Non-application of vehicle forfeiture in reckless driving offense due to disproportionalityInaplicación del comiso de vehículo en delito de conducción temeraria por desproporcionalidad

**II.** In the sole ground of the challenge, the public defender of the accused alleges the erroneous application of Article 110 of the Criminal Code. He points out that the forfeiture (comiso) for reckless driving is an interpretation relentlessly implemented by the Public Prosecutor's Office, despite the fact that forfeiture (comiso) is a form of confiscation that violates numeral 40 of the Magna Carta. He points out that the numeral regulating the institute is located within a chapter called "Civil Consequences of the Punishable Act" and therefore it is intended to restore aspects of economic content to the prior state. He additionally refers that the numeral is framed within the obtaining of things or objects deriving from the crime or in the use of instruments that produce a material and direct impact, and therefore it cannot be applied to abstract danger crimes such as the one at hand, because this goes against the restrictive interpretation established in numeral 2 of the Criminal Code. He points out that in the crime of reckless driving there is only potential danger, no injuries or death, nor did the agent obtain any financial gain from his action, and therefore the forfeiture (comiso) proves to be disproportionate because the driver is an alcoholic, who may have taken many years to acquire that property and loses it due to a bad decision made with impaired consciousness. He finishes by saying that "The vehicle is legal and its forfeiture (comiso) will in no way contribute to road safety, because whoever wants to drive will do so anyway and what is required is treatment for someone who is an alcoholic" (folio 160). He requests that the forfeiture (comiso) be annulled and his client be restored in his rights over his property. The ground must be upheld, although not necessarily for all the arguments made by the challenger, but for the reasons that will be stated. In the present case, it is on record that, indeed, the trial judge decreed the forfeiture (comiso), in favor of the State, of the white 1993 BMW vehicle, [Placa1] for which he indicated: "You are the owner of that BMW and there is a registry certification that supports this. Article 110 of the Criminal Code orders the forfeiture (comiso) in favor of the State of such goods or objects used in the commission of the crime and the commission of the crime is driving under the effects of alcohol and to drive one must drive a bicycle, a motorcycle, I don't know, an ATV, a vehicle, a bus, a truck and in this case it is a white BMW vehicle, which is your property, year 1993, [Placa2] therefore, upon it being proven that you were driving that vehicle and that you collided it in front of the Desamparados Police Station that day, October 12, 2009, the court orders precisely the forfeiture (comiso) of that vehicle in favor of the State. Now, regarding the arguments your defender made, that it was a double penalty, that the penalty is unconstitutional, in reality that is a topic that has already been overcome by the Constitutional Chamber. What the Chamber said when consulted, both by the members of Congress and by the coordinating judge of this court [Nombre1], regarding that reform to the Traffic Law, the Chamber, in none of the cases, found any defect of unconstitutionality and therefore the norm is applicable, not only because the CED1, I repeat, orders it, but because the Chamber itself already said there was no inconvenience to applying that penalty and, I repeat, you, by driving that vehicle while intoxicated, commit that act and consequently the instrument used in that act, its forfeiture (comiso) is ordered and, I repeat, the vehicle will pass into the hands of the State. You or your wife at that moment have it in provisional deposit and once this judgment is final you must return it to the court to place it in forfeiture (comiso) to the State." (DVD, third camera, 11:38:22 to 11:41:07; emphasis added). To adequately address the issues raised in the challenge in light of what was decided, it is necessary to analyze its various aspects.

**III.** Evidently, the first thing this Court must consider is whether, as the trial judge referred to in the challenged decision, there are pronouncements from the Constitutional Chamber that exhaust the discussion since, in such a case, it would suffice to apply them, given their binding nature (article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law). To verify this, it must be taken into account that driving under the effects of liquor was introduced in Costa Rica, as a crime, through a reform to the Criminal Code carried out via law number 8626 which, in turn, reformed the Traffic Law and was published on December 24, 2008, the date from which the crime under discussion came into force. So, it is from that date that the discussion on this topic began. A) Although before its entry into force, it is possible that the legislation was consulted by Parliament, unlike what the trial judge affirms, the Information Center of the Constitutional Chamber does not report that the legislators, in the approval process of that law, made any consultation, rather the only one referring to that subject matter alludes to the reform project currently in process (constitutional case file 10-005162-0007-CO, resolved by vote No. 2010-09059), which does not allude to the forfeiture (comiso), as it refers to legislation merely under discussion and, moreover, the forfeiture (comiso) of vehicles does not arise properly from the Traffic Law or from the special criminal norm introduced by it but from the application of a general norm of the Criminal Code to this illicit act. B) For this same reason, it is also not accurate to affirm that the Constitutional Chamber found no defect of constitutionality based on the consultations made by the Flagrancy Criminal Court. The votes issued in this regard by the Constitutional Chamber, numbers 7603-09, 10368-09, and 10363-09 did not address those issues; rather, the first declared the consultation not susceptible to being processed without making, in the reasoning part, any reference to this topic and, in the last two, the pronouncement was limited to the following: "The consultation formulated is processed in the sense that articles 254 bis, last paragraph of the Criminal Code and article 199 (200) of the Traffic Law are not contrary to the principles of legality, specificity, legal certainty, defense, and innocence. Regarding article 254 bis, first and second paragraphs, the consultation filed is declared not susceptible to being processed." C) In the same way, other actions of unconstitutionality filed against the Traffic Law are unrelated to the forfeiture (comiso) of vehicles driven under the effects of liquor, as they refer to penalties for loss of points on a driver's license (constitutional case file 10-11628-007-CO under admissibility review), to the joint and several liability of the registered owner of a vehicle if it is a rental company (constitutional case file 10-11503-007-CO, waiting to appoint a substitute judge), to the reasonableness of the fines in article 133 h of the Traffic Law (constitutional case file 10-8059-007-CO, assigned for review), to the fine for not using a seatbelt (case file 10-5132-007-CO, assigned for review), to defects in the law's formation and the disproportionality of the prison penalty and fines (constitutional case file 10-3555-007-CO summarily rejected by vote 5888-10 and 10-3226-007-CO summarily rejected by vote number 4803-10), to vehicle window tinting (case file 10-3225-007-CO summarily rejected by vote number 4798-10), to specifications in the technical inspection (case file 10-3227-007-CO summarily rejected by vote number 4801-10), to the vehicle restriction (case file 09-15355-007-CO rejected on the merits by vote number 19135-09), to permits for special transportation (constitutional case file 09-13854-007-CO summarily rejected by vote number 16293-10), to the time restriction for heavy vehicles (constitutional case file 09-12261-007-CO summarily rejected by vote number 15662-09), to criminal jurisdiction in traffic matters (constitutional case file 09-10751-007-CO processing denied by vote number 13083-09), to the breathalyzer test and the procedure to detect alcohol in blood (constitutional case file 09-4848-007-CO summarily rejected by vote number 7379-09 and constitutional case file 09-13854-007-CO summarily rejected by vote number 6293-10), to the duplicity of practical sanctions implied by driving under the effects of liquor due to the existence of an administrative sanction, disqualification, and imprisonment (constitutional case file 09-1944-007-CO rejected on the merits by vote number 3641-09), to the duplicity of sanctions for ingesting liquor by having the license suspended, being fined, and having the vehicle forfeited (comisarse) (constitutional case file 09-94-007-CO summarily rejected by vote number 600-09), and to the non-existence of concrete legally protected interests in the crime of reckless driving, conceived as an abstract danger crime (constitutional case file 09-96-007-CO rejected on the merits by vote number 204-09). D) The only case in which the petitioner expressly challenged the forfeiture (comiso) in cases of reckless driving was in case file 10-2225-007-CO, but the Constitutional Chamber denied processing without giving substantive arguments on the issue (vote number 4492-10). On other occasions, when actions were filed against a plurality of Traffic Law norms, the question was tangentially addressed, but it was considered that the issue of forfeiture (comiso) was not contemplated in the traffic legislation, and therefore it fell outside the scope of the pronouncement: "V.- Absence of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The claimant argues that by virtue of the reforms to the Traffic Law, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the following sanctions occur: economic fine, loss or seizure (decomiso) of the license, disqualification from driving for a specified period, seizure (decomiso) of the [Placa3], seizure (decomiso) of the vehicle, payment of transportation costs, tow trucks, vehicle deposit, imposition of precautionary measures and, eventually, imprisonment. Furthermore, he considers that the principle of non bis in idem is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he affirms that it is confiscatory because the economic possibility of each administered person is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is evident when observing that a higher penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having a current technical inspection. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the only penalty provided for in the challenged norm is that of one to three years of imprisonment, which may be substituted by an alternative measure of public utility service that may range from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The penalties of fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged norm. The other aspects indicated by the claimant are consequences derived from the crime, but they do not constitute a penalty in themselves and, in any case, they are not provided for in the challenged norm. VI.- Regarding the violation of the right to private property. The claimant affirms that the forfeiture (comiso) of the vehicle driven while intoxicated is unconstitutional, since, by the criterion of non-harmfulness and non-existence of a protected legally protected interest, there is no crime, there is no justification by the State. The administered person is exposed to their property suffering deterioration and damage that diminish their assets. From a reading of the challenged norm, it is confirmed that it makes no reference to the forfeiture (comiso) of the vehicle, because in reality this is a consequence of the crime that is contained in other norms, such as article 110 of the Criminal Code and 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code." (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. [Telf1] of 14:42 hrs. on March 24, 2009, case file 09-000788-0007-CO, the highlight is supplied). Thus, from an exhaustive search of the topics that have been discussed in the Constitutional Chamber relating to this matter, aided by the Information Center of that jurisdictional body (see folios 175 to 180), this Court realizes that there has been no pronouncement from the Constitutional Chamber on the aspect of interest, which renders that affirmation by the trial judge unfounded, as he merely expressed it without providing any concrete support for it. For this very reason, the right to effective judicial protection or the right to action obliges this Chamber to hear the claim. D) This Chamber disagrees with the argument issued by other cassation courts in the sense that the norm must be applied imperatively and that only the Constitutional Chamber could consider it disproportionate (see, for example, the vote of the Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón, Second Section, number 2010-302), because the ordinary judge has the obligation to directly apply the Law of the Constitution. The Constitutional Chamber itself, on other occasions, has considered that the issue of the proportionality of forfeiture (comiso) or how to interpret the norms that regulate it is an aspect that concerns ordinary judges and is outside its functions. Thus, before a judicial consultation formulated by that same office, the constitutional body referred: "...what is submitted for the knowledge of this Chamber is whether, in certain scenarios, the unrestricted application of Articles 83 and 87 of the Law on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, and Related Activities, which make no distinction whatsoever regarding the forfeiture (comiso) of goods derived from or used in drug trafficking activity, could imply a disproportionate penalty of confiscation, violating the guarantees provided in articles 40 of the Political Constitution and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The consultants argue that this could happen when the following circumstances concur simultaneously: that the subject directly affected by the forfeiture (comiso) is a person of scarce economic resources; that the object of the forfeiture (comiso) is a social interest dwelling; that said real estate constitutes the only real estate registered in that person's name. The Chamber observes that (...) the Judges' doubts are not related to the constitutionality of the norms themselves, but to their interpretation and application in specific cases, which exceeds the object of a consultation on constitutionality. The interpretation and application of the norms in the specific case is a task that clearly corresponds to the Ordinary Jurisdiction within the framework of its competence, which has been reiterated by this Chamber, for example in ruling N.2004-5008 of 14:46 hrs. on May 12, 2004. Therefore, the consultation is inadmissible, due to its object" (vote number [Telf2], the highlight is supplied). E) Finally, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office has requested that, given that the Criminal Cassation Court of Santa Cruz formulated a similar consultation to the Constitutional Chamber, by vote number 2010-149 of 11:28 hrs. on June 23, 2010 (constitutional case file 10-9043-007-CO in process), this Court wait for the decision of said body, which is not possible because, as indicated, there are not only precedents from the Constitutional Chamber itself that treat the application of the rules of forfeiture (comiso) as outside its jurisdictional scope, but also because the judicial consultation on constitutionality only has effects on the case file in which it is raised, without affecting other proceedings. Hence, waiting for that resolution could negatively affect this case, since the suspension of the proceedings would be de facto, without legal backing, and could result in the statute of limitations for the criminal action or, ultimately, a delay in justice (articles 41 of the Political Constitution and 102 and following of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law). For all the foregoing, it is appropriate, then, to proceed to determine whether, as the challenger proposes in a second argument, the forfeiture (comiso) is, in these cases, excessive.

**IV.** Regarding the constitutionality of forfeiture (comiso) as a general institute. A) Although, as established in articles 10 of the Magna Carta and 2 subsection b) of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the body that has concentrated control of constitutionality in our country is the Constitutional Chamber and, therefore, only it is competent to make declarations of unconstitutionality with general or erga omnes effects, the fact is that numeral 8.1 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch orders the ordinary judge not to apply laws or acts contrary to the Law of the Constitution. This indirect control, if you will, of constitutionality by the ordinary judge, has been understood by the Constitutional Chamber itself, in the sense that "...the judges of the ordinary courts, in the current Costa Rican constitutional justice system, cannot disapply for the specific case any act or norm that they deem unconstitutional, because if at the moment of deciding, and therefore of applying any norm, they were to question its constitutionality, they must formulate the reasoned consultation before the Constitutional Chamber. Except, as stated, that there are precedents or jurisprudence that frame the case under examination within the terms, scenarios, and criteria with which the Constitutional Chamber acted in those cases, because then the ordinary judge finds a binding margin for decision there" (Constitutional Chamber, vote number 1185-95, binding erga omnes according to the provisions of article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law). Then, based on these premises, given that one of the issues the challenger expressly establishes is the possible unconstitutionality of the general figure of forfeiture (comiso) established in article 110 of the Criminal Code, this Court would have to, if it shared his thesis, make the referred consultation. However, without prejudice to the powers that the Legal System confers upon the inhabitants to directly appeal to the constitutional body (numerals 75 and following of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law) and, in such case, without prejudice to what the Constitutional Court might consider, this Chamber harbors no doubt of constitutionality in relation to article 110 of the Criminal Code, insofar as the assessments made by the challenger are not shared, according to which forfeiture (comiso) is a form of confiscation, prohibited by constitutional article 40. B) Forfeiture (comiso) is an institution regulated in article 110 of the Criminal Code which, inserted in Book One (General Provisions), Title VII (Civil Consequences of the Punishable Act), single section, states: "The crime produces the loss in favor of the State of the instruments with which it was committed and of the things or values deriving from its execution, or that constitute for the agent a gain derived from the same crime, except for the right that the victim or third parties may have over them." For its part, article 40 of the Magna Carta indicates, effectively and as relevant, that "No one shall be subjected to (...) the penalty of confiscation." It is true that if one follows a merely grammatical definition, forfeiture (comiso) would have to be equated to confiscation, since the Dictionary of the Spanish Language issued by the Royal Spanish Academy, 22nd edition, gives that word such treatment because both derive from the Latin "commissum" which means, precisely, confiscation (cf.: http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/). However, to refer to the general constitutionality of forfeiture (comiso), one must not lose sight of the historical evolution of the figures, because the literal definition is not adequate considering that, inclusively, it is also equated to seizure (decomiso), thereby losing the boundaries that Western procedural, criminal, and constitutional doctrine has been establishing for institutions that, in current law, are completely different, for having different natures and effects. Hence, it is necessary to unravel the historical meaning of the constitutionally proscribed figure of confiscation. From this work, it is clear that the current article 40 of the Constitution, which was introduced into the Magna Carta without major discussions on this aspect (cf.: records of the National Constituent Assembly numbers 111, art. 3, volume II, p. 534; 170, art. 2, volume III, p. 501 and 179, art. 4, volume III, p. 608 consulted from the references made by [Nombre2], ; [Nombre3], [Nombre4] and [Nombre5]. Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, annotated, concorded, and with constitutional jurisprudence. IJSA, San José, 3rd edition, 2005, p. 407) is similar to that which existed in other previous national constitutions and, even, to a constitutional regulation that, unsuccessfully, was attempted to be made instead of the Magna Carta that governs us. In retrospect, then, and based on the work edited by [Nombre6], (The Constitutions of Costa Rica. Editorial U.C.R., San José, Volumes I to V, 1st edition, 2007) it is known that in that failed Constitution Project, presented by the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, revealing of the socio-historical will of the era, article 58 provided "Confiscation is prohibited, except for the forfeiture (comiso) established by criminal laws" that is, a difference between the two institutions was established, a distinction that was not accidental but rather came from other constitutional texts, since the Political Constitution of 1917, in article 24 regulated the topic stating: "...All penalties are personal. Torture, infamous penalties, nor confiscation of property shall be applied. The latter shall not prevent the forfeiture (comiso) of the instruments or objects of the crime." A less explicit formula was contemplated by the Constitution of 1871, in its article 24 which mentioned, simply, that "The use of torture and the penalty of confiscation is prohibited," wording that, in turn, was very similar to that contained in the Costa Rican Constitutions of 1869 (article 129 "...The use of ... the penalty of confiscation is prohibited") and 1859 (article 20: "...the penalties of confiscation and flogging are prohibited..."). However, from this date backward, the national constituents did concern themselves with outlining the basic characteristics of the figure they were proscribing. Thus, the reformed Constitution of 1848, in its article 110, stated: "No crime shall be punished with the penalty of confiscation; but this does not include forfeitures (comisos), nor the fines that the law imposes" while the Political Constitution of 1847, in its article 154 provided: "All confiscation of property is abolished, and it may only take place in the sole case of securing the rights of a third party" and the Political Constitution of the State of Costa Rica of April 9, 1844, established in its article 30: "No crime, whatever its nature, may be punished with the penalty of total or partial confiscation of property, nor under the pretext of indemnification for costs and damages, except for the rights of a third party." Meanwhile, the Law of Bases and Guarantees of March 8, 1841, in its article 2.2.10 stated: "All Costa Ricans (...) have the right (...) not to be imposed the total confiscation of property as a penalty..." and the Fundamental Law of the Free State of Costa Rica, of January 21, 1825, in its article 106, referred to the figure thus: "In no case shall there be seizure (embargo) of property, unless in that part where the crime carries with it pecuniary liability." Finally, both in the First and in the Second Interim Fundamental Social Pact of the Province of Costa Rica of, respectively, December 1, 1821, and January 10, 1822, the topic was addressed in article 304 of each of the fundamental texts in the same way: "Nor shall the penalty of confiscation of property be imposed" and, to conclude this historical recount, if one analyzes the Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, also called the Constitution of Cádiz of March 19, 1812, which obviously governed in the national territory before the independence process, the matrix of those references is understood, because numeral 304 stated: "Nor shall the penalty of confiscation of property be imposed." It is clear, then, that throughout national history there existed a dual concern of the constituent: on one hand to maintain the proscription of confiscation and, on the other, to differentiate the figure from others, such as forfeiture (comiso), fines, or seizure (embargo) even going so far as to allude to general or partial confiscation which, as will be discussed, is an improper distinction, as it generates confusion, which doctrine makes to establish the effects and identify the prohibited figure from the permitted one. Starting from the Constitution of Cádiz, doctrine, mainly Spanish, has been tasked with tracing the foundation of the proscription and its roots in the Roman-Germanic or continental-European law from which, evidently, all our legislation is nourished, which is necessary to quote, in extenso, to understand the current reality: "The forfeiture (comiso) currently included in the Criminal Code has become completely detached from the ancient penalty of general confiscation of property. This penalty, currently abolished from modern legal systems, finds its origin in Roman law. The most common form of confiscation of property in Roman criminal law was the so-called publicatio bonorum, consisting of the appropriation of all the property belonging to those who had been condemned to the capital penalty, which included not only the death penalty but also the penalty of exile as a substitute for it. The publicatio was an accessory or necessary consequence, not a true penalty, so it was not necessary to record its imposition in the condemnatory sentence. Later, and given the disproportion of this measure, which logically also affected the heirs of the accused, it was gradually limited, allowing the condemned and their family to retain a part of the assets, to cover their displacement into exile, if applicable, as well as their future subsistence. In the Middle Ages, the penalty of confiscation of property not only maintained the prominence it acquired during the Roman era, being one of the penalties most used to repress crimes of special gravity, but also became an extraordinarily important instrument placed at the service of monarchs through which they sought to assert their authority, protect the order they themselves established, and weaken their political adversaries. In the Criminal Law of the Ancien Régime, confiscation grew in prominence by appearing as one of the main means of financing the Monarchy. Its imposition was no longer limited to the perpetrators of the most serious crimes as in other times, but was imposed even for crimes of low social harm. Now, with the aim of obtaining the maximum yield from the condemned, confiscation was fundamentally reserved for persons of high financial capacity, to the extreme that if this penalty fell on an individual of scarce economic solvency, it was substituted by a corporal penalty or sending to the galleys. With the advent of the Enlightenment, its abolition was widely demanded (...) It was in 1812, in the Cadiz constituent process, where, despite the brake of the opinions of the traditionalists, the penalty of general confiscation of property was finally banished definitively from our legal system (Spanish), although in practice judges had stopped applying it quite some time before. None of the Criminal Codes subsequently promulgated give shelter among their precepts to this criminal sanction" (CEREZO [Nombre7], [Nombre8]. Legal-criminal analysis of the figure of forfeiture (comiso). Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pp. 6-8). Note how, from 1812 onward, the figure is suppressed from the Spanish Legal System and, with it, from our law, to the point that the prohibition was included in almost all the constitutional texts that have followed, alongside the proscription of mistreatment, flogging, the regulation of the death penalty, banishment, and what later came to be called the prohibition of torture, which evidences the intention to rationalize the punitive power of the State. C) This historical-constitutional framework allows us to understand the legal regulation that has been made of forfeiture (comiso) in the different repressive codes that the country has had. Thus, in the General Code of Carrillo of 1841, article 883, provided within the topic of the sentence of the criminal process, made possible the forfeiture (comiso) of the weapons, instruments, or utensils used to commit the crime and of the effects derived from it.

The same possibility was maintained in article 39 of the 1880 Penal Code; in articles 80(3) and 141 of the 1918 Penal Code; in articles 67(4) and 70 of the 1924 Penal Code; and in article 121 of the 1941 Penal Code, although these legislations expressly treated it as an accessory penalty and stipulated that it was not extendable to third parties and, unless the objects were inherently illicit, could only be decreed through a conviction (cfr.: [Nombre9], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1ª edición, 2006, págs. 36-37 and Código General. República de Costa Rica. Imprenta de Wynkoop, Nueva York, 1858. Parte III, pág. 92; Biblioteca de Derecho vigente de Costa Rica. Código Penal, 1914. Tipografía Lehmann, San José, pág. 19; Código Penal de 1918. Colección de leyes de Costa Rica, II Semestre, 1918, pág. 678; Código Penal de la República de Costa Rica, 1924. Edición ordenada por [Nombre10]. Imprenta [Nombre11]., San José, pág. 18 and Código Penal y Código de Policía. Imprenta Trejos Hermanos, San José, 1965, págs. 41-42). In summary, regardless of whether the Constitutions under which each of those penal codes was framed established any exception to specify that confiscation (confiscación) did not affect forfeiture (comiso) in criminal matters, the criminal legislator always maintained the regulation of the figure, providing for it as outside the constitutional prohibition, because it falls on specific objects and outlining some of the features with which it is applied today in our legal system: it cannot affect a third party unless due process has been respected or the objects are prohibited, and it can be decreed, in many cases, even if the criminal liability of the accused has not been established or a conviction issued.

• D)It is evident that the figure of forfeiture (comiso), as regulated in our positive law, while bearing some relationship to the figure of confiscation (confiscación) (the State assumes ownership of third-party property), is far from maintaining the character that said sanction had, which was a general measure, applicable to all the convict's property, whereas forfeiture (comiso) proceeds only over those items indicated by the rule, that is, over the property with which the crime is committed or that which originates from or constitutes the proceeds of the commission of the criminal offense, according to the current formulation of article 110 of the Penal Code which, at the time of its enactment, posed no interpretive difficulty and was not specifically commented upon (cfr.: Asamblea Legislativa. Código Penal: adicionado con la exposición de motivos y el dictamen afirmativo. Alcance Nº 120 a La Gaceta Nº 257 de 15 de noviembre de 1970, Imprenta Nacional, pág. 32).
• E)Based on these genealogical considerations, doctrine has distinguished various types of confiscation. The general-total, which proceeds over all property and is closely related to the historical figure prohibited by the majority of Spanish-American constituent framers; the general-partial, which affects a portion of the assets; and the particular, special, or proper, which is only over specific property that may be means or instruments of the crime (instrumenta sceleris); objects of the crime (objectum sceleris), fruits of the crime (producta sceleris), or proceeds from the crime. In addition to this, reference is also made to improper forfeiture, replacement forfeiture, or forfeiture of equivalent value, according to which those measures are substituted by the forfeiture of property into which the proceeds, fruits, or instruments of the crime were transformed or of other property of equivalent value to that which, being instruments, fruits, or proceeds of the crime, were disposed of or encumbered by their owner before the measure was decreed, and extended forfeiture (comiso ampliado), which falls on instruments or objects of the crime, its fruits, and proceeds, but occurs in the absence of a judicial declaration of criminal liability against any person, whether due to exemption from punishment or because the criminal action has been extinguished (on the subject cfr.: [Nombre12], . La regulación del comiso en el Proyecto de modificación del Código Penal. En: Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología, 05-04, 2003; [Nombre13], . El régimen específico de comiso en materia de tráfico de drogas. En: Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho, Nº 11, 1993, págs. 277-298; [Nombre14], . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004; [Nombre15], . El comiso frente al Nuevo Código Penal. En: Derecho Penal y Criminología. Colombia, Nº 15, set-dic. Vol. 4, 1981, págs. 183-192; [Nombre16], . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, págs. 559-574; [Nombre9], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José1ª edición, 2006; [Nombre17], [Nombre18]. La pena de comiso en el proyecto de Código Penal. En: Anuario de Derecho Penal y Ciencias Penales. España, Fascículos 1-2-3, enero-diciembre, Vol. 34, 1981, págs. 613-652; [Nombre17], [Nombre19]. Las penas patrimoniales en el Código penal español. Tras la Ley Orgánica 8/1983, editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1983, p. 251; [Nombre20], . La confiscación. En: Revista jurídica online. Facultad de Jurisprudencia y Ciencias Sociales y Políticas. Universidad de Guayaquil. Versión electrónica en: http://www.revistajuridicaonline.com; [Nombre21], [Nombre22]. El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs. 64-70 y 86-90; [Nombre23], . Las sanciones de confiscación: ¿Un intruso en el Derecho Penal? En: http://www.unifr.ch/ddp1/derechopenal/articulos/a_20080527_39.pdf).
• F)Based on that classification, scholars of the matter have pointed out that the prohibition of confiscation refers to the general and not to the special or particular. This is expressed, in order, by Spanish, Argentine, and Colombian authors who comment on rules similar to ours:

¬"...certain authors have sought to see in the figure of forfeiture a direct descendant of the archaic confiscatory sanction. However, despite the fact that in both cases property belonging to the defendant's assets is affected, unlike the penalty of confiscation of property, the forfeiture currently contemplated in our Penal Code is limited to taking that which has been obtained or used illicitly. Consequently, this implies only the definitive loss of those objects and pecuniary advantages derived from the commission of a criminal offense, constituting, as the case may be, a confiscation of an individual or special nature" ([Nombre24], [Nombre8]. Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 8).

¬"...given the pecuniary nature of this penalty, it must be carefully distinguished from the constitutionally prohibited confiscation, essentially based on the general character of the latter, as opposed to the special nature of forfeiture (decomiso) {the name given in Argentina to the institute that concerns us}, which must always fall on specific things. Of course, forfeiture would be unconstitutional if it did not respect the rule of humanity and minimum irrationality and, therefore, in the specific case became a penalty of confiscation" ([Nombre25]; [Nombre26] and [Nombre27]. Derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 943).

¬"Although the etymological root of forfeiture (comiso) is the Latin word comissum, meaning confiscation, constitutional systems have proscribed this form of punishment (...) It is worth remembering that already in Roman law, confiscation was provided for as the deprivation of all or part of one's assets, both by the community and by way of penalty, and on not a few occasions it was used with the primary purpose of seizing the convict's property to enrich the state. From its application in criminal law, confiscation was an accessory penalty imposed together with the main penalties of perduellio, relegatio, and sale as a slave of an individual who was previously free, or death sentences, condemnation to the mines, or delivery to a gladiatorial school. [Nombre28] came to prohibit total confiscation in general and allowed it to subsist for crimes against the State. In ancient laws, confiscation continued to be applied following Roman law and was abolished in almost all legislations beginning in the 18th century, with the argument that official appropriation of a person's assets without cause of legal procedure and by way of simple seizure was an unjust, inhumane, and aberrant penalty. In this sense, and for the Colombian case (...) during the colonial regime, the Spanish punitive legal system was in force, the source of which lies in the Siete Partidas, in which four major penalties and three minor penalties were enshrined, one of the first being banishment with seizure of all property. With the advent of independence, confiscation—understood as the deprivation of all the property that makes up a person's assets—was prohibited as a way of protecting private property from the arbitrariness of state power, but allowing for the possibility of establishing other types of measures or sanctions of a patrimonial content (...) the poverty of legal language was what led to the first codifications denominating as confiscation any sanction for a crime that meant a transfer of private property to the state, such as a fine or forfeiture, all of them receiving the improper name of special confiscations. However (...) what was proscribed for being considered an abusive exercise of the state's punitive power was the so-called general or universal confiscation, by virtue of which the offender was deprived of the entirety or a portion of their economic assets, but these so-called special confiscations have never been prohibited, given that the recognition of private property in liberal democracies has not led to the excess of affirming that punishment can in no case restrict rights of a patrimonial content" [Nombre29], . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs 30-32.

In Costa Rica, a similar position has been followed:

¬"The idea of universality that characterizes general confiscation is never found in the special one, and although in both cases a true transfer of ownership occurs for the benefit of the State, they must not be confused. Forfeiture (comiso) is also confiscation, but special, of a different nature and effects from those of general confiscation. It falls on specific property (...) It respects the rights that the victim or third parties may have over such property. It does not reach the assets of the responsible person's family (...) Reconciling article 40 of the Political Constitution with article 110 of the Penal Code, we can say that the penalty of confiscation prohibited by the former is that general one (...) Therefore, it does not extend to forfeiture as a species of confiscation, and article 110 of the Penal Code cannot be argued to be unconstitutional" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro. San José, 1984, págs. 363-364. In the same terms: [Nombre9], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José1ª edición, 2006, págs. 20-21).

Against the foregoing, it could be counter-argued that the Constitution prohibits confiscation, without distinguishing between the general and the special, and therefore includes both, and that since forfeiture is a particular confiscation, it is encompassed within the constituent prohibition. However, this would disregard the historical evolution of the institutions, since at the time the constituent framer established the rule being commented upon (and which then passed successively to other Magna Cartas until reaching the current one) confiscation always had a general character, and it was only later that specifications emerged, either as a preventive measure (decomiso) or as a special measure (comiso). That historical meaning is required in the interpretation of any normative provision: "The rules shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose" (article 10 in relation to article 14, both of the Civil Code), of course with the limitations additionally imposed by the principles pro libertatis and legality that arise in criminal and procedural criminal matters (articles 1 and 2 of the Penal Code and 1 and 2 of the Procedural Criminal Code). Given that it follows from the historical evolution that when the constituent framer prohibited "confiscation" he always had in mind to refer to the generalized dispossession of present and future property of the convict or their family by the State, a characteristic not held by the forfeiture (comiso) provided for in Costa Rican criminal legislation, since article 110 of the Penal Code and others established in special laws (cfr.: Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento del terrorismo: articles 87 to 92; Ley de armas y explosivos: articles 83 and 84; Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre: articles 90 to 100; Ley Forestal: article 65; Ley contra la delincuencia organizada: articles 34, 49 and 54; Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura: article 134; Ley de Juegos: article 7; Ley de Rifas y Loterías: article 8; Ley de procedimientos de observancia de los derechos de propiedad intelectual: articles 17 and 41 and Ley General de Salud: articles 359 to 361) only regulate proper special confiscation (or forfeiture (comiso)), without providing for anything regarding improper forfeiture, replacement forfeiture, or forfeiture of equivalent value, this Tribunal considers that there is no reason whatsoever to formulate an optional consultation on constitutionality, since the evolutionary understanding of the institutions dispels any doubt that might arise regarding the compatibility of the general authorizing rule for forfeiture (article 110 of the Penal Code) with article 40 of the Constitution.

V.- On the requirements for admissibility and the legal nature of forfeiture. Now then, having established, for the undersigned, the general constitutionality of forfeiture and, therefore, the lack of necessity to make any consultation on this point (it is reiterated: without prejudice to the powers of the Constitutional Chamber for pronouncements with general effect to which the challenger may resort), it is necessary to make a series of additional considerations in order to respond to other arguments made in the challenge. One of these essential assessments refers to the legal nature of the figure of forfeiture, since a series of consequences, sometimes contradictory to each other, can be derived from it, which will allow responding to this claim.

• A)In this regard, the first thing that must be said is, if you will, a truism, namely that the legal nature of an institute does not depend on its location in a particular regulation, but on the legal sphere in which its effects are produced (in the same sense see [Nombre30], . Curso de derecho penal español. Parte general, tomo I, Editorial Tecnos, 5ª edición, Madrid, 1996, pág. 183; [Nombre14], . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 32). If the former sufficed, the operation would be merely verificatory and would lead to the conclusion that forfeiture is a civil consequence of the crime because, in Costa Rica, it is located in a section of the Penal Code so titled. But the issue is not so simple because, if that false premise were accepted, it would imply concluding, for example, that since civil reparation in the criminal process is governed by the party disposition principle, forfeiture could not be ordered ex officio but would require a prior complaint from whoever holds the civil action on behalf of the State (which would be the Procuraduría General de la República or the Public Prosecutor's Office if delegated), none of which accords with, even, the imperative character of the legal rules regulating the matter (see articles 102(3) and 110 of the Penal Code and 367 and 480 of the Procedural Criminal Code, among others). Thus, the simplistic approach is not satisfactory.
• B)The legal nature of forfeiture has been one of the most discussed dogmatic issues. The answers that have been attempted in comparative law, while they may constitute an important indicator for elucidating the question in Costa Rica, are not incontrovertible for our system, since it is convenient to remember that the legal nature also cannot be forced or "transplanted" from one legal system to another, but depends on the current regulation of the effects attributed to it in our current legal system, which, although they may coincide with those operating in comparative law, may have specific characteristics, all of which must be assessed before adopting a position.
• C)Thus, the first thing that must be done to determine the legal nature of forfeiture is to establish the characteristics, effects, and circumstances in which it proceeds. According to the cited article 110, forfeiture requires, for its admissibility:

C.1) that a crime (delito) is being investigated, not a misdemeanor or contravention, this is so because the provision begins by stating "Every crime" and that expression, in a restrictive sense (article 2 of the Procedural Criminal Code), can only be understood as referring to acts classified as such by the legislator (Book II of the Penal Code or special laws) who made the distinction with misdemeanors (faltas) that have a different location in the normative body (Book III); C.2) that this crime is intentional. The rule does not expressly indicate this, but it states that what is lost are the instruments with which the offense was committed and the things originating from its commission. The authors on the matter have referred, in our view according to a restrictive interpretation in accordance with the principle of legality, that the intentional character of the measure is extracted from the provision of "instruments" contemplated by the law, since these: "...for the generality of the doctrine, are those that have been 'intentionally' used to commit the crime (...) with which those (...) of a negligent crime are, of course, excluded" ([Nombre31]. Derecho penal. Parte general. Editorial Astrea, 3ª edición, Buenos Aires, pág. 519. In the same sense: [Nombre32], [Nombre33]; [Nombre34], [Nombre35] and [Nombre27]. Manual de derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 1ª edición, 2005, pág. 734; [Nombre29], . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, pág. 59 y 64 and others cited in [Nombre9], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José,1ª edición, 2006, págs. 70-73); C.3) it would be applicable, in principle, to any intentional crime, as it is an institute regulated in the general part of the Penal Code, which is precisely characterized by affecting codified criminal types or those in special laws; C.4) it can affect third parties provided that they are made a party to the process. The rule does not establish this, which, if interpreted in isolation, would lead to ignoring this requirement that emanates from a systematic interpretation of the legal system and that places Constitutional Law as what it is, the foundation of the rest of the normative hierarchy (see, in this regard, votes number 712-2006 of the Third Chamber and 637-2010 of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of San José); C.5) forfeiture does not affect the rights of the victim or third parties in good faith, but rather these prevail over the state interest (in this sense, the votes of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of San José, numbers 2000-76, 2000-323, 2003-383 and 2004-101 and those of the Third Chamber, numbers 512-2001 and 1273-2005, among others); C.6) the effects arise from the crime, therefore it is normatively provided that forfeiture is decreed upon a conviction (article 367 of the Procedural Criminal Code). Is 'crime' to be understood as a typical, unlawful, and culpable act or as the abstract stipulation of illegality referred to by the legislator? National case law, in general terms, has understood it as a legislative provision, without a concrete declaration of liability, to the point that it has provided for the possibility of forfeiture in cases of dismissal, prosecutorial archives, final dismissal rulings, even for statute of limitations on the criminal action, acquittals, with alternative measures such as conciliations, suspensions of the process on probation, comprehensive reparation of harm and payment of fines, among others (see the count of votes made by [Nombre9], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1° edición, 2006, págs. 230-263); C.7) it lacks compensation, since it arises from a prior illegality, so it is an exception to the state's impossibility of assuming ownership of property without paying the value of the good (article 45 of the Political Constitution); C.8) it is a public order measure, so no party petition is required, and it can be decreed ex officio; C.9) as a measure arising from the state's power of imperium, it requires being provided for by law (Third Chamber, vote number 1217-1999), issued in a reasoned or well-founded manner, and there having been prior demonstration of the link or nexus between the object and the criminal act, so it is not a case of strict liability (Third Chamber, vote number 505-99); C.10) principles such as the presumption of innocence, due process, and the right to a defense govern, so the burden of proof lies with the State; C.11) in Costa Rica, the forfeiture of property used in the preparatory phase that does not become executive is not normatively regulated; C.12) the destination of the property, once its ownership is obtained by the State, is expressly set by law (cfr.: Ley de distribución de bienes confiscados o caídos en comiso, its regulation and manual).

• D)Based on similar considerations in comparative law, attempts have been made to explain the figure under comment by indicating that it is an accessory penalty, a security measure, a civil consequence of the crime, or a sui generis legal consequence of the crime (this includes those who consider it a third class of sanction in criminal law together with penalties and security measures but, in reality, it would be a fourth avenue, since reparation has already been accepted as the third). We will analyze each of these options:

D.1) Forfeiture as an accessory penalty: It has been said that forfeiture is an accessory penalty (in this sense, the votes of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of Cartago, numbers 2010-236 and 2010-265). However, the main criticism leveled against granting this legal nature is that forfeiture does not respond to the essential purpose of the sanction accepted by our constituent framer and legislator, which is positive special prevention or resocialization (articles 51 of the Penal Code and 5.6 of the American Convention on Human Rights), as it is more in keeping with retributive functions or negative general prevention (this is even accepted by the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of Cartago in votes numbers 2010-236 and 2010-265 when defining it as an accessory criminal sanction with a general prevention purpose). Forfeiture would also not respond, from this perspective, to the principle of culpability, which requires not only culpability for its imposition (that is, a sanction could not be imposed without culpability, so it could not be imposed in the absence of a principal penalty nor in cases where the perpetrator is not sanctioned, even if a criminal wrong existed), but also considers that this is gradable, which clashes with the rigid nature of the figure. Likewise, if it were a penalty, it would violate the principle regarding its highly personal character, since forfeiture is possible even against third parties, provided that they are given a hearing in the respective process and the property, with their consent, was used in the commission of crimes:

¬"The problems posed by this regulation of forfeiture derived precisely from its formal configuration as an authentic penalty. The penalty finds its foundation in culpability, so no penalty can be imposed without culpability. Hence, the following consequences derive in relation to the application of forfeiture. On the one hand, it could only be applied to the subject who had acted culpably, but not to one who, having carried out a typical and unlawful act, was nonetheless declared exempt from criminal liability for lack of culpability, for example, for being unimputable. But, on the other hand and furthermore, as the highly personal character of the penalty necessarily derives from the principle of culpability, the penalty of forfeiture could only be applied to the subject responsible for the criminal offense and, therefore, only with respect to instruments and fruits of the crime belonging to him, but not with respect to instruments that, having been used by the culpable party for the commission of the crime, were nonetheless the property of a third party not responsible for the crime (...) The foundation and purpose of forfeiture (...) may be (...) independent of the question of the ownership of the seizable objects" (cfr: [Nombre16], . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, págs. 559-560).

¬"...forfeiture does not respond to any of the purposes of the penalty, since it is neither provided for as a threat intended to dissuade from the commission of crimes nor as deserved punishment for the crime" [Nombre36], . Derecho penal, parte general, 6ª edición, Reppertor, Barcelona, 2002, pág 748.

Forfeiture is also not provided for, as an accessory penalty, in article 50.2 of the Penal Code, which regulates as such only the special disqualification defined in article 58 ibidem as the deprivation or restriction of one or more rights. This objection is both systematic (regarding the location of the figure) and in the face of constitutional principles, since it would clash with the principle of legality by exceeding the catalogue of accessory penalties expressly contemplated by the Penal Code and the regulations specific to them. The difficulty could be overcome by stating that there is a prior law providing for it for all crimes (article 110 of the Penal Code); that there are other special rules designating it as a penalty (for example, the Wildlife Conservation Law) and that the figure contemplates the deprivation of a right: property. However, the same article 58 of the Penal Code states that the accessory penalties provided for as such by the legislator have a term, which is the same as absolute disqualification and ranges from 6 months to 12 years (article 57), which is incompatible with the loss of ownership of the good, which is definitive. Likewise, against any penalty, principal or accessory, the possibility of filing for review is possible, which the Constitutional Chamber has indicated as incompatible with the res judicata derived from forfeiture (see vote number [Telf3]). Finally, it must not be forgotten that according to article 110 of the Penal Code: "...the assessment of forfeiture shall be made once the civil liabilities arising from the crime are satisfied (...) undoubtedly, if forfeiture retained the character of a penalty, it would not be admissible for the imposition of the penalty to depend on the satisfaction of civil liability." [Nombre37], ; [Nombre38], and [Nombre39], . La responsabilidad civil ex delicto. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, págs. 45, 47. Then, either forfeiture is not an accessory penalty or, if it were, it would be unconstitutional for violating the cited precepts, which makes it necessary to evaluate other possibilities.

D.2) Forfeiture as a security measure: From these questions, the doctrine pointed out that, in reality, it was not that the measure was unconstitutional but that it should not be seen as a penalty and, in attempting to explain it, it was thought that its nature was that of a security measure, which overcame the objection that it responded to a principle of culpability since this escapes security measures, whose foundation is, rather, the dangerousness of the active subject. Forfeiture and security measures also had in common responding more to special prevention criteria assumed in international instruments than to general prevention criteria. But criticism flared up again. First, because dangerousness in security measures arises before the existence of a wrong that may not be present in forfeiture, which is based on a presumed objective dangerousness of the thing per se (in the case of instruments used for the commission of the crime and in particular some types of them, such as weapons). Furthermore, because this explanation did not overcome the highly personal character that security measures also have and that escapes the figure of forfeiture:

¬"The first thing that must be noted is that forfeiture (...) does not have the nature of a security measure either (...) Security measures are based on the criminal dangerousness of the subject, manifested by the prior commission of one or more typical and unlawful acts (...) Security measures also have a highly personal character, in the sense that they can only be applied to the subject in whom the criminal dangerousness has been appreciated.

Security measures are oriented exclusively towards special prevention, that is, towards producing certain resocializing or incapacitating effects on the dangerous offender to prevent them from committing crimes in the future. Confiscation (comiso), on the other hand, is based on the objective dangerousness of the thing and is oriented (...) towards preventing that thing from being used in the future for the commission of new crimes, and not only by the offender but also by other subjects. Now then, the objective dangerousness of the thing and the probability of its future use for the commission of new crimes does not necessarily entail the criminal dangerousness of the offender who used it to commit the crime, in which case it could not be confiscated if confiscation were attributed the nature of a security measure. But even if the subject were dangerous, the confiscation of certain objects could hardly be an adequate measure to eliminate the dangerousness, given that it will not always be suitable for fulfilling the purposes of re-education, cure, or incapacitation characteristic of security measures. Finally, if confiscation had the nature of a security measure, then it would also not be possible to apply it with respect to objects belonging to a third party who, for not having committed any typical and unlawful act, could not be declared criminally dangerous...\" ([Nombre16] , . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, pág. 561).

Furthermore, in Costa Rican criminal law, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) declared security measures for imputable persons unconstitutional, leaving only curative security measures (see Article 98 subsections 3, 4 and 5 and votes numbers 88-92 and 1588-98 of the Constitutional Chamber) and confiscation (comiso), most of the time, is attached to a declaration of sanction for imputable persons and is not mentioned as a security measure (Articles 101 and 102 of the Criminal Code) which are also governed by the principle of legality (principio de tipicidad) and the prohibition of creation by analogy (Articles 97 and 2 of the Criminal Code), in addition to also having the possibility of cessation (Articles 100 of the Criminal Code and 478 of the Criminal Procedure Code) incompatible with confiscation. Given this, another option was considered.

D.3) Confiscation (comiso) as a civil consequence or remedial measure derived from the crime: although the Constitutional Chamber has referred to the figure from this perspective (thus in vote number [Telf3]: \"confiscation (comiso) is one of the civil consequences of the punishable act, along with restitution and the repair and indemnification of damages\"), which has also been accepted by some cassation jurisprudence (see, for example and among others, vote number 787-2006 of the Third Chamber), the truth is that, technically, confiscation cannot be considered a civil consequence. First because, as stated, in Costa Rica it can be decreed ex officio, which is alien to the party disposition principle (principio dispositivo) and the principle of congruence of civil matters. Second, because it does not have a reparatory, restitutive, or indemnifying character, to the point that Article 103 of the Criminal Code lists it apart from those purposes, which are characteristic of the consequences derived from a crime. Third because \"Civil liability ex delicto constitutes a matter of an essentially civil nature, regardless of whether it is examined in the criminal process, which explains why there is no obstacle to its knowledge being deferred, where appropriate, to the civil jurisdiction. And although the crime, regarding the birth of this liability, is a necessary prerequisite, it is not sufficient, since the production of damage is also required, an indispensable element for the birth of all civil liability, whether or not the act that caused it is typified in the Criminal Code\" (CEREZO [Nombre40] , . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 29), without it being possible to file, in the civil route, an isolated claim for confiscation. Also, because \"Civil liability is transmitted to the heirs (...) but the same cannot be maintained with respect to the heirs of the person responsible for the act. In cases of the death of the accused or defendant without confiscation having been agreed upon, it is not possible to apply...\" (QUINTERO [Nombre41] , ; [Nombre38] , and [Nombre39] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delictio. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pág. 46). To this, national doctrine adds that its effects are not of private law but in favor of the State, even though Costa Rica did not follow the recommendations discussed in the drafting of the Model Criminal Code for Latin America and placed the figure within the civil consequences. This, as stated, does not affect its real legal nature, and what can be derived is that the provision was erroneously located, without this affecting its effects, concluding that \"confiscation (comiso) cannot be an effect of civil liability ex delicto; in its essence, it is not a civil sanction\" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, pág. 376). From these reflections, another possibility was considered. D.4) confiscation (comiso) as a complex act, an accessory, legal, mixed, or sui generis consequence of the crime: There are consequences derived from the crime that exist by provision of law, without sharing the nature of those figures. In Costa Rican law, the following are located as such: the matter of condemnation in costs to the losing party (Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code); the publication of the sentence in crimes against honor (Article 155 of the Criminal Code); the reconstruction, suppression, reform, restitution, or registry rectification derived from the falsity of public instruments (Article 483 of the Criminal Procedure Code); the registration of certain types of resolutions (Articles 30 subsections j and k, 25 first paragraph, 36 ninth and tenth paragraphs of the Criminal Procedure Code and Law of the Judicial Registry and Archive) and confiscation (comiso). This has been regulated in countries like Germany and Spain and is accepted by the majority of doctrine, although without agreement on the appropriate name to use, but making it clear that it does not share the characteristics of the institutes indicated in previous sections:

¬\"...Henao [Nombre42] criticizes unitary positions (...) pointing out that (...) confiscation (comiso) is a phenomenon of a complex nature with a very broad functional scope, since it not only fulfills the task of punishment, but also those of restitution, compensation, policing and securing, and even procedural tasks of an evidentiary and precautionary nature (...) In the same sense, [Nombre43] and [Nombre44] are of the opinion of the complex nature of confiscation (...) [Nombre45] (...) raises the mixed character of the institution (...) In contrast to penalties or security measures, accessory consequences are coercive acts or sanctions of their own nature, legally linked to the imposition of a penalty for an intentional crime or misdemeanor, or they can be linked to it through a judicial pronouncement in certain cases. Thus, the placement of confiscation (...) as an accessory consequence implies that its basis is neither the culpability nor the dangerousness of the active subject of the crime.\" [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs. 59-60 y 62.

Even our legislation arises from the Model Criminal Code for Latin America, where the issue of the legal nature and correct placement of confiscation (comiso) was widely discussed: \"Finally, the opinion prevailed to situate confiscation with a criminal character, but not as a penalty, and outside the civil consequences of the punishable act, discarding the idea of this phenomenon as a procedural measure (...) One of the agreements of the Fourth Plenary Meeting held in Caracas, Venezuela from January 20 to 30, 1969, No. 89, was to include a text on confiscation, but on the understanding that it did not have the character of a penalty or an effect of civil liability (...) Why then, when ordering the regulations of that Code, was confiscation included (...) under the Title (...) relating to 'Civil liability derived from the crime'?\" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, págs. 369-370). G) Having said the above, this Court considers that, in effect, Costa Rican confiscation (comiso) is simply a consequence indicated by the legislator for the crime (for certain types of crimes, as stated and will be taken up again) that, although it has criminal features (legality, burden of proof, innocence, nexus with the act), civil features (proceeds against third parties), and administrative features (coerciveness and state ex officio action), it does not precisely fit any of them and, therefore, principles characteristic of penalties (such as culpability or temporality), security measures (such as personality), or reparation (such as the party disposition principle) cannot be applicable to it. Hence, it is valid for the legislator to regulate it to be applied ex officio, establishing the loss of ownership as definitive, etc. However, this does not mean that, as a measure that deprives rights, which it ultimately is, it is not subject to principles such as legality and proportionality, which are characteristic of any punitive matter, including in the area of administrative law, as they are the only limiters of the State's power of imperium, as will be addressed in more detail below.

VI.- The Principles of Legality and Proportionality in the Application of Confiscation (comiso): Discarding (due to that legal nature and the constitutionality assumed here) other possible criticisms that confiscation may have if viewed from those perspectives, the truth is that its imposition is not exempt from being governed, like any act of the Public Administration in which the power of imperium is applied, by the principles of legality and proportionality, so the confiscation decreed in this specific case must be analyzed based on such premises. A) Regarding legality, the confiscation of vehicles when driving under the influence of alcohol, that is, the confiscation applied to Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code, is, nowadays, a measure adopted, by way of interpretation, from a norm issued in a socio-historical context different from the one that governs us today, which, therefore, violates the principle of legality. On this subject, the Argentine criminalist and criminologist [Nombre46] has pronounced, pointing out that the principle of legality is not limited, as is usually estimated, to the existence of a strict, formal, and written law, but rather, with regard to the characteristic that this law be prior, the \"principle of historical respect for the legal ambit of the prohibited\" must be taken into account, according to which:

¬\"The law is a text. Every text has a context, both discursive and social. The ambit of what is legally prohibited varies even if the text remains identical, because the context constantly changes, since any product of human discourse activity derives its form and meaning from the social situation in which speech appears (...) The change of discursive context causes problems that are more serious when generated by changes in the social, cultural, or technological context (...) But the problem is complicated when, due to one of these changes, the text appears covering an unusually broad ambit of prohibition (...) In these cases, the cultural context of the legal text must be taken into account, and when a phenomenon of unusually extensive prohibition is verified, a historical reduction is imposed. Legality is a principle that serves to guarantee the limitation of the ambit of legislative criminalizing programming, and its meaning cannot be reversed by turning it into an argument for unusual and never foreseen extension in the original context of the text, the effect of which is to grant a selective space for criminalization that reaches the maximum limits of arbitrariness (...) Historical respect for the real ambit of the prohibited is imposed in legality because, otherwise, the simple omission of political agencies would extend punitive prohibitions in an unheard-of manner: the punitive is an ambit that political agencies must plan and increase through law, and the omission of these in the face of significant changes in the cultural or technological context constitutes a renunciation of their function, which is not constitutionally admissible. Primary criminalization is established by the action of political agencies and not by their omissions\" ([Nombre25] ; [Nombre26] and [Nombre27] . Derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 2000, pág. 113; emphasis supplied).

The 1973 Criminal Code regulated confiscation (comiso) for, as stated, intentional crimes. At the time that article was drafted, the majority of intentional crimes were result, injury, or mere activity crimes. Very few were the abstract danger norms contemplated by that regulation (among them were, following the original numbering of that code, the possession and manufacture of lock picks of Article 230, declared unconstitutional by vote number 6410-96; the danger of negligent accident of numeral 253, declared unconstitutional by vote number [Telf4]; illicit association of Article 272, and the possession of instruments for falsification of Article 370) since these were conceptualized as exceptional, given that they meant punishing acts at an earlier stage than the one where it traditionally had to be done (executive acts and not preparatory acts in the so-called iter criminis). This panorama has varied in Costa Rican criminal policy and, since then, there have been many special laws issued with crimes of that nature. The article for driving under the influence of alcohol arose with the reform of the Criminal Code of 2008, that is, 35 years after the confiscation norm was provided. Unlike what happened in the Law on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Unauthorized Drugs, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism (Articles 87 to 92), in the Law on Weapons and Explosives (Articles 83 and 84), in the Wildlife Conservation Law (Articles 90 to 100), and in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) (Article 65), to cite some examples, in which, despite the general norm of Article 110 of the Criminal Code, the legislator specifically established that the act provided for therein entailed confiscation (a declaration that would have to be considered unnecessary if it were considered that the article provided with a general character for the entire legal-penal system, but based on a determined context, could be applied to situations not even foreseen when it was created), the normative modification that introduced the provision at hand established nothing expressly regarding the applicability of confiscation. When reckless driving was discussed (which is a peculiar figure as it punishes driving under the influence of alcohol as an intentional crime, but then, that same conduct is considered negligent if a result of injury or death occurs, according to Articles 128 and 117 of the Criminal Code), the legislative file never mentioned the possibility of applying the confiscation of vehicles, which, as stated, could not be used for injury or homicide crimes committed even under the influence of alcohol, as they are negligent. In application of the cited Articles 10 and 14 of the Civil Code, which oblige considering the historical background in normative interpretation, this omission is an element that must be taken into account. Thus, the confiscation of vehicles for the commission of this act has emerged as an interpretation, the result of introducing an abstract danger norm into an article with general provisions designed for another socio-historical context. So much so that the reform projects for that regulation, given the various errors it presented, contemplate expressly excluding the confiscation of the vehicle as a measure derived from said behavior (in this sense, cf.: Article 291 of the comprehensive reform project to the Traffic Law recently presented by the MOPT, accumulated to legislative file 17.485, where a second paragraph is introduced to Article 110 of the Criminal Code according to which \"Vehicles involved in the commission of the acts typified in Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code are excluded from this provision\"). Likewise, in the historical context in which Article 110 of the Criminal Code was issued (1970), the discussion regarding confiscation was circumscribed to intentional result crimes, concrete danger crimes, mere activity crimes, and very few abstract danger situations. Even in Spain, starting from similar legal systems, that is, those that have a norm in the general part of the Criminal Code that authorizes confiscation and the introduction, much later, of the crime of reckless driving with contempt for the lives of others (Article 384 of the Criminal Code), an express norm was incorporated alongside that law, indicating: \"The motor vehicle or moped used in the acts provided for in the previous article shall be considered an instrument of the crime for the effects of Article 127 of this Code\" (cfr: [Nombre16] , . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. [Nombre47] , Valencia, 2006, p. 558), a distinction that would be useless if it were considered that the introduction of the criminal type within the general framework of prior norms were sufficient, it being necessary to add that, in that country, the criminal type of driving under the influence of alcohol implies a concrete danger, since it is not enough to drive with alcohol but rather that situation must concretely affect the ability to drive. B) Furthermore, the measure is disproportionate. Confiscation (comiso) cannot, and should not, be applied automatically, without considering other factors specific to the case. In comparative law, there is currently no discussion that this principle of proportionality must be used as a measurement parameter when deciding on the matter of confiscation. Some authors point out:

¬\"The criterion of proportionality had been proposed by doctrine to resolve the most frequent cases of confiscation of instruments of crime: that of motor vehicles. In effect, although in certain cases it may be justified, it seems notoriously dysfunctional when it involves negligent traffic offenses. Precisely for this reason, the Prosecutor's Office of the TS (Circular 6/1968) came to understand that a restrictive interpretation of what should be understood as an instrument obliges not considering motor vehicles as such. However, in crimes against traffic safety, such exclusion can be very difficult to operate. Hence the inevitability of resorting to the criterion of proportionality\" ([Nombre48] and [Nombre49] , . Las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Civitas, Madrid, 3ª edición, 1996, pág. 216).

¬\"...confiscation (comiso) (...) bears a close analogy with these penal consequences; by virtue of this, the same legal-constitutional principles that govern criminal sanctions are applicable to it. Such principles are: legality (...) and proportionality and the procedural guarantees of the accusatory principle, presumption of innocence, right of defense, and individualization of the consequence.\" [Nombre29] , . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, pág. 62 citing [Nombre50] , . El patrimonio criminal. Comiso y pérdida de la ganancia. Dykinson, Madrid, 2001, 28-30.

¬\"...both in the confiscation of instruments and in that of the effects, at the time of decreeing the measure, its proportionality must be considered with respect to those that are of lawful commerce, so that the judge can abstain from decreeing it or do so partially if they consider it to be disproportionate, especially when it involves a notorious imbalance between the value of the instrument and the penal significance of the act, to prevent confiscation from surpassing the penalty itself in affliction. It is clear that the judgment of proportionality is not applicable as a general rule in relation to the economic profit obtained from carrying out the crime, since the confiscation of the illicit benefits obtained by the perpetrator, regardless of their value, precisely covers the material advantage obtained in an unlawful manner (...) Thus, the requirements for the application of the principle of proportionality are two: that it does not involve the profits or the instruments and effects of the crime of illicit commerce, and that one of the three following conditions is alternatively met: a) that the value of the assets is not proportionate to the nature of the criminal offense, b) that the value is not related to the gravity of the crime, c) that civil liabilities have been completely satisfied. To establish whether conditions a) or b) are met, one must consider the class of legal right injured or endangered by the intentional offense, the form of attack or endangerment thereof, the greater or lesser degree of reproach attributed to the perpetrator, and the material and moral damages produced by the punishable act...\" [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs. 79-80.

Commenting on Article 127 of the Spanish Criminal Code, which has an imperative wording similar to our Article 110 as it states \"Every penalty imposed for an intentional crime or misdemeanor shall carry with it the loss of the effects (...) and of the instruments with which it was executed...\" (emphasis is not from the original), it is said:

¬\"The necessity and proportionality of confiscation (comiso) have nothing to do with the old automatism with which, by legal will, it had to be decreed. On the other hand, in accordance with the current regulation of confiscation, its application, as an accessory consequence, is not mandatory, unlike what occurs with accessory penalties (...) The modification of nature, (...) obliges justifying and explaining the proportionality between the scope of the confiscation and the act and its effects...\" [Nombre37] , ; [Nombre38] , and [Nombre39] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delicto. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, págs. 45, 47; and it is the same criterion maintained by national doctrine and jurisprudence:

¬\"...it is another principle, that of Proportionality, that gives us the guidelines to follow in its practical application, because as it is an extremely drastic penalty (sic) whose purpose is public tranquility, it affects the patrimony of an individual with a specific destination, which is the State, but not in an unlimited manner, but rather attending to the gravity of the act with respect to the type, nature, origin, use, and value of the asset to be confiscated. Since its use in Criminal Law is delimited by law, it is up to the judge to assess the appropriateness of confiscation according to the varied circumstances of each case, so that it does not imply a disproportionate confiscatory measure with respect to the illicit act that was committed with the assets used to commit a crime (...) Without forgetting that there are assets that mandatorily enter into confiscation, regardless of their value or effect on the owner, there are others that must be submitted for consideration in relation to and connection with the criminal act, in case their loss quantitatively exceeds the damage caused\" [Nombre9] , . El comiso de Bienes. San José, IJSA, 2006, págs. 65-66.

¬\"The (...) prosecutor (...) files an appeal (...) against the sentence (...) estimates that the trial court incurred a vice in iudicando when it considered that the confiscation of the dwelling requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office was not appropriate (...) The allegation is not receivable: confiscation is a civil consequence of the punishable act (...) It is manifest that the defendant is a person of scarce economic resources who dedicated herself to the sale of cocaine base (crack) to final consumers from her dwelling located in (...) San Rafael Abajo de Desamparados. The constitutional principle of proportionality applies not only to the penal sanction imposed on whoever is convicted of committing a crime, but also encompasses the civil and administrative consequences derived from said penalty. In this case, given the socioeconomic profile of the accused, acceding to the requested confiscation would be equivalent to proceeding to extend the punitive effects with clearly confiscatory aims to the detriment of the sole patrimony of the sentenced person, which manifestly violates the constitutional principle of proportionality. The case is different for the convicted perpetrators and participants for narco-activity who have multiple movable and immovable assets and enjoy a buoyant financial situation precisely as a result of their illicit activity. In this scenario, there is no doubt whatsoever that it is constitutionally proportionate to adopt the measure of confiscation, given that the impact on the protected legal right has been on a larger scale, which is evidenced by the profit obtained that has allowed them to acquire the seized assets. Therefore, the appeal is declared without merit...\" (Third Chamber, vote number 2004-24, 09:40 hrs. January 23, 2004; [Nombre51], [Nombre52], [Nombre53], [Nombre54] and [Nombre55]; emphasis supplied).

Having said this, it is pertinent to observe the consequences that the entirety of the legal system attributes to driving under the influence of alcohol to conclude that there is an excess that makes confiscation (comiso), in such circumstances, must be considered disproportionate, not only because the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol already has a plurality of legal effects provided for it (fine or imprisonment: Articles 130 subsection a of the Traffic Law and 254 bis of the Criminal Code; withdrawal of the vehicle from circulation or its [Placa3]: Articles 141 subs. a and 155 of the Traffic Law; loss of all points and suspension of all licenses for 2, 4, or 10 years, depending on whether it is the first, second, or third similar offense and the obligation to undertake awareness courses, road re-education, or treatment for addictions, once the suspension period has expired, to recover only part of the points: Article 71 bis subs. a) and 71 ter of the Traffic Law) but also, due to the fact that, regarding result-related illicit acts (that is, more serious acts), produced by driving vehicles under the influence of alcohol, such as injuries or death (Articles 117 and 128 of the Criminal Code), confiscation is not applicable, which, as has been stated, has been circumscribed to intentional crimes and not negligent ones like those referred to. This makes confiscation clearly inadmissible in the first scenario, based on the same constitutional principle of equality that obliges treating as equals (not applying confiscation) those who are in the same conditions (driving under the influence of alcohol). In addition to this, the accessory measure could be more burdensome than the principal penalty, considering that the prison sentence could be commuted to a fine, if the circumstances for it are met (Article 69 of the Criminal Code), in which case the day of fine cannot exceed the daily salary of the person (Article 53 ibidem), or the prison sentence could be substituted with public utility services (final paragraph of Article 254 bis of said code). Therefore, both because of the plurality of effects that the legal system currently gives to the same conduct, and because a similar behavior but with more serious effects is treated more leniently than the conduct at hand, and because the secondary could be more burdensome than the principal, this Court unanimously estimates that the cited disproportionality occurs when decreeing, in these cases, the confiscation of the vehicle, an object that does not come from the commission of the crime and whose general use is lawful. Even the same Constitutional Chamber has had the opportunity to pronounce on similar interpretative criteria of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, which is what the matter ultimately reduces to, indicating that \"...the directive issued by the Deputy Prosecutor's Office of Alajuela, at fourteen thirty hours on January thirteenth, two thousand nine, insofar as it requires the donation of the vehicle to the State, as a remedial plan to agree to the suspension of the trial process, in reckless driving crimes, is contrary to the Law of the Constitution, particularly to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness...\" Constitutional Chamber, vote number 8296-10. Although the full vote is not available at this date to know the reasons given by the Constitutional Chamber, it would make no sense for the Prosecutor's Office to transform a confiscation into a donation if the former were appropriate, because it would suffice to apply it, regardless of whether one was not facing a conviction, as has been customarily done in the country as explained above.

VII.- This Court is not unaware that what has been resolved here has not been the general position of other cassation courts such as, for example, the Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón (majority vote number 2010-302 of 10:00 hrs.

of August 6, 2010, in which, however, it is noted: "...the undersigned judges could describe the legislative decision as excessive, irrational, and disproportionate (sic) such that, in circumstances like those present in this case, the forfeiture of the vehicle must be ordered...") or from the Cartago Criminal Court of Cassation (votes numbers 2010-236 at 11:07 on July 9 and 2010-265 at 14:35 on August 10, 2010) and has been accepted, although for the purposes of filing the constitutional consultation, by others (Santa Cruz Court of Cassation, vote number 2010-149 and dissenting votes in the San Ramón Criminal Court of Cassation, within vote number 2010-302 and, sua sponte, in that of this Chamber, with a different composition, within vote number 2010-995). Nevertheless, this Court, based on the principle of judicial independence, considers other facets of the discussion and starts from premises distinct from those raised in those pronouncements, as it not only accepts the possibility that the ordinary judge applies the principle of proportionality but, additionally, discards the consideration of an accessory penalty, the basis on which those decisions are founded. Thus, the analysis conducted allows this Court to state, unanimously, that the measure of forfeiture of motor vehicles in the crime of reckless driving is, in the current state of our legislation, a disproportionate measure that borders on the principle of legality in the aspect referred to above. For these reasons, which do not necessarily coincide with all the arguments made by the appellant but which respond to a broad consideration of the appeal filed, in order to attend to the right to that challenge enshrined in Article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights, the appeal must be granted, revoking the appealed judgment insofar as it ordered the forfeiture, a measure that is rejected. The vehicle seized and placed in provisional deposit must be returned, definitively, to its owner without the need for a remand for this purpose." "II.- In the sole ground of the challenge, the public defender of the accused alleges the erroneous application of Article 110 of the Penal Code. He points out that forfeiture for reckless driving is an interpretation implacably implemented by the Public Prosecutor's Office, despite the fact that forfeiture is a form of confiscation that infringes numeral 40 of the Magna Carta. He points out that the numeral regulating the institute is located within a chapter entitled "Civil consequences of the punishable act," for which reason it is intended to restore aspects of economic content to the prior state. He additionally refers that the numeral is framed in the obtaining of things or objects coming from the crime or in the use of instruments that produce a material and direct affectation, for which reason it cannot be applied to abstract danger crimes such as the one at hand, as this violates the restrictive interpretation established by numeral 2 of the Penal Code. He points out that in the crime of reckless driving there is only potential danger, no injuries or death, and the agent did not obtain any economic benefit from his action, for which reason the forfeiture turns out to be disproportionate because the driver is an alcoholic, who may have taken many years to acquire that property and loses it for a wrong decision made with impaired consciousness. He ends by saying that "The vehicle is legal and its forfeiture will in no way contribute to road safety, because whoever wants to drive will do so anyway and what is required is treatment for someone who is an alcoholic" (folio 160). He requests that the forfeiture be set aside and his client's rights over his property be restored. The ground must be upheld, although not necessarily for all the arguments made by the challenger, but for the reasons that will be stated. In the present case, it is on record that, indeed, the trial judge decreed the forfeiture, in favor of the State, of the BMW vehicle, 1993, white, [Placa1], for which he indicated: "You are the owner of that BMW and there is a registry certification that supports this. Article 110 of the Penal Code orders the forfeiture in favor of the State of such property or objects used in the commission of the crime, and the commission of the crime is driving under the influence of alcohol, and to drive you must drive a bicycle, a motorcycle, I don't know, a quad, a vehicle, a bus, a truck, and in this case it is a BMW vehicle, white, which is your property, year 1993, [Placa2], therefore, upon proving that you were driving that vehicle and that you collided it in front of the Desamparados Police Station that day, October 12, 2009, the court precisely orders the forfeiture of that vehicle in favor of the State. Now, regarding the arguments made by your defender, that it was a double sanction, that the sanction is unconstitutional, in reality that is an issue that has already been overcome by the Constitutional Chamber. What the Chamber said, when consulted by both the deputies and the coordinator of this court [Nombre1], regarding that reform to the Traffic Law, the Chamber, in none of the cases, found any defect of unconstitutionality and therefore the norm is applicable, not only because CED1, I repeat, orders it so, but also because the Chamber itself already said that there was no impediment to applying that sanction and, I repeat, when you drive that vehicle in a state of drunkenness you commit that act and consequently, the instrument used in that act, its forfeiture is ordered, and I repeat the vehicle will pass into the hands of the State. You or your wife at that time have it in provisional deposit and once this ruling becomes final, you must return it to the court to place it in forfeiture to the State." (DVD, third camera, 11:38:22 to 11:41:07; emphasis added). To adequately address the issues raised in the challenge in light of what was decided, it is necessary to analyze their various facets.

III.- Evidently, the first thing this Court must consider is whether, as the trial judge stated in the appealed decision, there are pronouncements from the Constitutional Chamber that exhaust the discussion, since, in such a case, it would suffice to apply them, given their binding nature (Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). To verify this, it must be taken into account that driving under the influence of alcohol was introduced in Costa Rica as a crime through a reform to the Penal Code operated by Law 8626, which, in turn, reformed the Traffic Law and was published on December 24, 2008, the date from which the crime under discussion entered into force. Therefore, the discussion on this topic began from that date. A) Although before its entry into force, it is possible that the legislation was consulted by Parliament, contrary to what the trial judge affirms, the Information Center of the Constitutional Chamber does not report that the legislators, in the approval process of that law, made any consultation, but rather that the only one referring to that subject matter alludes to the reform project currently in process (constitutional file 10-005162-0007-CO, resolved through Vote No. 2010-09059), which does not allude to forfeiture, since it refers to legislation merely under discussion and, moreover, the forfeiture of vehicles does not arise properly from the Traffic Law or from the special criminal norm introduced by it, but from the application of a general norm of the Penal Code to this illicit act. B) For this same reason, it is also not accurate to affirm that the Constitutional Chamber found no defect of constitutionality based on the consultations made by the Flagrancy Criminal Court. The votes issued in this regard by the Constitutional Chamber, numbers 7603-09, 10368-09, and 10363-09, did not address those issues; rather, the first declared the consultation unevictable without making, in the recital section, any reference to this topic, and, in the last two, the pronouncement was limited to the following: "The consultation filed is evacuated in the sense that Articles 254 bis, last paragraph of the Penal Code and Article 199 (200) of the Traffic Law are not contrary to the principles of legality, specificity, legal certainty, defense, and innocence. Regarding Article 254 bis, first and second paragraphs, the consultation filed is declared unevictable." C) In the same manner, other unconstitutionality actions filed against the Traffic Law are not related to the forfeiture of vehicles driven under the influence of alcohol, as they refer to sanctions for point losses on the driver's license (constitutional file 10-11628-007-CO under admissibility study), to the joint and several liability of the registered owner of a vehicle if it is a rental company (constitutional file 10-11503-007-CO, awaiting appointment of substitute), to the reasonableness of the fines in Article 133 h of the Traffic Law (constitutional file 10-8059-007-CO, assigned for study), to the fine for not using a seat belt (file 10-5132-007-CO, assigned for study), to defects in the formation of the law and the disproportionality in the prison sentence and fines (constitutional file 10-3555-007-CO rejected outright through Vote 5888-10 and 10-3226-007-CO rejected outright through Vote number 4803-10), to vehicle window tinting (file 10-3225-007-CO rejected outright through Vote number 4798-10), to specifications in the technical inspection (file 10-3227-007-CO rejected outright through Vote number 4801-10), to vehicle restriction (file 09-15355-007-CO rejected on the merits through Vote number 19135-09), to permits for special transports (constitutional file 09-13854-007-CO rejected outright through Vote number 16293-10), to time restrictions for heavy vehicles (constitutional file 09-12261-007-CO rejected outright through Vote number 15662-09), to criminal jurisdiction in traffic matters (constitutional file 09-10751-007-CO processing denied through Vote number 13083-09), to the breath test and the procedure for detecting blood alcohol (constitutional file 09-4848-007-CO rejected outright through Vote number 7379-09 and constitutional file 09-13854-007-CO rejected outright through Vote number 6293-10), to the duplication of practical sanctions implied by driving under the influence of alcohol when an administrative sanction, disqualification, and imprisonment exist (constitutional file 09-1944-007-CO rejected on the merits through Vote number 3641-09), to the duplication of sanctions for ingesting alcohol due to the license being suspended, a fine being imposed, and the vehicle being forfeited (constitutional file 09-94-007-CO rejected outright through Vote number 600-09), and to the inexistence of concrete legal interests in the crime of reckless driving, conceived as an abstract danger crime (constitutional file 09-96-007-CO rejected on the merits through Vote number 204-09). D) The only case in which the petitioner expressly challenged forfeiture in reckless driving cases was in file 10-2225-007-CO, but the Constitutional Chamber denied the process without providing substantive arguments on the issue (Vote number 4492-10). On other occasions, when actions were filed against a plurality of norms of the Traffic Law, the question was tangentially addressed, but it was considered that the issue of forfeiture was not contemplated in the traffic legislation, so it fell outside the scope of the pronouncement: "V.- Inexistence of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The petitioner argues that by virtue of the reforms to the Traffic Law, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the following sanctions are produced: economic fine, loss or seizure of the license, disqualification from driving for a determined period, seizure of the [Placa3], seizure of the vehicle, payment of transport expenses, tow trucks, vehicle deposit, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, jail. In addition, he considers that the principle of ne bis in idem is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he affirms that it is confiscatory because the economic capacity of each administered person is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is verified by observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having the up-to-date technical inspection. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the only sanction provided for in the challenged norm is imprisonment of one to three years, which may be substituted by an alternative measure of community service provision that may be from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The sanctions of fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged norm. The other aspects pointed out by the petitioner are consequences derived from the crime, but do not constitute in themselves a penalty and, in any case, are not provided for in the challenged norm. VI.- On the violation of the right to private property. The petitioner affirms that the forfeiture of the vehicle driven in a state of drunkenness is unconstitutional, because as there is no crime, according to the criterion of non-harmfulness and non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The administered person is exposed to his property suffering deterioration and damage that impair his patrimony. From a reading of the challenged norm, it is verified that it makes no reference to the forfeiture of the vehicle, because this is actually a consequence of the crime that is contained in other norms, such as Article 110 of the Penal Code and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." (Constitutional Chamber, Vote No. [Telf1] at 14:42 on March 24, 2009, file 09-000788-0007-CO, the highlighting is supplied). Thus, from an exhaustive search of the issues that have been discussed in the Constitutional Chamber relating to this matter, aided by the Information Center of that jurisdictional body (see folios 175 to 180), this Court realizes that there has been no pronouncement from the Constitutional Chamber on the aspect at issue, which renders unfounded that assertion by the trial judge, who limited himself to expressing it without giving any specific support for it. For that very reason, the right to effective judicial protection or the right to action obliges this Chamber to hear the allegation. D) This Chamber disagrees with the argument issued by other cassation courts in the sense that the norm must be applied imperatively and that only the Constitutional Chamber could consider it disproportionate (see, for example, the vote of the San Ramón Criminal Court of Cassation, Second Section, number 2010-302), as the ordinary judge has the obligation to directly apply the Law of the Constitution. The Constitutional Chamber itself, on other occasions, has considered that the issue of the proportionality of forfeiture or the manner of interpreting the norms that regulate it is an aspect that concerns the ordinary judges and is foreign to its functions. Thus, faced with a judicial consultation filed by that same office, the constitutional body stated: "...what is submitted to the knowledge of this Chamber is whether, in certain circumstances, the unrestricted application of Articles 83 and 87 of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, and Related Activities, which make no distinction regarding the forfeiture of property coming from or used in drug trafficking activity, could imply a disproportionate confiscation penalty, violating the guarantees provided for in Articles 40 of the Political Constitution and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The consultants argue that this could happen when the following circumstances occur simultaneously: that the subject directly affected by the forfeiture is a person of scarce economic resources; that the object of the forfeiture is a social interest dwelling house; that said property constitutes the only real estate registered in the name of said person. The Chamber observes that (...) the Judges' doubts are not related to the constitutionality of the norms themselves, but to their interpretation and application in certain cases, which exceeds the object of a constitutionality consultation. The interpretation and application of norms in the specific case is a task that clearly corresponds to the Ordinary Jurisdiction within the framework of its competence, which has been reiterated by this Chamber, for example in Judgment N.2004-5008 at 14:46 on May 12, 2004. For the foregoing reasons, the consultation is inadmissible, by reason of its object" (Vote number [Telf2], the highlighting is supplied). E) Finally, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office has requested that, given that the Santa Cruz Criminal Court of Cassation filed a similar consultation with the Constitutional Chamber, through Vote number 2010-149 at 11:28 on June 23, 2010 (constitutional file 10-9043-007-CO in process), this Court wait for the decision of that body, which is not possible because, as indicated, not only do precedents exist from the Constitutional Chamber itself that treat the application of forfeiture rules as foreign to its jurisdictional orbit, but also that the judicial consultation of constitutionality only has effects in the file in which it is raised, without affecting other processes. Hence, waiting for that resolution could negatively affect this case, since the suspension of the proceeding would be de facto, without legal support, and could generate the statute of limitations for the criminal action or, ultimately, the delay of justice (Articles 41 of the Political Constitution and 102 and following of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). For all the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate, then, to proceed to determine whether, as proposed by the challenger in a second argument, forfeiture is, in these cases, excessive.

IV.- On the constitutionality of forfeiture as a general institute. A) Although, as established by Articles 10 of the Magna Carta and 2 subsection b) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the body that has concentrated constitutionality control in our country is the Constitutional Chamber and, therefore, only it is competent to make declarations of unconstitutionality with general effects or erga omnes, the truth is that numeral 8.1 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch orders the ordinary judge to not apply laws or acts contrary to the Law of the Constitution. This control, indirect if one wishes, of constitutionality by the ordinary judge, has been understood by the Constitutional Chamber itself, in the sense that "...the judges of the common order, in the current Costa Rican constitutional justice system, cannot disapply for the specific case any act or norm that they consider unconstitutional, because if at the moment of deciding, and therefore of applying any norm, they come to question its constitutionality, they must file a reasoned consultation before the Constitutional Chamber. Except, as stated, when there are precedents or jurisprudence that frame the case under examination within the terms, circumstances, and criteria with which the Constitutional Chamber acted in those, because there the common order judge finds a binding margin of decision" (Constitutional Chamber, Vote number 1185-95, binding erga omnes pursuant to the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). Therefore, based on those premises, given that one of the issues expressly raised by the challenger is the possible unconstitutionality of the general figure of forfeiture established in Article 110 of the Penal Code, this Court would have, if it shared his thesis, to file said consultation. However, without prejudice to the powers that the Legal System confers upon the inhabitants to appear directly before the constitutional body (numerals 75 and following of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) and, in such case, without prejudice to what the Constitutional Court might consider, this Chamber harbors no doubt of constitutionality in relation to Article 110 of the Penal Code, insofar as it does not share the assessments made by the challenger, according to which forfeiture is a form of confiscation, prohibited by Article 40 of the Constitution. B) Forfeiture is an institution regulated in Article 110 of the Penal Code which, inserted in Book One (General Provisions), Title VII (Civil consequences of the punishable act), single section, states: "The crime produces the loss in favor of the State of the instruments with which it was committed and of the things or values coming from its realization, or that constitute for the agent a profit derived from the same crime, except for the right that the offended party or third parties may have over them." For its part, Article 40 of the Magna Carta states, effectively and in what is relevant, that "No one shall be subjected to (...) the penalty of confiscation." It is true that if a merely grammatical definition is followed, forfeiture would have to be equated with confiscation, since the Dictionary of the Spanish Language issued by the Royal Spanish Academy, 22nd edition, gives that word such treatment because both derive from the Latin "commissum," which means, precisely, confiscation (cf.: http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/). However, to allude to the issue of the general constitutionality of forfeiture, the historical evolution of the figures must not be lost sight of, as the literal definition is not adequate given that, inclusively, it is also equated to seizure, thereby losing the boundaries that Western procedural, criminal, and constitutional dogmatics have been establishing for institutions that, in current law, are completely different, as they have a distinct nature and effects. Hence, it is necessary to unravel the historical sense of the figure of confiscation proscribed constitutionally. From this task, it is evident that the current Article 40 of the Constitution, which was introduced into the Magna Carta without major discussions on this aspect (cf.: minutes of the National Constituent Assembly numbers 111, art. 3, volume II, page 534; 170, art. 2, volume III, page 501 and 179, art.

4, volume III, pg.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> 608 consulted from the references made by [Nombre2], ; [Nombre3], [Nombre4] and [Nombre5] </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, annotated, concorded and with constitutional jurisprudence</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. IJSA, San José, 3rd edition, 2005, pg. 407)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> is similar to that which existed in other preceding national constitutions and, even, to a constitutional regulation that, unsuccessfully, was attempted to be made instead of the Magna Carta that governs us. In retrospect, then, and from the work edited by [Nombre6],</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Las constituciones de Costa Rica</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Editorial U.C.R., San José, Volumes I to V, 1st edition, 2007) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">it follows that in that failed Draft Constitution, presented by the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, revealing the socio-historical will of the era, Article 58 provided </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"Confiscation is prohibited, except for the forfeiture (comiso) established by criminal laws\" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">that is, a difference was established between both institutions, a distinction that is not casual but rather came from other constitutional texts, since the Political Constitution of 1917, in Article 24 regulated the matter indicating: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"...All punishment is personal. Torture shall not be applied, nor infamous penalties, nor confiscation (confiscación) of property. The latter shall not prevent the forfeiture (comiso) of the instruments or objects of the crime.\" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">A less explicit formula was contemplated by the Constitution of 1871, in its Article 24 which mentioned, simply, that </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"The use of torture and the penalty of confiscation (confiscación) is prohibited\" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">wording</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">which, in turn, was very similar to that contained in the Costa Rican Constitutions of 1869 (Article 129 </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"...The use of ... the penalty of confiscation (confiscación) is prohibited</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">\") and 1859 (Article 20: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"...the penalties of confiscation (confiscación) and flogging are prohibited...</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">\"). However, from this date backward, the national constituent assemblies did concern themselves with outlining the basic characteristics of the figure they were proscribing. It is thus that the reformed Constitution</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> of 1848, in its Article 110, indicated: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"No crime shall be punished with the penalty of confiscation (confiscación); but this does not include forfeitures (comisos), nor the fines that the law imposes\" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">while the Political Constitution of 1847, in its Article 154 provided: \"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">All confiscation (confiscación) of property is abolished, and it may only take place in the sole case</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> of securing the rights of a third party\" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">and the Political Constitution of the State of Costa Rica of April 09, 1844, established in its Article 30:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"No crime, whatever its nature, may be punished with the penalty of total or partial confiscation (confiscación) of property, nor under the pretext of compensation for costs and damages, except for the rights of a third party.\" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Meanwhile, the Ley de Bases y Garantías of March 08, 1841, in its Article 2.2.10 indicated: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"All Costa Ricans </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(...)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> have the right </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(...)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> not to have total confiscation (confiscación) of property imposed as a penalty...\" </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">and the</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Ley Fundamental del Estado Libre de Costa Rica, of January 21, 1825, in its Article 106, referred to the figure as follows: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"In no case shall there be seizure (embargo) of property, except for that part in which the crime entails pecuniary liability.\"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Finally, in both the First and the Second Pacto Social Fundamental Interino de la Provincia de Costa Rica of, respectively, December 01, 1821 and January 10, 1822, the matter was addressed in Article 304 of each of the fundamental texts in the same way: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"Neither shall the penalty of confiscation (confiscación) of property be imposed\"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> and, to conclude this historical account, if one analyzes the Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, also called the Constitution of Cádiz of March 19, 1812, which obviously governed the national territory before the independence process, the matrix of those references is understood, since number 304 indicated: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"Neither shall the penalty of confiscation (confiscación) of property be imposed\". </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">It is clear, then, that throughout national history there was a double concern of the constituent power: on the one hand to maintain the proscription of confiscation (confiscación) and, on the other, to differentiate the figure from others, such as forfeiture (comiso), fines, or seizure (embargo), even going so far as to allude to general or partial confiscation (confiscación) which, as will be stated, is an improper distinction, as it generates confusion, that the doctrine makes to establish the effects and identify the prohibited figure from the permitted one. Starting from the Constitution of Cádiz, the doctrine, mainly Spanish, has been responsible for tracing the foundation of the proscription and its roots in the Roman-Germanic or continental-European law from which, evidently, all our legislation is nourished, which it is necessary to cite, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">in extenso,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> to understand the current reality: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"The forfeiture (comiso) currently included in the Criminal Code has become completely unlinked from the ancient penalty of general confiscation (confiscación) of property. This penalty, now abolished from modern legal systems, finds its origin in Roman Law. The most common form of confiscation (confiscación) of property in Roman criminal law was the so-called publicatio bonorum, consisting of the appropriation of all property belonging to those who had been sentenced to capital punishment, which included not only the death penalty, but also the penalty of exile as a substitute for it. The publicatio was an accessory or necessary consequence, not a true penalty, such that it was not necessary to record its imposition in the sentencing judgment. Subsequently, and given the disproportion of this measure, which logically also affected the heirs of the accused, it was gradually limited, allowing the convicted person and his family to retain a part of the estate, to cover their displacement to exile, where appropriate, as well as their future subsistence. In the Middle Ages, the penalty of confiscation (confiscación) of property not only maintained the prominence it reached during the Roman era, being one of the penalties most used to repress crimes of special gravity, but also became an instrument of extraordinary importance placed at the service of the monarchs through which they sought to assert their authority, protect the order they themselves established, and weaken their political adversaries. In the Criminal Law of the Ancien Régime, confiscation (confiscación) grew in prominence, appearing as one of the main means of financing the Monarchy. Its imposition was no longer limited to the perpetrators of the most serious crimes as in other times, but was imposed even for crimes of low social harm. However, in order to obtain the maximum yield from the convicted person, confiscation (confiscación) was reserved fundamentally for persons of high patrimonial capacity, to the extreme that if this penalty fell upon an individual of scarce economic solvency, it was substituted by a corporal penalty or being sent to the galleys. With the advent of the Enlightenment, its abolition was generally requested </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(...) </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">It was in 1812, in the constituent process of Cádiz, where, despite the brake of the opinions of the traditionalists, the penalty of general confiscation (confiscación) of property was definitively banished from our legal system </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(Spanish)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, although in practice the judges had stopped applying it quite some time before. None of the Criminal Codes subsequently promulgated shelter this penal sanction among their precepts\" </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(CEREZO [Nombre7], [Nombre8] . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pgs. 6-8). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Note how, from 1812 onward, the figure is suppressed from the Spanish Legal System and, with it, from our law, to the point that the prohibition is included in almost all the constitutional texts that have succeeded one another, alongside the proscription of mistreatment, flogging, the regulation of the death penalty, banishment, and what later came to be called the prohibition of torture, which evidences the intention to rationalize the punitive power of the State. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">C) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">This historical-constitutional framework allows us to understand the legal regulation that has been made of forfeiture (comiso) in the different repressive codes that the country has had. Thus, in the Código General de Carrillo of 1841, Article 883, provided within the topic of the sentence in the criminal process, enabled the forfeiture (comiso) of the weapons, instruments, or tools with which the crime was committed and of the effects derived from it. The same possibility was maintained in number 39 of the Criminal Code of 1880; in Articles 80 subsection 3 and 141 of the Criminal Code of 1918; in numbers 67 subsection 4 and 70 of the Criminal Code of 1924; and in Article 121 of the Criminal Code of 1941, although these legislations expressly treated it as an accessory penalty and stipulated that it was not extendable to third parties and, unless it involved objects illicit in themselves, it could only be decreed by means of a conviction </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(cfr.: [Nombre9] , . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">El comiso de bienes</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, pgs. 36-37 and </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Código General. República de Costa Rica</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Imprenta de Wynkoop, New York, 1858. Part III, pg. 92; Biblioteca de Derecho vigente de Costa Rica. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Código Penal, 1914</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Tipografía Lehmann, San José, pg. 19; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Código Penal de 1918</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Colección de leyes de Costa Rica, II Semestre, 1918, pg. 678; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Código Penal de la República de Costa Rica</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, 1924. Edición ordenada por [Nombre10] . Imprenta [Nombre11] .</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, San José, pg. 18 and </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Código Penal y Código de Policía</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Imprenta Trejos Hermanos, San José, 1965, pgs. 41-42). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">In synthesis, regardless of whether the Constitutions in which each of those criminal codes are framed established some exception to specify that confiscation (confiscación) did not affect forfeiture (comiso) in criminal matters, the criminal legislator always maintained the regulation of the figure, providing for it as extraneous to the constitutional prohibition, as it falls upon specific objects and outlining some of the features with which it is applied today in our milieu: it cannot affect a third party unless due process has been respected for them or it involves prohibited objects, and it can be decreed, in many cases, even if the criminal responsibility of the accused has not been established nor a conviction issued. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">D)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> It is evident that the figure of forfeiture (comiso), as regulated in our positive law, although it maintains some relations with the figure of confiscation (confiscación) (the State assumes ownership of third-party property), is far from maintaining the character that said sanction had, which was a general measure, applicable to all the property of the convicted person, while forfeiture (comiso) proceeds only over those indicated by the norm, that is, over the property with which the crime is committed or those others coming from or that are the proceeds of the commission of the criminal illicit act, according to the current formula of Article 110 of the Criminal Code which, at the time of its enactment, had no interpretive difficulty and was not especially commented upon </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(cfr.: Legislative Assembly. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Código Penal: supplemented with the statement of motives and the affirmative opinion</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Alcance Nº 120 to La Gaceta Nº 257 of November 15, 1970, Imprenta Nacional, pg. 32)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">E)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Based on these genealogical considerations, the doctrine has distinguished various types of confiscation (confiscación). The </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">general-total</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, which is that which proceeds over all property and which is closely related to the historical figure prohibited by the majority of the Spanish-American constituent assemblies; the</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> general-partial</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, which affects a quota of the estate, and the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">particular</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> special </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">or</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> proper</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, which is only over certain property that may be means or instruments of the crime (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">instrumenta sceleris</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">); objects of the crime (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">objectum sceleris</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">), effects of the crime (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">producta sceleris</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">) or profits from the crime. In addition to that, reference is also made to </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">improper</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> forfeiture (comiso), </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">substitute</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> or</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> equivalent value</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> forfeiture (comiso), according to which those measures are substituted by the forfeiture (comiso) of property into which the profits, effects, or instruments of the crime were transformed, or of other property of equivalent value to those which, being instruments, effects, or profits of the crime, were alienated or encumbered by their owner before the measure was decreed, and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">extended forfeiture (comiso ampliado)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> which falls upon instruments or objects of the crime, their effects, and profits, but occurs in the absence of a judicial declaration of criminal responsibility against any person, whether due to exemption from penalty or because the criminal action was extinguished </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(on the topic cfr.: [Nombre12] , . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">La regulación del comiso en el Proyecto de modificación del Código Penal. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">En:</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, 05-04, 2003</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">[Nombre13] , . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">El régimen específico de comiso en materia de tráfico de drogas. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">En: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho,</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> Nº 11, 1993, pgs. 277-298; [Nombre14] ,</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004; [Nombre15] , . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">El comiso frente al Nuevo Código Penal. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">En: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Derecho Penal y Criminología</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Colombia, Nº 15, set-dic. Vol. 4, 1981, pgs. 183-192; [Nombre16] , . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Las consecuencias accesorias</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. En: AAVV.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, pgs. 559-574; [Nombre9] , . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">El comiso de bienes. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006; [Nombre17] , [Nombre18] . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">La pena de comiso en el proyecto de Código Penal. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">En: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Anuario de Derecho Penal y Ciencias Penales</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. España, Fascículos 1-2-3, enero-diciembre, Vol. 34, 1981, pgs. 613-652; [Nombre17] , [Nombre19]. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Las penas patrimoniales en el Código penal español. Tras la Ley Orgánica 8/1983</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1983, p. 251; [Nombre20] , .</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> La confiscación. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">En: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Revista jurídica online. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">Facultad de Jurisprudencia y Ciencias Sociales y Políticas. Universidad de Guayaquil. Electronic version at: http://www.revistajuridicaonline.com; [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, pgs. 64-70 and 86-90; [Nombre23], </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Las sanciones de confiscación: ¿Un intruso en el Derecho Penal? </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">At: http://www.unifr.ch/ddp1/derechopenal/articulos/a_20080527_39.pdf). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">F)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Based on that classification, scholars of the matter have pointed out that the prohibition of confiscation (confiscación) refers to the general and not to the special or particular one. This is how, in their order, Spanish, Argentine, and Colombian authors who comment on norms similar to ours express themselves: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">¬</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">\"...certain authors have sought to see in the figure of forfeiture (comiso) a direct descendant of the archaic confiscatory sanction. However, despite the fact that in both cases property belonging to the estate of the accused is affected, unlike the penalty of confiscation (confiscación) of property, the forfeiture (comiso) currently contemplated in our Criminal Code is limited to taking that which has been obtained or which has been illicitly used. Consequently, this implies only the definitive loss of those objects and pecuniary advantages derived from the commission of a criminal offense, constituting in its case a confiscation (confiscación) of an individual or special character\"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> (</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">[Nombre24] , [Nombre8] . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pg. 8).

...given the pecuniary nature of this penalty, it must be carefully distinguished from the confiscation prohibited constitutionally, essentially based on the general character of the latter, as opposed to the specificity inherent in forfeiture (comiso) {the name given in Argentina to the institute that concerns us}, which must always fall upon specific things. Of course, forfeiture would be unconstitutional if it did not respect the rule of humanity and minimum irrationality and, therefore, in the specific case became a penalty of confiscation" ([Nombre25]; [Nombre26] and [Nombre27]. Derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 943).

"Although the etymological root of comiso is the Latin word comissumm, which means confiscation, constitutional systems have proscribed this form of punishment (...) It is worth remembering that already in Roman law, confiscation was foreseen as the deprivation of all or part of a patrimony, both by the community and by way of penalty, and on not a few occasions it was employed with the preferential purpose of seizing the convict's property to enrich the state. From its application in criminal law, confiscation was an accessory penalty imposed along with the principal penalties of perduellio, relegation and sale as a slave of an individual who was formerly free, or death sentences, condemnation to the mines, or delivery to a gymnastics school. [Nombre28] came to prohibit total confiscation in general and left it subsisting for crimes against the State. In ancient laws, confiscation continued to be applied following Roman law and was abolished in almost all legislations starting in the 18th century, with the argument that the official appropriation of a person's patrimony without cause of legal procedure and by way of simple apprehension was an unjust, inhuman, and aberrant penalty. In that sense, and for the Colombian case (...) during the colonial regime, the Spanish punitive legal system was in force, whose source is located in the Siete Partidas, in which four major penalties and three minor penalties were enshrined, one of the first being exile with seizure of all property. With the advent of independence, confiscation—understood as the deprivation of all property comprising a person's patrimony—was prohibited as a way to protect private property from the arbitrariness of state power, but leaving open the possibility of establishing other types of measures or sanctions of patrimonial content (...) the poverty of legal language was what led to, in the first codifications, any sanction for a crime involving the transfer of private property to the state being called confiscation, such as a fine or comiso, all of them improperly receiving the name of special confiscations. However (...) what was proscribed for being considered an abusive exercise of the state's punitive power was the so-called general or universal title confiscation, by virtue of which the offender was deprived of the entirety or a portion of his economic patrimony, but those so-called special confiscations were never prohibited, given that the recognition of private property in liberal democracies has not led to the excess of affirming that a penalty can never, under any circumstances, restrict rights of patrimonial content" [Nombre29], . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, págs 30-32.

In Costa Rica, a similar position has been followed:

"The idea of universality that characterizes general confiscation is never found in the special one, and although in both cases a true transfer of ownership occurs for the benefit of the State, they should not be confused. Forfeiture (Comiso) is also confiscation, but special, of a nature and effects different from those of general confiscation. It falls upon specific goods (...) It respects the rights that the offended party or third parties may have over such goods. It does not reach the patrimony of the responsible party's family (...) Reconciling Article 40 of the Political Constitution with numeral 110 of the Penal Code, we can say that the penalty of confiscation prohibited by the former is that general one (...) Therefore, it does not reach comiso as a species of confiscation, and Article 110 of the Penal Code cannot be argued as unconstitutional" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro. San José, 1984, págs. 363-364. In the same terms: [Nombre9], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José 1st edition, 2006, págs. 20-21).

To the above, one could counter-argue by indicating that the Constitution prohibits confiscation, without distinguishing between general or special, so it includes both, and that since comiso is a particular confiscation, it is included within the constitutional prohibition. However, this would disregard the historical evolution of the institutions, because at the time the constituent established the rule under commentary (which later passed successively to other Magna Cartas until reaching the current one), confiscation always had a general character, and it was only later that specifications were generated, whether as a preventive measure (decomiso) or as a special measure (comiso). That historical sense is required in the interpretation of any normative provision: "Rules shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose" (Article 10 in relation to Article 14, both of the Civil Code), of course with the limitations that, additionally, the pro libertatis and legality principles arising in criminal and criminal procedural matters impose (Articles 1 and 2 of the Penal Code and 1 and 2 of the Criminal Procedural Code). Given that from the historical evolution it emerges that when the constituent prohibited "confiscation," they always had in mind referring to the generalized dispossession of goods, present and future, of the convicted person or their family by the State, a characteristic that the forfeiture (comiso) provided for in Costa Rican criminal law does not have, because Article 110 of the Penal Code and others established in special laws (cfr.: Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento del terrorismo: articles 87 to 92; Ley de armas y explosivos: articles 83 and 84; Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre: articles 90 to 100; Ley forestal: article 65; Ley contra la delincuencia organizada: articles 34, 49 and 54; Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura: article 134; Ley de Juegos: article 7; Ley de Rifas y Loterías: article 8; Ley de procedimientos de observancia de los derechos de propiedad intelectual: articles 17 and 41 and Ley General de Salud: articles 359 to 361) only regulate special confiscation proper (or comiso), without providing for anything regarding improper comiso, by replacement, or of equivalent value, this Court considers that there is no reason whatsoever to formulate an optional judicial review consultation (consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad), since the evolutionary understanding of the institutions vitiates any doubt that might arise regarding the compatibility of the general rule authorizing comiso (Article 110 of the Penal Code) with constitutional numeral 40.

V.- On the requirements for admissibility and the legal nature of forfeiture (comiso). Now then, the general constitutionality of forfeiture (comiso) having been established for the signatories herein, and, therefore, the unnecessariness of making any consultation on this point (it is insisted: without prejudice to the powers of the Constitutional Chamber for rulings of a general nature that the challenger may resort to), a series of additional weighings must be made in order to respond to other arguments made in the challenge. One of these essential assessments alludes to the legal nature of the figure of comiso, because a series of consequences, sometimes mutually opposed, can be derived from it, which will allow responding to this claim. A) In this regard, the first thing that must be said is, if you will, a truism, namely that the legal nature of an institute does not depend on the location it has in a particular regulation, but on the legal sphere in which its effects are produced (in the same sense see [Nombre30], . Curso de derecho penal español. Parte general, tomo I, Editorial Tecnos, 5th edition, Madrid, 1996, pág. 183; [Nombre14], . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 32). If the former were sufficient, the operation would be simply verifiable and would lead to concluding that comiso is a civil consequence of the crime because, in Costa Rica, it is located in a section of the Penal Code so titled. But the issue is not so simple because, if one were to accept that false premise, it would imply concluding, for example, that as civil reparation in the criminal process is governed by the dispositive principle, comiso could not be ordered ex officio but would require a prior lawsuit from whoever holds title to the civil action in representation of the State (which would be the Procuraduría General de la República or the Public Ministry if delegated), none of which accords with, even, the imperative character of the legal rules that regulate the matter (see Articles 102 sub-section 3 and 110 of the Penal Code and 367 and 480 of the Criminal Procedural Code, among others). This being the case, the simplistic approach is unsatisfying. B) The legal nature of comiso has been one of the most discussed topics in dogmatic legal theory. The answers that have been attempted in comparative law, although they may constitute an important indicator for elucidating the question in Costa Rica, are not incontrovertible for our system, since it is advisable to remember that the legal nature also cannot be forced or "transplanted" from one legal system to another, but depends on the current regulation of the effects attributed to it in our current legal system, which, although they may coincide with those operating in comparative law, may have specific characteristics, all of which must be assessed before adopting a position. C) This being the case, the first thing that must be done to determine the legal nature of comiso is to establish the characteristics, effects, and assumptions under which it is admissible. Pursuant to Article 110 cited, comiso requires, for its admissibility: C.1) that a crime (delito) is being investigated, not a minor offense (falta) or contravention, this because the numeral begins by indicating "Every crime (delito)" and that expression, in a restrictive sense (Article 2 of the Criminal Procedural Code), can only be understood as referring to acts classified as such by the legislator (Book II of the Penal Code or special laws) who made the distinction with minor offenses (faltas) that have a different location in the normative body (Book III); C.2) that this crime be intentional (doloso). The rule does not expressly indicate this, but it indicates that what is lost are the instruments with which the illicit act was committed and the things derived from its commission. The authors on the matter have referred, in our view in accordance with a restrictive interpretation consistent with the principle of legality, that the intentional character of the measure is extracted from the provision of "instruments" contemplated by the law, because these: "... for the generality of the doctrine are those that have been used 'intentionally' to commit the crime (...) with which are excluded, of course, the (...) of a negligent crime (delito culposo)" ([Nombre31]. Derecho penal. Parte general. Editorial Astrea, 3rd edition, Buenos Aires, pág. 519. In the same sense: [Nombre32], [Nombre33]; [Nombre34], [Nombre35] and [Nombre27]. Manual de derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 1st edition, 2005, pág. 734; [Nombre29], . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, pág. 59 and 64 and others cited in [Nombre9], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, págs. 70-73); C.3) it would be applicable, in principle, to any intentional crime, as it is an institute regulated in the general part of the Penal Code, which is characterized, precisely, by affecting the codified criminal types or those of special laws; C.4) it can affect third parties provided they are given a part in the process. This is not established by the rule, which, if interpreted in isolation, would lead to bypassing this requirement that arises from a systematic interpretation of the legal system and places Constitutional Law as what it is, the support of the rest of the normative hierarchy (see, in this regard, votes number 712-2006 of the Third Chamber and 637-2010 of the Criminal Cassation Court of San José); C.5) forfeiture (comiso) does not affect the rights of the offended party or third parties acting in good faith, rather these prevail over the state interest (in this sense, the votes of the Criminal Cassation Court of San José, numbers 2000-76, 2000-323, 2003-383 and 2004-101 and those of the Third Chamber, numbers 512-2001 and 1273-2005, among others); C.6) the effects arise from the crime, so it is normatively foreseen that comiso is ordered upon a conviction (sentencia condenatoria) (Article 367 of the Criminal Procedural Code). Is 'crime (delito)' to be understood as a typical, unlawful, and culpable act or as the abstract stipulation of illegality referred to by the legislator? National jurisprudence, in general terms, has understood it as a legislative provision, without a concrete declaration of liability, to the point that it has foreseen the possibility of comiso with dismissals, prosecutorial archiving, definitive dismissal rulings, even for expiration of the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution, acquittals, with alternative measures such as conciliations, suspensions of the process subject to conditions, comprehensive reparation of the damage and payment of a fine, among others (see the recount of votes in [Nombre9], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, págs. 230-263); C.7) it lacks compensation, as it arises from a previous illegality, so it is an exception to the state impossibility of assuming ownership of property without paying the value of the good (Article 45 of the Political Constitution); C.8) it is a measure of public order, so no party's petition is required, rather it can be ordered ex officio; C.9) as a measure arising from the state's power of imperium, it requires being provided for in law (Third Chamber, vote number 1217-1999), being issued in a reasoned or substantiated form and having had a prior demonstration of the link or nexus between the object and the criminal act, so it is not a strict liability (Third Chamber, vote number 505-99); C.10) principles such as the presumption of innocence, due process, and the right of defense govern, so the burden of proof falls on the State; C.11) in Costa Rica, the forfeiture (comiso) of goods used in the preparatory phase that does not become executive is not normatively regulated; C.12) the destination of the goods, once their ownership is obtained by the State, is expressly fixed by law (cfr.: Ley de distribución de bienes confiscados o caídos en comiso, its regulation and manual). D) Based on similar considerations in comparative law, an attempt has been made to explain the figure under commentary by indicating that it is an accessory penalty (pena accesoria), a security measure (medida de seguridad), a civil consequence of the crime (consecuencia civil del delito), or a sui generis legal consequence of the crime (here included are those who consider it a third class of sanction in criminal law along with penalties and security measures but, in reality, it would be a fourth path, since reparation has already been accepted as the third). We will analyze each of these options: D.1) Forfeiture (Comiso) as an accessory penalty: It has been said that comiso is an accessory penalty (in this sense the votes of the Criminal Cassation Court of Cartago, numbers 2010-236 and 2010-265). However, the main criticism leveled against granting this legal nature is that comiso does not respond to the essential purpose of the sanction accepted by our constituent and legislator, which is special positive prevention or resocialization (Articles 51 of the Penal Code and 5.6 of the American Convention on Human Rights), inasmuch as it aligns more with retributive functions or general negative prevention (even the Criminal Cassation Court of Cartago accepts this in votes numbers 2010-236 and 2010-265 by defining it as an accessory criminal sanction with a general prevention purpose).

Nor would forfeiture, from this perspective, respond to the principle of culpability (principio de culpabilidad) which requires not only culpability for its imposition (that is, a sanction could not be imposed without culpability, meaning it could not be imposed in the absence of a principal penalty nor in cases where the perpetrator is not sanctioned, even if a criminal wrong existed) but also considers that culpability is gradable, which clashes with the rigid nature of the figure. Likewise, if it were a penalty, it would violate the principle concerning its strictly personal nature, since forfeiture can be applied even against third parties, provided they are given a hearing in the respective proceeding and the assets, with their consent, were used in the commission of crimes:

¬"The problems posed by this regulation of forfeiture derived precisely from its formal configuration as an authentic penalty. The penalty has its foundation in culpability, so a penalty cannot be imposed without culpability. From this, the following consequences derive in relation to the application of forfeiture. On one hand, it could only be applied to the subject who had acted culpably, but not to someone who, having performed a typical and unlawful action, was nevertheless declared exempt from criminal responsibility due to the absence of culpability, for example, because they are not criminally responsible (inimputable). But, on the other hand and furthermore, since the strictly personal nature of the penalty necessarily derives from the principle of culpability, the penalty of forfeiture could only be applied to the subject responsible for the criminal offense and, therefore, only with respect to instruments and effects of the crime belonging to him, but not with respect to instruments that, having been used by the guilty party for the commission of the crime, were nevertheless the property of a third party not responsible for the crime (...) The basis and purpose of forfeiture (...) can be (...) independent of the question of the ownership of the confiscable objects" (cfr: [Nombre16] , . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, págs. 559-560).

¬"...forfeiture does not respond to any of the purposes of the penalty, since it is not provided for either as a threat intended to deter the commission of crimes or as a deserved punishment for the crime" [Nombre36] , . Derecho penal, parte general, 6ª edición, Reppertor, Barcelona, 2002, pág 748.

Forfeiture is also not provided for, as an accessory penalty, in Article 50.2 of the Criminal Code, which regulates as such only the special disqualification (inhabilitación especial) defined in numeral 58 ibídem as the deprivation or restriction of one or more rights. This objection is both systematic (regarding the location of the figure), and in light of constitutional principles, because it would clash with the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) by exceeding the catalogue of accessory penalties expressly contemplated by the Criminal Code and the regulations specific to them. The difficulty could be overcome by stating that there is a prior law that so provides for all crimes (Article 110 of the Criminal Code); that there are other special rules that designate it as a penalty (for example, the Wildlife Conservation Law, Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre); and that the figure contemplates the deprivation of a right: property. However, the same numeral 58 of the Criminal Code states that the accessory penalties provided for as such by the legislator have a time limit, which is the same as that of absolute disqualification and ranges from 6 months to 12 years (Article 57), which is incompatible with the loss of ownership of the asset, which is definitive. Likewise, against any penalty, principal or accessory, the possibility of requesting review exists, which the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has indicated is incompatible with the res judicata (cosa juzgada) derived from forfeiture (see vote number [Telf3]). Finally, it should not be forgotten that according to Article 110 of the Criminal Code: "...the consideration of forfeiture will be made after the civil liabilities arising from the crime are satisfied (...) undoubtedly, if forfeiture maintained the character of a penalty, it would not be admissible for the imposition of the penalty to depend on the satisfaction of civil liability." [Nombre37] , ; [Nombre38] , and [Nombre39] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delicto. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, págs. 45, 47. Therefore, either forfeiture is not an accessory penalty or, if it were, it would be unconstitutional for violating the cited precepts, making it necessary to evaluate other possibilities. D.2) Forfeiture as a security measure (medida de seguridad): Based on these questionings, the doctrine indicated that, in reality, it was not that the measure was unconstitutional but that it should not be seen as a penalty and, in trying to give it an explanation, it was thought that its nature was that of being a security measure, thereby overcoming the objection that it responded to a principle of culpability, since this escapes security measures whose basis is, rather, the dangerousness (peligrosidad) of the active subject. Forfeiture and security measures also had in common the fact that they respond more to special prevention criteria assumed in international instruments than to those of general prevention. But criticisms arose again. First, because dangerousness in security measures arises before the existence of a wrong that may not be present in forfeiture, which is based on a presumed objective dangerousness of the thing per se (in the case of instruments used for the commission of the crime and particularly of some types thereof, such as weapons). Furthermore, because this explanation did not circumvent the strictly personal nature that security measures also have and which escapes the figure of forfeiture:

¬"The first thing that must be noted is that forfeiture (...) does not have the nature of a security measure either (...) Security measures are based on the criminal dangerousness of the subject, revealed by the previous commission of one or several typical and unlawful acts (...) Security measures also have a strictly personal nature, in the sense that they can only be applied to the subject in whom criminal dangerousness has been assessed. Security measures are oriented exclusively towards special prevention, that is, towards the production of certain re-socializing or incapacitating effects on the dangerous perpetrator to prevent him from committing crimes in the future. Forfeiture, on the other hand, is based on the objective dangerousness of the thing and is oriented (...) towards preventing it from being used in the future for the commission of new crimes, and not only by the perpetrator but also by other subjects. However, the objective dangerousness of the thing and the probability of its future use for the commission of new crimes, does not necessarily entail the criminal dangerousness of the perpetrator who used it to commit the crime, in which case it could not be confiscated if forfeiture were attributed the nature of a security measure. But even if the subject were dangerous, the forfeiture of some objects could hardly be an adequate measure to eliminate the dangerousness, given that it will not always be suitable for fulfilling the purposes of re-education, cure, or incapacitation characteristic of security measures. Finally, if forfeiture had the nature of a security measure, then it would not be possible to apply it with respect to objects belonging to a third party who, for not having performed any typical and unlawful act, could not be declared criminally dangerous..." ( [Nombre16] , . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, pág. 561).

Furthermore, in Costa Rican criminal law, the Constitutional Chamber declared security measures for criminally responsible individuals (imputables) unconstitutional, leaving only curative security measures (see Article 98 sections 3, 4, and 5 and votes numbers 88-92 and 1588-98 of the Constitutional Chamber), and forfeiture, most of the time, is attached to a declaration of sanction for criminally responsible individuals and is not mentioned as a security measure (Articles 101 and 102 of the Criminal Code), which are also governed by the principle of specificity (tipicidad) and the prohibition of creation by analogy (Articles 97 and 2 of the Criminal Code), in addition to also having the possibility of cessation (Articles 100 of the Criminal Code and 478 of the Criminal Procedure Code), incompatible with forfeiture. Faced with this, another option was proposed.

D.3) Forfeiture as a civil consequence or remedial measure derived from the crime: although the Constitutional Chamber has referred to the figure from this perspective (thus in vote number [Telf3]: "forfeiture is one of the civil consequences of the punishable act, together with restitution and the repair and indemnification of damages"), which has also been accepted by some cassation jurisprudence (see, for example and among others, vote number 787-2006 of the Third Chamber, Sala Tercera), the fact is that, technically, forfeiture cannot be considered a civil consequence. First, because, as stated, in Costa Rica it can be decreed ex officio, which is alien to the party disposition principle (principio dispositivo) and the principle of congruence of civil matters. Second, because it does not have a reparative, restorative, or compensatory character, to the point that Article 103 of the Criminal Code lists it separately from those purposes, which are characteristic of the consequences derived from crime. Third, because "Civil liability ex delicto constitutes a matter of an essentially civil nature, regardless of whether it is examined in the criminal process, which explains why there is no obstacle to its knowledge being deferred, where appropriate, to the civil jurisdiction. And although the crime, with respect to the arising of this liability, is a necessary prerequisite, it is not sufficient, since the production of damage is also required, an indispensable element for the arising of any civil liability, whether or not the act that caused it is defined in the Criminal Code" (CEREZO [Nombre40] , . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 29), without it being possible to bring, in the civil courts, an isolated claim for forfeiture. Furthermore, because "Civil liability is transmitted to the heirs (...) but the same cannot be maintained with respect to the heirs of the responsible party. In cases of the death of the accused or defendant without the forfeiture having been agreed upon, it is not possible to apply it..." (QUINTERO [Nombre41] , ; [Nombre38] , and [Nombre39] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delictio. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pág. 46). To this, national doctrine adds that its effects are not of private law but in favor of the State, despite Costa Rica not following the recommendations discussed in the drafting of the Model Criminal Code for Latin America (Código Penal tipo para América Latina) and placing the figure within civil consequences. This, as stated, does not affect its true juridical nature, and what can be derived is that the provision was erroneously placed, without this affecting its effects, concluding that "forfeiture cannot be an effect of civil liability ex delicto; in its essence, it is not a civil sanction" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, pág. 376). Based on these reflections, another possibility was raised. D.4) Forfeiture as a complex act, an accessory, juridical, mixed consequence, or sui géneris consequence of the crime: There are consequences derived from the crime that are such by provision of law, without sharing the nature of those other figures. In Costa Rican law, such are the issue of the condemnation for costs of the losing party (Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code); the publication of the sentence in crimes against honor (Article 155 of the Criminal Code); the reconstruction, suppression, reform, restitution, or registry rectification derived from the falsification of public instruments (Article 483 of the Criminal Procedure Code); the registration of certain types of resolutions (Articles 30 sections j and k, 25 first paragraph, 36 ninth and tenth paragraphs of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of the Judicial Registry and Archives, Ley del Registro y Archivo Judiciales); and forfeiture. This has been regulated in countries such as Germany and Spain and is accepted by the majority of doctrine, although without agreeing on the appropriate name to use, but making it clear that it does not share the characteristics of the institutions indicated in previous sections:

¬"...Henao [Nombre42] criticizes unitary positions (...) pointing out that (...) forfeiture is a phenomenon of a complex nature with a very broad functional scope, since it not only fulfills the task of a penalty, but also those of restitution, compensation, policing, and assurance, and even procedural tasks of an evidentiary and precautionary type (...) In the same sense, [Nombre43] and [Nombre44] are of the opinion of the complex nature of forfeiture (...) [Nombre45] (...) raises the mixed character of the institution (...) In contrast to penalties or security measures, accessory consequences (consecuencias accesorias) are coercive acts or sanctions of a unique nature, legally linked to the imposition of a penalty for an intentional crime or misdemeanor, or can be linked to it through a judicial pronouncement in certain cases. Thus, the placement of forfeiture (...) as an accessory consequence implies that its basis is neither the culpability nor the dangerousness of the active subject of the crime." [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs. 59-60 y 62.

In fact, our legislation arises from the Model Criminal Code for Latin America, where the issue of the juridical nature and correct placement of forfeiture was widely discussed: "Finally, the opinion prevailed of placing forfeiture with a criminal character, but not as a penalty, and outside the civil consequences of the punishable act, discarding the idea of this phenomenon as a procedural measure (...) One of the agreements of the Fourth Plenary Meeting held in Caracas, Venezuela from January 20 to 30, 1969, No. 89, was to include a text on forfeiture, but on the understanding that it did not have the character of a penalty nor an effect of civil liability (...) Why, then, when ordering the regulations of that Code, was (...) forfeiture included under the Title (...) relating to 'Civil liability derived from the crime'?" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, págs. 369-370). G) Having said the above, this Tribunal considers that, indeed, Costa Rican forfeiture is simply a consequence established by the legislator for the crime (for a certain type of crimes, as stated and will be resumed) that, although it has criminal features (legality, burden of proof, innocence, link to the act), civil features (proceeds against third parties), and administrative features (state coerciveness and ex officio action), does not precisely fit any of them, and, therefore, principles characteristic of the penalty (such as culpability or temporality), security measures (such as personality), or reparation (such as the party disposition principle) cannot be applicable to it. Hence, it is valid for the legislator to regulate it to be applied ex officio, establishing the loss of ownership as definitive, etc. However, this does not mean that, as a measure that deprives rights, which it ultimately is, it is not subject to principles such as legality (legalidad) and proportionality (proporcionalidad), which are characteristic, inclusively, of any sanctioning matter, including in the area of administrative law, as they are the sole limiters of the State's power of authority (poder de imperio), as will be addressed in greater detail immediately.

VI.- The principles of legality and proportionality in the application of forfeiture: Discarding (due to that juridical nature and the constitutionality assumed here) other possible criticisms that forfeiture may have if starting from those perspectives, the fact is that its imposition is not exempt from being governed, like any act of the Public Administration where authority power is applied, by the principles of legality and proportionality, and therefore the forfeiture decreed in this specific case must be analyzed based on such premises. A) Regarding legality, the forfeiture of vehicles when driving under the influence of alcohol, that is, the forfeiture applied to Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code, is, as of today, a measure adopted, by way of interpretation, based on a norm issued in a socio-historical context different from the one that governs us today and which, therefore, violates the principle of legality.

On this subject, the Argentine criminal lawyer and criminologist [Nombre46] has stated, noting that the principle of legality is not limited, as is often thought, to the existence of a strict, formal, and written law, but rather, regarding the characteristic that this law be prior, the "principle of historical respect for the legal scope of the prohibited" must be taken into account, according to which:

¬"The law is a text. Every text has a context, both discursive and social. **The scope of what is legally prohibited varies even if the text remains identical, because the context continuously changes**, since any product of human discursive activity derives its form and meaning from the social situation in which speech appears (...) **The change in discursive context leads to problems that are more serious when generated by changes in the social, cultural, or technological context** (...) But the problem becomes complicated when, **due to one of these changes, the text appears to encompass an unusually broad scope of prohibition** (...) **In these cases, the cultural context of the legal text must be taken into account,** and when a phenomenon of unusual prohibitive extension is verified, **a historical reduction is imposed**. Legality is a principle that serves to guarantee the limitation of the scope of legislative criminalizing programming, and its meaning cannot be reversed by turning it into an argument for an unusual extension never foreseen in the original context of the text, the effect of which is to grant a selective space for criminalization that reaches the maximum limits of arbitrariness (...) Historical respect for the real scope of the prohibited is imposed in legality because, **otherwise, the simple omission of political agencies would extend punitive prohibitions in an unheard-of manner**: the punitive is a scope that political agencies must plan and increase through law, and their omission in the face of significant changes in cultural or technological context constitutes a renunciation of their function, which is not constitutionally admissible. **Primary criminalization is established by action of political agencies and not by their omissions**" ([Nombre25] ; [Nombre26] and [Nombre27] . *Derecho penal. Parte general*. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 113; emphasis supplied).

The 1973 Criminal Code regulated confiscation (*comiso*) for, as was said, intentional crimes. At the time that article was drafted, the majority of intentional crimes were crimes of result or injury or of mere activity. Very few were the norms of abstract danger contemplated by that regulation (among them were, following the original numbering of that code, the possession and manufacture of lock picks in Article 230, declared unconstitutional by vote number 6410-96; the danger of negligent accident in numeral 253, declared unconstitutional by vote number [Telf4]; illicit association in Article 272; and the possession of instruments for forgery in Article 370), as these were conceptualized as exceptional, given that they meant punishing acts at a stage earlier than that at which it traditionally had to be done (executive acts and not preparatory ones in the so-called *iter criminis*). This panorama has varied in Costa Rican criminal policy, and since then, many special laws with crimes of that nature have been issued. The article on driving under the influence of alcohol arises with the 2008 reform to the Criminal Code, that is, 35 years after the confiscation (*comiso*) norm was provided for. Unlike what happened in the *Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento del terrorismo* (Articles 87 to 92), in the *Ley de armas y explosivos* (Articles 83 and 84), in the *Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre* (Articles 90 to 100), and in the *Ley forestal* (Article 65), to cite some examples, in which, despite the general norm of Article 110 of the Criminal Code, the legislator specifically established that the act provided for therein implied confiscation (*comiso*) (a declaration that would have to be considered unnecessary if it were considered that the article provided for generally for the entire criminal-legal system, but based on a particular context, could be applied to situations not even foreseen when it was created), the regulatory modification that introduced the provision in question established nothing, expressly, regarding the applicability of confiscation (*comiso*). When reckless driving (*conducción temeraria*) was discussed (which is a peculiar figure because it sanctions driving under the influence of alcohol as an intentional crime, but then, that same conduct is considered negligent if a result of injuries or death is generated, pursuant to Articles 128 and 117 of the Criminal Code), in the legislative file, the possibility of applying the confiscation (*comiso*) of vehicles was never mentioned, which, as was said, could not be used in crimes of injury or homicide committed even under the influence of alcohol, for being negligent. In application of cited Articles 10 and 14 of the Civil Code, which obligate consideration of historical background in normative interpretation, this omission is an element that must be taken into account. Thus, the confiscation (*comiso*) of vehicles for the commission of this act has emerged as an interpretation, the result of introducing a norm of abstract danger into an article with general provisions conceived for another socio-historical context. So much so that the reform projects for this regulation, given the various errors it presented, contemplate expressly excluding the confiscation (*comiso*) of the vehicle as a measure derived from said behavior (in this regard, cf.: Article 291 of the comprehensive reform project to the *Ley de Tránsito* recently presented by the MOPT, accumulated to legislative file 17,485, where a second paragraph is introduced to Article 110 of the Criminal Code according to which *"Los vehículos involucrados en la comisión de los hechos tipificados en el artículo 254 bis del Código Penal quedan excluidos de esta previsión"*). Likewise, in the historical context in which Article 110 of the Criminal Code was issued (1970), the discussion regarding confiscation (*comiso*) was circumscribed to intentional crimes of result, concrete danger, mere activity, and very few situations of abstract danger. Even in Spain, based on similar legal systems, that is, those that have a norm in the general part of the Criminal Code authorizing confiscation (*comiso*) and the introduction, much later, of the crime of reckless driving with disregard for the lives of others (Article 384 of the Criminal Code), an express norm was incorporated, along with that law, indicating: *"El vehículo a motor o el ciclomotor utilizado en los hechos previstos en el artículo anterior, se considerará instrumento del delito a los efectos del artículo 127 de este Código"* (cfr: [Nombre16], . *Las consecuencias accesorias*. En: AAVV. *Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito*. [Nombre47], Valencia, 2006, p. 558), a distinction that would be useless if it were considered that the introduction of the crime type within the general framework of prior norms was sufficient, it must be added that, in that country, the criminal type of driving under the influence of alcohol implies a concrete danger, as it is not enough to drive with alcohol but rather that this situation must concretely affect the ability to drive. **B)** Furthermore, the measure is **disproportionate**. Confiscation (*comiso*) cannot, nor should, be applied automatically, without considering other factors specific to the case. In comparative law, there is, to date, no discussion that this principle of proportionality must be used as a measurement parameter when deciding the issue of confiscation (*comiso*). Some authors note:

¬*"The criterion of proportionality had been proposed by doctrine to resolve the most frequent cases of confiscation of the instruments of crime: that of motor vehicles. Indeed, although in certain cases it may be justified, it seems notoriously dysfunctional when it concerns negligent traffic crimes. Precisely for this reason, the Prosecutor's Office of the Supreme Court (Circular 6/1968) came to understand that a restrictive interpretation of what should be understood as an instrument obliges that motor vehicles not be considered as such. However, in crimes against traffic safety, such an exclusion can operate with great difficulty. Hence the inevitability of resorting to the criterion of proportionality"* ([Nombre48] and [Nombre49], . *Las consecuencias jurídicas del delito*. Civitas, Madrid, 3rd edition, 1996, p. 216).

¬*"...confiscation (*comiso*) (...) bears close analogy to these penal consequences; therefore, the same legal-constitutional principles that govern penal sanctions are applicable to it. These principles are: legality (...) and proportionality and the procedural guarantees of the accusatory principle, presumption of innocence, right to defense, and individualization of the consequence."* [Nombre29], . *El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar*. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, p. 62 quoting [Nombre50], . *El patrimonio criminal. Comiso y pérdida de la ganancia*. Dykinson, Madrid, 2001, 28-30.

¬*"...both in the confiscation of instruments and of effects, at the moment of decreeing the measure, its proportionality must be considered with respect to those that are of lawful commerce, so that the judge may abstain from decreeing it or do so partially if he considers it to be disproportionate, especially when it comes to a notorious imbalance between the value of the instrument and the penal significance of the act, to prevent confiscation (*comiso*) from surpassing the penalty itself in affliction. It is clear that the proportionality judgment is not applicable as a general rule in relation to the economic profit obtained from the commission of the crime, since the confiscation (*comiso*) of the illicit benefits obtained by the perpetrator, regardless of their value, precisely covers the material advantage obtained unjustly (...) Thus, then, the requirements for the application of the principle of proportionality are two: that it does not concern the profits nor the instruments and effects of the crime from illicit commerce, and that one of the following three conditions is alternatively met: a) that the value of the goods is not proportionate to the nature of the criminal offense, b) that the value is not related to the gravity of the crime, c) that civil liabilities have been completely satisfied. To establish whether conditions a) or b) are met, attention must be paid to the type of legally protected interest injured or endangered by the intentional offense, the form of attack or endangerment thereof, the greater or lesser degree of reproach attributed to the perpetrator, and the material and moral damages caused by the punishable act..."* [Nombre21], [Nombre22]. *El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar*. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, pp. 79-80.

Commenting on Article 127 of the Spanish Criminal Code, which has an imperative wording similar to that of our Article 110, as it states *"**Toda** pena que se imponga por un delito o falta dolosos llevará consigo la pérdida de los efectos (...) y de los instrumentos con que se haya ejecutado..."* (emphasis not in the original), it is said:

¬*"The necessity and proportionality of confiscation (*comiso*) have nothing to do with the former automaticity with which, by legal will, it had to be decreed. In contrast, according to the current regulation of confiscation (*comiso*), its application, as an accessory consequence, is not mandatory, unlike what occurs with accessory penalties (...) The modification of its nature, (...) obliges one to justify and explain the proportionality between the scope of the confiscation (*comiso*) and the act and its effects..."* [Nombre37], ; [Nombre38], and [Nombre39], . *La responsabilidad civil ex delicto*. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pp. 45, 47; and it is the same criterion held by national doctrine and jurisprudence:

¬*"...it is another principle, that of Proportionality, that gives us the guidelines to follow in its practical application, since being an extremely drastic penalty (sic) whose purpose is public tranquility, it comes to affect the assets of an individual with a specific destination which is the state, but not in an unlimited way, but rather attending to the gravity of the act regarding the type, nature, origin, use, and value of the good to be confiscated. Being delimited by law for its use in Criminal Law, it corresponds to the judge to assess the appropriateness of the confiscation (*comiso*) according to the varied circumstances of each case, so that it does not imply a disproportionate confiscatory measure in relation to the illicit act committed with the goods used to commit the crime (...) Without forgetting that there are goods that mandatorily enter confiscation (*comiso*), regardless of their value or effect on the owner, there are others that must be submitted for consideration in relation and connection to the criminal act, in the event that their loss quantitatively exceeds the damage caused"* [Nombre9], . *El comiso de Bienes*. San José, IJSA, 2006, pp. 65-66.

¬*"The (...) prosecutor (...) files an appeal (...) against the judgment (...) he considers that the trial court incurred in an error in iudicando when it considered that the confiscation (*comiso*) of the dwelling requested by the Public Ministry was not appropriate (...) The argument is not admissible: confiscation (*comiso*) is a civil consequence of the punishable act (...) It is apparent that the defendant is a person of scarce economic resources who dedicated herself to the sale of cocaine base (crack) to final consumers from her dwelling located in (...) San Rafael Abajo de Desamparados. **The constitutional principle of proportionality applies not only to the penal sanction imposed on whoever is convicted of committing a crime, but also encompasses the civil and administrative consequences derived from said penalty**. In this case, given the socioeconomic profile of the defendant, agreeing to the requested confiscation (*comiso*) would be equivalent to proceeding to extend the punitive effects with clearly confiscatory purposes to the detriment of the sole assets of the sentenced person, which ostensibly violates the constitutional principle of proportionality. Different is the case of perpetrators and participants convicted for drug activity who have multiple movable and immovable assets and enjoy a buoyant financial situation precisely as a result of their illicit activity. In that scenario, there is no doubt that it is constitutionally proportional to adopt the measure of confiscation (*comiso*), since the affectation of the legally protected interest has been on a larger scale and this is evidenced by the profit obtained that has allowed them to obtain the assets that are seized. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is declared without merit..."* (Sala Tercera, vote number 2004-24, 09:40 hrs. January 23, 2004; [Nombre51], [Nombre52], [Nombre53], [Nombre54] and [Nombre55]; emphasis supplied).

This being said, it is appropriate to observe the consequences that the entirety of the legal system attributes to driving under the influence of alcohol to conclude that there is an excess that makes confiscation (*comiso*), in such circumstances, must be considered disproportionate, not only because the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol already has a plurality of legal effects provided for (fine or imprisonment: Articles 130 paragraph a of the *Ley de Tránsito* and 254 bis of the Criminal Code; removal of the vehicle from circulation or its [Placa3]: Articles 141 para. a and 155 of the *Ley de Tránsito*; loss of all points and suspension of all licenses for 2, 4, or 10 years, depending on whether it is the first, second, or third similar offense and the obligation to carry out awareness courses, road safety re-education, or addiction treatment, once the suspension period has expired, to recover only part of the points: Article 71 bis para. a) and 71 ter of the *Ley de Tránsito*) but also, due to the fact that, against crimes of result (that is, more serious ones), caused by driving vehicles under the influence of alcohol, such as injuries or death (Articles 117 and 128 of the Criminal Code), the confiscation (*comiso*) that, as has been said, has been circumscribed to intentional and not negligent crimes like those referred to, is not applicable. This makes confiscation (*comiso*) clearly inadmissible in the first case, based on the same principle of constitutional equality that obliges treating as equals (not applying the confiscation (*comiso*)) those who are in the same conditions (driving under the influence of alcohol).

Additionally, the accessory measure could be more burdensome than the principal penalty, given that the prison sentence could be commuted to a fine, if the conditions for doing so were met (article 69 of the Código Penal), in which case the daily fine cannot exceed the person's daily wage (article 53 ibídem) or the prison sentence could be substituted with community service (final paragraph of article 254 bis of said code). Therefore, both because of the plurality of effects that the legal system currently assigns to the same conduct, and because similar behavior with more serious effects is treated more leniently than the conduct at hand, and because the secondary measure could be more burdensome than the principal one, this Court unanimously finds that the cited disproportionality arises when decreeing, in these cases, the forfeiture (comiso) of the vehicle, an object that does not originate from the commission of the crime and whose general use is lawful. Even the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has had the opportunity to rule on similar interpretative criteria from the Attorney General's Office (Fiscalía General de la República), which is what the matter ultimately boils down to, stating that "...the directive issued by the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney's Office of Alajuela, at two-thirty p.m. on January thirteenth, two thousand nine, insofar as it requires the donation of the vehicle to the State as a restorative plan to agree to the suspension of the trial process, in crimes of reckless driving (conducción temeraria), is contrary to the Law of the Constitution, particularly the principles of proportionality and reasonableness..." Sala Constitucional, vote number 8296-10. Although the full vote is not available as of this date to know the reasons given by the Sala Constitucional, it would make no sense for the Attorney General's Office to transform a forfeiture (comiso) into a donation if the former were appropriate, since it would suffice to apply it, regardless of whether or not a conviction was being faced, as has been customarily done in the country, as detailed above.

**VII.-** This Court is not unaware that what has been resolved here has not been the general position of other courts of cassation, such as, for example, the Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón (majority vote number 2010-302 of 10:00 hrs. on August 6, 2010, in which, however, it is noted: "...the undersigned judges could characterize the legislative decision (sic) that, in circumstances such as those present in this case, the forfeiture (comiso) of the vehicle must be ordered, as excessive, irrational, and disproportionate...") or the Criminal Cassation Court of Cartago (votes numbers 2010-236 of 11:07 on July 9 and 2010-265 of 14:35 on August 10, 2010), and it has been accepted, albeit for the purpose of formulating a constitutional query, by others (Cassation Court of Santa Cruz, vote number 2010-149, and dissenting votes in the Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón, within vote number 2010-302, and, ex officio, in that of this Chamber, with a different composition, within vote number 2010-995). However, this Court, based on the principle of judicial independence, considers other facets of the discussion and starts from premises different from those raised in those rulings, since it not only accepts the possibility that the ordinary judge apply the principle of proportionality but, additionally, discards the consideration of an accessory penalty, the basis upon which those decisions are founded. Thus, the analysis carried out allows this Court to unanimously state that the measure of forfeiture (comiso) of motor vehicles in the crime of reckless driving (conducción temeraria) results, in the current state of our legislation, in a disproportionate measure that borders on the principle of legality in its supra-referenced aspect. For these reasons, which do not necessarily coincide with the entire argument made by the appellant but which respond to a broad consideration of the appeal filed, to address the right that Article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights enshrines for such challenge, the appeal must be granted, revoking the appealed judgment insofar as it ordered the forfeiture (comiso), a measure that is rejected. The vehicle seized and placed in provisional deposit must be definitively returned to its owner without the need for remand for this purpose." Regarding Article 254 bis, first and second paragraphs, the consultation raised is declared unevacuable.

**C)** In the same manner, other actions of unconstitutionality filed against the Traffic Law are unrelated to the seizure (comiso) of vehicles driven under the influence of alcohol, as they refer to sanctions for point losses on the driver's license (constitutional case file 10-11628-007-CO under admissibility review), the joint and several liability of a vehicle's registered owner if it is a rental company (constitutional case file 10-11503-007-CO, awaiting appointment of a substitute magistrate), the reasonableness of fines under Article 133 h of the Traffic Law (constitutional case file 10-8059-007-CO, assigned for review), the fine for not wearing a seatbelt (case file 10-5132-007-CO, assigned for review), defects in the law-making process and the disproportionality of imprisonment and fines (constitutional case file 10-3555-007-CO rejected outright by vote 5888-10 and 10-3226-007-CO rejected outright by vote number 4803-10), vehicle window tinting (case file 10-3225-007-CO rejected outright by vote number 4798-10), specifications in the technical inspection (case file 10-3227-007-CO rejected outright by vote number 4801-10), vehicle restrictions (case file 09-15355-007-CO rejected on the merits by vote number 19135-09), permits for special transport (constitutional case file 09-13854-007-CO rejected outright by vote number 16293-10), time restrictions for heavy vehicles (constitutional case file 09-12261-007-CO rejected outright by vote number 15662-09), criminal jurisdiction in traffic matters (constitutional case file 09-10751-007-CO denied processing by vote number 13083-09), the breath test and the procedure for detecting blood alcohol (constitutional case file 09-4848-007-CO rejected outright by vote number 7379-09 and constitutional case file 09-13854-007-CO rejected outright by vote number 6293-10), the duplication of practical sanctions resulting from driving under the influence of alcohol due to the existence of an administrative sanction, disqualification, and imprisonment (constitutional case file 09-1944-007-CO rejected on the merits by vote number 3641-09), the duplication of sanctions for consuming alcohol due to license suspension, imposition of a fine, and seizure of the vehicle (constitutional case file 09-94-007-CO rejected outright by vote number 600-09), and the non-existence of specific legal interests in the crime of reckless driving, conceived as a crime of abstract danger (constitutional case file 09-96-007-CO rejected on the merits by vote number 204-09).

**D)** The only case in which the petitioner expressly challenged the seizure (comiso) in cases of reckless driving was in case file 10-2225-007-CO, but the Constitutional Chamber denied processing without providing substantive arguments on the issue (vote number 4492-10). On other occasions, when actions were filed against a plurality of provisions of the Traffic Law, the matter was tangentially addressed, but it was considered that the issue of seizure (comiso) was not contemplated in traffic regulations, and therefore it fell outside the scope of the ruling:

*"V.- Non-existence of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The petitioner argues that by virtue of the reforms to the Traffic Law, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the following sanctions occur: economic fine, loss or seizure (decomiso) of the license, disqualification from driving for a specified period, seizure (decomiso) of the [Placa3], seizure (decomiso) of the vehicle, payment of transportation costs, tow trucks, vehicle storage, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. Furthermore, he considers that the principle of non bis in idem is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he asserts that it is confiscatory because the economic capacity of each individual is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is evident when observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having an up-to-date technical inspection. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the only sanction provided for in the challenged provision is one to three years of imprisonment, which can be substituted by an alternative measure of community service that may range from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The sanctions of fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged provision. The other aspects indicated by the petitioner are consequences derived from the crime, but do not constitute a penalty in themselves and, in any case, are not provided for in the challenged provision. VI.- On the violation of private property rights. The petitioner asserts that the seizure (comiso) of the vehicle driven while intoxicated is unconstitutional, since in the absence of a crime, according to the criteria of non-harmfulness and non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no justification by the State. The individual is exposed to his property suffering deterioration and damages that impair his patrimony. From a reading of the challenged provision, it is evident that it makes no reference to the seizure (comiso) of the vehicle, because in reality this is a consequence of the crime that is contained in other provisions, such as article 110 of the Penal Code and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."* (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. [Telf1] of 2:42 p.m. on March 24, 2009, case file 09-000788-0007-CO, emphasis supplied).

Thus, based on an exhaustive search of the topics that have been discussed in the Constitutional Chamber related to this matter, assisted by the Information Center of that jurisdictional body (see folios 175 to 180), this Court realizes that there has been no ruling by the Constitutional Chamber on the relevant aspect, which renders that assertion by the trial judge unfounded, as he merely expressed it without providing any concrete support for it. For that very reason, the right to effective judicial protection or the right to action compels this Chamber to hear the claim.

**D)** This Chamber disagrees with the argument issued by other courts of cassation that the provision must be applied imperatively and that only the Constitutional Chamber could consider it disproportionate (see, for example, the vote of the Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón, Second Section, number 2010-302), because the ordinary judge has the obligation to directly apply the Law of the Constitution. The Constitutional Chamber itself, on other occasions, has considered that the issue of the proportionality of the seizure (comiso) or the manner of interpreting the provisions that regulate it is an aspect that pertains to ordinary judges and is outside its functions. Thus, in response to a judicial consultation formulated by that same office, the constitutional body stated:

*"...what is submitted to the knowledge of this Chamber is whether, in certain cases, the unrestricted application of articles 83 and 87 of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, and Related Activities, which make no distinction regarding the seizure (comiso) of assets originating from or used in drug trafficking activities, could imply a disproportionate penalty of confiscation, violating the guarantees provided in articles 40 of the Political Constitution and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The consulting judges argue that this could occur when the following circumstances are present simultaneously: that the subject directly affected by the seizure (comiso) is a person of scarce economic resources; that the object of the seizure (comiso) is a social interest dwelling house; that said property constitutes the only real estate registered under that person's name. The Chamber observes that (...) the doubts of the Judges are not related to the constitutionality of the provisions themselves, but with their interpretation and application in certain cases, which exceeds the object of a consultation of constitutionality. The interpretation and application of the provisions in the specific case is a task that clearly corresponds to the Ordinary Jurisdiction within the framework of its competence, as has been reiterated by this Chamber, for example in judgment N.2004-5008 of 2:46 p.m. on May 12, 2004. Due to the foregoing, the consultation is inadmissible, based on its object"* (vote number [Telf2], emphasis supplied).

**E)** Finally, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office has requested that, given that the Criminal Cassation Court of Santa Cruz formulated a similar consultation to the Constitutional Chamber, by means of vote number 2010-149 of 11:28 a.m. on June 23, 2010 (constitutional case file 10-9043-007-CO in process), this Court await the decision of said body, which is not possible because, as indicated, not only do precedents exist from the same Constitutional Chamber that treat the application of seizure (comiso) rules as outside its jurisdictional orbit but also, the judicial consultation of constitutionality only has effects on the case file in which it is raised, without affecting other proceedings. Hence, waiting for said resolution could negatively affect this case, since the suspension of the proceeding would be de facto, without legal backing, and could lead to the statute of limitations for the criminal action or, ultimately, the delay in justice (articles 41 of the Political Constitution and 102 et seq. of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). For all the foregoing, it is appropriate, then, to address the determination of whether, as proposed by the appellant in a second argument, the seizure (comiso) is, in these cases, excessive.

**IV.- On the constitutionality of seizure as a general institute. A)** Although, as established by articles 10 of the Magna Carta and 2 subsection b) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the body that has the concentrated control of constitutionality in our country is the Constitutional Chamber and, therefore, only it is competent to issue declarations of unconstitutionality with general or *erga omnes* effects, it is true that numeral 8.1 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch orders the ordinary judge not to apply laws or acts contrary to the Law of the Constitution. This control, indirect if you will, of constitutionality by the ordinary judge, has been understood by the same Constitutional Chamber to mean that *"...judges of the ordinary courts, in the current Costa Rican constitutional justice system, cannot disapply for the specific case any act or provision they deem unconstitutional, because if at the moment of deciding, and therefore of applying any provision, they come to question its constitutionality, they must formulate a reasoned consultation before the Constitutional Chamber. Except, as stated, when there are precedents or jurisprudence that frame the case under examination within the terms, assumptions, and criteria with which the Constitutional Chamber acted in those cases, because the ordinary judge then finds a binding margin of decision"* (Constitutional Chamber, vote number 1185-95, binding *erga omnes* pursuant to the provisions of article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). Therefore, based on these premises, given that one of the issues expressly raised by the appellant is the possible unconstitutionality of the general figure of seizure (comiso) established in article 110 of the Penal Code, this Court would have to make the referred consultation if it shared his thesis. However, without prejudice to the powers that the Legal System confers upon citizens to resort directly to the constitutional body (numerals 75 et seq. of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) and, in such case, without prejudice to what the Constitutional Court might consider, this Chamber harbors no doubt of constitutionality in relation to article 110 of the Penal Code, insofar as it does **not** share the assessments made by the appellant, according to which seizure (comiso) is a form of confiscation, prohibited by article 40 of the Constitution.

**B)** Seizure (comiso) is an institution regulated in article 110 of the Penal Code which, inserted in Book One (General Provisions), Title VII (Civil consequences of the punishable act), sole section, states: *"The crime produces the loss in favor of the State of the instruments with which it was committed and of the things or values derived from its commission, or that constitute for the agent a benefit derived from the same crime, except for the rights that the aggrieved party or third parties may have over them."* For its part, article 40 of the Magna Carta effectively states, and what is relevant, that *"No one shall be subjected to (...) the penalty of confiscation."* It is true that if a purely grammatical definition is followed, seizure (comiso) would have to be equated to confiscation, as the Dictionary of the Spanish Language issued by the Royal Spanish Academy, 22nd edition, gives that word such treatment by deriving, both, from the Latin "*commissum*" which means, precisely, confiscation (cf.: http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/). However, to address the issue of the general constitutionality of seizure (comiso), one must not lose sight of the historical evolution of the figures, since the literal definition is not appropriate given that, inclusively, it is also equated to seizure (decomiso), thereby losing the boundaries that Western procedural, criminal, and constitutional dogmatics have been establishing for institutions that, in current law, are completely different, as they have a different nature and effects. Hence, it is necessary to unravel the historical meaning of the figure of confiscation constitutionally proscribed. From this task, it is evident that the current constitutional article 40, which was introduced into the Magna Carta without major discussions on this aspect (cf.: records of the National Constituent Assembly numbers 111, art. 3, volume II, p. 534; 170, art. 2, volume III, p. 501 and 179, art. 4, volume III, p. 608 consulted from references made by [Nombre2], ; [Nombre3], [Nombre4] and [Nombre5] . *Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, annotated, concordanced and with constitutional jurisprudence*. IJSA, San José, 3rd edition, 2005, p. 407) is similar to that which existed in other preceding national constitutions and, even, to a constitutional regulation that, unsuccessfully, was attempted to be made instead of the Magna Carta that governs us. In retrospect, then, and based on the work edited by [Nombre6], (*The constitutions of Costa Rica*. Editorial U.C.R., San José, Volumes I to V, 1st edition, 2007) it is noted that in that failed Constitution Project, presented by the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, revealing the socio-historical will of the time, article 58 provided: *"Confiscation is prohibited, except for the seizure (comiso) established by criminal laws,"* that is, a difference was established between both institutions, a distinction that is not casual but rather came from other constitutional texts, as the Political Constitution of 1917, in article 24, regulated the issue stating: *"...All punishment is personal. Torture, infamous penalties, nor confiscation of assets shall be applied. The latter shall not prevent the seizure (comiso) of the instruments or objects of the crime."* A less explicit formula was contemplated by the Constitution of 1871, in its article 24, which simply mentioned that *"The use of torture and the penalty of confiscation are prohibited,"* wording which, in turn, was very similar to that contained in the Costa Rican Constitutions of 1869 (article 129 *"...The use of ... the penalty of confiscation is prohibited"*) and 1859 (article 20: *"...the penalties of confiscation and flogging are prohibited..."*). However, dating back from this point, the national constituents did concern themselves with delineating the basic characteristics of the figure they were proscribing. Thus, the amended Constitution of 1848, in its article 110, stated: *"No crime shall be punished with the penalty of confiscation; but this does not include seizures (comisos), nor the fines that the law imposes"* while the Political Constitution of 1847, in its article 154, provided: *"All confiscation of assets is abolished, and may only take place in the sole case of securing the rights of a third party"* and the Political Constitution of the State of Costa Rica of April 9, 1844, established in its article 30: *"No crime, whatever its nature may be, may be punished with the penalty of total or partial confiscation of assets, nor under the pretext of compensation for costs and damages, except for the rights of third parties."* Meanwhile, the Law of Bases and Guarantees of March 8, 1841, in its article 2.2.10 stated: *"All Costa Ricans (...) have the right (...) not to have total confiscation of assets imposed as a penalty..."* and the Fundamental Law of the Free State of Costa Rica, of January 21, 1825, in its article 106, referred to the figure as follows: *"In no case shall there be seizure (embargo) of assets, except for that part in which the crime entails pecuniary liability."* Finally, both in the First and Second Interim Fundamental Social Pact of the Province of Costa Rica of, respectively, December 1, 1821 and January 10, 1822, the topic was addressed in article 304 of each of the fundamental texts in the same manner: *"Nor shall the penalty of confiscation of assets be imposed"* and, to conclude this historical recount, if one analyzes the Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, also called the Constitution of Cádiz of March 19, 1812, which obviously governed the national territory before the independence process, the foundation of those references is understood, as numeral 304 stated: *"Nor shall the penalty of confiscation of assets be imposed."* It is clear, then, that throughout national history, there was a dual concern of the constituent power: on the one hand, to maintain the proscription of confiscation and, on the other, to differentiate the figure from others, such as seizure (comiso), fines, or seizure (embargo), even going so far as to allude to general or partial confiscation which, as will be discussed, is an improper distinction because it generates confusion, which the doctrine makes to establish the effects and identify the prohibited figure from the permitted one. Starting from the Constitution of Cádiz, doctrine, mainly Spanish, has been responsible for tracing the foundation of the proscription and its roots in Roman-Germanic or continental-European law, from which, evidently, all our legislation is nourished, which it is necessary to cite, *in extenso*, to understand the current reality: *"The seizure (comiso) currently included in the Penal Code has become completely disconnected from the ancient penalty of general confiscation of assets. This penalty, currently abolished from modern legal systems, finds its origin in Roman law. The most common form of confiscation of assets in Roman criminal law was the so-called publicatio bonorum, consisting of the appropriation of all assets belonging to those who had been condemned to capital punishment, which included not only the death penalty but also the penalty of exile as a substitute for it. The publicatio was an accessory or necessary consequence, not a true penalty, so it was not necessary to record its imposition in the condemnatory sentence. Subsequently, and given the disproportion of this measure, which logically also affected the accused's heirs, it was gradually limited, allowing the condemned person and his family to retain a part of the patrimony, to cover their displacement to exile, if applicable, as well as their future subsistence. In the Middle Ages, the penalty of confiscation of assets not only maintained the prominence it achieved during the Roman era, being one of the most widely used penalties to repress crimes of special gravity but, furthermore, it became an extraordinarily important instrument placed at the service of the monarchs through which they sought to assert their authority, protect the order they themselves established, and weaken their political adversaries. In the Criminal Law of the Ancien Régime, confiscation grew in prominence, appearing as one of the main means of financing the Monarchy. Its imposition was no longer limited to the authors of the most serious crimes as in other eras but was imposed even for crimes of low social harmfulness. However, in order to extract the maximum yield from the condemned person, confiscation was fundamentally reserved for persons of high asset capacity, to the extreme that if this penalty fell upon an individual of scarce economic solvency, it was substituted by a corporal punishment or being sent to the galleys."* With the advent of the Enlightenment, there was a widespread call for its abolition (...) It was in 1812, during the Cádiz constitutional process, where, despite the brakes imposed by traditionalist opinions, the penalty of general confiscation of property was definitively banished from our (Spanish) legal system, although in practice judges had stopped applying it quite some time before. None of the subsequently enacted Criminal Codes shelter this criminal sanction among their provisions" (CEREZO [Nombre7], [Nombre8]. *Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso*. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pp. 6-8). Note how, starting in 1812, the figure was eliminated from the Spanish Legal System and, with it, from our law, to the point that the prohibition was included in almost all subsequent constitutional texts, alongside the proscription of mistreatment, flogging, the regulation of the death penalty, banishment (extrañamiento), and what later came to be called the prohibition of torture, which demonstrates the intention to rationalize the State's punitive power. C) This historical-constitutional framework allows us to understand the legal regulation of confiscation (comiso) in the different repressive codes the country has had. Thus, in the General Code of Carrillo of 1841, Article 883, provided for within the topic of the sentence in criminal proceedings, enabled the confiscation (comiso) of the weapons, instruments, or utensils used to commit the crime and the effects derived from it. The same possibility was maintained in numeral 39 of the 1880 Criminal Code; in Articles 80 subsection 3 and 141 of the 1918 Criminal Code; in numerals 67 subsection 4 and 70 of the 1924 Criminal Code; and in Article 121 of the 1941 Criminal Code, although these legislations expressly treated it as an accessory penalty and stipulated that it was not extendable to third parties and, unless it involved objects that were illicit in themselves, it could only be decreed through a conviction (cfr.: [Nombre9], . *El comiso de bienes*. IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, pp. 36-37 and *Código General. República de Costa Rica*. Imprenta de Wynkoop, Nueva York, 1858. Part III, p. 92; Biblioteca de Derecho vigente de Costa Rica. *Código Penal, 1914*. Tipografía Lehmann, San José, p. 19; *Código Penal de 1918*. Colección de leyes de Costa Rica, II Semestre, 1918, p. 678; *Código Penal de la República de Costa Rica*, 1924. Edition ordered by [Nombre10]. Imprenta [Nombre11]. , San José, p. 18 and *Código Penal y Código de Policía*. Imprenta Trejos Hermanos, San José, 1965, pp. 41-42). In summary, regardless of whether the Constitutions within which each of these criminal codes were framed established some exception to specify that confiscation did not affect confiscation (comiso) in criminal matters, the criminal legislator always maintained the regulation of the figure, providing for it as outside the constitutional prohibition, because it falls on specific objects and outlining some of the features with which it is applied currently in our environment: it cannot affect a third party unless due process has been respected for them or it involves prohibited objects, and it can be decreed, in many cases, even if the criminal liability of the accused has not been established nor a conviction issued. D) It is evident that the figure of confiscation (comiso), as regulated in our positive law, although it bears some relation to the figure of confiscation (the State assumes ownership of third-party assets), is far from maintaining the character that said sanction had, which was a general measure, applicable to all the assets of the convicted person, while confiscation (comiso) proceeds only over those indicated by the norm, that is, over the assets with which the crime is committed or those others that come from or are the profit from the commission of the criminal illicit act, according to the current formula of Article 110 of the Criminal Code, which, at the time of its enactment, had no interpretative difficulty and was not especially commented on (cfr.: Asamblea Legislativa. *Código Penal: adicionado con la exposición de motivos y el dictamen afirmativo*. Alcance Nº 120 a La Gaceta Nº 257 de 15 de noviembre de 1970, Imprenta Nacional, p. 32). E) Based on these genealogical considerations, doctrine has distinguished various types of confiscation. The **general-total**, which proceeds over all assets and is closely related to the historical figure prohibited by the majority of Spanish-American constituents; the **general-partial**, which affects a portion of the estate; and the **particular**, **special**, or **proper** confiscation, which is only over certain assets that may be means or instruments of the crime (*instrumenta sceleris*); objects of the crime (*objectum sceleris*), effects of the crime (*producta sceleris*), or profits derived from the crime. In addition to this, reference is also made to **improper** confiscation, **replacement** confiscation or confiscation of **equivalent value**, according to which those measures are substituted by the confiscation of assets into which the profits, effects, or instruments of the crime were transformed or of other assets of equivalent value to those that, being instruments, effects, or profits of the crime, were sold or encumbered by their owner before the measure was decreed, and **extended** confiscation (**comiso ampliado**) which falls on instruments or objects of the crime, its effects, and profits, but occurs in the absence of a judicial declaration of criminal liability against any person, whether due to exemption from penalty or because the criminal action was extinguished (on the subject cfr.: [Nombre12], . *La regulación del comiso en el Proyecto de modificación del Código Penal.* En: *Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología*, 05-04, 2003; [Nombre13], . *El régimen específico de comiso en materia de tráfico de drogas.* En: *Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho,* Nº 11, 1993, pp. 277-298; [Nombre14], . *Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso.* Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004; [Nombre15], . *El comiso frente al Nuevo Código Penal.* En: *Derecho Penal y Criminología*. Colombia, Nº 15, Sep-Dec. Vol. 4, 1981, pp. 183-192; [Nombre16], . *Las consecuencias accesorias*. En: AAVV. *Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito*. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, pp. 559-574; [Nombre9], . *El comiso de bienes.* IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006; [Nombre17], [Nombre18]. *La pena de comiso en el proyecto de Código Penal.* En: *Anuario de Derecho Penal y Ciencias Penales*. España, Fascículos 1-2-3, January-December, Vol. 34, 1981, pp. 613-652; [Nombre17], [Nombre19]. *Las penas patrimoniales en el Código penal español. Tras la Ley Orgánica 8/1983*, editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1983, p. 251; [Nombre20], . *La confiscación.* En: *Revista jurídica online.* Facultad de Jurisprudencia y Ciencias Sociales y Políticas. Universidad de Guayaquil. Electronic version at: http://www.revistajuridicaonline.com; [Nombre21], [Nombre22]. *El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar*. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, pp. 64-70 and 86-90; [Nombre23], . *Las sanciones de confiscación: ¿Un intruso en el Derecho Penal?* En: http://www.unifr.ch/ddp1/derechopenal/articulos/a_20080527_39.pdf). F) Based on that classification, scholars of the matter have indicated that the prohibition of confiscation refers to the general and not to the special or particular. This is stated, in order, by Spanish, Argentine, and Colombian authors who comment on norms similar to ours:

¬*"...certain authors have sought to see in the figure of confiscation (comiso) a direct descendant of the archaic confiscatory sanction. However, despite the fact that in both cases assets belonging to the accused's estate are affected, unlike the penalty of confiscation of property, the confiscation (comiso) currently contemplated in our Criminal Code is limited to taking that which has been obtained or used illicitly. Consequently, this only implies the definitive loss of those objects and pecuniary advantages derived from the commission of a criminal offense, constituting, as the case may be, an individual or special confiscation"* ([Nombre24], [Nombre8]. *Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso*. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, p. 8).

¬*"...given the pecuniary nature of this penalty, it must be carefully distinguished from the constitutionally prohibited confiscation, essentially based on the general character of the latter, unlike the specialty inherent in forfeiture [the name given in Argentina to the institute that concerns us], which must always fall on specific things. Of course, forfeiture would be unconstitutional if it did not respect the rule of humanity and minimum irrationality and, therefore, in the specific case became a confiscation penalty"* ([Nombre25]; [Nombre26] and [Nombre27]. *Derecho penal. Parte general*. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 943).

¬*"Although the etymological root of comiso is the Latin word comissumm, meaning confiscation, constitutional systems have proscribed this form of punishment (...) It is worth remembering that already in Roman law, confiscation was provided for as the deprivation of all or part of an estate, both by the community and by way of penalty, and on many occasions, it was used with the primary purpose of seizing the assets of the convict to enrich the state. From its application in criminal law, confiscation was an accessory penalty imposed alongside the main penalties of perduellion, relegation, and sale as a slave of an individual who was previously free, or death sentences, condemnation to the mines, or delivery to a gymnastics school. [Nombre28] came to prohibit total confiscation in general and left it in place for crimes against the State. In ancient laws, confiscation continued to be applied following Roman law and was abolished in almost all legislations starting in the 18th century, with the argument of considering that the official appropriation of a person's estate without cause of legal procedure and by way of simple seizure was an unjust, inhumane, and aberrant penalty. In this sense, and for the Colombian case (...) during the colonial regime, the Spanish punitive legal system was in force, whose source lies in the Siete Partidas, which enshrined four major penalties and three minor penalties, one of the first being banishment with seizure of all property. With the advent of independence, confiscation -understood as the deprivation of all assets that make up a person's estate- was prohibited as a way to protect private property from the arbitrariness of state power, but leaving open the possibility of establishing other types of measures or sanctions of patrimonial content (...) the poverty of legal language led early codifications to denominate any sanction for a crime that meant a transfer of private assets to the state as confiscation, such as fines or confiscation (comiso), all of them receiving the improper name of special confiscations. However (...) what was proscribed for being considered an abusive exercise of the state's punitive power was the so-called general confiscation or universal title confiscation, by virtue of which the criminal was deprived of all or a portion of their economic estate, but those so-called special confiscations have never been prohibited, given that the recognition of private property in liberal democracies has not led to the excess of affirming that the penalty can never restrict property rights"* [Nombre29], . *El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar*. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, pp. 30-32.

In Costa Rica, a similar position has been followed:

¬*"The idea of universality that characterizes general confiscation is never found in the special one, and although in both cases a true transfer of ownership occurs to the benefit of the State, they should not be confused. Confiscation (comiso) is also confiscation, but special, of a different nature and effects from those of general confiscation. It falls on certain assets (...) It respects the rights that the victim or third parties may have over such assets. It does not reach the estate of the responsible party's family (...) Reconciling Article 40 of the Political Constitution with numeral 110 of the Criminal Code, we can say that the penalty of confiscation that the former prohibits is that general one (...) Therefore, it does not extend to confiscation (comiso) as a species of confiscation and Article 110 of the Criminal Code cannot be argued to be unconstitutional"* (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. *La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible*. Editorial Juricentro. San José, 1984, pp. 363-364. In the same terms: [Nombre9], . *El comiso de bienes.* IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, pp. 20-21).

To the above, one could counter-argue by stating that the Constitution prohibits confiscation, without distinguishing between general or special, therefore including both, and that since confiscation (comiso) is a particular confiscation, it is included within the constituent prohibition. However, this would ignore the historical evolution of the institutions, since at the moment the constituent established the norm under commentary (which then passed successively to other Magna Cartas until reaching the current one), confiscation always had a general character, with the specifications being generated later, either as a preventive measure (decomiso) or as a special measure (comiso). This historical sense is required in the interpretation of any normative provision: "*The norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose*" (Article 10 in relation to Article 14, both of the Civil Code), of course with the limitations that, additionally, impose the *pro libertatis* principles and the principle of legality that arise in criminal and criminal procedural matters (Articles 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code and 1 and 2 of the Criminal Procedural Code).

Given that the historical evolution shows that when the constituent power prohibited "confiscation," it always had in mind the generalized dispossession of assets, present and future, of the convicted person or their family by the State, a characteristic not present in the forfeiture (comiso) provided for in Costa Rican criminal law, since Article 110 of the Penal Code and others established in special laws (cfr.: Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism: articles 87 to 92; Weapons and Explosives Law: articles 83 and 84; Wildlife Conservation Law: articles 90 to 100; Forestry Law (Ley Forestal): article 65; Law against Organized Crime: articles 34, 49, and 54; Fisheries and Aquaculture Law: article 134; Gaming Law: article 7; Raffles and Lotteries Law: article 8; Law on Procedures for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: articles 17 and 41; and General Health Law: articles 359 to 361) only regulate special confiscation proper (or forfeiture (comiso)), without providing anything regarding improper forfeiture, substitute forfeiture, or forfeiture of equivalent value, this Court considers that there is no reason whatsoever to formulate a discretionary consultation of constitutionality, since the evolutionary understanding of the institutions dispels any doubt that might arise about the compatibility of the general enabling norm for forfeiture (Article 110 of the Penal Code) with Constitutional numeral 40.

**V.- On the requirements for proceeding and the legal nature of forfeiture.** Now, having established for the undersigned the general constitutionality of forfeiture and, therefore, the unnecessary nature of making any consultation on this point (it is reiterated: without prejudice to the powers of the Constitutional Chamber for general pronouncements that the challenger may resort to), it is necessary to make a series of additional considerations to respond to other arguments made in the challenge. One of these essential assessments alludes to the legal nature of the figure of forfeiture, since a series of consequences, sometimes contradictory, can be derived from it, which will allow a response to this claim. **A)** In this regard, the first thing that must be said is, so to speak, a truism, namely that the legal nature of an institute does not depend on its location in a particular regulation, but on the legal sphere in which its effects are produced (in the same sense, see [Nombre30] , . *Curso de derecho penal español. Parte general, tomo I*, Editorial Tecnos, 5th edition, Madrid, 1996, p. 183; [Nombre14] , . *Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso.* Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, p. 32). If the former were sufficient, the operation would be simply verificatory and would lead to the conclusion that forfeiture is a civil consequence of the crime because, in Costa Rica, it is located in a section of the Penal Code so titled. But the matter is not so simple because, if that false premise were accepted, it would imply concluding, for example, that since civil reparation in the criminal process is governed by the dispositive principle, forfeiture could not be ordered ex officio but would require a prior claim by the holder of the civil action on behalf of the State (which would be the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic or the Public Ministry if delegated), none of which is consistent with, even, the imperative character of the legal norms that regulate the matter (see articles 102 subsection 3 and 110 of the Penal Code, and 367 and 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code, among others). Thus, the simplistic approach is unsatisfactory. **B)** The legal nature of forfeiture has been one of the most debated doctrinal topics. The answers that have been attempted in comparative law, while they may constitute an important indicator for elucidating the question in Costa Rica, are not incontrovertible for our system, as it is convenient to remember that the legal nature cannot be forced or "transplanted" from one legal system to another, but rather depends on the current regulation of the effects attributed to it in our current legal system, which, although they may coincide with those operating in comparative law, may have specific characteristics, all of which must be assessed before adopting a position. **C)** Thus, the first thing that must be done to determine the legal nature of forfeiture is to establish the characteristics, effects, and scenarios in which it proceeds. According to Article 110 cited, forfeiture requires, for its proceeding: **C.1)** that a crime is being investigated, not a misdemeanor or contravention, because the numeral begins by indicating *"Todo delito"* and that expression, in a restrictive sense (Article 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code), can only be understood as referring to acts classified as such by the legislator (Book II of the Penal Code or special laws) who made a distinction with misdemeanors that have a different location in the normative body (Book III); **C.2)** that this crime is intentional. The norm does not expressly indicate this, but it states that what is lost are the instruments with which the illicit act was committed and the things deriving from its execution. Authors on the subject have referred, in our view according to a restrictive interpretation consistent with the principle of legality, that the intentional character of the measure is extracted from the provision of "instruments" contemplated by the law, since these: " ...for the generality of the doctrine are those that have been 'intentionally' used to commit the crime (...) with which those of a negligent crime are, of course, excluded" ([Nombre31] . *Derecho penal. Parte general*. Editorial Astrea, 3rd edition, Buenos Aires, p. 519. In the same sense: [Nombre32], [Nombre33] ; [Nombre34], [Nombre35] and [Nombre27] . *Manual de derecho penal. Parte general*. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 1st edition, 2005, p. 734; [Nombre29] , . *El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar*. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, p. 59 and 64 and others cited in [Nombre9] , . *El comiso de bienes.* IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, pp. 70-73); **C.3)** it would be applicable, *in principle*, to any intentional crime, as it is an institute regulated in the general part of the Penal Code, which is characterized, precisely, by affecting codified criminal types or those in special laws; **C.4)** it can affect third parties provided they are made a party to the process. This is not established by the norm, which, if interpreted in isolation, would lead to obviating this requirement that arises from a systematic interpretation of the legal system and places Constitutional Law as what it is, the underpinning of the rest of the normative hierarchy (see, in this regard, votes number 712-2006 of the Third Chamber and 637-2010 of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of San José); **C.5)** forfeiture does not affect the rights of the victim or third parties in good faith, but rather these prevail over the state interest (in this sense, the votes of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of San José, numbers 2000-76, 2000-323, 2003-383, and 2004-101, and those of the Third Chamber, numbers 512-2001 and 1273-2005, among others); **C.6)** the effects arise from the crime, so normatively it is provided that forfeiture is ordered upon a conviction (Article 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code). Is 'crime' to be understood as a typical, unlawful, and culpable act or as the abstract stipulation of unlawfulness referred to by the legislator? National jurisprudence, in general terms, has understood it as a legislative provision, without a concrete declaration of responsibility, to the point that it has provided for the possibility of forfeiture with dismissals, prosecutorial archiving, rulings of definitive dismissal, even for the statute of limitations on criminal action, acquittals, with alternative measures such as conciliations, probation suspensions, comprehensive damage reparation and fine payment, among others (see the recount of votes by [Nombre9] , . *El comiso de bienes.* IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, pp. 230-263); **C.7)** it lacks compensation, as it arises from a prior unlawfulness, meaning it is an exception to the State's impossibility of assuming ownership of property without paying the value of the asset (Article 45 of the Political Constitution); **C.8)** it is a public order measure, so a party's petition is not required, but it can be ordered ex officio; **C.9)** as a measure arising from the State's sovereign power, it requires being provided for in the law (Third Chamber, vote number 1217-1999), being issued in a reasoned or substantiated manner, and having had prior demonstration of the link or nexus between the object and the criminal act, and therefore it is not a case of objective liability (Third Chamber, vote number 505-99); **C.10)** principles such as the presumption of innocence, due process, and the right of defense govern, so the burden of proof rests with the State; **C.11)** in Costa Rica, the forfeiture of assets used in the preparatory phase that does not reach the executive phase is not normatively regulated; **C.12)** the destination of the assets, once their ownership is obtained by the State, is expressly fixed by law (cfr.: Law on the distribution of confiscated or forfeited assets, its regulations and manual). **D)** From similar considerations in comparative law, attempts have been made to explain the figure under discussion by indicating that it is an **accessory penalty**, a **security measure**, a **civil consequence of the crime**, or a ***sui generis* legal consequence** of the crime (this includes those who consider it a third class of sanction in criminal law alongside penalties and security measures but, in reality, it would be a fourth way, since reparation has already been accepted as the third). We will analyze each of these options: **D.1)** **Forfeiture as an accessory penalty:** It has been said that forfeiture is an accessory penalty (in this sense, the votes of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of Cartago, numbers 2010-236 and 2010-265). However, the main criticism made against granting this legal nature is that forfeiture does not respond to the essential purpose of the sanction accepted by our constituent power and legislator, which is positive special prevention or resocialization (articles 51 of the Penal Code and 5.6 of the American Convention on Human Rights) as it conforms more with retributive or negative general prevention functions (this is even accepted by the Criminal Cassation Tribunal of Cartago in votes numbers 2010-236 and 2010-265 when defining it as an accessory criminal sanction with a purpose of general prevention). Forfeiture would also not respond, from this perspective, to the principle of culpability which requires not only culpability for its imposition (that is, a sanction could not be imposed without culpability, so it could not be imposed in the absence of a principal penalty or in cases where the perpetrator is not sanctioned, even if there were a criminal wrong) but also considers that this is gradable, which clashes with the rigid character of the figure. Likewise, if it were a penalty, it would violate the principle regarding its strictly personal character since forfeiture is applicable even against third parties, provided they are given a hearing in the respective process and the assets, with their consent, were used in the commission of crimes:

¬"The problems posed by this regulation of forfeiture derived precisely from its formal configuration as an authentic penalty. The penalty has its basis in culpability, so a penalty cannot be imposed without culpability. Hence the following consequences arise in relation to the application of forfeiture. On the one hand, it could only be applied to the subject who had acted culpably, but not to someone who, having carried out a typical and unlawful action, was nevertheless declared exempt from criminal responsibility due to the absence of culpability, for example, for being non-imputable. But, on the other hand and moreover, since the strictly personal character of the penalty necessarily derives from the principle of culpability, the penalty of forfeiture could only be applied to the subject responsible for the criminal infraction and, therefore, only with respect to instruments and effects of the crime belonging to the perpetrator, but not with respect to instruments that, having been used by the culpable person for the commission of the crime, were nonetheless the property of a third party not responsible for the crime (...) The basis and purpose of forfeiture (...) can be (...) independent of the question of the ownership of the confiscatable objects" (cfr: [Nombre16] , . *Las consecuencias accesorias*. In: AAVV. *Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito*. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, pp. 559-560).

¬"...forfeiture does not respond to any of the purposes of the penalty, as it is provided neither as a threat aimed at deterring the commission of crimes nor as a deserved punishment for the crime" [Nombre36] , . *Derecho penal, parte general*, 6th edition, Reppertor, Barcelona, 2002, p. 748.

Forfeiture is also not provided for, as an accessory penalty, in Article 50.2 of the Penal Code, which regulates as such only the special disqualification defined in numeral 58 *ibidem* as the deprivation or restriction of one or more rights. This objection is both systematic (regarding the location of the figure) and in light of constitutional principles, as it would clash with the principle of legality by exceeding the catalog of accessory penalties expressly contemplated by the Penal Code and the regulations specific to them. The difficulty could be overcome by stating that there is a prior law that provides for it for all crimes (Article 110 of the Penal Code); that there are other special norms that designate it as a penalty (for example, the Wildlife Conservation Law) and that the figure contemplates the deprivation of a right: property. However, the same numeral 58 of the Penal Code states that accessory penalties provided for as such by the legislator have a term, which is the same as absolute disqualification, ranging from 6 months to 12 years (Article 57), which is incompatible with the loss of title to the asset, which is definitive. Likewise, against any penalty, principal or accessory, the possibility of filing for revision is available, something the Constitutional Chamber has indicated as incompatible with the *res judicata* deriving from forfeiture (see vote number [Telf3]). Finally, it must not be forgotten that according to Article 110 of the Penal Code: "...the weighting of forfeiture shall be made once the civil liabilities arising from the crime have been satisfied (...) undoubtedly if forfeiture maintained the character of a penalty, it would not be admissible for the imposition of the penalty to depend on the satisfaction of civil liability." [Nombre37] , ; [Nombre38] , and [Nombre39] , . *La responsabilidad civil ex delicto*. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pp. 45, 47. Then, either forfeiture is not an accessory penalty or, if it were, it would be unconstitutional for violating the cited precepts, making it necessary to evaluate other possibilities. **D.2) Forfeiture as a security measure:** Based on these questions, the doctrine pointed out that, in reality, the issue was not that the measure was unconstitutional, but that it should not be seen as a penalty and, when trying to explain it, it was thought that its nature was that of a security measure, thereby overcoming the objection that it responded to a principle of culpability, as this lies outside security measures whose basis is, rather, the dangerousness of the active subject. Forfeiture and security measures also had in common that they respond more to special prevention criteria assumed in international instruments than to those of general prevention. But again, criticisms intensified. First, because dangerousness in security measures arises from the existence of a wrong that may not be present in forfeiture, which is based on a presumed objective dangerousness of the thing *per se* (in the case of instruments used for the commission of the crime and particularly some types of them, such as weapons). Also, because this explanation did not overcome the strictly personal character that security measures also have and that goes beyond the figure of forfeiture:

¬"The first thing that must be noted is that forfeiture (...) does not have the nature of a security measure either (...) Security measures are based on the criminal dangerousness of the subject, revealed by the prior commission of one or more typical and unlawful acts (...) Security measures also have a strictly personal character, in the sense that they can only be applied to the subject in whom dangerousness has been assessed.

Security measures are oriented exclusively toward special prevention, that is, toward producing specific resocializing or incapacitating effects in the dangerous offender to prevent them from committing crimes in the future. Confiscation (comiso), on the other hand, is based on the objective dangerousness of the thing and is oriented toward preventing it from being used in the future for the commission of new crimes, and not only by the offender but also by other subjects. However, the objective dangerousness of the thing and the probability of its future use for the commission of new crimes does not necessarily entail the criminal dangerousness of the offender who used it to commit the crime, in which case it could not be confiscated if confiscation were attributed the nature of a security measure. But even if the subject were dangerous, the confiscation of some objects could hardly be an adequate measure to eliminate dangerousness, given that it will not always be suitable for fulfilling the purposes of re-education, healing, or incapacitation characteristic of security measures. Finally, if confiscation had the nature of a security measure, then it would also not be possible to apply it with respect to objects belonging to a third party who, for not having committed any typical and unlawful act, could not be declared criminally dangerous..." ([Nombre16], . Las consecuencias accesorias. In: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, p. 561).

Furthermore, in Costa Rican criminal law, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) declared security measures for imputable offenders unconstitutional, leaving only curative security measures (see Article 98, subsections 3, 4, and 5, and votes numbers 88-92 and 1588-98 of the Constitutional Chamber) and confiscation, most of the time, is attached to a declaration of sanction for imputable offenders and is not mentioned as a security measure (Articles 101 and 102 of the Criminal Code) which are also governed by the principle of legality (tipicidad) and the prohibition of creation by analogy (Articles 97 and 2 of the Criminal Code), in addition to also having the possibility of cessation (Articles 100 of the Criminal Code and 478 of the Criminal Procedure Code) which is incompatible with confiscation. In view of this, another option was proposed.

**D.3) Confiscation as a civil consequence or remedial measure derived from the crime:** although the Constitutional Chamber has referred to the figure from this perspective (as in vote number [Telf3]: *"confiscation is one of the civil consequences of the punishable act, along with restitution and the repair and indemnification of damages and losses"*), which some cassation jurisprudence has also accepted (see, for example and among others, vote number 787-2006 of the Third Chamber), the truth is that, technically, confiscation cannot be considered a civil consequence. First because, as stated, in Costa Rica it can be decreed ex officio, which is alien to the dispositive principle and the principle of congruence of civil matters. Second, because it does not have a reparative, restitutive, or compensatory character, to the point that Article 103 of the Criminal Code lists it apart from those purposes, which are characteristic of consequences derived from crime. Third because *"Civil liability ex delicto constitutes a matter of essentially civil nature, regardless of whether it is examined in the criminal process, which explains why there is no obstacle to its knowledge being deferred, where appropriate, to the civil jurisdiction. And while the crime, regarding the emergence of this liability, is a necessary prerequisite, it is not sufficient, as the production of damage is also required, an indispensable element for the emergence of all civil liability, whether or not the act that caused it is defined in the Criminal Code"* (CEREZO [Nombre40], . *Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso.* Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, p. 29), without it being possible to raise, in the civil sphere, an isolated claim for confiscation. Furthermore, because *"Civil liability is transmitted to heirs (...) but that cannot be upheld equally regarding the heirs of the person responsible for the act. In cases of the death of the accused or defendant without confiscation having been agreed upon, it is not possible to apply..."* (QUINTERO [Nombre41], ; [Nombre38], and [Nombre39] , . *La responsabilidad civil ex delictio*. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, p. 46). National doctrine adds to this that its effects are not of private law but rather in favor of the State, despite the fact that Costa Rica did not follow the recommendations discussed in the drafting of the Model Criminal Code for Latin America and placed the figure within civil consequences. This, as stated, does not affect its true legal nature and what must be derived is that the provision was erroneously placed, without that affecting its effects, concluding that *"confiscation cannot be an effect of civil liability ex delicto, in its essence it is not being a civil sanction"* (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. *La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible.* Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, p. 376). Based on these reflections, another possibility was raised. **D.4) Confiscation as a complex act, an accessory, legal, mixed consequence or *sui generis* consequence of the crime:** There are consequences derived from the crime that are so by provision of law, without sharing in the nature of those figures. In Costa Rican law, the following are located as such: the matter of the award of costs against the losing party (Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code); the publication of the judgment in crimes against honor (Article 155 of the Criminal Code); the reconstruction, suppression, reform, restitution, or registry rectification derived from the falsification of public instruments (Article 483 of the Criminal Procedure Code); the registration of certain types of resolutions (Articles 30 subsections j and k, 25 first paragraph, 36 ninth and tenth paragraphs of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of the Judicial Registry and Archives) and confiscation. This has been regulated in countries such as Germany and Spain and is accepted by the majority of doctrine, although without agreeing on the appropriate name to use, but making it clear that it does not share the characteristics of the institutes indicated in previous subsections:

¬*"...Henao [Nombre42] criticizes the unitary positions (...) pointing out that (...) confiscation is a phenomenon of complex nature with a very broad functional scope, as it not only fulfills the task of a penalty, but also those of restitution, compensation, policing, and assurance, and even procedural tasks of a probative and precautionary nature (...) In the same sense, [Nombre43] and [Nombre44] are of the view of the complex nature of confiscation (...) [Nombre45] (...) raises the mixed character of the institution (...) In contrast to penalties or security measures, accessory consequences are coercive acts or sanctions of their own nature, legally linked to the imposition of a penalty for an intentional crime or misdemeanor or can be linked to it through a judicial pronouncement in certain cases. Thus, the placement of confiscation (...) as an accessory consequence implies that its basis is neither the culpability nor the dangerousness of the active subject of the crime."* [Nombre21], [Nombre22]. *El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar.* Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, pp. 59-60 and 62.

Even our legislation arises from the Model Criminal Code for Latin America, where the topic of the legal nature and correct placement of confiscation was widely discussed: *"Finally, the opinion prevailed to situate confiscation with a criminal character, but not as a penalty, and outside the civil consequences of the punishable act, discarding the idea of this phenomenon as a measure of procedural character (...) One of the agreements of the Fourth Plenary Meeting held in Caracas, Venezuela, from January 20 to 30, 1969, No. 89, was to include a text on confiscation, but on the understanding that it did not have the character of a penalty nor an effect of civil liability (...) Why then, when ordering the regulations of that Code, was confiscation (...) included under the Title (...) relating to 'Civil liability derived from the crime'?"* (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. *La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible.* Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, pp. 369-370).

**G)** Having said the above, this Tribunal considers that, indeed, Costa Rican confiscation is, simply, a consequence indicated by the legislator for the crime (for a certain type of crimes, as was said and will be reiterated) which, although it has criminal features (legality, burden of proof, innocence, link to the act), civil features (it proceeds against third parties), and administrative features (state coercive power and ex officio nature), does not fit precisely into any of them and, therefore, cannot be subject to principles specific to penalties (such as culpability or temporality), to security measures (such as personality), or to reparation (such as the dispositive principle). Hence, it is valid for the legislator to regulate it to be applied ex officio, establishing the loss of ownership as definitive, etc. However, this does not mean that, as a measure depriving rights that it ultimately is, it is not subject to principles such as legality and proportionality, which are inherent, even, to any sanctioning matter, including in the area of administrative law, as they are the only limiters of the State's power of command (poder de imperio), as will be addressed in greater detail below.

**VI.- The principles of legality and proportionality in the application of confiscation:** Discarding (due to that legal nature and the constitutionality assumed here) other possible criticisms that confiscation may have if approached from those perspectives, the truth is that its imposition is not exempt from being governed, like any act of the Public Administration in which the power of command is applied, by the **<u>principles of legality and proportionality</u>**, so the confiscation decreed in this specific case must be analyzed based on such premises. **A)** Regarding **<u>legality</u>**, **the confiscation of vehicles** when **driving under the influence of alcohol**, that is, the confiscation applied to Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code, is, as of today, a measure adopted, by way of interpretation, from a norm issued in a socio-historical context different from the one that governs us today, which, for that reason, violates the principle of legality. On this topic, the Argentine criminal lawyer and criminologist [Nombre46] has pronounced himself, pointing out that the principle of legality is not limited, as is often estimated, to the existence of a strict, formal, and written law, but rather that, regarding the characteristic that such law be prior, the *"principle of historical respect for the legal scope of what is prohibited"* must be taken into account, according to which:

¬*"The law is a text. Every text has a context, both discursive and social. **The scope of what is legally prohibited varies even if the text remains identical, because the context continually changes**, since any product of the activity of human discourse derives its form and meaning from the social situation in which speech appears (...) **The change of discursive context entails problems that are more serious when generated by changes in the social, cultural, or technological context** (...) But the problem is complicated when, **due to one of these changes, the text appears covering an unusually broad scope of prohibition** (...) In these cases, **the cultural context of the legal text must be taken into account,** and when a phenomenon of unusual prohibitive extension is verified, **a historical reduction is imposed**. Legality is a principle that serves to guarantee the limitation of the scope of legislative criminalizing programming, and its sense cannot be reversed by converting it into an argument of unusual and never foreseen extension in the original context of the text, whose effect is to grant a selective space of criminalization that reaches the maximum limits of arbitrariness (...) Historical respect for the real scope of what is prohibited is imposed in legality because, **otherwise, the simple omission of political agencies would extend punitive prohibitions in an unprecedented manner**: the punitive is a sphere that political agencies must plan and increase through law, and the omission of these in the face of significant changes in cultural or technological context constitutes a waiver of their function, which is not constitutionally admissible. **Primary criminalization is established by action of political agencies and not by their omissions**"* ([Nombre25]; [Nombre26] and [Nombre27]. *Derecho penal. Parte general.* Ediar, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 113; emphasis added).

The 1973 Criminal Code regulated confiscation for, as stated, intentional crimes. At the time that set of articles was drafted, the majority of intentional crimes were result crimes, injury crimes, or mere conduct crimes. Very few were the norms of abstract danger that this legislation contemplated (among them were, following the original numbering of that code, the possession and manufacture of lock picks in Article 230, declared unconstitutional through vote number 6410-96; the danger of negligent accident in numeral 253, declared unconstitutional through vote number [Telf4]; illicit association in Article 272, and the possession of instruments for falsification in Article 370) since these were conceptualized as exceptional, given that they meant punishing acts at a stage prior to that in which they traditionally had to be done (executory acts and not preparatory ones in the so-called *iter criminis*). That panorama has changed in Costa Rican criminal policy and, since then, there have been many special laws issued with crimes of that nature. The article on driving under the influence of alcohol arises with the reform to the Criminal Code of 2008, that is, 35 years after the norm on confiscation was provided for. Unlike what happened in the *Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento del terrorismo* (Articles 87 to 92), in the *Ley de armas y explosivos* (Articles 83 and 84), in the *Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre* (Articles 90 to 100), and in the *Ley forestal* (Article 65), to cite some examples, in which, despite the general norm of Article 110 of the Criminal Code, the legislator specifically established that the act provided for therein implied confiscation (a declaration that would have to be considered unnecessary if it were considered that the article provided for generally for the entire criminal legal system, but based on a specific context, could be applied to situations not even foreseen when it was created), the normative modification that introduced the provision at hand established nothing, expressly, about the applicability of confiscation. When reckless driving was discussed (which is a peculiar figure because it sanctions as an intentional crime driving under the influence of alcohol but then, that same conduct is considered negligent if it generates a result of injuries or death, according to Articles 128 and 117 of the Criminal Code), in the legislative file, the possibility of applying the confiscation of vehicles was never mentioned which, as stated, was not possible to use in crimes of injuries or homicide committed even under the influence of alcohol, since they are negligent. In application of Articles 10 and 14 of the Civil Code cited, which require considering historical antecedents in normative interpretation, that omission is an element that must be taken into account. Thus, the confiscation of vehicles for the commission of this act has arisen as an interpretation, the result of introducing a norm of abstract danger into a set of articles with general provisions designed for another socio-historical context. So much has this been the case that the reform projects for that regulation, given the various errors it presented, contemplate expressly excluding the confiscation of the vehicle as a measure derived from said behavior (in this sense, cf.: Article 291 of the project for the comprehensive reform of the Transit Law recently presented by the MOPT, accumulated to legislative file 17.485, where a second paragraph is introduced to Article 110 of the Criminal Code according to which *"Excluded from this provision are the vehicles involved in the commission of the acts defined in Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code"*). Likewise, in the historical context in which Article 110 of the Criminal Code was issued (1970), the discussion around confiscation was limited to intentional result crimes, concrete danger crimes, mere conduct crimes, and very few situations of abstract danger.

Including in Spain, starting from similar legal systems, that is, they have a norm in the general part of the Penal Code that authorizes confiscation (comiso) and the introduction, much later, of the crime of reckless driving with contempt for the lives of others (article 384 of the Penal Code), an express norm was incorporated alongside that law, stating: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"The motor vehicle or moped used in the acts provided for in the previous article shall be considered an instrument of the crime for the purposes of article 127 of this Code"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(cfr: [Nombre16], . </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Las consecuencias accesorias</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">. In: AAVV.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">. [Nombre47]</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">, Valencia, 2006, p. 558)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> a distinction that would be useless if it were considered that the introduction of the offense within the general framework of prior norms were sufficient, and it must be added that, in that country, the criminal offense of driving under the influence of alcohol implies a concrete danger, since it is not enough to drive with alcohol, but that situation must concretely affect the ability to drive. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">B) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Furthermore, the measure is </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">disproportionate</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. Confiscation cannot, and must not, be applied automatically, without considering other factors specific to the case. In comparative law, there is, to date, no discussion that this principle of proportionality must be used as a measurement parameter when deciding on the issue of confiscation. Some authors point out: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">¬</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"The criterion of proportionality had been proposed by the doctrine to resolve the most frequent cases of confiscation of instruments of the crime: that of motor vehicles. Indeed, although in certain cases it may be justified, it seems notoriously dysfunctional when it comes to negligent traffic offenses. Precisely for this reason, the Prosecutor's Office of the Supreme Court (Circular 6/1968) came to understand that a restrictive interpretation of what should be understood as an instrument obliges not to consider motor vehicles as such. However, in crimes against traffic safety, such exclusion can operate very difficultly. Hence the inevitability of resorting to the criterion of proportionality"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">([Nombre48] </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">and [Nombre49], . </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Las consecuencias jurídicas del delito</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">. Civitas, Madrid, 3rd edition, 1996, p. 216). </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">¬"…</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">c</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">onfiscation </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> bears a close analogy to these penal consequences; by virtue of this, the same legal-constitutional principles that govern criminal sanctions are applicable to it. Such principles are: legality </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(...) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">and proportionality and the procedural guarantees of the accusatory principle, presumption of innocence, right of defense and individualization of the consequence."</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> [Nombre29],</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, p. 62 citing [Nombre50],</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">El patrimonio criminal. Comiso y pérdida de la ganancia</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. Dykinson, Madrid, 2001, 28-30.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">¬"…both in the confiscation of instruments and of effects, at the moment of decreeing the measure, the proportionality thereof must be considered with respect to those that are of lawful commerce, so that the judge may abstain from decreeing it or do so partially if they consider it to be disproportionate, especially when there is a notorious imbalance between the value of the instrument and the penal significance of the act, to prevent confiscation from surpassing the penalty itself in affliction. It is clear that the judgment of proportionality is not applicable as a general rule in relation to the economic profit obtained from the commission of the crime, since the confiscation of the illicit benefits obtained by the perpetrator, regardless of their value, precisely covers the material advantage obtained unlawfully </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> Thus, therefore, the requirements for the application of the principle of proportionality are two: that it does not concern the profits nor the instruments and effects of the crime of illicit commerce, and that one of the following three conditions is alternatively met: a) that the value of the goods is not proportionate to the nature of the criminal infraction, b) that the value is not related to the gravity of the crime, c) that civil liabilities have been completely satisfied. To establish whether conditions a) or b) are met, one must consider the type of legal interest injured or endangered by the intentional infraction, the form of attack or endangerment thereof, the greater or lesser degree of reproach attributed to the perpetrator, and the material and moral damages produced by the punishable act..."</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> [Nombre21], [Nombre22]. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, pp. 79-80.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Commenting on article 127 of the Spanish Penal Code, which has an imperative wording similar to that of our article 110, as it states </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">Every</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> penalty imposed for an intentional crime or misdemeanor shall entail the loss of the effects </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> and of the instruments with which it was executed..."</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(the emphasis is not from the original), </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">it is said: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">¬"The necessity and proportionality of confiscation have nothing to do with the former automaticity with which, by legal will, it had to be decreed. On the other hand, in accordance with the current regulation of confiscation, its application, as an accessory consequence, is not mandatory, unlike what happens with accessory penalties </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> The modification of nature, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> obliges one to justify and explain the proportionality between the scope of the confiscation and the act and its effects..."</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">[Nombre37], ; [Nombre38],</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">and [Nombre39] </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\"> , . </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">La responsabilidad civil ex delicto</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pp. 45, 47;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">and it is the same criterion maintained by national doctrine and jurisprudence:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">¬"…it is another principle, that of Proportionality, that gives us the guidelines to follow in its practical application, since as it is an extremely drastic penalty (sic) whose purpose is public tranquility, it comes to affect the patrimony of an individual with a specific destination that is the state, but not in an unlimited manner, but rather attending to the gravity of the act with respect to the type, nature, origin, use and value of the good to be confiscated. Being delimited by law in its use in Criminal Law, it corresponds to the judge to assess the appropriateness of confiscation according to the varied circumstances of each case, so that it does not imply a disproportionate confiscatory measure with respect to the illicit act that was committed with the goods used to commit a crime </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> Without forgetting that there are goods that mandatorily enter into confiscation, independently of their value or affectation to the owner, there are others that must be submitted for consideration in relation to and connection with the criminal act, in case their loss quantitatively exceeds the damage caused" </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">[Nombre9], . </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">El comiso de Bienes</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. San José, IJSA, 2006, pp. 65-66.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">¬"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">The </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">prosecutor (...) files an appeal </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> against the judgment </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> considers that the trial court incurred in a defect in iudicando when it considered that the confiscation of the dwelling requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office was not appropriate </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">The argument is not admissible: confiscation is a civil consequence of the punishable act </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> It is obvious that the defendant is a person of scarce economic resources who dedicated herself to the sale of cocaine base (crack) to final consumers from her dwelling located in </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> San Rafael Abajo de Desamparados. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">The constitutional principle of proportionality applies not only to the penal sanction imposed on whoever is convicted of committing a crime, but also encompasses the civil and administrative consequences derived from said penalty</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">. In this case, given the socioeconomic profile of the accused, agreeing to the requested confiscation would be equivalent to extending the punitive effects with clearly confiscatory purposes to the detriment of the only patrimony of the sentenced person, which ostensibly violates the constitutional principle of proportionality. Different is the case of the convicted perpetrators and participants for drug activity who have multiple movable and immovable goods and enjoy a buoyant financial situation precisely as a result of their illicit activity. In that scenario, there is no doubt that it is constitutionally proportionate to adopt the measure of confiscation, since the affectation of the protected legal interest has been on a larger scale and this is evidenced by the profit obtained that has allowed them to obtain the seized goods. For the foregoing, the appeal is declared without merit..." </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(Sala Tercera, vote number 2004-24, 09:40 hrs. January 23, 2004; [Nombre51], [Nombre52], [Nombre53], [Nombre54] and [Nombre55]; the emphasis is supplied).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">Having said this, it is appropriate to observe the consequences that the entirety of the legal system attributes to driving under the influence of alcohol to conclude that there is an excess that makes confiscation, in such circumstances, must be considered disproportionate, not only because the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol already has a plurality of legal effects provided for </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(fine or imprisonment: articles 130 subsection a of the Ley de Tránsito and 254 bis of the Penal Code; removal from circulation of the vehicle or its [Placa3]: articles 141 sub. a and 155 of the Ley de Tránsito; loss of all points and suspension of all licenses for 2, 4, or 10 years, depending on whether it is the first, second, or third similar offense and the obligation to carry out awareness courses, road re-education, or treatment for addictions, once the suspension period has expired, to recover only part of the points: article 71 bis sub. a) and 71 ter of the Ley de Tránsito) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">but, furthermore, due to the fact that, in the face of result-based illicit acts (that is, more serious ones), produced by driving vehicles under the influence of alcohol, such as injuries or death (articles 117 and 128 of the Penal Code), confiscation is not applicable, which, as has been said, has been circumscribed to intentional crimes and not negligent ones such as those referred to. This makes confiscation clearly inadmissible in the first scenario, based on the same principle of constitutional equality that obliges</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> treating as equals </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(not applying confiscation) </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">those who are in the same conditions </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101\">(driving under the influence of alcohol)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">. In addition to that, the accessory measure could be more burdensome than the main penalty, given that the prison sentence could be commuted to a fine, if the conditions for it were met (article 69 of the Penal Code), in which case the fine per day cannot exceed the daily wage of the person (article 53 </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">ibidem</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">) or the prison sentence could be substituted for community service (final paragraph of article 254 bis of said code). Therefore, as much because of the plurality of effects that the legal system gives, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">at this moment</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">, to</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> the same conduct, as because similar behavior but with more serious effects is treated more leniently than the conduct that concerns us, and because the secondary could be more burdensome than the main, this Court unanimously considers that the cited disproportionality occurs when decreeing, in these cases, the confiscation of the vehicle, an object that does not come from the commission of the crime and whose general use is lawful. Even the Constitutional Chamber itself has had the opportunity to rule on similar interpretative criteria of the Office of the Attorney General, which is what, ultimately, the matter boils down to, indicating that </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">"…the directive issued by the Deputy Prosecutor's Office of Alajuela, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on January thirteenth, two thousand nine, insofar as it requires the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">donation</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> of the vehicle to the State, as a reparatory plan to agree to the suspension of the trial process, in crimes of reckless driving, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">is contrary to Constitutional Law, particularly to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">…"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> Constitutional Chamber, vote number 8296-10. Although the full vote is not available to date to know the reasons given by the Constitutional Chamber, there would be no sense in the Prosecutor's Office transforming a confiscation into a donation if the former were applicable, since it would suffice to apply it, regardless of not being in the presence of a conviction, as has been customary to do in the country as set out above.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">VII.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">This Court is not unaware that what has been resolved here has not been the general position of other appellate courts such as, for example, the Criminal Appeals Tribunal of San Ramón (majority vote number 2010-302 of 10:00 hrs. on August 6, 2010, in which, however, it is noted:</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> "…the undersigned judges could describe the legislative decision (sic) to order the confiscation of the vehicle in circumstances such as those present in this case as excessive, irrational, and disproportionate…"</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">) or of the Criminal Appeals Tribunal of Cartago (votes numbers 2010-236 of 11:07 on July 9 and 2010-265 of 14:35 on August 10, 2010) and it has been accepted, although for the purposes of formulating a constitutional question, by others (Appeals Tribunal of Santa Cruz, vote number 2010-149 and dissenting votes in the Criminal Appeals Tribunal of San Ramón, within vote number 2010-302 and, ex officio, in that of this Chamber, with a different integration, within vote number 2010-995). However, this Court, based on the principle of judicial independence, considers other edges of the discussion and starts from premises different from those raised in those pronouncements, as it not only accepts the possibility that the ordinary judge applies the principle of proportionality but, additionally, discards the consideration of accessory penalty, the basis on which those decisions are founded. This being the case, the analysis carried out allows this Court to indicate, unanimously, that the measure of confiscation of motor vehicles in the crime of reckless driving is, in the current state of our legislation, a disproportionate measure and that borders on the principle of legality in the aspect </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">supra</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> mentioned. For these reasons, which do not necessarily coincide with the entire argument made by the appellant but that respond to a broad consideration of the appeal filed, to address the right to that challenge enshrined in article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights, the appeal must be granted, revoking the appealed judgment insofar as it ordered confiscation, a measure that is rejected. The vehicle seized and placed in provisional deposit must be returned, definitively, to its owner without, for this, a remand being necessary.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>" }

“II.- En el único motivo de la impugnación, el defensor público del encartado alega la errónea aplicación del artículo 110 del Código Penal. Señala que el comiso por conducción temeraria es una interpretación implementada implacablemente por el Ministerio Público, pese a que el comiso es una forma de confiscación que infringe el numeral 40 de la Carta Magna. Señala que el numeral que regula el instituto se ubica dentro de un capítulo denominado "Consecuencias civiles del hecho punible" por lo que se pretende restituir al estado anterior aspectos de contenido económico. Refiere, adicionalmente, que el numeral se enmarca en la obtención de cosas u objetos provenientes del delito o en el uso de instrumentos que produzcan una afectación material y directa, por lo que no puede aplicarse a delitos de peligro abstracto como el que nos ocupa, pues ello atenta contra la interpretación restrictiva que establece el numeral 2 del Código Penal. Señala que en el delito de conducción temeraria solo hay peligro potencial, no lesiones ni muerte ni el agente obtuvo ningún provecho patrimonial con su acción, por lo que el comiso resulta ser desproporcional pues el conductor es un enfermo alcohólico, a quien le ha podido costar muchos años adquirir ese bien y lo pierde por una mala decisión tomada con conciencia afectada. Finaliza diciendo que "El vehículo si es legal y su comiso en nada va a contribuir con la seguridad vial, pues quien quiere conducir lo hará de cualquier manera y lo que se requiere es un tratamiento para quien es enfermo alcohólico" (folio 160). Solicita se deje sin efecto el comiso y se restablezca a su patrocinado en los derechos sobre su propiedad. El motivo debe acogerse, aunque no necesariamente por todos los planteamientos que hace el impugnante, sino por las razones que se dirán. En el presente caso consta que, efectivamente, el juez de instancia decretó el comiso, en favor del Estado, del vehículo BMW, 1993, blanco, [Placa1] para lo cual indicó: "Usted es propietario de ese BMW y hay una certificación registral que así lo avala. El artículo 110 del Código Penal ordena el comiso en favor del Estado de dichos bienes u objetos utilizados en la comisión del delito y la comisión del delito es conducir bajo los efectos del alcohol y para conducir hay que conducir una bicicleta, una moto, no sé, un cuadraciclo, un vehículo, un bus, un camión y en este caso es un vehículo BMW, blanco, que es de su propiedad, año 1993, [Placa2] por lo tanto, al demostrarse que usted conducía ese vehículo y que lo colisionó frente a la Delegación de Desamparados ese día 12 de octubre del 2009, el tribunal ordena precisamente el comiso de ese vehículo en favor del Estado. Ahora, de los argumentos que dio su defensor, de que era una doble sanción, que la sanción es inconstitucional, en realidad ese es un tema que ya fue superado por la Sala Constitucional. La Sala lo que dijo al ser consultada, tanto por los señores diputados como por el señor coordinador de este tribunal [Nombre1] , esa reforma a la Ley de Tránsito, la Sala, en ninguno de los casos, encontró vicio alguno de inconstitucionalidad y por lo tanto es de aplicación la norma, no sólo porque así lo ordena el CED1 repito, sino porque ya la misma Sala dijo que no había ningún inconveniente para que se aplicara esa sanción y, repito, usted al conducir en estado de ebriedad ese vehículo comete ese hecho y en consecuencia el instrumento utilizado en ese hecho, se ordena su comiso y repito el vehículo pasará a manos del Estado. Usted o su esposa en aquel momento lo tienen en depósito provisional y una vez firme este fallo deben devolverlo al tribunal para ponerlo en comiso del Estado." (DVD, cámara tercera, 11:38:22 a 11:41:07; énfasis agregado). Para abordar adecuadamente los temas planteados en la impugnación de cara a lo resuelto, se hace necesario analizar sus diversas vertientes.

III.- Evidentemente, lo primero que este Tribunal debe plantearse es si, como el juez de instancia refirió en la decisión impugnada, existen pronunciamientos de la Sala Constitucional que agoten la discusión pues, en tal caso, bastaría aplicarlos, dado su carácter vinculante (artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Para verificar eso, debe tenerse en cuenta que la conducción bajo los efectos del licor se introdujo en Costa Rica, como delito, mediante una reforma al Código Penal operada a través de la ley número 8626 que, a su vez, reformó la Ley de Tránsito y fue publicada el 24 de diciembre de 2008, fecha a partir de la cual entró en vigencia el delito en comentario. Entonces, es desde esa data que se inicia la discusión sobre este tópico. A) Aunque antes de la vigencia, es posible que la normativa fuera consultada por el Parlamento, a diferencia de lo que afirma el juez de instancia, el Centro de Información de la Sala Constitucional no reporta que los legisladores, en el trámite de aprobación de esa ley, efectuaran alguna consulta, sino que la única referida a esa temática alude al proyecto de reforma actualmente en trámite (expediente constitucional 10-005162-0007-CO, resuelto mediante voto Nº 2010-09059), que no alude al comiso, pues se refiere a una normativa apenas en discusión y, por si fuera poco, el comiso de vehículos no surge propiamente de la Ley de Tránsito ni de la norma delictual especial por ella introducida sino de la aplicación de una norma general del Código Penal a éste ilícito. B) Por esta misma razón, tampoco resulta exacto afirmar que la Sala Constitucional no encontrara ningún vicio de constitucionalidad a partir de las consultas efectuadas por el Tribunal Penal de Flagrancias. Los votos emitidos al respecto por la Sala Constitucional, números 7603-09, 10368-09 y 10363-09 no abordaron esos temas sino que el primero declaró inevacuable la consulta sin hacer, en la parte considerativa, ninguna referencia a este tópico y, en los dos últimos, el pronunciamiento se circunscribió a lo siguiente: "Se evacua la consulta formulada en el sentido de que los artículos 254 bis, último párrafo del Código Penal y el artículo 199 (200) de la Ley de Tránsito no son contrarios a los principios de legalidad, tipicidad, seguridad jurídica, defensa e inocencia. En cuanto al artículo 254 bis, párrafos primero y segundo, se declara inevacuable la consulta planteada." C) De la misma manera, otras acciones de inconstitucionalidad planteadas contra la Ley de Tránsito no tienen relación con el comiso de vehículos conducidos bajo los efectos del licor, pues se refieren a sanciones por pérdidas de puntos en la licencia de conducir (expediente constitucional 10-11628-007-CO en estudio de admisibilidad), a la responsabilidad solidaria del dueño registral de un vehículo si se trata de una empresa de renta (expediente constitucional 10-11503-007-CO, a la espera de nombrar suplente), a la razonabilidad de las multas del artículo 133 h de la Ley de Tránsito (expediente constitucional 10-8059-007-CO, turnado en estudio), a la multa por el no uso del cinturón de seguridad (expediente 10-5132-007-CO, turnado en estudio), a vicios en la formación de la ley y la desproporcionalidad en la pena de cárcel y multas (expediente constitucional 10-3555-007-CO rechazado de plano mediante voto 5888-10 y 10-3226-007-CO rechazado de plano mediante voto número 4803-10), al polarizado de vehículos (expediente 10-3225-007-CO rechazada de plano mediante voto número 4798-10), a las especificaciones en la revisión técnica (expediente 10-3227-007-CO rechazado de plano mediante voto número 4801-10), a la restricción vehicular (expediente 09-15355-007-CO rechazada por el fondo mediante voto número 19135-09), a permisos para transportes especiales (expediente constitucional 09-13854-007-CO rechazada de plano por voto número 16293-10), a la restricción horaria para vehículos pesados (expediente constitucional 09-12261-007-CO rechazada de plano por voto número 15662-09), a la competencia penal en asuntos de tránsito (expediente constitucional 09-10751-007-CO denegado el trámite por voto número 13083-09), a la prueba de aliento y el procedimiento para detectar alcohol en sangre (expediente constitucional 09-4848-007-CO rechazado de plano por voto número 7379-09 y expediente constitucional 09-13854-007-CO rechazada de plano por voto número 6293-10), a la duplicidad de sanciones prácticas que implica la conducción bajo los efectos del licor al existir sanción administrativa, inhabilitación y cárcel (expediente constitucional 09-1944-007-CO rechazada por el fondo por voto número 3641-09), a la duplicidad de sanciones por ingerir licor por suspendérsele la licencia, imponérsele una multa y comisarse el vehículo (expediente constitucional 09-94-007-CO rechazada de plano por voto número 600-09) y a la inexistencia de bienes jurídicos concretos en el delito de conducción temeraria, concebido como delito de peligro abstracto (expediente constitucional 09-96-007-CO rechazada por el fondo por voto número 204-09). D) El único caso en que, expresamente, el gestionante reprochó el comiso en casos de conducción temeraria, fue en el expediente 10-2225-007-CO, pero la Sala Constitucional denegó el trámite sin dar argumentos de fondo sobre el tema (voto número 4492-10). En otras oportunidades, al plantearse acciones contra una pluralidad de normas de la Ley de Tránsito, se abordó tangencialmente la cuestión, pero se estimó que el tema del comiso no estaba contemplado en la normativa de tránsito, por lo que escapaba al objeto de pronunciamiento: "V.- Inexistencia de violación a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Argumenta el accionante que en virtud de las reformas a la Ley de Tránsito, se transgreden los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad porque se producen las sanciones de: multa económica, pérdida o decomiso de la licencia, inhabilitación para conducir por un plazo determinado, decomiso de las [Placa3], decomiso del vehículo, pago de gastos de transporte, grúas, depósito del vehículo, imposición de medidas cautelares y eventualmente, cárcel. Además, estima que se vulnera el principio de non bis in idem. En cuanto a la multa económica afirma que la misma es confiscatoria porque no se valora la posibilidad económica de cada administrado. Agrega que la desproporcionalidad se constata al observar que se impone una pena mayor por tener una luz quemada que por no contar con la revisión técnica al día. Al respecto, debe señalarse que la única sanción prevista en la norma impugnada es la de uno a tres años de prisión, la cual puede ser sustituida por una medida alternativa de prestación de servicio de utilidad pública que podrá ser de doscientas hasta novecientas cincuenta horas de servicio. Las sanciones de multa e inhabilitación no están previstas en la norma impugnada. Los demás aspectos señalados por el accionante son consecuencias derivadas del delito, pero no constituyen en sí mismos una pena y, en todo caso, no están previstos en la norma impugnada. VI.- Sobre la violación al derecho de propiedad privada. Afirma el accionante que el comiso del vehículo que se conduce en estado de ebriedad es inconstitucional, pues al no existir delito, por el criterio de no lesividad y no existencia de bien jurídico tutelado, no hay justificación por parte del Estado. Se expone al administrado a que su propiedad sufra un deterioro y daños que menoscaban su patrimonio. De una lectura de la norma impugnada se constata que la misma no hace ninguna referencia al comiso del vehículo, pues en realidad esta es una consecuencia del delito que está contenida en otras normas, tales como el artículo 110 del Código Penal y 465 del Código Procesal Penal." (Sala Constitucional, voto Nº [Telf1] de las 14:42 hrs. del 24 de marzo de 2009, expediente 09-000788-0007-CO, el destacado es suplido). De modo que a partir de una búsqueda exhaustiva de los temas que se han discutido en la Sala Constitucional relativos a esta materia, auxiliados por el Centro de Información de ese órgano jurisdiccional (ver folios 175 a 180), se percata este Tribunal que no ha existido pronunciamiento de la Sala Constitucional sobre el aspecto que interesa, lo que convierte en infundamentada aquella afirmación del juzgador de instancia, quien se limitó a expresarla sin dar ningún sustento concreto para ella. Por eso mismo, el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva o derecho a la acción obliga a que sea esta Cámara quien conozca del alegato. D) Esta Cámara discrepa del argumento emitido por otros tribunales de casación en el sentido de que la norma debe ser aplicada en forma imperativa y que solo la Sala Constitucional podría considerarla desproporcional (ver, por ejemplo, el voto del Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón, Sección Segunda, número 2010-302), pues el juez ordinario tiene la obligación de aplicar directamente el Derecho de la Constitución. La misma Sala Constitucional, en otras oportunidades, ha considerado que el tema de la proporcionalidad del comiso o la forma de interpretar las normas que lo regulan es un aspecto que atañe a los jueces ordinarios y que es ajeno a sus funciones. Así, ante una consulta judicial formulada por ese mismo despacho, el órgano constitucional refirió: "...lo que se somete a conocimiento de esta Sala es si, en determinados supuestos, la aplicación irrestricta de los artículos 83 y 87 de la Ley Sobre Estupefacientes Sustancias Sicotrópicas Drogas de Uso no Autorizado y Actividades Conexas, que no hacen distinción alguna en cuanto al comiso de los bienes provenientes o utilizados en la actividad del narcotráfico, podría implicar una desproporcional pena de confiscación, violando las garantías previstas en los artículos 40 de la Constitución Política y 21 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos. Los consultantes aducen que ello podría suceder cuando se presenten al mismo tiempo las siguientes circunstancias: que el sujeto directamente afectado por el comiso lo sea una persona de escasos recursos económicos; que el objeto del comiso lo sea una casa de habitación de interés social; que dicho inmueble constituya el único bien inmueble inscrito a nombre de dicha persona. La Sala observa que (...) las dudas de los Jueces no están relacionadas con la constitucionalidad de las normas en sí mismas, sino con su interpretación y aplicación en determinados casos, lo cual, excede el objeto de una consulta de constitucionalidad. La interpretación y aplicación de las normas en el caso concreto es una tarea que claramente corresponde a la Jurisdicción Ordinaria en el marco de su competencia, lo que ha sido reiterado por esta Sala, por ejemplo en la sentencia N.2004-5008 de las 14:46 horas del 12 de mayo del 2004. Por lo anterior, la consulta resulta inadmisible, en razón del objeto" (voto número [Telf2], el destacado es suplido). E) Por último, el representante del Ministerio Público ha solicitado que, dado que el Tribunal de Casación Penal de Santa Cruz, formuló una consulta similar a la Sala Constitucional, mediante voto número 2010-149 de las 11:28 hrs. del 23 de junio de 2010 (expediente constitucional 10-9043-007-CO en trámite), este Tribunal espere la decisión de dicho órgano, lo que no es posible pues, como se indicó, no sólo existen precedentes de la misma Sala Constitucional que tratan de la aplicación de las reglas del comiso como ajenas a su órbita competencial sino que, además, la consulta judicial de constitucional sólo tiene efectos en el expediente en que se plantea, sin que incida en otros procesos. De allí que esperar a dicha resolución podría afectar negativamente este caso, desde que la suspensión del trámite sería de hecho, sin respaldo jurídico, y podría generar la prescripción de la acción penal o, en última instancia, el retardo en la justicia (artículos 41 de la Constitución Política y 102 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Por todo lo expuesto procede, entonces, abocarse a la determinación de, si como lo propone el impugnante en un segundo argumento, el comiso resulta, en estos casos, desmedido.

IV.- Sobre la constitucionalidad del comiso como instituto general. A) Aunque, conforme lo establecen los artículos 10 de la Carta Magna y 2 inciso b) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el órgano que tiene el control concentrado de constitucionalidad en nuestro país es la Sala Constitucional y, por eso, sólo a ella compete efectuar declaratorias de inconstitucionalidad con efectos generales o erga omnes, es lo cierto que el numeral 8.1 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial le ordena al juez ordinario que no aplique las leyes o actos contrarios al Derecho de la Constitución. Este control, indirecto si se quiere, de constitucionalidad del juez ordinario, ha sido entendido por la misma Sala Constitucional, en el sentido de que "...los jueces del orden común, en el sistema de justicia constitucional costarricense actual, no pueden desaplicar para el caso concreto ningún acto o norma que estimen inconstitucional, pues si al momento de decidir, y por tanto de aplicar una norma cualquiera, llegaren a cuestionarse su constitucionalidad, deberán formular la consulta motivada ante la Sala Constitucional. Excepto, como se dijo, que existan precedentes o jurisprudencia que enmarquen el caso bajo examen en los términos, supuestos y criterios con que actuó la Sala Constitucional en áquellos, pues entonces allí encuentra el juez del orden común un margen de decisión vinculante" (Sala Constitucional, voto número 1185-95, vinculante erga omnes al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Entonces, a partir de esas premisas, dado que uno de los temas que expresamente establece el impugnante es la posible inconstitucionalidad de la figura general del comiso establecida en el artículo 110 del Código Penal, este Tribunal tendría, si compartiera su tesis, que efectuar la referida consulta. No obstante, sin perjuicio de las potestades que el Ordenamiento Jurídico le confiere a los habitantes para que acudan, de modo directo, ante el órgano constitucional (numerales 75 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) y, en tal caso, sin perjuicio de lo que el Tribunal Constitucional considerara, esta Cámara no alberga ninguna duda de constitucionalidad en relación con el artículo 110 del Código Penal, en tanto no se comparten las apreciaciones efectuadas por el impugnante, según las cuales el comiso es una forma de confiscación, prohibida por el artículo 40 constitucional. B) El comiso es una institución regulada en el artículo 110 del Código Penal que, inserta en el Libro Primero (disposiciones Generales), Título VII (Consecuencias civiles del hecho punible), sección única, refiere: "El delito produce la pérdida en favor del Estado de los instrumentos con que se cometió y de las cosas o valores provenientes de su realización, o que constituyan para el agente un provecho derivado del mismo delito salvo el derecho que sobre ellos tengan el ofendido o terceros." Por su parte, el artículo 40 de la Carta Magna señala, efectivamente y en lo que interesa, que "Nadie será sometido a (...) la pena de confiscación." Es cierto que si se sigue una definición meramente gramatical, comiso tendría que equipararse a confiscación, pues el Diccionario de la Lengua Española emitido por Real Academia Española, 22ava. edición, le da a esa palabra dicho tratamiento por derivar, ambas, del latín "commissum" que significa, justamente, confiscación (cfr.: http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/). Sin embargo, para aludir al tema de la constitucionalidad general del comiso, no debe perderse de vista la evolución histórica de las figuras, pues la definición literal no resulta adecuada habida cuenta que, inclusive, se equipara, también, al decomiso, con lo que se pierden los linderos que la dogmática procesal, penal y constitucional occidentales ha venido estableciendo para instituciones que, en el derecho actual, resultan completamente diferentes, por tener naturaleza y efectos distintos. De allí que sea necesario desentrañar el sentido histórico de la figura de la confiscación proscrita constitucionalmente. De dicha labor se desprende que el actual artículo 40 constitucional, que fue introducido a la Carta Magna sin mayores discusiones sobre este aspecto (cfr.: actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente números 111, art. 3, tomo II, pág 534; 170, art. 2, tomo III, pág. 501 y 179, art. 4, tomo III, pág. 608 consultadas a partir de las referencias efectuadas por [Nombre2] , ; [Nombre3] , [Nombre4] y [Nombre5] . Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, anotada, concordada y con jurisprudencia constitucional. IJSA, San José, 3ª edición, 2005, pág. 407) es similar al que existía en otras constituciones precedentes nacionales e, incluso, a una regulación constitucional que, infructuosamente, se intentó hacer en vez de la Carta Magna que nos rige. En retrospectiva, entonces, y a partir de la obra editada por [Nombre6] , (Las constituciones de Costa Rica. Editorial U.C.R., San José, Volúmenes I a V, 1ª edición, 2007) se tiene que en ese fallido Proyecto de Constitución, presentado por la Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República, revelador de la voluntad socio-histórica de la época, el artículo 58 disponía "Se prohíbe la confiscación, salvo el comiso que establecen las leyes penales" es decir, se establecía una diferencia entre ambas instituciones, distinción esa que no es casual sino que provenía de otros textos constitucionales, pues la Constitución Política de 1917, en el artículo 24 regulaba el tema indicando: "...Toda pena es personal. No se aplicará tormento, ni penas infamantes, ni confiscación de bienes. Esto último no impedirá el comiso de los instrumentos u objetos del delito." Una fórmula menos explícita contempló la Constitución de 1871, en su artículo 24 que mencionó, simplemente, que "Se prohíbe el uso del tormento y la pena de confiscación" redacción que, a su vez, era muy similar a la contenida en las Constituciones costarricenses de 1869 (artículo 129 "...Se prohíbe el uso de ... la pena de confiscación") y 1859 (artículo 20: "...son prohibidas las penas de confiscación y azotes..."). No obstante, desde esta fecha hacia atrás, los constituyentes nacionales sí se preocuparon por delinear las características básicas de la figura que estaban proscribiendo. Es así como la Constitución reformada de 1848, en su artículo 110, señalaba: "Ningún delito se castigará con pena de confiscación; mas esto no comprende los comisos, ni las multas que la ley impone" en tanto que la Constitución Política de 1847, en su artículo 154 dispuso: "Queda abolida toda confiscación de bienes, y solo podrá tener lugar en el único caso de asegurar los derechos de tercero" y la Constitución Política del Estado de Costa Rica del 09 de abril de 1844, estableció en su artículo 30: "Ningún delito, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza, podrá ser castigado con la pena de confiscación total o parcial de bienes, ni a pretexto de indemnización de gastos y perjuicios, salvo lo derechos de tercero." Mientras tanto, la Ley de Bases y Garantías del 08 de marzo de 1841, en su artículo 2.2.10 señaló: "Todos los costarricenses (...) tienen derecho (...) para que no se les imponga confiscación total de bienes por pena..." y la Ley Fundamental del Estado Libre de Costa Rica, del 21 de enero de 1825, en su artículo 106, se refirió así a la figura: "En ningún caso habrá embargo de bienes, a no ser en aquella parte en que el delito lleve consigo responsabilidad pecuniaria." Por último, tanto en el Primer como en el Segundo Pacto Social Fundamental Interino de la Provincia de Costa Rica de, respectivamente, el 01 de diciembre de 1821 y el 10 de enero de 1822, el tema fue tratado en el artículo 304 de cada uno de los textos fundamentales de la misma forma: "Tampoco se impondrá la pena de confiscación de bienes" y, para concluir este recuento histórico, si se analiza la Constitución Política de la Monarquía Española, también llamada Constitución de Cádiz del 19 de marzo de 1812, que obviamente rigió en el territorio nacional antes del proceso independentista, se comprende la matriz de aquellas referencias, pues el numeral 304 señalaba: "Tampoco se impondrá la pena de confiscación de bienes". Es claro, entonces, que a través de la historia nacional existió una doble preocupación del constituyente: por un lado por mantener la proscripción de la confiscación y, por el otro, por diferenciar la figura de otras, como el comiso, las multas o el embargo llegándose, inclusive, a aludir a confiscación general o parcial que, conforme se dirá, es una distinción impropia, pues genera confusión, que la doctrina hace para establecer los efectos e identificar la figura prohibida de la permitida. A partir de la Constitución de Cádiz, la doctrina, principalmente española, se ha encargado de rastrear el fundamento de la proscripción y sus raíces en el derecho romano-germánico o continental-europeo del que, evidentemente, se nutre toda nuestra legislación, lo que es necesario citar, in extenso, para comprender la realidad actual: "El comiso que se recoge actualmente en el Código Penal ha quedado completamente desvinculado de la antigua pena de la confiscación general de bienes. Esta pena, abolida actualmente de los ordenamientos jurídicos modernos, encuentra su origen en el Derecho romano. La forma más habitual de confiscación de bienes en el Derecho penal romano fue la denominada publicatio bonorum, consistente en la apropiación de todos los bienes pertenecientes a quienes habían sido condenados a la pena capital, la cual comprendía no sólo la pena de muerte, sino también la pena de exilio como sustitutiva de ésta. La publicatio era una consecuencia accesoria o necesaria, no una verdadera pena, de forma que no se hacía preciso dejar constancia de su imposición en la sentencia condenatoria. Posteriormente, y dada la desproporción de esta medida, que lógicamente afectaba asimismo a los herederos del inculpado, se fue limitando, permitiéndose que el condenado y su familia retuviesen una parte del patrimonio, para cubrir su desplazamiento al exilio, en su caso, así como su futura subsistencia. En la Edad Media, la pena de confiscación de bienes no sólo mantuvo el protagonismo que alcanzó durante la época romana, al ser una de las penas que en mayor medida se utilizaron para reprimir los delitos de especial gravedad, sino que, además, se convirtió en un instrumento de extraordinaria importancia puesto al servicio de los monarcas a través del cual pretendían hacer valer su autoridad, proteger el orden que ellos mismos establecían y debilitar a sus adversarios políticos. En el Derecho Penal del Antiguo Régimen, la confiscación fue creciendo en protagonismo al aparecer como uno de los principales medios de financiación de la Monarquía. Su irrogación ya no se limitó a los autores de los más graves delitos como en otras épocas, sino que se impuso incluso para delitos de escasa lesividad social. Ahora bien, con el objeto de sacar el máximo rendimiento del condenado, la confiscación se reservó fundamentalmente para personas de alta capacidad patrimonial, hasta el extremo de que si recaía esta pena sobre un individuo de escasa solvencia económica, era sustituida por una pena corporal o el envío a galeras. Con el advenimiento de la Ilustración se pidió generalizadamente su abolición (...) Fue en 1812, en el proceso constituyente gaditano, donde, pese al freno de las opiniones de los tradicionalistas, la pena de confiscación general de bienes se consiguió desterrar definitivamente de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico (español), aunque en la práctica los jueces la habían dejado de aplicar bastante tiempo antes. Ninguno de los Códigos penales ulteriormente promulgados dan cobijo entre sus preceptos a esta sanción penal" (CEREZO [Nombre7], [Nombre8] . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, págs. 6-8). Nótese cómo, a partir de 1812, se suprime la figura del Ordenamiento Jurídico español y, con ello, de nuestro derecho, al punto de ser recogida la prohibición en la casi totalidad de textos constitucionales que se han sucedido, a la par de la proscripción de malos tratos, azotes, la regulación de la pena de muerte, del extrañamiento y de lo que luego llegó a denominarse la prohibición de la tortura, lo que evidencia la intención de racionalizar el poder sancionador del Estado. C) Ese marco histórico-constitucional nos permite comprender la regulación legal que se ha hecho del comiso en los diferentes códigos represivos que ha tenido el país. Así, en el Código General de Carrillo de 1841, el artículo 883, previsto dentro del tema de la sentencia del proceso criminal, posibilitaba el comiso de las armas, instrumentos o utensilios con los que se cometió el delito y de los efectos derivados de este. Igual posibilidad se mantuvo en el numeral 39 del Código Penal de 1880; en los artículos 80 inciso 3 y 141 del Código Penal de 1918; en los numerales 67 inciso 4 y 70 del Código Penal de 1924 y en el artículo 121 del Código Penal de 1941, aunque estas legislaciones expresamente le dieron el trato de pena accesoria y estipularon que no era extensible a terceros y, salvo que se tratara de objetos en sí mismos ilícitos, sólo se podía decretar mediante sentencia condenatoria (cfr.: [Nombre9] , . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1ª edición, 2006, págs. 36-37 y Código General. República de Costa Rica. Imprenta de Wynkoop, Nueva York, 1858. Parte III, pág. 92; Biblioteca de Derecho vigente de Costa Rica. Código Penal, 1914. Tipografía Lehmann, San José, pág. 19; Código Penal de 1918. Colección de leyes de Costa Rica, II Semestre, 1918, pág. 678; Código Penal de la República de Costa Rica, 1924. Edición ordenada por [Nombre10] . Imprenta [Nombre11] . , San José, pág. 18 y Código Penal y Código de Policía. Imprenta Trejos Hermanos, San José, 1965, págs. 41-42). En síntesis, al margen de que las Constituciones en la que cada uno de esos códigos penales se enmarcan establecieran alguna salvedad para precisar que la confiscación no afectara el comiso en materia penal, el legislador penal siempre mantuvo la regulación de la figura, previéndolo como ajena a la prohibición constitucional, por recaer sobre objetos específicos y delineando algunos de los rasgos con que se aplica en la actualidad en nuestro medio: no puede afectar a tercero a menos que se le haya respetado el debido proceso o se trate de objetos prohibidos y puede decretarse, en muchos casos, aunque no se haya establecido la responsabilidad penal del acusado ni se dicte sentencia condenatoria. D) Es evidente que la figura del comiso, tal y como está regulada en nuestro derecho positivo, si bien guarda algunas relaciones con la figura de la confiscación (el Estado asume la titularidad de bienes de terceros), está muy lejos de mantener el carácter que tuvo dicha sanción, que era una medida general, aplicable a todos los bienes del condenado, en tanto que el comiso procede únicamente sobre aquellos que indica la norma, es decir, sobre los bienes con los que se comete el delito o aquellos otros provenientes o que sean provecho de la comisión del ilícito penal, según la actual fórmula del artículo 110 del Código Penal que, al momento de promulgarse, no tuvo ninguna dificultad interpretativa y no fue especialmente comentada (cfr.: Asamblea Legislativa. Código Penal: adicionado con la exposición de motivos y el dictamen afirmativo. Alcance Nº 120 a La Gaceta Nº 257 de 15 de noviembre de 1970, Imprenta Nacional, pág. 32). E) A partir de estas consideraciones genealógicas, la doctrina ha distinguido diversos tipos de confiscación. La general-total, que es la que procede sobre todos los bienes y que guarda estrecha relación con la figura histórica prohibida por la mayoría de los constituyentes hispanoamericanos; la general-parcial, que afecta a una cuota del patrimonio y la particular, especial o propia, que es solo sobre determinados bienes que pueden ser medios o instrumentos del delito (instrumenta seceleris); objetos del delito (objectum sceleris), efectos del delito (producta sceleris) o ganancias provenientes del delito. Adicional a ello se alude, también, al comiso impropio, de reemplazo o de valor equivalente, según el cual aquellas medidas se sustituyen por el comiso de bienes en los que se transformaron las ganancias, efectos o instrumentos del delito o en otros bienes de valor equivalente a los que, siendo instrumentos, efectos o ganancias del delito, fueron enajenados o gravados por su titular antes de decretarse la medida y el comiso ampliado que recae sobre instrumentos u objetos del delito, sus efectos y ganancias, pero se produce ante la inexistencia de una declaración judicial de responsabilidad penal en contra de persona alguna, ya sea por exención de pena o porque se extinguió la acción penal (sobre el tema cfr.: [Nombre12] , . La regulación del comiso en el Proyecto de modificación del Código Penal. En: Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología, 05-04, 2003; [Nombre13] , . El régimen específico de comiso en materia de tráfico de drogas. En: Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho, Nº 11, 1993, págs. 277-298; [Nombre14] , . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004; [Nombre15] , . El comiso frente al Nuevo Código Penal. En: Derecho Penal y Criminología. Colombia, Nº 15, set-dic. Vol. 4, 1981, págs. 183-192; [Nombre16] , . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, págs. 559-574; [Nombre9] , . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José1ª edición, 2006; [Nombre17] , [Nombre18] . La pena de comiso en el proyecto de Código Penal. En: Anuario de Derecho Penal y Ciencias Penales. España, Fascículos 1-2-3, enero-diciembre, Vol. 34, 1981, págs. 613-652; [Nombre17] , [Nombre19]. Las penas patrimoniales en el Código penal español. Tras la Ley Orgánica 8/1983, editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1983, p. 251; [Nombre20] , . La confiscación. En: Revista jurídica online. Facultad de Jurisprudencia y Ciencias Sociales y Políticas. Universidad de Guayaquil. Versión electrónica en: http://www.revistajuridicaonline.com; [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs. 64-70 y 86-90; [Nombre23], . Las sanciones de confiscación: ¿Un intruso en el Derecho Penal? En: http://www.unifr.ch/ddp1/derechopenal/articulos/a_20080527_39.pdf). F) A partir de esa clasificación, los y las estudiosos de la materia han señalado que la prohibición de confiscación, alude a la general y no a la especial o particular. Así se manifiestan, en su orden, autores españoles, argentinos y colombianos que comentan normas similares a la nuestra:

¬"...determinados autores han querido ver en la figura del comiso un descendiente directo de la arcaica sanción confiscatoria. Sin embargo, a pesar de que en ambos casos se afecta a bienes pertenecientes al patrimonio del inculpado, a diferencia de la pena de confiscación de bienes, el comiso que se contempla actualmente en nuestro Código Penal se limita a hacerse con aquello que se ha obtenido o que se ha utilizado ilícitamente. Por consiguiente, éste implica únicamente la pérdida definitiva de aquellos objetos y ventajas pecuniarias derivadas de la realización de una infracción delictiva, constituyendo en su caso una confiscación de carácter individual o especial" ([Nombre24] , [Nombre8] . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 8).

¬"...dado el carácter pecuniario de esta pena, debe ser cuidadosamente distinguida de la confiscación prohibida constitucionalmente, esencialmente a partir del carácter general de esta última, a diferencia de la especialidad propia del decomiso {denominación que se le da en Argentina al instituto que nos atañe}, que siempre debe recaer sobre cosas en particular. Por supuesto que el decomiso sería inconstitucional si no respetase la regla de humanidad y mínima irracionalidad y, por tanto, en el caso concreto deviniese una pena de confiscación" ([Nombre25] ; [Nombre26] y [Nombre27] . Derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 943).

¬"A pesar de que la raíz etimológica del comiso es el vocablo latino comissumm, que significa confiscación, los ordenamientos constitucionales han proscrito esta forma de punición (...) Conviene recordar que ya en el derecho romano se encontraba prevista la confiscación como privación de todo o parte del patrimonio, tanto por la comunidad como por vía de pena, y en no pocas ocasiones fue empleada con el propósito preferente de conseguir apoderarse de los bienes del penado para enriquecer al estado. Desde su aplicación en el derecho penal la confiscación era una pena accesoria que se imponía junto con las penas principales de perduelión, relegación y venta como esclavo de un individuo que antes fue libre o sentencias de muerte, condena a las minas o entrega a una escuela de gimnasia. [Nombre28] llegó a prohibir la confiscación total en general y la dejó subsistente para los delitos contra el Estado. En las antiguas leyes la confiscación se continuó aplicando siguiendo al derecho romano y se abolió en casi todas las legislaciones a partir del siglo XVIII, con el argumento de considerar que la apropiación oficial del patrimonio de una persona sin causa de procedimiento legal y por la vía de simple aprehensión era una pena injusta, inhumana y aberrante. En tal sentido, y para el caso colombiano (...) durante el régimen colonial rigió el sistema jurídico punitivo español, cuya fuente se sitúa en las Siete Partidas, en las que se consagraban cuatro penas mayores y tres penas menores, siendo una de las primeras el destierro con ocupación de todos los bienes. Con el advenimiento de la independencia, la confiscación -entendida como la privación de todos los bienes que conforman el patrimonio de una persona- fue prohibida como una manera de proteger la propiedad privada de la arbitrariedad del poder estatal, pero dejando a salvo la posibilidad de establecer otro tipo de medidas o sanciones de contenido patrimonial (...) la pobreza del lenguaje jurídico fue la que llevó a que en las primeras codificaciones se denominara confiscación a cualquier sanción del delito que significara un traslado de bienes particulares al estado, como la multa o el comiso, recibiendo todas ellas el nombre impropio de confiscaciones especiales. No obstante (...) lo que fue proscrito por considerarse un ejercicio abusivo de la potestad punitiva del estado fue la denominada confiscación general o a título universal, en cuya virtud se privaba al delincuente de la totalidad o de una cuota parte de su patrimonio económico, pero que nunca han sido prohibidas esas llamadas confiscaciones especiales, en atención a que el reconocimiento de la propiedad privada en las democracias liberales no ha conducido al exceso de afirmar que la pena no pueda, en ningún caso, restringir derechos de contenido patrimonial" [Nombre29] , . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs 30-32.

En Costa Rica, se ha seguido una posición similar:

¬"La idea de universalidad que caracteriza a la confiscación general, no se encuentra jamás en la especial, y si bien en ambos casos se opera una verdadera transferencia de propiedad en beneficio del Estado, no deben confundirse. El comiso es también confiscación, pero especial, de naturaleza y efectos diversos a los de la confiscación general. Recae sobre determinados bienes (...) Respeta los derechos que sobre tales bienes tengan el ofendido o terceros. No alcanza el patrimonio de la familia del responsable (...) Conciliando el artículo 40 de la Constitución Política con el numeral 110 del Código Penal, podemos decir que la pena de confiscación que prohíbe el primero, es aquella general (...) Por lo tanto, no alcanza al comiso como especie de confiscación y el artículo 110 del Código Penal, no puede argüirse de inconstitucional" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro. San José, 1984, págs. 363-364. En los mismos términos: [Nombre9] , . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José1ª edición, 2006, págs. 20-21).

A lo anterior podría contra-argumentarse indicando que la Constitución prohíbe la confiscación, sin hacer distinción entre la general o la especial, por lo que incluye ambas y que al ser el comiso una confiscación particular, está comprendida dentro de la prohibición constituyente. No obstante, ello desconocería la evolución histórica de las instituciones, pues al momento en que el constituyente estableció la norma de comentario (y que luego pasó sucesivamente a otras Cartas Magnas hasta llegar a la actual) la confiscación siempre tuvo un carácter general siendo luego de ello que se generan especificaciones, ya sea como medida preventiva (decomiso) o como medida especial (comiso). Ese sentido histórico se exige en la interpretación de cualquier disposición normativa: "Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas" (artículo 10 en relación con el 14 ambos del Código Civil), por supuesto con las limitaciones que, adicionalmente, imponen los principios pro libertatis y de legalidad que surgen en materia penal y procesal penal (artículos 1 y 2 del Código Penal y 1 y 2 del Código Procesal Penal). Dado que de la evolución histórica se desprende que cuando el constituyente prohibió la "confiscación" siempre tuvo en mente aludir a la desposesión generalizada de bienes, presentes y futuros, del condenado o su familia a cargo del Estado, característica que no tiene el comiso previsto en la normativa penal costarricense, pues el artículo 110 del Código Penal y otros establecidos en normas especiales (cfr.: Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento del terrorismo: artículos 87 a 92; Ley de armas y explosivos: artículos 83 y 84; Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre: artículos 90 a 100; Ley forestal: artículo 65; Ley contra la delincuencia organizada: artículo 34, 49 y 54; Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura: artículo 134; Ley de Juegos: artículo 7; Ley de Rifas y Loterías: artículo 8; Ley de procedimientos de observancia de los derechos de propiedad intelectual: artículos 17 y 41 y Ley General de Salud: artículos 359 a 361) solo regulan la confiscación especial propia (o comiso), sin que se prevea nada respecto del comiso impropio, de reemplazo o de valor equivalente, estima este Tribunal que no hay razón alguna ni para formular consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, desde que la comprensión evolutiva de las instituciones enerva cualquier duda que pudiera surgir sobre el acople de la norma general autorizante del comiso (artículo 110 del Código Penal) con el numeral 40 constitucional.

V.- Sobre los requisitos de procedencia y la naturaleza jurídica del comiso. Ahora bien, establecida para los aquí firmantes, la constitucionalidad general del comiso y, por ello, la innecesariedad de hacer consulta alguna sobre este extremo (se insiste: sin perjuicio de las potestades de la Sala Constitucional para pronunciamientos con carácter general a los que el impugnante puede acudir), es preciso hacer una serie de ponderaciones adicionales a fin de responder a otros planteamientos que se hacen en la impugnación. Una de esas valoraciones esenciales alude a la naturaleza jurídica de la figura del comiso, pues de ella pueden derivarse una serie de consecuencias, a veces contrapuestas entre sí, que permitirán responder a este reclamo. A) Al respecto, lo primero que debe decirse es, si se quiere, una verdad de Perogrullo, a saber que la naturaleza jurídica de un instituto no depende de la ubicación que este tenga en una normativa particular, sino de la esfera jurídica en la que se producen sus efectos (en igual sentido véase [Nombre30] , . Curso de derecho penal español. Parte general, tomo I, Editorial Tecnos, 5ª edición, Madrid, 1996, pág. 183; [Nombre14] , . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 32). Si bastara lo primero, la operación sería simplemente verificatoria y llevaría a concluir que el comiso es una consecuencia civil del delito porque, en Costa Rica, se ubica en una sección del Código Penal así titulada. Pero el tema no es tan sencillo porque, de aceptarse esa premisa falsa, ello implicaría concluir, por ejemplo, que como la reparación civil en el proceso penal se rige por el principio dispositivo, no podría ordenarse el comiso de oficio sino que se requeriría demanda previa de quien resulte titular de la acción civil en representación del Estado (que sería la Procuraduría General de la República o el Ministerio Público si le es delegada), nada de lo cual se aviene con, inclusive, el carácter imperativo de las normas legales que regulan el tema (ver los artículos 102 inciso 3 y 110 del Código Penal y 367 y 480 del Código Procesal Penal, entre otros). Así las cosas, el abordaje simplista no satisface. B) La naturaleza jurídica del comiso ha sido uno de los temas de mayor discusión dogmática. Las respuestas que se han intentado dar en derecho comparado, si bien pueden constituir un indicador importante para dilucidar la interrogante en Costa Rica, no son incontrovertibles para nuestro sistema, pues es conveniente recordar que la naturaleza jurídica tampoco se puede forzar o "transplantar" de un ordenamiento jurídico a otro, sino que depende de la regulación actual de los efectos que se le atribuyen en nuestro ordenamiento actual que, si bien pueden coincidir con los que operen en derecho comparado, pueden tener características específicas, todo lo cual debe valorarse antes de adoptar una posición. C) Así las cosas, lo primero que debe hacerse para determinar la naturaleza jurídica del comiso es establecer las características, efectos y supuestos en los que procede. Conforme al artículo 110 citado, el comiso requiere, para su procedencia: C.1) que se esté investigando un delito, no una falta o contravención, esto así porque el numeral inicia indicando "Todo delito" y esa expresión, en sentido restrictivo (artículo 2 del Código Procesal Penal) sólo puede entenderse como referido a los hechos calificados como tales por el legislador (Libro II del Código Penal o leyes especiales) quien hizo la distinción con las faltas que tienen una ubicación diversa en el cuerpo normativo (Libro III); C.2) que ese delito sea doloso. Esto no lo indica expresamente la norma, pero señala que lo que se pierde son los instrumentos con los que se cometió el ilícito y las cosas provenientes de su realización. Los autores de la materia, han referido, a nuestro modo de ver conforme a una interpretación restrictiva acorde con el principio de legalidad, que el carácter doloso de la medida se extrae de la previsión de "instrumentos" que contempla la ley, pues éstos: "...para la generalidad de la doctrina son los que se han empleado 'intencionalmente' para cometer el delito (...) con lo cual quedan excluidos, por supuesto, los (...) de un delito culposo" ([Nombre31] . Derecho penal. Parte general. Editorial Astrea, 3ª edición, Buenos Aires, pág. 519. En igual sentido: [Nombre32], [Nombre33] ; [Nombre34], [Nombre35] y [Nombre27] . Manual de derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 1ª edición, 2005, pág. 734; [Nombre29] , . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, pág. 59 y 64 y otros citados en [Nombre9] , . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José,1ª edición, 2006, págs. 70-73); C.3) resultaría aplicable, en principio, a cualquier delito doloso, por tratarse de un instituto regulado en la parte general del Código Penal, la cual se caracteriza, precisamente, por incidir en los tipos penales codificados o de leyes especiales; C.4) puede afectar a terceros siempre que se les dé parte en el proceso. Esto no lo establece la norma que, de interpretarse aisladamente, conduciría a que se obviara este requisito que dimana de una interpretación sistemática del ordenamiento jurídico y que coloca al Derecho de la Constitución como lo que es, sustento del resto de la jerarquía normativa (ver, al respecto, los votos número 712-2006 de la Sala Tercera y 637-2010 del Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José); C.5) el comiso no afecta los derechos del ofendido o de terceros de buena fe, sino que éstos predominan por sobre el interés estatal (en tal sentido, los votos del Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José, números 2000-76, 2000-323, 2003-383 y 2004-101 y los de la Sala Tercera, números 512-2001 y 1273-2005, entre otros); C.6) los efectos surgen del delito, por lo que normativamente se prevé que se dicte el comiso ante sentencia condenatoria (artículo 367 del Código Procesal Penal). ¿'Delito' ha de entenderse como hecho típico, antijurídico y culpable o como la estipulación abstracta de ilicitud referida por el legislador? La jurisprudencia nacional, en términos generales, lo ha entendido como previsión legislativa, sin declaración concreta de responsabilidad, al punto que ha previsto la posibilidad del comiso con desestimaciones, archivos fiscales, sentencias de sobreseimiento definitivo, aún por prescripción de la acción penal, absolutorias, con medidas alternas como conciliaciones, suspensiones del proceso a prueba, reparación integral del daño y pago de multa, entre otros (ver el recuento de votos que hace [Nombre9] , . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1° edición, 2006, págs. 230-263); C.7) carece de indemnización, pues surge ante una ilicitud previa, de modo que es una excepción a la imposibilidad estatal de asumir el dominio de la propiedad sin pagar el valor del bien (artículo 45 de la Constitución Política); C.8) es una medida de orden público, por lo que no se requiere instancia de parte sino que puede dictarse oficiosamente; C.9) como medida surgida del poder de imperio del Estado, requiere estar prevista en la ley (Sala Tercera, voto número 1217-1999), emitirse en forma motivada o fundamentada y habiendo existido demostración previa del vínculo o nexo entre el objeto y el hecho delictivo, por lo que no se trata de una responsabilidad objetiva (Sala Tercera, voto número 505-99); C.10) rigen principios como la presunción de inocencia, el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, por lo que la carga probatoria le incumbe al Estado; C.11) en Costa Rica no se regula normativamente el comiso de los bienes usados en la fase preparatoria que no llega a ser ejecutiva; C.12) el destino de los bienes, una vez obtenido su dominio por el Estado, está expresamente fijado por ley (cfr.: Ley de distribución de bienes confiscados o caídos en comiso, su reglamento y manual). D) A partir de similares consideraciones en el derecho comparado se ha tratado de explicar la figura en comentario indicando que se trata de una pena accesoria, una medida de seguridad, una consecuencia civil del delito o bien una consecuencia jurídica sui géneris del delito (aquí se incluye a quienes la estiman tercera clase de sanción en el derecho penal junto con las penas y las medidas de seguridad pero, en realidad, sería una cuarta vía, pues ya la reparación se ha aceptado como la tercera). Analizaremos cada una de esas opciones: D.1) Comiso como pena accesoria: Se ha dicho que el comiso es una pena accesoria (en tal sentido los votos del Tribunal de Casación Penal de Cartago, números 2010-236 y 2010-265). No obstante, la principal critica que se ha efectuado al otorgamiento de esta naturaleza jurídica es que el comiso no responde al fin esencial de la sanción aceptado por nuestro constituyente y legislador que es la prevención especial positiva o resocialización (artículos 51 del Código Penal y 5.6 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos) en tanto se aviene más con funciones retributivas o de prevención general negativa (así lo acepta, incluso, el Tribunal de Casación Penal de Cartago en los votos números 2010-236 y 2010-265 al definirlo como una sanción penal accesoria con una finalidad de prevención general). El comiso tampoco respondería, desde esta perspectiva, al principio de culpabilidad que requiere no solo la culpabilidad para imponerse (es decir, no cabría imponer una sanción sin culpabilidad, por lo que no podría imponerse ante la inexistencia de pena principal ni ante supuestos en que el autor no es sancionado, aunque hubiese un injusto penal) sino que considera que esta es graduable, lo que choca con el carácter rígido de la figura. Asimismo, de ser pena, violentaría el principio referente a su carácter personalísimo ya que el comiso cabe aún contra terceros, siempre y cuando se les dé audiencia en el proceso respectivo y los bienes, con su consentimiento, hayan sido usados en la comisión de delitos:

¬"Los problemas que planteaba esta regulación del comiso se derivaban precisamente de su configuración formal como una auténtica pena. La pena tiene su fundamento en la culpabilidad, de modo que no puede imponerse pena sin culpabilidad. De ahí se derivan las siguientes consecuencias en relación con la aplicación del comiso. Por una parte sólo podría ser aplicado al sujeto que hubiera obrado culpablemente, pero no a quien, habiendo realizado una acción típica y antijurídica, fuera no obstante declarado exento de responsabilidad criminal por ausencia de culpabilidad, por ejemplo por tratarse de un inimputable. Pero, por otro lado y además, como del principio de culpabilidad se deriva necesariamente el carácter personalísimo de la pena, únicamente cabría aplicar la pena de comiso al sujeto responsable de la infracción penal y, por tanto, sólo con respecto a instrumentos y efectos del delito pertenecientes a él, pero no respecto a los instrumentos que, habiendo sido utilizados por el culpable para la comisión del delito, fueran sin embargo propiedad de un tercero no responsable del delito (...) El fundamento y finalidad del comiso (...) pueden ser (...) independientes de la cuestión de la titularidad de los objetos decomisables" (cfr: [Nombre16] , . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, págs. 559-560).

¬"...el comiso no responde a ninguno de lo fines de la pena, pues no se prevé ni como amenaza destinada a disuadir de la comisión de delitos ni tampoco como castigo merecido por el delito" [Nombre36] , . Derecho penal, parte general, 6ª edición, Reppertor, Barcelona, 2002, pág 748.

El comiso tampoco está previsto, como pena accesoria, en el artículo 50.2 del Código Penal, que regula como tales solo la inhabilitación especial definida en el numeral 58 ibídem como la privación o restricción de uno o más derechos. Esta objeción es tanto sistemática (en cuanto a la ubicación de la figura), como de cara a principios constitucionales, pues chocaría con el principio de legalidad al extralimitarse el catálogo de penas accesorias que expresamente contempla el Código Penal y las regulaciones que a ellas le son propias. Podría superarse la dificultad refiriendo que hay una ley previa que lo dispone para todos los delitos (artículo 110 del Código Penal); que hay otras normas especiales que lo señalan como penas (por ejemplo la Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre) y que la figura contempla la privación de un derecho: la propiedad. No obstante, el mismo numeral 58 del Código Penal refiere que las penas accesorias previstas como tales por el legislador tienen un plazo, que es el mismo de la inhabilitación absoluta y que va de 6 meses a 12 años (artículo 57), lo cual es incompatible con la pérdida de la titularidad del bien, que es definitiva. Asimismo, contra toda pena, principal o accesoria, cabe la posibilidad de plantear revisión, lo que la Sala Constitucional ha señalado como incompatible con la cosa juzgada que deriva del comiso (ver voto número [Telf3]). Por último, no debe olvidarse que conforme al artículo 110 del Código Penal: "...la ponderación del comiso se hará a partir de que estén satisfechas las responsabilidades civiles dimanantes del delito (...) indudablemente si el comiso mantuviera el carácter de pena no sería admisible que la imposición de la pena pendiera de la satisfacción de la responsabilidad civil." [Nombre37] , ; [Nombre38] , y [Nombre39] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delicto. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, págs. 45, 47. Entonces, o el comiso no es una pena accesoria o, si lo fuera, sería inconstitucional por violar los citados preceptos, por lo que se hace necesario evaluar otras posibilidades. D.2) El comiso como medida de seguridad: A partir de esos cuestionamientos, la doctrina señaló que, en realidad, no se trataba de que la medida fuera inconstitucional sino que no debía verse como una pena y, al intentar darle una explicación, se pensó que su naturaleza era la de ser una medida de seguridad, con lo que se superaba la objeción de que respondiera a un principio de culpabilidad pues este escapa a las medidas de seguridad cuyo fundamento es, más bien, la peligrosidad del sujeto activo. Comiso y medidas de seguridad tenían en común, además, el responder más a criterios de prevención especial asumidos en instrumentos internacionales que a los de prevención general. Pero nuevamente arreciaron las críticas. Primero, porque la peligrosidad en las medidas de seguridad surge ante la existencia de un injusto que puede no estar presente en el comiso, que se basa en una presunta peligrosidad objetiva de la cosa per se (en el caso de instrumentos usados para la comisión del delito y en particular de algunos tipos de ellos, como las armas). Además, porque esta explicación no sorteó el carácter personalísimo que también tienen las medidas de seguridad y que escapa a la figura del comiso:

¬"Lo primero que debe advertirse es que el comiso (...) no tiene tampoco la naturaleza de una medida de seguridad (...) Las medidas de seguridad se fundamentan en la peligrosidad criminal del sujeto, puesta de manifiesto por la previa comisión de uno o varios hechos típicos y antijurídicos (...) También las medidas de seguridad tienen un carácter personalísimo, en el sentido de que sólo pueden ser aplicadas al sujeto en que se haya apreciado la peligrosidad criminal. Las medidas de seguridad se orientan exclusivamente en la prevención especial, es decir, a la producción de determinados efectos resocializadores o inoculizadores en el autor peligroso para evitar que cometa delitos en el futuro. El comiso, en cambio, se fundamenta en la peligrosidad objetiva de la cosa y se orienta (...) a impedir que aquella sea utilizada en el futuro para la comisión de nuevos delitos, y no sólo por el autor sino también por otros sujetos. Ahora bien, la peligrosidad objetiva de la cosa y la probabilidad de su utilización en el futuro para la comisión de nuevos delitos, no lleva aparejada necesariamente la peligrosidad criminal del autor que la utilizó para cometer el delito, en cuyo caso no podría ser decomisada si se atribuyera al comiso la naturaleza de una medida de seguridad. Pero es que aun cuando el sujeto fuera peligroso, el comiso de unos objetos difícilmente podría ser una medida adecuada para eliminar la peligrosidad, dado que no siempre será apta para cumplir los fines de reeducación, de curación o de inoculización propios de las medidas de seguridad. Finalmente, si el comiso tuviera la naturaleza de una medida de seguridad, entonces no cabría tampoco aplicarlo con respecto a objetos pertenecientes a un tercero que, por no haber realizado ningún hecho típico y antijurídico, no pudiera ser declarado criminalmente peligroso..." ([Nombre16] , . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, pág. 561).

Además, en el derecho penal costarricense, la Sala Constitucional declaró inconstitucionales las medidas de seguridad para imputables, dejando solo las medidas de seguridad curativas (ver artículo 98 incisos 3,4 y 5 y votos números 88-92 y 1588-98 de la Sala Constitucional) y el comiso, la mayor parte de las veces, va anexo a una declaratoria de sanción de imputables y no es mencionado como medida de seguridad (artículos 101 y 102 del Código Penal) que también se rigen por el principio de tipicidad y la prohibición de creación por analogía (artículos 97 y 2 del Código Penal), a más de que tienen, también, la posibilidad de cese (artículos 100 del Código Penal y 478 del Código Procesal Penal) incompatible con el comiso. Ante ello, se planteó otra opción.

D.3) El comiso como consecuencia civil o medida reparadora derivada del delito: aunque la Sala Constitucional se ha referido a la figura desde esta perspectiva (así en el voto número [Telf3]: "el comiso es una de las consecuencias civiles del hecho punible, junto con la restitución y la reparación e indemnización de daños y perjuicios"), lo que también ha aceptado alguna jurisprudencia de casación (ver, por ejemplo y entre otros, el voto número 787-2006 de la Sala Tercera), es lo cierto que, en forma técnica, el comiso no puede considerarse que sea una consecuencia civil. Primero porque, como se dijo, en Costa Rica se puede decretar oficiosamente, lo que es ajeno al principio dispositivo y de congruencia de lo civil. Segundo, porque no tiene carácter reparador, restitutivo o indemnizatorio, al punto que el artículo 103 del Código Penal lo enumera ajeno a esos fines, que son propios de las consecuencias derivadas de delito. Tercero porque "La responsabilidad civil ex delicto constituye una cuestión de naturaleza esencialmente civil, con independencia de que sea examinada en el proceso penal, lo que explica que no haya obstáculo a que su conocimiento sea diferido, en su caso, a la jurisdicción civil. Y si bien el delito, respecto del nacimiento de esta responsabilidad, es un presupuesto necesario, no lo es suficiente, pues se requiere además la producción de un daño, elemento imprescindible para el nacimiento de toda responsabilidad civil, se encuentre o no tipificado en el Código penal el hecho que lo ocasionó" (CEREZO [Nombre40] , . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 29), sin que sea posible plantear, en la vía civil, un reclamo aislado por comiso. Además, porque "La responsabilidad civil se trasmite a los herederos (...) pero eso no puede sostenerse igualmente respecto de los herederos del responsable del hecho. En los casos del fallecimiento del acusado o procesado sin que se haya llegado a acordar el comiso no es posible aplicar..." (QUINTERO [Nombre41] , ; [Nombre38] , y [Nombre39] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delictio. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pág. 46). A ello agrega la doctrina nacional que sus efectos no son de derecho privado sino a favor del Estado, a pesar de que Costa Rica no siguiera las recomendaciones discutidas en la elaboración del Código Penal tipo para América Latina y colocara la figura dentro de las consecuencias civiles. Esto, como se dijo, no afecta su naturaleza jurídica real y lo que cabe derivar es que la disposición fue erróneamente ubicada, sin que eso incida sus efectos, concluyéndose que "el comiso no puede ser un efecto de las responsabilidad civil ex delicto, en su esencia no está el ser una sanción civil" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, pág. 376). A partir de estas reflexiones se planteó otra posibilidad. D.4) el comiso como un acto complejo, una consecuencia accesoria, jurídica, mixta o sui géneris del delito: Hay consecuencias derivadas del delito que lo son por disposición de ley, sin participar de la naturaleza de aquellas figuras. En el derecho costarricense se ubican como tales el tema de la condena en costas a la parte vencida (artículo 267 del Código Procesal Penal); la publicación de la sentencia en delitos contra el honor (artículo 155 del Código Penal); la reconstrucción, supresión, reforma, restitución o rectificación registral derivada de la falsedad de instrumentos públicos (artículo 483 del Código Procesal Penal); la inscripción de cierto tipo de resoluciones (artículos 30 incisos j y k, 25 párrafo primero, 36 párrafos noveno y décimo del Código Procesal Penal y Ley del Registro y Archivo Judiciales) y el comiso. Así se ha regulado en países como Alemania y España y lo acepta la mayoría de la doctrina, aunque sin concordar sobre el nombre idóneo a usar, pero dejando claro que no participa de las características de los institutos señalados en acápites anteriores:

¬"...Henao [Nombre42] critica las posiciones unitarias (...) señalando que (...) el comiso es un fenómeno de naturaleza compleja con un alcance funcional muy amplio, pues no solamente cumple tarea de pena, sino también las de restitución, compensación, policivas y de aseguramiento, e inclusive procesales de tipo probatorio y cautelar (...) En el mismo sentido, [Nombre43] y [Nombre44] son del parecer de la naturaleza compleja del comiso (...) [Nombre45] (...) plantea el carácter mixto de la institución (...) En contraste con las penas o las medidas de seguridad, las consecuencias accesorias son actos coercitivos o sanciones de naturaleza propia, vinculados legalmente a la imposición de una pena por un delito o falta dolosos o pueden vincularse con ella mediante el pronunciamiento judicial en determinados casos. Así, la ubicación del comiso (...) como consecuencia accesoria implica que su fundamento no es la culpabilidad ni la peligrosidad del sujeto activo del delito." [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs. 59-60 y 62.

Inclusive, nuestra legislación surge del Código Penal tipo para América Latina, en donde se discutió ampliamente el tema de la naturaleza jurídica y correcta ubicación del comiso: "Finalmente privó la opinión de situar el comiso con un carácter penal, más no como una pena, y fuera de las consecuencias civiles del hecho punible, desechándose la idea de este fenómeno como una medida de carácter procesal (...) Uno de los acuerdos de la Cuarta Reunión Plenaria celebrada en Caracas, Venezuela del 20 al 30 de enero de 1969, el N° 89, fue el de incluir un texto sobre el comiso, pero en el entendido de que no tenía el carácter de pena ni de efecto de la responsabilidad civil (...) ¿Por qué entonces a la hora de ordenar la normativa de ese Código se incluyó (...) el comiso bajo el Título (...) relativo a la 'Responsabilidad civil derivada del delito'? (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, págs. 369-370). G) Dicho lo anterior, este Tribunal estima que, en efecto, el comiso costarricense es, simplemente, una consecuencia señalada por el legislador para el delito (para cierto tipo de delitos, según se dijo y retomará) que, aunque tiene rasgos penales (legalidad, carga de la prueba, inocencia, nexo con el hecho), civiles (procede contra terceros) y administrativos (coercitividad y oficiosidad estatal), no se ajusta con precisión a ninguno de ellos y, por eso, no le pueden ser aplicables principios propios de la pena (como la culpabilidad o temporalidad), de las medidas de seguridad (como la personalidad) o de la reparación (como el dispositivo). De allí que resulte válido que el legislador lo regule para aplicarse oficiosamente, estableciendo la pérdida de titularidad como definitiva, etc. No obstante, ello no significa que, como medida privativa de derechos que al fin y al cabo es, no esté sometida a principios como el de legalidad y de proporcionalidad que son propios, inclusive, de cualquier materia sancionatoria, inclusive en el área del derecho administrativo, por ser los únicos limitadores del poder de imperio del Estado, tal y como se abordará con mayor detalle enseguida.

VI.- Los principios de legalidad y proporcionalidad en la aplicación del comiso: Descartando (por esa naturaleza jurídica y por la constitucionalidad aquí asumida) otras posibles críticas que pueda tener el comiso si se parte desde aquellas perspectivas, es lo cierto que su imposición no está exenta de regirse, como cualquier acto de la Administración Pública en que se aplica el poder de imperio, por los principios de legalidad y proporcionalidad, por lo que debe analizarse el comiso decretado en este caso concreto a partir de tales presupuestos. A) En cuanto a la legalidad, el comiso de vehículos cuando se conduce bajo los efectos del licor, es decir, el comiso aplicado al artículo 254 bis del Código Penal, es, hoy por hoy, una medida adoptada, por vía de interpretación, a partir de una norma emitida en un contexto socio-histórico diverso al que nos rige en la actualidad que, por ello, vulnera el principio de legalidad. Sobre este tema se ha pronunciado el penalista y criminólogo argentino [Nombre46] , quien señala que el principio de legalidad no se limita, como suele estimarse, a que exista una ley estricta, formal y escrita, sino que, en lo que atañe a la característica de que esa ley sea previa, ha de tenerse en cuenta el "principio de respeto histórico al ámbito legal de lo prohibido" según el cual:

¬"La ley es un texto. Todo texto tiene un contexto, tanto discursivo como social. El ámbito de lo legalmente prohibido varía aunque el texto permanezca idéntico, porque el contexto cambia continuamente, puesto que cualquier producto de la actividad del discurso humano deriva su forma y significado de la situación social en que aparece el habla (...) El cambio de contexto discursivo acarrea problemas que son más graves cuando los generan cambios en el contexto social, cultural o tecnológico (...) Pero el problema se complica cuando, debido a uno de esos cambios, el texto aparece abarcando un ámbito de prohibición inusitadamente amplio (...) En estos casos se debe tomar en cuenta el contexto cultural del texto legal, y cuando se comprueba un fenómeno de inusitada extensión prohibitiva, se impone una reducción histórica. La legalidad es un principio que sirve para garantizar la limitación del ámbito de programación criminalizante legislativa, y no se puede revertir su sentido convirtiéndolo en un argumento de extensión inusitada y nunca prevista en el contexto originario del texto, cuyo efecto es conceder un espacio selectivo de criminalización que alcanza los límites máximos de arbitrariedad (...) El respeto histórico al ámbito real de lo prohibido se impone en la legalidad porque, de lo contrario, la simple omisión de las agencias políticas extendería de modo inaudito las prohibiciones punitivas: lo punitivo es un ámbito que deben planificar y aumentar las agencias políticas mediante la ley, y la omisión de estas frente a cambios significativos de contexto cultural o tecnológico constituye una renuncia a su función, que no es constitucionalmente admisible. La criminalización primaria se establece por acción de las agencias políticas y no por sus omisiones" ([Nombre25] ; [Nombre26] y [Nombre27] . Derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 2000, pág. 113; el destacado es suplido).

El Código Penal de 1973 reguló el comiso para, según se dijo, delitos dolosos. En el momento en que se redactó ese articulado, la mayoría de los delitos dolosos eran de resultado o lesión o de mera actividad. Muy pocas fueron las normas de peligro abstracto que contempló esa normativa (entre ellas estaban, siguiendo la numeración original de ese código, la tenencia y fabricación de ganzúas del artículo 230, declarado inconstitucional mediante voto número 6410-96; el peligro de accidente culposo del numeral 253, declarado inconstitucional mediante voto número [Telf4]; la asociación ilícita del artículo 272 y la tenencia de instrumentos para la falsificación del artículo 370) pues estos se conceptualizaban como excepcionales, dado que significaban punir hechos en un estadío anticipado a aquel en que tradicionalmente debía hacerse (actos ejecutivos y no preparatorios en el llamado iter criminis). Ese panorama ha variado en la política criminal costarricense y, desde entonces, son muchas las leyes especiales emitidas con delitos de esa naturaleza. El artículo de la conducción bajo los efectos del licor, surge con la reforma al Código Penal de 2008, es decir, 35 años después de prevista la norma del comiso. A diferencia de lo sucedido en la Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento del terrorismo (artículos 87 a 92), en la Ley de armas y explosivos (artículos 83 y 84), en la Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre (artículos 90 a 100) y en la Ley forestal (artículo 65), para citar algunos ejemplos, en que, a pesar de la norma general del artículo 110 del Código Penal, el legislador estableció específicamente que el hecho allí previsto implicaba el comiso (declaratoria que habría de estimarse innecesaria si se considerara que el artículo previsto con carácter general para todo el ordenamiento jurídico-penal, pero a partir de un contexto determinado, podía ser aplicado a situaciones ni siquiera previstas cuando fue creado), la modificación normativa que introdujo la disposición que nos ocupa nada estableció, expresamente, sobre la aplicabilidad del comiso. Cuando se discutió la conducción temeraria (que es una figura peculiar pues sanciona como delito doloso el conducir bajo los efectos del licor pero luego, esa misma conducta, se tiene como culposa si se genera un resultado de lesiones o muerte, según los artículos 128 y 117 del Código Penal), en el expediente legislativo nunca se mencionó la posibilidad de aplicar el comiso de los vehículos que, como se dijo, no era posible utilizar en los delitos de lesiones u homicidio cometidos aún bajo los efectos del licor, por ser culposos. En aplicación de los artículos 10 y 14 del Código Civil citados, que obligan a considerar los antecedentes históricos en la interpretación normativa, esa omisión es un elemento que debe tenerse en cuenta. Así las cosas, el comiso de los vehículos por la comisión de este hecho ha surgido como una interpretación, resultado de introducir una norma de peligro abstracto en un articulado con disposiciones generales pensadas para otro contexto socio-histórico. Tanto ha sido así que los proyectos de reforma de esa normativa, ante los diversos errores que presentó, contemplan excluir expresamente del comiso del vehículo como medida derivada de dicho comportamiento (en tal sentido cfr.: el artículo 291 del proyecto de reforma integral a la Ley de Tránsito presentado recientemente por el MOPT, acumulado al expediente legislativo 17.485, en donde se introduce un párrafo segundo al artículo 110 del Código Penal según el cual "Se excluye de esta previsión, los vehículos involucrados en la comisión de los hechos tipificados en el artículo 254 bis del Código Penal"). Asimismo, en el contexto histórico en que se emite el artículo 110 del Código Penal (1970) la discusión en torno al comiso se circunscribió a los delitos dolosos de resultado, de peligro concreto, de mera actividad y a muy pocas situaciones de peligro abstracto. Inclusive, en España, partiendo de ordenamientos jurídicos similares, es decir que poseen una norma en la parte general del Código Penal que autoriza el comiso y la introducción, mucho tiempo después, del delito de conducción temeraria con desprecio para la vida de los demás (artículo 384 del Código Penal) se incorporó, junto a esa ley, una norma expresa indicando: "El vehículo a motor o el ciclomotor utilizado en los hechos previstos en el artículo anterior, se considerará instrumento del delito a los efectos del artículo 127 de este Código" (cfr: [Nombre16] , . Las consecuencias accesorias. En: AAVV. Tratado de las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. [Nombre47] , Valencia, 2006, p. 558) distinción que resultaría inútil si se considerara que bastara la introducción del tipo en el marco general de normas anteriores, debiendo agregarse que, en aquel país, el tipo penal de conducción bajo los efectos del licor implica un peligro concreto, pues no basta conducir con licor sino que esa situación debe afectar concretamente la capacidad de manejar. B) Además, la medida resulta desproporcionada. El comiso no puede, ni debe, aplicarse automáticamente, sin considerar otros factores propios del caso. En el derecho comparado no hay, a la fecha, ninguna discusión que ese principio de proporcionalidad debe usarse como parámetro de medición al momento de decidir el tema del comiso. Señalan algunos autores:

¬"El criterio de proporcionalidad había sido propuesto por la doctrina para resolver los casos más frecuentes de comiso de instrumentos del delito: el de los vehículos de motor. En efecto, aunque en ciertos supuestos pueda estar justificado, parece notoriamente disfuncional cuando se trata de delitos imprudentes de tráfico. Precisamente por ello, la Fiscalía del TS (Circular 6/1968) vino entendiendo que una interpretación restrictiva de lo que debe entenderse por instrumento obliga a no considerar como tal a los vehículos de motor. Sin embargo, en los delitos contra la seguridad del tráfico tal exclusión puede operar muy difícilmente. De ahí la inevitabilidad del recurso al criterio de proporcionalidad" ([Nombre48] y [Nombre49] , . Las consecuencias jurídicas del delito. Civitas, Madrid, 3ª edición, 1996, pág. 216).

¬"...el comiso (...) guarda estrecha analogía con estas consecuencias penales; en tal virtud, le son de aplicación los mismos principios jurídico-constitucionales que rigen las sanciones penales. Tales principios son: legalidad (...) y proporcionalidad y las garantías procesales de principio acusatorio, presunción de inocencia, derecho de defensa e individualización de la consecuencia." [Nombre29] , . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, pág. 62 citando a [Nombre50] , . El patrimonio criminal. Comiso y pérdida de la ganancia. Dykinson, Madrid, 2001, 28-30.

¬"...tanto en el comiso de los instrumentos como en el de los efectos, en el momento de decretarse la medida debe considerarse la proporcionalidad de la misma respecto de aquellos que sean de lícito comercio, de manera que el juez puede llegar a abstenerse de decretarla o hacerlo parcialmente si considera que ella es desproporcionada, especialmente cuando se trata de un desequilibrio notorio entre el valor del instrumento y la significación penal del hecho, para evitar que el comiso llegue a superar en aflicción a la propia pena. Es claro que el juicio de proporcionalidad no resulta aplicable como regla general en relación con el provecho económico obtenido de la realización del delito ya que el comiso de los beneficios ilícitos obtenidos por el autor, con independencia de su valor, precisamente cobija la ventaja material obtenida en forma antijurídica (...) Así, pues, los requisitos para la aplicación del principio de proporcionalidad son dos: que no se trate de las ganancias ni de los instrumentos y efectos del delito de comercio ilícito, y que se cumpla alternativamente una de las tres condiciones siguientes: a) que el valor de los bienes no guarde proporción con la naturaleza de la infracción penal, b) que el valor no guarde relación con la gravedad del delito, c) que se hayan satisfecho completamente las responsabilidades civiles. Para establecer si se dan las condiciones a) o b) debe atenderse la clase de bien jurídico lesionado o puesto en peligro por la infracción dolosa, la forma de ataque o puesta en peligro del mismo, el mayor o menor grado de reproche que se atribuya al autor y los daños materiales y morales producidos por el hecho punible..." [Nombre21] , [Nombre22] . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs. 79-80.

Comentando el artículo 127 del Código Penal español, que posee una redacción imperativa similar a la de nuestro artículo 110 pues señala "Toda pena que se imponga por un delito o falta dolosos llevará consigo la pérdida de los efectos (...) y de los instrumentos con que se haya ejecutado..." (el destacado no es del original), se dice:

¬"La necesidad y proporcionalidad del comiso no tienen nada que ver con el antiguo automatismo con el que, por voluntad legal, se tenía que decretar. En cambio, de acuerdo con la actual regulación del comiso, su aplicación, en cuanto consecuencia accesoria, no es preceptiva, a diferencia de lo que ocurre con las penas accesorias (...) La modificación de naturaleza, (...) obliga a justificar y explicar la proporcionalidad entre el alcance del comiso y el hecho y sus efectos..." [Nombre37] , ; [Nombre38] , y [Nombre39] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delicto. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, págs. 45, 47; y es el mismo criterio que mantiene la doctrina y la jurisprudencia nacional:

¬"...es otro principio, el de Proporcionalidad, el que nos da los lineamientos a seguir en su aplicación práctica, pues al tratarse de una pena (sic) sumamente drástica cuyo fin es la tranquilidad pública, llega a afectar el patrimonio de un particular con un destino específico que es el estado, pero no de forma ilimitada, sino atendiendo a la gravedad del hecho respecto al tipo, naturaleza, procedencia, uso y valor del bien a comisar. Al estar delimitado por ley su uso en el Derecho Penal, le corresponde al juzgador valorar la procedencia del comiso de acuerdo a las variadas circunstancias de cada caso, para que no implique una medida confiscatoria desproporcionada respecto al hecho ilícito que se cometió con los bienes usados para delinquir (...) Sin olvidar que existen bienes que de forma obligatoria entran en comiso, independientemente de su valor o afectación al propietario, hay otros que deben ser sometidos a consideración con relación y conexidad al hecho delictivo, en caso que cuya pérdida supere cuantitativamente el daño ocasionado" [Nombre9] , . El comiso de Bienes. San José, IJSA, 2006, págs. 65-66.

¬"El (...) fiscal (...) interpone recurso (...) en contra de la sentencia (...) estima que el tribunal de instancia incurrió en vicio in iudicando cuando consideró que el comiso de la vivienda solicitado por el Ministerio Público no era procedente (...) El alegato no es de recibo: el comiso es una consecuencia civil del hecho punible (...) Resulta ostensible que la justiciable es una persona de escasos recursos económicos que se dedicaba a la venta de cocaína base (crack) a consumidores finales desde su vivienda situada en (...) San Rafael Abajo de Desamparados. El principio constitucional de proporcionalidad aplica no solamente a la sanción penal impuesta a quien resulte condenado por la comisión de un delito, sino también abarca a las consecuencias civiles y administrativas que se deriven de dicha pena. En este caso, dado el perfil socioeconómico de la imputada, acceder al comiso solicitado equivaldría a proceder a extender los efectos punitivos con fines claramente confiscatorios en desmedro del único patrimonio de la sentenciada, lo que vulnera ostensiblemente el principio de proporcionalidad de carácter constitucional. Distinto es el caso, de los autores y partícipes condenados por narcoactividad que cuentan con múltiples bienes muebles e inmuebles y gozan de una boyante situación financiera fruto precisamente de su ilícita actividad. En ese supuesto no cabe duda ninguna que resulta constitucionalmente proporcional adoptar la medida del comiso, puesto que la afectación al bien jurídico tutelado ha sido en mayor escala y ello se evidencia con el lucro obtenido que les ha permitido obtener los bienes que se incautan. Por lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar el recurso..." (Sala Tercera, voto número 2004-24, 09:40 hrs. 23 de enero de 2004; [Nombre51], [Nombre52], [Nombre53], [Nombre54] y [Nombre55]; el destacado es suplido).

Dicho esto, cabe observar las consecuencias que la totalidad del ordenamiento jurídico le atribuye a la conducción bajo los efectos del licor para concluir que existe un exceso que hace que el comiso, en tales circunstancias, deba considerarse desproporcionado, no sólo porque la conducta de conducir bajo los efectos del licor ya tiene previstas una pluralidad de efectos jurídicos (multa o prisión: artículos 130 inciso a de la Ley de Tránsito y 254 bis del Código Penal; retiro de circulación del vehículo o de sus [Placa3]: artículos 141 inc. a y 155 de la Ley de Tránsito; pérdida de la totalidad de puntos y suspensión de todas las licencias por 2, 4 ó 10 años, según se trate de la primera, segunda o tercera falta similar y la obligación de desplegar cursos de sensibilización, reeducación vial o tratamiento para adicciones, una vez vencido el plazo de suspensión, para recuperar solo parte de los puntos: artículo 71 bis inc. a) y 71 ter de la Ley de Tránsito) sino, además, por el hecho de que, frente a ilícitos de resultado (es decir, más graves), producidos con la conducción de vehículos bajo los efectos del licor, como las lesiones o la muerte (artículos 117 y 128 del Código Penal), no cabe el comiso que, como se ha dicho, se ha circunscrito a delitos dolosos y no culposos como los referidos. Esto hace, a todas luces, inadmisible el comiso en el primer supuesto, partiendo del mismo principio de igualdad constitucional que obliga tratar como iguales (inaplicar el comiso) a quienes estén en las mismas condiciones (conducir bajo los efectos del licor). Adicional a ello, la medida accesoria podría ser más gravosa que la pena principal, habida cuenta que la pena de prisión podría conmutarse a multa, si se dieran los supuestos para ello (artículo 69 del Código Penal), en cuyo caso el día de multa no puede superar el salario diario de la persona (artículo 53 ibídem) o bien se podría sustituir la pena de prisión por servicios de utilidad pública (párrafo final del artículo 254 bis de dicho código). Entonces, tanto por la pluralidad de efectos que el ordenamiento jurídico le da, en este momento, a la misma conducta, como porque un comportamiento similar pero con efectos más graves es tratado más benévolamente que la conducta que nos ocupa y porque lo secundario podría ser más gravoso que lo principal, estima unánimemente este Tribunal que se da la citada desproporcionalidad al decretarse, en estos casos, el comiso del vehículo, objeto que no proviene de la realización del delito y cuyo uso general es lícito. Inclusive la misma Sala Constitucional ha tenido oportunidad de pronunciarse sobre criterios interpretativos similares de la Fiscalía General de la República, que es a lo que, en definitiva, se reduce la cuestión, indicando que "...la directriz dictada por la Fiscalía Adjunta de Alajuela, a las catorce horas treinta minutos del trece de enero del dos mil nueve, en cuanto exige la donación del vehículo al Estado, como plan reparador para acordar la suspensión del proceso a prueba, en los delitos de conducción temeraria, resulta contraria al Derecho de la Constitución, particularmente a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad..." Sala Constitucional, voto número 8296-10. Aunque el voto integral a esta fecha no está disponible para conocer las razones dadas por la Sala Constitucional, ningún sentido tendría que la Fiscalía transforme un comiso en una donación si aquel fuera procedente pues bastaría con aplicarlo, al margen de que no se estuviera frente a una condenatoria, como se ha estilado hacer en el país según se ha expuesto atrás.

VII.- No desconoce este Tribunal que lo que aquí se ha resuelto no ha sido la posición general de otros tribunales de casación como, por ejemplo, del Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón (voto de mayoría número 2010-302 de las 10:00 hrs. del 06 de agosto de 2010 en que, sin embargo, se señala: "...los suscritos jueces pudiéramos calificar de excesiva, irracional y desproporcionada la decisión legislativa (sic) de que, en circunstancias como las que se hacen presentes en este caso, se deba disponer el comiso del vehículo...") o del Tribunal de Casación Penal de Cartago (votos números 2010-236 de las 11:07 del 09 de julio y 2010-265 de las 14:35 del 10 de agosto de 2010) y sí ha sido aceptado, aunque a los fines de formular la consulta de constitucional, por otros (Tribunal de Casación de Santa Cruz, voto número 2010-149 y votos disidentes en el Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón, dentro del voto número 2010-302 y, de oficio, en el de esta Cámara, con diversa integración, dentro del voto número 2010-995). No obstante, este Tribunal, a partir del principio de independencia judicial, considera otras aristas de la discusión y parte de premisas distintas a las planteadas en aquellos pronunciamientos, pues no sólo acepta la posibilidad de que el juez ordinario aplique el principio de proporcionalidad sino que, adicional a ello, descarta la consideración de pena accesoria, base sobre la que se cimentan aquellas decisiones. Así las cosas, el análisis efectuado permite a este Tribunal señalar, unánimemente, que la medida de comiso de vehículos automotores en el delito de conducción temeraria resulta, en el estado actual de nuestra legislación, una medida desproporcionada y que roza con el principio de legalidad en la vertiente supra referida. Por estas razones, que no necesariamente coinciden con todo el planteamiento efectuado por el recurrente pero que responden a una consideración amplia del recurso interpuesto, para atender al derecho que a esa impugnación consagra el artículo 8.2.h de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, se debe declarar con lugar el recurso, revocándose la sentencia impugnada en cuanto ordenó el comiso, medida que se rechaza. El vehículo decomisado y puesto en depósito provisional, debe ser devuelto, de modo definitivo, a su titular sin que, para ello, sea necesario el reenvío.”