Denial of pretrial detention extension in organized crime caseDenegatoria de prórroga de prisión preventiva en caso de delincuencia organizada

**IV. The request made by the Public Prosecutor's Office is not granted.-** Having examined the case file, the request from the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is not deemed reasonable; therefore, the extension of the pretrial detention (prórroga de la prisión preventiva) requested against the accused [Nombre1] is denied. It is important to note that even though Article 239 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) (Law 8720, Protection of victims, witnesses, and other intervening parties in criminal proceedings, reforms and additions to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Criminal Code) establishes that: *"Following a reasoned assessment and grounded resolution, the court may also order the pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) of the defendant when any of the following grounds exist, the crime is punishable by a prison sentence, and the prerequisite established in Article 37 of the Political Constitution is met: (...) d) It involves organized crime (delincuencia organizada)."* The term (organized crime (delincuencia organizada)) is defined in the Law Against Organized Crime (Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada) (No. 8754, published in Gazette No. 143 of July 24, 2009) as *"a structured group of two or more persons that exists for a certain period of time and acts in concert with the purpose of committing one or more serious crimes"* (Article 1 of Law No. 8754), with a serious crime understood to be one that *"within the range of penalties can be sanctioned with imprisonment of four years or more"* (Article 1 of Law No. 8754), a hypothesis within which the charge brought in this proceeding by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) falls; it is the criterion of those of us who subscribe this opinion that the need to assess the prerequisites and procedural risks (peligros procesales) set forth in numeral 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) always prevails. These recent reforms to procedural legislation regarding pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) could give the false impression that currently, the mere charge of a drug trafficking crime in its organized group modality automatically and relentlessly subjects the accused of this type of crime to the precautionary measure of pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) throughout the entire jurisdictional process until their legal situation is definitively established; however, this is not the case.

The reading of Article 239 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) can never be conducted as if this precept were unique or isolated, but rather, in accordance with a systematic interpretation, its content must be dimensioned alongside other procedural norms, among them, Article 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), which establishes the exceptional nature of precautionary measures, but especially Article 239 ibid: *"The court shall order the pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) of the defendant, provided that the following circumstances concur: (a) There are sufficient elements of conviction to reasonably sustain that the defendant is, with probability, the perpetrator of a punishable act or a participant in it. (b) There exists a reasonable presumption, by appreciation of the circumstances of the particular case, that the defendant will not submit to the proceeding (risk of flight (peligro de fuga)); will obstruct the investigation of the truth (risk of obstruction (peligro de obstaculización)); or will continue the criminal activity. (c) The crime attributed to the defendant is punishable by a custodial sentence."* That is to say, when deciding on requests for extension of pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) in drug trafficking matters where the prosecuting entity alleges its commission through an organized group, the judges must also examine the existence of verified evidence (indicios comprobados), the penalty for the crime, and furthermore, the procedural risks (peligros procesales) of flight, obstruction, or criminal reiteration. This is so much the case that Article 239 bis makes express reference to Article 37 of the Political Constitution, which provides: *"No one may be detained without verified evidence (indicio comprobado) of having committed a crime, and without a written order from a judge or authority in charge of public order..."* The systematic unity of law corresponds to the logical principle of non-contradiction, especially when it concerns closely related precepts such as those we have invoked.

Having clarified the foregoing, this Chamber assesses the request for extension of pretrial detention (prórroga de la prisión preventiva) presented by the prosecutor, with the purpose of keeping the accused [Nombre1] in custody, a request in which he recounts the facts constituting the accusation and also, in various sections he titles as: (i) Basis for the request; (ii) Regarding the verified evidence (indicio comprobado); (iii) Procedural history of the case; (iv) Procedural risks (peligros procesales) and prerequisites to extend pretrial detention (prisión preventiva); and (v) Petition; presents a request that is a literal copy of others previously filed before this court (Cf. folios 1168 to 1180, when he requested the extension for the accused [Nombre2], folios 999 to 1016, when requesting the extension for [Nombre3], [Nombre4], [Nombre5], and [Nombre6]), where he generally refers to the situation of the proceeding regarding all the defendants, as well as the procedural risks (peligros procesales), among which he mentions: the high penalty for the accused crime (drug trafficking), the knowledge the accused have of the evidence against them and, therefore, the high possibility of flight, without any situation existing that would favor or ensure their subjection to the proceeding; he also mentions the use of a significant number of vehicles, which contributes to easy mobility coupled with a lack of community ties (arraigo); he adds that although some defendants have stated they engage in dignified work, the investigation demonstrated that, on the contrary, they engaged in the storage, transportation, and sale of drugs; highlighting that in the specific case of the accused [Nombre1], she was responsible for collecting the drugs and the money of the organization.

It is not pleasant for this authority to mention that it has perceived inadequate management on the part of the petitioner regarding requests for extension of pretrial detention (prórroga de la prisión preventiva). This occurred in (i) Opinion No. 1331-2009, at 3:10 p.m. on December 2, 2009, when this Chamber clarified that it could not hear the request for extension of precautionary measures other than pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) against the accused [Nombre7], [Nombre8], and [Nombre9], sought by the prosecutor, because it lacked jurisdiction to do so in accordance with the provisions of Article 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) (which limits it to hearing extensions of pretrial detention (prisión preventiva)); (ii) in Opinion No. 1373-2009, at 10:20 a.m. on December 10, 2009, when this Court again declared that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the extension for the accused [Nombre2] and [Nombre1], both with the surname [Nombre10], also requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), because the ordinary period had not expired; (iii) in Opinion No. 103-2010, at 4:27 p.m. on February 2, 2010, when the request for extension of pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) for the accused [Nombre11] was not granted, as it was deemed that the procedural risks (peligros procesales) did not justify the prolongation of said measure, but where, in addition, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) submitted that request out of time, which, although based on a resolution issued by the Pavas Criminal Court (Juzgado Penal de Pavas) that incurred that error, did not exempt the prosecuting entity from verifying the deadlines and seeking the correction of any mistake. And (iv) finally now, where he once again files a petition with the aim of seeking to extend the detention of the accused [Nombre1], stating that the ordinary detention period expired on February 12, when in reality, as analyzed supra, it was February 11, 2010.

Aside from that situation, focused on the analysis of the current request and the arguments presented by the prosecutor, it is the criterion of this Court that in the specific case of [Nombre1], even though the prerequisites of a high penalty exist and the criminal judge considered (when issuing the Order to Open Trial (Auto de Apertura a Juicio)) there were sufficient elements of conviction to reasonably sustain that [Nombre1] – like one more of the defendants in this summary proceeding – could probably be a co-perpetrator or co-participant in the accused crime; it does not consider that the procedural risks (peligros procesales) converge in a manner that justifies maintaining pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) at this moment, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In that sense, it is essential to consider that the investigation is already concluded, and during the inquiry, no actions or conduct by [Nombre1] have been reported that reflect her intention to obstruct, influence, or eliminate evidence, much of which is documentary or consists of statements from officers of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial). However, two aspects are especially considered: (i) Given that the record shows that the accused [Nombre1] remained under precautionary measures other than pretrial detention (prisión preventiva), it is important that neither during the period of their validity nor at any other time have there been reports of criminal conduct attributable to her person, related or similar to those addressed in this proceeding. (ii) This peculiar situation that occurs in the case of [Nombre1] at the beginning of the proceeding (enjoying other precautionary measures) is useful and pertinent to reason that pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) is not, in this case, the necessary or indispensable means to keep her subject to this investigation (principle of necessity); nor that detention is the only means to reasonably counteract the risk of flight (peligro de fuga) (principle of suitability). The accused has demonstrated a willingness to submit to the proceeding, since even at the time the other precautionary measures were revoked, she voluntarily presented herself before the jurisdictional authority accompanied by her defense attorney, which dispels with sufficient credibility the risk of flight (peligro de fuga) invoked by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público).

By virtue of the foregoing, the immediate release of the accused [Nombre1] is ordered, unless another cause prevents it.

Those recent reforms to procedural legislation on pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) could give the false impression that currently, the mere accusation of a drug trafficking offense in its organized-group modality automatically and relentlessly subjects the accused to the precautionary measure of pretrial detention throughout the entire judicial process until their legal situation is definitively resolved; however, this is not the case.

A reading of Article 239 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) can never be performed as if this provision were unique or isolated; rather, in accordance with a systematic interpretation, its content must be dimensioned alongside other procedural norms, among them, Article 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which establishes the exceptional nature of precautionary measures (medidas cautelares), but especially Article 239 ibidem: "The court shall order the pretrial detention of the accused, provided that the following circumstances concur: (a) Sufficient elements of conviction exist to reasonably sustain that the accused is, with probability, the perpetrator of a punishable act or a participant in it. (b) A reasonable presumption exists, based on an assessment of the circumstances of the particular case, that the accused will not submit to the proceeding (flight risk (peligro de fuga)); will obstruct the investigation of the truth (obstruction risk (peligro de obstaculización)); or will continue the criminal activity. (c) The offense attributed to the accused is punishable by a custodial sentence." That is to say, when resolving requests for the extension of pretrial detention in drug-trafficking matters where the prosecuting entity alleges its commission through an organized group, judges must also examine the existence of verified indicia, the penalty for the offense, and additionally, the procedural risks of flight, obstruction, or criminal repetition. So much so that Article 239 bis makes express reference to Article 37 of the Political Constitution, which provides: "No one may be detained without a verified indicium of having committed an offense, and without a written order from a judge or authority responsible for public order..." The systematic unity of law corresponds to the logical principle of non-contradiction, especially when dealing with adjacent provisions such as those we have invoked.

Having clarified the foregoing, this Chamber evaluates the request for extension of pretrial detention submitted by the prosecutor, for the purpose of keeping the accused [Name1] in custody, a petition in which he provides a summary of the facts comprising the accusation and also, in different sections titled as: (i) Basis of the petition; (ii) Regarding the verified indicium; (iii) Procedural history of the case; (iv) Procedural risks and prerequisites for extending pretrial detention; and (v) Prayer for relief; submits a request that is a literal copy of others previously formulated before this office (Cfr. folios 1168 to 1180, when he requested the extension for the defendant [Name2], folios 999 to 1016, when requesting the extension for [Name3], [Name4], [Name5], and [Name6]), where he refers in general terms to the status of the proceeding with respect to all the accused, as well as to the procedural risks, among which he mentions: the high penalty for the charged offense (drug trafficking), the defendants' knowledge of the evidence against them and, therefore, the high likelihood of flight, without any situation existing that favors or ensures their subjection to the process; he also mentions the use of a significant number of vehicles, which contributes to easy mobility coupled with a lack of community ties (arraigo); he adds that despite some accused having claimed to engage in honest work, the investigation demonstrated that, on the contrary, they were engaged in the storage, transportation, and sale of drugs; highlighting that in the specific case of the defendant [Name1], she was responsible for collecting the drugs and money for the organization.

It is not pleasant for this authority to mention that it has perceived inappropriate handling by the petitioner regarding requests for extension of pretrial detention. This occurred in (i) ruling Nº 1331-2009, of 3:10 p.m. on December 2, 2009, when this Chamber clarified that it could not hear the request for extension of precautionary measures other than pretrial detention against the defendants [Name7], [Name8], and [Name9], as sought by the prosecutor, because it lacked competence to do so in accordance with Article 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which limits its jurisdiction to hearing extensions of pretrial detention); (ii) in ruling Nº 1373-2009, of 10:20 a.m. on December 10, 2009, when this Court again declared that it lacked competence to hear the extension for the defendants [Name2] and [Name1], both with the surname [Name10], also requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office, because the ordinary time limit had not expired; (iii) in ruling Nº 103-2010, of 4:27 p.m. on February 2, 2010, when the petition for extension of pretrial detention for the defendant [Name11] was denied upon determining that the procedural risks did not justify the prolongation of said measure, but where, additionally, the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office submitted that request untimely, which although based on a resolution issued by the Criminal Court of Pavas that incurred in that error, did not exempt the prosecuting entity from verifying the time limits and urging the amendment of any mistake. And (iv) finally now, where he again formulates a petition with the aim of seeking to extend the detention of the accused [Name1], affirming that the ordinary detention period expired on February 12, when in reality, as analyzed supra, it was February 11, 2010.

But aside from that situation, focusing on the analysis of the request now made and the arguments presented by the prosecutor, it is the opinion of this Court that in the specific case of [Name1], even though the prerequisites of a high penalty exist and the criminal judge estimated (when issuing the Order to Open Trial) that there were sufficient elements of conviction to reasonably sustain that [Name1] —as one more of the accused in this summary proceeding— could with probability be a co-perpetrator or co-participant in the charged offense; it does not find that the procedural risks converge with a gravity that justifies maintaining pretrial detention at this time, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In this regard, it is essential to consider that the investigation is already concluded and no actions or behaviors by [Name1] have been reported during the inquiry that reflect an intention to obstruct, influence, or eliminate evidence, much of which is documentary or consists of statements by officers of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial). But two aspects are especially considered: (i) With the record showing that the accused [Name1] remained under precautionary measures other than pretrial detention, it is significant that neither during the period they were in force nor at any other time have there been reports of criminal conduct attributable to her person, related or similar to those involved in this proceeding. (ii) This peculiar situation occurring in the case of [Name1] at the beginning of the process (enjoying other precautionary measures) is useful and pertinent to reason that pretrial detention is not, in this case, the necessary or indispensable means to keep her subject to this investigation (principle of necessity); nor that detention is the only means to reasonably counteract the flight risk (principle of suitability). The accused has demonstrated a willingness to submit to the proceeding, since even at the moment the other precautionary measures were revoked, she voluntarily appeared before the judicial authority accompanied by her defense attorney, which dispels with sufficient credibility the flight risk invoked by the Public Prosecutor's Office.

By virtue of the foregoing, the immediate release of the accused [Name1] is ordered, unless another cause prevents it."

“IV. No se acoge la petición formulada por el Ministerio Público.- Examinados los autos no se estima razonable la solicitud del Ministerio Público, por ende, no se accede a la ampliación de prórroga de la prisión preventiva formulada en contra de la encartada [Nombre1]. Es importante indicar, que aún cuando el artículo 239 bis del Código Procesal Penal (Ley 8720, Protección a víctimas, testigos y demás sujetos intervinientes en el proceso penal, reformas y adición al Código Procesal Penal y al Código Penal) establece que: "Previa valoración y resolución fundada, el tribunal también podrá ordenar la prisión preventiva del imputado, cuando se produzca cualquiera de las siguientes causales, el delito esté sancionado con pena de prisión y se cumpla el presupuesto establecido en el artículo 37 de la Constitución Política: (...) d) Se trate de delincuencia organizada." Término (delincuencia organizada) definido en la Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada (Nº 8754, publicada en la Gaceta Nº143 del 24 de julio de 2009) como "un grupo estructurado de dos o más personas que exista durante cierto tiempo y que actúe concertadamente con el propósito de cometer uno o más delitos graves" (artículo 1 Ley Nº 8754), entendiéndose por delito grave aquel que "dentro del rango de penas pueda ser sancionado con prisión de cuatro años o más." (artículo 1 Ley Nº 8754), hipótesis dentro de la cual se enmarca la imputación efectuada en este proceso por el Ministerio Público; es criterio de quienes suscribimos este voto que siempre impera la necesidad de valorar los presupuestos y peligros procesales dispuestos en el numeral 239 del Código Procesal Penal. Esas recientes reformas a la legislación procesal en materia de prisión preventiva, podrían dar la falsa impresión de que en la actualidad la sola imputación de un delito de tráfico de droga en su modalidad de grupo organizado, sujeta de forma automática e implacable al acusado por este tipo de delito a la medida cautelar de prisión preventiva durante todo el trámite jurisdiccional hasta que su situación jurídica se fija de forma definitiva, sin embargo, no es así. La lectura del artículo 239 bis del Código Procesal Penal nunca podrá realizarse como si este precepto fuera único o aislado, sino conforme con una interpretación sistemática, hay que dimensionar su contenido con otras normas procesales, entre ellas, el artículo 10 del Código Procesal Penal que sienta el carácter excepcional de las medidas cautelares, pero en especial, el artículo 239 ibídem: "El tribunal ordenará la prisión preventiva del imputado, siempre que concurran las siguientes circunstancias: (a) Existan elementos de convicción suficientes para sostener, razonablemente, que el imputado es, con probabilidad, autor de un hecho punible o partícipe en él. (b) Exista una presunción razonable, por apreciación de las circunstancias del caso particular, acerca de que aquel no se someterá al procedimiento (peligro de fuga); obstaculizará la averiguación de la verdad (peligro de obstaculización); o continuará la actividad delictiva. (c) El delito que se le atribuya esté reprimido con pena privativa de libertad." Es decir, también al resolverse solicitudes de ampliación de la prisión preventiva en asuntos de narcotráfico y donde el ente acusador reprocha su comisión mediante un grupo organizado, los juzgadores deben examinar la existencia de indicios comprobados, la penalidad del delito y además, los peligros procesales de fuga, obstaculización o reiteración delictiva. Tanto es así que el artículo 239 bis hace referencia expresa al artículo 37 de la de la Constitución Política, que dispone: "Nadie podrá ser detenido sin un indicio comprobado de haber cometido delito, y sin mandato escrito de juez o autoridad encargada del orden público..." Y es que la unidad sistemática del derecho se corresponde con el principio lógico de no contradicción, en especial, cuando se trata de preceptos próximos como los que hemos invocado. Aclarado lo anterior, esta Cámara valora la solicitud de prórroga de la prisión preventiva que presenta el señor fiscal, con el propósito de que la imputada [Nombre1]. continúe presa, petición en la cual hace un recuento de los hechos que integran la acusación y además, en diferentes apartados que intitula como: (i) Fundamento de la petición; (ii) Sobre el indicio comprobado; (iii) Historia procesal del caso; (iv) Peligros procesales y presupuestos para prorrogar la prisión preventiva y; (v) Petitoria; presenta una solicitud que es copia literal de otras formuladas con anterioridad ante este despacho (Cfr. folios 1168 a 1180, cuando solicitó la ampliación para la encartada [Nombre2]., folios 999 a 1016, al pedir la prórroga para [Nombre3]., [Nombre4]., [Nombre5]., . y [Nombre6].), donde alude en forma general a la situación del proceso respecto a todos los imputados, así como a los peligros procesales entre los que menciona: la alta penalidad del delito acusado (tráfico de drogas), el conocimiento que tienen los encartados de la prueba en su contra y por ello, la alta posibilidad de fuga, sin que exista situación que favorezca o asegure su sujeción al proceso; menciona también la utilización de una importante cantidad de vehículos, lo que abona a una fácil movilización aunada a una falta de arraigo; agrega que pese a que algunos imputados han manifestado dedicarse a un trabajo digno, la investigación demostró que por el contrario, se dedicaban al almacenamiento, transporte y expendio de drogas; destacando que en el caso específico de la encartada [Nombre1]., se ocupaba de recolectar las drogas y el dinero de la organización. No es grato para esta autoridad mencionar que ha percibido un manejo inadecuado por parte del gestionante, respecto a las solicitudes de prórroga de la prisión preventiva. Sucedió en el (i) voto Nº 1331-2009, de las 15:10 horas del 2 de diciembre de 2009 cuando este Cámara aclaró que no podía conocer la solicitud de prórroga de medidas cautelares diversas a la prisión preventiva contra los encartados [Nombre7]., [Nombre8]. y [Nombre9]., instadas por el fiscal, por no contar con competencia para hacerlo de conformidad con lo ordenado en el artículo 258 del Código Procesal Penal (que la limita para el conocimiento de prórrogas de prisión preventiva); (ii) en el voto Nº 1373-2009, de las 10:20 horas del 10 de diciembre de 2009, cuando de nuevo se declaró que carecía de competencia este Tribunal para conocer de la prórroga de las encartadas [Nombre2]. y [Nombre1]., ambas de apellidos [Nombre10] también pedida por el Ministerio Público, porque el plazo ordinario no había vencido; (iii) en el voto Nº 103-2010, de las 16:27 horas del 2 de febrero de 2010, al no acogerse la petición de prórroga de la prisión preventiva de la encartada [Nombre11] al estimarse que los peligros procesales no justificaban la prolongación de dicha medida, pero donde además, el representante del Ministerio Público presenta esa solicitud de forma extemporánea, que aunque basada en una resolución dictada por el Juzgado Penal de Pavas que incurre en ese error, no lo eximía al ente fiscal de verificar los plazos e instar la enmienda de cualquier yerro. Y (iv) finalmente ahora, donde de nuevo formula una petición con el afán de procurar ampliar la detención de la imputada [Nombre1]., afirmando que el plazo ordinario de detención se cumplía el día 12 de febrero, cuando en realidad como se analizó supra, fue el día 11 de febrero de 2010. Pero al margen de esa situación, enfocados en el análisis de la solicitud que ahora se hace y de los argumentos que expone el señor fiscal, es criterio de este Tribunal que en el caso específico de [Nombre1]. aún cuando se dan los presupuestos de una alta penalidad y el juez penal estimó (al dictar el Auto de Apertura a Juicio) existían elementos de convicción suficientes para sostener razonablemente que [Nombre1]. -como una más de los imputados en esta sumaria- podía ser con probabilidad coautora o copartícipe del delito acusado; no estima converjan los peligros procesales en entidad que justifique en este momento mantener la prisión preventiva, de acuerdo al principio de proporcionalidad. En ese sentido, resulta fundamental considerar que ya la investigación se encuentra concluida y no se han reportado durante la indagación, acciones o conductas de [Nombre1]. que reflejen su intención de obstruir, influir o eliminar la prueba, mucha de la cual es documental o consiste en declaraciones de oficiales del Organismo de Investigación Judicial. Pero de manera especial se consideran dos aspectos: (i) Constando en autos que la acusada [Nombre1]. se mantuvo con medidas cautelares diversas a la prisión preventiva, es importante que ni durante el período de su vigencia ni en otro, se tienen reportes de conductas delictivas atribuibles a su persona, afines o similares a las que ocupan este proceso. (ii) Esa situación peculiar que se da en el caso de [Nombre1]. al inicio del proceso (de gozar de otras medidas cautelares), resulta útil y pertinente para razonar que la prisión preventiva no es en este caso, el medio necesario o imprescindible para mantenerla sujeta a esta investigación (principio de necesidad); tampoco que la detención sea el único medio para contrarrestar razonablemente el peligro de fuga (principio de idoneidad). La imputada ha demostrado voluntad de someterse al proceso, pues incluso al momento de ser revocadas las otras medidas cautelares, de manera voluntaria y en compañía de su abogada defensora se hizo presente a la autoridad jurisdiccional, lo que despeja con suficiente credibilidad el peligro de fuga invocado por el Ministerio Público. En virtud de lo expuesto, se ordena la inmediata libertad de la imputada [Nombre1]., salvo si otra causa lo impide.”