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Res. 00614-2008 Sala Tercera de la Corte · Sala Tercera de la Corte · 29/05/2008
OutcomeResultado
The Criminal Chamber dismisses the criminal cassation appeal, upholding the conviction for aggravated deprivation of liberty without profit motive, but clarifies that enforcement of the abstract damages award from the habeas corpus proceeding requires a declaratory trial where the causal link and actual existence of harm must be proved.La Sala Tercera declara sin lugar el recurso de casación penal, confirmando la condena por privación agravada de libertad sin ánimo de lucro, pero precisando que la ejecución de la condena abstracta de daños y perjuicios proveniente del hábeas corpus requiere un proceso de conocimiento donde se demuestre el nexo causal y la existencia real del daño.
SummaryResumen
The Criminal Chamber, resolving a criminal appeal, analyzes the enforcement of abstract damages rulings issued by the Constitutional Chamber in habeas corpus and amparo proceedings when a fundamental right violation is declared. The ruling clarifies that such abstract condemnation does not prejudge the actual existence or quantification of damages, but rather opens the jurisdiction of the administrative-contentious judge for a full evidentiary trial. In this stage, the claimant bears the procedural burden of proving the existence, nature, and extent of the harm, as well as the causal link between the harmful administrative conduct and the claimed damages, based on the imputation criteria of Article 190 of the General Public Administration Act (normal/abnormal, legitimate/illegitimate functioning). The Chamber reiterates that the State's patrimonial liability is objective but moderated, requiring imputation criteria to avoid automatic wealth transfer. The enforcement proceeding thus becomes a declaratory process, not a mere liquidation.La Sala Tercera, al resolver un recurso de casación penal, analiza la naturaleza de la ejecución de sentencia de las condenas abstractas dictadas por la Sala Constitucional en casos de hábeas corpus y amparo, cuando se declara la violación de un derecho fundamental. La sentencia aclara que dicha condena en abstracto no prejuzga la existencia real de daños y perjuicios ni su cuantía, sino que abre la competencia del juez contencioso-administrativo para un verdadero proceso de conocimiento. En esta etapa, el ejecutante tiene la carga procesal de demostrar la existencia, naturaleza y extensión del daño, así como el nexo causal entre la conducta administrativa lesiva y los perjuicios reclamados, con base en los criterios de imputación del artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (funcionamiento normal/anormal, legítimo/ilegítimo). La Sala reitera que la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado es objetiva pero moderada, exigiendo criterios de imputación sin caer en una transferencia patrimonial automática. La ejecución de sentencia se desnaturaliza y se convierte en un proceso declarativo, no en una mera liquidación.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In this case, it is an abstract condemnation that must be made concrete in a subsequent enforcement proceeding; therefore, it is essential to assess the situation and circumstances under which the protected rights were violated, because, as indicated above, the ruling issued by the Constitutional Court is abstract. Thus, the referred condemnation opens the jurisdiction of the administrative-contentious judge to analyze the actual existence or non-existence of damages and set their amount according to the specific circumstances of the case. The nature of the debated substance demands objective proof of the existence of the alleged damages, and subsequently, that they are indeed the immediate and direct consequence of the State's conduct, whether active or omissive. Thus, the demonstration of a causal link between these two elements is required. That is, within the proceeding, the judge must determine whether the damages presented by the claimant are a consequence of public functioning or, on the contrary, the result of factors unrelated to administrative activity. This means that the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber does not per se generate a duty to recognize the compensation sought by the claimant; rather, this ruling presupposes a value judgment on the actual existence of the harm.En este caso, se trata de una condenatoria en abstracto que debe ser concretada en ejecución posterior, por ende, en estos casos es de rigor valorar la situación y circunstancias en las que los derechos tutelados fueron vulnerados, en razón de que como se ha indicado supra, el pronunciamiento que dicta el Tribunal Constitucional es en abstracto. Así, la condenatoria referida, lo que hace es abrir la competencia del juzgador contencioso administrativo para analizar sobre la existencia real o no de los daños y perjuicios, y fijar su monto acorde con las circunstancias propias del caso. La naturaleza de la substancia debatida exige una probanza objetiva de la existencia de los daños acusados, y luego, que son efectivamente consecuencia inmediata y directa de la conducta del Estado, sea esta activa u omisiva. De este modo, se impone la demostración de la existencia de un nexo causal entre estos dos apartes. Es decir, dentro del proceso el juzgador debe dirimir si los daños que presenta el ejecutante son consecuencia del funcionamiento público o si por el contrario, son el resultado de factores ajenos al quehacer administrativo. Lo dicho significa que la condenatoria dictada por la Sala Constitucional no genera per se, un deber de reconocimiento de la indemnización requerida por el ejecutante, más bien, este pronunciamiento presupone un juicio valorativo de la real existencia del daño.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"la responsabilidad patrimonial (que no civil) y extracontractual de la Administración Pública, se enmarca dentro de un régimen preeminentemente objetivo, que comprende en su base tanto la teoría del riesgo como el equilibrio en la ecuación patrimonial."
"the patrimonial (not civil) and extracontractual liability of the Public Administration falls within a preeminently objective regime, which fundamentally encompasses both the risk theory and the balance in the patrimonial equation."
Considerando V
"la responsabilidad patrimonial (que no civil) y extracontractual de la Administración Pública, se enmarca dentro de un régimen preeminentemente objetivo, que comprende en su base tanto la teoría del riesgo como el equilibrio en la ecuación patrimonial."
Considerando V
"En tanto se haya sufrido una lesión como consecuencia de una conducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que no tiene el deber de soportar, se impone el deber de resarcimiento, en virtud del principio de reparación integral del daño que se desprende del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política."
"Whenever a harm has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether active or omissive, which there is no duty to bear, the duty to compensate is imposed, by virtue of the principle of full reparation for harm derived from Article 41 of the Political Constitution."
Considerando V
"En tanto se haya sufrido una lesión como consecuencia de una conducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que no tiene el deber de soportar, se impone el deber de resarcimiento, en virtud del principio de reparación integral del daño que se desprende del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política."
Considerando V
"la condenatoria dictada por la Sala Constitucional no genera per se, un deber de reconocimiento de la indemnización requerida por el ejecutante, más bien, este pronunciamiento presupone un juicio valorativo de la real existencia del daño."
"the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber does not per se generate a duty to recognize the compensation sought by the claimant; rather, this ruling presupposes a value judgment on the actual existence of the harm."
Considerando V
"la condenatoria dictada por la Sala Constitucional no genera per se, un deber de reconocimiento de la indemnización requerida por el ejecutante, más bien, este pronunciamiento presupone un juicio valorativo de la real existencia del daño."
Considerando V
Full documentDocumento completo
V. […] The State is patrimonially liable to third parties for damages caused by its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning, except in cases of fortuitous events, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party; this general principle is established by Articles 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution and is adopted by Article 190 of the LGAP. In relation to a person who has suffered damage related to the functioning of the Administration, it must respond, regardless of the title under which such liability is claimed, which must in all cases be established, that is, the causal link between the damage and the public activity and the criterion for imputing this liability must be determined. Although it is objective, it does not renounce imputation criteria, since the contrary would imply a simple transfer of liability to the state patrimony, which is improper. The State's patrimonial liability arises from the need to protect the administered party from damages caused by its activity and which the injured party is not legally obligated to bear.
The imputation of the harmful result to the Administration gives rise to its duty to indemnify for the unlawfulness of its damaging conduct. On this topic, this Chamber recently indicated "[...]. However, no matter how broad the terms in which the State's patrimonial liability is currently assessed, it does not renounce the requirement of certain criteria for imputing damage to public activity, because otherwise it would be unsustainable for the Administration to be attributed liability for the entire functioning of society merely due to the connection of activities, even private ones, with the essential purposes and functions of the State. It is therefore necessary to rationalize and provide the sphere of imputation of damage to the Public Administration with adequate legal criteria. In our context, certainly numerals 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution are the basis for establishing the duty of indemnification borne by the State for damages caused.
However, the imputation criteria are clearly defined in Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration, where Article 190 states that the Public Administration shall respond 'for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party.' This is the general rule that establishes the foundations of the State's patrimonial liability in our context. The scenarios contemplated by the following rules, referring to liability for the unlawful conduct of public servants and for lawful conduct, complement this regime, but the general premises are defined by the cited article. It is based on these concepts of legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the Administration, that one must define when harmful conduct is imputed and when the State must respond patrimonially.
And in this regard, the First Chamber has indicated "[...] Due to the particularities inherent to the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the objective character achieved, with clear constitutional foundation, it cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted and permanent compensatory duty, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury. A regime of such nature would be unprecedented and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. For this reason, imputation criteria have been used which, in some way, dimension, within said objectivity, that indemnity duty originated by public conduct. Hence, it can be affirmed that the national system is a regime of patrimonial liability of the Public Administration of an objectively moderate nature, insofar as it does not renounce parameters or criteria of imputation, especially regarding abnormality and unlawfulness, in which, one way or another, the conduct of the public apparatus is assessed and qualified.
These are broad and different criteria from those of malice (dolo) and fault (culpa) traditionally used by common law, but which nonetheless become criteria of attribution that distance the institute from a mere automatic patrimonial transfer, without any assessment of the administrative conduct deployed. In this way, numeral 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning,' where legitimacy or its antithesis refers basically to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among other things, by the service-providing activity attributed to the State, as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the collective. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to 'lawful acts,' under the conception of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same rule from what it qualifies as 'normal functioning,' understood as material activity.
In this way, abnormality addresses those administrative conducts which, in themselves, depart from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, from technical rules or from expertise and prudent action in the deployment of its actions, with a harmful effect on the person. This allows noting that abnormality can manifest through malfunctioning; delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Abnormality and unlawfulness should therefore not be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even regarding the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or in accordance with the aforementioned rules, produces a harmful result, called by some doctrinal sector 'abnormal functioning by result,' because in such case, what operates is a liability for normal functioning with a harmful effect or result, indemnifiable, of course, provided that the requirements expressly pre-established by the Legal System itself are met (see the same Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration).
Nor should this 'abnormality' of functioning and the 'illegitimacy' of it be confused with the generic and basic unlawfulness, essential in all civil reparation. Indeed, patrimonial liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while in other times, from the basic principle translated into the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is concretized in the inexistence of that duty to bear the damage. Thus, if the victim has no duty to endure the injury (manifest as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, whether due to unforeseeability or inevitability. When such a duty to endure the injury does not exist, the breach of the duty to the person's patrimonial indemnity occurs, and to that extent, the injury caused in the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, subject to mandatory reparation.
In this way, it can be affirmed that only the injury is indemnifiable which, confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed unlawful at its base, insofar as the legal regime considers it unacceptable for the victim, regardless of the qualification that, subsequently and necessarily, is attributed to the public conduct. The contrary would be to affirm compensation for a harmful action in the face of a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and which, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified [...] That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in the indemnifiable damage, whether due to normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning. Be that as it may, those four imputation criteria used by the General Law of Public Administration in Article 190 must be deemed to have constitutional shelter and support, insofar as they concretize the transfer that the constituent made in numeral 41 to the ordinary legislator ('recourse to the laws') and instrumentalize the effective judicial protection enshrined in the Constitution.
And this being so, it must be concluded that such criteria apply to the patrimonial liability of all public authority, whether administrative, legislative, or jurisdictional [...]" precedent number 308-06 of 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2006 of the First Chamber [...]" precedent 1273-07 of 10:31 a.m. on October 30, 2007. Now then. When dealing with the patrimonial liability of the Administration, as indicated, taking into account the imputation parameters indicated by law, once these and the harmful result are demonstrated, it is proper to declare its patrimonial liability, regardless of whether or not the existence of criminal conduct by the official is proven. Thus, on this topic, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber has specified "[...] This Chamber has already had the opportunity to rule on the regime of patrimonial liability to which the State is subject. In this sense, in ruling No. 584 of 10 hours 40 minutes on August 11, 2005, it conducted a broad development and analysis on this topic, detailing its particularities, evolutionary framework, constitutional support, among other important considerations.
Regarding what is relevant to the case, it should be noted that the patrimonial (not civil) and non-contractual liability of the Public Administration is framed within a preeminently objective regime, which fundamentally comprises both the theory of risk and the equilibrium in the patrimonial equation. This essentially seeks the indemnity reparation for one who has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a full transformation in the central axis of the liability itself, because it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except regarding their personal liability). This undoubtedly causes a radical shift in the approach of its foundation, since the State will be liable whenever the victim has no duty to bear the damage, whether it is of a patrimonial or non-patrimonial nature.
From there, the reversal of the components and effects of the institute is evident. Both the essential presuppositions and the burden of proof acquire a new nuance, which frees the affected person not only from substantial but also procedural ties, and places the Administration in the obligated discharge against the charges and facts imputed to it. Within this framework, the markedly objective liability dispenses with the analysis of subjective and individual factors of the producing agent for the determination of the reparation of the damage, transferring to the sphere of the injured person. As long as an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, be it active or omissive, which one has no duty to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of integral reparation of the damage that derives from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution. In this same sense, one may consult, among many others, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 138 of 3:05 p.m. on August 23; 192 of 2:15 p.m. on November 6, both of 1991; 48 of 2:10 p.m. on May 29, 1996 and 55 of 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 1997.
In light of the provisions in said precedents, and as the Tribunal correctly provided, the Legal System, based on the General Law of Public Administration, adopts, as stated, the preeminently objective liability system. Therefore, the existence—and thus its demonstration—of malice (dolo) or fault (culpa) or, in general, a subjective fault imputable to the public servants or officials is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages and losses caused by its functioning to arise. Therefore, canon 190 of that legal body clearly provides for the State's liability for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, unless the exempting causes that this same provision exhaustively expresses converge in the specific case, namely; force majeure, fault of the victim, and act of a third party, it being the responsibility of the Administration to prove their existence. From this collegiate body, see judgments of this same Chamber No. 589-F-99 of 2:20 p.m. on October 1, 1999 and No. 252-F-01 of 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001.
In this same line, canon 194.3 of that same legal body establishes the legal bases for the liability of the State-Legislator. Numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Magna Carta, constitute the foundation and support of the liability of the State-Judge for judicial error, the abnormal or unlawful functioning of the jurisdictional function. Hence, one could not sustain an 'impunity' of the State, on the grounds that it lacks legal development, since it is established in principle, within the framework of the Constitution, at the same time that it would suppose a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of the arbitrariness of public powers. Seen thus, its recognition is not conditioned on the existence of a legal mandate regulating it. The referred liability is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referenced norms and which seeks the control of the exercise of all the function and conduct of the State in any of its spheres, as well as the protection of the rights and interests of those subject to justice [...]" precedent number 74-07 of 10:15 a.m. on February 2, 2007 of the First Chamber.
In the specific case, the subject matter of the habeas corpus proceeding before the Constitutional Chamber was the illegitimate deprivation of liberty of B by the authorities of the Police Information Center of the Public Force of Pérez Zeledón, J P I and D M L, which occurred on April 30, 2004. The unjustified conduct of two public officials in the exercise of their duties who deprived this person of liberty was analyzed. The carrying out of an act that was claimed to be arbitrary by public authorities was questioned, that is, due to the functioning of the Administration. The Constitutional Chamber requested reports from the involved officials and from the public superiors who were involved with the questioned act, and when resolving the appeal, it stated "[...] Proven facts. Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly proven, either because they have been so accredited or because the respondent has omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial ruling:
Any ruling that upholds the appeal shall order, in the abstract, the compensation for the damages and losses caused and the payment of the costs of the appeal, reserving their liquidation for the execution of judgment.” In this case, it involves an abstract condemnation that must be made concrete in a subsequent execution proceeding; therefore, in these cases, it is essential to assess the situation and circumstances in which the protected rights were violated, given that, as indicated above, the pronouncement issued by the Constitutional Chamber is in the abstract. Thus, the referred condemnation serves to open the jurisdiction of the contentious-administrative judge to analyze the actual existence or non-existence of the damages and losses, and to set their amount according to the specific circumstances of the case. This is so because, in these proceedings, what is done is to analyze the constitutional validity of the public conduct by virtue of which constitutionally enshrined rights and freedoms have been harmed.
In this type of constitutional proceeding, there is no debate or analysis regarding the damages and losses that may arise from the offending conduct, which, by its nature, would be improper. Therefore, such an assessment would be counterproductive to the very reason and essence of such a proceeding. Hence, the stage of execution of judgment constitutes a verification that the terms of the judgment executing the ruling issued by the Constitutional Chamber (referring to an abstract condemnation) have adequately weighed the demonstration that damage has indeed occurred, the existence of a causal link between the alleged damages and the conduct attributed, in this case, to the State or a decentralized public entity, so that this harmful effect can be imputed to it. At the same time, it verifies that the execution ruling falls within the parameters pre-established by the pronouncement that gave rise to that proceeding.
It is, then, an instance for measuring jurisdictional exercise, consisting of the confrontation of the provisions of the execution resolution with the measures derived from the preceding constitutional judgment, which imposes the duty to analyze the different aspects indicated […] From the foregoing, it is clear that the pronouncement of the Constitutional Chamber does not prejudge the actual existence of damages and losses in favor of the protected party, nor the quantification of these items, but rather, it issues a condemnation in the abstract by express mandate of law. For this reason, the examination of the appropriateness of these items must be the subject of analysis within an execution proceeding, as established by canon 51 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law cited. In this way, it is for the contentious jurisdiction to define the appropriateness and amount of these elements. Likewise, the execution of judgment proceeding in this type of situation is constituted as a “sui generis” litigation, very close to a trial on the merits.
As indicated, based on the aforementioned particularities, it does not consist of a mere liquidation of the elements that the executing party considers constitute the damages and losses. The nature of the debated substance requires objective proof of the existence of the alleged damages, and then, that they are effectively the immediate and direct consequence of the State's conduct, whether by act or omission. Thus, the demonstration of the existence of a causal link between these two aspects is required. That is to say, within the proceeding, the judge must determine whether the damages presented by the executing party are a consequence of the public functioning or if, on the contrary, they are the result of factors unrelated to the administrative activity. Only with such demonstration can the pecuniary liability demanded by the executing party be attributed to the State, which imposes a sine qua non condition for its condemnation.
In this sense, the causal link turns out to be the transcendental element that would allow access to their claims, which, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 317 in relation to 693, both of the Civil Procedure Code, must be demonstrated by the claimant, insofar as they are facts aimed at establishing the right to compensation alleged. On the other hand, the amount of the claims must be supported by the evidentiary elements provided, when they are required (since for the case of subjective moral damage, other application rules apply, as will be analyzed below). This Chamber has already indicated that from the relationship of provisions 317, subsection 1, 693, and 694 of the Civil Procedure Code, in conjunction with the general supplementary clause contained in Article 103 of the Regulating Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, it is inferred, with absolute clarity, that at the stage of execution of judgment, when there has been an abstract condemnation for the payment of damages and losses caused by State action violating the regime of fundamental rights, the procedural burden of proving the constitutive facts of the subjective right to compensation falls on the party asserting them, in this case, the executing party (in this regard, ruling No. 54 of 15 hours 10 minutes of June 12, 1996).
The foregoing means that the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber does not generate, per se, a duty to recognize the compensation required by the executing party; rather, this pronouncement presupposes a value judgment on the actual existence of the damage. For such purposes, the alleged harm must be real and will naturally require the pertinent evidence, given that, as courts of instance, the judges in the execution proceeding must necessarily evaluate the proofs offered, and the judgments must list the proven and unproven facts, as well as the analysis of the causal relationship between the questioned conducts and the damages and losses, and, based on criteria of equity and legality, determine the existence or non-existence of the claim, thereby establishing the concrete condemnation. In this regard, the judgments must apply the substantive norms referring to damages and losses, and logically assess the evidence under the terms established by the Civil Procedure Code (in this sense, from this Chamber, resolution No. 799 of 11 hours of October 18, 2002.) From the above, it follows that this is a proceeding in which the parties must debate the existence of the damage, its connection with the defendant and the executing party, its quantification, and other arguments inherent to this type of litigation.
Thus, the causal link constitutes the inexorable relational framework that must exist between both ends to generate, as a result, the duty to compensate. This link is elementary to generate the imputation of the damage, that is, to attribute the damage caused to a particular subject, in the specific case, the State. This detail is fundamental to be able to link the facts that gave rise to the condemnation in the constitutional venue with the compensatory claims requested in the execution of judgment proceeding, since such recognition does not arise as an irrefutable consequence of that condemnation, but rather from a subsequent proceeding in which its existence and the relationship of the aforementioned causation between the administrative acts and the claimed damages are proven through the evidentiary mechanisms already indicated. Seen in this way, the appropriateness of the liquidated items, as well as the amount of the sums awarded by the judge, must not be fixed by whimsical or arbitrary criteria; rather, they must attend to the merit of the case file and derive from the required adversarial process in this regard, under penalty of contravening the law […]” highlights are supplied (in the same sense and also from the First Chamber, consult, among others, precedents number 112 of 14:15 hours of July 15, 1992; 14 of 16:00 hours of March 2; 41 of 15:00 hours of June 18; 65 of 14:00 hours of October 1, all of the above from 1993; 100 of 16:10 hours of November 9; 116 of 14:00 hours of December 16, both from 1994; 45 of 14 hours 45 minutes of April 25 and No. 99 of 16 hours of September 20; the last two from 1995) 105-97 of 14:31 of November 21, 1997.
And notwithstanding that the considerations made refer to the execution proceedings of condemnations in amparo appeals, they are applicable insofar as condemnations for damages in habeas corpus are concerned, since the provisions in both cases are the same, as arises from the relationship of the second paragraph of Article 26 and 51 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law cited above, a situation that is not modified by the enactment of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. In this regard, it has been stated: “In the execution of amparos and habeas corpus, we do not (sic) face judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber, which in that specific aspect have the character of condemnation. A condemnation that, however, has the particularity of the indeterminacy of the compensatory elements granted […] In its traditional concept, judgment executions have been restricted to the quantification of damages and losses, which beforehand, have been demonstrated in the trial on the merits.
Thus, it has frequently been said that they are demonstrated in the main proceeding and quantified in the execution (when it has not been possible to do so in the trial on the merits). However, the situation is different in the case of the executions of the Constitutional Chamber, since we have repeatedly pointed out that the condemnation made by the Chamber in the compensatory aspect is made in the abstract, and that this requires the demonstration and quantification of the damage at the execution stage. This circumstance marks an important difference with the ‘common’ execution. In this particular proceeding, it is demonstrated and it is quantified. This denatures the very essence of the execution, because in this case, it is not simply executed, but rather the damages and losses are demonstrated and recognized, prior to their liquidation […]” González Camacho, Óscar Eduardo and others.
The New Contentious-Administrative Process. San José, Poder Judicial, Departamento de Artes Gráficas 2006. 664 p. p. 608 and 609. The basis of this proceeding will always be the facts subject to the habeas corpus or amparo, exactly as they are accredited in the judgment, and in this respect, this execution proceeding cannot disregard them.” …that being the case, it must be concluded that such criteria apply to the patrimonial liability of all public authorities, whether administrative, legislative, or jurisdictional…" precedent number 308-06 of 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2006, of the First Chamber…" precedent 1273-07 of 10:31 a.m. on October 30, 2007. Now then. When it comes to the patrimonial liability of the Administration, as indicated, taking into account the parameters of attribution set forth by law, once these and the harmful result are demonstrated, it is proper to declare its patrimonial liability, regardless of whether the existence of a criminal act by the official is proven or not.
Thus, regarding this issue, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber has specified: "…This Chamber has already had the opportunity to pronounce on the patrimonial liability regime to which the State is subject. In this regard, in ruling no. 584 of 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, it carried out a broad development and analysis of this subject, detailing its particularities, evolutionary framework, constitutional basis, among other considerations of importance. In what is relevant to the case, it should be noted that the patrimonial (and not civil) and extracontractual liability of the Public Administration is framed within a preeminently objective regime, which fundamentally comprises both the theory of risk and the equilibrium in the patrimonial equation. The essential purpose of this is the compensatory reparation for whoever has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority.
This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a complete transformation in the central axis of liability itself, as it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except as regards their personal liability). This undoubtedly causes a radical shift in the approach proper to its foundation, since there will be State liability whenever the victim does not have the duty to bear the damage, whether it is of a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial nature. From this point, the reversal of the components and effects of the institute in full is evident. Both the essential prerequisites and the burden of proof acquire a new nuance, which frees the affected party not only from substantial but also procedural ties, and places upon the Administration the obligated discharge against the charges and facts attributed to it.
Within this framework, the markedly objective liability dispenses with the analysis of subjective and individual factors of the producing agent for the determination of the reparation of the damage, transferring focus to the sphere of the injured party. Insofar as an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether active or by omission, which one does not have the duty to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of integral reparation of damages derived from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution. In this same sense, one can consult, among many others, the judgments of this Chamber, numbers 138 of 3:05 p.m. on August 23; 192 of 2:15 p.m. on November 6, both of 1991; 48 of 2:10 p.m. on May 29, 1996, and 55 of 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 1997.) In light of the provisions of said precedents, and as the Tribunal properly ordered, the Legal System, from the General Law of the Public Administration, adopts, as has been stated, the preeminently objective liability system.
Therefore, the existence—and, thus, its proof—of intent or fault or, in general, a subjective lack attributable to public servants or officials is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages and losses caused by their operation to arise. For this reason, canon 190 of that legal body clearly establishes the liability of the State for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, unless the exonerating causes that the same provision taxatively expresses converge in the specific case, namely; force majeure, the fault of the victim, and the act of a third party, with the burden falling on the Administration to prove their existence. From this collegiate body, one can see the judgments of this same Chamber, no. 589-F-99 of 2:20 p.m. on October 1, 1999, and no. 252-F-01, of 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001. In this same vein, canon 194.3 of that same legal body establishes the legal bases for the liability of the State as Legislator.
Numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Magna Carta, constitute the foundation and support of the liability of the State as Judge for judicial error, abnormal or illicit operation of the jurisdictional function. Hence, one could not sustain an 'impunity' of the State under the argument that it lacks legal development, since that liability is established in principle within the framework of the Constitution, and at the same time, it would imply a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of arbitrariness of public powers. Thus seen, its recognition is not conditional upon the existence of a legal mandate regulating it. The liability referred to is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referenced norms, and which seeks control over the exercise of all State function and conduct in any of its spheres, as well as the protection of the rights and interests of justiciable parties…" precedent number 74-07 of 10:15 a.m. on February 2, 2007, of the First Chamber.
In the specific case, the object of the habeas corpus proceeding before the Constitutional Chamber was the unlawful deprivation of liberty of B by the authorities of the Police Information Center of the Fuerza Pública of Pérez Zeledón, J P I and D M L, which occurred on April 30, 2004. The unjustified conduct of two public officials in the exercise of their duties who deprived this person of liberty was analyzed. The execution of an act that was claimed to be arbitrary by public authorities, that is, by the operation of the Administration, was questioned. The Constitutional Chamber requested reports from the officials involved and from the public superiors related to the questioned act, and when resolving the appeal, stated: "… I. Proven facts. Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly proven, either because they have been accredited or because the respondent has omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial order:
This Chamber has already indicated that from the relationship of sections 317, subsection 1, 693, and 694 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), in conjunction with the general supplementary clause contained in Article 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), it is inferred, with crystal clarity, that in the sentence execution stage, when there has been an abstract condemnation to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by a State action violating the regime of fundamental rights, the procedural burden of proving the facts constituting the subjective right to compensation is borne by the person asserting them, in this case, the executing party (in relation, ruling No. 54 of 15 hours 10 minutes of June 12, 1996). This means that the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) does not per se generate a duty to recognize the compensation sought by the executing party; rather, this pronouncement presupposes a value judgment on the actual existence of the damage (daño).
For such purposes, the losses (menoscabos) alleged must be real and will naturally require the pertinent evidence, given that, as trial courts, the judges of the execution process must necessarily evaluate the evidence offered, and in the judgments they must list the proven and unproven facts, as well as the analysis of the causal link (relación de causalidad) between the questioned conducts, the damages (daños y perjuicios), and, based on criteria of equity and legality, determine the existence or not of what is claimed, thus proceeding to establish the concrete condemnation. In this sense, the judgments must apply the substantive rules referring to damages (daños y perjuicios), and logically weigh the evidence in the terms established by the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) (in this sense, from this Chamber, resolution No. 799 of 11 hours of October 18, 2002.) From the foregoing it can be inferred that this is a process in which the parties must debate the existence of the damage (daño), its linkage with the defendant and the executing plaintiff, its quantification, and other arguments inherent to this type of litigation.
In this way, the causal link (nexo causal) constitutes the inexorable relational framework that must exist between both extremes to generate, as a result, the duty to compensate. This link is essential for generating the imputation of the damage (daño), that is, to attribute to a specific subject, in the present case, the State, the damage caused. This detail is fundamental to be able to link the facts that gave rise to the condemnation in the constitutional venue with the compensation claims sought in the sentence execution proceeding, since such recognition does not arise as an irrefutable consequence of that condemnation, but rather from a subsequent process in which its existence and the relationship of the aforementioned causal link between the administrative acts and the claimed damages (daños) are proven through the evidentiary mechanisms already indicated. Viewed this way, the appropriateness of the liquidated items as well as the amount of the sums awarded by the judge must not be established through capricious or arbitrary criteria, but rather must attend to the merit of the proceedings and derive from the required adversarial process, under penalty of violating the law [...]" the emphasized portions are supplied (in the same sense and also from the First Chamber (Sala Primera), consult, among others, the precedents number *112 of 14:15 hours of July 15, 1992; 14 of 16:00 hours of March 2; 41 of 15:00 hours of June 18; 65 of 14:00 hours of October 1, all the foregoing from 1993; 100 of 16:10 hours of November 9; 116 of 14:00 hours of December 16, both from 1994; 45 of 14 hours 45 minutes of April 25 and No. 99 of 16 hours of September 20; the last two from 1995)* 105-97 of 14:31 of November 21, 1997.
And notwithstanding that the considerations made refer to the processes for executing condemnations in amparo (amparo) appeals, they are applicable with respect to condemnations for damages (daños) in habeas corpus proceedings, since the provisions in both cases are the same, as arises from the relationship of the second paragraph of Article 26 and Article 51 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) cited above, a situation that is not modified by the enactment of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). In this regard, it has been stated "*In the execution of amparos (amparos) and habeas corpus (hábeas corpus), we are not (sic) faced with judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which in that specific aspect have the character of a condemnation. A condemnation that nevertheless has the particularity of the indeterminacy of the compensatory aspects granted [...] In its traditional concept, sentence executions have been restricted to the quantification of damages (daños y perjuicios), which, beforehand, have been demonstrated in the trial on the merits (proceso de conocimiento).
Thus, it has been frequently said that they are demonstrated in the main proceeding and quantified in the execution (when it has not been possible to do so in the trial on the merits). However, the situation is different in the case of executions of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), as we have repeatedly indicated that the condemnation made by the Chamber (Sala) in the compensatory aspect is made in the abstract, and that this requires the demonstration and quantification of the damage (daño) in the execution stage. This circumstance marks an important difference from the ‘common’ execution. In this particular process, it is demonstrated and quantified. This distorts the very essence of the execution, because in this case, it is not simply executed, but rather the damages (daños y perjuicios) are demonstrated and recognized, prior to their liquidation [...]" González Camacho, Óscar Eduardo et al. *El Nuevo Proceso Contencioso Administrativo*.
San José, Poder Judicial, Departamento de Artes Gráficas 2006. 664 p. pp. 608 and 609. The basis of this process will always be the facts subject of the habeas corpus or amparo (amparo), just as they are accredited in the judgment, and in this respect, this execution process cannot disregard them." The imputation of the harmful result to the Administration gives rise to its duty to compensate for the unlawfulness of its harmful behavior. Regarding this topic, this Chamber recently stated “[…]. Now, however broad the terms under which the State's patrimonial liability is currently assessed may be, there is no waiver of the requirement for certain criteria for imputing the damage to the public activity, because, otherwise, it would be unsustainable for the Administration to be attributed liability for the entire functioning of society merely due to the connection of even private activities with the essential purposes and functions of the State.
Thus, it is necessary to rationalize and provide suitable legal criteria for the sphere of imputing the damage to the Public Administration. In our system, certainly numerals 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution are the basis for establishing the duty of compensation that weighs on the State for damages caused; however, the criteria for imputation are clearly defined in Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of the Public Administration, when Article 190 states that the Public Administration shall be liable 'for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party.' This is the general rule that lays the foundations for the State's patrimonial liability in our system. The scenarios contemplated in the following rules referring to liability for the unlawful conduct of public servants and for lawful conduct complement this regime, but the general premises are defined by the cited Article.
It is from these concepts of legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the Administration that one must define when harmful conduct is imputed and when the State must answer financially. And in that regard, the First Chamber has stated “[…] Due to the particularities inherent to the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the objective character achieved, with clear constitutional foundation, it cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted and permanent duty to compensate, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury. A regime of such nature would be unheard of and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. For this reason, criteria of imputation have been used that somehow dimension, within said objectivity, that compensatory duty originating from public conduct. Hence, it can be affirmed that the national regime is one of patrimonial liability of the Public Administration of a moderately objective nature, insofar as it does not renounce parameters or criteria of imputation, especially regarding abnormality and unlawfulness, in which, in one way or another, the conduct of the public apparatus is assessed and qualified.
These are broad and diverse criteria from those of malice and fault traditionally used by common law, but which do not, for that reason, cease to be criteria of attribution that distance the institute from a mere automatic transfer of assets, without any assessment of the administrative conduct deployed. Thus, numeral 190 of our General Law of the Public Administration refers to 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning,' where legitimacy, or its antithesis, refers basically to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normality or abnormality points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among others, by the service-provision activity attributed to the State, as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the community. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to 'lawful acts,' under the conception of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same rule from what it qualifies as 'normal functioning,' understood as material activity.
In this way, abnormality addresses those administrative conducts that, in themselves, deviate from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes efficacy and efficiency) or from organization, technical rules, or the skill and prudent endeavor in the deployment of its actions, with harmful effect for the person. This allows us to point out that abnormality can manifest itself through poor functioning, delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Abnormality and unlawfulness, therefore, should not be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even in what corresponds to the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or in conformity with the abovementioned rules, produces a harmful result, called by some doctrinal sector 'abnormal functioning by result,' because in such case, what operates is a liability for normal functioning with a harmful effect or result, compensable, of course, provided that the prerequisites expressly pre-established by the Legal System itself are met (see Article 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration itself).
Nor should this 'abnormality' of the functioning and the 'illegitimacy' thereof be confused with the generic and foundational unlawfulness, essential in all civil reparation. Indeed, patrimonial liability is born of unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive rule, while in others, from the basic principle translated into the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is concretized in the non-existence of that duty to bear the damage. Thus, if there is no duty for the victim to endure the injury (manifested as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, failing that and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, whether because it was unforeseeable or unavoidable. When such duty to endure the injury does not exist, a breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person occurs, and to that extent, the injury caused in the legal sphere of the victim must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation.
Thus, it can be affirmed that only the injury that, confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed unlawful in its base is compensable, insofar as the legal regime considers it unacceptable for the victim, regardless of the qualification that, subsequently and necessarily, is attributed to the public conduct. The opposite would be to affirm compensation for a harmful action in the face of an impairment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified […] That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in compensable damage, whether due to normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning. Be that as it may, those four criteria of imputation that the General Law of the Public Administration uses in Article 190, must be deemed to have constitutional shelter and backing, insofar as they concretize the transfer that the constituent made in numeral 41 to the ordinary legislator ('occurring to the laws') and instrumentalize the effective judicial protection enshrined in the Constitution.
And this being so, it must be concluded that such criteria apply for the patrimonial liability of all public authority, whether administrative, legislative, or jurisdictional […]” precedent number 308-06 of 10:30 hours on May 25, 2006, of the First Chamber […]” precedent 1273-07 of 10:31 hours on October 30, 2007. Now then. When it comes to the patrimonial liability of the Administration, as indicated, bearing in mind the parameters of imputation set forth in the law, once these and the harmful result are demonstrated, it is appropriate to declare its patrimonial liability, regardless of whether or not the existence of criminal conduct by the official is proven. Thus, regarding this topic, the case law of the First Chamber has specified “[…] This Chamber has already had the opportunity to rule on the regime of patrimonial liability to which the State is subject. In this sense, in judgment no. 584 of 10 hours 40 minutes on August 11, 2005, it carried out a broad development and analysis on this subject, detailing its particularities, framework of evolution, constitutional support, among other considerations of importance.
In what becomes relevant to the case, it should be noted that the patrimonial (not civil) and non-contractual liability of the Public Administration is framed within a preeminently objective regime, which fundamentally includes both the theory of risk and the balance in the equity equation. This essentially seeks compensatory reparation for anyone who has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a full transformation in the central axis of liability itself, because it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except regarding their personal liability). This causes, without a doubt, a radical shift in the approach inherent to its foundation, since there will be State liability whenever the victim does not have the duty to bear the damage, whether this is of a material or non-material nature.
From that point on, the reversal of the components and effects of the institute as a whole is evident. Both the essential presuppositions and the burden of proof acquire a new nuance, which frees the affected party not only from substantive but also procedural ties, and places the Administration in the obligatory discharge regarding the charges and facts attributed to it. Within this framework, the markedly objective liability dispenses with the analysis of subjective and individual factors of the producing agent for the determinability of damage reparation, transferring itself to the sphere of the injured party. So long as an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, be it active or omissive, that one does not have the duty to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of full reparation of damage that stems from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution.
In this same sense, one may consult, among many others, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 138 of 15 hours 5 minutes on August 23; 192 of 14 hours 15 minutes on November 6, both of 1991; 48 of 14 hours 10 minutes on May 29, 1996; and 55 of 14 hours thirty minutes on July 4, 1997.) In light of the provisions of said precedents, and as the Court rightly ordered, the Legal System, based on the General Law of the Public Administration, adopts, as has been said, the system of preeminently objective liability. For this reason, the existence—and, therefore, its demonstration—of malice or fault or, in general, a subjective lack imputable to the public servants or officials is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages and losses caused by its functioning to arise. Therefore, canon 190 of that legal body provides with crystal clarity the State's liability for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, unless the exempting causes that that same provision, exhaustively, expresses—namely; force majeure, fault of the victim, and the act of a third party—converge in the specific case, with it corresponding to the Administration to prove their existence.
From this collegiate body, one may see the judgments of this same Chamber no. 589-F-99 of 14 hours 20 minutes on October 1, 1999, and no. 252-F-01, of 16 hours 15 minutes on March 28, 2001. Along this same line, canon 194.3 of that same legal body lays the legal foundations for the liability of the State as Legislator. Numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Magna Carta, constitute the foundation and support for the liability of the State as Judge for judicial error, and the abnormal or unlawful functioning of the jurisdictional function. Hence, one could not sustain an 'impunity' of the State under the basis that it lacks legal development, since that liability is established in principle, within the framework of the Constitution, while it would also imply a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of the arbitrariness of public powers. Viewed this way, its recognition is not conditioned on the existence of a legal mandate that regulates it.
The aforementioned liability is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referenced norms and that seeks control over the exercise of all State function and conduct in any of its spheres, as well as the protection of the rights and interests of the citizens subject to justice […]” precedent number 74-07 of 10:15 hours on February 2, 2007, of the First Chamber. In the specific case, the object of the habeas corpus proceedings before the Constitutional Chamber was the illegitimate deprivation of liberty of B by the authorities of the Police Information Center of the Public Force of Pérez Zeledón, J P I and D M L, occurring on April 30, 2004. The unjustified conduct of two public officials in the exercise of their duties who deprived this person of liberty was analyzed. The carrying out of an act claimed as arbitrary by public authorities, that is, by the functioning of the Administration, was questioned.
The Constitutional Chamber requested reports from the officials involved and from the public superiors who had to do with the questioned act, and upon resolving the appeal, stated “[…] Proven Facts. Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly proven, either because they have been so accredited or because the respondent omitted to refer to them according to what was provided in the initial order: That by resolution of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute of March sixteenth of the current year, the status of rentier residents was granted to the protected party and his wife, Ann Maxine Patton, for which reason, by official letter number P-182-2001, said institute requested the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners to grant the migratory category of resident to the protected party and his wife (folios 17 and 18 and report on folio 9); b) that on April thirtieth of the current year, at approximately seventeen hours and fifteen minutes, the officials of the CIFP, J P I and D M L, proceeded to follow the protected party's vehicle based on 'confidential reports' and a complaint that there was a foreigner in an irregular situation who needed to be identified (folio 36 and report on folio 27); c) that when the protected party's car stopped, they requested identification from the protected party and his wife, who showed them only an Arizona state license under the name B (folio 36 and report on folio 27);
“V. […] El Estado es responsable patrimonialmente frente a terceros por los daños que ocasione su funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo, salvo el caso fortuito, la culpa de la víctima o el hecho de un tercero y este principio general lo sientan los artículos 9, 11 y 41 de la Constitución Política y lo recoge el artículo 190 de la LGAP. Frente a la persona que ha sufrido un daño que se relacione con el funcionamiento de la Administración, ésta debe responder, con independencia del título bajo el cual se acoja tal responsabilidad, que deberá en todo caso establecerse, es decir, debe determinarse el nexo causal del daño con la actividad pública y el criterio de imputación de esta responsabilidad, que no obstante ser objetiva, no renuncia a tener criterios de imputación, pues lo contrario implicaría una simple traslación de responsabilidad al patrimonio estatal, lo que resulta improcedente.
La responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado surge por la necesidad de proteger al administrado de los daños que la actividad de aquélla ocasiona y que el perjudicado no está en la obligación jurídica de soportar. La imputación del resultado lesivo a la Administración hace surgir su deber de indemnizar por la antijuricidad de su comportamiento dañoso. En cuanto a este tema, esta Sala recientemente señaló “[…]. Ahora bien, por más amplios que sean los términos en los que actualmente se valora la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado, no se renuncia a exigir ciertos criterios de imputación del daño a la actividad pública pues, de lo contrario, sería insostenible para la Administración que se le atribuyera la responsabilidad de todo el funcionamiento de la sociedad sólo por la vinculación de las actividades incluso particulares, con los fines y funciones esenciales del Estado, de manera que es necesario racionalizar y dotar de criterios jurídicos adecuados la esfera de imputación del daño a la Administración Pública.
En nuestro medio, ciertamente los numerales 9, 11 y 41 de la Constitución Política son la base para establecer el deber de indemnización que pesa sobre el Estado por los daños ocasionados, sin embargo, los criterios de imputación están definidos con claridad en los artículos 190 y 191 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, cuando señala el artículo 190 que la Administración Pública responderá “por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero”. Esta es la norma general que sienta las bases de la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado en nuestro medio. Los supuestos que contemplan las normas siguientes referidas a la responsabilidad por la conducta ilícita de los servidores públicos y por conducta lícita complementan este régimen, pero las premisas generales las define el artículo citado.
Es a partir de estos conceptos de funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal de la Administración, que se debe definir cuándo se imputa una conducta dañosa y cuándo debe responder patrimonialmente el Estado. Y al respecto, la Sala Primera ha señalado “[…] Por las particularidades propias de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, generadas a través de su evolución gradual, así como el carácter objetivo alcanzado, con claro fundamento constitucional, no puede interpretarse como un deber resarcitorio, irrestricto y permanente, aplicable siempre y para todas las hipótesis de lesión. Sería inaudito un régimen de tal naturaleza y materialmente insoportable para cualquier Estado con recursos financieros limitados. Por ello se ha acudido a criterios de imputación que de alguna forma dimensionan, dentro de la objetividad dicha, ese deber indemnizatorio originado por la conducta pública.
De allí que puede afirmarse que, el nacional, es un régimen de responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública de carácter objetivamente moderado, en tanto no renuncia a parámetros o criterios de imputación, sobre todo en lo tocante a la anormalidad e ilicitud, en la que de una u otra forma, valora y califica la conducta del aparato público. Se trata de criterios amplios y diversos a los de dolo y culpa que tradicionalmente utiliza el derecho común, pero que no por ello, dejan de convertirse en criterios de atribución que alejan el instituto de una mera transferencia patrimonial automática, sin valoración alguna de la conducta administrativa desplegada. De esta manera, el numeral 190 de nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública refiere a “funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal”, de donde la legitimidad o su antítesis, hace referencia básicamente a las conductas jurídicas de la Administración, mientras que lo normal o anormal, apunta, ante todo (pero no en exclusiva), a la conducta material de la Administración, representada entre otras, por la actividad prestacional que se atribuye al Estado, como parte de la categoría social que también se le asigna en procura del bienestar general del colectivo.
Nótese como el artículo 194 de la indicada ley, hace referencia a los “actos lícitos”, bajo la concepción de actividad jurídica, distinguiéndolos en la misma norma, de lo que califica como “funcionamiento normal", entendido como actividad material. De esta manera, la anormalidad atiende a aquellas conductas administrativas, que en sí mismas, se apartan de la buena administración (conforme al concepto utilizado por la propia Ley General en el artículo 102 inciso d., que entre otras cosas incluye la eficacia y la eficiencia) o de la organización, de las reglas técnicas o de la pericia y el prudente quehacer en el despliegue de sus actuaciones, con efecto lesivo para la persona. Esto permite señalar que la anormalidad puede manifestarse a través de un mal funcionamiento; un funcionamiento tardío, o una ausencia total de funcionamiento. Anormalidad e ilicitud, no deben por tanto adoptarse como conceptos equivalentes, ni siquiera en lo que corresponde a la hipótesis de aquel funcionamiento que siendo debido o conforme con las reglas antedichas, produce un resultado dañoso, denominado por algún sector doctrinal como “funcionamiento anormal por resultado”, pues en tal caso, lo que opera es una responsabilidad por funcionamiento normal con efecto o resultado lesivo, indemnizable, claro está, siempre que se cubran los requisitos preestablecidos expresamente por el propio Ordenamiento Jurídico (véase el mismo artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública).
Tampoco debe confundirse esta “anormalidad” del funcionamiento y la “ilegitimidad” de éste, con la antijuricidad genérica y de base, imprescindible en toda reparación civil. En efecto, la responsabilidad patrimonial nace de la antijuricidad, que a su vez se constituye en su fundamento (derivado algunas veces de una norma positiva, mientras que en otras, del principio básico traducido en el deber de no dañar a otro), y que para esta materia particular se concreta en la inexistencia de ese deber para soportar el daño. Así las cosas, si no existe para la víctima el deber de sobrellevar la lesión (manifiesta como consecuencia final ablativa de la conducta pública), es porque la Administración debía evitarla, o, en caso contrario y bajo ciertas circunstancias, asumir las consecuencias reparadoras de aquella que no pudo impedir, bien por imprevisible, bien por inevitable. Cuando tal deber de sobrellevar la lesión no existe, se produce el incumpliendo al deber de indemnidad patrimonial de la persona, y en ese tanto, habrá que reputar la lesión causada en la esfera jurídica de la víctima, como antijurídica, y por ende, de obligada reparación.
De esta manera, puede afirmarse que sólo es indemnizable la lesión que confrontada con la globalidad del Ordenamiento, pueda reputarse como antijurídica en su base, en tanto que el régimen jurídico la considera inaceptable para la víctima, con independencia de la calificación, que posterior y necesariamente, se atribuya a la conducta pública. Lo contrario sería afirmar la compensación por acción dañosa frente a un menoscabo que el Ordenamiento no reprocha y que, por el contrario, tolera y conciente como normal y justificado […] Esa reiterada antijuricidad estará siempre presente en el daño indemnizable, bien sea por funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo. Sea como fuere, esos cuatro criterios de imputación que utiliza la Ley General de la Administración Pública en el artículo 190, han de reputarse de cobijo y respaldo constitucional, en tanto concretan la transferencia que el constituyente realizó en el numeral 41 al legislador ordinario (“ocurriendo a las leyes”) e instrumentalizan la tutela judicial efectiva que consagra la Constitución.
Y siendo ello así, habrá de concluirse que tales criterios aplican para la responsabilidad patrimonial de toda autoridad pública, sea administrativa, legislativa o jurisdiccional […]”precedente número 308-06 de las 10:30 horas del 25 de mayo de 2006 de la Sala Primera […]” precedente 1273-07 de las 10:31 horas del 30 de octubre de 2007. Ahora bien. Cuando se trata de la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración, como se indicó, teniendo en cuenta los parámetros de imputación que señala la ley, demostrados estos y el resultado dañoso, procede declarar su responsabilidad patrimonial, independientemente de que se compruebe o no la existencia de una conducta delictiva del funcionario. Así, en cuanto a este tema la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera ha puntualizado “[…]Ya esta Sala ha tenido la oportunidad de pronunciarse sobre el régimen de responsabilidad patrimonial a que está sujeto el Estado.
En este sentido en el fallo no. 584 de las 10 horas 40 minutos del 11 de agosto del 2005 realizó un amplio desarrollo y análisis sobre esta temática, detallando sus particularidades, marco de evolución, sustento constitucional entre otras consideraciones de importancia. En lo que viene relevante al caso, cabe señalar que la responsabilidad patrimonial (que no civil) y extracontractual de la Administración Pública, se enmarca dentro de un régimen preeminentemente objetivo, que comprende en su base tanto la teoría del riesgo como el equilibrio en la ecuación patrimonial. Con ello se procura esencialmente, la reparación indemnizatoria a quien ha sufrido una lesión atribuible a la organización pública como centro de autoridad. Este criterio finalista produce a su vez, una transformación plena en el eje central de la responsabilidad misma, pues abandona la observación analítica del sujeto productor del daño y la calificación de su conducta, para ubicarse en la posición de la víctima, que menguada en su situación jurídica, queda eximida en la comprobación de cualquier parámetro subjetivo del agente público actuante (salvo en lo que a su responsabilidad personal se refiere).
Esto ocasiona, sin duda, un giro radical en el enfoque propio de su fundamento, ya que habrá responsabilidad del Estado siempre que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar el daño, ya sea este de naturaleza patrimonial o extrapatrimonial. A partir de allí, es patente la reversión de los componentes y efectos del instituto en pleno. Tanto los presupuestos esenciales como la carga de la prueba, adquieren un nuevo matiz, que libera al afectado no solo de amarras sustanciales sino también procesales, y coloca a la Administración en la obligada descarga frente a los cargos y hechos que se le imputan. En este marco, la responsabilidad marcadamente objetiva dispensa el análisis de factores de corte subjetivo e individual del agente productor para la determinabilidad de la reparación del daño, trasladándose a la esfera del lesionado. En tanto se haya sufrido una lesión como consecuencia de una conducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que no tiene el deber de soportar, se impone el deber de resarcimiento, en virtud del principio de reparación integral del daño que se desprende del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política.
En este mismo sentido, pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las sentencias de esta Sala números 138 de las 15 horas 5 minutos del 23 de agosto; 192 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del 6 de noviembre, ambas de 1991; 48 de las 14 horas 10 minutos del 29 de mayo de 1996 y 55 de las 14 horas treinta minutos del 4 de julio de 1997.) A la luz de lo dispuesto en dichos precedentes, y como bien lo dispuso el Tribunal, el Ordenamiento Jurídico, a partir de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, adopta, según se ha dicho, el sistema de responsabilidad preeminentemente objetiva. Por ello, no es necesaria la existencia -y, por ende, su demostración-, del dolo o la culpa o, en general, una falta subjetiva imputable a los servidores o funcionarios públicos para que surja el deber de resarcir los daños y perjuicios causados por su funcionamiento. Por ello, el canon 190 de ese cuerpo legal dispone con meridiana claridad la responsabilidad del Estado por su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo que converjan en el caso concreto, las causas eximentes que esa misma disposición, de forma taxativa expresa, a saber; la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero, correspondiéndole a la Administración acreditar su existencia.
De este órgano colegiado, puede verse las sentencias de esta misma Sala no. 589-F-99 de 14 horas 20 minutos del primero de octubre de 1999 y no. 252-F-01, de las 16 horas 15 minutos del 28 de marzo del 2001.En esta misma línea, el canon 194.3 de ese mismo cuerpo legal sienta las bases legales de la responsabilidad del Estado Legislador. Los numerales 9, 11, 33, 41 y 154, todos de la Carta Magna, constituyen el fundamento y sustento de la responsabilidad del Estado Juez por el error judicial, el funcionamiento anormal o ilícito de la función jurisdiccional. De ahí que no podría sostenerse una “impunidad” del Estado, bajo el fundamento de que carece de desarrollo legal, pues aquella se encuentra establecida por principio, en el marco de la Constitución, a la vez que supondría un quebranto a la seguridad jurídica, el principio de igualdad y al control de la arbitrariedad de los poderes públicos.
Así visto, su reconocimiento no está condicionado a la existencia de mandato legal que la regule. La responsabilidad aludida se rige por lo estatuido en la Carta Fundamental, es decir, constituye un principio de base constitucional, impuesto por las normas referidas y que busca el control del ejercicio de toda la función y conducta del Estado en cualquiera de sus esferas, así como la tutela de los derechos e intereses de los justiciables […]” precedente número 74-07 de las 10:15 horas del 2 de febrero de 2007 de la Sala Primera. En el caso concreto, el objeto del proceso de hábeas corpus ante la Sala Constitucional constituyó la privación ilegítima de libertad de B por parte de las autoridades del Centro de Información Policial de la Fuerza Pública de Pérez Zeledón, J P I y D M L, ocurrida el 30 de abril de 2004. Se analizó la conducta injustificada de dos funcionarios públicos en ejercicio de sus cargos que privaron de libertad a esta persona.
Se cuestionó la realización de un acto que se demandaba arbitrario por parte de autoridades públicas, es decir, por el funcionamiento de la Administración. La Sala Constitucional pidió informes a los funcionarios involucrados y a los jerarcas públicos que tenían que ver con el acto cuestionado y al resolver el recurso señaló “[…] Hechos probados. De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos, sea porque así han sido acreditados o bien porque el recurrido haya omitido referirse a ellos según lo prevenido en el auto inicial: Que mediante resolución del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo del dieciséis de marzo del año en curso, se les otorgó la condición de residentes rentistas al amparado y a su esposa, Ann Maxine Patton, por lo que mediante oficio número P-182-2001, dicho instituto se solicitó a la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería la concesión de la categoría migratoria de residente al amparado y su esposa (folios 17 y 18 e informe a folio 9); b) que el treinta de abril del año en curso, aproximadamente a las diecisiete horas y quince minutos, los funcionarios del CIFP, J P I y D M L, procedieron a seguir al vehículo del amparado en base a "informes confidenciales" y una denuncia de que existía un extranjero en situación irregular que era necesario identificar (folio 36 e informe a folio 27); c) que cuando el auto del amparado se éste se detuvo, solicitaron la identificación del amparado y de su esposa, quienes les mostraron únicamente una licencia del estado de Arizona a nombre de B (folio 36 e informe a folio 27);
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