in mind that some Courts of Cassation, including this same Chamber, for example, in precedents number 2008-453, of 10:20 a.m., on September 26, and CED7, of 10:00 a.m., on November 14, both of 2008, have considered that such a requirement does not derive from the law and is only demandable when the culminating operation intends the infringement of a fundamental right, for example when the activity takes place in a dwelling and entry is necessary for its search, the truth is that, to assess its probative weight, this Chamber considers that, when not in urgency situations, the control and participation of, at least, a public defender is demandable, as a controller of the manner in which such a proceeding was carried out, so that it could serve as a counterbalance for the weighing of those elements, already within the process itself. If this participation does not occur and there is no plausible justification for it, the proceeding carried out in such a manner would not differ from a police-controlled purchase, despite the fact that, due to the infringement of the defense guarantee, given the conditions in which it was acted, the evidence obtained from said intervention cannot be validly used in the process. To do otherwise, that is, to recognize that a proceeding under those conditions “has lesser validity,” as the Trial Court affirms, but to accommodate and give value to the evidence obtained, is simply to circumvent the right to defense and the legal and constitutional norms that give it meaning. In reality, in the opinion of this Chamber, it cannot be pointed out that a final proceeding must be carried out in one way or another, and furthermore, it also cannot be affirmed that it is necessary to carry it out in every case, however, the fact is that the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), which is a normative body of public order, is what indicates the way in which certain acts must be carried out and has express sanctions when the right to defense is infringed –paragraph 178 subsection a) Cpp.– and therefore, it is the judge’s responsibility to verify compliance with the substantial requirements prescribed for certain acts, according to their nature. If the investigative strategy of the Public Prosecutor’s Office establishes carrying out that culminating operation in a certain way, it will be for the judges to assess the legality and scope of what was done and of the evidence gathered, as well as the probative weight that should be assigned to them. It is very important to mention, therefore, that this Chamber does not share the assessment and reasoning made by the Trial Court to consider the search and inspection of the vehicle valid in this case. The judges dismissed the defense’s allegations, making an individual, isolated, and fragmented analysis of each of those proceedings, as if they were not interwoven with a prior intervention, fully coordinated and controlled for the purpose of obtaining evidence and detaining the suspect, all of it carried out without the participation of the defense. The Trial Court thus referred to the police’s ability to carry out searches, without a prosecutor’s or judge’s order, and cites paragraph 189 Cpp., which, it argues, occurred in this case, so the presence of the defender was not necessary; similarly, it analyzes the vehicle search and again cited the Cpp, article 190, to indicate that the police do not need an order from a judge or prosecutor to search vehicles; finally, it again insisted that even if there were no search records of the collaborator in the first purchase that day of March 25, nor surveillance records, such acts, which the record should prove, can be accredited by other means, in support of which it cites paragraph 136 Cpp. All of these police powers have already been analyzed and are valid, when dealing with urgent, necessary, and indispensable situations, for which the police are empowered to act and do not need any order. But it turns out that the Trial Court overlooked that this search, that vehicle inspection, and that arrest, did not result from an urgent, novel, flagrant situation, but from a completely controlled, anticipated, and planned operation, where each step was previously established, in order to proceed to the arrest of the accused and obtain from him evidence prepared for that purpose. Therefore, an isolated analysis, disconnected from what really happened in this case, cannot be made, because that is a valid reasoning (in theory, in the abstract) but inapplicable to the case under analysis. Despite the knowledge of the norms that the Trial Court demonstrates, the same does not happen with Article 13 Cpp, a norm whose analysis and weighting is notably absent, as well as its validity for this specific case, a paragraph that is not mentioned in the entire judgment, nor is it taken into account in any way by the Trial Court, a norm which, therefore, appears completely diminished and unobserved. Furthermore, some statements made in the judgment powerfully attract this Chamber’s attention, not knowing what they respond to or what ideas lie behind them, for example, when it was affirmed, at the time record of 2:14:30 p.m.: “The Tribunal does not judge urban legends, does not judge people’s stories, it judges facts that are brought to the attention of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and judges them through evidence, not through, I repeat, urban legends that are presented by other persons (…)”; similarly, it is surprising the way in which the issue of the difference observed in the forensic report regarding the quantity of drugs (24 or 4 packages) is resolved when referring to the evidence obtained in the culminating or final operation, because even though it is not questioned and one might think it is, in effect, a material error, the Tribunal’s statement is surprising (time record 2:14:10) insofar as it concludes that regardless of whether the quantity did not correspond, “the truth and what is important is that it contained drugs and that is what is important, regardless of the quantity (…)”, when what was expected was to ponder what weight those circumstances could have on the respect for the chain of custody, for example, of the evidence, which is an integral part of due process, so it is not so certain that one can reason “regardless” of the quantities and weights not coinciding, as long as it is drugs, that is what matters. The Trial Court’s reasoning, although clearly and forcefully set forth, is contradictory, because it analyzes that the so-called final operation in this case, lacking judicial control or defense control, is different, has a different value, but then, when weighing its validity, as the defense attorney rightly claims, it ends up reaffirming the entire action; despite the fact that the basis of its analysis is precisely that for carrying out that operation, there was already a reasonable indication, a suspicion grounded in the entire investigation, that [Nombre22] was committing a crime, and although it insists on this idea emphatically, it never manages to link the importance, under these present conditions, for respect of the right to defense, as enshrined in Article 13 Cpp so many times mentioned by this Chamber, and its link to articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and precisely all those elements on which the Trial Court insists, which are present in this case—a prior investigation that allowed outlining and establishing the grounded and reasonable suspicion of being before a perpetrator of a crime and the need to verify it with greater force for his immediate arrest—are precisely the grounds for the right to defense to enter the scene, a detail of such weight that the Trial Court ignored. Hence, the defense’s claims must be upheld.

Because the evidence was gathered in disregard of the fundamental right of defense and, therefore, in violation of due process, the seizure records on folios 40, 43, and 45, the record of delivery of money to the collaborator on folio 41, the seizure records (actas de secuestro) on folios 46, 47, and 48, the search and seizure (registro y secuestro) record carried out on the vehicle on folio 49, as well as the results of the analysis of the evidence obtained in that operation, are declared ineffective.” The cover letter, consequently, of a good investigation is respect for the procedures and for fundamental rights and guarantees, which allow successful results to be achieved from the perspective of the Rule of Law, bearing in mind, of course, that the scientific rigor with which the inquiries are conducted (a task that corresponds to the police, in the first instance, in terms of gathering material evidence, its custody, and transfer to the corresponding Departments), also has an undeniable weight. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, especially in precedent number 5573-96, of 11:06 a.m., on October 18, 1996, established, regarding police-controlled purchases, the following: “[…] <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">The doctrine clearly distinguishes two figures, which are continually related to what is known as experimental crime: the agent provocateur and the undercover agent, but the truth is that not every time an undercover agent participates does provocation exist, that is,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> the undercover agent does not always determine the investigated subject to commit a crime—which is what the agent provocateur does—but rather generally intervenes when the crime has already been committed several times or is already being committed. Regarding experimental crime, it must be noted that it is a doctrinal creation applicable—in principle—to any common criminal figure, the particularity of which lies in the fact that it begins through the provocation or instigation of a police officer, a third-party collaborator thereof, or a private subject, in such a way that the iter criminis begins in appearance, but beforehand the provocateur, whether it be the State through the police or its collaborator, or the private subject, has controlled the entire development of the conduct and, even though in appearance the author or authors of the act are carrying out the crime, according to their plan, the truth is that there is no danger to the legal right nor possibility of consummation of the act, because its development is being controlled, precisely to prevent that from happening. It is, therefore, an “experiment,” in which consummation will never occur, nor will there be danger or injury to the protected legal right. For these reasons, in addition to others that criminal doctrine discusses, such as the fact that in these cases—it is noted—there exists, from the point of view of the active subject, an impossible crime, due to a “mistake of fact,” because there is no intent on the part of the instigator, etc., the truth is that this action is not criminal and therefore is not deserving of punishment, since it is nothing more than an experiment without transcendence for the rights protected by the legal system and that the criminal norm aims to protect. This is, in broad terms, what the doctrine proposes in this regard. But it is not incumbent upon the Chamber to venture into those fields, nor to excessively delimit the doctrinal concept of experimental crime, as those are matters proper to be elucidated by the jurisdictional criminal authorities. In the cited precedents, this Chamber indicates that experimental crime cannot provide grounds for a trial with independent criminal consequences, because, as stated, it is an “experiment.” It has also been noted that it can be evidentiary material to prove </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">another fact</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">, specifying that in any case it could never be the sole evidence. This last statement deserves to be clarified. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">The operations carried out by the police are not, in themselves, criminal, as they would be experimental crime in the majority of cases, or else, situations in which the officers or their collaborators act as “undercover agents,” passing themselves off as third parties who concur to corroborate that a person is already engaged in a certain criminal activity, which in any case was already occurring or had been consummated prior to this participation of the police agent. From that operation, sufficient indicia may result that allow proving that the person has already committed a criminal act, which is only reinforced—from the evidentiary point of view—by the experiment. For example, the police officer who buys drugs, that sale in itself is not a crime, because there is no possibility whatsoever for the legal right protected by the norm to be injured. But that purchase may have evidentiary force to prove </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#x2011;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">depending on the circumstances surrounding the specific case-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> that the seller is habitually engaged in that activity, because the sale itself, even of minimal quantities, indicates that the drugs were possessed for the purpose of commercialization or supply, an action that is also punishable by law. Under these conditions, especially due to the principle of evidentiary freedom that governs in our system, it will depend on the specific case, and on the assessment of the evidence in light of the rules of sound criticism, to determine if the evidence is sufficient to arrive at the necessary demonstration of guilt for the act, constitutionally required in Article 39, on the understanding that this act, is not the experiment or the action carried out with the participation of the undercover agent itself, but rather another fact that is eventually proven with the evidence obtained from the operation. This judgment corresponds to be made by the criminal trial judges, and its possible control falls to the Court of Cassation, by assessing the sufficiency of the reasoning of the ruling. The rigor that must be had in this matter of “experiments” or simulated operations, is due to the fact that it involves the pre-constitution of evidence against the accused. Therefore, the judge must be demanding in the assessment of this type of operation. The intervention in them of the judge of the investigation phase, as guarantor of the legality of the evidence, is advisable, but it cannot be denied in advance that value be given to an undercover operation if this judicial participation does not occur. The truth is that, reiterating what this Chamber and its jurisprudence have stated, the intervention of the judge is indispensable when it is intended to intrude upon or injure fundamental rights, for example, if a raid is intended to be carried out; if it is necessary to carry out a wiretap, in short, if the operation includes the affectation of any fundamental right. In the other cases, the judge, when assessing the evidence obtained from police investigations, must be particularly demanding regarding the existence of indicia that legitimize the undercover operation, so that it does not serve as a pretext for the authorities to tempt suspects and induce them to be authors of criminal acts that they perhaps had not planned to carry out, acting as typical agents provocateurs, because that conduct of the police is unconstitutional.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> Their mission is not to provoke crimes, but to investigate the criminal acts that are committed and apprehend their presumed authors, without detriment to the preventive function par excellence that corresponds to the administrative police, which can act as investigative police, in collaboration or in the absence of the intervention of the judicial police. Thus, if within a police operation carried out with undercover agents, the only existing evidence is precisely the experiment or what was done by the undercover agent, it will be up to the criminal judges in the specific case to determine if that evidence is sufficient to prove the criminal act being investigated, on the understanding </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">that a conviction could never be handed down for the experimental act</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">, which, as explained, is not a crime […]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> (emphasis supplied). In this precedent, the pronouncements that the constitutional body itself had made, indicating that controlled purchases could under no circumstances provide grounds for a conviction, statements that had been made in precedents number 0477-94, of 3:26 p.m. on January 25, and 1169-94, of 10:57 a.m. on March 2, both of 1994, are nuanced, because, with good judgment, it is indicated that everything will depend on the quality of the investigation and the evidence, and that can only be analyzed in light of each specific case. In reality, it could be that the investigation was based solely on police-controlled purchases, but with a high degree of control and quality, for example, because they were video recorded, so there is an independent record apart from the officer's statement alone; however, it would also be necessary that frequent surveillances at the site have been carried out and recorded, elements that evidence that, independently of the controlled purchases, the suspect person is engaged in the indiscriminate sale of drugs; moreover, all of this is significantly reinforced when the testimony of the police collaborator is obtained at trial. The latter takes on relevance, because it must be noted that there is no authorization to dispense with, in every case and in any case, the statement of the undercover agent or “collaborator,” as prosecutors and police authorities seem to understand it. Of course, that depending on the conditions under which the infiltration occurs, the type of crime investigated (whether organized or not), it could be that indeed, the physical integrity or the life of the undercover agent could be in danger. In such a case, the system has designed several options, without it being considered that there is full authorization not to make the undercover agent appear. In Article 11 of the already mentioned Law 8204, insofar as relevant, it states: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">In investigations, the police may avail themselves of collaborators or informants, whose identification must be kept confidential, in order to guarantee their integrity. If any of them is present at the time of the commission of the criminal act, such circumstance shall be reported to the competent judicial authority, without the need to reveal their identity. Unless their statement is deemed indispensable at any phase of the proceeding, the court shall order them to appear and, during the identification questioning, may omit data that could pose any risk to them or their family. Said testimony may be automatically incorporated into the plenary trial by reading, except if it is deemed indispensable to hear it live. In this case, they shall give their testimony solely before the court, the prosecutor, the accused, and their defense attorney; for this purpose, the temporary clearing of the courtroom shall be ordered […]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">”. It is clear that this law does not exempt or authorize dispensing with the statement of the undercover agent or collaborator in every case. Moreover, it must be noted that this law is prior to the recently approved Law 8720 of March 4, 2009, which regulates, in a special law, the subject of procedural and extra-procedural protection of victims and witnesses, which now fully applies to the protection that could be assigned to the undercover agent to obtain their statement as a witness, who indeed, in the event that they have participated as such, acquires that condition and therefore, their testimony would be relevant and, on occasions, essential. Of course, that the evidence for the prosecution, its selection, is a decision of the accusing body, in this case of the Public Ministry when formulating the accusation, so it will be up to the prosecutors to weigh the quality and weight of the evidence with which they decide to take a person to trial. Thus, continuing with the line of analysis being developed, an investigation could be based on controlled purchases and surveillances. If such police interventions have been independently recorded, if they have been carried out in such a way that they find solidity, they could eventually be the basis for a conviction, because there is greater support than the sole testimony of the police officers or the sole controlled purchases. The call for rigor in their assessment, which constitutional jurisprudence so punctually makes, is precisely because it is considered insufficient to convict a person solely on the word of the police officers, who have acted in police-controlled purchases and who, in this understanding, have produced evidence against the accused, of which only the police can account. Such investigative proceedings are considered valid as such, since the law empowers police investigators to carry out inquiries, notwithstanding that by themselves, they barely prove the existence of indicia, but would never be sufficient to convict, if they are only based on the police statement and the evidence supposedly obtained in such approaches or controlled purchases. The weighing of the type of investigation and the elements it yields, can only be done in each specific case, being clear that if only police-controlled purchases are available, supported, in turn,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> only by the officers' account, this evidence would be insufficient. If these police-controlled purchases, for example, are also supported by video recordings; if constant and reasonably frequent surveillances have been carried out and video-recorded, or at least documented in reports (actas); if furthermore, the trial counts on the testimony of the undercover collaborator(s) who made the supposed contacts and it is possible to establish that, independently of those contacts, the suspect person has carried out independent activity, then, that investigation of that nature and the elements it provides, could have a different weight from one that is only supported by the officers' word, as constitutional jurisprudence has rightly indicated. These police-controlled purchases are mere acts of investigation and as such, cannot be equated to acts that, as will be analyzed later, must be carried out as jurisdictional advancements of evidence (anticipos jurisdiccionales de prueba), with judicial control. They are mere and simple acts of investigation that, fulfilling the expected requirements (reports, signatures of the participants, record of the search prior to the collaborator, respect for the chain of custody of the evidence, etc.), can be appreciated as indicia and can even acquire greater strength insofar as there are independent means of control of such proceedings (videos, reports, third-party testimonies, etc.). Now then, from the appellant's arguments, it would seem to emerge that she starts from the assumption that in every investigation of this nature, it is necessary to carry out a “final operation” that must have, consequently, the participation of the defense. To respond to this argument, again one must bring up the non-existence of a system of legally assessed evidence (prueba legal tasada) that mandates carrying out a final proceeding in every drug investigation. Of course, it is clear that an investigation of this nature, although it could be prolonged over time, cannot become an indefinite situation either, so it is to be expected, according to the rules of experience, that the inquiries will generate a conclusion, as events unfold and always bearing in mind that everything will depend on the conditions present in each specific case. The scope of that outcome and the implications it may have, will delimit which is the form provided for in the Constitution</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> and in the law to carry it out. Thus, if to advance an investigation, it becomes necessary to intervene communications or seize private documents, the authorization and control of a judge for this is </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">necessarily</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> required; also, for example, to enter a suspect's domicile, likewise, authorization and direct action by the judge are required, as is also the case if it is necessary to seize correspondence or private documentation. The judge who authorizes these acts, must make a reasoned analysis of the existence of verified indicia that authorize that injury to fundamental rights as well as the necessity, usefulness,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> and proportionality of the measure in light of the characteristics of the case and the weight of the existing indicia, and for this reason the quality of the investigation that precedes or comes before said requests must be carefully pondered by the judge. The law also provides that any act that injures fundamental rights, that is definitive or unreproducible, or when it is necessary to receive a statement that, given the concurrence of certain qualified elements that the law develops, is presumed not to be obtainable at trial, the proceeding must be carried out according to the rules of what the legislator called jurisdictional advancement of evidence (anticipo jurisdiccional de prueba), regulated in Article 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). There are three scenarios that may complement each other but do not exclude each other. The constitutional jurisprudence cited above, explains that in the face of any possible injury to fundamental rights that will occur through any investigative proceeding, the presence and participation of the judge is necessary and this requirement is unavoidable, if one wishes to obtain evidence that can be legitimately incorporated into the process and not incur abusive and arbitrary actions, which can not only ruin an investigation, but could eventually even be criminal (e.g., illegal raids, illegitimate interception of communications, etc.).</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> It has already been explained that police-controlled purchases are mere investigative proceedings and do not require the presence and control of the</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> judge or the defense, as they are mere acts of investigation, which will have indiciary value, if the formal requirements of such police intervention have been verified. In this regard, the Third Chamber, in precedent number [Telf4], of May 20, 2005, indicated: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">controlled drug purchases, made by the police or with the aid of collaborators, constitute investigative tools that do not require supervision by a judge. These are investigative tasks of a properly investigative nature that are the responsibility of the competent bodies (police, Public Ministry), do not affect fundamental rights, and are lawful, provided they are carried out fulfilling certain requirements that guarantee their purity and lawfulness (e.g.: that they do not become a provocation to commit a crime, that measures are adopted to ensure the correct handling of what is obtained, among others). Such purchases, like trailing and surveillances, form part of a method that allows investigating authorities to obtain more and better information that, in effect, a criminal activity is being carried out and the manner in which it is executed, but, by virtue of the fact that, as stated, they do not affect the fundamental rights of any person and are of an eminently investigative nature, the judge's control will be carried out a posteriori, in the hypothesis that a criminal process is initiated, and that control will involve the examination of all police and Public Ministry actions, in order to determine if they complied with the law</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> […]”.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> In the same sense, the Court of Cassation of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José has pronounced, among others, in precedent number [Telf5], of 3:10 p.m., on October 1, 2010. This position, shared by this Chamber, analyzes police-controlled purchases in their proper dimension, as mere investigative proceedings, legitimate, that allow obtaining quality information about the effective (or not) realization of a criminal activity and its presumed perpetrator, so that the Public Ministry, which supervises police action in the functional direction, makes decisions about the course of the inquiries and, eventually, the proceedings that need to be carried out. Several controlled purchases, carried out legitimately and moreover, accompanied by recordings and frequent surveillances, give solidity to a reasonable hypothesis of suspicion about one or several determined persons. And here is where the prosecutor's decision-making enters the scene regarding the outcome of the investigation: if to advance it is necessary to injure fundamental rights, it is the Constitution and the procedural law that indicate how those actions must be carried out; if, assessing the nature of the indicia that the police investigation yields, it is decided that there are sufficient elements to carry out a proceeding with greater evidentiary value, the system imposes the obligation on the Public Ministry, to secure that proceeding, with, at least, the presence of the defense attorney. Article 13 of the Criminal Procedure Code states: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">From the first moment of the criminal prosecution and until the end of the execution of the sentence, the accused shall have the right to legal assistance and defense. For such purposes, they may choose a defense attorney of their confidence, but, if they do not do so, a public defender shall be assigned to them. The right to defense is non-waivable. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">The first act of the proceeding shall be understood as any judicial or police action that identifies a person as a possible author of a punishable act or a participant in it </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">[…]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">” (emphasis supplied). In some cases, constitutional jurisprudence itself has considered that the presence of the defense attorney is not even necessary, when, for example, the judge was present at the proceedings. Thus, in precedent number 1999-6469, of 2:33 p.m., on August 18, 1999, it stated: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">In the specific case, the appellant states that their fundamental right to due process has been seriously affected because in the initial proceedings carried out by the police, consisting of the preparation of the evidence to make them incur the crime for which they were later accused, the opportunity was not given for a public defender to participate representing their interests. In the Chamber's opinion, and as it refers exclusively to ensuring the fundamental rights of the appellant, the participation of the Criminal Judge who must ensure the effective fulfillment of fundamental guarantees during such actions is sufficient. In this regard, it must be remembered that one of the main changes brought about with the new Criminal Procedure Code, lies in the nature of the participation of the jurisdictional body, which in the current system serves, among other things, to control that the work of the investigating bodies is carried out in accordance with the rules and principles that oblige respect for the dignity of the human being and in particular their constitutional rights. In that way, it is sufficient that the competent judge has supervised and exercised control over the preliminary actions indicated by the appellant for the requirements of due process at the constitutional level to have been satisfied [….]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">”. For its part, the jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber has also considered it necessary, not only the presence of the judge in the so-called “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">final purchases</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">” which have also been called “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">jurisdictionally controlled purchases</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">”, especially, when they are required beforehand to legitimize the injury to a fundamental right, for example, the search of a domicile, but they have also considered legitimate actions by the Public Ministry, prepared to obtain direct evidence from the suspect and proceed immediately to their arrest, when in such proceedings, the prosecuting entity has acted with the presence and control of a defense attorney. Thus, for example, in precedent</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> number [Telf6], of 10:26 a.m. on June 25, 2004, it posed the following: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">it is necessary to indicate that when a drug sale verification operation is carried out and the use of an undercover agent is chosen,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">all the activity deployed by police authorities during the investigation must be carefully considered and is taken as a hypothesis of suspicion that must be confirmed or discarded through elements of evidence obtained independently from it, for the purpose of being able to prove the criminal responsibility of the person identified as the author or participant in the drug activity being pursued [...] When to demonstrate a pre-existing criminal activity, in this case drug activity, the introduction into the criminal group of an undercover agent is chosen as part of the police investigation, it is indispensable that independent corroboration of the information obtained by said agent be subsequently made, culminating with the obtaining of evidentiary elements obtained under judicial supervision that crowns the police theory of criminal responsibility as author or participant […]”.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> The same thesis was affirmed in ruling number [Telf7], of 8:57 a.m. on June 25, 2004, which considered that </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“they are not sufficient to sustain a judgment of certainty about her effective responsibility in the drug sale activity that was being carried out in the dwelling where she lived together with two other persons, hence the judges are correct when they affirm that the fact that Officer [Name1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">testified at trial that the accused sold him drugs on one occasion, on November 18 (without any additional element corroborating his word) would not allow it to be taken as proven that she was engaged in that activity, as it could not be overlooked that it was a simple controlled sale carried out by a police officer (acting as an undercover agent) without any type of jurisdictional or prosecutorial supervision or oversight, without, moreover, any additional elements having been gathered to corroborate that she was indeed engaged in that activity. Due to this, no logical defect is noted from the fact that the instance court assures that the word of Officer [Name2] , insofar as he describes and affirms that “experimental” purchase (in reality, it is a controlled purchase), that was supposedly observed by several officers of the Drug Control Police, must be qualified as “a purely investigative act […]”.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> The same position is seen in the already cited precedent [Telf8], and, furthermore, this criterion was reiterated in rulings number 2001-00781, of August 20, 2001, [Telf9], of 9:45 a.m. on January 19, [Telf10], of 4:40 p.m., on September 16, both of 2007.

This position has had nuances, precisely because our system is not one of rigid statutory proof and because the quality of the evidence and its possibilities for control must be analyzed in light of each specific case, without, in any event, failing to appreciate certain inconsistencies and conflicting criteria in the national case law position. Whether fundamental rights will be violated or not in the investigation of drug sale offenses is a guideline that has served in some jurisprudential precedents, following the guiding criterion of the Constitutional Chamber in the cited precedent 1999-6469, which is also based on constitutional and legal requirements, to distinguish when such jurisdictional control is necessary in the so-called “final operation.” It has been stated that if there will be no violation of fundamental rights, the presence of the guarantees judge is not necessary. In this regard, for example, the precedent [Telf11], at 11:10 a.m., on February 8, 2002, in which the Third Chamber stated: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Now, in order to resolve the dissatisfaction raised, it must be noted that in the final operation carried out in an investigation for possession of drugs for sale, the assistance and intervention of the judge is only necessary when it is indispensable to limit fundamental rights of persons, as occurs in the case of a search of a dwelling. The sentencing judge correctly reasons when indicating that the presence of a judicial authority was unnecessary, since the illicit business was conducted in a public place: the sidewalks of the locality (cf. folios 119 and 120). In the same vein, it is appropriate to clarify that the illicit act for which [Name3] was convicted</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">, in reality he was already carrying it out before being captured, since the actions undertaken evidenced the indiscriminate action of sale he made to habitual consumers. As this Chamber has established, in accordance with the principle of freedom of evidence, except for exceptions relating to fundamental rights, the validity of police action cannot be made subject to jurisdictional control, especially in cases such as this one, where there was clear and specific coordination with the Public Prosecutor's Office. In this regard, it must be considered that: “... In general terms, in the matter of psychotropic substances, the final operation constitutes a police act of verification of an ongoing criminal activity and, at the same time, it is presented as a</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> suitable means of proof to support the claim of the accused. However, because there is no rigid statutory proof in our system of evaluation, it cannot be demanded that the “controlled purchase” with the presence of the judicial authority and with the use of previously identified [Name4] be the only suitable means of proof to support a conviction for drug sale</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> ...”. (Cf. Voto No. 1.033-98, at 8:45 a.m. on October 30, 1.998. In the same vein, the following votes: CED3</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">, at 9:26 a.m. on November 12, 1.999, CED4</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">, at 9:20 a.m. on March 31, 2.000, CED5</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">, at 10:30 a.m. on February 16, 2.001) [….].</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” Note that it is affirmed, in the same line we have set out in this judgment,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> that it is not possible to demand that in every investigation for the crime of drug sale, it be necessary to carry out an outcome proceeding or final operation that includes the individualization of [Name4] and a purchase with control based on that nature.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> It has also been stated, a criterion which this Chamber, as already stated, shares, that jurisdictional control or control by the defense is not necessary in police-controlled purchases </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">(compras controladas policialmente)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, which are mere investigative acts with only a guiding and indiciary value, even though, depending on the quality of the records of this intervention, and by allowing independent control and sources distinct from the mere police intervention and account or their documents, they may acquire greater solidity and even provide a basis for a conviction. However, it should be noted that despite the fact that the case law of the Criminal Chamber, in this case, has not been consistent, it is observable, especially in recent case law, that a control is demanded (either by the defense or by the judge) when an intervention is to be carried out that will produce direct evidence against the accused and his arrest is imminent, in a controlled operation, as happens when already individualized money is used, either by the judge or by the prosecutor, since this act is given a different evidentiary vocation from that of mere police-controlled purchases. That is, even when it is accepted that the Public Prosecutor's Office can individualize the money to be used (precedent number [Telf12], at 10:20 a.m., on June 7, 2002, of the Third Chamber), it is clear and evident in the jurisprudential position of the Criminal Chamber and, even more so, in that of the Constitutional Chamber, that what is important is the control that either the counterparty—the defense, in this case—or the guarantees judge can perform over that activity, due to the effects expected and produced from an intervention of this nature: direct incriminating evidence against the accused, such as the finding in his possession of the previously individualized money, which allows it to be directly linked to the illicit activity that the police, in their investigation, have been able to profile at an indiciary level. Consequently, there must be control that this money was individualized prior to its use; that it was delivered to the collaborator or undercover agent beforehand and that the latter was searched;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> that the collaborator or undercover agent was followed and surveilled, then, that there was contact and delivery and, subsequently, that apparent drugs were obtained from that contact, in order to proceed with the arrest directed at searching the suspect and verifying whether, in effect, he carries the individualized money, conclusive proof of his contact with the collaborator, in the activity that he was supposedly carrying out indiscriminately and to persons other than the collaborators, which legitimizes his immediate arrest. And why is this control necessary? One might think that it is sufficient for the prosecutor to act and supervise everything. In fact, there are jurisprudential criteria in this sense, for example, precedent number [Telf5], at 3:10 p.m., on October 1st, previously cited, the Court of Cassation of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which in that regard, considered:</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">With respect to the \"final operation\", that is: the one in which the last controlled purchase of drugs is made, normally using previously identified money, and where the sellers are arrested and the drugs, the money, and any other evidence of interest are seized from them, this Chamber does not share the thesis of the lower court which, relying on judgment No. 9-07, handed down by the Third Chamber at 9:45 a.m. on January 19, 2007, demands the participation of the guarantees judge. In reality, that same Chamber has not maintained a uniform criterion and, thus, in resolutions such as No. 780-01, of August 20, 2001, and No. 414-05, of May 20, 2005, it indicated that controlled purchases do not require the presence of the criminal judge. In the latter judgment, it was stated: \"... controlled purchases of drugs, made by the police or with the aid of collaborators, constitute investigative tools that do not require supervision by a judge. They are tasks of a properly investigative nature that are the responsibility of the competent bodies (police, Public Prosecutor's Office), they do not affect fundamental rights, and they are in accordance with the law, provided they are carried out meeting certain requirements that guarantee their purity and their lawfulness (e.g.: that they do not become an incitement to commit a crime, that measures are adopted to ensure the correct handling of what is obtained, among others). Such purchases, like following and surveillances, form part of a method that allows the investigating authorities to obtain more and better information that, in effect, a criminal activity is being carried out and the manner in which it is executed, but, by virtue of the fact that, as stated, they do not affect the fundamental rights of any person and are of an eminently investigative nature, the judge's control will be carried out ex post facto, in the hypothesis that a criminal proceeding is initiated, and that control will involve the examination of all police and Public Prosecutor's Office actions, in order to determine whether they adhered to the law\". This Chamber shares the reasoning expressed in the judgment just transcribed, since controlled purchases of drugs (including that of the \"final operation\") do not imply an affectation of fundamental rights, and this is the fundamental parameter to which the legislator resorted to demand the intervention of the guarantees judge. Neither is his presence required to arrest a person or seize an object (except if, for that purpose, it were necessary to order the search of an inhabited place) and, from a logical standpoint, there is no reason whatsoever to distinguish between the last controlled purchase of drugs and all those that preceded it and to demand the judge's intervention in one and not in the rest, if all of them are legally identical. Ultimately, the fact that the police act without the judge's participation in an act in which they may legally do so (otherwise, the police function would be delegated to the judiciary), is reduced to a problem of subsequent control of the lawfulness of the action and the examination of the evidence according to the rules of sound criticism, to establish whether the elements gathered through that action possess evidentiary fitness or whether, for some reason, they resulted devoid of it (e.g.: due to an erroneous procedure in the chain of custody, because the police authorities could not give a full account of their actions and that they adhered to the law). Despite the thesis of the judges that this Chamber does not share, the truth is that the judgment on the merits is also supported by the reasons examined in the preceding Considerandos (the notorious deficiencies of the accusation and the scant reliability of the testimonial evidence), and they provide a solid basis for the decision reached […]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">”. Meanwhile, even the Criminal Chamber, which in many rulings has upheld the need for control, does not achieve a constant and clear line in its case law, going so far as to affirm in some resolutions that even the police themselves can identify money and use it. Thus, in precedent number [Telf12], at 10:20 a.m., on June 7, 2002, an opportunity in which it analyzed that this individualization or identification of money is not a definitive and irreproducible act, and it is even reasoned that the judicial police themselves can perform it. The scope of this position can also be appreciated in precedent number 0896-99, at 9:35 a.m., on July 19, 1999, an occasion in which it was expressly indicated: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">According to the rules established by the new Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no obstacle or prohibition preventing the prosecutor, as the official in charge of the investigation, from identifying the [Name4] that will be used in the controlled purchase, except for what may be indicated regarding the credibility of that evidence when there are grounds for it. As regulated by numeral 62 of said regulation, “... The Public Prosecutor's Office shall exercise the criminal action in the manner established by law and shall carry out the pertinent and useful proceedings to determine the existence of the criminal act. It shall have charge of the preparatory investigation, under jurisdictional control in the acts that so require ...”, from which it follows that, as a general rule, the investigation shall be in charge of the prosecutor, who has the power to directly and independently perform the acts necessary for such purposes, unless</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> -as an exception- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> these require jurisdictional control or it involves those cases in which the rules of the anticipated evidentiary proceeding apply. As understood from the foregoing, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">the act of identifying [Name4] for the purposes of an operation such as the one at hand, legally does not require jurisdictional order or control.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> In any event, not all the [Name4] used in all the controlled purchases were identified by the prosecution (only those used on August thirteenth, 1998), since prior to this date it was the Petty Court Judge of [Name5] who, acting as guarantees judge, took charge of this (see resolution at 3:25 p.m. on August 11, 1998, folio 4), therefore the arguments of the defense are not admissible. Regarding the absence of a record of the search of the undercover agent, although it is advisable that when said proceeding is carried out, it be recorded in writing, there is no obstacle to the fact that, as occurred here, it be accredited by other lawful evidentiary means such as testimonial evidence, since in accordance with the principle of freedom of evidence contemplated in article 182 ibid, “... the facts and circumstances of interest for the solution of the case may be proven by any permitted means of proof, except by express prohibition of law [...]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> This position was maintained in the first years of the Code of Criminal Procedure's validity, although it has been seen that in many subsequent jurisprudential precedents, it has been considered, in a line that can indeed be qualified as constant, and which even varies the position just cited, that jurisdictional control is required in the final outcome operation, although it must also be admitted that, rather than a problem of legitimacy, the scope of police proceedings and their value is reduced to a problem of probative weight, of sufficiency of elements to convict, it being a constant line in the sense that police-controlled purchases alone are not sufficient to support a conviction. “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Furthermore, even if we were to start from that fact (namely, the intervention of [Name6]. in the first transactions conducted by the police), from the comprehensive study of the remaining evidence, the existence of the aggravating circumstance is not derived </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">with absolute certainty</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">. In this sense, note that three controlled purchases were made from [Name7].</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> on June 16, 26, and 28, 2001. The first two were conducted by the police and only the last one had jurisdictional control (folios 14 to 17, 18 to 20 and 38 front and back). On this last occasion, it should be added, the one who acted in association with [Name7].</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> was the convicted person [Name8]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> . After that transaction, a search was conducted both at the home of the young person [Name9]. and at the house of [Name7]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> . In the first property, no evidence of the crime was obtained and the minor [Name10] could not even be located (folio 69 front). In the second house, traces of drugs were found (which, it should be noted, [Name7].</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> tried to destroy) and the previously identified [Name4] were found in the possession of [Name8].</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> . Finally, in the vicinity of the home of [Name7].</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> several packages containing drugs were located (folios 33 to 35 front, 36 front and back, 37 front, 40 front and back and 69 to 72 front). As seen, regarding the intervention of a minor in the illicit activity, the evidence is reduced to two transactions conducted by the police without any jurisdictional control. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">The police version regarding the existence of the aggravating factor, in other words, was not confirmed through other evidentiary elements obtained under the supervision of the judge of the preparatory stage or the parties to the proceeding.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> While the proceedings conducted on June 28 allowed it to be determined that -as the police maintained-, [Name7].</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> was engaged in selling drugs, it could not be confirmed that he did so using a minor, since [Name10] did not intervene in the transaction, and in the search conducted at the home of this minor, no evidence was found linking him to the illicit act[…]Thus, it is undeniable that the Trial Court breached the rules of sound criticism by deriving from the controlled purchases and the results of the search proceedings conducted, the aggravating circumstance contemplated in article 71 subsection c) of Law No. 7786 […]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">” Third Chamber, [Telf2], at 11:15 a.m., on December 23, 2005 (emphasis supplied). Note importantly how it speaks of the importance of control </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">by the judge or the parties</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">, of that outcome activity, which produces direct and “confirmatory” evidence of the inquiries made by the police.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> Several reflections and conclusions can be drawn from all that has been reasoned and the case law cited: our system is one of free assessment of evidence and freedom of evidence; It is not possible, consequently, to specify that a crime must be investigated in a certain way or must necessarily include a specific proceeding; the Political Constitution and procedural law establish what the requirements are for the realization of evidence or proceedings that affect or violate fundamental rights, formalities that the</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> Public Prosecutor's Office must respect, without any option; finally, the investigative strategy is defined by the prosecuting body, through the functional direction of the police, and the decisions made during the investigation are its sole responsibility: if it fails in the scope of these, if it does not succeed in giving solidity to the inquiries, or if it conducts proceedings without meeting the legal or constitutional requirements, the validity, weight, and importance of such elements falls to be weighed by the adjudicator. In the opinion of this Chamber, in the performance, by the Public Prosecutor's Office, of evidentiary activity that may prove decisive, directed against a person against whom there are already solid indicia that he commits a criminal act, who is already individualized throughout an investigation in which sufficient indicia have been gathered that this person is committing a crime, adequate control must be guaranteed, which the system already provides for and is the right to have technical defense counsel, as clearly indicated by article 13 </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Cpp</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. Thus, we are not facing a simple caprice, a concession, or a favor that the Public Prosecutor's Office or the police itself has in these cases with these characteristics, but rather it concerns compliance with legal requirements. It cannot be stated that in these cases, with the characteristics already indicated, the presence of the defense is not necessary, since all the requirements that the law establishes to impose the defender's control are present: the suspect is already individualized, and sufficient indiciary elements have been gathered that point to him as the probable perpetrator of a crime, throughout the investigation. Therefore, depending on the nature of the case and the action, under the conditions already stated, the presence and control of the defender is always necessary, and even, additionally, that of the guarantees judge. It is a transcendent decision that, in light of respect for fundamental rights,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">and the right of defense is one</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">, as well as for evidentiary purity, the Public Prosecutor's Office must weigh and act consequently. Whatever the decision, the elements it provides in support of its accusation must, in any case, be weighed by the adjudicator in light of legal and constitutional requirements, and not for reasons of mere convenience or utility. And indeed, the procedural system itself, within an internal coherence and protected by respect for the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, contemplates how to act in urgent, unforeseen situations, how to proceed in the face of imponderables, so that the authorization to violate fundamental rights without prior jurisdictional control is reasonably contemplated for the police and even for any citizen, because the circumstances</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> make such prior authorization unreasonable and impossible: thus, all cases of search without a court order, a scenario provided for even in the Political Constitution –numeral 23- and developed in procedural law, article 197 </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Cpp</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">.; arrest in flagrante delicto, even practiced by any person, with the condition that the detainee be brought before a judge within the non-extendable period of 24 hours -Article 37 of the Political Constitution-. In the case of police officers who surprise someone in flagrante delicto, they are not only authorized but have the unavoidable duty to intervene in his arrest and</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> search him; the search or frisk in urgent cases, upon well-founded suspicion, can even be conducted by the judicial police -CED6</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">, including the search of vehicles -[Placa1]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">-, which may even encompass an indeterminate number of persons, at a specific time and place,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> in cases of necessity (escape of suspects in recent and serious events, etc. that justify road closures due to criminal pursuit), as analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber. If the judicial police observe an individual selling drugs to private parties, they are authorized for the immediate arrest of that person, as it is a crime in flagrante delicto, to prepare the respective report for the Public Prosecutor's Office, with the evidence they have gathered. However, as it may happen that such observation proves insufficient to give rise to a proceeding and a conviction, it is preferred in these cases to gather information with greater rigor, which is why such inquiries are entrusted to the police, who were created for such tasks. How this investigation is conducted, the quality of the information produced, the control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the decisions made by this body, will be subject to weighing in each specific case by the judge, according to the defined procedural rules. And why is this investigative work and its sources of control important? Because, first, if it concerns only controlled purchases, no matter how much the officers testify about the presumed contact of the collaborator with the suspicious person and provide the evidence, how can police incitement be ruled out? How can it be proven that apart from those contacts with the undercover agent, indiscriminate sale to third parties is conducted, which truly harms the legal interest protected by the norm? To do this, surveillances must accompany them, frequent, continuous, to clearly specify that this activity </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">is carried out independently of the police-controlled presence and contact</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. For the analysis of these elements, it is not enough that the police work is considered honest or the officers' accounts sincere, but it is required, in addition to their intervention, to have more elements, because the mere investigative intervention of the police and their control of those contacts is not sufficient, even if these actions are backed by official records (actas), because the official records and the police testimony revolve around the same point: police-controlled purchases.</span> If the records are different and allow independent control, the weight could be different, all of which will always depend on the conditions present in each case.

**III- What happened in the specific case**: Against the defendant [Name11], the judicial police received confidential information that he was engaged in selling crack in the center of the city of Puntarenas, aided by another individual nicknamed [Placa2] and also using the vehicle with plates [Placa3] [Placa2]. According to that information, he carries out this activity during the day and at night, every day of the week, with an increase on weekends (cf. criminal news report, folios 1 and 2). It is said that he hides the drug in the vehicle and his name and particulars are already given, it being established that the mentioned vehicle is his property. Under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the judicial police of Puntarenas began the investigation to gather elements to verify the information received. The strategy outlined, because it is thus evident from the proceedings, was to carry out controlled purchases with a police “collaborator (colaborador),” which is nothing more than an undercover agent. The first controlled purchase was carried out solely by officer [Name12], on February 12, 2009, in the afternoon, accompanied by that collaborator, who has never been identified nor brought to the stand, but who delivered to the investigators what, he said, he obtained from the suspect, which turned out to be a rock of cocaine base crack (cf. controlled purchase report folios 10 to 12, drug sale verification record, folio 13, and chain of custody of evidence, folios 14 and 15); a second purchase on February 27, in the afternoon, with the participation of officer [Name12] and [Name13], with “one of our confidential collaborators” (folio 16) for which a search record, a purchase record, and a chain of custody of evidence record were prepared (folios 16 to 20); a third controlled purchase, by the same officers indicated, on March 2, in the afternoon, under the same conditions as the previous ones and at the same site (folios 21 to 25); a fourth purchase on March 17, in the morning, specifically at 8:50 a.m., carried out solely by [Name13], indicating that the suspect bent down and dug something out of the ground, taking out a jar from which he took what he gave to the collaborator, which, after being analyzed, was verified to be cocaine base crack (folios 26 to 31). That same day, at 9:00 a.m., officer […] positioned himself “at a strategic point on the north side of the Municipal Market near the site where the suspect [Name11] was located” (folio 32) and conducted surveillance “to observe the flow of people who would approach the suspect.” He documented that four people, whom he identified by nicknames and affirmed to be recognized addicts in the area, approached within a period of 30 minutes, making brief exchanges with the suspect. At folio 36 and at 3:00 p.m. on March 23, 2010, there appears a money identification record, carried out by prosecutor [Name14], at the Assistant Prosecutor's Office of Puntarenas, of two [Name4] of one thousand colones series D94364544 and D98920165, and it is recorded that identification is made “for the purpose of the anti-drug police operation that the judicial police and the Public Prosecutor's Office will carry out today […] The identified money will remain in the custody of the undersigned Assistant Prosecutor, to later deliver it to the Confidential Collaborator who will attempt to confirm one more sale of an unauthorized use drug, in accordance with Article 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) and rulings 2002-525 of the Third Chamber, rulings 2005-586 and 2006-966 of the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José […].” On the reverse of folio 37, there is a received stamp on the photocopies of the identified [Name4], dated March 23, 3:00 p.m. Documentarily, following that [Name4] identification record, a report appears summarizing that on the morning of March 25, 2010 (no longer March 23 as recorded when the [Name4] were identified), prosecutor [Name15] went with officer [Name13] and the “collaborator” to carry out a controlled purchase from the suspect, which is affirmed to have occurred at 10:20 a.m., in the vicinity of Hotel El Río, where, after the search and delivery of money, the purchase of a rock of what turned out to be cocaine base crack is carried out. Then, on that same date of March 25 (and not March 23 as the day the money was identified was recorded), at 11:00 a.m., the following note appears at folio 39: “At eleven o'clock on the twenty-fifth of March 2010, the undersigned prosecutor hereby certifies that the public defender's office was called requesting the duty public defender [Name16], furthermore, the cell phone was called on three occasions, with the line ringing and not being answered, and a beeper message was sent to radio messages, with the locating of the defense being unsuccessful, given that this is a case of drug sale on public streets with urgency and that a controlled purchase was recently carried out, the location of the suspect being suitable for the final operation, the operation is proceeded with without public defense. That is all. [Name17]. Narcotics Prosecutor […].” Immediately following are the following documents: collaborator search record, at 11:03 a.m.; money delivery record, 11:05 a.m.; record of 11:08 a.m., of collaborator follow-up; record of 11:30 a.m., of suspect search; vehicle search record 11:58 a.m., and the records of seizure of evidence, from folios 40 to 49). We have that four investigative diligences of controlled drug purchases were carried out, with the participation of an undercover or unidentified collaborator, and a single surveillance at the site where the defendant was being investigated for the illicit activity. A fifth purchase of the same nature, with the participation of the prosecutor, as one more investigator, was carried out at 10:20 a.m. on March 25, without there being records of a search, delivery of money, and follow-up of the collaborator, a diligence carried out by prosecutor [Name15] in the company of officer [Name12]. All of these are controlled purchases at an investigatory, police level, and they allowed the gathering of reasonable and well-founded suspicions that the accused was engaged in drug sales; his modus operandi was sketched out in the investigation, and reasonably, those investigative elements allowed supporting a probability of participation by [Name11] in a crime. With this scaffold of elements, the prosecutor decided to carry out a controlled purchase with marked money, in order to then proceed, this Chamber considers, to the arrest of the suspect and his search. This decision by the prosecutor is made knowing that there are already reasonable elements to point to [Name11] as responsible for selling the drug cocaine base crack, reasonable elements that the police investigation had allowed to be gathered and that he himself, acting with the officers, verified. Thus, this decision cannot be made without guaranteeing that person the control of the legal counsel (defensa técnica) to which he is entitled. This Chamber considers that, under these conditions, the prosecutor was not authorized to attempt to carry out the operation without the assistance of the public defender's office and, contrary to the assertions of the Trial Court, to which reference will be made later, it cannot be left to the discretion of the Public Prosecutor's Office when and how it carries out operations with or without public defense, because that obligation is imposed by law. The time and manner of carrying out the diligence is something that the police and the Public Prosecutor's Office indisputably plan. There are, of course, many aspects of logistics, security, and planning involved in an operation of this nature, which are the exclusive domain of the police under the direction of the prosecutor. But just as those aspects are coordinated, it must be clear that the public defender's office must be included within that planning, even if further details are not reported so as not to jeopardize the outcome. And it is emphasized that it concerns the public defender's office, because this diligence is about to be carried out to conclude an investigation. This diligence aims to gather more evidentiary elements that will allow the Public Prosecutor's Office to eventually support an accusation against the accused, who is intended to be arrested at the conclusion of that operation, so it is obvious that, under these conditions, such an operation must be carried out respecting the right of the investigated person, already a suspect of a crime, to have a defense counsel. And it is the public defender's office, a service paid for by the State, because it would be absurd to forewarn him in advance of the operation and his possible arrest so that he could appoint a lawyer of his choice. The public defender's office is called upon to act as technical advisor for that investigated person and to guarantee, as a qualified observer, the manner in which events unfold and to formulate objections and make the claims deemed pertinent in safeguarding the rights of that investigated person. They are not there as decoration, nor do they attend “in defense of no one,” as the Trial Court surprisingly asserts, but rather they are a professional paid by the State, assigned the mission of defending the rights of that investigated person in the diligence to be carried out. And, even if it is uncomfortable and not to the liking of some, this is the option our democratic system chose and that the legislator designed for cases where a police or judicial diligence is to be carried out against a person for whom there already exist sufficient and reasonable indications that they committed or are committing a crime, and Article 13 of the Cpp so indicates, which, of course, is not an invention; it is a normative provision of the highest guarantee level that neither hinders, nor obstructs, nor makes difficult, nor wrecks police investigative activity, nor implies an inadmissible advantage for the investigated person, nor means that information leaks or that diligences are frustrated; that is, it implies no risk whatsoever nor generates any alteration for the success of that diligence, action, or inquiry. It does not imply paralyzing procedures, nor alerting the suspect, nor hindering the work; that is, there is no reasonable, plausible justification, from the perspective of the right to defense and the integrity of the evidence, for not complying with the legal requirements in these cases, which mean exercising, with equality of arms, a control, a counterweight, regarding the procedural possibilities of investigating the truth, and, if the investigation is solid, if the procedures are free of flaws, defects, or illegalities, no prosecutor, no police officer should fear any risk, ensuring that their activity of a definitive or evidential nature against a person already individualized and about to be arrested is supervised and monitored by the public defender's office, because furthermore, the procedural law requires it. Urgent, imminent, and compelling cases do not require functional direction, nor a prosecutor, nor a defense counsel; we are all clear on that, and the system has already provided for these contingencies and the validity of actions carried out in that way. The system has also granted the police, especially the judicial police, important investigative powers and authorizes them to validly carry out a large number of diligences (numerals 67 to 69, 283 to 268, all of the Cpp), for which they do not require defense oversight; securing the scene of the incident; lifting fingerprints, indications, and evidence; surveillance diligences, tailing, controlled purchases; interviews with people who may know information; searching data in public databases to guide investigations; searches, arrests, and inspections in specific cases; in short, a large number of diligences that only the investigator and their preparation, along with the direction and guidance of the prosecutor, can establish and must perform, document, and carry out their task; no one questions that. However, and contrary to the position held by the Trial Court in this case, there is no justification whatsoever that supports the prosecutor's office decision to carry out that operation in the way it did, without the participation of the defense, who did not attend not out of indolence or irresponsibility—as is affirmed without any justification in the judgment—but because of the precipitous and thoughtless manner in which the prosecutor's office decided to act, so it is indeed attributable to the Public Prosecutor's Office that the diligences carried out in this case, due to the particularities already established, are illegitimate and must be so declared. There was no urgency whatsoever that led the prosecutor to act in the way he did. The entire investigation that was carried out allowed establishing that the defendant, apparently, carried out his presumably criminal activity every day, at all hours, in public places in Puntarenas. The police controlled purchases were carried out spaced out over time and allowed establishing that circumstance. It should even be noted that the accused was arrested inside his vehicle, while consuming marijuana in the company of a woman, who was momentarily detained at the site (cf. folio 44 record), so there was neither a risk of flight, nor alert to the suspect, nor any other element that would justify urgent or precipitous action, as occurred in this matter. On the contrary, evidence was received indicating that on that day it had been decided to suspend the operation because the defendant presumably noticed the police presence. Thus, at trial, the statement of public defender [Name18] was received, the content of which is not even mentioned in the sentence, such that it is not possible to understand how it is concluded that it was due to her negligence that she did not attend the operation, unless the Trial Court, without saying so expressly, adopts the opinion expressed by officer [Name12] (DVD, record of 9:31:20 a.m., on September 2, 2010), which equally lacks support, as will be analyzed later. On the contrary, from listening to the defender's testimony, from the record on the DVD at 10:22:04 a.m., on August 20, 2010, it is evident how said professional narrated that from 9 o'clock in the morning on that March 25, having been informed of an operation, she accompanied the prosecutor, officer [Name12], and the collaborator, in a vehicle heading to carry out the final controlled purchase. She observed the [Name4] identification record and verified their numbers. She affirmed that they made several circuits, because the suspect apparently—whose identity was unknown to her—was not in his usual position and suspected the police presence. On one of those rounds, they came face-to-face with the investigated person and, suspecting they had been seen, they withdrew from the site, and then finally, by radio, they communicated that they would suspend the diligence, therefore all these people went to the Courts building, were discussing the alternatives, and finally, they told her to return to her office and they would contact her. This was affirmed even by officer [Name12], as he said they decided to wait a couple of hours (DVD record, from 9:28:09 a.m. onwards). She advised that she was going to file a document at the Family Court and would be in her office. The return of all the people occurred around ten thirty that morning; she took five minutes to go to the Court and waited in her office, where she was fully locatable, besides the fact that it is an office located in the same building as the prosecutor's office and the judicial police. The defender explained that she went to the restroom and therefore left her beeper in the office, to avoid dropping it, and immediately spoke with her boss, always being within the public defender's offices, where the auxiliary staff already knew of her presence there, and where there are office telephone numbers that the Prosecutor's Office and judicial police officers know and constantly use as a means of contact. When she is notified that they are looking for her, she called officer [Name12] and was told she was not there; she contacted the prosecutor's cell phone and he tells her he cannot speak to her, and several minutes later she finds out that the operation was carried out because she did not appear. She explained that she was always in the Public Defense offices, and even if it had been the case that she was not there or was in other functions, there is always a duty roster and any other defender would be under the obligation to attend the diligence, because, she literally said, the public defense service cannot be left uncovered. She pointed out that the beeper is the means of communication assigned to them, when they are available, to be located after 4:30 in the afternoon, or when attending a diligence, she must carry it, in case she is required for another. She clarified that both the prosecutor's office and the judicial police and the Criminal Court know the public defender's office's working methods and have always coordinated with them. This witness was sincere and clear; she even acknowledged that days before, an attempt had been made to carry out the operation without being able to do so, she not knowing the reasons, which is not even documented in the case file. She also affirmed that she could not say, when attending the initial hearing (indagatoria), whether the accused was an addict or not, as that would be assuming it. And she clearly recognized that the defense staff always attends these types of operations, which are carried out constantly, to ensure the legality of the procedures and the rights of the investigated. So, first of all, there is no justification for the prosecutor to decide to leave without going to the defense offices or coordinating by phone at the office, if minutes before they were together and the defender cooperated and accompanied them for a long time; nor are these remote, distant, or hard-to-communicate sites; therefore, the urgency and haste with which the prosecutor decides to leave, brief minutes after they had separated from the defender, is not acceptable, and that urgency cannot arise from the simple will of the prosecutor and make the immediate presence, at his disposal, of a defender—be it the duty defender or any other—depend on that thoughtless decision. If it was indeed urgent, this has not been accredited at all, and there is also no evidence to indicate what changed from those minutes prior to the moment when it was decided to act without being able to notify and locate the defender. Officer [Name12] acknowledges that around 9 o'clock in the morning the operation had been coordinated; they went with the defender, but had to withdraw because they apparently alerted to police presence, so they returned to the courts and decided to wait a couple of hours. However, according to the records, by ten thirty in the morning he was already in the company of the prosecutor carrying out a controlled purchase, which, he said, took place in front of them. He argues that for that reason they decide to carry out the final operation and returned to the Courts, trying by all means to locate the defender, and she “did not appear,” so the prosecutor, seated in his offices, decided to carry it out without the defense. That is, being in the same building, being able to go to the offices of the public defender's office, to call the official telephone numbers, this was not done, and therefore, it seemed to this officer that they could not wait to carry out such an important operation because an irresponsible individual had disappeared (record from 9:30:30 onwards). However, there is no evidence that this was an urgent action, because even the same officer acknowledged that they were watching the subject, who was there calmly, as always, so that course of action is not reasonable, just as there is no evidence that the defender irresponsibly disengaged from the case to frustrate the operation. Note that there are significant elements leading to classifying the prosecutor's decision as precipitous and whimsical: the [Name4] identification record was made two days before the operation, because it was said that they were going to be used on that date, March 23. However, two days pass, without it being documented what happened, and suddenly that same prosecutor appears, in the morning hours of March 25, acting in the company of a police officer and the collaborator, personally controlling a purchase, which has no particularity distinguishing it from all the previous ones, all of this already carried out without the presence of the defender, with whom they had tried to carry out the very same diligence, minutes before. Twenty minutes later, he decides to carry out a purchase, with the [Name4] that he had marked two days before and that were not used on the established day; he certifies that he made some unanswered calls at that moment to the “duty” defense and makes the “urgent” decision to carry out the concluding operation, without specifying that minutes before they had tried to carry it out, in the company of the defender, and that they had decided to suspend the diligence. None of these considerations, nor the content of the defender's testimony, were analyzed in the sentence; therefore, the Trial Court's conclusions are openly unfounded. The prosecutor went to the site without coordinating again with the defense, decides to carry out the operation, and limits himself to sending messages to the beeper; since they do not answer him and he does not locate the defender by that means, he writes a note and continues, when, from the statement of [Name12], it is clear that, according to his account, they returned to the Office to “coordinate” with the defense and were in the same building. This Chamber, upon reviewing the case file, listening to the sentence, and observing the documentary evidence and the trial, finds no basis whatsoever to affirm, as the Trial Court does, that it was the indolence of the public defender's office of the city of Puntarenas that was responsible for the operation being carried out without the defense's participation. Nor does it have any element indicating that the defender knew of the imminence of the operation and that she deliberately or negligently divested herself of her communication devices or was unlocatable, so as not to attend the diligence, as the Trial Court suggests, and that these were the only reasonably available means of communication. Those are very serious assertions, which lack support. On the contrary, the records of the process allow it to be appreciated that the prosecutor acted precipitously, made hasty decisions without any justification, and precisely because of the way he acted, he rendered the oversight of the public defender's office over his actions nugatory. If the operation was urgent, why did he mark money two days before, to use it on a date different from the one that finally resulted? Why did the prosecutor decide to have a prior approach with the suspect and then cannot return and coordinate the conclusion and the evidence to be produced with the public defender's office, if hours before, and even minutes before, he was with the public defender and decided to suspend the operation? The Trial Court is correct in pointing out that it cannot be left to the defense's discretion when and how the operation is carried out, as well as that the police had no way of foreseeing that the prosecutor would carry out the conclusion of his investigation in that manner. Indeed, it is an obligation of the public defender's office, according to legal and regulatory provisions and the directives issued in this regard that regulate its work, to have available staff for carrying out this type of diligence and operations. If a public defense professional, with the proper information and coordination, does not attend without any justification, it is appropriate to establish whether it is necessary to impose disciplinary responsibilities or of another kind, the same if they give information to the suspects or impede the diligence in any way, all serious conducts for which there is no basis to affirm were present in this case, in such a way that, in the same manner as the Trial Court defends the honesty of the police and the credibility of their accounts, it should have proceeded with respect to the public defender and the Public Defender's Office of the locality of Puntarenas, because it makes assertions without any support, for, if it had support, it should have proceeded to file the corresponding complaints and not simply discredit a professional and a service, without foundation. The Trial Court forgot to consider that the Public Prosecutor's Office cannot either invoke a non-existent urgency and make nugatory the participation of the defense in a diligence of this nature, which the trial body itself recognizes has a validity “different” from a diligence carried out with jurisdictional oversight or with that of the public defender's office.

In the case of persons who were together just minutes before, who work in the same building, and who can communicate more fluidly by internal telephone and even in person, the prosecutor’s decision appears completely unjustified. In the opinion of this Chamber, it is clear that while the Prosecutor is in charge of investigations, functional direction over the police, and the duty to act objectively, it is also true that the prosecutor acts in the proceeding as a party, especially in a proceeding that has come to be called one of “markedly accusatory” features, so that the prosecutor’s action is as a party and, therefore, when in the development of that activity fundamental rights are going to be affected, the prosecutor must necessarily obtain the authorization and intervention of the judge, and when the prosecutor is going to carry out evidentiary acts **that are not urgent,** in which direct evidence is expected to be obtained from a suspect who has already been identified and against whom there are already reasonable and plausible indications that the suspect is committing or is in the process of committing a crime, the prosecutor must do so, as required by law, with the control of at least defense counsel, because so states the final paragraph of Article 13 of the *Cpp* already cited, and it is required by respect for due process, the right to a defense, procedural balance, good-faith litigation, and the principle of loyalty. If it is decided not to have such control, the weight of the proceedings so conducted is weakened and loses effectiveness. Note that we are not speaking of that control in police purchases, the scope and weight of which have been clearly defined here. We speak of the decision of the accuser to conduct specific, planned proceedings, seeking to gather further evidentiary elements, which refer to a person whom the police investigations already permit profiling with great clarity as a suspect, with information gathered in those investigations that already permits appreciation of a certain regularity and seriousness of the indications (various controlled purchases, follow-ups, and surveillance that allow establishing what type of activity, where and how it is carried out, and what type of substance is being sold, etc.). And this is the most important aspect that must be analyzed in light of the claims in this specific case. Although we have cited and commented on jurisprudential precedents indicating that the presence of the judge is not necessary when an evidentiary activity is to be carried out with money or any other individualized object that will not affect fundamental rights, the truth is that in this specific case, this Chamber considers that the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) had no justification for failing to coordinate the presence of a public defender, who would act as a qualified observer and guarantor of the right to a defense of the person being investigated in that act with evidentiary force that it intended to carry out. From the result of that proceeding, decisive evidence was expected to be obtained for the immediate detention of the suspect. And we agree with the jurisprudential position which states that, in cases such as this one, where there is a lengthy investigative task by the police, of a certain quality, that has been verified over a period of time, making it possible to locate places and the mode of action of the person under investigation, without any urgency whatsoever, the decision of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to carry out an outcome intervention, for evidentiary purposes, should have considered the presence of defense counsel, because there was no justification for not doing so and, under those conditions, the law so prescribes. Its decision meant that [Nombre4] were identified for use by an undercover agent, who did not testify at trial; that this transaction was supervised solely by the prosecutor and the police, without this representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office testifying as a witness at trial, because he acted as accuser, giving blessing to evidence that he himself produced and controlled, which does not conform to the system of checks and balances that underlies the criminal proceeding designed by our legislator (see in this regard Precedent number 965-2004 of 9:50 a.m. on August 13, 2004, of the Third Chamber). That outcome operation, which only the decision of the Public Prosecutor’s Office defines whether to carry out or not, this Chamber does consider that, in order to differentiate it from any police-controlled purchases, it must be an act subject to control, to exercise a counterweight, with the necessary participation of the defense and even the judge, in cases where, additionally, fundamental rights will be harmed. This Chamber is aware of the position held by the Third Chamber stating that in these operations jurisdictional control is indispensable, a position that can be considered even more guarantor-based, although it has had its nuances, especially when, as has been seen, the operation takes place in a public area and fundamental rights will not be harmed. That position of the Chamber was outlined in Precedent number [Telf8] of 9:30 a.m., on April 7, 2006, at which time, regarding what is relevant, it stated “*[…] In the case under examination, just as the petitioner claims, **without any justification**, jurisdictional control was omitted in a transcendent phase within the investigative operation deployed, which was to verify the effective illicit activity attributed to the accused, referring to the sale of drugs, which would be done, according to the investigative strategy, through a **jurisdictionally controlled** purchase, in which an undercover agent would acquire a certain amount of drugs from the accused. However, this jurisdictional control, as claimed by the appellant, did not occur in this case, **without there being any determining element that prevented it**, so that no difference whatsoever is perceived between the police-controlled purchases under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor’s Office on February 19, March 5, and March 29, all in 2005 (indiciary acts), and the purchase made on the following April 18, at 8:25 p.m., beside the commercial business “Burger King” in Tamarindo, jurisdiction of Santa Cruz de Guanacaste, which became the final operation, which produced the detention of the accused and the search and seizure (allanamiento) carried out in his dwelling house, located a considerable distance from the site where the drugs were acquired. And this undifferentiated situation is motivated by the fact that this last transaction, like the previous ones, was controlled in its entirety by the Drug Control Police, under the functional direction of the accusing body, with the police officers being the actors who, as they indicated at trial (see folios 379 to 386) and was verified through documentary evidence provided to the proceeding, were the only ones who witnessed the sale of drugs that the defendant made to the undercover agent [Nombre19] , and it is the prosecutorial representative who receives the packet with marijuana from the police officer (see folio 147), and also frisks the accused (see folio 148) […] This guaranteeing task, contrary to what the Trial Court stated in its ruling (see folios 388, 389, and 394), incurring a partial and erroneous reading of the jurisprudential precedents of this Chamber (votes 822-04, 1132-04, and 198-05), was not exhausted with the jurisdictional participation in the identification and delivery to the undercover agent of the [Nombre4] used in the final purchase (see folios 144 to 146), nor with its presence during the search and seizure carried out (see folios 151 to 155), insofar as control was required in the acts prior to and subsequent to the operation: that the undercover agent not associate with other persons before contacting the accused as seller, thus guaranteeing that he did not acquire drugs from a third party; the seizure from the accused of the identified [Nombre4] with which the purchase was made, which was executed in this case by the representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, who ultimately, together with the Drug Control Police, were those in charge of directing and controlling the purchase operation, replacing the Criminal Judge of the Preparatory Procedure, who was in another place for the purpose of carrying out the search and seizure ordered at the defendant’s house, and who contacts the latter and the evidence collected at the purchase site **forty-five minutes** after his detention by the police forces and the prosecutor, who indicated to the Judge at that time that when [Nombre20] was detained , “[Nombre21] voluntarily”, he handed over the previously identified [Nombre4], when he was invited to display his belongings before proceeding to frisk him, the participation of any representative of the public defense being missed, who not only was not present to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the accused, who was already fully identified at the time of the final operation, but was also neither summoned nor invited to witness the actions carried out, aggravated by the absence of the judicial body. It should be noted on this topic, that while it is true, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated that the absence of defense counsel in initial investigative proceedings and in preliminary acts that will lead to the individualization of the accused does not violate due process and the right to a defense, **that is so, provided that there is sufficient participation and control by the guarantees judge** (among others, see vote number 6469-99, at 2:33 p.m. on September 18, 1999. Constitutional Chamber).* Based on the foregoing considerations, in this particular case, examined the action of the police, under the functional direction of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which had as a corollary the detention of the defendant and the seizure of some evidence, they become unsuitable to prove the illicit conduct charged (that the accused [Nombre20] was indeed engaged in the illicit trade of drugs, ruling out that his actions were provoked by the police), and also insufficient as evidentiary elements that provide effective support for the conviction handed down: the surveillance carried out previously and the corresponding purchases controlled by police officers; the evidence collected there; the testimonies of the police officers who participated in the operation, including that of the undercover officer, who repeated before the Judges the mechanics of the police investigative acts carried out; evidence efficient enough to support the *notitia criminis* that allowed the request to open the trial and the search and seizure carried out at the defendant’s dwelling house, which yielded a very small amount of seized drugs (half a cigarette and a “tocola” of marijuana), but not to prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, the hypothesis of the accusation, preserving only an indiciary character, insofar as the unjustified lack of jurisdictional control fostered a clear evidentiary imbalance to the detriment of the defendant’s interests. […] As this Chamber has held on other occasions in accordance with constitutional jurisprudence: “...although police activities of controlled drug purchases constitute a useful investigative mechanism to provide support for the ‘notitia criminis’ received and to legitimize subsequent actions that may affect fundamental rights (e.g., the search and seizure of a private enclosure), by themselves they are not sufficient to overcome the state of innocence of the accused, arriving at the necessary certainty of the commission of the crime. It is thus necessary for such types of investigative tools to be backed by other items of evidence that corroborate them beyond any doubt. (In this sense, the resolutions of this Chamber may be consulted: No. 270-02 at 3:55 p.m. on March 21, No. 1086-02 at 11:10 a.m. on October 25, and No. 1293-02 at 9:36 a.m. on December 20, 2002; all from the year 2002; as well as No. 78-04 at 9:10 a.m. on February 13, 2004). It is not about pointing out the need for ‘legal’ or ‘fixed’ evidence, but about specifying the evidentiary scope that can reasonably be recognized to certain investigative acts within the framework of a democratic rule of law that grants individual freedom and the principle of innocence a primary and fundamental value..” (cf. vote number 822-04, at 10:02 a.m. on July 9, 2004. Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice) […]”. Even if this position could be considered even more reasonable, at least, with regard to this case, it is clear that defense counsel had to be present and that proceeding could not be carried out without guaranteeing the right to technical defense. The evidence gathered by the prosecutor in this case, in open disrespect of the right to a defense, is illegitimate, and the purchase that preceded it, although carried out by the prosecutor, is nothing more than a controlled purchase like those carried out by the police, with the added difficulty that there are no records of prior frisk, nor of tailing, nor of delivery of money, and the prosecutor who acted did not testify as a witness, nor was he offered as evidence, since he is the same one who filed the accusation and appeared at trial. In the opinion of this Court, this proceeding, due to the characteristics present in this case, cannot be controlled by the prosecutor, nor can it be considered that his presence is a guarantee, because he collects incriminating evidence against a person already individualized as a suspect of a crime, thanks to prior investigations, so the right to a defense must be guaranteed, as a counterweight and guarantee of respect for that fundamental right.* Although from the considerations set forth in the cited jurisprudential precedent, it seems that the consideration emerges that in a final controlled purchase (outcome of the investigation), jurisdictional control is always required, and with it being clear that some Cassation Courts, including this very Chamber, for example, in Precedents number 2008-453, at 10:20 a.m., on September 26, and CED7, at 10:00 a.m., on November 14, both of 2008, have considered that such a requirement does not derive from the law and that it is only required when the outcome operation seeks to harm some fundamental right, for example when the activity takes place in a dwelling and entry is necessary for its search, the truth is that, to assess its evidentiary weight, this Chamber considers that it is required, when not in situations of urgency, the control and participation of at least a public defender, as an auditor of the manner in which such a proceeding was carried out, so that it could serve as a counterweight for the weighing of those elements, already within the proceedings themselves. If this participation does not occur and there is no plausible justification for it, the proceeding so carried out would not differ from a police-controlled purchase, despite the fact that, due to the harm to the guarantee of defense, given the conditions under which the action was taken, the evidence obtained from such intervention cannot be validly used in the proceedings. To do the opposite, i.e., to recognize that a proceeding under those conditions “has less validity,” as the Trial Court asserts, but to give admission and value to the evidence obtained, is simply to circumvent the right to a defense and the legal and constitutional norms that give it meaning. In reality, in the opinion of this Chamber, it cannot be stated that a final proceeding must be carried out in one way or another, and even, nor can it be affirmed that it is necessary in every case to carry it out, although the truth is that the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), which is a normative body of public order, is the one that indicates the manner in which certain acts must be carried out and has express sanctions when the right to a defense is harmed – Article 178 subsection a) *Cpp* .- and therefore, it is incumbent upon the adjudicator to verify compliance with the substantial requirements prescribed for certain acts, according to their nature. If the investigative strategy of the Public Prosecutor’s Office establishes carrying out that outcome operation in a certain manner, it will be for the judges to assess the legality and scope of what was done and of the evidence gathered, as well as the evidentiary weight that should be assigned to them. It is very important to mention, therefore, that this Chamber does not share the assessment and reasoning that the Trial Court makes to consider the frisk and search of the vehicle valid in this case. The adjudicators dismissed the arguments of the defense, making an individual, isolated, and fragmented analysis of each one of those proceedings, as if they were not interwoven with a prior intervention, fully coordinated and controlled with the purpose of obtaining evidence and detaining the suspect, all carried out without the participation of the defense.* The Trial Court thus referred to the possibility that the police have to carry out frisks, without an order from the prosecutor or judge, and cites Article 189 *Cpp.*, which, it argues, occurred in this case, so the presence of defense counsel was not necessary; in the same way, it analyzes the search of the vehicle and again cited the *Cpp*, Article 190, to state that the police do not need an order from the judge or prosecutor to search vehicles; finally, it again insisted that even though there were no frisk records for the collaborator in the first purchase on that day of March 25, nor tailing records, such acts, which the record should prove, can be credited by other means, in support of which it cites Article 136 *Cpp*. All these police powers have already been analyzed and are valid, when dealing with urgent, necessary, and indispensable situations for which the police are empowered to act and do not need any order. But it turns out that the Trial Court overlooked that this frisk, that vehicle search, and that detention did not result from an urgent, novel, flagrant situation, but from a completely controlled, anticipated, and planned operation, where each step was previously established, in order to proceed with the detention of the accused and obtain from him evidence prepared for that purpose. Therefore, an isolated and unlinked analysis of what really occurred in this case cannot be made, because that is reasoning that is valid (in theory, in the abstract) but inapplicable to the situation under analysis. Despite the knowledge of the norms that the Trial Court demonstrates, the same does not occur with Article 13 *Cpp*, a norm whose analysis and weighing is conspicuously absent, as well as its validity for this specific case, an article that is not mentioned at all in the judgment, nor is it taken into account in any way by the Trial Court, a norm that, therefore, appears completely diminished and unobserved. Moreover, some statements made in the ruling powerfully draw the attention of this Chamber, and it is not known what they correspond to nor what ideas lie behind them, for example, when it was stated, at the 14:14:30 recording: “*The Court does not judge urban legends, does not judge people’s tales, it judges facts that are brought to the attention of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and judges them through evidence not through, I repeat, urban legends that are presented by other persons (…)*”; similarly, the manner in which the issue of the difference noted in the criminalistics expert report regarding the amount of drugs (24 or 4 packages) when referring to the evidence obtained in the outcome or final operation, is surprising, because even though it is not questioned and one might think that it is, in effect, a material error, the statement of the Trial Court (recording at 14:14:10) in concluding that regardless of the quantity not matching, “*the truth and the important thing is that it contained drugs and that is what is important, regardless of the amount (…)*”, when what was expected was to weigh how much weight those circumstances could have in respect for the chain of custody, for example, of the evidence, which is an integral part of due process, so it is not so true that one can reason “regardless” that the quantities and weights do not coincide, provided it is drugs, that is what matters. The reasoning of the Trial Court, although clearly and forcefully stated, is contradictory, for it analyzes that the so-called final operation in this case, lacking jurisdictional control and defense control, is different, has a different value, but later, when weighing its validity, as the defense counsel rightly claims, it ends up reaffirming the entire action; despite the fact that the basis of its analysis is precisely that for the carrying out of that operation, there was already a reasonable indication, a well-founded suspicion from all the investigation, that [Nombre22] was committing a crime, despite insisting on this idea emphatically, it never manages to link the importance, under those present conditions, to respect for the right to a defense, as enshrined in the many times mentioned by this Chamber, Article 13 *Cpp*, and its link to Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and precisely all those elements on which the Trial Court insists that are present in this case – a prior investigation that allowed outlining and establishing the well-founded and reasonable suspicion of being before the perpetrator of a crime and the need to verify it with greater force for immediate detention – are precisely the grounds for the right to a defense to come into play, a detail of such weight that the Trial Court ignored. Hence, the claims of the defense must be upheld. Because they were gathered in disregard of the fundamental right to a defense and, therefore, in violation of due process, the frisk records on folios 40, 43, and 45, the money delivery record to the collaborator on folio 41, the seizure records on folios 46, 47, and 48, the search and seizure record carried out on the vehicle on folio 49, as well as the analysis results of the evidence obtained in that operation, are declared ineffective.”

“II- En nuestro sistema procesal penal, no existe la prueba legal tasada, es decir, no se impone a los sujetos procesales, la obligación de que determinados hechos sean acreditados con un específico o particular medio de prueba, al que se asigna de antemano un peso o valor. De manera que, en principio, todo hecho puede ser acreditado con cualquier medio de prueba, siempre y cuando sea legítimo ‑numeral 182 del Código Procesal Penal (en adelante Cpp.)-. La legitimidad es sustancial y formal, pues no sólo basta con la regularidad formal del acto, sino que sustancialmente la validez debe resultar del respeto a los derechos fundamentales y a las garantías procesales esenciales. Sólo cumpliendo tales requerimientos, puede estimarse un proceso justo, en respeto al debido proceso y solamente en esas condiciones es que la prueba puede ser válidamente considerada y valorada. En materia de la investigación de los delitos relacionados con la venta de drogas, especialmente, existe una estrategia de investigación que se ha difundido en nuestro medio y que participa en mucho, de las estrategias definidas desde la Convención de Naciones Unidas contra el Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes y Sustancias Psicotrópicas, aprobada por ley número 7198 del 1° de noviembre de 1990, además receptadas por la Ley sobre Estupefacientes, incluida la vigente, número 8204 del 11 de enero de 2002 (artículos 10 y 11). Nos referimos específicamente a la realización de compras controladas, logradas de los sospechosos de dedicarse a la actividad de venta de drogas, para cuya realización se echa mano de la figura del agente encubierto. Así, se logra policialmente verificar la información que se ha recibido, en cuanto a la dinámica de la actividad supuestamente realizada, la frecuencia, los sitios, así como el tipo y cantidad de droga que supuestamente se transa y el precio que se asigna. Ya la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional desde hace bastante tiempo, analizó la constitucionalidad de esta estrategia de investigación, validándola como tal, pese a lo cual, desde el punto de vista sustantivo, especificó que cada vez que un agente encubierto logra realizar una “compra” del sospechoso, no se configura delito alguno porque no se da la lesión al bien jurídico, desde que el agente no es consumidor, la venta no es real y todo lo relacionado con ese acercamiento está bajo el control policial, de manera que únicamente tendría valor como indicio, alcanzado de una diligencia de investigación, como cualquier otra, insuficiente, en todo caso, para sustentar una condenatoria, si no aparece reforzada con elementos de prueba independientes. Esta posición es sostenida por la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera y por los distintos Tribunales de Casación Penal del país (entre otras de la Sala Tercera, consúltense antecedentes número 162-98, de las 11:17 horas, del 20 de febrero de 1998, [Telf1], de las 10:55 horas, del 12 de noviembre de 2004; [Telf2], de las 11:15 horas, del 23 de diciembre de 2005; CED1, de las 9:05 horas, del 10 de noviembre de 2006; CED2, de las 9:55 horas, del 25 de mayo de 2007). Cómo debe reforzarse ese indicio que surge de las compras controladas policialmente y cómo debe finalizarse una investigación de esa naturaleza, es algo que corresponde definir al Ministerio Público y a la policía, dirigida por aquél. La definición de las estrategias de investigación es algo que compete establecer a quienes tienen a su cargo precisamente la labor de acopio de pruebas para verificar la comisión de un delito y sus autores o partícipes. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia ha contribuido a evidenciar cuándo una investigación ha sido exitosa –en términos de buenos resultados probatorios y de respeto a los derechos fundamentales-; cuándo ha sido insuficiente y cuándo ha sido ineficaz, por obtener prueba ilegítima que no puede utilizarse válidamente, por lesionar derechos fundamentales y ser inadmisible como elemento a considerar. Para medir y sopesar la eficiencia en una investigación en materia de drogas (como en cualquier investigación de cualquier otro delito), no sólo es suficiente valorar la estrategia de investigación y sus resultados tangibles (en evidencia física, material y detenciones) sino además y antes bien, puede afirmarse, si el camino utilizado para obtener esas pruebas y esos resultados, es respetuoso de los derechos fundamentales y las garantías procesales, o si son actos arbitrarios, de uso ilegítimo de las facultades policiales o de investigación que la ley ha diseñado. Muchos discursos que circulan en nuestro medio llevan a hacer creer que el respeto a los derechos y garantías fundamentales se constituye en un obstáculo para la persecución de los autores de delitos y para garantizar la paz y seguridad a la que tienen derecho todos los habitantes de nuestra Nación. En realidad, debe señalarse que el respeto de los derechos y garantías es una obligación de los llamados “agentes de la ley” (fiscales, policías, jueces) y solamente actuando en conformidad con el sistema diseñado constitucional, convencional y legalmente, puede apreciarse y valorarse el trabajo realizado en una investigación y considerarse válida la prueba y las conclusiones obtenidas. Entonces, ese respeto no es una concesión ni una gracia sino un deber, para asegurar que los procedimientos policiales y las estrategias para investigar los hechos, solamente se realicen dentro de un marco de control y respeto, para garantizar a todos los ciudadanos que no hay abuso, arbitrariedad, falsedad o corrupción en las labores que realiza la policía y el Ministerio Público cuando investigan los hechos delictivos cometidos y colaboran en la identificación de sus responsables. Así, se ha señalado “La naturaleza excepcional de diligencias tendientes a restringir derechos fundamentales dentro del proceso penal, hace que su aplicación no sólo deba respetar parámetros de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, sino que además, obliga a contar con un control jurisdiccional que se refleje –de manera inexorable - en una resolución que exponga en forma diáfana los motivos por los que resulta necesario transgredir determinados derechos constitucionales. Dichos requisitos deben cumplirse en diligencias como intervención de las comunicaciones y allanamiento, que si bien es cierto en esta última se permite en casos muy excepcionales prescindir de una orden de juez, la utilización de ambas encuentra un límite intrínseco en la idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad de la medida. El respeto a esas condiciones que se exigen constitucionalmente, constituye un freno al ejercicio del poder estatal y -de manera correlativa- una garantía para el imputado en el sentido de que su esfera de intimidad, su domicilio y demás derechos fundamentales, no serán vulnerados mediante actuaciones ilegítimas producidas en el ejercicio del poder abusivo, sino, dentro de un marco de constitucionalidad reflejado en cada una de las actuaciones que tendrán como fin el desarrollo del proceso penal en un Estado de Derecho. II.- Es precisamente por la importancia de los derechos que pueden resultar lesionados, que las formalidades que preceden a actuaciones propias de una investigación no pueden ser soslayadas por las autoridades policiales, ni por los jueces que tienen a su cargo el examen de legitimidad de la prueba. Debe tenerse claro, que no se trata del mero afán de cumplir con ritualismos, sino de una garantía constitucional que toma vida al momento en que un órgano jurisdiccional expone razonadamente los motivos por los que resulta indispensable para efectos del proceso, vulnerar derechos fundamentales cuya tutela deriva de la misma Constitución Política […]”. [Telf3], de las 8:45 horas, del 11 de febrero de 2005 de la Sala Tercera. Se autoriza ciertamente a estos agentes el uso de la fuerza, de medios coercitivos y de lesión de ciertos derechos fundamentales, con intervención, en estos últimos casos, de la autoridad del juez, necesarios para poder llevar adelante la tarea de lograr la identificación y sanción de los responsables de un delito, pero se da al mismo tiempo el marco en que tal fuerza y tales lesiones deben y pueden ser realizadas. Lo demás es abuso, arbitrariedad, inadmisible en un Estado de Derecho. La carta de presentación, en consecuencia, de una buena investigación, es el respeto a los procedimientos y a los derechos y garantías fundamentales, que permiten conseguir resultados exitosos desde la óptica del Estado de Derecho, teniendo claro, desde luego, que el rigor científico con el que se conduzcan las pesquisas (labor que corresponde realizar a la policía, en primera instancia, en cuanto a recopilación de evidencias materiales, su custodia y traslado a los Departamentos correspondientes), también tiene un peso indiscutible. La jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, en especial en el precedente número 5573-96, de las 11:06 horas, del 18 de octubre de 1996, estableció, respecto de las compras controladas policialmente, lo siguiente: “[…] La doctrina distingue claramente dos figuras, que continuamente son relacionadas con lo que se conoce como delito experimental: el agente provocador y el agente encubierto, pero lo cierto es que no siempre que participa un agente encubierto, existe provocación, es decir, no siempre el agente encubierto determina al sujeto investigado a cometer un delito -que es lo que hace el agente provocador-, sino que generalmente interviene cuando el delito ha sido consumado varias veces o se está cometiendo ya. En cuanto al delito experimental, debe señalarse que es una creación doctrinal aplicable -en principio- a cualquier figura delictiva común, cuya particularidad radica en que se inicia por provocación o instigación de un oficial de policía, de un tercero colaborador de ésta, o de un sujeto particular, de manera tal que el iter criminis se inicia en apariencia, pero de antemano el provocador, llámese Estado por medio de la policía o su colaborador, o el sujeto particular, tienen controlado todo el desarrollo de la conducta y, aun cuando en apariencia el autor o los autores del hecho estén llevando a cabo el delito, según su plan, lo cierto es que no existe peligro para el bien jurídico ni posibilidad de consumación del hecho, porque su desarrollo está siendo controlado, para evitar precisamente que eso suceda. Es pues, un “experimento”, en el que nunca se producirá la consumación, ni habrá peligro o lesión para el bien jurídico tutelado. Por estas razones, además de otras que la doctrina penal discute, como el hecho de que en esos supuestos -se señala- existe, desde el punto de vista del sujeto activo, un delito imposible, por darse un “error de tipo”, por no existir dolo en el instigador, etc., lo cierto es que esta acción no es delictiva y por lo tanto no es merecedora de pena, pues no es más que un experimento sin trascendencia para los bienes tutelados por el ordenamiento jurídico y que pretende proteger la norma penal. Esto es en líneas generales lo que plantea la doctrina al respecto. Pero no compete a la Sala incursionar en esos campos, ni delimitar en demasía el concepto doctrinal del delito experimental, pues esos son extremos propios para ser dilucidados por las autoridades jurisdiccionales de lo penal. En los antecedentes citados, esta Sala señala que el delito experimental no puede dar base a un juzgamiento con consecuencias penales independientes, pues como se dijo, es un “experimento”. Se ha señalado además que sí puede ser elemento probatorio para acreditar otro hecho, puntualizando que en todo caso nunca podría ser única prueba. Esta última afirmación merece ser clarificada. Los operativos que realiza la policía, no son en sí mismos delictivos, pues serían delito experimental en la mayoría de los casos, o bien, situaciones en que los oficiales o sus colaboradores actúan como “agentes encubiertos”, haciéndose pasar por terceros que concurren a corroborar que una persona ya se dedica a una determinada actividad delictiva, que en todo caso ya se producía o se había consumado con anterioridad a esta participación del agente policial. De ese operativo puede tenerse como resultado, suficientes indicios que permitan acreditar que la persona ya ha cometido un hecho delictivo, el que sólo se ve reforzado -desde el punto de vista probatorio- con el experimento. Por ejemplo, el policía que compra droga, esa venta en sí misma no es delito, porque no hay posibilidad alguna para que se lesione el bien jurídico protegido por la norma. Pero esa compra, puede tener fuerza probatoria para acreditar ‑dependiendo de las circunstancias que rodeen el caso concreto- que el vendedor se dedica habitualmente a esa actividad, porque ya la venta, aunque de cantidades mínimas, indica que se poseía esa droga con fines de comercialización o suministro, acción que también resulta penada por la ley. En esas condiciones, especialmente por el principio de libertad probatoria que rige en nuestro medio, dependerá del caso concreto, y de la valoración de la prueba a la luz de las reglas de la sana crítica, determinar si es suficiente la prueba para arribar a la necesaria demostración de culpabilidad en el hecho, exigida constitucionalmente en el artículo 39, en el entendido de que ese hecho, no es el experimento o la actuación realizada con participación del agente encubierto en sí, sino otro hecho que eventualmente con la prueba obtenida del operativo se ve acreditado. Ese juicio corresponde realizarlo a los jueces penales de mérito, y su control eventual le compete a la Sala de Casación, mediante la valoración de la suficiencia de la fundamentación del fallo. La rigurosidad que debe tenerse en esta materia de “experimentos” u operativos simulados, se debe a que se trata de preconstitución de prueba contra el acusado. Por ello, el juzgador debe ser exigente en cuanto a la valoración de este tipo de operativos. La intervención en ellos del juez de la fase de investigación, como garante de la legalidad de la prueba es lo recomendable, pero de antemano no podría negarse valor a un operativo encubierto si esta participación del juez no se da. Lo cierto es que, reiterando lo que esta Sala y su jurisprudencia han manifestado, la intervención del juez es indispensable cuando se pretenda incursionar o lesionar derechos fundamentales, por ejemplo, si se pretende realizar un allanamiento; si es necesario realizar una intervención telefónica, en fin, si el operativo incluye la afectación de algún derecho fundamental. En los demás casos, el juez al valorar la prueba obtenida de las investigaciones policiales, debe ser particularmente exigente respecto de la existencia de indicios que legitimen el operativo encubierto, de modo que no sirva como pretexto para que las autoridades tienten a los sospechosos y los induzcan a ser autores de hechos delictivos que a lo mejor no tenían planeado realizar, actuando como típicos agentes provocadores, porque ese proceder de la policía es inconstitucional. Su misión no es provocar delitos, sino investigar los hechos delictivos que se cometan y aprehender a sus presuntos autores, sin detrimento de la función preventiva por excelencia que le corresponde a la policía administrativa, que puede actuar como policía de investigación, en colaboración o en defecto de la intervención de la policía judicial. Así, si dentro de un operativo policial realizado con agentes encubiertos, la única prueba existente es precisamente el experimento o lo realizado por el agente encubierto, corresponderá a los jueces penales en el caso concreto determinar si esa prueba es suficiente para acreditar el hecho delictivo que se investigaba, en el entendido de que nunca podría condenarse por el hecho experimental, que según se expuso, no resulta ser delito […]” (destacados suplidos). Se matizan en este precedente, las afirmaciones que la propia instancia constitucional había realizado, al señalar que las compras controladas en ningún caso podrían dar base a una condenatoria, afirmaciones que se habían hecho en los precedentes número 0477-94, de las 15:26 horas del 25 de enero y 1169-94, de las 10:57 horas, del 2 de marzo, ambos de 1994, porque, con buen criterio, se señala que todo dependerá de la calidad de la investigación y de la prueba y ello solamente puede analizase a la luz de cada caso concreto. En realidad, podría ser que la investigación se basase únicamente en compras controladas policialmente, pero con un alto grado de control y calidad, por ejemplo, porque se han registrado en vídeo, de modo que se tiene un registro independiente de la sola declaración del oficial; sin embargo, además sería necesario que se hayan realizado vigilancias frecuentes en el sitio y que se hayan registrado, elementos que evidencian que, con independencia de las compras controladas, la persona sospechosa se dedica a la venta indiscriminada de droga; además, todo ello se refuerza de manera importante cuando se logra en debate la declaración del colaborador policial. Esto último cobra relevancia, porque hay que señalar que no existe una autorización para prescindir en todo caso y en cualquier caso, de la declaración del agente encubierto o “colaborador”, como parecieran entenderlo los fiscales y las autoridades policiales. Desde luego que dependiendo de las condiciones en que se dé la infiltración, el tipo de delincuencia investigada (si es organizada o no), podría ser que en efecto, la integridad física o la vida del agente encubierto pudiera correr peligro. En tal caso, el sistema ha diseñado varias opciones, sin que pueda considerarse que existe una autorización plena para no hacer comparecer al encubierto. En el artículo 11 de la Ley 8204 ya mencionada, en lo que interesa, señala “En las investigaciones, la policía podrá servirse de colaboradores o informantes, cuya identificación deberá mantener en reserva, con el objeto de garantizarles la integridad. S alguno de ellos está presente en el momento de la comisión del hecho delictivo, se informará de tal circunstancia a la autoridad judicial competente, sin necesidad de revelar la identidad. Salvo si se estima indispensable su declaración en cualquier fase del proceso, el tribunal le ordenará comparecer y, en el interrogatorio de identificación, podrá omitir los datos que puedan depararle algún riesgo a él o a su familia. Dicho testimonio podrá ser incorporado automáticamente al juicio plenario mediante lectura, excepto si se juzga indispensable escucharlo de viva voz. En este caso, rendirá su testimonio solo ante el tribunal, el fiscal, el imputado y su defensor; para ello, se ordenará el desalojo temporal de la sala […]”. Queda claro que esta ley, no exime ni autoriza a prescindir de la declaración del agente encubierto o colaborador en todo caso. Además, debe señalarse que esta ley es anterior a la recientemente aprobada ley 8720 del 4 de marzo de 2009, que regula, en una ley especial, el tema de la protección procesal y extraprocesal de las víctimas y los testigos, que se aplica ahora plenamente a la protección que podría asignarse al agente encubierto para lograr su declaración como testigo, que en efecto, en caso de que sí haya participado como tal, adquiere esa condición y por ende, su testimonio resultaría relevante y, en ocasiones, esencial. Desde luego que la prueba de cargo, su elección, es una decisión del órgano acusador, en este caso del Ministerio Público al formular la acusación, de manera que corresponderá a los fiscales ponderar la calidad y peso de la prueba con la que decidan llevar a una persona a juicio. Así, continuando con la línea de análisis que se desarrollaba, una investigación podría sustentarse en compras controladas y vigilancias. Si tales intervenciones policiales se han registrado de manera independiente si se han realizado de modo tal que encuentren solidez, podrían eventualmente ser base de una condenatoria, porque se tiene un mayor respaldo que la sola declaración de los oficiales de policía o las solas compras controladas. El llamado a la rigurosidad en su valoración, que tan puntualmente hace la jurisprudencia constitucional, es precisamente porque se considera insuficiente que se condene a una persona únicamente con el dicho de los oficiales de policía, que han actuado en compras controladas policialmente y que en este entendido han producido prueba contra el acusado, de la que únicamente la policía puede dar cuenta. Tales diligencias de investigación, se consideran válidas como tales, pues la ley les faculta a los investigadores de la policía para realizar las pesquisas, no obstante que por sí solas, apenas acreditan la existencia de indicios, pero nunca serían suficientes para condenar, si solamente se sustentan en el dicho policial y la evidencia supuestamente obtenida en tales acercamientos o compras controladas. La ponderación del tipo de investigación y los elementos que arroja, únicamente puede hacerse en cada caso concreto, teniendo claro que si solamente se cuenta con compras controladas policialmente, apoyadas, a su vez, solo en el relato de los oficiales, esta prueba sería insuficiente. Si estas compras controladas policialmente, por ejemplo, se respaldan además, con registros en vídeos; si se han realizado vigilancias registradas en video, constantes y con cierta frecuencia, o el menos, documentadas en actas; si además se cuenta en juicio con el testimonio del o los colaboradores encubiertos que ha realizado los supuestos contactos y se logra establecer que, con independencia de esos contactos, la persona sospechosa ha realizado una actividad independiente, entonces, esa investigación de esa naturaleza y los elementos que aporta, podría tener un peso distinto de aquella que solamente se apoya en el dicho de los oficiales, como bien lo ha señalado la jurisprudencia constitucional. Estas compras controladas policialmente, son meros actos de investigación y como tales, no pueden ser equiparados a los actos que, como se analizará más adelante, deban realizarse como anticipos jurisdiccionales de prueba, con control jurisdiccional. Son meros y simples actos de investigación que, cumpliendo los requisitos esperables (actas, firmas de los actuantes, registro de la requisa previa al colaborador, respeto a la custodia de las evidencias, etc.), pueden ser apreciados como indicios y que incluso pueden adquirir mayor fortaleza en tanto haya medios independientes de control de tales diligencias (videos, actas, testimonios de terceros, etc.). Ahora bien, de los planteamientos de la impugnante pareciera desprenderse que parte del supuesto de que en toda investigación de esta naturaleza, es necesario realizar un “operativo final” que debe tener, en consecuencia, la participación de la defensa. Para responder a este planteamiento, de nuevo hay que traer a colación la inexistencia de un sistema de prueba legal tasada que obligue a realizar en toda investigación de drogas, una diligencia final. Desde luego que es claro que una investigación de esta naturaleza, aunque podría prolongarse en el tiempo, tampoco puede convertirse en una situación indefinida, por lo que es esperable, según las reglas de la experiencia, que las pesquisas vayan decantándose por una conclusión, según se vayan desarrollando los acontecimientos y siempre teniendo en cuenta que todo dependerá de las condiciones presentes en cada caso concreto. El alcance de ese desenlace y las implicaciones que pueda tener, delimitarán cuál es la forma prevista en la Constitución y en la ley para realizarla. Así, si para llevar adelante una investigación, resulta necesario intervenir comunicaciones o secuestrar documentos privados, se requiere necesariamente la autorización y control de un juez para ello; también, por ejemplo, para incursionar en el domicilio de un sospechoso, de igual forma se requiere autorización y actuación directa del juez, como también si es necesario incautar correspondencia o documentación privada. El juez que autoriza esos actos, debe hacer un análisis fundado de la existencia de indicios comprobados que autoricen esa lesión a los derechos fundamentales así como la necesidad, utilidad proporcionalidad de la medida en atención a las características del caso y al peso de los indicios existentes y por ello la calidad de la investigación que precede o antecede a dichas solicitudes debe ser cuidadosamente ponderada por el juez. La ley también prevé que todo acto que lesione derechos fundamentales, que sea definitivo o irreproductible o bien cuando sea necesario recibir una declaración, que, ante la concurrencia de algunos elementos calificados que la ley desarrolla, se presuma no lograrse en debate, se debe realizar la diligencia según las reglas de lo que el legislador denominó anticipo jurisdiccional de prueba, regulado en el artículo 293 del Código Procesal Penal. Son tres supuestos que pueden complementarse pero no se excluyen entre sí. La jurisprudencia constitucional antes citada, explica que frente a toda posible lesión a derechos fundamentales que vaya a darse por cualquier diligencia de investigación, es necesaria la presencia y participación del juez y esta exigencia es ineludible, si se quiere lograr prueba que pueda ser legítimamente incorporada al proceso y no incurrir en actuaciones abusivas y arbitrarias, que no sólo pueden dar al traste con una investigación, sino que eventualmente, podrían hasta ser delictivas (vgr. allanamientos ilegales, interceptación ilegítima de comunicaciones, etc.). Se explicó ya que las compras controladas policialmente, son meras diligencias de investigación y no requieren la presencia y control del juez ni de la defensa, pues son meros actos de investigación, que tendrán un valor indiciario, si se han verificado los requisitos formales de tal intervención policial. En este sentido, la Sala Tercera, en el antecedente número [Telf4], del 20 de mayo de 2005, señaló “las compras controladas de drogas, hechas por la policía o con el auxilio de colaboradores, constituyen herramientas de investigación que no requieren ser supervisadas por un juez. Se trata de labores de carácter propiamente investigativo que se encuentran a cargo de los órganos competentes (policía, Ministerio Público), no afectan derechos fundamentales y se ajustan a derecho, siempre que se realicen cumpliendo ciertas exigencias que garanticen su pureza y su licitud (v. gr.: que no se conviertan en una provocación a delinquir, que se adopten medidas para asegurar el correcto manejo de lo obtenido, entre otras). Tales compras, al igual que los seguimientos y las vigilancias, forman parte de un método que permite a las autoridades investigadoras obtener mayor y mejor información de que, en efecto, se está llevando a cabo una actividad delictiva y la manera en que se ejecuta, pero, en virtud de que, como se dijo, no afectan los derechos fundamentales de persona alguna y revisten una naturaleza eminentemente investigativa, el control del juez se efectuará a posteriori, en la hipótesis de que se inicie un proceso penal y ese control supondrá el examen de todas las actuaciones policiales y del Ministerio Público, a fin de determinar si se apegaron a derecho […]”. En el mismo sentido se ha pronunciado el Tribunal de Casación del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, entre otros, en el antecedente número [Telf5], de las 15:10 horas, del 1° de octubre de 2010. Esta posición, compartida por esta Cámara, analiza las compras controladas policialmente en su justa dimensión, como meras diligencias de investigación, legítimas, que permiten obtener información de calidad sobre la efectiva (o no) realización de una actividad delictiva y su presunto responsable, para que el Ministerio Público, quien supervisa la actuación policial en la dirección funcional, tome las decisiones sobre el rumbo de las pesquisas y, eventualmente, las diligencias que sean necesario realizar. Varias compras controladas, realizadas legítimamente y además, acompañadas de registros y vigilancias frecuentes, dan solidez a una hipótesis razonable de sospecha sobre una o varias personas determinadas. Y aquí es donde entran a escena las decisiones del (o la) fiscal respecto al desenlace de la investigación: si para avanzar es necesario lesionar derechos fundamentales, es la Constitución y la ley procesal las que señalan cómo deben realizarse esas actuaciones; si ya, valorando la entidad de los indicios que la investigación policial arroja, decide que hay elementos suficientes para realizar una diligencia con mayor valor probatorio, el sistema impone la obligación al Ministerio Público, de asegurar esa diligencia, con, al menos, la presencia del defensor. El artículo 13 del Código Procesal Penal señala: “Desde el primer momento de la persecución penal y hasta el fin de la ejecución de la sentencia, el imputado tendrá derecho a la asistencia y defensa letrada. Para tales efectos, podrá elegir un defensor de su confianza, pero, de no hacerlo, se le asignará un defensor público. El derecho de defensa es irrenunciable. Se entenderá por primer acto del procedimiento, cualquier actuación judicial o policial, que señale a una persona como posible autor de un hecho punible o partícipe en él […]” (destacados suplidos). En algunos casos, la propia jurisprudencia constitucional ha considerado que incluso no es necesaria la presencia del defensor, cuando, por ejemplo, en las diligencias ha estado presente el juez. Así, en el precedente número 1999-6469, de las 14:33 horas, del 18 de agosto de 1999, señaló “En el caso concreto, el recurrente señala que su derecho fundamental al debido proceso ha sido afectado gravemente porque en las diligencias iniciales llevadas a cabo por parte de la policía, consistentes en la preparación de los elementos de convicción para hacerlo incurrir en el delito por el que se le acusó posteriormente, no se dio oportunidad de que participara un defensor público que representara sus intereses. A criterio de la Sala, y cuanto se refiere exclusivamente a velar por los derechos fundamentales del recurrente, resulta suficiente la participación del Juez Penal que debe velar por el efectivo cumplimiento de las garantías fundamentales durante tales actuaciones. Al respecto, debe recordarse que uno de los principales cambios llevados a cabo con el nuevo Código Procesal Penal, radica en la naturaleza de la participación del órgano jurisdiccional que en el actual sistema sirve, entre otras cosas, para controlar que la labor de los órganos de investigación, se lleve a cabo conforme a las reglas y principios que obligan a respetar la dignidad del ser humano y en particular sus derechos constitucionales. De esa forma, resulta suficiente que el juez competente haya supervisado y ejercido control sobre las actuaciones preliminares que señala el recurrente para que se hayan satisfecho los requerimientos del debido proceso a nivel constitucional [….]”. Por su parte, la jurisprudencia de la Sala Penal también ha considerado necesario, no sólo la presencia del juez en las llamadas “compras finales” que también se han llamado “compras controladas jurisdiccionalmente”, en especial, cuando se requieren en forma previa para legitimar la lesión a un derecho fundamental, por ejemplo, el registro de un domicilio, sino que han considerado legítimas actuaciones del Ministerio Público, preparadas para obtener prueba directa del sospechoso y proceder de inmediato a su detención, cuando en tales diligencias, el ente fiscal ha actuado con la presencia y control de un defensor. Así, por ejemplo, en el precedente número [Telf6], de las 10:26 horas del 25 de junio de 2004, planteó lo siguiente: “es necesario indicar que cuando se realiza un operativo de comprobación de venta de drogas y se opta por la utilización de un agente encubierto, toda la actividad desplegada por las autoridades policiales durante la investigación debe ser cuidadosamente considerada y es tenida como una hipótesis de sospecha que debe ser confirmada o descartada mediante elementos de prueba obtenidos de forma independiente a la misma, a efectos de poder acreditar la responsabilidad penal de quien es señalado como autor o partícipe en la narcoactividad que se persigue [...] Cuando para demostrar una actividad delictiva preexistente, en este caso de narcoactividad, se opta por la introducción en el grupo criminal de un agente encubierto como parte de la investigación policial, es indispensable que se haga posteriormente una corroboración independiente de la información obtenida por dicho agente, que culmine con la obtención de elementos probatorios obtenidos bajo supervisión jurisdiccional que corone la tesis policial de responsabilidad penal de autor o partícipe […]”. Igual tesis se afirmó en la resolución número [Telf7], de las 8:57 horas del 25 de junio de 2004, que consideró que “no resultan suficientes para sustentar un juicio de certeza acerca de su efectiva responsabilidad en la actividad de venta de drogas que se estaba llevando a cabo en la vivienda donde ella habitaba junto con otras dos personas, de donde llevan razón los juzgadores en cuanto afirman que el hecho de que el oficial [Nombre1] afirmara en juicio que la imputada le haya vendido drogas en una oportunidad, ello el día 18 de noviembre (sin ningún elemento adicional que corrobore su dicho) no permitiría tener por demostrado que ésta se estaba dedicando a esa actividad, pues no podría dejarse de lado que se trató de una simple venta controlada llevada a cabo por un oficial de policía (actuando como agente encubierto) sin ningún tipo de supervisión o fiscalización jurisdiccional o fiscal, sin que por lo demás se hayan recabado elementos adicionales que vinieran a corroborar que ella en efecto se estaba dedicando a esa actividad. Debido a ello, no se advierte ningún vicio lógico por el hecho de que el tribunal de instancia asegure que el dicho del oficial [Nombre2] , en cuanto describe y afirma esa compra “experimental” (en realidad se trata de una compra controlada), que supuestamente fue observada por varios de los oficiales de la Policía de Control de Drogas, deba calificarse como “un acto puramente investigativo […]”. La misma posición se aprecia en el antecedente número [Telf8] ya citado y, además, este criterio se reiteró en las resoluciones número 2001-00781, del 20 de agosto de 2001, [Telf9], de las 9:45 horas del 19 de enero, [Telf10], de las 16:40 horas, del 16 de setiembre, ambas de 2007. Esta posición ha tenido matices, precisamente porque nuestro sistema no es de prueba legal tasada y porque la calidad de la prueba y sus posibilidades de control deben analizarse a la luz de cada caso concreto, sin que, en todo caso, se dejen de apreciar ciertas inconsistencias y criterios encontrados en la posición de la jurisprudencia nacional. Si en la investigación de los delitos de venta de droga, se van a lesionar o no derechos fundamentales, este es una pauta que ha fungido en algunos precedentes jurisprudenciales, siguiendo el criterio orientador de la Sala Constitucional, en el precedente 1999-6469 de cita, que además, se basa en las exigencias constitucionales y legales, para distinguir cuándo es necesario ese control jurisdiccional en el llamado “operativo final”. Se ha dicho que si no se va a dar lesión a los derechos fundamentales la presencia del juez de garantías, no es necesaria. En este sentido, por ejemplo, el antecedente [Telf11], de las 11:10 horas, del 8 de febrero de 2002, en el que la Sala Tercera señaló “Ahora bien, a fin de resolver la inconformidad planteada, debe acotarse que en el operativo final realizado en una investigación sobre tenencia de drogas para la venta, la asistencia e intervención del juez sólo resulta necesaria, cuando sea indispensable limitar derechos fundamentales de las personas, como sucede en caso de allanamiento de morada. Correctamente lo razona el sentenciador, cuando indica que la presencia de una autoridad jurisdiccional era innecesaria, pues el negocio ilícito se realizaba en un lugar público: la aceras de la localidad (confrontar folios 119 y 120). En el mismo orden de ideas conviene aclarar, que el ilícito por el que se condenó a [Nombre3] , en realidad ya lo venía ejecutando antes de ser capturado, pues las acciones emprendidas evidenciaron la acción indiscriminada de venta que hacía a consumidores habituales. Tal como lo ha establecido esta Sala, de acuerdo al principio de libertad probatoria, salvo con las excepciones relativas a los derechos fundamentales, no puede supeditarse la validez de la actuación policial al control jurisdiccional, máxime en casos como el presente, en que se contó con una clara y concreta coordinación con el Ministerio Público. Al respecto debe considerarse, que: “... En términos generales, en materia de psicotrópicos, el operativo final constituye un acto policial de comprobación de una actividad delictiva en curso y a la vez, se presenta como un medio de prueba idóneo para sustentar el reclamo del acusado. Empero, por no existir en nuestro sistema de valoración, la tasación de prueba, no puede exigirse que la “venta controlada” contando con la presencia de la autoridad jurisdiccional y con la utilización de [Nombre4] previamente identificados, sea el único medio de prueba idóneo para fundamentar un fallo condenatorio por venta de drogas ...”. (Confrontar Voto No. 1.033-98, de 8:45 horas del 30 de octubre de 1.998. En el mismo sentido, los siguientes votos: CED3 , de 9:26 horas del 12 de noviembre de 1.999, CED4 , de 9:20 horas del 31 de marzo de 2.000, CED5 , de 10:30 horas del 16 de febrero de 2.001) [….].” Nótese que se afirma, en la misma línea que hemos expuesto en esta sentencia, que no es posible exigir que en toda investigación por el delito de venta de droga, sea necesario realizar una diligencia de desenlace u operativo final que incluya la individualización de [Nombre4] y una compra con control a partir de esa naturaleza. También se ha expuesto, criterio que esta Cámara, ya se dijo, comparte, que no es necesario que exista control jurisdiccional ni de la defensa, en las compras controladas policialmente, que son meros actos de investigación con valor orientador e indiciario únicamente, aún cuando, dependiendo de la calidad de los registros de esta intervención, por permitir un control independiente y fuentes distintas de la mera intervención y relato policial o sus documentos, puedan llegar a adquirir mayor solidez e incluso dar base a una decisión condenatoria. Sin embargo, es de hacer notar que a pesar de que la jurisprudencia de la Sala Penal, en este caso, no ha sido constante, sí se nota, especialmente en jurisprudencia reciente, que se exige un control (bien de la defensa, bien del juez) cuando se va a dar una intervención que va a producir prueba directa contra el acusado y es inminente su detención, en una operación controlada, como sucede cuando se utiliza ya dinero individualizado, bien por el juez, bien por el fiscal, pues se le da a este acto, un vocación probatoria distinta, de la que tienen las meras compras controladas por la policía. Es decir, aún cuando se acepta incluso que el Ministerio Público puede individualizar el dinero a utilizar (antecedente número [Telf12], de las 10:20 horas, del 7 de junio de 2002 de la Sala Tercera) es claro y patente en la posición jurisprudencial de la Sala Penal y mucho más aún, en la de la Sala Constitucional, que lo importante es el control que, bien la contraparte -la defensa, en este caso- o el juez de garantías, puede realizar de esa actividad, por los efectos que se esperan y producen de una intervención de esta naturaleza: prueba incriminatoria directa contra el acusado, como es el hallazgo en su poder, del dinero previamente individualizado y que permite lograrlo directamente con la actividad ilícita que la policía, en su investigación, ha podido perfilar a nivel indiciario. Debe, en consecuencia, haber control de que ese dinero se individualizó previamente a su utilización; que se entregó al colaborador o encubierto en forma previa y que éste fue requisado; que se le dio seguimiento y vigilancia al colaborador o encubierto, luego, que hubo contacto y entrega y, posteriormente, que se logró aparente droga de ese contacto, para proceder a la detención dirigida a requisar al sospechoso y verificar, si, en efecto, porta el dinero individualizado, prueba contundente de su contacto con el colaborador, en la actividad que supuestamente, realizaba en forma indiscriminada y a otras personas distintas de los colaboradores y que legitima su inmediata detención. ¿Y por qué es necesario ese control? Podría pensarse que basta que sea el fiscal el que actúe y supervise todo. De hecho, existen criterios jurisprudenciales en ese sentido, por ejemplo, el antecedente número [Telf5], de las 15:10 horas, del 1° de octubre antes citado, el Tribunal de Casación del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, que al respecto, estimó: “En lo que atañe al "operativo final", es decir: aquel en que se realiza la última compra controlada de drogas, dando uso normalmente a dinero identificado de previo y donde se detiene a los vendedores y se les decomisa la droga, el dinero y cualquier otra evidencia de interés, esta Cámara no comparte la tesis del tribunal a quo que, con apoyo en la sentencia No. 9-07, dictada por la Sala Tercera a las 9:45 horas de 19 de enero de 2007, exige la participación del juez de garantías. En realidad, esa misma Sala no ha sostenido un criterio uniforme y, así, en resoluciones como la No. 780-01, de 20 de agosto de 2001 y la No. 414-05, de 20 de mayo de 2005, señaló que las compras controladas no demandan la presencia del juez penal. En el último fallo se expuso: "... las compras controladas de drogas, hechas por la policía o con el auxilio de colaboradores, constituyen herramientas de investigación que no requieren ser supervisadas por un juez. Se trata de labores de carácter propiamente investigativo que se encuentran a cargo de los órganos competentes (policía, Ministerio Público), no afectan derechos fundamentales y se ajustan a derecho, siempre que se realicen cumpliendo ciertas exigencias que garanticen su pureza y su licitud (v. gr.: que no se conviertan en una provocación a delinquir, que se adopten medidas para asegurar el correcto manejo de lo obtenido, entre otras). Tales compras, al igual que los seguimientos y las vigilancias, forman parte de un método que permite a las autoridades investigadoras obtener mayor y mejor información de que, en efecto, se está llevando a cabo una actividad delictiva y la manera en que se ejecuta, pero, en virtud de que, como se dijo, no afectan los derechos fundamentales de persona alguna y revisten una naturaleza eminentemente investigativa, el control del juez se efectuará a posteriori, en la hipótesis de que se inicie un proceso penal y ese control supondrá el examen de todas las actuaciones policiales y del Ministerio Público, a fin de determinar si se apegaron a derecho". Esta Cámara comparte los razonamientos expresados en la sentencia recién transcrita, pues las compras controladas de drogas (incluida la del "operativo final") no implican afectación de derechos fundamentales y es ese el parámetro fundamental al que acudió el legislador para exigir la intervención del juez de garantías. Tampoco se requiere su presencia para detener a una persona o decomisar algún objeto (salvo que para ello fuere preciso ordenar el registro de un lugar habitado) y, desde el punto de vista lógico, no existe razón alguna para distinguir entre la última compra controlada de drogas y todas las que le precedieron y demandar la intervención del juez en una y no en las restantes, si todas ellas son jurídicamente idénticas. A fin de cuentas, el hecho de que la policía actúe sin la participación del juez en un acto en que legalmente puede hacerlo (de otro modo, se delegaría la función policial en la judicatura), se reduce a un problema de control posterior de licitud de la actuación y del examen de las probanzas con arreglo a la sana crítica para establecer si los elementos recogidos a través de esa actuación poseen aptitud probatoria o si, por algún motivo, resultaron desprovistos de ella (v. gr.: por un erróneo proceder en la cadena de custodia, porque las autoridades policiales no pudieron dar cuenta cabal de sus acciones y de que se ajustaron a derecho). Pese a la tesis de los jueces que esta Cámara no comparte, lo cierto es que el fallo de mérito se sustenta también en las razones examinadas en los Considerandos precedentes (las notorias deficiencias de la acusación y la escasa confiabilidad de la prueba testimonial) y ellas brindan a lo resuelto sólido asidero […]”. Por su parte, incluso la Sala Penal, que en muchos fallos ha sostenido la necesidad del control, no alcanza una línea constante y clara en su jurisprudencia, llegando a afirmar en algunas resoluciones, que incluso la propia policía puede identificar dinero y utilizarlo. Así, en el antecedente número [Telf12], de las 10:20 horas, del 7 de junio de 2002, oportunidad en la que analizó que esta individualización o identificación de dinero, no es un acto definitivo e irreproductible e incluso se razona que puede realizarlo la misma policía judicial. El alcance de esta posición puede apreciarse también en el antecedente número 0896-99, de 9:35 horas del 19 de julio de 1999, oportunidad en la que expresamente se indicó: “De acuerdo a las reglas que establece el nuevo Código Procesal Penal, no existe ningún obstáculo o prohibición para que el fiscal, como funcionario encargado de la investigación, identifique los [Nombre4] que serán utilizados en la compra controlada, salvo lo que pueda indicarse sobre la credibilidad de esa prueba cuando haya bases para ello. Según lo regula el numeral 62 de dicha normativa, “... El Ministerio Público ejercerá la acción penal en la forma establecida por la ley y practicará las diligencias pertinentes y útiles para determinar la existencia del hecho delictivo. Tendrá a su cargo la investigación preparatoria, bajo el control jurisdiccional en los actos que lo requieran ...”, de lo cual se colige que, por regla general, la investigación estará a cargo del fiscal, quien tiene la facultad de practicar directa e independientemente los actos necesarios a dichos efectos, salvo que -como excepción- estos requieran de control jurisdiccional o se trate de aquellos casos en los que corresponda aplicar las reglas del anticipo jurisdiccional de prueba. Como se entiende de lo expuesto, el acto de identificación de [Nombre4] a efectos de un operativo como el que nos ocupa, legalmente no requiere de orden o control jurisdiccionales. En todo caso, no todos los [Nombre4] utilizados en todas las compras controladas fueron identificados por la fiscalía (sólo los empleados el día trece de agosto de 1998), pues con anterioridad a esta fecha fue el Juez Contravencional de [Nombre5] quien, actuando como juez de garantías, se ocupó de ello (ver resolución de las 15:25 horas del 11 de agosto de 1998, folio 4), por lo que los alegatos de la defensa no son de recibo. En lo que respecta a la ausencia de acta de requisa del encubierto, si bien resulta conveniente que cuando dicha diligencia se realice la misma quede asentada por escrito, no existe ningún obstáculo para que, como aquí ocurrió, ello se acredite por otros medios probatorios lícitos tales como la prueba testimonial, pues de acuerdo al principio de libertad probatoria que contempla el artículo 182 ibídem, “... podrán probarse los hechos y las circunstancias de interés para la solución del caso, por cualquier medio de prueba permitido, salvo prohibición expresa de ley[... ]”. Esta posición se sostuvo en los primeros años de vigencia del Código Procesal, aunque se ha visto que en muchos antecedentes jurisprudenciales posteriores, se ha considerado, en una línea que sí puede calificarse de constante, e incluso que varía la posición recién citada, que se requiere de control jurisdiccional en el operativo de desenlace final, aunque también debe admitirse que antes que un problema de legitimidad, el alcance de las diligencias policiales y su valor, se reduce a un problema de peso probatorio, de suficiencia de elementos para condenar, siendo constante la línea en el sentido de que solo compras controladas policialmente, no son suficientes para apoyar una decisión condenatoria. “A mayor abundamiento, aún y cuando partiéramos de ese hecho (a saber, de la intervención de [Nombre6]. en las primeras transacciones que efectuó la policía), del estudio integral de las restantes probanzas no se deriva con absoluta certeza la existencia de la circunstancia agravante. En este sentido, véase que se hicieron tres compras controladas a [Nombre7]. los días 16, 26 y 28 de junio del 2001. Las dos primeras fueron efectuadas por la policía y solo la última contó con control jurisdiccional (folios 14 a 17, 18 a 20 y 38 frente y vuelto). En esta última ocasión, cabe agregar, quien actuó en asocio con [Nombre7]. fue el sentenciado [Nombre8] . Luego de esa transacción se realizó un allanamiento tanto en la vivienda del joven [Nombre9]. como en la casa de [Nombre7] . En el primer inmueble no se obtuvo ninguna evidencia del delito y ni siquiera se logró ubicar al menor de edad [Nombre10]. (folio 69 frente). En la segunda casa se encontraron rastros de droga (que cabe señalar, [Nombre7]. trató de destruir) y se encontró en poder de [Nombre8]. los [Nombre4] previamente identificados. Finalmente, en las cercanías de la vivienda de [Nombre7]. se ubicaron varios envoltorios que contenían droga ((folios 33 a 35 frente, 36 frente y vuelto, 37 frente, 40 frente y vuelto y 69 a 72 frente). Como se ve, acerca de la intervención de un menor de edad en la actividad ilícita, la prueba se reduce a dos transacciones efectuadas por la policía sin control jurisdiccional alguno. La versión policial en cuanto a la existencia del agravante, dicho en otras palabras, no fue confirmada a través de otros elementos de prueba obtenidos bajo la supervisión del juez de la etapa preparatoria o las partes del proceso. Si bien las diligencias efectuadas el día 28 de junio permitieron determinar que -tal y como lo sostenía la policía-, [Nombre7]. se dedicaba a la venta de drogas, no se pudo confirmar que lo hacía utilizando a un menor de edad, ya que en la transacción no intervino [Nombre10]. y en el allanamiento efectuado en la casa de este menor de edad no se encontró ninguna evidencia que lo vinculara con el ilícito[…]De tal suerte, es innegable que el Tribunal quebrantó las reglas de la sana crítica al derivar de las compras controladas y los resultados de las diligencias de allanamiento efectuadas la circunstancia agravante que contempla el artículo 71 inciso c) de la ley No. 7786 […]” Sala Tercera, [Telf2], de las 11:15 horas, del 23 de diciembre de 2005 (destacados son suplidos). Nótese de manera importante cómo se habla de la importancia del control por el juez o las partes, de esa actividad de desenlace, que produce prueba directa y “confirmatoria” de las pesquisas realizadas por la policía. Varias reflexiones y conclusiones es posible obtener de todo lo razonado y la jurisprudencia que se ha citado: nuestro sistema es de libre apreciación de la prueba y de libertad probatoria; No es posible, en consecuencia, especificar que un delito debe ser investigado de determinada manera o debe incluir necesariamente una determinada diligencia; la Constitución Política y la ley procesal establecen cuáles son los requisitos para la realización de pruebas o diligencias que afecten o lesionen derechos fundamentales, formalidades que debe el Ministerio Público respetar, sin opción alguna; finalmente, la estrategia de investigación la define el órgano acusador, mediante la dirección funcional de la policía y las decisiones que tome en el curso de la investigación, son de su entera responsabilidad: si falla en el alcance de éstas, si no logra darle solidez a las pesquisas o bien, si realiza diligencias sin cumplir los requerimientos legales o constitucionales, la validez, peso e importancia de tales elementos, corresponde ser ponderado por el juzgador. En criterio de esta Cámara, en la realización, por parte del Ministerio Público, de actividad probatoria que pueda resultar determinante, dirigida contra una persona de la que ya se tienen sólidos indicios de que realiza un hecho delictivo, que ya está individualizada a lo largo de una investigación en la que ha acopiado suficientes indicios de que esta persona está cometiendo un delito, debe garantizarse un adecuado control, que el sistema ya prevé y es el del derecho que tiene de contar con una defensa técnica, tal y como de manera diáfana lo señala el artículo 13 Cpp. De modo tal que no se está frente a un simple capricho, una concesión o una gracia que tiene el Ministerio Público o la propia policía en estos casos con estas características, sino que se trata del cumplimiento de los requisitos legales. No puede señalarse que en estos casos, con las características ya señaladas, la presencia de la defensa no es necesaria, pues se dan todos los requisitos que la ley establece para imponer el control del defensor: ya está el sospechoso individualizado y se han recopilado elementos indiciarios suficientes que lo señalan como probable autor de un delito, a lo largo de la investigación. Por ello, dependiendo de la naturaleza del caso y de la actuación, en las condiciones ya dichas, siempre es necesaria la presencia y control del defensor e incluso, además, del juez de garantías. Es una decisión trascendente que, a la luz del respeto de los derechos fundamentales, y el derecho de defensa lo es, así como de pureza probatoria, debe sopesar el Ministerio Público y actuar en consecuencia. Cualquiera que sea la decisión, los elementos que aporte como apoyo a su acusación, deberán en todo caso, ser ponderados por el juzgador a las luz de las exigencias legales y constitucionales y no por razones de mera conveniencia o utilidad. Y es que incluso el sistema procesal, dentro de una coherencia interna y amparado en el respeto de los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, contempla cómo actuar en situaciones urgentes, imprevistas, cómo proceder frente a imponderables, de manera que se contempla razonablemente la autorización para lesionar derechos fundamentales sin control jurisdiccional previo, a la policía e incluso a cualquier ciudadano, porque las circunstancias hacen tal autorización previa, irrazonable e imposible: así, todos los casos de allanamiento sin orden judicial, supuesto previsto incluso en la Constitución Política –numeral 23- y desarrollados en la ley procesal, artículo 197 Cpp.; la detención en flagrante delito, incluso practicada por cualquier persona, con la condición de que se ponga al detenido en el improrrogable plazo de 24 horas, a la orden de un juez -37 de la Constitución Política-. En el caso de los oficiales de policía que sorprendan en flagrante delito a alguien, no sólo están autorizados, sino que es su deber ineludible intervenir en su detención y requisarlo; el registro o requisa en casos urgentes, ante sospecha fundada, puede realizarla incluso la policía judicial -CED6 , comprendiéndose el registro de vehículos -[Placa1] -, que puede abarcar incluso a un número indeterminado de personas, en un momento y sitio específicos, en casos de necesidad (fuga de sospechosos en hechos recientes y graves, etc. que justifican cierres de carretera por persecución por delito), como lo ha analizado la Sala Constitucional. Si la policía judicial observa a un sujeto vendiendo droga a particulares, está autorizada para la detención inmediata de esa persona, por ser un delito flagrante, confeccionar el informe respectivo al Ministerio Público, con la prueba que haya recopilado. Sin embargo, como puede suceder que esa observación resulte no ser suficiente para dar origen a un proceso y a una condena, se prefiere en estos casos recopilar información con mayor rigurosidad, por eso es que tales pesquisas se encomiendan a la policía, que está creada para esas labores. Cómo se realice esta investigación, la calidad de la información que se produzca, el control y supervisión del Ministerio Público y las decisiones que tome este órgano, serán objeto de ponderación en cada caso concreto, por el juez, según las reglas procesales definidas. Y por qué es importante esta labor de investigación y sus fuentes de control, pues porque, en primer lugar, si se trata solamente de compras controladas, por más que los oficiales declaren sobre el presunto contacto del colaborador con la persona sospechosa y aporten la evidencia ¿cómo descartar la provocación policial?, ¿cómo acreditar que aparte de esos contactos con el encubierto, se realiza venta indiscriminada a terceros, que sí lesionan el bien jurídico tutelado por la norma? Para eso se deben acompañar vigilancias, frecuentes, continuas, para especificar con claridad que esa actividad se realiza con independencia de la presencia y contacto controlado por la policía. Para el análisis de estos elementos no basta con que se estime honesto el trabajo policial o sinceros los relatos de los oficiales, sino que se requiere, adicional a su intervención, de mayores elementos, porque la sola intervención investigadora de la policía y contralora de esos contactos, no es suficiente, aunque estas actuaciones se respalden en actas, porque las actas y el testimonio policial giran alrededor del mismo punto: las compras controladas policialmente. Si los registros son otros y permiten un control independiente, el peso podría ser distinto, todo lo cual dependerá siempre de las condiciones presentes en cada caso.

III- Lo sucedido en el caso concreto: Contra el justiciable [Nombre11] , la policía judicial recibió información confidencial de que se dedicaba a la venta de crack en el centro de la ciudad de Puntarenas, auxiliado por otro sujeto apodado [Placa2] y además utilizando el vehículo placas [Placa3] [Placa2] . Según esa información, esta actividad la realiza en el día y en la noche, todos los días de la semana, con incremento los fines de semana (cfr. informe de noticia criminis, folios 1 y 2), Se dice que en el vehículo oculta la droga y ya se da su nombre y calidades, estableciéndose que el vehículo mencionado, es de su propiedad. Bajo dirección funcional del Ministerio Público, la policía judicial de Puntarenas inicia la investigación para recopilar elementos que permitan verificar la información recibida. La estrategia trazada, porque se desprende así de las actuaciones, fue realizar compras controladas con un “colaborador” policial, que no es más que un agente encubierto. La primera compra controlada la realiza únicamente el oficial [Nombre12]., el 12 de febrero de 2009, en horas de la tarde, en compañía de ese colaborador, que nunca se ha identificado ni se ha traído a estrados, pero entrega a los investigadores lo que, dijo, obtuvo del sospechoso, que resultó ser una piedra de cocaína base crack (cfr. informe de compra controlada folio 10 a 12, acta de comprobación de venta de droga, folio 13 y custodia de evidencias, folios 14 y 15); una segunda compra el 27 de febrero, en horas de la tarde, con participación del oficial [Nombre12]. y de [Nombre13]., con “uno de nuestros colaboradores confidenciales” (folio 16) de la que se confeccionó un acta de requisa, de compra, de custodia de la evidencia (folios 16 a 20); tercera compra controlada, por los mismos oficiales señalados, el 2 de marzo, en horas de la tarde, en las mismas condiciones que las anteriores y en el mismo sitio (folios 21 a 25); cuarta compra del 17 de marzo, en horas de la mañana, específicamente a las 8:50 horas, realizada únicamente por [Nombre13]., indicándose que el sospechoso se agachó y desenterró algo del piso, sacando un frasco del que sacó lo que entregó al colaborador, que luego de ser analizado, se verificó que se trataba de cocaína base crack (folios 26 a 31). Ese mismo día, a las 9:00 horas, el oficial […] se ubicó “en un punto estratégico en el costado norte del Mercado Municipal cerca del sitio donde se ubicó al sospechoso [Nombre11] ” (folio 32) y realizó una vigilancia “para observar el flujo de personas que llegarían al sospechoso”. Consignó documentalmente que se acercaron en el tiempo de 30 minutos, cuatro personas a quienes identificó con sobrenombres y afirma ser reconocidos adictos en la zona, quienes realizan breves intercambios con el sospechoso. A folio 36 y a las 15:00 horas del 23 de marzo de 2010, aparece un acta de identificación de dinero, realizada por el fiscal [Nombre14] , en la Fiscalía Adjunta de Puntarenas, de dos [Nombre4] de un mil colones series D94364544 y D98920165 y se consigna que se identifica “a efecto de operativo policíal (sic) antidrogas que practicaremos la policía judicial y el Ministerio Público hoy […] El dinero identificado quedará en custodia del suscrito Fiscal Auxiliar, para luego entregarlo al Colaborador Confidencial que intentara confirmar una venta más de droga de uso no autorizado, de conformidad con el artículo 62 del Código Procesal Penal y los votos 2002-525 de la Sala Tercera, votos 2005-586 y 2006-966 del Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José […]”. A folio 37 vuelto aparece un sello de recibido en las fotocopias de los [Nombre4] identificados, de fecha 23 de marzo, 15:00 horas. Documentalmente, de seguido a esa acta de identificación de [Nombre4], aparece un informe donde se reseña que el 25 de marzo de 2010 en horas de la mañana (ya no el 23 de marzo como se consignó al identificar los [Nombre4]), el fiscal [Nombre15] , se trasladó con el oficial [Nombre13] y el “colaborador” a efectuar una compra controlada del sospechoso, lo que se afirma, se realizó a las 10:20 horas, en las inmediaciones del Hotel El Río, donde se realiza, posterior a la requisa y entrega de dinero, la compra de una piedra de lo que resultó ser cocaína base crack. Luego, con esa misma fecha 25 de marzo (y no el 23 de marzo como se consignó el día en que se identificó el dinero), a las 11 horas, aparece a folio 39 la siguiente constancia “Al ser las once horas del veinticinco de Marzo de 2010, se hace constar por el suscrito fiscal que se llamo (sic) a la defensa publica (sic) solicitando a la defensora de turno [Nombre16] (sic), además se le llamo (sic) al teléfono (sic) celular en tres ocasiones siendo que la línea sonaba y no se contestaba además se le puso un beeper a radio mensajes siendo infructuoso la ubicaron (sic) de la defensa, siendo que se trata de un caso de venta de drogas en vía pública con urgencia y que recientemente se llevo (sic) a cabo una compra controlada, siendo la ubicación del sospechoso idónea (sic) para el operativo final, se procede a realizar el operativo sin defensa publica (sic). Es todo. [Nombre17] . Fiscal de Narcotráfico […].” De seguido aparecen los siguientes documentos: acta de requisa del colaborador, a las 11:03 horas; acta de entrega de dinero, 11:05 horas; acta de las 11:08 horas, de seguimiento del colaborador; acta de las 11:30 horas, de requisa al sospechoso; acta de registro de vehículo 11:58 horas y las actas de secuestro de las evidencias, de folios 40 a 49). Tenemos que se realizaron cuatro diligencias de investigación de compras controladas de droga, con participación de un encubierto o colaborador no identificado y una única vigilancia en el sitio en que se investigaba al justiciable por la actividad ilícita. Una quinta compra de la misma naturaleza, con participación del fiscal, como un investigador más, se realizó a las 10:20 horas del 25 de marzo, sin que consten actas de requisa, de entrega de dinero y de seguimiento al colaborador, diligencia que realizó el fiscal [Nombre15] en compañía del oficial [Nombre12]. Todas esas son compras controladas a nivel indiciario, policial y permitieron acuerpar sospechas razonables y fundadas de que el acusado se dedicaba a la venta de droga, su modo de operar quedó dibujado en la investigación y razonablemente, esos elementos de investigación permitían sustentar una probabilidad de participación de [Nombre11]. en un delito. Con este andamiaje de elementos, el fiscal decidió realizar una compra controlada con dinero individualizado, Estima esta para proceder luego a la detención del sospechoso y su requisa. Esta decisión del fiscal, se toma conociendo que ya tiene razonables elementos para señalar a [Nombre11]. como responsable de vender droga cocaína base crack, razonables elementos que la investigación policial había permitido reunir y que él mismo, actuando con los oficiales, constató. Así, esta decisión no puede ser tomada sin garantizar a esa persona el control de la defensa técnica a que tiene derecho. Estima esta Cámara que, en esas condiciones, el fiscal no estaba autorizado para pretender la realización del operativo sin asistencia de la defensa pública y, contrario a las afirmaciones del Tribunal, a las que se hará referencia luego, no puede quedar al arbitrio del Ministerio Público cuándo y cómo realiza operativos con o sin defensa pública, porque esa obligación se la impone la ley. El momento y forma de realización de la diligencia es algo que indiscutiblemente planifica la policía y el Ministerio Público. Hay desde luego, envueltos en un operativo de esta naturaleza, muchos aspectos de logística, de seguridad, de planeamiento, que son resorte exclusivo de la policía bajo la dirección del fiscal. Pero así como se coordinan esos aspectos, así debe tenerse claro que debe contarse dentro de esa planificación, aunque no se informe de mayores datos para no arriesgar su resultado, a la defensa pública. Y se enfatiza que se trata de la defensa pública, porque apenas se va a realizar esa diligencia para culminar una investigación. Esa diligencia pretende allegar mayores elementos probatorios que permitan al Ministerio Público eventualmente sustentar una acusación en contars del acusado, a quien se pretende detener, en la finalización de ese operativo, por lo que salta a la vista que, en esas condiciones, tal operacíón debe realizarse, respetando el derecho del investigado y ya sospechoso de delito, de contar con un defensor. Y es la defensa pública, servicio pagado por el Estado, pues sería absurdo prevenirle con antelación de la realización del operativo y de su posible, para que nombre a un abogado de confianza. Se llama a la defensa pública para que funja como asesor técnico de esa persona investigada y garantice como un observador calificado, la forma en que se desenvuelven los acontecimientos y formule las objeciones y haga los reclamos que estime pertinentes en resguardo de los derechos de esa persona investigada. No está allí de adorno, ni acude “en defensa de nadie” como de manera sorprendente afirma el Tribunal, sino que es un profesional pagado por el Estado y al que se le asigna la misión de defender los derechos de esa persona investigada en la diligencia a realizar. Y, aunque resulte incómodo y no sea del agrado de algunos, es la opción que nuestro sistema democrático escogió y que el legislador diseñó para los casos en que se vaya a realizar una diligencia policial o judicial contra una persona respecto de la que ya existen indicios suficientes y razonables de que cometió o está cometiendo un delito y así lo señala el artículo 13 Cpp, que, desde luego, no es un invento, es una previsión normativa del más alto nivel garantista que ni estorba, ni entorpece, ni dificulta, ni da al traste con la actividad de investigación policial, ni implica una ventaja inadmisible para la persona investigada, ni significa que se fugue información o que se frustren diligencias; es decir, no implica riesgo alguno ni genera ninguna alteración para el éxito de esa diligencia, actuación o pesquisa. No implica paralizar los procedimientos, ni alertar al sospechoso, ni entorpecer las labores, es decir, no existe ninguna justificación razonable, plausible, desde la lectura del derecho de defensa y la pureza de la prueba, para que no se cumpla con las exigencias legales en estos casos, que significan ejercer en igualdad de armas, un control, un contrapeso, respecto de las posibilidades procesales de averiguación de la verdad y, si la investigación tiene solidez, si los procedimientos no tienen vicios, defectos o ilegalidades, ningún fiscal, ningún policía debe temer riesgo ninguno, asegurando que su actividad de carácter definitivo o probatorio contra una persona individualizada ya y próxima a detener, sea supervisada y monitoreada por la defensa pública, porque además, así lo exige la ley procesal. Los casos urgentes, inminentes y apremiantes, no requieren ni dirección funcional, ni fiscal, ni defensor, eso todos lo tenemos claro y el sistema ya ha previsto esas contingencias y la validez de las actuaciones así llevadas a cabo. También el sistema le ha concedido a la policía, especialmente a la judicial, facultades importantes de investigación y le autoriza a realizar válidamente gran cantidad de diligencias (guarismos 67 a 69, 283 a 268, todos del Cpp), para las que no requiere control de la defensa; aseguramiento del sitio del suceso; levantamiento de huellas, indicios y evidencias; diligencias de vigilancias, seguimientos, compras controladas; entrevistas a personas que puedan conocer información; búsqueda de datos en bases públicas que orienten las investigaciones; requisas, detenciones, registros en supuestos determinados; en fin, una gran cantidad de diligencias que solamente el investigador y su preparación, junto a la dirección y guía del fiscal, puede establecer y debe hacerlas, documentarlas y llevar adelante su tarea, eso nadie lo pone en duda. Sin embargo y contrario a la posición sostenida por el Tribunal de Juicio en este caso, no hay justificación alguna que respalde la decisión de la fiscalía de realizar ese operativo de la forma en que lo hizo, sin participación de la defensa, la que no acudió no por desidia o irresponsabilidad, como sin justificación alguna se afirma en el fallo, sino por la forma precipitada e irreflexiva en que la fiscalía decidió actuar, por lo que sí le es achacable al Ministerio Público que esas diligencias realizadas en este caso, por las particularidades ya establecidas, sean ilegítimas y así debe declararse. No había ninguna urgencia que llevara al fiscal a actuar de la forma en que lo hizo. Toda la investigación que se llevó a cabo permitió establecer que el justiciable, en apariencia, realizaba su actividad presuntamente delictiva, todos los días, a toda hora, en sitios públicos de Puntarenas. Las compras controladas policiales se realizaron espaciadas en el tiempo y permitieron establecer esa circunstancia. Incluso debe notarse que el acusado fue detenido dentro de su vehículo, cuando consumía marihuana en compañía de una mujer, que fue detenida momentáneamente en el sitio (cfr. acta de folio 44), de manera que ni hubo riesgo de fuga, alerta del sospecho ni otro elemento que justificara un actuar urgente o precipitado, como se dio en este asunto. Al contrario, se recibió prueba que señala que ese día se había decidido suspender el operativo porque presuntamente el justiciable se percató de la presencia policial. Así, en el juicio se recibió la declaración de la defensora [Nombre18] , cuyo contenido ni siquiera es mencionado en la sentencia, de manera que no es posible comprender cómo se concluye que fue por su negligencia que no acudió al operativo, a no ser que el Tribunal, sin decirlo expresamente, haga suya la opinión externada por el oficial [Nombre12]. (DVD, registro de las 9:31:20 horas, del 2 de setiembre de 2010), que carece igualmente de sustento, como se analizará luego. Al contrario, de la escucha del testimonio de la defensora, a partir del registro en el DVD de las 10:22:04 horas, del día 20 de agosto de 2010, consta cómo dicha profesional narró que desde las 9 de la mañana de ese día 25 de marzo, al haber sido informada de un operativo, acompañó al fiscal, al oficial [Nombre12]. y al colaborador, en un vehículo que se dirigía a realizar la compra final controlada. Observó el acta de identificación de [Nombre4] y constató sus números. Afirmó que efectuaron varios rodeos, pues en apariencia el sospechoso ‑cuya identidad ella ignoraba- no estaba en la misma posición de siempre y sospechaba la presencia policial. En una de esas vueltas se toparon al investigado de frente y, ante la sospecha de que los hubiera visto, se alejaron del sitio y luego finalmente por radio comunicaron que suspenderían la diligencia, por lo que todas estas personas se trasladaron hasta el edificio de los Tribunales, estuvieron conversando sobre las alternativas y finalmente, le dijeron a ella que regresara a su oficina y ellos se comunicarían. Esto lo afirmó incluso el oficial [Nombre12], pues dijo que decidieron esperar un par de horas (registro en DVD, de las 9:28:09 horas en adelante). Ella advirtió que se dirigía a entregar un escrito al Juzgado de Familia y estaría en su oficina. El regreso de todas las personas se dio alrededor de las diez y media de esa mañana, ella demoró cinco minutos en ir al Juzgado y esperó en su oficina, donde estuvo plenamente localizable, además de que se trata de una oficina ubicada en el mismo edificio de la fiscalía y la policía judicial. La defensora explicó que se retiró al baño y por eso dejó su beeper en la oficina, para evitar que se le cayera y de inmediato conversó con su jefe, siempre encontrándose en las instalaciones de la defensa, donde el personal auxiliar ya sabía de su presencia allí y donde se tienen números telefónicos de la oficina que la Fiscalía y los oficiales de la policía judicial conocen y usan constantemente como medio de contacto. Cuando ella es avisada de que la están buscando, llamó al oficial [Nombre12]. y le dijeron que no estaba; se comunicó al celular del fiscal y éste le dice que no la puede atender y varios minutos después se entera que el operativo se realizó porque ella no apareció. Explicó que ella siempre estuvo en las oficinas de la Defensa Pública e incluso si hubiese sido el caso de que ella no estuviera o se encontrase en otras funciones, siempre hay un rol y cualquier otro defensor estaría en la obligación de acudir a la diligencia, porque, literalmente dijo, no puede quedar descubierto el servicio de la defensa pública. Señaló que el beeper es el medio de comunicación que les asignan, cuando están disponibles, para ser localizados fuera de las 4:30 de la tarde o bien cuando atienden una diligencia, debe llevarlo, por si la requieren en otra. Aclaró que tanto la fiscalía como la policía judicial y el Juzgado Penal conocen la forma de trabajo de la defensa y siempre han coordinado con ellos. Esta testigo fue sincera y clara, incluso reconoció que días antes se había tratado de realizar el operativo sin poder hacerlo, desconociendo ella las razones, lo que ni siquiera está documentado en el sumario. Además afirmó no poder decir, cuando ya atendió la indagatoria, si el acusado era adicto o no, pues sería suponerlo. Y reconoció claramente que el personal de la defensa siempre acude a este tipo de operativos, que se realizan constantemente, para velar por la legalidad de los procedimientos y los derechos de los investigados. De manera que, en primer lugar, no existe ninguna justificación para que el fiscal decidiera salir sin acudir a las oficinas de la defensa o coordinar telefónicamente en el despacho, si minutos antes estuvieron juntos y la defensora colaboró y los acompañó por largo tiempo; tampoco se trata de sitios alejados o distantes o con difícil comunicación; por ende la urgencia y premura con la que el fiscal decide salir, breves minutos después de que se habían separado de la defensora, no es aceptable y esa urgencia no puede surgir de la simple voluntad del fiscal y hacer depender de esa decisión irreflexiva, la presencia inmediata y a su disposición, de un defensor, sea el de turno o del que sea. Si efectivamente era urgente, esto no se ha acreditado en absoluto y tampoco hay evidencia que señale qué fue lo que varió de esos minutos previos, al momento en que se decidió actuar sin poder avisar y localizar a la defensora. El oficial [Nombre12]. reconoce que alrededor de las 9 de la mañana se había coordinado el operativo, elllos fueron con la defensora, pero debieron retirarse porque aparentemente alertaron de la presencia policial, por lo que regresaron a los tribunales y decidieron esperar un par de horas. Sin embargo, según las actas, ya a las diez y media de la mañana estaba él en compañía del fiscal realizando una compra controlada, que, según dijo, se dio frente a ellos. Aduce que por esa razón deciden realizar el operativo final y se regresaron a los Tribunales, tratando de localizar por todos los medios a la defensora y “no apareció” por lo que el fiscal, sentado en sus oficinas, decidió realizarlo sin la defensa. Es decir, encontrándose en el mismo edificio, pudiendo dirigirse a las oficinas de la defensa pública, llamar a los teléfonos oficiales, no se hizo y por eso a este oficial le pareció que no podían esperarse para realizar un operativo tan importante, a que una persona irresponsablemente se desapareciera (registro de las 9:30:30 en adelante). Sin embargo, no existe evidencia de que se tratara de una actuación urgente, porque incluso el mismo oficial reconoció que estaban vigilando al sujeto que allí se encontraba tranquilamente, como siempre, de manera que no resulta razonable ese proceder, como tampoco hay ninguna evidencia de que la defensora irresponsablemente se haya desentendido del caso para frustrar la realización del operativo. Nótese que existen importantes elementos que llevan a calificar de precipitada y antojadiza la decisión del fiscal: el acta de identificación de [Nombre4] se realizó dos días antes del operativo, porque se dijo que era en esa fecha 23 de marzo que se iban a utilizar. No obstante, pasan dos días, sin que se justifique documentalmente qué ocurrió y de repente aparece ese mismo fiscal, en horas de la mañana del 25 de marzo, actuando en compañía de un oficial de policía y el colaborador, realizando personalmente el control de una compra, que no tiene ninguna particularidad que la distinga de todas las anteriores, todo ello ya realizado sin la presencia de la defensora, con la que habían tratado de realizar la misma diligencia, minutos antes. Veinte minutos después decide realizar una compra, con los [Nombre4] que ha individualizados dos días antes y que no se usaron el día establecido, hace constar que hizo en ese momento unas llamadas no atendidas a la defensa “de turno” y toma la decisión “urgente” de realizar el operativo de desenlace, sin especificar que minutos previos habían tratado de realizarlo, en compañía de la defensora y que habían decidido suspender la diligencia. Ninguna de estas consideraciones, ni el contenido del testimonio de la defensora, fue analizado en la sentencia, por lo que las conclusiones del Tribunal son abiertamente infundadas. El fiscal acudió al sitio sin coordinar nuevamente con la defensa, decide hacer el operativo y se limita a enviar mensajes al beeper, como no le atienden y no localiza a la defensora por ese medio, pone una constancia y sigue adelante, cuando, de la declaración de [Nombre12], se desprende que, según su dicho, se regresaron al Despacho para “coordinar” con la defensa y estaban en el mismo edificio. Esta Cámara, de la revisión del sumario, de la escucha de la sentencia y de la observación de la prueba documental y el juicio, no encuentra ningún fundamento para afirmar, como lo hace el Tribunal, que fue la desidia de la defensa pública de la ciudad de Puntarenas, la responsable de que el operativo se realizara sin participación de la defensa. Tampoco cuenta con elemento alguno que señale que la defensora supo de la inminencia del operativo y que deliberada o negligentemente se haya despojado de sus elementos de comunicación o no fuera localizable, para no acudir a la diligencia, como lo sugiere el Tribunal y que estos fueran los únicos medios de comunicación razonablemente disponibles. Esas son afirmaciones muy serias, que carecen de respaldo. Al contrario, las constancias del proceso permiten apreciar que el fiscal actuó en forma precipitada, tomó decisiones apresuradas sin ninguna justificación y precisamente por la forma en que actuó, hizo nugatorio el control de la defensa pública sobre sus actuaciones. Si el operativo era urgente ¿por qué individualizó dinero dos días antes, para usarlo en una fecha distinta de la que finalmente resultó? ¿por qué el fiscal decide tener un acercamiento previo con el sospechoso y luego no puede regresar y coordinar con la defensa pública el desenlace y la prueba a producir, si horas antes e incluso minutos antes, estuvo con la defensora pública y decidió suspender el operativo?. El Tribunal de Juicio acierta cuando señala que no puede quedar en criterio de la defensa cuándo y cómo se hace el operativo, como también que la policía no tenía cómo prever que el fiscal llevaría adelante el desenlace de sus pesquisas de esa forma. En efecto, es obligación de la defensa pública, según las disposiciones legales, reglamentarias y las directrices giradas al respecto y que regulan su labor, tener personal disponible para la realización de este tipo de diligencias y operativos. Si un profesional de la defensa pública, con la debida información y coordinación, no acude sin justificación alguna, corresponde establecer si es necesario sentar responsabilidades a nivel disciplinario y de otra índole, lo mismo si da información a los sospechosos o impide la diligencia de alguna forma, conductas todas graves de las que no hay ninguna base para afirmar que hayan estado presentes en este caso, de modo tal que en la misma forma en que el Tribunal defiende la honestidad de la policía y la credibilidad de sus relatos, debió proceder con la defensora pública y la Defensa Pública de la localidad de Puntarenas, porque lanza afirmaciones sin ningún respaldo, pues, si lo tuviera, debió proceder a formular las denuncias correspondientes y no simplemente desacreditar a una profesional y a un servicio, sin fundamento. Olvidó el Tribunal considerar que tampoco puede el Ministerio Público echar mano de una urgencia inexistente y hacer nugatoria la participación de la defensa en una diligencia de esta naturaleza, que el propio órgano de juicio reconoce que tiene una validez “distinta” de una diligencia realizada con control jurisdiccional o de la defensa pública. Tratándose de personas que estuvieron juntos minutos antes, que laboran en el mismo edificio y que pueden comunicarse más fluidamente por el teléfono interno e incluso personalmente, la decisión del fiscal aparece completamente injustificada. En criterio de esta Cámara es claro que si bien el Fiscal tiene a su cargo las investigaciones, la dirección funcional sobre la policía y el deber de actuar con objetividad, también lo es que actúa en el proceso como parte, especialmente en un proceso que se ha dado en llamar de rasgos “marcadamente acusatorio”, de manera que su actuación es como parte y por ello, cuando en el desarrollo de su actividad vaya a afectar derechos fundamentales, debe necesariamente lograr la autorización y la intervención del juez y, cuando vaya a realizar actos probatorios que no sean urgentes, en los que espere lograr prueba directa de un sospechoso, que ya tiene individualizado y contra el que ya cuenta con indicios razonables y plausibles de que comete o está cometiendo un delito, debe hacerlo según lo exige la ley, con el control de, al menos, el defensor, porque así lo señala el párrafo final del artículo 13 del Cpp ya citado, lo impone el respeto al debido proceso, al derecho de defensa, al equilibrio procesal, a la litigación de buena fe y al principio de lealtad. Si se decide no contar con dicho control, el peso de las diligencias así realizadas se debilita y pierde efectividad. Nótese que no estamos hablando de ese control en las compras policiales, cuyo alcance y peso ha quedado aquí claramente definido. Hablamos de la decisión del acusador de realizar diligencias específicas, planificadas, tratando de allegar mayores elementos probatorios y que se refieren a una persona que ya las investigaciones policiales permiten perfilar con mucha claridad, como sospechoso, con información acopiada en esas investigaciones, que permite apreciar ya cierta regularidad y gravedad de los indicios (varias compras controladas, seguimientos y vigilancias que permiten establecer qué tipo de actividad, dónde y cómo se realiza y qué tipo de sustancia es que se vende, etc.). Y este es el aspecto más importante que hay que analizar a la luz de los reclamos en este caso concreto. Aunque hemos hecho cita y comentario de antecedentes jurisprudenciales en los que se señala que no es necesaria la presencia del juez cuando se vaya a realizar una actividad probatoria con dinero o cualquier otro objeto individualizado, que no vaya a afectar derechos fundamentales, lo cierto es que en este caso concreto, esta Cámara considera que el Ministerio Público no tenía ninguna justificación para no coordinar la presencia de un defensor público, que fungiera como observador calificado y garante del derecho de defensa de la persona investigada en ese acto con fuerza probatoria que pretendía realizar. Del resultado de esa diligencia, se espera obtener evidencias determinantes para la detención inmediata del sospechoso. Y convenimos con la posición jurisprudencial que señala que, en casos como el presente, en el que media una labor investigadora de la policía, prolongada en el tiempo, de determinada calidad, que ha sido constatada a lo largo de un período de tiempo, permitiendo ubicar lugares y modo de actuar de la persona investigada, sin que mediase urgencia alguna, la decisión del Ministerio Público de realizar una intervención de desenlace, con carácter probatorio, debió considerar la presencia de un defensor, pues no había ninguna justificación para que así no se hiciera y, en esas condiciones, así lo prescribe la ley. Su decisión implicó que se identificaran [Nombre4] a utilizar por un agente encubierto, que no declaró en el debate; que fuera supervisada esa transacción únicamente por el fiscal y la policía, sin que este representante del Ministerio Público declarara como testigo en debate, porque fungió como acusador, dando bendición a una prueba que él mismo produjo y controló, lo que no se aviene al sistema de frenos y contrapesos que subyace en el proceso penal diseñado por nuestro legislador (consúltese al respecto antecedente número 965-2004 de las 9:50 horas del 13 de agosto de 2004 de la Sala Tercera). Ese operativo de desenlace, que solamente la decisión del Ministerio Público define si se realiza o no, sí considera esta Cámara que, para diferenciarse de cualquiera de las compras controladas policialmente, debe ser un acto sometido a control, para ejercer un contrapeso, con participación necesaria de la defensa e incluso del juez, en el caso en que además, se vaya a lesionar derechos fundamentales. Esta Cámara conoce la posición sostenida por la Sala Tercera en la que señala que en estos operativos es indispensable el control jurisdiccional, posición que aún puede considerarse más garantista, aunque ha tenido sus matices, especialmente cuando, comos e ha visto, el operativo se realiza en vía pública y no se van a lesionar derechos fundamentales. Esa posición de la Sala quedó delineada en el precedente número [Telf8] de las 9:30 horas, del 7 de abril de 2006, oportunidad en la que, en lo que interesa, señaló “[…]En el caso examinado, tal y como lo reclama la gestionante, se omitió, sin justificación alguna, el control jurisdiccional en una fase trascendente dentro del operativo de investigación desplegado, cual era comprobar la efectiva actividad ilícita atribuida al imputado, referida a la venta de drogas, lo que se haría, de acuerdo a la estrategia investigativa, mediante una compra controlada jurisdiccionalmente, en la que un agente encubierto adquiriría del acusado una determinada cantidad de droga. Sin embargo, este control jurisdiccional, como lo reclama la impugnante, no se produjo en este caso, sin que se cuente con algún elemento determinante que lo impidiera, de modo que no se advierta diferencia alguna entre las compras controladas policialmente bajo la dirección funcional del Ministerio Público, los días 19 de febrero, 5 y 29 de marzo, todos de 2005 (actos indiciarios), y la compra efectuada el 18 de abril siguiente, a las 20:25 horas, al costado del negocio comercial “Burger King” en Tamarindo, jurisdicción de Santa Cruz de Guanacaste, que vino a constituir el operativo final, que produjo la detención del encausado y el allanamiento practicado en su casa de habitación, ubicada a una distancia considerable del sitio donde se adquirió la droga. Y esta situación indiferenciada se motiva en el hecho, de que esta última transacción, al igual que las anteriores, fue controlada en su totalidad por la Policía de Control de Drogas, bajo la dirección funcional del órgano acusador, siendo los agentes policiales los actores que, según indicaron en juicio (ver folios 379 a 386) y se acreditó mediante la prueba documental aportada al proceso, fueron los únicos que presenciaron la venta de droga que el justiciable, hizo al agente encubierto [Nombre19] , y es la representación fiscal quien recibe del oficial de policía el envoltorio con marihuana (ver folio 147), y además requisa al imputado (ver folio 148) […]Esta labor garantizadora, contrario a lo que señaló el Tribunal en el fallo (ver folios 388, 389 y 394), incurriendo en una lectura parcial y errónea de los antecedentes jurisprudenciales de esta Sala (votos 822-04, 1132-04 y 198-05), no se agotó con la participación jurisdiccional en la identificación y entrega al agente encubierto de los [Nombre4] utilizados en la compra final (ver folios 144 a 146), ni con su presencia durante el allanamiento practicado (ver folios 151 a 155), en el tanto se requería su control en los actos previos y posteriores al operativo: que el agente encubierto no se relacionara con otras personas antes de contactar al acusado como vendedor, garantizando así que no adquiriera droga de un tercero; el decomiso al imputado de los [Nombre4] identificados con los que se realizó la compra, lo que fue ejecutado en esta causa por la representante del Ministerio Público, quien en definitiva, junto con la Policía de Control de Drogas, fueron los encargados de dirigir y controlar el operativo de compra, en sustitución de la Jueza Penal del Procedimiento Preparatorio, quien se encontraba en otro lugar, a efecto de llevar a cabo el allanamiento ordenado en la casa del justiciable, y que entra en contacto con este último y con la evidencia recolectada en el sitio de la compra, cuarenta y cinco minutos después de su detención por parte de los efectivos de la policía y la fiscal, quien le indicó a la Jueza en ese momento, que al ser detenido [Nombre20] , “[Nombre21] forma voluntaria”, le entregó los [Nombre4] previamente identificados, cuando se le invitó a que exhibiera sus pertenencias antes de proceder a su requisa, echándose de menos la participación de algún representante de la defensa pública, quien no solo no estuvo presente, para velar por el respeto a los derechos fundamentales del imputado, quien ya para el momento del operativo final estaba plenamente identificado, sino que tampoco fue citado o invitado para presenciar las actuaciones realizadas, agravado ello por la inasistencia del órgano jurisdiccional Cabe señalar, sobre este tema, que si bien es cierto, la Sala Constitucional ha indicado, que la ausencia del defensor en las diligencias investigativas iniciales y en los actos preliminares que conducirán a la individualización del imputado, no quebranta el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, ello es así, siempre y cuando exista la participación y el control suficiente de parte del juez de garantías (entre otros, ver voto número 6469-99, de las 14:33 horas del 18 de setiembre de 1999. Sala Constitucional). Con fundamento en las anteriores consideraciones, en este caso en particular, examinada la actuación de la policía, bajo la dirección funcional del Ministerio Público, que tuvo como corolario la detención del justiciable y la incautación de algunas evidencias, devienen inidóneas para acreditar la conducta ilícita acusada (que el imputado [Nombre20]. efectivamente se dedicaba al comercio ilícito de drogas, descartándose que su actuar fuera provocado por la policía), resultando insuficientes también como elementos probatorios que proporcionen el soporte efectivo al fallo condenatorio dictado: las vigilancias efectuadas con anterioridad y las correspondientes compras controladas por los agentes policiales; la evidencia allí recolectada; los testimonios de los oficiales de policía que participaron en el operativo, incluido el del oficial encubierto, que repitieron ante los Jueces la mecánica de los actos de investigación policial realizados, elementos de prueba eficientes para sustentar la notitia criminis que permitió solicitar la apertura a juicio y el allanamiento practicado en la casa de habitación del justiciable, que arrojó una ínfima cantidad de droga decomisada (medio cigarrillo y una “tocola” de marihuana), pero no para acreditar, fuera de toda duda razonable, la hipótesis de la acusación, conservando tan solo un carácter indiciario, en tanto, la injustificada falta de control jurisdiccional, propició un claro desequilibrio probatorio en detrimento de los intereses del encausado. […]Como en otras oportunidades lo ha sostenido esta Sala con arreglo a jurisprudencia constitucional: “...si bien las actividades policiales de compras controladas de drogas constituyen un mecanismo de investigación útil para dar sustento a la “notitia criminis” recibida y legitimar posteriores actuaciones que puedan afectar derechos fundamentales (v. gr.: el allanamiento de un recinto privado), por sí solas no son suficientes para vencer el estado de inocencia del acusado, arribando a la necesaria certeza de la comisión del delito. Es preciso, entonces, que tal tipo de herramientas de investigación se vea respaldado por otros elementos de prueba que lo corroboren más allá de toda duda. (En este sentido, pueden consultarse las resoluciones de esta Sala: No. 270-02 de 15:55 horas de 21 de marzo, la No. 1086-02 de 11:10 horas de 25 de octubre y la No. 1293-02. de 9:36 horas de 20 de diciembre de 2002; todas del año 2002; así como la No. 78-04 de 9:10 horas de 13 de febrero de 2004). No se trata de señalar la necesidad de pruebas “legales” o “tasadas”, sino de puntualizar los alcances probatorios que razonablemente pueden reconocerse a ciertos actos investigativos en el marco de un Estado democrático de derecho que concede a la libertad individual y al principio de inocencia un valor primario y fundamental..” (cfr. voto número 822-04, de las 10:02 horas del 9 de julio de 2004. Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) […]”. Aún si esta posición podría considerarse aún más razonable, al menos, en lo que toca a este caso, es claro que la defensa debía estar presente y no podía realizarse esa diligencia sin garantizar el derecho de defensa técnica. La prueba recabada por el fiscal en este caso, en abierto irrespeto del derecho de defensa, es ilegítima y la compra que le precedió, aunque realizada por el fiscal, no pasa de ser una compra controlada como las realizadas policialmente, con la dificultad añadida de que no existen, actas de requisa previa, ni de seguimiento ni de entrega de dinero y el fiscal que actuó, no declaró como testigo, ni fue ofrecido como prueba, pues es el mismo que formuló la acusación y acudió a debate. En criterio de este Tribunal, esta diligencia, por las características presentes en este caso, no puede ser controlada por el fiscal, ni puede estimarse que su presencia es garantía, porque recopila prueba incriminatoria contra una persona individualizada ya como sospechosa de un delito, gracias a las investigaciones previas, de manera que debe ser garantizado el derecho de defensa, como contrapeso y garantía del respeto a ese derecho fundamental. Aunque de las consideraciones expuestas en el antecedente jurisprudencial de cita, parece desprenderse la consideración de que en una compra controlada final (desenlace de la investigación), se requiere siempre el control jurisdiccional y teniendo claro que algunos Tribunales de Casación, incluido esta misma Cámara, por ejemplo, en los antecedentes número 2008-453, de las 10:20 horas, del 26 de setiembre y CED7, de las 10:00 horas, del 14 de noviembre, ambas de 2008, han considerado que tal requerimiento no deriva de la ley y que solamente es exigible cuando del operativo desenlace se pretenda la lesión a algún derecho fundamental, por ejemplo cuando la actividad se desarrolle en la vivienda y sea necesario el ingreso para su registro, lo cierto es que, para valorar su peso probatorio, esta Cámara estima que es exigible, cuando no se está en situaciones de urgencia, el control y participación de, al menos, un defensor público, como contralor de la forma en que tal diligencia se realizó, de modo que pudiera servir de contrapeso para la ponderación de esos elementos, ya dentro del proceso mismo. Si esta participación no se da y no hay justificación plausible para ello, la diligencia así realizada no se diferenciaría de una compra controlada policialmente, no obstante que por la lesión a la garantía de defensa, dadas las condiciones en que se actuó, las evidencias logradas de dicha intervención no pueden ser válidamente utilizadas en el proceso. Lo contrario, es decir, reconocer que una diligencia en esas condiciones “tiene menor validez”, como lo afirma el Tribunal, pero darle cabida y valor a las evidencias obtenidas, es simplemente burlar el derecho de defensa y las normas legales y constitucionales que le dan sentido. En realidad, en criterio de esta Cámara, no puede señalarse que una diligencia final deba realizarse de una u otra forma, e incluso, tampoco puede afirmarse que sea necesario en todo caso realizarla, no obstante lo cierto es que el Código Procesal Penal, que es un cuerpo normativo de orden público, es el que señala la forma en que determinados actos deben ser realizados y tiene sanciones expresas cuando se lesione el derecho de defensa –numeral 178 inciso a) Cpp.- y por ello, al juzgador compete verificar el cumplimiento de los requisitos sustanciales que se prescriben para determinados actos, según su naturaleza. Si la estrategia de investigación del Ministerio Público establece realizar ese operativo de desenlace en determinada forma, corresponderá a los jueces valorar la legalidad y alcance de lo actuado y de las pruebas acopiadas, así como el peso probatorio que corresponde asignarles. Es muy importante mencionar, por ello, que esta Cámara no comparte la valoración y el razonamiento que hace el Tribunal parar estima válida la requisa y el registro del vehículo en este caso. Los juzgadores desestimaron los alegatos de la defensa, haciendo un análisis individual, aislado y fragmentado de cada una de esas diligencias, como si no estuviesen entrelazadas con una intervención previa, plenamente coordinada y controlada con la finalidad de obtener prueba y detener al sospechoso, realizada toda ella sin la participación de la defensa. Se refirió así el Tribunal, a la posibilidad que tiene la policía de realizar requisas, sin orden de fiscal o de juez y hace cita del numeral 189 Cpp., lo que, aduce, se dio en este caso, por lo que no resultaba necesaria la presencia del defensor; de igual forma, analiza el registro del vehículo y de nuevo citó el Cpp, artículo 190, para señalar que la policía no necesita orden de juez ni del fiscal para registrar vehículos; por último, de nuevo insistió en que aún cuando no hubiera actas de requisa del colaborador en la primer compra de ese día 25 de marzo, ni de seguimiento, tales actos, que el acta debería probar, pueden ser acreditados por otros medios, en apoyo de lo cual cita el numeral 136 Cpp.. Todas estas potestades policiales ya han sido analizadas y son válidas, cuando se trate de supuestos urgentes, necesarios e indispensables, para los cuales la policía está facultada a actuar y no necesita orden alguna. Pero resulta que el Tribunal pasó por alto que esta requisa, ese registro de vehículo y esa detención, no resultaron de una situación urgente, novedosa, flagrante, sino de una operación controlada completamente, anticipada y planificada, donde cada paso estaba previamente establecido, para proceder a la detención del acusado y obtener de él evidencias preparadas para ello. Entonces, no puede hacerse un análisis aislado y desvinculado de lo que realmente ocurrió en este caso, porque eso es un razonamiento válido (en la teoría, en abstracto) pero inaplicable al supuesto en análisis. Pese al conocimiento de las normas que evidencia el Tribunal, no sucede lo mismo con el artículo 13 Cpp, norma de la que se echa de menos su análisis y ponderación, así como su vigencia para este caso concreto, numeral que no es mencionado en toda la sentencia, ni es tenido en cuenta de ninguna forma por el Tribunal, norma que, por lo tanto, aparece completamente disminuida e inobservada. Además, llaman poderosamente la atención de esta Cámara algunas afirmaciones que se hacen en el fallo, que no se sabe a qué responden ni qué ideas tienen detrás, por ejemplo, cuando se afirmó, al registro de las 14:14:30 horas “El Tribunal no juzga leyendas urbanas, no juzga cuentos de la gente, juzga hechos que son puestos en conocimiento del Ministerio Público y los juzga a través de pruebas no a través, repito, de leyendas urbanas que sean presentadas por otras personas (…)”; de igual forma, sorprende la manera en que se resuelve el tema de la diferencia que se aprecia en el dictamen criminalístico, respecto a la cantidad de droga (24 ó 4 paquetes) al referirse a la evidencia obtenida en el operativo desenlace o final, pues aún cuando no está cuestionado y podría pensarse que se trata, en efecto, de un error material, sorprende la afirmación del Tribunal, (registro de las 14:14:10) en cuanto concluye que con independencia de que no correspondiera la cantidad “lo cierto y lo importante es que contenía droga y eso es lo importante, con independencia de la cantidad (…)”, cuando lo esperable era ponderar cuánto peso podría tener esas circunstancias en el respeto a la cadena de custodia, por ejemplo, de las evidencias, que es parte integrante del debido proceso, por lo que no es tan cierto que pueda razonarse “con independencia” de que las cantidades y los pesos no coincidan, siempre que se trate de droga, eso es lo que importa. El razonamiento del Tribunal, aunque expuesto de forma clara y contundente, es contradictorio, pues analiza que el llamado operativo final de este caso, al no contar con control jurisdiccional ni de la defensa, es distinto, tiene un valor distinto, pero luego, al ponderar su validez, como bien lo reclama la defensora, termina reafirmando toda la actuación; a pesar de que el fundamento de su análisis es precisamente que para la realización de ese operativo, ya se tenía un indicio razonable, una sospecha fundada en toda la investigación, de que [Nombre22]. estaba cometiendo un delito, pese a que insiste sobre esta idea de manera enfática, nunca logra vincular la importancia, en esas condiciones presentes, para el respeto del derecho de defensa, según lo consagra en tantas veces mencionado por esta Cámara, numeral 13 Cpp y su vínculo con los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 8 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y precisamente todos esos elementos sobre los que insiste el Tribunal, que están presentes en este caso ‑una investigación previa que permitió delinear y establecer la sospecha fundada y razonable de estar frente a un autor de un delito y la necesidad de verificarlo con mayor fuerza para su inmediata detención- son precisamente los fundamentos para que entre a escena el derecho de defensa, detalle de tanto peso, que el Tribunal ignoró. De allí que deban acogerse los reclamos de la defensa. Por haberse recopilado en inobservancia del derecho fundamental de defensa y, por ende, en infracción al debido proceso, se declaran ineficaces las actas de requisa de folios 40, 43 y 45, el acta de entrega de dinero al colaborador, de folio 41, las actas de secuestro de folios 46, 47 y 48, el acta de registro y secuestro realizado en el vehículo de folio 49, así como los resultados de análisis de la evidencia obtenida en ese operativo.”