MINAE's Failure to Expropriate Lands in Las Baulas National ParkOmisión del MINAE de expropiar en Parque Nacional Las Baulas

I.- Preliminary matters. Having reviewed the proceeding attached to folios 92 to 94, Mario Boza Loría, Randall Arauz Vargas, Rolando Castro Córdoba, Roxana Silman Carranza, and Didiher Chacón Chaverri are admitted as coadjuvants of the active party in this jurisdictional appeal. Likewise, Ms. Laura Patricia Charpentier Soto is admitted as a coadjuvant of the passive party of the amparo. The foregoing under the terms regulated by Article 34, paragraph 3 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.

II.- Now then, regarding the request for clarification and supplementation of the order issued by the Constitutional Chamber in the initial ruling of the proceeding, filed by the special judicial representative of the companies Global Acquisitios Gloac, Limitada; Rancho Bellomar, Sociedad Anónima; Corporación Lacheaven de Ventana, Sociedad Anónima; Vista Flor Velas, Sociedad Anónima; Playa de Mijos, Limitada; and Garden Cour, Sociedad Anónima, at folios 183 to 186; the request is denied, considering that this provision, contrary to what the petitioner claims, does not require any additional precision for its material execution. The foregoing is without prejudice to the power held by the petitioner to raise any claims deemed necessary for the defense of his interests.

III.- Regarding the claim of the amparo appeal processed under expediente Nº05-012170-0007-CO, which was consolidated with this matter by means of resolution Nº2005-13616 of 15:10 hrs. on September 30, 2005. In a brief appearing at folios 166 to 174, Mr. Mario Andrés Boza Loría claims non-compliance by the Municipality of the Canton of Santa Cruz with the order issued by the Constitutional Chamber in the amparo’s initial resolution, namely: "to issue the necessary directives and dispatch the pertinent orders, within the scope of its attributions and powers, so that the municipal permits and environmental viabilities (viabilidades ambientales) that are granted ensure no harm to the species known as the Leatherback Turtle (Tortuga Baula), nor to the beaches where they nest." The foregoing because the sued Corporation granted a construction permit (permiso de construcción) within the Las Baulas National Marine Park (Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas), in contravention of the environmental regulations in force. In his report, the Mayor of the sued Corporation stated that the construction permit was granted upon proof that the application contained the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) issued by SETENA and that the Constitutional Chamber did not suspend the granting of those licenses (report at folios 218 to 219). On this point, it must be noted that it exceeds the purpose of the amparo to determine whether SETENA bypassed environmental regulations on the occasion of the aforementioned authorization, which rather constitutes a matter of mere legality to be ventilated in the ordinary Jurisdiction. For that reason, Boza Loría's petition must be denied, without prejudice to what will be set forth later when the merits of this jurisdictional appeal are addressed.

IV.- Purpose of the appeal. The appellants claim the violation of their fundamental rights, particularly the rights protected in Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution, by the omission of the authorities of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) to expropriate the private properties within the Las Baulas National Park, despite the fact that Ley Nº7524 of July 10, 1995 establishes that obligation to protect the nesting of the leatherback turtles, which are in danger of extinction. They also allege that the Ministry of Finance has not reserved the necessary resources to cover the value of the lands to their owners, while SETENA has granted several environmental viabilities (viabilidades ambientales) without verifying compliance with the requirements set forth in the legal system for that purpose. For its part, the Municipality of the Canton of Santa Cruz granted various construction permits without requiring the aforementioned viability. In their view, the foregoing is unjustified and injures the Right of the Constitution.

V.- Proven facts. (...).

VI.- Regarding the amparo against the Ministry of Environment and Energy. The claim concerns the omission of the sued Ministry to expropriate the private lands located within the Las Baulas National Park, despite the fact that the Law creating that National Park, Ley Nº7524 of July 10, 1995, stipulates that obligation to safeguard the nesting of the leatherback turtle, which is in danger of extinction. In this regard, Article 2 of Ley Nº7524 stipulates:

"ARTICLE 2.- Expropriations. To comply with this Law, the competent institution shall manage the expropriations of all or part of the properties included in the zone delimited in the preceding article.

The private lands included in that delimitation shall be subject to expropriation and shall be considered part of the Las Baulas National Marine Park, until they are acquired by the State through purchase, donations, or expropriations; in the meantime, the owners shall enjoy the full exercise of the attributes of ownership." In this sense, although the sued Minister in his report mentions that by resolution NºR–421–MINAE of 10:30 hrs. on November 8, 2004, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta Nº237 of December 3, 2004, the acquisition of a property located within the referred park was declared of public interest, whereby "since that date the State has expressed, through suitable means, its interest and will to acquire the lands within the mentioned national park" (report at folio 67), it deeply calls the attention of the Constitutional Court that Ley Nº7524 entered into force on August 16, 1995; such that the time elapsed—almost ten years—for the Executive Branch to commence the expropriation of those properties is unjustified and injures the rights protected in Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution, in that the State ignores its obligation to take the appropriate and necessary measures, in accordance with international law and on the basis of the most reliable scientific data available, for the protection, conservation, and recovery of sea turtle populations and their habitats, including the restriction of human activities that may seriously affect sea turtles, especially during the periods of reproduction, incubation, and migration, in the terms of the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, approved by means of Ley Nº7906 of September 24, 1999. By virtue of the foregoing, the appropriate course is to grant the amparo insofar as it is directed against the Ministry of Environment and Energy—for its omission to initiate, with due celerity, the expropriation procedures referred to in Ley Nº7524 of July 10, 1995—while nonetheless warning the sued party, in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, that it must not incur in the future in the acts or omissions that gave basis to the granting of the appeal.

VII.- Regarding the amparo against the Ministry of Finance. The inertia of the sued agency in reserving the necessary funds to carry out the expropriations indicated in Ley Nº7524 of July 10, 1995 is alleged. On this point, the sued Minister in his report stated that in the Budget Law for the year 2005, the sum of ¢925,000,000.00 was included to cover the value of the lands destined for the conservation area, in accordance with the appraisals and the respective judgments (report at folio 58), the execution of which corresponds to MINAE. The sued Minister also indicated that the declaration of public interest for the property of Mrs. Marion Edith Unglaube is subsequent to the preliminary draft budget for the year 2005 submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (report at folio 85), whereby no improper situation is perceived that violates the Right of the Constitution. No infringement of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be attributed to the authorities of the Ministry of Finance, for which reason the appeal must be dismissed on this point.

VIII.- Regarding the amparo against the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental). From the documentary evidence attached to the case file, as well as from the report rendered by the ad-hoc Secretary General of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat—which is given under the solemnity of an oath, with timely warning of the consequences, including criminal ones, provided for in Article 44 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law—it is not proven that the authorities of SETENA—contrary to what the appellants claim—granted the environmental licenses (licencias ambientales) or viabilities in contravention of the legal system in force, for which reason the appropriate course is to dismiss the appeal on this point. In this sense, the sued party stated: "SETENA shall not grant environmental licenses when the corresponding environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental) offers indications that the proposed development would endanger the conservation of this endangered species" (report at folio 61). Indeed, if the affected parties disagree with the results of the environmental assessments (evaluaciones ambientales) that gave rise to the granting of those licenses, they may well file before the sued party the claims and procedures that the legal system establishes for the defense of their interests, where they have greater opportunities than in the summary amparo proceeding to present evidentiary elements and the respective technical studies. It is worth mentioning that both the Ministry of Environment and Energy and the National Environmental Technical Secretariat took the necessary measures not to authorize future development proceedings within the park, and to suspend the processing of procedures initiated for the purpose of obtaining an environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) in that zone. Consequently, the amparo must be denied on this point.

IX.- Regarding the amparo against the Municipality of the Canton of Santa Cruz. The appeal must also be dismissed insofar as it is directed against the sued Corporation, as the sued Mayor stated in his sworn report that the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) from SETENA is an indispensable requirement for the sued Municipality to grant a construction permit (permiso de construcción) at the site.

X.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, the appropriate course is to grant the amparo, only insofar as it is directed against the Ministry of Environment and Energy for having delayed nearly 10 years in initiating the expropriation procedures for the private lands located within the Las Baulas National Marine Park, in the terms of Ley Nº7524 of July 10, 1995. As for the rest, the appeal is dismissed.

In view of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the amparo insofar as it is directed against the Ministry of Environment and Energy – for its failure to initiate, with due speed, the expropriation proceedings referred to in Ley Nº7524 of July 10, 1995 –, not without first warning the respondent, in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), that it must not incur in the future in the acts or omissions that gave rise to the granting of the appeal.

VII.- Regarding the amparo against the Ministry of Finance. The inertia of the respondent agency in reserving the necessary funds to carry out the expropriations indicated in Ley Nº7524 of July 10, 1995 is alleged. On this point, the respondent Minister stated in his report that the Budget Law (Ley de Presupuesto) for the year 2005 included the sum of ¢925,000,000.00 to cover the value of the lands destined for the conservation area, in accordance with the appraisals and the respective judgments (report on folio 58), the execution of which corresponds to MINAE. The respondent Minister also pointed out that the declaration of public interest for the property of Mrs. Marion Edith Unglaube is subsequent to the preliminary draft budget for the year 2005 submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (report on folio 85), and thus an undue situation that violates the Right of the Constitution is not apparent. No infraction of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be attributed to the authorities of the Ministry of Finance, for which reason the appeal must be dismissed with respect to this point.

VIII.- Regarding the amparo against the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental). From the documentary evidence submitted to the case file, as well as from the report rendered by the ad-hoc General Secretary of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) – which is given under the solemnity of oath, with timely warning of the consequences, including criminal ones, provided for in Article 44 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) – it has not been proven that the authorities of SETENA – unlike what the appellants claim – granted environmental licenses or approvals (viabilidades ambientales) in contravention of the current legal system, for which reason it is appropriate to declare the appeal without merit on this point. In this regard, the respondent stated: “SETENA will not grant environmental licenses when the corresponding environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental) provides indications that the proposed development would endanger the conservation of this endangered species” (report on folio 61). Indeed, if the affected parties disagree with the results of the environmental assessments (evaluaciones ambientales) that gave rise to the granting of these licenses, they may well formulate before the respondent the claims and procedures that the legal system establishes for the defense of their interests, a venue where they enjoy greater opportunities than in the summary amparo proceeding to present the respective evidentiary elements and technical studies. It is worth mentioning that both the Ministry of Environment and Energy and the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) took the necessary measures not to authorize future development activity within the park, and to suspend the processing of proceedings instituted in order to obtain an environmental approval (viabilidad ambiental) in that zone. Consequently, the amparo must be denied with respect to this point.

IX.- Regarding the amparo against the Municipality of the Canton of Santa Cruz. The appeal must also be dismissed insofar as it is directed against the respondent Corporation (Corporación), as the respondent Mayor mentioned in his report under oath that the environmental approval (viabilidad ambiental) from SETENA is an indispensable requirement for the respondent Municipality (Municipalidad) to grant a construction permit at the site.

X.- Conclusion. In view of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the amparo, only insofar as it is directed against the Ministry of Environment and Energy for having delayed nearly 10 years in initiating the expropriation proceedings for the private properties located within the Las Baulas National Marine Park, under the terms of Ley Nº7524 of July 10, 1995. In all other respects, the appeal must be dismissed.” To comply with this Law, the competent institution shall manage the expropriations of all or part of the properties included in the zone delimited in the previous article. The private lands included in that delimitation shall be susceptible to expropriation and shall be considered part of the Las Baulas National Marine Park (Parque Nacional Marino las Baulas), until such time as they are acquired by the State, through purchase, donations, or expropriations; meanwhile, the owners shall enjoy the full exercise of the attributes of ownership.” In this regard, although the respondent Minister in his report mentions that through resolution No. R–421–MINAE of 10:30 a.m. on November 8, 2004, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 237 of December 3, 2004, the acquisition of a property located within the referenced park was declared of public interest, with which “since that date the State has expressed through the appropriate means its interest and willingness to acquire the lands within the mentioned national park” (report on folio 67), it deeply draws the attention of the Constitutional Court that Law No. 7524 entered into force on August 16, 1995; such that the time elapsed for the Executive Branch to begin the expropriation of those properties, nearly ten years, is unjustified and injures the rights protected in articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution, in that the State evades its obligation to take appropriate and necessary measures, in accordance with international law and based on the most reliable scientific data available, for the protection, conservation, and recovery of sea turtle populations and their habitats, among them, the restriction of human activities that may seriously affect sea turtles, especially during periods of reproduction, incubation, and migration, under the terms of the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, approved through Law No. 7906 of September 24, 1999. By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the amparo insofar as it is directed against the Ministry of Environment and Energy – for its omission to initiate, with due speed, the expropriation procedures referred to in Law No. 7524 of July 10, 1995–, not without first warning the respondent, in accordance with the provisions of article 50 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, that it must not incur in the future in the acts or omissions that gave rise to the acceptance of the appeal.

VII.- Regarding the amparo against the Ministry of Finance. The inertia of the respondent agency is accused, for failing to reserve the necessary funds to carry out the expropriations indicated in Law No. 7524 of July 10, 1995. On this matter, the respondent Minister in his report stated that in the Budget Law for the year 2005 the sum of ¢925,000,000.00 was included to cover the value of the lands destined for the conservation area, in accordance with the appraisals and the respective judgments (report on folio 58), the execution of which corresponds to MINAE. The respondent Minister also indicated that the declaration of public interest for the property of Mrs. Marion Edith Unglaube is subsequent to the preliminary draft budget for the year 2005 presented by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (report on folio 85), such that no undue situation is appreciated that violates the Right of the Constitution. No infraction of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment can be attributed to the authorities of the Ministry of Finance, a reason for which the appeal must be dismissed regarding this point.

VIII.- Regarding the amparo against the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental). From the documentary evidence attached to the case file, as well as from the report rendered by the ad-hoc General Secretary of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) –which is given under the solemnity of oath, with timely warning of the consequences, including criminal ones, provided for in article 44 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction– it is not considered accredited that the authorities of SETENA –unlike what the appellants allege– conferred environmental licenses or environmental viabilities in contravention of the legal system in force, a reason for which it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal regarding this point. In this sense, the respondent stated: “SETENA will not grant environmental licenses when the corresponding environmental impact assessment (evaluación ambiental) offers indications that the proposed development would endanger the conservation of this endangered species” (report on folio 61). Indeed, if the affected parties disagree with the results of the environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones ambientales) that gave rise to the granting of those licenses, they may well submit to the respondent the claims and procedures that the legal system establishes for the defense of their interests, a forum where they enjoy greater opportunities than in the very summary amparo proceeding to present evidentiary elements and the respective technical studies. It is worth mentioning that both the Ministry of Environment and Energy, and the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), took the necessary measures to not authorize a future development management within the park, and to suspend the processing of the procedures established in order to obtain an environmental viability in that zone. Consequently, the amparo must be denied regarding this point.

IX.- Regarding the amparo against the Municipality of the Canton of Santa Cruz. The appeal must also be dismissed insofar as it is filed against the respondent Corporation, given that the respondent Mayor mentioned in his sworn report that SETENA's environmental viability is an indispensable requirement for the respondent Municipality to grant a construction permit on the site.

X.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the amparo, only insofar as it is directed against the Ministry of Environment and Energy for having delayed nearly 10 years in initiating the expropriation procedures for the private lands located within the Las Baulas National Marine Park (Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas), under the terms of Law No. 7524 of July 10, 1995. As for the rest, the appeal must be dismissed.”

“I.- Cuestiones preliminares. Vista la gestión que corre agregada a folios 92 a 94, se tiene a los señores Mario Boza Loría, Randall Arauz Vargas, Rolando Castro Córdoba, Roxana Silman Carranza, y Didiher Chacón Chaverri como coadyuvantes de la parte activa de este recurso jurisdiccional. Asimismo, se tiene a la Sra. Laura Patricia Charpentier Soto como coadyuvante de la parte pasiva del amparo. Lo anterior en los términos en que está regulado por el artículo 34 párrafo 3º de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

II.- Ahora bien, en lo que atañe a la solicitud de aclaración y adición de la orden dictada por la Sala Constitucional en el auto inicial del proceso, formulada por el apoderado especial judicial de las empresas Global Acquisitios Gloac, Limitada; Rancho Bellomar, Sociedad Anónima; Corporación Lacheaven de Ventana, Sociedad Anónima; Vista Flor Velas, Sociedad Anónima; Playa de Mijos, Limitada; y Garden Cour, Sociedad Anónima, a folios 183 a 186; no ha lugar a lo pedido, teniendo en cuenta que esa disposición, lejos de lo que aduce el gestionante, no requiere de ninguna precisión adicional para su ejecución material. Lo anterior, sin perjuicio de la potestad de que goza el gestionante de plantear los reclamos que estime necesarios para la defensa de sus intereses.

III.- Sobre la pretensión del recurso de amparo tramitado bajo el expediente Nº05-012170-0007-CO, el cual fue acumulado a este asunto por medio de la resolución Nº2005-13616 de las 15:10 hrs. de 30 de setiembre de 2005. En memorial que obra a folios 166 a 174 el Sr. Mario Andrés Boza Loría que reclama el incumplimiento de la Municipalidad del Cantón de Santa Cruz de la orden emitida por la Sala Constitucional en la resolución de curso del amparo, en el sentido de: “emitir las directrices necesarias y girar las órdenes pertinentes, dentro del ámbito de sus atribuciones y competencias, para que los permisos municipales y viabilidades ambientales que se otorguen garanticen la no afectación de la especie conocida como Tortuga Baula, así como de las playas donde estas anidan”. Lo anterior por cuanto, la Corporación accionada confirió un permiso de construcción dentro del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas, en contravención de las disposiciones vigentes en materia ambiental. En su informe, el Alcalde de la Corporación accionada manifestó que el permiso de construcción fue conferido al acreditarse que la solicitud contenía la viabilidad ambiental emitida por la SETENA y que la Sala Constitucional no suspendió el otorgamiento de esas licencias (informe a folios 218 a 219). Sobre el particular, se debe advertir que excede el objeto del amparo dilucidar si la SETENA soslayó la normativa ambiental con ocasión de la autorización aludida, lo cual más bien constituye un extremo de mera legalidad que se debe ventilar en la Jurisdicción ordinaria. Por ese motivo se debe denegar la petición de Boza Loría, sin perjuicio de lo que se expondrá más adelante cuando se conozca por el fondo este recurso jurisdiccional.

IV.- Objeto del recurso. Las recurrentes reclaman la violación de sus derechos fundamentales, en particular de los derechos protegidos en los artículos 21 y 50 de la Constitución Política, por la omisión de las autoridades del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, del Ministerio de Hacienda y de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental de expropiar los inmuebles privados dentro del Parque Nacional Las Baulas, pese a que la Ley Nº7524 de 10 de julio de 1995 establece esa obligación para proteger la anidación de las tortugas baula, las cuales se encuentran en peligro de extinción. Acusan, asimismo, que el Ministerio de Hacienda no ha reservado los recursos necesarios para cubrir el valor de los fundos a sus propietarios, mientras que la SETENA ha otorgado varias viabilidades ambientales sin verificar el cumplimiento de los requisitos contemplados en el ordenamiento con ese fin. Por su parte, la Municipalidad del Cantón de Santa Cruz confirió diversos permisos de construcción sin requerir la viabilidad aludida. En su criterio, lo anterior es injustificado y lesiona el Derecho de la Constitución.

V.- Hechos probados.(…).

VI.- Del amparo contra el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía. Se reclama la omisión del Ministerio recurrido de expropiar los fundos privados situados dentro del Parque Nacional Las Baulas, pese a que la Ley de creación de ese Parque Nacional, Ley Nº7524 de 10 de julio de 1995, estipula esa obligación para salvaguardar la anidación de la tortura baula, que está en peligro de extinción. Al respecto, el artículo 2º de la Ley Nº7524, estipula:

“ARTICULO 2.- Expropiaciones. Para cumplir con la presente Ley, la institución competente gestionará las expropiaciones de la totalidad o de una parte de las fincas comprendidas en la zona delimitada en el artículo anterior.

Los terrenos privados comprendidos en esa delimitación serán susceptibles de hasta tanto no sean adquiridos por el Estado, mediante compra, donaciones o los atributos del dominio.” En este sentido, aunque el Ministro accionado en su informe menciona que por resolución NºR–421–MINAE de las 10:30 hrs. de 8 de noviembre de 2004, publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta Nº237 de 3 de diciembre de 2004, se declaró de interés público la adquisición de un inmueble situado dentro del parque referido, con lo cual “desde esa fecha el Estado ha expresado por los medios idóneos su interés y voluntad de adquirir los terrenos dentro del mencionado parque nacional” (informe a folio 67), llama profundamente la atención del Tribunal Constitucional que la Ley Nº7524 entró en vigencia desde el 16 de agosto de 1995; de modo que el plazo transcurrido para que el Poder Ejecutivo comenzara la expropiación de esos inmuebles, de casi diez años, es injustificado y lesiona los derechos protegidos en los artículos 21 y 50 de la Constitución Política, en cuanto soslaya el Estado su obligación de tomar las medidas apropiadas y necesarias, de conformidad con el derecho internacional y sobre la base de los datos científicos más fidedignos disponibles, para la protección, conservación y recuperación de las poblaciones de tortugas marinas y de sus hábitat, entre ellas, la restricción de las actividades humanas que puedan afectar gravemente a las tortugas marinas, sobre todo durante los períodos de reproducción, incubación y migración, en los términos de la Convención interamericana para la protección y conservación de las tortugas marinas, aprobada por medio de la Ley Nº7906 de 24 de setiembre de 1999. En virtud de lo expuesto, lo procedente es declarar con lugar el amparo en cuanto se dirige contra el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía –por su omisión de iniciar, con la celeridad debida, los procedimientos de expropiación a que hace referencia la Ley Nº7524 de 10 de julio de 1995–, no sin antes advertir al recurrido, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 50 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que no debe incurrir a futuro en los actos u omisiones que dieron base a la acogida del recurso.

VII.- Del amparo contra el Ministerio de Hacienda. Se acusa la inercia de la dependencia recurrida de reservar los fondos necesarios para efectuar las Ley Nº7524 de 10 de julio de 1995. Sobre el particular, el Ministro accionado en su informe manifestó que en la Ley de Presupuesto para el año 2005 se incluyó la suma de ¢925.000.000,00 para cubrir el valor de los terrenos destinados al área de conservación, de acuerdo con los avalúos y las sentencias respectivas (informe a folio 58), cuya ejecución corresponde al MINAE. También señaló el Ministro recurrido que la declaratoria de interés público del inmueble de la señora Marion Edith Unglaube es posterior al anteproyecto de presupuesto para el año 2005 presentado por el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (informe a folio 85), con lo que no se aprecia una situación indebida que vulnere el Derecho de la Constitución. Ninguna infracción del derecho al medio ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado se puede atribuir a las autoridades del Ministerio de Hacienda, motivo por el cual se debe desestimar el recurso en lo que a este punto corresponde.

VIII.- Del amparo contra la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental. De la prueba documental allegada a los autos, como del informe rendido por el Secretario General ad-hoc de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental –que es dado bajo la solemnidad del juramento, con oportuno apercibimiento de las consecuencias, incluso penales, previstas en el artículo 44 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional– no se tiene por acreditado que las autoridades de la SETENA –a diferencia de lo que aducen las recurrentes– confirieran las licencias o las viabilidades ambientales en contravención del ordenamiento jurídico vigente, razón por la cual lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso en lo que a este punto corresponde. En este sentido, el recurrido expuso: “La SETENA no va a conceder licencias ambientales cuando la evaluación ambiental correspondiente ofrezca indicios que el desarrollo propuesto haría peligrar la conservación de esta especie en peligro de extinción” (informe a folio 61). En efecto, si las afectadas se muestran disconformes con el resultado de las evaluaciones ambientales que dieron origen al otorgamiento de esas licencias, bien pueden formular ante el recurrido los reclamos y los procedimientos que el ordenamiento establece para la defensa de sus intereses, lugar donde gozan de mayores oportunidades que en la vía sumarísima del amparo de presentar los elementos de prueba y los estudios técnicos respectivos. Cabe mencionar que tanto el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, como la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, tomaron las medidas necesarias para no autorizar a futuro una gestión de desarrollo dentro del parque, y de suspender el trámite de los procedimientos instaurados con el fin de obtener una viabilidad ambiental en esa zona. Consecuentemente, se debe denegar el amparo en lo que a este punto corresponde.

IX.- Del amparo contra la Municipalidad del Cantón de Santa Cruz. También se debe desestimar el recurso en cuanto se enfila contra la Corporación recurrida, al mencionar el Alcalde accionado en su informe bajo juramento que la viabilidad ambiental de la SETENA es un requisito indispensable para que la Municipalidad accionada otorgue un permiso de construcción en el sitio.

X.- Conclusión. En virtud de lo expuesto, lo procedente es declarar con lugar el amparo, únicamente en cuanto se dirige contra el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía por haber demorado casi 10 años en iniciar los procedimientos de expropiación de los fundos privados situados dentro del Parque Nacional Marino Las Baulas, en los términos de la Ley Nº7524 de 10 de julio de 1995. En lo demás, se debe desestimar el recurso.”