Amparo against municipal eviction without due process on loaned landAmparo contra desalojo municipal sin debido proceso sobre terrenos cedidos en préstamo

II.- On the merits. From the report rendered under oath, as well as the evidence contained in the record, this Court considers that the claim of the appellants is receivable. This Court is not disregarding the authority of the respondent municipality to revoke, for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration, any use permit granted over public domain assets (bienes demaniales), which, it is true, is granted on a precarious basis (a título precario); it is also true that upon repossessing the asset, the respondent Municipality is obliged to respect certain minimum guarantees of the rights of third parties. The first of these is that the action of the corporate entity must not be untimely. This rule, derived from the prohibition of arbitrariness –Article 11 of the Political Constitution–, is expressed, for cases such as the one at hand, in Article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration, which states:

“Use permits for the public domain, and other acts that recognize an expressly and validly granted precarious right (derecho a título precario) to an administered party, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary, and in all cases a prudential period must be granted for compliance with the act of revocation.” In the specific case, the Chamber finds it proven that since the year nineteen ninety-four, the respondent Municipality authorized, as a loan, the appellants to place their houses on a piece of land located at that time behind the Hotel Barbizón, (folios 42-43), a piece of land that at that time the municipality considered large enough to build more dwellings. In this manner, it was ceded to them for "the necessary time while the Municipality can execute the housing project it has scheduled." Despite this, starting in the year two thousand nine, the Municipality began proceedings to declare the obvious and manifest nullity of the agreement adopted in article 1.6. of ordinary session number 76-94 of the fifth of December, nineteen ninety-four, a procedure that shall be governed by the rules of Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, and the appellants have been notified on several occasions of the municipal corporation's desire to revoke or annul what was agreed. However, by official communication UTV-277-2020 dated the fourth of October, two thousand ten, from the Technical Road Unit (Unidad Técnica Vial), in which a report is rendered to the Council and referring to the road in the vicinity of Residencial El Tirol, it determines that the access is neither inventoried nor classified under any category, and therefore it recommended that a study be requested from the Municipal Cadastre Department to determine the terms under which it is inventoried. Despite that recommendation, it cannot be deduced from the record that the respondent authorities acted in that direction, and in doing so, would have been able to establish with complete clarity and certainty the nature of the land in question. Said omission constitutes a clear violation of due process, as well as of the respondent Municipality's obligation to act in accordance with the law and with the guidelines established by Articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code:

“Things are public which, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those which all can benefit from by being delivered to public use.

All other things are private and the object of individual property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, which in such case, as civil persons, are no different from any other person…” Thus, by virtue of the foregoing, the proper course is to grant the appeal, without prejudice to the respondent Public Administration, prior to initiating the procedure for the reopening of the public road, should this be appropriate, complying with the formal and substantial requirements indicated above, and determining with certainty the legal nature of the real property (inmueble) occupied by the appellants.

III- With regard to the alleged right of possession and property indicated by the appellants, it is evident that the Chamber cannot consider the existence of any of those rights as accredited, as this is not a matter within its jurisdiction. In that respect, both the Municipality and the appellants must resort to the ordinary legality route to dispute their respective property or possession rights over said land and exercise in that instance the actions established by common legislation, and the appeal is declared without merit as to those aspects.

This rule, derived from the prohibition of arbitrariness – article 11 of the Political Constitution – is expressed, for cases such as the one at hand, in article 154 of the General Law of Public Administration, which states:

*“Permits for the use of the public domain, and other acts that expressly and validly recognize a right held on a precarious (precario) basis to an administered party, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability for the Administration; but the revocation shall not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period for compliance with the revocation act shall be given in all cases.”* In the specific case, the Chamber has established as proven that since 1994, the respondent Municipality authorized, as a loan (préstamo), the petitioners to locate their houses on a land located at that time behind the Hotel Barbizón (folios 42-43), a land that the municipality at that time considered large enough to build more housing. In this way, it was ceded to them for “the time necessary while the Municipality can execute the housing project it has planned.” Despite this, starting in 2009, the Municipality initiated procedures to declare the absolute and manifest nullity (nulidad evidente y manifiesta) of the agreement adopted in article 1.6. of ordinary session number 76-94 of December 5, 1994, a procedure that will be governed by the rules of article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, and the petitioners have been notified on several occasions of the municipal corporation’s desire to revoke or annul what was agreed. However, through official letter UTV-277-2020 dated October 4, 2010, from the Unidad Técnica Vial, in which a report is rendered to the Council and referring to the road in the vicinity of Residencial El Tirol, it determines that the access is neither inventoried nor classified under any category, and therefore recommended that a study be requested from the Departamento de Catastro Municipal to determine the terms in which it is inventoried. Despite this recommendation, it cannot be inferred from the case file that the respondent authorities acted in that direction, thus having been able to establish with complete clarity and certainty the nature of the land in question. Said omission constitutes a clear injury to due process (debido proceso), as well as to the obligation of the respondent Municipality to act in accordance with the law and in accordance with the guidelines established by articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code:

*“Public things (cosas públicas) are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can avail themselves by being given over to public use.* *All other things are private and the object of private property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person…”* Thus, by virtue of the foregoing, the appropriate course is to grant the appeal, without prejudice that the respondent Public Administration, before initiating the procedure for the reopening of the public road, if that were appropriate, complying with the formal and substantial requirements indicated above, determines with certainty the legal nature of the property occupied by the petitioners.

**III-** Regarding the alleged right of possession and property claimed by the petitioners, it is evident that the Chamber cannot consider the existence of any of those rights as proven, as it is not a matter within its competence. On that point, both the Municipality and the petitioners must resort to the ordinary legal channel to dispute their respective property or possession rights regarding said land and exercise in that instance the actions established by common legislation, with the appeal being declared without merit as to such points.”

“II.- Sobre el fondo. Del informe rendido bajo juramento, así como de la prueba que consta en autos este Tribunal considera que resulta de recibo el reclamo de las recurrentes. Este Tribunal no está desconociendo la potestad de la municipalidad recurrida para revocar, por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia sin responsabilidad de la Administración, cualquier permiso de uso, que se otorgue en bienes demaniales el cual sí es cierto, es otorgado a título precario, también es lo cierto que al reasumir el bien la Municipalidad recurrida está obligada a respetar ciertas garantías mínimas de los derechos de terceros. La primera de ellas consiste en que la acción del ente corporativo no debe ser intempestiva. Esta regla, derivada de la interdicción de la arbitrariedad –artículo 11 de la Constitución Política-, se expresa, para casos como el que aquí ocupa, en el artículo 154 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública que dice:

“Los permisos de uso del dominio público, y los demás actos que reconozcan a un administrado un derecho expresa y válidamente a título precario, podrán ser revocados por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia sin responsabilidad de la Administración; pero la revocación no deberá ser intempestiva ni arbitraria y deberá darse en todos los casos un plazo prudencial para el cumplimiento del acto de revocación.” En el caso concreto, la Sala tiene por demostrado que desde el año mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, la Municipalidad recurrida, autorizó en calidad de préstamo que las recurrentes ubicaran sus casas en un terreno ubicado en aquel momento, detrás del Hotel Barbizón, (folios 42-43), terreno que en ese momento consideró la municipalidad lo suficientemente grande como para construir más viviendas. De de ese modo se les cedió por "el tiempo necesario mientras la Municipalidad pueda ejecutar el proyecto de vivienda que tiene programado". Pese a ello, a partir del año dos mil nueve, la Municipalidad inició trámites para declarar la nulidad evidente y manifiesta del acuerdo adoptado en el artículo 1.6. de la sesión ordinaria número 76-94 del cinco de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, procedimiento que se regulará con las reglas del artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y las recurrentes han sido notificadas en varias ocasiones del deseo de la corporación municipal de revocar o anular lo acordado. Sin embargo, mediante oficio UTV-277-2020 de fecha cuatro de octubre del dos mil diez, de la Unidad Técnica Vial, en el cual se rinde informe al Concejo y en referencia al camino en las cercanías del Residencial El Tirol, determina que el acceso no está inventariado, ni está clasificado bajo ninguna categoría, por ello recomendó que se solicitara un estudio en el Departamento de Catastro Municipal, que determinara los términos en los que está inventariado. Pese a esa recomendación, de autos no se extrae que las autoridades recurridas hubieran actuado en esa dirección, y de esa manera hubieran logrado establecer con toda claridad y certeza la naturaleza del terreno en cuestión. Dicha omisión constituye una clara lesión al debido proceso, así como a la obligación de la Municipalidad recurrida de actuar conforme a derecho y conforme a los lineamientos que establecen los artículos 261 y 262 del Código Civil:

“Son cosas públicas las que, por ley, están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregadas al uso público.

Todas las demás cosas son privadas y objeto de propiedad particular, aunque pertenezcan al Estado o a los Municipios, quienes para el caso, como personas civiles, no se diferencian de cualquier otra persona…” Así en virtud de lo accionada, previo a que inicie el procedimiento de reapertura del camino público, si ello fuera procedente, cumpliendo los recaudos formales y sustanciales señalados anteriormente y determine con certeza la naturaleza jurídica del inmueble ocupado por las recurrentes.

III- En lo que se refiere al alegado derecho de posesión y de propiedad que indican las recurrentes, resulta evidente que la Sala no puede tener por acreditada la existencia de alguno de esos derechos por no ser materia propia de su competencia. En ese extremo tanto la Municipalidad, como las recurrentes deberán acudir a la vía de legalidad ordinaria para discutir sus respectivos derechos de propiedad o posesión respecto de dicho terreno y ejercer en esa instancia las acciones que establezca la legislación común, procediendo la declaratoria sin lugar del recurso en cuanto a tales extremos.”