Constitutionality of driving under the influence as a concrete-danger offenseConstitucionalidad de la conducción bajo influencia del alcohol como delito de peligro concreto

* 090007880007CO * * 090007880007CO * Res. No. 2009004955 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and fifty-two minutes of March twenty-fourth, two thousand nine.

Unconstitutionality action brought by Reinhard Gottfried Wilheim Becker, of legal age, single, in a common-law union, businessman, of German nationality, residency card number 704-133739-001483, resident of Arenal de Tilarán de Guanacaste; against articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeenth, two thousand eight, and 254 bis of the Penal Code.

Whereas:

1.- By document received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at eight hours forty-six minutes of January twenty-first, two thousand nine, the petitioner requests that articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeenth, two thousand eight, and 254 bis of the Penal Code be declared unconstitutional. As grounds for unconstitutionality, he indicates: a) non-existence of harm to a protected legal interest; b) violation of due process; c) violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality; d) violation of the right to private property. a) Non-existence of harm to a protected legal interest: Firstly, the petitioner indicates that imprisonment is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, which is why said penalty, for someone who drives under the influence of alcohol, is disproportionate and does not protect a valid legal interest. The case would be different if, under the influence of alcohol, an accident is caused, or the death or injuries of a person, where the legal interest harmed is life or physical integrity and a penalty duly defined in the Penal Code already exists. There are other, less burdensome forms of repression and prevention for this type of conduct that the State can demand and it does not constitute the only path to follow, such that the principle of applying imprisonment as a last resort is not fulfilled. For example, the establishment of education and culture programs for new generations, rehabilitation programs, community work, financial fines, removing license plates, certification programs for good driving practices, rehabilitation programs, etc. That is, there is a clear violation of Article 28 of the Constitution, since it is not enough, as jurisprudence indicates, for a conduct to fit into a criminal type; rather, it is essential that a significant harm to the protected legal interest is produced. b) Violation of due process: Before the enactment of the new Ley de Tránsito (Traffic Law), driving under the influence of alcohol resulted in a fine and an administrative sanction. In contrast, with the entry into force and the classification of the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol as a crime, the driver becomes an accused person and, consequently, is subject to a series of constitutional guarantees and rights entirely ignored in the law and its application. The Chamber has been consistent in its jurisprudence in establishing that no one can be subject to a sanction without his guilt having been demonstrated through a procedure in which the right of defense is respected. Thus, the right of defense in general comprises a series of principles, among which are the principle of notification, the principle of imputation, the right to be heard, the right of defense itself, the principle of innocence, and the right to technical defense, and even more importantly, the constitutional guarantee of Article 36 of the Political Constitution that “in criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against himself…” much less to produce evidence against himself. All these principles are violated by classifying driving under the influence of alcohol as a crime, since in the reform to the law, and even more so in practice, there are no guarantors responsible for ensuring that these constitutional guarantees and rights can be fulfilled. Both in the reform introduced by the Law and in its application by the authorities, detainees who are allegedly under the influence of alcohol are not warned regarding their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make statements before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney, despite which the law authorizes that a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) be administered to them. Thus, the law does not provide a procedure to guarantee the right of defense of the accused nor does it establish guarantors who can provide protection for these rights. c) Violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality: The reforms introduced in the challenged Law absolutely transgress the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. When a driver is stopped for driving under the influence of alcohol, the following sanctions are produced: financial fine, loss or seizure (decomiso) of the license, disqualification (inhabilitación) from driving for a specified period, seizure of the license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, towing, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. In such terms, there is definitively no proportionality in the new criminal type introduced by the Law. The Law is becoming something totally and completely arbitrary and inquisitorial, far from the democratic and rule-of-law system in which we live. There are other less burdensome means to achieve the end pursued by the new Law, and given the possibility of less burdensome sanctions, the imposition of the most burdensome sanction does not proceed according to the rules and principles already indicated. Additionally, in the reform introduced to the Ley de Tránsito, whose unconstitutionality is alleged, a single person is being judged and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, forfeiture (comiso), disqualification) for the same act, which transgresses the constitutional precept that no one can be tried twice for the same act, and the criminal type is going beyond this act, violating said principle. That is, the new law allows up to nine sanctions to be imposed for a single act. It is also worth indicating that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of typicality, since there are at least 8 sanctions less burdensome than imprisonment for that conduct, but even so, the rule sanctions with imprisonment. In another vein, regarding the financial fine, it is confiscatory, also breaching the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since the economic capacity of each individual (administrado) must be analyzed in each specific case. The Law generally establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and which in some cases go beyond the economic capacity of the individuals, establishing fines of more than one base salary, that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. Finally, the lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the penalties imposed by the reform whose unconstitutionality is alleged is evident when, for example, a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having an up-to-date technical inspection, with the second conduct being clearly more serious than the first. As with this, there are countless examples in the law cited. d) Violation of the right to private property: Private property is inviolable, and no one can be deprived of his own except for a legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law. The seizure and subsequent forfeiture of the car in the specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. Since no crime exists, due to the criterion of no harm and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no cause for justification by the State to seize and subsequently effect the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State and deprive the individual of private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, and eventually with imprisonment, and despite that, the forfeiture of the property is carried out, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. It would be sufficient to leave the offender without the possibility of driving in case of transgressing an administrative rule for driving under the influence of alcohol, or to remove the license plates, or impose a fine, or a combination of these, but never the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State for a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it violates the constitutional right to private property. Furthermore, it is confiscatory as it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for the care of the car and towing transportation. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual to his property suffering deterioration and damages that diminish his assets. The petitioner indicates that he currently appears as an accused in a judicial case pending in the Fiscalía (Prosecutor's Office) of Cañas, processed under case file number 08-200005-413-PE, which is pending resolution.

2.- By resolution of sixteen hours twenty minutes of February ninth, two thousand nine, the petitioner was warned: to substantiate in a clear and precise manner, with specific citation of the rules or principles considered infringed, the reasons why he considers that the challenged articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 are unconstitutional; to provide a literal certification of the document where he invoked the unconstitutionality of those rules in the pending base matter; to provide seven sets of copies plus all of the documentation presented (six for the Magistrates of the Chamber and one for the Procuraduría General de la República) as well as those necessary for the opposing parties appearing in the base matter, if any, and the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados (Bar Association) for the sum of two hundred fifty colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial document. (folio 47 front) 3.- By document presented at thirteen hours twenty-five minutes of February sixteenth, two thousand eight, the petitioner appears to comply with the warning (folios 49 to 53), indicating the following: Article 254 bis of the Penal Code transgresses Article 28 of the Constitution, given that driving under the influence of alcohol does not transgress any protected legal interest nor harm third parties. If third parties were to be harmed, there are already rules that sanction the conduct, such as negligent injury (lesiones culposas), negligent homicide (homicidio culposo), among others. That is, we are not in the presence of a conduct that needs to be penalized, and it is up to the State to do so only as a last option, or as a last resort (última ratio), if there is a need to do so, and currently there is no exhaustion by the State of all means to achieve the end. Additionally to this, said rule, together with the regulations of 130 subsection a) (formerly 129), 141 (formerly 140), 139 subsection c) (formerly 138), 144 (formerly 143), transgresses the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The sanctions that are applied: a fine of seventy-five percent of the base salary, loss or seizure of the license, disqualification from driving for a specified period, seizure of the license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, towing, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually imprisonment. That is, the conduct that harms no legal interest and is therefore not punishable, in addition to that, has a series of sanctions that violate constitutional principles. In the reform introduced to the Ley de Tránsito, whose unconstitutionality is alleged, a single person is being judged and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, forfeiture, disqualification) for the same act, which transgresses the constitutional precept that no one can be tried twice for the same act. That is, the new Law allows up to 9 sanctions to be imposed for a single act. It is also worth indicating that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of typicality, since there are at least eight sanctions less burdensome than imprisonment for that conduct, but even so, the rule sanctions with imprisonment. In another vein, regarding the financial fine, it is confiscatory, also breaching the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since the economic capacity of each individual must be analyzed in each specific case, violating Article 40 of the Political Constitution. The law establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and which in some cases go beyond the economic capacity of the individuals, establishing fines of more than one base salary, that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. The reforms introduced to the Ley de Tránsito, where the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol is classified, transgress said principles and there is no procedure that guarantees the right of defense when administering the breathalyzer test. The system in practice does not guarantee the fundamental principles of due process and the right of defense, and there is no warning that the accused may or may not abstain from undergoing the breathalyzer test, nor any safeguard regarding the manipulation that could be given to this type of evidence. By this, it is meant that a procedure must be established under which the right of defense of the accused can be guaranteed, be it technical assistance, warning of constitutional rights and guarantors of this situation, the right not to produce evidence against oneself, among others. When the breathalyzer test is administered, there is no guarantor who can attest to the warning of such rights, since those who administer these tests are traffic officers (oficiales de tránsito), and given that we are now in the presence of a crime, these rights must still be respected and guaranteed, and neither the law nor the system provides for this situation. Even when an accused person could refuse to submit to the breathalyzer test examination and be forced to do so, there are no guarantors of constitutional rights and basically of Article 36 of the Constitution, which is why they consider that the rule in Article 107 is unconstitutional. Private property is inviolable, and even when one drives under the influence of alcohol, there is no justification by the State to seize the vehicle and subject it to a series of damages simply by keeping it in a vehicle depot, exposed to the elements and handling by third parties. The seizure and subsequent forfeiture of the car in the specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. Since no crime exists, due to the criterion of no harm and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no cause for justification by the State to seize and subsequently effect the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State and deprive the individual of private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, and eventually with imprisonment, and despite that, the forfeiture of the property is carried out, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. This is sufficient to understand the lack of reasonableness and the disproportionality of this measure. It would be sufficient to leave the offender without the possibility of driving in case of transgressing an administrative rule for driving under the influence of alcohol, to remove the license plates, or to impose a fine, or a combination of these, but never the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State for a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it violates the constitutional right to private property. Furthermore, it is confiscatory as it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for the care of the car and towing transportation. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual to his property suffering deterioration and damages that diminish his assets.

4.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it involves the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical or similar petition that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Vargas Benavides; and,

Considering:

I.- On admissibility. The unconstitutionality action is admissible only in relation to the provisions of Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Penal Code, given that, as can be seen at folio 29 of the file, the invocation of unconstitutionality in the pending base matter was made with respect to that rule and not with respect to the others. Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as a requirement for admissibility the existence of a pending base matter, where unconstitutionality was invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Likewise, Article 79 of the same Law establishes that the document filing the action must be presented together with a literal certification of the document where the unconstitutionality was invoked in the main matter. In the case under analysis, the base matter is the case being pursued against the petitioner in the Fiscalía of Cañas for the crime of “Violation of the Ley de Tránsito,” processed under case file number 08-200005-413-PE, and it is confirmed that unconstitutionality was invoked by stating at folio 29 front: “Additionally to the above, in my opinion, the crime defined in the new law borders on the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and even more so is confiscatory and a violation of private property, another of the constitutional rights that we Costa Ricans hold, by seizing the vehicle and refusing its immediate return to the registered owner.” II.- Object of the action. Article 254 bis of the Penal Code states:

“Article 254 bis.- A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years and disqualification from driving vehicles of all types for one (1) to five (5) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed contests, or drag races (piques) against one or several vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality.

If the driver is under any of the conditions indicated in the preceding paragraph and those outlined in subsections a) and b) of Article 107 of the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, No. 7331 (Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, No. 7331), of April 13, 1993, and its amendments, a prison sentence of two (2) to six (6) years shall be imposed, and moreover, the person shall be disqualified from driving all types of vehicles for two (2) to ten (10) years.

A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty (150) kilometers per hour.

A prison term of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five (0.75) grams of alcohol per liter of blood.

A recidivist driver shall be imposed a prison sentence of two (2) to eight (8) years.

When a prison sentence of three (3) years or less is imposed, the court may substitute the custodial sentence for an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública), which may range from two hundred (200) hours to nine hundred fifty (950) hours of service, in the places and manner indicated in Article 71 ter of the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its amendments.” As a first ground, the petitioner argues that the challenged rule is contrary to the principle of harmfulness (ofensividad), given that there is no legal interest to protect. In his judgment, imprisonment is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, which is why he considers that imposing said penalty on someone who drives under the influence of alcohol is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that no valid legal interest is protected, since no harm is produced to life or physical integrity. He indicates that there are less burdensome measures or sanctions that could be applied. As a second aspect, the petitioner states that the reform made to the Ley de Tránsito, regarding driving while intoxicated classified as a crime, infringes the principles of notification, imputation, innocence, right to be heard, right of defense itself, right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against himself, much less to produce evidence against himself. This, because there are no persons responsible for ensuring compliance with these constitutional guarantees and rights, since detainees who are allegedly under the influence of alcohol are not warned regarding their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make statements before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He states that despite this, the law permits the breathalyzer test to be administered to them. As a third issue, the petitioner argues that the challenged rule infringes the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because, upon incurring the conduct provided for in the questioned rule, a multiplicity of sanctions is produced: a financial fine, loss or seizure of the license, disqualification from driving for a specified period, seizure of the license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, towing, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. He states that this also violates the principle of non bis in idem. Regarding the financial fine, he states that it is confiscatory because the economic capacity of each individual is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is confirmed by observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having an up-to-date technical inspection. Finally, he alleges a violation of the right to private property, given that the vehicle is seized, which he considers unconstitutional, since no crime exists, due to the lack of protection of a legal interest, there is no justification by the State. The individual is exposed to his property being damaged and suffering deterioration.

III.- On the legal interest protected in the challenged rule. The petitioner states that imprisonment is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, which is why he considers that imposing said penalty on someone who drives under the influence of alcohol is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that the rule does not protect any legal interest. He indicates that there are less burdensome measures or sanctions that could be applied. This Tribunal has already ruled in relation to the issue of the protection of legal interests in the challenged rule and the reasonableness of using imprisonment as a sanction:

“IV.- On the protection of legal interests in the challenged rule. While it is true that every criminalized conduct must have as its objective the protection of a specific legal interest, the legislator has the power to design criminal rules as he considers they best adapt to the nature of the interest sought to be protected and in accordance with the purposes he has assigned to the penalty and to criminal law in general, which can be not only retributive, but also preventive – whether general positive or negative prevention –, resocializing, etc. The dominant doctrine has distinguished between crimes of harm (lesión) and crimes of endangerment (peligro), based on the different intensity of the attack on the legal interest. In crimes of harm, the production of harm to the legal interest or to the object that represents it is required for the typicality of the act, while in endangerment crimes, that effect is not required, producing an advancement of the protection of the interest to phases prior to its effective impairment or harm. The delineation between one class of crime and another can present difficulty in the face of specific criminal figures. Thus, in crimes where collective interests such as public health, traffic safety, etc., are protected, if the impact that the conduct entails for the collective legal interest is considered, they can be seen as crimes of harm; however, in relation to individual legal interests, they only represent a danger. The differentiation between crimes of abstract endangerment (peligro abstracto) and crimes of concrete endangerment (peligro concreto) is also not easy in some cases, since in both, a wrongfulness of action is required, while only crimes of concrete endangerment require a true wrongfulness of the result, which consists precisely in that concrete creation of danger. According to the majority doctrinal opinion, crimes of abstract endangerment sanction the execution of a conduct generally considered dangerous, without the need for an effective danger to the protected legal interest to occur. The aim is to punish the dangerousness of the conduct itself, without evaluating the capacity for harm or the actual creation of danger to the protected legal interests. In these, the dangerousness of the typical conduct is determined through a legal generalization based on the consideration that certain behaviors are generally dangerous for the typical object and, ultimately, for the legal interest. The legislator selects forms of behavior that are typically dangerous for the corresponding legal interest, without the need to establish in each particular case the concrete creation of danger to the object of the action or the legal interest protected in the rule. An effective creation of danger – judged ex post – for the object of the action or the protected legal interest is not required, although it is required that the performance of that behavior implies – from an ex ante perspective – a risk of producing a concrete creation of danger or harm to the legal interest. The doctrine has encountered difficulties in determining whether crimes of abstract endangerment imply a true content of material wrongfulness, and it is debated whether they are violative or not of the principles of culpability and harmfulness (lesividad). The Constitutional Chamber, for its part, has determined that not all criminal types of abstract endangerment are unconstitutional (In this regard, resolutions 2805-96 can be consulted, which ruled in relation to the articles regulating the illegal carrying of weapons; 1792-99 in relation to the possession of forgery instruments and criminal association (asociación ilícita); 4673-03 on crimes under the Ley de Migración y Extranjería (Immigration and Aliens Law); and 218-06 on crimes under the Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso no Autorizado, Legitimación de Capitales y Actividades Conexas (Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Money Laundering, and Related Activities).

In crimes of concrete danger, in contrast, the danger to the legal interest does constitute an express element of the offense, so that in order to consider the crime consummated, the judge must verify the production of a real danger to an object of the action, causally linked and objectively attributable to it. Therefore, as in crimes of injury, there must be created, if not a result, a “danger of concrete result” insofar as it constitutes an adequate and non-permitted risk of injury, which requires as prerequisites that the object of the action has entered the operative scope of the person who endangers it and, subsequently, that the behavior has created a proximate danger of injury to that object of the action. In the provision under analysis, the criminalized conducts are of concrete danger, given that it has been reliably demonstrated that they produce injurious results to legal interests considered of great value to society. The criminal offenses described (driving on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed contests or drag races against one or more vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality; driving a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty kilometers per hour; driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five grams of alcohol per liter of blood) constitute multi-offensive actions, that is, they endanger, as the case may be, various legal interests such as public safety (seguridad común), public order, property, physical integrity, health, and life. These are interests whose protection is legitimate under the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the possibility of restricting those conducts that injure the rights of third parties, morals, or public order:

“When private actions transcend the person who performs them and compromise the common good (public order or morals or cause harm to a third party), they are regulable by the State and even prohibited by it, provided there are grounds for doing so and the regulation passes the reasonableness test required by substantive due process. Thus, the individual must accept those restrictions on his freedom of action that the legislator establishes for the promotion of social coexistence within the limits of what is enforceable, provided that the independence of the person is maintained. Freedom is restrictable, however, by virtue of sufficient reasons from a constitutional perspective. The foregoing leads to the principle of negative liberty, which, as a principle, does not grant a definitive permission to do or omit whatever one wishes to the extent that sufficient reasons – rights of third parties, morals, or public order – do not justify a restriction of negative liberty. With this, the principle of negative liberty can take into account the individual’s connection to the community. We therefore depart from the premise that the State is forbidden from interfering in the sphere of private liberty, except where public order, morals, or the rights of third parties are involved, in which case, state regulation would be possible, by means of a formal law. The restriction, however, must be only that which is necessary to achieve the proposed end, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, parameters of constitutionality according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Tribunal. The consulted bill, which establishes the mandatory use of seat belts, involves a matter inherent to the common good (understood as the general public good), and therefore constitutes a conduct susceptible to legal regulation, which in the judgment of the Chamber is compatible with Constitutional Law […] Maintaining order and safety on roads directly affects two fundamental aspects of life in society, such as the health and life of those who use them. Law number 7331 has the purpose of regulating the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the nation's land routes, as well as everything related to road safety (article 1), for pedestrians as well as drivers and passengers, which denotes the existence of an indissoluble link between regulation for the use of public roads and the safety of those who travel on them, which fully justifies the State's intervention in the matter.” (Judgment 2004-01603-04 of nine hours thirty minutes of February seventeen, two thousand four) The conducts provided for in article 254 bis of the Penal Code are, in themselves, risky or dangerous for property, health, integrity, and life of persons. Furthermore, they are conducts that seriously affect public order and public safety (seguridad común). Moreover, upon consulting the Statement of Reasons (Exposición de Motivos) of legislative file 16.496 (folios 2 to 45) which gave rise to Law 8696, sufficient reasons of public interest are found that legitimize the State's intervention in regulating certain conducts deemed harmful to the community and to individuals in particular:

“Deaths and injuries from traffic accidents are a problem for public health and the development of countries, as categorically indicated by the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, presented in 2004 by the World Health Organization. The report reveals that 1.2 million people die annually from traffic accidents. Of these, 20 to 50 million suffer injuries or become disabled, accounting for 2.1% of total deaths globally. Projections indicate that traffic accidents will increase and that by the year 2020, they will occupy third place as the main cause of morbidity and mortality, which is alarming. Each victim of a traffic accident represents a high social and economic cost for society and for families. Worldwide, the figure is close to 518 billion dollars, and for Latin America, it is impacting more than 1.5% of the gross domestic product. Costa Rica is not immune to this global problem, traffic accidents being the first cause of violent deaths; due to several factors, among which are high levels of aggressiveness and stress, manifested in reckless conduct and habits reproduced daily by users of the transit system […] To establish the risk factors associated with the occurrence of these deaths, the database of 'in situ' deaths from traffic accidents over a six-year period (2000-2005) was used, obtaining the following results: a.- 28.77%, 636 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident to excess speed […] b.- 18.09%, 400 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident to pedestrian imprudence […] c.- 16.92%, 374 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to being under the effects of alcohol […] d.- 12.71%, 281 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to driver imprudence […] e.- 9.45%, 209 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to improper passing […] f.- 6.06%, 134 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to cyclist imprudence […] g.- 4.30%, 95 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to mechanical failure […] h.- The remaining 3.70%, 82 deceased persons, is attributed as a possible cause to other factors […].” Regarding alcohol consumption and its relationship with traffic accidents, it is noted:

“[…] traffic accidents are related to alcohol consumption as one of the main causes of avoidable mortality and morbidity. Various studies have determined that blood alcohol concentrations above 0.5 g/l correlate with a linear risk of having a traffic accident and presenting more severe injuries. Alcohol produces a non-selective depression of the central nervous system, impairing psychomotor function, sensory perception (sight and hearing), modifying the person's behavior, etc. In general, the effects of alcohol are directly proportional to its concentration in the blood: the higher the concentration, the greater the impairment. It is perfectly demonstrated that alcohol markedly impairs psychomotor function and the ability to drive safely. While the trend in developed countries regarding deaths resulting from driving with alcohol is downward, in neighboring Latin American nations and even nationally it is clearly increasing, hence an increase in the amount of the current fine is also proposed, as a way to inhibit the driver from committing this type of violent reactions. From the 'in situ' death database over six years of data, it was obtained that of a total of 2,211 deceased persons, 16.92%, that is, 374 deaths, is attributed as a possible cause of the accident to the presence of alcohol.” In relation to drivers who exceed speed limits, it is held:

“In recent years, we have seen how the practice of a deadly 'pastime' has proliferated on the streets of San José. Irresponsible drivers, generally young people, test their machines and driving skill on the open public road in an attitude that openly threatens their physical integrity and that of third parties. This situation has already caused many accidents and loss of life of innocent pedestrians who transit unprotected before the recklessness of these drivers. The existing regulations are insufficient to prevent these demonstrations or 'drag races' (piques), so the task should be the creation of applicable norms to permanently solve this problem.” From the foregoing, it is concluded, then, that the conducts provided for in the challenged provision do injure individual and social legal interests and, from that point of view, do not infringe the principle of harmfulness (principio de lesividad) provided for in article 28 of the Political Constitution.

V.- On the reasonableness of the challenged provision. The claimant considers that the State cannot interfere in the sphere of people's lives beyond what is reasonable. That is, the criminal prohibition must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. He argues that in the case of the challenged provision, the prohibition is not necessary because it does not protect any concrete legal interest, it is not suitable because prison is not the best means of protection, as it is a subhuman means to solve problems, which creates more violence and desocializes; and, regarding proportionality, since the acts criminalized as reckless driving (conducción temeraria) do not protect any legal interest, it is disproportionate to impose a penalty when a disciplinary sanction could prevent harm to third parties and, moreover, there already exist other criminal offenses in current laws that protect the real damages caused. As indicated, the conducts provided for in the challenged provision do affect or endanger highly valuable legal interests for society and for individuals in particular. Reckless driving (conducción temeraria) in our country constitutes the main cause of violent deaths. Driving while intoxicated, high speed, and engaging in races or 'drag races' (piques) on public roads are truly reprehensible conducts that reflect a great contempt for one's own life and the lives of others. They denote a serious cultural problem and a loss of the values that should govern social life, such as respect for others, solidarity, courtesy, and altruism. The State is not only legitimized to prohibit and sanction such conducts, in accordance with the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, but it has the obligation to intervene to protect the legal interests that are injured or endangered, given that those who do not perform these actions should not have to suffer the consequences of the harmful acts of others and deserve state protection. The fact that the prison sentence is used as a deterrent for the referred conducts is not in itself disproportionate, given the extremely high danger that said conducts generate for the legal interests considered of greatest value to society. Furthermore, it can be observed that the legislator establishes alternative sanctions that make it possible to apply imprisonment as a last resort and only for the minimum indispensable time, in accordance with the parameters established in article 71 of the Penal Code.” (Judgment 2004-09 of fourteen hours forty minutes of February eleven, two thousand nine) Based on the arguments set forth in the partially transcribed resolution, the action is rejected on the merits regarding that point.

IV.- Non-existence of injury to due process (debido proceso). The claimant states that the reform made to the Transit Law (Ley de Tránsito), regarding driving while intoxicated classified as a crime, infringes the principles of notice, imputation, innocence, right to a hearing, right to a defense itself, right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against oneself, much less to produce evidence against oneself. This is because there are no guarantors charged with ensuring compliance with these constitutional guarantees and rights, since detainees who are allegedly under the effects of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make a statement before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He states that despite this, the Law allows the blood alcohol test (alcoholemia) to be performed on the accused. On this matter, it must be noted that for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes introduced by the reform to the Transit Law, particularly the one provided for in article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, that is, driving while intoxicated, the principles, rights, and guarantees that comprise due process (debido proceso), provided for both in the Political Constitution and in the various international law instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) and the very jurisprudence of this Chamber, must be respected. The exercise of the right of defense must be fully respected by all public authorities and must be recognized from the moment a person has the status of accused, that is, from when they are identified as a possible perpetrator of a punishable act or participant in it, through any act of investigation or procedure (article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that the defense of any of the parties in the procedure is inviolable. Likewise, article 93 of the same Code indicates that before the accused makes a statement about the facts, they shall be required to appoint a lawyer to assist them. If the accused does not choose a defense attorney of their confidence, the State shall provide a public defender to exercise technical defense. As for elements of evidence, they will only have value if they have been obtained by a lawful means and incorporated in accordance with the procedure established by the Code of Criminal Procedure (article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). If in the specific case, any infringement of the elements that comprise due process has occurred, it is a problem that is not attributable to the challenged norms but to their application by the authorities, which is not reviewable through this channel.

V.- Non-existence of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The claimant argues that by virtue of the reforms to the Transit Law, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the sanctions of: economic fine, loss or seizure of the license, disqualification from driving for a determined period, seizure of the license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation expenses, towing, vehicle storage, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment, are produced. Furthermore, he considers that the principle of non bis in idem is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he states that it is confiscatory because the economic possibility of each administered party is not assessed. He adds that disproportionality is verified by observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having an up-to-date vehicle inspection. In this regard, it must be noted that the only sanction provided for in the challenged provision is imprisonment from one to three years, which can be substituted by an alternative measure of providing public utility service that may range from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The sanctions of fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged provision. The other aspects indicated by the claimant are consequences derived from the crime, but do not in themselves constitute a penalty and, in any case, are not provided for in the challenged provision.

VI.- On the violation of the right to private property. The claimant states that the seizure (comiso) of the vehicle driven while intoxicated is unconstitutional, since in the absence of a crime, according to the criteria of non-harmfulness and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The administered party is exposed to their property suffering deterioration and damages that impair their patrimony. From a reading of the challenged provision, it is verified that the same makes no reference to the seizure of the vehicle, since in reality this is a consequence of the crime contained in other norms, such as article 110 of the Penal Code and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

VII.- Conclusion. Based on the considerations set forth, the action is rejected outright (de plano) in relation to articles 29 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeen, two thousand eight. Regarding article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.

Therefore (Por tanto):

The action is rejected outright (de plano) regarding articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeen, two thousand eight. Regarding article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.

Adrián Vargas B.

Acting President (Presidente a.i.)

Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Rosa María Abdelnour G. Roxana Salazar C.

Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. E-mail address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional Thus, the right of defense in general comprises a series of principles, among which are the principle of notification (principio de intimación), the principle of imputation (principio de imputación), the right to be heard (derecho de audiencia), the right of defense itself (derecho de defensa en sí), the principle of innocence (principio de inocencia), and the right to technical defense (derecho de defensa técnica), and even more importantly, the constitutional guarantee of Article 36 of the Political Constitution that “in criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against himself…” much less to produce evidence against himself. All of these principles are violated by the criminalization of driving under the influence of alcohol, since in the reform of the law and even more so in practice, there are no guarantors responsible for ensuring that these guarantees and constitutional rights can be fulfilled. Both in the reform introduced by the Law and in its application by the authorities, detainees who are allegedly under the influence of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to testify before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney; despite this, the law authorizes that a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) be administered to them. Thus, the law does not provide a procedure to guarantee the defendant’s right of defense, nor does it establish guarantors who can protect these rights. <u>c) Violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality:</u> The reforms introduced in the challenged Law absolutely violate the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. When a driver is detained for driving under the influence of alcohol, the following sanctions are imposed: financial fine, loss or confiscation of the driver’s license, disqualification from driving for a set period, confiscation of license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. In such terms, there is definitively no proportionality in the new criminal offense introduced by the Law. The Law is becoming something totally and completely arbitrary and inquisitorial, far from the democratic system and the rule of law in which we live. There are other less burdensome means to achieve the aim sought by the new Law, and given the possibility of less burdensome sanctions, the imposition of the most burdensome sanction is not appropriate according to the rules and principles already indicated. Additionally, in the reform introduced to the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), the unconstitutionality of which is alleged, a single person is being tried and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, confiscation, disqualification) for the same act, which violates the constitutional precept that no one can be tried twice for the same act, and the criminal offense goes beyond this fact, violating said principle. That is to say, the new law allows for up to nine sanctions to be imposed for a single act. It is also worth noting that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad), as there are at least 8 sanctions less burdensome than prison for that conduct, yet still, the rule punishes with imprisonment. In another line of thought, regarding the financial fine, it is confiscatory, also violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since the economic possibility of each individual must be analyzed in each specific case. The Law generally establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and that in some cases go beyond the economic possibility of the individuals, establishing fines of more than one base salary (salario base), that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. Finally, the lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the penalties imposed by the reform whose unconstitutionality is alleged is evident when, for example, a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having a current vehicle inspection (revisión técnica), the second conduct being clearly more serious than the first. There are countless examples like this in the cited law. <u>d) Violation of the right to private property:</u> Private property is inviolable and no one may be deprived of their own, except for legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law. The seizure and subsequent confiscation of the car in this specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. Since there is no crime, based on the criterion of no harm (no lesividad) and the nonexistence of a protected legal interest (bien jurídico tutelado), there is no justification on the part of the State to be able to seize and subsequently confiscate the vehicle for the benefit of the State and deprive the individual of their private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, eventually with prison, and despite that, the confiscation of the property is carried out, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. It would suffice to leave the offender without the possibility of circulation in the event of violating an administrative rule on driving under the influence of alcohol, or to remove the license plates, or the fine imposed, or a combination of these, but never confiscate the vehicle for the benefit of the State in the face of a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it violates the constitutional right to private property. Moreover, it is confiscatory because it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for the care of the car and tow truck transport. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual to their property suffering deterioration and damage that diminish their assets. The petitioner states that he is currently charged in a judicial case before the Prosecutor's Office of Cañas (Fiscalía de Cañas), processed under expediente number 08-200005-413-PE, which is pending resolution.

2.- By resolution at sixteen hours and twenty minutes on February ninth, two thousand nine, the petitioner was warned: to substantiate clearly and precisely, with specific citation of the rules or principles considered infringed, the reasons why Articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 challenged are considered unconstitutional; to provide a literal certification of the brief where he invoked the unconstitutionality of those rules in the underlying case (asunto base) pending resolution; to provide seven sets of copies plus all the documentation submitted (six for the Justices of the Chamber and one for the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República)) as well as those necessary for the opposing parties in the underlying case, if any, and the Costa Rican Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados) stamp for the sum of two hundred fifty colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief. (folio 47 front) 3.- By brief submitted at thirteen hours twenty-five minutes on February sixteenth, two thousand eight, the petitioner appears to comply with the warning (folios 49 to 53), stating the following: Article 254 bis of the Penal Code violates Article 28 of the Constitution, given that driving under the influence of alcohol does not harm any protected legal interest or harm third parties. If third parties were harmed, there are already rules that sanction the conduct, such as negligent injury (lesiones culposas), negligent homicide (homicidio culposo), among others. That is, we are not in the presence of conduct that must be criminalized, and it is up to the State to do so only as a last option or as a last resort (última ratio) if there is a need to do so, and currently there is no exhaustion by the State of all means to achieve the end. Additionally, this rule, together with the regulations of Article 130 subsection a) (formerly 129), 141 (formerly 140), 139 subsection c) (formerly 138), 144 (formerly 143), violates the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The sanctions that are applied: a fine of seventy-five percent of the base salary (salario base), loss or confiscation of the driver’s license, disqualification from driving for a set period, confiscation of license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually imprisonment. That is, the conduct that does not harm any legal interest and therefore is not punishable, additionally has a series of sanctions that violate constitutional principles. In the reform introduced to the Traffic Law, the unconstitutionality of which is alleged, a single person is being tried and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, confiscation, disqualification) for the same act, which violates the constitutional precept that no one can be tried twice for the same act. That is, the new Law allows for up to 9 sanctions to be imposed for a single act. It is also worth noting that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad), as there are at least eight sanctions less burdensome than prison for that conduct, yet still, the rule punishes with imprisonment. In another line of thought, regarding the financial fine, it is confiscatory, also violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since it must be in each specific case that the economic possibility of each individual must be analyzed, violating Article 40 of the Political Constitution. The law establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and that in some cases go beyond the economic possibility of the individuals, establishing fines of more than one base salary, that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. The reforms introduced to the Traffic Law, where the conduct of driving under the influence of liquor is criminalized, violate said principles, and there is no procedure that guarantees the right of defense when administering the breathalyzer test. The system in practice does not guarantee the fundamental principles of due process and the right of defense, and there is no warning that the defendant may or may not refrain from undergoing the breathalyzer test, nor about the potential manipulation of this type of evidence. This means that a procedure must be established under which the defendants' right of defense can be guaranteed, be it technical assistance, warning of constitutional rights and guarantors of this situation, not to produce evidence against themselves, among others. When the breathalyzer test is administered, there is no guarantor who can attest to the warning of such rights, since those who administer said tests are traffic officers, and given that we are now in the presence of a crime, those rights must still be respected and guaranteed, and the law nor the system foresee this situation. Even if a defendant may refuse to submit to the breathalyzer test and be forced to do so, there are no guarantors of constitutional rights and basically of Article 36 of the Constitution, which is why they consider the rule of Article 107 to be unconstitutional. Private property is inviolable, and even when driving under the influence of liquor, there is no justification on the part of the State to be able to seize the vehicle and subject it to a series of damages just for having it in a vehicle depot with exposure to inclement weather and handling by third parties. The seizure and subsequent confiscation of the car in this specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. Since there is no crime, based on the criterion of no harm (no lesividad) and the nonexistence of a protected legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State to be able to seize and subsequently confiscate the vehicle for the benefit of the State and deprive the individual of their private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, eventually with prison, and despite that, the confiscation of the property is carried out, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. This suffices to understand the lack of reasonableness and the disproportionality of this measure. It would suffice to leave the offender without the possibility of circulation in the event of violating an administrative rule on driving under the influence of alcohol, to remove the license plates, or the fine imposed, or a combination of these, but never confiscate the vehicle for the benefit of the State in the face of a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it violates the constitutional right to private property. Moreover, it is confiscatory because it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for the care of the car and tow truck transport. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual to their property suffering deterioration and damage that diminish their assets.

4.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that turns out to be manifestly unfounded, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, equal or similar petition that was rejected.

Drafted by Justice Vargas Benavides; and,

Considering:

I.- On admissibility. The action of unconstitutionality is admissible only in relation to the provisions of Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Penal Code, since, as can be seen at folio 29 of the file, the invocation of unconstitutionality in the underlying case pending resolution was made regarding that rule and not regarding the others. Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as an admissibility requirement the existence of an underlying case pending resolution, where the unconstitutionality was invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Likewise, Article 79 of the same Law establishes that the brief filing the action must be submitted together with a literal certification of the brief where the unconstitutionality was invoked in the main case. In the case under analysis, the underlying case is constituted by the cause being pursued against the petitioner in the Prosecutor's Office of Cañas, for the crime of "Violation of the Traffic Law (Infracción a la Ley de Tránsito)," processed under expediente number 08-200005-413-PE, and it is verified that the unconstitutionality was invoked when stating at folio 29 front: “Additionally to the above, in my opinion the crime typified in the new law borders on the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and furthermore is confiscatory and a violation of private property, another of the constitutional rights that we Costa Ricans hold, by seizing the vehicle and refusing its immediate return to the registered owner.” II.- Object of the action. Article 254 bis of the Penal Code states:

“Article 254 bis.- A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years and disqualification from driving vehicles of all types, for one (1) to five (5) years, shall be imposed on anyone who drives on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed competitions, or drag races against one or several vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality.

If the driver is under any of the conditions indicated in the preceding paragraph and those indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 107 of the Traffic Law by Public Land Routes, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its reforms, a prison sentence of two (2) to six (6) years shall be imposed, and additionally, they shall be disqualified from driving all types of vehicles for two (2) to ten (10) years.

A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives a motor vehicle at a speed greater than one hundred fifty (150) kilometers per hour.

A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five (0.75) grams of alcohol per liter of blood.

A repeat offender shall be sentenced to prison for two (2) to eight (8) years.

When a prison sentence of three (3) years or less is imposed, the court may substitute the custodial sentence with an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública), which may range from two hundred (200) hours to nine hundred fifty (950) hours of service, in the places and manner indicated in Article 71 ter of the Traffic Law by Public Land Routes, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its reforms.” As the first ground, the petitioner alleges that the challenged rule is contrary to the principle of offensiveness (principio de ofensividad), given that there is no legal interest to protect. In his judgment, prison is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an anti-juridical action typified as a crime, so he considers that imposing said penalty on someone who drives under the influence of liquor is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that no valid legal interest is protected, as no impact on life or physical integrity occurs. He points out that less burdensome measures or sanctions exist that could be applied. As a second point, the petitioner asserts that the reform made to the Traffic Law, regarding driving while intoxicated typified as a crime, violates the principles of notification (principio de intimación), imputation (principio de imputación), innocence (principio de inocencia), right to be heard (derecho de audiencia), right of defense itself (derecho de defensa en sí), right to technical defense (derecho a la defensa técnica), and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against themselves and much less to produce evidence against themselves. This is because there are no persons in charge of ensuring that these guarantees and constitutional rights are fulfilled, since detainees who are allegedly under the influence of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to testify before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He asserts that despite this, the law allows a breathalyzer test to be administered to them. As a third issue, the petitioner argues that the challenged rule violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because, when engaging in the conduct provided for in the questioned rule, a multiplicity of sanctions is produced: a financial fine, loss or confiscation of the driver’s license, disqualification from driving for a set period, confiscation of license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage costs, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. He asserts that this further violates the principle of non bis in idem. Regarding the financial fine, he states that it is confiscatory because the economic possibility of each individual is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is verified when observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light than for not having a current vehicle inspection. Finally, he alleges a violation of the right to private property, given that the vehicle is confiscated, which he deems unconstitutional, since in the absence of a crime, due to the lack of protection of a legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The individual is exposed to their property being damaged and suffering deterioration.

III.- On the protected legal interest in the challenged rule. The petitioner states that prison is the strongest sanction for someone who commits an anti-juridical action typified as a crime, so he considers that imposing said penalty on someone who drives under the influence of liquor is disproportionate by virtue of the fact that the rule does not protect any legal interest. He points out that less burdensome measures or sanctions exist that could be applied. This Court has already ruled on the issue of the protection of legal interests in the challenged rule and the reasonableness of the use of imprisonment as a sanction:

“IV.- On the protection of legal interests in the challenged rule. While it is true that every criminalized conduct must have as its objective the protection of a specific legal interest, the legislator has the power to design criminal laws as they consider best adapted to the nature of the interest sought to be protected and in accordance with the objectives assigned to the penalty and to criminal law in general, which may be not only retributive but also preventive—whether of a positive or negative general prevention—resocializing, etc. The dominant doctrine has distinguished between crimes of injury and crimes of danger, according to the differing intensity of the attack on the legal interest. In crimes of injury, the production of the injury to the legal interest or the object representing it is required for the typicality of the act, whereas in crimes of danger, that effect is not required, producing an advancement of the protection of the interest to phases prior to its effective impairment or injury. The delimitation between one class of crimes and another can be difficult when facing specific criminal types. Thus, in crimes where collective interests such as public health, traffic safety, etc., are protected, if one considers the impact that the conduct implies for the collective legal interest, they may be considered crimes of injury; however, in relation to individual legal interests, they only imply a danger. The differentiation between crimes of abstract danger and concrete danger is also not easy in some cases, since both require an action deemed wrongful, whereas only concrete danger crimes require a true result deemed wrongful, which consists precisely of that specific endangering. According to the majority doctrinal opinion, crimes of abstract danger sanction the implementation of conduct generally reputed to be dangerous, without the need for a danger to the protected legal interest to materialize. The aim is to punish the dangerousness of the conduct itself, without evaluating the capacity for injury or the actual endangering of the protected legal interests. In them, the dangerousness of the typical conduct is determined through a legal generalization based on the consideration that certain behaviors are generally dangerous for the typical object and, ultimately, for the legal interest. The legislator selects forms of behavior typically dangerous for the corresponding legal interest, without needing to establish in each specific case the concrete endangering of the object of the action or the legal interest protected in the rule. An effective endangering—judged ex post—for the object of the action or the protected legal interest is not required, although it is required that the performance of that behavior implies—from an ex ante perspective—a risk of producing a concrete endangering or injury to the legal interest. Doctrine has found difficulties in determining whether crimes of abstract danger imply a true content of material anti-juridicity, and it is debated whether they violate the principles of culpability and offensiveness or not. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), for its part, has determined that not all criminal types of abstract danger are unconstitutional (In this regard, rulings 2805-96, which ruled on articles regulating the illegal carrying of weapons; 1792-99 regarding possession of counterfeiting instruments and criminal association; 4673-03 on crimes in the Migration and Aliens Law; and 218-06 on crimes in the Law on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Unauthorized Drugs, Legitimization of Capital and Related Activities may be consulted). In concrete danger crimes, in contrast, the danger to the legal interest does constitute an express element of the criminal type, so in order to consider the crime consummated, the judge must verify the production of a real danger for an object of the action, causally linked and objectively attributable to it. Therefore, as in crimes of injury, if not a result, a ‘danger of a concrete result’ must be created, insofar as it is an adequate and non-permitted risk of injury, which requires as prerequisites that the object of the action has entered the operational sphere of the person who endangers it, and then that the behavior has created a proximate danger of injury to that object of the action. In the rule under analysis, the criminalized conduct is of concrete danger, insofar as it has been conclusively demonstrated that it produces harmful results to legal interests considered of great value to society.

The criminal offenses described (driving on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed contests or drag races (piques) against one or more vehicles, against the clock or any other modality; driving a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty kilometers per hour; driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five grams of alcohol per liter of blood) constitute multi-offensive actions, that is, they endanger, as the case may be, various legal interests such as common security, public order, property, physical integrity, health, and life. These are interests whose protection is legitimate under the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the possibility of restricting those behaviors that harm the rights of third parties, morals, or public order:

“When private actions transcend the person who executes them and compromise the common good (public order or morals or cause harm to a third party), they are regulable by the State and even prohibited by it, provided there are reasons for it and the regulation passes the reasonableness test required by substantive due process. Thus, the individual must accept those restrictions on their freedom of action that the legislator establishes for the promotion of social coexistence within the limits of what is demandable, provided the independence of the person is maintained. Freedom is restrictable, indeed, by virtue of sufficient reasons from the constitutional perspective. The foregoing leads to the principle of negative freedom, which, as a principle, does not grant a definitive permission to do or omit whatever one wants to the extent that sufficient reasons—rights of third parties, morals, or public order—do not justify a restriction of negative freedom. With this, the principle of negative freedom can take into account the individual's connection with the community. We start, then, from the premise that the State is forbidden from interfering in the sphere of private freedom, unless public order, morals, or the rights of third parties are involved, in which case, state regulation would be possible, by means of a formal law. The restriction, however, must only be what is necessary to achieve the intended purpose, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, parameters of constitutionality according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court. The consulted bill, which establishes the mandatory use of the seatbelt, entails a question inherent to the common good (understood as the general public good), and therefore constitutes conduct susceptible to legal regulation, which in the judgment of the Chamber is compatible with the Law of the Constitution […] Maintaining order and safety on the roads directly affects two fundamental aspects of life in society, such as the health and life of those who use them. Law number 7331 aims to regulate the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the nation's land routes, as well as everything related to road safety (article 1), both for pedestrians and for drivers and passengers, which denotes the existence of an indissoluble link between the regulation for the use of public roads and the safety of those who travel on them, which fully justifies the intervention of the State in the matter.” (Sentencia 2004-01603-04 of nine hours thirty minutes on February seventeen, two thousand four) The conducts provided for in article 254 bis of the Penal Code are in themselves risky or dangerous for the property, health, integrity, and life of persons. Moreover, they are conducts that seriously affect public order and common security. Furthermore, upon consulting the Statement of Motives (Exposición de Motivos) of legislative file 16.496 (folios 2 to 45), which gave rise to Law 8696, sufficient reasons of public interest are found that legitimize the intervention of the State in the regulation of certain conducts deemed harmful to the community and to individuals in particular:

“Deaths and injuries from traffic accidents are a problem for public health and the development of countries, as categorically stated in the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, presented in 2004 by the World Health Organization. The report reveals that 1.2 million people die each year from traffic accidents. Of these, 20 to 50 million suffer injuries or become disabled, accounting for 2.1% of total deaths globally. The projections made indicate that traffic accidents will increase and that by the year 2020, they will occupy third place as the main cause of morbidity and mortality, which is alarming. Each victim of a traffic accident represents a high social and economic cost for society and for families. Globally, the figure is close to 518 billion dollars, and for Latin America it is impacting more than 1.5% of the gross domestic product. Costa Rica is not immune to this global problem, with traffic accidents being the first cause of violent deaths; due to several factors, among which are high levels of aggressiveness and stress, manifested in reckless behaviors and habits that users of the traffic system reproduce day after day […] To establish the risk factors associated with the occurrence of these deaths, the database of 'in situ' deaths from traffic accidents over a six-year period (2000-2005) was used, yielding the following results: a.- 28.77%, 636 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident, excess speed […] b.- 18.09%, 400 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident, pedestrian imprudence […] c.- 16.92%, 374 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause of being under the effects of alcohol […] d.- 12.71%, 281 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, driver imprudence […] e.- 9.45%, 209 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, improper passing (adelantamiento indebido) […] f.- 6.06%, 134 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, cyclist imprudence […] g.- 4.30%, 95 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, mechanical failure […] h.- The remaining 3.70%, 82 deceased persons are attributed as a possible cause, other factors […].” Regarding alcohol intake and its relationship with traffic accidents, it is stated:

“[…] traffic accidents are related to alcohol consumption as one of the main causes of preventable mortality and morbidity. Various studies have determined that blood alcohol concentrations above 0.5 g/l correlate with a linear risk of having a traffic accident and sustaining more serious injuries. Alcohol produces a non-selective depression of the central nervous system, impairing psychomotor function, sensory perception (sight and hearing), modifying the person's behavior, etc. In general, the effects of alcohol are directly proportional to its concentration in the blood: the higher the concentration, the greater the impairment. It is perfectly demonstrated that alcohol markedly impairs psychomotor function and the ability to drive safely. While the trend in developed countries regarding fatalities resulting from driving with alcohol is downward, in neighboring Latin American nations and even nationally it is clearly increasing, hence an increase in the amount of the current fine is also proposed, as a way to inhibit the driver from committing this type of violent reaction. From the database of 'in situ' deaths over six years of data, it was obtained that of a total of 2,211 fatalities, 16.92%, that is, 374 deaths, are attributed as a possible cause of the accident the presence of alcohol.” In relation to drivers who exceed speed limits, it is maintained:

“In recent years, we have seen how the practice of a deadly 'pastime' has proliferated on the streets of San José. Irresponsible drivers, generally young people, test their machines and skill behind the wheel on the public thoroughfare in an attitude that openly threatens their physical integrity and that of third parties. This situation has already caused many accidents and losses of innocent pedestrians' lives who travel unprotected before the imprudence of these drivers. The existing regulations are insufficient to prevent these demonstrations or 'drag races' (piques), so the task must be to create applicable rules to permanently solve this problem.” From the foregoing, it is concluded, therefore, that the conducts provided for in the challenged rule do harm individual and social legal interests, and from that point of view, they do not violate the principle of offensiveness (lesividad) provided for in article 28 of the Political Constitution.

**V.- On the reasonableness of the challenged rule.** The plaintiff considers that the State cannot interfere in the sphere of life of persons beyond what is reasonable. That is, the criminal prohibition must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. He argues that in the case of the challenged rule, the prohibition is not necessary because it does not protect any specific legal interest, it is not suitable because prison is not the best means of protection, as it is an inhuman means to solve problems, which creates more violence and desocializes; and, as to proportionality, since the acts classified as reckless driving (conducción temeraria) do not protect any legal interest, it is disproportionate to impose a penalty when a disciplinary sanction could prevent harm to third parties, and, furthermore, other criminal offenses already exist in current laws that protect the real damages caused. As indicated, the conducts provided for in the challenged rule do affect or endanger highly valuable legal interests for society and for individuals in particular. Reckless driving (conducción temeraria) in our country constitutes the main cause of violent deaths. Drunk driving, high speed, and the holding of races or "drag races" (piques) on public roads are truly reprehensible behaviors that reflect a great contempt for one's own life and the lives of others. They denote a serious cultural problem and a loss of the values that should govern social life, such as respect for others, solidarity, courtesy, altruism. The State is not only legitimized to prohibit and sanction such conducts, in accordance with the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, but it has the obligation to intervene to protect the legal interests that are harmed or endangered, given that those who do not perform these actions should not have to suffer the consequences of the harmful actions of others and deserve state protection. The fact that the prison sentence is used as a deterrent for the referred conducts is not in itself disproportionate, given the extremely high danger that the mentioned conducts generate for the legal interests considered of greatest value to society. In addition, it can be observed that the legislator establishes alternative sanctions that make it possible to apply prison as a last resort and only for the minimum indispensable time, in accordance with the parameters established by article 71 of the Penal Code.” (Sentencia 2004-09 of fourteen hours forty minutes on February eleven, two thousand nine) Based on what is set forth in the partially transcribed resolution, the action is rejected on the merits regarding that point.

**IV.- Nonexistence of injury to due process.** The plaintiff affirms that the amendment made to the Ley de Tránsito, regarding driving under the influence of alcohol classified as a crime, infringes the principles of notification (intimación), imputation (imputación), innocence, right to a hearing, right to defense itself, right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against themselves, much less to produce evidence against themselves. This is because there are no guarantors charged with overseeing compliance with these constitutional guarantees and rights, as detainees who are presumably under the effects of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to testify before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He affirms that despite this, the Law allows a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) to be administered to the accused (imputado). In this regard, it must be pointed out that for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes introduced by the amendment to the Ley de Tránsito, particularly that provided for in article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, i.e., driving under the influence of alcohol, the principles, rights, and guarantees that comprise due process must be respected, as provided for both in the Political Constitution and in the various international law instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), and the very jurisprudence of this Chamber. The exercise of the right to defense must be fully respected by all public authorities and must be recognized from the moment a person has the status of accused (imputado), i.e., from when they are identified as a possible perpetrator of a punishable act or a participant in it, through any act of the investigation or procedure (article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that the defense of any of the parties in the procedure is inviolable. Likewise, article 93 of the same Code indicates that before the accused (imputado) testifies about the facts, they shall be required to appoint a lawyer to assist them. If the accused (imputado) does not choose a defense attorney of their own choosing, the State shall provide a public defender to exercise the technical defense. As for the elements of proof, they shall only have value if they have been obtained by a lawful means and incorporated according to the procedure established by the Code of Criminal Procedure (article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). If, in the specific case, any violation of the elements that comprise due process has occurred, it is a problem that does not stem from the challenged rules, but from their application by the authorities, which is not controllable through this avenue.

**V.- Nonexistence of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.** The plaintiff argues that by virtue of the amendments to the Ley de Tránsito, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the following sanctions are produced: economic fine, loss or confiscation of the license, disqualification from driving for a specified period, confiscation of the license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation costs, tow trucks, vehicle storage, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, jail. In addition, he considers that the non bis in idem principle is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he affirms that it is confiscatory because the economic possibility of each administered person is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is verified by observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light bulb than for not having the technical inspection (revisión técnica) up to date. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the only penalty provided for in the challenged rule is one to three years of prison, which can be substituted by an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública) that may be from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The sanctions of fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged rule. The other aspects pointed out by the plaintiff are consequences derived from the crime, but they do not themselves constitute a penalty and, in any case, are not provided for in the challenged rule.

**VI.- On the violation of the right to private property.** The plaintiff affirms that the seizure (comiso) of the vehicle driven while intoxicated is unconstitutional, since, as there is no crime, according to the criterion of no offensiveness (no lesividad) and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The administered person is exposed to their property suffering deterioration and damages that impair their patrimony. From a reading of the challenged rule, it is verified that it makes no reference to the seizure (comiso) of the vehicle, for in reality this is a consequence of the crime that is contained in other rules, such as article 110 of the Penal Code and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

**VII.- Conclusion.** Based on the considerations set forth, the action is rejected outright (de plano) in relation to articles 29 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeen, two thousand eight. Regarding article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.

**Por tanto:** The action is rejected outright (de plano) regarding articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeen, two thousand eight. Regarding article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.

Adrián Vargas B. Acting President Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Rosa María Abdelnour G. Roxana Salazar C.

**EXPEDIENTE N° 09-000788-0007-CO** Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. E-mail address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW MATTERS", "resultado": "Jurisdictional conflict unfounded", "despachoOrden": "8", "despacho": "Sala Constitucional", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionOral": "0", "esResolucionRelevante": "1", "fecha": "2009-03-24", "tipoDocumento": "EXT", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "tipoContenido": "Majority vote", "sourceName": "Documentos", "formatoDocumento": "ESCRITO", "tipoResolucion": "De Fondo", "tipoInformacion": "Resolución Judicial", "html": "04955-09.&nbsp; RECKLESS DRIVING. 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Nº 2009004955</span></b><span\r\nlang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> <o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p><b><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'>SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA\r\nCORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas y cincuenta y dos\r\nminutos del veinticuatro de marzo del dos mil nueve.</span></b><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:EN'> <o:p></o:p></span></p> **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and fifty-two minutes on the twenty-fourth of March, two thousand nine.** Action of unconstitutionality brought by Reinhard Gottfried Wilheim Becker, of legal age, single, in a common-law union, businessman, of German nationality, residence card number 704-133739-001483, resident of Arenal de Tilarán de Guanacaste; against articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeenth, two thousand eight, and 254 bis of the Criminal Code.

**Whereas (Resultando):** **1.-** By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at eight hours forty-six minutes on January twenty-first, two thousand nine, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 of Law number 8696 of December seventeenth, two thousand eight, and 254 bis of the Criminal Code be declared. As grounds for unconstitutionality, he indicates: a) non-existence of harm to a protected legal interest (bien jurídico tutelado); b) violation of due process; c) violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality; d) violation of the right to private property. a) Non-existence of harm to a protected legal interest: Firstly, the claimant points out that a prison sentence is the strongest penalty for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, which is why such a penalty, for driving under the influence of alcohol, is disproportionate and does not protect a valid legal interest. The case would be different if, under the influence of alcohol, an accident, death, or injury to a person were caused, where the legal interest harmed is life or physical integrity, and a duly classified penalty already exists in the Criminal Code. There are other, less onerous forms of repression and prevention for this type of conduct that the State can demand, and it does not constitute the only path to follow, so the principle of applying imprisonment as a last resort is not satisfied. For example, the establishment of education and cultural programs for new generations, rehabilitation programs, community work, economic fines, removing license plates, certification programs for good driving practices, rehabilitation programs, etc. That is, there is a clear violation of Article 28 of the Constitution, insofar as it is not sufficient, as jurisprudence indicates, for conduct to fit within a criminal type (tipo penal); it is essential that significant harm to the protected legal interest be produced. b) Violation of due process: Before the enactment of the new Traffic Law, driving under the influence of alcohol resulted in a fine and administrative sanction. In contrast, with the entry into force and the classification of the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol as a crime, the driver becomes an accused person (imputado) and, consequently, with a series of constitutional guarantees and rights entirely ignored in the law and its application. The Chamber has been consistent in its jurisprudence in establishing that no one may be subject to a sanction without their guilt having been proven through a procedure that respects the right of defense. Thus, the right of defense in general encompasses a series of principles, among which are the principle of notification (principio de intimación), the principle of imputation (principio de imputación), the right to a hearing, the right of defense itself, the principle of innocence, the right to technical defense, and more importantly, the constitutional guarantee of Article 36 of the Political Constitution that "in criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against themselves..." much less to produce evidence against themselves. All these principles are violated by the classification as a crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, since in the reform to the law and even more so in practice, there are no guarantors responsible for monitoring that these constitutional guarantees and rights can be fulfilled. Neither in the reform introduced by the Law nor in its application by the authorities are detainees who are presumably under the influence of alcohol warned regarding their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to testify before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney; despite this, the law authorizes the administration of a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) to them. Thus, the law does not provide a procedure to guarantee the right of defense of the accused nor establish guarantors who can protect these rights. c) Violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality: The reforms introduced in the challenged Law absolutely transgress the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. When a driver is detained for driving under the influence of alcohol, the following sanctions are produced: economic fine, loss or seizure (decomiso) of the license, disqualification (inhabilitación) from driving for a determined period, seizure of license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage expenses, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. In such terms, there is definitively no proportionality in the new criminal type introduced by the Law. The Law is becoming something completely and utterly arbitrary and inquisitorial, far from the democratic and rule-of-law system in which we live. There are other, less onerous means to achieve the end sought by the new Law, and given the possibility of less onerous sanctions, the imposition of the most onerous sanction is not appropriate according to the rules and principles already indicated. Additionally, in the reform introduced to the Traffic Law, the unconstitutionality of which is being alleged, the same person is being judged and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, seizure (comiso), disqualification) for the same act, which transgresses the constitutional precept that no one may be tried twice for the same act, and the criminal type is going beyond this fact, violating said principle. That is, the new law allows for up to nine sanctions to be imposed for the same act. It is also worth noting that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad), since there are at least 8 sanctions less onerous than imprisonment for that conduct, but even so, the norm sanctions with a prison sentence. In another order of ideas, regarding the economic fine, this is confiscatory, also breaching the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since it must be in each specific case that the economic possibility of each individual subject to administration (administrado) is analyzed. The Law, in general, establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and which in some cases go beyond the economic possibility of individuals subject to administration, establishing fines of more than one base salary (salario base), that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. Finally, the lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the penalties imposed by the reform, the unconstitutionality of which is alleged, is evidenced when, for example, a greater penalty is imposed for having a burnt-out light than for not having a current vehicle technical inspection, the second conduct being clearly more serious than the first. Like this one, there are countless examples in the cited law. d) Violation of the right to private property: Private property is inviolable, and no one may be deprived of theirs, except for legally proven public interest, upon prior compensation in accordance with the law. The seizure (decomiso) and subsequent forfeiture (comiso) of the car in the specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. In the absence of a crime, according to the criterion of no harmfulness (no lesividad) and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no cause of justification on the part of the State to be able to seize and subsequently effect the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State and deprive the individual subject to administration of private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, and eventually with imprisonment, and despite this, the forfeiture of the property is effected, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. It would suffice to leave the offender without the possibility of driving in the event of transgressing an administrative norm on driving under the influence of alcohol, or to remove the license plates, or the imposed fine, or a combination of these, but never the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State for a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it is violative of the constitutional right to private property. Furthermore, it is confiscatory as it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for vehicle care and tow truck transport. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual subject to administration to their property suffering deterioration and damages that diminish their assets. The claimant indicates that he currently appears as an accused (imputado) in a judicial cause pending before the Prosecutor's Office of Cañas, processed under expediente number 08-200005-413-PE, which is pending resolution.

**2.-** By resolution issued at sixteen hours twenty minutes on February ninth, two thousand nine, the claimant was warned to: substantiate in a clear and precise manner, with specific citation of the norms or principles deemed infringed, the reasons why he considers that the challenged articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141 and 144 are unconstitutional; provide a literal certification of the brief where he invoked the unconstitutionality of those norms in the base matter (asunto base) pending resolution; provide seven additional sets of copies of all the documentation presented (six for the Justices of the Chamber and one for the Procuraduría General de la República) as well as those necessary for the opposing parties appearing in the base matter, if any, and the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados for the sum of two hundred fifty colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief. (folio 47 front) **3.-** By brief presented at thirteen hours twenty-five minutes on February sixteenth, two thousand eight, the claimant appears to comply with the warning (folios 49 to 53), stating the following: Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code transgresses Article 28 of the Constitution, given that driving under the influence of alcohol does not transgress any protected legal interest nor harm third parties. If third parties were to be harmed, there are already norms that sanction the conduct, such as negligent injury (lesiones culposas), negligent homicide (homicidio culposo), among others. That is, it is not a case of conduct that must be criminalized, and it falls to the State to do so only as a last option or as a last resort (última ratio) if there is a need, and currently, the State has not exhausted all means to achieve the end. Additionally, this norm, together with the provisions of 130 subsection a) (formerly 129), 141 (formerly 140), 139 subsection c) (formerly 138), 144 (formerly 143), transgresses the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The sanctions applied are: a fine of seventy-five percent of the base salary, loss or seizure (decomiso) of the license, disqualification (inhabilitación) from driving for a determined period, seizure of license plates, seizure of the vehicle, payment of transportation, tow truck, and vehicle storage expenses, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually imprisonment. That is, the conduct that harms no legal interest and therefore is not punishable has, in addition, a series of sanctions that violate constitutional principles. In the reform introduced to the Traffic Law, the unconstitutionality of which is being alleged, the same person is being judged and sanctioned more than once and with different penalties (fine, seizure (comiso), disqualification) for the same act, which transgresses the constitutional precept that no one may be tried twice for the same act. That is, the new Law allows for up to 9 sanctions to be imposed for the same act. It is also worth noting that the existence of these other sanctions demonstrates the contravention of the principle of specificity, since there are at least eight sanctions less onerous than imprisonment for that conduct, but even so, the norm sanctions with a prison sentence. In another order of ideas, regarding the economic fine, this is confiscatory, also breaching the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since it must be in each specific case that the economic possibility of each individual subject to administration is analyzed, violating Article 40 of the Political Constitution. The law establishes and imposes fines that are confiscatory, disproportionate, and irrational, and which in some cases go beyond the economic possibility of individuals subject to administration, establishing fines of more than one base salary, that is, more than what an ordinary person earns in a month, which is disproportionate. The reforms introduced to the Traffic Law, where the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol is classified, transgress these principles, and there is no procedure that guarantees the right of defense when administering the breathalyzer test. The system, in practice, does not guarantee the fundamental principles of due process and the right of defense, and there is no warning that the accused may or may not abstain from undergoing the breathalyzer test, nor regarding the manipulation that this type of evidence could be subjected to. By this it is meant that a procedure must be established under which the right of defense of accused persons can be guaranteed, be it technical assistance, warning of constitutional rights and guarantors of this situation, the right not to produce evidence against oneself, among others. When the breathalyzer test is administered, there is no guarantor who can attest to the warning of such rights, since those who administer said tests are traffic officers, and given that we are now in the presence of a crime, those rights must still be respected and guaranteed, and neither the law nor the system provide for said situation. Even when an accused person can refuse to submit to the breathalyzer test and be forced to do so, there are no guarantors of the constitutional rights, and basically of Article 36 of the Constitution, which is why they consider the norm of Article 107 to be unconstitutional. Private property is inviolable, and even when driving under the influence of alcohol, there is no justification on the part of the State to be able to seize the vehicle and subject it to a series of damages simply by keeping it in a vehicle depot, with exposure to inclement weather and manipulation by third parties. The seizure and subsequent forfeiture (comiso) of the car in the specific case is totally and completely unconstitutional. In the absence of a crime, according to the criterion of no harmfulness and the non-existence of a protected legal interest, there is no cause of justification on the part of the State to be able to seize and subsequently effect the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State and deprive the individual subject to administration of private property. Likewise, it is disproportionate and unjustified that the driver is disqualified from driving, sanctioned with fines, and eventually with imprisonment, and despite this, the forfeiture of the property is effected, which in many cases even belongs to a third party. It is enough to understand the lack of reasonableness and the disproportionality of this measure. It would suffice to leave the offender without the possibility of driving in the event of transgressing an administrative norm on driving under the influence of alcohol, to remove the license plates, or the imposed fine, or a combination of these, but never the forfeiture of the vehicle in favor of the State for a potential crime whose significance also does not justify such action, as it is violative of the constitutional right to private property. Furthermore, it is confiscatory as it exceeds those parameters and imposes fines for vehicle care and tow truck transport. Apart from this situation, it exposes the individual subject to administration to their property suffering deterioration and damages that diminish their assets.

**4.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any petition presented for its review that proves to be manifestly unfounded, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical, or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Justice Vargas Benavides; and, **Considering (Considerando):** **I.- On admissibility.** The action of unconstitutionality is admissible only in relation to the provision of Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Criminal Code, given that, as can be seen at folio 29 of the expediente, the invocation of unconstitutionality in the base matter pending resolution was made regarding that norm and not regarding the others. Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as a requirement for admissibility the existence of a base matter pending resolution, where the unconstitutionality had been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Likewise, Article 79 of the same Law establishes that the brief filing the action must be presented together with a literal certification of the brief where the unconstitutionality was invoked in the principal matter. In the case under analysis, the base matter is the cause being pursued against the claimant in the Prosecutor's Office of Cañas, for the crime of "Violation of the Traffic Law," processed under expediente number 08-200005-413-PE, and it is verified that the unconstitutionality was invoked when pointing out at folio 29 front: *"In addition to the above, in my opinion, the crime classified in the new law borders on the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and moreover is confiscatory and a violation of private property, another of the constitutional rights that we Costa Ricans hold, by seizing the vehicle and refusing its immediate return to the registered owner."* **II.- Object of the action.** Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code states:

*“Article 254 bis.- A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years and disqualification (inhabilitación) from driving vehicles of all types, of one (1) to five (5) years, shall be imposed on anyone who drives on public roads in illicit races, illegal speed contests, or drag races (piques) against one or several vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality.* *If the driver is under any of the conditions indicated in the preceding paragraph and those indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 107 of the Law of Traffic on public land routes, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its reforms, a prison sentence of two (2) to six (6) years shall be imposed, and, in addition, they shall be disqualified from driving all types of vehicles for two (2) to ten (10) years.* A prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty (150) kilometers per hour.

Prison of one (1) to three (3) years shall be imposed on anyone who drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five (0.75) grams of alcohol per liter of blood.

A repeat offender shall be sentenced to a prison term of two (2) to eight (8) years.

When a prison sentence of three (3) years or less is imposed, the court may substitute the custodial sentence with an alternative measure of public utility service, which may range from two hundred (200) hours to nine hundred fifty (950) hours of service, in the locations and manner set forth in article 71 ter of the Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, and its amendments." As a first argument, the claimant alleges that the challenged norm is contrary to the principle of offensiveness (ofensividad), given that there is no legal interest (bien jurídico) to protect. In his view, jail is the strongest penalty for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, and therefore he considers that imposing such a penalty for anyone who drives under the influence of alcohol is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that no valid legal interest is being safeguarded, since there is no impact on life or physical integrity. He notes that there are less burdensome measures or sanctions that could be applied. As a second point, the claimant asserts that the reform made to the Ley de Tránsito, regarding driving under the influence of alcohol classified as a crime, infringes upon the principles of notification (intimación), imputation (imputación), innocence, the right to a hearing, the right of defense itself, the right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obligated to testify against oneself and much less to produce evidence against oneself. This is because there are no personnel charged with ensuring that these constitutional guarantees and rights are complied with, as detainees who are presumably under the influence of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make statements before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He states that despite this, the law allows a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) to be performed on them. As a third issue, the claimant argues that the challenged norm infringes the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because incurring the conduct set forth in the questioned norm results in a multiplicity of sanctions: a financial fine, loss or confiscation of the license, disqualification from driving for a specific period, confiscation of the license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation costs, tow trucks, vehicle storage, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, jail. He asserts that this also violates the principle of non bis in idem. Regarding the financial fine, he affirms that it is confiscatory because the financial capacity of each individual subject to the administration is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is evident when observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burned-out light bulb than for not having an up-to-date vehicle inspection. Finally, he alleges a violation of the right to private property, given that the vehicle is confiscated, which he considers unconstitutional, since, in the absence of a crime, due to the lack of protection of a legal interest (bien jurídico), there is no justification on the part of the State. The individual is exposed to his property being damaged and suffering deterioration.

III.- Regarding the legal interest (bien jurídico) protected in the challenged norm. The claimant states that jail is the strongest penalty for someone who commits an unlawful act classified as a crime, and he therefore considers that imposing such a penalty for anyone who drives under the influence of alcohol is disproportionate, by virtue of the fact that the norm does not protect any legal interest. He notes that there are less burdensome measures or sanctions that could be applied. This Court has already ruled on the issue of the protection of legal interests (bienes jurídicos) in the challenged norm and the reasonableness of using prison as a sanction:

"IV.- Regarding the protection of legal interests (bienes jurídicos) in the challenged norm. While it is true that every criminalized conduct must aim to protect a specific legal interest, the legislator has the power to design criminal norms as deemed best adapted to the nature of the interest intended to be protected and in accordance with the purposes assigned to the penalty and to criminal law in general, which can be not only retributive but also preventive—whether for general positive or negative prevention—, resocializing, etc. The dominant doctrine has distinguished between crimes of injury (lesión) and crimes of danger (peligro), based on the differing intensity of the attack on the legal interest. In crimes of injury, the materialization of the injury to the legal interest or the object representing it is required for the criminality of the act, whereas in crimes of danger, this effect is not required, resulting in the advancement of the protection of the interest to phases prior to its effective impairment or injury. The delimitation between one class of crime and another can present difficulties when faced with specific criminal figures. Thus, in crimes protecting collective interests such as public health, traffic safety, etc., if one considers the impact the conduct has on the collective legal interest, they may be considered crimes of injury; however, with respect to individual legal interests, they only represent a danger. The differentiation between crimes of abstract danger (peligro abstracto) and crimes of concrete danger (peligro concreto) is also not easy in some cases, since both require a disvalue of action, while only crimes of concrete danger require a true disvalue of result, which consists precisely in that concrete creation of danger. According to the majority doctrinal opinion, crimes of abstract danger penalize the execution of a conduct generally reputed to be dangerous, without the need for a danger to the protected legal interest to actually materialize. The aim is to punish the dangerousness of the conduct itself, without evaluating the capacity for injury or the actual creation of danger to the protected legal interests. In these crimes, the dangerousness of the typical conduct is determined through a legal generalization based on the consideration that certain behaviors are generally dangerous for the typical object and, ultimately, for the legal interest. The legislator selects forms of behavior that are typically dangerous for the corresponding legal interest, without the need to establish in each particular case the concrete endangerment of the object of the action or the legal interest protected in the norm. An effective endangerment—judged ex post—of the object of the action or the protected legal interest is not required, although it is necessary that carrying out this behavior implies—from an ex ante perspective—a risk of producing a concrete endangerment or injury to the legal interest. Doctrine has found difficulties in determining whether crimes of abstract danger imply a true content of material unlawfulness, and it is debated whether they violate the principles of culpability and harmfulness (lesividad) or not. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), for its part, has determined that not all criminal types of abstract danger are unconstitutional (In this regard, see rulings 2805-96, which ruled on the articles regulating the illegal carrying of weapons; 1792-99 regarding the possession of counterfeiting instruments and illicit association; 4673-03 on crimes under the Ley de Migración y Extranjería; and 218-06 on crimes under the Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso no Autorizado, Legitimación de Capitales y Actividades Conexas). In crimes of concrete danger, on the other hand, the danger to the legal interest does constitute an express element of the criminal type, so that for the crime to be considered consummated, the judge must verify the creation of a real danger for an object of the action, causally linked and objectively attributable to it. Therefore, just as in crimes of injury, it must create, if not a result, a 'danger of concrete result' insofar as it is an adequate and impermissible risk of injury, which requires as prerequisites that the object of the action has entered the operational sphere of the person endangering it and, subsequently, that the behavior has created a proximate danger of injury to that object of the action. In the norm under analysis, the criminalized conducts are of concrete danger (peligro concreto), insofar as it has been reliably demonstrated that they produce injurious results to legal interests (bienes jurídicos) considered of great value to society. The criminal types described (driving on public roads in illegal races, illegal speed contests or drag races against one or several vehicles, against the clock, or any other modality; driving a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding one hundred fifty kilometers per hour; driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when the blood alcohol concentration is greater than zero point seventy-five grams of alcohol per liter of blood) constitute multi-offensive (pluriofensivas) actions, that is, they endanger, as the case may be, various legal interests such as public safety (seguridad común), public order (orden público), property, physical integrity, health, and life. These are interests whose protection is legitimate under the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the possibility of restricting those conducts that injure the rights of third parties, morality, or public order:

"When private actions transcend the person who executes them and compromise the common good (public order or morality or cause harm to a third party), they are regulable by the State and even prohibited by it, provided there are reasons for doing so and the regulation passes the reasonableness test required by substantive due process. Thus, the individual must accept those restrictions on his freedom of action that the legislator establishes for the promotion of social coexistence within the limits of what is demandable, provided the independence of the person is maintained. Freedom is restrictable, by virtue of sufficient reasons from a constitutional perspective. The foregoing leads to the principle of negative liberty, which, as a principle, does not grant a definitive permission to do or omit whatever one wants insofar as sufficient reasons—rights of third parties, public morality or order—do not justify a restriction of negative liberty. Thereby, the principle of negative liberty can take into account the individual's link to the community. We start, then, from the premise that the State is forbidden to interfere in the sphere of private liberty, unless public order, morality, or the rights of third parties are involved, in which case, state regulation would be possible, through a formal law. The restriction, however, must be only what is necessary to achieve the proposed end, in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, parameters of constitutionality according to the reiterated jurisprudence of this Court. The legislative bill consulted, which establishes the mandatory use of seat belts, entails a matter inherent to the common good (understood as the public good in general), and constitutes, therefore, a conduct susceptible to legal regulation, which in the judgment of the Chamber is compatible with the Law of the Constitution […] Maintaining order and safety on the roads directly affects two fundamental aspects of life in society, such as the health and life of those who use them. Law number 7331 aims to regulate the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the nation's land routes, as well as everything related to road safety (article 1), for both pedestrians and drivers and passengers, which denotes the existence of an indissoluble link between the regulation for the use of public roads and the safety of those who travel on them, which fully justifies the intervention of the State in this matter." (Ruling 2004-01603-04 of nine hours thirty minutes of February seventeenth, two thousand four) The conducts set forth in article 254 bis of the Penal Code are, in themselves, risky or dangerous for the property, health, integrity, and life of persons. Furthermore, they are conducts that seriously affect public order and public safety (seguridad común). To further elaborate, upon consulting the Statement of Motives for legislative file 16.496 (pages 2 to 45) that gave rise to Law 8696, sufficient reasons of public interest are found that legitimize the State's intervention in the regulation of certain conducts deemed harmful to the community and to individuals in particular:

"Deaths and injuries from traffic accidents are a problem for public health and the development of countries, as categorically stated by the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, presented in 2004 by the World Health Organization. The report reveals that 1.2 million people die each year from traffic accidents. Of these, 20 to 50 million suffer injuries or are disabled, accounting for 2.1% of total deaths globally. Projections indicate that traffic accidents will increase and that by the year 2020, they will occupy third place as the main cause of morbidity and mortality, which is alarming. Each victim of a traffic accident represents a high social and economic cost for society and families. Globally, the figure is close to 518 billion dollars, and for Latin America, it is impacting more than 1.5% of the gross domestic product. Costa Rica is not immune to this global problem, with traffic accidents being the leading cause of violent deaths; due to several factors, among which are high levels of aggressiveness and stress, manifested in reckless behaviors and habits that are reproduced day after day by users of the traffic system […] To establish the risk factors associated with the occurrence of these deaths, the database of 'in situ' deaths from traffic accidents over a six-year period (2000-2005) was used, obtaining the following results: a.- 28.77%, 636 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident, excess speed […] b.- 18.09%, 400 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause of the traffic accident, pedestrian imprudence (imprudencia del peatón) […] c.- 16.92%, 374 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, being under the effects of alcohol […] d.- 12.71%, 281 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, driver imprudence (imprudencia del conductor) […] e.- 9.45%, 209 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, improper passing (adelantamiento indebido) […] f.- 6.06%, 134 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, cyclist imprudence (imprudencia del ciclista) […] g.- 4.30%, 95 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, mechanical failure (falla mecánica) […] h.- The remaining 3.70%, 82 deceased persons, attributed as a possible cause, other factors […]." Regarding alcohol intake and its relationship with traffic accidents, it is stated:

"[…] traffic accidents are related to alcohol consumption as one of the main causes of preventable mortality and morbidity. Various studies have determined that blood alcohol concentrations exceeding 0.5 g/l correlate with a linear risk of having a traffic accident and presenting more serious injuries. Alcohol produces a non-selective depression of the central nervous system, impairing psychomotor function, sensory perception (sight and hearing), modifying the person's behavior, etc. In general, the effects of alcohol are directly proportional to its concentration in the blood: the higher the concentration, the greater the impairment. It is perfectly demonstrated that alcohol markedly impairs psychomotor function and the ability to drive safely. While the trend in developed countries regarding fatalities resulting from driving with alcohol is downward, in neighboring Latin American nations and even nationally, it is clearly on the rise; hence, an increase in the amount of the current fine is also proposed, as a way to inhibit drivers from committing this type of violent reaction. From the database of 'in situ' deaths over six years of data, it was found that of a total of 2,211 fatalities, 16.92%, that is, 374 deaths, were attributed to the presence of alcohol as a possible cause of the accident." Regarding drivers who exceed speed limits, it is stated:

"In recent years, we have seen how the practice of a deadly 'pastime' has proliferated on the streets of San José. Irresponsible drivers, generally young people, test their machines and driving skills on the public thoroughfare in an attitude that openly threatens their physical integrity and that of third parties. This situation has already caused many accidents and loss of life for innocent pedestrians who travel unprotected against the imprudence of these drivers. The existing regulations are insufficient to prevent these demonstrations or 'drag races' (piques), so the task must be the creation of applicable norms to permanently solve this problem." From the foregoing, it is concluded, then, that the conducts set forth in the challenged norm do indeed injure individual and social legal interests (bienes jurídicos) and, from that point of view, do not infringe upon the principle of harmfulness (lesividad) provided for in article 28 of the Political Constitution.

V.- Regarding the reasonableness of the challenged norm. The claimant considers that the State cannot interfere in the sphere of people's lives beyond what is reasonable. That is, the criminal prohibition must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. He argues that in the case of the questioned norm, the prohibition is not necessary because it does not protect any concrete legal interest (bien jurídico), it is not suitable because jail is not the best means of protection, as it is an inhumane means to solve problems, which creates more violence and desocializes; and, regarding proportionality, since the acts classified as reckless driving (conducción temeraria) do not protect any legal interest, it is disproportionate to impose a penalty when a disciplinary sanction could prevent harm to third parties, and furthermore, there already exist other criminal types in current laws that protect the actual damages caused. As indicated, the conducts set forth in the challenged norm do affect or endanger legal interests (bienes jurídicos) that are highly valuable to society and to individuals in particular. Reckless driving in our country constitutes the main cause of violent deaths. Driving while intoxicated (estado de ebriedad), high speed, and holding races or 'drag races' (piques) on public roads are truly reprehensible conducts that reflect a great disregard for one's own life and the lives of others. They denote a serious cultural problem and a loss of the values that should govern social life, such as respect for others, solidarity, courtesy, and altruism. The State is not only legitimized to prohibit and sanction such conducts, in accordance with the provisions of article 28 of the Political Constitution, but it has the obligation to intervene to protect the legal interests that are injured or endangered, given that those who do not carry out these actions should not have to suffer the consequences of the harmful actions of others and deserve state protection. The fact that a prison sentence is used as a deterrent for the aforementioned conducts is not in itself disproportionate, given the extremely high danger that said conducts generate for the legal interests considered of greatest value to society. Furthermore, it can be observed that the legislator establishes alternative sanctions that make it possible to apply prison as a last resort and only for the minimum essential time, in accordance with the parameters established in article 71 of the Penal Code." (Ruling 2004-09 of fourteen hours forty minutes of February eleventh, two thousand nine) Based on what was set forth in the partially transcribed ruling, the action is rejected on the merits regarding this point.

IV.- Non-existence of injury to due process. The claimant asserts that the reform made to the Ley de Tránsito, regarding driving under the influence of alcohol classified as a crime, infringes upon the principles of notification (intimación), imputation (imputación), innocence, the right to a hearing, the right of defense itself, the right to technical defense, and the constitutional guarantee that in criminal matters no one is obligated to testify against oneself and much less to produce evidence against oneself. This is because there are no guarantors charged with ensuring that these constitutional guarantees and rights are complied with, as detainees who are presumably under the influence of alcohol are not advised of their constitutional right not to produce evidence against themselves, not to make statements before the authorities, and to be assisted at all times by a defense attorney. He states that despite this, the Law permits a breathalyzer test (alcoholemia) to be performed on the accused (imputado). On this matter, it must be noted that for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes introduced by the reform to the Ley de Tránsito, particularly the one set forth in article 254 bis, fourth paragraph of the Penal Code, i.e., driving while intoxicated (estado de ebriedad), the principles, rights, and guarantees that make up due process must be respected, as provided for both in the Political Constitution and in the various international law instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), and the jurisprudence of this Chamber itself. The exercise of the right of defense must be fully respected by all public authorities and must be recognized from the moment a person has the status of accused (imputado), that is, from the time they are identified as the possible perpetrator of a punishable act or a participant in it, through any act of the investigation or procedure (article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that the defense of any of the parties in the proceeding is inviolable. Likewise, article 93 of the same Code states that before the accused (imputado) makes a statement about the facts, they shall be required to appoint an attorney to assist them. If the accused does not choose a defense attorney of their own choosing, the State shall provide a public defender to exercise the technical defense. As for evidentiary elements, these shall only have value if they have been obtained through a lawful means and incorporated in accordance with the procedure established by the Code of Criminal Procedure (article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

If, in the specific case, there has been some infringement of the elements that comprise due process, it is a problem that does not stem from the challenged norms, but from their application by the authorities, which is not reviewable through this channel.

**V.- Nonexistence of a violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.** The claimant argues that by virtue of the amendments to the Traffic Law, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are violated because the following sanctions are imposed: economic fine, loss or confiscation of the license, disqualification from driving for a set period, confiscation of the license plates, confiscation of the vehicle, payment of transportation costs, towing, vehicle storage fees, imposition of precautionary measures, and eventually, imprisonment. Furthermore, he considers that the principle of *non bis in idem* is violated. Regarding the economic fine, he states it is confiscatory because the economic capacity of each individual is not assessed. He adds that the disproportionality is evident when observing that a greater penalty is imposed for having a burnt-out light than for not having an up-to-date technical inspection. In this regard, it must be noted that the only penalty provided for in the challenged norm is one to three years of imprisonment, which can be substituted by an alternative measure of community service (prestación de servicio de utilidad pública) that may range from two hundred to nine hundred fifty hours of service. The sanctions of a fine and disqualification are not provided for in the challenged norm. The other aspects pointed out by the claimant are consequences derived from the crime, but do not themselves constitute a penalty and, in any case, are not provided for in the challenged norm.

**VI.- Regarding the violation of the right to private property.** The claimant states that the confiscation of the vehicle driven while intoxicated is unconstitutional, since, in the absence of a crime, based on the criterion of no harm and the non-existence of a legally protected interest, there is no justification on the part of the State. The individual is exposed to their property suffering deterioration and damages that undermine their estate. A reading of the challenged norm confirms that it makes no reference to the confiscation of the vehicle, as this is actually a consequence of the crime that is contained in other norms, such as Article 110 of the Criminal Code and Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

**VII.- Conclusion.** Based on the considerations set forth, the action is rejected outright in relation to Articles 29 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 of Law Number 8696 of December 17, 2008. Regarding Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Criminal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.

**Por tanto:** The action is rejected outright with respect to Articles 129 subsection e), 107 subsection c), 138 subsection c), 130 subsection e), 134, 136, 141, and 144 of Law Number 8696 of December 17, 2008. Regarding Article 254 bis, fourth paragraph, of the Criminal Code, the action is rejected on the merits.

Adrián Vargas B.

Presidente a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Rosa María Abdelnour G. Roxana Salazar C.

**EXPEDIENTE N° 09-000788-0007-CO**

* 090007880007CO * * 090007880007CO * Res. Nº 2009004955 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas y cincuenta y dos minutos del veinticuatro de marzo del dos mil nueve.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Reinhard Gottfried Wilheim Becker, mayor, soltero, en unión de hecho, empresario, de nacionalidad alemana, cédula de residencia número 704-133739-001483, vecina de Arenal de Tilarán de Guanacaste; contra los artículos 129 inciso e), 107 inciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136, 141 y 144 de la Ley número 8696 del diecisiete de diciembre del dos mil ocho y 254 bis del Código Penal.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las ocho horas cuarenta y seis minutos del veintiuno de enero del dos mil nueve, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 129 inciso e), 107 inciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136, 141 y 144 de la Ley número 8696 del diecisiete de diciembre del dos mil ocho y 254 bis del Código Penal. Como motivos de inconstitucionalidad señala: a) inexistencia de lesión a bien jurídico tutelado; b) violación al debido proceso; c) violación a los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad; d) violación al derecho de propiedad privada. a) Inexistencia de lesión a bien jurídico tutelado: En primer lugar, señala el accionante que la pena de cárcel es la sanción más fuerte para quien comete una acción antijurídica tipificada como delito, razón por la cual, dicha pena, para quien conduzca bajo los efectos del licor, resulta desproporcionada y no tutela un bien jurídico válido. Diferente sería el caso de si bajo los efectos del licor se ocasiona un accidente, muerte o lesiones de una persona, donde el bien jurídico lesionado es la vida o la integridad física y ya existe una pena debidamente tipificada en el Código Penal. Existen otras formas de represión y prevención menos gravosas para este tipo de conductas que el Estado puede exigir y no constituye el único camino a seguir, por lo que no se cumple con el principio de la aplicación de la cárcel como último recurso. Por ejemplo, la instauración de programas de educación y cultura para las nuevas generaciones, programas de rehabilitación, trabajo comunitario, multas económicas, el quitar placas, programas de certificación de buenas prácticas de conducción, programas de rehabilitación, etc. Es decir, existe una clara violación al artículo 28 constitucional, por cuanto no basta, como lo señala la jurisprudencia, con que una conducta encaje en un tipo penal sino que es esencial que se produzca una lesión significativa al bien jurídico tutelado. b) Violación al debido proceso: Antes de la promulgación de la nueva Ley de Tránsito, el conducir bajo los efectos del alcohol traía como consecuencia una multa y sanción administrativa. En cambio, con la entrada en vigencia y la tipificación de la conducta de conducir bajo los efectos del alcohol como delito, se convierte al conductor en un imputado y en consecuencia, con una serie de garantías y derechos constitucionales obviados del todo en la ley y su aplicación. La Sala ha sido reiterada en su jurisprudencia al establecer que a nadie se le podrá imponer una sanción sin que a través de un procedimiento en que se respete el derecho de defensa se haya demostrado su culpabilidad. Así, el derecho de defensa en general comprende una serie de principios, entre los cuales están, el principio de intimación, el principio de imputación, el derecho de audiencia, el derecho de defensa en sí, el principio de inocencia y el derecho de defensa técnica y más importante aún la garantía constitucional del artículo 36 de la Constitución Política de que “en materia penal nadie está obligado a declarar contra sí mismo…” mucho menos a producir prueba en su contra. Todos esos principios son violentados con la tipificación como delito de la conducción bajo los efectos del alcohol, pues en la reforma a la ley y más aún en la práctica, no existen garantes encargados de vigilar que se puedan cumplir con estas garantías y derechos constitucionales. Tanto en la reforma introducida por la Ley como en la aplicación de ésta por las autoridades, no se advierte a los detenidos y que están presuntamente bajo los efectos del alcohol respecto a su derecho constitucional de no producir prueba en su propia contra, de no declarar ante las autoridades y de ser asistido en todo momento por un defensor, a pesar de esto la ley autoriza a que se les practique la alcoholemia. Así las cosas, la ley no da un procedimiento para garantizar el derecho de defensa del imputado ni establece garantes que puedan dar protección a estos derechos. c) Violación a los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad: Las reformas introducidas en la Ley impugnada transgreden absolutamente los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Cuando se detiene a un conductor conduciendo bajo los efectos del alcohol, se producen las siguientes sanciones: multa económica, pérdida o decomiso de la licencia, inhabilitación para conducir por un plazo determinado, decomiso de las placas, decomiso del vehículo, pago de gastos de transporte, grúas y depósito del vehículo, imposición de medidas cautelares y eventualmente, cárcel. En tales términos, definitivamente no existe proporcionalidad en el nuevo tipo penal introducido por la Ley. La Ley se está transformando en algo total y completamente arbitrario e inquisitorio, lejos del sistema democrático y de derecho en que se vive. Hay otros medios menos gravosos para alcanzar el fin que pretende la nueva Ley y ante la posibilidad de sanciones menos gravosas no procede la imposición de la sanción más gravosa según las normas y principios ya indicados. Adicionalmente, en la reforma introducida a la Ley de Tránsito y cuya inconstitucionalidad se alega, se está juzgando y sancionando más de una vez y con penas distintas (multa, comiso, inhabilitación) por el mismo hecho a una misma persona lo que transgrede el precepto constitucional de que nadie puede ser juzgado dos veces por el mismo hecho y el tipo penal está yendo más allá de este hecho, violentando dicho principio. Es decir, la nueva ley permite que se impongan hasta nueve sanciones por un mismo hecho. Vale además indicar que la existencia de estas otras sanciones demuestra la contravención al principio de tipicidad, pues existen al menos 8 sanciones menos gravosas que la cárcel para esa conducta, pero aún así, la norma sanciona con pena de cárcel. En otro orden de ideas, en cuanto a la multa económica, ésta resulta confiscatoria, quebrantando también los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, toda vez que deberá ser en cada caso concreto que se deba analizar la posibilidad económica de cada administrado. La Ley en general establece e impone multas que resultan confiscatorias, resultan desproporcionadas e irracionales y que en algunos casos va más allá de la posibilidad económica de los administrados estableciendo multas de más de un salario base, es decir, más de lo que una persona común gana en un mes, lo que resulta desproporcional. Por último, la falta de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las penas impuestas con la reforma cuya inconstitucionalidad se alega, queda en evidencia cuando por ejemplo, se impone una pena mayor por tener una luz quemada que por no contar con la revisión técnica al día, siendo a todas luces la segunda conducta más grave que la primera. Como éste, hay un sinnúmero de ejemplos en la ley de cita. d) Violación al derecho de propiedad privada: La propiedad privada es inviolable y a nadie puede privarse de la suya, si no es por interés público legalmente comprobado, previa indemnización conforme a la ley. El decomiso y posterior comiso del carro en el caso concreto, resulta total y completamente inconstitucional. Al no existir delito, por el criterio de no lesividad y no existencia de un bien jurídico tutelado, no existe una causa de justificación por parte del Estado para poder decomisar y posteriormente efectuar el comiso del vehículo a favor del Estado y privar de la propiedad privada al administrado. Asimismo, resulta desproporcional e injustificado, que al conductor se le inhabilite para la conducción, se le sancione con multas, eventualmente con cárcel y a pesar de eso, se efectúe el comiso del bien, que en muchas ocasiones incluso pertenece a un tercero. Bastaría con dejar al infractor sin posibilidad de circulación en caso de transgredir una norma administrativa de conducción bajo los efectos del alcohol, o remover las placas, o la multa impuesta, o una combinación de éstas, pero nunca al comiso del vehículo a favor del Estado ante un potencial delito que su significancia tampoco justifica tal actuar pues resulta violatorio del derecho constitucional a la propiedad privada. Además, resulta confiscatorio por cuanto excede esos parámetros e impone multas por cuido del carro y transporte de grúas. Aparte de esta situación, expone al administrado a que su propiedad sufra el deterioro y daños que menoscaben su patrimonio. Señala el accionante que actualmente figura como imputado en una causa judicial seguida en la Fiscalía de Cañas, tramitada con el número de expediente 08-200005-413-PE, la cual se encuentra pendiente de resolver.

2.- Por resolución de las dieciséis horas veinte minutos del nueve de febrero del dos mil nueve, se previno al accionante: fundamentar en forma clara y precisa, con cita concreta de las normas o principios que se consideran infringidos, las razones por las cuales considera que los artículos 129 inciso e), 107 inciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136, 141 y 144 cuestionados, son inconstitucionales; aportar certificación literal del escrito donde invocó la inconstitucionalidad de esas normas en el asunto base pendiente de resolver; aportar siete juegos de copias más de toda la documentación presentada (seis para los Magistrados de la Sala y una para la Procuraduría General de la República) así como las necesarias para las partes contrarias que figuren en el asunto base, si las hubiere y el timbre del Colegio de Abogados por la suma de doscientos cincuenta colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito inicial. (folio 47 frente) 3.- Por escrito presentado a las trece horas veinticinco minutos del dieciséis de febrero del dos mil ocho, el accionante se apersona a cumplir con lo prevenido (folios 49 a 53), señalando lo siguiente: El artículo 254 bis del Código Penal transgrede el artículo 28 de la Constitución, dado que conducir bajo las influencias del alcohol no transgrede ningún bien jurídico tutelado ni perjudica a terceros. Si se llegara a perjudicar a terceros, ya existen normas que sancionan la conducta, tales como lesiones culposas, homicidio culposo, entre otros. Es decir, no se está en presencia de una conducta que tenga que penalizarse y le corresponde al Estado realizarlo hasta que sea la última opción o como última ratio si hay necesidad de hacerlo y en la actualidad no existe agotamiento por parte del Estado de todos los medios para poder alcanzar el fin. Adicionalmente a esto, dicha norma, en conjunto con la normativa del 130 inciso a) (antes 129), 141 (antes 140), 139 inciso c) (antes 138), 144 (antes 143), transgrede los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Las sanciones que se aplican: multa de un setenta y cinco por ciento del salario base, pérdida o decomiso de la licencia, inhabilitación para conducir por un plazo determinado, decomiso de las placas, decomiso del vehículo, pago de gastos de transporte, grúas y depósito del vehículo, imposición de medidas cautelares y eventualmente cárcel. Es decir, la conducta que no lesiona ningún bien jurídico y por lo tanto no es penalizable, además de eso, tiene una serie de sanciones que violentan los principios constitucionales. En la reforma introducida a la Ley de Tránsito y cuya inconstitucionalidad se alega, se está juzgando y sancionando más de una vez y con penas distintas (multa, comiso, inhabilitación) por el mismo hecho a una misma persona, lo que transgrede el precepto constitucional de que nadie puede ser juzgado dos veces por el mismo hecho. Es decir, la nueva Ley permite que se impongan hasta 9 sanciones por un mismo hecho. Vale además indicar que la existencia de estas otras sanciones demuestra la contravención al principio de tipicidad, pues existen al menos ocho sanciones menos gravosas que la cárcel para esa conducta, pero aún así, la norma sanciona con pena de cárcel. En otro orden de ideas, en cuanto a la multa económica, ésta resulta confiscatoria, quebrantando también los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, toda vez que deberá ser en cada caso concreto que se deba analizar la posibilidad económica de cada administrado, violentando el artículo 40 de la Constitución Política. La ley establece e impone multas que resultan confiscatorias, desproporcionadas e irracionales y que en algunos casos va más allá de la posibilidad económica de los administrados, estableciendo multas de más de un salario base, es decir, más de lo que una persona común gana en un mes lo que resulta desproporcional. Las reformas introducidas a la Ley de Tránsito y donde se tipifica la conducta de conducir bajo los efectos del licor, transgreden dichos principios y no existe un procedimiento que garantice el derecho de defensa a la hora de practicar la alcoholemia. El sistema en la práctica no garantiza los principios fundamentales del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa y no hay advertencia de que el imputado pueda o no abstenerse de practicarse la alcoholemia ni la manipulación que se le pueda dar a este tipo de prueba. Con esto se quiere decir, que debe establecerse un procedimiento bajo el cual se pueda garantizar el derecho de defensa de los imputados, llámese asistencia técnica, advertencia de derechos constitucionales y garantes de esta situación, a no producir prueba en su contra, entre otros. Cuando se practica la alcoholemia no existe un garante que pueda dar fe de la advertencia de tales derechos, toda vez que quienes practican dichas pruebas son los oficiales de tránsito y siendo que ahora se está en presencia de un delito, aún así deben de respetarse y garantizarse dichos derechos y la ley ni el sistema prevén dicha situación. Aún cuando un imputado pueda negarse al sometimiento del examen de la alcoholemia y obligársele a tal, no existen garantes de los derechos constitucionales y básicamente del artículo 36 constitucional, por lo que consideran que la norma del artículo 107 es inconstitucional. La propiedad privada es inviolable y aún cuando se conduzca bajo los efectos del licor, no existe justificación por parte del Estado para poder decomisar el vehículo y ser objeto de una serie de daños por el solo hecho de tenerlo en un depósito de vehículos con la exposición de las inclemencias del tiempo y la manipulación de éste por parte de terceras personas. El decomiso y posterior comiso del carro en el caso concreto, resulta total y completamente inconstitucional. Al no existir delito, por el criterio de no lesividad y no existencia de un bien jurídico tutelado, no existe una causa de justificación por parte del Estado para poder decomisar y posteriormente efectuar el comiso del vehículo a favor del Estado y privar de la propiedad privada al administrado. Asimismo, resulta desproporcional e injustificado que al conductor se le inhabilite para la conducción, se le sancione con multas, eventualmente con cárcel y a pesar de eso, se efectúe el comiso del bien, que en muchas ocasiones incluso pertenece a un tercero. Basta para comprender la falta de razonabilidad y la desproporcionalidad de esta medida. Bastaría con dejar al infractor sin posibilidad de circulación en caso de transgredir una norma administrativa de conducción bajo los efectos del alcohol, a remover las placas, o la multa impuesta o una combinación de estas, pero nunca al comiso del vehículo a favor del Estado, ante un potencial delito que su significancia tampoco justifica tal actuar pues resulta violatorio del derecho constitucional a la propiedad privada. Además, resulta confiscatorio por cuanto excede esos parámetros e impone multas por cuido del carro y transporte de grúas. Aparte de esta situación expone al administrado a que su propiedad sufra deterioro y daños que menoscaben su patrimonio.

4.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Vargas Benavides; y,

Considerando:

I.- Sobre la admisibilidad. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es admisible únicamente en relación con lo dispuesto en el artículo 254 bis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, dado que conforme puede apreciarse a folio 29 del expediente, la invocatoria de inconstitucionalidad en el asunto base pendiente de resolver, se hizo en cuanto a esa norma y no en cuanto a las demás. El artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como requisito de admisibilidad, la existencia de un asunto base pendiente de resolver, donde se hubiere invocado la inconstitucionalidad, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Asimismo, el artículo 79 de la misma Ley establece que el escrito de interposición de la acción debe ser presentado junto con certificación literal del escrito donde se invocó la inconstitucionalidad en el asunto principal. En el caso que se analiza, el asunto base lo constituye la causa seguida contra el accionante en la Fiscalía de Cañas, por el delito de “Infracción a la Ley de Tránsito”, tramitada con el número de expediente 08-200005-413-PE y se constata que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad al señalar a folio 29 frente: “Adicionalmente a lo anterior, a mi criterio el delito tipificado en la nueva ley roza con los principios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y más aún resulta confiscatorio y una violación a la propiedad privada, otro de los derechos constitucionales que ostentamos los costarricenses al decomisar el vehículo y negarse a su devolución inmediata al propietario registral.” II.- Objeto de la acción. El artículo 254 bis del Código Penal señala:

“Artículo 254 bis.- Se impondrá pena de prisión de uno (1) a tres (3) años y la inhabilitación para conducir vehículos de todo tipo, de uno (1) a cinco (5) años, a quien conduzca en las vías públicas en carreras ilícitas, concursos de velocidad ilegales o piques contra uno o varios vehículos, contra reloj o cualquier otra modalidad.

Si el conductor se encuentra bajo alguna de las condiciones indicadas en el párrafo anterior y las señaladas en los incisos a) y b) del artículo 107 de la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, N.° 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, y sus reformas, se impondrá pena de prisión de dos (2) a seis (6) años y, además, se le inhabilitará para conducir todo tipo de vehículos de dos (2) a diez (10) años.

Se impondrá pena de prisión de uno (1) a tres (3) años, a quien conduzca un vehículo automotor a una velocidad superior a ciento cincuenta (150) kilómetros por hora.

Se impondrá prisión de uno (1) a tres (3) años, a quien conduzca bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas, cuando la concentración de alcohol en la sangre sea mayor a cero coma setenta y cinco (0,75), gramos de alcohol por cada litro de sangre.

Al conductor reincidente se le impondrá una pena de prisión de dos (2) a ocho (8) años.

Cuando se imponga una pena de prisión de tres (3) años o menos, el tribunal podrá sustituir la pena privativa de libertad por una medida alternativa de prestación de servicio de utilidad pública que podrá ser desde doscientas (200) horas hasta novecientas cincuenta (950) horas de servicio, en los lugares y la forma señalados en el artículo 71 ter de la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, N.° 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, y sus reformas.” Como primer motivo, el accionante aduce que la norma impugnada es contraria al principio de ofensividad, dado que no existe un bien jurídico que proteger. A su juicio, la pena de cárcel es la sanción más fuerte para quien comete una acción antijurídica tipificada como delito, por lo que considera que imponer dicha pena para quien conduzca bajo los efectos del licor, resulta desproporcionado, en virtud de que no se tutela ningún bien jurídico válido, pues no se produce afectación a la vida o integridad física. Señala que existen medidas o sanciones menos gravosas que podrían aplicarse. Como segundo aspecto, afirma el accionante que la reforma realizada a la Ley de Tránsito, en cuanto a la conducción en estado de ebriedad tipificada como delito, infringe los principios de intimación, imputación, inocencia, derecho de audiencia, derecho de defensa en sí, derecho a la defensa técnica y la garantía constitucional de que en materia penal nadie está obligado a declarar contra sí mismo y mucho menos a producir prueba en su contra. Esto por cuanto, no existen encargados de vigilar que se cumpla con estas garantías y derechos constitucionales, pues no se advierte a los detenidos que están presuntamente bajo los efectos del alcohol, respecto de su derecho constitucional de no producir prueba en su contra, de no declarar ante las autoridades y de ser asistido en todo momento por un defensor. Afirma que a pesar de eso, la ley permite que se les practique la alcoholemia. Como tercer tema, el accionante plantea que la norma impugnada infringe los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad porque al incurrir en la conducta prevista en la norma cuestionada, se producen multiplicidad de sanciones: multa económica, pérdida o decomiso de la licencia, inhabilitación para conducir por un plazo determinado, decomiso de las placas, decomiso del vehículo, pago de gastos de transporte, grúas, depósito del vehículo, imposición de medidas cautelares y eventualmente, cárcel. Afirma que esto además vulnera el principio de non bis in idem. En cuanto a la multa económica afirma que la misma es confiscatoria porque no se valora la posibilidad económica de cada administrado. Agrega que la desproporcionalidad se constata al observar que se impone una pena mayor por tener una luz quemada que por no contar con la revisión técnica al día. Por último, aduce violación al derecho de propiedad privada, dado que se decomisa el vehículo, lo cual estima inconstitucional, pues al no existir delito, por la falta de protección a un bien jurídico, no hay justificación por parte del Estado. Se expone al administrado a que su propiedad sea dañada y sufra un deterioro.

III.- Sobre el bien jurídico tutelado en la norma impugnada. Refiere el accionante que la cárcel es la sanción más fuerte para quien comete una acción antijurídica tipificada como delito, por lo que considera que imponer dicha pena para quien conduzca bajo los efectos del licor, resulta desproporcionado en virtud de que la norma no tutela ningún bien jurídico. Señala que existen medidas o sanciones menos gravosas que podrían aplicarse. Este Tribunal ya se pronunció en relación con el tema de la tutela de bienes jurídicos en la norma impugnada y la razonabilidad de la utilización de la prisión como sanción:

“IV.- Sobre la protección a bienes jurídicos en la norma impugnada. Si bien es cierto, toda conducta penalizada ha de tener como objetivo la protección de un bien jurídico determinado, el legislador tiene la facultad de diseñar las normas penales conforme considere se adaptan mejor a la naturaleza del bien que se pretende tutelar y de acuerdo con los fines que le ha asignado a la pena y al derecho penal en general, los cuales pueden ser no sólo retributivos, sino también preventivos -ya de prevención general positiva o negativa-, resocializadores, etc. La doctrina dominante ha distinguido entre delitos de lesión y de peligro, atendiendo a la distinta intensidad del ataque al bien jurídico. En los delitos de lesión se exige para la tipicidad del hecho la producción de la lesión del bien jurídico o del objeto que lo representa, mientras que en los de peligro no se exige ese efecto, produciéndose un adelantamiento de la protección del bien a fases anteriores a la de su efectivo menoscabo o lesión. La delimitación entre una y otra clase de delitos puede ofrecer dificultad frente a figuras delictivas concretas. Así, en los delitos en los que se tutelan bienes colectivos como la salud pública, la seguridad del tráfico, etc., si se considera la afectación que las conductas suponen para el bien jurídico colectivo, pueden tenerse como delitos de lesión; sin embargo, frente a los bienes jurídicos individuales, sólo suponen un peligro. La diferenciación entre los delitos de peligro abstracto y delitos de peligro concreto tampoco es fácil en algunos casos, ya que en ambos se requiere un desvalor de acción, mientras que sólo los delitos de peligro concreto exigen un verdadero desvalor del resultado, que consiste precisamente en esa concreta puesta en peligro. Según la opinión doctrinal mayoritaria, los delitos de peligro abstracto sancionan la puesta en práctica de una conducta reputada generalmente peligrosa, sin necesidad de que se haga efectivo un peligro para el bien jurídico protegido. Se busca castigar la peligrosidad misma de la conducta, sin entrar a evaluar la capacidad de lesión o la real puesta en peligro de los bienes jurídicos tutelados. En ellos se determina la peligrosidad de la conducta típica a través de una generalización legal basada en la consideración de que determinados comportamientos son generalmente peligrosos para el objeto típico y, en definitiva, para el bien jurídico. El legislador selecciona formas de comportamiento típicamente peligrosas para el bien jurídico correspondiente, sin que deba establecerse en cada caso particular la concreta puesta en peligro del objeto de la acción o del bien jurídico protegido en la norma. No se exige una efectiva puesta en peligro –juzgada ex post- para el objeto de la acción o el bien jurídico protegido, aunque sí que la realización de ese comportamiento suponga –desde una perspectiva ex ante- un riesgo de producción de una concreta puesta en peligro o de la lesión del bien jurídico. La doctrina ha encontrado dificultades en determinar si los delitos de peligro abstracto implican un verdadero contenido de antijuridicidad material y se discute si son violatorios o no de los principios de culpabilidad y lesividad. La Sala Constitucional, por su parte, ha determinado que no todos los tipos penales de peligro abstracto son inconstitucionales (Al respecto, pueden consultarse las sentencias 2805-96, que se pronunció en relación con los artículos que regulan la portación ilícita de armas; 1792-99 en relación con la tenencia de instrumentos de falsificación y asociación ilícita; 4673-03 sobre los delitos de la Ley de Migración y Extranjería y 218-06 sobre los delitos de la Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso no Autorizado, Legitimación de Capitales y Actividades Conexas). En los delitos de peligro concreto, en cambio, el peligro para el bien jurídico sí constituye un elemento expreso del tipo, de modo que para considerar consumado el delito, el juez ha de comprobar la producción de un peligro real para un objeto de la acción, ligado causalmente y objetivamente imputable a ésta. Por lo tanto, al igual que en los delitos de lesión, debe crearse, si bien no un resultado, sí un “peligro de resultado concreto” en cuanto sea un riesgo de lesión adecuado y no permitido, que requiere como presupuestos que el objeto de la acción haya entrado en el ámbito operativo de quien lo pone en peligro y, luego que el comportamiento haya creado un peligro próximo de lesión de ese objeto de la acción. En la norma que se analiza, las conductas tipificadas son de peligro concreto, en tanto, se ha demostrado fehacientemente que las mismas producen resultados lesivos de bienes jurídicos considerados de gran valor para la sociedad. Los tipos penales descritos (conducción en las vías públicas en carreras ilícitas, concursos de velocidad ilegales o piques contra uno o varios vehículos, contra reloj o cualquier otra modalidad; conducción de un vehículo automotor a una velocidad superior a ciento cincuenta kilómetros por hora; conducción bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas, cuando la concentración de alcohol en la sangre sea mayor a cero coma setenta y cinco gramos de alcohol por cada litro de sangre) constituyen acciones pluriofensivas, esto es, que ponen en peligro, según sea el caso, diversos bienes jurídicos tales como la seguridad común, el orden público, la propiedad, la integridad física, la salud y la vida. Se trata de bienes cuya protección resulta legítima al amparo de lo dispuesto en el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política, que establece la posibilidad de restringir aquellas conductas que lesionen los derechos de terceros, la moral o el orden público:

“Cuando las acciones privadas trascienden al que las ejecuta y comprometen el bien común (orden o moral pública o causan daño a tercero) son regulables por el Estado y aun prohibidas por éste, siempre y cuando haya motivos para ello y la regulación pase el examen de razonabilidad que exige el debido proceso sustantivo. Así, el individuo tiene que aceptar aquellas restricciones de su libertad de acción que el legislador establece para la promoción de la convivencia social dentro de los límites de lo exigible, siempre que se mantenga la independencia de la persona. La libertad es restringible, eso sí en virtud de razones suficientes desde la óptica constitucional. Lo anterior conduce al principio de libertad negativa, que, en tanto principio, no otorga una permisión definitiva de hacer u omitir lo que se quiera en la medida en que razones suficientes, -derechos de terceros, la moral o el orden públicos- no justifiquen una restricción de la libertad negativa. Con ello, el principio de la libertad negativa puede tomar en cuenta la vinculación del individuo con la comunidad. Partimos entonces de la premisa de que al Estado le está vedado interferir en el ámbito de la libertad particular, salvo que de por medio se encuentre el orden público, la moral o los derechos de terceros, en cuyo caso, la regulación estatal resultaría posible, por medio de una ley formal. La restricción eso sí debe ser únicamente la necesaria para lograr el fin propuesto, de acuerdo con los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, parámetros de constitucionalidad según la reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal. El proyecto de ley consultado, que establece la obligatoriedad del uso del cinturón de seguridad, entraña una cuestión inherente al bien común (entendido como bien público en general), y constituye por tanto, una conducta susceptible de regulación legal, que a juicio de la Sala es compatible con el Derecho de la Constitución […] Mantener el orden y la seguridad en las vías incide directamente en dos aspectos fundamentales de la vida en sociedad, como lo son la salud y la vida de quienes las utilizan. La ley número 7331 tiene como objeto regular la circulación de vehículos, personas y semovientes, por las vías terrestres de la nación, así como todo lo relativo a la seguridad vial (artículo 1), tanto de peatones como de conductores y acompañantes, lo que denota la existencia de un nexo indisoluble entre la ordenación para el uso de las vías públicas y la seguridad de quienes transiten por ellas, que justifica plenamente la intervención del Estado en la materia.” (Sentencia 2004-01603-04 de las nueve horas treinta minutos del diecisiete de febrero del dos mil cuatro) Las conductas previstas en el artículo 254 bis del Código Penal, en sí mismas resultan riesgosas o peligrosas para la propiedad, la salud, integridad y vida de las personas. Además, se trata de conductas que afectan gravemente el orden público y la seguridad común. A mayor abundamiento, al consultar la Exposición de Motivos del expediente legislativo 16.496 (folios 2 a 45) que dio origen a la Ley 8696, se encuentran suficientes razones de interés público que legitiman la intervención del Estado en la regulación de determinadas conductas que se estiman dañosas para la colectividad y para los individuos en particular:

“Las muertes y lesiones por accidentes de tránsito son un problema para la salud pública y el desarrollo de los países, tal y como lo señala categóricamente el Informe Mundial sobre Prevención de los Traumatismos Causados por el Tránsito, presentado en el año 2004 por la Organización Mundial de la Salud. El informe revela que 1.2 millones de personas mueren al año por accidentes de tránsito. De estos 20 a 50 millones sufren lesiones o quedan incapacitados, produciendo el 2.1% del total de muertes a nivel global. Las proyecciones realizadas señalan que los accidentes de tránsito se incrementarán y que para el año 2020, ocuparán el tercer lugar como principal causa de morbilidad y mortalidad, lo cual resulta alarmante. Cada víctima de un accidente de tránsito representa para la sociedad y para las familias un alto costo social y económico. En el ámbito mundial la cifra es cercana a los 518 miles de millones de dólares y para América Latina está impactando más de 1.5% del producto interno bruto. Costa Rica no es ajena a esa problemática mundial, siendo los accidentes de tránsito la primera causa de muertes violentas; por varios factores, entre los cuales se encuentran los altos niveles de agresividad y estrés, manifestados en conductas y hábitos temerarios que reproducen día con día los usuarios del sistema de tránsito […] Para establecer los factores de riesgo asociados a la ocurrencia de estas muertes, se utilizó la base de datos de muertes “in situ” por accidentes de tránsito en período de seis años (2000-2005) obteniéndose los siguientes resultados: a.- El 28.77%, 636 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa del accidente de tránsito, el exceso de velocidad […] b.- El 18.09%, 400 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa del accidente de tránsito, la imprudencia del peatón […] c.- El 16.92%,374 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa estar bajo los efectos del alcohol […] d.- El 12.71%, 281 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa la imprudencia del conductor […] e.- El 9.45%, 209 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa el adelantamiento indebido […] f.- El 6.06%, 134 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa la imprudencia del ciclista […] g.- El 4.30%, 95 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa la falla mecánica […] h.- El restante 3.70%, 82 personas fallecidas se le atribuye como posible causa otros factores […].” En cuanto a la ingesta alcohólica y su relación con los accidentes de tránsito, se señala:

“[…] los accidentes de tránsito están relacionados con el consumo de alcohol como una de las principales causas de mortalidad y morbilidad evitable. Diversos estudios han determinado que concentraciones de alcohol en sangre superiores a 0,5 g/l se correlacionan con un riesgo lineal de tener un accidente de tránsito y presentar lesiones de mayor gravedad. El alcohol produce una depresión no selectiva del sistema nervioso central, deteriorando la función psicomotora, la percepción sensorial (vista y oído), modifica el comportamiento de la persona, etc. En general, los efectos del alcohol son directamente proporcionales a su concentración en la sangre: a mayor concentración mayor deterioro. Está perfectamente demostrado que el alcohol deteriora marcadamente la función psicomotora y la capacidad para conducir con seguridad. Mientras la tendencia en los países desarrollados en relación a los fallecidos producto de la conducción con alcohol viene a la baja, en las naciones latinoamericanas vecinas e incluso en el ámbito nacional está en franco aumento, de ahí que también se propone un incremento en el monto de la multa actual, como una forma de inhibir al conductor a cometer esta clase de reacciones violentas. De la base de datos de muertes “in situ” en seis años de datos, se obtuvo que de un total de 2.211 fallecidos, el 16.92%, es decir 374 muertos, se le atribuye como posible causa del accidente la presencia del alcohol.” En relación con los conductores que sobrepasan los límites de velocidad, se sostiene:

“En los últimos años, hemos visto como ha proliferado en las calles de San José la práctica de un mortal “pasatiempo”. Conductores irresponsables, generalmente jóvenes, ponen a prueba sus máquinas y destreza al volante en plena vía pública en una actitud que abiertamente amenaza su integridad física y la de terceros. Esta situación ha provocado ya, muchos accidentes y pérdidas de vidas de inocentes peatones que transitan desprotegidos ante la imprudencia de estos conductores. Las regulaciones que existen son insuficientes para evitar estas demostraciones o “piques”, por lo que la labor deberá ser de creación de las normas aplicables para solucionar de forma permanente esta problemática.” De lo expuesto, se concluye, entonces, que las conductas previstas en la norma impugnada sí lesionan bienes jurídicos individuales y, sociales y desde ese punto de vista, no infringen el principio de lesividad previsto en el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política.

V.- Sobre la razonabilidad de la norma impugnada. Estima el accionante que el Estado no puede interferir en la esfera de vida de las personas, más allá de lo razonable. Esto es, que la prohibición penal debe ser necesaria, idónea y proporcional. Aduce que en el caso de la norma cuestionada, la prohibición no es necesaria porque no tutela ningún bien jurídico concreto, no es idónea porque la cárcel no es el mejor medio de protección, pues se trata de un medio infrahumano para solucionar problemas, que crea más violencia y desocializa; y, en cuanto a la proporcionalidad, como los hechos tipificados como conducción temeraria, no tutelan bien jurídico alguno, resulta desproporcionado imponer una pena cuando con una sanción disciplinaria se podría evitar que se cause daño a terceros y además ya existen otros tipos penales en leyes vigentes que protegen los daños reales causados. Conforme se indicó, las conductas previstas en la norma impugnada sí afectan o ponen en peligro bienes jurídicos altamente valiosos para la sociedad y para los individuos en particular. La conducción temeraria en nuestro país constituye la principal causa de muertes violentas. El manejo en estado de ebriedad, la alta velocidad y la realización de carreras o “piques” en las vías públicas, son conductas realmente reprochables que reflejan un gran desprecio por la propia vida y la vida de los demás. Denotan un grave problema cultural y una pérdida de los valores que deben regir la vida social, tales como el respeto a los demás, la solidaridad, la cortesía, el altruismo. El Estado no sólo se encuentra legitimado para prohibir y sancionar tales conductas, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política, sino que tiene la obligación de intervenir para tutelar los bienes jurídicos que resultan lesionados o puestos en peligro, dado que quienes no realizan esas acciones, no tienen por qué sufrir las consecuencias del actuar dañoso de los demás y merecen la protección estatal. El hecho de que se utilice la pena de prisión como disuasora de las conductas referidas, no resulta en sí mismo desproporcionado, dado el altísimo peligro que las mencionadas conductas generan para los bienes jurídicos considerados de mayor valor para la sociedad. Además, puede observarse que el legislador establece sanciones alternativas que posibilitan el aplicar la prisión como último recurso y sólo por el tiempo mínimo indispensable, de conformidad con los parámetros que establece el artículo 71 del Código Penal.” (Sentencia 2004-09 de las catorce horas cuarenta minutos del once de febrero del dos mil nueve) Con base en lo expuesto en la resolución parcialmente transcrita, se rechaza por el fondo la acción en cuanto a ese extremo.

IV.- Inexistencia de lesión al debido proceso. Afirma el accionante que la reforma realizada a la Ley de Tránsito, en cuanto a la conducción en estado de ebriedad tipificada como delito, infringe los principios de intimación, imputación, inocencia, derecho de audiencia, derecho de defensa en sí, derecho a la defensa técnica y la garantía constitucional de que en materia penal nadie está obligado a declarar contra sí mismo y mucho menos, a producir prueba en su contra. Esto por cuanto, no existen garantes encargados de vigilar que se cumpla con estas garantías y derechos constitucionales, pues no se advierte a los detenidos que están presuntamente bajo los efectos del alcohol, respecto de su derecho constitucional de no producir prueba en su contra, de no declarar ante las autoridades y de ser asistido en todo momento por un defensor. Afirma que a pesar de eso, la Ley permite que se practique la alcoholemia al imputado. Sobre el particular, debe señalarse que para la investigación y juzgamiento de los delitos introducidos por la reforma a la Ley de Tránsito, particularmente el previsto en el artículo 254 bis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, sea, la conducción en estado de ebriedad, deben respetarse los principios, derechos y garantías que componen el debido proceso, previstos tanto en la Constitución Política, como en los diversos instrumentos de derecho internacional aplicables en Costa Rica, el Código Procesal Penal y la misma jurisprudencia de esta Sala. El ejercicio del derecho de defensa debe respetarse plenamente por parte de todas las autoridades públicas y ha de reconocerse desde el momento en que una persona tiene la condición de imputado, sea, desde que es señalado como posible autor de un hecho punible o partícipe en él, mediante cualquier acto de la investigación o del procedimiento (artículo 81 del Código Procesal Penal). El artículo 12 del Código Procesal Penal establece que es inviolable la defensa de cualquiera de las partes en el procedimiento. Asimismo, el artículo 93 del mismo Código señala que antes de que el imputado declare sobre los hechos, se le requerirá el nombramiento de un abogado para que lo asista. Si el imputado no escoge un defensor de su confianza, el Estado le proveerá un defensor público para que ejerza la defensa técnica. En cuanto a los elementos de prueba, éstos solo tendrán valor si han sido obtenidos por un medio lícito e incorporados conforme al procedimiento que establece el Código Procesal Penal (artículo 181 del Código Procesal Penal). Si en el caso concreto, se ha dado alguna infracción a los elementos que integran el debido proceso, es un problema que no es de las normas impugnadas, sino de su aplicación por parte de las autoridades, lo cual, no es controlable en esta vía.

V.- Inexistencia de violación a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Argumenta el accionante que en virtud de las reformas a la Ley de Tránsito, se transgreden los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad porque se producen las sanciones de: multa económica, pérdida o decomiso de la licencia, inhabilitación para conducir por un plazo determinado, decomiso de las placas, decomiso del vehículo, pago de gastos de transporte, grúas, depósito del vehículo, imposición de medidas cautelares y eventualmente, cárcel. Además, estima que se vulnera el principio de non bis in idem. En cuanto a la multa económica afirma que la misma es confiscatoria porque no se valora la posibilidad económica de cada administrado. Agrega que la desproporcionalidad se constata al observar que se impone una pena mayor por tener una luz quemada que por no contar con la revisión técnica al día. Al respecto, debe señalarse que la única sanción prevista en la norma impugnada es la de uno a tres años de prisión, la cual puede ser sustituida por una medida alternativa de prestación de servicio de utilidad pública que podrá ser de doscientas hasta novecientas cincuenta horas de servicio. Las sanciones de multa e inhabilitación no están previstas en la norma impugnada. Los demás aspectos señalados por el accionante son consecuencias derivadas del delito, pero no constituyen en sí mismos una pena y, en todo caso, no están previstos en la norma impugnada.

VI.- Sobre la violación al derecho de propiedad privada. Afirma el accionante que el comiso del vehículo que se conduce en estado de ebriedad es inconstitucional, pues al no existir delito, por el criterio de no lesividad y no existencia de bien jurídico tutelado, no hay justificación por parte del Estado. Se expone al administrado a que su propiedad sufra un deterioro y daños que menoscaban su patrimonio. De una lectura de la norma impugnada se constata que la misma no hace ninguna referencia al comiso del vehículo, pues en realidad esta es una consecuencia del delito que está contenida en otras normas, tales como el artículo 110 del Código Penal y 465 del Código Procesal Penal.

VII.- Conclusión. Con base en las consideraciones expuestas, se rechaza de plano la acción en relación con los artículos 29 inciso e), 107 inciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136, 141 y 144 de la Ley número 8696 del diecisiete de diciembre del dos mil ocho. En cuanto al artículo 254 bis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, se rechaza por el fondo la acción.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción en cuanto a los artículos 129 inciso e), 107 inciso c), 138 inciso c), 130 inciso e), 134, 136, 141 y 144 de la Ley número 8696 del diecisiete de diciembre del dos mil ocho. En cuanto al artículo 254 bis párrafo cuarto del Código Penal, se rechaza por el fondo la acción.

Adrián Vargas B.

Presidente a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Rosa María Abdelnour G. Roxana Salazar C.

2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional